Aquino v.

Enrile
59 SCRA 183
FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and
detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and
held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President “for being participants or  for having
given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and
to take over the Government by force…” General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in
the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire
country under martial law.

ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare
martial law subject to judicial inquiry?; and
2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance with the declaration of martial law?

HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry,
while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in
the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation
of martial law has become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or
detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress
invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger
thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation
of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in
this case.

CABANAS V PILAPIL (SECOND DIVISION) GR L-25843 JULY 25, 1974

CABANAS-PLAINTIFF (MOTHER of the MINOR: Millian Pilapil: 10 yrs old at the time of the
complaint: Beneficiary of the proceeds of the Insurance Policy from the child’s deceased
father -Florentino Pilapil)
FRANCISCO PILAPIL- DEFENDANT (uncle- Brother of the Deceased)

FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil had a child with Melchor Cabanas named Millian Pilapil who was only
10 yrs old. He insured the proceeds of his insurance policy to her child MP with his brother
Francisco Pilapil as the trustee since at that time, MP was still a minor. Upon his death, the
proceeds were paid to his brother (Fran P). In this effect, MC (Melchor Cabanas) who was
living with child is seeking the delivery of such sum. MC filed a bond required by the Civil
Code. Defendant (Fran P) would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by
invoking the terms of the insurance policy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mother is the rightful trustee of her daughter who is a minor in the
proceeds of the insurance policy left by her husband

HELD:
Yes. The court AFFIRMED the lower court’s decision of making MC the trustee of MP,
though a stronger case were presented for the uncle. This decision of the court mainly relies
on Articles 320 and 321of the CC which the former, provides that a father, in the absence of
the mother is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority and if the property is worth two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to court’s approval, while the latter, render that the property which the
unemancipated child (MP) has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any
lucrative title, belongs to the child, and in usufruct to the mother or father under whom he is
under parental authority and whose company he lives. In the case at bar, the beneficiary is a
minor under the custody and parental authority of her mother. The said minor acquired the
property with lucrative title and which makes her usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. The court
in consideration with the CC provisions, asserts their decision that there is no ambiguity in the
language employed and it was an appealed decision. The paramount consideration in this
instant case is the welfare of the child and the added circumstances wherein the child stays
with her mother, not her uncle, proves that there is no evidence of lack of maternal care and
that it adheres as well to the concept of PARENSPATRIAE, where a minor is to accord at his
best interest. It is not only consonance but natural as well, for a parent to be preferred and the
court cannot remain insensible in her valid plea of assertion of priority as a mother of MP.
After all, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, The State shall strengthen the family as a
basic social institution. It is the the family as a unit that has to be strengthened.

BERNARDITA MACARIOLA V HON.ELIAS ASUNCION (SUPREME COURT) AM NO. 133-

J MAY 31, 1982

MACARIOLA- COMPLAINANT
ASUNCION- RESPONDENT

FACTS:
Mac (claimant) is one of the heirs of the deceased Francisco Reyes whose properties
where subject to partition among his children (Sinfrosa Bales, Luz Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperta Reyes, Adela and Priscilla Reyes and Mac itself). A Civil Case was filed in
the Court of Instance in Leyte and was rendered by J Asun and was decided and became
final for lack of appeal. On Oct 16, 1953, a project of partition was submitted to the
respondent notwithstanding the fact that it was not signed by the parties involved in civil case
but only by their respective counsels. One of the properties involved in the project of partition
(Lot 1184) was adjudicated to Luz, Anacorita, Adela and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares.
(divided into 5 lot-1184 A-E). Later on, Lot E was sold to Dr. Galapon, and the latter sold it to
J Asun and his wife. Spouses Galapon and Asuncion conveyed their shares and interest in
Lot E to “Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries”, registered to SEC on January 9,
1967 and wherein J Asun is the president and her wife is the secretary. In this effect, Mac
filed complaint against J Asun on the grounds: that J Asun violated Art. 1491 par 5 of NCC in
the acquisition of a portion of Lot-E: that J Asun violated Art. 14 pars 1 and 5 of Code of
commerce because of association with the aforesaid Fishing industries: and that he was guilty
of coddling an “impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by becoming friends with
Dr. Galapon who is not a member of the Bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not J Asun violates Art 1491 par 5 of NCC in acquisition of Lot-1184 E
Whether or not J Asun violates Art 14 pars 1 and 5 of Code of Commerce because of
his association with “the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries”
Whether or not J Asun acted in disregard of Judicial Decorum

