Objective Interpretation

Objective Interpretation
Author(s): E. D. Hirsch, Jr.

Source: PMLA, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Sep., 1960), pp. 463-479
Published by: Modern Language Association
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OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION
By E. D. Hirsch, Je.
sents may be construed correctly or incorrectly.

THEcome
now FACT to that the all
designate term "criticism"The
commentary has
literary text (in spite of the semi-mystical
on textual meaning reflects a general acceptance claims made for its uniqueness) does not have a
of the doctrine that description and evaluation special ontological status which somehow ab-
are inseparable in literary study. In any serious solves the reader from the demands universally
confrontation of literature it would be futile, of imposed by all linguistic texts of every descrip?
course, to attempt a rigorous banishment of all tion. Nothing, that is, can give a conventional
evaluative judgment, but this fact does not give representation the status of an immediate given.
us the license to misunderstand or misinterpret The text of a poem, for example, has to be con?
our texts. It does not entitle us to use the text strued by the critic before it becomes a poem for
as the basis for an exercise in "creativity" orhim.
to Then it is, no doubt, an artifact with spe?
submit as serious textual commentary a dis-cial characteristics. But before the critic con-
guised argument for a particular ethical, cul? strues the poem it is for him no artifact at all,
and if he construes it wrongly, he will subse-
tural, or aesthetic viewpoint. Nor is criticism's
chief concern?the present relevance of a text? quently be talking about the wrong artifact, not
a strictly necessary aspect of textual commen? the one represented by the text. If criticism is to
tary. That same kind of theory which argues thebe objective in any significant sense, it must be
founded on a self-critical construction of textual
inseparability of description and evaluation also
meaning, which is to say, on objective inter?
argues that a text's meaning is simply its mean?
ing "to us, today." Both kinds of argument sup-pretation.
port the idea that interpretation is criticism andThe distinction I am drawing between inter?
pretation and criticism was one of the central
vice versa. But there is clearly a sense in which
we can neither evaluate a text nor determine principles in the now vestigial science of her-
what it means "to us, today" until we have meneutics.
cor- August Boeckh, for example, divided
rectly apprehended what it means. Understand? the theoretical part of his Encyklopadie into two
sections, one devoted to Interpretation {Herme-
ing (and therefore interpretation, in the strict
neutik) and the other to Kritik. Boeckh's dis-
sense of the word) is both logically and psycho-
cussion of this distinction is illuminating: inter?
logically prior to what is generally called criti?
cism. It is true that this distinction between pretation is the construction of textual meaning
understanding and evaluation cannot always as such; it explicates {legt aus) those meanings,
show itself in the finished work of criticism? and only those meanings, which the text explicitly
nor, perhaps, should it?but a general grasp or implicitly represents. Criticism, on the other
and
acceptance of the distinction might help correct hand, builds on the results of interpretation; it
some of the most serious faults of current criti? confronts textual meaning not as such, but as a
cism (its subjectivism and relativism) and might component within a larger context. Boeckh
even make it plausible to think of literary study defined it as "that philological function through
as a corporate enterprise and a progressive dis- which a text is understood not simply in its own
cipline. terms and for its own sake, but in order to es-
No one would deny, of course, that the more tablish a relationship with something else, in
important issue is not the status of literary study such a way that the goal is a knowledge of this
as a discipline but the vitality of literature? relationship itself."1 Boeckh's definition is useful
especially of older literature?in the world at in emphasizing that interpretation and criticism
large. The critic is right to think that the text confront two quite distinct "objects," for this is
should speak to us. The point which needs to be the fundamental distinction between the two
grasped clearly by the critic is that a text cannot activities. The object of interpretation is textual
be made to speak to us until what it says has meaning in and for itself and may be called the
been understood. This is not an argument in meaning of the text. The object of criticism, on
favor of historicism as against criticism?it is the other hand, is that meaning in its bearing
simply a brute ontological fact. Textual meaning on something else (standards of value, present
is not a naked given like a physical object. The
1 August Boeckh, Encyclopadie und Methodologie der philo-
text is first of all a conventional representation logischen Wissenschaften, ed. E. Bratuscheck, 2nd ed. (Leip?
like a musical score, and what the score repre- zig, 1886), p. 170.
463
464 Objective Interpretation
concerns, etc.) and this object may

subjectivism therefore
and be have for
individualism which
called the relevance of the text. many students discredited the analytical move-
The distinction between the meaning and the ment. By normative principles I mean those
relevance of a text was first clearly made by notions which concern the nature of a correct
Frege in his article "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung," interpretation. When the critic clearly conceives
where he demonstrated that although the mean- what a correct interpretation is in principle, he
ings of two "texts" may be different, their refer- possesses a guiding idea against which he can
ent or truth-value may be identical.2 For ex? measure his construction. Without such a guiding
ample, the statement, "Scott is the author of idea, self-critical or objective interpretation is
Waverley" is true and yet the meaning of "Scott" hardly possible. Current theory, however, fails
is different from that of "the author of Waverley." to provide such a principle. The most inrluential
The Sinn of each is different, but the Bedeutung and representative statement of modern theory
(or one aspect of Bedeutung?the designatum of is Theory of Literature by Wellek and Warren, a
"Scott" and "author of Waverley") is the same. book to which I owe much. I ungratefully select
Frege considered only cases where different it (especially Ch. xn) as a target of attack, both
Sinne have an identical Bedeutung, but it is also because it is so inrluential and because I need a
true that the same Sinn may, in the course of specific, concrete example of the sort of theory
time, have different Bedeutungen. For example, which requires amendment.3
the sentence, "There is a unicorn in the garden,"
is prima facie false. But suppose the statement I. The Two Horizons of Textual Meaning
were made when there was a unicorn in the gar? The metaphorical doctrine that a text leads a
den (as happened in Thurber's imaginative life of its own is used by modern theorists to
world); the statement would be true; its rele? express the idea that textual meaning changes in
vance would have shifted. But true or false, the the course of time.4 This theory of a changing
meaning of the proposition would remain the meaning serves to support the fusion of inter?
same; for unless its meaning remained self-identi- pretation and criticism, and, at the same time,
cal we would have nothing to label true or false. the idea that present relevance forms the basis
Frege's distinction, now widely accepted by for textual commentary. But the view should not
logicians, is a special case of Husserl's general remain unchallenged, since if it were correct there
distinction between the inner and outer horizons could be no objective knowledge about texts.
of any meaning. In my first section I shall try to Any statement about textual meaning could be
clarify Husserl's concept and to show how it valid only for the moment, and even this tem-
applies to the problems of textual study, and porary validity could not be tested, since there
especially to the basic assumptions of textual would be no permanent norms on which validat-
interpretation. ing judgments could be based. While the "life"
My purpose is primarily constructive rather theory does serve to explain and sanction the
than polemical. I would not willingly argue that fact that different ages tend to interpret texts
interpretation should be practiced in strict differently, and while it emphasizes the impor-
separation from criticism. I shall ignore criti? tance of a text's present relevance, it overlooks
cism simply in order to confront the special the fact that such a view undercuts all criticism,
problems involved in construing the meaning or even the sort which emphasizes present relevance.
Sinn of a text. For most of my notions I disclaim If the view were correct, criticism would not only
any originality. My aim is to revive some for- lack permanent validity, it could not even claim
gotten insights of literary study and to apply to current validity by the time it got into print.
the theory of interpretation certain other in? Both the text's meaning and the tenor of the age
sights from linguistics and philosophy. For al? would have altered. The "life" theory really
though the analytical movement in criticism has masks the idea that the reader construes his
permanently advanced the cause of intrinsic own, new meaning instead of that represented
literary study, it has not yet paid enough atten- by the text.
tion to the problem of establishing norms and
2 Gottlob Frege, "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung," Zeitschrift
limits in interpretation. If I display any argu- fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100, 1892. The ar?
mentative intent, it is not, therefore, against the ticle has been translated, and one English version may be
analytical movement, which I approve, but only found in: H. Feigl and W. Sellars, Readings in Philosophical
against certain modern theories which hamper Analysis (New York, 1949).
the establishment of normative principles in 2nd8 Rend Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature,
ed. (New York, 1956), Ch. xn. This chapter is by Wellek.
interpretation and which thereby encourage the 4 See, for example, Theory of Literature, p. 31.
E. D. Hirsch, Jr. 465
The "life" theory textual

