You are on page 1of 160

DILIGENCE

FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP


INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Withdrawal of Regulated COT


Wash Trades
Futures Contracts

November 21, 2006


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

STATEMENT OF USE AND SCOPE LIMITATIONS


At the request of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (“SECP”),
Diligence USA, LLC (“Diligence”)1 conducted a forensic examination of certain alleged
manipulative and/or illicit activities related to the stock market events of March 2005, as
transacted on the Karachi Stock Exchange (“KSE”). The primary allegations examined
related to the withdrawal of regulated COT (“Carry Over Transaction” financing, also
known as “Carry Over Trade” or Badla financing) and in-house Badla, wash trades, and
violations of Clause 3(b) of the Regulations Governing Futures Contracts (exceeding the
Rs 50 million reporting threshold).

This Report of Findings (“Report”) presents findings and conclusions from the work
completed by Diligence and incorporates facts and information brought to our attention
as of November 21, 2006 on these issues. The Report is intended for the use of the
SECP, pursuant to its Letter of Engagement with Diligence (“LOE”) and without the
prior consent of the SECP, may not be released or used for any other purposes. Diligence
shall not be responsible for, and hereby expressly disclaims any liability whatsoever
directly or indirectly related to, use of the Report by parties other than the SECP for any
reason or purpose whatsoever.

Diligence was not tasked with examining, and therefore the Report does not
systematically analyze, trading activities and related issues which may have occurred on
the Lahore or Islamabad exchanges during March 2005.

Additionally, please be advised that should new or supplemental information of any kind
come to Diligence’s attention which, either alone, or in combination with information
previously provided to Diligence, is deemed relevant and material to the findings and
conclusions presented herein, or should Diligence be requested to conduct new or
supplemental forensic analysis related to the findings in the Report or in other related
areas, Diligence reserves the right to revise or amend the Report’s findings and
conclusions accordingly.

1
Diligence is a leading provider of investigative, anti-corruption/anti-fraud, forensic accounting, and due
diligence services to Fortune 500 companies, leading financial institutions, law firms, international
organizations, and various domestic and foreign government agencies. Headquartered in Washington, D.C.
with key offices in New York, London, Moscow, Brussels and Hong Kong, Diligence consults with clients
on business intelligence matters, compliance policies/programs, litigation support, and international risk
management strategies. Diligence has an operationally experienced, multi-lingual and international staff
with diverse backgrounds including domestic and international law enforcement, global financial media
investigation and reporting, the World Bank Department of Institutional Integrity (corruption and fraud
investigations unit), the Volcker Committee investigation of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq, and
“Big Four” accounting and auditing firms.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 2 OF 11


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

REPORT CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PART I. WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT PAGE 1 TO 38

PART II. WASH TRADES PAGE 1 TO 7

PART III. FUTURES CONTRACTS PAGE 1 TO 8

APPENDICES

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 3 OF 11


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In March 2005, the KSE 100 Index experienced a sudden and significant decline. After a
substantial rise in early 2005 to a record high of 10,303 on March 15, 2005 (an intensified
run which lured large numbers of investors into the market and pushed trading to
unprecedented volumes), the KSE 100 then fell precipitously, losing approximately 25%
of its value in only eight trading sessions.2

Given the considerable investment losses experienced by individual market participants,


strong public reaction ensued in Karachi and elsewhere. Lacking definitive answers,
rumors and theories abounded as to the underlying cause of the sudden rise and fall of the
market in March 2005. Speculation arose in attempts to explain the possible contributing
factors. Expressed possibilities included overambitious day traders and an overheated
futures counter, as well as the manipulation of the financing and equity markets by
various major market players. This last hypothesis has received the most attention, and it
is the main subject of this Report.

The March 2005 market fall was a significant socio-economic event in Pakistan: billions
of rupees in capital market value were created and reversed in a matter of weeks, and
there were widespread accusations of unscrupulous and manipulative behavior. Seeking
answers, politicians and the media in Pakistan called for serious governmental inquiries
to determine both the root causes of the market’s decline and whether manipulation or
other wrong-doing had, in fact, contributed to the wide-spread financial losses.

In response, the SECP appointed a Taskforce in April 2005 with terms of reference to
investigate, among other things: the causes of the significant market decline; the role of
various market participants; and certain market manipulation allegations.3

In its June 2005 report (the “Taskforce Report”), the Taskforce concluded that the rise
and fall of the stock market in March 2005 was at least partly attributable to a number of
manipulative activities, schemes and market abuses involving unnamed brokers. The
Taskforce Report further suggested that there was an orchestrated scheme to influence
scrip prices involving several brokers, which directly or indirectly conspired to artificially

2
The KSE 100 index rose from 6,220 on Jan. 3, 2005, to 10,303 on Mar. 15, 2005, and fell to 7,708 on
Mar. 28, 2005. “Market Overview,” Pakistan Press International Information Services Jan. 4, 2005,
“Stock Market Report,” Pakistan Press International Information Services Mar. 16 and Mar. 29, 2005.
3
Dr. Tariq Hassan "Statement Before the Public Accounts Committee on The Recent Crisis in the Stock
Exchanges & Measures Taken by the Authorities" (Islamabad, Pakistan, Apr. 2, 2005). See SECP website
<www.secp.gov.pk>. “SECP Constitutes Task Force To Investigate Stock Market Crises” SECP Press
Release, Apr. 2, 2005.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 4 OF 11


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS
inflate the market, lock in prices by selling short in Futures, then constrict liquidity--
causing prices to plunge and reaping billions in illicit gains in the process.4

To summarize the alleged scheme’s key components:

1. First, certain brokers conspired to use manipulative trading practices to drive scrip
prices up. Through wash trades and misleading statements, they created artificial
euphoria and overly optimistic sentiments – drawing additional investors into the
market and driving scrip prices even higher.
2. These brokers liberally supplied increasing volumes of COT for the heightened
demand in trading, which further escalated prices and permitted smaller investors
to take on highly leveraged positions. These brokers later systematically
restricted COT availability, sending share-hungry weak investors to the Futures
counter.
3. As scrip prices rose, the brokers locked in those (inflated) prices by selling
heavily in the March Futures contracts and further complicated the scenario by
selling shares they did not actually own, fully intending to defer the acquisition of
those shares to a later date to benefit from anticipated price declines.
4. At a later stage, these same brokers then adversely influenced the market’s
liquidity through additional COT restrictions which had the effect of stalling the
market and sending scrip prices downward. Brokers then purchased the requisite
shares in the Ready Market, at highly discounted prices, to satisfy delivery of
setoff shares in settlement of their March Futures sales contracts and reaping hefty
profits in the process.
5. Finally, in order to prevent massive defaults by buyers stuck with open Futures
contracts, these same brokers persuaded regulators to create special trading
periods and to extend the normal settlement period by three days to allow the
brokers to provide additional COT funding to Futures contract holders.

The Taskforce acknowledged that the enormity of the task of analyzing the various
factors associated with the market’s fall in March 2005 necessitated a much longer and
more thorough investigation. Its effort was complicated both by the massive volume of

4
“The Taskforce has identified the factors and actions which contributed to the instability in the stock
prices, both as the market went up and as it collapsed. Relying on macro-level information, the Taskforce
Report has described the manner in which some participants appear to have benefited from the
manipulation of market sentiment, prices and liquidity; identifies the key causes of the situation that
developed in March 2005; and explains how the transactions arranged outside the rules of the market
ostensibly to ‘save’ the market benefited some of the very people who arranged these transactions.” Stock
Market Taskforce, Report of the Taskforce: Review of the Stock Market Situation, (Islamabad, Pakistan,
2005) para 7. The Taskforce Report went on to conclude that “a pattern emerges in which different scrips
were manipulated and played in different ways by the major brokers to their advantage.” para 54. The
market’s regulators and KSE’s board and management also shared in the blame. paras: 32, 43-48. See also
paras: 13, 16-18, 23, 24, 26, 28-35, 39, 54 and 55.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 5 OF 11


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS
data to examine, and by the inherent limitations of this data. Accordingly, the Taskforce
called on the SECP to conduct a follow-on forensic investigation of the most material
alleged abuses.5

RETENTION OF INDEPENDENT FORENSIC INVESTIGATORS AND SCOPE OF


WORK
Diligence was retained by the SECP in July 2006 to examine in more detail the activities
surrounding the March 2005 events, and specifically, to determine if manipulative
schemes and/or illicit conduct were prevalent and played a key role in the market’s
precipitous decline.

Over the past few months, Diligence has conducted an independent examination6 into the
most noteworthy allegations: 1) restriction and withdrawal of COT (including, to the
extent possible, in-house Badla7), 2) wash trades, and 3) violation of the regulations
governing futures contracts. Particular emphasis was placed on the regulated COT issue
because of its perceived importance and the relative availability of reliable data.

In the process of its work, Diligence acquired and examined a multitude of electronic
data records ranging from KSE Ready, Futures and COT transactions, back-office broker
trading records and general ledger information, as well as detailed Central Depository
Corporation of Pakistan (“CDC”) share balance data. This information, comprising tens
of millions of electronic records, was compiled, reconciled where possible and loaded to
a comprehensive database for analysis. In addition to this expansive repository of
electronic information, Diligence acquired and reviewed an extensive number of
hardcopy documents including analyst reports, news articles and KSE activity reports.8

5
Ibid. paras: 24 (regarding wash trades), 33 (regarding the manipulation of COT), and 55 (regarding the
sale of scrips in Futures market not yet owned by the seller).
6
The SECP provided general assistance and support to Diligence in our investigation of the matters
covered in this Report. Diligence otherwise acted independently throughout the investigation in fulfilling
its mandate under the terms of the LOE, including data sought and obtained, methodologies applied and the
resulting findings.
7
Comprehensive and accurate data on the quantities and activities of in-house Badla are not reported
publicly by individual brokers or maintained in any form within the public domain. Diligence found
abundant indirect evidence (e.g. press reports) of the existence of this form of unregulated Badla which, to
the extent it exists, is in violation of Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969.
8
In the course of its investigation, Diligence requested information (through the SECP in some cases) from
a number of parties, including the SECP itself, KSE, CDC and certain brokers. All such parties cooperated
and provided certain data responsive to Diligence’s requests. There was insufficient time, in some cases,
however, to independently verify or cross check such data. There were also issues, in certain cases, with
delays in obtaining the data and, as noted above, with the quality of the data - factors that periodically and
adversely impacted the progress of our work.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 6 OF 11


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS
Throughout this effort, Diligence gained a true appreciation for the enormity and
difficulty of the Taskforce’s mandate. Generally, the collection and analysis of historical
information of this nature and magnitude is a difficult task. The data collection and
analysis was further complicated in this case, however, by the inconsistent and often
incomplete nature of the trading-related records and information provided to Diligence.

In particular, the absence of universal client identification codes across all brokers, the
inconsistent use of client codes within individual brokers, the presence and widespread
use of CDC group accounts, and the KSE’s failure to preserve the order book records and
critical compliance documents all presented significant obstacles to addressing the
various issues herein. Diligence was not able to analyze, in many respects, the type of
trading-related data that is normally generated and safeguarded by securities market
participants elsewhere.

Accordingly, we support the view that the Taskforce should have been provided with
additional time, resources and expertise to more thoroughly examine these complicated
matters prior to rendering its report. Diligence further takes note of the fact that the SECP
has committed itself in this past year to improving the quality of the reporting process
and has implemented or is moving forward on important regulations aimed at increasing
transparency and accountability in Pakistan’s capital markets, many of which address the
identified shortcomings and limitations we encountered in the data.9

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Under the existing circumstances, and on the basis of the evidence examined to date, we
render findings and conclusions that greatly differ, in many respects, with the findings
and conclusions rendered by the Taskforce. Most significantly, we do not find sufficient
evidence to support the paramount scheme of manipulation in the manner put forth by the
Taskforce for the period in question. Nor do we find sufficient evidence to support the
alleged scheme’s primary element (withdrawal of COT) that was ostensibly responsible
for the fall of market prices. We find no patterns of activity or credible evidence to
support a theory that, during March 2005, certain influential brokers systematically and
manipulatively inflated and then deflated market prices, reaping substantial profits in the
process.

9
For example, the SECP has now required the implementation of Unique Identification Numbers for all
investors. This requirement will enable the three exchanges and the SECP to easily identify the underlying
client behind any stock market transaction, across all brokers. SECP Letter to KSE, LSE and ISA, Aug. 3,
2006. Also, the SECP has suggested that CDC eliminate the use of group accounts for reporting client
holdings at CDC. Individual sub-accounts at CDC will more readily allow for the identification of
beneficial share ownership and the assessment of potential short sale violations. Letter from SECP to
Central Depository Company of Pakistan Limited. “Prohibition on Use of Group Account By CDS
Participants.” No. 1(6)cdc/pol/1997, 6 Jan. 2005.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 7 OF 11


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS
It is important to note however that, as a result of our analyses, we did find prima-facie
evidence of possible wrongdoing by a significant number of brokers in certain areas. We
are of the view, however, that these potential wrongful acts individually or collectively
were not elements of an elaborate scheme to manipulate the volatility of the market, as
alleged by the Taskforce. In all such cases, Diligence has provided its underlying data
and analyses to the SECP for its action as per law.

PART I – COT WITHDRAWAL

In Part I of this Report, we present our examination of COT and in-house Badla
activities. Contrary to the Taskforce’s findings, we found no evidence that regulated
COT was restricted or withdrawn from the market in the weeks prior to the market’s fall
as a result of voluntary and manipulative actions of any influential broker. Instead we
find that although there was, in fact, a withdrawal of certain regulated COT during
February and March of 2005, this activity was attributable to two independent factors: (1)
the execution of the SECP’s previously planned and announced phase out of COT
funding for certain scrips, which had begun in October 2004; and (2) the temporary
suspension of “New COT” availability for two heavily-traded scrips, Pakistan State Oil
(PSO) and Pakistan Telecommunications Company Limited (PTC), in connection with
their respective moves to Spot trading to execute announced dividend payments - a
necessary trading practice and “normal course of business” event.

Moreover, we found that the market’s supply of “New COT” (the value of newly initiated
carry over transactions transacted on the KSE on a given trading day) for the scrips not
subject to a regulated withdrawal or self-imposed temporary suspension increased during
the two weeks immediately prior to the market’s fall and remained stable and available
until the market’s virtual shut-down beginning March 21st.

Trading information on unregulated Badla (“in-house Badla”) is not readily available


from exchanges or the public domain, but only from individual brokers engaging in such
activities. Even then, data, if any, provided by individual brokers could not be reasonably
or easily independently verified or tested for completeness or accuracy with a sufficient
degree of certainty. Given these and additional time constraints, reliable and verifiable
data related to potential trading levels of in-house Badla was not obtainable. Therefore,
Diligence is unable to provide any conclusive findings in this area.

PART II – WASH TRADES

In Part II, we present our examination of potential violations of certain securities


regulations in connection with wash trades within the same broker and between different
brokers. Given the lack of unique client identification codes at that time, an examination
of potential wash trades between different brokers was not possible, contrary to
statements made by the Taskforce. Also contrary to the conclusions reached by the
Taskforce, in our examination of potential wash trades within the same broker, we found
no systemic patterns or evidence to suggest influential brokers had collectively

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 8 OF 11


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS
orchestrated multiple series of wash trades for purposes of broad-scale market
manipulation.

During the course of our examination, we did however find numerous individual and
isolated incidents of potential violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Ordinance, 1969 (“SEO”), generally applicable to wash trades. Details on these matters
have been provided to the SECP for its action as per law.

PART III – FUTURES CONTRACTS

In Part III, we describe our findings of potential and significant manipulations by brokers
related to violations of Clause 3(b) of the Regulations Governing Futures Contracts
(exceeding the Rs 50 million threshold) and Section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Ordinance. Clause 3(b), during the relevant timeframe of this review, prohibited a broker
from having a net sale position in futures contracts of a particular scrip in excess of Rs 50
million without providing evidence that it held the shares sold above the threshold.

We identified 2,491 instances across 88 brokers with net sales positions in March 2005
futures contracts alone that exceeded the Rs 50 million threshold for a particular scrip.
Collectively, these net sale positions total in the billions of rupees. Many of the cases, if
substantiated as being non-compliant with Clause 3(b), could represent serious violations.
We have provided this information to the SECP, which is pursuing the matter as per law.

Using share data obtained from CDC, we further identified thirteen brokers trading on the
Futures counter in potential breach of Clause 3(b) and Section 17(a) of the SEO. The
more serious potential violations amount to hundreds of millions of rupees in value in
unaccounted for shares and, if substantiated, would represent a serious violation of the
securities regulations.10 Again the matter has been provided to the SECP for its action as
per law.

Lastly, in addressing the Taskforce’s primarily central element of its scheme of market
manipulation – which is the withdrawal of regulated COT by the same brokers in large
net sale positions in excess of share holdings at CDC – we examined the lending of New
COT on COT-eligible scrips by the more influential brokers during the weeks preceding
the market’s fall. We found no evidence that the brokers – individually or collectively –
engaged in a withdrawal of available New COT from these scrips in the market.

10
We caution the reader of the many limitations of the CDC data in making a prima facie case of non-
compliance or violation of securities regulations. These limitations and caveats are described in more
detail in Part III of this Report. Clearly, in substantiating any violation of securities regulations, additional
evidence not collected as part of this analysis will be required.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 9 OF 11


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS
MISCELLANEOUS

In addition to the alleged schemes described above, Diligence also attempted to analyze
whether one or more brokers conducted illicit blank Ready Market sales. This scheme
involves selling shares on the Ready Market that the investor does not own and cannot
deliver at the T+3 settlement date.

Unlike Futures positions which can be accumulated and quantified for each discrete
monthly contract, ready positions cannot be quantified on the basis of KSE activity alone.
Reliable and detailed investor-level share balance information is required in order to
determine whether a client has transacted a blank sale on the Ready Market. As discussed
elsewhere in this Report, the use of group accounts at CDC precluded such an analysis
for the period at issue. Without additional verifiable and complete information from
individual brokers, it is not possible to determine whether or not this type of illicit
activity was perpetrated on the market during March 2005.

CLOSING REMARKS
It has been Diligence’s privilege to work with the SECP on this matter. We are grateful
for the assistance and many courtesies that have been extended to us by individuals and
entities in Karachi and Islamabad during the course of our investigation.

We are sensitive to the fact that many investors may have lost significant sums in the
KSE crash of March 2005. Such an event demands a thorough investigation into the facts
and circumstances underlying the market’s movements, to determine if fraud and
manipulation occurred at the expense of those investors. Investors must also recognize,
however, that securities markets everywhere have inherent and individually unique risks
which, without warning or manipulation, may unexpectedly cause the market to rise or
fall as risks, regulations, economic conditions and market sentiments quickly change.

In the time period since March 2005, the capital markets of Pakistan have been awash in
speculation, conspiracy theories, allegations, mis-leading conclusions and unfounded
views as to what and who may have caused the market’s rapid rise and decent. We found
this situation to be unnecessarily fueled by rumor and innuendo, and seriously absent of
definitive facts and complete and proper analysis. Had the Taskforce been afforded
additional time and resources to investigate the facts and events of March 2005 further,
perhaps more definitive findings and conclusions would have been reached, and mis-
understandings in the market, would have been diminished.

Diligence’s objective in this matter was to present an independent and objective expert
analysis of the key market-related events of March 2005. In so doing, we hope our work
helps bring to justice those found guilty of violating securities laws, but more
importantly, helps bring closure to an unfortunate and disruptive episode for Pakistan by
finally putting to an end the unfounded allegations and speculation that have continued to
persist concerning the market’s crash and resulting Taskforce Report. We also hope that

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 10 OF 11


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS
our investigation assists the SECP and others with the on-going process of adding
additional critically-needed elements of transparency, accountability and integrity to
Pakistan’s capital markets. To that goal, we respectfully present Diligence’s Report of
Findings to the SECP.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 11 OF 11


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

PART I

Withdrawal of Regulated COT

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 1 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY……………………………………….……. 3
II. FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF CARRY OVER TRANSACTIONS ON THE
KARACHI STOCK EXCHANGE………………………………………….……. 4
A. IMPORTANCE TRENDS OF COT INVESTMENT
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “NEW” COT AVAILABILITY
C. PROPORTION OF COT ACROSS ELIGIBLE SCRIPS AND BROKERS
D. THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF COT PRIOR TO MARCH 16, 2005
III. MANDATED PHASE-OUT OF COT………………………………………...… 11
A. INTRODUCTION
B. EFFECTS OF PHASE-OUT ON MARKET LIQUIDITY
IV. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF COT………………………………………… 15
A. INTRODUCTION
B. EFFECTS OF SUSPENSION ON MARKET LIQUIDITY
V. ACTIVE COT-ELIGIBLE SCRIPS…………………………………………..... 19
A. INTRODUCTION
B. EXAMINATION OF COT ACTIVITY AND TRENDS
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF
REGULATED COT……...…………………………………………………… 29
VII. OTHER FINDINGS………………………………………………………........ 33
A. PATTERNS IN FUTURES TRADING
B. COT TRENDS DURING MARKET’S DECLINE

GLOSSARY

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 2 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY


In this Part, we focus on the possible role of regulated COT in the decline of the KSE
during the first quarter of 2005, and respond in certain limited respects to the allegations
and issues put forth by the Taskforce Report on the subject. The analysis addresses the
allegations and issues concerning only the withdrawal of COT financing before the
market’s decline. Other possible contributing factors to the events of March 2005 put
forth by the Taskforce Report and others are addressed in other Parts of this Report.

We specifically address below, through analysis of the following three core questions, the
allegations that regulated COT transacted on the KSE open market was intentionally
restricted by COT lenders prior to, and thus precipitated, the market’s decline:

1. Was there a substantial withdrawal of funds from the COT market in the period
immediately prior to the market’s steep decline?
2. If there was a withdrawal, what was its cause?
3. Is there credible evidence that indicates or suggests that any such withdrawal of
funds was manipulative in nature – as part of a scheme to essentially defraud the
market?
The answer to the first core question is “yes.” Diligence confirmed the findings of the
Taskforce which reported that there was a withdrawal of funds from the COT market in
the weeks and months prior to the market’s decline.

In answering the second and third core questions, it is important to note that our forensic
investigation, pursuant to the SECP’s request, has gone further and to additional levels of
detail than the previous work of the Taskforce, the SECP itself, and others. 1 Our TP PT

extensive and detailed analysis in this area established that funds were withdrawn from
the COT market. We further identified the reasons for the withdrawal of funds.
Significantly, we have found no credible evidence, as of the date of this Report, which
indicates or suggests that the withdrawal of funds from the regulated COT market was
manipulative in nature. Accordingly, with respect to the regulated COT subject that is the
subject of this Part, there does not appear to be a factual basis for recommending to the
SECP that it should consider legal proceedings against any firm(s) or individual(s) based
on a market manipulation theory.

1
TP The SECP provided general assistance and support to Diligence in our investigation of the matters
PT

covered in this Report. Diligence otherwise acted independently throughout the investigation in fulfilling
its mandate under the terms of the LOE, including data sought and obtained, methodologies applied and the
resulting findings.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 3 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

The following analysis, glossary and accompanying appendices describe and illustrate in
detail the methodologies used in our forensic examination of millions of trading records
and other data which substantiate these central conclusions. 2 TP PT

II. FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF CARRY OVER


TRANSACTIONS ON THE KARACHI STOCK EXCHANGE
Prior to the introduction of the Continuous Funding System in August 2005, COT was a
primary financing facility used to leverage the purchase of securities in the Pakistani
capital markets. COT, also referred to as “carry over trades” or regulated Badla
financing, had historically played an integral role in providing liquidity to Pakistan’s
three capital markets. Seeking a more modern financing alternative with less attendant
risk to participants, the SECP moved in September 2004 to begin the permanent phase-
out of COT as the market’s primary leveraging mechanism. 3 TP PT

The significance of the COT mechanism is that its use enabled an investor in the Ready
Market to defer or “carry over” settlement, and thus defer payment, of a purchase of
scrips to a future date. In essence, COT was a form of repurchase agreement. In
conducting a carry over transaction, the investor sold all or a portion of his/her open
position in eligible scrips to a COT lender with the agreement to repurchase the shares in
a subsequent trading cycle. In exchange, the lender was paid a rate of interest, which
fluctuated based on market conditions and regulations. 4 TP PT

In addition to this regulated market (as established in the “Carry Over Transactions
Regulations, 1993”), brokers have customarily engaged in unregulated COT lending
through what is commonly referred to as “In-house Badla.” This practice consists of
financing COT directly and solely between the broker and client, and is not conducted

2
TP A critical analytical point is that the conclusions herein were reached on the basis of available data. We
PT

note that a key set of data under the KSE’s control and central to addressing the three core questions no
longer exists, and was therefore not available for review and analysis: the KSE’s daily order book of
queued and filled orders for new open market COT for the days before and during the market’s steep
decline. The KSE daily order book would provide, theoretically, an indication of whether request orders for
COT were increasingly being left unfilled as the demand for COT increased, indicating a squeeze in
liquidity. KSE representatives have explicitly and consistently stated to Diligence that this data is not
available, except for the single day of Mar. 15, 2005 previously collected by the SECP. Nonetheless, our
findings are conclusive based on other available evidence.
3
TPKSE Continuous Funding System Regulations, 2005; Aug. 22, 2005. See also: “Time-Bound Action
PT

Plan for Phasing-Out of Carry-Over Transaction (COT)” SECP Directive, Sept. 3, 2004,
No.SMD/SE/2(72)/2003.
4
TPFor COT, the borrower had the option of deferring settlement up to ten days. See KSE website:
PT

<www.kse.com.pk>. COT Regulations did not prohibit investors from selling shares they owned in the
COT market that had not been purchased that day on the Ready Market. Interview with SECP staff.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 4 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

through the stock exchanges. Due to the lack of available and reliable data maintained by
the brokers, Diligence has not been able to examine the activities related to the market’s
in-house Badla, and therefore this Part does not include definitive findings concerning the
possible broker activities related to in-house Badla. Additionally, the regulated and
unregulated COT activities on the Lahore or Islamabad exchanges were not included in
the scope of the Diligence LOE. 5 TP PT

For purposes of the analysis herein, it is important for the reader to understand two
critical terms used to describe different types of COT specific to this Part:

• New COT: represents the value (in Rupees) of new carry over transactions
transacted on the KSE on a given trading day. New COT is equivalent to “Open
Market COT” provided on the KSE Daily Unreleased/Open Market COT reports.

• Total COT: represents the value (in Rupees) of outstanding carry over
transactions at the end of a given trading day. Total COT is the sum of unreleased
carry over transactions from the previous trading day plus New COT. Total COT
is equivalent to “Total COT” provided on the KSE Daily Unreleased/Open
Market COT reports.

A. IMPORTANCE AND TRENDS OF COT INVESTMENT


In October 2004, as the regulated COT phase-out began, COT was available on only
twenty-nine of more than 670 scrips traded on the KSE. 6 Despite this limitation to fewer
TP PT

than five percent of listed scrips, trading in COT-eligible scrips accounted for the large
majority of the trading activity in the Ready Market. 7 TP PT

In the few months prior to its regulated phase-out, the market’s Total COT remained
relatively stable, fluctuating between Rs 22.7 billion and Rs 28.5 billion per day. 8 TP PT

Starting in November 2004, however, Total COT began to increase significantly,


reaching an all-time high of Rs 40.3 billion on February 18, 2005. As shown in Chart 1,

5
TPSee: “Carry Over Transaction Regulations,” Jan. 11 1993. On Sept. 11, 2006, the SECP mandated the
PT

elimination of In-House Badla in an effort to increase the transparency of the COT market. See: “In-House
Badla Banned: CFS Cap Enhanced to Rs 55 Billion for KSE: Recorder Report,” Business Recorder Sept.
12, 2006. Dilawar Hussain “SECP Defers In-House Badla Ban” Dawn: The Internet Edition Sept. 21, 2006.
6
See Appendix A for list of scrips, by symbol and name, and their respective scheduled phase-out dates.
TP PT

KSE Transaction Market Data, July 2004 to March 2005.


7
TPBetween July and October 2004, for example, more than 90% of total trading activity on the KSE was
PT

represented by trading in COT-eligible scrips. KSE Transaction Market Data; Ready Market, July 2004 to
Oct. 2004.
8
TPThe findings as described throughout this Part are generally represented in share values (in Pakistani
PT

Rupees), as opposed to number of shares. Findings will also be described in number of shares in the event
such data reflects a different pattern or trend than share values.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 5 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

this dramatic rise soon gave way to a precipitous drop of Rs 11.0 billion to Rs 29.0
billion by March 15, 2005 (the day before scrip prices on the KSE began their steep
decline), bringing the daily levels of Total COT back to a level more consistent with its
2004 volumes. 9 The rapid decline in Total COT in the days prior to the market’s drop
TP PT

was later identified by many—including investors, regulators, the SECP Task Force and
the press—as the result of likely market manipulation. The drop in Total COT was
further viewed by many as a primary contributing factor to the market’s eventual
collapse. 10 TP PT

Chart 1 – Daily Values of Total COT, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period July 1, 2004
to March 15, 2005

9
KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, July 2004 to Mar. 2005 Karachi Stock Exchange
TP PT

website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History, 2004, 2005.


10
TP Taskforce Report, paras: 33 - 35. See also: Dr. Tariq Hassan "Statement Before the National Assembly
PT

Standing Committee on Finance and Revenue: On Actions Taken by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the Recommendations of the Report of the Task Force" (Islamabad, Pakistan Aug. 3,
2005). See: Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan website <www.secp.gov.pk>. See also: Bilal
Mohammad Ali “Pullout of Badla financiers blamed for KSE Crises” The News International, Mar. 31,
2005. See also: “Stock Market Crisis: PM Asks SECP to Investigate Reasons” Dawn Mar. 31, 2005. See
also: Amanullah Khan, “PM Wants Smiles Back At KSE” Pakistan Observer Mar. 31, 2005. See also:
“Recent KSE Downslide: PM Orders Inquiry” Daily Times Mar. 31, 2005.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 6 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

45

40

35
Rs. Billions

30

25

20
7/5/2004

8/4/2004
8/14/2004
8/24/2004
9/3/2004

10/3/2004
10/13/2004

10/23/2004

11/12/2004
11/22/2004

12/2/2004
12/12/2004

1/1/2005

1/11/2005

2/10/2005

3/2/2005
7/15/2004
7/25/2004

9/13/2004
9/23/2004

11/2/2004

12/22/2004

1/21/2005
1/31/2005

2/20/2005

3/12/2005
Graph Notes: From February 18 to March 15, 2005, available COT declined from an all-time peak of Rs
40.3 billion to Rs 29.0 billion—a drop of 28%.

B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “NEW” COT AVAILABILITY


The significance of New COT is best illustrated by comparing the differing elements of
control of a COT borrower and lender, respectively. Once a COT borrower had initiated
a COT transaction, he or she then had the option to roll-over his or her position on a daily
basis for up to ten trading days. The borrower was thus in temporary control of when to
exercise the scrip’s repurchase and the related release of his or her debt. 11 TP PT

Conversely, the COT lenders were in total control of the amount of New COT provided
to the open COT market each trading day. This distinction is important and is the basis
for our use of daily New COT transactions as the more suitable metric in examining the
financiers’ control of and impact on liquidity in the market.

11
TP Karachi Stock Exchange website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT. Historical data related to the daily
PT

aging of unreleased COT was not maintained by the KSE. However, daily levels of New COT averaged
71% of Total COT during the period July 1, 2004 to Mar. 15, 2005, suggesting that most COT was released
after just one trading cycle. KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, July 2004 to February
2005, Karachi Stock Exchange website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History 2004, 2005. See Chart B-
1 in Appendix B.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 7 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

The daily volume of New COT from July to October 2004 varied from day to day, but
was fairly stable overall, ranging from between Rs 16.0 billion to Rs 24.9 billion
throughout the four-month period. As shown in Chart 2, daily transaction values of New
COT began increasing significantly in November 2004, as trading volumes in the Ready
Market began to rise. In January 2005, for example, the average daily volume of New
COT was Rs 22.7 billion. This rose to Rs 24.4 billion in February 2005, an increase of
7.5%. 12 TP PT

The growing daily values of New COT also brought an increase in its daily volatility. In
December 2004, for example, the daily volume of New COT fluctuated between Rs 17.5
billion and Rs 27.5 billion, dropping as much as Rs 6.0 billion in one day. 13 The TP PT

following month, January 2005, the range of transactions widened as the volumes of New
COT fluctuated between Rs 14.0 billion and Rs 30.1 billion. At this point, the
accentuated peaks and valleys of New COT trading show a cyclical pattern, rising sharply
during the earlier days of the month, followed by relatively rapid and steep downturns
toward the end of the month. 14 TP PT

Despite the dramatic variability of New COT during the above periods, its intra-monthly
cycles and sudden steep declines were not mirrored in the Ready Market’s activities. The
Ready Market’s trading volumes and prices continued their rapid ascent during these
periods. 15 TP PT

Chart 2 – Daily Values of New COT, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period July 1, 2004
to March 15, 2005

12
TP KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, July 2004 to Feb. 2005, Karachi Stock Exchange
PT

website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History, 2004, 2005.


13
TP The value of New COT was Rs 27.5 billion and Rs 17.5 billion on Dec. 22, 2004 and Dec. 28, 2004
PT

respectively. Between Dec. 24, 2004 and Dec. 27, 2004 (one trading day), New COT value decreased from
Rs 25.7 billion to Rs 19.7 billion, a drop of Rs 6 billion. KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily
Reports, July 2004 to Feb. 2005, Karachi Stock Exchange website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History,
2004, 2005.
14
TPKSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, July 2004 to Feb. 2005, Karachi Stock Exchange
PT

website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History, 2004, 2005.


15
TP Even prior to 2005, the steep daily declines in New COT did not seem to have any meaningful negative
PT

influence on trading volumes in the Ready Market. For example, New COT decreased 33% from Rs 25
U U

billion to Rs 16.6 billion between August 27, 2004 and September 6, 2004, yet trading volumes in the
Ready Market remained unaffected. Similar decreases in New COT were evident during the weeks of
October 14 th , November 29 th and December 27 th , but again with seemingly no negative effect on the
P
P
P
P
P
P

volume of Ready Market trades. See Chart B-2 in Appendix B.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 8 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

35

30

25
Rs. Billions

20

15

10
7/5/2004
7/15/2004
7/25/2004
8/4/2004
8/14/2004
8/24/2004
9/3/2004
9/13/2004
9/23/2004
10/3/2004
10/13/2004
10/23/2004
11/2/2004
11/12/2004
11/22/2004
12/2/2004
12/12/2004
12/22/2004
1/1/2005
1/11/2005
1/21/2005
1/31/2005
2/10/2005
2/20/2005
3/2/2005
3/12/2005
Graph Notes: Daily investment in New COT was highly variable from day-to-day, and became highly
cyclical month-to-month in the months preceding the March 2005 situation. Increases in New COT were
followed by sharp decreases of 37%, 53% and 52%, respectively, during the months of December 2004 and
January and February 2005.

C. PROPORTION OF COT ACROSS ELIGIBLE SCRIPS AND BROKERS


In addition to being available in only a limited number of the market’s total listed scrips,
investment in COT was heavily concentrated across relatively few of the COT-eligible
scrips. Of the twenty-nine scrips eligible for COT between July 2004 and October 2004,
approximately 50% of daily New COT investment was concentrated within five scrips:
OGDC, POL, PSO, PTC and NBP. As the phase out of COT progressed, the collective
proportion of COT exposure held in these five scrips relative to the entire COT market
increased steadily. In fact, by March 2005, the New COT held in these scrips represented
roughly 80% of all daily New COT. 16 TP PT

An analysis of trading data reveals that most of the brokers trading on the KSE
participated in the COT market. Similar to scrips, however, daily transactions of New

16
TP KSE Market Transaction Data July 2004 to Oct. 2004. KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily
PT

Reports, July 2004 to Dec. 2004, Karachi Stock Exchange website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT
History, 2004. SECP Directive, Sept. 3, 2004.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 9 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

COT on the KSE were heavily concentrated across relatively few brokers. 17 Of the 138 TP PT

brokers participating in the COT market on behalf of lenders, six brokers accounted for
approximately 50% of the total value of COT purchases occurring between January 3,
2005 and March 15, 2005. By order of descending New COT values, the six brokers
were: Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd, Arif Habib Securities Limited, Atlas
Capital Markets (Pvt.) Limited, KASB Securities Limited, Orix Investment Bank
Pakistan Ltd., and Akberally Cassim & Sons. Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities and Arif
Habib Securities together represented close to 30% of the total New COT lending market
during that period. 18 TP PT

Brokers representing the borrowers of COT were less concentrated. Of the 142 brokers
participating in COT sale transactions during this same period, 50% were accounted for
by twelve brokers, with one broker—Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities—individually
representing over 15% of the total COT sales market. 19 TP PT

More detailed analyses of broker and scrip-related trading trends and activities in the
weeks prior to the market’s decline in March 2005 are provided in later sections of this
Part.

D. THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF COT PRIOR TO MARCH 16,


2005
The daily reduction of Total COT in the time period immediately preceding the market’s
sharp decline in mid- to late-March has received considerable attention by regulators, the
Taskforce and others. Many have alleged that the decline in Total COT from February
18, 2005 (its peak) to March 15, 2005 was a leading cause of the market’s fall.
Moreover, many have also alleged that the drop in Total COT was due to the
manipulative actions of a few major COT brokers and lenders. 20 TP PT

17
TP KSE Market Transaction Data, July 1, 2004 to Oct. 31, 2004. Of the approximately 200 member
PT

brokers registered with KSE during the period July 1, 2004 to Mar. 15, 2005, 138 brokers representing
COT lenders participated in COT purchase transactions. Similarly, 142 of the 200 brokers representing
COT borrowers participated in COT sale transactions. KSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 2005 to Mar.
2005.
18
TP Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities Pvt Ltd represented 14.3%. Arif Habib Limited represented 14.0%.
PT

KSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005. See Charts B-3 and B-4 in Appendix B for a
graphical representation of broker proportions of COT purchase and sale activity.
19
TP KSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005. See Charts B-3 and B-4 in Appendix B for a
PT

graphical representation of broker proportions of COT purchase and sale activity. See Tables C-1 and C-2
in Appendix C for a complete listing of the brokers participating in regulated COT sale and purchase
transactions on the KSE open market for the period Jan. 3, 2005 to Mar. 15, 2005.
20
TP PT Stock Market Taskforce, paras: 7, 28-35, 39, 54, and 55.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 10 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Chart 3 – Daily Values of Total and New COT, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period
January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005

45

40

Total COT
35

30
Rs. Billions

25

20
New COT

15

10

-
1/3/2005
1/5/2005
1/7/2005
1/9/2005
1/11/2005
1/13/2005
1/15/2005
1/17/2005
1/19/2005
1/21/2005
1/23/2005
1/25/2005
1/27/2005
1/29/2005
1/31/2005
2/2/2005
2/4/2005
2/6/2005
2/8/2005
2/10/2005
2/12/2005
2/14/2005
2/16/2005
2/18/2005
2/20/2005
2/22/2005
2/24/2005
2/26/2005
2/28/2005
3/2/2005
3/4/2005
3/6/2005
3/8/2005
3/10/2005
3/12/2005
3/14/2005
Graph Notes: Investment in New and Total COT declined in the period immediately preceding the Ready
Market’s steep decline in late March 2005. Total COT declined from its high of Rs 40.4 billion on
February 18, 2005 to Rs 28.9 billion on March 15, 2005. Investment in New COT declined from its high of
Rs 33.3 billion to Rs 13.5 billion on March 15, 2005.
The following sections of this Part specifically address the apparent reduction in Total
COT, and present findings and conclusions that run counter to the general allegations that
have been offered concerning this subject. In Section III, we assess the impact of the
mandated phase-out of COT as prescribed by the SECP’s plan finalized in September
2004. In Section IV, we analyze the effects on Total and New COT of the scrips removed
from COT-eligibility by regulation prior to the market’s steep decline in March 2005. In
Section V, we analyze the effects on Total and New COT of the scrips temporarily
suspended from COT trading prior to the decline. In Section VI, we analyze the effects
on Total and New COT of the scrips which were not subject to the regulated phase-out or
temporary suspension. Lastly, in Section VII, we present our summary and conclusions
and conclude the Part with a brief mention of other findings, presented in Section VIII.

