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Statutory Interpretation: General

Principles and Recent Trends


The exercise of the judicial power of the United States often requires that courts construe statutes to
apply them in particular cases and controversies. Judicial interpretation of the meaning of a statute is
authoritative in the matter before the court. Beyond this, the methodologies and approaches taken by
the courts in discerning meaning can help guide legislative drafters, legislators, implementing
agencies, and private parties.

The Supreme Court has expressed an interest “that Congress be able to legislate against a background
of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.” Though the feed-
back loop of interpretive practices coming from the courts may not always speak well to actual
congressional practice and desires, the judiciary has developed its own set of interpretive tools and
methodologies, keeping in mind that there is no unified, systematic approach for unlocking meaning
in all cases.

Though schools of statutory interpretation vary on what factors should be considered, all approaches
start (if not necessarily end) with the language and structure of the statute itself. In this pursuit, the
Court follows the principle that a statute be read as a harmonious whole whenever reasonable, with
separate parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context.

Still, the meaning of statutory language is not always evident. To help clarify uncertainty, judges
have developed various interpretive tools in the form of canons of construction. Canons broadly fall
into two types. “Language,” or “linguistic,” canons are interpretive “rules of thumb” for drawing
inferences based on customary usage, grammar, and the like. For example, in considering the
meaning of particular words and phrases, language canons call for determining the sense in which
terms are being used, that is, whether words or phrases are meant as terms of art with specialized
meanings or are meant in the ordinary, “dictionary” sense. Other language canons direct that all
words of a statute be given effect if possible, that a term used more than once in a statute ordinarily
be given the same meaning throughout, and that specific statutory language ordinarily trumps
conflicting general language. “Ordinarily” is a necessary caveat, since any of these “canons” may
give way if context points toward a contrary meaning.

Not infrequently the Court stacks the deck, and subordinates the general, linguistic canons of
statutory construction, as well as other interpretive principles, to overarching presumptions that favor
particular substantive results. When one of these “substantive” canons applies, the Court frequently
requires a “clear statement” of congressional intent to negate it. A commonly invoked “substantive”
canon is that Congress does not intend to change judge-made law. Other substantive canons disfavor
preemption of state law and abrogation of state immunity from suit in federal court. As another
example, Congress must strongly signal an intent to the courts if it wishes to apply a statute
retroactively or override existing law. The Court also tries to avoid an interpretation that would raise
serious doubts about a statute’s constitutionality.

Interpretive methods that emphasize the primacy of text and staying within the boundaries of statutes
themselves to discern meaning are “textualist.” Other approaches, including “intentionalism,” are
more open to taking extrinsic considerations into account. Most particularly, some Justices may be
willing to look to legislative history to clarify ambiguous text. This report briefly reviews what
constitutes “legislative history,” including, possibly, presidential signing statements, and the factors
that might lead the Court to consider it.

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