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Lee H. Hamilton, Director BOARD OF TRUSTEES: Joseph A. Cari, Jr., Chairman Steven Alan Bennett, Vice Chairman PUBLIC MEMBERS The Secretary of State Colin Powell; The Librarian of Congress James H. Billington; The Archivist of the United States John W. Carlin; The Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities Bruce Cole; The Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution Lawrence M. Small; The Secretary of Education Roderick R. Paige; The Secretary of Health & Human Services Tommy G. Thompson; PRIVATE M EMBERS Carol Cartwright, John H. Foster, Jean L. Hennessey, Daniel L. Lamaute, Doris O. Mausui, Thomas R. Reedy, Nancy M. Zirkin
The KGB in Afghanistan
-- English Edition --
Christian Ostermann, Director
Vasiliy Mitrokhin Working Paper No. 40
ADVISORY COMMITTEE: William Taubman (Amherst College) Chairman Michael Beschloss (Historian, Author)
Introduced and edited by Christian F. Ostermann and Odd Arne Westad
James H. Billington (Librarian of Congress) Warren I. Cohen (University of MarylandBaltimore) John Lewis Gaddis (Yale University) James Hershberg (The George Washington University) Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Woodrow Wilson Center) Sharon Wolchik (The George Washington University)
Washington, D.C. February 2002
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT
THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES CHRISTIAN F. OSTERMANN, Series Editor This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 1991 by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former “Communist bloc” with the historiography of the Cold War which has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history. Among the activities undertaken by the project to promote this aim are a periodic BULLETIN to disseminate new findings, views, and activities pertaining to Cold War history; a fellowship program for young historians from the former Communist bloc to conduct archival research and study Cold War history in the United States; international scholarly meetings, conferences, and seminars; and publications. The CWIHP Working Paper Series is designed to provide a speedy publications outlet for historians associated with the project who have gained access to newly-available archives and sources and would like to share their results. We especially welcome submissions by junior scholars from the former Communist bloc who have done research in their countries’ archives and are looking to introduce their findings to a Western audience. As a non-partisan institute of scholarly study, the Woodrow Wilson Center takes no position on the historical interpretations and opinions offered by the authors. Those interested in receiving copies of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin or any of the Working Papers should contact: Cold War International History Project Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW Washington, DC 20523 Telephone: (202) 691-4110 Fax: (202) 691-4001 Email: COLDWAR1@wwic.si.edu CWIHP Web Page: http://cwihp.si.edu
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPERS SERIES Christian F. Ostermann, Series Editor
#1 Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War” #2 P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague and Warsaw” #3 James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum” #4 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Committee of Information, 1952-53” #5 Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of SovietEast German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-61” #6 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-62)” #7 Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, “Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Two Reports” #8 Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-50: New Evidence From Russian Archives” #9 Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, “New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports” #10 Norman M. Naimark, “‘To Know Everything and To Report Everything Worth Knowing’: Building the East German Police State, 1945-49” #11 Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback” #12 Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold War, and the Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery” #13 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post-War Relations with the United States and Great Britain” #14 Ruud van Dijk, “The 1952 Stalin Note Debate: Myth or Missed Opportunity for German Unification?” #15 Natalia I. Yegorova, “The ‘Iran Crisis’ of 1945-46: A View from the Russian Archives” #16 Csaba Bekes, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics” #17 Leszek W. Gluchowski, “The Soviet-Polish Confrontation of October 1956: The Situation in the Polish Internal Security Corps” #18 Qiang Zhai, “Beijing and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965-68: New Evidence from Chinese Sources” #19 Matthew Evangelista, “’Why Keep Such an Army?’” Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions” #20 Patricia K. Grimsted, “The Russian Archives Seven Years After: ‘Purveyors of Sensations’ or ‘Shadows Cast to the Past’? ” #21 Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, “‘On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981’ Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the SEJM of the Republic of Poland” #22 Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, “77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-77” #23 Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-81 and the End of the Cold War” #24 John P. C. Matthews, “Majales: The Abortive Student Revolt in Czechoslovakia in 1956”
“The Merchants of the Kremlin—The Economic Roots of Soviet Expansion in Hungary” #29 Rainer Karlsch and Zbynek Zeman.#25 Stephen J.. “Who Murdered ‘Marigold’? New Evidence on the Mysterious Failure of Poland’s Secret Initiative to Start U. “Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers’ Party: From de-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism” #38 János Rainer. “The End of the Soviet Uranium Gap: The Soviet Uranium Agreements with Czechoslovakia and East Germany (1945/1953)” #30 David Wolff. 1949-1956” #36 Paul Wingrove. September 1945-December 1946" #27 James G.W. “Mao’s Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador. 1949-1973” #35 Vojtech Mastny. Gluchowski. 1948-1959” #31 Eduard Mark.S. “The KGB in Afghanistan” (English Edition) 3 . with the assistance of L. Hershberg.. “Conversations with Stalin on Questions of Political Economy” #34 Yang Kuisong. “Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude towards the Indochina War. 1963-1965” #33 Ethan Pollock. “NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies.’ Foreign Policy Correspondence between Stalin and Molotov and Other Politburo Members. Borhi. Morris. 1966" #28 Laszlo G. “‘The Allies are Pressing on You to Break Your Will. translated by Vladimir Zubok. “Revolution By Degrees: Stalin's National-Front Strategy For Europe. “The New Course in Hungary in 1953” #39 Kathryn Weathersby. Pechatnov. “’One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events’: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the SinoSoviet Alliance and Split. “The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970’s: The View from Moscow” #26 Vladimir O.-North Vietnamese Peace Talks. 1953-55” #37 Vladimir Tismaneanu. 1941-47” #32 Douglas Selvage. “‘Should We Fear This?’ Stalin and the Danger of War with America” #40 Vasiliy Mitrokhin. “The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Nonproliferation.
ed. The Fall of Détente (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. for instance. 1999. 977-1075. 1994). Bradsher.3 Mitrokhin. rev. (Washington. The number of active agents in the country ran into the hundreds and served a role not only in Afghanistan but also in neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iran. who became known in the West in 1999 when he co-authored with Christopher Andrew The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention (Karachi: Oxford University Press. Détente and Confrontation. that the head of the KGB. 1978-1979. Yuri Andropov. and Odd Arne Westad. pp. The government of Sardar Muhammad Daud5 (1973-1978) worked closely with the Soviets. 3 See the report by the British Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. 75-117. In these cases were the details of the operations of the KGB and other Soviet intelligence gathering organizations going back to 1918. 1999). and several of Daud’s ministers had 1 For a recent account of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. see Raymond L. We have also known that the KGB took on a major role in propping up the unpopular regime of Babrak Karmal2 after December 1979. 4 New York: Basic Books. as it is usually the case with intelligence organizations in both East and West. and that the organization’s local representatives in Kabul prepared many of the reports that won a majority in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leaders for the decision. Garthoff. The 1999 volume provides an overview of some of these materials as regards operations in the United States and Western Europe.1 We have known. The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report (London.” in Westad. 2 Also transliterated as Babrak Kemal. The text that follows is an edited version of a manuscript outlining the KGB’s operational activities in Afghanistan between 1978 and 1983. 1997). “The Road to Kabul: Soviet Policy in Afghanistan. and Henry S..” 4 . But. Mitrokhin tells us that the KGB was deeply involved with Soviet Afghan policies from the very beginning. was a major initiator of the decision to intervene. a former KGB archivist who defected to Britain in 1992. pp. ed. The Brookings Institution Press. 5 Also transliterated “Daoud. little detail of the KGB’s Afghan operations has been available—until now. authored by Vasiliy Mitrokhin.4 brought with him six cases of notes when he defected. June 2000).INTRODUCTION By Christian Ostermann and Odd Arne Westad It has long been assumed that the KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopastnosti— Committee of State Security) played a major role in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
contacts with the KGB. and prisons. and the “Representatives. intelligence. Mitrokhin shows that the Soviet Union was not involved with the Afghan Communists’ overthrow of Daud’s government in April 1978 (the “Saur Revolution”). 23. The best examples are the KGB surveillance of the messenger whom General Zaplatin. While we think Mitrokhin is wrong in seeing them as Soviet agents first and Afghan Communists second. the degree to which they were involved with Soviet intelligence is important to establish. From the winter of 1978/79 on. p. however. As is often the case with historical intelligence materials. Confirming what is known from other sources. sabotage. and the party advisers—has been known for some time. The KGB in Afghanistan was divided into two main units: The “Residency. the military. whose identities were not known to the Communist Afghan government (the code-names as well as the real names of some of these agents are mentioned in Mitrokhin’s text). Mitrokhin does not mention the assassination of the Mohammed Akbar Khaibar. targeting the growing Islamist opposition. Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention. The PDPA claimed that Khaibar was murdered by the government. while several sources indicate that he may have been shot by his rivals inside the Communist Party. but Mitrokhin’s material provides us with some wonderful examples of how Soviet agencies often came to work at cross-purposes. a Parchami leader of People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on 17 April 1978. covert operations. the chief political adviser to the Afghan army. there are no major surprises in Mitrokhin’s account. That the leading Afghan Communists worked with the KGB prior to taking power comes as no surprise. connected with security. 5 . the KGB. but not exclusively. In addition came hundreds of KGB intelligence operatives.6 although the KGB had received advance warning of the plot against Daud. sent to Moscow in December 1979 in a desperate attempt at preventing a Soviet invasion. See Bradsher. Also.7 The organization did bring in its own experts to Afghanistan right after the new government took over. both Afghans and Soviets. the rivalry among the main Soviet agencies operating in Afghanistan—the embassy. and the failed attempt at removing Hafizullah Amin 6 7 Referred to in the text as “April Revolution. the Khalq faction. KGB special units started operating inside Afghanistan.” Curiously.” who were KGB officers sent to assist the Afghan government in various functions—generally.” which worked from within the Soviet embassy. which led to the start of the anti-Daud demonstrations in Kabul and the coup on 27 April. and was quick to exploit the new opportunities for intelligence gathering that the Communist control of the country offered.
67-69.si. While it is clear that Moscow’s interest in the critical year 1979 lay in finding ways for the two main PDPA factions to cooperate against their increasingly efficient Islamist enemies. pp. 4: Documents on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Influenced by the bloody suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 and the dissident movement—all of which he could follow through the files he administered as well as Western records—Mitrokhin became increasingly disaffected with the KGB. faction driven accusations of Amin being an American agent that in the last resort convinced many in Moscow. CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997). 124-127. 10 8 9 Curiously.8 What is most striking (and most useful) about Mitrokhin’s text is the pervasive sense it gives of the distrust that the KGB fomented and spread among Afghan and Soviets alike. http://cwihp. 6-8. where it was his job to respond to requests by other departments. the KGB’s operations achieved exactly the opposite—by concocting rumors and slander. CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994). 6 . 133-137.pdf. 9 The Afghanistan manuscript occupies a special place within the corpus of materials Mitrokhin brought to the West. pp. 70-75. 10 The Sword and the Shield. Mitrokhin provides little new evidence on US actions in Afghanistan. It is therefore fitting that it was the local KGB bosses who—sensing their chief Yuri Andropov’s willingness to use force to remove Amin from power—dredged up those old. who should have known better. For Soviet and other East-bloc documentation on the Soviet war in Afghanistan see CWIHP e-Dossier No.from power in September 1979. while he worked in the archives of the KGB First Chief Directorate in Yasenovo outside Moscow.edu/pdf/ afghan-dossier. Most of these materials consist of notes which Mitrokhin had copiously assembled over several years. as well as: CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993). that it was necessary to invade. a project that became feasible when he was put in charge in 1972 of the movement of the FCD archives from the KGB’s headquarters at Lubyanka in central Moscow to Yasenevo southwest of the capital Moscow. in which Soviet ambassador Puzanov became a hapless diplomatic victim of what still seems (despite Mitrokhin’s lack of clarity on this point) a KGB-hatched plot. 145-184. the KGB contributed significantly to the destruction of the PDPA (complete in most senses before the Soviet December invasion) and to the dysfunctionality of Soviet Afghan policies. By the early seventies he had decided to compile his own account of the KGB’s foreign operations. pp. Mitrokhin had moved from the operational side of the FCD to its archives in late 1956. pp.
In the case of personal names. a few excisions have been made to his original text in response to security.’ Only in my case it was actually written ‘for the secret cache. he used every opportunity to take notes of the documents he saw. According to the author. 11 Letter from Vasiliy Mitrokhin to Christian Ostermann. July 2000. Starting in 1977. ‘for the desk drawer. Working in complete secrecy. By no means is the manuscript therefore a complete record.” It was written. legal and related concerns. see below.In charge of checking. all have been identified fully in the text or in the notes as far as possible. so far as the editors are aware.12 With the author’s consent. “to be put [away] for afterwards. sorted and transcribed them. Though based on these notes. or as we used to say about things which we know would never past the censors and be published. He revised and rewrote the Afghanistan manuscript in 1986-87. and destroyed the original notes. once safely in his dacha. Mitrokhin soon conceived of the idea to create his own archive. he first took these notes in longhand while working in the archives and later.’” Three copies—one top and two carbon copies—of the manuscript existed at the time of completion. 17 May 2001. the manuscript is “based exclusively on information from the Soviet KGB” to which he had access and does not bring in material from any other source. All of these excisions are indicated in the text. The editors have added footnotes in annotation of the text (marked “Editors’ Note”). the Afghanistan manuscript was written by Mitrokhin after he retired from the KGB in 1984. which began in 1974. Afghan names have been rendered in standard English transliteration. seemingly to no avail. Vasiliy Mitrokhin would be the first to point out that his notes captured only a small part of the totality of documents.” with a flood of documents coming through his hands on a daily basis. 12 Ostermann interview with Vasiliy Mitrokhin. none of them. Mitrokhin sent the bottom copy to the US when he first tried to make contact with American authorities. compiling and indexing the records in the process of the transfer. materially affects the account of the events in question. 7 . He then sent the second carbon copy to the British government and later destroyed the typed top copy before his defection to the UK. a copy of which went to the archives after a month. The documents he saw were mostly informational cables from the First Directorate to the Politburo and Foreign Ministry.11 Mitrokhin intended the Afghanistan volume to be the first of a planned series of books entitled “In the Footsteps of the Filth. his decade-long work in the archive was a “massive filtering exercise. Codenames of KGB officers and agents have been kept throughout. according to Mitrokhin.
8 . roofless mud-brick houses. 13 14 Letter from Vasiliy Mitrokhin to Christian Ostermann. calumnies and deeds of the Soviet nomenklatura. July 2000. see below. 11-12. pp.Moreover. Mitrokhin has stated that “I wrote it in a hurry. was “a way of expressing my personal perception of events and my rejection of the criminal intentions. and as a result certain notes which I wrote to accompany my account took on an emotional tone.”13 *** According to the introduction to his 1999 book.” This. the author explains. The Sword and the Shield. The Soviet media preserved a conspiracy of silence about the systematic destruction of thousands of Afghan villages.’”14 By engaging in a conspiracy of his own—which has allowed us to see some of those materials—the former keeper of the secrets may have atoned for the shame he felt over his country’s actions. the flight of four million refugees. creating a rather unbalanced narrative. while striving to stick to the facts.” writes his co-author Christopher Andrew: “The horrors recorded in the files were carefully concealed from the Soviet people. reduced to forlorn groups of uninhabited. and the deaths of a million Afghans in a war which Gorbachev later described as a ‘mistake. the publication of these notes has taken Vasiliy Mitrokhin full circle: “The KGB files which had the greatest emotional impact on Mitrokhin were those on the war in Afghanistan.
I am sending you one of these works in progress. but I assume that the readers of your Bulletin might be interested in the material. the criterion today is the same as it always was because it speaks the truth. It is based exclusively on information from the Soviet KGB to which I had access and does not bring in material from any other sources. but I wrote it in a hurry and as a result certain notes which I wrote to accompany my account took an emotional tone.LETTER TO THE EDITOR Dear Editor: I have seen an issue of your Bulletin. Thirteen years have passed and the world has changed beyond recognition. For example. in response to your invitation to readers to join the debate on the issue. and it is what makes the work special—in terms of both its strengths and its weaknesses! In writing it I have stuck strictly to the facts. “Okayanshchina”—the Afghanistan Chapter—for you to read. working in complete secrecy. the potential readership has been depleted. This was a way of expressing my personal perception of events and my rejection of the criminal intentions. Some points in the piece are topical even now. which deals with matters in which I have a professional interest. creating a rather unbalanced narrative.” I was writing it in the Soviet Union. I am working on a large number of pieces on the subject of the Cold War. The piece deals with events in and around Afghanistan and the activities of the Bolshevik nomenklatura in the region between 1962 and 1983. Can a political essay written long ago about the events of a long gone era mean anything to a reader of today? I believe that it can. The Afghanistan Chapter is the first study for a planned series of books entitled “In the Footsteps of Filth. This was a deliberate decision. Admittedly. reference is made to intelligence service methods for combating basmachestvo—an anti-Soviet movement in Central Asia— between 9 . but also because the information comes from a new and highly prolific source. calumnies and deeds of the Soviet nomenklatura. and it was completed in January 1987. not just because it has a strong basis in fact.
I have made absolutely no amendments. a document of its time. UK 10 . uncover crimes and reestablish the truth. I hope that the wheat will not be thrown away with the chaff in the winnowing process. the management of military operations. are a gift to anyone seeking to shoot it down. both those I have spelled out and those I have not. as we used to say about things which we knew would never pass the censors and be published. The same methods were employed in Afghanistan and. The shortcomings of the piece. Now this same piece of work. “for the desk drawer. according to witnesses.” For obvious reasons it could not be published. The errors cannot detract form the main purpose of the work. and even talking about it had to be deferred until circumstances allowed.” Only in my case it was actually written “for the secret cache. There are strong similarities between the steps taken by the authorities in relation to Afghanistan and Chechnya. the running of preventive measures operations. which is to unmask lies. excisions. and one explanatory phrase has been moved from the main text into attachment 3. are still used today in Chechnya.” or. is once again being offered to the Americans for publication.1918 and 1930. including the desperate search for support from the locals on the ground. and the flood of disinformation. MITROKHIN July 2000 London. The pseudonym is a coded version of my family surname written backwards. Only 2 words have been replaced. or rearrangements of the material. The Afghanistan Chapter was written “to be put by for afterwards. The piece remains in its original form. additions.
and the Loyah Jirgah is dissolved. Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan (Lanham. Daud proclaimed president and defense minister. the principal ones being the Khalq and the Parcham (named after their respective newspapers). begins armed insurgency. and Garthoff. Afghanistan: the Great Game Revisited. 11 . called the Hizb-I-Isalmi. 1977 14 February The new constitution. The Soviet Union and India extend diplomatic recognition to the new government. It is based on Ludwig W. 18 July 19 July 24 August 1975 A fundamentalis Muslim group. is approved by the Loyah Jirgah. By Rosanne Klaus (New York: Freedom House. Bradsher. 1967-1968 1973 17 July Former Prime Minister Prince Muhammad Daud Khan deposes his cousin. ed. 15 This is not a comprehensive chronology. King Zahir Shah. or Grand Assembly. establishing a presidential one-party system. Adamec. Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention. is assassinated in Kabul. 15 February Muhammad Daud is sworn in as president. The PDPA splits into several factions. one of the founders of the PDPA and leading Parcham intellectual. 1978 17 April Mir Akbar Khaibar. and proclaims a republic. Nur Mohammad Taraki serves as secretary general. 1997). Détente and Confrontation. Zahir Shah announces his abdication.CHRONOLOGY15 1965 Establishment of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). 1987). MD: The Scarecrow Press.
” First Mujahedin camp set up in Pakistan Breakdown of the Khalq-Parchami alliance. Babrak Karmal (Parcham) is named vice president of the RC. is taken hostage by 12 . Parchami leaders are removed from power and sent abroad as ambassadors. Hafizullah Amin rises to power within the PDPA and government to become deputy to Taraki. Premier Taraki states Afghanistan is “non-aligned and independent. A “Revolutionary Military Council” assumes power. Nur Muhammad Taraki (Khalq) is named President and Premier of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Defense Minister Ghulam Haidar Rasuli. President Daud has PDPA leaders arrested. and Vice President Sayyid Abdullah are killed in the course of the coup along with Daud and his brother Muhammad Naim. A “Revolutionary Council” (RC) is proclaimed. 30 April 6 May May-June July 18 August 21 August November 3 December 5 December Winter 1978/79 Muslim-led armed resistance against the new regime spreads to most of the Afghan provinces. Karmal is denounced as head of a Parcham-led plot.20 April 26 April 27-28 April Thousands turn Khaibar’s funeral into an anti-government demonstration. Daud is overthrown. Kabul Radio announces that a plot to overthrow the government has been foiled and Defense Minister Abdull Qadir has been arrested for involvement in the plot. Adolph Dubs. Members of the PDPA gain power in a coup d’état coup led by communist sympathizers in the armed forces. 1979 14 February US Ambassador to Afghanistan. Interior Minister Abdul Qadir Nuristani. Taraki arrives in Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders. The governments of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union conclude a 20-year Treaty of Friendship. The PDPA Politburo orders the arrest of Planning Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand (Parcham) and Public Works Minister Muhammad Rafi’i (Parcham) for their part in the conspiracy. Good Neighborliness and Cooperation in Moscow.
27 March 1 April April/May June 29 June Early July July Mid-July 27-28 July 13 . the Politburo sends an airborne battalion to Bagram and about 125 KGB special forces to Kabul. He remains in Afghanistan until 22 December. CPSU International Department head Boris Ponomarev is dispatched to Afghanistan to ease up on anti-Parcham purges. The US protests the use of force by the Afghan government to free the US ambassador. Further Afghan requests for direct (specialist) troop support by Moscow are rejected. Assadullah Sarwari is named the head of the Afghan intelligence. to assess the situation in Afghanistan and to underline Soviet concerns. Anti-Amin leaflets distributed in Kabul. A 600-man airborne battalion is secretly flown from the USSR to be stationed at the air base in Bagram. Moscow continues to complain about the recurrent purges in Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Amin is named premier. A new government is announced: Col.terrorists in Kabul. Amin reshuffles the cabinet again: Watanjar and Mazduryar are removed from their posts. 20 March Taraki is invited to Moscow. in support. Uprising in Heart 17-19 March CPSU Politburo discusses situation in Afghanistan. Afghan forces rush the building in which he is held. Taraki’s pleas for intervention by Soviet troops are rejected.) CPSU Politburo decides to press Taraki and Amin to build up their security presence throughout the country. 22 February 16 March US President Jimmy Carter orders US aid to Afghanistan to be reduced. and he is slain. Aslam Watanjar is appointed minister of defense and Sheijan Mazduryar minister of internal affairs. While assured of Soviet political and logistical support. the absence of effective local authority and of a “national front” movement that included non-communist forces. Soviet Foreign Ministry official Vasiliy Safronchuk is sent to Kabul to advise on Afghan foreign policy and broadening the regime’s political base.
A high-level 63-men Soviet military delegation, headed by Deputy Defense Minister and Army General Ivan Pavlovskiy arrives to assess the military situation in Afghanistan. Upon return to Moscow in November, Pavlovskiy advises against Soviet troop intervention.
En route from a summit meeting of the non-aligned countries in Havana, Taraki stops in Moscow.
14 September Amin escapes an apparent assassination attempt by Taraki’s security guard. Amin purges four members (Minister of Communications, Sayed Gulabzoy, Mazduryar, Sarwari and Watanjar) from his cabinet, places Taraki under arrest and takes over the presidency in addition to the foreign and defense ministries. (Gulabzoy, Sarwari and Watanjar escape with the Soviet assistance.) 16 September PDPA Central Committee elects Amin general secretary. 6 October Amin’s chief deputy Shah Wali accuses Soviet ambassador Puzanov of complicity in the abortive assassination attempt on Amin in front of a gathering of communist country representatives. Puzanov is declared persona non grata and departs on 19 November. (He is succeeded in his position by Fikryat Tabeev on 28 November.) Taraki is killed on Amin’s orders. Andropov is authorized to bring Karmal from Czechoslovakia to Moscow. Operation “Zenith:” KGB Special forces are dispersed to determine popular reaction to Soviet invasion. The CPSU Politburo’s “Afghanistan Commission” submits a memorandum that expresses deep concern over the situation in Afghanistan. Soviet special forces battalion of airborne troops of Central Asians sent to Afghanistan.
8 October 10 October October
Between 1 and 12 December USSR Defense Minister Ustinov orders the drafting of contingency plans for dispatch of Soviet troops. 2, 3, 12 and 17 December Amin repeatedly requests Soviet troops to be sent to Afghanistan. 6 December The CPSU Politburo approves the dispatch of 500 GRU special forces to Afghanistan.
10 December Ustinov orders the call-up of the reserves and combat readiness for two army divisions, one engineer and one airborne division plus military air transport units in the Turkestan Military District. 12 December Key CPSU Politburo members decide to remove Amin forcefully and to bolster the new government with a limited contingent of Soviet troops. 17 December An assassination attempt on Amin fails, but the head of the counterintelligence police, his nephew Assadullah Amin, is wounded heavily. 25-27 December 7,700 Soviet troops airlanded in Afghanistan; the 108th Motorized rifle Division heads towards Kabul. 27 December Soviet forces seize Kabul. Babrak Karmal takes power. 27 December Operation “Storm:” Soviet covertly assault on Tajbeg (Presidential) Palace and kill Amin. 27 December CPSU Politburo approves a series of messages explaining and justifying Soviet invasion. 27-28 December
5th Motorized Rifle Division enters Afghanistan.
1980 4 January Carter addresses the nation, condemning the invasion of the “small, nonaligned sovereign nation of Afghanistan.” The UN Security Council opens debate on Afghanistan. The Soviet Union vetoes a UN resolution that called for the immediate withdrawal of “all foreign troops in Afghanistan.” The vote is 13 to two in favor of the resolution. The UN General Assembly votes 104 to 18 with 18 abstentions for a resolution that “strongly deplored” the “recent armed intervention” in Afghanistan and called for the “total withdrawal of foreign troops” from the country. President Carter announces sanctions against the Soviet Union, including a grain embargo.
5 January 7 January
Sixty countries boycott the Moscow Olympics in protest of the invasion of Afghanistan.
20 November The UN General Assembly votes by 111 to 22 with 12 abstentions for a resolutions that calls for the “unconditional” pullout of “foreign troops” from Afghanistan. 1981 22 August Five Afghan resistance groups form an alliance and create a 50 member advisory council.
1983 19 January UN Deputy Secretary General Diego Cordovez begins a peace mission to Geneva, Tehran, Islamabad, and Kabul to resolve the Afghan crisis. UN sponsored talks on Soviet troop withdrawal ends in Geneva without progress.
1984 17 May US Vice President George Bush visits the Khyber Pass, where he condemned the Soviet invasion and expresses support for the Afghan resistance. The U.S. House of Representatives appropriations committee approves $50 million in covert aid to Afghanistan. The foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan meet seperately in Geneva with a UN intermediary in talks on a political settlement to the Afghan War.
1986 4 May Babrak Karmal resigns as secretary gerneral of the PDPA because of “ill health,” according to Kabul Radio. He is replaced by Najibullah, former head of Khad. Babrak retains the post of chairman of the Revolutionary council and a seat in the seven member politburo.
1988 6 January In an interview with Afghan News Agency, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze says the Soviet Union hopes to be out of Afghanistan by the end of 1988 regardless of the 16
He. and the United States sign the Geneva accords. The Marxist regime collapses. 14 April 15 May 1989 14 February 18 February The last Soviet soldier leaves Kabul airport. the Soviet Union. links troop withdrawal to the cessation of US aid to the Mujahedin. proclaims the Islamic State of Afghanistan. 23 February 1991 13 September The USSR and the United States agree to end delivery of weapons to the Afghanistan combatants as of 1 January 1992. The Soviet Union begins withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. 17 . 15 December The Soviet Union stops arms deliveries to Afghanistan. The United States and the Soviet Union will be the guarantors of the agreement which also provides for the return of Afghan refugees and a halt to military aid by both sides. Mujahadin leaders elect Abdul Rasul Sayyaf as acting prime minister and Sebghatullah Mujadiddi as acting president of the interim government. however. 1992 April Mujadiddi arrives in Kabul. religious and ethnic factions. The government declares a nationwide state of emergency. President Najibullah appoints new cabinet members. Fighting continues among various political. 8 February Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev says Soviet troops will begin pulling out of Afghanistan on 15 May if a settlement can be reached by mid-March. Afghanistan. Under the agreement the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops within nine months. Pakistan.type of rule established there.
THE KGB IN AFGHANISTAN By Vasiliy Mitrokhin Table of Contents The Founding of the Party The April Coup The September Coup The December Coup The War Discord The Offspring of the Cheka Enemy Number One Appendix I Appendix II AFGHANISTAN: Unsorted Miscellany 19 27 50 86 119 133 144 156 175 179 181 18 .
Neither the kings nor Daud16 took any serious decisions without taking the northern giant and its interests into consideration. Executed on 9 October 1979. One such agent was Nur Muhammad Taraki.THE FOUNDING OF THE PARTY Afghanistan occupies an important strategic position. the KGB viewed this as a threat to the communists. After it became a republic. It had a long border with the Soviet Union. In the past the border had been open from both sides and the populations mixed freely. Afghanistan continued the same course of acting as a balance between the East and the West and it did not alter its friendly attitude to its neighbor. 18 Member of the Khalq faction of the PDPA. the Cheka opposed Iran's plans to build the first railway in Afghanistan and American plans to establish a metallurgical plant and a network of hospitals offering primary medical assistance to the population. and was able to concentrate the efforts of the local special services on foreign representatives of targeted organizations and to divert attention away from the pro-Soviet elements. Uzbeks. Following the introduction of the Bolshevik regime in Central Asia. The influence of the USSR on all aspects of life in the country is considerable. free and easy movement was stopped and open opponents forced into neighboring Afghanistan. The Cheka17 kept a close check on the actions of the government and hindered close relations with other countries. The Cheka had a sound agent network in the country. But when Daud considered establishing his own political party. It thought that he might follow the example of Iran and ban other political parties.000 descendants of the Tadjiks. Turkmen and Kirghizians who fled from the repression living in Afghanistan. In particular. There are now almost 750. 19 .18 codename ‘Nur. Early Soviet secret police agency and a forerunner of the KGB. had considerable leverage on the political processes.’ He became an agent in 1951 and was in contact with the 16 17 Editors’ Note: Sardar Mohammad Daud took power in a coup in 1973. was well-informed on the situation of the various political factions. Some of the KGB agents became adherents of Marxism-Leninism and a few became active in the International Communist and Workers' Movement with the help of the organs. president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. and after the Saur Revolution. Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the new regime in Russia and it is traditionally a friendly neighbor.
Kozyrev and A. The Bolshevik and Chekist omnivorous plunderers were quite tenacious and energetic in seizing and holding onto power and becoming the masters of the defenseless expanse.V. A Central Committee of thirty and a politburo of five were established. Their criminality is steadfast and endemic and is passed on through natural selection to new generations of the caste. At the beginning the groups obediently followed Moscow's instructions. In essence this was not an organic merger. Babrak Karmal (codename 'Marid') together with ‘Makhmui. He was also advised to publish a newspaper through a figurehead. There were no more than three hundred members.Petrov. Name of one faction of the PDPA which supported Babrak Karmal in opposition to Nur Muhammad Taraki. Babrak and Taraki became personally acquainted. so that he could justify his source of income in the eyes of the authorities. He was then joined by Hafizullah Amin. The criticism of Stalin at the Party Congress concerned only the personality of Stalin. At the meetings the program. the head of the International Department. Khrushchev merely wiped away the halo of holiness from the tyrant and had him removed from the mausoleum.following operatives in the Kabul Residency: Sagadiev. the PDPA. The named derived from the newspaper Parcham. and other members of the apparatus. founded in 1968 and published by Sulaiman Layeq. He was familiarized with Stalin's recommendations to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Aidit. Spiridonov. and the system and the rules established through the cult continued to get stronger. 22 Author’s Note: Stalin's reputation with the nomenklatura was almost unscathed. At that time Taraki was acting alone and he did not have any friends. a man of means.21 He was received by [Boris] Ponomarev. rules.22 19 20 Editors’ Note: Not identified.’ ‘Akbar’ and ‘Khuma. He was buried in the central cemetery by the Kremlin wall in Red Square next to his accomp lices in crime. Kostromin. and Babrak his deputy. Stalin primitively and cunningly combined religion and state power 20 . Fedoseev. Kozlov. At the end of 1962. There was a new breed of exploiters. Babrak’s followers were called Parchamists and Taraki’s Khalqists.’19 established a group with communist leanings called Parcham20 (Banner) in about 1957. not Stalinism in general. By profession Taraki was a journalist and writer. strategy and financing of the PDPA were discussed. and together they established a Marxist group called Khalq. 21 Editors’ Note: Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Taraki was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Taraki visited Moscow at the invitation of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. The two groups later united and in 1965 became the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. the nomenklatura. He was advised to be extremely cautious in his party work until the authorities had given permission for the party to act officially and to concentrate on setting up the most important sections of the party in illegal conditions. Another agent.
Brezhnev. Allilueva abandoned her children for the state to maintain and went off by herself. The Residency24 rejected such allegations and considered that these rumors were aimed at discrediting his [Taraki’s] rival and bringing division and distrust into the ranks of the PDPA. He appeared serious and well-prepared politically to lead his party. and in particular the Uzbeks. who quit the PDPA in 1968 to found Settem-i-Milli. that is either when intelligence officers and agents do not hide their nationality and hold a position in an official representation of their country as cover for their intelligence work or when staff members and intelligence agents carry out intelligence work in a foreign country using false identity papers. 21 . The members have their own discipline and morals. A Residency lives and acts according to its own rules. prophesies. Badashi. It is engaged in a secret fight using methods and means forbidden by law in vitally important areas of the state organism to the detriment of the government and people of the targeted country. a member of the original PDPA Central Committee. He based his ideas on the fact that Babrak was the first political prisoner to be freed by the authorities in 1952. Chernenko and Gorbachev. the KGB informed the CPSU Central Committee that it was stopping its agent contacts with him and added that “if the situation arose when it was essential to resume secret contact with Taraki in order to give practical assistance to this party. revere their mentor. But Stalin outdid his teacher in his cruelty. and the robbers from the dens of 'the hairy ones' and 'the bald ones'. a general's pension and a car with a chauffeur. Almost at the same time two soldiers who had been captured in Afghanistan returned to the Union from England. (Vladimir Voinovich noted a certain order in the succession of leaders of the nomenklatura according to their hair: Lenin. The intelligentsia named Lenin the greatest evil in the world. 23 an Uzbek by nationality. Their tracks faded out somewhere in the northern camps. And when 'the cuckoo' had settled down in the Soviet paradise once more she had a burning desire to go to the capitalist hell. that an armed conflict with the government should be started in Afghani Turkestan using the dissatisfaction of the Tam. All the contents have been destroyed. No doubt there were good reasons for the material to be destroyed. The arrival of Allilueva from England has not been forgotten. Like a cuckoo laying its eggs in another bird's nest. then together. The CPSU Central Committee considered such action precipitate. as one of her husbands called her. Andropov. Taraki then divulged his suspicions about contacts between his deputy Babrak and Afghan counter-intelligence. 24 Author’s Note: The Residency is one of the sections of the intelligence service in a foreign country which is heavily disguised. tormentors. It carries out intelligence work both from a legal and illegal position. It is given wide state and political authority by its government. returned the nomenklatura gave her a furnished residence. to use the terminology of the satirist VOINOVICH. He informed the Central Committee about the suggestion from one of the leaders of the PDPA. Imprisoned in the summer of 1978 and executed on 17 September 1979. When this 'wanton bitch'. Saints. eulogies. blind faith and a demonstration of loyalty appeared. Stalin. When Taraki was elected Secretary of the Party.) 23 Editors’ Note: Probably Mohammad Tahir Badakshi. Khrushchev. tortures. And she departed.Taraki made a good impression on the members of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee. an northern-based anti-Pushtun Marxist faction. a freemason of Scottish initiation. gags and camps for those with different ideas. For 'the cuckoo' was not an ordinary citizen but the daughter of a great bandit. The nomenklatura respects the relations of the dictator. Only the covers remain of the archive files on Dzhugashvili.
The PDPA was financed by the CPSU Central Committee. He told him to observe the strictest secrecy and that the work with the party leadership of the PDPA must be done in such a way that the authorities knew only a few of the leaders of the party. leading CPSU Politburo member. He had served as deputy foreign minister in 1955. Pakistan (1957-1958). and food supplies. 22 . Taraki was told in the International Department of the [CPSU] Central Committee that he should say that he had been invited to Moscow by Soviet writers and the Society of Afghan-Soviet Friendship. the United States (1958-1963) and again Pakistan (1963). replied to the KGB that Suslov. I. trade unions 25 26 Editors’ Note: Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov. He was imp risoned under Daud and killed in prison. Its newspaper was also financed in this way. prime minister 1965-1967. For this it is necessary to also use legal possibilities. he should follow a moderate liberal-democratic course and gain the support of leftist activists.V. Their meetings took place either in a car belonging to an operative or in the residence of an operative where Taraki was secretly taken.000 Afghani for the election campaign for the People's Council.” The head of this section of the International Department of the Central Committee. Taraki asked the Residency for ideas for the paper and to write articles. such as Taraki and Babrak. In this way a base will be made for the development of the democratic movement which will act as a basis for the practical activities of the PDPA. The newspaper Khalq began publication in April 1965. the rose to become CPSU General Secretary. Editors’ Note: Yury Vladimirovich Andropov headed the KGB from 1967 to 1982. Milovanov. On 17 December 1966 Milovanov had a meeting with Spiridonov28 to instruct him how to handle Taraki. the equivalent of 4. He was given a personal allowance of 180 hard currency rubles.000 Afghani. and as ambassador to Britain (1956).25 Ponomarev and Andropov26 had read the letter from the KGB and agreed on 18 February 1965 that the KGB should continue to maintain secret contacts with Taraki on party matters. They must train senior members secretly in case those known to the authorities were arrested. He told Prime Minister Maiwandwal27 this when he met him once and he even told him that the government should fear not the leftist forces but the rightist elements and reactionaries who were aiming to come to power. 27 Editors’ Note: Muhammad Hashim Maiwandval.the KGB could make such contact with the utmost care. in particular the setting up of student and youth organizations. In 1965 Taraki was given 50. Taraki should be told that “because of the relations between our countries and the existing situation in the country. 28 Editors’ Note: Not identified.
a security officer and members carrying out operational agent work. then it must be disbanded and I must go abroad to India. 29 30 Editors’ Note: Iranian Communist Party. publications of the Iranian Tudeh Party.30 He gave information on the situation in the country. although this must appear to be his own personal wishes and opinions. Milovanov added that publication of the party's program by the newspaper Khalq as was done at present was incorrect and inopportune.” Taraki was asked by the Residency to carry out some operational measures. telephone calls and letters of protest to the Chinese embassy from 'workers' and expressions of indignation from China's 'Afghan friends' were all organized. the setting up and use of an agent apparatus. agents. he said that “[a]s he would be connected with a magazine which was the organ of the Communist and Workers' Parties.and so on. the gathering of intelligence information and the execution of operational agent measures. 23 . operational technical and other forces and means aimed at achieving the stated aim quickly and fulfilling a concrete intelligence task. when necessary. he considered the present circumstance as recognition by the fraternal parties of the People's Democratic Parties of Afghanistan. On 22 and 23 February. An operative is a member of the intelligence service who is directly engaged in intelligence work.” It should be suggested to Taraki that he should obtain permission from the authorities to receive the magazine Problemy Mira i Sotsialisma and that he should correspond through the Residency on questions of party work. Milovanov concluded by telling Spiridonov to show more initiative and not to be afraid of giving Taraki advice. the Pashtu problem. “If the Soviet comrades consider that the time is not yet ripe in Afghanistan for a party such as the PDPA to be established and function. He gave leads on people and several agents were recruited with his help. his deputies and assistants.31 the Afghan army and the government. In his turn Taraki expressed his dissatisfaction with Moscow's delaying tactics and the way it sent books. Syria or Ceylon and undertake literary work. Through him the protest demonstration on 21 February 1967 outside the Chinese embassy in Kabul against the divisive actions of the Chinese. in January 1967. 29 and so on.” But at the same time. Author’s Note: The operational staff of a legal Residency are the Resident. Taraki was showing unnecessary impatience with Babrak and was drawing hasty organizational conclusions. when he gave an operative a letter to the editor of the magazine Problemy Mira i Sotsialisma. Operational measures are planned and agreed secret actions by one or several members of the intelligence service using.
But “as a person Taraki was a complex and contradictory character. often took jokes made about him in the wrong way and liked to be given a lot of attention. On 23 February. rode past the Chinese embassy on his bicycle and threw them over the fence. but ‘Nur' [Taraki] made it clear by his conduct that ‘Moscow was behind him’ and insisted that his line was put into action. Taraki sent a letter to Brezhnev34 asking that “economic assistance to the government of Afghanistan. spoken by tribes mainly in the south and east. This became particularly noticeable after his visit to the Soviet Union. In September 1968 the Center33 asked the Residency to vet Taraki thoroughly using operational technical means. Taraki and Babrak were totally unable to do their party work together. 33 Author’s Note: The Center is the term generally used for the central apparatus of the intelligence service. Saleh. which in August 1967 led to a split within the leadership of the PDPA. tried to follow more flexible tactics in the practical work of the PDPA. He wrote letters with the same contents in Persian with his left hand. should be halted. Babrak accused Taraki of taking bribes. particularly supplies of consumer goods such as sugar and petrol on credit. He bitterly remarked that Moscow did not consider him a Communist whereas in Afghanistan everyone without exception called him a Communist. Naturally we are not asking that assistance which increases and strengthens the 31 Editors’ Note: Pashtu (Pushto) is one of the national languages of Afghanistan. He felt that the Kremlin had insulted the PDPA. 32 Editors’ Note: No further identification. and having 400. Major Pashtu speaking cities in Afghanistan are Kabul and Kandahar (Qandahar). 32 a member of the PDPA.Taraki telephoned the Chinese embassy himself and at the request of his ‘Chinese friends’ in Afghanistan expressed their displeasure and indignation. having contacts with Americans. It viewed him positively and considered him a true and sincere friend of the USSR who co-operated conscientiously [and] observed the rules of secrecy and carried out an assignment in the American embassy. as an educated man. 24 . The Residency defended Taraki as it had done previously with Babrak. These characteristics could have been one of the reasons for his disagreement with the other leader of the PDPA.000 Afghani deposited in a Pashtu bank. There are an estimated 9 million speakers of Pashtu in Afghanistan. On 1 October 1970. Babrak. owning four cars. Dr. He was painfully vain.” Taraki was noticeably depressed when he was told in August 1968 about the forthcoming conference of Communist Parties in Moscow and the decision not to invite the PDPA. Babrak.
working class should be stopped. Supplies of luxury goods should be halted as they are used personally by the rulers of the country.” Further on he wrote: “At the Congresses of Fraternal Parties it was confirmed that the Socialist camp must give all-round assistance to democratic and anti-imperialist forces throughout the world. I hope that you will pay attention to the activities of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan which adheres to Marxism-Leninism and is fighting against imperialism and reaction. From the very beginning the PDPA has been spreading the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in Afghanistan.” On 17 October 1972 Taraki warned the Residency that Daud was planning a coup d'état. In May 1973, Azhar Abdullah Samad35 (agent 'Fatekh'), reported that Daud was ready for a coup and gave specific plans for the coup. In July Taraki reproachfully noted that “if our Soviet comrades had not forbidden Khalq members from serving in the army five or six years ago, then the majority of the officers involved in the coup would be members of Khalq. Now there is only a group of young officers who are sympathetic to Khalq.” The Residency instructed Taraki to move loyal supporters into leading posts in the new state apparatus. In 1974 he was given the usual advance of 50,000 Afghanis. The PDPA had not managed to organize itself and dissolved into its former rival Khalq and Parcham factions with their own press organs of the same name. The Residency considered that the disagreements between the groups were based not on political and ideological lines but on their struggle for leadership and recognition by the Soviet Union. Taraki was amazed by the indecisiveness of the position of the CPSU Central Committee. He said that “[i]f the USSR considers that Babrak is right, you must tell me this and say where I am wrong. Taraki and Babrak should not be a problem for the USSR. The main point is that the democratic forces in Afghanistan are growing. But they need the same support from the CPSU as it gives to democratic and communist parties in other countries. Without material and moral assistance from the CPSU it will be unbelievably difficult for the communists of Afghanistan to continue their activities while the dynasty deals its insidious blows to our party.”
Editors’ Note: Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, CPSU First/General Secretary 1964-1982. Editors’ Note: Abdul Samad Azhar, a member of the Parcham faction of the PDPA believed to be the assassin of the Daud. Arrested in 1979 by the Amin government and held until January 1980, he was appointed commander of the Sarandoy (police) in January 1980 and made alternate member of the CC. He served as ambassador to Cuba and India, and in 1986 became a full member of the PDPA CC. He was appointed ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1989 and defected in 1990.