III. MANDATED PHASE-OUT OF COT


A. INTRODUCTION

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 11 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

COT has long been suspected as having a strong, and not altogether positive, influence on
the equity markets. From a historical perspective, market analysts, securities experts and
others had consistently identified COT/Badla financing as the likely root cause for
previous, pre-2005 occurrences of severe market volatility in the Pakistani capital
markets. 21 In response, SECP leadership and ranking representatives from the three
TP PT

domestic exchanges moved during 2004 to establish a plan to phase out COT in favor of
a more contemporary margin-based financing mechanism. 22 TP PT

The SECP’s September 2004 final plan contained detailed measures to be undertaken by
the exchanges in implementing the phase-out and articulated a strict schedule for the
phase-out of the twenty-nine scrips then currently participating in COT. The plan
provided for scrips to be phased-out on a weekly basis—at the rate of one per week—in
reverse order of their Total COT on August 31, 2004. The scheduled phase-out was to
begin in October 2004 and conclude in June 2005. 23 TP PT

Eighteen of the twenty-nine scrips were phased-out prior to the beginning of the market’s
decline in late-March 2005. For purposes of this analysis, we refer to these scrips
collectively as “GROUP A.” 24 TP PT

B. EFFECTS OF PHASE-OUT ON MARKET LIQUIDITY


1. The Period October 8, 2004 to December 31, 2004

21
TP Previous severe market declines in the Pakistani capital markets occurred in May 2000, Sept. 2001, and
PT

May 2002. See Elliot Blair Smith “Pakistan’s Stocks Sizzle; Reforms Lift Market 56% Since Last Sept.
11” USA Today Sept. 16, 2002: B.07. See also: “Pakistan Shares End Lower on Border Tension Concerns”
Dow Jones International News May 21, 2002. See also: “Karachi Stock Market Crashes Amid Rising
Tension with India” BBC Monitoring South Asia – Political May 21, 2002. See also: “Pakistan Crisis
Looming on Unregulated Badla Deals,” Pakistan Press International Sept. 29, 2000. See also: “Pakistan
Stocks below 1,500 on liquidity squeeze” Reuters News June 23, 2000.
22
TP Chairman’s Message by Tariq Hassan, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. See
PT

SEP website http://www.secp.gov.pk/Chairman/Message.htm. See also: “Coordination Meeting Between


SEC and Stock Exchanges”, SECP Press Release Apr. 15, 2004. See also: “Leading Commercial Banks
Offer Support for Margin Financing Mechanisms” SECP Press Release, June 17, 2004. Margin financing
had been introduced as a method of leveraged financing for securities transactions in order to reduce the
risk that borrowers would default on payment for purchased shares. In contrast to the COT financing
system, which allowed market participants to purchase shares in advance of securing financing, the margin
financing system would require prospective stock purchasers to secure financing prior to purchasing shares
in the Ready Market. This refined financing process was designed to prevent settlement crises from
persisting due to lack of available Badla financing to market players -- a trend that appears to be
historically repetitive, as described in the press reports.
23
TP PT SECP Directive Sept. 3, 2004. The phase-out schedule is included for reference purposes in Appendix
A.
24
TP PT See Appendix D for a list of the scrips included in GROUP A.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 12 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Three months into the scheduled phase-out, seven of the twenty-nine COT-eligible scrips
had been phased out. The effects of the phase-out of the first seven scrips on the liquidity
of the COT market were negligible, as the initial scrips in the phase-out plan represented
proportionately the smallest investments of COT. 25 TP PT

2. The Period of January 1, 2005 to February 18, 2005


As mandated by the SECP, COT eligibility for seven additional scrips was phased out
between January 1, 2005 and February 18, 2005. The collective impact of these seven
scrips was almost Rs 5 billion, and represented about 13% of the market’s Total COT at
the beginning of this six-week period. 26 However, the net effect of their phase-out on
TP PT U U

the market’s Total COT again proved negligible, as Total COT for COT-eligible scrips,
despite being fewer in number, continued its steep climb to its February 18 peak, as
shown in Chart 3. The net gain in COT values during this period was achieved despite
the withdrawal of almost Rs 5 billion from the seven phased-out scrips, indicating that
new investment in COT for the scrips not yet affected by the phase-out significantly
outpaced the COT withdrawn because of the phase-out. 27 TP PT

25
TP PT SECP Directive, Sept. 3, 2004. The phase-out schedule is included for reference purposes in Appendix
D.
26
TP Values and percentages quoted are based on Total COT volumes in these scrips on Jan. 3, 2005, and are
PT

provided for reference in Appendix D.


27
TPKSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005. Karachi Stock Exchange
PT

website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History, 2005.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 13 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

3. The Period of February 19, 2005 to March 18, 2005


The withdrawal of Total COT from the four scrips phased-out between February 19 and
March 18, 2005, had a similar impact on liquidity as the withdrawals from the previously
phased-out seven scrips: approximately Rs 5 billion was eliminated. However, this later
withdrawal of liquidity, although similar in size, was achieved through the phase-out of a
smaller number of scrips in a shorter period of time. Consistent with the original intent
of the phase-out plan, the investment of COT being phased-out each week was steadily
increasing. 28 TP PT

In contrast to the earlier periods, however, the cumulative effect of the scrips phased-out
during the period from February 19 to March 18, 2005, ultimately had a significant
negative impact on Total COT during that period. The level of New COT transactions
for the remaining few COT-eligible scrips did not keep pace with—and did not offset—
the COT withdrawn by the phase-outs. Total COT actually declined sharply in all scrips
during the latter half of February 2005. Although COT transaction volumes began rising
again during the first half of March, they did not rise fast enough to offset the amount of
COT withdrawn from the COT market by the scrips being phased-out.

4. Conclusion
Collectively, the Total COT of the scrips phased-out from COT eligibility from January
to March 18, 2005, amounted to Rs 10 billion, or 28% of the market. 29 Despite some
TP PT

increases in New COT in the remaining COT-active scrips, and possible increases in in-
house Badla, the removal of a large number of scrips from COT eligibility by March 18,
2005 clearly had a negative effect on the overall available liquidity in the market and may
well have been a major contributor to the market’s instability.

The critical finding is that the withdrawal of liquidity, in this instance, was the result of
external regulatory forces unrelated to voluntary broker and/or COT lender action . This
U U

withdrawal was mandated by SECP and KSE regulations, developed through a


collaborative effort that was highly publicized to market participants, including brokers,
lenders and the investing public through coverage in consumer and financial trade media.
Accordingly, the withdrawal of COT for these scrips cannot be attributed to the voluntary
or manipulative actions of any broker or lender.

28
TP Values and percentages quoted are based on Total COT volumes in these scrips on Feb. 18, 2005, and
PT

are provided for reference in Appendix D. MCB was phased-out effective Mar. 18, 2005, which falls three
days after the beginning of the stock market’s decline. However, given its relatively low levels of COT
investment during its final week of eligibility (primarily due to trading Spot), MCB is included within the
group of scrips classified as being phased-out before the market’s decline for purposes of this analysis.
29
TP PT See Appendix D.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 14 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Chart 4 – Daily Values of Total and New COT for Group A Scrips (Scrips Phased-
Out), KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 18, 2005

12

WCCL

10
DSFL Total Value Phased-Out
PGF Rs. 10 billion
8
FFC
Total COT PICIC
SSGC
Billions

NML
6

LUCK
4
New COT
SNGP
2
ACBL
MCB
-
1/3/05
1/5/05
1/7/05
1/9/05
1/11/05
1/13/05
1/15/05
1/17/05
1/19/05
1/21/05
1/23/05
1/25/05
1/27/05
1/29/05
1/31/05
2/2/05
2/4/05
2/6/05
2/8/05
2/10/05
2/12/05
2/14/05
2/16/05
2/18/05
2/20/05
2/22/05
2/24/05
2/26/05
2/28/05
3/2/05
3/4/05
3/6/05
3/8/05
3/10/05
3/12/05
3/14/05
3/16/05
3/18/05
Graph Notes: The scheduled phase-out of certain scrips in the February 18 to March 18, 2005 timeframe
removed over Rs 5 billion from the COT market and had a significant negative effect on overall market
liquidity.

IV. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF COT


A. INTRODUCTION
In the two weeks prior to the decline of the KSE in March 2005, two scrips that were
subject to relatively high volumes of COT activity each had their eligibility for New COT
voluntarily and temporarily suspended for a period of five trading days. Weeks earlier,
the boards of both Pakistan State Oil (PSO) and Pakistan Telecommunications Company
Limited (PTC) had announced the payment of dividends, given the strong financial
performance of the respective companies. 30 Consequently, both scrips moved to trading
TP PT

30
TP In the last week of February 2005, the boards of both PSO and PTC approved the issuance of dividend
PT

payments. For PSO, the Board announced an interim cash dividend of Rs 11 per share translating into cash
payout of Rs 1.9 billion to its shareholders, a dividend that was Rs 4 per share more than the prior year
period. “Pakistan State Oil pay Rs 1.9 Billion All-Time High Interim Dividend” Pakistan Press
International Information Services, Feb. 22, 2005. PTC’s board had recommended an unusual interim
dividend payment at the rate pf Rs 2 per share. “Pakistan Shares End Higher; Telecom, Energy Stks Gain,”
Dow Jones Asian Equities Report Feb. 15, 2005.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 15 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

on a Spot (T+1) basis in the Ready Market to facilitate the closing of their share transfer
books. 31 Their suspension from the New COT market, although temporary and
TP PT

according to normal practice, was significant in both timing and volume, and thereby
became one of a set of independent circumstances that potentially contributed to the
uncertainties in the capital markets during this critical period prior to the decline. For
purposes of this analysis, we collectively refer to the PSO and PTC scrips as “GROUP B.”

B. EFFECTS OF SUSPENSION ON MARKET LIQUIDITY


Historically, both PSO and PTC had been heavily traded stocks on the Karachi Stock
Exchange. This trend increased in 2005 as investor interest in the shares grew with
repeated reports of possible privatization, the heavily promoted sale of stakes in the
companies to foreign entities, and general positive news surrounding the two companies.

1. Pakistan State Oil (PSO)


A strong outlook for PSO coupled with privatization interests sparked very heavy trading
volumes of the scrip in the Ready and COT markets in the early months of 2005. 32 In TP PT

January, for example, the average daily value of Total COT for PSO was Rs 5.7 billion,
representing 15.9% of the average daily volumes of the total market. These strong
volumes continued in February, resulting in PSO having the heaviest average daily
investment in Total COT of any single scrip. Clearly, COT availability in PSO was
significant to the liquidity of the overall market.

31
TP The KSE trading procedures defines Spot/T+1 transactions as the following: “For about 5 days before
PT

the closure of shares transfer book notified by the company, transactions are settled on T+1 basis.” See:
Karachi Stock Exchange website <www.kse.com.pk/kse4/phps/trading/php>. In-line with Spot trading
relating to book closure and payment of dividends to shareholders, the CDC procedures state that spot
trading is necessary, "in order to enable them to distribute the benefits accruing as a result of the corporate
actions to each beneficial owner according to his entitlement." See: “CDC Operating Procedures” Feb. 15,
2005 Central Depository Company Chapter 5: Handling of Corporate Actions 5.1: Book Closure.
Similarly, the rationale of the NCSS procedures, as provided by the National Clearing Company of
Pakistan Limited, states that the purpose of the Balance Order T+1 settlement cycle, “shall be used for
settlement of exchange trades and non-exchange transaction in a security in which book closure has been
announced by the issuer for ascertaining the names of the holders who are entitled to dividend...” National
Clearing Company of Pakistan Limited, “NCSS Procedures” Amended based on 32 nd Board Meeting. PSO
P
P

and PTC both submitted the required C/A-1 Annexure to notify the CDC of Spot trading in advance of the
trading. See: Abdul Hameed to Aftab Diwan, Letter to CDC Mar. 2, 2005. See also: Ahmed Ali Jafri to
Aftab Diwan, Letter to CDC Feb. 22, 2005.
32
TP “Pakistan Shares End Higher; Telecom, Energy Stks Gain,” Dow Jones Asian Equities Report Feb. 15,
PT

2005. “Pakistan State Oil improves on record profit by 23%” The Pakistan Newswire Feb. 21, 2005.
“Pakistan PSO 1H Net PKR2.61 B Vs. PKR2.12 B Last Yr” Dow Jones Emerging Markets Report Feb. 21,
2005. “PSO Improves on Record Profit by 23%” Frontier Star Feb. 21, 2005. “Pakistan State Oil pay Rs
1.9 Billion All-Time High Interim Dividend” Pakistan Press International Information Services Feb. 22,
2005. “Pakistan Shares End Higher; Telecom, Energy Stks Gain,” Dow Jones Asian Equities Report Feb.
15, 2005. “Fresh EOIs Invited for Privatization of PSO by March 4” The Pakistan Newswire Jan. 13, 2005.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 16 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

PSO moved to trading Spot on March 10, 2005, thus temporarily suspending its
participation in the New COT market for five trading days until March 17 th . As shown in
P
P

Chart 5, the impact of the temporary suspension of PSO reduced the level of Total COT
in the market by approximately Rs 4 billion, or 12%. 33 TP PT

2. Pakistan Telecommunications Company Limited (PTC)


Similar to the high trading volumes experienced by PSO, heavy trading volumes in shares
of PTC were attributed to the looming privatization interests as the government
committed to sell a 26% stake in the nation's leading telecomm provider, coupled with
the fact that high-earnings expectations were anticipated by market analysts for the
company. 34 TP PT

Trading volumes in PTC in both the Ready and COT markets were also relatively heavy
in the first months of 2005. In January 2005, the average daily value of Total COT was
Rs 3.2 billion, increasing in February to Rs 4.9 billion per day, or about 13% of the total
market. These volumes ranked PTC as the fourth heaviest in Total COT of all COT-
eligible scrips. 35 TP PT

PTC moved to trading Spot on March 15, 2005, and temporarily suspended its
participation in the COT market for five trading days. It resumed participation in COT
on March 22 nd , during the middle of the market’s freefall. As shown in Chart 6, the
P
P

impact of the temporary suspension of PTC from the New COT market reduced the level
of Total COT in the market by about Rs 3 billion, or 10%. 36 TP PT

3. Combined Impact on COT Market


Undoubtedly, the temporary suspension of COT for both PSO and PTC during the
approximate same time period had a substantial impact on the COT market as a whole,
and may well have been a major contributor to the market’s instability. Their combined
temporary suspension reduced the level of Total COT in the market by about Rs 7 billion,
or slightly more than 21%. An additional noteworthy fact is that this suspension of newly
available COT occurred at a time when each week, scrips with larger and more
significant levels of COT were exiting the COT market because of regulatory mandate.

33
TPKSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, Jan. 2005 -- Mar. 2005. Karachi Stock Exchange
PT

website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History, 2005.


34
TP “Privatization Affairs” Telecommunications International Edition Dec. 2004. “VSNL Interested in
PT

PTCL Privatization” World Markets Analysis, Jan. 10, 2005. “Pakistan Shares End at Record High; PTCL
Leads Gainers,” Dow Jones Asia Equities Report Jan. 26, 2005. “Pakistan Shares End Up; PTCL, Pakistan
State Oil Lead” Dow Jones Asia Equities Report Jan. 10, 2005.
35
TP PT Ibid.
36
TP PT Ibid.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 17 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Chart 5 – Daily Values of Total and New COT in PSO, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the
Period March 1 to March 15, 2005

4
Rs. Billions

Total PSO COT


3

2
New PSO COT
1

-
3/1/2005
3/2/2005
3/3/2005
3/4/2005
3/5/2005
3/6/2005
3/7/2005
3/8/2005
3/9/2005
3/10/2005
3/11/2005
3/12/2005
3/13/2005
3/14/2005
3/15/2005
3/16/2005
3/17/2005
3/18/2005
3/19/2005
3/20/2005
3/21/2005
3/22/2005
3/23/2005
3/24/2005
3/25/2005
3/26/2005
3/27/2005
3/28/2005
3/29/2005
3/30/2005
3/31/2005
Graph Notes: The move to spot trading on March 10 th temporarily suspended trading in COT for PSO.
P
P

This had an immediate downward affect of about Rs 4 billion on the levels of liquidity in the market.

Chart 6 – Daily Values of Total and New COT in PTC, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the
Period March 1 to March 15, 2005

4
Rs. Billions

Total PTC COT


3

2
New PTC COT
1

-
3/1/2005
3/2/2005
3/3/2005
3/4/2005
3/5/2005
3/6/2005
3/7/2005
3/8/2005
3/9/2005
3/10/2005
3/11/2005
3/12/2005
3/13/2005
3/14/2005
3/15/2005
3/16/2005
3/17/2005
3/18/2005
3/19/2005
3/20/2005
3/21/2005
3/22/2005
3/23/2005
3/24/2005
3/25/2005
3/26/2005
3/27/2005
3/28/2005
3/29/2005
3/30/2005
3/31/2005

Graph Notes: The move to spot trading on March 15 th temporarily suspended trading in COT for PTC.
P
P

This had an immediate downward affect of about Rs 3 billion on the levels of liquidity in the market.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 18 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

4. Conclusion
Similar to the group of scrips subject to the COT phase-out prior to mid-March 2005, we
find that the temporary suspension of New COT trading for PSO and PTC was not due to
voluntary or manipulative pull-out of COT by lenders. In fact, this COT suspension was,
in both cases, a company-directed suspension for administrative reasons in the normal
course of business. 37 No actions of any broker and/or COT lender can be attributed to
TP PT

the temporary suspension of New COT for PSO and PTC for this period, nor could
anyone have foreseen the unfortunate timing of such suspensions in terms of overall
liquidity conditions existing at the time.

V. ACTIVE COT-ELIGIBLE SCRIPS


A. INTRODUCTION
Nine scrips eligible for COT fall outside of our analytical GROUPS A and B. Unlike the
other scrips, these were not subject to any regulated or company-directed withdrawal or
phase-out of COT prior to the market’s steep decline. For ease of reference, we refer to
these scrips collectively as “GROUP C.” 38 TP PT

Entering 2005, the scrips within GROUP C represented the majority of the market’s total
investment in regulated COT. As shown on Chart 7, Total COT in the nine scrips totaled
Rs 19.7 billion on January 3, 2005, which represented 54% of the total market. Not
surprisingly, the proportion of this group’s Total COT relative to the overall market
increased as COT eligibility in scrips outside of this group was phased-out, or
temporarily suspended. On March 15, 2005, for example, at the time when both PSO and
PTC were trading Spot, the percentage of Total COT represented by the nine scrips of
GROUP C ballooned to 81% (or Rs 23.6 billion) of the market’s Rs 29.0 billion. 39 TP PT

The nine scrips within GROUP C also generally accounted for a significant portion of
daily trading volumes on the Ready Market. Between January 3, 2005 and March 15,
2005, trading in these scrips represented 49% of the total value of shares traded on the
KSE, and as shown in Chart 7, played a large role in dictating the overall daily

37
TP PT For example, see Taskforce Report (June 2005), paras 28 and 54.
38
TP The nine scrips comprising GROUP C represented the final nine COT-eligible scrips to be phased out as
PT

according to the SECP’s phase-out schedule. They are: BOP, DGKC, FFBL, HUBC, ICI, MLCF, NBP,
OGDC and POL. SECP Directive, Sept. 3, 2004. See Appendix A.
39
TPKSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005. Karachi Stock Exchange
PT

website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History, 2005.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 19 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

movements of the market. Clearly, the importance of these scrips to the market’s overall
sentiments and daily movements was significant. 40 TP PT

Chart 7 – Daily Values of Total COT for Entire Market and Group C Scrips, KSE,
In Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005

45

40
Total COT Investment
in all scrips
35

30
Rs. Billions

25

20
Total COT Investment
15
in Group C scrips

10

-
1/3/2005
1/5/2005
1/7/2005
1/9/2005
1/11/2005
1/13/2005
1/15/2005
1/17/2005
1/19/2005
1/21/2005
1/23/2005
1/25/2005
1/27/2005
1/29/2005
1/31/2005
2/2/2005
2/4/2005
2/6/2005
2/8/2005
2/10/2005
2/12/2005
2/14/2005
2/16/2005
2/18/2005
2/20/2005
2/22/2005
2/24/2005
2/26/2005
2/28/2005
3/2/2005
3/4/2005
3/6/2005
3/8/2005
3/10/2005
3/12/2005
3/14/2005
Graph Notes: Total COT for Group C scrips increased in the weeks prior to the market’s decline while
Total COT for the market decreased (due to the withdrawal/suspension of COT for scrips being phased-out
or going Spot)., demonstrating that the decline was not attributable to the scrips within Group C.

B. EXAMINATION OF COT ACTIVITY AND TRENDS


Our analysis included an examination of the daily values of New and Total COT of the
scrips within GROUP C for evidence of any contraction of the availability of COT in the
weeks leading up to the market’s decline. As none of the scrips within GROUP C were
scheduled for phase-out until after March 15 th , evidence of a decrease in COT investment
P
P

within these scrips prior to that date might suggest a possible intentional pull-back of
liquidity in the regulated COT market.

40
TP KSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005. Worthy of note is that OGDC, a member of
PT

GROUP C, was the heavyweight of the KSE 100, representing on some days more than 50% of its day-to-
day movement. KSE 100 Daily Data.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 20 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

1. Contribution to Total Investment in COT


As shown in Chart 8, Total COT for the scrips within GROUP C, in general, rose steadily
from January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005, moving from Rs 19.7 billion to Rs 23.7 billion,
an increase of 19.8%. More noteworthy is that during this period, while the market’s
overall value of Total COT declined, Total COT in GROUP C scrips slightly increased , U U

from Rs 22.4 billion to Rs 23.6 billion. 41 TP PT

2. Daily Availability of New COT


An examination of daily transactions in New COT shows similar results. Focusing
specifically on the period from March 1 to March 15, 2005, we found that:

• The daily transactions of New COT for GROUP C, as shown in Chart 8, increased U U

as a whole, moving from Rs 9.7 billion on March 1 to Rs 13.4 billion on March


15, an increase of almost Rs 4 billion. 42 TP PT

• The level of daily transactions of New COT for four of the five trading days prior
to the market’s decline on March 16 th experienced trading volumes in excess of
P
P

the average daily trading volume of New COT for the group over the preceding
six week period. 43TP PT

• As shown in Chart 9, investment in New COT for each of the individual scrips
within GROUP C generally followed the trend of the group as a whole. By March
15, the day before the market began its decline, all nine scrips were experiencing
higher daily volumes (in Rupees) of New COT than at the beginning of the
month. Moreover, the daily volume of New COT for eight of the nine scrips on
March 15 th was at or higher than the average daily level of New COT for the prior
P
P

two weeks in March 2005. 44 TP PT

Accordingly, we found no indication that the availability of New COT for any of these
scrips, on the whole, was withdrawn from the market. These findings refute the
allegation and commonly-held perception that COT was voluntarily withdrawn from the

41
TP PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005.
42
TP PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 1 to Mar. 15, 2005.
43
TP Daily transactions of New COT for GROUP C scrips were Rs 13.1 billion on March 9 th , Rs 13.3 billion
PT P P

on March 10 th , Rs 11.6 billion on March 11 th , Rs 13.6 billion on March 14 th , and Rs 13.4 billion on March
P
P
P
P
P
P

15 th . The average level of New COT transactions from Feb. 1, 2005 to Mar, 15, 2005 was Rs 12.7 billion.
P
P

KSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 1 to Mar. 15, 2005.


44
TP PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 1 to Mar. 15, 2005.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 21 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

market by brokers and/or COT lenders in the days immediately prior to the market’s
fall. 45 TP PT

Chart 8 – Daily Values of Total and New COT in Group C Scrips, KSE, In Rupees Billions,
For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005

25

Total COT Investment


In Group C scrips
20

15
Rs. Billions

10

New COT Investment


In Group C scrips
5

-
1/3/2005
1/5/2005
1/7/2005
1/9/2005
1/11/2005
1/13/2005
1/15/2005
1/17/2005
1/19/2005
1/21/2005
1/23/2005
1/25/2005
1/27/2005
1/29/2005
1/31/2005
2/2/2005
2/4/2005
2/6/2005
2/8/2005
2/10/2005
2/12/2005
2/14/2005
2/16/2005
2/18/2005
2/20/2005
2/22/2005
2/24/2005
2/26/2005
2/28/2005
3/2/2005
3/4/2005
3/6/2005
3/8/2005
3/10/2005
3/12/2005
3/14/2005
Graph Notes: Total investment in New and Total COT for Group C scrips actually increased during the
U U

week immediately preceding March 16, 2005, the start of the market’s decline. Investment in New COT
increased from Rs 10.5 billion to Rs 13.4 billion between March 7 and March 15, 2005.

45
TP We note the possibility that one or more individual lenders may have pulled back from the COT market
PT

between Mar. 1 and Mar. 15, 2005, however, the COT trend levels indicate that any departure was replaced
by COT from new lenders or from a greater participation by existing lenders.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 22 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Chart 9 – Daily Values of New COT for Group C Scrips, By Scrip, KSE, In Rupees Billions,
For the Period March 1 to March 15, 2005

BOP
4
DGKC
FFBL
Rs. Billions

3 HUBC
ICI
MLCF
2
NBP
OGDC

1 POL

-
3/1/2005

3/2/2005

3/3/2005

3/4/2005

3/5/2005

3/6/2005

3/7/2005

3/8/2005

3/9/2005

3/10/2005

3/11/2005

3/12/2005

3/13/2005

3/14/2005

3/15/2005
Graph Notes: Each individual scrip included in Group C experienced increasing levels of investment in
New COT during the two weeks preceding March 15, 2005.

3. Variability and Cyclicality of New COT


As described earlier in this Part, the volume of daily transactions in New COT during
2004 and early 2005 was highly cyclical and experienced wide variations in relatively
short time spans. Frequent downward trends in daily transactions of New COT over
multiple daily trading periods were not uncommon. Yet a comparison of daily
transactional volumes of New COT to Ready Market trades shows that any downward
trends that may be present from time to time did not appear to directly or negatively
influence the daily trading volumes of the same scrips. 46 TP PT

As shown in Chart 8, New COT for the scrips comprising GROUP C continued a cyclical
pattern during early 2005 until the market’s decline in mid-March 2005. For example,
daily New COT in January ranged from a high of Rs 15.6 on January 6 th to a low of Rs P
P

6.2 billion on January 31 st , a fluctuation of Rs 9.4 billion, or 60% from the month’s high.
P
P

Similarly, daily New COT in February ranged from a low of Rs 7.3 billion on February
1 st to a high of Rs 17.9 billion on February 14 th , a change of Rs 10.6 billion, and again,
P
P
P
P

approximately a 60% fluctuation. Nonetheless, despite the severe fluctuations, daily

46
TP See Chart B-2 in Appendix B comparing daily levels of New COT investment to Ready Market trading
PT

volumes (in share values). KSE Market Transaction Data, July 2004 to Mar. 2005.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 23 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

trading volumes of these scrips on the Ready Market remained high and continued to
increase, as shown in Chart 10.

Chart 10 – Daily Values of Ready Market Trades Compared to New COT for Group C
Scrips, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005
70

60

50
Rs. Billions

40
Ready Market Investment
in Group C scrips
30

20

10
New COT Investment
In Group C scrips
-
1/3/2005
1/5/2005
1/7/2005
1/9/2005
1/11/2005
1/13/2005
1/15/2005
1/17/2005
1/19/2005
1/21/2005
1/23/2005
1/25/2005
1/27/2005
1/29/2005
1/31/2005
2/2/2005
2/4/2005
2/6/2005
2/8/2005
2/10/2005
2/12/2005
2/14/2005
2/16/2005
2/18/2005
2/20/2005
2/22/2005
2/24/2005
2/26/2005
2/28/2005
3/2/2005
3/4/2005
3/6/2005
3/8/2005
3/10/2005
3/12/2005
3/14/2005
Graph Notes: Despite fluctuations in New COT for Group C scrips, total Ready Market transactions for
these same scrips remained high and continued to increase up until March 15, 2005.

4. Trends in Broker-Initiated Levels of COT Investment


The absence of any noticeable withdrawal of funds in the New COT market largely
eliminates the need to further analyze the data. Nevertheless, given the turmoil and
rumors surrounding the market’s decline, we examined the COT trading activities at the
broker level to determine who, if any, may have voluntarily withdrawn sizeable funds
from the COT market in the weeks prior to the market decline. 47 TP PT

As shown in Chart 11, the daily purchases of New COT by the eleven brokers with the
largest trading volumes in the COT market did not generally decrease between March 1
and March 15. Collectively, these eleven brokers represented a large majority of the total
purchases of New COT during this period, any one of which traded daily in substantial

47
TP Because the total levels of investment in New COT did not generally decline within Group C scrips in
PT

the two weeks prior to March 16, 2005, any substantial withdrawal of investment funds from regulated
COT market by a broker (or brokers) would have been replaced by new funds from another broker (or
brokers). Nevertheless, an examination of New COT activity at the broker level during this period might
possibly uncover attempts, albeit unsuccessful, by one or more brokers to manipulate the market.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 24 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

volumes of COT. Yet the data shows no indication of a substantial withdrawal of funds
by any of these major brokers during this period. 48 TP PT

In addition, we conducted a limited examination of the client-level trading data acquired


from the two largest brokers trading in the COT market—Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities
(Pvt.) Ltd (“AKD”) and Arif Habib Securities Limited (“AHS”)—to identify, where
possible, the underlying source of funds of New COT. 49 The analysis was conducted to
TP PT

determine whether COT funding was concentrated among a relatively few lenders and
whether the brokers themselves provided a meaningful portion of total funds lent.

The data shows that for the period March 1 to March 15, 2005, funds provided for New
COT through the two largest providers were heavily concentrated among relatively few
lenders. In the case of AKD, over 80% of its New COT purchases were provided by only
seven lenders. 50 Two of the seven clients were major banks accounting for 50% of the
TP PT

total purchases. In the case of AHS, a total of thirteen banks or mutual funds comprised
80% of AHS’s total COT purchased. 51 In cases where clients are concentrated, the risk
TP PT

of manipulation is mitigated by the fact that the large majority of the lenders were
regulated third-party banks, mutual funds or other financial institutions that are seemingly
independent of the brokers and subject to separate financial and regulatory controls. 52 TP PT

48
TPThe eleven largest brokers were determined based on Total COT values for the period Mar. 1, 2005 to
PT

Mar. 15, 2005. We note the unusual, one-day temporary drop in New COT purchase transactions by Aqeel
Karim Dhedhi Securities, yet this decrease appears spread across a number of individual financiers and is
mitigated by the increase in New COT from March 4 to March 15, 2005. See: KSE Market Transaction
Data Mar. 1 2005 to Mar. 15 2005.
49
TP AKD and AHS accounted for 19.8% and 10.2%, respectively, (collectively 30%) of the New COT
PT

investment purchased for GROUP C scrips during the period March 1 to March 15, 2005. KSE Market
Transaction Data, Mar. 1 – Mar. 15, 2005.
50
TPKSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 1 – Mar. 15, 2005. Trading data, Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities,
PT

Mar. 1 – Mar. 15, 2005.


51
TPKSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 1 – Mar. 15, 2005. Arif Habib Securities Client Listing, Mar. 1 –
PT

Mar. 15, 2005.


52
TP We note that on Feb. 26, 2005, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) issued a circular through their Banking
PT

Policy Department, capping the amount of Badla lending by each of the nation’s banks and Development
Finance Institutions (DFIs) falling under the regulatory authority of SBP. This restriction was a measure
used in coordination with the phase-out plan of COT. The circular explicitly stated that COT exposure for
all banks and DFIs should not exceed, in any scrip, their respective COT exposures in the corresponding
scrips as of Feb. 25, 2005. Although the effects of this directive have not been quantified, the possibility
exists that this bank regulation also played a role in limiting the availability of COT that might have been
made available for the remaining COT-eligible scrips. See: BPD Circular No. 5 of 2005 “Replacement of
COT with Margin Financing” Muhammad Ashraf Khan, Sr. Joint Director.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 25 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Chart 11 – Daily Purchases of New COT for Group C Scrips, By Brokers Representing
Lenders, KSE, In Rupees Millions, For the Period March 1 to March 15, 2005

3,000

2,500

2,000
Rs. Millions

1,500

1,000

500

-
3/1/2005

3/2/2005

3/3/2005

3/4/2005

3/5/2005

3/6/2005

3/7/2005

3/8/2005

3/9/2005

3/10/2005

3/11/2005

3/12/2005

3/13/2005

3/14/2005

3/15/2005
AKD AHSL KASB Atlas Capital
First Capital Orix Darson Securities Elixir Securities
Standard Capital Jahangir Siddiqui Motiw ala Securities

Graph Notes: The top brokers through which COT was provided generally experienced slight increases in U U

New COT during the first two weeks of March 2005.

For each broker examined, it did not appear that proprietary accounts or broker-
controlled banks or mutual funds played a significant part in providing regulated COT
financing. In our view, this reduces the broker’s control and influence in the short-term
over the supply or withdrawal of COT investment funds. 53 TP PT

5. Comment on COT Investment at Lahore Stock Exchange


Although the focus of this Part is entirely on certain events impacting COT investment on
the KSE, we also briefly analyzed, for comparison purposes, the trends of New COT on
the Lahore Stock Exchange (“LSE”) in the nine COT-eligible scrips comprising GROUP C
during the first two weeks of March 2005. As shown in Chart 12, our analysis shows the

53
TP The identification of underlying lenders was based entirely on client-level data obtained from the
PT

brokers. We did not perform any confirmation procedures to validate the data or client names including
reviewing underlying transaction documentation such as confirmation slips or trade tickets. On July 28,
2006 the SECP implemented regulations requiring Pakistan’s three exchanges to ensure that brokers
identify, via the use of a Unique Identification Number, the identity of the individual behind a stock market
transaction. SECP letter to KSE, LSE and ISE, Aug. 3, 2006.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 26 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

same upward trend in New COT at the LSE as found at the KSE, indicating the absence
of a systemic and voluntary withdrawal of COT for these active scrips. 54 TP PT

Chart 12 – Daily Purchases of New COT for Group C Scrips, Lahore Stock Exchange, In
Rupees Billions, For the Period March 1 to March 15, 2005

4
Rs. Billions

-
1/3/2005

1/6/2005

1/9/2005

1/12/2005

1/15/2005

1/18/2005

1/21/2005

1/24/2005

1/27/2005

1/30/2005

2/2/2005

2/5/2005

2/8/2005

2/11/2005

2/14/2005

2/17/2005

2/20/2005

2/23/2005

2/26/2005

3/1/2005

3/4/2005

3/7/2005

3/10/2005

3/13/2005
Graph Notes: Consistent with the KSE, investment in New COT on the LSE for Group C scrips also
increased during the first two weeks of March 2005.

6. In-House Badla
A major remaining issue area concerning whether or not COT funds were withdrawn as
part of a scheme to possibly manipulate the market is the possible role of unregulated “in-
house” Badla. Although no accurate, authoritative market size estimates exist, various
news articles and market experts surmise that the in-house market may have approached
volumes (of amounts loaned) as large, if not much larger than the regulated market
itself. 55 TP PT

54
TP LSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 3 – Mar. 15, 2005, LSE Website <www.lahorestock.com>.
PT

Interestingly, daily trading in New COT for Group C scrips on LSE, as shown in Chart 12, did not
experience the high variability from day-to-day as reflected in the COT trading on the KSE.
55
TP "KSE Big Fish Vying to Arm Speculators" The International News:
PT

<www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=24865>; Interview with SECP Staff. Recent events demonstrate the


difficulty in ascertaining the full amount of the market’s outstanding in-house Badla. For example, in
conjunction with the recent new regulations to ban in-house Badla, brokers were required by the SECP to
report the outstanding balances of in-house Badla. In October 2006, 45 brokers reported a total of Rs 9

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 27 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Diligence has not been able to obtain any useful public or other data or information from
the market or independent third parties regarding the quantities and activities of in-house
Badla existing in the days and weeks prior to the market’s decline in March 2005.
Diligence has learned from Pakistani auditors and accountants familiar with in-house
broker financing activities and the recording of those activities in a broker’s books and
records, that quality, accurate and reliable figures on in-house Badla on a daily basis are
not readily available and indistinguishable in the books from the broker’s regulated COT.
It would therefore be extremely difficult and very costly to extract and reconcile this
financing source, and would also be virtually impossible to quantify or to verify its
accuracy or completeness on such a wide scale.

From a high-level analytical perspective, we note that a variety of issues effectively


preclude a normal detailed forensic review of this information. First, since this market is
by definition, “in-house,” there is no central KSE or other exchange repository of
transactional information from which to access and analyze regularly recorded
information. There is no data existing in a uniform format in a professionally designed
and operated control environment to establish reliable data trends and findings. To
undertake a comprehensive review of the possible role of in-house Badla would therefore
require the acquisition, loading and analysis of disparate data types and records from each
and every broker (and/or possibly involved third parties) providing in-house Badla.
Second, assuming the unlikely ability to acquire this core data, it is further unlikely that
there would be any control totals or other mechanisms for use in corroborating the
accuracy and completeness of whatever data was provided by the brokers (and/or
possibly involved third parties). Any resulting analysis would therefore be suspect,
because of the questions surrounding whether or not the data was appropriate, accurate
and complete. 56TP PT

In summary, this market lacks transparency and accountability. Therefore, assuming the
amounts of in-house Badla involved are in fact substantial, as posited by media and
market experts, any possible broker manipulation of scrip-related financing would have
been more likely to occur, if at all, in this unregulated and opaque financing environment
than in the regulated COT market.

billion of in-house Badla to the SECP (SECP Information). In the same article, in-house Badla was
estimated as high as Rs 90 billion (Dawn, Nov. 18, 2006, pg 9)
56
TP Interview of and statements by independent financial statement auditors familiar with the accounting,
PT

record keeping and financial statement reporting of in-house Badla.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 28 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF


REGULATED COT
In summary, our findings support the observations of the Taskforce and others on a
central point: there was a significant decrease in overall investment in the regulated COT
market (concerning the KSE) in the days and weeks prior to the market’s March 2005
decline. Whether the decline in COT played a key role in the market’s rapid descent, as
alleged by the Taskforce and others, was not the subject of this Report, although certainly
one cannot dismiss the importance of its possible impact.

Our findings, however, do not support the assertion that the withdrawal of COT was the
product of a manipulative scheme by brokers and COT lenders to propel the market into a
pronounced freefall to reap illicit gains on possibly illegal short positions. Conversely,
we find that the withdrawals were directly linked to identifiable and quantifiable
regulatory and/or self-imposed (by certain companies) factors. We do not find credible
evidence that the withdrawal of funds from the regulated COT market was engineered by
certain brokers or other financial participants, or was otherwise manipulative in nature.

The substantial data collected and analyzed as part of this effort leads to two fundamental
conclusions concerning the withdrawal of funds from the COT market:

1) The net drop in Total COT investment from its peak on February 18 to just prior
to the market’s decline on March 16 of Rs 12 billion was entirely attributable to
the withdrawal of COT investment from i) the scrips phased-out of COT
eligibility and ii) the two scrips temporarily moving to Spot and suspending their
COT eligibility (See Sections IV and V); and

2) The level of New COT for the scrips not subject to a regulated or self-imposed
withdrawal for this same February and March period was cyclical (essentially
consistent with historical patterns) and, more significantly, did not appear to
adversely impact Ready Market trading as the daily trading volumes of these
scrips on the Ready Market for this period remained high and continued to
increase. (See Section VI).

Finally, although this Part does not probe the question of what precisely caused the
market decline, we note and cannot ignore a convergence of multiple independent and
identifiable events within a short time frame prior to the Ready Market’s decline that
individually and collectively restricted the availability of COT and strongly influenced
market sentiments. We also note the strong influence likely played by the skyrocketing
trades and record open and precarious positions in the Futures markets.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 29 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

1. Summary and Conclusions Presented Graphically


Presented below are additional graphical representations of our findings and conclusions
related to the withdrawal of regulated COT from the KSE market.

In Chart 13, we present a side-by-side comparison of the daily levels of Total COT for
each of the featured analytical groups: GROUP A, GROUP B and GROUP C. As shown in
the chart, the daily levels of Total COT for GROUPS A and B, the scrips for which COT
was phased-out or temporarily suspended, declined leading up to the weeks preceding the
market’s steep decline. Conversely, Total COT for GROUP C, scrips which continued to
be eligible for and actively trading in COT, generally increased during the same time
period.