HELD:
NO.On the first issue at hand, the court find no merit in the contention of Mac that J Asun
violates Art 19 par 5 of NCC because the prohibition in the aforesaid article applies only to the
sale or assignment of the property (the subject of litigation) and must take place “DURING
THE PENDENCY” of the litigation of the property. In the case at hand, J Asun purchased Lot
1184- E on March 6, 1965 and from that, it can be assert that the “lot in question” was no
longer the subject of litigation. It had long become final for there was no appeal that took
place after a decision was rendered on June 8, 1963. Furthermore, J Asun did not directly
bought it from the plaintiffs involved in the civil case but from Dr. Galapon who purchased it
earlier on good faith. And though a Civil Case 4234 was filed by Mac questioning the two
orders and project of partition, it can no longer change or affect the aforesaid facts- that the
questioned order was “EFFECTED AND CONSUMMATED LONG AFTER THE FINALITY OF
THE AFORESAID DECSION OR ORDERS”, However, though he was not found guilty for the
violation, it was improper of him to acquire the Lot because possible suspicion that his
acquisition was related to his official actuation in civil case 3010 may arise.
 NO.On the second issue, J Asun cannot be held liable for Art 14 pars 1 and 5 of Code of
Commerce because it can be noted that Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of
an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees in the engagement of business making it political in essence. Moreover, a transfer
of sovereignty from Spain to the US and Us to Republic of the Phils. must be deemed
abrogated because of change of sovereignty. Therefore the aforesaid Article has no legal and
binding effect and therefore cannot be applied to J Asun. More to the point, it does not appear
from the records that J Asun participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business
transaction of his corporation (J ASUN TRADER…) and that his business was not befitted in
any other means. Likewise, to sustain the point, there is no provision in both 1935 and 1973
constitution nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from
engaging or having interest in a lawful business.

NO.With respect to the third issue, the court rules that as long as Judge A did not
influence his official actuation as judge, then it did not render him guilty. For there is no
tangible proof as well that Judge A give any undue privileges to Tan or that the latter
benefited in his practice of law.

Judge A though not guilty to the issues at dispute, was reminded by the court to be more
DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES”.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS V VILLASOR ET AL., (SECOND DIVISION) GR L-30671

NOVEMBER 28, 1973

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS- PETITIONER

VILLASOR, ET AL- RESPONDENTS

FACTS:
On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered against the petitioner (Republic of the Phils)
herein. In the aforesaid decision, under Special Proceedings No. 2156-R, an arbitration award
in the amount of Php 1, 712, 396 was confirmed. On June 24, 1969, Villasor (respondent)
issued an Order declaring the finality and executory effect of the decision rendered. In the
Said order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued dated June 26, 1969 and
served notices of garnishment in several banks specially on the “monies due to AFP in the
form of deposit sufficient to cover the amount mentioned on the writ. (The funds of AFP on
deposit with banks particularly PVB and PNB are public funds allocated for the payment of
pensions of retirees, pay and allowance of military and civilian and for the maintenance of
AFP. A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioner (Republic of the Phil)
on the contentions that Villasor acted in excess jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse
of discretion hence the issuance of the aforesaid writ is null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of alias writ of execution by the respondent valid

HELD:
No. It is not valid because it does not conform with what the Constitution dictates. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the jurist concept that the state as well
its government is immune from suit unless,, there is an express authorization from the
legislature. The exemption from suit is established not on because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.In regards to public
funds, the latter cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. In the case at bar, though
the judgment was rendered by Villasor as final and executory, it must be noted that AFP
funds are public funds and under the law, government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment for the obvious consideration of public policy.
There is a rule that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment.
Subjecting its officers, to garnishment would permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. More
to the point, moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the
disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion. The functions and public services rendered
by State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
The Court granted writs of certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioner, nullifying noth
the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the
alias writ of execution issued thereunder. A preliminary Injunction was made permanent.