Taraki wrote a book The New Life. It was published under the pseudonym Nazir Zadeh. But the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee instructed the Residency that it would not be a good idea to distribute the book in the country as this would bring an undesirable reaction from Babrak whose political authority and standing in the leftist movement had increased significantly since the proclamation of the republic. The Center set out its opinion of the work with Taraki and Babrak in an operational letter to Kabul on 25 October 1974.36 “In the course of regular meetings and conversations with 'Marid' [Babrak] and 'Nur' [Taraki] you must carefully, in the form of friendly advice and without referring to instructions from Moscow, tell them not to take any steps without prior agreement by us which could be used by their enemies as a pretext for striking a blow at their groups or compromising them. 'Marid' and ‘Nur' should also be warned again that they must desist from attacking each other and accusing each other of anti-republican activities, as this plays into the hands of the reactionary forces and will lead to the collapse of the democratic movement in Afghanistan. We request that you inform us by telegram of your meetings and conversations with 'Marid' and Nur'.”
Author’s Note: An operational letter is a letter from the Center or a Residency on operational and organizational matters of intelligence work.
THE APRIL COUP
In 1977 on instructions from Moscow, a secret substitute was chosen, trained and confirmed for every member of the Central Committee and secretary of the city and provincial organizations of the PDPA. Their task was to take over in the event of unexpected repression and arrests of the leading workers. At the same time new tactics to disinform the authorities were adopted and rumors were spread that Khalq had “disbanded itself.” Taraki was regularly given money from the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee unknown to the other members of the PDPA Central Committee. Although H. Amin was a very close friend of Taraki and was completely trusted by him, even he was not fully informed about the financial operations. Taraki was given 30,000 Afghani on 15 March 1977 and a further 30,240 Afghani on 25 May. [In 1975] Daud [had] established a Party of National Revolution and banned all other parties. The Residency [in Kabul] instructed the leaders of the PDPA to infiltrate its people into Daud’s party and to carry out subversive work from inside. Taraki was advised to be particularly careful and to avoid unnecessary meetings with other members of the Central Committee. On 25 April 1978 the authorities arrested Taraki, Babrak, Shah Wali37 and several other leaders of the party. But the PDPA already felt confident. A secret meeting of the underground members of the PDPA Central Committee was immediately called. It decided to carry out a coup d'état on the morning of 27 April and to seize power. Organization of the coup was entrusted to the illegal deputy of H. Amin, Figir. He had also coordinated the preparatory work. The main role in the coup was given to the 4th and 15th tank brigades and to commando forces that were to capture Kabul and take control of all the government buildings in the city. They were supported by the air force and air defense forces. The head of the airforce and air defense forces, [Col. Abdul] Qadir,38 and his deputy, Nazar Muhammed, commanded the military forces.
Editors’ Note: Also transliterated as Shah Vali. Editors’ Note: A Parchami member of the PDPA, commander of the air defense forces in 1973, participated in the Saur Revolution and became head of the Revolutionary Council until a civilian government was formed under Taraki. He became minister of defense for three months in May 1978, but was sentenced to death in August. Freed when
” The telegrams were sent immediately. In November 1985 he resigned from the politburo. The KGB [center] sent a reply the same day which stated. Taraki asked the USSR for its support in the event of an attack from Iran and Pakistan and for quick recognition of the new regime. In the narrow sense it refers to the intelligence and counterintelligence organs. 40 Editors’ Note: Soviet ambassador since 1972. that: “[t]he possibility cannot be excluded that Mossad42 is willfully provoking the military organization of this party to take action against the government in order to deal it a blow. the commander of the first battalion of the 4th tank brigade took over. On 26 April the Residency informed the Center by express telegram.] Abdul Qadir and Major Aslam. A Revolutionary Council led by Amin. Taraki’s personal representative Saleh went to the Soviet embassy to establish contact.m. He briefed them on the situation in Kabul and said that the last pockets of resistance had been crushed and that the Revolutionary Council was in full control. misinterpreted the situation and were hedging against the possibility that the attempted coup would not succeed. and organizations of ideological subversion and psychological warfare. On 28 April at 4:30 p. the Residency. The government of Daud fell. Recalled two years later. Rafi (agent ‘Niruz') immediately informed the Residency about the extraordinary events about to take place.-Gen. Ambassador Puzanov40 informed the Politburo and expressed the opinion that “there is a danger that among the members of the PDPA Central Committee still at liberty there may be some who will take extreme measures. Colonel [now made Maj. the border guards. 28 . he was elected to parliament. At the same time events in Afghanistan moved rapidly. he was restored to his party positions and served as minister of defense (1982-1985). On the same day Amin met an operational officer and asked for advice whether the General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. the immigration and customs services.” As can be seen. with top priority. and he was killed. They may be incited to do this by provocateurs from the government's special organs. the intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations.. and a year later was appointed ambassador to Poland.Gulyabzoi39 (agent 'Mamad') and M. the police and gendarmerie. he reportedly sought asylum in Europe. Taraki. should make a radio broadcast to the people on 29 April or the morning of 30 April. 41 Author’s Note: Special organs or services are state organizations. the embassy and the Moscow leadership had little knowledge of the situation in the country. 39 Editors’ Note: Said Muhammad Gulyabzoi. The Revolutionary Council concerted its actions with Taraki and Babrak. the service of active measures and disinformation.41 In our view such extreme action in the present situation could lead to the defeat of the progressive forces in the country. departments and institutions of the opponent which are directly or indirectly connected to the organization and execution of intelligence and counter-intelligence work in the territory of its own country and abroad. among other things. After the fall of the Marxist regime. whether he should speak Babrak Karmal came to power.
” Power was shared by Taraki. Taraki expressed the view that if his Soviet colleagues had not given the mistaken advice to support the Daud regime in every way. He spoke about the new organs of power and the urgent problems but for tactical reasons said nothing about the leading role of the party and its part in the conspiracy. 29 . It was to meet Amin and tell him that Moscow considered that a president should be proclaimed and a government set up as soon as possible. Its resolutions were sent to the Residency. Qadir. and the numbers were still rising. asked for advice on how to deal with all the people under arrest. and whether Taraki should be declared only president of the country or general secretary as well at the same time. This view was firmly refuted by the Soviet side. 44 Editors’ Note: Also known as I. Amin ('Kazem') made a radio broadcast to the people. 45 Editors’ Note: Soviet News Agency. A large number of the troops loyal to the Revolutionary 42 43 Editors’ Note: Israeli intelligence organization. Amin asked the Soviet Union to recognize the new regime in Afghanistan as soon as possible. On 30 April the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee met to discuss the events in Afghanistan. There were now over ten thousand. Puzanov and the Resident43 V[iliov] G. the prisons were overcrowded. the party which he led would have been able to seize power three years earlier. A.' On 6 May the Minister of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan. Krivoguz. A. It agreed that Taraki should be proclaimed president but that it should not be mentioned that he was also the general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. This could be announced at a later date. H. Amin. which explained that during these years Daud had exposed himself as a demagogic and unprincipled politician. Babrak and Qadir. Author’s Note: The Resident is a member of the intelligence service who is appointed leader of the Residency by an order of the central apparatus. In its report to Moscow the Residency stressed that “Amin is a firm supporter of co-operation with the Soviet Union and the CPSU. After the April coup ‘Nur' (Taraki) became 'Dedov.in the name of the PDPA or just in the name of the Military Revolutionary Council. Similar instructions were sent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Puzanov. On his behalf and on behalf of his comrades. Osadchy (codename ‘Evgeny’)44 met Taraki in the house of the TASS45 correspondent. On the evening of 29 April.
49 Author’s Note: The Military Residencies. 47 Editors’ Note: Zahir Shah. like the KGB Residencies. the security service and the military counter-intelligence service. Abbas (codename 'Estekhbarat'). on the orders of the Center.R. They obtained lists of agents and targets in the King's47 and Daud’s administrations. The GRU48 of the USSR Ministry of Defense asked its Residency49 to obtain material 46 Editors’ Note: Soviet foreign minister after 1957. including A. During the first days of the new regime the Residency. Country Foreign Ministry Trade Ministry Aeroflot TASS APN Novosti UN Others: Morflot. have their own networks throughout the world. took active measures to obtain the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Politburo agreed with Andropov’s suggestion that a member of the KGB who had long had an agent relationship with Qadir (codename 'Osman') should be sent to Kabul with instructions on how to deal with the detainees. This is shown in the table given below of the number and place of cover in May 1962. Gorelov was confirmed as leader of the Soviet military specialists. king 1933-1973. Andropov and [Andrey Andreyevich] Gromyko46 raised this question with the Politburo.S. atomic agency etc 1 4 2 1 1 l 1 2 1 2 1 Total New York Washington England France West Germany Italy Switzerland Norway Sweden Denmark Netherlands Belgium 16 14 11 5 7 5 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 9 4 3 3 2 1 3 2 4 2 2 1 1 l 13 33 21 24 14 12 9 3 1 1 l 1 3 1 2 2 7 9 9 7 6 30 .S. In the operation they used agents who held high positions in the special services.N. 48 Editors’ Note: Soviet military intelligence. Later (1985-88) head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.Council were needed to guard them. Major General L. the acting head of the military counter-intelligence service.
The KGB security officer is a member of a legal KGB Residency who is appointed as assistant to the ambassador on matters of security. In September the Chief Directorate for the Defense of the Interests of Afghanistan (AGSA)51 was established on the basis of the Directorate of National Security. Bogdanov ('Desnin'). The security officer is entrusted to maintain official contacts with the special services of the host country in certain situations. They were led by L. Argentine 1. Mexico 7 and Greece 8. His functional duties include defining and executing measures to protect the premises of Soviet representations in the targeted country and their official duties. Libya 7. 51 Editors’ Note: Da Afghanistan da Gatay da Satanay Edora—main Afghan security and intelligence service. Each service wanted to get its own material. Finland 5. documentation on seismic intelligence around Faizabad. Guinea 3. known as KHAD—Khedamat-I Ettela’at-I Daulati (State Information Service) after the Soviet invasion. monitoring the embassies of the USA.P. and the organization of work to ensure the security of Soviet citizens stationed abroad and their families. tightening conditions for representatives of the Main Iran Cambodia Japan Burma Thailand Israel Turkey Ethiopia Morocco Uruguay Canada India Indonesia Iraq Egypt 6 2 2 4 3 1 1 2 l 4 2 7 2 3 4 10 1 6 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 6 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 4 1 12 3 10 5 7 6 18 3 7 2 7 6 5 6 9 Total numbers for other countries are Afghanistan 4. Mali 4. the People's Republic of China and Pakistan. Austria 14.50 and other material. Iran. Syria 7. Pakistan 9.on American establishments near Kabul. Its work was aimed at targeting the missions of Western countries. Not all countries are mentioned in the table. In August a representation of the KGB was set up in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA] to assist in the organization of new security organs and in work to defend the new regime. Somalia 3. 50 Editors’ Note: Town in Northeastern Afghanistan. Ghana 6. 31 . In May the first group of Soviet advisers from the special services arrived in Kabul.
Adversary52 in the country and technical penetration of Western target establishments and internal enemies. On Andropov’s orders several members of the Residency were revealed to Amin: the Resident V.G. Osadchy who was a Councilor in the embassy; P.S. Golivanov, a Second Secretary; Lieutenant-Colonel S.G. Bakhturin, the security officer; and Y.L. Kukhta, the First Secretary. The head of the KGB representation, Colonel Bogdanov, explained to Amin that for understandable reasons before the April Revolution they had carried out the orders of the Soviet government to maintain clandestine contact with the PDPA leadership. They were now engaged in putting an end to the subversive work of the intelligence services of the Western countries against the USSR and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. As early as May, members of the Residency had held talks with the Minister of Internal Affairs, Nur Ahmed Nur, the head of the police and gendarmerie and the head of the National Security Directorate, Asadullah, and Amin himself about the need to get rid of the Western advisers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Amin said that he and Taraki had agreed that they would gradually replace the German specialists with Soviet advisers and specialists when the Germans’ contracts expired. In November the KGB searched Taraki’s home and place of work for technical listening devices. Nothing suspicious was found. In July  the Residency informed the Center in alarm that the struggle for the leadership of the PDPA had not only split the leadership but also affected the lower ranks of the party. Taraki and Amin, having finished their reprisals against rightwing reactions, had started an active attack on the Parchamists. They had abandoned the democratic methods first adopted and begun a real terror against them. The persecution of the Parchamists could have serious consequences, and if it continued could lead to fighting between the factions and even to civil war. Babrak’s followers had convinced the Soviet representatives that “only the leadership of the CPSU can influence the wild opportunists and force them to change their attitude towards the Parcham group.” Disagreements between Taraki and Amin on the one hand and the Parcham leaders on the other had become antagonistic. There were negative rumors among the members of the party that Taraki was an agent of the CIA and the KGB, and that Amin was an American agent under deep cover. Taraki was flirting with the USSR in order to obtain
Editors’ Note: The United States.
large-scale economic assistance, strengthen his position and then move over into the camp of the pro-Westerners and reactionary Muslims. Amin enjoyed the complete trust of Taraki. He would finally remove him from power, part company with the ministers who are faithful to him, and turn Afghanistan towards the West [, it was said]. Both groups were fighting for positions. The supporters of Taraki won. Babrak was removed and exiled. He was appointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia [in July 1978]. There was a purge of the party and state apparatus, accusations of conspiracy, arrests and torture. The 'isolators' and prisons were over-full and basic human rights were flouted. This was all done in the name of the Revolution, for the sake of its further development and strengthening. The practice of excessive sycophancy and of constantly extolling and praising Taraki and Amin became the norm. For the sake of personal interests the party history of the period before and after the coup was re-written and falsified. The role and place of the party and its leaders in the life of the country were deliberately distorted. Documents, articles and letters were rewritten and altered. Approval of a person was given for personal and subjective reasons rather than on a realistic basis. Nepotism, string-pulling and time-serving assumed the utmost importance. Positions and spheres of activity were allotted on the basis of devotion to the leader. The nation's wealth was plundered. Groundless slander and denunciations flourished. Respectable and honest people were subjected to repression by the police. The country turned into a mass torture-chamber. People were executed without any investigation or trial. A vast chasm formed between the people and the regime which relied on force and the support of the security organs, the army and the police. It demanded absolute submission from everyone and everything. People with a dubious reputation and rogues and scoundrels of every kind came to the surface. To the leaders the organs of repression are the same as an axe to an executioner. The Residency noted that the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan had shown itself incapable of finding a solution to the urgent political and socio-economic problems facing society and of using the available possibilities to stabilize the country. The internal struggle and intrigues within the PDPA had been and still were the main stumbling block preventing the PDPA from becoming a mass political organization firmly based on Marxism-Leninism. This organization should have been capable of becoming the leading and directing force of Afghan society and the force behind its organizational and ideological rebirth. Instead, a process began which transformed the PDPA into a 33
sect of people chosen and devoted to their leader and connected to each other through family relationships and their interest to retain power for their own personal aggrandizement. The Residency maintained operational contacts with all the important representatives of both factions. These people occupied key positions in the party, the state apparatus, the press and public organizations. They regarded the Soviet representatives as “their elder colleagues and Comrades-in-arms in the class struggle.”53 On 4 May 1978 Brezhnev was informed about the agent apparatus in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. He gave his approval that the work with agents should continue on a confidential basis.54
Author’s note: “Comrades-in-arms in the class struggle” is plain hypocrisy hidden in a grand style. The main thing for them is power. During the work with the Afghan comrades it was instilled into them that the USSR was not only a geographical neighbor, like any other country, but a country on whose red banner was written the proletarian motto of the whole world: “Proletarians of all countries unite!” (In Afghanistan the proletariat numbered only 250,000 out of a total population of 15 million.) The USSR was the ideological fatherland of all communists. Therefore, regardless of the country where a communist was born, the citizenship he held, the place where he was, his attachment to the USSR was permanent as his branch was only green because it received the essential juices of life from the firm Soviet trunk to which it was attached. If the branch were to be cut off from the USSR it would wither and break into small pieces with the loss of power and privilege. [French Communist Party leader] Maurice Thorez once expressed the general feeling of communists with the words: “When communists fight on the side of the USSR it is more than friendship, more than solidarity. It is a battle for us too'. We remember the words of Lenin: '...We are internationalists. We are striving to unite closely and fully the workers and peasants of all the nations of the world in a single universal Soviet republic.” And the Soviet and international nomenklatura are consistently striding towards their cherished goal. 54 Author’s Note: When a regime similar to the Soviet system is established in a country and KGB agents come to power and occupy the most senior posts, then the agent relationship with the country is interrupted and some agents become trusted contacts. What is the difference between an agent relationship and a trusted relationship? An agent relationship in intelligence circles is a form of contact between the intelligence service and a person who has been brought into intelligence work, and to secret co-operation as an agent, either under his own flag or a false flag. An agent carries out intelligence tasks consciously, systematically and secretly according to an agreement on secret co-operation with an official representative of the intelligence service or a representative of some organization, sometimes false, whose role is being played secretly by a member or agent of the intelligence service. A trusted relationship and trusted co-operation are a form of intelligence relations between intelligence officers who, as a rule, are concealing the fact that they belong to an intelligence service and people who are not bound by any obligations to the intelligence service but who carry out the intelligence requests of the intelligence officers in a form and within limits which are acceptable to them. Trusted contacts provide operatives with information on the basis of ideological and political compatibility, material interest, and friendly or other relations which have been established between them. The basis of the contact are the spiritual and material needs of the person, his interests and his personal characteristics which the operatives use to give him motives for a trusted relationship. Contacts of influence are particularly important in government and political circles which are used in secret by the intelligence service to carry out active measures to influence state organs and the social and political life of the targeted country. In accepting such a relationship the foreigner tries to act on the whole within the laws and norms of the country of which he is a citizen in order not to expose himself to the threat of a criminal investigation.
therefore. The co-operation of a foreigner with the service must be secret. people who have serious political influence on a national and international scale. and bribery was rife.” Only really major government and political figures are included in this category. a trusted contact does not receive any operational training. Baryali said that he could not understand why the Khalq group was always mentioned in Soviet writing on Afghanistan as the leading democratic party in the country whereas the Parcham group was hardly ever mentioned. But But in such a relationship he does things which are outside the norms of a usual acquaintance and clearly recognizes that the operative is acting. Bogdanov and Gorelov also confirmed that the PDPA leadership had concentrated its efforts on the internal political struggle. [Boris S. The member of the Residency. The possible forms of recruitment and the methods to be used for the secret co-operation as an agent are explained.] Ivanov.Parcham sources pointed out that the state and party apparati were full of people who had compromised themselves in the past. Only the head of the FCD has the right to open and close files on “especially unofficial contacts. not as a private person. Nekrasov in Moscow and asked to meet someone from the CPSU Central Committee. The tasks are set more precisely and the methods to be used examined in more detail. a cousin of Babrak and a member of the PDPA Central Committee. The class structure had altered as these wielders of power had different ideologies. The definition of the final aim must be one of the main tasks of the first steps of the targeting. Unlike an agent. displaying clear short-sightedness regarding the true enemies of the Revolution. In a recruitment targeting the elements of secrecy are introduced more prominently and firmly. in other words. constantly has to make sure that the confidential character and nature of the relationship has not become known to the contact's acquaintances or to possible agents of the opponent. met the operative E. When a confidential contact has been examined and tested. More attention is paid to obtaining the material which to a certain extent reveals the interests of the intelligence service and its methods of working. a relatively clear divergence from the official opportunities. The difference between the relationship with trusted contacts and the relationship with recruitment targets at a certain stage of their development is that in the former case there is a definite degree of observance or transgression by the foreigner and the member of the Residency of the lawful and administrative norms. Mahmud Baryali (codename ‘shir’). Information is obtained from him or he is directed to take certain actions.” 35 . then he is asked to guarantee that he will not divulge the nature of his relationship to his associates or the special services of the opponent and that he will not use the relationship against the interests of the KGB. and is known to be reliable and honest. but in his capacity as the representative of some institution and that he is representing not his own personal interests but the needs of the institution.I. whereas in the latter case these limits have not yet been established and the intelligence service is trying to push the contact beyond the observance of certain legal rules. such as heads of state and government leaders. In intelligence work there is one more form of secret relationship which is similar to a trusted contact. He wanted to give a picture of the situation in the country. When targeting a contact the service must know whether it is aiming to establish an agent or trusted contact relationship. leaders of the main political parties and the most important members of the business world. Confidential relationships differ from legal relationships through the awareness and stability of the business-like dealings of the foreigner with the intelligence service. not without his knowledge but from a clear and mutual understanding between the foreigner and the intelligence officer. A clever and successful use of 'especially unofficial contacts' is considered a very positive contribution to the work of a Residency. It is known as an “special unofficial contact. in practice on the elimination of the Parcham group.
The Resident in Islamabad. The former Parcham leaders who were sent to work abroad would remain firm Leninists dedicated to socialism and progress in Afghanistan. B. The internal struggle is fraught with serious consequences. which could lead to the destruction of the party itself.the real communists were all in the Parcham party. Batrayev. Amin had told him that Taraki’s resolutions must be carried out without questioning. Walil to London. If Baryali were to make critical remarks about Taraki. then Batrayev was not to support such judgements but to suggest that at the present time in the interests of the people of Afghanistan most attention should be paid to strengthening the ranks of the PDPA. was informed of Baryali’s appointment as the ambassador of Afghanistan. he himself to Pakistan. It was explained to Batrayev that there were no differences of principle between the groups. However. Nur Ahmed Nur to Washington. Their Soviet comrades should be on their guard. People are being persecuted who are absolutely faithful to the Soviet Union. as the authority of the USSR was still beyond reproach to the leadership of the PDPA and the armed forces. supporters of Babrak had expressed the mistaken view that the Khalq faction was not 36 . then the PDPA might follow the same path as the Communist Party of China. the Khalq faction had seized power through intrigues and machinations. The USSR must act before it was too late and correct its Afghan friends. The true inspirers and organizers of the revolution were the Parchamists and their supporters in the armored forces of the army. They had then set about routing the Parcham who had nineteen of the twenty-nine seats in the Central Committee. whom their Soviet colleagues had incidentally condemned themselves for his crimes. In conversations with Soviet representatives. and Anahita to Belgrade.N. He was asked to coach him in diplomatic practices and the functions of an ambassador in order to help him make quickly the psychological move from someone expressing discontent with his government and a party opponent to an ambassador of his country who was able conscientiously and honorably to fulfill the important state duties asked of him. Taraki had personally decided to remove all nineteen from their positions in the country and to send them abroad as ambassadors. and the CPSU was mistaken to count on the Khalq. Babrak had been sent to Czechoslovakia. Amin retorted that he was warning Baryali as a friend but that he was free to determine his own fate. They had slandered the army and introduced their supporters. If this process was delayed. They would shoot those who did not obey as Stalin had done. When Baryali objected that their revolution had its own peculiarities and that they should not copy blindly what had been done in the USSR by Stalin.
I have no means to support myself. If the ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan did not wish to return to his country. if the ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan spoke to him about the internal political struggle in the PDPA. Baryali touched on the question of political asylum during a meeting with Batrayev who refused tactfully. such information is subjective and merely reflects the opinion of the supporters of Babrak.in control of the situation in the country as they were engaged in a struggle with the Parchamists and that this could lead in the near future to a possible deterioration of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. He then went to Moscow and telephoned Nekrasov’s apartment. In September the USSR ambassador was instructed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that. “I do not know what to do. The [KGB] Resident was to act in the same manner. then he was to make it clear that he would not be given political asylum in the USSR. then he was to say that this was an internal matter of Afghanistan. the situation was tragic and they all faced death.” Baryali ('Shir') reacted enthusiastically to the reestablishment of contacts in June 1978 and showed a wish to be useful. Baryali went to Czechoslovakia where he met Babrak.G. I have a letter from Babrak but I do not know to whom to give it. he would remain a firm communist and true friend of the Soviet Union. Discussion of these problems should be avoided and one must not allow oneself to be dragged into the internal struggle in the PDPA. 55 Editors’ Note: Rostislav A. Ulianovsky was the deputy head of the CPSU CC International Department. He begged for urgent measures to be taken to save Babrak and his supporters. All our hopes are in our Soviet comrades. “In our opinion. in spite of any troubles. “In the name of humanism save us! In the name of humanism save us!” He repeated this phrase several times and sobbed as he did so.” This conversation was reported to Suslov and Ponomarev. 37 . The ambassador said that he would not return to Kabul and asked him to tell the Soviet leaders that. He said that the Parchamists were in a critical situation. They instructed that Baryali should be received in the International Department of the Central Committee. A. Polyakov talked to him. Ulianovsky55 avoided the conversation.
The leadership of the PDPA under Taraki and Amin had not listened to the opinions and wishes of the CPSU Central Committee that all the democratic forces of the Afghan people should unite and take an active part in the reconstruction of the country. The KGB representation and the Residency also noted such faults. it was thought that in the future he might take the same action against Taraki and his closest supporters. The dissatisfaction with the government. that Amin was fuelling the struggle against the Parchamists and the critical Khalqists in order to strengthen his leading position in the party. which was already apparent. The time for delight had passed. Baryali inquired why Moscow was advising him now to decide for himself whether he should return to Kabul or not as though it did not know what was happening there. and his deputy were planning to go to the West instead of returning to Kabul. Amin said that they should be allowed to go to Europe as. He explained Babrak’s view of the situation in the country.” In a month and a half the situation in Afghanistan would change in a way that would not be good for Taraki. the authorities will have to arrest them and decide what to do with them further. The Afghan military attaché. In the past. he noted. The Parchamists decided not to aggravate the revolutionary situation at this stage.Baryali complained that he did not understand the position of the Soviet Union and its attitude to the physical elimination of true and faithful communists. He accused Puzanov of giving the Soviet Union disinformation on the situation in the country. Taraki ordered that they be taken back to the capital under escort. Taraki and Amin took hasty measures to speed up the process of getting rid of potential rivals for power. There were mass arrests and 38 . would become more universal. It would be followed by criticism and attacks on Taraki. For the sake of rewards he was prepared to sacrifice the lives of thousands of true communists. his Soviet comrades had always given him advice on how to act and he had never let them down. The first sign of a split between them [Taraki and Amin] came at the end of May 1978 and concerned members of military attaché’s staff in Moscow.” Before Ponomarev made an unofficial visit to Kabul. “if they come back to Afghanistan. “He should be a communist as well as an ambassador. Babrak was particularly displeased with Puzanov. Khamil Turabaz. the state and the army. Such a decision should not be understood as capitulation. It was said in political circles in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the PDPA. Taking Amin’s personal qualities into account.
The conspirators do not want to disclose any new facts and are therefore prepared to do this. In May 1978. We are sure that we will manage to do this. According to Taraki. Gen. as enemies of the April Revolution. 39 .” Shapur was in a depressed state of mind. 59 Editors’ Note: The Society of Muslim Brothers (Jam’iat-I Ikhwan al-Muslimin).repressive measures against personal rivals in the party and the underground. Aziz. He constantly cried and asked to be shot quickly. Editors’ Note: Maj. A. 58 Editors’ Note: Ruhollah Khomeini. as the USSR was helping the country and was not hindering the removal and elimination of people who were known for their pro-Soviet views. Iranian Shi'ite cleric led the 1978/9 Iranian Revolution that overthrew Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979 and became Iran's supreme political and religious authority. They were tortured. said confidentially. founded in 1929 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna was a religio-political organization. the Minister of Defense [of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. those arrested were being held in a special prison. Shapur Ahmedzai. Shapur.57 was arrested. Abdullah Akhad Umusi.A. pan-Islamic in outlook and aimed at imposing Islamic law on all aspects of the social and political life of the Muslim nation. An example was the case of Qadir who had played an important role in the coups of 1973 and 1978. the Soviet leadership had betrayed them. The rest of those arrested were shot. In mid-June an order was 56 57 Editors’ Note: Later identified as the head of the Jumhuriat hospital. followed by other ministers and officials. It was thought in Afghanistan that. On 17 August. Akbar56 was accused of working for the CIA. investigations were only held in cases where the accused were prepared to give evidence. Qadir was arrested. Hedeyat has already killed himself. The task now is to reveal the political leadership of the conspiracy. M. 900 inhabitants of the Balkh province60 were arrested on the orders of the First Secretary of the PDPA Provincial Committee. Qadir has not confessed yet but he has admitted several mistakes he made. the provincial capital. On 15 August the head of the general staff. The followers of Khomeini58 and members of the Muslim Brothers organization59 were to be eliminated at once. to find out who is behind Qadir and Shapur. Twenty-seven “conspiracies” were uncovered during the first few months following the April Coup. A commission was set up to investigate their counter-revolutionary activities. As the head of counter-intelligence. A personal enemy of Taraki. The policy of Taraki and Amin to get rid of people they considered unsuitable in order to concentrate all power in their own hands became very apparent. They were thrown into prison in Mazar-i-Sharif. He told Ambassador Puzanov: “Many of them are close to committing suicide. Only a very narrow circle knew where this was situated.
spies and terrorists. It is so simple. It is governed by Party directives and Party control. That's where the opposition is hiding!' Before the War lists of inhabitants were hung on buildings or in the entrances. but the accounts of the food block showed that the number under arrest had decreased daily by 30 to 70 people.. They tore his stomach muscles with their boots. There was also an incident concerning an inexperienced young Chekist in Moscow who repeatedly failed to meet his target of arrests of enemies. Investigator Solovyov and his apprentice Shukshin broke two of his ribs. There were plans to arrest and punish the enemies of the people. There was unheard of fuss about the so-called fundamental law. “I know that I have lived like a reptile which has been trying to bite without being noticed. stationed in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif. which had just been declared the most human and just.. Those to be shot had dug trenches for their own burial. Diskant was a Jew. 50 to 60 had been shot each night by the 18th infantry division. Author’s Note: The practices of the Party and Chekists come to light. But at least I am spending the last days of my life in the knowledge that I have finally decided to expose the bastards and myself. exists and works only as a direct organ of the Party. Their relatives received parcels from there from those who had disappeared.I think that I do not have the need. He is now regarded as an exemplary intelligence officer. He had really had nothing to do with them.” At his trial Diskant denied all the evidence he had given under interrogation.. pierced his lung and broke his skull with a hammer covered in bandages. He was exposed as a spy for four countries. born in 1898. German and Polish intelligence services and to have been engaged in Trotskyite activities. Here are two examples of how things were done. The prison administration explained that the men had been sent to the Urals and Siberia in the USSR where they were used for hard labor. His evidence was obtained with an iron cable with a ball bearing at the end. There was no documentation on the prisoners held.. There was no time as the plan had to be fulfilled. but parallel to this were Stalin's sadistic evil acts which were surrounded with silence. He confessed to working for the Japanese. The protocol had been dictated by the investigator Balandin.A. There are many things you can do. It is now a matter of purely technical measures to allow our courts to strengthen and hasten the repression against the Mensheviks. who was arrested in Chita in 1938. I know that my awful life has made my good working wife unhappy and that I am leaving two unfortunate children who will curse me and despise me all their lives.” The underlinings are Lenin's. They said that in Vladivostok one of the Troika signed an execution order for his father without glancing at it or stopping to think for a minute. 40 . The Cheka was established. He said that he had been tortured and beaten and had substituted foreign intelligence services and Trotskyite activities for real people and events. The parcels contained various articles such as soap in which letters were hidden describing the difficult conditions and exhausting work. But it is easier to catch clever crooks in their offices. my boy. The NKVD agent D. Bystroletov behaved badly abroad and was unlucky at home. I will gladly meet my death as atonement for my sins.61 60 61 Editors’ Note: Located in north-central Afghanistan. On examination it was found that the numbers had decreased as many had already been shot. At meetings he was accused of remissness and a lack of initiative. protecting the human rights of the citizen. Choose any old name or number on the list. Millions of people got caught in the millstone of the socialist competition of the Chekists to over-fulfill their targets in their hunt for enemies. the truly populist Stalinist constitution. M. Diskant was executed. Once an older colleague felt sorry for him and said: 'You are silly. As Lenin said: “Revolutionary force and dictatorship is a wonderful thing.Ts.' In a note to Unschlick on 31 January 1922 he wrote: 'I simply cannot be in the politburo. Go into any block of flats and look at the list of inhabitants.sent from Kabul that all those arrested should be taken to the capital.
and the head of the Jumhuriat hospital. But behind these screens even now. who had both been arrested. technical and creative intelligentsia from attempts by the opponent to take them away from the influence of Marxism-Leninism. Khazarov that he was always pleased to accept advice from his Soviet friends and to learn from the experience of the CPSU as the struggle with the Parchamists was like the struggle between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.” Puzanov agreed in part with Amin’s conclusions and informed Moscow of this.Taraki informed Puzanov about an anti-government plot which was discovered in August 1978. An investigator for particularly important cases who was Jewish by nationality was arrested for espionage and accused of cohabiting with the Israeli ambassador. philosophical circles.00140” to the senior staff of the KGB of Moscow and the Moscow region on 11 October 1983. But it is not only this but our common aim which unites us. Iran. At the end of 1952. Gorkin. Of course this was not pointed out in the report. as the Chairman of the KGB Chebrikov has admitted.I.. confirmed that: “The Soviet courts and the state security service of the USSR are of the same age. openness and perestroika. the Chekists are continuing to press agents to take illegal actions and make false denunciations and are using them for their personal.F. “The authorities now have confessions from most of those arrested. A. Stalin ordered that a conspiracy and connections with capitalist intelligence services must be uncovered in the case of the doctors. foresee these changes and take measures to stop their negative influence'. “In our view Qadir was not politically mature.. He added: “The party was unable to make Qadir a true Marxist-Leninist. 41 .We take pleasure in noting that the state security organs and the courts decide all these difficult problems in a spirit of mutual understanding and firm working ties. For a while it is possible to conceal it with the florid curtains of democracy.. Shapur. However much you try you cannot breathe when the air is stifling.A. Akbar. In Chebrikov’s words the main idea was to protect students and the young generation of scientific. The chief lawyer Vyshinsky considered that material evidence was not necessary for the conviction of a political opponent. China. M. the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR. had revealed these plans.” Amin said. local and ethnic groups and religious and mystical sects and not to allow them to move into the structure of the regime. [Four words excised.. mercenary aims. prepared to withstand any negative influence. There is no analogy in the history of man.] The conspirators had planned to eliminate Taraki and Amin and to elect a new leadership. He was inclined to adventurism and was rather foolish. A confession by the accused was sufficient. The ambassador justified the actions of the leaders of the PDPA which “in the opinion of the embassy will strengthen the revolutionary government and enhance the influence of the party in the armed forces of Afghanistan. political groups. “Further improvements in the work with agents and trusted people in the light of the situation declared in the order of the KGB of the USSR on 4 June 1983 No. firmly and accurately react to all the changes in society. Golda Meir [seven words excised].” Evidence is extorted to the advantage of the charge. You will not change nature. and to fight against the underground of independent organizations. On the 50th anniversary of the Cheka. The profession of the Chekist is unique.” Amin assured Puzanov and V. That was our mistake. The KGB 'must be in the midst of the masses and know them. And it is agent work and the reliable and well-trained agent apparatus of the KGB which plays the main role in this. Pakistan. The former head of the general staff. the USA. Saudi Arabia and the Federal Republic of Germany were involved.
000 civilians and 3. and in Afghanistan they were struggling to form a single and united party.200 supporters in the army on the eve of the April Coup. there had been 500 members of Parcham and 1. The corresponding figures for Khalq were 470 members and 1. based on the Soviet model.100 supporters. At a reception for a KGB delegation led by V. They reduced the authority of the party and rejected any initiatives from members of the Revolutionary Council. the head of the First Chief Directorate (FCD) of the KGB. 62 Editors’ Note: Taraki had been killed in 1979. Amongst civilians there were 5. strengthened his influence and tried to become popular with the people. They were sabotaging the orders of the commanders and conducting a campaign against the government. A Taraki-Amin cult was inculcated. “We respect the experience of a multi-party system in some socialist countries. Kryuchkov. that the whole history of the PDPA was being distorted. internally the Bolsheviks had fought against the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries. the Central Committee and the ministers. and that the events of 27 and 28 April 1978 were being described as a model for revolution. the Residency had noted that Amin was comparing Taraki to Lenin.A.500 members of Parcham and 100 fewer members of Khalq. Even before this. the Residency wrote to the Center that some members of the Khalq faction were continuing to extol Taraki’s personality and his role in the establishment of the PDPA. At the end of June 1979 there were 14. His radio broadcasts always began with the words “in the name of the Almighty… . in January 1981.” According to estimates by the Residency.62 They were spreading rumors in the army that the Parchamists had temporarily taken control.000 members of the armed forces in the PDPA. For this purpose he went to the mosque on Fridays to pray.Taraki got rid of his rivals.” Later. They were moving away from the Marxist-Leninist principles of party life and the construction of a state. The power of the party was concentrated in the hands of Taraki and Amin who did not want to change to a collective method of governing the country. 42 . What is happening in Afghanistan is the beginning of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Taraki likened the April Revolution in Afghanistan to the October Revolution in Russia: power had been seized quickly. “but we prefer to follow the example of the USSR.” he said.
65 Editor’s Note: Col. and release several agents and trusted contacts who had been accused by the authorities of anti-government activities. member of the Parchami faction of the PDPA. Their advice was often contradictory.63 the former head of the police and gendarmerie of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. clear of any suspicions of political disloyalty. in an objective light. At the same time he uttered this reprimand: “A new state apparatus is being formed in the country.64 Mohammed Rafi. what is happening in the country. Muhammad Rafi’I. Politburo member since 1981.Babrak was afraid to speak out against Taraki because of the position of his Soviet comrades.-Gen. the former member of the Revolutionary Council and Minister of Public Works. particularly those who worked for many years in Afghanistan under the old regime and have now returned. Minister of Public Works May to August 1978. Some Soviet specialists. who had previously had agent relations with Afghans who had now become government and political figures. In reply to one such request the Chief of the Directorate of National Security. often have a dated view of the country and do not see. Samad Azkhar. Asadullah. the Defense Minister Qadir. 66 Author’s Note: Amin’s words seem to suggest that the presence of the KGB. 1986-1988). H. Amin. compromised the former helpers. Amin was told that these people were doing useful work for Soviet intelligence and thereby contributing to the people's democratic revolution in Afghanistan and strengthening the friendship between the Soviet and Afghan peoples. In five years time they may be released. and many others. Through its representative the KGB appealed a number of times to H. then purged. His conversations with them had shown that they had not adopted a definite line regarding party problems and that they did not have a true picture of the facts.” Amin himself appeared prepared to release Afghan citizens who were well known by the Soviet comrades and who were friends of the USSR. on Amin’s behalf. 43 . said. Sharq. that “the lives of some of the people arrested who were connected with you will be saved. and a socio-economic transformation is under way. to terminate the prosecution. Editors’ Note: From Appendix 1. Appointed Minister of Defense under Karmal (1980-1982. People mentioned included the former Deputy Prime Minister under Daud. who was controlling the work of the organs of state security.”66 63 64 Editors’ Note: Mohammad Hassan Sharq. Abdul Salam.65 the former Deputy Minister of Trade.
Taraki and Amin. If this weapon is used decisively. The policies of Taraki and Amin towards the people are causing great resentment. “They made a deal and organized a plot with the help of the USA and China. as it was during the revolt in Kabul yesterday.S. Ivanov. B. he became a member of the PDPA politburo and a year later was named primed minister (1981-1988). His sentence was later commuted to 15 years imprisonment. veteran KGB Officer. After the Saur Revolution he was purged with other leading Parchamis and sentenced to death.N. ranking KGB officer in Kabul from spring 1979. 69 Editors’ Note: Boris S. He had not even spoken to the whole Politburo but had limited himself to meetings with Taraki and Amin. Panjshiri. No one has yet dared to speak out against Taraki or Amin as they are frightened of being labeled enemies of the revolution. I agree that repressions are an extremely severe weapon. Innocent people are being arrested for no reason at night in front of their crying wives and children. (codename “Richard”) on 29 July 1979 and informed him about a letter from the CPSU Central Committee which Ponomarev had delivered to the Central Committee of the PDPA.” said Taraki. lieutenant-general. Panjshiri thanked him for his trust and assured him that he would continue to work tirelessly for the good of his country to strengthen the friendship between the parties and the peoples of the fraternal countries. a former literature teacher at Kabul Teachers College and later major government and party figure. Ivanov.” This conversation took place on 6 August 1979.On behalf of his superiors. Puzanov asked Taraki that Keshtmand 67 and Qadir—who had both been arrested—not be executed. But Lenin taught us to be merciless towards the enemies of the revolution and millions of people had to be eliminated in order to secure the victory of the October Revolution. “Their guilt is great. member of the Parcham faction and Minister of Planning in the first PDPA government. 44 . “is decided in the Politburo by two people. After Babrak Karmal returned to power. The rest are merely bit players who applaud.68 regretted that Ponomarev had avoided meeting the majority of party activists. “Everything.” he remarked. it is clear what the outcome will be. Ponomarev visited Kabul from 17 to 20 July 1979 with the aim of giving guidance. 68 Editors’ Note: Ghulam Dagastir Panjshiri. In a confidential conversation the Minister of Public Works. The former accepts and confirms the resolutions that the latter proposes. 69 He met Dostagir Panjshiri.” Ponomarev’s mistake or oversight was rectified by B. He said that the present practice of unconditional submission to the decisions of Taraki and Amin would not help to 67 Editors’ Note: Sultan Ali Keshtmand.
Amin was taking a big risk as he would be made the scapegoat if the fight against the rebels was not won. The first deputy [assigned to assist the leadership] of the Representation was put in charge of the work of the intelligence department. One such delegation. [Ilyin].” The Soviet representatives and the Afghan leadership became noticeably alienated.overcome past mistakes or aid in the recovery and normalization of the situation in the country. made up of the head of the Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. With the help of German colleagues he sent large amounts of valuable goods to Moscow for the Minister of Internal Affairs of 45 . Ivanov sent the following telegram to Moscow on 29 July. to some extend. and five deputies of the KGB representative were appointed to cover counter-intelligence.S. Ivanov and L. In March 1979 the Politburo passed a special resolution appointing General N.Y. [As a result. Amin asked his people why the Soviet comrades had made this urgent visit to Taraki and replied himself: “Apparently they are concerned about the government reshuffle of which we did not inform them of in advance. The Residency greatly valued “Richard’s” information. was sent to gendarmerie in May and June. Amin was again put in charge of military affairs.-Gen. military counterintelligence.P. Veselkov to the group of advisers from the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs attached to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. It seems that he did this on purpose to show Amin that the Soviet side regards him highly. Gorelov This is the same I. Various delegations were sent to various bodies in Afghanistan to influence the Afghans.70 the chief [Soviet] military adviser. An information and analysis group was formed. Drozdetsky who was found guilty of intrigues and illegal deals when he was in East Germany as a communications officer at the KGB Representation to the Interior Ministry of the East German Republic. Following his meeting with Amin. Lev. On 27 July 1979 Taraki made additional changes in the government. N. Drozdetsky. The Afghans.Y.I. as well as border questions and the [actions of] Ministry of Internal Affairs. I.” A report was received in Moscow that American diplomats in Kabul considered the government reshuffle as a desperate attempt to save the situation. “Taraki did not give Amin a completely accurate account of our message to him. Puzanov. displayed willfulness and acted without consultation. went to Taraki and demanded an explanation for the changes.71 and the head of a department. 70 71 Editors’ Note: Lt. Gorelov. The staff of the Representation was increased. A.] the [Soviet] advisers and specialists were instructed to collect more detailed information on actions [undertaken] by the Afghans.