In Chart 14, we present the same data of Total COT by analytical groups, but the data is
displayed in a format that illustrates the relative proportions of the market’s Total COT
that are represented by the three analytical groups. As shown in the chart, Total COT of
GROUP C represents the largest portion of the market’s Total COT, and is thus an
influential factor of the market’s total liquidity. For this group we found no indications
of COT being withdrawn prior to the market’s decline. Also reflected in the chart is the
underlying basis for the decrease in the aggregate level of Total COT, which we found
was entirely attributable to the mandated or temporary phase-out of COT by the scrips in
GROUPS A and B.

Charts 15 and 16 follow the same formats as Charts 13 and 14, respectively, except that
the data in Charts 15 and 16 represent investment in New COT (not Total COT) across
U U

the three analytical groups. Although the data set changes for these two charts, the
patterns are similar. As shown in the charts, New COT for GROUPS A and B decline, as a
result of their respective regulated or self-imposed withdrawal from the COT market,
whereas New COT for GROUP C increases, refuting the allegations that there was a
coordinated scheme to withdraw regulated financing from the market.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 30 OF 39


Rs. Billions Rs. Billions

-
5
10
15
20
25
30

0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1/3/2005 1/3/2005
1/5/2005 1/5/2005
1/7/2005 1/7/2005

NOVEMBER 21, 2006


1/9/2005 1/9/2005
1/11/2005 1/11/2005
1/13/2005 1/13/2005
1/15/2005 1/15/2005
1/17/2005 1/17/2005
1/19/2005 1/19/2005

Phased-out Scrips
1/21/2005 1/21/2005
1/23/2005 1/23/2005
1/25/2005 1/25/2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS

1/27/2005
1/27/2005
All Other Scrips

1/29/2005
1/29/2005
1/31/2005
1/31/2005
2/2/2005
PSO/PTCL

2/2/2005

PSO/PTCL
2/4/2005
2/4/2005
2/6/2005
2/6/2005
2/8/2005
2/8/2005 2/10/2005
2/10/2005 2/12/2005
2/12/2005 2/14/2005

All other scrips


2/14/2005 2/16/2005
Phased-out Scrips

2/16/2005 2/18/2005
2/18/2005 2/20/2005
2/20/2005 2/22/2005
2/22/2005 2/24/2005
2/24/2005 2/26/2005
2/26/2005 2/28/2005

KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3 to March 15, 2005
KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3 to March 15, 2005
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

2/28/2005 3/2/2005

3/2/2005 3/4/2005

3/4/2005 3/6/2005
3/8/2005
3/6/2005
3/10/2005
3/8/2005
3/12/2005
3/10/2005
3/14/2005
3/12/2005
3/16/2005
3/14/2005
Chart 13 – Daily Values of Total COT Comparing Scrip Groups A, B and C Side-by-Side,

Chart 14 – Daily Values of Total Outstanding COT Divided Into Scrip Groups A, B and C,

PART I - PAGE 31 OF 39
WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT
Rs. Billions
Rs. Billions

-
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20

0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1/3/2005 1/3/2005
1/5/2005 1/5/2005
1/7/2005 1/7/2005
1/9/2005

Scrips
1/9/2005

NOVEMBER 21, 2006


Phased-out
1/11/2005 1/11/2005
1/13/2005 1/13/2005
1/15/2005 1/15/2005
1/17/2005 1/17/2005

All Other Scrips


1/19/2005 1/19/2005
1/21/2005 1/21/2005
1/23/2005 1/23/2005

PSO/PTCL
1/25/2005 1/25/2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS

1/27/2005 1/27/2005
1/29/2005 1/29/2005
All Other Scrips

1/31/2005 1/31/2005
2/2/2005 2/2/2005
2/4/2005 2/4/2005
2/6/2005 2/6/2005
2/8/2005 2/8/2005
2/10/2005 2/10/2005
2/12/2005 2/12/2005
2/14/2005 2/14/2005
2/16/2005 2/16/2005
2/18/2005
PSO/PTCL

2/18/2005

Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3 to March 15, 2005


2/20/2005 2/20/2005
2/22/2005
Phased-out Scrips

2/22/2005
2/24/2005
2/24/2005

2/26/2005
2/26/2005
KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3 to March 15, 2005
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

2/28/2005 2/28/2005
3/2/2005
3/2/2005
3/4/2005
3/4/2005
3/6/2005
3/6/2005
3/8/2005
3/8/2005
3/10/2005
3/10/2005
3/12/2005
3/12/2005
3/14/2005
Chart 16 – Daily Values of New COT Divided Into Scrip Groups A, B and C, KSE, In

3/14/2005
3/16/2005
Chart 15 – Daily Values of New COT Comparing Scrip Groups A, B and C Side-by-Side,

PART I - PAGE 32 OF 39
WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

VII. OTHER FINDINGS


In the course of our on-going forensic investigation, we examined millions of trading and
transactional records and events across the Ready, Futures and COT markets. Although
outside of the central focus of this Part, we present certain findings and trends in this
concluding section that we believe are relevant to the general subject of market liquidity.

A. TRADING PATTERNS IN FUTURES MARKET


In the months leading up to the KSE 100’s peak on March 15, 2005, trading volumes in
the KSE’s Futures Market rapidly accelerated. As shown in Chart 17, by March 10, 2005
(just a few days before the market’s decline), trading volumes at the Futures counter,
which historically have been a fraction of the volumes in the Ready Market, shot past the
trading volumes in the Ready Market and reached unprecedented levels. What exactly
caused this abnormal shift of interest to the Futures Market has yet to be definitively
investigated, but some have attributed the shift to the decrease in available COT in the
Ready Market due to the COT phase-out, and the lack of a sufficient alternative in margin
financing, as weak investors sought more purchase opportunities in a rapidly rising
market.

Also noteworthy is the heightened and unparalleled level of open positions in the Futures
Market, as shown in Chart 18. With the extraordinary levels of leverage in the COT
markets, the combined leverage in the markets in the days immediately preceding the
steep decline can not be dismissed or ignored, and may have played a critical role in the
market’s instability at that time.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 33 OF 39


In Millions of Shares Billions

-
20
40
60
80
100
120

0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1-Oct-04 7/5/04
8-Oct-04
7/12/04
15-Oct-04
7/19/04
22-Oct-04

March 24, 2005


7/26/04

NOVEMBER 21, 2006


29-Oct-04
5-Nov-04 8/2/04
19-Nov-04 8/9/04
26-Nov-04 8/16/04
30-Nov-04
8/23/04
3-Dec-04
8/30/04
10-Dec-04
17-Dec-04
9/6/04
24-Dec-04 9/13/04
31-Dec-04 9/20/04
REPORT OF FINDINGS

7-Jan-05 9/27/04
14-Jan-05
10/4/04
19-Jan-05
10/11/04
28-Jan-05
4-Feb-05 10/18/04
11-Feb-05 10/25/04

Quantity
18-Feb-05 11/1/04
25-Feb-05 11/8/04
For the Period October 1, 2004 to March 24, 2005

28-Feb-05
11/15/04
1-Mar-05

VALUE
11/22/04
2-Mar-05
3-Mar-05 11/29/04
7-Mar-05 12/6/04
8-Mar-05 12/13/04
9-Mar-05
12/20/04
10-Mar-05
12/27/04
11-Mar-05
1/3/05
Ready Market

14-Mar-05
15-Mar-05 1/10/05
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

16-Mar-05 1/17/05
17-Mar-05 1/24/05
18-Mar-05
1/31/05
21-Mar-05
2/7/05
22-Mar-05
2/14/05
23-Mar-05
24-Mar-05 2/21/05
2/28/05
Market

3/7/05
Futures

PKR 0
PKR 10
PKR 20
PKR 30
PKR 40
PKR 50
PKR 60
PKR 70
PKR 80
PKR 90

3/14/05
Chart 17 – Daily Trade Volumes in Ready and Futures Market, KSE, In Rupees Billions,

Rs. Billions
Chart 18 – Daily Totals of Open Futures Positions, KSE, For the Period October 1, 2004 to

PART I - PAGE 34 OF 39
WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

B. COT TRENDS DURING MARKET’S DECLINE


Earlier in this Part, we noted that New COT for actively trading COT-eligible scrips
(scrips that had not been phased-out or temporarily moved to trading Spot) generally
increased during the two weeks preceding March 16 th . We also described how all major
P
P

brokers representing the purchasers of New COT, individually and as a group, followed
the same pattern of slightly increasing COT funding over the same two-week period. We
did not identify any one broker or group of brokers acting in concert contrary to this
general market trend during this period.

We also performed a limited review of the COT market patterns between March 16 and
March 24, the period immediately following the KSE 100’s peak, and a period of
precarious turnover and price instability in the markets. The purchase transaction data by
the largest brokers in the COT market are shown in Chart 19. The data shows that the
largest brokers transacting COT purchases appeared to follow the same general trends of
the overall market. The data does not indicate or suggest that any one broker or group of
brokers appeared to have manipulated the COT market or acted in concert contrary to the
general market trend. 57 TP PT

The percentage of New COT lending as compared to the volume of trading in the Ready
Market is shown in Chart 20. Although New COT declined that week, this appears to be
a function of demand, as trading volumes in the Ready Market declined similarly during
the same period. There appears to be no indication that the amount of New COT relative U U

to trading volumes in the Ready Market declined, but rather, it remained steady.
U U

As previously noted, the KSE did not systematically retain information related to orders
placed on the exchange. Because order information provides details on bid and offer
volumes and prices, it is an accurate gauge of the supply and demand forces that drive the
ultimate executed trades. In reference to the COT analysis above, COT order information
would have been instrumental in our ability to determine whether decreases in New COT
during the period March 16 to March 24 were a result of a decrease in financier supply
or, alternatively, were a function of a decrease in demand related to the general downturn
in the market.

57
TP PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 16, 2005 – Mar. 24, 2005.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 35 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Chart 19 – Daily Values of New COT Purchases By Top Brokers, Representing Lenders,
KSE, In Rupees Millions, For the Period March 16 to March 24, 2005

3,000

2,500

2,000
Millions

1,500

1,000

500

-
3/16/05

3/17/05

3/18/05

3/19/05

3/20/05

3/21/05

3/22/05

3/23/05

3/24/05
Atlas Capital AKD Multiline
AHSL First Capital Orix
Darson Elixir Standard Capital
KASB Escorts Bank First Equity Modaraba

Graph Notes: New COT provided through the largest brokers showed generally uniform decreasing trends
consistent with the general market downturn.

Chart 20 – Daily Percentage of New COT Purchases to Volume of Trading in Ready


Market by Scrip Group, In Rupees Millions, For the Period March 1 to March 18, 2005

120%

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
3/1/2005

3/2/2005

3/3/2005

3/4/2005

3/5/2005

3/6/2005

3/7/2005

3/8/2005

3/9/2005

3/10/2005

3/11/2005

3/12/2005

3/13/2005

3/14/2005

3/15/2005

3/16/2005

3/17/2005

3/18/2005

PHASED-OUT OTHER OGDC/POL

Graph Notes: New COT as a percentage of volume of trading in the Ready Market remained steady during
the critical days immediately following the KSE 100’s peak on March 15 th . P
P

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 36 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

GLOSSARY

Book Closure Period of completing and closing business journals, ledgers, and
other accounting records (including the transfer of revenue and
expense accounts) at the end of a period in preparation of a
corporate action such as a payment of dividend, issuance of bonus
shares, stock split, merger, acquisition, etc.

COT Carry Over Transaction (also known as “Carry Over Trade” or


Badla financing) was a financing mechanism providing investors
and market participants in the Pakistani securities markets with
funding to leverage their investments. COT enabled investors to
“carry over” their positions in the market without taking delivery,
thus deferring settlement. COT was replaced with the Continuous
Funding System in August 2005.

• New COT: As used in this Part represents the value (in


Rupees) of new carry over transactions transacted on the KSE
on a given trading day. New COT is equivalent to “Open
Market COT” provided on the KSE Daily Unreleased/Open
Market COT reports.

• Total COT: As used in this Part, Total COT represents the


value (in Rupees) of outstanding carry over transactions at the
end of a given trading day. Total COT is the sum of unreleased
carry over transactions from the previous trading day plus New
COT. Total COT is equivalent to “Total COT” provided on the
KSE Daily Unreleased/Open Market COT reports.

COT-Eligible Scrip A scrip in which COT funding was a permitted, viable method for
leveraging trades.

COT Borrower An investor who borrows COT funding from a COT lender at the
agreed COT rate in order to leverage his/her position in the market.
The COT borrower is represented as the “Seller” in the COT
market transaction data records, as he/she is temporary “selling”
his/her Ready Market position in a given scrip to the COT lender
for purposes of collateral.
COT Lender The provider of COT funding who agrees to make the funding
available at the prevailing COT rate. This lender can be a bank,
development financial institution, non-bank financial institution, a
broker, etc. A COT lender can also be an individual who decides to
“invest” his money in the COT market in order to realize profits
afforded by the COT rate. A lender makes financing available on

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 37 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

the COT market through a broker. The COT lender is represented


as the “Buyer” in the COT market transaction data records as
he/she is temporarily “buying”, for purposes of collateral, the
Ready Market scrip shares which are the subject of the COT
financing.
In-House/Unregulated
COT Funding COT funding made available to investors directly by a broker
through an unregulated transaction. These “off exchange”
transactions are not transparent to the market and are not recorded
or controlled by any exchange. In contrast to regulated COT, rates
are not capped for in-house/unregulated COT funding.

KSE Karachi Stock Exchange

KSE 100 Index A securities market indicator for the Karachi Stock Exchange,
(similar to the Dow Jones Industrial Index of the New York Stock
Exchange) that aggregates the overall daily performance of 100
selected scrips.

KSE Market
Transaction Data A complete record of all individual trades executed on either the
Ready or COT markets for a given trading day.

KSE Unreleased/
Open Market COT
Daily Reports Daily reports produced by the KSE that define the daily values of
Unreleased COT (COT carried over and not released), Open
Market COT (our New COT), and Total COT (our Total COT) for
each COT-eligible scrip on a given trading day.
Ready Market The KSE’s T+3 trading market.

Regulated COT
Market The COT market in which transactions consist of investors buying
and selling COT funding at a regulated COT rate. Transactions in
this market were transparent and subject to exchange recording and
control and were regulated by the Carry Over Transactions
Regulations, 1993.

Scrip Equivalent to a share or shares of an issuer’s stock.

SECP Taskforce The group of individuals commissioned on April 2, 2005 by the


SECP to determine the causes underlying the securities market
downturn in Pakistan in March 2005. The Task Force was chaired
by Justice (Retd.) Saleem Akhtar, and also included members Dr.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 38 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Mohammad Zubair Khan, Shahid Hafiz Kardar, and Sultan Allana.


The Task Force issued its report to the SECP in June 2005.

Spot Trading (T+1) Trading of securities in which settlement occurs within one day of
the trade - usually associated with an issuer corporate action, such
as a dividend payment.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 39 OF 39


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES

PART II

Wash Trades

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART II - PAGE 1 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES

I. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE


A wash trade is defined as “a purchase and sale of a security either simultaneously or
within a short period of time by a single investor or by two or more parties conspiring to
create artificial market activity in order to profit from a rise in the security’s price”.1 We
understand that the SECP takes the position that wash trades are a direct violation of
Section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969.

The Taskforce identified the prolific use of wash trades as a critical component in the
overall scheme perpetrated by certain brokers to “pump” the market prior to its
precipitous decline. Specifically, the Taskforce concluded:

1) “The analysis of stock market data helped identify a number of potential cases of
market abuse where players had undertaken “wash trades”; either for the same
client or a series of common clients across brokers to “pump” the market.
Analysis shows that the brokers and their clients largely dealt with each other in
groups or sub groups at both broker and client level.”2

2) “Large volumes were also traded between clients of the same brokerages and
there were numerous instances of the same client or house account of a broker
being both buyer and seller, in violation of rules, raising concerns about the
sanctity of these transactions.”3

The Taskforce called for its identified wash trade abuses to be further investigated by the
SECP. As described in detail below, Diligence undertook several steps in response to the
Taskforce’s request, namely reviewing:

1) The KSE trading data for intra-broker wash trading activities, or wash trades by
same clients within one broker.

2) The KSE trading data for inter-broker wash trading activities, or wash trades by
same clients across more than one broker.

3) The client-level detailed trading data for a sample of four large-volume brokers
suspected of participating in excessive wash trading, to determine if any
additional illegal wash trading had occurred.

1
Barron’s- Dictionary of Investment Terms – John Downs and Jordan Elliott Goodman, 6th Edition – New
York: Barron’s, 2003. The Taskforce defined a wash trade similarly as “an illegal stock trading practice
whereby an investor simultaneously buys and sells shares in a company through two different brokers.
Such a trade enhances the activity in the stock, giving the impression of active trading without any change
in beneficial ownership, a clear violation of Section 17 of the SEO, 1969.” Taskforce Report, fn 10.
2
Taskforce Report, para 23.
3
Ibid., para 24.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART II - PAGE 2 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES

II. REVIEW OF TASKFORCE FINDINGS


A. INTRA-BROKER WASH TRADES
The taskforce relied exclusively on client codes represented in KSE trading data to
identify purported intra-broker wash trades included as Appendix VIII to its report.4 To
confirm the accuracy of the methodology employed by the Taskforce, we compared the
client codes represented in the KSE trading data for several large brokers to the client
information from the broker’s back-office trading data and identified a number of
instances in which certain trades were inappropriately categorized as wash trades by the
Taskforce. The following is one such example:

Row 10 of Taskforce Appendix VIII indicates that client 013758 at broker 128 (KASB
Securities) transacted wash trades of 250,000 shares of OGDC during March 2005.
Based on our review of the KSE data, these 250,000 shares were made up of four distinct
trades, the details of which are listed below in Chart 1.

Chart 1 - KSE data for select purported Wash trades identified by Taskforce

Ticket # Date Broker Buyer Seller Scrip Shares Value


91452669 09-Mar-05 128 013758 013758 OGDC-MAR 50,000 8,050,000
91452959 09-Mar-05 128 013758 013758 OGDC-MAR 50,000 8,050,000
91470891 09-Mar-05 128 013758 013758 OGDC-MAR 50,000 8,042,500
92329569 14-Mar-05 128 013758 013758 OGDC-MAR 100,000 17,950,000

In our review of trade data acquired directly from KASB, we noted that the underlying
parties to these transactions were in fact not the same individuals and that the transactions
were therefore not wash trades. Chart 2 below includes details obtained directly from
KASB trading data.

4
Diligence must note that although the Taskforce, paragraph 23 of its report, described the trades in
Appendix VIII as where “the investor simultaneously buys and sells shares in a company through two
different brokers” (emphasis added), the trades presented in Appendix VIII are purported wash trades of the
same client within the same broker. We have included Apprendix VIII from the Taskforce Report for
reference following the Appendices for Part II.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART II - PAGE 3 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES

Chart 2- KASB Trade Data on the Same Four Trades

Ticket # Buy or Sell Client Shares Client Name


91452669 B 02333 50,000 [redacted]
91452669 S 03758 50,000 [redacted]

91452959 S 03758 50,000 [redacted]


91452959 B 02334 50,000 [redacted]
91470891 B 03866 50,000 [redacted]
91470891 S 03758 50,000 [redacted]

92329569 B 04182 100,000 [redacted]


92329569 S 03758 100,000 [redacted]

During the course of our investigation, we determined that the client codes contained in
the KSE’s trading data are at times incomplete and inconsistent, making it difficult to
identify with certainty and accuracy the investors underlying the market transactions.
This limitation of the KSE data, as demonstrated by the example above, calls into
question the Taskforce’s reliance on the KSE data’s client codes as prima facie to
characterize the trades identified in Appendix VIII as wash trades.

Until just recently, brokers were not required to use a unique client code identifying
system to consistently and accurately track client information of this kind. Therefore, the
client codes submitted by brokers to the exchange through the trading system, and
consequently the data provided to us by the KSE, cannot be relied upon, without
substantial additional corroboration, for purposes of precisely identifying investors.

During the second half of 2005, we understand that the SECP issued Show Cause Notices
to all of the brokers with trades listed on Appendix VIII, requesting responses to wash
trade allegations as originally put forth by the Taskforce. We reviewed certain minutes
of the SECP adjudication hearings related to a sample of the Show Cause Notices, and in
particular we reviewed the minutes related to the hearing concerning possible wash trade
abuses involving KASB.5 We noted that the explanations provided by KASB, and
accepted by SECP, for the type of trade detailed in the example above conformed with
our conclusion that the Taskforce had erred in asserting that all trades included in its
Appendix VIII were wash trades. However, the SECP concluded, and many brokers
agreed, that certain trades identified by the Taskforce were in fact trades in which the
buyer and seller were one in the same. It appears, based on conclusions reached by SECP

5
Minutes of Hearing in the Matter of Show Cause Notice dated 23 Aug 2005 issued to KASB (7 Sep
2005).

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART II - PAGE 4 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES

adjudicators however, that a preponderance of these trades may have been placed
inadvertently without manipulative intent.6

B. INTER-BROKER WASH TRADES


In further support of its conclusions on wash trades, the Taskforce presented an analysis
of “inter-trading” between several “top brokers.” The graphical analysis7 details the
trading relationships in shares of OGDC, on a broker-level, between seven brokers.

As a preliminary matter, it is unclear to Diligence why the Taskforce used a diagram of


partial trades of scrip between different clients among different brokers as a graphical
representation of large volumes of wash trades. Investors trading on the KSE must use a
broker to effect a stock market transaction. That any number of brokers, particularly the
larger ones, have a significant amount of trading activity between one another is not
surprising, is not indicative of wash trading, and is, in fact, quite normal and expected.
Further, that certain trades between individual investors occur within the same broker is
also to be expected, particularly within brokers that count thousands of investing clients.

Additionally, we find three significant flaws in the Taskforce’s analysis. First, the
Taskforce report highlighted the fact that for these seven brokers, there appeared to be a
correlation in the amount of shares purchased and sold. This analysis was remiss in that
it did not take into account the actual underlying clients involved in these trades. In the
case of Akeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (“AKD”) trading with Muhamad Anas Kapadia
(“MAK”) for example, close to 500 AKD clients accounted for the OGDC trades
between these two brokers. To believe that AKD and MAK conspired to perpetrate fraud
would require one to believe that the 500 clients at AKD may have also conspired with
MAK clients to enter into wash trades of 3.7 million shares. 8 In our opinion, this

6
The SECP informed Diligence that based on information gleaned from their adjudication of the Show
Cause Notices the majority of the trades characterized by the Taskforce as wash trades were not ultimately
considered wash trades by the SECP.
7
Taskforce Report, page 14.
8
For example, the chart in paragraph 24 of the Taskforce report notes that Akeel Karim Dhedhi Securities
(AKD) and Muhamad Anas Kapadia (MAK) traded Rs. 3.7 million shares of OGDC with each other during
the month of March 2005. We reviewed the KSE data and noted that AKD clients purchased 3.7 million
shares of OGDC from MAK clients and MAK clients purchased 3.4 million shares of OGDC from AKD
clients during the month of March 2005. While the similarity in these two figures might elicit curiosity, a
closer look at the KSE data (for which AKD client codes where found to be fairly reliable) shows that 254
separate AKD clients bought OGDC shares from MAK and conversely 244 AKD clients sold OGDC
shares to MAK. Only 89 AKD clients both bought from and sold shares to MAK, leaving 409 AKD
clients that could not have perpetrated any wash trades (unless perhaps through a complicated scheme of
collusion). Of the 89 clients that did overlap, we reviewed details related to the largest one, client 1080
which is AKD’s proprietary in-house trading account. We noted that client AKD #1080 purchased 569,100
shares from at least seven different clients at MAK (note that the KSE data shows a blank MAK client code
for 453,400 shares out of the 569,000). On the sale side, AKD #1080 sold 455,100 shares to at least 13
clients (similarly, the KSE MAK data shows a blank MAK client code for 210,000 shares out the 455,100).

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART II - PAGE 5 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES

scenario would be very unlikely. It is impossible to reach such a conclusion without a


detailed review of the underlying clients and the trading patterns among them.

Second, successfully executed wash trades serve the purpose of temporarily hyping the
market and raising stock prices within a very short period time (measured in minutes).
Therefore, wash trade analyses must be performed on an exceptionally granular level,
preferably on a trade by trade basis. We believe that the analysis of summary trading
data aggregated over a period of one month is not representative of individual client
trading behavior and cannot accurately identify potential wash trades.

Third, the absence of a universal identification coding system for investors renders it
virtually impossible from using only KSE data to identify the same clients across
different brokers. Without a universal identification coding system in place, in order to
effectively and completely analyze wash trades within and across brokers in light of the
limitations in the KSE data, one would need to review and compare the detailed back-
office trading data of each and every broker to accurately identify the underlying clients,
as many investors have accounts at numerous brokers.9 This approach is complicated and
would require the collection and examination of back-office trading data from an
extraordinarily large number of brokerages to be meaningful. Even then, due to
inconsistencies in names and spellings, and the requirement to manually confirm that
clients across different brokers are one and the same through additional verification such
as addresses or identification numbers would render virtually impossible the formation of
any reliable conclusions on the potential wash trades between brokers.10

Based on the above, we believe that the conclusions drawn by the Taskforce relating to
inter-broker wash trades were premature and were not based on sound empirical
evidence. We believe that any successful analysis of wash trades would have had to have
been performed at the client level and on an individual trade level to have been effective.

Only one of the clients at MAK both bought from and sold shares to AKD #1080 (1,000 shares purchased
and 10,000 shares sold).
9
The implementation of Universal Identification Codes for clients in 2006 provided the SECP with
statistics as to the number of accounts clients hold across different brokers. According to the data, 16% of
investors, or 22,414 investors, maintained investment accounts at more than one broker. Sixty-eight
investors held accounts at more than ten brokers.
10
The implementation of Universal Identification Codes for clients will alleviate this data limitation and
greatly enhance the ability to track same client trades across different brokers.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART II - PAGE 6 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES

C. WASH TRADE ANALYSIS OF FOUR LARGE BROKERS


1. Identification of Potential Wash trades
As a result of the significant KSE data limitations discussed above, Diligence was unable
to systematically analyze potential inter-broker wash trades. We did, however, review
back-office trading data of four of the larger brokers to identify potential intra-broker
wash trades within each of these brokers.11 Our analysis differed from that of the
Taskforce, focusing on all scrips traded on the KSE12.

2. Analysis of Potential Wash trades


We identified a number of instances, at all four brokers, in which the same underlying
client appears to have been both the purchaser and seller on the same market trade. Part
II-Appendices A through D detail these potential wash trades, by scrip and by day. To
assess whether these identified trades were truly wash trades, we attempted to answer the
following two questions:

1) Were the trade volumes large enough to potentially impact scrip price?

2) Were the trades followed by additional non-wash trades by the same investor
through which he/she could have profited from a price increase?

In answer to question 1), we compared the value of each potential wash trade to that
day’s total trading activity for the same client and scrip, as well as total trading activity
for that scrip on the entire KSE. We identified several instances for which the wash trade
appeared to be material to total trading activity for the same scrip. In the majority of
cases, however, the size of the wash trade represented only a very small fraction of that
client’s total trades for the day, and often less than one percent of the scrips’ total KSE
market activity. The following examples relate to two of the brokers reviewed:

• For one broker, we identified 63 trades for which the buyer and seller were the
same. Of those 63 trades, only 5 trades were large enough to represent more than
3% of total market trading activity for that scrip on that day.

• For another broker, we identified 37 trades for which the buyer and seller were
the same. Of those 37 trades, only one trade, of a very thinly-traded scrip,
accounted for more than 3% of total market turnover.

11
We reviewed four of the larger brokers engaging in potential wash trades based solely on KSE
transaction data.
12
The Taskforce’s analysis examined potential wash trades on just the heaviest traded scrips within the
KSE100. Diligence’s analysis focuses on all scrips traded on the KSE by the broker under review.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART II - PAGE 7 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES

In answer to question 2, we analyzed the subsequent trading activity of each client


involved in a potential wash trade. This review was designed to identify instances where
a client transacting a wash trade may have benefited from a price increase through a sale
transaction subsequent to the wash trade. We identified several such March cases which
may have resulted in illicit gain, two examples of which we include below.13 We have
referred all potential material cases of wash trading to the SECP for action as per law.

• An institutional client at a large broker engaged in significant wash trades of the


same scrip for three consecutive days. One particular day saw a total of 15 wash
trades, spread over 4 trading hours. Between and around those various wash
trades, the institutional client also engaged in significant sales of the same scrip to
other market participants. Throughout the course of these 4 trading hours, the
scrip’s trading price increased from Rs. 81.8 to close at Rs. 89.

• A large broker entered into 9 significant wash trades during one day of a typically
thinly-traded scrip. These trades were placed through the broker’s own
proprietary trading account. In addition to these wash trades, the broker entered
into sale transactions of over 1.6 million shares of the same scrip on the same day.
The scrip’s share price increased from Rs. 31 to Rs. 33 during this trading day.

In summary, we did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that pervasive wash trade
abuses, whether alone or in combination with other potential abuses, were perpetrated
within the context of a conspiracy to hype and manipulate the market during March 2005,
as put forth by the Taskforce. Diligence also does not believe that the methodologies used
by the Taskforce in reviewing this wash trade area were sound or fact based, and we
respectfully disagree with the resulting Taskforce Report’s conclusions and suggestions
on wash trades. There may have been isolated cases where violations of Section 17(a)
occurred, and Diligence has referred all potential material cases of wash trading to the
SECP for action as per law.

13
To preserve the process integrity of the SECP's possible enforcement of these cases, we have not
included information as to the identity of the brokers and clients involved in these cases.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART II - PAGE 8 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS FUTURES CONTRACTS

PART III

Futures Contracts

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III - PAGE 1 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS FUTURES CONTRACTS

I. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE


In its report, the Taskforce alleged that some brokers, in the weeks preceding the
market’s decline, executed a large amount of sales of March 2005 Futures contracts that
resulted in having net sale positions in excess of same scrip shares held at CDC or
recently purchased in the Ready Market. Such activity, referred to in Western markets as
“naked short sales”, results in illegal profits for manipulative investors who reap the
difference between the contractually agreed upon future sale price and the lower price
paid for shares purchased at or near delivery date. Net sale positions of this type in
excess of Rs 50 million are in violation of the Regulations Governing Futures Contracts
of the Karachi Stock Exchange (Guarantee) Limited, Clause 3(b) and possibly Section
17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969.

The Taskforce further alleged that the brokers obtaining the large naked short sale
positions in Futures contracts were the same brokers responsible for the market’s steep
decline by way of their intentional reduction of regulated COT lending. The Taskforce
inferred that the motive for the broker’s manipulative actions was to sell in Futures at
very high prices as the market was rising, then to purchase the shares later in the Ready
Market at discounted prices to effectuate delivery at settlement.

From the Taskforce Report:

1) “The Sellers in the March Futures contract were of two types: (i) those that were
holding shares that they had sold in the futures and locked in their arbitrage
profits…(ii) the other sellers of the March contract, in clear violation of KSE rules
(although not easily enforceable due to group accounts), may not have held the
shares that they had sold in the future, but had planned to buy these after the
market fell. The latter category of sellers could have played a role in bringing
prices down in the ready market by pulling out Badla financing.”1 (emphasis
added)

2) “It is possible that the Badla providers who were reducing their lending in specific
scrips after March 08, had been selling actively in the ready market and were
holding sell positions (i.e., selling) in the March futures contract in the same
scrips…”2

3) “This environment [reduction of Badla] made it possible for investors to buy these
stocks cheaply compared to their prices in the first week of March. This could
have enabled investors who had sold these two scrips in the future to pick up
stocks at much lower prices [from the Ready Market] thereby making large
capital gains. The holding back of Badla by financiers who had earlier sold in the

1
Taskforce Report, para 39.
2
Ibid., para 33.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III - PAGE 2 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS FUTURES CONTRACTS

future market at a high price suggests that these brokers could have been involved
in such a manipulation.”3

The Taskforce called for these apparent abuses to be further investigated by the SECP.

As described in detail below, Diligence undertook several steps in response to the


Taskforce’s request to examine the trading activities of brokers selling in the Futures
market, namely:

1) Identifying any instances of brokers in net sales positions in excess of the Rs 50


million threshold of Clause 3(b) in March 2005 Futures contracts, thus triggering
a need for the broker to satisfy the KSE that the shares sold were indeed held or
recently purchased by the broker as directed in Clause 3(b).

2) For the brokers holding the largest net sales positions in March 2005 Futures
contracts, comparing the broker’s net sales positions to the shares reported held
by the broker in its accounts at CDC. A short-fall in shares held of greater than
Rs 50 million might be found to be a potential violation of Clause 3(b) and
Section 17(a).

3) Quantifying and examining the lending of New COT for COT-eligible scrips by
the market’s more influential brokers for the period March 1 to March 18, 2005,
to determine whether New COT for those scrips was reduced by these brokers,
which could be a potential violation of Section 17(a).

Based on our analysis, we found numerous incidents in which brokers, subject to


additional factual and legal analysis, may be in significant violation of the securities
regulations. We are not, however, of the opinion that the potential violations were an
intentional and integral part of a larger scheme to inflate, and then crash the market, as
alleged by the Taskforce and others. Rather, these potential violations, if substantiated,
are more likely to be individual isolated instances designed to take advantage of and to
abuse regulatory loopholes and lack of oversight in order to profit from, at that time,
overly optimistic sentiments in a highly volatile market.

3
Ibid., para 55.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III - PAGE 3 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS FUTURES CONTRACTS

II. FINDINGS
A. IDENTIFICATION OF BROKERS WITH NET SALES POSITIONS
OVER CLAUSE 3(B) THRESHOLD

Clause 3(b) seeks to limit the risk of naked short selling in the Pakistani markets by
brokers.4 The regulation states:

“No member shall have a sale position in a particular scrip of more than Rs
50 million, unless the actual shares sold over and above the aforesaid limit
are deposited with the exchange or the broker gives documentary evidence
that the shares are lying in CDC or with some bank or DFI, to the
satisfaction of the KSE management. For the purposes of establishing such
sale position, net buy position in T+3 shall be net off from net sale position
in Futures Counter.”

Based on our interpretation of the statute, brokers with aggregate net sales positions (on a
broker rather than individual client level) in a particular scrip in excess of Rs 50 million
are required to either: (1) deposit with the KSE the shares exceeding the Rs 50 million
threshold, or (2) provide the KSE documentary evidence that the shares are recorded at
CDC.5

Using detailed KSE data of trading activities in the Futures and Ready Market, our
examination identified, for March 2005 futures contracts, all instances in which a broker
trading a particular scrip appeared to have exceeded the Rs 50 million threshold. To
calculate the broker’s net sale position in a particular scrip, we aggregated the share value
of the broker’s cumulative net sale position on a daily basis in March 2005 futures
contracts.6

4
It is important to note that Clause 3(b) is ambiguous in terms of whether it is intended to apply at the
broker or the client level. We believe that its plain meaning supports application at the broker level, for a
particular scrip, but note that the clause’s precise interpretation has not yet been tested in Pakistani courts.
5
We understand from SECP that the CDC is the only allowable depository in which to register ownership
of shares is the CDC, in spite of the language in Clause 3(b) pertaining to the deposit of shares at
institutions other than CDC.
6
Cumulative balances of net open futures positions were calculated based on actual daily trading values of
the scrips on the day purchased. For the purposes of this calculation, shares held were not revalued on a
daily basis based on new price movements. Also, for purposes of this analysis, net buy positions in T+3
were not netted from the cumulative net futures position as is provided for in Clause 3(b). In most cases,
we found the broker’s net T+3 position immaterial to the analysis and to the identification of potential
violators of Clause 3(b). Nonetheless, consideration of a broker’s net T+3 position, if any, may impact the
precise quantification of the potential violation.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III - PAGE 4 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS FUTURES CONTRACTS

We identified a total of 2,491 instances of brokers whose open net sales positions in
March 2005 Futures contracts for a particular scrip, on a particular day, exceeded the Rs
50 million threshold of Clause 3(b).7 These 2,491 cases were spread out between 88
brokers and across 24 futures-eligible scrips. Part III Appendix B lists these 2,491
instances.

Consistent with Clause 3(b), these brokers were required, at the time their positions
exceeded the Rs 50 million threshold, to deposit with the KSE the shares representing the
excess amount over the threshold, or provide documentation to KSE that the shares were
recorded at CDC. Accordingly, and for purposes of our follow-on analysis of potential
Clause 3(b) violations, we have provided our list of brokers to the SECP for further
action as per law.

B. EXAMINATION OF NET SALES POSITIONS OF LARGER VOLUME


BROKERS FOR VIOLATIONS OF CLAUSE 3(B) AND SECTION 17(A)
Section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance (1969) prohibits the use of any
scheme, act or practice calculated to act as a fraud upon the market. The participation in
naked short sales to a significant degree may be construed as a violation of Section 17(a):

“Prohibition of fraudulent acts, etc--- No person shall, for the purpose of inducing,
dissuading, effecting, preventing, or in any manner influencing or turning to his
advantage, the sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly, --

(a) employ any device, scheme, artifice, or engage in any act, practice or course
of business which operates or is intended or calculated to operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person”

We examined further the net open sales positions in March 2005 Futures contracts of the
thirteen brokers with the largest net sales positions across multiple scrips. In order to
conduct this analysis, we collected account information from CDC detailing the
quantities of shares held by each of the brokers for each of the scrips traded.

On a broker level basis for each individual trading day of March 2005 Futures contracts,
we compared the open net position of each of the thirteen brokers by scrip to the
aggregate balance of same scrip shares recorded in the broker’s accounts at CDC.8 The

7
An “instance”, for purposes of this analysis, represents each day a broker exceeds the threshold for a
particular scrip. This definition may not necessarily represent the same number of separate actionable
events as may be defined under the securities regulations. For the purposes of this calculation, shares were
not revalued on a daily basis based on daily closing share price. Revaluing futures positions on a daily
basis based on closing share price may impact the amounts calculated.
8
Under regulations in force at March 2005, brokers were allowed to open and maintain shares in several
accounts at CDC: main account, house account, group account and client accounts. For this analysis, the

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III - PAGE 5 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS FUTURES CONTRACTS

results of this analysis for each of the thirteen brokers analyzed is summarized in Chart
III-1 below, and is also provided in Part III-Appendix A. These results support the
inferences raised by the Taskforce in relation to these activities.

Chart III-1: Sample of Thirteen Brokers With Net Futures Sales Positions Greater
Than Value of Same Scrip Shares Held at CDC9
As Marked With an X
Broker Scrip
BOP DGKC FABL FFBL FFC ICI NBP NML OGDC PGF POL PPL PSO PTC SNGP
Atlas Cap'l X X X X X
AKD X X X X
BMA X X X
AHSL X X X X X X X X X X X
Orix Inv't X X X X X X X X
Elxir Sec X X X X X X
KASB X X X
Taurus X X X X
A. Jabbar X X X X
Escorts Inv X X X X
Siddiqui X X X X
A. Cassim X X X X X X X X
Motiwala X X X X X X X X

We found that each one of the thirteen brokers, for at least one trading day within one
scrip, had net futures sales balances of Rs 50 million greater than the value of their
respective holdings at CDC. Most noteworthy are those brokers whose apparent shortfall
in shares at CDC amounted to hundreds of millions of rupees and was prolific across
several scrips for an extended period of time. If substantiated, these trading positions
could be significant violations of Clause 3(b) and Section 17(a). For example:10

• By March 15, 2005, ‘Broker AHSL’s’ net sales positions in March 2005 futures
for seven scrips were in excess, in material amounts, of its share holdings at CDC.
The broker’s net sales position in PSO March futures, for example, was slightly
over Rs 1 billion more than the aggregate share value of PSO scrip recorded in the
broker’s accounts at CDC. The broker’s net sales position in PTC March futures,
for example, was Rs 551 million more than the aggregate share value of PTC scrip
recorded in the broker accounts at CDC.
• Beginning in the four trading days prior to and including March 15, 2005, ‘Broker
AKD’ accumulated net sales in PTC futures of Rs. 750 million in excess of the
broker’s holdings of the scrip as recorded in its accounts at CDC.

share amounts in all of the brokers various accounts were aggregated together. As of April 1, 2005 the
SECP moved to prohibit the use of group accounts at CDC. Letter from SECP to Central Depository
Company of Pakistan Limited. “Prohibition on Use of Group Account By CDS Participants.” No.
1(6)cdc/pol/1997, 6 Jan. 2005.
9
We emphasize that the brokers on this list have not been proven at this stage to have violated the
securities laws, but rather are under inquiry by the SECP for potential misconduct.
10
See schedules of detailed analysis for each of the thirteen brokers in Part III-Appendix A

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III - PAGE 6 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS FUTURES CONTRACTS

• ‘Broker MMM’, as of March 15, 2005, had net sales positions for seven scrips in
excess of the broker’s share holdings at CDC. Noteworthy is that on March 16,
2005, the total number of shares held in the broker’s accounts at CDC (the vast
majority was in its group account) dropped from 4.8 million to just 175,000. Yet
its cumulative net sales position in FABL futures remained at or near 5 million
shares until the end of the trading month.11

We have referred to the SECP for further action as per law all instances for which the
broker’s net sales position exceeded its share amounts recorded at CDC. We note that in
performing this analysis, we encountered several limitations in the use of CDC data as
the basis for prima facie evidence of violations of either Clause 3(b) or Section 17(a).
Use of CDC data is hampered by a number of limitations including: (1) CDC is a national
depository and shares held at CDC may be trading on an exchange other than KSE; (2) a
broker in a net futures trading position appearing to be in excess of shares held at CDC
may have the shares in another member’s account at CDC, in which case there may be no
violation of Clause 3(b); (3) there are short timing delays between trade date and
settlement date that may impact the precise date at which the violation occurred, as well
as the precise quantification of the amount; and (4) shares at CDC that are pledged or
recently sold may not be so identified as unavailable for consideration in the share
threshold analysis element of Clause 3(b).