thus meaning]implicitly
a substantial identity ofplaces
'struc?
principle of change ture'squarely
which has remained where the same throughoutit be
that is, not in textual meaning
the ages. This structure, however,as such
is dynamic: it b
changing generations of readers.
changes throughout Accord
the process of history while
Wellek, for example, thethemeaning
passing through of th
minds of its readers, critics,
changes as it passes "through
and fellow theis self-
artists."7 First the "structure" minds
readers, critics, and fellow
identical; then it changes!artists."5
What is given in one Now
even a few of the norms which determine a text's breath is taken away in the next. Although it is a
meaning are allotted to readers, and made de- matter of common experience that a text ap-
pendent on their attitudes and concerns, it is pears different to us than it appeared to a former
evident that textual meaning must change. But age, and although we remain deeply convinced
is it proper to make textual meaning dependentthat there are permanent norms in textual study,
upon the reader's own cultural givens? It may we cannot properly explain the facts by equating
be granted that these givens change in the course or fusing what changes with what remains the
of time, but does this imply that textual meaning same. We must distinguish the two and give
itself changes? As soon as the reader's outlook iseach its due.
permitted to determine what a text means, we A couplet from Marvell, used by Wellek to
have not simply a changing meaning but quitesuggest how meaning changes, will illustrate my
possibly as many meanings as readers. point:8
Against such a reductio ad absurdum, the pro- My vegetable love should grow
ponent of the current theory points out that in a Vaster than empires and more slow.
given age many readers will agree in their con-
struction of a text and will unanimously repudi- Wellek grants that "vegetable" here probably
ate the accepted interpretation of a former age. means more or less what we should nowadays
For the sake of fair-mindedness, this presumedexpress by "vegetative," but he goes on to sug?
unanimity may be granted, but must it be ex?gest that we cannot avoid associating the modern
plained by arguing that the text's meaning hasconnotation of "vegetable" (what it means "to
changed? Recalling Frege's distinction betweenus"). Furthermore, he suggests that this enrich?
Sinn and Bedeutung, the change could be ex? ment of meaning may even be desirable. No
plained by saying that the meaning of the textdoubt, the associated meaning is here desirable
has remained the same, while the relevance of (since it supports the mood of the poem), but
that meaning has shifted.6 Contemporary readers Wellek could not even make his point unless we
will frequently share similar cultural givens and could distinguish between what "vegetable"
will therefore agree about what the text means to probably means as used in the text, and what it
them. But might it not be the case that they commonly means to us. Simply to discuss the
agree about the text's meaning "to them" be? issue is to admit that Marvell's poem probably
cause they have first understood its meaning?does not imply the modern connotation, since
If textual meaning itself could change, contempo? if we could not separate the sense of "vegetative"
rary readers would lack a basis for agreement or from the notion of an "erotic cabbage," we could
disagreement. No one would bother seriously tonot talk about the dirBculty of making the sepa?
discuss such a protean object. The relevance ofration. One need not argue that the delight we
textual meaning has no foundation and no ob-may take in such new meanings must be ignored.
jectivity unless meaning itself is unchanging. To On the contrary, once we have self-critically
fuse meaning and relevance, or interpretationunderstood the text, there is little reason to
and criticism, by the conception of an autono-exclude valuable or pleasant associations which
mous, living, changing meaning, does not really enhance its relevance. But it is essential to ex?
free the reader from the shackles of historicism; clude these associations in the process of inter?
it simply destroys the basis both for any agree?pretation, in the process, that is, of understanding
ment among readers and for any objective study what a text means. The way out of the theoreti-
whatever. cal dilemma is to perceive that the meaning of a
The dilemma created by the fusion of Sinn
and Bedeutung in current theory is exhibited as 6 Theory of Literature, p. 144.
soon as the theorist attempts to explain how 6 It could also be explained, of course, by saying that cer?
tain generations of readers tend to misunderstand certain
norms can be preserved in textual study. The texts.
explanation becomes openly self-contradictory: 7 Theory of Literature, p. 144. My italics.
"It could be scarcely denied that there is [in 8 Theory of Literature, pp. 166-167.
text does not change, and that the modern, differ?