Mielke informed the KGB Representative. Drozdetsky was immediately recalled. The Afghan leadership was told that he had made unreasonable demands from the USSR for resources.” 46 .K. And I would ask you not to take the place of ministers and not to transfer their responsibilities and functions to some commission of some kind. in fact to be jointly responsible for everything. They were unwittingly under Misaq’s influence. a member of the Politburo. to be responsible for fulfilling the plans as well as drawing them up. should agree on all decisions. Shcholokov.” to run the economic and financial side together with the minister of planning. and his actions were inspired by Maoists. Again Misaq reasonably remarked: “I beg you not bring your bureaucratic ways into Afghan ministries! We have enough of our own.The advisers were active and delved into all the crevices of the ministries. In January 1979 Misaq was compromised in Moscow in the eyes of the leadership of Afghanistan. He suggested that all parties. as well as in third countries using the possibilities of the KGB. the adviser N. Fadeikin. Minister of Finance Abdul Karim Misaq. made the reasonable objection that “the Ministry is not the United Nations!” The call to give the advisors a more important role was received by the Afghans with visible perplexity and even annoyance. Grechin suggested that a permanent commission with advisers as members should be set up in the Ministry of Trade to deal with operational matters. He had openly expressed the idea that the USSR should help the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan “to build socialism in thirty months.” The KGB saw this remark as a sign of dependence on the USSR and [a possible source of] discreditation of Soviet assistance. Grechin said that he wanted “to be a shadow minister. you never know when it might be needed” is an Afghan saying. which Afghanistan was not in a position to absorb. Amin encouraged the Afghans to ask for more as “the Russians will give it. the USSR. that the Germans who had been involved in the speculation had been arrested and would be tried. Shcholokov made him a commissar which is equal to a general. Ministers must be completely responsible for all the activities of their ministries. i. For example. and no commissions of any sort must take their place. the ministers and advisers. A. but instead of the dock and a convoy to the distant Archipelago Gulag he joined the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.”72 It was then decided to discredit Misaq. I. 72 Author’s Note: “Bring everything. Misaq was hostile to the USSR.e. Afghanistan is more important to the USSR than the USSR is to Afghanistan so the Soviets are prepared to make any sacrifices.
chief political adviser to the Afghan army from May 1978. Bribery was rife. the adviser to the Minister of Finance. They must increase the fighting capability of the Afghan army and teach it to fight and to use the experience of the Soviet army during the war. We need experienced generals of whom we know there are many in the USSR. Vasiliy P. The Afghan agent “Rakkas”75 said that he personally had seen widespread bribery in the Soviet Union. was extremely rude to the Minister of Trade. 47 . It stated that Ambassador Puzanov. Zaplatin. Goobandi. We gave your advisers wide powers in the leadership of the Afghan troops. drank heavily and led a life of debauchery. The CPSU Central Committee received an anonymous letter. military adviser Gorelov and KGB Resident Osadchy had formed a pact. We punish them severely for any failure to accept the advice of your commanders. “and his deputy (Khramchenko) is incapable of taking any serious decisions. They made the auditors drunk and bribed them.” “It is difficult to deal with your present leader. Gen.” The Afghans were also disenchanted with the reality of Soviet life. 75 Editors’ Note: Gaylari Baktari. They distorted the party line for personal and careerist reasons.Zotov. and gifts and presents were extorted from Soviet and Afghan specialists. “The Afghan troops led by adviser Bryaskin have long since shown themselves incapable of eliminating the anti-government bands. The party organizer from the CPSU Central Committee was also enriching himself. the doctors and other staff had not only counted on presents and bribes but had used delaying tactics and other methods to ensure they obtained them. There was discontent on the Soviet side too. This suggests to us that not all your advisers are sufficiently competent. 73 who was a member of the Revolutionary Council. but it was shown in a different way. Those who were uncooperative could expect reprisals and to be sent back home.” Amin told General Zaplatin74 referring to Gorelov. The military attaché and the counselors of the embassy wrote false papers and accounts. Editors’ Note: Maj. Amin was depressed about the military operation at the end of 1978 in the gorge of Kamdezh in the district of Nangrakharsk. made themselves rich. The 73 74 Editors’ Note: Abdul Quddus Goorbandi. For their part the Afghans expressed their disquiet about the competence of the military advisers. Minister of Agriculture under Daud. When his wife had been in the Botkin hospital in Moscow. They looted embassy funds.
But an hour later Sadykov reappeared with a sub-machine gun in his hand. and N. let out all the grievances that he had bottled up. an argument started which developed into a slanging-match. He had suffered for a long time and put up with coarse remarks from his superiors about his inaccurate translations and with unprintable abuse. The family of Semechenko was informed that he had died heroically while carrying out his international duty. An hour later Sadykov woke up. Junior Lieutenant Maloletkin managed to disarm him and he was taken into another room where he was left to sleep. They took him to the other room.P. He grabbed a sub-machine-gun and threatened revenge. the commander of the division. the head of the border guards. Lieutenant Sadykov. There was ample to drink and everyone took advantage.author regretted the execution of Daud who was “our man to the core.A. still shooting at random. and Maloletkin and an Afghan soldier were wounded. Semenchenko. He started firing in the corridor and then ran outside. made his way to the duty officer's room and shouted excitedly: “You think that you are defending the Motherland? Yes? No. an Uzbek. It was then reported further up the chain of command.S. Semenchenko was killed. What a sober person thinks. which was stationed in the town of Khost. the head of the intelligence department. He was still under the influence of wine and vodka. The military became undisciplined while carrying out their international duty. was informed of the incident in hushed tones.” He cursed the new leadership of Afghanistan. As happens when people are drunk. Among the guests were Lieutenant-Colonel Kalinin. held a banquet to celebrate the anniversary of their graduation. On 21 June 1979 four interpreters from the 25th division. Ryabchinsky and Kostin tried to reason with him and calm him down. a drunk person blurts out. Here is an example. Tutushkin. 48 . the deputy of the chief military adviser. Gorofes. Those present grew alarmed. the commander of the 59th artillery regiment. you are all traitors!” And he carried on saying the unutterable. The officers Kisiliev. Major N. S. Krus. He was incensed and began to abuse the advisers.
he replied that it belonged to the state. “But how can we get it?” He asked Dragyalis to find out whether it could be arranged so that his signature could be used instead of that of the three signatories.Yu. Amin preferred to follow the experience of Mongolia. since you are my advisor. Amin asked him: “And did you report to Comrade Kosygin?” When Dragyalis replied in the affirmative. Consider the development of Afghanistan like the development of one of the republics of the USSR. Their relationship was quite good. 49 . Amin’s personal adviser on financial matters and planning. It is still [in its] early days. at the moment we are like a premature baby which must be protected from any kind of capitalist infection and capitalist path of development. Would it not be possible to arrange it somehow so that I can sign and get the money?” He paused for a moment and then added: “If I signed as prime minister?” When Amin was asked specifically whether the money belonged to the state or to him personally.THE SEPTEMBER COUP P. He explained: “You see. he raised the question of Afghan deposits in foreign banks. This money can only be withdrawn if the checks are signed by three accredited signatories. We are still not strong. described Amin as gifted and intellectually mature but cruel and ambitious. and we cannot allow private capital into our country. Dragyalis told Amin about his previous work. We cannot let these people out of the country as they might use their right as a signatory and we will then lose the money. He said that he [Amin] was trying to concentrate power in his own hands. As the permanent representative of the Lithuanian SSR at the Council of Ministers of the USSR he had met the top Soviet leaders.” Once. Let it be thought of as the sixteenth republic. in July 1979. Dragyalis (code name “ROMOV”). We have 400 million dollars in twenty private banks in various countries. Amin said ironically: “Then you are the most remarkable person in Afghanistan!” As far as the development of Afghanistan was concerned. “I have something to say to you.
50 . the ambassador of Afghanistan in Bonn and an agent of imperialism. He suggested that with Taraki’s help Amin should be given work of lesser importance or. In 1978 Amin met Husein Payande. the former Minister of Education and an opponent of communism. In the USA. Pazhvak. but is really planning to get hold of the 400 million dollars by any means. then are the interpreter and I dangerous witnesses of the plans of an adventurist?” The KGB considered this conversation very strange. An exchange of fire ensued and Amin threatened Babrak with a pistol. Ya. had a meeting with a deputy head of the FCD. Amin had been friendly with an old university friend. G. In a special room in the hotel Spinzar Amin met General Jeilan Tutakheil and an American whose identity was not established. He expressed the view of top Soviet officials in Kabul that a radical political turnover was needed in the leadership of the country. All the other members followed them blindly. who was married to an American. Sarwari Nasher. They had several drinking-bouts together. Editors’ Note: Tudeh. The Representation and the Residency became increasingly receptive to such advice. Medyanik. In Kabul he used to meet the chairman of the Spinzar joint-stock company. who had maintained contact with King Zahir Shah. made to retire. The first step in this direction could be the removal from power of Amin and the establishment of a climate of trust and 76 77 Deputy Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost. N. Yu. in New York. P. In June 1979 the head of the Soviet trade mission in Afghanistan. Nasher gave Amin financial support in the election campaign. Amin stayed in Europe to visit Ali Akhmad Popal.Dragyalis concluded: “If one presumes that Amin not only wishes. Pakistan and Iraq and towards the People's Party of Iran77 and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Bulakh. After the April Coup Amin freed him from prison and provided him with a automobile and a driver. They collected information on damaging episodes in Amin’s life and decided to pursue this line. Was Amin planning to get the money and slip away? Amin had become more than the KGB could manage! Dost76 (the agent “PIERS”) repeatedly said at meetings that the opinions and wishes of one or two people dominated the party. Babrak opposed his nomination. the Iranian Communist Party. At Taraki’s suggestion Amin was nominated for membership of the PDPA Central Committee. He is hostile towards the communist parties of India. On the way home from the US. better still.
Gulyabzoi. are openly expressing their dissatisfaction with Amin. the Minister of Defense.P. The main task for Soviet citizens in Afghanistan is to make sure that Kabul does not alter its traditionally friendly and good-neighborly relations towards the Soviet Union. Shah Wali and M. the Supreme Commander of the People's Militia. Gulyabzoi and Ali Shah Paiman. and Assadullah Sarwari. in the latter's apartment. He interprets the letter from the CPSU Central Committee to the Afghan leadership as a desire on of the Soviet side to limit his wish to take policy decisions himself and as an attempt to restrict his freedom of action in the relentless battle against the counter-revolutionaries. 79 Editors’ Note: Mahamoud Suma. replaced by Asadullah Amin. the minister of higher education. He said that an anti-Amin group had been formed by [Aslam] Watanjar. in October 1979. the Minister of Communications. Ivanov and Osadchy think that Amin is trying to seize power.goodwill at all levels in the economic and party mechanism. the Chief Directorate for the Defense of the interests of Afghanistan. They expressed their view that “the best course for us to follow in this situation would be to support Taraki who welcomed the letter from the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and considered it of direct assistance to him in his aim of establishing a collective leadership in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. These ministers had personally reported to Taraki on the situation in the country. Taraki and Amin are taking decisions themselves without consulting with the other members of the PDPA Central Committee. the head of the group of Soviet advisers. Of the five members of the Politburo of the Central Committee—excluding Taraki and Amin—Amin is supported by two. There is no collective leadership. He wants to have his own people in Moscow. Sarwari spoke critically of Amin to L. Sarwari was appointed vice president and deputy prime minister. but soon afterward sent as ambassador to Mongolia (1980-1986). Suma.79 In 78 Editors’ Note: Asadullah Sarwari. member of the Khalq faction of the PDPA. In December 1979.” Ivanov and Osadchy sent a telegram to the Center stating that on 16 June 1979 Tarun.78 the head of AGSA. the head of Taraki’s chancellery. as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Bogdanov. met Veselkov.. He opposes the drafting of a constitution and the establishment of local authorities in the form of People's (Revolutionary) Councils. a nephew of Hafizullah Amin. [Sheijan] Mazduryar. 51 . S. and not to Taraki. An important role in this could be played by the Parchamists who had some experience of government. the Minister of Internal Affairs. “They would probably be able to deal with the people and the clergy. Amin had insisted that they should report to him. Exactly a month later they informed Moscow of their views on the situation regarding the leadership in the country.
3. It is not clear why it is not the other way round as it is not Amin who was accredited to Puzanov!” On 1 September 1979 the KGB gave the highest authorities its views on possible ways to overcome the critical situation in Afghanistan. Amin was the main organizer of this policy. the leading role in which must be given to members of the PDPA. Representatives of patriotically inclined members of the clergy and tribes and representatives of national minorities and the intelligentsia must be brought into the government. 2. Taraki and Amin were relying on military force to solve all internal problems and were continuing to take unjustified mass punitive measures.” “Thus. [and that the population] was becoming increasingly anti-Soviet. He personally should be held responsible for the ungrounded mass punitive measures and the failures of internal policies.M. This [improvement] will. The memorandum made the following suggestions: 1. The memoranda stated that the government of Taraki and Amin was clearly losing its authority among the people. A way should be found to remove Amin from the leadership of the country.” And another point. Taraki should be persuaded that it is essential to establish a democratic coalition government. at various levels. 52 . Taraki. including Parchamists. that they should increase work with the masses in order to give the regime a broad social basis were almost totally ignored. Soviet representatives gave.” concluded Ivanov and Osadchy. as he is guilty of pursuing a flawed internal policy. Political prisoners who were illegally arrested—in particular members of the Parcham faction—should be released and rehabilitated. of course. “an improvement in the situation of the DRA leadership today depends a lot on N. be impossible unless the principle of collective leadership is accepted and Amin’s wish to rule the government alone is impeded. and in the government by eleven of the 17 members. advice and suggestions to Taraki and Amin.the Central Committee he is supported by 14 of the 30 members. Amin was unable to establish a working relationship with Ambassador Puzanov.
Babrak. the concentration of excessive power in the hands of others. Our observations did not disclose that he had not kept his word. could be dangerous for the fate of the revolution.” The tested formula of dictatorial power! This was a direct and open instruction to Taraki to get rid of Amin. Taraki was given the script for a production of a political play and consent that it should be performed in real life. Instructions were sent to Havana to arrange a meeting with Taraki there during which he would be asked to stop over in Moscow on his way home for an important meeting with Brezhnev. 80 Author’s Note: Talking to the Soviet ambassador about Babrak. The main point of the note was: “I would not consider that I had fulfilled my duty to you. Brezhnev saw Taraki on 10 September and read with aplomb the note which had been written by the KGB and jointly approved by Andropov. but also.80 5. It spoke of the fears of the Soviet leadership about the situation in Afghanistan. BILIAK said: “Treating him simply on humane grounds. we provided him with somewhere to live and made him give an undertaking that he would not engage in any actions whatsoever against the present government in Afghanistan. to discuss the stabilization of the internal political situation in the DRA. Parcham leader who has emigrated to the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia. not only to your Soviet comrades. Some of these proposals were used as the basis of the document drafted for Brezhnev’s meeting with Taraki [on 10 September 1979]. Ustinov81 and Gromyko. However. to the members of the PDPA. if I did not raise another matter which is causing particular concern. the armed forces and the organs of state security. Comrade Taraki. They decided to use Amin and to blame him for all the mistakes. under the circumstances of the Afghan revolution. the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia V. An unofficial meeting should be arranged with K. failures and crimes committed politically and militarily. He has an agreement with our publishing house to translate ‘The lessons of the development of a crisis…’ into Farsi. It can hardly be expedient for someone to occupy an exclusive position in the leadership of the country.4. 53 . Comrade Taraki. the party and the leadership. according to information we have.” 81 Editors’ Note: Soviet Defense Minister. A “fall back” leadership of the PDPA should be prepared in the DRA in case the crisis situation in the country deteriorates. Your special role as General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee in the leadership of the party and the state is understandable. even your closest aides.
his previous contact. Taraki met A. After this conversation with Taraki. He spoke about the conference in Havana of the heads of state and heads of governments of the non-aligned countries and his meetings and talks there.Before flying to Kabul. On 11 September a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the DRA was held. the Minister of Internal Affairs. “The Road to Kabul: Soviet Policy in Afghanistan. 54 . 1997). Sarwari. Watanjar. When Taraki came to power he was jokingly re-christened Nikolai Mikhailovich Tarakanov [tarakan is Russian for cockroach] by the members of the Residency. Ivanov and Gorelov informed the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee that there was a marked deterioration in relations between Taraki and Amin. He raised the question of removing these people from their positions and punishing them. On the same day Taraki met Puzanov. the Minister for Border Security. Taraki tried to persuade Amin to accept the apologies of these members of the government and to consider the matter closed. Amin did not even change his mind when Taraki promised on the telephone to remove all his opponents from their posts and [stated] that he was prepared to let Amin become General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. and Mazduryar. Watanjar and Mazduryar had also been invited. In his report Sarwari stressed that the initiator of the internal struggle in the party was none other than Amin. 82 Editors’ Note: See Odd Arne Westad. The Fall of Détente (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. categorically refused to attend. Amin. pp. He emphasized that during Taraki’s absence an assassination attempt had been made against him. at a meeting on 12 September.” Taraki had evidently decided his position beforehand. the Minister of Communications. Events began to develop rapidly. The people behind it were Gulyabzoi.V. Naturally however. Petrov. he concealed the main subject of their talks. 1978-1979. for an account of these events based on the Russian Foreign Ministry archives. and he listened to a detailed report from Sarwari on the position in the leadership of the DRA. On 13 September they reported: “Following Taraki’s return to Kabul. the head of the security organs.127-130. Amin gave him a report on the situation in the country and the party. On 13 September Taraki invited Amin to continue their conversation about the normalization of the leadership. Amin did not agree. 82 Puzanov.. when he found out that Gulyabzoi. ed.” in Westad. Taraki was met at Kabul airport by the whole Afghan leadership He set about immediately implementing Brezhnev’s instructions. Taraki reported on his meeting with Brezhnev and expressed his deep satisfaction with their conversation.
Pavlovskiy.m. 71 years old in 1979. Moscow time on 13 September we visited Taraki at his residence in the House of the People at the request of the Politburo. Amin in the People's Guard and it. This request was explained by the fact that there were sympathizers of H. On behalf of Taraki. informed the Soviet Representative by telephone that Amin had come to Taraki’s residence where they were holding talks. Tarun. At 9:30 p. Amin declared that he was relinquishing the premiership and becoming minister of defense. At 9:20 p. the Soviet ambassador.m. had led a delegation to Czechoslovakia shortly prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. but Amin refused and declared that all his demands must be met.m. At our request he invited H. could not be fully relied on. collectively. the Chief of the General Armed Forces Staff. a relation of H. the head of the Chancellery of the Revolutionary Council. Pavlovskiy. Amin might order the military units loyal to him to take up arms against Taraki could not be excluded. deputy defense minister and commandant of the Soviet Ground Forces.Amin called to his office Jandad. At the same time we were trying to restrain members of both groups from acting in haste and without thinking. the head of the National Guard. Sarwari. i. Ivanov and Gorelov. therefore. Amin.m. spent all his time in the building of the city committee of the party. Pavlovskiy83 and B.” A telegram addressed to Andropov stated: “Taraki tried again to persuade Amin to come to his residence. Andropov and other members of the [CPSU] Politburo was signed by the group of four—namely Puzanov. otherwise he would take active measures. Gulyabzoi.. He ordered them not to carry out any instructions from Taraki.” The next telegram. on 13 September. Taraki said this was a plot. a deputy foreign minister and secretary of the Kabul city committee of the PDPA.S. It stated that: “At 9:00 p. I. Amin and A. Tarun was told in reply that “within an hour Puzanov. Both groups were trying to enlist our [Soviet] support. on 13 September the situation was critical. Watanjar and Mazduryar came to the Soviet embassy at 7:30 p. Sarwari requested that a group of Soviet comrades be lent to help in the operation to arrest Amin. Amin. For our part we were sticking firmly to the line that the situation in the leadership of the DRA must be normalized along party lines. Ivanov would visit Taraki and Amin. 55 .G. and that he would be in charge of all the armed forces. and Yakub. In 1979. The possibility that H. and the negotiations were broken off. addressed [this time] to Brezhnev. Pavlovskiy. he was head of the Soviet military delegation then visiting Afghanistan. A[sadullah] Amin. All of Amin’s supporters were ordered to remain at their posts and to maintain contact with H. Amin who came in 83 Editors’ Note: Gen.e. Ivan G.
gives up his life before Taraki he will die knowing that he has fulfilled his duty. Amin was honored to be a true follower of Taraki. Brezhnev had spoken to him very convincingly about the necessity of unity in the party and leadership during their conversation in Moscow on 10 September. (He had been in the adjoining room. H. Taraki and Amin were being protected by reinforced units of their personal bodyguards. The ministers who had been in the Soviet embassy from 7:30 p. on 13 September did not spend the night at their own residences as Taraki had suggested they should. Jandad said that the state of alert for the People's Guard which guarded Taraki’s residence had been cancelled in the morning of 14 September. Amin then went to his own residence. as a true follower of Taraki. and it is natural for our Soviet friends and brothers to send us such a message. local time on 14 September. And if Taraki ceases to serve the Motherland. Amin. but the present problems are not so complex. although short message. We support unity. Amin.” “During the ensuing conversation we stressed that the unity of the party and the leadership of the country was the main key to achieving victory over the enemies of the revolution and to building a new life. Even at his meeting with Comrade Gromyko in the spring of 1978 he. H. meaningful and deep. At the time of revolution it is like that.) Taraki and Amin listened carefully to the statement of the Soviet leadership—the Politburo and Comrade Brezhnev personally. then he. I thank the Soviet leadership for its very timely.” “Amin declared that”—the telegram went on to say—“he agreed totally with what had been said. Taraki and Amin were together in the private rooms of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council until 1:00 a. rather 56 .” The night of 13 to 14 September passed quietly in Taraki’s residence. although much could be said about the subject.immediately. We were later told that before our arrival H. Our reply is also short. but sometimes certain questions arise which need to be settled. And if he. They had evidently held a conversation and reached a certain agreement. to 11:55 p.m. Taraki agreed with this and said that Comrade L. H.m. Taraki then asked Comrade Pavlovskiy to tell them about the progress of the military operations. But the men had not been allowed into the city since 13 September. Amin had come to Taraki on his own accord. Amin. Taraki said: ‘This is a very interesting message. according to Jandad [the commander of the People's Guard]. had told the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs that Comrade Taraki was the recognized leader and that H. will do everything to continue the work of his teacher.m.I.
Amin and Taraki discussed the situation and tried to find a compromise. He accused Amin of insubordination and 57 . Taraki was prepared to remove Sarwari and Gulyabzoi.m. Amin wanted Tarun.they hid in covert premises. Taraki telephoned Watanjar and said something to him. Taraki continued to want to appoint two of them. in the morning of 14 September.P. the letter to Taraki and Amin from the Soviet leadership which was given to them by Puzanov. B. Throughout the evening and until 1:00 a. to be a refusal by the Prime Minister to submit to the [PDPA] chairman and that they considered that their lives were in danger. S. The prime minister declared: “On 13 September at 1:30 p. Amin went to Taraki’s residence. They argued as to whom to appoint as head of AGSA. As Jandad said.” Taraki opposed this and proposed that Watanjar should be appointed Minister of Defense and Mazduryar Minister of Internal Affairs. Amin and Taraki discussed on the telephone the situation in the Afghan leadership.m.m. Taraki accused Amin of insubordination and threatened to remove him from all his posts. In the morning of 14 September Amin continued to insist by telephone on the removal of the four. Ivanov and L. However. Amin rejected this proposal and supposedly demanded a plenum of the Central Committee or an emergency meeting of the Revolutionary Council.” At 12:30 on 14 September. Tarun. but he insisted on new appointments for Watanjar and Mazduryar. it can be said that Amin did not resort to extreme actions. Bogdanov paid a visit to Amin in the building of the Ministry of Defense at Amin’s request. Taraki declared that he did not intend to summon the organs and that he would act with the powers with which he was already invested. A[ZIZ] Akhbari. As the events which took place during the night of 13 to 14 September showed. Through the head of the chancellery of the Revolutionary Council. Taraki wanted the head of counter-intelligence. “the visit to Taraki and Amin by their Soviet comrades helped to reduce the tension between the two leaders. Amin learned that Sarwari and others were being sheltered in the Soviet embassy. The conditions of the agreement reached between them are not yet known. In the evening of 13 September. Pavlovskiy and Ivanov played an important role in their reconciliation. Then Amin said to Watanjar on the telephone: “Why have you run away? Are you hiding? And you called yourselves heroes of the revolution?” In reply Watanjar said that all four of them had considered the conversation between Taraki and Amin at 1:30 p. Amin insisted that the ministers should be removed from their posts and sacked for organizing a conspiracy and factional anti-party activities. as he was convinced that the Soviet side would not support any actions which might aggravate the situation in the Afghan leadership and work against the unity of the PDPA.
while giving instructions and orders in the name of Taraki. On the instructions of the prime minister. go to the USSR. a close relation of K. to consult with Moscow.m.Amin.Brezhnev personally. Pavlovskiy. he would be killed. Asadullah Amin. Gorelov and Bogdanov to discuss his three scenarios. Amin.I. indeed. Ivanov. Amin said he was prepared to resign from all his posts. A. Ivanov. Amin insisted that he was absolutely devoted to the USSR and the CPSU and prepared to do what his Soviet comrades wanted. However Amin could keep Taraki isolated in his residence and take further steps to normalize the situation on the advice of his Soviet comrades. In reply to the question whether he could meet with the Soviet comrades. the head of the AGSA [counter-intelligence directorate]. Gorelov and Bogdanov] suggested that Amin should try to normalize the situation in the Afghan leadership and to prevent any further deterioration in accordance with the letter from the Soviet leadership and L. Moscow time.m.m. the Prime Minister of the DRA. by 3:30 p.summoned him. Amin turned to Ivanov and Bogdanov for advice on how to act and put forward the following scenarios for consideration. Aziz Akbari later visited Deputy Foreign Minister Asadullah Amin in order to receive further instructions. At 5:20 p. or even kill himself if his Soviet comrades considered this to be in the interests of the revolution. Amin spoke to Taraki for a long time in the presence of Ivanov and Bogdanov. He had deduced from these words that his life was in real danger. asked Aziz to carry out his duty and not to leave the building of the AGSA without permission. on 14 September. Pavlovskiy. and give him a reply by 5:00 p. For their part [Puzanov. At the same time he suggested that there was a conspiracy by the group of 58 . on the morning of 14 September. that is. He asked Puzanov. Amin let it be understood that he could only be reconciled with Taraki if the chairman of the Revolutionary Council accepted his conditions unconditionally. ordered him [Aziz Akbari] to act as head of the Chief Directorate for the Protection of the Interests of Afghanistan. Amin said that Taraki had demanded that he come to him without any arms or bodyguards. on 14 September the following telegram reached Moscow from the Resident in Kabul: “According to the information our people were given by Aziz Akbari.Amin declared that he must do so. H. Aziz was thoroughly searched and disarmed. If he would go to Taraki’s residence. AGSA. to leave the country and. At the entrance in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
who were accompanying the Prime Minister. The conversation was in strict accordance with the declaration of the Soviet leadership. particularly the morning when he went to the House of the People to meet Taraki and us. if Taraki voluntarily resigned as general secretary. Fakir. the Politburo and L. the deputy minister of Internal Affairs. we were unable to persuade Amin that Taraki should remain General Secretary of the Central Committee. “In the evening of 14 September we had a conversation with Amin which lasted for two and a half hours. As they were going up the stairs to Taraki’s office. and other people close to the Prime Minister were maintaining contact with the provinces from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and issuing orders to the governors. Asadullah Amin. must voluntarily relinquish his post of general secretary at a plenum of the Central Committee. Pavlovskiy. a demonstration would be organized in the country against Taraki. 15 September. Amin spoke strongly against Taraki and accused him of attempting to take his life at various times. Amin let it be understood that. who had resorted to terror and forced true members of the PDPA to take decisive action. Hafizullah had in effect carried out the coup.Watanjar-Golyabzoi. Taraki’s bodyguard killed the chief aide of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. Tarun. A. for reasons of poor health. Akbari also stressed that. then Amin would guarantee his safety and honor and his position as Chairman of the 59 . In spite of our insistence and wellfounded arguments. Amin insisted on his proposal and said that the army and the party would not forgive the blood spilled by the group of ministers and assassination attempts by Taraki. Amin stated that Taraki. Ivanov and Gorelov sent a telegram to the Politburo on 15 September on the situation in Kabul.I. the 4th and 5th tank brigades and the 190th artillery regiment had been arrested.” Amin declared that tomorrow. Brezhnev. He will remain as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council.” Puzanov. On Amin’s orders political workers and commanders of the central corps. and H. We spoke strongly against the removal of Taraki. there could be a massacre of a number of members of the PDPA and also a reshuffle of the staff in the Afghan special organs. People loyal to Amin had been appointed. In the evening new appointments were announced. unless urgent and decisive measures were taken to restrain Amin. Amin’s bodyguard. However.” “By the time of the meeting with Amin. and that the officers will demand revenge.
for the time being at least. and the security organs. Aziz Akbari. Shah Wali went into the office of Pavlovskiy and Gorelov and informed them that Taraki had been removed from all his posts and that Amin had been elected general secretary in his place. my son. I have been true to the party and the people. and Amin was elected in his place. Amin’s people. and Amin agreed that. it appeared. On 13 and 14 September the Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. but the Soviet comrades will evidently not save me as they must consider the reaction of the US. The resolutions had been unanimous. the party. which would aggravate the situation. Puzanov. with 26 of the 31 members present. there would not be any. He informed him of the following in confidence. P168/6. We insisted that there should be no demonstrations or arrests. farewell. local time. from the CPSU Central Committee to visit Amin. finally concentrated in his own hands the leadership of the country. Amin. summoned Bogdanov to an urgent meeting at AGSA.” On 15 September at 9:00 a. If I do not see you again. was one of H. Taraki had said to Akbari: “I am isolated and powerless to take any action. They were to state the view and stress the advice of the Soviet leadership that no repressive measures should be taken against Taraki. Taraki had been deprived of all communications with the outside world.” There was a swift reaction from Moscow. in effect. Pavlovskiy. The General Secretary and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. On 16 September a plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA took place. Ivanov and Gorelov were instructed in resolution No.Revolutionary Council. I can only be saved by the intervention of the Soviet Union. The plenum was held in the building of the ministry of defense in a room next to the office of the Soviet military advisers. had. his relatives and supporters and that he should not be condemned. Prime Minister H. Prior to that. 60 . Taraki was removed from his post as general secretary of the party. During the night of 14 to 15 September. the newly appointed head of the Chief Directorate for the Protection of the Interests of Afghanistan (AGSA). We agreed to continue our talks with Amin in the morning of 15 September. on the afternoon of 14 September. Taraki. was kept under house arrest by troops of the People's Guard under the command of Jandad who. the armed forces. carried out a coup d’état and. dated 15 September 1979.m. As soon as the plenum ended.
Amin. excluding him from the Politburo and the Central Committee. as a sincere follower of Taraki. should die before Taraki. “On 13 September 1979 the Soviet Ambassador I.. Rather.Amin himself then visited Pavlovskiy and announced that he had been elected general secretary. Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Wali summoned Ambassador Puzanov and officially informed him that a resolution had been passed at the plenum of the PDPA Central Committee removing Taraki from the post of Secretary General. Taraki thanked L. then he. although it is also short. will do everything to continue the work of his teacher. “I noticed long ago that Amin has the tendency to concentrate power in his own hands but I did not attach any particular significance to this.” “On 14 September we all met. If Taraki should cease to serve his country. the diary had been written with hindsight. They said that they must close ranks and act together from a position of unity. Gorelov visited Taraki at his residence on instructions from the Center.G. Amin. with Taraki in his residence in the House of the People. D. and banning him from the party for “terrorist activities. ‘The message is timely. . B. wrote in the diary in the ambassador’s name. Amin. in October. Ryurikov.S. It is true that the entry in the diary was not written in the heat of the moment.” 61 . We said that the situation had again deteriorated and that the situation required unity in the leadership of the party and in the state. On 16 September. would be elected chairman of the highest organ of the country. who also acted as interpreter.. later. again. At our request Taraki invited Amin. Brezhnev and the other Soviet leaders for their concern at the fate of the Afghan Revolution.m. B. there would be a meeting of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA at which he. He said that at 3:00 p..” Amin said: “Taraki is the recognized leader and H. but he mentioned his disagreements with Amin. Amin” as well as other crimes. Pavlovskiy. The same events are described in Puzanov’s diary for 19 September. However. Taraki thanked them. by the ambassador’s first secretary. the murder of six people and the attempted murder of H. he will die in the knowledge that he has done his duty. recently this tendency has become dangerous. And if he. Amin had been elected Secretary General.I. Ivanov and L. profound and comprehensive. We support unity. but sometimes matters arise which need to be settled.C. They said that the Soviet leadership hoped that the leaders of Afghanistan would display a great sense of responsibility towards the Revolution. Amin has the honor to be his follower.
“I had doubts before I left for Havana”—continued Taraki. he created such an atmosphere. after the meeting he came to me and demanded that the four ministers. Thorez was a memb er of the Politburo of the Communist Party of France. The clans of Kunaev. Amin understood that the matter was known and he ordered his people to stop their conspiratorial activities. This happens in Western Communist parties too. the head of AGSA. Her other husband. and stressed that the head of state must attend the conference. The wife of M. “Amin had been very insisting that I should go. The son of Andropov was a roving ambassador. and Honecker made his wife a minister. A. When I returned from Havana. Some posts in the Soviet Union are already handed down the generations. A. but he gave both his son and grandson nice little posts.” Kosygin made his son-in-law Gvishiani an academician.M. I brushed aside my doubts and went to Havana. The nomenklatura arranges the education of its children and prepares them for power. Watanjar. It opens special schools. Rashidov and other Central Asian leaders all did very well for themselves. was the editor of Izvestia and really filled the role of a Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Minister. immediately informed me about three conspiracies conceived by Amin. Amin however. Amin. The examples are countless.84 […] A real leader. Dictatorship and personality cults lead to inherited power. One family is ruling the country just as it was in the times of the King and Daud. These conspiracies were averted as every time Sarwari told Amin about them. that ministers are frightened to contradict him and to speak out freely. Within the government. Nepotism is part of the nomenklatura system. Amin gave posts to his relatives everywhere. During the Krushchev thaw the son-in-law of the Party Secretary. was an exception to the saying: “They do not make corporals into generals. His daughter was a Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and his daughter Galina was unrestrained in her acquisition of valuables and sexual laxity. In Luxembourg Urbani father handed power down to Urbani’s son. The Kim Il-Sung dynasty is ruling North Korea. Mao Tse Tung’s wife committed excesses in China. Nevertheless. 84 Author’s Note: Nepotism is the norm in nomenklatura countries. Adzhubei. both in the party and in the government. Her official husband worked in the circus and was a Hero of Socialist Labor. not someone with a club. is needed to lead the party. He is exaggerating his role in the leading and carrying out the Revolution.Amin reacts badly to criticism. held nine posts in various departments in the government and the party. It got to such a point that his nephew. He persecutes anyone who criticizes him and even goes so far as assassination. Amin reported to a meeting of the Council of Ministers that the situation was calm and that all was well. Thus. During Brezhnev’s time his family played an important role in Soviet high society.A.N. kept in the background. refused to go [with me]. He appointed his daughter Director of the Foreign Language Library of the US SR. S. Gromyko. However. 62 . Sarwari. the son of A. Churbanov. such as the one in Kharkov for the children of the regional Party committee only. M. the Ceaucescu’s Romania and the Castro’s Cuba. He is advertising and extolling his own personality. Tupolev became the General Constructor and Yakovlev also handed over to his son. a member of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the State Committee for Economic Ties. Zhivkov’s daughter was the number two in Bulgaria.
Tarun. The other Amin aide. Taraki’s bodyguard came in. was in command of the army. Tarun said that the guards could leave. Such things also happen in democracies. Amin. But this was an exception rather than the rule.” Yesterday. 63 . According to the bodyguard. Comrade L. Taraki immediately agreed with this and telephoned Amin to invite him. Tarun then fired at one of them and was immediately killed by them. Amin’s aide. Gorelov went to the window and saw H. I refused categorically and again called for conciliation. S. I told him that I would not allow repression against my comrades. In such a situation one cannot rule out the possibility of open conflict. Taraki. sub-machine gunfire was heard on the other side of the door to Taraki’s office. The guards said that they would not go. Amin said that he would gladly come. 13 September. A few minutes later. but on the condition that he abandons his policies of repression.N. Taraki said that this was not true. as I. Amin had hatched the conspiracy. As before I am prepared to work with Amin. Amin running alongside the wall of the grounds of the residence. The tone of our conversation was sharp. I said that he was forcing the ministers to hide from his people who were persecuting them. the chief aide of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council—a supporter of Amin—and Vazir. Amin smiled and said that I was mistaken and that he.Sarwari. am the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chairman of the Revolutionary Council. He said that Amin and others had begun to walk up the staircase. Vazir was wounded.Gulyabzoi. Ivanov said that there were persistent rumors that the order had been given to kill Amin as soon as he appeared in the House of the People. In India the Nehru family was in power for decades. Judging by everything.S. Comrade B. since they were no longer needed. As we were waiting for Amin.D. A. Amin is in fact taking the military command into his own hands. Amin again repeated his demands. be arrested or immediately appointed ambassadors and promptly sent out of the country. With the help of his people in the Kabul city party committee he is taking additional measures to establish overall control over the city. To my comment that Amin must obey my orders. Mazduryar and the head of AGSA.D. For our part we [the Soviets] expressed the view that it would be sensible to invite Amin to today's meeting as had been done yesterday. In front were S.
We telephoned Amin from Taraki’s office and said that the four of us would like to visit him immediately. got into cars and left.Taraki then rang Amin and told him that what had happened was the result of a misunderstanding between the guards. The driver of the Soviet ambassador. Taraki agreed. We therefore agreed to meet two-and-a-half hours later at 7:30 p. After he put the receiver down he told us that it was a provocation. A few minutes later shots were heard. followed by my aide Vazir and myself. who was standing by the car at the gates. it was impossible to speak as the telephones kept ringing.” Record of the conversation with the Prime Minister of the DRA. At that moment a single shot from a tank was heard fairly close. Two of the guards remained at the entrance to Taraki’s residence. There were no guards around. in the afternoon. Bending down and keeping close to the wall. The others went with me into the hall with the swimming pool and then towards the staircase. told us that Tarun had gone up and greeted him before Amin’s car had arrived. Amin told us about the incident in the House of the People. I ran down to the hall and out into the grounds. saying that Soviet comrades were with him. Amin was agitated but welcomed [us] warmly. When Tarun got to the landing before the last flight of stairs there was a burst of gunfire. but without my guard. I refused. Amin said that he was waiting and would be pleased to see us. A sub-machine-gun was lying on the floor in front of the stairs. Tarun walked in front. As soon as Amin arrived. had run out. However. It was suggested that under the circumstances we should immediately visit Amin. Accompanied by six bodyguards I went to the House of the People. I then 64 . When we got to the bottom of the stairs we saw Tarun's body lying on the ground. We arrived at the appointed time. on 14 September 1979 Following our meeting with Taraki and the shooting we immediately visited Amin in the Ministry of Defense. We traveled in two cars. one of them wounded. Then. We expressed our deep regret at the tragic incident in the House of the People and our deep sympathy at the death of Tarun whom we had known to be a true friend of the Soviet Union.m. He had several bullets in his head and chest. 'In the morning'—Amin said—‘Taraki invited me to come to him. The guards outside had not fired any shots. Amin and the guards. he rang again and invited me for a talk. the two of them had walked with four or five guards into the grounds in order to go to Taraki. Amin.
which are so difficult for the revolution. A split in the party and the army would be ruinous for the Revolution. The Soviet leaders firmly believe that Taraki must be at the head of the party and the state and that Amin must keep his posts. The commanders obey only me. to the Ministry of Defense but it did not work. it would be imperative to wait a while for feelings to cool down for the higher interest of party and state. Taraki said that as commander-in-chief he was ordering me to appear in the House of the People. 65 . No one will obey his orders. whereas his were. I reaffirmed what I had said to him yesterday. More than a hundred shots have been fired at me before this. one of his people. Today Taraki wanted to kill me. But the point was. which will be held [shortly]. that Taraki’s orders were not carried out at the moment by the armed forces. I am convinced that it was me whom they wanted to kill. I replied that the Minister of Defense has the right to appoint and dismiss officers of the rank of major. as long as it had the help of the Soviet comrades. However. that I was the commander. not he. Amin said. Then Watanjar began to telephone the divisions and tell the commanders that they should prepare themselves to defend the Revolution and Taraki. Yesterday Taraki wanted to send Watanjar. He clearly did not plan to do this in the presence of Soviet comrades. 'I am in command of all the divisions and corps. he telephoned me and said that I do not have the right to do this. We said that we understood the complexity of the situation. When Taraki heard about this.returned to help them carry out Vazir who was wounded. my car would not start and we then got into the other car and went to the Ministry of Defense. The conflict must not be allowed to escalate. The Soviet leaders had asked us in particular to convey to Taraki and Amin that unity was really essential in the present circumstances. Now you can see for yourselves what Taraki wanted. I gave orders for the commanders of the 4th and 15th armored brigades to be dismissed in order to preserve security and prevent an attack by the tank units [against me]. will dismiss Taraki from the posts he held although he [Amin] opposes this. I knew that an attempt on my life was being planned and was ready for this when I met Taraki at the airport on his return from Havana. but he must have forgotten to cancel his orders and his people began to shoot. Amin said that the revolution in Afghanistan could clearly develop without him.’ We again expressed our deep regret at the incident and said that in the present circumstances it was particularly important to be restrained and composed. As though on purpose.’ Amin then said that a plenum of the PDPA Central Committee.
even if he did not agree with it. By quitting voluntarily he will retain a worthy position. fully. Amin said that he considered the Soviet comrades the most responsible people in Afghanistan. The present situation would be resolved in the best party and state spirit. It could cause a crisis. He could foresee what would happen. During the last two days four people have been killed.’ We [the Soviets] said again. The last few days have shaken the party. including my closest comrades-in-arms Navab85 and Stan Gol of AGSA. and despotism and of his exploitation of the PDPA 85 Editors’ Note: Navab Ali. The leaders would overcome their disagreements and work together as before in accordance with the declarations of Taraki and Amin. Amin said that he could try to suggest that Taraki should retain his post as General Secretary. Amin again spoke forcefully against Taraki. He will be cheered with shouts of 'Hoorah!'. He. could not be responsible for the consequences. Everyone knows about the other victims of Taraki’s terror. citing ill health as his reason. deputy director of the AGSA.The existing correlation of forces in the leadership gave Amin sufficient authority and the widest possibilities to work for the good of the revolution. He spoke of his egoism. At the same time he will remain Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA. 66 . My comrades in the army are angry and are demanding revenge for the blood spilled. He has extolled his personality and finally resorted to terror. The army is very set against Taraki and will speak out against him retaining the post of General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. He has not allowed me to chair the meetings of the government. forcefully. Taraki has usurped his power. He will be called a great leader and founder of the party as before. He was prepared to follow any advice from his Soviet friends. but that this would cause a lot of discontent. If Amin removed Taraki he would not be understood. that it was essential to preserve unity in the leadership and between Taraki and Amin. Sur Gol from the Ministry of Health has disappeared without a trace. authoritarianism. however. It is therefore essential that a plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA be held during the next few days at which Taraki must resign as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA. ‘The party knows—said Amin—that I have been shot at a hundred times and that Tarun has been killed.
He. If Taraki were to retain his posts the duplicity would remain and there was a danger of new conflicts. This concern was unselfish and was based on the interests of the Afghan people. of the Soviet ambassador and the Soviet comrades here were important to the PDPA and the country. strengthen it. When asked what should be reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. We spoke against the intended removal of Taraki from the post of Secretary General. to enable the USSR to extend its political support of the DRA and to strengthen co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries. Nevertheless. Taraki. it had been decided that their dismissal and the new appointments would be announced with reference to Taraki as had been done previously. A meeting of the PDPA Politburo had just been held during which it was decided that there should not be two opposing forces within the leadership.m. had ignored them and had done little to put them into action. We said that we considered that this was highly undesirable and ought to be stopped. bearing in mind the views of his Soviet friends. was prepared to do everything in order to release the advice and suggestions of the Soviet leaders. which would have a negative effect on the Revolution. Amin said that he would talk again to his comrades.” [end record] We continued our talks with Amin on 15 September at 11:00 a. on the contrary. of Comrade Ponomarev. once the present situation was normalized. He also said that there would be demonstrations in Kabul against Taraki on 15 September. Amin promised to prevent it. Amin. In conclusion we again spoke firmly about the need to retain unity in the party. Gulyabzoi and Mazduryar and the appointment of new people. however. Amin replied that at the present time his military colleagues were demanding that Taraki should be removed from all his posts. When we reminded Amin that just the 67 . Taraki had created an atmosphere of fear in the leadership of the party and in the state 'I did everything for him and he repaid me with an attempt on my life.’ We mentioned the question of changes in the government. of Comrade Brezhnev personally.for his own personal purposes. Amin said that he fully understood the concern of his Soviet friends about the fate of the revolution. But he was not sure that he would be able to do anything. Amin said that the advice and suggestions of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. We noted that the announcement referred to confirmation of these changes by Taraki. Amin said that Taraki was opposed to the dismissal of these people. Amin declared that the departure of Taraki would not destroy the unity of the party but. the dismissal of Watanjar.
unforeseen consequences. as the whole country knew him as the organizer and leader of the Party and the Revolution.” said Amin. Amin replied that he respected the opinion of the Soviet leadership. However. “We will see whether this will be possible. Ivanov and Gorelov visited Amin and conveyed to him the congratulations of the Soviet leaders on his appointment as General Secretary and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. Enemies could make use of the split in the party and the prevailing doubts. Amin said that Taraki’s residence was under heavy guard and that no one was being allowed to enter. On the orders of the Center. He hoped that the Soviet comrades would understand this correctly. This could lead to a serious feeling of distrust towards the party and the regime.evening before he had said that Taraki would keep the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and now he was saying that Taraki must be removed from all his posts. 16 September. his relations and supporters and that Taraki should not be condemned. ‘It was only when I [Amin] told the comrades that our Soviet friends would support the formula—[that CC PDPA] accept his [Taraki’s] request to stand down from 68 . Soviet Ambassador Pavlovskiy. he said that many comrades in the party and the army were demanding this. We again said that such hasty changes were not sensible. they expressed the opinion and strong advice of the Soviet leadership that no repressive measures should be taken against Taraki. We found out that the telephone lines had been cut. to discuss the matter. They asked what he really meant by these words. still believed that Taraki’s removal of from all posts he held would be the best way to solve the problem.” On 17 September 1979. He. A plenum of the PDPA Central Committee would be held the following day. it was a pity that the Soviet comrades had not been able to attend the plenum of the Central Committee and the meeting of the Revolutionary Council the previous day as they would have seen how difficult it was to convince the members of the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council to stop their demands that Taraki must be punished severely. One must not underestimate the political consequences of Taraki’s removal from the PDPA leadership. Amin promised to discuss the matter again with members of the Politburo and other comrades. Amin. Amin thanked them and expressed his warm greetings and best wishes to the Soviet leaders. The party cannot afford such a shake-up now. There was no way to meet Taraki. The breaking of convictions and ideals was a very difficult and serious matter which could have serious.