C. NEW COT ACTIVITY OF LARGER BROKERS APPEARING TO BE


OVER CLAUSE 3(B) THRESHOLD

The Taskforce alleged that the brokers obtaining large naked short sale positions in
Futures contracts were some of the same brokers responsible for the market’s steep
decline, as a direct result of their reduction of lending in the regulated COT market. Such
activities could be violations of Section 17(a), and as such, the Taskforce called for a
further forensic investigation into these allegations.12

In our examination of these allegations, we analyzed the amount of New COT provided
to the market during the first two weeks of March 2005 by the same thirteen brokers

11
Interestingly, per a review of the KSE trading records, this broker transacted no sales in FABL in the
Ready market on the KSE between the trading days of March 14 to March 17, inclusive. It is unclear to us
why the broker’s CDC-registered shares would have decreased drastically, other than the possibility that
the broker may have transacted significant sales of the scrip on another stock exchange, or sold them “off-
market” to another broker or client. This example highlights certain caveats and qualifications noted
elsewhere in the Report concerning data availability and scope of work.
12
Taskforce Report, paras: 33, 39 and 55 (as quoted at beginning of Part III).

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III - PAGE 7 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS FUTURES CONTRACTS

identified in Section B above.13 Chart III-2 below shows that the New COT provided by
these brokers remained relatively stable through March 15 or, in some cases, actually
increased. Consistent with our findings in Part I of this Report, we find no evidence to
support the Taskforce’s allegations that brokers influential to the market and trading in
significant naked short sale positions purposefully restricted COT lending to profit from
their sales positions.

Chart III-2 – Daily Purchases of New COT for Sample of Thirteen Brokers For the
Period March 1 to March 15, 2005

3,000

2,500

2,000
Rs. Millions

1,500

1,000

500

-
3/1/05

3/2/05

3/3/05

3/4/05

3/5/05

3/6/05

3/7/05

3/8/05

3/9/05

3/10/05

3/11/05

3/12/05

3/13/05

3/14/05

3/15/05
AKD BMA Capital AHSL
Orix Inv. Bank Elixir Securities KASB Sec. Ltd.
Tauru Sec. Ltd. Escorts Inv Bank Abdul Jabbar Khanani
Jahangir Siddiqui Akberally Cassim Motiw ala
Atlas Inv. Bank

13
As presented in Part I of this Report, New COT represents the value (in Rupees) of newly initiated carry
over transactions transacted on the KSE on a given trading day. New COT is equivalent to “Open Market
COT” provided on the KSE Daily Unreleased/Open Market COT reports.

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III - PAGE 8 OF 8


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

PART I - APPENDICES

Withdrawal of Regulated COT

NOVEMBER 21, 2006


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

APPENDIX A – SECP COT SCRIP PHASE-OUT SCHEDULE


Phased-Out w.e.f. Scrip # Symbol
October 8, 2004 1 SEPCO Southern Electric Power Company
Ltd.
October 22, 2004 2 BSBF BSJS Balanced Fund
November 5, 2004 3 PICB PICIC Commercial Bank
November 19, 2004 4 TELE Telecard Ltd.
December 3, 2004 5 FABL Faysal Bank
December 17, 2004 6 UNBL Union Bank
December 31, 2004 7 ENGRO Engro Chemical
January 7, 2005 8 WCCL World Communications Ltd.
January 14, 2005 9 DSFL Dewan Salman Fiber Ltd.
January 21, 2005 10 PGF PICIC Growth Fund
January 28, 2005 11 FFC Fauji Fertilizer
February 4, 2005 12 PICIC Pakistan Industrial Credit &
Investment Corp.
February 11, 2005 13 SSGC Sui Southern Gas Co.
February 18, 2005 14 NML Nishat Mills Ltd.
February 25, 2005 15 LUCK Lucky Cement
March 4, 2005 16 SNGP Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd.
March 11, 2005 17 ACBL Askari Commercial Bank
March 18, 2005 18 MCB Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd.
March 25, 2005 19 MLCF Maple Leaf Cement
April 1, 2005 20 ICI ICI Pakistan
April 8, 2005 21 FFBL Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim
April 15, 2005 22 BOP Bank of Punjab
April 22, 2005 23 PTC Pakistan Telecommunication
Company Ltd.
April 29, 2005 24 HUBCO Hub Power Co.
May 6, 2005 25 NBP National Bank of Pakistan Ltd.
May 13, 2005 26 POL Pakistan Oil Fields Ltd.
May 20, 2005 27 DGKC D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd.
May 27, 2005 28 OGDC Oil and Gas Development Corp.
June 3, 2005 29 PSO Pakistan State Oil

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 1 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

APPENDIX B – TRENDS IN THE TRADING DATA FOR


READY AND COT MARKETS, KARACHI STOCK
EXCHANGE

Chart B-1 – Percent of Daily Values of New COT to Daily Values of Total COT,
KSE, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
1/3/2005
1/6/2005
1/9/2005
1/12/2005
1/15/2005
1/18/2005
1/21/2005
1/24/2005
1/27/2005
1/30/2005
2/2/2005
2/5/2005
2/8/2005
2/11/2005
2/14/2005
2/17/2005
2/20/2005
2/23/2005
2/26/2005
3/1/2005
3/4/2005
3/7/2005
3/10/2005
3/13/2005
3/16/2005

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 2 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

APPENDIX B – TRENDS IN THE TRADING DATA FOR


READY AND COT MARKETS, KARACHI STOCK
EXCHANGE

Chart B-2 – Daily Trading Values for Ready Market and New COT, KSE, In
Rupees Billions, For the Period July 1, 2004 to March 15, 2005

120

100

80
Total Ready
Market Value
Rs. Billions

60

40
New COT
Value
20

-
05-Jul-04
12-Jul-04
19-Jul-04
26-Jul-04

04-Oct-04
11-Oct-04
19-Oct-04
26-Oct-04
02-Nov-04
10-Nov-04
23-Nov-04
30-Nov-04
08-Dec-04
16-Dec-04
27-Dec-04
04-Jan-05
11-Jan-05
18-Jan-05
27-Jan-05
03-Feb-05
10-Feb-05
17-Feb-05
24-Feb-05
03-Mar-05
10-Mar-05
06-Sep-04
13-Sep-04
20-Sep-04
27-Sep-04
02-Aug-04
09-Aug-04
16-Aug-04
23-Aug-04
30-Aug-04

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 3 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

APPENDIX B – TRENDS IN THE TRADING DATA FOR


READY AND COT MARKETS, KARACHI STOCK
EXCHANGE

Chart B-3 – New COT by Brokers Representing COT Lenders, KSE, In Rupees
Billions, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005

(In Rupee Billions) AKD


Rs. 156.0 , 14%

All Other
(118 brokers) AHSL
Rs. 533.0 Rs. 152.0, 14%
49%

Atlas
Rs. 76.7, 7%

KASB
Rs. 67.8, 6%

Akberally Cassim , Rs. Orix


49.8 , 5% Rs. 51.8, 5%

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 4 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

APPENDIX B – TRENDS IN THE TRADING DATA FOR


READY AND COT MARKETS, KARACHI STOCK
EXCHANGE

Chart B-4 – New COT by Brokers Representing COT Borrowers, KSE, In Rupees
Billions, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005

(In Rupee Billions) AKD Mohammed Hussain


Rs.169.9 , 15% Adhi
Rs. 56.1 , 5% Standard Capital
Rs. 39.3 , 4%
All other (124 Brokers)
Rs. 539.8 , 49% KASB
Rs. 38.4 , 4%

First Capital
Rs. 37.1 , 3%

Darson Securities
Rs. 33.8 , 3%

First National
Munir Khanani
Rs. 33.8 , 3%
Securities
Rs. 19.9 , 2%
DJM
Rs. 32.1 , 3%
AHSL Abdul Jabbar Motiwala
Rs. 27.8 , 3% Khanani Securities
Rs. 29.6 , 3% Rs. 29.7 , 3%

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 5 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

APPENDIX C – LISTS OF BROKERS PARTICIPATING IN


COT OPEN MARKET, KARACHI STOCK EXCHANGE
Table C-1 – Daily Transactions of New COT of Brokers Representing COT Lenders
( Purchase Transactions), For the Period January 3 to March 15, 2005

Traded Value (in % of Cumulative


Broker Name Rupees) total %

Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd 155,999,610,853 14.35% 14.35%

Arif Habib Limited 151,999,873,872 13.98% 28.33%

Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd. 76,654,870,388 7.05% 35.38%

KASB Securities Ltd. 67,849,093,332 6.24% 41.62%

Orix Investment Bank (Pak) Ltd. 51,808,542,777 4.77% 46.39%

Akberally Cassim & Sons 49,812,885,151 4.58% 50.97%

First CapitaL Equities Ltd. 43,023,078,851 3.96% 54.93%

Darson Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 35,843,278,553 3.30% 58.22%

DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 35,482,319,978 3.26% 61.49%

Standard Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 32,148,257,691 2.96% 64.44%

Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets 26,529,163,203 2.44% 66.88%

Invest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 21,152,926,383 1.95% 68.83%

Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. 20,537,995,259 1.89% 70.72%

Escorts Investment Bank Ltd. 20,290,117,464 1.87% 72.59%

BMA Capital Management Limited 18,181,436,841 1.67% 74.26%

First Equity Modaraba 16,927,631,037 1.56% 75.82%

Security Investment Bank Ltd. 16,649,447,864 1.53% 77.35%

Multiline Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 16,366,883,918 1.51% 78.85%

Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 14,202,481,185 1.31% 80.16%

Taurus Securities Limited 13,879,981,466 1.28% 81.44%

Global Securities ( Pakistan ) Ltd. 13,048,361,791 1.20% 82.64%

Live Securities (Private) Ltd. 12,777,515,485 1.18% 83.81%

Capital One Equities Limited. 11,409,045,950 1.05% 84.86%

Aziz Fidahusein & Co. (Private) Ltd. 10,727,998,360 0.99% 85.85%

Noman Abid & Company Ltd. 10,122,753,452 0.93% 86.78%

Prudential Securities Limited 9,523,131,437 0.88% 87.65%

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 6 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Traded Value (in % of Cumulative


Broker Name Rupees) total %

FDM Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd 9,291,597,008 0.85% 88.51%

Intermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 8,297,089,153 0.76% 89.27%

Mohammed Hussain Adhi 7,847,869,662 0.72% 89.99%

First National Equities Ltd. 7,180,519,874 0.66% 90.65%

Ali Husain Rajabali Limited 6,674,810,202 0.61% 91.27%

Alfalah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6,246,504,625 0.57% 91.84%

Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 5,563,467,441 0.51% 92.35%

Time Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 4,775,946,784 0.44% 92.79%

Tewfiq Mohammed Amin Fikree 4,495,868,019 0.41% 93.21%

We Financial Services Ltd. 4,456,364,189 0.41% 93.62%

Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 4,276,861,066 0.39% 94.01%

Aba Ali Habib 4,175,699,533 0.38% 94.40%

Invisor Securities (Private) Ltd. 3,871,487,388 0.36% 94.75%

Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 3,784,586,917 0.35% 95.10%

Ali Hassnain Yousuf Ali 3,450,856,510 0.32% 95.42%

Mohammed Saad Maniar 3,349,035,952 0.31% 95.72%

Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 3,331,720,710 0.31% 96.03%

AMZ Securities (Pvt) Limited 3,295,244,941 0.30% 96.33%

Asian Securities Limited 3,163,763,454 0.29% 96.63%

Concordia Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 2,804,816,040 0.26% 96.88%

Kausar Abbas Bhayani 2,204,490,946 0.20% 97.09%

AMPLE Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 2,186,032,765 0.20% 97.29%

Fortune Securities Limited 2,073,066,731 0.19% 97.48%

Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 1,984,621,318 0.18% 97.66%

I. I. Kodvavi Securities ( Private ) Ltd 1,909,611,573 0.18% 97.84%

Ismail Abdul Shakoor 1,754,538,137 0.16% 98.00%

Dalal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 1,560,438,833 0.14% 98.14%

HH Misbah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 1,547,416,113 0.14% 98.28%

Siddik Moti 1,531,510,477 0.14% 98.42%

Mohammed Junaid Memon 1,462,954,147 0.13% 98.56%

Pak Meezan Securities (Pvt.)Ltd 1,270,204,977 0.12% 98.68%

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 7 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Traded Value (in % of Cumulative


Broker Name Rupees) total %

H. M. Idrees H. Adam 1,237,729,199 0.11% 98.79%

Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Ltd. 1,194,020,819 0.11% 98.90%

Saao Capital (Private) Ltd. 1,070,573,563 0.10% 99.00%

B & B Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 909,306,041 0.08% 99.08%

Dawood Mohammed 899,815,501 0.08% 99.16%

ACE Securities ( Private ) Ltd. 702,620,119 0.06% 99.23%

Abbasi Securities (SMC-PVT) Ltd 671,530,858 0.06% 99.29%

Akhai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 621,706,261 0.06% 99.35%

Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura 601,616,193 0.06% 99.40%

Prime Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 578,224,250 0.05% 99.46%

Abdul Jabbar Khanani 567,834,751 0.05% 99.51%

Khatoon Hajiani 561,040,201 0.05% 99.56%

Cliktrade Limited 471,501,319 0.04% 99.60%

Eastern Capital Ltd. 406,062,403 0.04% 99.64%

Altaf Adam 338,324,836 0.03% 99.67%

Mohammed Farooq H. Abdullah 308,297,877 0.03% 99.70%

Abdul Kadir Yusuf 307,698,712 0.03% 99.73%

Friendly Securities ( Private ) Ltd. 283,119,763 0.03% 99.75%

A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 273,537,759 0.03% 99.78%

Mohammed Siddique Suleman 205,126,656 0.02% 99.80%

Mohammed Tariq Moti 182,490,410 0.02% 99.82%

Zillion Capital Securi. (Pvt.) Ltd 170,093,967 0.02% 99.83%

Salman Services (Pvt) Limited 135,097,888 0.01% 99.84%

Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Ltd. 134,596,230 0.01% 99.86%

Muhammad Shahid Durvesh 105,068,013 0.01% 99.87%

Shahid Ali Habib Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 103,327,077 0.01% 99.88%

Zafar Moti Capital Sec. (Pvt.)Ltd 101,569,296 0.01% 99.88%

Amin Siddiq Parekh Sec.(Pvt.)Lt 90,697,895 0.01% 99.89%

M. Munir Khanani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 86,263,966 0.01% 99.90%

Malik Khan Awan 78,103,023 0.01% 99.91%

Moosa Noor Mohammed Shahzada & Co. 77,561,398 0.01% 99.91%

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 8 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Traded Value (in % of Cumulative


Broker Name Rupees) total %

KAI Securities (Private) Ltd. 74,238,324 0.01% 99.92%

Abdul Majeed Zakaria 56,168,045 0.01% 99.93%

Mohammed Anaf Kapadia 53,978,204 0.00% 99.93%

Mohammed Anas Kapadia 52,342,975 0.00% 99.94%

Muhammad Hussain A. Karim 50,616,010 0.00% 99.94%

Al-Asar Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 50,063,626 0.00% 99.95%

Alfa Adhi Securities ( Pvt.) Ltd. 48,430,555 0.00% 99.95%

A. Sattar Motiwala Sec.(Pvt.) Ltd 48,269,096 0.00% 99.95%

A. Latif Noorani 44,920,800 0.00% 99.96%

Javed Omer Vohra & Company Ltd. 41,705,180 0.00% 99.96%

Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 40,563,909 0.00% 99.97%

Oriental Securities (Private) Ltd 37,806,738 0.00% 99.97%

MARS Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 36,944,841 0.00% 99.97%

Yacoob Habib 36,061,372 0.00% 99.98%

Haji Ghani Haji Usman 35,713,530 0.00% 99.98%

Mohammed Ayub Younus Adhi 30,769,205 0.00% 99.98%

Mohammed Ashfaq Hussain 29,564,623 0.00% 99.99%

A. Sattar Dawood Adhi 28,099,748 0.00% 99.99%

AAG Securities (Private) Ltd. 26,904,336 0.00% 99.99%

Haroon Suleman 17,317,517 0.00% 99.99%

M. Nisar M. Usman Ashrafi 15,862,307 0.00% 99.99%

A.R. Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 13,489,750 0.00% 100.00%

Muhammad Nadeem Abdul Ghaffar 9,643,252 0.00% 100.00%

Finex Securities Limited 9,234,638 0.00% 100.00%

Bawa Securities ( Pvt. ) Ltd. 7,946,680 0.00% 100.00%

MAC Securities (Private) Ltd. 6,287,090 0.00% 100.00%

Marfani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 5,313,671 0.00% 100.00%

Continental Capital Management (Pvt) Ltd 5,180,019 0.00% 100.00%

M.R.A Securities ( Pvt ) Ltd. 4,635,625 0.00% 100.00%

Mohammed Anis Ismail 1,411,250 0.00% 100.00%

Apex Capital Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd. 1,264,389 0.00% 100.00%

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 9 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Traded Value (in % of Cumulative


Broker Name Rupees) total %

Aziz Moosa Khanani 998,035 0.00% 100.00%

Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 970,209 0.00% 100.00%

Iqbal Usman Kodv. Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd 763,750 0.00% 100.00%

Salim M. Sozer 379,500 0.00% 100.00%

Al-Mal Securities & Services Ltd. 206,052 0.00% 100.00%

Tahir Shafique 105,100 0.00% 100.00%

TOTAL 1,087,166,404,217

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 10 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Table C-2 – Daily Transactions of New COT of Brokers Representing COT


Borrowers (Sell Transactions), For the Period January 3 to March 15, 2005
Traded Value (in % of Cumulative
Broker Name Rupees) total %

Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd 169,579,911,117 15.60% 15.60%

Mohammed Hussain Adhi 56,064,138,222 5.16% 20.76%

Standard Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 39,318,916,154 3.62% 24.37%

KASB Securities Ltd. 38,427,031,707 3.53% 27.91%

First CapitaL Equities Ltd. 37,076,941,916 3.41% 31.32%

Darson Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 33,830,704,243 3.11% 34.43%

First National Equities Ltd. 33,828,891,135 3.11% 37.54%

DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 32,156,307,754 2.96% 40.50%

Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 29,732,768,029 2.73% 43.23%

Abdul Jabbar Khanani 29,581,740,098 2.72% 45.95%

Arif Habib Limited 27,811,869,351 2.56% 48.51%

M. Munir Khanani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19,911,742,114 1.83% 50.34%

Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. 18,731,357,480 1.72% 52.07%

Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 18,071,682,667 1.66% 53.73%

Mohammed Anas Kapadia 17,780,665,353 1.64% 55.36%

Multiline Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 16,912,840,439 1.56% 56.92%

Live Securities (Private) Ltd. 16,399,671,480 1.51% 58.43%

Ismail Abdul Shakoor 15,208,589,513 1.40% 59.83%

SAZ Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd 14,885,744,597 1.37% 61.20%

Prudential Securities Limited 12,899,157,561 1.19% 62.38%

FDM Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd 11,799,841,418 1.09% 63.47%

Yacoob Habib 11,239,447,543 1.03% 64.50%

Intermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 11,150,859,822 1.03% 65.53%

Fortune Securities Limited 11,116,575,959 1.02% 66.55%

Friendly Securities ( Private ) Ltd. 10,984,697,198 1.01% 67.56%

A.R. Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 10,847,918,280 1.00% 68.56%

Zillion Capital Securi. (Pvt.) Ltd 10,436,229,929 0.96% 69.52%

I. I. Kodvavi Securities ( Private ) Ltd 10,132,905,075 0.93% 70.45%

First Equity Modaraba 10,016,863,530 0.92% 71.37%

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 11 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Traded Value (in % of Cumulative


Broker Name Rupees) total %

Muhammad Nadeem Abdul Ghaffar 9,846,763,419 0.91% 72.28%

Time Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 9,092,099,540 0.84% 73.11%

Dalal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 8,815,793,992 0.81% 73.93%

Taurus Securities Limited 8,378,534,774 0.77% 74.70%

Mohammed Anaf Kapadia 7,550,514,387 0.69% 75.39%

Bawa Securities ( Pvt. ) Ltd. 7,515,833,287 0.69% 76.08%

A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 7,323,409,800 0.67% 76.76%

Aba Ali Habib 7,281,180,323 0.67% 77.43%

Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6,986,929,176 0.64% 78.07%

Muhammad Hussain A. Karim 6,491,215,222 0.60% 78.66%

Prime Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6,466,062,150 0.59% 79.26%

Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Ltd. 6,314,174,235 0.58% 79.84%

KAI Securities (Private) Ltd. 6,309,486,770 0.58% 80.42%

Haji Ghani Haji Usman 5,753,894,293 0.53% 80.95%

AMPLE Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 5,666,309,929 0.52% 81.47%

M. Nisar M. Usman Ashrafi 5,475,501,976 0.50% 81.97%

Moosa Noor Mohammed Shahzada & Co. 5,443,372,522 0.50% 82.48%

Muhammad Javed Surmawala 5,358,318,865 0.49% 82.97%

Azee Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 5,334,000,570 0.49% 83.46%

Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 5,285,766,901 0.49% 83.95%

Bagasra Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 5,220,538,549 0.48% 84.43%

ACE Securities ( Private ) Ltd. 5,196,738,449 0.48% 84.90%

Shahid Ali Habib Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 5,092,846,699 0.47% 85.37%

Siddik Moti 5,016,516,038 0.46% 85.83%

MAC Securities (Private) Ltd. 4,877,072,393 0.45% 86.28%

M.R.A Securities ( Pvt ) Ltd. 4,443,975,167 0.41% 86.69%

Pak Meezan Securities (Pvt.)Ltd 4,428,418,666 0.41% 87.10%

HH Misbah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 4,369,732,566 0.40% 87.50%

Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 4,318,932,737 0.40% 87.90%

Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Ltd. 4,115,833,784 0.38% 88.28%

Mohammed Ayub Younus Adhi 4,063,459,169 0.37% 88.65%

Eastern Capital Ltd. 3,991,196,588 0.37% 89.02%

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 12 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Traded Value (in % of Cumulative


Broker Name Rupees) total %

Concordia Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 3,923,839,401 0.36% 89.38%

Kausar Abbas Bhayani 3,772,337,373 0.35% 89.72%

We Financial Services Ltd. 3,738,812,436 0.34% 90.07%

Khatoon Hajiani 3,734,461,996 0.34% 90.41%

Global Securities ( Pakistan ) Ltd. 3,723,274,116 0.34% 90.75%

Invest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 3,563,547,108 0.33% 91.08%

Zafar Moti Capital Sec. (Pvt.)Ltd 3,537,399,699 0.33% 91.41%

Iqbal Usman Kodv. Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd 3,481,940,378 0.32% 91.73%

Aziz Fidahusein & Co. (Private) Ltd. 3,467,072,797 0.32% 92.05%

Continental Capital Management (Pvt) Ltd 3,308,552,896 0.30% 92.35%

Saao Capital (Private) Ltd. 3,243,264,093 0.30% 92.65%

Mohammed Siddique Suleman 3,170,173,622 0.29% 92.94%

Invisor Securities (Private) Ltd. 3,073,279,944 0.28% 93.22%

Escorts Investment Bank Ltd. 2,906,712,055 0.27% 93.49%

Al-Asar Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 2,892,094,322 0.27% 93.76%

Orix Investment Bank (Pak) Ltd. 2,851,824,272 0.26% 94.02%

MARS Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 2,750,332,524 0.25% 94.27%

Cliktrade Limited 2,662,620,509 0.24% 94.52%

Javed Omer Vohra & Company Ltd. 2,611,880,665 0.24% 94.76%

Haroon Suleman 2,609,339,539 0.24% 95.00%

Capital One Equities Limited. 2,516,101,373 0.23% 95.23%

B & B Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 2,310,980,921 0.21% 95.44%

A. Latif Noorani 2,310,569,124 0.21% 95.65%

Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 2,232,006,732 0.21% 95.86%

Mohammed Anis Ismail 2,052,800,384 0.19% 96.05%

Ali Husain Rajabali Limited 1,971,106,123 0.18% 96.23%

Ashfaq Zakaria Ghory 1,965,222,746 0.18% 96.41%

A. Sattar Motiwala Sec.(Pvt.) Ltd 1,885,375,605 0.17% 96.58%

Salman Services (Pvt) Limited 1,813,922,874 0.17% 96.75%

AAG Securities (Private) Ltd. 1,812,041,967 0.17% 96.92%

Mohammed Ashfaq Hussain 1,678,443,685 0.15% 97.07%

AMZ Securities (Pvt) Limited 1,640,580,755 0.15% 97.22%

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 13 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Traded Value (in % of Cumulative


Broker Name Rupees) total %

Muhammad Shahid Durvesh 1,611,860,921 0.15% 97.37%

Mohammed Tariq Moti 1,518,680,714 0.14% 97.51%

Mohammed Saad Maniar 1,488,464,363 0.14% 97.65%

Mohammed Farooq H. Abdullah 1,425,566,211 0.13% 97.78%

Alfa Adhi Securities ( Pvt.) Ltd. 1,356,306,906 0.12% 97.90%

Finex Securities Limited 1,316,288,367 0.12% 98.02%

Zohra w/o M. Siddiq Mayari 1,303,230,468 0.12% 98.14%

Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura 1,285,730,475 0.12% 98.26%

Ali Hassnain Yousuf Ali 1,283,365,480 0.12% 98.38%

Oriental Securities (Private) Ltd 1,228,658,689 0.11% 98.49%

Akberally Cassim & Sons 1,221,461,074 0.11% 98.61%

Malik Khan Awan 1,214,882,806 0.11% 98.72%

A. Sattar Dawood Adhi 1,036,625,745 0.10% 98.81%

Al-Mal Securities & Services Ltd. 1,008,071,041 0.09% 98.91%

Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd. 974,322,729 0.09% 99.00%

Lakhani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 972,659,128 0.09% 99.08%

Apex Capital Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd. 880,586,503 0.08% 99.17%

Marfani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 842,217,555 0.08% 99.24%

Mohammed Tariq Vohra 840,264,477 0.08% 99.32%

Amin Siddiq Parekh Sec.(Pvt.)Lt 795,968,970 0.07% 99.39%

Abdul Majeed Zakaria 790,430,039 0.07% 99.47%

BMA Capital Management Limited 754,108,006 0.07% 99.54%

Abdul Kadir Yusuf 584,856,617 0.05% 99.59%

Ghulam Mohammed Ismail 550,054,103 0.05% 99.64%

Mohammed Junaid Memon 485,634,172 0.04% 99.69%

Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 485,477,940 0.04% 99.73%

Akhai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 473,378,930 0.04% 99.77%

Irfan Mazhar Securities (Pvt.)Ltd 472,942,750 0.04% 99.82%

Noman Abid & Company Ltd. 428,023,093 0.04% 99.86%

Altaf Adam 301,563,307 0.03% 99.88%

Aziz Moosa Khanani 254,822,729 0.02% 99.91%

H. M. Idrees H. Adam 185,970,583 0.02% 99.92%

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 14 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

Traded Value (in % of Cumulative


Broker Name Rupees) total %

Abbasi Securities (SMC-PVT) Ltd 176,624,082 0.02% 99.94%

Zaitoon M. A. Shakoor 174,172,304 0.02% 99.96%

Asian Securities Limited 108,190,643 0.01% 99.97%

Salim M. Sozer 86,401,218 0.01% 99.97%

Arif H. Yousuf Saya 85,467,256 0.01% 99.98%

Mohammed Hussain Ismail 55,700,100 0.01% 99.99%

Dawood Mohammed 51,524,195 0.00% 99.99%

Sakarwala Capital Sec.(Pvt.) Ltd 30,646,460 0.00% 100.00%

Memon Securities (Private) Ltd. 25,006,275 0.00% 100.00%

Alfalah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19,969,840 0.00% 100.00%

Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets 7,882,300 0.00% 100.00%

TOTAL 1,087,166,404,217

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 15 OF 16


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT

APPENDIX D – LIST OF SCRIPS COMPRISING GROUP A


(I.E., SCRIPS PHASED-OUT OF COT AS OF MARCH 18,
2005)
To Be Phased-Out Scrip # Symbol Value of Value Date
w.e.f. Total COT
(in millions)
October 8, 2004 1 SEPCO Rs. 20.4 August 31, 2004
October 22, 2004 2 BSBF Rs .62.2 August 31, 2004
November 5, 2004 3 PICB Rs. 88.0 August 31, 2004
November 19, 2004 4 TELE Rs. 115.5 August 31, 2004
December 3, 2004 5 FABL Rs. 129.7 August 31, 2004
December 17, 2004 6 UNBL Rs. 165.6 August 31, 2004
December 31, 2004 7 ENGRO Rs. 186.6 August 31, 2004
Subtotal RS. 768.0

January 7, 2005 8 WCCL Rs.25.3 January 3, 2005


January 14, 2005 9 DSFL Rs. 304.8 January 3, 2005
January 21, 2005 10 PGF Rs. 930.1 January 1, 2005
January 28, 2005 11 FFC Rs. 635.0 January 3, 2005
February 4, 2005 12 PICIC Rs. 909.0 January 3, 2005
February 11, 2005 13 SSGC Rs. 601.7 January 3, 2005
February 18, 2005 14 NML Rs. 1,462.4 January 3, 2005
Subtotal Rs. 4,868.3

February 25, 2005 15 LUCK Rs. 957.5 February 18, 2005


March 4, 2005 16 SNGP Rs. 2,208.0 February 18, 2005
March 11, 2005 17 ACBL Rs. 611.6 February 18, 2005
March 18, 2005 18 MCB Rs. 1,388.8 February 18, 2005
Subtotal Rs. 5,165.9

OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 16 OF 16


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES

PART II - APPENDICES

Wash Trades

NOVEMBER 21, 2006


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS

Appendix A – List of Potential Wash Sales (in shares)


Arif Habib Securities Limited
% of Wash % of Wash % of Wash
Client Code Scrip Date Wash Trades Client Purchases Trades Client Sales Trades Total Market Trades
0008 ACBL 01-Mar-05 7,000 45,000 15.6% 19,000 36.8% 3,200,700 0.2%
0001 POL 02-Mar-05 2,500 48,000 5.2% 105,500 2.4% 47,360,300 0.0%
0008 FNEL 03-Mar-05 500 1,000 50.0% 500 100.0% 353,500 0.1%
0008 PPL-MAR 03-Mar-05 10,000 273,500 3.7% 320,500 3.1% 141,795,000 0.0%
0022 PSO 04-Mar-05 1,900 121,900 1.6% 16,900 11.2% 53,868,800 0.0%
0001 POL 07-Mar-05 5,000 65,000 7.7% 134,000 3.7% 15,184,100 0.0%
0008 LUCK 07-Mar-05 42,500 252,000 16.9% 183,000 23.2% 23,744,500 0.2%
0001 POL 08-Mar-05 5,000 112,500 4.4% 156,000 3.2% 36,913,100 0.0%
0008 BAFL 08-Mar-05 1,700 36,700 4.6% 1,700 100.0% 1,395,200 0.1%
0008 PPL-MAR 08-Mar-05 3,000 68,000 4.4% 65,000 4.6% 62,754,500 0.0%
0020 PCMF 09-Mar-05 100,000 1,428,000 7.0% 100,000 100.0% 2,595,000 3.9%
0020 PPFL 09-Mar-05 100,000 1,153,500 8.7% 100,000 100.0% 1,490,000 6.7%
0007 OGDC-MAR 10-Mar-05 100,000 350,000 28.6% 125,500 79.7% 104,916,500 0.1%
0020 PCMF 10-Mar-05 50,000 402,000 12.4% 50,000 100.0% 625,500 8.0%
003 NIB 14-Mar-05 1,500,000 1,500,000 100.0% 1,500,000 100.0% 3,347,500 44.8%
CC2150 PPFL 25-Mar-05 11,000 95,000 11.6% 95,000 11.6% 998,000 1.1%
0003 POL 29-Mar-05 200,000 740,200 27.0% 300,000 66.7% 18,622,000 1.1%

Notes

1) Highlighted rows represent potential wash trades that account for over 3% of total market turnover for that day.

November 21, 2006 PART II APPENDICES - PAGE 1 OF 5


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS

Appendix B – List of Potential Wash Sales (in shares)


KASB Securities Ltd.
% of Wash % of Wash % of Wash
Client Code Scrip Date Wash Trades Client Purchases Trades Client Sales Trades Total Market Trades
04182 BAFL 09-Mar-05 15,000 599,300 2.5% 599,300 2.5% 1,717,800 0.9%
04182 BAFL 10-Mar-05 90,000 594,300 15.1% 594,300 15.1% 1,268,200 7.1%
05503 ENGRO 18-Mar-05 1,500 90,900 1.7% 90,900 1.7% 1,955,300 0.1%
05544 HUBC 08-Mar-05 55,500 840,000 6.6% 840,000 6.6% 35,363,500 0.2%
05358 HUBC 31-Mar-05 7,000 2,086,000 0.3% 2,039,000 0.3% 6,707,000 0.1%
02364 JPGL 29-Mar-05 20,000 69,000 29.0% 69,000 29.0% 529,000 3.8%
05425 KESC 18-Mar-05 500 1,500 33.3% 1,500 33.3% 1,584,000 0.0%
05840 LISL 17-Mar-05 500 500 100.0% 500 100.0% 194,000 0.3%
05840 LISL 22-Mar-05 500 500 100.0% 500 100.0% 119,000 0.4%
03304 NBP 04-Mar-05 1,000 18,000 5.6% 18,000 5.6% 57,762,200 0.0%
03758 NBP 17-Mar-05 42,800 42,800 100.0% 42,800 100.0% 28,532,100 0.2%
02364 OGDC 09-Mar-05 96,300 1,987,886 4.8% 1,987,800 4.8% 190,302,900 0.1%
06654 OGDC 09-Mar-05 100 6,500 1.5% 4,500 2.2% 190,302,900 0.0%
02574 OGDC 18-Mar-05 34,000 175,000 19.4% 175,000 19.4% 120,913,500 0.0%
00663 PICIC 28-Mar-05 50,000 452,900 11.0% 192,800 25.9% 1,094,900 4.6%
00663 PICIC 29-Mar-05 920,700 1,136,300 81.0% 1,512,000 60.9% 2,831,800 32.5%
00663 PICIC 31-Mar-05 275,900 500,000 55.2% 325,900 84.7% 1,061,300 26.0%
05525 PIOC 07-Mar-05 25,000 150,000 16.7% 150,000 16.7% 4,677,000 0.5%
05544 PPL 14-Mar-05 50,000 350,000 14.3% 350,000 14.3% 6,475,400 0.8%
04182 PPL 22-Mar-05 1,000 21,500 4.7% 11,000 9.1% 6,605,200 0.0%
03758 PRIB 09-Mar-05 5,000 6,000 83.3% 6,000 83.3% 7,500 66.7%
06424 SNGP 14-Mar-05 500 500 100.0% 3,500 14.3% 36,452,300 0.0%
06511 SNGP 24-Mar-05 500 16,500 3.0% 16,500 3.0% 4,186,000 0.0%
06548 SSGC 09-Mar-05 10,000 47,500 21.1% 88,000 11.4% 4,651,500 0.2%
06051 SSGC 17-Mar-05 500 10,000 5.0% 4,000 12.5% 3,183,500 0.0%
06548 SSGC 31-Mar-05 5,000 101,500 4.9% 100,500 5.0% 9,214,500 0.1%
06455 TAJT 17-Mar-05 1,000 1,000 100.0% 6,000 16.7% 23,500 4.3%

Notes

1) Highlighted rows represent potential wash trades that account for over 3% of total market turnover for that day.

November 21, 2006 PART II APPENDICES - PAGE 2 OF 5


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS

Appendix C – List of Potential Wash Sales (in shares)


Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd
% of Wash % of Wash % of Wash
Client Code Scrip Date Wash Trades Client Purchases Trades Client Sales Trades Total Market Trades
1182 POL 01-Mar-05 1,500 2,061,300 0.1% 1,243,000 0.1% 36,801,000 0.0%
1512 POL 03-Mar-05 145,000 3,126,600 4.6% 2,183,800 6.6% 34,556,100 0.4%
1512 PPL-MAR 03-Mar-05 75,000 9,693,500 0.8% 3,214,000 2.3% 141,795,000 0.1%
1575 PPL-MAR 03-Mar-05 68,000 9,693,500 0.7% 3,214,000 2.1% 141,795,000 0.0%
1196 PTC 04-Mar-05 128,000 14,220,000 0.9% 12,121,000 1.1% 430,751,000 0.0%
6310 ICI 07-Mar-05 200 97,300 0.2% 421,700 0.0% 6,128,100 0.0%
1512 OGDC 07-Mar-05 25,000 2,110,500 1.2% 7,526,800 0.3% 194,296,200 0.0%
1186 OGDC 08-Mar-05 38,000 6,542,000 0.6% 1,312,000 2.9% 229,928,600 0.0%
0820 INIL 08-Mar-05 400 4,800 8.3% 400 100.0% 23,400 1.7%
1080 SNGP 09-Mar-05 95,000 1,700,000 5.6% 9,665,000 1.0% 30,693,300 0.3%
1524 POL 10-Mar-05 11,000 1,466,700 0.7% 1,136,900 1.0% 42,951,300 0.0%
1399 NML-MARB 14-Mar-05 60,000 712,000 8.4% 1,048,000 5.7% 5,731,000 1.0%
1031 OGDC 14-Mar-05 1,000 3,260,400 0.0% 6,212,500 0.0% 180,455,600 0.0%
2300 MUKT 16-Mar-05 2,000 3,000 66.7% 2,000 100.0% 3,500 57.1%
1399 NML-MARB 18-Mar-05 3,500 601,500 0.6% 528,500 0.7% 3,517,000 0.1%
1080 PPL 21-Mar-05 153,500 1,393,300 11.0% 1,654,500 9.3% 9,863,200 1.6%
1753 PPL 29-Mar-05 7,400 109,300 6.8% 438,100 1.7% 13,089,900 0.1%

Notes

1) Highlighted rows represent potential wash trades that account for over 3% of total market turnover for that day.