tual meaning: what the author's contemporaries
ent connotation of a word like "vegetable"
would ideally have construed, what the ideal
belongs, if it is to be entertained at all, to the
present-day reader construes, what the norms of
constantly changing relevance of a text's mean?
language permit the text to mean, what the best
ing.
critics conceive to be the best meaning, and so on.
It is in the light of the distinction between
In support of these other candidates, various
meaning and relevance that critical theories like
T. S. Eliot's need to be viewed.9 Eliot, like other aesthetic and psychological objections have been
aimed at the author: first, his meaning, being
modern critics, insists that the meaning of a
conditioned by history and culture, is too con-
literary work changes in the course of time, but,
fined and simple; second, it remains, in any case,
in contrast to Wellek, instead of locating the
inaccessible to us because we live in another age,
principle of change directly in the changing out-
or because his mental processes are private, or
looks of readers, Eliot locates it in a changing because he himself did not know what he meant.
literary tradition. In his view, the literary tradi?
Instead of attempting to meet each of these ob?
tion is a "simultaneous" (as opposed to temporal)
order of literary texts which is constantly rear-
jections separately, I shall attempt to describe
ranging itself as new literary works appear on the general principle for answering all of them,
and in doing so, to clarify further the distinction
the public scene. Whenever a new work appears
it causes a rearrangement of the tradition as a between meaning and relevance. The aim of my
exposition will be to confirm that the author's
whole, and this brings about an alteration in the
meaning of each component literary text. When meaning, as represented by his text, is unchang-
ing and reproducible. My problem will be to show
Shakespeare's Troilus, for example, entered the
tradition, it altered the meaning not only of that although textual meaning is determined by
Chaucer's Troilus, but also, to some degree, the the psychic acts of an author, and realized by
meaning of every other text in the literary tradi? those of a reader, textual meaning itself must not
tion. be identified with the author's or reader's psychic
If the changes in meaning Eliot speaks of are acts as such. To make this crucial point, I shall
considered to be changes in relevance, then his find it useful to draw upon Husserl's analysis of
conception is perfectly sound. And indeed, by verbal meaning.
definition, Eliot is speaking of relevance rather In his chief work, Logische Untersuchungen,
than meaning, since he is considering the work in Husserl sought, among other things, to avoid an
relation to a larger realm, as a component rather identification of verbal meaning with the psychic
than a world in itself. It goes without saying that acts of speaker or listener, author or reader, but
the character of a component considered as such to do this he did not adopt a strict, Platonic
changes whenever the larger realm of which it is idealism by which meanings have an actual
a part changes. A red object will appear to have existence apart from meaning-experiences. In?
different color qualities when viewed against stead, he affirmed the objectivity of meaning by
differently colored backgrounds. The same is analyzing the observable relationship between
true of textual meaning. But the meaning of the it and those very mental processes in which it is
text (its Sinn) does not change any more than actualized. For in meaning-experiences them?
the hue and saturation of the red object changes selves the objectivity and constancy of meaning
are confirmed.
when seen against different backgrounds. Yet
the analogy with colored objects is only partial : Husserl's point may be grasped by an example
I can look at a red pencil against a green blotting from visual experience.10 When I look at a box,
pad and perceive the pencil's color in that special then close my eyes, and then re-open them, I can
context without knowing the hue and saturation perceive in this second view the identical box I
of either pencil or blotter. But textual meaning is
a construction, not a naked given like a red ob? 9 T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," Se-
lected Essays (New York, 1932).
ject, and I cannot relate textual meaning to a 10 Most of my illustrations in this section are visual rather
larger realm until I have construed it. Before I
than verbal since the former may be more easily grasped. If,
can judge just how the changed tradition has at this stage, I were to choose verbal examples I would have
altered the relevance of a text, I must under- to interpret the examples before making my point. I discuss
stand its meaning or Sinn. a literary text in the second and third sections. The example
of a box was suggested to me by Helmut Kuhn, "The Phe-
This permanent meaning is, and can be, noth?
nomenological Concept of 'Horizon'," in Philosophical Es?
ing other than the author's meaning. There have says in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. Marvin Farber (Cam-
been, of course, several other definitions of tex- bridge, Mass., 1940).
by others. Anything
saw before. Yet, although not sharable inthe
I perceive this sense
same
does notare
box, the two acts of seeing belong distinctly
to the verbal "intention" or ver?
different
bal meaning.
?in this case temporally Thus, when I say, "The
different. The air issame
crisp,"
sort of result is obtained whenI may be Ithinking,
alter among
my other things,of
acts
seeing spatially. If I go"I should
to have eaten less at supper,"
another side and of "Crisp
the
air reminds
room, or stand on a chair, me of myIchildhood
what actuallyin Vermont,"
"see"
alters with my changeand inso on. In certain types of utterance
perspective, and suchyet I
unspoken accompaniments
still "perceive" the identical box; I tostill meaning under-
may be
stand that the object of sharable,
my but in general theyis
seeing are not,
the and same.
they
Furthermore, if I leave do not,
thetherefore,
room, generallyand
belong to verbal
simply
recall the box in memory,meaning. IThestill
non-verbal aspects of the speaker'sthat
understand
the object I remember is "intention"
identicalHusserl calls
with"experience"
theand the
object
verbal ones "content."
I saw. For if I did not understand However, how
that, by "content"
could
he does not mean simply "intellectual
I insist that I was remembering? The examples content"
but all those aspects
are paradigmatic: All events of of the "intention," cogni-
consciousness,
tive, emotive,
not simply those involving phonetic perception
visual (and in writing, even and
memory, are characterizedvisual) which
by may the
be conveyed to others by
mind's the
ability
linguistic means employed.13
to make modally and temporally different acts of
Husserl's analysis
awareness refer to the same object (in myofbriefawareness.
exposition)
An object for the mind makes, then, the following
remains the points:
same 1) Verbal
even
though what is "going onmeaning,
in being
theanmind" "intentional object,"
is not is un-
the
same. The mind's "object"
changing,therefore may
that is, it may be reproduced not be
by differ?
equated with psychic ent processes
"intentional acts," and as
remains self-identical
such; the
mental object is self-identical over2) against
through all these reproductions. Verbal mean? a
ing is the sharable "content" of the speaker's
plurality of mental acts.11
The relation between an act of awareness and "intentional object." 3) Since this meaning is
its object Husserl calls "intention," using theboth unchanging and interpersonal, it may be
reproduced by the mental acts of different per?
term in its traditional philosophical sense, which
is much broader than that of "purpose" and sons.is Husserl's view is thus essentially historical,
roughly equivalent to "awareness." (Whenfor I even though he insists that verbal meaning
employ the word subsequently, I shall be using is unchanging, he also insists that any particular
it in Husserl's sense.)12 This term is useful for
verbal utterance, written or spoken, is histori-
distinguishing the components of a meaning- cally determined. That is to say, the meaning is
experience. For example, when I "intend" a box,determined once and for all by the character of
there are at least three distinguishable aspects
the speaker's "intention."14
of that event. First, there is the object as per-Husserl's views provide an excellent context
ceived by me, second, there is the act by which for
I discussing the central problems of interpreta?
tion. For once we define verbal meaning as the
perceive the object, and finally there is (for physi-
"content" of the author's "intention" (which for
cal things) the object which exists independently
of my perceptual act. The first two aspects of the
11 See Aaron Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Con?
event Husserl calls "intentional object" and sciousness," in Philosophical Essays, ed. cit.
"intentional act" respectively. Husserl's point, 12 Although Husserl's term is a standard philosophical one
then, is that different "intentional acts" (onfor which there is no adequate substitute, students of lit?
different occasions) "intend" an identical "in? erature may unwittingly associate it with the intentional
fallacy. The two uses of the word are, however, quite dis-
tentional object." tinct. As used by literary critics the term refers to a purpose
The general term for all "intentional objects" which may or may not be realized by a writer. As used by
is meaning. Verbal meaning is simply a special Husserl the term refers to a process of consciousness. Thus in
kind of "intentional object," and like any other the literary usage, which involves problems of rhetoric, it is
one, it remains self-identical over against the possible to speak of an unfulfilled intention, while in Hus?
serl's usage such a locution would be meaningless. In order
many different acts which "intend" it. But the to call attention to the fact that I use the word in Husserl's
noteworthy feature of verbal meaning is its sense, I have consistently placed inverted commas around
supra-personal character. It is not an "intentionalit?an awkward procedure which may avert misunderstand-
object" for simply one person, but for many? ing.
13 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band.
potentially for all persons. Verbal meaning is, byUntersuchungen zur Phanomenologie und Theorie der Erkennt-
definition, that aspect of a speaker1 s uintention" nis. I Teil, 2nd ed. (Halle, 1913), pp. 96-97.
which, under linguistic conventions, may be shared 14Ibid.,p. 91.
the authorthe
brevity's sake I shall call simply have author's
in mind such an implication?"
"verbal intention"), the problem for
If that is the the inter-
principle, all hope for objective
preter is quite clear: he must distinguish
interpretation those since in most
must be abandoned,
meanings which belong to casesthatit is "verbal inten?
impossible (even for the author himself)
tion" from those which do not belong.
to determine This what
precisely prob?
he was thinking of at
lem may be rephrased, of course,
the time or in a he
times way that
composed his text. But this
nearly everyone will accept: the interpreter
is clearly has
not the correct principle. When I say,
to distinguish what a text "I have a headache,"
implies from what I may indeed
it imply "I
does not imply; he must givewould
theliketext
someits full due,
sympathy," and yet I might not
but he must also preserve norms
have been and limits.
explicitly For
conscious of such an impli?
hermeneutic theory, the problem is to
cation. The first find
step, a discovering a
then, in
principle for judging whether
principlevarious possible
for admitting and excluding implica?
implications should or should not
tions is be admitted.
to perceive the fundamental distinction
between the
I describe the problem in terms ofauthor's "verbal intention" and the
implication,
since, for practical purposes,meanings
it liesof atwhich
theheheartwas explicitly
of conscious.
the matter. Generally, the explicit
Here again,meanings of a
Husserl's rejection of psychologism
text can be construed to the satisfaction of mostis useful. The author's "verbal intention" (his
readers; the problems arise in determining im-total verbal meaning) may be likened to my
explicit or "unsaid" meanings. If, for example, "intention"
I of a box. Normally, when I perceive
announce, "I have a headache," there is no diffi-a box, I am explicitly conscious of only three
culty in construing what I "say," but there maysides, and yet I assert with full confidence (al?
be great difficulty in construing implications though I might be wrong) that I "intend" a box,
like "I desire sympathy," "I have a right not toan object with six sides. Those three unseen
engage in distasteful work." Such implicationssides belong to my "intention," in precisely the
may belong to my verbal meaning, or they maysame way that the "unconscious" implications
not belong. This is usually the area where the of an utterance belong to the author's "inten?
interpreter needs a guiding principle. tion." They belong to the "intention" taken as a
It is often said that implications must be de-whole.
termined by referring to the "context" of the Most if not all meaning-experiences or "inten-
utterance, which, for ordinary statements liketions" are occasions in which the whole meaning
"I have a headache," means the concrete situa? is not explicitly present to consciousness. But
tion in which the utterance occurs. In the case of how are we to define the manner in which these
written texts, however, "context" generally "unconscious" meanings are implicitly present?
means "verbal context": the explicit meaningsIn Husserl's analysis, they are present in the
which surround the problematical passage. But
form of a "horizon," which may be defined as a
these explicit meanings alone do not exhaust
system of typical expectations and probabilities.15
what we mean by "context" when we educe im? "Horizon" is thus an essential aspect of what we
plications. The surrounding explicit meaningsusually call "context." It is an inexplicit sense
provide us with a sense of the whole meaning,of the whole, derived from the explicit meanings
and it is from this sense of the whole that we present to consciousness. Thus, my view of three
decide what the problematical passage implies.surfaces, presented in a familiar and typically
For we do not ask simply, "Does this implicationbox-like way, has a horizon of typical continua-
belong with these other, explicit meanings?" buttions; or, to put it another way, my "intention"
rather, "does this implication belong with theseof a whole box defines the horizon for my view of
other meanings within a particular sort of totalthree visible sides. The same sort of relationship
meaning?" For example, we cannot determine holds between the explicit and implicit meanings
whether "root" belongs with or implies "bark"in a verbal "intention." The explicit meanings
unless we know that the total meaning is "tree" are components in a total meaning which is
and not "grass." The ground for educing impli?bounded by a horizon. Of the manifold typical
cations is a sense of the whole meaning, and this
continuations within this horizon the author is
is an indispensable aspect of what we mean bynot and cannot be explicitly conscious, nor would
"context."
it be a particularly significant task to determine
Previously I defined the whole meaning ofjust an which components of his meaning the au-
utterance as the author's "verbal intention."
16 See Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, ed. L. Land-
Does this mean that the principle for admitting
grebe (Hamburg, 1948), pp. 26-36, and H. Kuhn, "The
or excluding implications must be to ask,Phenomenological
"Did Concept of 'Horizon'," ed. cit.
thor was thinking of. verbal