We had kept firmly to the line that Taraki must remain General Secretary and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. The Soviet ambassador assured Amin on the telephone that nothing would happen to him if he came to Taraki. Shah Wali. Shah Wali. that is. the same day.his posts because of illness—that the members of the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council agreed unwillingly.m.Amin therefore refused to go to Taraki. Amin managed to get outside. by Amin himself. nothing like this had been said in our talks with Amin. invited the ambassadors of the socialist countries to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Tarun walked in front. but Comrade H. to a meeting of ambassadors of the socialist countries. This was partly seen in the address by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister. did not agree to go to Taraki without a guard although Taraki insisted that he should. On 6 October. Amin. but he 69 . Their home will also be heavily guarded so that an attempt cannot be made on Taraki’s life. however. He said: “On 14 September Taraki asked H. (Of course. Taraki finally agreed that Amin should go to him with a guard.Amin was informed that if he went to Taraki he would be killed. At 5 p. Amin to go to him. Taraki’s guards opened fire and fatally wounded Tarun. There is a possibility of this as the hatred towards him is very strong. He hoped that his Soviet friends would assist him greatly in the field of party co-operation by educating party members in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism so that they would take an irreversible step forward. He was hoping for economic assistance for Afghanistan and that in the military field the Soviet comrades would help achieve new victories over the enemy.” A different view of the events in the House of the People was given by the Afghan side. Taraki again asked H. Behind him were the three guards. Amin arrived accompanied by his guard and three aides. Amin said that he would work very closely with his Soviet friends and that he would take steps to eliminate known faults and to improve the style and methods of his work. H. But as they got close to Taraki’s office.)” Today—Amin continued—Taraki and his family will be taken to their home under heavy guard. He told them that a conspiracy by Taraki had been uncovered.Amin to go to him. when the Soviet ambassador was with Taraki. increase the number of advisers and political workers and strengthen the state security. a member of the Politburo. But Taraki will not be imprisoned.
Amin said: ‘I am sure that it was not like that. There was a telephone call from Taraki. was said because this is what was said openly to the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee. I went with my bodyguard to Taraki on the same day. issue a protest about Shah Wali’s statement and demand a refutation. Of course. Through an interpreter the Soviet ambassador said that H. “In reply to our statement about the provocative statement made by Shah Wali at the meeting of ambassadors from the socialist countries. I said that they wanted to kill me. it is possible to deny this now.was also fired at and he only managed to escape alive through the selflessness and ingenuity of his aides who led him away using the wall as cover. the leader of the military advisers.” ‘You—[Amin] said—are complaining and expressing anxiety. This is how the representative of the KGB described the conversation with Amin in his report to the head of the FCD. It is a pity. What was said by Shah Wali to the ambassadors of the socialist countries.m. met Amin at 6 p.P. Moreover. H. but surely this could have been said before. On 9 October Ambassador Puzanov.S. I am prepared to defer to my Soviet comrades. Amin is firmly convinced that this is what was said. We have talked many times but you have said nothing on these matters before.” Moscow was immediately informed about Shah Wali’s statement.’ “When the Soviet representatives had said what had really happened. We are always ready to follow their advice on matters of diplomacy and international relations. I insisted on the bodyguard as I was aware of the danger. there were Afghan comrades in the room with Amin and they heard me speaking. Gorelov. He said that he expected the Soviet comrades to do the same. Orders were given from there to meet Amin. But our friends said nothing to us and even now you have come three or four days after Shah Wali spoke. There was the telephone call I mentioned. Maybe our Soviet comrades should have told us what to say and how to act. Kryuchkov. And if the comrades 70 . Amin could come to Taraki and that H. Amin said that he would not adhere to protocol but would speak as a comrade and brother. Amin would not be fired at. All this time the Soviet ambassador remained with Taraki in his office. Ivanov and L. Deputy Minister of Defense General Pavlovskiy. You have seen for yourselves that this was not excessive.’ ‘On the morning of 14 September—Amin continued—I described the situation to Comrades B. Bogdanov. and the leader of the KGB representation. Bogdanov.
‘If you so want. On questions of international relations and foreign affairs we are prepared to accept their advice about what should be said and what should not be said. although this story is extremely important. I greatly respect my Soviet comrades. Amin said: ‘So I should summon my comrades and tell them that everything they have heard is not what actually happened? Of course. this is my firm conviction. then I will die with a clear conscience as I did everything according to my convictions. There may be mistakes and misunderstanding. As far as what happened is concerned I do not feel any guilt.’ continued Amin. Can I be mistaken? Can my mistake cause damage to the world communist movement? And if the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee thinks so. In any case. If the interpreter cannot confirm this now. but at the same time I respect the convictions of my Soviet comrades. I said only what I felt and believed. if you so want. although I did tell them what really happened. Shah Wali is not guilty of anything.who were with Taraki do not remember. But if I am destined to die. H. resign as General Secretary and let another person be chosen. Amin by Taraki and the failure of this attempt which have been distributed to the army and the party? The pamphlets set out the facts in the same way. I am prepared to do this but will it be the right thing? Would it be right to recall the pamphlets The attempt on the life of H.’ “‘I was probably mistaken to report this story to the Politburo and the Central Committee of the PDPA.’ When the Soviet representatives insisted that an accurate picture of what had happened must be given. And I respect their understanding of events and their conviction. then I will accept their advice and do everything that my Soviet comrades want. you 71 . I can call a plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA. then the interpreter must remember as it was with him that I spoke on the telephone before the incident. This would cause harm to me as General Secretary and harm to the whole party. We do not see any difficulties in this. then he will certainly tell you when you get to the embassy and remind you what happened. We sense that the Soviet leaders are worried. If my account of the events to the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee and to the Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee was a mistake. I suggest that. We value our Soviet friends. If my Soviet comrades so wish. My Soviet comrades have a different point of view. And I repeat that Shah Wali has nothing to do with it. then the blame lies all with me as I set out the events in accordance with my convictions. I am sure that my convictions are correct. ‘we will not say anything else to anyone about this. This should not have been done.
But if necessary. However. to broaden the discussion and for the Afghan side to make some kind of retraction. But if we were to begin with a retraction. Amin said that he would like to apologize if Shah Wali gave the wrong date. to commit suicide. In the party they will ask what kind of a general I am if I deceive them. And my Soviet friends would hardly want me to renounce what I believe in. I will not abandon my beliefs.’ Amin said that he did not think it worthwhile to make a fuss about the statement by Shah Wali. this would be received badly by the Central Committee of the PDPA and the whole country. Amin. Amin did not inform the Soviet representatives of the death of Taraki although the official announcement had already been transmitted by the Afghan news agency Bakhtar with a note 'not to be used until 8 p. It should be noted that during the talks H. 14 September instead of 13 September. Gulyabzoi. Amin’s. And what's more. There should be no worries about the friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet and Afghan peoples and the communist parties of the two countries. Watanjar. In order to get rid of my convictions I would have to vanish.can make known your point of view and refute our statements regarding the time spent in the Soviet embassy by the four ministers.m. When the Soviet representatives said that the announcement by Shah Wali could be used by the enemies of Soviet-Afghan friendship Amin declared: ‘Don't be afraid! Let the people from Washington come and see for themselves that they cannot harm our friendship. it would be good if the Soviet leaders were informed of his. And if there were any questions. has no complaints on this point.’ 72 .’ In conclusion Amin said that he was prepared to do what the Soviet leaders wanted. I am prepared to submit and to act against my convictions although this will mean acting against my conscience. even if this were against his wishes. It would be better for them to give their own version to the ambassadors of the socialist countries. he will tell you everything. you should say: ‘Ask Amin. They would say that the retraction had been made under pressure from the Soviets. If it were retracted. and that he. Mazduryar and Sarwari. point of view and based their decisions on this. We would not make any objections. then it could lead anywhere.’ ‘For our part we will stick to our statements to the press.’ H. I give my word that we are marching towards communism. on 9 October of this year. Our enemies are upset as they have no hope. This would not be the communist way.
It is difficult to understand how such a liar and tactless person has been ambassador here for so long. I do not wish to meet him or talk to him. Amin again related his misadventures on that memorable day. Puzanov was replaced by Tabeev. then I cannot stop myself from saying everything I think about this person. He sometimes contained his fury with difficulty. I find it unpleasant that the Soviet ambassador (at this point Amin swore volubly) tries to depict the events of September 14 in a different light and asks me to confirm this untruth. I am very angry at Puzanov’s conduct in the whole affair. But when Ambassador Puzanov lied to me directly and tried to convince me that he did not invite me through the interpreter to come to him when he was with Taraki and the Generals Pavlovskiy. 73 . Gorelov and Ivanov. This is why I asked Doctor Shah Wali. This is what happened.” said Amin.During the talks H. At the same time there were moments when he appeared to collect his thoughts and gave the impression that he did not want to spoil his relations completely. member of the CPSU CC. all the details of the organized plot and the attempt on my life. “that it would have been possible and was necessary to make known certain details of the organized conspiracy and attempt on my life without causing harm to the prestige of the Soviet Union for the sake of our friendship which is our main goal. Amin was brash and provocative. He spoke angrily about Puzanov using unprintable language. 86 Editors’ Note: Fikryat Tabeev.’” It is possible that Amin reckoned that the ears and eyes of the KGB would take note of his sharp criticism of Puzanov as well as his general displeasure. who does not know the details of the attempt on my life. I shall never do this. 86 the First Secretary of the Regional Party Committee of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. They would report this to Moscow which would draw the correct conclusions. Comrade Brezhnev is the only person to whom I can explain in more detail the reasons for my disagreement with Taraki. “I understand. The talks lasted for about two hours.” On 13 October a report was made known by those close to Amin which recounted in detail the events of 14 September. ambassador since December 1979. to invite the ambassadors from the socialist countries and tell them just a few details of the attack. He interrupted the Soviet representatives and did not give them a chance to state their point of view calmly.
said that he would speak in a comradely and brotherly way without protocol and that he expected the Soviet comrades to do the same. when he was with Taraki on 14 September. Amin must understand that the statements by Shah Wali which distort the truth are not only in contradiction to the spirit of comradely relations between our parties and countries. But it is well known that the Soviet ambassador did not speak to Amin on the telephone from the residence of Taraki. but the Soviet side said nothing on these matters. We insist that authoritative Afghan representatives immediately explain to the ambassadors of the socialist countries the true course of events and correct the false impression which must have been given by the utterances of Shah Wali. had given to the politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA. 'The Soviet comrades are making complaints and expressing their concerns. but surely they could have done this sooner. which cast a shadow on the Soviet representatives in Kabul.Here is an excerpt from the diary of Puzanov.B. Likewise Shah Wali gave a false account of the time spent in the Soviet embassy by the four former ministers. when he had listened to this. dated 17 October. Gorelov and Bogdanov visited Amin on the instructions of the Center. on this subject.” 74 . Pavlovskiy. guaranteed Amin’s safety during his meeting with Taraki and the Soviet representatives when he spoke to H. “On 9 October 1979 the Soviet Ambassador. We met and talked a number of times. Amin. had made pronouncements during his meeting with the ambassadors of the socialist countries in Kabul. Rurikov. Amin. It was suggested that the Soviet ambassador. 'It is a pity 87 Editors’ Note: Corrected from “Democratic. They actually went to the Soviet embassy on 13 September. It was written by D. Shah Wali. It was made known that Moscow was very displeased by the fact that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA. including the ambassadors of Yugoslavia and the People’s87 Republic of China. not 14 September. when almost nothing was known about the discord within the leadership of the PDPA. but they will inevitably be used by the adversary to harm the cause of the Afghan Revolution and can be used by our enemies to discredit Soviet-Afghan relations. the interpreter.’ Shah Wali had spoken thus to the ambassadors of the socialist countries because this was precisely the information that he. Amin on the telephone. But the Soviet comrades had said nothing before and had now come only three or four days after Shah Wali had spoken.
I am absolutely sure that this is what was said. The Soviet ambassador had spoken to Amin through an interpreter immediately after the incident when the Soviet representatives decided to visit Amin immediately as they considered it necessary to speak to him personally in order to avoid any misunderstanding. But the distortions expressed by Shah Wali must be corrected. ‘I am sure that it was not like that. it is possible to deny this now. We said that we understood that it was quite possible for events to become muddled in one's mind as a result of a nervous shock. Of course. I am prepared to defer to the Soviet comrades. Ivanov.’ Pavlovskiy said that everyone who was with Taraki on 14 September was here now apart from B. Moreover. You saw for yourselves that my precautions were not excessive.that this is what happened. And if the comrades who were with Taraki do not remember. Amin could come to Taraki and that they would not shoot at H. We are always prepared to accept their advice on matters of diplomacy and international relations. We again confirmed that there had been no telephone call from the Soviet ambassador prior to the incident. It is possible that the Soviet comrades should have told us what to say and how to act.S. I went to Taraki with my guards.’ We stressed that there had been no telephone call from us prior to the incident in Taraki’s residence. then he is sure to remember when he returns to the embassy and he will tell you what happened. In any case. I insisted on this as I sensed the danger. ‘In any case. I am convinced that the telephone conversation took place. ‘During the morning of 14 September. Maybe my mistake will cause damage to the world communist movement? If the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee so wants. this is what I firmly believe. Before the incident on 14 September I received a telephone call from Taraki. If the interpreter does not confirm this here now.’ They again outlined the course of events. then the interpreter must remember as it was with him that I spoke before the incident. Through an interpreter the Soviet ambassador said that H. my impression of what happened is this. Amin. 75 .’ Amin continued. Afghan comrades were with me in the room and they heard what I said. ‘I described the situation to Comrades Ivanov and Bogdanov. then I will accept its advice and do everything that the Soviet comrades want.’ said Amin. Perhaps I am wrong. I said that they wanted to kill me.
The enemies are worried because they have no hope. We highly regard our Soviet friends and are prepared to accept their advice on what to say and what not to say on questions of international policy and foreign affairs.’ To our insistence that a correct account of what happened must be given Amin said: ‘Do you want me to call my comrades together and tell them that everything that they heard does not correspond to what happened? I deeply respect the Soviet comrades and am prepared to do what they say. ‘The mistake. He had informed the ambassadors of the socialist countries of what he had heard of the events at the politburo and the Central Committee of the PDPA and the politburo and the Central Committee had been informed thus by Amin.’ said Amin. But would this be right?’ They again demanded that Shah Wali’s distortion of the facts should be corrected. then the blame is all mine as I described events as I believed them to be.Amin said that Shah Wali was not to blame. ‘have no reason to be afraid. They can choose someone else. There should be no concern regarding the friendship and brotherhood of the two countries. And I repeat that Shah Wali has nothing to do with it. Concerning what happened. The Soviet comrades hold a different point of view. I can summon a plenum of the Central Committee and resign as General Secretary. They said that there were already talk and comment on Shah Wali’s statement in the diplomatic corps. ‘was probably that I reported this story to the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee. But if I am sentenced to die. I should not have done this although I reported what had happened.” “‘If my report to the politburo and the Central Committee of the PDPA was a mistake. 76 . I repeat that I do not feel any guilt. I spoke only of what I went through and of what I am convinced. Let the people from Washington come and see for themselves that they cannot harm our friendship.’ said Amin. then I will die with a clear conscience as I have acted in accordance with my convictions. ‘The Soviet comrades. Information which is undesirable and does not conform to actuality could reach Western journalists who would not lose the opportunity to use it for their own aims. I give my word that we are following the path to communism step by step.’ They again repeated that Shah Wali had distorted the facts and that this must be corrected. If the Soviet comrades so wish. I respect their interpretation of the events and their beliefs. the Soviet and Afghan peoples and the communist parties of the two countries.
Shah Wali. you know. Amin was in an agitated state and spoke with a raised voice throughout the conversation on the message from the Center. It is arranged through an agreed signal to solve urgent matters which have suddenly arisen.’” On 29 October the Residency reported that Amin had shown noticeable concern at the reaction of the leadership of the USSR to the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As we parted. A Representational residence is a residence in the targeted country which is rented by the intelligence service with operational funds for a member of the legal Residency. A distorted account of the role of the Soviet representatives in these events was also contained in a restricted document in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA. We again insisted that corrections should be made. At a meeting with Soviet KGB representatives on 15 October Amin said that he was under the impression that “the Soviet leaders are offended with me because of the nature of my conversation on 9 October with the Soviet Ambassador Puzanov.Amin suggested that the Soviets should make the refutation themselves and said that the Afghans would not object. the Residency noted that Amin would for a time maintain a cordial attitude towards the USSR and the CPSU.88 He was the Third Secretary in the embassy. Gulyabzoy. What happened to the four ministers? At 8:00 a. The residence is chosen as suitable for someone 77 .] Samunin (codename 'Macloy') was summoned to an emergency meeting. he said: ‘Maybe I have been speaking too loudly and too quickly during our conversation but. I was brought up in the mountains and that is how we speak in the mountains. Pavlovskiy.m.’ Amin was told in reply that the Soviet leadership could not let pass such a serious fact as the attempts in the address by Shah Wali to cast a shadow on the role of the USSR and to connect somehow the Soviet side with the events in the House of the People on 14 September. on 14 September the operative [Valeri I. but that he was also actively propounding his theory about the equal responsibility of Afghan officials and Soviet advisers for the situation in the country. Amin said that the matter would be raised at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee and that he would report on the results. to the ambassadors of the socialist countries. 88 Author’s Note: An emergency meeting is a meeting between an intelligence officer and an agent at the request of one or the other. Gorelov and Bogdanov when I defended Shah Wali and put all the blame on myself.” Citing Afghan sources.
700 meters from the Soviet embassy. Ivanov and Gorelov. Their moustaches were shaved off and they were dressed in the uniform of the unit. At 2:30 p. in order to test Amin.m.” wrote the Residency. Then Sarwari. Ivanov and Gorelov were involved in an attempt to lure him into a trap. Amin said that it had been decided to dismiss these ministers as conspirators. Pavlovskiy.] A complete list of the PDPA military organization. He added that Mazduyar was at home. Mazduryar and Sarwari. They were housed in a separate room on the upper floor of the villa. At 11 a. 78 . Cover in the intelligence service is the official (legal) job held by the intelligence officer or illegal agent. there was a brief telephone conversation between Watanjar and Taraki. Gulyabzoi ('Mamad') knew about this house as he had attended meetings here from 1973 to 1975.Watanjar and Sarwari declared that Amin wanted to kill them and asked that the Soviet ambassador and B. in conversation with Puzanov. On 14 September. Gulyabzoi. It conceals the fact that he belongs to the intelligence service and hides his intelligence work. Pavlovskiy. Sarwari noted that many secret members of the PDPA who belonged to the military and had been introduced to Amin as people prepared to take part in the revolution were either victims of repression or removed from their posts by Daud’s regime. Daud. [9 lines excised.m. It is the position. The KGB Representation was instructed to deny any knowledge of the whereabouts of these people and elaborate measures were taken to keep secret the fact that three of the ministers were in the villa. the three ministers arrived by car secretly at Samunin’s official residence. together with the later disappearance of three of them is causing great concern to Amin. On the orders of Ivanov and with the agreement of the ambassador they were secretly transferred to the base of the special ‘Zenith’ unit. had been found amongst the papers of M. Their appearance was altered. Ivanov (codename 'Zorin') should be informed of this. They opened the gates. The terrorist act was the work of Taraki together with the gang of four and some of these four were being hidden by the Soviets. Amin asserted that Puzanov. He also uses it for operational purposes with the necessary precautions. Puzanov categorically denied this. drove into the garden and hid the car in the garage.S. had introduced to him as active communists and of his cover position and he lives there with his family. but that the remaining three were perhaps hiding in the Soviet Embassy. organization or enterprise where he works abroad. “The visit to the Soviet embassy on 13 September by Watanjar. institution. which was known only to Amin and Taraki.
An agent of AGSA. who was killed during an attempt on the life of Sarwari. [One line excised. Sarwari had informed Taraki of this in writing. Amin had made Sarwari give him and his nephew. Sarwari explained to Amin that the murder of these activists could lead to undesirable consequences in the party and that it would be better to remove them by accusing them of secret contacts with the leader of the Setami Melli nationalist organization. part of the money from the sale of property confiscated by AGSA from people who had been arrested and their families. Assadullah Amin. Sarwari and Amin were the only people who knew about the planned arrest of the group. For example.revolutionaries members of the Parcham military organization. a supporter of Amin. This postponed their execution. Soon afterwards these people were arrested. 90 also went to Amin. A shop was opened in Kabul to sell this property and the proceeds went to Amin. Misaq. Sarwari was convinced that Amin had organized the group and that he had managed to warn the terrorists about their impending arrest. eight hundred Russian Nikolaev gold coins and twelve boxes of women's jewelry. one of the Mujahideen groups. An agent found out about this and the terrorist act was prevented.89 He was under arrest and under pressure would give evidence about the contacts of D. Four million Afghani. [Tahir] Badakhshi. taken from members of the family of the well-known member of the clergy. Mojaddedi. 79 . 650 American dollars had been found in the pocket of Navab. 90 Editors’ Note: Sibghatullah Mojaddedi. Panjshiri and H. When Sarwari reported this to Amin. Executed 17 September 1979. the latter ordered the terrorists to be arrested but not one of them could be found. later founded the National Liberation Front of Afghanistan. the police and other officials. members of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee.] In the summer of 1979 Amin had discussed with Sarwari the organization of a terrorist act against Panjshiri and H. Amin had spoken to the head of the technical radar service of the anti-aircraft defense force and agreed with him that he should arrange for the plane carrying Taraki to be shot down by anti-aircraft guns. prominent Muslim cleric. Amin used this money to bribe commanders of military units. Misaq with this organization. On the eve of Taraki’s flight from Havana to Afghanistan. Amin 89 Editors’ Note: Founding member of the PDPA. Altogether Sarwari handed over to him 300 million Afghani. Left party in 1968 because of perceived Pushtu dominance. On 4 September AGSA uncovered five people who were planning an attempt on the life of Taraki.
way of wearing clothes.” Operation 'Raduga' [Rainbow] was devised to take the three ministers illegally out of Afghanistan to the USSR. terrorist. It covers their sex.800.91 The Representation and the KGB Residency in Kabul added their own comments to the effect that “the material from Sarwari. Gromyko. Andropov.000 Afghani to Hamse.000 Afghani given by the USSR to the Afghan security organs.800. The information from the ministers was sent right to the top of the Kremlin. and 25. This was the first time such information had been obtained and that it needed to be carefully verified. to Brezhnev.gave 40.92 91 Editors’ Note: Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko. face and eyes. hats and 80 . the commander of the air force. All three ministers depicted Amin as an American spy. When talking freely to those close to him. 92 Author’s Note: A written portrait is a description along defined lines of a person's appearance. functional peculiarities such as habits.000 Afghani to Muhammad Nazar. [Approximately 2 lines excised. as these people could not show any firm evidence or documentary proof. nationality or race. way of walking. He used the propaganda arsenal and the lexicon of the Americans. gesticulations. height. body built and anatomic details such as shape of head. age.] All three men were agitated and angry with Amin. provocateur. usual pose. the commander of the transport regiment. This would be difficult. full member of the CPSU Central Committee from 1971 and of the Politburo from 1977. In June 1979 his son went secretly to Japan and took with him 128 kilograms of valuables belonging to the king and to Daud. Every time that the USSR turned down a request by Taraki for Soviet troops to be sent to Afghanistan. Suslov. Amin did not conceal his joy from his closest companions as he understood that the arrival of Soviet troops would hinder his plans to seize power. only 25. In Japan his son met high-ranking Americans and Japanese. Of the 55. A detailed description of the fugitives was given to Moscow so that written portraits could be prepared. Valuables from the palaces of King Zahir Shah and Daud also landed in the hands of Amin and his relations. This involved a cover story about rotating personnel from the ‘Zenith’ unit which protected Soviet buildings. Amin always spoke arrogantly and ironically about the USSR and its leaders. The remaining 30 million were deposited into Amin’s personal bank account. adventurist and plunderer. voice. Ustinov and Chernenko. General Secretary from February 1984 until his death in 1985.000 Afghani were used. Watanjar and Gulyabzoi had not been known previously.
the police and voluntary policemen. Bakhturin and B. The plan for Operation ‘Raduga’ was as follows. was to be involved when necessary. household articles and sports equipment. KPPs are set up at road junctions and at approaches and exits to built-up areas.Glotov. When the plane was unloaded. from the 7th Directorate of the KGB. an interpreter. They are manned by members of the state security service. 3 wigs.On 18 September ten members of the unit flew from Moscow to the air base at Bagram in an Il-76. It covers their clothes and describes the type.I. Kabanov. briefcase and walking stick. who were to be used 'unconsciously' to guard and conduct the ‘Raduga’ party from Kabul to Bagram. L. the embassy bus driven by a Residency operational driver and a GAZ-69 lorry.D. Written portraits are essential for surveillance operations and for searching for and recognizing a person. and lists the articles they carry such as umbrella. colors and condition. They were to be assisted by four members of the Kabul ‘Zenith’ unit under the command of the commander of the unit. It notes any peculiarities such as scars. before the arrival of the plane. 1. Part of the load was sent as diplomatic baggage. Ivanov and Dadykin would see the vehicles through the Bagram checkpoint. It is used to alter the appearance of individuals with different clothes and footwear. Ivanov. hats and luggage. 81 . One of the lorries carried special containers. Zorin. a specialist on documents. The plane carried two covered lorries. Talybov.I Dadykin. led by Kabanov.N. the army. N. 93 Author’s Note: A control checkpoint. An operational group was established by the KGB Residency and Representation consisting of S. various criminals and suspicious types with the aim of detaining them by checking their papers. Ivanov and A. Yu. a make-up artist with the necessary accessories hurriedly brought in from Berlin. products and equipment for doing hair and creams and liquids for changing the color of hair from black to auburn. B. An operational wardrobe is a collection of material and technical items used to disguise members of the intelligence service and agents when they are engaged in an operation. warts and tattoos. who were informed of the nature of Operation ‘Raduga’. all made abroad. M. V.S. 60 kilometers from Kabul. the leader of the group.A. The car carrying the ‘Zenith’ group baggage would unload at the villa and then ‘Raduga’ would be loaded. Various tools and instruments are given to members so that they can appear as workmen in organizations. The people and lorry would be unloaded from the plane. N. There would be a car. the vehicles would set off for Kabul. Bogdanov was directly responsible for running the operation and the leader of the operation.S. Prior footwear. enterprises and the service industries. The operational group would travel to Bagram. S. Also on the plane was an operational group from Directorate S of the FCD: V. is a checkpoint erected on routes thought to be used by agents of the intelligence services of the capitalist countries.93 2. Adrianov. which are used to equip illegals sent to work abroad.P. and two officers from the KGB Representation. Surkov. The wardrobe of the intelligence service contains specially chosen outfits for men and women.G. birthmarks. KPP. light-brown and chestnut. An AN-12 accompanied the plane from Fergana to Bagram.
In view of Sarwari’s appearance. Surkov did a rehearsal with a soldier from the ‘Zenith’ unit. 82 . The ‘Raduga’ container and the disguised luggage would be put into the car. It was equipped with four small mountain rescue oxygen tanks sufficient for six hours.94 The guests were housed in a two-story detached house surrounded by a high fence in Lunacharsky Street which belonged to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. Ivanov and Chepurnoy. The ministers were flown to Tashkent.G. The Soviet embassy had earlier requested the Afghan commander of the airbase through the military adviser to co-operate in allowing onto the base people leaving for the Union at the end of their tour of duty and their luggage. A. Samudin and the drivers Karpov and Tikhonov from the Residency took part in the second stage of the operation. The operational officers were provided with accreditation from the Prime Minister of the DRA and diplomatic passes. S.A. Many people were awarded honors and congratulated by the Chairman of the KGB for their role in the operation. Osadchy. followed by the lorry with ‘Raduga.’ the bus carrying the departing soldiers from the unit and the GAZ-69 with a cover party would set off for Bagram along a route planned to avoid the heavily guarded central part of Kabul. 3. Then the convoy led by Kabanov’s car. Kabanov. Between Kabul and the first control point a car carrying the Soviet military adviser at the Bagram airbase would join the convoy to ensure that the cars passed unhindered through the control points on the route. The members of the ‘Zenith’ group who were leaving would then board the plane. B.N. Surkov. Dadykin. Chuchukin. Watanjar and Sarwari and give them the required appearance. Bakhturin. The car containing ‘Raduga’ would be put on the plane without being unloaded. 4.to this the make-up artist would do the necessary work on Gulyabzoi. Unavailable parts were obtained by the Center.N. Bakhturin and Dadykin were in charge of the convoy as it passed the Bagram checkpoint and drove across the aerodrome to the plane. A timetable down to the last minute was drawn up for the route. The ‘Zenith’ soldiers would carry Soviet passports with exit-entrance visas. After intense preparation and measures to distract attention Operation ‘Raduga’ was carried out on 19 September. Bogdanov was in charge of the operation. They were awarded and congratulated by the Chairman of the KGB for their part in the affair. a container was prepared for him by the Residency with all essential equipment. Before the actual loading of ‘Raduga’ into the lorry. Gulyabzoi and Watanjar were documented as soldiers from the Zenith unit and given Soviet passports. 94 Author’s Note: The following members of the KGB Representation took part in the operation: V.
Y. excluding expenditure of the KGB Representation.600 in 1979 and 126.I. Lines N 83 . On 19 September the deputy head of the 8th Department of the FCD. The Residency believed that Sarwari had taken this money from AGSA funds. L. who had worked with the ministers during a posting in Kabul. was sent to Sofia to arrange with the Bulgarians for temporary refuge to be given clandestinely to the Afghans. and an operational officer from the 3rd Department of Directorate K. flew to Tashkent to interview them. Kukhta.L.600 hard currency rubles in 1978. The money remained without an owner.220. Colonel I.950 American dollars were found when Sarwari’s car. Captain Y. The replies to possible questions from the Bulgarians proved unnecessary. On 25 September the deputy head of the FCD. All three refused the money and said that it was not theirs. and his deputy. 4. On 14 October the former ministers flew on TU-134 A from Tashkent to Sofia accompanied by Yershov and Kukhta. Incidentally. the KGB representative in Sofia.The building was equipped with listening devices which were used from 19 September to 14 October. On 27 September Medyanik. Medyanik. If the Bulgarians were to ask why the Afghans could not remain in the USSR. 115.P. the expenses of the Kabul Residency were 111.000 Afghanis and 53. Ershov. Ninety-two tapes of conversations were recorded.000 in 1980. The saying is true that one does not accuse oneself and that it is the thief who shouts ‘Stop thief!’ The dollars were sent to Moscow and the Afghanis incorporated in the Residency’s expenditures for 1979. was searched. If they were to raise the question of expenses on their upkeep.T. he was to refer to the special relationship between the Soviets and Afghans. used by the ministers to flee to the KGB clandestine residence in Kabul. Savchenko. P. To conclude this story we will mention the following.I. The men from Kabul were given a specially equipped villa about a hundred kilometers from Varna in the area of Shumen. The Bulgarians did not ask any questions. Pastukhov had a meeting and discussion [with the Bulgarians—names and four lines excised]. he was to say that the Soviets were ready to take all expenses on themselves.
Travelling expenses 3. 4. In June 1979 this was increased to 5 million Afghani. Government expenditure 4. some from necessity.350 hard currency rubles in Belgrade. said that they had been passed-over and that their energetic participation in the events of 13 September to 16 September had not been duly appreciated by Amin. The cost of feeding and clothing the Zenit group on army standards was 1 million hard currency rubles. 14. and 2 million Afghani. But in the higher and middle echelons of the regime dissatisfaction with Amin became apparent. Money allocated: a) salaries b) shortfall in currency exchanges c) supplements d) bonuses and rewards 2.800 hard currency rubles. and some from indecision. the Revolutionary Council and the government were firm supporters of Amin. In the Revolutionary Council there were twenty-two members who supported Amin. the secretaries of the Central Committee.95 THE DECEMBER COUP The failure to remove Amin sorely hurt the pride of the Kremlin elders and the KGB. In 1978 the monthly expenditure on operators was: 1.254 hard currency rubles in Brasilia. respectively. These are for workers who do not have the cover of an organization. some from conviction. 95 In 1978 the Residency and the Representation were allocated an additional 1 million Afghani. For example. 4. Operational expenses: a) payments to agents b) the upkeep of safe houses c) running expenses of safe houses and meeting places d) furnishings and equipment e) operational expenses f) legalization and the organization of cover g) the purchase and maintenance of operational technical equipment h) the running costs of cars i) the purchase and upkeep of clothes j) wages to teachers k) the purchase of foreign literature and stationery. and 43. and six who were enemies. The Residency considered that the majority of the members of the Politburo.720.510 X 4 = 310.040 yen or 30. 4. 2.480 yen a year in Tokyo. The budget is the operational expenses of the Residency in hard currency. The attitude of the remaining six members was not known.900 hard currency rubles. 29. Their costs are therefore not included under 'salaries'. An example is the salaries of radio interceptors. the 16th and 19th Departments and the purchase of new cars and the replacement of old cars. The character of Amin did not fit into the usual mould of a leader of a friendly country. Operative workers receive a salary from the organization which they are representing abroad. The expenses were allocated on the following lines: 1. People expressed their grievances. 77.195 US dollars in Reykjavik. six who vacillated or went along. seven who were opponents.800 US dollars in Mexico City. They feared an unexpected turn of events.900 hard currency roubles in London.095 hard currency rubles plus a shortfall 84 .and NTR. Every Residency has a service for intercepting conversations on international and local radio lines.
was dismissed from his post and voiced aloud his annoyance that he was not elected to the Central Committee plenum. It appeared later that he was an agent of Amin to whom he recounted everything that was said at the meetings. 85 . In October the arrival at Kabul airport of a passenger DC-10. Amin tried to get rid of Taraki as quickly as possible and to avoid the possibility of unwelcome actions by his opponents.010 hard currency rubles a month was spent on the four stationary posts of the radio interceptor 'Probe' and the two mobile posts in cars. This allowed him to gain time to strengthen his position and deal covertly with those who stood in his way. Aziz [Ahmad Akhbari]. Major Ali Shah Paiman. The members of his entourage closest to him were persuading Amin to adopt a reasonable attitude towards the USA and the [other] Western countries. The deputy head of the Directorate of Counter-Intelligence (Kam). In his actions during the September days Amin used the prevailing situation in the country in quite a masterly way to deal quickly a crushing blow to his opponents and remove Taraki from the political arena. The key positions were given to people who were personally devoted to Amin.one of those thus displeased was the commander of the Ministry of Internal Affairs units. Amin tried to create an atmosphere of openness. which had been purchased from the American Ariana company. Amin instructed the Afghan mass media to reduce the sharp tone of its publications and pronouncements against imperialism and Pakistan. At his meetings with Soviet representatives. was given wide and enthusiastic coverage. Taking into account the position of the Soviets towards Taraki and his supporters. He expressed his willingness to follow all their suggestions and wishes. He took various steps to ascertain the true attitude of the Soviet leadership towards himself. a nephew of Asadullah Sarwari. Nurach Ruin. attended the open and closed gatherings of the opponents of Amin. The Residency and the KGB representation claimed that Amin had given a false interpretation of the Soviet position at the Special Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee and the emergency meeting of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA on 16 September. He had made it appear that the Soviet side would not object to the dismissal of Taraki from his posts on the grounds of “the state of his in the exchange rate of 3. A campaign was organized to compromise Taraki and his supporters as enemies of the Revolution and accomplices of imperialism.900 hard currency rubles in New York. 61.
threats and blackmail.health. rockets and tanks. The agent operational situation following Amin’s rise to power was characterized by the following points: 1. There were signs of anti-Sovietism and an increase in the American presence. Those holding supreme power had aged and grown decrepit. The gathering. expressed his displeasure at the fact that the USSR was giving the DRA less material and military aid than it had given to Cuba and Vietnam although Afghanistan was its immediate neighbor and had a common border. 3. all the Pushtun are descended from King Abdurashid who was a descendent of the biblical King Saul. There was a general growth in anti-Soviet incidents. 86 . According to this.96 Amin was told to think seriously about the future of the clan and to concern himself with its safety and wellbeing. Gurgusht. circulation and analysis of compromising material on Soviet citizens. The political targeting of Soviet citizens on the personal orders of Amin and gradual pressure on Soviet specialists with a view to using them to transmit slanted information to Moscow through unofficial channels bypassing the embassy and leadership of other departments. Afghans do not need the beggarly Russian socialism and Russian politics. He was to stop playing with the party and in future to appoint to the top government posts only his own relations. The Afghans began to say openly that after the 1978 Revolution Afghanistan would have managed perfectly “without Russian machine-guns. The Pushtun have passed down their proud genealogy from generation to generation. The head of the Worker's Counter-Intelligence. 4.” The degree of openness and trust shown by the officers in their talks with the advisers was noticeably less than before. He was not eternal and when he was gone 96 Author’s Note: The Amin clan is Pushtun. Sarbaniys. This task was given to the organs of Kam and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.” 2. 1 line excised. The Pushtuns are divided into four large groups. He said that the Soviet leadership did not always understand the political situation in the world correctly and accurately. Asadullah Amin. Covert searches and surveillance of Soviet citizens. All the 405 Pushtun clans or tribes are descended from the sons of Abdurashid and their descendants. He condemned the fact that the USSR was gradually and steadily ceding one position after another in the international arena to world imperialism. Kerlarniy and Gilzai. [Approx.] At the same time the Center was informed that a meeting of members of the Amin clan was held in October in the town of Pachman. The Residency drew up this list in October. King Abdurashid was converted to Islam by the Prophet Muhammad.
“These models are unacceptable to Afghanistan. Planes and tanks have destroyed and are destroying villages where simple workers live. When the uprising against Amin takes place. “the Afghan army is fighting against the people. then he would not be able to give orders to kill people. but the Afghan kings ruled the country for centuries without a party. of course. The Afghans called the rebels the people. When the situation has been consolidated.P. Abdul Rakhman Abkhat. He claimed that the Soviet advisers also took part in the interrogations and tortures.” The Residency concluded that everything suggested that Amin was wittingly or unwittingly working towards a collapse and defeat of the Revolution and that he was serving reaction and imperialism. Afghanistan will rely on effective aid from the Muslim countries. A. Zaryab.” he said. The utterances of several Afghan politicians were made known from various sources. was arrested and imprisoned. Afghanistan’s attachment to the USSR is only a short-term tactical step caused by the internal situation. Zaryab expressed the opinion that Amin had destroyed the cream of the Afghan intelligentsia and that 17.their enemies would get even with the clan. Are the Russians guilty or not? The Afghans are convinced that. The Soviet side was involved in the punitive policies of the regime and co-operated in the repression on an equal basis with the Afghans. When he was released he told of his time in prison and the torture. Amin reportedly said the following: “Of course. as it is bound to do sooner or later.” The well-known Afghan writer and editor of the magazine Khonare Khalq.000 people had been killed. I support the principle of collective leadership and the party. if the Soviet Union did not support Amin. “In fact. Amin has not already driven 87 . wipe villages from the earth and crush innocent peasants with the tracks of tanks. It will follow the example of Egypt and come out openly against the presence of Soviet advisers in the country. The temporary chargé d'affaires of Afghanistan in Yugoslavia. The majority of Afghans were convinced that Afghan officials and Soviet advisers bore equal responsibility for the situation in Afghanistan. sowed harmful bacilli of doubts about Soviet socialism and its various forms in the East European countries to a group of diplomats in Belgrade. M.” “I could perhaps rule the country by myself with the support of people close to me and my true aides. then simple people in Afghanistan will make short work of the Russians if. Hatred of Russians was increasing amongst the people.
” The number of anti-Soviet people was also increased by the followers of Taraki. Anti-Soviet feelings were widespread amongst the intelligentsia. Now it is common to hear in educated circles that the Russians massacred the Afghan intelligentsia in order to make it easier for them to keep the country under control. It developed into an armed attack. Socialism and the Soviet Union are concepts which have been seriously compromised in Afghanistan for a long time. On 28 November a film was shot in the official residence of the head of the Afghan state. In October there was a revolt in units of the 7th infantry division which was stationed near Kabul. The Moscow bosses attributed particular significance to information from the Residency about contacts which were said to have taken place between Afghan government officials and the extreme Muslim opposition. “The present leadership of Afghanistan is doing everything to undermine the trust of Afghans in friendship with the USSR. They believed that the USSR and its advisers had facilitated the coup by Amin and the downfall of Taraki and that they were directly involved in the changes in the party and state apparatus. But we find it difficult to explain to simple people why the Soviet Union is helping the Amin government which is hostile to all Afghans.” This is what Parchamis said to Soviet citizens. People living in areas close to the House of the People saw the flag and thought that the government of Amin had been overthrown. Things seem to be going this way. The mutineers shouted the slogans: “Long live Taraki! Long live Marxism-Leninism. They consider that is was and remains a true friend of the Afghan people. During the shooting a flag of the Daud regime was raised. The people loudly expressed their joy. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the genuine and devoted friends of the Soviet Union to rebuff such arguments as the majority of Afghans can see that the official line of the USSR is to support the government of Amin. The Parchamists have not changed their attitude towards the USSR. Officers who supported Taraki led the mutiny. The meeting was said to have taken place at the end of September in the province 88 . embraced and congratulated each other.them from the country.” The following episode illustrates the mood amongst the people. The presence of Soviet advisers in the army and security organs was seen as a measure taken by the USSR to support and strengthen the Amin regime.
On 25 October a senior assistant of the head of the 8th Department of the FCD. but it will take time. 89 . The power-addicts decided to take decisive action. the influence of the Persian Ayatollah revolution on Afghanistan and the establishment of an Islamic regime.97 Right-wing Muslim representatives came from Pakistan to attend the meeting. Ivanov. The latter's pseudonym was changed and he became known as ‘Martov. Petrov. Officers were told that the situation in Afghanistan was quite unacceptable and that events would follow which would require the direct involvement of many officers. Amin’s delegate reportedly said in so many words that “Everything is acceptable.V.” The KGB considered as particularly dangerous any signs of a possible rapprochement between Afghanistan and Iran. An end to the armed struggle was discussed.S.” The elder brother of H. Amin was seeking an agreement with the internal counter-revolutionary leaders involving a compromise by which Soviet specialists and advisers would leave the country. There was also very little on this in the press. Everyone was to be prepared for this. At the end of October meetings were held in FCD departments. said to some supporters: “It would clearly be sensible for us to follow Egypt's course and treat the Russians as President [Anwar] Sadat did. At the same time the Residency voiced its indignation at the indifference shown by Amin to the results of the December Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and to the views expressed by Brezhnev during his talks with B. 97 Editors’ Note: Largely Parchami province north of Kabul. At one of his meetings with a member of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee he said that things could not be delayed in view of the present situation in the DRA and that they could not wait for the train to leave as the achievements of the revolution were under threat. Lieutenant-Colonel A. Everything pointed to a military invasion. Abdullah.’ Babrak tried hard to influence the Soviet position through the Czechs. Operational groups were set up and a general staff from the leaders of the FCD was established. Amin compared himself to Stalin and remarked on his role in the establishment and strengthening of the socialist system in the USSR. was sent to Prague to work with Babrak. Amin.of Logar. the flag would be changed and Muslin rebels would be freed from prison.