November 21, 2006 PART II APPENDICES - PAGE 3 OF 5


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS

Appendix D – List of Potential Wash Sales (in shares)


Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets
% of Wash % of Wash % of Wash
Client Code Scrip Date Wash Trades Client Purchases Trades Client Sales Trades Total Market Trades
003630 FABL 01-Mar-05 1,000 6,000 16.7% 87,500 1.1% 6,312,000 0.0%
003630 PIOC 01-Mar-05 1,500 2,000 75.0% 2,000 75.0% 766,500 0.2%
002600 ZLFI 01-Mar-05 1,500 2,700 55.6% 5,700 26.3% 13,300 11.3%
003630 DGKC 02-Mar-05 1,000 60,000 1.7% 5,000 20.0% 22,861,800 0.0%
004038 OGDC 02-Mar-05 1,500 125,000 1.2% 125,000 1.2% 184,708,400 0.0%
003630 PGF 03-Mar-05 3,000 10,000 30.0% 22,000 13.6% 1,994,500 0.2%
003630 PPL 03-Mar-05 1,500 8,500 17.6% 13,000 11.5% 5,636,700 0.0%
004038 PTC 04-Mar-05 5,000 25,000 20.0% 30,000 16.7% 430,751,000 0.0%
003242 JSCML 04-Mar-05 11,000 11,000 100.0% 11,000 100.0% 35,000 31.4%
004038 NBP 04-Mar-05 1,000 115,000 0.9% 140,000 0.7% 57,762,200 0.0%
004038 PTC 07-Mar-05 500 2,500 20.0% 2,500 20.0% 290,249,500 0.0%
003630 DGKC 07-Mar-05 10,000 53,500 18.7% 78,500 12.7% 85,415,300 0.0%
002600 APL 07-Mar-05 500 1,600 31.3% 2,500 20.0% 1,674,000 0.0%
003333 CTTL 07-Mar-05 13,000 465,500 2.8% 25,000 52.0% 1,606,000 0.8%
000900 POL-MAR 08-Mar-05 25,000 418,500 6.0% 43,500 57.5% 9,431,500 0.3%
002969 FCCL 08-Mar-05 1,500,000 2,000,000 75.0% 2,453,500 61.1% 24,836,000 6.0%
004038 PTC 08-Mar-05 1,000 82,500 1.2% 82,500 1.2% 332,177,500 0.0%
002600 PPL 09-Mar-05 1,000 3,000 33.3% 4,000 25.0% 7,758,100 0.0%
002600 PSO 09-Mar-05 3,000 14,500 20.7% 14,000 21.4% 47,071,900 0.0%
003333 CTTL 09-Mar-05 25,500 879,500 2.9% 34,500 73.9% 2,125,500 1.2%
004038 PTC 09-Mar-05 2,000 82,500 2.4% 82,500 2.4% 332,177,500 0.0%
003333 PAKRI 10-Mar-05 5,000 41,700 12.0% 8,200 61.0% 107,200 4.7%
002745 ATRL 10-Mar-05 4,500 35,000 12.9% 5,000 90.0% 632,500 0.7%
004038 PTC 10-Mar-05 2,500 5,000 50.0% 2,500 100.0% 226,118,500 0.0%
003242 FCCL 10-Mar-05 175,000 675,000 25.9% 1,150,000 15.2% 14,381,000 1.2%
002600 ENGRO 11-Mar-05 3,600 5,100 70.6% 10,200 35.3% 2,016,100 0.2%
000588 JSIB 14-Mar-05 500 13,100 3.8% 600 83.3% 388,900 0.1%
003630 DGKC 14-Mar-05 6,000 76,000 7.9% 126,000 4.8% 45,631,700 0.0%
003862 SNGP 14-Mar-05 75,000 175,000 42.9% 275,000 27.3% 36,452,300 0.2%
004038 PTC 14-Mar-05 1,000 87,500 1.1% 159,000 0.6% 57,569,800 0.0%
003630 DGKC 15-Mar-05 1,000 97,500 1.0% 71,500 1.4% 72,848,500 0.0%
003088 NBP-MAR 17-Mar-05 500 75,500 0.7% 500 100.0% 9,458,500 0.0%
003630 JOVC 22-Mar-05 200 200 100.0% 200 100.0% 7,600 2.6%
003630 BOSI 22-Mar-05 1,000 1,000 100.0% 1,000 100.0% 728,500 0.1%
003630 JOVC 24-Mar-05 200 200 100.0% 500 40.0% 3,100 6.5%

November 21, 2006 PART II APPENDICES - PAGE 4 OF 5


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS

Appendix D – List of Potential Wash Sales (in shares)


Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets
% of Wash % of Wash % of Wash
Client Code Scrip Date Wash Trades Client Purchases Trades Client Sales Trades Total Market Trades
003630 PSO 25-Mar-05 2,000 2,000 100.0% 4,000 50.0% 11,237,800 0.0%
003630 FCCL 29-Mar-05 2,000 40,500 4.9% 27,500 7.3% 10,387,000 0.0%
003630 FCCL 30-Mar-05 5,000 51,000 9.8% 38,500 13.0% 9,477,500 0.1%
003630 PIOC 30-Mar-05 1,000 38,000 2.6% 8,000 12.5% 1,900,500 0.1%
003630 JSIB 31-Mar-05 1,000 3,000 33.3% 5,500 18.2% 661,900 0.2%
002600 JSIB 31-Mar-05 1,000 3,000 33.3% 2,000 50.0% 661,900 0.2%
002600 ZLFI 31-Mar-05 100 300 33.3% 100 100.0% 900 11.1%

Notes

1) Highlighted rows represent potential wash trades that account for over 3% of total market turnover for that day.

November 21, 2006 PART II APPENDICES - PAGE 5 OF 5


FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES

APPENDIX VIII FROM


TASKFORCE REPORT JUNE
2005 – WASH TRADES –
REPRODUCED FOR
REFERENCE

NOVEMBER 21, 2006


BUYER SELLER
Name of Member BRY SLR CLIENT CLIENT TRADE QTY No Trades Scrip
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 154 154 1,348,800 16 OGDC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 1,335,000 35 OGDC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 960,000 13 PTC-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 154 154 500,000 6 PTC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 435,000 9 PTC-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 154 154 400,000 3 NBP-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 11 11 382,500 7 OGDC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 346,300 27 PSO-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 11 11 300,000 3 PTC-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013758 013758 250,000 4 OGDC-FWD
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 SA SA 250,000 3 OGDC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 216,900 6 OGDC-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013600 013600 200,000 1 PTC-FWD
Arif Habib Securities Limited 50 50 0003 0003 200,000 2 POL-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 AFTAB AFTAB 175,000 4 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 155,000 7 OGDC-FWD
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19 19 1512 1512 145,000 6 POL-REG
Multiline Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 49 49 01 01 129,500 4 OGDC-REG
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19 19 1196 1196 128,000 1 PTC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 801 801 114,500 2 PTC-FWD
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 801 801 114,300 3 NBP-REG
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 189 189 113,900 3 OGDC-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 110,700 52 OGDC-REG
Arif Habib Securities Limited 50 50 0007 0007 100,000 1 OGDC-FWD
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013600 013600 100,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Live Securities (Private) Limited 43 43 1044 1044 100,000 1 PTC-FWD
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013600 013600 100,000 1 NBP-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 003 003 100,000 1 OGDC-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 0121 0121 100,000 1 OGDC-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 101 101 100,000 3 PSO-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 012364 012364 96,300 2 OGDC-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 96,000 12 NBP-FWD
MRA Securities (Private) Limited 194 194 01 01 95,000 1 PTC-REG
Ismail Abdul Shakoor 74 74 44 44 94,500 2 PTC-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 1823 1823 94,000 1 OGDC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 89,900 1 NBP-REG
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 B13 B13 85,000 1 OGDC-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 154 154 75,000 2 POL-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 67,500 9 OGDC-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 112 112 66,600 1 NBP-REG
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 AR14 AR14 66,500 1 PTC-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 61,000 9 PSO-FWD
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 2202 2202 61,000 3 OGDC-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 54,100 8 NBP-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 12 12 52,900 2 OGDC-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013758 013758 50,000 1 NBP-FWD
Sikandar Esmail Ahmed Bagasrawala 140 140 35 35 50,000 1 PTC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 109 109 49,500 2 PTC-FWD
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 189 189 49,500 2 PTC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 214 214 47,500 1 OGDC-FWD
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 46,500 2 PTC-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 46,300 19 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 376 376 44,000 4 PTC-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 AFTAB AFTAB 43,500 3 OGDC-FWD
Sakarwala Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 10 10 IK IK 43,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 43,000 3 OGDC-FWD
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013758 013758 42,800 1 NBP-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 114 114 41,400 1 OGDC-REG
Sikandar Esmail Ahmed Bagasrawala 140 140 35 35 40,500 1 PTC-FWD
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19 19 1186 1186 38,000 1 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 36,500 13 PSO-FWD
Prime Securities (Private) Limited 184 184 R R 36,500 1 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 801 801 35,200 2 OGDC-REG
Ghulam Mohammed Ismail 131 131 G1 G1 35,000 1 PSO-FWD
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 33,000 26 PSO-FWD
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 304 304 29,000 7 PTC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 304 304 27,700 14 OGDC-REG
Al - Asar Securities (Private) Limited 34 34 SM1 SM1 26,500 2 NBP-REG
A. R. Securities (Private) Limited 75 75 454 454 26,000 2 PTC-REG
Salim M. Sozer 121 121 CO CO 25,200 2 NBP-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 25,000 3 OGDC-FWD
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 H45 H45 25,000 1 OGDC-FWD
ACE Securities (Private) Limited 67 67 2 2 25,000 1 OGDC-FWD
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110520 110520 25,000 1 OGDC-FWD
S. C. Securities (Private) Limited 112 112 772 772 25,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 07002 07002 25,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets Limited 149 149 900 900 25,000 1 POL-FWD
Fortune Securities Limited 46 46 14E 14E 25,000 1 PTC-FWD
Yousuf Ibrahim 89 89 J15 J15 25,000 1 PTC-FWD
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19 19 1512 1512 25,000 1 OGDC-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013600 013600 25,000 1 OGDC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 112 112 24,000 2 PTC-FWD
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 201 201 24,000 1 OGDC-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 018 018 22,500 2 OGDC-FWD
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 351 351 22,200 59 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 21,300 9 POL-REG
Pak Meezan Securities (Pvt.) Limited 161 161 017001 017001 20,500 1 OGDC-FWD
S. C. Securities (Private) Limited 112 112 711 711 20,500 1 OGDC-FWD
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013600 013600 20,000 2 POL-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 12 12 19,500 2 OGDC-FWD
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 101 101 19,400 5 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 19,100 4 OGDC-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110520 110520 19,000 1 PTC-REG
S. C. Securities (Private) Limited 112 112 711 711 18,500 1 POL-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 17,800 6 PSO-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 11 11 17,600 1 POL-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 I I 17,300 3 OGDC-REG
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 116 116 447 447 17,000 3 OGDC-REG
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 P P 16,500 14 OGDC-REG
Yousuf Ibrahim 89 89 HH HH 16,000 1 PTC-FWD
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 17 17 15,000 1 OGDC-FWD
AMZ Securities ( Pvt) Limited 167 167 50 50 15,000 1 POL-FWD
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013758 013758 15,000 2 POL-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110407 110407 15,000 1 PTC-REG
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 14,500 4 PTC-REG
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 18001 18001 14,000 8 NBP-FWD
Sakarwala Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 10 10 130001 130001 14,000 1 PTC-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 018 018 13,600 1 OGDC-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 13,500 4 NBP-FWD
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 801 801 13,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 514 514 12,500 1 NBP-FWD
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 12,500 2 PSO-FWD
Arif Habib Securities Limited 50 50 0001 0001 12,500 3 POL-REG
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19 19 1524 1524 11,000 1 POL-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 12 12 11,000 2 POL-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 101 101 10,500 3 PTC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 475 475 10,500 2 PTC-REG
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 09011 09011 10,500 3 PTC-REG
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 RSS RSS 10,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 22 22 10,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 10,000 5 OGDC-REG
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 116 116 447 447 10,000 1 PTC-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 M01 M01 10,000 1 PTC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 223 223 10,000 1 PTC-REG
Javed Omer Vohra & Co. Ltd. 151 151 65 65 9,500 1 NBP-FWD
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 31 31 9,500 1 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 351 351 9,500 19 PTC-REG
Alfa Adhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 21 21 679 679 9,000 1 OGDC-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 G G 9,000 6 OGDC-REG
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 9,000 3 OGDC-REG
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 09011 09011 9,000 4 OGDC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 9/1 9/1 8,900 1 PSO-REG
Capital One Equities Limited 150 150 AA AA 8,900 1 PSO-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 8,500 6 PSO-REG
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 157 157 8,400 3 NBP-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 8,000 7 POL-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 G G 8,000 3 PTC-REG
Abdul Majeed Zakaria 40 40 A19 A19 7,500 1 OGDC-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 I I 7,500 1 NBP-REG
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 P P 7,500 7 PTC-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 L L 7,000 2 OGDC-FWD
A. R. Securities (Private) Limited 75 75 454 454 6,800 1 OGDC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 6,500 2 PTC-FWD
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 22 22 6,200 1 NBP-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 6,000 2 POL-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 111 111 6,000 1 PTC-FWD
Finex Securities Limited 44 44 1103 1103 6,000 2 PTC-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 8C 8C 6,000 1 PTC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 95 95 5,900 9 OGDC-REG
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 420 420 5,800 3 OGDC-REG
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 5,700 8 PSO-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 3 3 5,600 3 POL-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110296 110296 5,500 2 PSO-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 113 113 5,500 5 PTC-FWD
Orix Investment Bank Pakistan Limited 77 77 0068 0068 5,100 1 PSO-REG
Elixir Securities Pakistan (Private) Limited 100 100 N683 N683 5,000 1 NBP-FWD
Concordia Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 85 85 T10 T10 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 5 5 5,000 2 OGDC-FWD
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 930 930 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 I I 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 5MK 5MK 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Yousuf Ibrahim 89 89 HH HH 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Zaitoon M. A. Shakoor 25 25 YK YZ34 YK YZ34 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 G G 5,000 1 POL-FWD
Finex Securities Limited 44 44 1103 1103 5,000 2 PTC-FWD
Ismail Abdul Shakoor 74 74 NAR NAR 5,000 1 PTC-FWD
Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Limited 18 18 SS SS 5,000 10 PTC-FWD
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 5,000 1 PTC-FWD
Muhammad Junaid Memon 170 170 01/RANA 01/RANA 5,000 1 PTC-FWD
Prime Securities (Private) Limited 184 184 4112 4112 5,000 1 PTC-FWD
Zahoor Abdul Ghaffar 156 156 D D 5,000 1 PTC-FWD
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 5,000 1 NBP-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 33 33 5,000 1 OGDC-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110915 110915 5,000 1 OGDC-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 00 00 5,000 1 POL-REG
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 116 116 329 329 5,000 1 PSO-REG
First Equity Modaraba 181 181 5 5 5,000 1 PSO-REG
AAG Securities (Pvt) Limited 118 118 05N 05N 5,000 1 PTC-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 A044 A044 5,000 1 PTC-REG
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 09011 09011 4,700 2 NBP-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 5C 5C 4,500 1 OGDC-FWD
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 4,500 1 POL-FWD
Muhammad Anaf Kapadia 152 152 38 38 4,500 1 POL-FWD
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110664 110664 4,500 1 PSO-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 4,500 1 PSO-FWD
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 024427 024427 4,500 1 POL-REG
Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 145 145 2038 2038 4,500 2 PTC-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 12 12 4,500 3 PTC-REG
HH Misbah Securities (Private) Limited 37 37 W45 W45 4,500 1 PTC-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 G G 4,400 8 POL-REG
Live Securities (Private) Limited 43 43 S31 S31 4,200 1 NBP-REG
Noman Abid & Company Limited 12 12 2005 2005 4,000 2 NBP-FWD
Elixir Securities Pakistan (Private) Limited 100 100 I108 I108 4,000 1 PTC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 95 95 3,800 13 NBP-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 CF CF 3,500 3 OGDC-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 112 112 3,500 1 OGDC-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 202 202 3,500 1 OGDC-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 CMS CMS 3,500 2 NBP-REG
Muhammad Anaf Kapadia 152 152 SD1 SD1 3,500 1 PSO-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 3,500 5 PTC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 3,300 2 POL-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 3,300 3 PSO-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 415 415 3,100 3 POL-REG
Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Limited 88 88 30/251 30/251 3,000 1 NBP-FWD
Muhammad Farooq Haji Abdullah 93 93 FD FD 3,000 2 NBP-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 213 213 3,000 6 OGDC-FWD
A. Sattar Dawood Adhi 55 55 Z Z 3,000 1 POL-FWD
Apex Capital Securities (Private) Limited 188 188 G29 G29 3,000 1 PTC-FWD
Muhammed Siddiq Suleman 191 191 DSK DSK 3,000 1 NBP-REG
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 B B 3,000 1 OGDC-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 L L 3,000 1 POL-REG
Zillion Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 47 47 720 720 3,000 1 POL-REG
Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets Limited 149 149 2600 2600 3,000 1 PSO-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 J J 3,000 2 PTC-REG
Mr. Muhammad Shahid Durvesh 24 24 G31 G31 3,000 1 PTC-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 2,900 3 POL-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 351 351 2,900 28 POL-REG
I. I. Kodvavi Securities (Private) Limited 169 169 100 100 2,600 2 POL-REG
Sikandar Esmail Ahmed Bagasrawala 140 140 20 20 2,500 1 NBP-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 QB QB 2,500 1 OGDC-FWD
SAZ Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 187 187 80040 80040 2,500 1 OGDC-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 K K 2,500 1 POL-FWD
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 G1 G1 2,500 1 PSO-FWD
Sakarwala Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 10 10 IK IK 2,500 2 PSO-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 HR1 HR1 2,500 1 PTC-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 106 106 2,500 5 PTC-FWD
Friendly Securities ( Pvt.) Limited 163 163 UN UN 2,500 1 NBP-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 305 305 2,500 2 NBP-REG
Muhammad Anaf Kapadia 152 152 38 38 2,500 1 NBP-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 12 12 2,500 1 POL-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 R49 R49 2,500 1 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 305 305 2,500 1 PTC-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 2202 2202 2,500 1 PTC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 95 95 2,400 1 PSO-REG
Muhammad Anaf Kapadia 152 152 SD1 SD1 2,100 1 POL-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 CF CF 2,000 1 NBP-FWD
I. I. Kodvavi Securities (Private) Limited 169 169 318 318 2,000 1 NBP-FWD
Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Limited 18 18 SS SS 2,000 4 NBP-FWD
Amin Siddique Parekh Securities (Pvt) Limited 166 166 F12 F12 2,000 1 OGDC-FWD
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 574 574 2,000 1 OGDC-FWD
MAC Securities (Private) Limited 106 106 111 111 2,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 2,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 116 116 472 472 2,000 1 POL-FWD
Amin Siddique Parekh Securities (Pvt) Limited 166 166 F12 F12 2,000 2 POL-FWD
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 574 574 2,000 2 POL-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 15074 15074 2,000 2 POL-FWD
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 2824 2824 2,000 1 POL-FWD
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 140 140 2,000 1 PSO-FWD
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 475 475 2,000 1 PSO-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 2,000 4 PSO-FWD
Noman Abid & Company Limited 12 12 961 961 2,000 1 PSO-FWD
Yousuf Ibrahim 89 89 HH HH 2,000 1 PSO-FWD
Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 145 145 2038 2038 2,000 1 PTC-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 213 213 2,000 4 PTC-FWD
Aziz Fidahusein & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. 87 87 1ARK 1ARK 2,000 1 OGDC-REG
Zafar Moti Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 32 32 W390 W390 2,000 1 OGDC-REG
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 2,000 3 POL-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 L01 L01 2,000 1 POL-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 G G 2,000 3 PSO-REG
Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets Limited 149 149 3630 3630 2,000 1 PSO-REG
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 09011 09011 2,000 1 PSO-REG
Global Securities Pakistan Limited 101 101 HA HA 2,000 1 PTC-REG
Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Limited 18 18 SS SS 2,000 4 PTC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 112 112 2,000 1 PTC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 305 305 1,900 1 OGDC-REG
Arif Habib Securities Limited 50 50 0022 0022 1,900 1 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 351 351 1,900 15 PSO-REG
Muhammad Hussain Abdul Karim 53 53 HI HI 1,900 1 PSO-REG
Siddiq Moti 111 111 A491 A491 1,800 1 POL-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 1,700 1 NBP-REG
Eastern Capital Ltd. 7 7 S/ISL45 S/ISL45 1,700 1 PSO-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 M01 M01 1,500 1 OGDC-FWD
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 5 5 1,500 1 POL-FWD
Siddiq Moti 111 111 H1 H1 1,500 1 POL-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 15074 15074 1,500 1 PSO-FWD
Altaf Adam 1 1 952 952 1,500 2 NBP-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 1,500 1 POL-REG
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19 19 1182 1182 1,500 1 POL-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 304 304 1,500 11 PSO-REG
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 AR276 AR276 1,500 1 PSO-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 1,500 2 PTC-REG
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 D03 D03 1,300 1 OGDC-REG
MRA Securities (Private) Limited 194 194 01 01 1,300 2 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 791 791 1,200 1 OGDC-REG
Salim M. Sozer 121 121 CO CO 1,200 1 POL-REG
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 1,200 12 PSO-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 201 201 1,100 1 NBP-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 65 65 1,100 1 NBP-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 376 376 1,100 2 OGDC-REG
Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Limited 18 18 SS SS 1,100 8 PSO-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 4210 4210 1,100 2 PSO-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 26 26 1,000 1 NBP-FWD
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 475 475 1,000 1 NBP-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 1,000 2 NBP-FWD
Altaf Adam 1 1 951 951 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 MS MS 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Ismail Abdul Shakoor 74 74 JSQ JSQ 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mohammed Saad Maniar 96 96 L034 L034 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Sikandar Esmail Ahmed Bagasrawala 140 140 20 20 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Azee Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 108 108 5564 5564 1,000 1 POL-FWD
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110296 110296 1,000 2 POL-FWD
HH Misbah Securities (Private) Limited 37 37 E1 E1 1,000 1 POL-FWD
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 RZ RZ 1,000 1 POL-FWD
Muhammad Hussain Abdul Karim 53 53 JA JA 1,000 1 POL-FWD
SAZ Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 187 187 07 07 1,000 1 POL-FWD
Sikandar Esmail Ahmed Bagasrawala 140 140 24126 24126 1,000 1 POL-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 1,000 2 POL-FWD
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 12 12 1,000 1 PSO-FWD
FDM Capital Securities (Private) Limited 94 94 U38 U38 1,000 1 PSO-FWD
Khawaja Amir Ishaq 119 119 G14 G14 1,000 1 PSO-FWD
MRA Securities (Private) Limited 194 194 01 01 1,000 1 PSO-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 1,000 2 PSO-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 213 213 1,000 2 PSO-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 SS SS 1,000 1 PTC-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 ECM ECM 1,000 1 PTC-FWD
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 1,000 1 PTC-FWD
Altaf Adam 1 1 917 917 1,000 1 NBP-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013304 013304 1,000 1 NBP-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 1,000 1 NBP-REG
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19 19 1031 1031 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 9/42 9/42 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 2430 2430 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 A044 A044 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Malik Khan Awan 137 137 005006 005006 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 8C 8C 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Zillion Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 47 47 720 720 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Amanullah Haji Mohammed Marfani 73 73 AHAD AHAD 1,000 2 POL-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 A044 A044 1,000 1 POL-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 J J 1,000 2 POL-REG
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 6 6 1,000 2 POL-REG
MAC Securities (Private) Limited 106 106 J69 J69 1,000 1 PSO-REG
Noman Abid & Company Limited 12 12 1085 1085 1,000 1 PSO-REG
Abbasi Securities (SMC-Pvt.) Limited 61 61 956 956 1,000 1 PTC-REG
Malik Khan Awan 137 137 2057 2057 1,000 1 PTC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 113 113 1,000 2 PTC-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 900 1 OGDC-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110296 110296 700 2 POL-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 700 7 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 376 376 600 2 NBP-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 901 901 600 1 OGDC-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 372 372 600 1 POL-REG
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 D03 D03 600 1 POL-REG
Multiline Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 49 49 01 01 600 2 POL-REG
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 P P 600 2 POL-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 11 11 600 1 PSO-REG
Ample Securities (Pvt.) Limited 171 171 Q3 Q3 500 1 NBP-FWD
Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets Limited 149 149 3986 3986 500 1 NBP-FWD
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 AF1 AF1 500 1 NBP-FWD
Altaf Adam 1 1 9 9 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 6 6 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Khawaja Amir Ishaq 119 119 T4 T4 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 MP41 MP41 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 15074 15074 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Orix Investment Bank Pakistan Limited 77 77 0072 0072 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 113 113 500 1 OGDC-FWD
AAG Securities (Pvt) Limited 118 118 14S 14S 500 1 POL-FWD
Amanullah Haji Mohammed Marfani 73 73 6016 6016 500 1 POL-FWD
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 9/2 9/2 500 1 POL-FWD
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110361 110361 500 1 POL-FWD
Haji Ghani Haji Usman 28 28 153 153 500 1 POL-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 500 1 POL-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 112 112 500 1 POL-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 Y Y 500 1 POL-FWD
Zaitoon M. A. Shakoor 25 25 YK YZ91 YK YZ91 500 1 POL-FWD
Rafi Securities (Private) Limited 159 159 680 680 500 1 PSO-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 Y Y 500 1 PSO-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 CF CF 500 1 PTC-FWD
Memon Securities (Private) Limited 92 92 49 19 49 19 500 1 PTC-FWD
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 AFTAB AFTAB 500 1 PTC-FWD
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 475 475 500 1 PTC-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 546172 546172 500 1 PTC-FWD
Sakarwala Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 10 10 IK IK 500 1 PTC-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 71 71 500 1 PTC-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 J J 500 1 PTC-FWD
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 116 116 330 330 500 1 NBP-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 8C 8C 500 1 NBP-REG
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 AF1 AF1 500 1 NBP-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 5/39 5/39 500 1 OGDC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 303 303 500 1 OGDC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 355 355 500 1 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 AF1 AF1 500 1 OGDC-REG
Rafi Securities (Private) Limited 159 159 221 221 500 1 OGDC-REG
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 101 101 500 1 POL-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 8C 8C 500 1 POL-REG
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 09011 09011 500 1 POL-REG
Zafar Moti Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 32 32 305 305 500 1 POL-REG
Al - Asar Securities (Private) Limited 34 34 A A 500 1 PSO-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 X205 X205 500 1 PSO-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 500 1 PSO-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 475 475 500 1 PSO-REG
Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 145 145 2042 2042 500 1 PTC-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 6 6 500 1 PTC-REG
Khawaja Amir Ishaq 119 119 AWJ AWJ 500 1 PTC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 311 311 500 1 PTC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 354 354 500 1 PTC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 A82 A82 500 1 PTC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 500 1 PTC-REG
Zafar Moti Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 32 32 W390 W390 500 1 PTC-REG
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 H1 H1 400 1 POL-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 606 606 400 1 PSO-REG
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 1 1 400 1 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 305 305 400 2 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 311 311 300 3 OGDC-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 1823 1823 300 2 POL-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 415 415 300 2 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 311 311 300 3 PSO-REG
Siddiq Moti 111 111 I I 300 1 PSO-REG
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 P P 300 1 PSO-REG
FDM Capital Securities (Private) Limited 94 94 U94 U94 200 1 OGDC-REG
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 200 2 OGDC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 95 95 200 2 POL-REG
Finex Securities Limited 44 44 1103 1103 200 1 POL-REG
Fortune Securities Limited 46 46 B B 200 2 POL-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 109 109 200 1 POL-REG
Muhammad Javed Surmawala 35 35 1539 1539 200 1 POL-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 200 2 POL-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 200 2 POL-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 646 646 200 1 PSO-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 111191 111191 200 1 PSO-REG
Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 145 145 66/2 66/2 100 1 NBP-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 304 304 100 1 NBP-REG
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 100 1 NBP-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 116654 116654 100 1 OGDC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 308 308 100 1 OGDC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 353 353 100 1 OGDC-REG
Noman Abid & Company Limited 12 12 1240 1240 100 1 OGDC-REG
Rafi Securities (Private) Limited 159 159 411 411 100 1 OGDC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 100 1 OGDC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 113 113 100 1 OGDC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 5/39 5/39 100 1 POL-REG
Eastern Capital Ltd. 7 7 S/1 S/1 100 1 POL-REG
ACE Securities (Private) Limited 67 67 3214 3214 100 1 PSO-REG
Fortune Securities Limited 46 46 B B 100 1 PSO-REG
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 5 5 100 1 PSO-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 2202 2202 100 1 PSO-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 100 1 PSO-REG
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS FUTURES CONTRACTS

PART III – APPENDICES

FUTURES CONTRACTS

NOVEMBER 21, 2006


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS
APPENDIX A – NET POSITION IN MARCH 2005 FUTURES IN EXCESS OF SHARES HELD
AT CDC
Broker 017: Atlas Investment Bank Ltd.
Shares Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date NML OGDC PPL PSO SNGP
Rs. 124 Rs. 189.75 Rs. 314.90 Rs. 488.90 Rs. 76.35
21-Feb-05 713,000 2,451,801 391,400 758,800 180,440
22-Feb-05 501,500 2,228,401 394,900 761,100 181,440
23-Feb-05 246,000 2,093,301 184,400 515,200 14,820
24-Feb-05 133,500 1,408,301 (325,100) 490,200 224,820
25-Feb-05 493,500 1,766,501 (510,600) 619,500 (9,680)
28-Feb-05 290,000 1,594,301 (528,100) 562,600 194,320
01-Mar-05 488,000 1,777,301 (209,900) 748,400 191,320
02-Mar-05 466,500 1,395,001 (229,600) 854,400 572,320
03-Mar-05 (58,500) 728,201 (264,800) 548,000 277,820
04-Mar-05 (40,700) 490,901 (375,300) 597,700 (168,680)
07-Mar-05 (25,700) 238,401 (238,800) 423,700 (974,680)
08-Mar-05 (29,800) (322,899) (674,800) 183,500 (1,128,480)
09-Mar-05 1,200 (236,599) (750,800) 59,200 (1,278,100)
10-Mar-05 (30,800) (168,599) (685,500) 157,700 (1,223,100)
11-Mar-05 75,200 278,301 (720,500) 122,900 (1,055,100)
14-Mar-05 (130,800) 728,501 (678,500) (347,500) (1,125,600)
15-Mar-05 (263,800) 662,951 (807,500) (343,900) (1,095,100)
16-Mar-05 (259,800) 698,951 (611,500) (286,500) (1,075,100)
17-Mar-05 (159,800) 1,294,951 (567,200) (250,500) (1,105,100)
18-Mar-05 (132,300) 481,251 (499,200) (252,000) (812,100)
21-Mar-05 (32,300) 852,051 (530,200) (220,500) (774,600)
22-Mar-05 (32,300) 854,151 (400,200) (218,600) (2,100)
24-Mar-05 (32,300) 1,280,151 (440,200) (134,900) (622,600)
25-Mar-05 (32,300) 1,280,151 (429,700) 57,500 (636,600)
28-Mar-05 7,700 1,379,751 (462,200) (33,000) (611,600)

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 1 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 019 Akeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.


Shares Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
SCRIP
Date NBP OGDC POL PTC
Rs. 161.75 Rs. 189.75 Rs. 346.5 Rs. 87.90
21-Feb-05 2,032,261 1,506,365 2,563,371 677,000
22-Feb-05 1,140,061 1,399,612 1,808,231 744,100
23-Feb-05 1,187,361 1,469,212 1,910,631 2,811,100
24-Feb-05 151,161 (66,388) 2,369,431 (2,066,400)
25-Feb-05 1,715,961 (133,288) 2,510,031 (1,969,900)
28-Feb-05 2,911,661 (182,288) 2,095,331 (2,040,900)
01-Mar-05 2,094,761 2,411,612 1,521,331 316,600
02-Mar-05 912,061 3,090,512 1,578,731 1,821,600
03-Mar-05 4,700,261 2,788,012 2,297,331 3,646,100
04-Mar-05 5,516,041 3,956,162 1,495,631 (1,721,100)
07-Mar-05 4,232 1,216,862 (252,689) (4,276,600)
08-Mar-05 255,283 15,840,062 24,811 2,002,629
09-Mar-05 (737,717) 14,258,062 364,311 11,629
10-Mar-05 (961,017) 6,566,362 542,911 (2,291,371)
11-Mar-05 2,469,403 7,590,909 (294,389) (5,195,871)
14-Mar-05 1,872,503 6,116,309 566,511 (7,236,371)
15-Mar-05 (76,397) 5,937,109 643,011 (8,555,371)
16-Mar-05 555,062 2,437,909 210,011 (7,903,871)
17-Mar-05 263,762 (585,991) (465,789) (200,871)
18-Mar-05 218,562 (418,391) (245,229) 5,039,629
21-Mar-05 (102,838) 187,514 (285,529) 5,195,329
22-Mar-05 (374,138) 1,089,214 1,843,571 7,918,329
24-Mar-05 981,262 2,045,214 2,474,571 8,360,329
25-Mar-05 684,762 2,748,114 2,417,271 8,210,329
28-Mar-05 1,369,762 2,966,700 2,505,971 4,476,829

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 2 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 022: BMA Capital Management Limited


Share Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date OGDC PPL PTC
Rs. 189.75 Rs. 314.90 Rs. 87.90
21-Feb-05 801,209 509,500 743,600
22-Feb-05 99,209 507,500 735,600
23-Feb-05 23,109 503,000 759,600
24-Feb-05 (71,391) 409,500 274,600
25-Feb-05 327,109 436,000 115,100
28-Feb-05 136,009 438,000 67,100
01-Mar-05 181,109 461,500 99,600
02-Mar-05 131,109 (109,000) 2,600
03-Mar-05 28,409 (116,300) 141,100
04-Mar-05 (222,191) (81,000) (366,400)
07-Mar-05 (486,191) (80,000) (565,900)
08-Mar-05 (916,191) (61,000) (83,400)
09-Mar-05 (510,591) (89,000) 227,100
10-Mar-05 (357,591) (90,000) 445,600
11-Mar-05 (359,691) (85,000) 455,100
14-Mar-05 (334,191) (85,500) 456,100
15-Mar-05 (326,191) (83,500) 225,600
16-Mar-05 (356,191) (81,500) (434,400)
17-Mar-05 (353,891) (83,500) (733,400)
18-Mar-05 (511,000) (83,500) (883,900)
21-Mar-05 (611,500) (83,500) (984,500)
22-Mar-05 (524,500) (84,780) (984,500)
24-Mar-05 (367,200) (85,780) (984,500)
25-Mar-05 (364,600) (85,780) (984,500)
28-Mar-05 (361,600) (86,780) (1,095,300)

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 3 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 050: Arif Habib Securities Limited


Share totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date FFBL FFC ICI NBP NML OGDC POL PPL PSO PTC SNGP
Rs. 40.70 Rs. 175.45 Rs. 141.75 Rs. 161.75 Rs. 124.00 Rs. 189.75 Rs. 346.50 Rs. 314.90 Rs. 488.90 Rs. 87.90 Rs. 76.35
21-Feb-05 2,909,833 2,151,330 56,090 12,319,599 1,894,089 2,742,963 2,619,048 2,115,500 1,535,834 5,944,600 1,142,537
22-Feb-05 3,948,833 2,101,330 47,090 11,542,099 1,783,389 2,275,963 1,914,048 1,834,500 1,533,934 5,600,900 1,355,037
23-Feb-05 5,340,833 1,584,330 447,090 10,495,899 1,958,989 2,220,963 1,370,498 1,363,500 1,576,634 6,067,400 1,388,037
24-Feb-05 4,497,333 1,590,330 455,090 10,650,599 1,036,389 2,489,963 1,153,998 1,051,000 1,128,634 5,264,400 1,403,037
25-Feb-05 2,373,833 1,284,730 56,090 8,863,024 (933,511) 2,441,963 952,998 660,500 407,034 4,790,900 1,969,037
28-Feb-05 (240,667) 1,189,230 43,090 8,635,124 (1,207,511) 1,809,663 910,498 590,500 239,634 (298,600) 1,867,037
01-Mar-05 219,333 1,007,630 43,090 6,539,924 (1,415,511) (64,137) 979,998 535,000 242,434 (1,741,600) 1,305,537
02-Mar-05 1,252,333 383,630 41,090 6,593,424 (445,011) 1,509,263 757,998 711,200 1,047,934 901,900 1,991,437
03-Mar-05 357,833 383,630 41,090 2,346,124 (452,011) 483,188 424,273 631,000 (255,366) 3,290,900 1,366,037
04-Mar-05 981,333 (60,370) 54,090 2,295,324 (1,334,011) 1,086,388 366,398 322,600 (539,066) 4,515,900 1,960,943
07-Mar-05 750,833 (273,370) 42,090 6,090,824 (1,338,011) 1,821,238 51,173 5,100 (40,366) 5,406,400 1,997,743
08-Mar-05 801,833 (272,370) 42,090 7,671,224 (1,522,961) 1,261,538 (13,027) 197,200 (232,946) 5,101,400 2,017,743
09-Mar-05 1,261,833 (883,370) 51,090 6,993,724 (3,245,861) 1,382,863 (87,602) 978,200 (555,846) 6,595,900 551,493
10-Mar-05 895,833 (1,894,870) 37,750 7,010,624 (3,496,861) 366,738 (466,727) 350,200 (735,346) 4,383,300 354,093
11-Mar-05 1,040,833 (1,982,870) 37,750 5,993,124 (3,381,861) (676,962) (464,452) 1,688,200 (850,546) (5,277,650) 1,284,093
14-Mar-05 1,505,833 (1,559,370) 42,750 4,551,024 (3,106,361) (429,587) (509,027) 1,945,800 (758,446) (7,589,650) 1,760,793
15-Mar-05 1,504,333 (1,956,870) (501,750) 5,343,024 (3,095,061) (635,267) (628,977) 2,294,300 (2,091,246) (6,268,850) 1,579,593
16-Mar-05 758,333 (1,981,870) (501,750) 479,024 (3,102,561) (1,144,517) (651,977) 2,114,300 (2,083,046) (10,560,750) 1,379,593
17-Mar-05 715,333 (2,041,470) (501,750) 1,643,824 (3,127,561) (1,087,192) (643,077) 2,065,300 (2,281,046) (12,680,000) 65,093
18-Mar-05 627,833 (2,138,970) (502,750) 816,524 (3,337,561) (1,334,492) (656,402) 1,512,800 (2,278,546) (13,263,000) 149,093
21-Mar-05 653,333 (2,177,870) (497,750) 1,323,224 (3,437,561) (1,168,992) (665,402) 38,300 (2,322,046) (12,000,700) 132,093
22-Mar-05 598,333 (2,129,370) (502,750) 528,124 (3,437,561) (663,742) (668,002) (418,700) (2,391,046) (11,952,700) 110,093
24-Mar-05 603,833 (1,114,870) (505,750) (309,876) (3,061,761) (506,242) (473,302) (774,700) (1,693,546) (11,816,200) 92,593
25-Mar-05 612,833 (915,370) (500,750) (284,876) (3,061,761) (487,242) (667,502) (662,700) (1,712,046) (11,816,700) 92,593
28-Mar-05 513,833 (915,370) (500,750) (293,176) (3,061,761) (668,967) (669,152) (314,200) (1,693,846) (10,987,200) (361,407)

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 4 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 077: Orix Investment Bank Pakistan Limited


Share Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date DGKC NBP OGDC PGF POL PPL PTC SNGP
Rs. 80.60 Rs. 161.75 Rs. 189.75 Rs. 61.85 Rs. 346.50 Rs. 314.90 Rs. 87.90 Rs. 76.35
21-Feb-05 660,000 14,100 852,002 1,285,000 410,925 1,342,500 597,200 708,100
22-Feb-05 (239,000) (123,400) 573,002 797,500 401,025 (1,310,500) 515,200 443,600
23-Feb-05 346,500 (98,400) (721,998) (395,500) (374,475) (2,918,500) (440,800) 451,600
24-Feb-05 346,500 (88,400) (822,498) (395,500) (353,375) (2,979,000) (453,300) 142,400
25-Feb-05 891,000 (113,400) (855,198) (445,500) (404,175) (2,681,500) (595,800) 145,700
28-Feb-05 900,500 (98,800) (1,295,298) (445,500) (432,175) (2,234,000) (617,800) (494,800)
01-Mar-05 880,500 (12,900) (2,120,798) (470,500) (485,675) (2,370,000) (286,800) (501,800)
02-Mar-05 35,000 132,700 (1,557,398) (57,500) (145,388) (1,418,000) 1,648,700 (591,300)
03-Mar-05 10,000 (348,900) (1,710,798) (67,500) (336,688) (1,495,500) 621,700 (28,500)
04-Mar-05 35,000 (304,400) (1,634,648) (67,500) (405,188) (1,486,000) 682,700 (29,600)
07-Mar-05 10,000 (233,600) (1,472,648) (1,500) (241,688) (1,449,500) 929,200 64,900
08-Mar-05 40,000 (177,600) (1,577,648) (116,500) (514,688) (1,482,000) 311,700 64,900
09-Mar-05 40,000 198,400 (1,542,148) (116,500) (489,688) (1,527,000) 1,802,200 474,500
10-Mar-05 0 162,400 (1,427,448) (216,500) (443,188) (650,000) 2,337,700 474,500
11-Mar-05 0 199,400 (1,439,448) (30,500) (406,188) (695,000) 3,170,700 474,500
14-Mar-05 0 319,400 (1,512,348) (16,500) (479,188) (342,500) 2,467,700 11,500
15-Mar-05 0 232,600 (1,352,548) (16,500) (567,888) (1,505,500) 2,390,200 5,000
16-Mar-05 (4,500) 45,600 (1,227,048) (31,500) (584,388) (1,207,500) 2,551,200 2,000
17-Mar-05 (2,500) (101,200) (1,244,548) (29,500) (481,588) (1,189,000) 2,065,200 1,786
18-Mar-05 (4,500) (102,700) (1,234,048) (29,500) (515,088) (1,254,500) 1,355,200 21,786
21-Mar-05 0 (102,700) (1,376,748) (14,500) (519,888) (1,129,500) 1,794,700 23,786
22-Mar-05 0 (102,200) (1,376,748) (14,500) (544,888) (1,152,000) 1,684,700 23,786
24-Mar-05 0 (121,500) (1,361,748) (14,500) (545,888) (1,152,000) 1,586,200 3,786
25-Mar-05 30,500 (121,500) (1,262,048) 268,375 (535,888) (1,290,500) 1,586,200 3,786
28-Mar-05 30,500 (121,500) (1,259,648) 268,375 (570,388) (1,289,500) 1,586,200 3,786

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 5 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 100: Elixir Securities Pak.