But meanings.
it is They
of are the
not simply kinds of
utmost im
portance to determine meanings,
the norhorizon
are they single meanings
which corre?defi
the author's "intention" as a whole. For it is sponding to individual "intentional acts" (Wil-
only with reference to this horizon, or senseliamsburg of the Blue is not simply an individual patch
whole, that the interpreter may distinguishof color); they are typical meanings, particular
those
implications which are typical and properyet com?reproducible, and the typical components of
ponents of the meaning from those which are such meanings are similarly specific. The inter-
not.
The interpreter's aim, then, is to positpreter's the job is to specify the text's horizon as far
author's horizon and carefully to exclude hisasown he is able, and this means, ultimately, that he
accidental associations. A word like "vegetable," must familiarize himself with the typical mean?
for example, had a meaning-horizon in Marvell's ings of the author's mental and experiential
language which was evidently somewhat differ? world.
ent from the horizon it has in contemporary The importance of the horizon concept is that
English. This is the linguistic horizon it ofdefines
the in principle the norms and limits which
word, and it strictly bounds its possible implica? bound the meaning represented by the text. But,
tions. But all of these possible implications at the do same time, the concept frees the inter?
not necessarily belong within the horizonpreter of the from the constricting and impossible task
particular utterance. What the word implies of discovering
in what the author was explicitly
the particular usage must be determined by thinking
ask- of. Thus, by defining textual meaning
ing, "Which implications are typical components as the author's meaning, the interpreter does not,
of the whole meaning under consideration?" as it Byis so often argued, impoverish meaning; he
analogy, when three surfaces are presented simply to excludes what does not belong to it. For
me in a special way, I must know the typical example, if I say, "My car ran out of gas," I im-
continuations of the surfaces. If I have never ply, typically, "The engine stopped running."
encountered a box before, I might think thatBut thewhether or not I also imply "Life is ironical"
unseen surfaces were concave or irregular, depends
or I on the generality of my "intention."
might simply think there are other sides, Some but Ilinguistic utterances, many literary works
have no idea what they are like. The probability among them, have an extremely broad horizon
that I am right in the way I educe implications which at some points may touch the boundaries
depends upon my familiarity with the type of man's
of intellectual cosmos. But whether or not
meaning I consider. this is the case is not a matter for a priori dis-
That is the reason, of course, that the genre cussion; the decision must be based on a knowl-
concept is so important in textual study. edgeable By inference as to the particular "inten?
classifying the text as belonging to a particular tion" being considered.
genre, the interpreter automatically posits Within a the horizon of a text's meaning, how?
general horizon for its meaning. The genreever, pro- the process of explication is unlimited. In
vides a sense of the whole, a notion of typical this respect Dryden was right; no text is ever
meaning-components. Thus, before we interpret fully explicated. For example, if I undertook to
a text, we often classify it as "casual conversa- interpret my "intention" of a box, I could make
tion," "lyric poem," "military command,"explicit "sci- unlimited implications which I did not
entific prose," "occasional verse," "novel," notice in my original "intention." I could educe
"epic," and so on. In a similar way, I have tonot only the three unseen sides, but also the fact
classify the object I see as a box, a sphere, a tree, that the surfaces of the box contain 24 right
and so on, before I can deduce the character of angles, that the area of two adjoining sides is
its unseen or inexplicit components. But these less than half the total surface area, and so on.
generic classifications are simply preliminary And if someone asked me whether or not such
indications. They give only a rough notion of the meanings were implicit in my "intention" of a
horizon for a particular meaning. The aim ofbox, I must answer affirmatively. In the case of
interpretation is to specify the horizon as far aslinguistic meanings, where the horizon defines a
possible. Thus, the object I see is not simply a much more complex "intentional object," such
box but a cigarette carton, and not simply thatdeterminations are far more difficult to make.
but a carton for a particular brand of cigarettes.But the probability of an interpreter's inference
If a paint mixer or dyer wants to specify a par?may be judged by two criteria alone: the accu-
ticular patch of color, he is not content to call it racy with which he has sensed the horizon of the
blue; he calls it Williamsburg Blue. The examplewhole and the typicality of such a meaning
of a color patch is paradigmatic for all particularwithin such a whole. Insofar as the inference
meets these criteria, it is truly to raiseanprivate associations (experience)

explication of to the
textual meaning. It simply renders level of public implicationsthat
explicit (content).
which was, consciously or unconsciously, However, this basically
in sound
the argument re?
author's "intention." mains one-sided. For even though verbal mean?
The horizon which grounds and sanctions ing must conform to public linguistic norms
inferences about textual meaning is the inner (these are highly tolerant, of course), no mere
horizon of the text. It is permanent and self- sequence of words can represent an actual verbal
identical. But beyond this inner horizon any meaning with reference to public norms alone.
meaning has an outer horizon; that is to say, any Referred to these alone, the text's meaning re?
meaning has relationships to other meanings; it mains indeterminate. This is true even of the
is always a component in larger realms. This simplest declarative sentence like "My car ran
outer horizon is the domain of criticism. But out of gas" (did my Pullman dash from a cloud
this outer horizon is not only unlimited, it isof Argon?). The fact that no one would radically
also
changing since the world itself changes. Inmisinterpret
gen? such a sentence simply indicates
eral, criticism stakes out only a portion ofthat thisits frequency is high enough to give its usual
outer horizon as its peculiar object. Thus, meaningfor the apparent status of an immediate
example, Eliot partitioned off that aspect of the But this apparent immediacy obscures a
given.
text's outer horizon which is defined by the complex process of adjudications among mean-
simultaneous order of literary texts. The simul- ing-possibilities. Under the public norms of
taneous order at a given point in time is there- language alone no such adjudications can occur,
fore the inner horizon of the meaning Eliot is since
in- the array of possibilities presents a face of
vestigating, and this inner horizon is just as indifference. The array of possibilities only
blank
definite, atemporal, and objective as the inner
begins to become a more selective system of
horizon which bounds textual meaning.probabilities
But when, instead of confronting merely
the critic, like the interpreter, must construe a word sequence, we also posit a speaker who
correctly the components of his inner horizon, very likely means something. Then and only
and one major component is textual meaning then does the most usual sense of the word se?
itself. The critic must first accurately interpret
quence become the most probable or "obvious"
the text. He need not perform a detailed explica?
sense. The point holds true a fortiori, of course,
tion, but he needs to achieve (and validate) when that we confront less obvious word sequences
clear and specific sense of the whole meaning like those found in poetry. A careful exposition
which makes detailed explication possible. of this point may be found in the first volume of
Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, which
II. Determinateness of Textual Meaning
is largely devoted to a demonstration that verbal
In the previous section I defined textual mean?
meaning arises from the "reciprocal determina-
ing as the "verbal intention" of the author, and of public linguistic possibilities and sub-
tion"
this argues implicitly that hermeneutics must jective specifications of those possibilities.17
stress a reconstruction of the author's aims and
Just as language constitutes and colors subjec-
attitudes in order to evolve guides and norms fortivity, so does subjectivity color language. The
construing the meaning of his text. It is fre-author's or speaker's subjective act is formally
quently argued, however, that textual meaning necessary to verbal meaning, and any theory
has nothing to do with the author's mind, but which tries to dispense with the author as speci-
only with his verbal achievement, that the ob? fier of meaning by asserting that textual meaning
ject of interpretation is not the author but his is purely objectively determined finds itself
text. This plausible argument assumes, of course,chasing will-o'-the-wisps. The burden of this
that the text automatically has a meaning sim? section is, then, an attack on the view that a
ply because it represents an unalterable sequence
of words. It assumes that the meaning of a word16 The phrase, "piece of language," comes from the first
sequence is directly imposed by the public norms paragraph of William Empson's Seven Types of Ambiguity,
3rd ed. (New York, 1955). It is typical of the critical school
of language, that the text as a "piece of language"Empson founded.
is a public object whose character is defined by17 Vol. I. Language, trans. R. Manheim (New Haven,
public norms.16 This view is in one respect sound, 1953). It is ironic that Cassirer's work should be used to
since textual meaning must conform to public
support the notion that a text speaks for itself. The realm of
language is autonomous for Cassirer only in the sense that
norms if it is in any sense to be verbal (i.e.,
it follows an independent development which is reciprocally
sharable) meaning; on no account may the inter?
determined by objective and subjective factors. See pp. 69
preter permit his probing into the author's mind178, 213, 249-250, et passim.
text is a "piece of language" and