WYLIE V RARANG GR No. 74135, May 28 1992, 209 SCRA 357

M. H. WYLIE and CAPT. JAMES WILLIAMS- PETITIONERS
AURORA I. RARANG and THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT-
RESPONDENTS

FACTS:
M. H. Wylie (Petitioner) was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt. James
Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City.
Aurora I. Rarang on the other hand, was an employee in the office of the Provost Marshal
assigned as merchandise control guard. M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant
administrative officer supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was
published daily by the US Naval Base station. The POD featured important announcements,
necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of the
regular features of the POD was the "action line inquiry." On February 3, 1978, the POD
made a publication, under the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" which mentioned a certain
person named “Auring” who is described as a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the
Provost Marshal. The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the
Office of the Provost Marshal and was subsequently proven that it was her being referred to
when petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication.
Rarang then filed an action for damages alleging that the article constituted false, injurious,
and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation
exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and
circulated in the English language and read by almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel. The
defendants however contended by filing a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the
defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the performance of their official
functions as officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit; and the
United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued
without its consent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the American naval officers (such as Wylie and Capt. Williams) who commit a
crime torturous act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state
immunity from suit. Does the grant of rights, power, and authority to the US under the RP-US
Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts?

HELD:
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to
have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or
where there is showing of bad faith (Chavez v. Sandiganbayan).It may be argued, as a
general rule, that Capt. Williams as commanding officer of the naval base was far removed in
the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold
him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base. However, in this particular
case, the records show that the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for
approval and that he approved it. ART. 2176, CC prescribes a civil liability for damages
caused by a person’s act or omission constituting fault or negligence, stating that, “Whoever
by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,..” Moreover, ART. 2219(7), Civil Code
provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation.”Indeed, the imputation of theft contained in the POD was a defamation against
the character and reputation of the PR. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the
Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name “Auring” if the article will be
published. The petitioners, however, were NEGLIGENT because under their direction, they
issued the publication without deleting the said name. Such act or omission was ULTRA
VIRES and CANNOT be deemed part of official duty. It was a TORTIOUS ACT which
ridiculed the PR. As a result of petitioner’s act, PR suffered besmirched reputation, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, especially so, since the article was baseless
and false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities, are liable for the damages they
caused the Private Respondent.

G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND
TRANSPORTATION, respondents.
FACTS: Police Power

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation

composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to
operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to
vehicular traffic. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which deals with Phasing out and Replacement of  Old and
Dilapidated Taxis. On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as
Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well
as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration,
they are roadworthy and fit for operation.

ISSUES:
A.  Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the
manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners’
constitutional right to procedural due process?
B.  Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the
assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners’ constitutional rights to.
(1)  Equal protection of the law;
(2)  Substantive due process; and
(3)  Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard

HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It
can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society.  It may also regulate
property rights.  In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando “the necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even
if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded”.

CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-

appellants,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch
11, and the
CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.
Facts:
A petition for review was filed questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.
640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, which penalizes
any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other
performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full
payment for admission tickets.Aggrieved by the effect of the ordinance herein petitioners filed
a special civil action in the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City,
praying the subject ordinance be declared void and unconstitutional.The Court of First
instance upheld the validity and constitunality of the subject ordinance. Motion for
reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power of the local municipal
board?