Share Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date DGKC FFBL OGDC PPL PSO PTC
Rs. 80.60 Rs. 40.70 Rs. 189.75 Rs. 314.90 Rs. 488.90 Rs. 87.90
21-Feb-05 565,875 260,826 202,114 546,000 172,720 (18,400)
22-Feb-05 473,875 289,326 652,364 377,500 199,320 (358,400)
23-Feb-05 464,475 1,069,826 (543,911) 119,500 510,820 1,148,600
24-Feb-05 297,025 238,326 (549,611) (237,500) 494,120 836,100
25-Feb-05 469,625 233,326 (367,361) (600,500) 520,320 854,600
28-Feb-05 488,375 350,326 (828,986) (604,700) 300,620 3,719,100
01-Mar-05 505,125 454,826 (572,111) (740,500) 497,120 661,100
02-Mar-05 259,100 519,326 480,764 (331,600) 311,720 1,185,600
03-Mar-05 199,725 519,826 (13,986) (298,500) (109,480) 1,476,100
04-Mar-05 130,600 718,326 (329,361) (564,600) (265,480) 2,073,600
07-Mar-05 155,975 1,288,326 (65,111) (425,100) (281,480) 3,087,100
08-Mar-05 253,750 1,211,826 (790,986) (570,600) 198,020 455,100
09-Mar-05 193,725 679,826 (161,361) (633,100) 283,020 (812,400)
10-Mar-05 111,475 1,031,826 (501,111) (500,000) 336,120 (737,400)
11-Mar-05 418,600 160,826 (1,390,236) (561,000) 270,520 (259,400)
14-Mar-05 (98,775) (762,674) (385,611) (533,100) 138,120 (873,900)
15-Mar-05 (569,725) (202,674) (489,936) (446,100) (289,880) 260,800
16-Mar-05 (360,725) (481,174) (1,906,061) (400,600) (431,880) (1,060,700)
17-Mar-05 (414,150) 26,326 (956,361) (519,600) (414,880) (1,341,199)
18-Mar-05 35,900 536,826 (970,186) (168,100) (431,880) (1,114,599)
21-Mar-05 (340,825) 949,826 (777,936) 748,900 284,120 (937,400)
22-Mar-05 251,575 1,068,826 (802,836) 731,900 302,620 (940,400)
24-Mar-05 (49,475) 954,326 (209,686) 810,400 291,820 (617,900)
25-Mar-05 (171,275) 908,326 (339,611) 826,200 421,420 (618,900)
28-Mar-05 48,875 (4,174) (372,386) 1,107,200 457,920 1,023,600

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 6 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 128: KASB Securities Limited


Share Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date PPL PSO PTC
Rs. 314.90 Rs. 488.90 Rs. 87.90
21-Feb-05 601,200 558,777 15,932,350
22-Feb-05 791,500 225,477 19,003,825
23-Feb-05 554,500 167,277 15,880,950
24-Feb-05 722,000 279,277 16,428,450
25-Feb-05 (100,900) 463,277 16,024,050
28-Feb-05 (543,300) 545,677 15,646,550
01-Mar-05 (989,700) 1,078,477 8,370,050
02-Mar-05 (70,500) 951,977 2,318,675
03-Mar-05 (322,300) 830,777 321,400
04-Mar-05 89,300 172,577 (1,820,600)
07-Mar-05 (450,000) 295,577 4,035,475
08-Mar-05 (498,500) 172,677 4,293,475
09-Mar-05 (900,500) 130,877 5,258,125
10-Mar-05 (102,600) 696,977 5,232,675
11-Mar-05 200 653,877 5,399,675
14-Mar-05 (535,700) 618,977 5,463,550
15-Mar-05 (72,800) 778,477 6,146,550
16-Mar-05 319,700 933,977 708,550
17-Mar-05 302,600 820,477 6,512,500
18-Mar-05 174,400 847,977 7,875,900
21-Mar-05 (67,800) 658,977 6,977,138
22-Mar-05 (247,300) 579,977 6,712,638
24-Mar-05 (337,400) 263,777 6,073,760
25-Mar-05 (359,500) (274,623) 6,300,300
28-Mar-05 (431,700) (248,323) 7,845,300

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 7 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 129: Taurus Securities Limited


Share Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date BOP OGDC PSO PTC
Rs. 109.80 Rs. 189.75 Rs. 488.90 Rs. 87.90
21-Feb-05 28,149 249,211 62,360 2,739,683
22-Feb-05 144,149 (107,389) (449,140) 2,349,183
23-Feb-05 158,649 (100,189) (462,940) 2,037,183
24-Feb-05 51,649 86,264 (391,940) 1,535,683
25-Feb-05 109,649 454,164 (454,240) 1,702,683
28-Feb-05 137,149 (9,936) (311,240) 2,668,183
01-Mar-05 139,649 222,314 (310,040) 2,154,583
02-Mar-05 124,149 (162,186) (374,240) 2,171,583
03-Mar-05 (381,851) 52,314 (374,240) 1,524,783
04-Mar-05 (347,351) 170,114 (365,740) 1,485,783
07-Mar-05 (399,351) 134,314 (360,840) 1,345,283
08-Mar-05 (435,351) (37,986) (352,540) 1,578,783
09-Mar-05 (446,851) (547,886) (296,140) 1,497,283
10-Mar-05 (402,351) (48,233) (326,940) 4,219,683
11-Mar-05 (407,351) 3,517 (334,440) 2,661,583
14-Mar-05 (421,851) (800,332) (406,640) 1,998,583
15-Mar-05 (466,351) (850,682) (398,740) 1,739,083
16-Mar-05 (421,251) (798,682) (394,140) 1,152,083
17-Mar-05 (431,451) (756,582) (460,640) 40,083
18-Mar-05 (468,451) (627,682) (460,235) (339,917)
21-Mar-05 (346,951) (838,282) (460,235) (334,917)
22-Mar-05 (374,451) (1,167,182) (462,735) (334,617)
24-Mar-05 (372,951) (799,882) (468,735) (334,617)
25-Mar-05 (395,451) (223,882) (481,735) (334,617)
28-Mar-05 (396,451) (204,082) (481,735) (270,617)

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 8 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 134 Abdul Jabbar Khanani


Share Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date NBP OGDC PSO PTC
Rs. 161.75 Rs. 189.75 Rs. 488.90 Rs. 87.90
21-Feb-05 6,000 153,013 24,520 27,000
22-Feb-05 500 55,013 6,045 (34,500)
23-Feb-05 (149,500) (49,987) (20,955) (39,000)
24-Feb-05 (271,000) 72,613 112,545 (451,500)
25-Feb-05 306,300 (89,487) 127,045 (372,500)
28-Feb-05 436,300 (121,087) 334,549 812,500
01-Mar-05 (212,000) (31,987) 131,449 (191,500)
02-Mar-05 44,100 223,513 299,949 500,500
03-Mar-05 294,800 2,734,913 257,549 1,556,900
04-Mar-05 63,000 1,302,013 180,249 1,694,400
07-Mar-05 (31,500) 886,513 123,649 (395,600)
08-Mar-05 2,272,600 3,410,513 720,349 425,900
09-Mar-05 1,352,100 3,969,113 274,549 (8,000)
10-Mar-05 734,100 2,949,213 161,049 (1,507,000)
11-Mar-05 937,900 1,767,513 155,249 (1,144,000)
14-Mar-05 610,400 707,613 (282,251) 179,000
15-Mar-05 (503,000) (299,887) (326,951) (305,500)
16-Mar-05 (512,500) (1,010,887) (661,951) 2,870,000
17-Mar-05 (565,400) 911,613 337,049 1,185,000
18-Mar-05 (680,200) 2,720,313 832,049 2,040,000
21-Mar-05 207,700 1,078,964 942,563 1,633,000
22-Mar-05 162,000 1,217,264 769,963 1,793,500
24-Mar-05 979,100 1,158,264 835,383 1,772,000
25-Mar-05 841,300 1,153,664 829,426 1,768,500
28-Mar-05 763,300 1,157,864 868,726 1,855,500

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 9 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 138: Escorts Investment Bank Limited


Share Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date POL PPL PSO PTC
Rs. 346.50 Rs. 314.90 Rs. 488.90 Rs. 87.90
21-Feb-05 58,204 60,500 373,800 2,162,400
22-Feb-05 (155,696) 88,200 386,591 2,555,400
23-Feb-05 1,304 138,800 381,891 3,021,400
24-Feb-05 (34,696) (113,700) 380,891 2,829,100
25-Feb-05 (10,396) (160,200) 396,991 2,912,100
28-Feb-05 (92,396) (173,700) 367,191 2,427,600
01-Mar-05 (59,796) (212,100) 354,691 2,801,100
02-Mar-05 (454,796) (97,300) 351,291 1,739,100
03-Mar-05 (545,396) (905,400) 468,091 1,916,600
04-Mar-05 (654,296) (655,200) 618,391 2,334,100
07-Mar-05 (763,896) (537,200) 801,491 1,119,100
08-Mar-05 (881,696) (477,200) 507,391 837,800
09-Mar-05 (945,596) (565,700) 400,391 1,146,800
10-Mar-05 (953,996) (628,200) 318,891 1,461,800
11-Mar-05 (842,896) (632,800) 359,591 1,389,300
14-Mar-05 (963,596) (648,600) 262,091 2,465,800
15-Mar-05 (911,796) (599,100) (138,909) 2,684,400
16-Mar-05 (1,001,596) (537,500) (168,909) 3,219,400
17-Mar-05 (976,696) (441,700) (227,909) (320,600)
18-Mar-05 (1,016,296) (594,100) (136,409) (783,600)
21-Mar-05 (949,096) (564,600) (146,909) (342,100)
22-Mar-05 (991,196) 117,600 224,591 102,900
24-Mar-05 (1,003,196) 24,100 167,191 12,900
25-Mar-05 (939,096) (4,900) 208,091 (2,100)
28-Mar-05 (784,096) 9,100 210,691 275,400

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 10 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 149 Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets Limited


Share Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date NBP NML PPL PSO
Rs. 161.75 Rs. 124.00 Rs. 314.90 Rs. 488.90
21-Feb-05 1,500,180 0 1,798,132 596,900
22-Feb-05 885,180 (172,500) 1,709,632 568,500
23-Feb-05 330,180 (430,500) 1,196,632 530,100
24-Feb-05 348,880 (630,500) (545,868) 450,200
25-Feb-05 267,380 (630,500) (967,430) 422,800
28-Feb-05 330,880 (722,500) (1,154,930) 372,700
01-Mar-05 2,697,080 (692,500) (1,241,730) 436,700
02-Mar-05 2,615,080 (692,500) (792,630) 380,300
03-Mar-05 1,531,580 (692,500) (876,630) 380,100
04-Mar-05 1,601,080 (742,500) (816,130) 556,800
07-Mar-05 1,338,380 (942,500) (824,130) 489,600
08-Mar-05 1,470,230 (942,500) (820,930) 467,300
09-Mar-05 848,430 (942,500) (837,930) 704,200
10-Mar-05 937,130 (942,500) (931,430) 659,000
11-Mar-05 (132,770) (942,500) (913,930) (69,700)
14-Mar-05 (389,970) (942,500) (1,044,430) (529,000)
15-Mar-05 (135,970) (942,500) (1,068,430) (233,000)
16-Mar-05 (145,970) (942,500) (960,430) (382,921)
17-Mar-05 (88,670) (942,500) (954,930) (435,921)
18-Mar-05 (230,970) (942,500) (1,019,430) (602,921)
21-Mar-05 (248,970) (942,500) (610,930) (455,921)
22-Mar-05 (332,150) (942,500) (450,430) (415,500)
24-Mar-05 (312,650) (942,500) (469,130) 751,900
25-Mar-05 (309,150) (942,500) (712,130) 638,900
28-Mar-05 (310,850) (942,500) (681,056) 663,000

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 11 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 182: Akberaqlly Cassim & Sons


Share Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date BOP DGKC FFBL NML OGDC POL PTC SNGP
Rs. 109.80 Rs. 80.60 Rs. 40.70 Rs. 124.00 Rs. 189.75 Rs. 346.50 Rs. 87.90 Rs. 76.35
21-Feb-05 766,500 631,109 841,260 1,261 360,376 1,497,649 2,909,100 1,431,500
22-Feb-05 779,500 631,109 839,260 1,261 390,376 1,441,749 2,936,100 838,500
23-Feb-05 491,500 631,109 839,260 1,261 386,976 1,113,049 2,454,600 562,000
24-Feb-05 481,500 631,109 864,260 (855,239) 228,776 1,082,549 1,065,100 (640,400)
25-Feb-05 481,500 631,109 909,260 (1,643,239) 247,776 1,072,549 908,100 (431,400)
28-Feb-05 461,500 592,609 (96,240) (1,683,739) 234,776 1,037,149 472,100 (271,100)
01-Mar-05 463,500 592,609 (1,255,740) (830,739) (134,224) 928,349 451,100 (732,100)
02-Mar-05 427,000 555,609 (1,205,740) (41,239) (167,224) 505,049 536,600 (806,800)
03-Mar-05 728,500 442,609 (570,240) (15,739) (133,724) 316,549 868,100 (895,300)
04-Mar-05 1,324,500 329,609 181,260 1,261 53,116 290,869 (768,400) (833,500)
07-Mar-05 1,125,000 (596,891) (116,240) (151,239) 182,926 280,869 (1,757,400) (599,500)
08-Mar-05 1,018,500 (1,257,391) (166,240) (290,739) 51,026 276,669 (3,575,900) (464,000)
09-Mar-05 629,500 (1,343,471) 331,760 (1,635,739) 31,026 272,019 (4,763,400) (1,160,000)
10-Mar-05 178,500 (1,478,391) 354,260 (1,483,239) 163,026 172,019 (5,874,400) (1,170,000)
11-Mar-05 12,000 (1,478,961) (15,740) (1,343,739) 152,584 132,019 (6,343,400) (1,160,000)
14-Mar-05 (197,500) (1,678,391) 24,260 (1,311,739) (30,626) (24,981) (6,233,400) 92,500
15-Mar-05 (338,000) (1,855,391) 4,260 (1,411,739) (81,406) (26,791) (6,258,400) 430,000
16-Mar-05 (278,000) (1,905,391) (166,740) (1,401,739) 54,394 (54,491) (6,428,400) 445,000
17-Mar-05 (299,500) (1,920,011) (236,240) (1,401,739) 46,594 (70,191) (5,981,400) 227,500
18-Mar-05 (284,500) (1,884,811) (770,240) (1,301,739) 97,094 (86,481) (6,031,400) 0
21-Mar-05 (284,500) (1,888,591) (770,240) (1,295,739) 196,504 (86,481) (6,045,400) 0
22-Mar-05 (284,500) (1,188,591) (770,240) (1,295,739) 208,604 (86,481) (6,045,500) 966,000
24-Mar-05 (839,500) (1,188,591) (770,240) (1,295,739) 221,604 (91,481) (6,070,500) 1,076,500
25-Mar-05 (839,500) (1,188,591) (711,740) (1,295,739) 199,604 (91,481) (6,070,500) 1,106,500
28-Mar-05 (839,500) (1,298,721) (716,740) (1,295,739) 199,604 (91,481) (5,990,500) 140,500

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 12 OF 13


SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005

REPORT OF FINDINGS

Broker 198: Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Limited


Share Totals in Parentheses (negative values) indicate potential blank sale position
Scrip
Date BOP FABL NBP OGDC PGF POL PPL PTC
Rs. 109.80 Rs. 66.25 Rs. 161.75 Rs. 189.75 Rs. 61.85 Rs. 346.50 Rs. 314.90 Rs. 87.90
21-Feb-05 100,500 4,040,911 380,000 (513,473) 5,500 492,460 1,491,200 (169,900)
22-Feb-05 101,000 3,519,411 355,000 (1,172,473) 6,500 491,420 978,800 (462,900)
23-Feb-05 101,500 3,377,911 374,000 (1,949,973) (800,500) 161,020 (149,500) (1,808,400)
24-Feb-05 107,500 2,769,411 845,500 (882,373) (800,000) 18,520 (594,400) (421,900)
25-Feb-05 120,500 2,899,911 904,300 (1,260,373) (798,500) (100,480) (364,000) (521,400)
28-Feb-05 131,500 568,911 909,800 (1,286,373) (808,000) 220,820 (618,200) 231,100
01-Mar-05 124,500 (42,589) 905,800 (1,420,873) (807,000) 124,620 (421,500) 60,100
02-Mar-05 177,500 (6,589) 797,600 (1,512,373) (807,500) 105,720 131,200 (304,400)
03-Mar-05 49,000 491,911 856,100 (1,233,073) (808,000) 135,220 163,400 (380,900)
04-Mar-05 33,000 (190,089) 341,800 (1,669,073) (803,000) 567,920 20,300 862,100
07-Mar-05 18,500 (1,436,089) (312,900) (2,454,973) (803,000) 145,320 53,800 (384,900)
08-Mar-05 16,500 (1,269,089) (308,900) (2,051,473) (800,000) 159,720 150,700 (95,400)
09-Mar-05 432,500 (666,089) (235,700) (2,070,373) (796,500) (161,580) 3,005,700 (907,400)
10-Mar-05 489,500 (455,089) (924,000) (2,733,673) (796,500) (160,080) 141,400 (1,113,400)
11-Mar-05 72,500 (391,589) (1,083,500) (1,586,673) (796,000) (206,880) 125,700 (829,900)
14-Mar-05 (362,000) (319,089) (1,111,500) (1,769,173) (745,500) (204,880) 594,400 (1,242,400)
15-Mar-05 (366,000) (366,089) (1,094,500) (1,604,673) (739,500) (199,980) 1,329,000 (1,801,400)
16-Mar-05 (400,000) (5,007,589) (876,000) (1,237,123) (739,500) (539,780) 273,000 (4,435,400)
17-Mar-05 (400,500) (5,008,589) (827,500) (1,377,423) (740,000) (415,980) 318,000 2,068,100
18-Mar-05 (411,500) (4,984,589) (768,000) (1,974,023) (742,500) (343,180) 137,100 248,600
21-Mar-05 (411,500) (4,984,589) (754,000) (2,162,823) (629,500) (122,980) 3,010,000 1,819,600
22-Mar-05 (416,500) (4,984,589) (772,700) (2,213,223) (630,000) (135,980) 4,528,500 1,803,600
24-Mar-05 (269,500) (4,984,589) (744,200) (2,147,723) (628,500) (139,480) 4,384,500 2,466,600
25-Mar-05 (195,500) (4,984,589) (722,200) (2,049,123) (625,250) (119,780) 4,127,500 2,466,100
28-Mar-05 (266,000) (4,984,589) (720,200) (2,156,023) (625,250) (132,980) 4,027,000 1,271,600

NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 13 OF 13


! "# $ %% & ' ( '

! " #$ # % %&'&("'
! ""#$ # % "') (' *%
+ ,#$ # % "-*'(- ' *
+ -#$ # % )-,'-(*',
+ " #$ # % ((&',%)')%
+ ""#$ # % ( &' "*')
+ "&#$ # % ("&' %-' )%
+ "%#$ # % (("'"(&'**%
+ " #$ # % )* '(&)',%
+ "*#$ # % (&"'%*%',%
+ ",#$ # % ()"' ""' )%
+ )"#$ # % (%,')-&'%%
+ ))#$ # % (%,'" ('-
+ )&#$ # % ( )'&-&')-
") ./ 0 1 )&# /# % %"'"%%'&&
") ./ 0 1 )%# /# % %"'" -'))
") ./ 0 1 ! -#$ # % *)'")('
") ./ 0 1 ! " #$ # % *)'",*'
") ./ 0 1 ! ""#$ # % *)')&,'",%
") ./ 0 1 ! "&#$ # % *"'(%%'*
") ./ 0 1 ! "%#$ # % *)')%*')(%
") ./ 0 1 ! " #$ # % *)'"-%')(%
") ./ 0 1 ! "*#$ # % *)'"-%'%,%
") ./ 0 1 ! ",#$ # % *"'*-,' "
") ./ 0 1 ! )"#$ # % *"'(%)' "
") ./ 0 1 ! ))#$ # % )' -('%(
") ./ 0 1 ! )%#$ # % "',)(',-
") ./ 0 1 )"# /# % " ,'& "'-"%
") ./ 0 1 ))# /# % )) ')) ' )
") ./ 0 1 )(# /# % (, '(%)')
") ./ 0 1 )&# /# % &( '-)-'"
") ./ 0 1 )%# /# % &% ')-,'(-%
") ./ 0 1 ),# /# % & ,') %'(*
") ./ 0 1 "#$ # % &,"'"&)'(*
") ./ 0 1 )#$ # % ( &'( *')*
") ./ 0 1 (#$ # % &)-'* "'%)
") ./ 0 1 &#$ # % &-&',"-'(&%
") ./ 0 1 *#$ # % (- '* ,'"-%
") ./ 0 1 ,#$ # % &",'% "' -%
") ./ 0 1 -#$ # % &)&') )'%-%
") ./ 0 1 " #$ # % ( '" ('-)
") ./ 0 1 ""#$ # % %"*'%)%' &%
") ./ 0 1 "&#$ # % (""'"&,'*&%
!" # " $%& % $ '()*)+)* +$
!" # " ,%& % $ ' *+-+* +$
!" # " )%& % $ ,*( ,*-+$
!" # " (%& % $ (-*-$+*-+$
!" # " %& % $ ' ,*$($*-,
!" # " %& % $ *()$*'
!" # " +%& % $ ,$* )*
!" # " $%& % $ $-*'' *',
!" # . %& % $ -$*$- *)+
!" # . '%& % $ ),*$,)*,,
!" # . +%& % $ ' )*$ (*-
!" # . )%& % $ ' ,*$$-*()
!" # . (%& % $ ' )* -$*$)
!" # . -%& % $ $'*''+*,-$
!" # . %& % $ $*+, *-)
!" # . %& % $ '*+-$*)-$
!" # . +%& % $ ' *)-+*))
!" # . $%& % $ ,(* ,)*+-$
!" # . ,%& % $ ,(*+(-* -$
!" # . )%& % $ , *'-)*-)
!" # . (%& % $ $,*+,,*'-$
!" # . %& % $ ' * )*)+$
!" # . %& % $ ' *$,)* $$
!" # . +%& % $ ' $* (*) $
!" # . $%& % $ ' )*$$ *,-
!" # / % % $ ,(*)) * $
!" # / '% % $ )'*$ *' $
!" # / +% % $ )'*+( *+ $
!" # / $% % $ )-*-$)* +$
!" # / (% % $ (+*'(+*))
!" # / %& % $ (+*'$)* +$
!" # / %& % $ (+*',,*')
!" # / '%& % $ ($*' '*)
!" # / +%& % $ ($* * )
!" # / )%& % $ (+*, +*))
!" # / (%& % $ ($*+' *(
!" # / -%& % $ ($*$')* +$
!" # / %& % $ ($*) *,-$
!" # / %& % $ (+* --*++$
!" # / +%& % $ ('*'+)*$
!" # / $%& % $ (+* *+
!" # / ,%& % $ ('*-,-*
!" # / )%& % $ (+* $*))
!" # / (%& % $ (+* '+* -$
!" # / %& % $ ('* ,)*)-$
!" # / %& % $ )(* - * -$
!" # / +%& % $ ,)* )*' $
, 0& # " # 1 1 $%& % $ -)*, ,*+ $
, 0& # " # 1 1 ,%& % $ - * $(* )$
, 0& # " # 1 1 (%& % $ (,*, -*' $
, 0& # " # 1 1 %& % $ ()*++ *,,$
, 0& # " # )%& % $ ((* (* $$
, 0& # " # (%& % $ )(*- *)(
, 0& # " # -%& % $ , * )$*)$$
, 0& # " # %& % $ ((* -+* (
, 0& # " # %& % $ - *(-$* (
, 0& # " # +%& % $ -$*(-)*($$
, 0& # " # $%& % $ -$*$+ *('
, 0& # " # ,%& % $ '(*,- *$(
, 0& # " # )%& % $ '-*$()* '
, 0& # " # &" -%& % $ * ()*(,$
, 0& # " # &" %& % $ *' * -
, 0& # " # &" %& % $ *' *(,$
, 0& # " # &" +%& % $ * ),*(,$
, 0& # " # ./ +% % $ $,*,)+*(+$
, 0& # " # ./ (% % $ ( * '*,,
, 0& # " # ./ %& % $ *), *$'$
, 0& # " # ./ +%& % $ ''-*- )* '$
, 0& # " # ./ $%& % $ +( *)( * '$
, 0& # " # ./ ,%& % $ $$*(- * '$
, 0& # " # ./ )%& % $ ')-*---*-($
, 0& # " # / %& % $ $ *$+,*-+
, 0& # " # / %& % $ $+*($$*$-
, 0& # " # / '%& % $ $ *) (* +
, 0& # " # / +%& % $ $$* ()* +
, 0& # " # / )%& % $ $$*'+'* +
, 0& # " # / (%& % $ $ *( -* +
, 0& # " # / (%& % $ $ *' )*)-
, 0& # " # / %& % $ $ * +$*,($
, 0& # " # / +%& % $ $ * ,-*''$
, 0& # " # ." (% % $ $ *)$$* (
, 0& # " # ." %& % $ $ *$'$*) $
, 0& # " # ." +%& % $ +(* ( *'$$
, 0& # " # ." )%& % $ +,*,'+*,(
, 0& # " # ." (%& % $ $ *-+,* (
, 0& # " # ." -%& % $ ' *$--* $$
, 0& # " # ." %& % $ '('* ) *)'
, 0& # " # ." %& % $ '($*, ,*'$$
, 0& # " # ." +%& % $ '(+*)'$* $
, 0& # " # ." $%& % $ '($*( ,*-$$
, 0& # " # ." ,%& % $ '()*'- * $$
, 0& # " # ." )%& % $ '()* ' *+ $
, 0& # " # ." (%& % $ '*(-)*$(
, 0& # " # ." %& % $ +*' $*)$$
, 0& # " # ." %& % $ -(*+ * )$
, 0& # " # " %& % $ (-*$'(* -
, 0& # " # " %& % $ )* ' *,+
, 0& # " # " +%& % $ $+)*,+$*- $
, 0& # " # " $%& % $ * , *'-)*$-
, 0& # " # " ,%& % $ (',*'-$*--
, 0& # " # " )%& % $ - $* ''*(-
, 0& # " # " (%& % $ $- * (,* ,$
, 0& # " # . +% % $ + *)$)*,(
, 0& # " # . $% % $ ++*$) *)($
, 0& # " # . -%& % $ $'*''(*)
, 0& # " # . %& % $ ,,*$('*$
, 0& # " # . %& % $ , * ) *)
, 0& # " # . +%& % $ , *$( * -$
, 0& # " # 2 (%& % $ $$*+ ,*)$
, 0& # " # 2 %& % $ -),*$)$*,'
, 0& # " # 2 %& % $ )++*')+* $
, 0& # " # 2 +%& % $ (,$* ) *
, 0& # " # 2 $%& % $ $-$*$--*))$
, 0& # " # 2 ,%& % $ '))*-' *$)$
, 0& # " # 2 )%& % $ , -* ( * $
, 0& # " # 2 (%& % $ ' (*- +*$$
, 0& # " # 2 %& % $ )-*'$,*-
, 0& # " # 2 %& % $ +$* ) *,$
, 0& # " # 2 +%& % $ $-*+-(*-($
, 0& # " # 2 $%& % $ , *( +*)'$
) & # " # &" '%& % $ ( *', *$-
) & # " # &" +%& % $ )(* ) *,
) & # " # &" )%& % $ ),* $+*,
) & # " # &" (%& % $ ),*, $*,
) & # " # &" -%& % $ )'* $*',
) & # " # &" %& % $ ),*' (* '$
) & # " # &" %& % $ )$*''-*,($
) & # " # &" +%& % $ ),* --* ($
) & # " # &" $%& % $ - *)) *)
) & # " # &" ,%& % $ - * +$*+,
) & # " # &" (%& % $ - *( * ($
) & # " # ./ '%& % $ $ *) $*)
) & # " # ./ +%& % $ ('*'+-*
) & # " # ./ )%& % $ +*(()* -$
) & # " # ./ (%& % $ -+*'( *,-$
) & # " # ./ -%& % $ ,)*--(* -$
) & # " # ./ %& % $ +*- *)
) & # " # ./ %& % $ '+* -*)
) & # " # ./ +%& % $ ' -*$+-*+
) & # " # ./ $%& % $ )+*, ,*+)
) & # " # ./ ,%& % $ , *+) *
) & # " # ./ (%& % $ -,* *'+$
) & # " # ./ %& % $ - *-- *)+$
) & # " # ." '%& % $ ) * $(*'$
) & # " # ." (%& % $ ,(*++,*
) & # " # ." -%& % $ )'* -$* $
) & # " # ." %& % $ ,,*' *)$
) & # " # ." %& % $ ,$* $)*,
) & # " # ." $%& % $ $(* $-*(
) & # " # ." ,%& % $ $-*$ +*(
) & # " # ." )%& % $ $(*$ *(
) & # " # ." (%& % $ , * '-*$
) & # " # ." %& % $ , * $*$
) & # " # ." %& % $ $+*, (*-
) & # " # ." +%& % $ $$*+ ,*+
) & # " # " +% % $ ,'*)''*,
) & # " # " $% % $ )-* ) *,$$
) & # " # " (% % $ ) *(,'* $$
) & # " # " %& % $ - * ))*+$$
) & # " # " %& % $ (+* --*$(
) & # " # " '%& % $ ,*++'* '
) & # " # " +%& % $ (+*,' * (
) & # " # " )%& % $ $ * ,,*) $
) & # " # " (%& % $ ,)* +-* $$
) & # " # " -%& % $ ((*, $*,(
) & # " # " %& % $ )+* ,*,(
) & # " # " %& % $ -)*' ,*+ $
) & # " # " +%& % $ $+*',,*,$$
) & # " # " $%& % $ '+'*,')*'$$
) & # " # " ,%& % $ ( *--,*('
) & # " # " )%& % $ )-* +-*+'
) & # " # " (%& % $ $$*+((* $
) & # " # " %& % $ $ *, -* $
) & # " # " %& % $ ,*$ (* ($
) & # " # " $%& % $ ,*,' *(
) & # " # . '%& % $ -)*' *) $
) & # " # . +%& % $ ,*'(,*+$
) & # " # . )%& % $ ) * ,,*'
) & # " # . (%& % $ '$*) +* $
) & # " # . -%& % $ - *$(+*'$
) & # " # . %& % $ ,,*+ )* )$
) & # " # . %& % $ $,*-, * $
) & # " # . +%& % $ , *-( *$ $
) & # " # . $%& % $ , * '-* )$
) & # " # . ,%& % $ ' *( -*
) & # " # . )%& % $ $*$ '*-$
) & # " # . (%& % $ ,*') * $
) & # " # . %& % $ * ( *) $
) & # " # . %& % $ * ' *+,$
) & # " # . +%& % $ $*+ *$($
) & # " # / '%& % $ $-* ( *
) & # " # / +%& % $ - *, *',
) & # " # / )%& % $ $ * ,$* '$
) & # " # / (%& % $ ,'*)) *+
) & # " # / -%& % $ ,,*- -* '$
) & # " # / %& % $ ,-* (,*'
) & # " # / %& % $ ,,*)'+*$,
) & # " # / +%& % $ ) * -$*),
) & # " # / $%& % $ ,-*,, * ,
) & # " # / ,%& % $ ,(* '$* ,
) & # " # / )%& % $ ,(*(+)* ,
) & # " # / (%& % $ ,*+ *
) & # " # / %& % $ '*( +*-($
) & # " # / %& % $ )+*,''* $
) & # " # / +%& % $ )$* ,-*,$
( 1 13 # " # &" '% % $ *)(+*()
( 1 13 # " # &" +% % $ *+)-*')
( 1 13 # " # &" $% % $ * +)*++$
( 1 13 # " # &" (% % $ --*-$ *++$
( 1 13 # " # &" %& % $ --*)'$*,-$
( 1 13 # " # &" %& % $ -'*-$+* $
( 1 13 # " # &" '%& % $ - *(($*()$
( 1 13 # " # &" +%& % $ ,,*-+'*
( 1 13 # " # &" )%& % $ ($*( *,,
( 1 13 # " # &" (%& % $ (,*+ ,*'
( 1 13 # " # &" -%& % $ - *(( * ,
( 1 13 # " # &" %& % $ ( * ('*)
( 1 13 # " # &" %& % $ ( * )+*,,
( 1 13 # " # &" +%& % $ ()* ' *,
( 1 13 # " # &" $%& % $ (*)(+*$'$
( 1 13 # " # &" ,%& % $ ,*'- *,,
( 1 13 # " # &" )%& % $ ,*'''*,,
( 1 13 # " # &" (%& % $ $*)($* ,
( 1 13 # " # ." %& % $ ) *$ $* ($
( 1 13 # " # ." '%& % $ ))* )-*(
( 1 13 # " # ." +%& % $ )'*) * '$
( 1 13 # " # ." )%& % $ ) *,$ *',
( 1 13 # " # ." (%& % $ ))* $ *',
( 1 13 # " # ." -%& % $ ( *- -*+,
( 1 13 # " # ." %& % $ ))*-+,* ,
( 1 13 # " # ." %& % $ ( *, * ($
( 1 13 # " # ." +%& % $ ( * '-*(,
( 1 13 # " # ." $%& % $ )(* (-*,,
( 1 13 # " # ." ,%& % $ ,'* '-*',
( 1 13 # " # ." )%& % $ ,'* '-*',
( 1 13 # " # ." (%& % $ ,'*+''*(
( 1 13 # " # ." %& % $ ,+*,''*
( 1 13 # " # ." %& % $ ,$*+)-*,
( 1 13 # " # ." +%& % $ ,,*( (*(
( 1 13 # " # . %& % $ *-- *,(
( 1 13 # " # . '%& % $ +*)(,*)'
( 1 13 # " # . +%& % $ $ *,()*
( 1 13 # " # . )%& % $ (-* (,* $
( 1 13 # " # . (%& % $ --*$',* )$
( 1 13 # " # . -%& % $ (+* +(*-
( 1 13 # " # . %& % $ ,(*') *,)$
( 1 13 # " # . %& % $ ,'* '$*( $
( 1 13 # " # . +%& % $ ,+*+ )*)$
( 1 13 # " # . $%& % $ $'*+ *')$
( 1 13 # " # . ,%& % $ -*,)-*')$
( 1 13 # " # . )%& % $ )*++ * )$
( 1 13 # " # . (%& % $ +)* ((*
( 1 13 # " # . %& % $ )* $* +
( 1 13 # " # . %& % $ * -*- $
( 1 13 # " # . +%& % $ +* ,,*$)$
( 1 13 # " # . $%& % $ ,* ,*$)$
( 1 13 # " # 2 '%& % $ $$*$$,*
( 1 13 # " # 2 +%& % $ ,*-+ *))$
( 1 13 # " # 2 )%& % $ )* '-*$ $
( 1 13 # " # 2 (%& % $ (*$+$*(,$
( 1 13 # " # 2 -%& % $ *'' *)'$
- 3 4 5 5 # " % % $ )* (*+
- 3 4 5 5 # " '% % $ ,*-(+*,+$
- 3 4 5 5 # " +% % $ -*( *'-$
- 3 4 5 5 # " $% % $ )*'$ *,)$
- 3 4 5 5 # " (% % $ -*$ ,*- $
- 3 4 5 5 # " %& % $ , *( '* $
- 3 4 5 5 # " '%& % $ +,*' (* )$
- 3 4 5 5 # " +%& % $ $ * '*' $
- 3 4 5 5 # " (%& % $ $ *$ +*
- 3 4 5 5 # " -%& % $ +(*+('*
- 3 4 5 5 # " %& % $ ,$*))$*+
- 3 4 5 5 # " %& % $ )$*+$+* $
- 3 4 5 5 # " +%& % $ ))* ,,*)$
- 3 4 5 5 # " $%& % $ ,(*)' *))$
- 3 4 5 5 # " ,%& % $ + * $'*' $
- 3 4 5 5 # " )%& % $ $*, *,$
- 3 4 5 5 # " &" $% % $ $$*$$,*)
- 3 4 5 5 # " &" (% % $ $,*)) * ,
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ +% % $ , *-$)*))$
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ %& % $ (+* ( *()
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ %& % $ - * +,*-+$
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ '%& % $ ) * )*')
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ )%& % $ $(*,' *(
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ (%& % $ *$ (*-
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ %& % $ ,)* (,*
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ +%& % $ * $ *,,'*,+$
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ $%& % $ - ,*'+$*')
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ ,%& % $ * )*- ,* )
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ )%& % $ * ,*--(*$)
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ (%& % $ * $,*- )*))
- 3 4 5 5 # " ./ %& % $ * ' *( *))
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." '%& % $ $ * ) * $$
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." )%& % $ +* (,* '
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." (%& % $ (,*,--* $
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." %& % $ ' *-(+*,$$
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." %& % $ $,*' ,*((
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." +%& % $ -*$'$* $
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." $%& % $ '$*'$$*' $
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." ,%& % $ )'* (*'$$

!
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." (%& % $ - *' * (
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." %& % $ )*,$+*((
- 3 4 5 5 # " ." %& % $ ,* (-* '
- 3 4 5 5 # " " % % $ ''*, * ,
- 3 4 5 5 # " " +% % $ - *- )*'-$
- 3 4 5 5 # " " (% % $ )'*(+,*--$
- 3 4 5 5 # " " %& % $ * ,)* +'* )
- 3 4 5 5 # " " %& % $ ', * ($*'+$
- 3 4 5 5 # " " %& % $ ())*+)$*()
- 3 4 5 5 # " " +%& % $ * , *+$+*
- 3 4 5 5 # " " $%& % $ ,$(* $ *,)
- 3 4 5 5 # " " ,%& % $ * ' *,, * -$
- 3 4 5 5 # " " )%& % $ *+ '* )(*++$
- 3 4 5 5 # " " (%& % $ ,-*, *)
- 3 4 5 5 # " . )%& % $ )'*'-'*'+$
- 3 4 5 5 # " . ,%& % $ $(* (*(-$
- 3 4 5 5 # " . )%& % $ +(,*) -*$)
- 3 4 5 5 # " . (%& % $ ('* *(-$
- 3 4 5 5 # " . %& % $ )'*- *,,
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 '% % $ $-* ' *
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 +% % $ -+* ( *)'$
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 (% % $ - *, (*,($
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 %& % $ -)*$,+* ($
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 %& % $ * * '$
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 '%& % $ )*,+(*'($
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 +%& % $ -(*' (* '$
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 )%& % $ +,$*++'*-+$
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 (%& % $ + '* - * $
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 -%& % $ +(* ,*( $
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 %& % $ ,(*$ $*$$$
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 %& % $ ,'-*'((* +
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 +%& % $ (+ * ,)*+ $
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 $%& % $ ()$*'((*'-
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 ,%& % $ ),,*--'*-+
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 )%& % $ , '*$)+* +
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 (%& % $ ,+ *$ *(,$
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 %& % $ ,+(* + *(-$
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 %& % $ +'-* ',*$+$
- 3 4 5 5 # " 2 +%& % $ + )*($ *,,$
& & 6 " ./ +%& % $ )+* -*) $
& & 6 " ./ )%& % $ $*$''*+ $
& & 6 " ./ (%& % $ +'*+(+*,$
& & 6 " ./ (%& % $ ,-*' (*'
& & 6 " 2 +%& % $ ) *-($* $$
& & 6 " 2 )%& % $ ()* )* $
& & 6 " 2 (%& % $ ((*+ *, $
& & 6 " 2 %& % $ ((*$,(*, $
& & 6 " 2 (%& % $ * )(*- $
& & 6 " 2 %& % $ *$+ *+ $
+ & 5 5 5 5 2 )%& % $ $(*')'*$($