therefore, is that of a defense
the inclusive interpretation. of
notion that a text represents
The most "adequate" construction
the determina
is the one
verbal meaning of anwhich gives the fullest coherent account of all
author.
One of the consequences
the text'sarising
potential meanings.19
from the view
that a text is a piece ofInclusivism is desirable as a position
language?a which
purely pub
induces a readiness
object?is the impossibility of todefining
consider the results ofin prin
ple the nature of a correct
others, but, aside interpretation.
from promoting an estimable Th
tolerance, it
is the same impasse which has little theoretical
results from value. the
For theo
that a text leads a life
althoughofits aimits own,
is to reconcile and
different indee
plausible
the two notions are readings
corollaries since
in an ideal, comprehensive any "pi
interpreta?
of language" must have ain changing
tion, it cannot, meani
fact, either reconcile different
when the changing public norms
readings or choose of
between them. language
As a normative
viewed as the only ones ideal, or principle
which of correctness,
determine
it is useless. th
sense of the text. It isThis point may be illustrated
therefore not by citing two ex-
surprising
find that Wellek subscribes implicitly
pert readings of a well-known poem by Words- to th
text-as-language theory.worth. I shall first quote
The textthe poemisand viewed
then
quote excerpts from two published
representing not a determinate exegeses in
meaning, bu
rather a system of meaning-potentials
order to demonstrate the kind of impasse which specif
not by a meaner but by inclusivism
the always provokespotency
vital when it attempts ofto lan
reconcile interpretations,
guage itself. Wellek acutely perceivesand, incidentally,
the to dan
of the view: "Thus the
demonstrate
system the veryof kind of
norms
interpretive prob?
is grow
ing and changing and lem
will
which calls
remain,
for a guiding principle:
in some sense
always incompletely and imperfectly
A slumber did my spirit seal; realize
But this dynamic conception does not mean I had no human fears:
mere subjectivism and relativism. All the differ? She seemed a thing that could not feel
ent points of view are by no means equally right. The touch of earthly years.
It will always be possible to determine which
point of view grasps the subject most thoroughly No motion has she now, no force;
and deeply. A hierarchy of viewpoints, a criticism She neither hears nor sees;
Rolled round in earth's diurnal course,
of the grasp of norms, is implied in the concept of
With rocks, and stones, and trees.
the adequacy of interpretation."18 The danger of
the view is, of course, precisely that it opens the Here are excerpts from two commentaries on the
door to subjectivism and relativism, since lin? final lines of the poem; the first is by Cleanth
guistic norms may be invoked to support any Brooks, the second by F. W. Bateson:
verbally possible meaning. Furthermore, it is not
1. [The poet] attempts to suggest something of the
clear how one may criticize a grasp of norms
which will not stand still.
lover's agonized shock at the loved one's present
lack of motion?of his response to her utter and
Wellek's brief comment on the problem in- horrible inertness. . . . Part of the effect, of course,
volved in defining and testing correctness in resides in the fact that a dead lifelessness is sug?
interpretation is representative of a widespread gested more sharply by an object's being whirled
conviction among literary critics that the most about by something else than by an image of the
correct interpretation is the most "inclusive" object in repose. But there are other matters which
one. Indeed, the view is so widely accepted that are at work here: the sense of the girFs falling back
Wellek did not need to defend his version of it into the clutter of things, companioned by things
(which he calls "Perspectivism") at length. Thechained like a tree to one particular spot, or by
things completely inanimate like rocks and stones.
notion behind the theory is reflected by such
. . . [She] is caught up helplessly into the empty
phrases as "always incompletely and imper? whirl of the earth which measures and makes time.
fectly realized" and "grasps the subject most
thoroughly." This notion is simply that no single
18 Theory of Literature, p. 144.
interpretation can exhaust the rich system of 19 Every interpretation is necessarily incomplete in the
meaning-potentialities represented by the text. sense that it fails to explicate all a text's implications. But
Ergo every plausible reading which remains this kind of incomplete interpretation may still carry an ab-
within public linguistic norms is a correct reading solutely correct system of emphases and an accurate sense
of the whole meaning. This kind of incompleteness is radically
so far as it goes, but each reading is inevitably different from that postulated by the inclusivists, for whom
partial since it cannot realize all the potentialities a sense of the whole means a grasp of the various possible
of the text. The guiding principle in criticism, meanings which a text can plausibly represent.
She is touched by and held by two

earthly time
constructions in its
of meaning rigorously exclude
most powerful and horrible image.
one another. Precisely the same strictures hold,
2. The final impression the poem of leaves
course, for
isthe
not argument
of two that Bateson's read?
contrasting moods, but of a singleing comprehends that of Brooks. Nor can mode
mood mounting
(3) escape with impunity.
to a climax in the pantheistic magnificence of theAlthough it seems to
last two lines. . . . The vague living-Lucy
preserve a stress bothof on this
negation and on affirma-
poem is opposed to the grander tion,dead-Lucy who
thereby coalescing the two readings, it ac-
has become involved in the sublime processes
tually excludes of and labels them
both readings,
nature. We put the poem down satisfied, because
not simply partial, but wrong. For if the poem
its last two lines succeed in eflecting a reconciliation
gives equal stress to bitter irony and to afiirma-
between the two philosophies or social attitudes.
Lucy is actually more alive now tion,that
then anysheconstruction
is dead, which places a pri?
mary stress on
because she is now a part of the life of Nature, andeither meaning is simply incor-
rect.
not just a human "thing."20
The general principle implied by my analysis
Now, if we grant, as I think we must,
is very simple.that both
The sub-meanings of a text are
the cited interpretations arenot permitted
blocks which can be the
by brought together addi-
text, the problem for the inclusivist is verbal
tively. Since to recon-
(and any other) meaning is a
cile the two readings. structure of component meanings, interpretation
Three modes of reconciliation are available to
has not done its job when it simply enumerates
the inclusivist: (1) Brooks's reading includeswhat the component meanings are. The inter?
Bateson's; it shows that any affirmative sugges?preter must also determine their probable struc?
tions in the poem are negated by the bitterly ture, and particularly their structure of em-
ironical portrayal of the inert girl being whirled phases. Relative emphasis is not only crucial to
around by what Bateson calls the "sublime meaning (perhaps it is the most crucial and
processes of Nature." (2) Bateson's reading in? problematical element of all), it is also highly
cludes Brooks's; the ironic contrast between the restrictive; it excludes alternatives. It may be
active, seemingly immortal girl and the passive, asserted as a general rule that whenever a reader
inert and dead girl is overcome by a final un- confronts two interpretations which impose
qualified affirmation of immortality. (3) Each ofdifferent emphases on similar meaning compo?
the readings is partially right, but they must benents, at least one of the interpretations must be
fused to supplement one another. The very factwrong. They cannot be reconciled.
that the critics differ suggests that the meaning By insisting that verbal meaning always ex-
is essentially ambiguous. The emotion expressed hibits a determinate structure of emphases, I do
is ambivalent, and comprises both bitter regret not, however, imply that a poem or any other
and affirmation. The third mode of reconciliation
text must be unambiguous. It is perfectly pos?
is the one most often employed, and is probably, sible, for example, that Wordsworth's poem
in this case, the most satisfactory. A fourth type ambiguously implies both bitter irony and posi-
of resolution, which would insist that Brooks is tive affirmation. Such complex emotions are
right and Bateson wrong (or vice versa) is not commonly expressed in poetry, but if that is the
available to the inclusivist, since the text, as kind of meaning the text represents Brooks and
language, renders both readings plausible. Bateson would be wrong to emphasize one emo-
Close examination, however, reveals that none tion at the expense of the other. Ambiguity or,
of the three modes of argument manages to for that matter, vagueness is not the same as
reconcile or fuse the two different readings. Mode indeterminateness. This is the crux of the issue.
(1), for example, insists that Brooks's reading To say that verbal meaning is determinate is not
comprehends Bateson's, but although it is con- to exclude complexities of meaning but only to
ceivable that Brooks implies all the meaningsinsist that a text's meaning is what it is and not
which Bateson has perceived, Brooks also implies a hundred other things. Taken in this sense, a
a pattern of emphasis which cannot be reconciledvague or ambiguous text is just as determinate
with Bateson's reading. While Bateson construes as a logical proposition; it means what it means
a primary emphasis on life and affirmation, and nothing else. This is true even if one argues
Brooks emphasizes deadness and inertness. No that a text could display shifting emphases like
amount of manipulation can reconcile these
divergent emphases, since one pattern of empha? 20 Cleanth Brooks, "Irony as a Principle of Structure," in
M. D. Zabel, ed., Literary Opinion in America, 2nd ed. (New
sis irrevocably excludes other patterns, and, York, 1951), p. 736. F. W. Bateson, English Poetry. A Critical
since emphasis is always crucial to meaning, the Introduction (London, 1950), p. 33 and pp. 80-81.
E. D. Ilirsch, Jr. 473
The first consists