Held:
No, the subject ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power.While it is true that a
business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds
of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be
unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the
regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The right of the owner
to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the
property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the
proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what
prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did
not approve could stay away

Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec Elisea Gozun et al

Published November 22, 2010
G. R. No. 157882 – 485 SCRA 586 – Police Power – Eminent Domain

FACTS
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies
when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995,
Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed
an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later
CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After
the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the
law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of
property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as
unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section
107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking”  of private property
for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the
corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR,
through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own,
permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation. Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is
not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state
may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of
rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or
economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that “to require
compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by
purchase.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

HELD:
The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the case at bar, Didipio failed to
show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is not w/o just compensation.
Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR.
To wit, Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations. Section 107.
Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the
surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining
operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in
104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

Pelaez v. Auditor General No. L-23825, 15 SCRA 569 [Dec 24, 1965] 48 DELEGATION of
POWERS

FACTS
The President, purporting to act pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
(RAC), issued EOs 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating 33 municipalities. Soon after, VP
Pelaez, instituted the present special civil action challenging the constitutionality of said EOs
on the ground, among others, that Sec 68 of the RAC relied upon constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President. The challenged Sec 68 provides: “the
President x x x may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province,
subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and
increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more
subprovinces, separate any political division x x x into such portions as may be required,
merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another x x x”
ISSUE
Does Sec 68 of the RAC constitute an undue delegation of legislative power?

HELD
Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Sec 68
of the RAC, insofar as it grants to the President the power to create municipalities does not
meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy xxx, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.58 It is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that the law: (a) be complete in itself x x x and (b) x x x fix a standard to which the
delegate must conform x x x. The completeness test and sufficient standard test must be
applied concurrently, not alternatively. [In delegating legislative power to another branch of
the govt by law,] it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law : (a) be complete in itself—it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate—and (b) x x x fix a standard—the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. (Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569)
Salonga v. Farrales No. L-47088, 105 SCRA 359 [July 10, 1981]
ARTICLE II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

FACTS
Respondent Farrales is the owner of a parcel of residential land in Olongapo City. Prior to the
acquisition of the land, petitioner Salonga was already in possession as lessee of a part of the
land, on which she had erected a house. Due to non-payment of rentals, Farrales then filed
an ejectment case against Salonga and other lessees. Decision was rendered in favor of
Farrales. Meanwhile, Farrales sold to the other lessees the parcels of land on which they
respectively occupy so that when the decision was affirmed and executed on appeal, the
ejectment case was then only against Salonga. Salonga persistently offered to purchase the
subject land from Farrales but the latter consistently refused. Salonga filed an action for
specific performance praying that Farrales be compelled to sell to him, but it was dismissed.
In this appeal, she now invokes Art II, Sec 6 of the 1973 Constitution on social justice.

ISSUE
Is the constitutional provision on social justice applicable in this case?

HELD.
No. It must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
property owners who under the Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The
social justice consecrated in our 32 ARTICLE II. Fundamental Principles and State Policies
Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another
who is not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on
obligations and contracts,42 and is therefore, beyond the power of Courts to grant.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.
Art II, Sec 16 is self-executing and judicially enforceable — J. Feliciano concurring.

Oposa v. Factoran GR 101083, 224 SCRA 792 [July 30, 1993]

Facts.
Concerned over the continued deforestation of the country, petitioners, all minors represented
by their parents, instituted a civil complaint as a taxpayers’ class suit “to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage
of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.” They pray for
the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements (TLA) in the country and to order the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to cease and desist from
approving new TLAs. On motion of then DENR Sec. Factoran, the RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of a cause of action. Factoran avers that the petitioners raise an issue
political (whether or not logging should be permitted) which properly pertains to the legislative
or executive branches. Petitioners, claiming to “represent their generation as well as the
generation yet unborn”, allege their fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology
was violated by the granting of said TLAs.

Issues.
(1) Do petitioners have a cause of action “to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth”? (2) Do the petitioners have a locus standi to
file suit?

Held.
(1) Yes. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. xxx Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right.43 (2)
Yes. The case is a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest to all citizens of the Philippines and the petitioners are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
filing of a valid class suit44 are present. We find no difficulty in ruling 43 The Court further
held that while the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow
that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such
a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation xxx the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers xxx that the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those xxx generations [to come] xxx. In
J. Feliciano’s separate concurring opinion, he opined that the Art II, Sec 15 and 16 of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable in its present form (Oposa v.
Factoran, GR 101083) 44 Revised Rules of the Court, Rule 3, Sec 12: Class suit. When the
subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so
numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds
to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned
may sue or 34 ARTICLE II. Fundamental Principles and State Policies that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. We find enough averments to show, prima facie, the claimed violation
of their rights on which reliefs may be granted. The case cannot be thus said to raise a
political question. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-à-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. Petition granted.