"
+ & 5 5 5 5 2 -%& % $ ,+*' -* $
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 " +% % $ ( * ' * '
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 " $% % $ )+*$+,*$ $
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 " (% % $ $$*' * (
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . '%& % $ )* *+ $
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . +%& % $ -,*(,$*$ $
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . )%& % $ -)*' +*)(
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . (%& % $ * ' *,'
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . -%& % $ ,*)$-* $
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . +%& % $ $-*++$*((
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . $%& % $ * '-*$'
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . ,%& % $ ,+*$ * $$
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . )%& % $ +*$ *((
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . (%& % $ )*' * $$
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . %& % $ '$* -,*, $
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . %& % $ )*- ,*--
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . +%& % $ ''* )+*')
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 . $%& % $ $*, *$,
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 )%& % $ , * +*+
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 (%& % $ $'* -'*-+
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 -%& % $ ) * ,-*)-
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 %& % $ '+'*( *
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 %& % $ (*() *$,
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 +%& % $ )(* +$*,'$
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 $%& % $ ),* +)*$'$
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 ,%& % $ $ *( +*-'$
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 )%& % $ $ *( +*-,
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 (%& % $ ( * ,* ,
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 %& % $ $ *+ *+'
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 %& % $ $'* ',*,'
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 +%& % $ , * ''*'
( 7 8 /5 7 8 9 2 $%& % $ , *'')* )$
+' " " # ./ )%& % $ ,$*$+(* )
+' " " # . %& % $ )* ,-* +$
+' " " # . '%& % $ -)*$- *+($
+' " " # . +%& % $ '+*$,-*+'$
+' " " # . )%& % $ ('* + *(,
+' " " # . (%& % $ '$*-,'*(,
+' " " # . -%& % $ ) *))'*),
+' " " # . %& % $ ) *,'(*',
+' " " # . %& % $ '(*'( *,($
+' " " # . +%& % $ - *+,,*-($
+' " " # . $%& % $ --*),)*(,
+' " " # . ,%& % $ ((* ,-*+,
+' " " # . )%& % $ -+*'--*),
+' " " # . (%& % $ -$*,-$* ($
+' " " # . %& % $ '*' '*''$
+' " " # . %& % $ )* +'*,-$
+' " " # . +%& % $ ,)*, $*$,$
+' " " # . $%& % $ ' *))'*'(

#
+' " " # 2 -%& % $ ,(* ( *('
+' " " # 2 %& % $ '*, $*$
+' " " # 2 +%& % $ $ *$')*+$
+' " " # 2 $%& % $ ( *)' *, $
+' " " # 2 )%& % $ *( +*')$
+' " " # 2 (%& % $ ,)*+,+*)
+' " " # / %& % $ ,-*-,(*+-
+' " " # / +%& % $ ) * ' *- $
+' " " # / $%& % $ ) *+, *- $
++ : " . +%& % $ $$*( '*,+$
+$ 4 5 ! "9 4 $% % $ $ *$$ *)
+$ 4 5 ! "9 4 '%& % $ $ *( +*+$
+$ 4 5 ! "9 4 )%& % $ $ *,, *-$
+$ 4 5 ! "9 4 %& % $ $ * -$*
+$ 4 5 ! "9 4 +%& % $ $ *,+,* $
+$ 4 5 ! "9 4 )%& % $ $ * (*$
+$ 4 5 ! "9 4 %& % $ $ *$ *)$
+$ 4 5 ! "9 4 +%& % $ $ *-+$*
+$ 4 5 ! ./ +% % $ )-*$)'*+'
+$ 4 5 ! ./ $% % $ '$*, *-$$
+$ 4 5 ! ./ (% % $ )(*)-(*+$$
+$ 4 5 ! ./ %& % $ )(*+ ,*'$$
+$ 4 5 ! ./ )%& % $ ,)* * $
+$ 4 5 ! 2 )%& % $ * (*-(
+$ 4 5 ! 2 (%& % $ ($* ( *'+
+$ 4 5 ! 2 -%& % $ , * -+*'-
+$ 4 5 ! 2 %& % $ , *$,,* ($
+$ 4 5 ! 2 %& % $ ,'*+(+* ($
+$ 4 5 ! 2 +%& % $ ,'* $* '$
+$ 4 5 ! 2 $%& % $ ,'* +'*,'$
+) ; # # " ./ ,%& % $ -,*$$,*',$
+) ; # # " . %& % $ )'*) )*$
+) ; # # " . +%& % $ ,'*,'(*()$
+) ; # # " . $%& % $ *+, *
+- & # " # . +%& % $ ,*(('*,)$
+- & # " # . )%& % $ $*( $*$ $
+- & # " # . (%& % $ -+* $ *
+- & # " # . -%& % $ ()*,+ *
+- & # " # . %& % $ )$*,,,*, $
+- & # " # . %& % $ ()*$'+*, $
+- & # " # . +%& % $ - *,'-* $
+- & # " # . $%& % $ $-* ,,*
+- & # " # . )%& % $ $+*,, *
+- & # " # . (%& % $ ,(* ,-* $
+- & # " # . %& % $ ,,*- (* )$
+- & # " # . %& % $ ((*)($*-)$
+- & # " # . +%& % $ - *,++*()
+- & # " # . $%& % $ - *+ (*'-
$ <7 " " % % $ $ *) -*( $
$ <7 " " '% % $ ,$* '* $
$ <7 " " +% % $ )$*,+ *,
$ <7 " " $% % $ )(* -$*,,
$ <7 " " (% % $ )(* $$*-
$ <7 " " %& % $ (,*)$-*+,
$ <7 " " %& % $ (,*+ -*$,
$ <7 " " '%& % $ ( *- )*$
$ <7 " " +%& % $ )(*(--* ,
$ <7 " " )%& % $ ( * ((*(($
$ <7 " " (%& % $ ( *$-,*'($
$ <7 " " -%& % $ ($*- +*,($
$ <7 " " %& % $ ($*, +* '$
$ <7 " = />. +%& % $ , * $ * )
$ <7 " = />. $%& % $ ,'* ) *,)
$ <7 " = />. )%& % $ , *' * )
$ <7 " = />. (%& % $ ,'* --* )
$ <7 " = />. %& % $ ,'*))+* )
$ <7 " = />. %& % $ $,* '* +$
$ <7 " = />. +%& % $ $,* '* +$
$ <7 " = />. $%& % $ $$*+('* +$
$ <7 " " (% % $ $'* +-*('
$ <7 " " '%& % $ $'*'))*('
$ <7 " " +%& % $ $ *$ )* (
$ <7 " " -%& % $ $'* ' * (
$ <7 " " ,%& % $ $$*+ $* $$
$ <7 " % % $ $,*,' *,)$
$ <7 " % % $ ,+* ',* )$
$ <7 " '% % $ +(* )*-
$ <7 " +% % $ +)*'--*+
$ <7 " (% % $ $ *+(,*)-$
$ <7 " %& % $ ,-* '-*,-$
$ <7 " %& % $ )(*$ *'+$
$ <7 " +%& % $ ''*(($* +$
$ <7 " )%& % $ $ * ($*+
$ <7 " -%& % $ ' )*(('*)-$
$ <7 " %& % $ +( * , *,
$ <7 " %& % $ +-+*( *'
$ <7 " +%& % $ +-$* *(-$
$ <7 " $%& % $ $,$* $)*(
$ <7 " ,%& % $ $,,* $)*'
$ <7 " )%& % $ $,)*,,(*(
$ <7 " %& % $ $,)* $* -$
$ <7 " %& % $ $, *,--*,+
$ <7 " +%& % $ + )* $ *),$
$ <7 " $%& % $ + *+ *' $
$ <7 " 1 1 $%& % $ ( *' -*+
$ <7 " +% % $ ,(*+ *'+
$ <7 " $% % $ )(*+ $*$ $
$ <7 " (% % $ ((*(-,*++
$ <7 " %& % $ '+*+' *+,$
$ <7 " %& % $ '+$* +$* $
$ <7 " '%& % $ ''-* - * $
$ <7 " +%& % $ +'$*($ * $
$ <7 " )%& % $ $-+* ),* -
$ <7 " (%& % $ ,) *$ -*- $
$ <7 " -%& % $ , *$',* $
$ <7 " %& % $ ,+-* ,$* +
$ <7 " %& % $ )--*, * $
$ <7 " +%& % $ ( +*$')*$-
$ <7 " $%& % $ ( -* ) *$,$
$ <7 " ,%& % $ -)(* )* ,$
$ <7 " )%& % $ -(+* -'* $
$ <7 " (%& % $ * ' *, (* ,$
$ <7 " %& % $ * $* )$*-,$
$ <7 " &" % % $ ,-*) )*$
$ <7 " &" '% % $ ) *$ -*$($
$ <7 " &" +% % $ , *))(*,,
$ <7 " &" $% % $ ',(*+ -*( $
$ <7 " &" (% % $ '('*,--*))
$ <7 " &" %& % $ + $* ( *$ $
$ <7 " &" %& % $ + $*$ (*- $
$ <7 " &" '%& % $ + ,*$ *- $
$ <7 " &" +%& % $ $+ *) $*$)
$ <7 " &" )%& % $ $+'* ,,*+)
$ <7 " &" (%& % $ $$ * -* +$
$ <7 " &" -%& % $ $, *, (*$-$
$ <7 " &" %& % $ $$(*'),*$+$
$ <7 " &" %& % $ $+-* +,*))
$ <7 " &" +%& % $ $+-*$$'*))
$ <7 " &" $%& % $ $$'* '*$+$
$ <7 " &" ,%& % $ $$'*+ *)-$
$ <7 " &" )%& % $ $$ * '(* -$
$ <7 " &" (%& % $ $$)*) '* -$
$ <7 " &" +%& % $ $ *$ * -$
$ <7 " ./ % % $ ) *', *(
$ <7 " ./ '% % $ ()* $'*'$
$ <7 " ./ +% % $ - *- $*
$ <7 " ./ $% % $ (*'-)*$,
$ <7 " ./ (% % $ ()* ((*(,
$ <7 " ./ %& % $ ( * ) *,,
$ <7 " ./ %& % $ +''*) ,*$,
$ <7 " ./ '%& % $ $ $*- +* ($
$ <7 " ./ +%& % $ $$ *$ *+,
$ <7 " ./ )%& % $ $,,* *(,
$ <7 " ./ (%& % $ , *))'*)($
$ <7 " ./ -%& % $ $- *'+(*-,
$ <7 " ./ %& % $ ,$ * - *+,
$ <7 " ./ %& % $ ,+ *((+* ($
$ <7 " ./ +%& % $ , ,* ( *,($
$ <7 " ./ $%& % $ , )*()'*)'$
$ <7 " ./ ,%& % $ ,-)*(+'* ,
$ <7 " ./ )%& % $ ) '*,' *)
$ <7 " ./ (%& % $ ) ,*, (*,
$ <7 " ./ %& % $ ) *'-(*,
$ <7 " ./ +%& % $ ) *'-(*,
$ <7 " ." %& % $ ,-*++(* ,
$ <7 " ." '%& % $ ))*) * ,
$ <7 " ." +%& % $ $ *())*,'$
$ <7 " ." )%& % $ $)* + *(
$ <7 " ." (%& % $ ,$* (*
$ <7 " ." -%& % $ (*),(*$($
$ <7 " ." %& % $ )(*)-)*,,
$ <7 " ." %& % $ ))* --*+'$
$ <7 " ." +%& % $ )(*'()*+,
$ <7 " ." $%& % $ )-*--)* '$
$ <7 " ." ,%& % $ (+*( *+($
$ <7 " ." )%& % $ ($* *-'$
$ <7 " ." (%& % $ (,* +* '$
$ <7 " ." %& % $ (-* '* '$
$ <7 " ." %& % $ (-*+-+*,'$
$ <7 " ." +%& % $ ((*-, *-$$
$ <7 " ." $%& % $ (-*'+ *)(
$ <7 " " +% % $ - *) * '
$ <7 " " $% % $ - *-+ *-($
$ <7 " " (% % $ * -(*$,
$ <7 " " %& % $ ' (* +$*,
$ <7 " " %& % $ '''*$$-* ($
$ <7 " " '%& % $ '(-* )$*,,
$ <7 " " +%& % $ +' *' ,* '$
$ <7 " " )%& % $ $ ,*)) *(
$ <7 " " (%& % $ +,+*)+'*-
$ <7 " " -%& % $ '(*+ +*,
$ <7 " " %& % $ + -*$$)*-
$ <7 " " (%& % $ )+*) *$
$ <7 " " %& % $ +) * ) *+(
$ <7 " " %& % $ +(,*++)*+-
$ <7 " " +%& % $ +, * +'*'-
$ <7 " " $%& % $ +, * +'*'-
$ <7 " . +% % $ $ *$($* ,
$ <7 " . $% % $ ((*)+ *- $
$ <7 " . (% % $ ($*(-(*-,
$ <7 " . %& % $ $'*' )*'-$
$ <7 " . %& % $ +)* * $
$ <7 " . '%& % $ $+,*$, * ($
$ <7 " . +%& % $ )$ * )(* ,$
$ <7 " . )%& % $ ) +*, -*$,$
$ <7 " . (%& % $ $, *)+)*+-
$ <7 " . -%& % $ ( (*))'* $
$ <7 " . %& % $ -,)*+'(*-+
$ <7 " . %& % $ - * -+*) $
$ <7 " . +%& % $ ()(*$,$*',$
$ <7 " . $%& % $ *'-'*( *,+
$ <7 " . ,%& % $ *'-(*' * $
$ <7 " . )%& % $ *+(,*)$(* +
$ <7 " . (%& % $ *+(,*) $*,-
$ <7 " . %& % $ *$ +*+ *+'$
$ <7 " . %& % $ *$',* ,,*)($
$ <7 " . +%& % $ * (*-( *$)
$ <7 " . $%& % $ * )*- )*$)
$ <7 " 2 '% % $ (-*) )*+'
$ <7 " 2 +% % $ ),*''+*'(
$ <7 " 2 $% % $ +)*$,-*(
$ <7 " 2 (% % $ +,,* ,-* -$
$ <7 " 2 %& % $ $,'* -*--$
$ <7 " 2 %& % $ $-(*$$+* +$
$ <7 " 2 '%& % $ $(,*, )*,-$
$ <7 " 2 +%& % $ $( * *++$
$ <7 " 2 )%& % $ $((* -+*,$$
$ <7 " 2 (%& % $ ,'-* ),*'$$
$ <7 " 2 -%& % $ +$ *( ,*$ $
$ <7 " 2 %& % $ $)(*,) *( $
$ <7 " 2 %& % $ *+ '* ,*'-$
$ <7 " 2 +%& % $ *,-+* ( *--$
$ <7 " 2 $%& % $ *,(-*($+*$)
$ <7 " 2 ,%& % $ *( *+',*)
$ <7 " 2 )%& % $ *( -*- +*'
$ <7 " 2 (%& % $ *( $*'$+* +$
$ <7 " 2 %& % $ *) *', *,)
$ <7 " 2 %& % $ *) +*'$-*
$ <7 " 2 +%& % $ *,(-* ,*, $
$ <7 " 2 $%& % $ *,(-* , * $
$ <7 " / %& % $ ) *-($*-'$
$ <7 " / %& % $ ,+*, ,*),
$ <7 " / '%& % $ ,'* -$*$
$ <7 " / +%& % $ , * *$
$ <7 " / )%& % $ ,'*'$ *',
$ <7 " / (%& % $ , *+,-*)($
$ <7 " / -%& % $ *+ -*,'$
$ <7 " / %& % $ * +'*,'$
$ <7 " / %& % $ $*),(*,'$
$ <7 " / +%& % $ --*( -*$($
$ <7 " / $%& % $ +*' -*''$
$ <7 " / ,%& % $ -* $-*''$
$ <7 " / (%& % $ (*- *''$
$ <7 " / +%& % $ -* ')*('$
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 -%& % $ , *' -*'
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 %& % $ ( * * -
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 %& % $ )+*- +*+)
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 +%& % $ )-* - *()
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 $%& % $ ('*, * -$
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 ,%& % $ + *,' *
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 )%& % $ ((*-)-*
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 (%& % $ '*$,(* )
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 %& % $ '*$ -* )
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 %& % $ (*- -*,'$
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 +%& % $ '*$) *,+
$ &# &# 9 5 < 2 $%& % $ '*) * +
$) " =3 " # &" (% % $ $'* ($*($
$) " =3 " # &" '%& % $ ,+* + *+'
$) " =3 " # &" +%& % $ -(*+$'* $
$) " =3 " # &" )%& % $ *)(,*' $
$) " =3 " # &" (%& % $ * -(*' $
$) " =3 " # &" -%& % $ '*-'$*+ $
$) " =3 " # &" %& % $ * ( *' $
$) " =3 " # &" %& % $ *-$,*+)$
$) " =3 " # &" +%& % $ ,*+ *)$
$) " =3 " # &" $%& % $ *) ,*,$
$) " =3 " # &" ,%& % $ * '$*
$) " =3 " # &" )%& % $ * *))$
$) " =3 " # &" (%& % $ (* ($*$)$
$) " =3 " # ./ -%& % $ -+*') * '
$) " =3 " # ./ %& % $ ) *,) *)'
$) " =3 " # ./ %& % $ +$*)+-* '
$) " =3 " # ./ +%& % $ - *--$*)(
$) " =3 " # ./ $%& % $ - * ''*) $
$) " =3 " # ./ ,%& % $ -*- * $$
$) " =3 " # ./ )%& % $ '+*- *- $
$) " =3 " # ./ (%& % $ -$*-$$*$$$
$) " =3 " # ./ %& % $ -+*+((* -
$) " =3 " # ./ %& % $ -+*+((* -
$) " =3 " # " -%& % $ )*,))* '
$) " =3 " # " %& % $ +(*( -*'$$
$) " =3 " # . +%& % $ '-*,+ *$+
$) " =3 " # . -%& % $ ) *$$$* ,$
$) " =3 " # . (%& % $ (-*'$ * +
$) " =3 " # . %& % $ -+*)--*$)
$) " =3 " # . %& % $ $ * )*'$$
$) " =3 " # . +%& % $ -* ()*-$$
$) " =3 " # . $%& % $ $*, '*((
$) " =3 " # 2 +%& % $ '*),$*))$
$) " =3 " # 2 $%& % $ +*+) *
$) " =3 " # 2 ,%& % $ ,* '-*)
$) " =3 " # 2 )%& % $ *+, *(
$) " =3 " # 2 (%& % $ -)* -,*))$
$) " =3 " # 2 %& % $ ('*+,$* ($
$) " =3 " # 2 %& % $ )'*) $*-
$) " =3 " # / -%& % $ ,+*('$*))$
$) " =3 " # / %& % $ ,-*$) *+ $
$) " =3 " # / %& % $ $ *) *$ $
$) " =3 " # / +%& % $ ,$*' *-$
$) " =3 " # / $%& % $ , *-, * $
$) " =3 " # / (%& % $ $'*'- *))$
, ? " # ./ +% % $ ( *-+ * $
, ? " # . % % $ -$*+ +* +
, ? " # . '% % $ - * (*+$$
, ? " # 2 )%& % $ $-* ((*'-
, ? " # 2 (%& % $ $,*- -*+'
, ? " # 2 -%& % $ $$*+ *)
,+ & < " # . (% % $ (+*+ *''$
,+ & < " # . %& % $ * )(*,)$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & (% % $ $,*$,+*$ $
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & %& % $ $,* '(*$-
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & %& % $ $+* ')*+ $
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & -%& % $ $'* , *$-
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & %& % $ $,* ' *),$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & %& % $ $)*'+,* ,$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & +%& % $ ,)* ( *( $
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & $%& % $ ,-*$ *(-
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & ,%& % $ ,'* ('*$,$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & )%& % $ ,-*,+ *',$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & (%& % $ ) * (*++
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & %& % $ ,(*, *',$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & %& % $ ) *' *+(
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & +%& % $ ,-* (,*''$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " & $%& % $ ,-* + * $
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . %& % $ +-*-''* ,$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . %& % $ ')*+ ,* )$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . '%& % $ + *'(+*,'$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . +%& % $ *( ,* ,$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . )%& % $ ,*($'*-,$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . (%& % $ ' *- * -
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . -%& % $ '$*(''*$,$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . %& % $ ''* *- $
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . %& % $ ''* ''* $
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . +%& % $ -* $ *),$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . $%& % $ -*( -*$,$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . ,%& % $ -(*)'-* $
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . )%& % $ '*) -*$,$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . (%& % $ *$ ,*' $
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . %& % $ (* -*$ $
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . %& % $ -*)+'*',$
,, 13 9 4 # # # " . +%& % $ -*$'(*()
,, 13 9 4 # # # " 2 )%& % $ )'*-)'* $
,) = " # &" +%& % $ $(*+$(* $
,) = " # &" )%& % $ ,,*' *$ $
,) = " # &" (%& % $ )+*$+ *) $
,) = " # &" -%& % $ ((* ('*
,) = " # &" %& % $ '* '$*,)$
,) = " # &" %& % $ $*' +*$ $
,) = " # &" +%& % $ +* $+*+ $
,) = " # &" $%& % $ *'$+*')$
,) = " # &" ,%& % $ $*()(*-$
,) = " # &" )%& % $ +*) ,*
,) = " # &" (%& % $ - *(+-* )$
,) = " # &" %& % $ ( *(-'*+
,) = " # &" +%& % $ ( *+$)*),
,) = " # " (%& % $ $$*( $*
,) = " # " %& % $ ))* -$* +$
,) = " # " %& % $ ,*-)(* ,
,) = " # " +%& % $ -*-- *,+$
,) = " # " $%& % $ -*-- *,+$
,) = " # . %& % $ $+* (,*$
,) = " # . %& % $ -*)$ * $
,) = " # . +%& % $ )*'$ *),$
,) = " # . $%& % $ -*()+*,-$
,( & 5 4 ./ (% % $ $-*,)'* )$
,( & 5 4 " (%& % $ ()* (,*'($
,( & 5 4 . %& % $ $*($-*',
,( & 5 4 . %& % $ (-*+)-*,'$
,( & 5 4 . +%& % $ + * ( *''$
,( & 5 4 . $%& % $ ),*, )*+($
,( & 5 4 . (%& % $ ,$* ' *',
,( & 5 4 . +%& % $ - *,$'*+)$
,( & 5 4 2 %& % $ $,*$ (*' $
,( & 5 4 2 )%& % $ -+* (*
,( & 5 4 2 -%& % $ $* ) *,
,( & 5 4 2 %& % $ --*-, *+-
,( & 5 4 2 %& % $ '*- ,* (
,( & 5 4 2 $%& % $ )(*,+(*)'
,( & 5 4 2 +%& % $ ,$*-,+*+,$
,( & 5 4 2 $%& % $ ,,* *-,$
,- 1 " # " '%& % $ $ *- * ,
,- 1 " # " (%& % $ )-*+,'*-($
,- 1 " # " -%& % $ -$*' $*(($
,- 1 " # " %& % $ )(* (+* ($
,- 1 " # " %& % $ -$* + * ($
,- 1 " # " +%& % $ )-*++ *),
,- 1 " # " ,%& % $ $ *- )* '$
,- 1 " # " (%& % $ , *(-(* '$
,- 1 " # " %& % $ $$*+) * ,
,- 1 " # " $%& % $ $$*,-(*,-
,- 1 " # 2 (% % $ $ * ,*) $
,- 1 " # 2 %& % $ $ * $ *$ $
,- 1 " # 2 +%& % $ $ *( -*$$$
)+ 1 5 . )%& % $ $(*($,* -
)+ 1 5 . (%& % $ $$*$) *),$
)+ 1 5 . -%& % $ )(* +*,+
)+ 1 5 . %& % $ ) *)--*( $
)+ 1 5 . %& % $ )+* * ,$
)+ 1 5 . +%& % $ )+* '* -
)+ 1 5 . $%& % $ $)* - *-)

!
)+ 1 5 . ,%& % $ $'* ,'* )
)+ 1 5 . )%& % $ $'*' +*
)+ 1 5 . (%& % $ $+* ) *
)+ 1 5 . %& % $ $+*' (*,
)+ 1 5 . +%& % $ $)*, *)+$
)+ 1 5 1 1 '% % $ ) *+ -*'
)+ 1 5 1 1 +% % $ ) *' )*'
)+ 1 5 1 1 $% % $ , *$- *++
)+ 1 5 1 1 (% % $ , * ,*(,$
)+ 1 5 1 1 %& % $ $-*)$(*,,$
)+ 1 5 1 1 %& % $ ,'* )-*)-
)+ 1 5 1 1 '%& % $ , *(- *+ $
)+ 1 5 1 1 +%& % $ ,'* ) *+,$
)+ 1 5 1 1 (%& % $ , *+( *-,$
)+ 1 5 1 1 -%& % $ ,'*'$-*$+
)+ 1 5 1 1 %& % $ , *() *++
)+ 1 5 1 1 %& % $ ,'* *' $
)+ 1 5 1 1 +%& % $ , * )-*)-
)+ 1 5 1 1 $%& % $ , *-, *-+
)+ 1 5 1 1 ,%& % $ , *++-*-+
)+ 1 5 1 1 )%& % $ $(*(' *-+
)+ 1 5 1 1 (%& % $ , * , * ,$
)+ 1 5 1 1 %& % $ , *'$(*(,$
)+ 1 5 / % % $ , *+ * -$
)+ 1 5 / '% % $ ( * ) *+
)+ 1 5 / +% % $ ( *($ * -
)+ 1 5 / $% % $ $ *' )* -
)+ 1 5 ." )%& % $ $'*+- *)
)+ 1 5 " )%& % $ (,* , *$+$
)+ 1 5 . $% % $ , *-)+* -
)+ 1 5 . %& % $ *)) *+ $
)+ 1 5 . '%& % $ )-* *(-$
)+ 1 5 . )%& % $ ) * * ,$
)+ 1 5 . (%& % $ $'* +*',$
)+ 1 5 . %& % $ ,,*,) *,'$
)+ 1 5 . %& % $ )$*$$$* +$
)+ 1 5 . $%& % $ , *,+'*')
)+ 1 5 2 $% % $ $ *',,*($
)+ 1 5 2 (% % $ ((*, -*
)+ 1 5 2 %& % $ )+*'+$*$)$
)+ 1 5 2 %& % $ ),*+ *-
)+ 1 5 2 ,%& % $ )(* --*()$
)$ #># # " # ./ $%& % $ + *(-,*+-$
)$ #># # " # ./ ,%& % $ +-*$' * )
)$ #># # " # ./ )%& % $ $,* *,-$
)$ #># # " # ./ (%& % $ $ *),)*'-$
)$ #># # " # " ,%& % $ ( * ( *,($
)$ #># # " # " )%& % $ '*))+*$($
)) . :1 " # '%& % $ ) * $ *-
)) . :1 " # +%& % $ ,)* + *+

"
)) . :1 " # )%& % $ ,+*'' *',
)) . :1 " # (%& % $ $+*) +*-,
)) . :1 " # ./ % % $ $ * '-* (
)) . :1 " # ./ '% % $ -+* -)* -$
)) . :1 " # ./ +% % $ -* ,*- $
)) . :1 " # ./ $% % $ (*( (*(+
)) . :1 " # ./ (% % $ ' '*$ ,*',$
)) . :1 " # ./ %& % $ ' * (* -
)) . :1 " # ./ %& % $ '+,*+( *(+
)) . :1 " # ./ '%& % $ + ,*($'*,+
)) . :1 " # ./ +%& % $ + * +*++
)) . :1 " # ./ )%& % $ '-)*))-*-,$
)) . :1 " # ./ (%& % $ + *,',* $
)) . :1 " # ./ -%& % $ + '*) -*' $
)) . :1 " # ./ %& % $ '-)* -(*(,$
)) . :1 " # ./ %& % $ + * )-*+-
)) . :1 " # ./ +%& % $ + * ,)*--
)) . :1 " # ./ $%& % $ ') *$-,*',$
)) . :1 " # ./ ,%& % $ '$+*$)(*(,$
)) . :1 " # ./ )%& % $ '$$* ,'* $
)) . :1 " # ./ (%& % $ '$ *, )*$,$
)) . :1 " # ./ %& % $ '$ *))(*, $
)) . :1 " # ." '% % $ '(*))+*,)$
)) . :1 " # ." +% % $ + *( -* ,$
)) . :1 " # ." $% % $ ')*-) * '$
)) . :1 " # ." (% % $ +)* ,(*-'$
)) . :1 " # ." %& % $ ,$* $(*'($
)) . :1 " # ." %& % $ $(* ',* ($
)) . :1 " # ." '%& % $ ',*--(* '$
)) . :1 " # ." +%& % $ + * - *$,
)) . :1 " # ." )%& % $ (,*($,*'
)) . :1 " # ." (%& % $ )+*'(,*,'$
)) . :1 " # ." -%& % $ ,$*',)*(
)) . :1 " # ." %& % $ +'*')'* ,
)) . :1 " # ." %& % $ ' *(,+*)
)) . :1 " # ." +%& % $ $,*$ $*-'$
)) . :1 " # ." $%& % $ , *+ $*,
)) . :1 " # ." ,%& % $ $-* '$*(($
)) . :1 " # ." )%& % $ $-*$$,*$'$
)) . :1 " # ." (%& % $ ) *'$(*,'$
)) . :1 " # ." %& % $ ,-* '-*
)) . :1 " # ." %& % $ ),* ,-*
)) . :1 " # " % % $ $+*+ *'
)) . :1 " # " % % $ $,$*(+ *, $
)) . :1 " # " '% % $ -()*))-*',$
)) . :1 " # " +% % $ * ''*-((*'$$
)) . :1 " # " $% % $ * $,*, +*)$$
)) . :1 " # " (% % $ * )'*) *$(
)) . :1 " # " %& % $ -),* *+(
)) . :1 " # " %& % $ * '*( *$ $