H. Watanjar and Sarwari.” “On 18 October 1979 the group of Khalq leaders. two from Czechoslovakia. but he has given no indication of the subject of these talks in his meetings with Soviet representatives.In November the future rulers of Afghanistan were taken to Moscow. inevitably including the removal of Amin. H. The official view of the KGB on this matter was expressed in a “particularly important” memorandum addressed to Brezhnev in November. 2. “After the changes in the leadership of the party and the state of Afghanistan the situation in the country began to deteriorate sharply in a way which is detrimental to the interests of the USSR. He said that Watanjar was better suited for this. Amin to come to power. Gulyabzoi. They were then moved close to the border. They set out a program to restore the genuine character of revolutionary reconstruction in the DRA. Amin’s men and representatives of the right-wing Muslim opposition are trying to find a way to solve the conflict. three from Bulgaria and two clandestinely from Yugoslavia. fabricated rumors are being spread in the DRA which discredit the Soviet Union and cast doubts on the activities of Soviet officials in Afghanistan. 159. p. Together they set about absorbing the instructions of the KGB. The operational officer Ershov. Recently unfriendly remarks about the USSR have begun to appear in documents and speeches made by high-ranking officials to closed party and office meetings. The attitude of Gulyabzoi was considered cowardly. Babrak and Sarwari discussed this with him but he refused on the grounds that he carried far less weight politically than the others. wrote a letter to the CPSU Central Committee in which they gave a critical analysis of the mistakes of Taraki which had allowed H. See CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996/97). It was suggested that Gulyabzoi should be illegally taken to Kabul to carry out preparations. Amin. On 30 October of the same year Karmal Babrak. 90 . wrote a personal letter to Brezhnev which gave a frank account of the situation in the country. Amin himself has met the US chargé d’affaires a number of times. On the direct orders of H. He described Amin as “an 98 Editors’ Note: Probably a personal letter from Andropov to Brezhnev. There are increasingly frequent reports of an intended shift of the DRA’s foreign policy to the right.771 rubles were spent under article 9 on the seven while they were in Moscow from 2 November to 12 December.98 Here are some excerpts. the Parcham leader.
The achievement of these aims will be assisted by the fraternal assistance. was put forward as his deputy. A military committee to plan the military and political operation to eliminate H. The Afghan friends have decided to send the former member of the Central Committee of the PDPA. Nur Akhmad Nur. tactics and policies. All this work was carried out under the decisive influence of the recommendations of the CPSU Central Committee which were conveyed to the Afghan friends in the course of meetings with representatives of the Soviet leadership.”99 In the letter he wrote “(. Abdul Vakil.. The leading members of the party are prepared to organize and unite communists. “In order to carry out their political program the healthy forces of the PDPA intend to come to power by overthrowing the regime. Sarwari. a Ukrainian anarchist active in Ukraine during the Russian Civil War.Afghan Makhno. It will draw up concrete plans. Vakil met in Moscow with the help of the Committee for State Security. Amin and his clan from power. friendship with the USSR and the struggle against imperialism. They worked on a general political platform and concrete plans to remove H. consultations. Gulyabzoi.) in the name of all the members of the party I solemnly declare that the party. to Afghanistan to maintain contact between the underground and the Center.” At the beginning of November of the same year the most senior members of the Afghan political émigrés. Later the former Minister of Communications of the DRA. All the other members of the Center led by Comrade Babrak will shortly be moved closer to the Afghan 99 Editors’ Note: Nestor Ivanovich Makhno. the need to end forever the split in the ranks of Afghan communists and to unite in a new party. the party and the state. Babrak and his comrades-in-arms had a clear understanding of the principles of Soviet foreign policy and the need to rely on their own resources. Amin has been set up. Babrak. Watanjar. K. a supporter and associate of Taraki. Gulyabzoi. The Afghan comrades unanimously agreed that Karmal Babrak should be the leader of the whole struggle for the revival of the PDPA and the elimination of the distorted course of reconstruction of the DRA. advice and suggestions of our Soviet friends. Anahita Rotebzad and A. is fully prepared to fulfil its duty and in a positive way solve the problems of the April Revolution. will be sent to organize on the spot the anti-Amin movement. 91 . Sarwari. following the Leninist principles of creative methodology. patriots and all the progressive and democratic forces in Afghanistan.. The main points of the program were: the necessity to remove Amin from the political arena as soon as possible.
Military units in small groups were sent into Afghanistan and members of the KGB were sent in under various forms of cover.” The fly-wheel started turning. two members of the KGB Directorate of Government Communications under Ministry of Foreign Affairs consultant cover and long-lasting food supplies worth 5. It consisted of 13 departments: 92 . They had also asked for an operational group of twelve men from the 7th Directorate of the KGB to protect the leaders of Soviet establishment in the DRA. his brother A. ten hand-held and four mounted grenade throwers were also secretly sent in. On 8 December the Residency was instructed to organize with precaution. In March 1979 Puzanov and Ivanov had already asked for an additional 20 border guards in civilian clothes but with the necessary arms (sub-machine guns. The Center already has general outlines of the military plan which includes a rapid military operation in the capital with the physical elimination of H. in accordance with the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee. grenades and pistols) to be sent to bolster the protection of the embassy in Kabul. In November an operation was carried out to exchange the soldiers of the ‘Zenith’ unit with specially trained border guards.Amin and the other most dangerous people. while observing necessary measures of secrecy. The KGB is closely monitoring the development of events in the DRA and.Amin. Preparations 100 Directorate S was the most important branch of intelligence. is giving the Afghan friends material and technical assistance on matters which arise in the course of work together with advice and suggestions. On 7 December two specialists from the Chief Directorate of Border Guards arrived to study the communication lines of Amin’s new residence. The 8th Department of Directorate S100 of the FCD was asked to carry it out. 15 armored carriers. namely the Illegal branch.000 rubles. In view of all this it is considered expedient in the interests of the USSR to give the healthy forces of the PDPA essential material and other support and to facilitate the implementation of their program. and “to give your opinion of its possible use in the measures known to you. armed helicopters. 25 armored personnel carriers. the monitoring in Kabul and the provinces of ‘Buran’ broadcasts from Dushanbe beamed towards Afghanistan.border so that they can work more effectively and clandestinely. A motorized company of border troops consisting of 208 combat soldiers.” Preparation for Operation ‘Agat’ went ahead at full speed.
Panasyuk. built a cache on Czech territory and placed West German and American weapons within it. to the West and the British Government's subsequent expulsion of 105 KGB officers and agents in September 1971 placed the Department and the Residency in an exceptionally difficult situation. Thus. Third Section . The Department monitored practically all the most important enterprises. The daring lads and fly-by-nights selected for the purpose underwent basic sabotage training.handled photography and radio. tunnels. Parachute training from aircraft took place at a training ground near Kaunas. Second Section . arson. the 3rd Directorate. The Department was engaged in what is known in the criminal jargon as wet jobs. explosions.Training of the Special Reserve. bridges. work relating to the Socialist countries under the codename 'PROGRESS'. those of railway track men. fabrication of documentation and seals. The training grounds were dispersed throughout the country.Department P . 7. They led the Czechoslovak Security Service to this cache. There were occasions when the KGB resorted to compromising a foreign state.Work from Illegal positions on the American continent. 12. Security Department. Japan and Asia. when in response to a given signal the members of the group were to gather with their essential kit at a prearranged place. The London Residency was compelled to switch entirely to work from official positions. or Department V). Ryabov. The Department trained sabotage and Intelligence groups.handled language training. Jewish and Armenian emigration channel. Ahead of time storage places were sought and prepared. and weapons and radio transmitter-receivers were pre-positioned in them. the settlements within reach. Its main base was located in the Moscowregion township of Balashikha. 6. nuclear stations. Lyalin. characteristic landmarks.The Chinese People's Republic. A.work under cover of the USSR Chamber of Commerce. on the eve of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces in 1968. mechanical breakdowns and terrorism. according to the timetable.R. Botyan and V. The defection of an officer of the Department. and routes from the landing place to the target of sabotage.e. The sabotage and intelligence groups were trained for operations in a specific area of a country. climatic conditions at various times of the year. 8.African countries and countries in the Near and Middle East.handled clandestine premises.the seashore. 5. as was the timing and nature of state and religious festivals and popular celebrations. in the premises of the former Higher Intelligence School. aircraft landing strips. emergency call-outs were arranged. forestry officials. From time to time. and the selection of trained individuals as dangles under the auspices of the FCD. 10. i. SW. 2. First Section . The route to be taken by sabotage intelligence groups and the sabotage targets were photographed and located on the map.Strategic communications. one-time assignments abroad. The suggestion 93 .European countries. Training and deployment of Special Agents through the German. [In addition] Group R . and were grouped in small detachments. the direction of the wind in various seasons. postal addresses within the USSR. In order to disguise sabotage and intelligence groups as local inhabitants. the necessary kit was acquired samples of military uniforms.Work with trainer-Illegals. Before that it had been an autonomous section attached to the FAD (the 13th Department. It studied suitable landing places . 9. villas. the topography of the locality. police and gendarmerie officers. and articles of civilian clothing worn by the population in the landing areas were purchased. The language and phonetic peculiarities of the given area were studied. sabotage. 11. poisoning. they were called up for 45 days for training. the SCD. depots. P. [Osobyy Rezerv . The 8th Department was integrated in the Directorate S structure in 1976.Documentation of Illegals. badges of rank for officers and other ranks. The process of re-establishing the agent network went on until the end of 1975. hydro-electric stations. and the KGB of individual republics. murder. in mountain rifle units. Arms were acquired abroad by various means and were accumulated gradually for eventual use.carried out analytical work for the leadership.Conduct of special operations. the operational group V of the KGB plenipotentiary apparatus in the GDR consisting of G.] 4. T.1. Australia and New Zealand.O. oil pipelines and cables. 3.
The people of Afghanistan provided a unique example of the conduct of guerrilla warfare on a wide scale. Agent groups of foreign nationality generally consisted of a Special Agent. but differed in that the guerrillas relied on contact with the population. were sent in from somewhere outside or were recruited individually on the spot and carried out specific sabotage assignments. Israeli experience against Palestinian camps in Lebanon and Palestinian methods against the Israelis were used in the Afghan refugee camps and in heavily populated areas of Pakistan. On the eve of the Second World War. The 1716 military manual relating to the ‘Corps Volant’—mobile corps—specified: “It is to go into [the enemy’s] rear or enter his territory and cause a diversion. doubted the plausibility of the version put forward. Alone. diversion came to mean subversive activities. an officer of the 8th Department. security and viability of intelligence and sabotage detachments on the territory of foreign countries. Kikot.was that the BND and CIA were preparing their people for armed insurrection against the Socialist achievements of the people. an agent who was the keeper of a post-box. Each group consisted of 15-25 individuals. there were also courses for frontier guard officers and a 100-hour program designed to raise the combat qualifications of young KGB officers. The landing of a sabotage and intelligence group was arranged by night. The term ‘diversion’ was introduced in Russia under Peter I. The idea of setting up and discovering a cache of American arms in Afghanistan on the border with Iran was being developed by the Intelligence agencies in order to accuse the USA publicly of interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.e. or any other property through explosions. installations. was appointed to head it. The Department painstakingly studied the organization and structure of guerrilla detachments. there were special 'Vystrel' courses for officers at Solnechnegorsk (near Moscow) on the theme of 'Military leadership personnel'. who had been recalled from Havana. The League of Nations was more decisive. Later on it came to mean the activities of the small secret detachments or groups designated to weaken the enemy side whenever it could be reached in order to prepare the ground for major blown in another location. and were conducting permanent armed struggle. The support point agents were intended to ensure the combat effectiveness. The activities of a sabotage or intelligence group were similar to guerrilla operations. In 1982. wrecking designed o damage the enemy’s economic and military might. The KGB drafted the text of an article for the press. causing mass poisoning. Not less than 4-6 targets a year were processed by the Department for the F Line. or by day in foul weather or fog.” The meaning of the term has evolved. The keepers of post-boxes were used by the intelligence service for clandestine postal communication with the sabotage and intelligence groups. spreading epidemics and epizootics 94 . on the other hand. The Department was fully engaged in developing methods of sabotage and terrorism in the Afghan theatre. transport and communications. with the masses. and almost without support. as for its aggression against Finland the USSR was expelled from its ranks as an aggressor. a support point agent. and with the government forces of its own country. Illegals or agents. All files on agents of foreign or Soviet nationality which for some reason were consigned to archives were examined by the 8th Department with a view to selecting people for its purposes. Later on it came to mean the activities of small secret detachments or groups designed to distract attention from the main operations. Kutusov included guerrilla warfare in his strategic plan for a military campaign. At Balashikha. the Soviet nomenklatura spent 7 years destroying a nation. i. the Minister of Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia. a 'training center for Afghanistan' was set up at Balashikha. which used inhumane methods of waging war. the Afghan people successfully waged war exclusively by guerrilla methods against the army of a superpower. and agents who carried out the actual operations. At one time it was considered to be a maneuver on the enemy’s flanks or rear o distract attention from the main operations. without modern weapons. the development of a resistance movement. Before the eyes of the whole world. and methods and means of armed struggle abroad. while in its annual adverse resolutions the UN did not even name the bandits. without an army. The sabotage people. For the purpose of training foreigners. The participants became commanders of armed formations operating against their own government. sabotage. To his credit. arson or other means. (codename ‘Pavel’). feebly repeating calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Diversion is an extreme form of an intelligence service’s subversive activity: it consists of wrecking or damaging enterprises. but the sabotage network could also consist of individual intelligence officers.
All this was tested in combat conditions in the Spanish Civil War. 103 agents and 115 cooptees with the aim of wrecking and undermining a state and causing panic. together with delayed-action mines and toxic chemical compounds. Lieutenant-General A. New types of explosives were invented. as well as mines camouflaged as ordinary everyday objects—coal. the Russian emigration and foreign organizations. the head of the 8th Department of Directorate S. Thousands of diversion specialists were trained and new diversion devices were produced. Two admittedly not very successful attempts were made to set fire to the Polish passenger liner “Stefan Batory. B. Over 1. Colonel Lazarenko. Major General Krasovsky. using foreign markings and materials. Major-General Kirpichenko. information and ordinary people. Petrov. D. On 12 December A. foodstuffs and medicines in caches (in the ground and under water).G. Throughout December members of the KGB and agents who were Soviet citizens kept a twenty-four hour watch. It deprives the nomenklatura of its monopoly right to interpret events.V. They were joined on December 23 by another three and later by a whole group led by the head of the 7th Directorate. Mamsurov was attached to him as a diversion specialist. The nomenklatura will therefore no tolerate the free exchange of ideas. Towards the end of 1937 a number of diversion brigades were formed into the 14th Partisan Corps under the command of D. logs. it gives the population the illusion that there is a growing understanding between the USSR and the West. flux. Preparation for a large-scale diversionary warfare was begun in 1925. In 1938 the Cheka placed in caches over 2. Ungri. experiments were carried out on the long-term storage of these [devices] as well as weapons.were at the final stage. waste metal. Mines camouflaged as a load of coal were put on boar steamships in Latin-American and European countries. H. and the communist parties operate as a subversive fifth column in the rear of the democracies. the deputy head of the 8th Department of Directorate S was directly in charge. weapons and ammunition. peat. and members of other KGB directorates at the Center and the periphery flew to Kabul. Diversion causes casualties and has a negative effect on the population’s morale.600 military advisers and specialists.” Diversionary detachments operated within the republican Army. The term “ideological diversion” is now widely used to cover radio. The Cheka considers objective information from the West to be most dangerous as it acts as an instrument of political influence in all spheres of Soviet society. were sent to Kabul to help Ivanov. For its part. it contains elements of incitement and it stimulates dissidence. the senior assistant of the 8th Department of the FCD. On the same day ten members of Group A of the 7th Directorate of the KGB arrived in Kabul. a senior operational officer. press and television propaganda.000 tons of explosives. 21 members of the Residency and 10 operational officers from the ‘Zenith’ unit were engaged in intelligence gathering through the SK (Soviet Colony) line. 95 . the struggle is waged on Soviet grounds. Beschastnov. ammunitions. compact mines for use against railways were produced.Chicherin. it exploits subversive forces. the head of Directorate S.D. and his deputy. In 1929 a joint work-shop/laboratory was set up in Kiev under the diversion school to devise and test diversion devices. The Cheka made skilful use of diversionary methods against the White Guards. 61 members of KGB Representation. coke—and also delayed-action grenades with a charge consisting of 75% potassium chlorate and 20-25 powdered sugar.
Stefanek. who was in the USSR.” The ambassador later remarked that Western propaganda in Afghanistan against the revolution was more effective than the propaganda of the PDPA and the socialist countries. In the city there were rumors of an imminent attack by the Parchamists. which was unable to present the positive aspect of the revolution in a positive form. that Amin was pursuing a line which was independent of the USSR and that. then the ambassador saw Babrak. Amin told the ambassador several times that he would like to visit the USSR as General Secretary of the PDPA for talks with Brezhnev and that he would go at any time that was convenient to Moscow. “There is noone more suitable and authoritative than Babrak in Afghanistan. Babrak had been elected Deputy General Secretary with the approval of the leaders of the Khalq faction and Taraki personally at a joint plenum in July 1977. In November the Cuban ambassador to Afghanistan told the deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. as the most likely candidate for the top post. “one must not rule out the physical elimination of Amin. The Parchamis considered that Karmal Babrak had automatically become General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee following the death of Taraki. Those Khalqis who did not accept the resolutions of the extraordinary plenum of the PDPA Central Committee on 16 September 1979 at which Amin was elected General Secretary could return to the party and play their part in the struggle against the bloody dictatorship of the Amin gang. that he would be removed with the help of the Soviet Union and that Babrak and his comrades-in-arms would soon be brought to Afghanistan to take charge of a coup d’état and to take power into his own hands.were in contact with the Residency. Telegraph communications from Kabul to Moscow to Kabul were in constant use. Leaves and discharges were cancelled in some sections. The Afghans wanted to know why the advisers had recently been remaining in their units later at night than usual.” If there were a coup. The commanders of the 37th regiment and the 26th airborne regiment showed that they distrusted the advisers. Amin’s days were numbered. therefore. The last time he had raised this question with Ambassador Tabeev was on 6 December. It was noted that the armed forces of the DRA were becoming wary of the Soviet personnel. His 96 . The underground Parcham group considered the death of Taraki an important factor as it would force honest members of the Khalq faction to think seriously again about the unity of the PDPA. They said that Babrak was in Moscow.
Sultan.000 troops. But the Residency considered that Zaplatin had not been sufficiently critical of the events which took place in Afghanistan in September. boots. Kapustin tried to subordinate all the other army services to the political organs. decided to react favorably to the request by Yakub.persistent hints were politely brushed aside. the senior military adviser to the head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Afghan army. winter hats. warm socks. The head of the general staff of the [Afghan] Ministry of Defense. Zaplatin. The Residency also had a negative opinion of the senior military adviser to the head of the political department of the [Word(s) excised] central army corps in Kabul. underwear. For these reasons he was recalled to Moscow for ‘consultations’ which lasted for an undefined period. He was favored and trusted by Amin. trousers.K. that he did not take an objective view of the decisions of the leadership of the DRA and was too close to Igbal. In December Kapustin continued to meet the head of the Kam political department. radio stations were supplied and agreement was reached on the re-stationing of two Afghan divisions from the north of the country to other regions. Colonel E. After the removal from power of Amin.” 97 . Yakub. He was guilty of showing-off. Warm coats. but he concealed these meetings. Kapustin. “Completely under the influence of Zaplatin. asserting at the same time that this was his principled party position. on the other hand. He did not consider in depth the events of September and repeated the propaganda themes of Amin and Igbal.N. uncritical of himself and inclined to be demagogic. One was Major-General V. M. Lieutenant-General S. The fighting was taking place in difficult mountain conditions in low temperatures and the army needed winter uniforms for 10. His requests for military supplies were met. wrote a letter to the embassy stating that the Afghan army was engaged in armed conflict with the enemies of the regime. The embassy and the chief military adviser. foot bindings and gloves were all required. were sent back to the Soviet Union. Some advisers. exaggerating his success. Kapustin pretended that he had altered his ideas but he became quiet and withdrawn. Magometov. as they were considered politically immature. At the same time everything was done to prevent Amin having even the slightest suspicions about the true reasons behind the incomprehensible conduct of the Soviet leaders. but not to give any firm dates for the delivery of the kit. being stubborn.P. Igbal. although the first batch for one to two thousand men would be sent by air in the near future. The number of advisers and specialists in the country increased. boasting. Igbal and Amin repeatedly asked when the general would return.
as he was to take up a new post in Ethiopia. his father had served as military commissar in M. Kostromin. Kukhta. On 13 December Zabralov left Kabul for Moscow. V. Another interpreter who was leaving Kabul on the same flight as Zabralov was also to give this same information to Zaplatin. a move which prevented Zabralov’s cover being exposed to the military. Amin was taken under guard to this palace through guarded streets. He reported on Igbal and Ali Shah Paiman. Osadchy and L.A. He had been in contact at various times with Yu.One of the military adviser’s sources of information was the agent 'Zadrov'.m. Amin’s new residence. As the report was to be duplicated anyway. I. The Residency had no complaints about the interpreters who both behaved correctly. On the following day he reported his meeting with Zabralov to an operational officer.S. Evdokimov (‘Nekrasov'). They just send me from one office to another. Incidentally. He spoke more about his own affairs and the squabbling and disorder at work. an interpreter for the military advisers to the central army corps of the Afghan army. Katkov. Another agent who reported on the advisers was the senior interpreter D.I.G. the Russian guard dog!” 98 . At 3 p. on 20 December. Kryuchkov was immediately informed. Kapustin asked him to get in touch with Zaplatin and to tell him the following.Ye.P.Zabraev. A unit of the People's Guard which was responsible for the protection of the head of the party and state was also moved there. Sholokhov’s township of Veshenskaya. Senior Lieutenant I.L. Zabralov was allowed to meet Zaplatin and give him the information. Zabralov must go straight from the airport to the home of Zaplatin and tell him this exceptionally important news so that the latter could report it to the top leaders. Ivanov was planning some venture in Afghanistan which Kapustin and other advisers considered rash and foolish. without showing much interest in Afghanistan. On 22 December posters were stuck up in Kabul with the slogans “Death to the communists and imperialists! Death to the traitor H. Something momentous was being planned and Amin was evidently aware that an attack might be made against him. The latter listened to Kapustin impassively. He complained that “no one pays any attention to me anywhere. Amin. There were rumors among the advisers that there would soon be important changes in the leadership of the DRA.P. B. He was the interpreter for Zaplatin’s meetings with Amin.” During the evening of 17 December a Soviet company of “guards” was stationed in the palace of Dar-ul-Aman. Zabralov carried out Kapustin’s request on the day of his arrival. Eleven tanks moved in.
On 22 December Amin listed the cases of American intervention in various regions of the world in a speech to workers of the Ministry of Health.On 23 December Amin showed increased interest in the situation at the Bagram air force base. Some people considered the arrival of Soviet troops a sign of support for the Amin regime.” The main units began to move in during the night of 25 to 26 December. number. The most well-informed members of the general staff of the army of the DRA declared that the aim of the action was to overthrow Amin. brought to Amin’s attention the broadcasts by Western radio stations asserting that Soviet troops had entered the DRA. The head of the Kam political directorate. M. The head of the Directorate of the Worker's Counter-Intelligence. I consider myself free from any obligations to the West.” On 25 December a meeting of the Politburo chaired by Amin was held in the House of the People. Babrak. K. The head of the base. type and load of the Soviet planes which arrived and the place from where they had flown. reported to Amin that Soviet military units had arrived at Bagram. Tkach. 99 . commanded by Lieutenant-General B. The 40th army. began the occupation of Afghanistan. others that the USSR was breaking off relations with Amin and preparing to remove him. He mentioned the concentration of American naval ships in the Persian Gulf which were threatening the lives of the fraternal Iranian working people.I. On 24 December Ambassador Tabeev informed the Politburo: “Recently there have been criticisms of the actions of the Americans. Our possibilities have been exhausted. The Afghans did not know precisely what was happening. was mentioned. The agents in the military counter-intelligence service had gone into action and the movement of motor transport and military convoys was controlled. gave orders for the counter-intelligence departments at Kabul aerodrome and Bagram air base to inform him of the time. On the eve of the invasion by the Soviet army Amin said with feeling to Sultan Akhmad: “All my efforts to improve relations with the USA and other Western countries have been fruitless. Asadullah Rakhman. not to support him and that the USSR would help people opposed to Amin to come to power. Hakim. Sultan. For the first time Afghan pilots in MI-25 helicopters flew at a height of 60 to 70 meters over the cantonment where the Soviet parachute troops were stationed. The question of the current field work in the country and preparations for a spring campaign were discussed. The leader of Parcham.
Then I would not have gone grey from dealing with all the rebels. the article ended with the slogan: “Down with the interventionists!” “As the Afghan press is subject to strict censorship the article could not have been published without the sanction of H. The 350th infantry paratroop regiment guarded the Kabul aerodrome. The 181st motorized regiment with an artillery division was in Pil-I Charki in the town of Garibgar to prevent the [Afghan] 4th and 15th tank brigades breaking 100 . a language which few Afghans know. The command post of the division was set up 1. A report was sent to the Center from Kabul on 26 December. It stated that: “The experience of history shows that it is the people of any country who are the decisive force in the struggle for the realization of their rights and. The 103rd airborne division defended Kabul. It was printed in an English-language newspaper. Fazelbek.” The invasion brought its first victims. exclaimed: “They should have brought in the troops from the USSR in the summer. Neither troops.” Kabul was surrounded by front-line Soviet units to prevent any attempts by the Afghan army to liberate Kabul. The evening edition of the Kabul Times on 25 December had published an article under the headline “The will of the people will be the deciding factor” which was ambiguous. The 108th motorized regiment with an artillery division was in the area of the towns of Karga. In general the article reflects the ambiguous and cautious attitude of Amin and his entourage towards the increased Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. holding the main points of the city with forces from the 317th and 357th paratroop regiments. The time chosen to print the article was not a coincidence. killing four crew members and thirty seven military personnel. Darulaman and Kalakhoja with the aim of preventing the 8th and 7th infantry divisions and the 37th commando regiment of the Afghan army from moving from the west and south towards Kabul. A GRU battalion was concentrated in the area of Darulaman in the south-western outskirts of Kabul.The chief of the general staff.5 kilometers west of the aerodrome. nor atomic weapons nor equipment can achieve what the will of the people can achieve. Amin. The 345th special paratroop regiment guarded the Bagram aerodrome. An Il-76 flew into a mountain in the area of the pass of Salang. Vietnam. Kampuchea and Iran. in particular.” Citing the peoples of Afghanistan. Yakub. It was clearly intended to turn the pro-Western sections of the population against the Soviet troops and to enable the mass propaganda resources of western countries to make an immediate fuss about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The 180th motorized division was concentrated ten kilometers north of Kabul. in the fight for freedom.
ordered the commander of the 2nd army corps. to arrest his retinue and the government. The commander of the 1st army corps. was the signal for the attack to begin. The 234th tank regiment and special units were 5 km [kilometers] north of Kabul.through to Kabul from the east. timid attempts at resistance were decisively crushed. The Minister for the Border and Governor of the province of Kandahar.motorised regiment at Daukatabad. where the explosive device had been placed beforehand. Over 700 members of the KGB from the Center and the Periphery were dropped into Kabul to take part in “Operation Agat. Most of the officers of the armed forces of the DRA changed allegiance under the influence of the Soviet advisers. 101 Author’s note: The leadership advises young Directorate S officers to volunteer to see military operations in Afghanistan for themselves. The 24th tank regiment was 25 km north-east of Shindand. The 5th motorized division was ten kilometers further west. the 373rd motorized regiment five kilometers south of the Harsanb pass and the 1st motorized regiment fifteen kilometers north-west of Herat. Amin.-Gen.” The troops were dressed in Afghan army uniforms. replied to an order from the Soviet military to halt the resistance by saying that he was prepared to lay down his arms and obey the new government if he would not be killed. sappers and supply units five km north of Hargech. Such large losses forced Andropov to question the expediency of hanging portraits in mourning frames of heroes killed whilst carrying out their noble international mission in the halls and corridors as this would attract unnecessary attention. On 27 December the KGB began Operation ‘Agat’ [Agate] to storm the residence of the President of the DRA and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA. The command post was set up in Chakharchosh. The few. Kabir. Sakhram. But the latter did not obey the order and declared that he recognized the Babrak government. an artillery regiment. Over 100 of the KGB were killed in the attack on the palace. Maj.101 At this time the main aim of the Soviet military units was to disarm any Afghan military formations which were trying to break out to defend Amin and were not taking orders from Babrak. for a minimum of 6 months. to eliminate him and those close to him physically. the 371st. 101 . Dust.D. M. They did not attempt to defend the regime and expressed their readiness to serve the new authorities. An explosion under a tree in the central square of the capital. He was given an assurance on this point. covering the route from the capital to Charikar. to attack Kabul and crush the disturbance. 10 km north of Shindand. H. S.
Amin’s elder brother. to be shot. The leadership did not forgive him for the failed idea to help Taraki to get rid of Amin. Ponomarev and Kruychkov. “We would like. Paiman.At 10:30 a. The arrested members of the government and the Revolutionary Council were taken to this same prison from the radio building. Abdullah. Members of H. Ivanov. Gromyko. The house of the commander of the People's Guard. 102 102 Only Lieutenant-General B. Jandad. Ustinov.m. three daughters. Jandad. We hope that the government of the USSR will award orders to these comrades. Jandad was captured and taken to the building of the special services.” Lazarenko was given the title of General although there was no provision for this in the establishment. “as soon as we have our own orders to bestow them on all the Soviet troops and Chekists who took part in the fighting. was made a Hero of the Soviet Union.” said Babrak. Kirpichenko became Lieutenant-General and was soon appointed First Deputy Chief of the FCD. Amin’s family.S. who had arranged and ran “Operation Agat” and who had the Chekist experience of 1968 for 'delicate' matters. daughter-in-law. his son. Amin’s residence. which was not far from Amin’s residence.” Babrak also asked that a permanent direct telephone line should be established for the head of the DRA and the General Secretary of the PDPA with Brezhnev. and the commander of the People's Militia. He was given a job in the apparatus of the Chairman of the KGB. on 28 December the last pocket of resistance was crushed. the wife of the eldest son Abdurakhman and the wives of Asadullah Amin were put in Pol-I Charki prison. was removed from his post of First Deputy Chief of the FCD. a member of the 8th Department of Directorate S. Members of the KGB were promoted and received awards for “Operation ‘Agat’ [Agate]. shooting those responsible for the death of the Soviet stormers. He stressed that he was firmly convinced that the Soviet Chekists and military had displayed heroism and bravery during the storming of H. was captured in the village of Mazar-I Sharif and put in a special 'isolator' prison. Andropov. Members of the government and the Revolutionary Council were arrested. 102 . including the former commander of the People's Guard. Two of Amin’s sons had been killed in the fighting. Babrak wanted the severest punishment for all the former leadership of the DRA. Babrak asked the KGB representatives to assure Andropov that he would unswervingly carry out all Andropov’s suggestions and advice. and Kozlov. was seized.
To the suggestion that it could be the work of the Parchamists.” The interrogation of those arrested began. She reminded him that he had had friendly relations with her husband. but “if the Soviet comrades consider a change of the leadership of the DRA essential.” Khuma asserted: “I think that the fighting will go on.” At a preliminary interrogation Igbal said that he had never hurt a fly in his life and that he had only carried out the orders of the leadership of the party. were all in house number 104 in the 3rd district of Kabul. I saw these as an attempt to expose my anti-Amin feelings which they would pass on to Amin. Babrak angrily berated him: “We and the Soviet comrades considered you a true Communist. Finally Bakhed said: “It must be the work of the top leaders. and the Consul of the DRA in Quetta. stating that he had “always spoken out against killings. “As for my talks with the Soviet comrades. If I had known the true intention of the Soviet comrades. Minister of Water Resources and Energy M. the head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the PDPA Khuma.” They were all worried about the fate of Amin and Igbal. Panjshiri was taken from the prison to Babrak. Some of them thought that what was happening was 'a provocation by the USA'. They then began to guess that the USSR had been involved in the events which had taken place. Hashemi. When Babrak was making his radio broadcast there were Soviet tanks on the streets of Kabul. it really will. Paiman was severely depressed.Afghan officials had no idea what was happening on the night of 27 to 28 December. He did not know whether Amin was a criminal. Minister of Communications M.” Panjshiri said that he had not agreed with Amin but that he could not openly oppose him so he had adopted a position of secret opponent. had often opposed the policies of Amin. then I undoubtedly would have conducted myself differently. Zarif. others that it was an attack by the Muslim Brothers. After Babrak’s radio broadcast they were all in a state of despondency and paralysis. as his friend. The Soviets wouldn't allow it. Abdul Wahed. He wrote a letter to Kapustin. Suma. arrests and punishments. D. He agreed to read out any text criticizing Amin on the radio. Khuma suggested that it could be a provocation by the Parchamists and that the broadcast might not have come from the Kabul radio station. You betrayed the interests of the Soviet comrades who spoke to you in Moscow. then I wholly agree with this. Zafir replied confidently: “They won't get anywhere. had worked honestly and would 103 .” The wife of Igbal asked Kapustin to help free her husband and to help her find a job and somewhere to live. Minister of Higher and Secondary Education M.
9 Parchamists. Urgent measures must 103 104 Editors’ Note: Followers of the Muslim Brotherhood. who was undergoing medical treatment in the USSR. 12 Khomeinists. 32 rebels. Soviet establishments and Soviet citizens in the DRA. Bogdanov and Osadchy received an order from Andropov that “when the first stage of the operation has been completed. Ivanov. The KGB used this for propaganda purposes and arranged a television show which put forward the idea that the prisoners would have been executed if the Soviet troops had not got there in time and that the army had carried out a noble mission. moral and economic help which the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan had repeatedly made to the government of the Soviet Union. Information must be obtained about the feelings of the various sections of Afghan society in order to evaluate what was happening and take the appropriate measures in good time.” He asked Kapustin and Zaplatin to help to free him. Amin.” The Soviet embassy noted that “which the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan had repeatedly made to the government of the Soviet Union” had been added to the original text transmitted during the night of 27-28 December. Minister Fakir was prepared to speak against Amin. After the elimination of Amin. It spoke of “the insistent request for urgent political. 12 Akhvanists and 13 Khomeinists had been convicted.continue to work for his poor people and would never be a traitor. 9 Maoists. 28 rebels. assistance must be given to the healthy forces in the PDPA to expand the social base of the new regime in order to gain control of the situation in the country as soon as possible. a cousin and son-in-law of H. 21 conspirators and 49 Akhvanists. Author’s Note: Some prisoners were released from prison. He had been taken there shortly before these events suffering from ‘food poisoning. Babrak asked the Soviet government to hand over Asadullah Amin. 10 Maoists. Measures must be taken to include in the new leadership of the organs people who have shown their loyalty to the ideals of the April Revolution and have proved themselves to be friends of the USSR.’ An investigation of prisoners under Amin’s rule showed that 129 had been shot.103 [Another] 40 members of Parcham. 22 conspirators.104 On the evening of 28 December an announcement from the new DRA government was broadcast on Kabul radio. Kirpichenko. The government of the Soviet Union had accepted the proposal of the Afghan side. 104 . Everything possible must be done to achieve a favorable atmosphere for the Soviet military units.
K Amin deceived the party and the people when he declared that the Soviet Union had approved the removal of Taraki from the party and government. continued by the Khalq government and reorganized by Karmal in 1981 into a six brigade defense force. Asadullah Sarwari became the deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA. Gromyko and Ponomarev.” The Residency and Representation moved their own people into important party and government posts. The KGB compiled reports on the events in the DRA and the new leadership. the Revolutionary Council and the Afghan government were banished from the party and arrested. Particular attention must be given to the organization of the work of military counterintelligence in the DRA. reducing the position of the Central Committee of the PDPA and the Revolutionary Council to that of purely nominal organs. A memorandum. Most of the people subjected to repression and physical elimination were people who had taken an active part in the April revolution.000 men created under Daud. The leadership of the Sarandoy105 which was an important factor in maintaining and increasing social order must be strengthened. Ustinov. People either related to H. Amin established a regime of personal dictatorship in the country. dated 31 December. All the members of the Representation and Residency must expand and consolidate their operational position in order to obtain reliable information and influence the development of events in the way we need. H.Amin or tied to him through personal devotion were appointed to the top posts in the party and state. who did not conceal their sympathy towards the USSR and defended the Leninist norms of internal party life.be taken to normalize and strengthen the work of the security services according to the principles formulated by Babrak. 105 . No. It stated that: “After the coup d’etat and murder of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan. Taraki. which was carried out by Amin in September of this year. On 30 December they directed the security organs of the DRA to uncover underground organizations and supporters of Amin. Many members of the Central Committee of the PDPA.M.2519-A. “On the Events in Afghanistan on 27 and 28 December 1979” for the CPSU Central Committee was signed by Andropov. N. 105 Gendarmerie force of some 20. the situation in Afghanistan seriously deteriorated and became critical.
together with the difficulties specific to Afghan conditions. All this. the mass executions and the disregard for the law caused widespread dissatisfaction in the country. The government of the DRA established favorable conditions for the work of the American cultural center and. they achieved fundamental changes in the internal political situation in the country and the elimination of the achievements of the revolution. Amin tried to strengthen his position by reaching a compromise with the leaders of the internal counter-revolution. Amin held confidential meetings with the American charge d’affaires in Kabul. the repression. the special services of the DRA halted their work against the embassy of the USA. the military and others who were suspected of being ant-Amin were eliminated without trial. Supported by outside forces on an increasingly large scale under Amin’s regime. Numerous posters began to appear in the capital exposing the anti-populist character of the present regime and calling for unity in the struggle against ‘the clique of H. A considerable number of officers expressed their anger at the domination of the incompetent proteges of H. on Amin’s orders. Reacting perceptively to the increasing anti-Amin mood in Afghanistan. It became the elimination of the party. Amin. were concerned about the fate of the revolution and the independence of the country. In effect a broad anti-Amin front was formed in the country. H. Karmal Babrak and Asadullah Sarwari. In the period following the September events alone over 600 members of the PDPA. Through intermediaries he established contact with the leaders of the rightwing Muslim opposition. Amin. they set about uniting all the anti-Amin groups in the country and 106 .On the direct orders of H. to become more active. The dictatorial methods of government. made the development of the revolutionary processes extremely difficult and enabled the counter-revolutionary forces. Restrictions were put on their contacts with Afghan representatives. which were really in control in many of the provinces. who were in emigration abroad.’ The unrest also spread to the army. Amin false rumors were circulated in the DRA discrediting the Soviet Union and casting a shadow on the activities of Soviet officials in Afghanistan. The scale of the political repression assumed an increasingly mass character. At the same time attempts were made to establish contacts with the Americans within the framework of 'a more balanced foreign policy' approved by Amin.
. to defining the social base and strengthening the authorities on the spot. Amin carried out an armed attack during the night of 27 to 28 December which ended in the overthrow the regime of H. Sarwari for the Khalq faction and Babrak for the Parcham faction declared that the party had finally united. “In its manifesto the new regime stated that it would fight for the complete victory of the national-democratic. anti-imperialist revolution and for the protection of the national independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan. Babrak was elected leader of the new party and Sarwari his deputy. the decision was taken to send the necessary contingent of the Soviet army to Afghanistan. a considerable part of the Afghan army and the state apparatus which welcomed the establishment of the new leadership of the DRA and the PDPA. Amin. the clans and national minorities. One of the first actions which attracted much attention from the Afghan public was the release of a large number of political prisoners which 106 As marked in Russian original. Its foreign policy would pursue a comprehensive strengthening of friendship and co-operation with the USSR.abroad in order to save the country and the revolution.. In view of the mistakes of the former regime. the new leadership intends to pay serious attention to the broad democratization of public life and to legality. the forces opposed to H. They included representatives of the former Parcham and Khalq factions. Because of the extremely difficult conditions which threatened the achievements of the April Revolution and the security of our country. and to adopt a flexible attitude to religion. all the more so as the former government of the DRA had also requested this. it became essential to extend additional military support to Afghanistan. The new government and Revolutionary Council was formed from a wide and representative base. In accordance with the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978. the intelligentsia. and non-party people. representatives from the army. . On the wave of patriotic feelings which had overcome fairly broad sections of the Afghan population following the introduction of Soviet troops which was carried out in strict accordance with the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978. anti-feudal. 107 .106 Disagreements were cast aside and the former split in the PDPA healed.. This attack was widely supported by the working masses..
In this light it is possible to be sure that the new leadership of the DRA will be able to find an effective way to stabilize completely the situation in the country. . Andropov was the only signatory who knew the whole truth about the events.” The general opinion of the Afghan public was that Afghanistan could have managed without Soviet tanks. Allah is the only central power.” In January 1980. He is able to take a sober and objective view of the situation in Afghanistan.included prominent politicians and military personalities. and the people quickly rose in the defense of Allah against the occupiers. Gorelov in December 1979. He has always been noted for his sincere goodwill towards the Soviet Union and is held in great respect in the party and throughout the country. It will therefore be necessary to teach the people the correct interpretation of the events. immediately after the invasion of Soviet troops into the country. Many of them (Qadir. “The Russian infidels want to substitute the Devil for the holy faith in Allah. Ivanov and Magometov108 that “the population now thinks that the Soviet Union brought Karmal Babrak and the new government to power.107 Babrak can be described as one of the best-trained leaders of the PDPA theoretically. Babrak admitted to Tabeev. 108 . Facts were distorted and rearranged.” On 25 December.…. socialist and worker's parties in the appropriate ways.-Gen. The Afghans could have sorted the situation out themselves and the Russians were only 107 108 As marked in Russian original.” The memorandum was written according to the rules of disinformation. The Afghan people quickly grasped the meaning of the occupation. posters had appeared in Kabul with the slogan “Get rid of the Russians and teach them the same lesson we taught the English. Gromyko to calm the concerns of foreign countries about the actions of the USSR. He had prepared and influenced them and had stagemanaged what had happened. In Afghanistan. Keshtmand.-Gen. Editors’ Note: Lt. The rest knew only part of the truth and their role had been subsidiary as a form of insurance. Magometov replaced Lt. Rafi. and a false interpretation of the situation was given. and Ponomarev to influence communist. The situation in the country is becoming normal. and other) have taken an active and keen part in the work of the new Revolutionary Council and government. S.. The attitude towards the Soviet military and specialists remains generally good. Ustinov had been given the task of occupying the country.
made the following comment on the events of 27 and 28 December. helped by Czechoslovakia which had given political asylum to Babrak. to return to the USSR before their presence begins to make Afghans feel hostile.P.110 and explained the reasons behind the sending of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. Babrak thanked the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for moving Boniadi and said: “Now he can live quietly in Kabul. People in Kabul say that it is good that Babrak Karmal has returned. Andrei. Amin was hated. “No one now feels optimistic in the way many intellectuals did after the events of April 1978. declared in connection with the overthrow of Amin that “the present political situation was the work of the Soviet Union. Andrei expressed the view that the action taken by the Soviet government in Afghanistan would not improve the standing of the USSR.” In an attempt to placate world opinion over the occupation of Afghanistan. the Ambassador of the CSSR in Afghanistan. but the arrival of foreign troops in Kabul and other parts of the country brings no joy to Afghans. a special meeting of the Permanent Bureau of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party was held to discuss Afghanistan.” He said to a member of the KGB that “the inhabitants of Afghanistan consider that it would be a good thing for the Soviet troops.” 109 . the KGB devised various active measures and began to carry them out. This is simply interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.causing havoc. a department head in the Ministry of Education and a former member of the City Committee of the PDPA. visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Drozdenko. but there have been many examples in Afghanistan during the last few years when seemingly decent people have become scoundrels and sadists. The Soviet ambassador in Romania. Boniadi. On 29 December. No repressive measures will be taken against him as long as he does not attack the new regime. He expected the Romanians to take a positive and understanding view. but that it is also important how he returned.” complained Faruk. his plan to remain in the West was thwarted and he was forcibly returned to Kabul. The Russians had brought Karmal to power. Zaryab. V.” The editor-in-chief of the Afghan magazine Farkhany Khalq. The Parchamists are generally considered honest and decent.”109 “Afghanistan has become a second Czechoslovakia. On 29 December. The Secretary 109 Author’s Note: Boniadi was dismissed. A. “The Soviet embassy must stop the Parchamists from disarming the Khalqis without authorization or they will shoot. having done their job.