those Sunday supplement of habits, engrams,
magic squares prohibi- wh
first seem to jut outtions,and
and the like
thenderived from
topast jutlinguistic
in. W
usage; these
texts of this character (if are the
any"virtualities" of the langue.
exist), one n
Based on these virtualities,
only say that the emphases shift, there and
are, in addi-
must
tion, sharable
therefore, be construed meaning-possibilities which
statically. Any have sta
never before been
construction would simply actualized;
be wrong.these are theThe
"po- fu
tentialities." The two
mental flaw in the "theory of types of meaning-possibili?
the most incl
ties taken
interpretation" is that it together constitute the langue
overlooks the whichprob
of emphasis. Since the speech community
different draws upon.of
patterns But this
emph
exclude one another, system of possibilities must be is
inclusivism distinguished
neither
genuine norm nor an from adequate
the actual verbal utterances of individuals prin
guiding
who draw upon it. These actual utterances are
for establishing an interpretation.
But aside from the fact that inclusivism can? called paroles; they are uses of language, and
actualize some (but never all) of the meaning-
not do its appointed job, there are more funda?
possibilities constituting the langue.
mental reasons for rejecting it and all other inter-
pretive ideals based on the conception that a Saussure's distinction pinpoints the issue: does
a text represent a segment of langue (as modern
text represents a system of meaning-possibilities.
No one would deny that for the interpreter theorists
the hold) or a parole? A simple test suffices
text is at first the source of numerous possibleto provide the answer. If the text is composed of
interpretations. The very nature of language sentences
is it represents parole, which is to say
such that a particular sequence of words canthe determinate verbal meaning of a member of
the speech community. Langue contains words
represent several different meanings (that is why
public norms alone are insufncient in textual and sentence-forming principles, but it contains
interpretation). But to say that a text might no sentences. It may be represented in writing
only by isolated words in disconnection {Worter
represent several structures of meaning does not
as opposed to Worte). A parole, on the other
imply that it does in fact represent all the mean?
ings which a particular word sequence can legally hand, is always composed of sentences, an asser-
convey. Is there not an obvious distinction be? tion corroborated by the firmly established prin?
tween what a text might mean and what it does ciple that the sentence is the fundamental unit of
mean? According to accepted linguistic theory, speech.22 Of course, there are numerous elliptical
it is far more accurate to say that a written com? and one-word sentences, but wherever it can be
position is not a mere locus of verbal possibilities,correctly inferred that a text represents sen?
but, rather, a record (made possible by the tences and not simply isolated words, it may also
invention of writing) of a verbal actuality. The be inferred that the text represents parole, which
interpreter's job is to reconstruct a determinate is to say, actual, determinate verbal meaning.
actual meaning, not a mere system of possibili? The point is nicely illustrated in a dictionary
ties. Indeed, if the text represented a system of definition. The letters in boldface at the head of
possibilities, interpretation would be impossible, the definition represent the word as langue, with
since no actual reading could correspond to a all its rich meaning-possibilities. But under one
mere system of possibilities. Furthermore, if the of the sub-headings, in an illustrative sentence,
text is conceived to represent all the actual struc? those same letters represent the word as parole,
tures of meaning permissible within the public as a particular, selective actualization from
norms of language, then no single construction langue. In yet another illustrative sentence,
(with its exclusivist pattern of emphases) could under another sub-heading, the very same word
be correct, and any legitimate construction would represents a different selective actualization. Of
be just as incorrect as any other. When a text is course, many sentences, especially those found
conceived as a piece of language, a familiar and in poetry, actualize far more possibilities than
all too common anarchy follows. But, aside from illustrative sentences in a dictionary. Any pun,
its unfortunate consequences, the theory contra- for example, realizes simultaneously at least
dicts a widely accepted principle in linguistics. I
refer to Saussure's distinction between langue 21 This is the "synchronic" as opposed to the "diachronic"
and parole. sense of the term. See Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de lin-
Saussure defined langue as the system of guistique generale (Paris, 1931). Useful discussions may be
linguistic possibilities shared by a speech com- found in Stephen Ullman, The Principles of Semantics (Glas-
gow, 1951), and W. v. Wartburg, Einfuhrung in die Pro-
munity at a given point in time.21 This system of blematik und Methodik der Sprachwissenschaft (Halle, 1943).
possibilities contains two distinguishable levels. 22 See, for example, Cassirer, p. 304.
has bungled soBut

two divergent meaning-possibilities. badly the
that his
pun utterance will be
is nevertheless an actualization from
misconstrued, langue
then it serves and
him right when folk
misunderstand him. However, put in linguistic
not a mere system of meaning-possibilities.
terms,
The langue-parole distinction, the position
besides becomes unsatisfactory. It
aifirming
the determinateness of textual meaning,
implies that the meaning also
represented by the text
clarifies the special problemsis notposed
the paroleby of revised
an author, but rather the
and interpolated texts. With parole of "the speech
a revised text, community."
com- But since
posed over a long period ofonly timeindividuals
(Faust, utter paroles,
for ex? a parole of the
ample) how are we to construe the unrevised
speech community is a non-existent, or what the
portions? Should we assumeGermans that they call an Unding.
still meanA text can represent
what they meant originally or onlythat
the parole
they of a speaker
took on or author, which is
a new meaning when the rest another of way the text
of saying was
that meaning requires a
altered or expanded? With meaner. compiled or interpo?
lated texts, like many books However, of the Bible, it is not should
necessary that an
we assume that sentences from varied the
text represent prove-parole he desired t
nances retain their original It meanings,
is frequentlyor the that
case, when an au
these heterogeneous elements have
bungled, that become
his text in- represents no par
tegral components of a new total
Indeed there aremeaning? In
but two alternatives: either the
terms of Saussure's distinction, the
text represents thequestion
author's verbal meaning or it
becomes: should we consider represents the text to represent
no determinate verbal meaning at all.
a compilation of divers paroles or of
Sometimes, a course,
new it unitary
is impossible to detect
parole "respoken" by the new author
that the author has or editor?
bungled, and in that case,
I submit that there can be no definitive answer even though his text does not represent verbal
to the question, except in relation to a specific
meaning, we shall go on misconstruing the text
scholarly or aesthetic purpose, for in realityasthethough it did, and no one will be the wiser.
question is not, "How are we to interpret the But with most bungles we are aware of a dis-
text?" but, "Which text are we to interpret?" Is
junction between the author's words and his
it to be the heterogeneous compilation of past probable meaning. Eliot, for example, chided
paroles, each to be separately considered, orPoe thefor saying "My most immemorial year,"
new, homogeneous parole? Both may be repre- when Poe "meant" his most memorable year.24
sented by the written score. The only problem Now we all agree that Poe did not mean what
is to choose, and having chosen, rigorouslyspeakers
to of English generally mean by the word
"immemorial"?and so the word cannot have
refrain from confusing or in any way identifying
the two quite different and separate "texts"the usual meaning. (An author cannot mean what
with one another. Without solving any concrete he does not mean.) The only question, then, is:
problems, then, Saussure's distinction neverthe?
does the word mean more or less what we convey
less confirms the critic's right in most cases byto"never-to-be-forgotten" or does it mean
regard his text as representing a single parole.
nothing at all? Has Poe so violated linguistic
Another problem which Saussure's distinctionnorms that we must deny his utterance verbal
clarifies is that posed by the bungled text, where
meaning or "content"?
the author aimed to convey a meaning which his The question probably cannot be answered by
words do not convey to others in the speech fiat. But since Poe's meaning is generally under?
community. One sometimes confronts the prob? stood, and since the single criterion for verbal
lem in a freshman essay. In such a case, the ques?
meaning is communicability, I am inclined to
tion is, does the text mean what the author describe Poe's meaning as verbal.251 tend to side
wanted it to mean or does it mean what the
speech community at large takes it to mean? 23 Sewanee Review, 54, 1946. Reprinted in W. K. Wimsatt,
Much attention has been devoted to this Jr., prob?
The Verbal Icon (Lexington, Ky., 1954).
lem ever since the publication in 1946 of Wim- 24 T. S. Eliot, "From Poe to Valery," Hudson Review, 2,
1949, p.232.
satt's and Beardsley's essay on "The Intentional
25 The word is, in fact, quite effective. It conveys the sense
Fallacy."23 In that essay the position wasof taken
"memorable" by the component "memorial," and the
(albeit modified by certain qualifications)sense
thatof "never-to-be-forgotten" by the negative prefix. The
the text, being public, means what the speechdifference between this and Jabberwocky words is that it
appears to be a standard word occurring in a context of
community takes it to mean. This position is,
standard words. Perhaps Eliot is right to scold Poe, but he
in an ethical sense, right (and language, being
cannot properly insist that the word lacks a determinate
social, has a strong ethical aspect): if the author
verbal meaning.
with the Poes and Malaprops poses. Of course,of thethe