The Constitution requires no specific form in making appropriations but only that it be
made by law —Art VI, 29(1)
Guingona v. Carague GR 94571, 196 SCRA 221 [Apr 22, 1991]

Facts.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for foreign debt service in
the 1990 budget. Petitioners contend that the 3 presidential decrees authorizing such
automatic appropriation violate Sec 29 (1), Art VI of the Constitution. It is asserted, among
others, that it did not meet the alleged required definiteness, certainty, and exactness in
appropriation, and so it is an undue delegation of legislative power as the President, by virtue
of which, determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.

Issue.
Is the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget violative of Art VI, Sec 29
(1) of the Constitution?

Held.
No. Our Constitution does not require a definite, certain, exact or “specific appropriation made
by law” unlike the Nebraska Constitution invoked by petitioners. Our Constitution simply
states that moneys paid out of the treasury must be made pursuant to an appropriation made
by law. More significantly, our Constitution does not prescribe any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made,
except that it be “made by law” such as precisely the authorization under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words xxx an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past
but subsisting legislation) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of
laws by the present Congress). The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual
laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or
special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. compared with the targets set at the time the agency budgets were
approved. (Guingona v. Carague, GR 94571)

HOUSE OFFICERS, HOUSE RULES, DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS, THE HOUSE JOURNAL

Art VI, Sec 16. “Majority” simply refers to the number more than half the total.
Constitution is silent on the manner of selecting officers other than the Senate
President and House Speaker – Art VI, Sec 16 (1).
Santiago v. Guingona, Jr. GR 134577, 298 SCRA 756 [Nov 18, 1988]

Facts.
Upon opening its 1st regular session, the Senate held its election of officers. Sen. Fernan was
declared duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, the Senate failed to arrive at a consensus
on the matter of the Minority leader for which Sen. Tatad and Sen. Guingona of the PRP and
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP83 (both “minority” parties, LAMP being the “majority”) respectively were
being considered. After 3 session days of debate on the issue, Sen. Pres. Fernan formally
recognized Sen. Guingona as minority leader upon receiving information that all Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP senators signed in agreement for the latter. Sens. Santiago and Tatad of the
PRP instituted this present petition for quo warranto alleging that Guingona had been
usurping a position which, to them, rightfully belongs to Tatad. They assert the definition of
“majority” in Art VI, sec 16(1) of the Constitution refers to a group of senators who (1) voted
for the winning 83 People’s Reform Party and Lakas—National Union of Christian Democrats
—United Muslim Democrats of the Philippines, respectively 63 ARTICLE VI. Legislative
Department Sen. Pres. and (2) accepted committee chairmanships, therefore those otherwise
comprise the “minority.” Accordingly, they are of the view that Guingona, having voted for
Fernan (the elected Sen. President), belongs to the “majority.” In view thereof, they assert Art
VI, sec 16(1) has not been observed in the selection of the Minority Leader.

Issue.
Did Guingona unlawfully usurp the position of Minority Leader in the view that Art VI, sec
16(1) of the Constitution was not observed?
Held.
No. In dismissing the petition, he term “majority” simply “means the number greater than half
or more than half of any total”. Art VI, sec 16(1) does not delineate who comprise the
“majority” much less the “minority”. Notably, the Constitution [in Art VI, sec 16(1)] is explicit on
the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent
on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that it says is
that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise
of the prerogative conferred [to the House] xxx. In the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines xxx this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the
acts of the Senate relative thereto.

Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the
ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-
6 month imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from
being enforced.  The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it
is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No.
640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n)
of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for
theaters and not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general
welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue:
Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices
of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of
power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City?

Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:
1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to
control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of
exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper
police regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and
other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the
exercise of delegated police power by the local government.
People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from
selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid
exercise of police power.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in
question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power
as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public
generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere
with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the
Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade,
and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater
owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for
general admission, balcony and lodge.
Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience
due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law
The court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the
public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents
who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they
would for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding
savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these
savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it
likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out,
there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners
since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age
as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not
provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of
Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the
age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is
clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover,
there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health,
safety, morals and the general welfare.
Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by
movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price
of admission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will
be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less
children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for
themselves.
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the
proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable
consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the
performance on condition that he behaves properly.  Such ticket, therefore, represents a right,
Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of
sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also,
necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any
condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to
dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain.
In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has not found it
appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances.
This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public
interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as
a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects
on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the
prevailing cultural traits are considerable.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must
be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its
provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of
regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should
not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.
34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an
inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process
clause.
Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the
ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or
unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper
evidence
Chavez v Romulo GR NO 157036, June 9, 2004

Facts: GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to

suspend the issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR).
Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner,
Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request was
denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and injunction against Executive Secretary
Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.

Issue: Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to

property? Whether or not the banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a
valid exercise of police power?

Held. Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR
may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal
privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license
subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the
statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked. Revocation of it does
not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege. The basis for its
issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed Guidelines do
not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the
carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their
firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a
reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime
incidents will be curtailed.
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT V CA 260 DCRA 319

FACTS: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the
introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan
to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the
proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being
deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the
validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts
and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the
cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of
police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common
good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the
burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order,  particularly, its ARB
requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban
against the deployment of performing artists to “”high risk”” destinations, a measure
which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very
least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals
adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It
cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
 Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. PCA
G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998
Mendoza, J.

Facts:

                PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the
rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all
its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and
beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by
law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators.
On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer
require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a
condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free
enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red
tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested
areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities.  The
APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93.
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and
HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and
TONYCALVENTO,
respondents
.G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto.  He asked
Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet.
This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996.  The ground for said
denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial,
respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order.  In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional
Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to
issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring
as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco
Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing
resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON  Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid.  This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be
contrary to that of the national government’s.  However, this freedom to exercise contrary views
does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly
enacted by Congress.  Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should
not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of
government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress.  As held in Tatel vs. Virac,
ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.  The reasons for this is
obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp
Philippine Apparel Workers’ Union v. NLRC
GR L-50320, 31 July 1981 (105 SCRA 444)
First Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concurring

Facts: In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement, the Union submitted a
set of bargaining proposals to the company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but due to the impasse, the Union
filed a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the parties be assisted in concluding a collective
agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977,
the parties signed the agreement providing for a three-stage wage increase for all rank and file employees,
retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to take effect on 1
May 1977 providing for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This
increase was implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the company.  The controversy arose when the petitioner union
sought the implementation of the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement. The company alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage increase (roughly P22 per
month) as partial compliance with the requirements of PD 1123, so that it is obliged to pay only the balance of P38
per month, contending that that since there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties as early as 2
April 1977 about the wage increases which were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption
provided for in the Rules Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other hand, maintains that the living allowance
under PD 1123 (originally PD 525) is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80. On 13 February 1978,
the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA against the company. On 30 May 1978,
an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the  complaint and referred the case to the parties to resolve
their disputes in accordance with the machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this order,
both parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission (Second Division) promulgated its
decision, setting aside the order appealed from and entering a new one dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit,
relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that agreement between the parties was made 2 April 1977
granting P27 per month retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was squarely under the exceptions provided for in
paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union filed for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc
dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls under the exceptions.

Held: The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3 September1977, when PD 1123 was already in
force and effect, although the increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April 1977. There is nothing in the
records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before May 1977, to allow the company to fall
within the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected
contract nor an actual payment of said increase. There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary
opinion expressed in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a
wrong premise or representation on the part of the company. The company had declared that the parties have
agreed on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with inflation brought about
by, among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting the fact that negotiations were still being held on other
unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining items (which were only agreed upon on 3 September 1977). The
Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as used in its rules implementing PD 1123, and its
explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when it is based on
misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties, the same cannot be applied. There is
no distinction between interpretation and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains
the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary
is not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond
the scope of the law. The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the
commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the
negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases embodied in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against the company.