” On 28 December. however the events were explained by the USSR. Babrak to come to power. The immediate task facing the new government was to stabilize the situation 110 Editors’ Note: Stefan Andrei.” Dumitru Popescu.] The situation. the Beijing Residency received instructions to use the following arguments in talks with representatives of the Muslim countries in the local diplomatic and press corps. “The deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan must be viewed as a direct result of the events in Iran. and made it easy for the forces which were supported from outside to organize a counter. established a reign of bloody terror and ignored the interests of the people and the national minorities.of the Central Committee for Propaganda. But there were still healthy forces within the PDPA which had made it possible for the government of national unity led by K. which favored the rebels. was the result of the policies of Amin who had usurped power in the country. It counted on understanding of the action it had been forced to take in Afghanistan. and blindly follow. the Soviet Union is also demanding understanding and support from the socialist countries. The Soviet leadership considered that the Iranian leadership and Ayatollah Khomeini in person must be informed of this. 110 . While pursuing its global aims. said in his speech that: “Romania must not agree with. Ambassador Vinogradov met Khomeini in the city of Qum and tried to explain the reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [Eight lines excised. He informed him in confidence that the Americans and [US] President [Jimmy] Carter personally had asked the Soviet government a number of times to show understanding of the American position in the Iranian-American conflict. Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs 1978-1984. stated that the Soviet Union had given “us prepared information regarding the events which have taken place in Afghanistan and. Sentenced to 14 years imprisonment in 1992. But the Soviet leaders had rejected the groundless arguments of the Americans who were concealing their hand in Iran. LIA Radulescu. a member of the Permanent Bureau [of the Executive Political Committee of the RCP Central Committee]. Khomeini said in reply that “there could be no mutual understanding between a Muslim nation and a non-Muslim government. Amin’s disregard for the slogans and principles of the April Revolution had deprived him of the support of influential Muslim circles in Afghanistan. the policies of the USSR.revolutionary attack.” On 8 January 1980. the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan is evidence of its hegemonic policies.
including an improvement in relations with Iran and Pakistan. for example. Operational reports from the Ukraine. including military assistance in accordance with the 1978 treaty. The purpose of the anti-Soviet campaign in the UN was to distract the attention of world opinion from such acute problems for the Arab countries as the Camp David accord and the capitulation of Sadat. They were forbidden to make use of their weapons except as self-defense in cases of unprovoked attack. The policies of Amin had betrayed the interests of the Afghan people and allowed the rebels who had been sent from other countries to get the support of some decent Muslims who had been confused by bourgeois propaganda. Babrak’s government had been forced to turn to the Soviet government for assistance.” 111 . The Soviet troops in Afghanistan were under the same rules as United Nations troops. It could not swallow the deceptive explanations and stories. Those present were assured that the December change of leadership in Afghanistan had been executed by the Afghan people itself and was only for their benefit.” “The Soviet Union really strives for world domination. The change of leadership had created favorable conditions for resolving internal and external matters.” An active measure was also carried out at a meeting of the International Secretariat of Solidarity with the Arab Peoples in Tripoli. “We intervene ourselves and then want the Western countries to approve our action. It would allow the problems of the country to be solved by peaceful means and not by repression as had been done under Amin. The population of the USSR was also not delighted by the provocative behavior of its government.in the country and to keep the armed bands which had been sent from outside away from the people. “I feel ashamed to be Russian. and it was not leaping with joy. The very presence of Soviet troops could only help stabilize of the situation in the country and they would be withdrawn as soon as this is achieved. but why has it picked on Afghanistan?” Even some members of the KGB overcame their fear of being denounced and confided their dismay at the actions of the Kremlin chiefs to their friends. which were given to explain the occupation of a foreign country. The discussion of Afghanistan in the UN sets a precedent for the USA to interfere in future in the internal affairs of other countries. noted the negative reaction of the intelligentsia to the sending of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. We are serfs and beggars ourselves and make others captive and poor. In order to stabilize the situation in the country and stop foreign intervention. The Soviet troops were only there to stabilize the situation and to prevent fratricidal war.
during a meeting in Moscow on 14 October 1980. On 29 December. Andropov. The Soviet government responded favorably to the request from a friendly government and met the request. Amin had officially handed the Soviet ambassador the request for Soviet troops. Thanks to these comrades and the threat of direct aggression against the country. These parties had been hostile to each other 112 . They suggested the following approach. which threaten the achievements of the April Revolution and the security interests of the USSR. The head of the KGB. The Soviet troops observed complete neutrality during the December events.And the KGB continued to shower the world with misinformation about the events in Afghanistan in the same way as it covered the American embassy in Moscow with bugging equipment. The USSR had nothing to do with the events of 27 December 1979 which ended with the removal of Amin. The Afghan side had repeatedly requested that a limited contingent of Soviet troops be sent to Afghanistan. China. sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. On 24 February 1980 Tabeev and Ivanov sent a joint telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the FCD about a united Soviet and Afghan explanation of the reasons for the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. This evil plot was uncovered by healthy forces within the leadership of the DRA who had infiltrated into the narrow circle of those trusted by Amin. Amin was forced to accept the introduction of Soviet troops in order not to reveal his part in the plans for an external and internal counter-revolution. Parcham the party of the intelligentsia. “In 1978 the Parcham and Khalq parties carried out a revolution. even if this led to a war in the region. Pham Hung. gave the following account of the events in Afghanistan to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. as the counter-revolutionaries were being supported from outside by the USA. Khalq is a military party. Amin could not disagree with the majority of the members of the Afghan leadership. Pakistan and the reactionary Muslim regimes. Even before 27 December. The Afghan people cannot manage without military assistance from the USSR as long as there is a threat of foreign aggression and foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. They elected Babrak General Secretary of the PDPA. Amin planned a counter-revolutionary coup with the assistance of the CIA and the Muslim underground. China and Pakistan for their troops to be sent in order to put an end to the independence. the PDPA Central Committee condemned Amin and decided on his removal and execution. The plan of the imperialists and reactionary forces was to establish a puppet regime headed by Amin and to appeal to the USA. The introduction of Soviet troops in the DRA began in the second half of December 1979.
He was then arrested and strangled to death in prison. 113 . The Parcham and the Khalq supporters continued to struggle.for fifteen years. Taraki was aware of this but he paid no attention to it. a very complex and unclear figure. Later proof was found which confirmed the intention to eliminate the gains of the April Revolution and to establish an Islamic republic under the leadership of Iran. On his own initiative Amin called a plenum at which Taraki was dismissed from all his posts. He had not had any contacts with the USSR nor with Taraki and Babrak when he was a member of the underground. one American newspaper wrote that ‘order would be established’ in Afghanistan by March 1980. Evidently the USA and Iran were relying on Amin. Amin had had difficult relations with the mullahs (there are about 40. As a result all the Afghan people turned against him. When he realized the danger. Babrak was sent to the CSSR as ambassador. He became Deputy Chairman of the Party.000 mosques in Afghanistan). [One line excised] Amin concentrated vast power in his own hands. and had carried out unsuccessful land reforms. They were both generally Marxist-Leninist parties but they differed on tactics. Thus. Foreign Affairs and State Security. The Afghan underground used the arrival of the Soviet troops in the country to seize power. The majority of Parchamis were dismissed from responsible posts in the government and were either sent to other countries as ambassadors or repressed.” Who overthrew Amin? In time his overthrow coincided with the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. As a result of the April Revolution (which was carried out by the Khalq faction) Taraki came to power. At that time Babrak was the deputy leader of the party. There were two reasons for the Soviet troops to be sent to Afghanistan: to defend the revolution and to safeguard the security of the Soviet Union. If the USA had moved into Afghanistan we would have been forced to keep a large number of troops on the Soviet-Afghan border. it was already too late as Amin had all the power in his own hands. At first he was pleased with Amin and did not notice how the latter was taking all the power into his own hands. Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Defense. After his departure Amin became the second most important person in the country. Amin ordered a whole village to be bombed if ten or more men from the village joined an underground group. Deputy President of the Republic. Taraki was quite old.
It contained a 'secret letter' supposedly written by Peter to his descendants setting out ways and means to conquer Europe and establish a world dominion of Russia. Too much grain was being piled up in the grain stores of the USA. with a radical solution to the Pushtu and Baluchi111 problem to the advantage of Afghanistan. Afghanistan had an excess of this ore. The next stage of the disinformation action was the spreading of a rumor that the 114 . the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture were all involved as well as other organizations. Taraki raised the question with Brezhnev of Afghanistan extending to the sea and training the army to act in this region. the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The different opinions of the USA and its European partners were taken into account. recovering from its initial stupor. In response to some reduction in grain shipments to the USSR imposed by Carter. Soviet internationalism often covers vast geographical expanses under the guise of the fight against imperialism. The First Chief Directorate. The second stage was to put forward the opinion that the USSR could get by without any grain purchases from the USA. Australia and New Zealand to replace those from the USA. The timing of the arrival of the troops and the coup against Amin was carefully planned. therefore. The Americans. Hindustan has been like a magnet from time immemorial and attracted the gaze of conquerors. the KGB. The KGB managed to direct the American intelligence service to good areas to confirm the information it had received from the sputniks. Author’s Note: From 1973 to 1976 the Afghan government established and armed a tribal formation with 3. The parliaments of the democratic countries were celebrating Christmas. First of all a disinformation operation was carried out to make the Americans confused about the real figures for the grain harvest in the USSR. These were in line with the so-called 'will' of Peter the Great. The autocrat somehow planned to take from England its most priceless pearl and sent to India the Cossack troops of the Atamans Orlov and Platov.Strategic considerations must not be ignored. Canada.” he said. At the government level. And it is only five hundred versts from Afghanistan to the southern seas. A general picture of the harvest can be obtained from sputniks but evidence from agents is needed for precise figures. was forced to accept the idea that Moscow would not let Afghanistan out of its sphere of influence. gas and other minerals. Pakistan was viewed as a foreign body in the region. France did not dramatize the situation at all as it considered that Afghanistan had in practice always been under the influence of the USSR.”112 111 112 Editors’ Note: One of Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities located primarily in the Nimrus province. The ill-prepared march ended in a sad state before the distant goal was reached. particularly against Pakistan. The Carter adminis tration. The book 'The Expansion of the Russian State from the Time of its Establishment to the Beginning of the 19th Century' by the French historian Lesoir had prompted this feeling. “We must not leave the Pakistani Pushtun and Baluchi in the hands of the imperialists. The USA was bogged down in a drawn-out conflict with Iran. The false impression was given that the Soviet Union was obtaining supplies from Argentina. They could reach the Strait of Hormuz and the shores of the Indian Ocean. France and the FRG did not accept Carter’s proposals for political sanctions. “Already now it would be possible to launch a national liberation struggle amongst these tribes and include the Pushtun and Baluchi regions in Afghanistan. Paradoxically this foreign initiative was in keeping with the goals of the Communists. Tsar Pavel was tempted too. the KGB devised a complex active measure to remove the boycott. the embassy and the advisors. The nomenklatura was also bound to take into account the increased demand by industry for copper.000 men to fight against the government of Bhutto. began to correct their estimate of the grain harvest upwards. the sources of which were becoming exhausted. The vigilance of Amin and his entourage was undermined by the efforts of the KGB. Taraki and Amin threw an exciting idea to the Soviet politicians. the 2nd Chief Directorate. Napoleonic France was preparing to march on Russia and had secured the approval of the European courts. Like toreadors waiving a red flag to a bull.
” In October he again raised his favorite theme. But as soon as losses were recorded the 2nd. the active measures of the KGB in economic and grain policies brought a saving of 500 million hard currency rubles over the two year period.Chief Directorate came on the scene accusing the members of the FCD of making money for themselves. Reagan kept his promise. If we do not fulfill this historic task. This was timed to the moment when the price of grain on the world market was at its lowest. then one can say that we have been working in vain.” The nomenclatura urged their Afghan friends not to be up in the clouds and to wait a little for the ocean as this would distract the forces and means of the young republic away from the primary tasks of strengthening its position inside the country. In the end it was the Americans who asked the USSR to restart the grain purchases. In the mid-20th century the area on both sides of the line 115 . The acceptance of this line--which was named for Sir Mortimer Durand. marking their respective spheres of influence.? The FCD had to account for its actions and prove that it had not been at fault. Andropov said that the disinformation service was the only intelligence organ which made a profit. and then to the valley of the Indus which must be our border. in modern times it has marked the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. who induced Abdor Rahman Khan. He did not recognize the Durand line113 as final but he did not raise the matter in public. Matrosov. According to figures of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. We wish to see the sea with our own eyes. Five people were made Heroes of Socialist Labor and dozens were awarded orders for their part in this operation. There is a right time for everything. if they were elected President for the 1980 to 1984 term. This forced Reagan and the other Presidential candidates to announce that. the head of the KGB border troops approved. The territory of Afghanistan must reach to the shores of the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. to agree to a boundary--may be said to have settled the IndoAfghan frontier problem for the rest of the British period. The fruit was not yet ripe. all the others only spent gold. About gold. The 2nd. possibly with the connivance of traders in the stock exchange. amir of Afghanistan. We must have an outlet to the Indian Ocean!” Babrak also cherished the idea of a greater Afghanistan.Chief Directorate asked too many questions: why was the transaction unprofitable. They should limit themselves meanwhile to the possibilities of their special services in Pakistan and Baluchistan. They suspected that espionage was involved. why gold was not bought at the lowest prices but when it was still falling etc. Pressure was put on farmers through agents of influence. why was the gold not sold when the price was at its peak. “It is right not to raise the matter of the borders with neighbors now. In the drive for good money the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee gave permission for the FCD to engage in gold speculation on international stock exchanges. then they would lift the embargo. The nomenclatura Americans were using a substance which was harmful to people and animals in the grain stores. 113 Durand Line is the boundary established in the Hindu Kush in 1893 running through the tribal lands between Afghanistan and British India. “Our task is to direct the officers and soldiers and all the Afghan people to the Durand line which we do not recognize.In August 1978 Amin was heatedly telling Puzanov and Gorelov: “We are not parading the question of Pushtunistan and Baluchistan in the press although this question is still on the agenda. citing the peculiarities of the state of the stock market.
114 Author’s Note: There was insufficient accommodation for soldiers called up from the reserve. There were attempts to form small groups to fight for the liberation of the Uzbek nation 116 . Some tried to get hold of arms in order to move into the mountains and begin an armed struggle against the authorities. The units and formations were brought up to full strength. The broadcasts of the Gorgan radio in Turkish advocating Islam. The Turks who had been expelled from Georgia were demanding that they should be allowed to return. The KGB considered these anti-Soviet. In 1980 approximately 7. THE WAR A state of emergency was introduced in the regions of the USSR bordering Afghanistan and Iran. On mobilization days there were unfavorable rumors and gossip about Soviet conditions and the events in Iran and Afghanistan.5 million Pashtuns were living in the area around the Durand Line. It was forbidden to mention the planned invasion in any communications. There was talk of introducing the Chechen method of mass strikes. The Soviet Mullah called on the people to follow Khomeini as a new prophet.cautioned them with the saying: “First it is necessary to conquer Afghanistan!” The temptations were great.114 became the subject of a movement for Pashtun independence and establishment of an independent state of Pakhtunistan. 'Holy' letters from Muslims and Christians were distributed in villages and towns. There was a sharp increase in military and special transport. The people bought up food and essential items and many families got ready to depart for the country. Military reservists was mobilized and vehicles commandeered from the economy. They dis tributed leaflets calling for the underground organizations to be united. The Crimean Tatars sought out foreigners in order to give them papers calling for the Crimean question to be raised in the UN. There was a sharp increase in the incidents of indiscipline amongst the troops and absence without leave. The undeclared war against the Afghan people had begun. 49 soldiers dressed as civilians were detained in Ashkhabad during the night of 3 January 1980. the Iranian religious life and an Islamic state had a profound effect on the people. There were strong nationalist and anti-Russian feelings amongst the Uzbeks. the risks minimal and serious opposition seemed unlikely. 7 machine-guns and 2 pistols were taken from them. put on military alert and holidays and leave were cancelled. The young people were particularly aggressive. The Germans held firm views and there was a strong emigration movement.
on trains. a large-scale speculator. They made life unbearable for Russians. Marshal Sokolov115 arrived in Kabul on 4 January 1980 in a decisive mood. Gold coins. Sokolov. Mara. The special military trains did not make any stops. A music teacher. bought 15. Counter-intelligence targeting of foreigners was stepped up. Several hundred people with such views were put under the watch of the KGB. auditors. Any suspicious correspondence was kept and the writers investigated. The situation was regulated and agents posted in places of work and leisure. Attempts by Soviet citizens to flee to Iran were stopped. was involved in currency speculation. Mitkalev. The KGB dealt with the internal situation without much difficulty. Soviet Deputy Minster of Defense (1967-1987). in houses and in beds. Sokolov. Konov. The generals were also full of enthusiasm and could not wait to prove themselves against the weak opponent. Preparations were made at full speed for the possible evacuation from Afghanistan and Iran to the USSR of foreigners and groups of Iranians and Afghans. sunglasses. a member of the FCD in Kabul who had previously worked in a Residency in an African country. Lieutenant-Colonel Eduard Goncharov. They were staffed by transferring career officers from the Line departments and officers called up from the reserve. All official communication and radio posts were taken over. For this purpose a reception procedure was worked out. had written a manuscript about Soviet life and the teaching of Marxism-Leninism as it really was. The routes were divided into segments and hidden surveillance posts were set up. Letters which mentioned that the troops were on a state of alert were confiscated. Investigations were made to ascertain whether the USA had activated its illegals. shop managers.The KGB was in charge of the transport of troops and military equipment. People who had a knowledge of Farsi were selected. 117 . from the influence of the Russians. filtration points set up and operational investigative groups established. He paid more than a million rubles. There was no real danger. On 16 February. A special assignment group from Service R of the KGB was sent to Kushka. In January 1980 a senior engineer at an agro-chemical laboratory in the town of Bairam-Ali. The airforce heavily bombarded the rebels and the army started action. Agent work was stepped up in all the sectors. frightened them with threats of violence and crossed their names off the lists of candidates for elections to the Soviets. Kurbanov. 115 Editors’ Note: Marshal Sergei L. sales assistants. Special departments were added to the military units. Buffet staff. He 'had the idea' of overthrowing the Soviet regime and had written an article entitled 'Reporting with a Gag in Your Mouth' which he had wanted to give to the Americans. Ashkhabad and other towns and cities were involved.F. The KGB received many reports of politically immature criticism of the Party and state leadership and the sending of troops to Afghanistan.500 gold coins. Economic targets were put under increased guard and the control of mail and telephone conversations was increased. S. train attendants and ticket off1cers from Kushka. cigarette lighters and scarves were smuggled into the Soviet Union. drugs. Smuggling operations by Soviet citizens and Afghans were uncovered. was arrested.
a member of the NDPA provincial committee and the head of the department of the governorship. There was a similar situation in the city of Herat. Sergei F. Magometov met Babrak and gave a review of the situation. The military was used to restore order. there were anti-Soviet demonstrations in Kabul. led the fight against the Parcham aristocracy.K. 43 tanks. In the summer of 1980 the city of Kandahar revolted. They told him about the actions of the Soviet army.” said Sokolov to illustrate the situation. 30 tanks and 200 armored personnel carriers and personnel carriers with tracks from the Soviet Union and 11 companies (over 1. the head of the organization department. on Babrak’s suggestion. Abdul Zahir Chupon. 118 . Kaiut. Paikarju. the commandant of the city. the Afghan air force 56. There a group of Khalq supporters was organized to fight against the Babrak government. the deputy secretary of the Herat City Committee. From 20 to 23 February. They had the authority to co-ordinate and direct the work of the Defense and Interior Ministries and the organs of state security. Planes and artillery were used on a large scale. two Secretaries from the district provincial committees. The surrounding areas and villages were combed. “Our air force has carried out 240 combat flights. The city was put in a state of siege. Soviet aircraft carried out 158 sorties and the Afghans 49. 40 personnel carriers with tracks and mobile multiple rocket launchers from the Afghan army took part.000 Soviet soldiers). Other members were Major-General Qadir. Hedge-hopping flights were made over the city and the surrounding area in order to frighten the people. Qadir was made commandant of the city. First Deputy Chief of the USSR General Staff. nine 116 Editors’ Note: Gen.Akhromeev116 and S. the Secretary of the Party Committee of Herat Province. More than 900 of the demonstrators were arrested. Then the attack began.S. B. A center for the normalization of the situation in Kabul was set up and headed by Sarwari. On 30 August the city was completely surrounded by Soviet troops. The bridges were blocked. Akhromeev. 24 companies (over 2. barriers and hidden ambushes were set up on all the roads leading into the city. the deputy commander of the 17th infantry division in charge of political work. and. the Secretary of the City Committee who was a Khalq supporter.000 soldiers). Their reaction was rather the reverse. A. The first onslaught did not frighten people. Most of the countryside was in the hands of the rebels. The group included SAGIN. Ivanov.
Four times they tried to break through the tightening ring. The city was surrounded by Soviet troops.L. The besieged showed fierce resistance and displayed heroism and personal bravery with their poor arms. The most vulnerable parts of the Afghan-Iranian border were firmly closed and the roads mined. The KGB 'Cascade' units of 145 men and the false groups which were set up to expose the genuine resistance groups and eliminate them played an important role. 651 were imprisoned. 43 army patrols combed the streets.500 men with massive military hardware and arms were involved. two paratroop battalions and a special reconnaissance company took part in the military action.500 people. the national gendarmerie. As a trophy the victor acquired 13 motor vehicles. Herat fell on 11 September. The battle for the city lasted for a week. As a result of the month-long battles five of the twenty-two administrative units in the province of Herat were cleared of rebels. An operational group from the USSR Ministry of Defense and the KGB Representation worked out a plan for military. Katichev had been the military adviser to the division. were arrested. In October another nine were cleared. In March 1979 there had been an attempted revolt against the authorities. Two motorized infantry regiments. Combat units with Afghan 119 . The proximity of Iran and the probability that Iran would be used as a base for extending the partisan movement to the Western part of Afghanistan was taken into consideration. Altogether over 4. 551 rebels were killed in the fighting. This was not the first trouble in the 17th infantry division. Over 2. 73 rifles and 40 kilograms of explosives.members of the city and district party committees and two leading members of the Sarandoy. 17 members of Khad. operational and political actions against the insurgents and the establishment of the authorities of the Kabul regime in the city and the province. Four control points were set up in the city.225 people were kept. An infiltration camp was set up in the stadium where over 2. 44 party activists and 152 combat troops from the Sarandoy were sent from Kabul. The local members of the special services were not included in the planning of this operation for fear that information might be leaked to the adversary.036 prisoners taken. 35 dedicated enthusiasts were selected locally. Everyone entering and leaving the city was checked and anyone considered at all suspicious was detained. At that time Lieutenant-Colonel S. including four Iranians. In September a series of military and operational-military operations were carried out both in Herat and in the surrounding area and province. Three leaders of the uprising were killed and 1. 19 motorcycles.
Jusjan. They closed off the areas which had been liberated by the troops and checked all the inhabitants. Badgis and Faryab to the Turkmen SSR. But the army was unreliable and there were a lot of desertions. The provinces of Balkh. tea. A small quantity of flour. The successful experience of the 'Cascade' unit was later used in other provinces. sugar. salt. enterprises and individuals. But when Babrak naively asked MATROSOV and Chuchukin to ease the border control so that the citizens of both countries could mix freely. the head of the Directorate of the border troops of the KGB replied that he could not do this as it would have undesirable consequences. The commandos chosen are extremely brave people who like the excitement or members of the resistance movement who have been captured and recruited. as the Cheka calls them.accomplices ransacked buildings and houses. At a meeting of the senior officers they gave their permission for the Soviet commanders to carry out combat operations within a radius of 50 kilometers from the place where the Soviet troops were stationed without prior permission or agreement with the Afghans. and V. namely to prevent the free and uncontrolled mixing of the people.000 men and an airforce and anti-aircraft force of 15.000 opposed the rebels. They infiltrate a liberation movement and through vile means liquidate the patriots or lead them to be attacked by the armed forces of the KGB and army. A special resolution of the Politburo and the Council of Ministers of the USSR stated that it was desirable for direct Party. the head of the FCD Kryuchkov. The second phase of the war against the Afghan people was started by the Soviet troops. As members of these groups combat agents are selected who are prepared to take decisive action entailing the risk of life. The border command began to pander to the people from the very beginning. Marshal Sokolov. soap and kerosene was taken from Tajikistan to the province of Badakhshan. 121 people were killed in skirmishes and 357 taken prisoner. but it was made to appear that these provinces were eager to join the Soviet republics and that the nationalities living there were keen to be with their Soviet brothers. Bamian and Takhar were linked to the Tadjik SSR and Herat. geographical and economic factors were taken into account. arms and ammunition were confiscated. The latest weapons and technology were used including chemical poisons. footwear. Badakhshan. co-operation between them and the people is damaged and a feeling of uncertainty established in a short time and with minimal losses.000. Nangarkhar and the city and province of Kabul were linked to the Uzbek SSR. The main task was to eliminate the leaders of the rebel units and bands. rice. 13 local and village Muslim committees were eliminated. The airforce was heavily involved. The Ministry of Trade was ordered to arrange to purchase from the people of the province agricultural produce and handicrafts in exchange for manufactured goods. Samangan. Harmful literature. Spolnikov flew to Herat on 1 October. in the form of gas bombs of short 117 Author’s Note: A band is an armed group of two or more which is formed to attack government and public buildings. They expressed their approval of the actions of the Soviet command and KGB units. Kunduz.117 In 1978 and 1979 an army of 132.N. clothes for 30. communications channels are seized. 120 . Combat agent groups serve as the KGB reserve but they are seldom used independently for tactical tasks. The army was equipped with all essential supplies from the USSR. Tadjik and Turkmen republics and the provinces of the DRA. Parvan. He said this without revealing that the function of the Chekists was actually the opposite. which actually act like real bands. Ethnic. It is the false bands. In this way resistance groups are eliminated. government and economic links to be established between the Uzbek.
Each district has a military council. So the Soviets took over responsibility for maintaining order on the borders.000 meters depending on the physical terrain. He spent over 20. Ustinov reported to Brezhnev that the Soviet troops and KGB units were playing the main role in the fight against the counter-revolution. colleagues and their homes and place of work are all carefully checked during the selection process. Along borders with socialist countries this strip is 100 meters deep. He kept a three-roomed residence in Leningrad and acquired three cars and a motorcycle for his relations. The border troops were in full control of the Soviet-Afghan border. Along the entire border there is a strip of land 8 to 10 meters wide which is ploughed and raked. Particularly strict regulations are enforced in the strip of land adjoining the border. outposts and control points. departments. People entering the area have to pass passport control and special stamps are put in passports.000 rubles of public money on improvements to the house. Their area includes land. on the borders with China. The men. Border guards and the territorial organs of the KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs are responsible for controlling the border.118 5. Sometimes operatives will descend on a village as though they are attending celebrations in order to meet an agent. There are special regulations for people living and working in the area and relating to the ownership of all kinds of boats and flying machines. An operative is judged on the number of recruitments and signals he receives from agents. 121 . In the border troops intelligence officers and all the officers are responsible for agent work as well as the special departments. Virtually all the adults are recruited or are former agents. The Chekist leaders insisted that the borders of the DRA with Pakistan. each responsible for a certain part of the border. the chiefs act outside the law. carries out special checks and decides who should have access to the border. internal waterways. Total operational agent work is carried out amongst the local people. There were only three people in his family. modernists.duration. the second department of the headquarters of the border unit. Counter-intelligence work is carried out everywhere where people are living. lived in a mansion with six rooms and 123 square meters of living space. The battles were fought on the basis of intelligence information about the opponent obtained from Pakistan and Iran where the partisans regrouped and rested before returning to Afghanistan. They set up ambushes 118 Author’s Note: The border troops of the KGB are more reliable. the head of the special KGB department of the Carpathian military district. rivers and lakes. general staff. A district is divided into between several border units. their relations. Iran and Afghanistan from 500 to 2. lived in a two-story villa in the middle of Lvov with his wife. Iran and China should be completely closed. Norway and Finland 2 kilometers deep and on the borders with Turkey. various services and the intelligence service. a special department of the border unit. the head of the KGB border troops in the Turkestan district. the number of statements he obtains from people he has dealt with personally and the number of lectures and meetings he conducts. There is alarmed barbed wire. Wielding great power. Along the border the head of the border district shares power with the military. dogs and operational technical specialists. Four or five KGB sections are involved: the apparatus of the KGB of the district. A special department of the KGB collates all the material. And if there is a railway line in the area then the transport department of the KGB is also involved. a special department of the combat units and the police. But the Afghans had neither the troops nor the will to carry out their share of the job. trendies and listen to the Western radio.000 men were on patrol. Each unit in turn has a commandant's office. Each has three or more firing sections. During the selection process many people are rejected because they are considered hippies. General Goryainov. People who have a criminal record are forbidden to live or work in these areas. Like a hoop on a barrel they encircle the country and seal all the possible escape routes. Lieutenant-General Kovalevsky. A commandant's office consists of several outposts which are responsible for a certain area.
” In the summer of 1980 the territory of Afghanistan was divided into eight zones on the suggestion of the Soviet side. They had been used for communications and supplies from China to Afghanistan. [17 lines excised. Special commando battalions were established. the PDPA provincial committees. His task was to co-ordinate the work of the local organs of power. In the Turkestan border district alone more than 140 warning notices in 1960 were received. In May 1980. closed 400 kilometers of the border with China and Pakistan from where the three borders meet to the Doro pass and closed 16 passes and paths on Pamir. the embassy and the barracks at Tape Tajbek. the Soviet border troops occupied Afghan Pamir. The Kabul province was surrounded by lines of defense. Shafin was the representative in the northwestern zone. the units of the armed forces. N.for the partisans on the main supply routes from Termez. The KGB Representation and Soviet command considered that the population of Afghanistan did not support the government and was fleeing to Pakistan and Iran. B. Babrak was quite right when he declared to the Soviet ambassador and Grekov on 24 January 1981 that: “Now that the Soviet Union has taken such serious steps to save the Afghan revolution. Ambushes and traps were set up on the routes thought likely to be used by partisans trying to reach Kabul. the fates of our countries have really merged together. Paths and passes were destroyed and mines laid. socio-economic and propaganda resolutions of the top party and state organs were carried out in the zone.] 122 . Khad and the Sarandoy and to make sure that the military. N. additional KGB units were stationed behind the second border line on the borders with Pakistan and Iran in January 1981. Increased staff and technical means are used at places where they are likely to cross the border. the Soviet army communications center. On Andropov’s orders substantial. They considered that the Kabul authorities would be unable to overcome the Dushmen themselves and that they were incapable of A state of alert for all the operational staff is put into action when information of a possible attempt to cross the border by people on the hunted list is obtained. Dekhnesh in the north. Muhamed in the southeast. Their record cards are sent to all KGB departments and the special departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Takhzib in the northeast. These people are being hunted throughout the Union. A representative of the PDPA Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council was appointed to each zone. In the event of a rebellion the Soviet military units were to hide in such places as the military club. and Watanjar in the center. Kushka and other points to Kabul. There were three lines protecting the border. All KGB organs are supplied with information on them. their likely routes and methods and photographs. Five border brigades and new combat units were set up. M.
Rafi. The powers of the Soviet representatives in the zones were extended. were also invited. Matters discussed included cooperation between the Afghans and Soviets in military operations. the protection of economic targets and legal proceedings.dealing with the scale and intensity of the actions by the Dushmen. Romantsov and V.].N. A. Moscow gave the Soviet army the task of completely suppressing the resistance movement. Maximov).P. An operational group from the USSR Ministry of Defense was set up to coordinate the action. Akhromeev. Spolnikov. The military advisers to the general staff of the zones were allowed to engage up to a battalion in action [Word(s) excised. The Soviets decided the agenda for the meetings.A.V.I. Nur. political work amongst the people. [approx. the 40th army. Y. Its members were Sokolov. Chuchukin and N. director of the KHAD (1980-1986). Full participation by the USSR was required. These persons were instructed to give practical assistance to the command. Gulyabzoi. Alexeev. the DRA Ministry of Defense and the PDPA Central Committee in order to improve the concerted actions of the Soviet and Afghan units by using the staff of the Turkestan Military District and the 40th army.K. 119 Editors’ Note: Najibullah. Together with V. They were given the authority to take operational decisions in the fight against the insurgents. Matrosov. In some weak places Soviet troops replaced the Afghan troops. Sokolov also convened joint meetings of the leaders of the armed forces of the DRA and members of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee and the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council. The Afghans Keshtmand. Expanded meetings of the commanders of the 'Cascade' units and senior party and military advisers from the KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs in the administrative zones were held on a regular basis in the Soviet embassy. 1986-1992. getting rid of the rebels and extending the Kabul regime to the whole country in 1981. the apparatus of military advisers and the KGB Representation. Zerai. Executed in September 1996.119 who had been appointed by the administrative zones PDPA central committees and the Revolutionary Council. the general staff of the Turkestan Military District (under the command of Colonel-General Y. President of Afghanistan. ¾ line excised?] Sokolov and Akhromeev were responsible for coordinating the actions of the army and the border troops. 123 . and Najibullah. Makarov they also had responsibility for co-operating with the KGB.
The political officers complained that this meant that Party-Komsomol studies and political education suffered. A weekly report to Andropov and Ustinov stated that “1.084 transport flights.552 members of the Sarandoy were killed.236 armed actions. pilots. Kozlov. Some of the rebels fled into the mountains and froze to death there as they did not have warm clothes. Reserve units of border troops.000 sorties either to drop bombs or to give cover to the land forces. 56 of the 73 battalions were engaged in constant battles with no breaks or change of men. The operational reports to Moscow described the heroic acts of the army and the bravery and courage of the troops. equipment and arms. helicopter pilots and paratroopers. 39 battalions from the southern group of armies were engaged. Mayorov. In January and February military operations involved 792 battalion days. In March Tabeev. 436 a month. The 40th army was supplied with 81.” At the same time the foreign press readily published the Chekist inventions that the limited Soviet military contingent was fulfilling exactly the same duties as the UN troops in Lebanon.500 tons of military supplies. and there was increased co-operation between the military and the KGB Representation. In the Herat province the government could barely call its own 249 of the 124 . Better use was made of intelligence information. In the Kunduz province the insurgents controlled 346 of the 384 villages and only 38. and Spolnikov asked the government for three more regiments and three border units so that they could “clear the enemy from the territory of the DRA by the end of the year and stabilize the situation in the country. were controlled by the regime in Kabul. paratroopers and aircraft of the border troops were thrown into the fighting in the north of the country. The supposed enemy was attacked at full force on the ground and from the air.036 combat sorties and 3. In April the airforce carried out 3. The insurgents resisted desperately and dealt retaliatory blows to the Soviet and government troops. In the same year they made 760 unexpected attacks destroying 567 transport vehicles and damaging 500 administrative centers. (10%).390 rebels were killed between 25 February and 5 March. In 1981 they carried out 5. The protection of communications was also improved. From January 1981 there was an unprecedented upsurge in Soviet military activity. A large part of the country was controlled by the rebels. 4. They were merciless to the enemy.As a result of these actions there was an improvement in the movement and deployment of troops.” The troops of the 40th army were stretched to the limit in the fighting. The airforce carried out 12.
125 .121 D. When reporting to Ustinov on 120 Author’s Note: There was a minor episode on 10 March 1980. to raise the matter. whose main aim is to acquire complete power. pushes other concerns to one side. In the provinces of Balkh. (16%). the plan of the Soviets to crush the adversary in 1981 remained unfulfilled. To call them animals is to insult animals as they are of use to people. a weakening of their position and an exit from the political arena. a member of the Politburo and chairman of the Party Control [Commission] of the PDPA CC. women and children? It is difficult to find a name. Samangan and Faryab barely 43% of the 1. And if Afghans change their views this is seen as a defeat. Panjshiri. He mentioned the huge losses amongst the civilian population and the battering of Afghan men. The Russians have done nothing for the people and the people are ashamed of them. 40 rebels broke into the 100th reserve brigade of the Ministry of Defense of the DRA. Someone who does not care for his neighbor cannot be called human.M. Babrak asked Minister of Foreign Affairs S. He expressed the fear that Afghanistan could end up without a workforce.120 The population suffered great losses. Jozjan.1. They raided the stores and took 131 sub-machine-guns. They said: “What do you call Russian bombers and tanks which attack the elderly. the better. who was going to Moscow to sign a treaty on the status of the Soviet troops were stationed in Afghanistan. All the same. was displaying unheard of cruelty and ruthlessness and was acting on the principle of ‘the worse it is. 121 Author’s Note: It could not have been otherwise. Dost. 35 Degtyaryov machine-guns. Any communist group. 50 carbines. In Moscow Dost raised the matter of the conduct of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan with the Soviets.’ The soldiers and officers had no aversion to marauding and speculating with military property and fuel. The cruel actions of the Soviets aroused the hatred of the people. pistols and ammunition. They loaded it into cars and got away without being stopped. And if one part of the body is sick. then the whole body feels the pain.792 villages were under government control but the Kabul regime did not feel easy even in these places. The seeking of domination is based on the ideas of Lenin who asserted that Bolshevism as a form of tactics was suitable for all communists. Everyone has something in common. On 12 March 1980. The deadline for the eliminating the adversary was put off until the next year.” Even Babrak dared to mention the cruel Soviet actions when he was talking to the Soviet representatives. They disregarded the traffic rules. The Parchamis became Bolsheviks instead of Mensheviks and therefore wanted total power.517 villages. was very upset that the Soviet army was beginning to fight against the Afghan people.
For example.000.000.” Y. including 100 on electric power stations and electricity transmission lines and 60 on gas pipelines. They carried out 4.000 to 35. Around these groups insurgent units grew up numbering 500. 35 % of the territory of the whole country. 126 . The insurgents carried out 811 attacks on transport convoys and individual vehicles. and these then increased their number by drawing on local inhabitants. and the operational department of the 40th army put the number of people in such groups in the DRA at 30. They fired at administrative centers 1. Altogether 59 of the 186 administrative units and 54 of the 100 volosts [smaller administrative units]. During the first nine months of 1982 there were 7.000 rebels. His exit routes to the south.000 to 55.500 meters. west and east are cut off.620 acts of sabotage against important economic targets. an average of 854 a month which was almost twice as many as in the previous year. “The adversary has gone into the mountains with an altitude of 4. Nidjrab and Joybar the adversary is shut in ravines and has showed fierce resistance. KGB estimates put the figure at 50. The decision has been taken to eliminate a group of the adversary at the end of the winter period when the temperature in the mountains and the large amount of snow which has fallen in February will not allow the adversary to take cover in the mountains.500 times and carried out 1.. the apparatus of the chief military adviser. were under their control.” Small detachments and groups of trained organizer bandits were sent in from Iran and Pakistan onto the territory of the DRA. in the northeastern administrative zone. Maksimov. in a report to Ustinov and Andropov on the actions of the troops in January 1982. and 7 million people.300 attacks on military units.. 46% of the total population. They controlled 82% of all the kishlaks [villages] in the zone.U.the actions of the 40th army and the units of the KGB and Interior Ministry over the autumn and winter of 1981-82.000 to 4. wrote that: “The counter-revolutionary forces have managed to keep their zones of influence and to attract a considerable part of the population into the armed struggle against the existing regime . Sokolov was forced to admit that the efforts to eliminate the insurgents had not been completely successful. there were reckoned to be 40 serious centers of resistance with up to 4. To the north there are steep mountain faces which are inaccessible in winter.689 armed attacks on Soviet and government targets. Estimates by the USSR Ministry of Defense.000 fighters. In the areas of Tagab. They destroyed 800 vehicles.
The various partisan groups were beginning to coordinate their actions. The combat capability and morale of the army of the DRA was at a low level. There were specialized commands to attack aviation and armored tanks and groups of engineers to build dug-outs and defensive positions.000 rebels and took 4.000 men in nine months. He summoned them and.336 were wounded. grenade launchers and heavy machine-guns.500 deserted. inspected the 11th division.500 to 3. and the deputy of the chief military adviser. Cheremnykh. Mukhamed Nadir. Akhromevev and Osadchy suggested to Babrak that the conscription age should be lowered to eighteen. 2. In 1981 30. the term of service extended to three years. He then hit the commander. 850 taken prisoner and 2. the Minister of Defense. ordered 127 . They paid a visit to the canteen of the 7th artillery regiment. On 11 February 1981. They cleared rebels from 13 administrative units and volosts.000 Afghani.The Soviets noted that the rebels were becoming more organized and better trained.000 each month. V. The officers openly disobeyed orders. On 7 February 1982. There were also vast numbers of deserters in subsequent years. They began to make more use of mines and landmines. and with a smile said that if he did not bring order into the regiment. he himself would stick the blanket in his mouth and shove it in his stomach.200 were killed. 35. Thus. slapped their faces with his glove and ordered them to be arrested for six days.048 taken prisoner. and dust rose up from the blanket. They began to avoid battles and to maneuver more. Over 17. The ranks of the army were filled by compulsory conscription. and the wages of a soldier raised to 3. They killed 6. He turned to the commander of the regiment. in front of everyone else. 1.500 prisoners. Sokolov.P. From January to October the border troops in the northern regions took part in 182 combat operations. the Sarandoy alone lost about 8. Rafi. and Rafi noticed two soldiers who were not wearing white overalls.800 of the enemy were killed and 5. The leaders of the rebels held the view that they should preserve their men and prepare for an attack when the Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Afghanistan. The tactics of the partisans also changed. mortars. The following episode illustrates the ways of the army. according to the Soviet military and KGB.000 deserted from the army. The number of deserters was six times greater than the number killed which was also very high. and in 1982 from 2. co-operated with the Dushmen and went over to their side. On the following day Rafi patted with his hand a bed. During the first half of 1982 the Soviet troops were engaged in 23 serious battles.000 men had deserted from the army by 30 April 1980.
thirty kilometers south of the Tajik town of Khorog. At 2:05 p. The Soviet nomenklatura was forced to change its tactics in the war and to abandon the idea of conquering the whole country at once. But if it proves impossible to make real headway in the normalization of the situation and the elimination of the counterrevolution.him to be tied up and put in the lavatory where he was kept under guard until four in the morning by the soldiers accompanying the minister. A plan was devised to keep firm control over the regions which could be effectively controlled and to introduce national. In August 1981 Babrak discussed the situation with Sokolov and compared the situation in the country with wartime communism in the Soviet Union. Marshal Sokolov. Territorial committees for the defense of the revolution were set up in villages. Of greatest importance at the present stage is the personal authority and experience of the military chief. Moscow time on 19 November 1979 two Afghan planes flew into the air space of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and dropped two bombs on the border village of Nishusp. They said that they had given assistance to the Dushmen and encouraged the centers of resistance.122 Setbacks in the war disenchanted the Afghans. Surveillance of the population and its mood was stepped up and any movements and new people were noted. It later became known that the planes had been flying to bomb positions held by the rebels. They reckoned that this would allow them gradually to gain control of the whole country.m. either. all the actions of the authorities must be along those lines. streets and groups of houses. The Soviets were unable to finish off the partisans in 1982. social and economic changes in them. He said: “Although it would not be right to proclaim openly wartime communism. The slogan of the counterrevolution was to drive the Russian enslavers out of the country and to overthrow the puppets they had installed in Kabul. Five civilians were killed and ten people wounded. The aim was to achieve a decisive victory in the northern zones bordering the Soviet Union first. They depicted the leadership of the DRA as dependants who were trying to hand over the management of the party and the country to the Soviet advisers.” He gave the reasons for this as the weakness of the PDPA and its officials and the lack of any interest or participation by the popular masses. 128 . The KGB and military blamed the actions of international imperialism and the reactionary Islamic states. Babrak told those close to him that it was too early for him to be active “until the period of the Soviet advisers is over. but had become lost because they had no detailed maps or radio control and the visibility was poor. He then sent him to Kabul. then I intend 122 Author’s Note: There were unpleasant incidents in the northern zone.
Nur. It is all the work of the Khalq faction!” 129 .L. The Chekists considered that the Afghans were becoming increasingly critical of the military leaders and the situation in the country.to ask Andropov to come to the DRA to take direct charge of the actions aimed at improving the situation in Afghanistan. Moscow listened to him and sent the marshal whom he had not fully trusted before. Gol Aga expressed his feelings: “Why are we. and the DRA Ministry of Defense had not only failed to crush the counterrevolution but they had reached a deadlock. At a meeting of one party organization. Rafi and Gol Aga spread rumors that the Soviets were taking bribes from officers who belonged to the Khalq faction. the Parchamis. The PDPA Central Committee and Babrak.” said Gulyabzoi. Sokolov had returned to Kabul in May. They went to the Soviet embassy during Amin’s coup in September 1979. he exclaimed: ”I do not want to be in the same place as the Marshal. Gulyabzoi and Mazduryar. being accused of betraying the national interests? Was it we who invited the Soviet troops to Afghanistan? No! It was Watanjar. in spite of the fact that they had been told persistently what to do. “When he was in Moscow.” And Nadibullah added that the Marshal had returned in order to correct the mistakes he had made in 1980. Many people could not understand why the Soviet troops were staying in the country for so long. Babrak spoke about the bad work of General Mayorov and asked that Marshal Sokolov should be sent back to Afghanistan. were slow in developing a proper propaganda campaign to explain the purpose of the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan. the Soviet military advisers. I shall leave the country.” A little later Babrak said that Marshal Sokolov. When Baryali heard that S. They maintained that the Soviet representatives were unprincipled and responsible for the crimes of Taraki and Amin.