reader world,
must realize verbal
for
the norms of language meaning remain by his far
own subjective
more actstolerant
(no one can
than dictionaries and do that for him),
critics like but if he remembers
Eliot suggest.that his
On the other hand, every job is tomember
construe the author's
of themeaning, he will
speech
community, and especially attempt tothe exclude his own predispositions
critic, has a duty and
to avoid and condemntosloppiness impose those of the author.needless
and But no one can
ambiguity in the use ofestablish language,another's meaning
simply withincertainty.
order The
to preserve the effectiveness interpreter'sof goal
theis simply this: to show
langue itself.that a
Moreover, there must given be a reading is more probable
dividing linethan others. In
between
verbal meanings and those hermeneutics, verification is awhich
meanings process of estab-
we
half-divine by a supra-linguistic lishing relative probabilities. exercise of
imagination. There must To establish
be aa dividing
reading as probable lineit is first
be?
tween Poe's successful necessary disregard of reference
to show, with normal to theusage
norms
and the incommunicable word
of language, sequences
that it is possible. Thisof a crite-
is the bad
freshman essay. However, that the
rion of legitimacy: dividing
reading must line is
be permis-
not between the author's meaning and the sible within the public norms of the langue in
reader's, but rather between the author's parole which the text was composed. The second crite-
and no parole at all. rion is that of correspondence: the reading must
Of course, theoretical principles cannot di? account for each linguistic component in the
rectly solve the interpreter's problem. It is one text. Whenever a reading arbitrarily ignores
thing to insist that a text represents the deter? linguistic components or inadequately accounts
minate verbal meaning of an author, but it is for them, the reading may be presumed improb-
quite another to discover what that meaning is. able. The third criterion is that of generic ap-
The very same text could represent numerous propriateness: if the text follows the conventions
different paroles, as any ironic sentence discloses of a scientific essay, for example, it is inappropri-
("That's a bright idea!?" or "That's a bright ate to construe the kind of allusive meaning
ideal"). But it should be of some practical conse-found in casual conversation.27 But when these
quence for the interpreter to know that he doesthree preliminary criteria have been satisfied,
have a precisely defined task, namely to discoverthere remains a fourth criterion which gives
the author's meaning. It is therefore not only significance to all the rest, the criterion of plausi-
sound but necessary for the interpreter to in- bility or coherence. The three preliminary norms
quire, "What in all probability did the author usually permit several readings, and this is by
mean? Is the pattern of emphases I construe the definition the case when a text is problematical.
author's pattern?" But it is both incorrect and Faced with alternatives, the interpreter chooses
futile to inquire, "What does the language of thethe reading which best meets the criterion of
text say?" That question can have no deter? coherence. Indeed, even when the text is not
minate answer. problematical, coherence remains the decisive
III. Verification criterion, since the meaning is "obvious" only
because it "makes sense." I wish, therefore, to
Since the meaning represented by a text is that
focus attention on the criterion of coherence,
of another, the interpreter can never be certain
and shall take for granted the demands of legiti?
that his reading is correct. He knows further-
macy, correspondence, and generic appropriate-
more that the norms of langue by themselvesness.
are I shall try to show that verification by the
far too broad to specify the particular meanings
criterion of coherence, and ultimately, therefore,
and emphases represented by the text, that these
verification in general, implies a reconstruction
particular meanings were specified by particular
of relevant aspects in the author's outlook. My
kinds of subjective acts on the part of thepoint
au? may be summarized in the paradox that
thor, and that these acts, as such, remain inac-
objectivity in textual interpretation requires
cessible.26 A less self-critical reader, on the other
explicit reference to the speaker's subjectivity.
hand, approaches solipsism if he assumes that The paradox rerlects the peculiar nature of
the text represents a perspicuous meaning sim?
coherence, which is not an absolute, but a de-
ply because it represents an unalterable sequence
of words. For if this "perspicuous" meaning26isTo recall Husserl's point: a particular verbal meaning
depends on a particular species of "intentional act," not on a
not verified in some way, it will simply besingle,
the irreproducible act.
interpreter's own meaning, exhibiting the con?27 This third criterion is, however, highly presumptive,
notations and emphases which he himself since
im-the interpreter may easily mistake the text's genre.
pendent quality. The laws of coherence are between different coherent readings. Verification
variable; they depend upon the nature of the by coherence implies therefore a verification of
total meaning under consideration. Two mean? the grounds on which the reading is coherent.
ings ("dark" and "bright," for example) which 77 is necessary to establish that the context invoked
cohere in one context may not cohere in another.28 is the most probable context. Only then, in relation
"Dark with excessive bright" makes excellent to an established context, can we judge that one
sense in Paradise Lost, but if a reader found the reading is more coherent than another. Ulti-
phrase in a textbook on plant pathology, he mately, therefore, we have to posit the most
would assume that he confronted a misprint for probable horizon for the text, and it is possible
"Dark with excessive blight." Coherence de? to do this only if we posit the author's typical
pends on the context, and it is helpful to recall outlook, the typical associations and expectations
our definition of "context": it is a sense of the which form in part the context of his utterance.
whole meaning, constituted of explicit partial This is not only the single way we can test the
meanings plus a horizon of expectations and relative coherence of a reading, but is also the
probabilities. One meaning coheres with another only way to avoid pure circularity in making
because it is typical or probable with reference sense of the text.
to the whole (coherence is thus the first cousin An essential task in the process of verification
of implication). The criterion of coherence can is, therefore, a deliberate reconstruction of the
be invoked only with reference to a particular author's subjective stance to the extent that this
context, and this context may be inferred only stance is relevant to the text at hand.29 The im-
by positing the author's "horizon," his disposi- portance of such psychological reconstruction
tion toward a particular type of meaning. This may be exemplified in adjudicating between
conclusion requires elaboration. different readings of Wordsworth's "A Slumber
The fact that coherence is a dependent quality Did My Spirit Seal." The interpretations of
leads to an unavoidable circularity in the process Brooks and Bateson, different as they are, re-
of interpretation. The interpreter posits mean? main equally coherent and self-sustaining. The
ings for the words and word-sequences he con- implications which Brooks construes cohere
fronts, and, at the same time, he has to posit a
beautifully with the explicit meanings of the
whole meaning or context in reference to which poem within the context which Brooks adum-
the sub-meanings cohere with one another. The brates. The same may be said of Bateson's
procedure is thoroughly circular; the context is
reading. The best way to show that one reading
derived from the sub-meanings and the sub- is more plausible and coherent than the other is
meanings are specified and rendered coherent to show that one context is more probable than
with reference to the context. This circularity the other. The problem of adjudicating between
makes it very difficult to convince a readerBateson to and Brooks is therefore, implicitly, the
alter his construction, as every teacher knows. problem every interpreter must face when he
Many a self-willed student continues to insist tries to verify his reading. He must establish the
that his reading is just as plausible as his instruc-
most probable context.
tor's, and, very often, the student is justified; Now when the homme moyen sensuel confronts
his reading does make good sense. Often, bereavementthe such as that which Wordsworth's
only thing at fault with the student's reading is
that it is probably wrong, not that it is inco- 28 Exceptions to this are the syncategorematic meanings
herent. The student persists in his opinion pre? (color and extension, for example) which cohere by necessity
cisely because his construction is coherent and regardless of the context.
29 The reader may feel that I have telescoped a number of
self-sustaining. In such a case he is wrong be?
cause he has misconstrued the context or sense steps
of here. The author's verbal meaning or "verbal intention"
is the object of complex "intentional acts." To reproduce this
the whole. In this respect, the student's hard-
meaning it is necessary for the interpreter to engage in "in?
headedness is not different from that of all self-
tentional acts" belonging to the same species as those of the
convinced interpreters. Our readings are author.too (Two different "intentional acts" belong to the same
species when they "intend" the same "intentional object.")
plausible to be relinquished. If we have a dis-
That is why the issue of "stance" arises. The interpreter
torted sense of the text's whole meaning, the
needs to adopt sympathetically the author's stance (his dis-
harder we look at it the more certainly we shall
position to engage in particular kinds of "intentional acts")
find our distorted construction confirmed. so that he can "intend" with some degree of probability the
Since the quality of coherence depends upon same "intentional objects" as the author. This is especially
clear in the case of implicit verbal meaning, where the inter-
the context inferred, there is no absolute stand-
preter's realization of the author's stance determines the
ard of coherence by which we can adjudicate
text's horizon.
poem explicitly presents

Wordsworth is, in ahe adumbrates,
given period, more consistent
than most poets. Besorrow
cally, a horizon including that as it may, we shall
and in
ability. These are never
for him
be certain what anycomponents
writer means, and
since Bateson grounds his interpretation
very meaning of bereavement. Sorrow in a a
consolability cannot fail
conscious to ofbe
construction associated
the poet's outlook, his
death when the loved one,
reading must be deemed formerly
the more probable one so a
and alive, is imagineduntil as lying
the uncovering in
of some the
presently earth,
unknown
less, dumb, inert, insentient. And,
data makes a different construction since t
of the poet's
no hint of stance appear but
life in heaven more valid.
only of bodily
the comforts
Christianity of
Bateson's procedure is appropriatelie beyon
to all texts,
poem's horizon.
Affirmations
including anonymous ones. On too deep
the surface, it for
like those Bateson insists
would seem impossible to on, simply
invoke the author's d
probable outlook
cohere with the poem's when the authormeanings
explicit remains un?
do not belong to theknown, context.
but in this limiting caseBrooks's
the interpreter r
therefore, with its emphasis
simply makes his psychological on inconso
reconstruction
and bitter irony, is clearly
on the justified
basis of fewer data. For even with anony?not o
the text but by reference
mous texts it is crucialto universal
to posit not simply some h
attitudes and feelings.
author or other, but a particular subjective
But the trouble stance such
with in reference to
a which the construed con?
reading is appa
to most Wordsworthians. The poet is not an text is rendered probable. That is why it is im?
homme moyen sensuel; his characteristic attitudes portant to date anonymous texts. The inter?
are somewhat pantheistic. Instead of regarding preter needs all the clues he can muster with
rocks and stones and trees merely as inert ob- regard not only to the text's langue and genre,
jects, he probably regarded them in 1799 as but also to the cultural and personal attitudes
deeply alive, as part of the immortal life of na? the author might be expected to bring to bear in
ture. Physical death he felt to be a return to the specifying his verbal meanings. In this sense, all
source of life, a new kind of participation in texts, including anonymous ones, are "attrib-
nature's "revolving immortality." From every? uted." The objective interpreter simply tries to
thing we know of Wordsworth's typical attitudes make his attribution explicit, so that the grounds
during the period in which he composed the for his reading are frankly acknowledged. This
poem, inconsolability and bitter irony do not opens the way to progressive accuracy in inter?
belong in its horizon. I think, however, that pretation, since it is possible, then, to test the
Bateson overstates his case, and that he fails to assumptions behind a reading as well as the
emphasize properly the negative implications in coherence of the reading itself.
the poem ("No motion has she now, no force"). The fact that anonymous texts may be suc-
He overlooks the poet's reticence, his distinct cessfully interpreted does not, however, lead to
unwillingness to express any unqualified evalua- the conclusion that all texts should be treated as
tion of his experience. Bateson, I would say, has anonymous ones, that they should, so to say,
not paid enough attention to the criterion of speak for themselves. I have already argued that
correspondence. Nevertheless, in spite of this, no text speaks for itself, and that every construed
and in spite of the apparent implausibility of text is necessarily "attributed." These points
Bateson's reading, it remains, I think, somewhat suggest strongly that it is unsound to insist on
more probable than that of Brooks. His proce- deriving all inferences from the "text itself."
dure is also more objective. For even if he had When we date an anonymous text, for example,
botched his job thoroughly and had produced a we apply knowledge gained from a wide variety
less probable reading than that of Brooks, his of sources which we correlate with data derived
method would remain fundamentally sound. from the text. This extrinsic data is not, how?
Instead of projecting his own attitudes (Bateson ever, read into the text. On the contrary, it is
is presumably not a pantheist) and instead of used to verify that which we read out of it. The
positing a "universal matrix" of human attitudes extrinsic information has ultimately a purely
(there is none), he has tried to reconstruct the verificative function.
author's probable attitudes so far as these are The same thing is true of information relating
relevant in specifying the poem's meaning. It is to the author's subjective stance. No matter
still possible, of course, that Brooks is right and what the source of this information may be,
Bateson wrong. A poet's typical attitudes do whether it be the text alone or the text in con?
not always apply to a particular poem, although junction with other data, this information is
extrinsic to verbal meaning of theas such.