This was because they considered that the Soviet troops would deal 130 .DISCORD Before the group of Afghans was taken from Tashkent to Kabul on the eve of Amin’s elimination. and the Khalq supporters should know this. At one meeting Babrak said: “The USSR is supporting the Parchamis. As early as March 1980 the senior Chekists and military leaders in Afghanistan had reported to Andropov and Ustinov that little thought was being given to the fight against the rebels in the Ministry of Defense and the chief political directorate of the DRA. They were grateful to the CPSU. Asadullah Sarwari. Babrak swore that he would forget his personal feelings towards the Khalq supporters and take into consideration only the interests of the state.” The point was that the majority of the army commanders were Khalqis. But the new party and state leadership did not keep its promises and oaths and the bitter intra-party fighting did not cease. all expressed warm thanks for the assistance and care received at a difficult time. member of the Central Committee and Interior Minister. and Brezhnev for their international approach to the events in Afghanistan. Politburo member. then it will be eliminated down to the last soldier by the Soviet army. Said Muhamed Gulyabzoi. and Sherjan Mazduryar. the [Soviet] government. the Minister of Communications. They said that they valued the opinions of their Soviet comrades more than anything else and considered it their duty as Communists to follow all the instructions of the Soviet leadership. member of the Central Committee and Minister of Transportation. Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Deputy Prime Minister. Aslan Watanjar. If any division takes up arms against the government.
in discussing the candidate put forward by the Soviet military commanders. He tried to compromise senior officers. He guessed that they were giving unapproved information about the situation to the Soviet command. Babrak reacted badly to these suggestions. and new organizations established. In June he attended a meeting in the Soviet embassy with Tabeev and Grekov. Niyaz Muhamad. “Taraki tried to teach them Communism. but that that did not mean that there were no true Communists among them. All they can think about is motorcars. He did not give up the idea of 123 Editors’ Note: Account of the Prophet’s deeds and words.with this. the head of the economic department of the PDPA Central Committee. in December 1980 that the Afghans had been instructed to tell Soviet officials they met that there was unity in the party. in confidence. in the presence of Osadchy and Rafi. It was assumed that [the report was so written] in order to criticize more openly the mistakes of the Khalq [faction] in general. Tabeev said that Khalqism had been finally crushed as a political movement. There is no unity. who had been reporting on the appointment of a new commander of the 11th infantry division. especially those who were Khalqists. The Khalq supporters were being punished for giving Soviet specialists true information. On 3 September 1980. 131 . the safety of the population of the whole country had been secured and good conditions for economic activity had been established.” Niyaz tried to object and said: “The right things are being said but the ideas of the party are being distorted. They clearly do not understand that this is interference in our internal affairs.” Niyaz was rudely interrupted by the provocative question: “Who gave you these ideas?” There was opposition to the Soviet suggestions that the Khalqists and Parchamists should be considered as members of a single party. who was in Moscow for medical treatment. The people do not support the party at all. The hadith123 is taking precedence over the party.” Babrak specifically wanted more independence and space to maneuver in matters of personnel. even among the party secretaries. said. without criticizing particular individuals. Babrak. positions and amusements. Government positions are being given to friends. Party organizations in which the majority of members were Khalqists have been disbanded. expressed his annoyance: “I cannot understand why the Soviet comrades take such decisions without consulting me as General Secretary of the PDPA. but he failed. The leadership thinks that the USSR will solve all the economic and military problems.
there will be no unity in the PDPA and the government cannot become strong. He often complained: “It was not my idea that I should sit at the same table as the Khalqists. considered the Khalqists to be opportunists in the ranks of the PDPA.removing the Khalqists from the government and. When he spoke to his Soviet partners. and the party itself gave no basis for such ambitions. “As long as you keep my hands bound and do not let me deal with the Khalq faction. but did little to put it into action. Watanjar and Mazduryar as well as Sarwari. There can be no organic unity as long as there are Khlalqists in the party. The leadership of the PDPA did not achieve a breakthrough in the stabilization and normalization of the situation in the country.” As time passed Babrak became more and more anti-Khalq. They tortured and killed us. Amin and the Khalq faction to be completely discredited. It did not manage to overcome the main negative consequences of the policies 132 . of removing Gulyabzoi. wanted Taraki. The Residency considered that Babrak was not yet up to the task of leading the party. He listened attentively to advice. and his personal position was not improving. They still hate us. failed to differentiate between the supporters of Taraki and the supporters of Amin. As before he was limited by his narrow Parcham views. the army. At the same time he tried to get rid of any possible rivals and strengthen his own position in the party and the state. He studied in detail a course of lectures published by the Iranian Tudeh Party on the history of the CPSU and noted all the opposition and anti-party movements and groups which had been crushed by the Bolsheviks. then why cannot we in the PDPA deal the same way with the Khalq faction? Until this is done there will be no unity in the PDPA. Why did Babrak adopt such an extreme position? The situation in the country.” he kept saying. and was adopting the tactics of positive inaction. Babrak conceived the theoretical basis for his idea of installing order to the PDPA by crushing the Khalq faction and exposing the ideological failings of Khalqism-Tarakism. he spoke as someone who had found the truth and was convinced of it rather than someone who was searching for it. “Their hands are stained with blood. They are the enemies of unity! “ Babrak displayed the same attitude towards Trud [Labor] and ROTA [Revolutionary Organization of the Workers of Afghanistan] organizations. in particular. What unity is this? Would it not be better to fight against this opportunism?” In 1980 and 1981. His main conclusion from these history lessons was: “If the CPSU broke up and crushed so many factions and groups before it achieved a monopolistic unity.
Babrak promised to carry out all their suggestions. clarity and the ability to foresee future development all increase the information value of the report.1 in the FCD is the information and analysis service which collects intelligence information from all the Residencies. set out conclusions following from the analysis and proposals on measures to be taken. 1 of the FCD. logical with a well-grounded argument and suggestions and follow a strict line of thought with a precise use of terms and concepts. in Tashkent in December 1981. Pavlov. His energy was given a boost. The Service asks the Residencies for information on various political subjects. Representations. were noticeably insincere with their Soviet comrades. There are about 500 staff in the Service. head of the information group of the KGB Representation and a member of Service No. and apathy on the part of the population towards the established regime. the 1st departments of the territorial organs of the KGB. Babrak and his entourage were deeply concerned that neither the army nor the 124 Author’s Note: The Service No. This is shown by the fact that all the speeches and resolutions for the Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee in July 1980 were drawn up by the Soviets. that is. TASS. to appoint Kadyr Deputy Defense Minister. It had no idea of its main tasks.of the Taraki and Amin governments. to increase the strength of the army and the Sarandoy. 124 The meetings of the Politburo. the choice of information which could influence the development of events. They behaved like dependants but. but this did not last for long. Selection and fresh information and ideas. Most of this work was done by Major A.] 133 . They presumed that other matters would be settled by the Soviets. the foreign press and Soviet periodicals.V. Andropov and his protege Kryuchkov visited Afghanistan. The Residency considered that in the not too distant future it would be necessary to set out plainly to him the conditions for further cooperation and to continue to work with him with this in mind. As far as possible the reports should be short with the maximum information in the minimum of words. indifference. The leadership of the party did not know the real state of affairs in the various spheres of life in the party and the country. the institutes of the Academy of Science of the USSR. the Secretariat of the PDPA Central Committee and the government were a spontaneous exchange of opinions and no resolutions were passed unless they had been prepared beforehand by the Soviets. [3/4 page excised. These materials are used as the base for analytical reports which analyze interesting problems and developments. excluding Institute I of the FCD which has three times as many staff. There are members of the Service in all the large and average-sized residencies. GRU and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These were negativism. The Afghans paid an unreasonable amount of attention to internal party intrigues. Babrak held the view that an increase of Soviet influence and intervention in Afghanistan would increase his prestige and importance but not allow the Soviets to control him as they might wish. to achieve unity in the party. Babrak also met Andropov and Ustinov once again. and to sack a number of people. at the same time.
He ordered his bodyguards to make a show of being in his office when Gulyabzoi. In May 1982 a working group from the PDPA Central Committee carried out a review of the work of the DRA Ministry of Internal Affairs.” In some places the Parchamis resorted to using terror against their rivals. The Parchamis considered that the national conference of the PDPA in March 1982 marked their victory over the Khalq faction. The KGB also tried hard to vindicate Gulyabzoi. Watanjar and Mazduryar of factionalism. At first the KGB tried to vindicate Sarwari and prevented attempts by Babrak. Keshtmand called “for the Khalqists to be dealt with within a year. but within the single party there were internal party groupings. The KGB only approved Sarwari’s appointment as ambassador when Sarwari himself asked for its agreement that he should give up his political work. In May 1980 Tabeev and Ivanov recommended that the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the KGB should agree that Sarwari should receive medical attention in the USSR and then be sent as ambassador to Mongolia in order to reduce the tension in the PDPA between the Khalq and Parcham factions. Gulyabzoi should be treated in the same manner. Gulyabzoi. Therefore. He was nervous and irritable when he spoke to Sarwari. Parchamists or Trudists. The report was not shown to the leadership of the Ministry of Internal 134 . He claimed that in the PDPA there were no Khalqists. Watanjar. Keshtmand. Sarwari considered the struggle against them necessary in order to prevent any anti-government conspiracies. They spread rumors that the USSR had appointed Parchamists who were really representatives of the bourgeoisie and had nothing to do with the interests of the people to head the DRA. which needed to be dealt with on political and organizational lines. Mazduryar and other Khalqists went there as though they were preparing to attack him. it was a united party. he asked the Soviet representatives to consider sending Sarwari and Gulyabzoi abroad. Rafi and Kadyr to dismiss him for the crimes he had committed under Amin when he was in charge of the security services. The First Secretary of the Balkh province eliminated more than ten Khalqists.Sarandoy were Parchamist. Khalqists in the party apparatus and army were concerned about their careers and safety. They considered their real power base to be Khad and certain units of party activists. Babrak accused Sarwari. He had worked well as Minister of Internal Affairs. He was considered faithful and devoted to Soviet-Afghan cooperation. The Khalqists were placed under increased pressure.
The Residency obtained the report by operational means.V. disagreed and thought that the matter should be discussed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the appropriate conclusions should be drawn.K. Nevertheless. Tabeev backed down. The disagreement with Tabeev was reported to Moscow. Gulyabzoi's work was criticized at a closed meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee chaired by Babrak on 4 September and the question of his dismissal from his post as minister was raise. The KGB Representation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs told the Soviet ambassador that the report on the Ministry of Internal Affairs was prejudiced and that the conclusions of the report should not be discussed by the PDPA Central Committee. with a reference to the approval of the ambassador of the USSR. The Residency considered that it had not been written objectively. This resulted in an order to Tabeev to annul the conclusions about Gulyabzoi's factional activities and to put on the agenda measures design to improve the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA. and that it belittled the role of Soviet assistance in the establishment of the Sarandoy as an active armed force. They decided to submit a prepared draft resolution of the Central Committee of the PDPA and a plan to improve the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Central Committee of the PDPA. that the choice of facts was weighed against Minister Gulyabzoi. He justified this on the grounds that it had been agreed with the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs that stern sanctions should be taken against Gulyabzoi. they asked Tabeev to use his influence so that the report would be discussed but no action taken. In spite of the agreement with Tabeev that the Secretariat of the Central Committee should not be used against Gulyabzoi. Discussions of these proposals would not be linked to the earlier report on the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. With the approval of a senior Party adviser. A. On 21 September the matter of accusing Gulyabzoi or not was again raised with Tabeev. Conceding that the discussions would be used to discredit Gulyabzoi and dismiss him from his ministerial post. On 5 September the representatives of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs again spoke against Gulyabzoi’s dismissal at a meeting with Tabeev attended by the chief military adviser and acting senior Party adviser V. that it was a reflection of the internal political struggle. but was given to Babrak and some of the Secretaries of the Central Committee. Fateyev. Tabeev insisted that the failures of the work of the ministry and Gulyabzoi be examined. Romantsov. the draft Central Committee resolution which was sent to the Central Committee was 135 .Affairs. however. Tabeev.
altered. The representatives of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs therefore proposed that the ambassador and the chief military adviser should, through Romantsov, invite the Afghans to postpone the meeting scheduled for 25 September on the grounds that additional work was needed on the matter. At a planning meeting with Babrak, the KGB representative would ask him, as General Secretary, to take charge personally of the deliberations of the Central Committee on the written drafts as this was the wish of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Najibullah added fuel to the fire by showing Babrak material on amoral behavior by Gulyabzoi and a plan by one of the latter's relations to recruit the commander of the battalion of Babrak’s guards. The KGB Representation and the Residency began to view the actions of Babrak and his accomplices as at odds with the interests of the USSR in Afghanistan. This was seen in the growing anti-Soviet mood in the party and the country and the slowing-down of the revolutionary process. The sectarian and dependent line adopted by Babrak acted as a brake and forced the USSR to conduct the war against the Dushmen by itself. These people began to keep information on the true situation in the party and the country away from the Soviet advisers. Najibullah warned a delegation from Khad to be extremely careful in Moscow when talking about the situation in Afghanistan and the PDPA, as there were listening devices in the building housing the Afghan delegation. Babrak, N. A. Nur, M. Baryalai, S. Ye. Keshtmand, Rotebzad and Gol Aka all belonged to this orthodox group. They hindered the promotion of Afghans who had graduated from the Academy and higher education institutes in the USSR. 173 of the 271 who had studied in the Soviet Union were in the forces but only one held a high post. He was the head of the general staff of the corps. Military personnel who had studied in the capitalist countries, on the other hand, held higher posts and were at least division commanders. Gol Aka was an extreme Parchamist. He accused the advisers of being pro-Khalq and of working against the general trend of party unity. He held the view that there could be no reconciliation between the Parcham and Khalq factions. “The Khalqists who have committed crimes against the people can hide for as long as they like, but they will get their just retribution. Traitors and murderers were tried and condemned in the Soviet Union long after the war had ended; the same thing will happen in Afghanistan.”
The KGB Representation and Residency proposed that Gol Aka should be dismissed from his post of head of the political directorate of the army. They also considered Babrak lazy. He got up at nine in the morning and did not work very hard. He was rather like Taraki. He made ministers wait. He received the Minister of Internal Affairs not as a minister of internal affairs, but as an informant on the situation in the leadership of the PDPA. Babrak was prone to self-doubt and vacillation, and this was reflected in a distinct hesitancy and flabbiness in his dealings with other people and the way he was easily influenced. But he considered himself to be one of the great figures of the world and of more significance than Cuba’s Castro. He mistrusted G.D. Pandshiri, a member of the Politburo and Chairman of the Party Control Commission, as he “still has his own view about everything and is a cause and source of the intra-party disagreements.” He indirectly criticized his cousin, Minister of Finance A. Wakhil, for cooperating with the KGB. Babrak’s morals were also not beyond reproach, and he had an affair with Politburo member Anahita Roetebzad. Minister Gulyabzoi reported to Babrak daily on the situation in the country during the preceding twenty-four hours. He was surprised by the Soviet representatives’ conduct towards Babrak. They did not influence him in the way they should and they turned a blind eye to his heavy drinking as well as to his work in the party. Babrak was a passive leader of the party and country. His only concern was how to compromise the leaders of the Khalq faction. He was not concerned about consolidating the situation in the country as he considered that the Soviets must do this. At the same time, however, he criticized the work of the Soviet advisers. As Gulyabzoi said on one occasion, “Babrak is the president of the court rather than the country, and I am not the Minister of Internal Affairs of the DRA but the Minister of Internal Affairs of Kabul as most of the country is controlled by the rebels.” The life style of those close to Babrak was far from commendable. M. Baryalai, a half-brother of Babrak on his father's side and Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and head of the international department of the Central Committee who was viewed as a possible future leader, was dealing in houses and cars. Nur and Zerai sat together drinking tea everyday from 8 to 10 am chatting by the samovar.
Najibullah, Dost and Sakyki125 were another group. They were more flexible in their views on party unity but they did not question Babrak’s resolutions. Nepotism and favoritism towards relations and friends was rife within the leadership. They had no qualms about embezzling government property to satisfy their own needs and pleasure. In March 1982 Sokolov and Akhromeev reported to Ustinov that Nur, Baryalai and Gol Aka were acting against the interests of party unity. They had the support of Keshtmand, Najibullah and Rafi. These people were particularly dangerous as their influence was increasing, they frequently ignored the opinions and recommendations of the Soviet advisers and were behaving insincerely and like Pharisees. The military leaders suggested that they should be gradually relieved from their key positions and sent abroad. Abdul Kadyr was completely trusted by the Soviet organs and military. The Residency had a high opinion of him and considered him to be a man of principle and devoted to the USSR. He considered the discord between the Khalq and Parcham factions to be a consequence of the social standing of the Parchamists. The majority of Parchamists came from the privileged layers of Afghan society whereas the Khalqists were mostly poor and working-class. He had been physically tortured in prison, and the nerve in his right hand had been severed. Babrak was aware of his strong personality and secretly disliked and mistrusted him. The Residency suggested that he should be used more, bearing in mind Babrak’s opinion of him. In 1982 the Soviets managed to send Rafi to the USSR for military training and to put Kadyr in his place. Marshal Sokolov gave the following report on him. “A. Kadyr is loyal to the Soviet Union and will not make any important military or political moves without orders from the Soviets or their agreement. He has a good working relationship with General M.I. Sorokin. It is our view that A. Kadyr is one of the party and state leaders who has good prospects and could be of use to us.” But Najibullah added information about Kadyr’s dishonest financial dealings, his anti-party attitude and his conspiratorial plans to his blameless reference. Kadyr had tried to persuade Gulyabzoi to join forces and use military force to restore order. Kadyr’s idea was that the army would take over
Editors’ Note: Probably Muhammed Yorin Sadiq, director of the Council of Ministers.
When an Afghan delegation was preparing to go to Moscow to attend the 26th Congress of the CPSU. This was regarded by the Parcham faction as a great blow against the Khalq tendency. At the same time he asked Babrak to do the following. Fateev. 139 . Mayorov and Spolnikov sent a telegram to Andropov with the following requests: When dealing with the delegation they should force the Afghans to take part in the combat operations and not be observers of the actions by the Soviet troops. Zamaryanov were some of the ideological advisers to the PDPA. Veselov. Babrak considered this adventurism and provocation on the part of Kadyr. V. then they should reply that there was no need for this and that the matter had been raised in such a way only because of Babrak’s subjective opinion of him. Taraki was not mentioned among the communists who had died since the previous congress. Safronchuk. Lomonosov. At the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The membership of the party increased by more than twenty times between April 1978 and October 1982 126 Editors’ Note: The 26th CPSU Congress took place in February-March 1981. A. Romantsov and V.G.K.G. Kadyr. S.and then hand over power to the healthy forces in the party once democracy had been strengthened in the country. the question of transferring Finance Minister Wakhil to diplomatic work. then they were to say that the Soviet side had a realistic view of the situation in Afghanistan.V. Kozlov. that Soviet representatives were working in all areas of the DRA and had accurate information on the situation in the country and the party.” V. would head a left or right wing opposition. and then he [Babrak] could crush the [real] opposition that would have been exposed by this plan. V. If the Afghans were to remark that the Soviet representatives in the DRA had not been informed objectively and well on various matters.S. 126 Tabeev. Babrak had been unable to unite the party and stabilize the situation in the country. particularly. They should make Babrak pay attention to the number of people in the party and state apparatus. He. the police and the state security services who belonged to Islamic parties and organizations which posed a serious threat to the Revolution. as assistance in the struggle against the Khalq “equivalent to half a year of our own efforts. which would give the impression of democracy in the DRA.M. Grekov. the officer corps. They were to suggest that the extreme Khalqists could be isolated with the help of the honest Khalqists to whom more attention should be paid. If personnel matters were raised. Kozlov.
the punitive organs. which accounted for 28.class.500 members.when it stood at 60. The party had grown because of the offspring of the Cheka. the Central Committee or the Revolutionary Council.000 members and the Kabul party organization which accounted for 11. Only 8% could possibly be described as working. There were no members of the working-class in the highest party or state organs.000. 140 . The membership was petty-bourgeois by class.
Membership papers for 5. administrative units. 4.577 young men who were avoiding conscription were rounded up and sent to the conscription posts. he asserted that “Khad has become a real fighting force against the enemies of the Revolution. The State Information Service.” At a meeting of senior officers and operational staff in May 1982. He said that he had the highest regard for Chairman Andropov. for the first time in Afghan history.500 informers in the agent network. Now it was mostly engaged in agent operational measures. They underwent operational training in the USSR and in the Kabul training center. 8. was active throughout the country and in all layers of society. 269 operational groups were set up. There were regular preemptive purges in Kabul. 1.000 members of the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Islamic Party127 were found. 540 members of Khad and over 1. consisted of 11 operational sections. Under his leadership the KGB had made an invaluable contribution in the establishment of the PDPA and played an invaluable role in defending the revolutionary gains of the April Revolution.600 homes. There were 9. The staff was increased from 700 in January 1980 to 16. one of the strongest and most radical Islamic resistance movements supported by Pakistan. a personnel directorate and 11 support services.392 members of Sarandoy.THE OFFSPRING OF THE CHEKA The security organs zealously absorbed KGB training.650 in 1982. 71 people were arrested including five members of the pro-Chinese organization ‘Freedom-loving Patriots’ and five members of the Shiite organization Nasr.700 party activists were involved in the operations. The KGB had made it possible to establish an effective security service that. 141 . From 2 February to 8 February 1981 they searched 9. They belonged to 63 party cells. Departments of the State Information Service (Khad) functioned in all 29 provinces. In August 1981 Babrak expressed his great approval of the KGB’s work in the DRA. 56% were members of the PDPA and 28% members of the Democratic Youth Organization. a political directorate. They were restructured in 1980 along the same lines.” The bulk of the work of the security organs had been the armed struggle against the insurgents.240 members of the military. and kholosts. “It had started at lower than zero. Later 500 members of the 127 Editors’ Note: Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan.
an explosive device with a timer. Najibullah personally met Bhutto at the steps of the plane.500 dollars. 60 students and 128 129 Author’s Note: A pro-Chinese group was uncovered and eliminated in the town of Mazari Sharif. 31 officials. They included 127 army personnel. Considerable propaganda was made about the terrorist regime in Pakistan.128 ‘Operation Alamgir’ (Sword-bearer) was carried out on 2 March. The Residency and KGB Representation advised Najibullah how to make the best use of the situation politically and against Pakistan. Qaddafi 131 promised to give asylum to the hijackers and to put the hostages in a camp. Najibullah had been dressed in the uniform of an airport worker for the meeting. 131 Editors’ Note: Muammar al.Qaddafi (also spelled Muammar Khadafy. Murtaz Bhutto129 was the leader of the terrorists. 12 leaders of the organization were recruited and infiltrated into the underground. In February 1982 the underground organization Sazman-e-lekhali (Liberation) and its printing press and its Vakhav radio station were liquidated. and it was then decided that the plane should be flown to Libya with the agreement of Tripoli. President of Pakistan (1978-88).HAQ130 asked Brezhnev to persuade the Afghan government to release the passengers and the plane. They had discussed ways to fight the Pakistani regime and at the end of 1980 had agreed on the plane hijacking. At the same time ZIA-UL. Bhutto asked for three members of the Al Zulfikar organization to join the hijackers. The plane was then refuelled and flown out of Kabul. A plane belonging to the Pakistani state airline was hijacked by a group of Pakistani terrorists during a flight to West Germany. During the night of 2 to 3 March. 130 Editors’ Note: Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq. three Kalashnikovs with ammunition and four grenades.Kabul section of Gulbuddin's party were found and put under guard. The organization had extensive contacts among teachers. They obtained the archives of the Maoist organization Peikar and arrested its members. or Mu'ammar 142 . Prior to this he had visited Kabul three times and met Najibullah. During his interrogation he gave the names of 825 people. Moammar Gadhafi. Pakistani chief of Army staff. The leader of the underground “Islamic Society of Afghanistan” was detained. The plane landed at Kabul airport. The hijackers demanded the release of all political prisoners in Pakistan. students and white-collar workers in the capital and other cities. the head of Khad. The women on board were allowed to leave the plane. The terrorists were given 4. Editors’ Note: Son of the former Pakistani president (1971-73) and Prime Minister (1973-77) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was overthrown and executed by the military.
000 of the 5. They pretended to be armed groups of Dushmen. Talks were held with the leaders of another 162 units. 132 They operated against real Mujahedin groups and killed and slaughtered them whenever an opportunity arose.715. There were 84 such bands in October 1982. An important aspect of the work of Khad was the effort to disrupt the partisan groups and to persuade them to give up the armed struggle. but their number was never complete because of the high number of desertions. More than 450 air and artillery attacks on their bases were carried out on the basis of Khad agent information. 132 Editors’ Note: Literally “Bandits. surrender to the authorities and go over to the government side. During the first half of 1982. 9 traders and 10 members of the army were arrested. Some 300 Islamic committees were crushed and 6.600 Al-qadhdhafi). the provincial organs of Khad used over 800 agents who had been infiltrated into the partisan groups. The KGB tried to organize the border troops to act as an impressive force. 2. Khad took part in 750 large-scale and local operations against the partisans.500 members of various underground organizations. They provoked clashes between different partisan groups and when necessary pretended to abandon their armed opposition. a total of 130.7% of the armed forces. The KGB attached particular importance to the establishment of the so-called false bands. They liquidated 27 terrorist groups numbering 300 men. For example. In 1982 the organs arrested over 1.” first used with reference to the Islamic guerilla opposition in the USSR in the 1920s. 143 . This represented 43.schoolchildren. and two more were formed by January 1983. 250 units gave up their arms and were formed into 50 self-defense groups. 7 teachers. rendered 170 extreme leftist groups harmless and disrupted mass anti-government demonstrations planned for the 4th anniversary of the April Revolution and religious festivals. 13 workers. 200 self-defense units were set up in the part of the country controlled by the government. By 1983 their number had been increased to 27. They crushed about 200 anti-government groups. During the first three months of 1983. The ideal ratio of border troops to the regular army is one to three. There was a special commission of the Central Committee of the PDPA and the Revolutionary Council on conscription into the border forces. 140 air raids and 360 local attacks were carried out on the basis of their leads.000 partisans captured. leader of Libya since from 1970.
which opposed the Khalqi regime and set up a mujahedin group. Fully-armed mobile reserve forces were on stand-by in every district.000 joint actions with the army in 1982.756 cooptees.000 operations and took part in 1. anti-Pushtun faction. There were 73. Of a total of 1. In 1981. An extra 11 operational cover forces of 50 men each and 30 ambushes with twenty men each were set up. There were plans for 10 border brigades. pro-Chinese group led by Dr.732 officers 1.” a Marxist. and over a hundred had been trained in the USSR.000 to 90. With their cooperation 256 underground groups with 18. Setam-i Milli133 and Shu’la-Yi Javid. around Kabul and on the routes which could be used by Dushmen.000 officers and sergeants had been trained in the Soviet Union. 50 Dushmen agents were exposed. Over 5. parades and meetings or in mounting guards at diplomatic representations. Military counter-intelligence serves the army operationally.new conscripts in 1982 deserted.300 were members of the PDPA. 135 Author’s Note: In 1982 a directive order from the KGB forbade all the mass media to mention in any written or spoken form that the KGB was involved in safeguarding and maintaining order during demonstrations.000 members were exposed. Rahim Mahmudi. Up to 7.838 agents and 1. For the 5th anniversary of the April Coup precautionary measures were taken in the capital. Suspicious and strange people were detained in every area of the capital every day and night. Their number was to be increased to 85. Khad stepped up its watch on places and routes used by foreigners.135 133 134 Editors’ Note: “National Oppression.000 Sarandoy troops patrolled round the clock. 144 . The [security] organs prepared for the state holidays with particular care. 207 topographical reconnaissance batteries and 145 mortar batteries. This was almost three times the usual number. The Sarandoy set up observation posts to watch positions from where rockets or heavy weapons could be launched into the military parade or rally.000 military personnel in the police. The KGB representatives noted that there were a large number of men in the army and border troops who supported Muslim Brothers. Preventive purges were carried out in 12 areas of the city and nearby villages.000 in 1983.134 and that this badly affected discipline. 560 members controlled 3. Editors’ Note: Shu’la-yi javid (eternal flame). From 21 April to 10 May the organs introduced extra security. Protection of the Afghan leadership was carried out by specialists from the 9th KGB Directorate who had experience protecting the Kremlin leaders. The Sarandoy units carried out 4.
to obtain pre-emptive information on the Afghan émigrés. There were residencies in Quetta. 8 136 Editors’ Note: Located in Pol-I Charki. The 1st Department covered Pakistan. Communications with Kabul were through the Soviet residencies. Bonn.Following the Soviet example. Karachi and Chaman. it was known only as the 10th Directorate. In Pakistan there were 107 agents and 115 active trainees.” There were intelligence posts with three or four people in the border regions working under the cover of the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities. Iran and third countries. A separate organ within Khad was Feda. 61. Tehran. who had completed intelligence courses in Tashkent. a specialist on Iran where he had worked from 1964 to 1969.136 In May 1982 an intelligence service was set up in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.M. To hide its identity. Gilmand. Lezhnin (‘Yuri’). the 2nd Department Iran. An adviser to the Intelligence Directorate was A. In Lenin's words: “A good communist is also a good Chekist. military personnel and members of the special services of Pakistan were recruited. Ankara. Khost. Nimruz. the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. the special services of the USA. Those involved were trusted PDPA members who had undergone special training in the USSR. The head of this department was Ahmad Shah Paiya. 15 officials. a village on the Kabul River east of Kabul. It was made up of 14 departments in the center and 10 departments in the Khad directorates in the provinces near the borders with Iran and Pakistan and in the towns of Herat. 26 agents had direct access to the headquarters of the Islamic rebel organizations. Peshawar. the prison was built under Daud. the son of Galam Haidar. There were 315 agents and 250 trainees in the agent apparatus. Jalalabad. Paktik and Kunduz. 145 . China and the Islamic countries. Based on West German designs. In the first year a profit of 30 million Afghani was made from production of the prisoners. Zabul. Farah. Bombay. Delhi. Kandahar. The figures for Iran were 39 and 73. In June 1981 there were 370 in the intelligence service. The intelligence service was set up to organize and develop intelligence work against Pakistan. Islamabad. and 48 agents were in the rear of the Afghan emigration. compulsory labor was first introduced in prisons in the DRA in 1981.000 sets of uniforms and underwear were made for the military police in the workrooms of the Pol-I Charki prison. Kuwait. They used Soviet codes. Meshked. It also had a department dealing with the tribes as well as an illegals department. and to establish residencies abroad.
The KGB concocted a personal letter from G. Nabi’s headquarters. A Committee of Patriotic Refugees operated in Pakistan as a cover. 800 anti-Gulbeddin [Hekmatyar]139 pamphlets. The intelligence service found channels through which it could penetrate the headquarters of the Afghan resistance. It sent intelligence officers and agents with internal Hadji identity papers on assignments. It informed Nabi that Gulbeddin Hekmatyar was planning to get rid of him.000 leaflets. Writings and tape cassettes were distributed in its name.members of Khad became legalized and infiltrated the centers and branches of the insurgent organizations and parties in Pakistan. 37 agents were involved in this work. 137 S. Hekmatyar to the commander of one of the fronts of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan and a suitable commentary from a newspaper. radical Islamist and chief of the Hizb-I Islami-yi Afghanistan. Turi and Banjavur tribes. 139 Editors’ Note: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.inqilal-I Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement). 138 Editor’s Note: Prominent Mujahedin leader. head of the resistance group Harakat. They bought foreign passports pretending to be Afghans wishing to go to Saudi Arabia to earn money. At the same time a specially written letter from an anonymous member of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan was left in M. Modjaddedi138 and G. Momand. 15. 146 . were dropped in the Barsako and Kachi Gori refugee camps in the Peshawar region. Nabi. The ‘letter’ discredited Hekmatyar to the Mujahedin leaders and the Pakistani authorities.’ attempts were made to turn one against the other. They compromised M. It established contact with the leaders of the Aphridi. written in Pushtun by Muhammed Nabi. Fifteen agent groups consisting of 455 men were active amongst the free tribes on special assignments which were a strictly held state secret. According to the postulate ‘Divide et impera.000 in Pushtun and 5.000 in Dari. 20. At the end of 1980. on the announcement by the government of the DRA on 1 January 1981 on the return of refugees were dropped in 59 places amongst the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement. the training centers of the resistance and the special services of Pakistan and Iran. The intelligence service infiltrated the leadership of the tribes of the northwest frontier province and Baluchistan. 137 Editors’ Note: Manlassi Muhammed Nabi Muhammadi. one of the seven Mujahedin groups formed in Peshawar. Hekmatyar and accused them of having contacts with reactionary Islamic regimes against the interests of the Afghan people.
inhabiting the eastern slope of the Sulaiman range in Paktia Province. They tried to find Afghan quislings and to make them more dependent on the occupiers. Bhutto. TABEEV pressed the CPSU Central Committee to award the APN Avitsenna international prize to the Chairman of the Council of the Ulema of the DRA. S. as the people of the country were under their influence and they could persuade them to support the Kabul regime. ammunition and 150 Kalashnikovs. NAZISHEN AMROKHVAN. had talks with Najibullah. In April 1982 the leader of the Baluchis. The KGB itself changed the strategy of the fight. [25 lines excised. Khad opened two more camps for training combat troops who would be the backbone of guerilla units in the fight against Pakistan and Iran. Mir Khozar Khan. Najibullah promised to give him 400 military instructors. Taraki is considering how to take such action. At the end of December 1980. arms. In the middle of 1980 a plan was drawn up for a military strike against the Jadran tribes141 in the province of Paktia and the defeat of the units of Mullah Jalaluddin. Baluchis from neighboring countries underwent military training in three camps. a well-known Sind nationalist and political activist of the People’s Party of Pakistan.V. 147 .” This idea was the result of a visit to Kabul in May 1979 by the son of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was drawn up jointly by Sokolov.Special actions were undertaken by 11 Feda combat groups. Babrak was kept informed. The ideas of Amin and Taraki to strike Pakistan were realized. [CPSU] Party adviser S. But in September the same people decided against any large-scale military operations and [decided] to concentrate instead on 140 Author’s Note: The agreed actions were also discussed during meetings between Babrak and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Pakistan. and Aslam Benaresi. On 5 July 1979 Amin had told Resident Osadchy that the only way to influence the Pakistani leadership would be to disturb the internal political situation and to organs unrest in the province of Sind. Kozlov. KGB representatives and the embassy. the leader of the Pakistani Baluchis in Afghanistan. AFGHANI. asked Babrak for financial and military assistance. Khair Bakhsh Mari. He asked the Afghan government to give assistance to the struggle against Zia-Ul-Haq and to allow them to use the territory of Afghanistan for this purpose.140 The KGB repeatedly demanded that they should work persistently and flexibly with the leaders of the tribes and clergy. Mir Khozar Khan was desperate to fight in Baluchistan and to liberate it. “We can do this for three or four months and then the Pakistanis will have a problem which will be much more serious for them than what they are doing here.] 141 Editors’ Note: Related to the Khostwal Pashtuns.
Uruz. all the preaching in the mosques was put under the control of the security apparatus. The success. 41 million Afghani were allocated for this purpose. In December 1982 the security organs began to negotiate with him and won him over as an ally through the principle of ‘divide and conquer. Minister of the Borders and Tribes Faiz Muhammad attempted to negotiate with the tribal leaders but he was killed. It had taken control of 34 districts in the provinces of Tur. and was a powerful military force.’ one of the leaders of the military command of the Hazarajat and made a deal which led to his agreement to cooperate. the organization of the Young Hazarajat. however. In place of the disbanded union. In 1981 the KGB Residency and the 5th Directorate of Khad established contact with ‘Patriot. Said Husein Shah Masrur. ‘Patriot’ was given a place in the government. There were 90. In exchange for the disbandment of the Islamic Union of the Hazarajat. it only proved possible to make little more than 200 of the 300. under its own control. and Bamian. Han. Some tribes were given material assistance through Khad. Khad had talks with 315 tribal elders representing 18 large tribes accounting for 1 million people altogether.000 clergy change sides. was less than modest. This was largely because of the numbers involved and the difficult terrain. 20. a Shiite religious leader and religious poet who was well-known in the north of the country. Long-term and complex measures to end the undesirable activities of the clergy and to persuade them to cooperate with the authorities were drawn up.000 people in the tribes.000 of them armed. Khad managed to forge links with the Shiite clergy and leaders and arranged for them to meet Babrak. The authorities accused Mullah Jalaluddin of ignoring the traditional Muslim customs of hospitality and of killing the envoy. Explanatory work was carried out among the population through the security organs. Press conferences with fictitious and actual Mujahedins and meetings supporting the policies of the 148 . The Hazarajat Shiite Islamic Union had led the uprising against the Taraki and Amin governments. Masur led a partisan combat unit. The leaders were bribed and armed units hired to cover some parts of the borders with Pakistan and Iran.disruption of the tribes. attacked the Pushtunization of the northern provinces by Taraki and Amin and the persecution and abolition of the rights of the Khezaris. However. Political workers were sent to the tribes and leaflets were dropped. Khad set up.’ On his orders four bombing raids were carried out against strongholds of rival partisan groups in the provinces of Balkh and Jozjan.
000 hard currency rubles for special purposes. The border intelligence was given 30. The external debt was over 1. 180 million for agriculture and 360 million for industry.000. political and military fields. advancing the normalization of the situation and building on the achievements already made in the socio-economic. Moreover. The Afghan state had a serious deficit. 3. the Soviet nomenklatura forked out for the salaries of 12.000 hard currency rubles for the peripheral security organs and 1. One million was allocated to bribe certain leading Muslim personalities and to keep them satisfied.000 for work with the tribes.000 golden [hard currency] rubles for the intelligence work of AGSA and the Directorate of Defense.7 times the annual income of the state. In January 1979 Amin was given 20. Here are some examples of the actual aid. or 800.000 town and 38. The Residency and KGB Representation considered that through their special measures the Afghan security organs were doing a good job.government were held. They were given broad powers. which was covered by the Soviets. The general additional requirement came to 740 million hard currency rubles.000 million Afghani. guides and other agents to expose the hiding places of the rebels in the towns and drew up plans of their houses and the their approaches. including 255 million for the Afghan army.000 village mullahs—5 million karbovanets [Ukrainian word for hard currency ruble] in 1980 and 10 million in 1981 and 1982. In 1980 the Afghans were given military equipment and ammunition worth 110 million hard currency rubles.000 million Afghani.800 rubles and a further 40. Leaflets and pamphlets explaining the economic and cultural reforms in the country were distributed. in disrupting the activities of the Mujahedin. they were active among the tribes. sabotage and the recruitment of agents. For the first half of the current year the figure was 70 million. The construction of the Institute of Social Sciences and the building of the PDPA Central Committee were financed in full [by Soviet aid]. In 1981. Practically the whole repressive apparatus was permanently funded by the Soviets. They recruited informants.600 million dollars.600. and in the setting-up of self-defense units. In many ways the KGB compared the national 149 . 250 million gold rubles were transferred for the salaries of the members of Khad. The KGB ‘Cascade’ units operated in parallel throughout the country.000 rubles in 1983.000. 200. The internal state debt was over 16. The Secretaries of the provincial committees were provided with cars. As well as terrorist actions. In 1980 Khad was given 1.
Many of the rebels fled to neighboring Afghanistan and used its territory as a sanctuary for forays into Soviet Central Asia. 981. The Chekist organs undertook to provide the army with agents to point out targets for bombing raids and guides to approach the partisan concentrations. provided information. At the beginning of 1981. A coordination group was set up with members of the Residency and KGB Representation. formulate proposals. S. 143 Author’s Note: The Residency noted that some of the Soviet Party. a Sunni of Tajik nationality. called basmachi. He was Hodzha Shir-Aga Chungara. p. age 45. the GRU Residency and representatives from Soviet army intelligence in the DRA was held to discuss the coordination of the gathering and use of information on the partisans and underground and methods to use in the fight against them. Détente and Confrontation. in the Central Asian areas formerly under imperial Russia’s control. They went to meet him without carrying any arms and persuaded him to cooperate and abandon the struggle. guides and informants. Through his loyal service. the ‘Cascade’ units. See Garthoff. then Chungara must take up arms against his former associates. a former Deputy Chairman of the KGB. the KGB Representation in the DRA. a group of advisers from the Ministry of the Interior. They demanded that if they were not to disarm the unit. P. was done by the KGB Representation and Residency and operational groups from the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. 150 . Ivashutin.liberation struggle of the Afghan Mujahedin to the basmachestvo142 in the USSR. and submit them to the Soviet military command. and carried out special actions against leaders of the units. operational officers from a ‘Cascade’ unit in Herat province became personally acquainted through agents with the head of a 250-man unit of Dushmen. actively helped to crush resistance units. Present at the meeting were B. ‘Abay’ won the trust of the Cheka and his unit was allocated another 640 fighters. the ‘Cascade’ units and GRU Residency to analyze the information. Ivanov of the FCD and the head of GRU. a meeting of the leaders of the KGB. ideological and economic advisers and some members of the embassy were not prepared to take their share of the burden in normalizing the situation in the DRA. which was outside the fight against the Mujahedin. I. the Residency. From April 1981 to March 1982 his force took part in 21 major combat operations jointly with a ‘Cascade’ unit and independently carried 142 During the 1920s. Moscow consolidated Soviet control over the fierce resistance by local insurgents. It therefore thought it appropriate to carry over to Afghanistan the methods and tactics the Cheka had used against the basmachi. His unit controlled important communication lines and 48 villages. Most of this work. Chungara (‘Abay’) diligently carried out all KGB instructions.143 On 19 November 1980.
Denskevich. S. M. Grankin. Taraki and Amin. and Iao Abdullah Khanai in the area of Alboraz in the Balkh province.’ They included V. Agamohammed Rakhim Khan. A. Altogether. whose band was part of the partisan forces of Ulusvaki Karabach. V. Ye.V. who led a band of 180 men in the area of Akch in the province of Jozjan. ‘Abay’s’ unit treacherously killed 20. Their forces were used in the same way as those of Chungar. the senior adviser of the KGB Representation in the area. Dir Abdullah Jan in the volost of Faiz in the same province. the commander of a ‘Cascade’ unit.000. This group had made audacious attacks on Soviet troops in Herat and the surrounding area. Chungar was also given a Stechkin pistol with a thousand cartridges as well as a holiday in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1982. Among them were Kamal Gulbagazani and two of his deputies and Kaum Turkan. Potapov and M. N. Rakhim Khan had been a bandit for twelve years without a break during the times of the King. Zhuravlev. In 1982 confidential relations were established with some other partisan commanders including Dir Oraz Heldy. The KGB kept a close eye on friend and foe alike. On the instigation of the KGB he liquidated 26 active members of the Muslim society and then announced on the radio that he had gone over to the government side. Anikeev became the representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Zhuravlev. In April they each received a further 150. His force also killed the commander of the ‘Cobalt’ group in Herat.out 40 ambushes and liquidated 31 commanders of resistance units. who had taken Kulazhenko. prisoner. 151 . Kozlov. In March 1981 ‘Abay’ and two of his assistants were given 300. In 1983 B.500 hard currency rubles). was also persuaded to give up. Four additional posts were created for operational officers who knew the Pushtun and Dari languages and had experience working in Iran and Pakistan.Kostromin his deputy. an adviser from the CPSU Central Committee. ‘Cascade’ officers and members of the 8th Department of Directorate S of the FCD worked with ‘Abay. M.P. operating in the Kabul province.500 people and took 80 prisoners.000 Afghani (4. S. Daud. Yu.Voskoboynikov was appointed head of the KGB Representation and Major-General L. M.
Khieu Samphan was a Doctor of History and proponent of pure communism. Communists and members of the intelligentsia who hindered the establishment of the new order. said: “We are engaged in an irreconcilable battle against an experienced and perfidious enemy. able to understand the situation more quickly and correctly. He was an engineer and had received his higher education in France. Sakharovsky. The Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Vietnam. who was head of the Foreign Intelligence Service from 1956 to 1971. The delegation had included an untrustworthy person and this was told to the Soviet ambassador to North Vietnam.] Andropov spoke to the Minister about internal problems and difficulties with food supplies. but also of single hostile acts'. Pol Pot held Trotskyite views. This was the case in Berlin. including the intelligence organs. There were still many supporters of Pol Pot in the administration. He wrote: “To defend democracy is primarily 152 . Czechoslovakia and Poland. When the Pol Pot regime was overthrown in Kampuchea there were less than a hundred communists. of course. 'The CPSU and the Soviet government consider that the need to increase agricultural production is so serious that it is on a par with the defense of the country. And this means that the struggle is more merciless. B. that is pure communism. families destroyed and barrack-style living conditions imposed were eliminated. He will be able to deal a decisive blow and will surpass the opponent with his bravery. At a conference marking the 50th anniversary of the state security service A. We will not have a Petöfi Club but we do have prisons'. organizations and districts. the NATO countries and China. The USSR is building up a powerful military and economic potential which is a reliable defense for the socialist countries and other progressive forces in the world” [14 lines excised.one must understand that the struggle between the organs of state security and the special organs of the opponent in the present conditions reflect the present stage of a heightening of the class struggle.. acted mercilessly not only on the international stage but also in its own camp. was asked during a meeting with the head of the 2nd Chief Directorate. called on the organs of state security 'to preserve such a situation in the country which will completely exclude the possibility. Chan Dong.624 rubles. The main opponent at the present time is the USA. able to expose the weak points of the opponent. Andropov again declared that “the Soviet Union is not only talking about world revolution but is actually helping it.) The Cheka. not only of any real anti-Soviet movements.” In a conversation with the Vietnamese Minister Pham Hung in October 1980. Chaplin.144 Their representatives and citizens were cultivated by the KGB. The example was given of the occasion when the Soviet side invited a delegation from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kampuchea to the USSR without consulting the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Vietnam. In March 1963 at a meeting with members of the Soviet intelligentsia Krushchev threatened: 'The Soviet Union is not Hungary and it is not 1956 now.M. under which the monetary system was eliminated. in a global struggle between two world systems. tenacity and inventiveness. (A two-day visit to Leningrad from Moscow for the Vietnamese delegation cost the FCD 1. In September 1975 the Deputy Chairman of the KGB. Hungary. The battle will be won by the side that is better prepared. to agree on the composition of a delegation from Kampuchea to be invited to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Vietnam.” For his part Pham Hung spoke about the situation in Kampuchea.” In 1968 Andropov told a meeting of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB: “. Tsinev. Today the same question is being decided as in the first days of Soviet power: who [will prevail over] whom? Only today this question is not being decided within our country but within the framework of the whole world system. Grigorenko.ENEMY NUMBER ONE Enemy number one refers primarily to the USA and the Western powers.N.. 145 144 Author’s Note: The main opponent is defined by the top authorities and is one or several states against whom a struggle is being fought at that particular moment in time on all fronts using the major forces and means of all the state organs.
The threat would be greatest for Party activists. Brezhnev assured him: “We will not permit any legal opposition in the country. In reply to concerns expressed by Honecker in the Crimea in 1978 about the spread of different ideas..[40 lines excised. acquisition of information. penetrating a facility. exposure. Yusuf146 summoned US ambassador Steeves and expressed the displeasure of the government at the American attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. It has nothing to do with the well-being of the people as the communists like to pretend. that the Americans had been engaged in anti-Afghan activities.] The Residency then made the Afghan government believe that the Americans were interfering in the election campaign and backing people that suited them for election to the country’s parliament. Andropov convinced his colleague: 'If Walesa with his fascist ways came to power. I cannot believe this. the human rights section. This was very clear in a conversation between Andropov and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Poland.” And again. Chekists and the military.] 146 Editors’ Note: Muhammad Yusuf. incitement of certain actions. there are already signs that the counterrevolutionary disease is attacking the army'. then the communists would be thrown in prison. Talking about the need for strong action against Solidarity. their families who would suffer at the hands of the reactionaries if. they are winning over senior people in Poland. God forbid.” “Sometimes our Polish colleagues say that they cannot rely on the Party as it has collapsed. former Minister of Mines and Industry.” The aim of the nomenklatura is to keep power for the sake of power and to protect its privileges. must be told that it is not just a matter of defending the socialist achievements in Poland. but how can I convince our colleagues there in Poland?” 145 Author’s Note: Development is understood to be the implementation of such agent operational measures involving a person or site designated by intelligence which ensure the achievement of the goals assigned by it (recruiting. On 9 August Prime Minister M. executed and persecuted. The organs of state security have done this in all the stages of the life of the Soviet state. to stop decisively any actions which could cause harm to the policies of our party.. Chekists and military leaders.” “Vyshinsky and Walesa have got hold of the free trade unions. through an agent. [36 lines excised.communists. but about defending their own lives. Milevsky. and particularly Party activists. discrediting. But why are they not worried about the effects of inaction which might allow the counter-revolution to succeed?” “. The article was circulated to the members of the Afghan government and the diplomatic corps. “All talk about the criticisms by the West of us being just show either a lack of thinking or something worse. In May an article appeared in a Cairo newspaper under the headline: “What is happening in the heart of Asia?” The article was generally favorable to the Afghans but it mentioned the anti-Afghan activities of the Americans. exercising influence and so on)...out of three million Party members it must be possible to find a hundred thousand who are prepared to sacrifice themselves. appointed Prime Minister in March 1963 by King Zahir Shah. 153 . [Three lines excised. they should succeed. Milevsky agreed: “You have convinced me.” “. in Moscow on 17 November 1980. You are telling me that some of your people feel unable to take responsibility for decisive actions against the counter-revolution.” Andropov admitted to his Polish colleague Kovalchik that the USSR could not accept 'the third basket'.] In January 1965 calumny was fed to the king. These measures helped strengthen the anti-American feelings of the ruling circles in Afghanistan and to impede the work of the Americans. M. of the Helsinki treaty as it would allow us to be shaken from within.
Denmark and Holland went there and tried under various pretexts to meet Soviet citizens and get to know them. Meanwhile. The Residency had agents and informants in all the Soviet communities. ‘Azat’ was a translator for the State Committee for Economic Relations.The Residency maintained that the overthrow of the King was quite unexpected by the Americans. They agreed to meet in the restaurant [name excised] to discuss his request quietly. the Residency asked its agent Faiz Muhamed (‘Akbar’). FRG and the USA. It was thought possible that at any moment there could be anti-Soviet outbursts from local or international extremists. Prior to this he had been Secretary of the Komsomol District Committee in Baku. It was noted that an increasing number of tourists from the USA. planes at the airport and places where Soviet citizens lived. Anti-Soviet groups were established in Turkey. who worked for the Afghan counter-intelligence service. British and West German specialists were working in the northern part of the country close to the Soviet border.] One policeman grabbed an American by the throat and two others by his arms. [Names and identifying details excised. [13 lines excised. and to unite all the reactionary and anti-Soviet elements in a single force. the Residency paid increased attention to the security of Soviet institutions. ‘Akbar’ used an operational group from the counter-intelligence department under the leadership of Azhar Abdullah Samad ('Fatekh'). But they were not giving enough signals about the hostile intentions of the adversary’s special services. While 'Azat' was talking to the Americans in the restaurant the police rushed up to the Americans. Several emissaries and specialists in covert actions were sent to the country. It was suspicious that Americans. The best trained were used against the Americans. The number of agents and the way they were spread out among the targets made it possible to cover the Soviet colony. to take steps to detain the Americans and ascertain their identity.] Mir-Movsumov hinted that he was thinking of fleeing to the West but did not know how to go about it alone and would like their advice and cooperation. to move its agents into leading posts in the government. French. therefore.] In April 1974 [name no printed] (agent ‘Azat’) was dangled before two Americans. and that the American special services had. In 1977 there were 72 agents and 90 informants who were Soviet citizens. For this reason. [Three words including name excised. They took him out of the 154 . to overthrow the republic. and a further 15 agents and 19 informants who were military specialists. tried to repair this omission by taking active steps to restore the monarchy.
147 148 Editors’ Note: Corrected from “Sterba. Azkher underwent police training in Egypt and the USA.” Editors’ Note: Corrected from “Brapidgip. The agent 'Ali' (Mukham Aziz) a former mayor of Kabul. The doors to Afghanistan were widely opened for so-called progressive journalists such as [name excised] of the [nationality excised] newspaper [name excised] who was a trusted contact of the Cuban Intelligence Service so that they could report favorably on the situation in the country. 'Azat' was given a wrist watch. [One lines with name excised. He was the chief of the headquarters of the police and gendarmerie in Daud’s time and a former head of Kabul airport. Pakistanis and Chinese in the internal affairs of the country and to make complaints to the UN and other international organizations. the correspondent of an American radio and television company and other Western journalists. was in charge of ‘Luch' which had seven members.] The Residency used the situation to increase Soviet influence in government circles and to undermine the position of the Americans.” 155 . K. Golivanov. His contact was the Deputy Resident for counter-intelligence. Dost. The above-mentioned agent 'Fatekh' was a member of the agent group 'Luch' [ray] which was set up by the Residency under the flag of the Parcham party when the latter had just been formed. shoved him into a police car and took him to the police station. 25 lines excised] The KGB took measures to secure the expulsion of American correspondents from Afghanistan in order to limit the possibility that the true situation in the country would be reported. The correspondents concerned included James P. YURI Mikhailovich Surnin. William Branigan148 of The Washington Post. R. The Resident. The matter was reported to the President and described as a planned American provocation aimed at damaging relations with a friendly country. was made an Honored Member of the State Security Service for his part in the affair. The Residency constantly nagged its man in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sterba147 of The New York Times.restaurant. Daud approved of the police action. Two other Americans [names excised] were also detained. James Dorsay of The Christian Science Monitor. He began to co-operate in 1972 and was engaged in active measures and special actions. to publish articles on the interference by the Americans. [Approx.
It would operate on international and internal flights through Aeroflot and purchase planes in the USSR.On 10 April 1980 the Chekists organized a press conference for foreign and local journalists in Kabul to condemn the supply of American chemical weapons to the Mujahedin and their use of them.149 gave the press conference. Editors’ Note: US Ambassador Adolph “Spike” Dubs was kidnapped and killed on 14 February 1979. Sarbuland. 156 . Ambassador Tabeev asked Babrak to organize an anti-American demonstration in Kabul to coincide with ‘Afghanistan Day’ on 21 March which had been announced by REAGAN and the European parliaments. It is understandable why Andropov kept this under his own personal control. The Minister of Culture and Information. By publishing “documents” in the Palestinian press in Beirut the Residency wanted to show the Afghan leadership that the Americans were using the disagreements in the PDPA between the Khalqists and the Parchamists and the poor state of the army to weaken the regime and create internal political difficulties. Both the questions and the replies had been written by the KGB. His accreditation was therefore viewed as part 149 150 Editors’ Note: Abdul Majid Sarbuland. But how was the incident of the general poisoning of the population in Bazla Gumbat in the area of operation of Soviet units in the Afghan Pamir to be concealed? 350 Kirghizian families suffered from a fatal mysterious illness coughing up blood. When he had been in Moscow as a First Secretary at the embassy he had been closely covered. It devised a scheme for the nationalization of the Afghan airline Ariana. The KGB considered that Dubs knew the region well and that he was connected to the CIA and trusted by them. On 14 May 1980 arrangements were made to influence a series of questions from a correspondent of the Bakhtar news agency to Minister Dost. appointed in January 1980. It was rehearsed beforehand. Babrak highly approved of the press conference. The head of an Afghan patrol in Herat and a captured Iranian took part and denounced the Americans. On 12 March on Andropov’s instructions. There were slogans attacking the interference by international imperialism under the USA in the internal affairs of the DRA: “Death to Imperialism!” and “Death to Reagan!” Special mention must be made of the Dubs150 affair. The demonstration was held outside the American embassy on March 20. The Cheka was anxious about the appointment of Dubs as ambassador to Afghanistan.
not enter into negotiations with the terrorists but liquidate them instead and keep prying eyes away from the hotel. The mystery around [the events concerning] Dubs’ death has not yet been solved. S. On 3 August 1978 the Resident in Kabul. Klushnikov. The assault team. Kutepov ('Krabs'). dressed in protective Soviet vests and armed with Kalashnikovs. Dubs had been [instrumental] in strengthening American positions and influence in the Middle East and the region of the Persian Gulf and was one of the people behind the idea of the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran triangle. expressed the fear that “it cannot be ruled out that in his contacts with the Afghan leadership. an adviser on crime prevention with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA. and the other managed to escape. On 14 February 1979 some unknown people seized Dubs on the street and took him to the Hotel Kabul. the security assistant to the ambassador and First Secretary. one was taken prisoner. They did not allow the Americans. Second Secretary. During the operation they had suggested that they stall for time. Yu. who had come to the hotel.” The Residency wrote to the Center in the same vein that the American embassy in Kabul under Dubs was actively engaged in spreading propaganda amongst the people and the intelligentsia and was trying to make them believe that the USSR was occupying the country with a view to using it as a bridgehead for spreading its influence to India. Dubs will take advantage of his ‘deep’ understanding and knowledge of the situation in the USSR and Soviet foreign policy. G. The terrorists demanded that Bahruddin Bals and Faizani of the Setame Melli group should be released in return for the release of the ambassador (both Bals and Faizani had been shot immediately after the April Coup). At the time of the assault. is one of the most dangerous aspects of his activities. This. [present] in the hotel were S. On the advice of the KGB. not inform correspondents. as well as mentioning the above. Bakhturin (code name ‘Volgin’). Leaden clouds driven by the Cheka were thickening and automatic hail would follow. in our view. This is what [we know] happened. Pakistan and Southeast Asia. to take any of the used bullet shells. Two of the terrorists were killed.of the USA’s desire to influence the new Afghan government and to make sure that Afghanistan did not become too close to the USSR. Osadchy. Amin ordered an assault group to storm the hotel room and kill the terrorists. Dubs was fatally wounded and died. In 157 . and A. I. showered the room where the terrorists and hostage were with bullets. received a telegram about Dubs which. He had at least two bullet wounds. It became clear that the four terrorists had had only three pistols.
They agreed to express their condolences to the Americans. one terrorist killed and another wounded. In order to frustrate requests from the Americans to question the detained terrorist and hunt down the one who escaped. Sarwari and Tarun were to say that the Afghan side had independently and without consultation decided to take radical action to deal with the terrorists and that there had been no Soviet advisers present at all. As soon as the Cheka got rid of Amin. The story that all four kidnappers had been killed during the assault would be fed to the newspapers. “During investigations into the crimes of the CIA agent Amin. a gun of unknown origin similar to a Kalashnikov was planted in the room and registered as taken from the terrorists.case the room was to be examined by experts. the group of extremists. the disinformation service planted a new version of the death of Ambassador Dubs in the foreign press. During the shooting Ambassador Dubs was fatally wounded. who were members of an Islamic organization. Amin was acting as an imperialist agent and the terrorists were therefore prepared to take extreme measures in order to make the Americans acknowledge this. By eliminating Muslims. Amin gave orders for the otherwise needless assault and ordered that no mercy should be shown. They were liquidated by Tarun at Amin’s orders. Tarun himself was killed in unexplained circumstances on 14 September 1979. When Dubs was in the hands of the terrorists in the Kabul Hotel. it was decided to shoot the one who had been detained and to shoot another prisoner pretending that he was the fourth terrorist. it has become known that the four ‘terrorists’ were members of an Islamic Shiite organization and that they were reacting to Amin’s unjustified mass repression. to lower flags on government buildings and to print photographs of the four terrorists in the newspapers. By kidnapping Dubs. intended to force the American ambassador to speak about Amin’s co-operation with the Americans and to expose him as a CIA agent. If the Americans were to ask for an explanation for the involvement of Soviet advisers in the operation to capture the terrorists. Amin. On the following day Osadchy and Yuly visited Amin on instructions from the Center to agree on how to justify the affair to the Americans. Two were captured but they were killed on the following day. They had planned to kidnap the American ambassador and to force him under the threat of death to reveal his cards and acknowledge the ties between the embassy of the USA in Kabul and Amin. Amin took measures to eliminate all the members of the group and 158 . During the night both the doomed men were executed.
Amin who had studied in the USA and that notices should be put in the press through the embassies in Paris. The reason for these requests was to be the investigation into the death of Taraki and Amin’s involvement in it.” In February 1980 the Residency used the commander of the People's Militia.to save himself from exposure. and two West German diplomats were targeted. Babrak declared that this was yet further definite proof that Amin was connected with American intelligence. as he advocated an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan. Andropov was informed and a Letter “Z” device was set up in 159 . The conduct of the Carter administration was shocking. It was suggested to Babrak that the government of the DRA should ask the American administration to hand over the CIA and FBI files on H. The story of how Amin became a CIA agent is as follows. Azhar Abdullah Samad (the agent 'Fatekh'). A FRG citizen. London. A handwriting specialist was in one of the KGB operational groups sent to Afghanistan. After Amin’s death a note with a CIA telephone number in Amin’s handwriting was found in [Amin’s] notebook. The KGB also targeted personnel from other countries. According to the results of the investigation proved that the Americans were involved in the death of the ambassador. Rome and Bonn asking anyone who had any information on Amin to send it to the authorities. The Residency maintained that the Chinese were engaged in serious work to sabotage Soviet influence in Afghanistan. as was the Indian ambassador. A newspaper article “On Whose Conscience is the Death of Ambassador Dubs?” laid the blame on the Americans. and that they were showing interest in Soviet citizens. which depicted the ambassador in a bad light to Taraki and Amin. [Four names excised. It found it easy to sacrifice the life of the American ambassador in order to keep secret Amin’s connections with the CIA. not just the United States. The Residency considered this dangerous to Soviet interests. in an attempt to disseminate more disinformation on the Dubs affair. who worked for the UN in a veterinary laboratory in Mazar-i-Sherif. It fed false stories through the special [propaganda] organs. For over two years a listening operation (Letter “Z”) was carried out on the accommodation of fourteen Chinese specialists working at a textile plant in Kabul. On 16 February a KGB adviser gave Babrak this notebook and showed him the entry.] The latter had had close relations with Taraki and Amin who had trusted and liked them.
made up as follows: 360 rubles for the head of Service 1. In 1971 there were 2. 23 on Ukrainian émigrés. recording contacts between Soviet citizens and 151 Author’s Note: Directorate K.390. which was next to the living-room room of the Chinese specialists. There were then 39 agents in the Federal Republic of Germany. 160 . 21 on Lithuanian émigrés. A control point with a tape recorder was hidden in a bedside cupboard in the same room. His entrance to the building was next door to that used by the Chinese specialists. 5 on Belorussian émigrés.885 Soviet people in Afghanistan.000. 170 each for the operatives. 190 rubles each for the 47 senior operative staff. In April 1979 the Chinese went home and the listening devices were removed. 3 on the government. 10 in Libya. 33 stateless and 780 Soviet citizens. S. 4 on the armed forces of the DRA. 17 on Armenians and 33 on the other nationalities of the USSR. 110 rubles for the chief office clerk. 110 rubles for the secretary. In 1963 there were 104 people in the central apparatus. 160 for the proof-reader. To process the material Chinese language specialists from Institute T of the FCD. 21 in France. including the former 9th and 14th departments. By 1973 the figure had risen to 4. had 1. sections of the 2nd Chief Directorate and the 3rd Directorate of the KGB. 260 rubles each for the eleven senior assistants. 11 on Estonians. then Service 2. including members of their families. ‘Contact’ was an operational analytical system.037 agents. Ruchkin. 6 on the Americans. 340 rubles each for the three deputy heads. 16 on Latvians. The KR Directorate then had 75 agents and 90 trusted contacts there. Sheptukhe.January 1977. Members of the 14th Department of the FCD installed a microphone in the wall of the doctor's bedroom. were sent to Kabul. 5 on the situation in the provinces. People’s Republic of China and the NATO countries. 110 rubles each for the two shorthand typists. the counter-intelligence directorate. 6 on the local special services and a number of agents and trainees to expose the Mujahedin and their ties with international organizations. There were 55 agents working on Russian émigrés. The KGB also suspected its socialist friends and compatriots of anti-Sovietism and treachery.V.S. adjoined the residence of a Soviet doctor. The agents were allocated thus: 8 on the situation in the country. The accommodation of the Chinese. The Residency and Center combed the mass of papers looking for a hidden meaning in the everyday chatter. Huseinov and G. 98 rubles for the senior typist and 87 rubles each for the two typists. 11 in Belgium and 11 in Austria. excluding people working abroad and in different organizations. 224 were foreigners. At the end of 1963 the agent network.684 rubles. 220 rubles each for the 17 assistants. (target “Gnezdo” [nest]). In 1980 the KR group of ten operational officers were cultivating relations in the embassies of the US. Service 2 of the FCD. 23 in the USA. combined all the counterintelligence sections working abroad. Its role was to organize active offensive work to infiltrate the special services and to cover Soviet citizens and specialists abroad. The monthly salary bill was 20. a Directorate K151 operational officer. They had 18 agents and 44 foreign trainees. In Kabul alone there were 1.
In 1975 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 152 Editors’ Note: Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. The KR counter-intelligence operational attention covered the apparatus of the Chief military adviser and specialists from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the armed forces. involving the governments of the Islamic countries to hostile propaganda. Author’s Note: A member of the KGB Representation was present at the interrogation of rebels in Herat. It was noted that some of the military personnel had been affected by ideological sabotage.members of the embassies of Poland. Soviet nuclear physicist. The Chekists did not relax. that the British organized a public viewing in India of an anti-Soviet film showing the savagery of Soviet soldiers and that the Iranian special services were involved in anti-government attacks in Herat. The senior member of the group of Party advis ers.153 A large number were military advisers or military specialists. Kozlov. S.V. making a fuss about the Afghan question and distorting the aims and principles of Soviet-Afghan cooperation. tried to find out what the advisory apparatus was doing and so on. that they regarded the Soviet international assistance to the healthy forces in Hungary. Rozalis and Tikhomir. CSSR and Afghanistan as aggression. an outspoken advocate of human rights and civil liberties. There were reports on joint drinking sessions [receptions] and trips outside the city.] [They wrote that] the Afghan Fund was set up in the USA to support the bandits. Bulgaria. They listened to The Voice of America and Deutsche Welle radio stations and approved the ideas of Sakharov152 and his associates. 161 . On 1 March 1973 at a meeting in Moscow the military advisers and military attaches were ordered to increase their influence in the countries where they were stationed and to select candidates for military training in the Soviet Union. They were sent home. They wrote that the enemies were strengthening and developing their cooperation in Afghanistan. suggested ways to work with the people and put forward ideas for political propaganda. They displayed an inappropriate curiosity about the Soviet military losses in Afghanistan. Bogoroditsky. They let their imagination run wild in letters to the Center about the supposed threat to the USSR from the Western countries and from the People’s Republic of China. coordinating their actions to subvert the position of the Union. Vasilyev and Yuldashev paid a high price for their careless friendship with the Bulgarians Bratan. The members of these embassies were trying to develop their acquaintances with Soviet citizens. A KGB adviser worked in the investigation department of KHAD. [Three lines excised. The group received many signals about off-duty contacts by the military advisers and attempts by the Afghans to be on close terms with the advisers and to have a good time with them. the GDR and CSSR.
476 civilian specialists and translators in the civil service and trade departments. to undermine and weaken his position. Those disabled were given the privileges awarded to soldiers disabled during the Second World War. The name 'limited contingent' for the occupation forces can be seen as an active measure. His surname was not Marbanov but Banov. their foreign policy and the resolution of international problems. Boris Vladimirovich Marbanov. The Arab press published very critical reviews and reports on the film and the Zionist. as it was the Socialist hare who devoured a stallion! [Four lines excised. the FRG 20. From 1983 this was raised to three years for every year of actual service. One cannot disagree with Lenin who said that “in politics honesty is the result of strength. and described him as an historian. 3. Their aim is to confuse the opponent. the People’s Republic of China 11. One should also remember the 100. to suggest that their numbers were less than they were and that it was a modestly armed force with a limited role.] The number of staff in the embassies was as follows: the USA 19. pro-Israeli sympathies of the USA. The British also had two people working in the Nur eye hospital and two with an international organization. His photograph shows a young man with a fashionable beard and glasses. His beard was not his own and the glasses came from the KGB stores. France 10 and Great Britain 12.504 staff and 1. 162 . This was used as an excuse to instill anti-American feelings in the government. Active operations are the same as active measures but the term is usually applied to large-scale operations.000 plus serving in the army of the Limited Contingent of Troops. They try to influence the internal and external situation in the targeted countries in a way which is beneficial to the intelligence service. in the Soviet side: 250 were at the embassy. Its aim was to deceive people. to thwart his plans and the realization of his goals. to weaken the political economic military and ideological position of the opponent. Active measures encompass all agent operational acts aimed at influencing the various spheres of the political life of the targeted countries. The USA is compromised everywhere and whenever possible. to disrupt their plans and intentions and to create conditions which are beneficial to the Soviet Union. In the middle of the 1960s the Americans showed the film Exodus in Kabul. hypocrisy the result of weakness. The cover gave the name of the author. Andropov even warned Chekists to watch out for American war preparations. 103 in the Soviet trade office. They were matched by the following. But as early as January 1980 the KGB began to receive hopeful reports ‘Of Special Importance’ about a lack of unity in the Western ranks over Afghanistan.This was all bitter slander on the capitalist wolf. In 1984 Ogonyok published a booklet entitled 'Jackals in a pack of wolves' about the CIA and NTS in Afghanistan. The Kremlin expected the West to react sharply and decisively to its actions in Afghanistan. The booklet did not contain facts or proof of anything and the author was not an historian but a Chekist and member of the disinformation service. and 1.600 translators in the advisory apparatus.” Military service in Afghanistan was at first counted as two years for every year of service there.
Kennedy. Bahr gained the impression that three factors governed the situation: uncertainty.” he declared. Bahr was convinced that the actions of the Washington administration were dictated primarily by “Carter’s pathological wish to be elected for a second term” and were a consequence of the lack of a united view of the key contemporary problems among the President's advisers. leading foreign policy and arms control expert of the (West) German Social Democratic Party and member of the (West) German parliament.” This feeling was strengthened by the failure of the administration to react in a sensible and decisive way to the events in Afghanistan and Iran. the desire for strong leadership and a growing fear of war with the Soviet Union. “will then be ready to agree to a neutral regime in that country. Edward Kennedy’s presidential campaign. The President's National Security Adviser was. From his conversations in the USA. in Bahr’s words. 160 Editors’ Note: Edward M. “Didn't we catch the Russians unaware?” Brzezinski asked with disappointment. West German Federal Chancellor 1974-1982. “Jimmy and I have done a good job!” he boasted to Bahr. Marshall Shulman. of course. 159 Editors’ Note: Peter Edelman. Brzezinski. Issues Director of Sen. Nixon and Gerald R. During his ten days there Egon Bahr. 163 . that is. a prominent figure in the Democratic Party from the 1970s.” In order to calm him down Bahr noted that it was known in Bonn that the Soviet Union had taken possible Western reactions into account when it had decided to move into Afghanistan and that it was well-prepared for it. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State under Presidents Richard M. National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter. met Benson.157 Shulman158 and the lawyer Peter Edelman159 who was a confidante of Senator Edward Kennedy. economically and militarily. intoxicated with “the surprise effect of an attack on the Soviet Union. last surviving brother of President John F. special advisor with the rank of ambassador to the Secretary of State for Soviet Affairs from 1977-80. After a pause he began to talk about future relations between the USA and USSR. 155 Editors’ Note: Helmut Schmidt. Ford. Kissinger. “The United States. if the 154 Editors’ Note: Egon Bahr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. 156 Kissinger. Kennedy. the Federal Secretary of the Social Democrats. 157 Editors’ Note: Henry A. US Senator (D-MA) since 1963. 156 Editors’ Note: Dr. 158 Editors’ Note: Dr. Brzezinski expressed his belief that the Afghan conflict would fizzle out in five to six months. 160 He found out their ideas about the new situation in the Middle East. Bahr found Brzezinski extremely pleased with himself. The reason for this was “the general loss of faith in the power of America politically.Detailed information on the results of a visit by Bahr154 to the USA at the request of Chancellor Schmidt155 were received from a source in government circles in the FRG. From his short trip to the USA.
” Vance declared. Vance remarked that “we need SALT-2. Brzezinski cited serious moral and material support for Pakistan and Turkey from America's NATO allies as one such measure. Brzezinski stressed. Brzezinski maintained.” He admitted to Bahr that it had been his idea to withdraw the treaty from the Senate and said that “even before the events in Afghanistan it had become clear that it would not go through. “and history will approve the action I took. Bahr declared that the President's adviser “had learnt nothing from his position. On American policy towards the USSR. Secretary of State from 1977 to 1980.” Talking about the problems of Soviet-American relations.” Bahr considered Vance161 to support a balanced and consistent policy based on real and sensible compromises.” 161 Editors’ Note: Cyrus Vance. if measures were adopted to strengthen the Western world. it would be possible to return to the SALT-II and other treaties. In the present situation the treaty would have failed altogether which would have made everyone go back to the beginning.” he declared. Brzezinski declared that “the offensive against the Soviet Union will continue and the West will make it understood in each case that it does not intend to forgive or leave anything unpunished.” “Withdrawing the treaty saved it. Although Vance foresaw a “long confrontation with the USSR” he would have liked to wrap it into a well constructed program which would not cause concern to America's allies.” Regarding US relations with the People’s Republic of China.” “We will give China everything except for arms. This would be possible. Vance openly complained to Bahr that all his attempts to “form a consistent foreign policy from Brzezinski’s fragmented ideas and to protect the reputation of the State Department were hampered by the opportunist ideas of the National Security Adviser.Soviets do not establish bases there. was full of anti-Sovietism as before and would try to use any opportunity to damage relations between the USA and USSR and to flex American muscles. if the conflict with Iran could be settled. 164 . The National Security Adviser suggested that London should be responsible for Pakistan and Bonn for Turkey. Brzezinski stated that “the Chinese card will be an active instrument of American foreign policy. Summarizing Brzezinski’s position.” By then.
162 “I asked him whether we were prepared morally and militarily to defend the Chinese if the Russians were to take any action. he thought that Kissinger was “frightening the government with increasing zeal about Soviet aggression and pushing the administration to take stupid and hasty steps which he then mercilessly criticizes in public. would be the end of sensible policies and peace.” To forget the latter. which would damage the reputation of America irretrievably. to play the Chinese card in the military field would drive the Russians into a corner and their only way out would be a nuclear strike against China to wipe out its military potential.” In this way he also strengthened the impression that the White House was incapable of safeguarding the interests of the nation without him. 165 . he maintained.On relations with the US’s European allies. According to Kissinger. Vance considered it essential that a certain amount of caution should be shown. and that it was taking the country from one crisis to another.” In his conversation with Bahr. 162 US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had visited the PRC from 5-9 January 1980. Bahr found his meetings with Kissinger particularly interesting as they enabled him to learn about the personal diplomacy of the former US Secretary of State. Bahr became firmly convinced that Kissinger was playing a subtle game against the present administration. “the Polish savior of America who was biologically repugnant to him. Kissinger replied that in such a situation the USA would be forced to leave China to its fate. Kissinger stressed a number of times that “the rivalry with the USSR which Brzezinski is besotted with is only possible when there is cooperation.” In essence. Kissinger called the flirtation with Beijing by the American Defense Secretary [Harold Brown] on anti-Soviet grounds idiotism.” On American relations with China. In general Bahr gained the impression that Vance was sincerely concerned about bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and the problem of military détente. and in particular against Brzezinski. Vance stressed that he “understood the special interest of the Europeans in safeguarding the results of détente and that it was therefore wrong to criticize them for silently opposing certain American plans. Kissinger referred to his meeting with Brown when the latter returned from the People’s Republic of China. To get involved with Beijing in military matters would be extremely dangerous. Kissinger. When discussing bilateral relations between the USA and China.
would soon wane and that it would return to Iran. For this reason he said that it was essential to support those forces in the USA which opposed Carter. In his talks with Bahr. the protracted character of the Iranian conflict increased Carter’s chances of re-election as it enabled him to demonstrate his firmness. which were overshadowing this conflict. The Senator considered that the foreign policy part of Brezhnev's speech to voters in the Bauman district 163 Editors’ Note: John V. Kennedy to relay the latter's ideas on ways to lessen international tension to the Soviet leadership. meaning primarily the pretender to the post of head of the White House. according to Bahr. Kennedy was sure. Bahr noted that “Carter is incurable with his inconsistency and flawed decisions which he takes on the spur of the moment for reasons of prestige. were close to that position.” On 5 March an American politician. who. he telephoned him to express his regret that he could not meet him because of an election trip to Iowa and said that he could fly to Europe at a later date to meet him personally. Edelman was very open and on the instructions of the Senator gave Kennedy’s analysis of events. Edward Kennedy. Shulman maintained that the Carter administration was primarily guilty as it had not given the USSR any room to move and had driven it into a corner so that the decision the Russians had taken had been the only possible one. Peter Edelman. were also favorable to Carter. John V. had made a brilliant analysis of the causes for the Afghan events.” 166 . Democratic senator from California (1971-1977). The question “Who started this conflict by hiding the Shah in America?” would be asked which would be awkward for the present administration. Tunney. He sent Bahr his confidante. Edelman said that this would enable Kennedy to campaign “for the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and other countries in the interests of peace. Tunney. The events in Afghanistan.” Bahr was convinced that it would become increasingly difficult to work with the American administration. According to the Senator. Summarizing his impressions from his American meetings.The views of Shulman. When the senator learnt that Bahr was in the USA. Edelman said bluntly to Bahr that “if Moscow were able to help Kennedy in this way it could count on a very positive development in Soviet-American relations. a close associate of Sen. however. Senator E. Kennedy. Corrected from “Tunny.” A trump card for Kennedy would be his involvement in some form in settling the problem of the American hostages in Tehran. that the public interest in Afghanistan. which had been fuelled by the American authorities.163 was in Moscow on behalf of E.
” But there were other groups in the USA who were also represented inside the administration (Vance. He would be bound to continue his policies of aggravating Soviet-American relations. Christopher. the Pentagon and the military industrial complex. He would also urge him to make the Afghan government more democratic and to include in it members of other parties and the clergy. Kennedy thought it essential to make a speech on 16 to 18 March on the events in Afghanistan. if he won his re-election. The atmosphere of tension and hostility towards the whole Soviet people was being fuelled by Carter. He intended to call on the White House to guarantee that it would not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and to use all the means it could to ensure that China and Pakistan would stop interfering in the country. which could force the Carter administration to act to de-escalate the crisis. He had to act immediately as inaction by the peace-loving forces in the USA would make it impossible for Carter. 164 Editors’ Note: Warren Christopher. Having considered all these points. it was his duty to take action himself.reflected the consistency and steadfastness of the USSR to the policy of détente and created a real basis for a settlement of the Afghan question. The White House was feeding the public opinion with nonsense about “the Soviet military threat” and Soviet ambitions for military expansion in the Persian Gulf. Brzezinski. 167 . US Deputy Secretary of State 1977-1981. 1993-1997. At the same time the Carter administration was trying to distort the peace-loving ideas behind Brezhnev’s proposals. He would ask the Soviet government. the situation could only be worse.164 and others) who considered that Carter’s policies were against the interests of the US and that the tension could be lessened through negotiations with Brezhnev. if the outcome of the Soviet-American talks were favorable. to change course. particularly in the Islamic countries. Secretary of State. He would call on the government of Babrak Karmal to announce a policy of nonalignment and [to declare] that it would not join a military alliance or allow the presence of foreign troops. If the Republicans were to win. in spite of the negative consequences for him personally. He wanted to call on the governments of the USA and the USSR to start negotiations on concrete measures to guarantee non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and to draw up mutually acceptable forms of these guarantees with the participation of the UN. Kennedy had come to the conclusion that. All the Republican presidential candidates were whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria and prophesying that “the Russians will be stained with Afghan blood as the Americans were in Vietnam and that the standing of the USSR will decrease.
Byrd166 and A. In this way the acuteness of the Afghan problem would be less apparent.000 to 20. Watson Jr. which used KGB arguments to refute the Western account of a Soviet military threat.000) from Afghanistan and fix a date for the withdrawal of the remaining troops in 1980-81. Senator (D-CA). 165 166 Editors’ Note: Thomas J. For example. Editors’ Note: Robert Byrd. The White House was actually demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. withdraw some troops (10. such as security problems in Europe and trade and economic cooperation including grain sales to the USSR. cast doubts on the idea that the tension in Afghanistan was due to the USSR and exposed American efforts to build neutron weapons. Cranston167 became known. in agreement with the Afghan authorities. whereas Kennedy. T. They had said that at the forthcoming meeting in Vienna the Americans intended to discuss a wide range of questions relating to Soviet-American relations. considered that their withdrawal should be linked with measures to guarantee non-interference from outside in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Tunney stressed the basic difference between Kennedy’s proposals and those of the USA administration. Chevenement. 168 Editors’ Note: Apparently code name for the French newspaper Le Monde. Senator (D-WV) since 1958 167 Editors’ Note: Alan Cranston.to demonstrate its goodwill and. on 12 July 1980 the French ‘Vestnik’168 published an article by the leader of CERES. chairman of IBM and ambassador to the Soviet Union. 165 and Senators R. The President of the Islamic Council of Social Service (agent 'Rogov') made a speech with the same aim.. There were some voices which muffled the sharp criticism of the Soviet invasion. in other words an acknowledgement that they were unlawfully sent into the country. Watson. The KGB reported this information to the top together with its own comments. 168 . 1968-1993.” On 14 May confidential remarks by the American Ambassador in Moscow. not touching the question of the legality of the presence of the Soviet troops. as well as Afghanistan. He thought that some of his proposals would be acceptable to the Soviet government and would be grateful if Brezhnev could express his approval if this were the case as this would give a powerful boost to the peace-loving forces. “Although not all Kennedy’s proposals are acceptable to us they are worth considering as they contradict the line taken by Carter and other politicians.
on the withdrawal of some troops from Afghanistan. But the Afghans did not understand the poster. Editors’ Note: Bruno Kreisky. He said that “it was an extremely clever and far-sighted move which showed that the Soviet leadership was interested in a political solution to the Afghan problem. optimistically. third President of the Fifth Republic of France (1974-81). for example. The nomenklatura often gave out bits of disinformation.” D'Estaing was flattered that he was the first Western Prime Minister [President] to be told of this decision by Brezhnev. Posters were sent from Moscow with the caption “The CIA is turning Asia into a continent of death-row leaders” and were hung in the ministries and building s where the delegations were staying and meeting. And Chancellor Kreisky170 thought it showed that the USSR was prepared to establish “the pre-Afghan climate” in relations between the West and the East as a counterbalance to the impulsive line adopted by Carter in international affairs. Posters [stating that] “The CIA is turning Asia into a continent of kamikaze leaders” were hung on ministries and buildings where the delegations were staying and meeting. one can interpret a rude sign as a blessing. picked up any faint signs of a political solution to the problem. Giscard D'Estaing169 swallowed the bait readily. leader of the Social Democratic Party of Austria and chancellor of Austria (1970-83). They asked: “Why is there a portrait of Taraki amongst those killed? He was a Communist and founder of the PDPA!” The West. including the Soviet embassy and delegation. It was not the first time someone had been taken in. When one so wants. It would seem that the West understood and was not so happy in 1986 with Gorbachev’s promise to withdraw six regiments from Afghanistan ahead of schedule. These posters were sent by the Residency to embassies and delegations. The government of Schmidt was taken in by the trick with the same enthusiasm. 1987 169 170 Editors’ Note: Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.In July an International Meeting of Solidarity with the People of Afghanistan was held. 169 .
[excised] 'Mamad' . 'Habib' . 'Sima' .[excised]. 'Dekabryov' .[excised] 'Sharki' . 'Travin' . 'Dedov' .[excised] 'Semyon' . 171 Real names and identifying details excised.[excised] 'Bashir' .[excised].[excised] 'Pers' .[excised] 'Fatekh' .[excised].[excised].[excised] 'Dust' .[excised] 'Pavel' .[excised] 'Osman' .[excised] 'Kazem' . 'Araz' .[excised] 'Ben' . 'Bost' .[excised].[excised].[excised] 'Shiit' . 170 .[excised] 'Piruz' .[excised] 'Martov'.[excised].[excised] 'Verny' [faithful] . 'Pyotr' .APPENDIX I List of Agents and Informants 171 'Nur'.
[excised] 'Samad' . 'Rakkas' . 'Potomok' .[excised] 'Lori' .[excised].[excised] 'Vin' .[excised] 'Ktorov' .'Ustod' .[excised] 'Rostov' .[excised] 'Shayan' . 'Volin' .[excised] 'Alexander' . 'Fizik' [physicist] .[excised].[excised].[excised] 'Shir' .[excised] 'Ostad' .[excised].[excised] 'Fakir' .[excised] 'Jan' .[excised] 'Mekhr' .[excised] 'Merkury' [ Mercury] .[excised] 'Salikh' .[excised] 'Borin' .[excised].[excised].[excised] 'Ali' .[excised]. 'Abdullah' .[excised] 'Iskhak' . 'Bakhed' .[excised]. 'Karpov' .[excised] 171 .[excised]. 'Siddik' . 'Arbakesh' .
[excised] 'Satar' .[excised].[excised] 'Mishkar' .[excised] 'Fakir' .[excised].[excised] 'Miron' . 'Furman' .[excised] 'Ragim' . 'Kharvar' .[excised] 'Ahmed' .[excised] 'Yakov' .[excised] 'Gardez' .[excised].[excised] 'Akbar' .[excised] 'Mirab' . 'Samarin' .[excised] 'Saturi' .[excised] 'Nafar' . 'Syoma' .[excised] 'Antar' .[excised] 'Asamai' . 'Jafar' .'Fuladi' .[excised].[excised] 'Khavar' .[excised] 'Hodzha' .[excised] [excised] [excised] 'Richard' .[excised] [excised]. 172 .[excised] 'Anwar' .[excised] [excised].
'Pimen' .[excised].[excised] 'Noy' .[excised] 'Zubrov' .[excised]. 'Kim' .[excised]. 'Pers' .[excised].[excised].[excised].[excised]. 'Komov' . 'Roschin' .[excised] 'Kholmov' . 'Emir' .'Volodya' . 173 . 'Noble' . 'Sizov' .[excised].[excised]. 'Furman' .[excised].[excised]. 'Tamada' . 'Mure' . 'Pyotr' .[excised] 'Tikhon' .[excised] 'Rasul' . 'Remiz' .[excised].[excised] 'Shiit' .[excised].[excised] 'Pavel' .[excised].[excised] 'Belov' .
?] [excised]. [excised]. KOSTROMIN L. BOGATOV V..P.A.R. [excised]. MARTOV . [excised]. 172 KGB worknames are italicized.APPENDIX II A list of members of the KGB and agents who were Soviet citizens in Afghanistan172 OSADCHY [excised].MARTYNUSHKIN Valery Alexandrovich [excised].L. VARLAMOV V. [excised].[excised]. [excised].ROMASHKO Mikhail Platonovich [excised]. BAKHTURIN S. [excised]. VOSKOBOYNIKOV B. NIZHELSKY Valery Pavlovich [excised]. [excised]. MIRAN . KUKHTA Yu. INOYATOV R.L. DESNIN . further identifying information was excised.A.P.P.G.SAMUNIN Valery Ivanovich [excised].S. ABDRASHITOV R.BOGDANOV L.M.P. MURATOV D. KRIVOGUZ I. [F.N. [excised]. PANCHENKO A. ZYRYANOV F.. [excised]. [excised]. ALEXANDROV Yuri Mikhailovich [excised]. 174 . GOLIKOV – GOLIVANOV P. [excised]. [excised]. MACLOY . CHUCHUKIN V.
NAZAROV H. ISAKOV. KARPOV [excised]. 175 . VALYEV – BAULIN V. VILEN – NAROV Haydar H.N. [excised]. ISAYEV – SPIRIN Vladimir Li [excised].A. [excised]. [excised]. SVETLANOV – OBLOV Aleksandr Stepanovich [excised]. SHAROV Ye. SURNIN Yuri Mikhailovich [excised].M. ANTONOV ORLOV-MOROZOV Aleksandr Victorovich [excised]. [excised].A. KHAYATOV E. SURKOV A. GRANIN Stanislav Mikhailovich [excised].ALIYEV Ismail Murtuza Ogly [excised]. [excised]. TIKHONOV [excised]. [excised]. CHEPURNOY [excised]. DADYKIN [excised].
Sarval [excised]. 173 174 “a” indicates an agent. (a) Miron [excised].AFGHANISTAN Unsorted Miscellany a173 [excised]. Nizami [excised]. 175 “d” indicates confidential contact. Sima [excised]. Kazem [excised]. (o) Karayev [excised]. o174 [excised]. Farid [excised]. Vin [excised]. D 175 Bost Anderabi . AFGHANISTAN – To be filed Agent [excised].[excised]. 176 . Vernyy [the true one] [excised]. “o”indicates operational officer. Martov [excised]. Khivad [excised].
177 .[Words excised].
1945-1963 (1998). 1953: the Cold War. ABOUT THE EDITORS Odd Arne Westad is Lecturer in International History at the London School of Economics. 178 . With Christopher Andrew he co-authored The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (1999). the German Question and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain (2001). His recent publications include Uprising in East Germany. Christian Friedrich Ostermann is director of the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Fellow at the National Security Archive at George Washington University. His recent publications include Reviewing the Cold War (2000). The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years (1997) and Brothers-in-Arms: The Rise and Fall of the SinoSoviet Alliance. defected to Britain in 1992. a former KGB archivist.ABOUT THE AUTHOR Vasiliy Mitrokhin.
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