linguistic Strictly
components he employed. And
the criterion
speaking, the author's subjective of generic
stance isappropriateness
not is rele-
part of his verbal meaning vant even
only so far
whenas generic
heconventions
ex? are pos-
sessed
plicitly discusses his feelings andand accepted
attitudes.by the author.
This The fact that
is Husserl's point again. The these criteria all refer ultimately
"intentional ob? to a psycho?
ject" represented by a text islogical construction
different fromis hardly
thesurprising when
"intentional acts" which realize it. When the we recall that to verify a text is simply to estab-
interpreter posits the author's stance, he sympa- lish that the author probably meant what we
thetically re-enacts the author's "intentional construe his text to mean. The interpreter's
acts," but although this imaginative act is neces? primary task is to reproduce in himself the au?
sary for realizing meaning, it must be distin- thor's "logic," his attitudes, his cultural givens,
guised from meaning as such. In no sense in doesshort his world. For even though the process
the text represent the author's subjective stance: of verification is highly complex and difficult,
the interpreter simply adopts a stance in order thetoultimate verificative principle is very simple:
make sense of the text, and, if he is self-critical,
the imaginative reconstruction of the speaking
he tries to verify his interpretation by showing subject.30
his adopted stance to be, in all probability, The thespeaking subject is not, however, identical
author's. with the subjectivity of the author as an actual
Of course, the text at hand is the safest sourcehistorical person; it corresponds, rather, to a
of clues to the author's outlook, since men do very limited and special aspect of the author's
adopt different attitudes on different occasions. total subjectivity; it is, so to speak, that "part"
However, even though the text itself should be of the author which specifies or determines ver?
the primary source of clues and must always bal be meaning.31 This distinction is quite apparent
the final authority, the interpreter should make in the case of a lie. When I wish to deceive, my
an effort to go beyond his text wherever possible, secret awareness that I am lying is irrelevant to
since this is the only way he can avoid a vicious the verbal meaning of my utterance. The only
circularity. The harder one looks at a text from correct interpretation of my lie is, paradoxically,
an incorrect stance, the more convincing the in- to view it as being a true statement, since this is
correct construction becomes. Inferences about the only correct construction of my "verbal in?
the author's stance are sometimes difficult tention." Indeed it is only when my listener has
enough to make even when all relevant data are my meaning (presented as true) that
understood
brought to bear, and it is self-defeating he tocanmake
judge it to be a lie. Since I adopted a truth-
the inferential process more difficult thantelling it needstance, the verbal meaning of my utter?
be. Since these inferences are ultimately extrinsic,
ance would be precisely the same, whether I was
there is no virtue in deriving them from the text lying or suffering from the erroneous
deliberately
alone. One must not confuse the result of a con? conviction that my statement was true. In other
struction (the interpreter's understanding words,
of an author may adopt a stance which
the text's Sinn) either with the process of con?
differs from his deepest attitudes in the same
struction or with a validation of that process.way that an interpreter must almost always
The Sinn must be represented by and limited by
the text alone, but the processes of construction30 Here I purposefully display my sympathies with Dil?
and validation involve psychological reconstruc?
they's concepts, Sichhineinfuhlen and Verstehen. In fact, my
whole argument may be regarded as an attempt to ground
tion and should therefore be based on all the data
available. some of Dilthey's hermeneutic principles in Husserl's epis-
temology and Saussure's linguistics.
Not only the criterion of coherence but all the
31 Spranger aptly calls this the "cultural subject." See
other criteria used in verifying interpretations
Eduard Spranger, "Zur Theorie des Verstehens und zur
geisteswissenschaftlichen Psychologie" in Festschrift Johannes
must be applied with reference to a psychological
Volkelt zum 70. Geburtstag (Munich, 1918), p. 369. It should
reconstruction. The criterion of legitimacy, for
be clear that I am here in essential argeement with the Amer?
example, must be related to a speaking subject,
ican anti-intentionalists (term used in the ordinary sense). I
since it is the author's langue, as an internal
think they are right to exclude private associations from
possession, and not the interpreter's, which
verbal meaning. But it is of some practical consequence to
defines the range of meaning-possibilities ainsist
text that verbal meaning is that aspect of an author's mean?
ing which is interpersonally communica&/e. For this implies
can represent. The criterion of correspondence
that his verbal meaning is that which, under linguistic
has force and significance only because we norms,
pre- one can understand, even if one must sometimes work
sume that the author meant something by hard each to do so.
awareness
adopt a stance different which may his
from agree orown.32
disagree, approve But f
or disapprove, but which
the process of interpretation, the does author's
not participate in priv
experiences are irrelevant. The
determining their verbal only
meaning. relevan
To interpreta?
aspect of subjectivity islevel
tion, this that which
of awareness determ
is as irrelevant as it is
verbal meaning or, in inaccessible. In construing and
Husserl's verifying verbal
terms, "cont
In a sense all poets are, of
meaning, only thecourse, liars, and
speaking subject counts.
some extent all speakers A separate are,
exposition but
would be required
the todelibe
lie, spoken to deceive, isproblems
discuss the a borderline case.
of psychological reconstruc-
most verbal utterances the speaker's public tion. I have here simply tried to forestall the
stance is not totally foreign to his private atti? current objections to extrinsic biographical and
tudes. Even in those cases where the speaker historical information by pointing, on the one
deliberately assumes a role, this mimetic stance hand, to the exigencies of verification, and, on
is usually not the final determinant of his mean? the other, to the distinction between a speaking
ing. In a play, for example, the total meaning of subject and a "biographical" person. I shall be
an utterance is not the "intentional object" of satisfied if this part of my discussion, incomplete
the dramatic character; that meaning is simply as it must be, will help revive the half-forgotten
a component in the more complex "intention" of truism that interpretation is the construction of
the dramatist. The speaker himself is spoken. anotherJs meaning. A slight shift in the way we
The best description of these receding levels of speak about texts would be highly salutary. It
subjectivity was provided by the scholastic is natural to speak not of what a text says, but of
philosophers in their distinction between "first what an author means, and this more natural
intention," "second intention," and so on. Irony, locution is the more accurate one. Furthermore,
for example, always entails a comprehension of to speak in this way implies a readiness (not
two contrasting stances ("intentional levels") notably apparent in recent criticism) to put
by a third and final complex "intention." The forth a whole-hearted and self-critical effort at
"speaking subject" may be defined as the final the primary level of criticism?the level of
and most comprehensive level of awareness de- understanding.
terminative of verbal meaning. In the case of a Yale University
lie the speaking subject assumes that he tells the
New Haven, Conn.
truth, while the actual subject retains a private
awareness of his deception. Similarly, many 32 Charles Bally calls this "dedoublement de la p
speakers retain in their isolated privacy a self- alite." See his Linguistique generale et linguistique fran
conscious awareness of their verbal meaning, an 2nd ed. (Bern, 1944), p. 37.

Objective Interpretation - Hirsch JR

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Objective Interpretation - Hirsch JR

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Author(s): E. D. Hirsch, Jr.

sents may be construed correctly or incorrectly.

concerns, etc.) and this object may

The "life" theory textual

text does not change, and that the modern, differ?

thor was thinking of. verbal

meets these criteria, it is truly to raiseanprivate associations (experience)

text is a "piece of language" and

She is touched by and held by two

The first consists

has bungled soBut

with the Poes and Malaprops poses. Of course,of thethe

poem explicitly presents

extrinsic to verbal meaning of theas such.

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