#
)) . :1 " # " '%& % $ * '+*+ *- $
)) . :1 " # " +%& % $ * )*'-+*$(
)) . :1 " # " )%& % $ * )*$ * (
)) . :1 " # " (%& % $ * ,*'+'* $$
)) . :1 " # " -%& % $ * '-* ,'*($$
)) . :1 " # " %& % $ ))$*) -*$(
)) . :1 " # " %& % $ )(-*,',*($$
)) . :1 " # " +%& % $ ,)-*+,(* (
)) . :1 " # " $%& % $ )-+* $(*$(
)) . :1 " # " ,%& % $ ) * (* $
)) . :1 " # " )%& % $ ,-$*,+$*'(
)) . :1 " # " (%& % $ ) +* ,,* (
)) . :1 " # " %& % $ ,( *-''* +$
)) . :1 " # " %& % $ ,(,*($ *+ $
)) . :1 " # 2 '% % $ -+* + *
)) . :1 " # 2 +% % $ -$* *(-
)) . :1 " # 2 $% % $ --*+ )*, $
)) . :1 " # 2 (% % $ -(*) ,* $
)) . :1 " # 2 %& % $ -(*)')*',$
)) . :1 " # 2 %& % $ '* '-*,-
)) . :1 " # 2 '%& % $ ,*)++*,-
)) . :1 " # 2 +%& % $ *$$ *$ $
)) . :1 " # 2 )%& % $ - * $*+($
)) . :1 " # 2 (%& % $ + * +-*-($
)) . :1 " # / %& % $ $)*$ ,*+$$
)) . :1 " # / '%& % $ $)*()'*-$$
)- 1 < & @5 #" +%& % $ $$*) *,'$
)- 1 < & @5 #" ,%& % $ $ *$ *+,
( ; 5 AB &# 3& ! 2 (%& % $ $+*-, *+)$
(+ &# & 45 # " # ./ ,%& % $ $+*,,(*,-$
(+ &# & 45 # " # ./ )%& % $ $+*+,)*$+$
(+ &# & 45 # " # ./ (%& % $ $ *) *-
(+ &# & 45 # " # ./ %& % $ - *$-)*($
(+ &# & 45 # " # " ,%& % $ ' ,* ((*+'$
(+ &# & 45 # " # " )%& % $ ' ,*'' *(,
(+ &# & 45 # " # " (%& % $ *-) * ($
(+ &# & 45 # " # " %& % $ * * ,$
(+ &# & 45 # " # " %& % $ ('*) *()$
(+ &# & 45 # " # " +%& % $ (,* *-$
(+ &# & 45 # " # " $%& % $ ( *))(*'+$
(+ &# & 45 # " # . +%& % $ $-* +,*$-
(+ &# & 45 # " # . )%& % $ $$* '(*'-
(+ &# & 45 # " # . ,%& % $ , * $* +
(+ &# & 45 # " # . %& % $ ,'*) ,*,+
(+ &# & 45 # " # . %& % $ ( * *--
(+ &# & 45 # " # . +%& % $ $+*+, *$ $
(+ &# & 45 # " # . $%& % $ $'* )*,)
(+ &# & 45 # " # 2 )%& % $ $'*),(*'+
($ " # " $%& % $ )+*(,,*- $
($ " # " ,%& % $ ) *-+ * $
($ " # " (%& % $ , *'),*+)$
($ " # " %& % $ ) *+-,*)
($ " # " %& % $ ))*(( *',$
($ " # 2 (%& % $ ) * )+*, $
($ " # 2 -%& % $ , *) (* -$
() @@ 5 # " # +%& % $ ,,*'$)*-'$
() @@ 5 # " # $%& % $ , *,)'*(($
() @@ 5 # " # (%& % $ $ *' *,
() @@ 5 # " # %& % $ $ *, -*,
() @@ 5 # " # " % % $ - * *
() @@ 5 # " # " '% % $ (+*'--*$'$
() @@ 5 # " # " +% % $ ),*)- *+$$
() @@ 5 # " # " $% % $ )$*' '*,
() @@ 5 # " # " (% % $ ('*+)-* $
() @@ 5 # " # " %& % $ ,)* (*- $
() @@ 5 # " # " '%& % $ +*,$)* $
() @@ 5 # " # " +%& % $ $*,+,* $
() @@ 5 # " # " )%& % $ - * *(
() @@ 5 # " # " (%& % $ (-*))$*-$
() @@ 5 # " # " -%& % $ , * -+*'
() @@ 5 # " # " %& % $ ,+* -* $
() @@ 5 # " # " %& % $ - *,-,*-
() @@ 5 # " # " +%& % $ +*)+ *, $
() @@ 5 # " # " $%& % $ ' * - *'$
() @@ 5 # " # " )%& % $ , * ' *($
() @@ 5 # " # " %& % $ )+* ,*$+
(( A C < " # . $%& % $ ,+*(++* +
(( A C < " # . ,%& % $ ,$*) '*-(
(( A C < " # . )%& % $ ,+*( ,* '$
(( A C < " # . (%& % $ ,(* )-*$ $
(( A C < " # . %& % $ ,(* $(*+$$
(( A C < " # . %& % $ ,(* -$*-$$
(( A C < " # . +%& % $ ) *+- *$ $
(( A C < " # . $%& % $ ) *( +* $
(( A C < " # / +%& % $ $'*+')*) $
(( A C < " # / )%& % $ $ *)),* '
(( A C < " # / (%& % $ $'* , *,'
(( A C < " # / -%& % $ $ *$+'*($$
(( A C < " # / %& % $ $ *',$* '
(( A C < " # / +%& % $ $,*$ $*,'
(( A C < " # / $%& % $ $$*$ *) $
(( A C < " # / ,%& % $ $ *'--*( $
(( A C < " # / )%& % $ $ * *+ $
(( A C < " # / (%& % $ $$* *$ $
(( A C < " # / %& % $ $$*$'-*($$
(( A C < " # / %& % $ $(*'')*-($
(( A C < " # / +%& % $ $(*, *)'
(( A C < " # / $%& % $ $(* ' *)'
(( A C < " # / $% % $ $,*-' *(+$
(( A C < " # / (% % $ $,*''+* )
(( A C < " # / %& % $ , * '-*
(( A C < " # / %& % $ , *++,*
(( A C < " # / '%& % $ ,$* *
(( A C < " # / +%& % $ ,$* + *,
(( A C < " # / (%& % $ ,+*, '* )
(( A C < " # / -%& % $ ,+*' ,*,)
(( A C < " # / %& % $ ,'*$ *,)
(( A C < " # / %& % $ ,'*-) *)
(( A C < " # / +%& % $ ,'*,-,*$
(( A C < " # / $%& % $ ,'*-$+* +$
(( A C < " # / )%& % $ ,+*+$(*)+$
(( A C < " # / (%& % $ ,+*)((*'+$
(( A C < " # / %& % $ ,$*( -*(+$
(( A C < " # / %& % $ ,,* *-+$
- # " # " %& % $ ) * ,)*)+
- # " # " +%& % $ ) * *' $
- # " # " $%& % $ ) *+ (*)+$
- # " # . +%& % $ , *', *+ $
- # " # . $%& % $ $,*,-'*-'$
- 1 # " # &" %& % $ $'* * -
- 1 # " # &" %& % $ $'* *,-
- 1 # " # &" ,%& % $ $ * ',* $
- 1 # " # &" )%& % $ $ *++ * +
- 1 # " # &" (%& % $ $'*-' * $
- 1 # " # &" %& % $ $'*-( *,
- 1 # " # &" +%& % $ $+*+ +*(-
- 1 # " # ./ $%& % $ $ *,)+* +$
- 1 # " # ./ ,%& % $ ( * +'*-)
- 1 # " # " %& % $ ',*$),*,($
- 1 # " # " ,%& % $ ,+* ,*
- 1 # " # " %& % $ ($* -)*
- 1 # " # . %& % $ ,+*,))* ($
- 1 # " # 2 )%& % $ ,*+)$*
- 1 # " # 2 -%& % $ $*$+ *(-
-+ & #" ./ %& % $ $+* ' *( $
-+ & #" " +%& % $ $(*$,+*,
-+ & #" " )%& % $ )'*-''*),
-+ & #" " -%& % $ (,*(('*
-+ & #" " %& % $ ,,*--'*+($
-+ & #" . +%& % $ $ * )'*+($
-+ & #" . (%& % $ ($* ((* ($
-+ & #" 2 )%& % $ ' (*-)+*)$
-+ & #" 2 (%& % $ '+ *$ +*-,
-+ & #" 2 -%& % $ '$* , *$'
-, & 5 & . +%& % $ ,-* ) * )
-, & 5 & . )%& % $ $ *$( *,-$
-, & 5 & . (%& % $ ) *) (*'
-, & 5 & . -%& % $ ,'* -$*(
-, & 5 & . +%& % $ $+*$$$*--$
-, & 5 & . $%& % $ ,+*),-* )
-, & 5 & . %& % $ (,* * $$
-, & 5 & . %& % $ -'*$)-*('$
-, & 5 & . +%& % $ -+*+ (*,(
-, & 5 & . $%& % $ - *- *,
-) 1 " # " % % $ ,-*',(* +$
-) 1 " # " '% % $ ( * -*-,$
-) 1 " # " +% % $ ),*() *(,
-) 1 " # " $% % $ ),*'$'*$($
-) 1 " # " (% % $ ),* -)*''$
-) 1 " # " %& % $ )-* +$*,
-) 1 " # " %& % $ ( *' * ($
-) 1 " # " '%& % $ ( *')'*-($
-) 1 " # " +%& % $ ( * )(*)'$
-) 1 " # " )%& % $ )-*'$+* '$
-) 1 " # " (%& % $ )+*, +*)'$
-) 1 " # " -%& % $ $ * '*$($
-) 1 " # " %& % $ $,*() *)
-) 1 " # " %& % $ $$*( )*,($
-) 1 " # " +%& % $ $+*(+'*'($
-) 1 " # " $%& % $ $ *,++*(($
-) 1 " # " ,%& % $ $ * -,*(,
-) 1 " # ./ %& % $ $)*,,,*$
-) 1 " # ./ '%& % $ ) *,$+*))$
-) 1 " # ./ (%& % $ ) * ,,*,)$
-) 1 " # ." '%& % $ ()*') *
-) 1 " # ." (%& % $ $ *+,$*+)
-) 1 " # ." -%& % $ -,*' -*)
-) 1 " # ." %& % $ )(*' -* -$
-) 1 " # ." %& % $ ,-* ,)*-+$
-) 1 " # ." +%& % $ ,)*) (*--$
-) 1 " # ." $%& % $ ,(*( ,* -$
-) 1 " # " % % $ , * '*)($
-) 1 " # " % % $ + ,*' $*-+
-) 1 " # " '% % $ $--*$ )*),
-) 1 " # " +% % $ , '*+) *-(
-) 1 " # " $% % $ )) *' ,*+$
-) 1 " # " (% % $ ) +*(, *,
-) 1 " # " %& % $ )$ *,++*+
-) 1 " # " %& % $ ,($* ,'*+
-) 1 " # " '%& % $ )(+*( *$)$
-) 1 " # " +%& % $ ),$*,,$*)$
-) 1 " # " )%& % $ )')*+ -*'
-) 1 " # " (%& % $ )+ *()-*)
-) 1 " # " -%& % $ )$(* +* )$
-) 1 " # " %& % $ ) * '(*) $
-) 1 " # " %& % $ ( -*$-(*-
-) 1 " # " +%& % $ ), *-+,* $
-) 1 " # " $%& % $ )' *' *+)$
-) 1 " # " ,%& % $ +( * ' *)
-) 1 " # " )%& % $ +- * -$*
-) 1 " # " (%& % $ +()*)+,*,
-) 1 " # " %& % $ $+ * +(*+'
-) 1 " # " %& % $ + $*+--*, $
-) 1 " # " +%& % $ + -* ))* $
-) 1 " # . '% % $ (-* + *,
-) 1 " # . +% % $ )(*)(,* ,
-) 1 " # . $% % $ *+$ *,(
-) 1 " # . (% % $ - * +)*,'$
-) 1 " # . %& % $ ,-*$-(* '$
-) 1 " # . %& % $ *+)'*' $
-) 1 " # . '%& % $ ) * (-*',$
-) 1 " # . +%& % $ *(,-* )$
-) 1 " # . )%& % $ '(* ,-*+
-) 1 " # . (%& % $ $ *-),* )$
-) 1 " # . -%& % $ '-,* $*()$
-) 1 " # . %& % $ ',+* - *+)$
-) 1 " # . %& % $ '$ *+$ * $
-) 1 " # . +%& % $ +' * ' *))$
-) 1 " # . $%& % $ + (*)),*$
-) 1 " # . ,%& % $ + *( $*'$
-) 1 " # . )%& % $ + -*( *( $
-) 1 " # . (%& % $ + ,* ,*( $
-) 1 " # . %& % $ --*','*
-) 1 " # . %& % $ ' *+ +*,
-) 1 " # . +%& % $ '-* -'* ,$
-) 1 " # . $%& % $ '+* $+*$-$
-) 1 " # 2 %& % $ - * , *
-) 1 " # 2 '%& % $ *-'+*
-) 1 " # 2 +%& % $ ,+*$ -*
-) 1 " # 2 )%& % $ $(*-,(*'
-) 1 " # 2 (%& % $ - *,'(*',
-) 1 " # 2 -%& % $ ,*)-$*-+
-) 1 " # 2 %& % $ +*,'(*-(
-) 1 " # 9 " '% % $ $ *( '*)'
-) 1 " # 9 " +% % $ $ *(-)*',$
-) 1 " # 9 " $% % $ $,*)- *,'
-) 1 " # 9 " %& % $ $,*)-(*$(
-) 1 " # 9 " %& % $ $)*' '*)(
-) 1 " # 9 " '%& % $ $)*' (*) $
-) 1 " # 9 " +%& % $ $ * , * '
-( & 5 7 5 . (% % $ ,)*+($*) $
-( & 5 7 5 . %& % $ ) *-,+* ($
-( & 5 7 5 2 %& % $ ''*+'+* )$
-( & 5 7 5 2 %& % $ $)*- '* )$
-( & 5 7 5 2 +%& % $ -(*- *- $
-( & 5 7 5 2 $%& % $ $ * ,)*' $
-( & 5 7 5 2 ,%& % $ --* $,*-)$
-( & 5 7 5 2 )%& % $ -* $*()$
-( & 5 7 5 2 (%& % $ $(*+ $*$ $
-( & 5 7 5 2 %& % $ $ *(, *+'$
= : # # " # /4 $%& % $ ,,*,)-*' $
= : # # " # /4 ,%& % $ $-*)$'*',$
= : # # " # /4 )%& % $ $(*)- *, $
= : # # " # /4 (%& % $ ) *+ )* $
= : # # " # /4 %& % $ )'* $-*) $
= : # # " # /4 $%& % $ )'*'+-*+,$
= : # # " # " +%& % $ , *)',* )$
= : # # " # " $%& % $ )+* - *($
= : # # " # " ,%& % $ -,*') *
= : # # " # " )%& % $ -)* ' *
= : # # " # " (%& % $ *, (*))$
= : # # " # " %& % $ *( * $
= : # # " # ./ '% % $ - *' (*, $
= : # # " # ./ +% % $ - *) ,*-'
= : # # " # ./ $% % $ (* -$* $
= : # # " # ./ (% % $ $*-( *
= : # # " # ./ %& % $ ((*(+(* $
= : # # " # ./ +%& % $ ,,*$)+*')$
= : # # " # ./ (%& % $ '+* *+)$
= : # # " # ./ %& % $ *---*) $
= : # # " # ./ %& % $ + *$) *()$
= : # # " # ./ +%& % $ ' *,' *'
= : # # " # ./ $%& % $ )+*))'*) $
= : # # " # ./ ,%& % $ '$(*' )*$ $
= : # # " # ./ )%& % $ -*),$* $
= : # # " # ./ (%& % $ ,+*,-$* )$
= : # # " # ./ %& % $ +,*,, *+-
= : # # " # " +% % $ '(*( +*('$
= : # # " # " $% % $ ) * *(
= : # # " # " (% % $ ) * ,-* )
= : # # " # " %& % $ ( * -*(+$
= : # # " # " %& % $ ) *$ '*-)
= : # # " # " '%& % $ +-* --*$+$
= : # # " # " +%& % $ +*++ * -$
= : # # " # " )%& % $ ()* $+*
= : # # " # " (%& % $ ,*) ,*
= : # # " # " -%& % $ ++* ,)*,+$
= : # # " # " %& % $ *( (*-+$
= : # # " # " %& % $ +'*+ ,*
= : # # " # " +%& % $ '+*(,'*(
= : # # " # " $%& % $ *--$* )
= : # # " # " ,%& % $ ()*- *+-$
= : # # " # " )%& % $ *) *(+$
= : # # " # " (%& % $ ' * , *+-$
= : # # " # . '%& % $ ),* ''* -
= : # # " # . +%& % $ ')* , *'+
= : # # " # . )%& % $ ' *)+ *'+
= : # # " # . +%& % $ )-*(-'*(,$
= : # # " # . $%& % $ )$*$,(* $
= : # # " # . ,%& % $ '+(*$ -*--
= : # # " # . )%& % $ '+ *( '* -
= : # # " # . (%& % $ '$ * *(-
= : # # " # 2 % % $ $+*+ '*,+
= : # # " # 2 (%& % $ ''*, )* '$
= : # # " # 2 -%& % $ +'*+$(* ,$
= : # # " # 2 %& % $ *-+)*) $
= : # # " # 2 %& % $ *) *,'$
= : # # " # 2 +%& % $ ( *+ )*)
= : # # " # 2 $%& % $ , *, -*$
= : # # " # 2 ,%& % $ ' * )*'($
= : # # " # 2 )%& % $ - *++$*-($
= : # # " # 2 (%& % $ $(*+$$*',
= : # # " # 2 %& % $ $)* -*($
= : # # " # 2 %& % $ $)*+'-*+
= : # # " # 2 +%& % $ ''*-' *,+$
= : # # " # 2 $%& % $ '+* *(-$
/ " # " % % $ *- -* +$
/ " # " +% % $ *-( *-+$
/ " # " $% % $ '* ,)*-+$
/ " # " (% % $ *' (*,)
/ " # " %& % $ *, -*-
/ " # " %& % $ '*' -*-
/ " # " '%& % $ +*+( * )
/ " # " +%& % $ -*-$ *,-$
/ " # " )%& % $ *--(* +$
/ " # " (%& % $ * ),*(-$
/ " # " -%& % $ *+',*
/ " # " %& % $ (* ,(* )
/ " # " ,%& % $ ($* $)*+-$
/ " # " )%& % $ ) *(( *$
/ " # " (%& % $ $-*+ +*,)
/ " # " %& % $ ),*$(,*+,
/ " # " %& % $ , *(' *-,
/ " # . %& % $ ++* $(*((
/ " # . '%& % $ , *-- * $
/ " # . +%& % $ *(+ * $
/ " # . )%& % $ )*-' * $
/ " # . (%& % $ + * --* $
/ " # . -%& % $ '-*(( * $$
/ " # . %& % $ '(*() *'$$
/ " # . %& % $ ''*+ *) $
/ " # . +%& % $ ''* ''*,(
/ " # . $%& % $ )-*( *+'
/ " # . ,%& % $ $ * ' *' $
/ " # . )%& % $ $ * (-* $
/ " # . (%& % $ ,-*+'$*,(
/ " # . %& % $ )*+( *-
/ " # . %& % $ $ *-+,*-$
/ " # . +%& % $ $ *'$$*+$
/ " # 2 (%& % $ (,*(++* '$
/ " # 2 %& % $ -'*)$)*(($
/ " # / +%& % $ ,$*$ ,*$)$
, & " # 2 )%& % $ $)*), *,'$
, & " # 2 %& % $ ,(* '$* -$
, & " # 2 %& % $ )+* ) * '$
, & " # 2 +%& % $ )+*)- *(
, & " # 2 $%& % $ ( *$ * ,
, & " # 2 ,%& % $ )-*)+$*-
, & " # 2 )%& % $ )$*),,* '$
, & " # 2 (%& % $ ,)*$(+*)
, & " # 2 %& % $ ) *$--*)+
, & " # 2 %& % $ )$*$ $*,-
, & " # 2 +%& % $ )(*()-* (
, & " # 2 $%& % $ )(*()-* (
) 7 C < " % % $ $'*+),*+($
) 7 C < " % % $ $+* $ * ($
) 7 C < " '% % $ $'*$$$*
) 7 C < " +% % $ ) *$)(* '$
) 7 C < " $% % $ )$* ,(*( $
) 7 C < " (% % $ )$*) $*, $
) 7 C < " %& % $ ),*$ ,*')$
) 7 C < " %& % $ ) * $ *+)$
) 7 C < " '%& % $ ),*'()*-)$
) 7 C < " +%& % $ )$*-+$*
) 7 C < " )%& % $ )'* ' *
) 7 C < " (%& % $ ))* - *( $
) 7 C < " -%& % $ ))*) ,*( $
) 7 C < " %& % $ ))* +*))$
) 7 C < " %& % $ )(*,, * $
) 7 C < " +%& % $ $)*)( *$)$
) 7 C < " $%& % $ $)*)('*(
) 7 C < " ,%& % $ $,* $,* $
) 7 C < " )%& % $ $,* $-* $
) 7 C < " (%& % $ $+* $'*, $
( @ # " # " +%& % $ - *,' *-(
( @ # " # " (%& % $ * - *- $
( @ # " # " %& % $ ,'*( ,*)
( @ # " # " %& % $ )'*( (*( $
( @ # " # " +%& % $ ))*++ *')$
( @ # " # " $%& % $ ))*,,)*( $
( @ # " # 2 )%& % $ )* *(
( @ # " # 2 (%& % $ - *) ,* +
( @ # " # 2 -%& % $ , *,+-*)
( @ # " # 2 %& % $ )(*+)+* ,
( @ # " # 2 %& % $ $,*('-*-,
( @ # " # 2 +%& % $ , *$ ,*('$
( @ # " # 2 $%& % $ ,,*,)+*$($
( @ # " # 2 ,%& % $ ,+* +'*''$
( @ # " # 2 )%& % $ - * -+*$($
( @ # " # 2 (%& % $ ()*$' * '$

!
( @ # " # 2 %& % $ (*+ -*$-
( @ # " # 2 %& % $ +*( ,*),
( @ # " # 2 +%& % $ ' *$' *-'$
( @ # " # 2 $%& % $ ' *, * ($
- # " # +%& % $ ),* -,* )
- # " # $%& % $ ')*')(*
- # " # ,%& % $ '$* ( *,
- # " # )%& % $ '(*',)*()
- # " # " (%& % $ ,)* (-*,$
& . %& % $ $$*$ *',
& . %& % $ *,'$*$
& . '%& % $ $ *)--* +
# " # 2 %& % $ $,* $*-(
# " # 2 +%& % $ + *$ )*- $
# " # 2 $%& % $ + * ( *$$$
# " # 2 ,%& % $ -)*( (*,(
# " # 2 )%& % $ +,*'+(* '
# " # 2 (%& % $ ''* '+*) $
# " # 2 %& % $ $,*'$,* '$
# " # 2 %& % $ $+*,' *$ $
# " # 2 +%& % $ $(*), *(+
# " # 2 $%& % $ $(*)-)*+,$
+ 2 # " # = />. '% % $ $-* ++*-,$
+ 2 # " # = />. +% % $ ,+*() *$ $
+ 2 # " # = />. $% % $ ) *,')*($
+ 2 # " # = />. (% % $ ( * ,$*' $
+ 2 # " # = />. %& % $ ('* ( *')$
+ 2 # " # = />. '%& % $ ($* ) *$)$
+ 2 # " # = />. +%& % $ ($*'',*( $
+ 2 # " # = />. %& % $ *' ,*- $
+ 2 # " # = />. %& % $ $*---*
+ 2 # " # = />. +%& % $ ) *+)(*')
+ 2 # " # = />. $%& % $ $$* ,*+)
+ 2 # " # 79 $% % $ $ *(',*($
+ 2 # " # 79 (% % $ ,'*('$*) $
+ 2 # " # 79 %& % $ ,-* - *
+ 2 # " # 79 +%& % $ ,-*(- *,$
+ 2 # " # 79 %& % $ ,-*- ,*) $
+ 2 # " # 79 %& % $ $ *++)*-
+ 2 # " # "9 4 +% % $ $'* ++*,
+ 2 # " # "9 4 $% % $ ( *$ *--$
+ 2 # " # "9 4 (% % $ +*,+ * -$
+ 2 # " # "9 4 %& % $ +*)- * +$
+ 2 # " # "9 4 )%& % $ -,*'((*,)
+ 2 # " # "9 4 )%& % $ - *-,(* -$
+ 2 # " # +% % $ , * -,*,,$
+ 2 # " # %& % $ ((*+$)*)-
+ 2 # " # +%& % $ ')* * $
+ 2 # " # ./ % % $ $*+ *)
+ 2 # " # ./ '% % $ -* *

"
+ 2 # " # ./ '%& % $ '(* ' *,
+ 2 # " # ./ %& % $ *' *')$
+ 2 # " # ." '% % $ *-' * '
+ 2 # " # ." +% % $ )* ,*-)
+ 2 # " # ." (% % $ ')* (,*'-$
+ 2 # " # ." +%& % $ * (*,+$
+ 2 # " # " % % $ - * '$*+-
+ 2 # " # " % % $ $,* +$*,)$
+ 2 # " # " +% % $ )*' *-'
+ 2 # " # " $% % $ ,-*'+ *))$
+ 2 # " # " %& % $ $+* + * )$
+ 2 # " # " ,%& % $ $ *'),*$ $
+ 2 # " # 2 '% % $ '*'' * ($
+ 2 # " # 2 +% % $ ,*-, * ($
+ 2 # " # 2 $% % $ '*- +*-$$
+ 2 # " # 2 '%& % $ ' *(- *, $
+ 2 # " # 2 (%& % $ (-* +)* $$
< 5 # " # ./ +%& % $ $'*( *'$
< 5 # " # " -%& % $ ((*+ *($
< 5 # " # " %& % $ (,*('(* $
< 5 # " # . $% % $ + *,- *+'$
& 5 5< 3 7 2 +%& % $ ))*, )*$$
& 5 5< 3 7 2 ,%& % $ ,(*,$ *$$
& 5 5< 3 7 2 )%& % $ ,'* -(*
& 5 5< 3 7 2 (%& % $ ,+*,)$*,
& 5 5< 3 7 2 %& % $ )+*) +*'$
& 5 5< 3 7 2 %& % $ ) * (*,
$ 3 /5 @ . % % $ ( *(-)*+'$
$ 3 /5 @ . )%& % $ )(*(+ * ,
$ 3 /5 @ . %& % $ $* -(* ($
$ 3 /5 @ . %& % $ *(-)*$($
$ 3 /5 @ . +%& % $ *'' *-'
$ 3 /5 @ . $%& % $ +'*'$ *')
$ 3 /5 @ . ,%& % $ ,,*$, *$
$ 3 /5 @ . )%& % $ )+* ''* )
$ 3 /5 @ . (%& % $ - *) * '$
$ 3 /5 @ . +%& % $ ),*)$ *+'$
$ 3 /5 @ " '% % $ $+*, *')
$ 3 /5 @ " +% % $ ,(*-(-*
$ 3 /5 @ " $% % $ ) *)) *'-
$ 3 /5 @ " (% % $ ( *,,+* +
$ 3 /5 @ " %& % $ ()*,')*,,$
$ 3 /5 @ " %& % $ ((*--(*-+
$ 3 /5 @ " )%& % $ ((*) $*$+
$ 3 /5 @ " (%& % $ - * $-*++
$ 3 /5 @ " -%& % $ - *(( * ,$
$ 3 /5 @ " %& % $ (-* (*),$
$ 3 /5 @ " %& % $ )'* ,(* +
$ 3 /5 @ " $%& % $ )'* '+*(-
$ 3 /5 @ " )%& % $ )'* +)*,-

#
$ 3 /5 @ " (%& % $ ,+*+ (* ,$
$ 3 /5 @ " +%& % $ $+* $ *+ $
$ 3 /5 @ & (% % $ ,+*$+'* +$
$ 3 /5 @ & (%& % $ $(*,( *,-$
$ 3 /5 @ & (%& % $ )'*( )*')
$ 3 /5 @ & +%& % $ ,(*'+ *(
$ 3 /5 @ & $%& % $ ,(* ((* (
$ 3 /5 @ &" % % $ ++*)$+* +
$ 3 /5 @ &" (% % $ +$*'''*(-
$ 3 /5 @ &" %& % $ '$*))(*' $
$ 3 /5 @ &" %& % $ +(*) *-$$
$ 3 /5 @ &" '%& % $ + *)-)*,)
$ 3 /5 @ &" +%& % $ (,*-,'*'$$
$ 3 /5 @ &" %& % $ ( *+ *($$
$ 3 /5 @ &" $%& % $ -$* $-* (
$ 3 /5 @ 1 1 '% % $ $ *'' * )$
$ 3 /5 @ 1 1 +% % $ $ *,, * )$
$ 3 /5 @ 1 1 (%& % $ $$* *$
$ 3 /5 @ " +% % $ $ *$),*+
$ 3 /5 @ " -%& % $ , *-,+*
$ 3 /5 @ . % % $ *))-*,,$
$ 3 /5 @ . %& % $ '$*,))* -
$ 3 /5 @ . %& % $ ),*$' * $
$ 3 /5 @ . '%& % $ ' +* ()*)'
$ 3 /5 @ . +%& % $ $ *$ -*$,
$ 3 /5 @ 2 (%& % $ , * ,-* $
$ 3 /5 @ 2 -%& % $ *$'+*)+$
$ 3 /5 @ 2 %& % $ -,*) *)-$
$ 3 /5 @ 2 %& % $ $*'$+* -$
$ 3 /5 @ 2 +%& % $ ))*-- *
$ 3 /5 @ 2 $%& % $ )(*' $* -$
$ 3 /5 @ 2 ,%& % $ ' ,*- $*+-$
$ 3 /5 @ 2 )%& % $ ' * ))*--$
$ 3 /5 @ 2 (%& % $ ' *() *,+$
$ 3 /5 @ 2 +%& % $ ' *( $*''
$ 3 /5 @ / (% % $ $ *'' *'$$
$ 3 /5 @ / %& % $ $ *+$ *$$$
$ 3 /5 @ / '%& % $ $'* *,(
$ 3 /5 @ / +%& % $ $'* ('* (
) 7# &# 1 7# " +%& % $ $'*' *'($
) 7# &# 1 7# " $%& % $ $'*'+-*(($
) 7# &# 1 7# " +%& % $ $'* ''*,+$
) 7# &# 1 7# ./ -%& % $ $(*+ )* )
( 4 " # ./ %& % $ $ * ,,*) $
( 4 " # ./ +%& % $ ),* + *$'
( 4 " # ." '% % $ ,(*($(* $
( 4 " # ." +% % $ ,(*+((*'+$
( 4 " # ." $% % $ )'* *+)
( 4 " # ." (% % $ ) * -*'
( 4 " # ." %& % $ ,)*( '*(
( 4 " # ." %& % $ '* ,*)
( 4 " # ." '%& % $ ,$* (,*
( 4 " # ." +%& % $ ((*)+ * -$
( 4 " # ." )%& % $ (,* '$* -$
( 4 " # ." (%& % $ -,*($'*-)
( 4 " # " $% % $ ,* - *'$
( 4 " # " (% % $ ()*)+)*'
( 4 " # " %& % $ + (* '*'
( 4 " # " %& % $ '('*,+-* )$
( 4 " # " '%& % $ +(+*)'(*))$
( 4 " # " +%& % $ + *(,(*$$
( 4 " # " )%& % $ +'+* ('*+)$
( 4 " # " (%& % $ ++)* ,*)
( 4 " # " -%& % $ $,'*$ (*)$
( 4 " # " %& % $ ',)*),'*$
( 4 " # " %& % $ '$(* *, $
( 4 " # " +%& % $ +'+*++'*+ $
( 4 " # " $%& % $ '-+*-+$*
( 4 " # " ,%& % $ '$ * (+*
( 4 " # " )%& % $ '( *, +*-)$
( 4 " # " (%& % $ + +* $ *+
( 4 " # " %& % $ +,)*) ,* -$
( 4 " # " %& % $ $ (* + *'
( 4 " # " +%& % $ $ +* +'*++$
( 4 " # " $%& % $ $ '*( *'
( 4 " # . %& % $ (-*'$ *)+$
( 4 " # . '%& % $ )* '$* $
( 4 " # . +%& % $ '-'*-)$*',
( 4 " # . )%& % $ '-,* , * ($
( 4 " # . (%& % $ '$$*(, *+'$
( 4 " # . -%& % $ '-)*)$'*,
( 4 " # . +%& % $ ( * -,*) $
( 4 " # . $%& % $ )+*- *+-
( 4 " # 2 $% % $ -+* , *-($
( 4 " # 2 (% % $ ' *((,*''$
( 4 " # 2 %& % $ '++*','*(($
( 4 " # 2 %& % $ +$ *'+ *(($
( 4 " # 2 '%& % $ ,$ *) $*$
( 4 " # 2 +%& % $ )$ *+'(*''$
( 4 " # 2 )%& % $ ) ,*---*, $
( 4 " # 2 (%& % $ ( +* ''*-($
( 4 " # 2 -%& % $ )(+*$ * $
( 4 " # 2 %& % $ ) )*( +* ,$
( 4 " # 2 %& % $ )$+*+( *$'$
( 4 " # 2 +%& % $ ,-(* (*+,
( 4 " # 2 $%& % $ ,,$*( ,* ($
( 4 " # 2 ,%& % $ ,$ *' -*+
( 4 " # 2 )%& % $ ),,* ++* ($
( 4 " # 2 (%& % $ ) +* --*('$
( 4 " # 2 %& % $ ,-+* +* $$
( 4 " # 2 %& % $ ) ,*, $* +
( 4 " # 2 +%& % $ )$ * )* '
( 4 " # 2 $%& % $ )$ * ,$*$'
- 2 " ./ % % $ +-* +*- $
- 2 " ./ % % $ +-* ')*-$
- 2 " ./ +% % $ $'* * $
- 2 " ./ $% % $ $ *((+* $
- 2 " ./ %& % $ $ *- '*-$
- 2 " ./ %& % $ $'*- $* $
- 2 " ./ '%& % $ $'*' +*-
- 2 " ./ +%& % $ ''*) ,*+
- 2 " ./ )%& % $ $'*()(*($
- 2 " ./ +%& % $ $+*)''* $
- 2 " ./ $%& % $ $'*-,,*$$
- 2 " ./ ,%& % $ +)*$ $*)$
- 2 " ./ (%& % $ +)*()'*)$
- 2 " . % % $ *),-*
- 2 " 2 % % $ $'* )* -$
- 2 " 2 +% % $ (-* , *++$
- 2 " 2 %& % $ ()*'' *-+$
- 2 " 2 %& % $ ( *-),*,-$
- 2 " 2 +%& % $ (-*'),*,-$
- 2 " 2 )%& % $ ((*-)+* -$
- 2 " 2 (%& % $ (-*$$+* -$
- 2 " 2 %& % $ (-*)' *()
- 2 " 2 ,%& % $ - * ( *,
- 2 " 2 %& % $ - * ,*,
' /5 & 5 1 ." '% % $ $$*'-$* )
' /5 & 5 1 ." +% % $ $ *'(+*,
' /5 & 5 1 . %& % $ ++* $*(
' /5 & 5 1 . %& % $ ++*+( *+$
' /5 & 5 1 . '%& % $ ( *)$ *,$
' /5 & 5 1 . +%& % $ ,$* )$*+'
' /5 & 5 1 . )%& % $ )'*$++*- $
' /5 & 5 1 . (%& % $ ,)*+ $* $
' /5 & 5 1 . -%& % $ ( *- -*'(
' /5 & 5 1 . %& % $ ) *,$'*$'
' /5 & 5 1 . %& % $ )$* *)'
' /5 & 5 1 . +%& % $ ('*( (*($$
' /5 & 5 1 . $%& % $ )-*( ,*)(
' /5 & 5 1 . ,%& % $ ) *-$)*((
' /5 & 5 1 . )%& % $ ,,* $$*)$$
' /5 & 5 1 . (%& % $ ) *+ *$(
' /5 & 5 1 . %& % $ )'*)-'*)-
' /5 & 5 1 . %& % $ )'*($ *(+
' /5 & 5 1 . +%& % $ )-*$, *+ $
' /5 & 5 1 . $%& % $ ( *,-)* )$
' /5 & 5 1 2 (%& % $ --*( *+,
' /5 & 5 1 2 -%& % $ $* $*)'
' /5 & 5 1 2 %& % $ +* ) *)
' /5 & 5 1 2 %& % $ *-)'*''
' /5 & 5 1 2 +%& % $ * (+*$'
' /5 & 5 1 2 $%& % $ -*, * '
' /5 & 5 1 2 ,%& % $ $*$ (*- $
' /5 & 5 1 2 )%& % $ $*)()*'$$
' /5 & 5 1 2 (%& % $ )*+$(*)$$
' /5 & 5 1 2 %& % $ (*' +* ,
' /5 & 5 1 2 %& % $ (*($'*$,
' /5 & 5 1 2 +%& % $ -* (,*)+
' /5 & 5 1 2 $%& % $ -* $$*--
'+ 0 45 +%& % $ $(* ( *'$
'+ 0 45 $%& % $ , *+,,*$$
'+ 0 45 ,%& % $ $(*(( *, $
'+ 0 45 )%& % $ $(* , *()$
'+ 0 45 $%& % $ - *,-$*)-$
'+ 0 45 ,%& % $ --* -+*
'+ 0 45 )%& % $ *$+-*-+$
'+ 0 45 (%& % $ *,( *-)
'+ 0 45 %& % $ *)+(* )$
'+ 0 45 +%& % $ '*$) * '
'+ 0 45 ./ +%& % $ ,'* *-$$
'+ 0 45 ./ $%& % $ ''*'' * (
'+ 0 45 ./ ,%& % $ ')'*-,)* (
'+ 0 45 ./ )%& % $ '(+*$)(* $
'+ 0 45 ./ (%& % $ ',$* $+*)(
'+ 0 45 ./ %& % $ '+,* - *$'
'+ 0 45 ./ %& % $ '+$*((+*,$
'+ 0 45 " $%& % $ , * ')*-+
'+ 0 45 " ,%& % $ )* '*(-
'+ 0 45 " )%& % $ $,* ,$*(-
'+ 0 45 " (%& % $ , *(('* ,$
'+ 0 45 . +%& % $ ,+* $ *$$
'+ 0 45 . $%& % $ ($* $,*))$
'+ 0 45 . ,%& % $ '$ * )-* $
'+ 0 45 2 )%& % $ * -* '
'+ 0 45 2 (%& % $ ),*$ )*-$
'+ 0 45 2 %& % $ ,$*-$,*'-
'+ 0 45 2 %& % $ ,*$-'* +
'+ 0 45 2 +%& % $ -(* (*) $
'+ 0 45 2 $%& % $ ('* (,* $
'$ C 7 & (% % $ -*'()* $
'$ C 7 & %& % $ *($)*')$
'$ C 7 & %& % $ * $*-
'$ C 7 & (%& % $ --*)')*+
'$ C 7 ./ ,%& % $ (*,, *($$
'$ C 7 ./ )%& % $ *()+*-(
'$ C 7 ./ (%& % $ (,*( $* '
'$ C 7 ./ %& % $ ) *'( *-(
'$ C 7 " %& % $ ),*,+)*+ $
'$ C 7 " +%& % $ $,*) (* ,$
'$ C 7 " )%& % $ )*'$$*, $
'$ C 7 " %& % $ )-*((,*)-
'$ C 7 " %& % $ (* )*,+
'$ C 7 " +%& % $ ) *-,'*,,$
'$ C 7 " ,%& % $ ( * * $
'$ C 7 " )%& % $ '+*+$'*)-
'$ C 7 " %& % $ ('*+( *,,
'$ C 7 " +%& % $ ((* ,-*,,
'$ C 7 " $%& % $ ((*'('*')$
'$ C 7 . %& % $ $+* (*-($
'$ C 7 . '%& % $ $'*' '* $$
'$ C 7 . %& % $ ) *(-(* -
'$ C 7 . %& % $ ) *,( *'+
'$ C 7 . +%& % $ $(*,('*++
'$ C 7 . ,%& % $ ( *)- * ,$
'$ C 7 . )%& % $ )(* )-*)-
'$ C 7 2 %& % $ $ *)-)* ,
'$ C 7 2 +%& % $ ' * ()*$,
'$ C 7 2 $%& % $ -(*(-,*+,
'$ C 7 2 ,%& % $ )*$+$*-'$
'( = 1 " # ./ %& % $ ) *+ +* +$
'( = 1 " # ./ '%& % $ * +(*$
'( = 1 " # ./ +%& % $ )$*+($*'+$
'( = 1 " # ./ )%& % $ ()*) * )
'( = 1 " # ./ (%& % $ ,(* -,*,-$
'( = 1 " # ." % % $ $,*++(*$ $
'( = 1 " # ." %& % $ ()* *(($
'( = 1 " # ." '%& % $ - * +(* ,
'( = 1 " # ." +%& % $ ' *, '*,($
'( = 1 " # ." )%& % $ ,'*+,-*,,
'( = 1 " # ." (%& % $ ' ,*) +* ,
'( = 1 " # ." -%& % $ '+ *(-,*(
'( = 1 " # ." %& % $ '+ *$$ *(
'( = 1 " # ." %& % $ '+ *,$,*(,
'( = 1 " # ." +%& % $ '+$* '*,'$
'( = 1 " # ." $%& % $ ' ,*' -*+($
'( = 1 " # ." ,%& % $ '$ * ((* ,
'( = 1 " # ." )%& % $ '+-*-,(* ($
'( = 1 " # ." (%& % $ '$ *(( *+'$
'( = 1 " # ." %& % $ '$ * , *,($
'( = 1 " # " +% % $ , * )$*-+
'( = 1 " # " $% % $ ) *$ *$'
'( = 1 " # " (% % $ )'* -+*+ $
'( = 1 " # " %& % $ - *--+* $
'( = 1 " # " %& % $ ($* (+*+ $
'( = 1 " # " '%& % $ ' *+- *+ $
'( = 1 " # " +%& % $ '*) '* $
'( = 1 " # " )%& % $ )'*+ ,*''
'( = 1 " # " (%& % $ )$* (+*$(
'( = 1 " # " -%& % $ '* +,*,'
'( = 1 " # " %& % $ ( * )-*)$$
'( = 1 " # " %& % $ ($*+)-*'$$
'( = 1 " # " +%& % $ ( *','* $
'( = 1 " # " $%& % $ ) *--'*$$$
'( = 1 " # " ,%& % $ $)* $$*)(
'( = 1 " # " )%& % $ '(*($ *((
'( = 1 " # " (%& % $ ))* ''*+ $
'( = 1 " # " %& % $ )(*+) *'+$
'( = 1 " # . $%& % $ '* + *( $
'( = 1 " # . ,%& % $ * +,*'(
'( = 1 " # . )%& % $ +,*+,(*-'
'( = 1 " # . (%& % $ $*)$)*$ $
'( = 1 " # . %& % $ *-, *)'$
'( = 1 " # 2 %& % $ (,*''(*-(
'( = 1 " # 2 '%& % $ -(*(''*-$$
'( = 1 " # 2 +%& % $ $ *' (* (
'( = 1 " # 2 )%& % $ + *(+ * +$
'( = 1 " # 2 (%& % $ $ * ''* ,
'( = 1 " # 2 -%& % $ ,* +*(-
'( = 1 " # 2 %& % $ -* ),* ,
'( = 1 " # 2 %& % $ ''*+( * )
'( = 1 " # 2 +%& % $ -)*)' * -$
'( = 1 " # 2 $%& % $ '* ',*++$
'( = 1 " # 2 )%& % $ $ *()+* )
'( = 1 " # 2 (%& % $ ()*' $*))
'( = 1 " # 2 %& % $ $ *()-*)($
'- " " %& % $ ,(*($$*)+
'- " " %& % $ ('* +,* -
'- " " +%& % $ ()* +,* -
'- " " $%& % $ -+*)),*,-
'- " )%& % $ $ *$' *+ $
'- " -%& % $ $+*$ (*')$
'- " %& % $ $,* ,-*+ $
+ 6 # " # ." '%& % $ )$*, +*, $
+ " %& % $ - *($$* $
+ " %& % $ )-* $'*))$
+ " $%& % $ ,-*( * $
+ " ,%& % $ , *, +*($
+ " )%& % $ ,+*(+,*$$
+ " (%& % $ $)*),-* )$
+ " %& % $ $ *()$* )$
+ " %& % $ $'* ,*
+ " 2 )%& % $ $$* ) *('$
+ " 2 (%& % $ '*$ '*- $
+ " 2 -%& % $ ''*(+'*'$$
+ " 2 %& % $ ()* $* $
+ " 2 %& % $ (+*$+$*) $
+ " 2 +%& % $ ((* ''* $
+ " 2 $%& % $ ()*$ * $
+ " 2 ,%& % $ --*-) *+ $
+ " 2 )%& % $ -(*'(-*+)$
+ " 2 (%& % $ ' *) * $
+ " 2 %& % $ *),)*)-
+ " 2 %& % $ * ' *)-
+ " 2 +%& % $ +* +-* )$
+ " 2 $%& % $ +* ('*)
+' " # /4 +%& % $ $ *) *$)
+' " # ./ '%& % $ $ *($$*-
+' " # ./ +%& % $ $*$+(*
+' " # ./ )%& % $ ,*+)+*,$
+' " # ./ (%& % $ - * (,* )$
+' " # ./ -%& % $ ((*$),*)
+' " # ./ %& % $ (-*( +*
+' " # ./ %& % $ ( *)' *(
+' " # ./ $%& % $ $+*$-(*))$
+' " # ./ (%& % $ $ *'''*-$
+' " # . %& % $ (+* $* )$
+' " # . %& % $ -'*) *+ $
+' " # . '%& % $ ))*(,,* )$
+' " # . -%& % $ $ *+ ,*''$
+' " # . %& % $ $ *'-(* '$
+' " # . +%& % $ $ *, (*$($
+' " # . $%& % $ $ *) *+,
+' " # . )%& % $ , *, '*
+' " # 2 +%& % $ $ * ) * )$
+' " # 2 )%& % $ ,'* -* ,
++ / 5 ./ $%& % $ $(*$$'*(+$
++ / 5 . %& % $ ((* +-*(
++ / 5 . '%& % $ -,*( *(
++ / 5 . +%& % $ * +'*
++ / 5 . )%& % $ *',-*()$
++ / 5 . (%& % $ *, )* )$
++ / 5 . -%& % $ * *()$
++ / 5 . %& % $ +* $+* $
++ / 5 . %& % $ *' )*-)$
++ / 5 . +%& % $ '* (*))$
++ / 5 . $%& % $ $*,)(*))$
++ / 5 . ,%& % $ *'-'*+)$
++ / 5 . )%& % $ '*' )*+)$
++ / 5 . (%& % $ $* , *-)$
++ / 5 . %& % $ ,* --*-)$
++ / 5 . $%& % $ (* ++*-)$
++ / 5 2 $%& % $ $+*)+$*)$
++ / 5 2 ,%& % $ $'*,$$*
++ / 5 2 )%& % $ - *-(,* $
++ / 5 2 (%& % $ '*$)-*( $
++ / 5 2 %& % $ '* $)*' $
++ / 5 2 %& % $ +* ,-*),$
++ / 5 2 +%& % $ -* (*-(
+$ # " # ./ +% % $ $,* +-*- $
+$ # " # ./ $% % $ $+*) )*)
+$ # " # ./ (% % $ $ *- $* $
+$ # " # ./ %& % $ $ *, *$
+$ # " # ./ %& % $ )(*(, *-$
+$ # " # ./ '%& % $ )-* +$*)
+$ # " # ./ )%& % $ $,*$((*))$
+$ # " # ./ (%& % $ $+*,, *
+$ # " # ./ $%& % $ )+* ''* )$
+$ # " # / $%& % $ $ *$ *)($
+$ # " # / ,%& % $ $+*$ ,*''$
+, 0 & 5 # #" < # " ./ )%& % $ $'* $* $
+, 0 & 5 # #" < # " ./ $%& % $ $)* ('*,,$
+, 0 & 5 # #" < # " 2 %& % $ (-* ' *-$
+, 0 & 5 # #" < # " 2 +%& % $ ))*+- *
+, 0 & 5 # #" < # " 2 $%& % $ )$*) (*,$
+, 0 & 5 # #" < # " 2 ,%& % $ ,)* )'*, $
+, 0 & 5 # #" < # " 2 )%& % $ ,)*+,'*,
+, 0 & 5 # #" < # " 2 (%& % $ ))*-+'*
+, 0 & 5 # #" < # " 2 %& % $ )-*+,,*)$
+, 0 & 5 # #" < # " 2 +%& % $ )$* -'*'$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . % % $ $ *$,$* +
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . +% % $ --*( )* +
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . $% % $ * *(
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . (% % $ * ,*$)
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . %& % $ *, *,
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . '%& % $ ('*,++*$-$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . +%& % $ )*-$'* +$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& (%& % $ $ *+'$*),
+- 0 5 6 3 #& -%& % $ $)*''-*,'$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& '%& % $ ,(*' ,*,
+- 0 5 6 3 #& +%& % $ (+*,+ *+)$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& )%& % $ (*+,,* $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& (%& % $ (*+,+*+$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& -%& % $ )*,,-*-
+- 0 5 6 3 #& %& % $ '(* $*+
+- 0 5 6 3 #& %& % $ +$*) )* )$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& $%& % $ +$*')-*+)$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ,%& % $ ++* ) *-)$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& )%& % $ ' *-()*) $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& (%& % $ ' *-($* )$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& %& % $ ''* $ * (
+- 0 5 6 3 #& &" '% % $ $ *+$ * )$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& &" +% % $ )$*) )* $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& &" (% % $ (,*+'-*, $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& &" %& % $ ('* )+*-$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& &" '%& % $ ('* ) *+$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& &" +%& % $ ((*--)*+$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& &" )%& % $ *) +* $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ %& % $ , * $* )$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ +%& % $ ,*) * $

!
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ )%& % $ ,'* ) *)$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ (%& % $ +*) -*'$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ -%& % $ $$*)-+*-
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ %& % $ $*)$)*+ $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ %& % $ $*)$)* $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ +%& % $ '* ,*'$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ $%& % $ $*,) *+
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ ,%& % $ *+$ *))$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ )%& % $ --*- $*( $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ (%& % $ +*))'*$ $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ./ %& % $ (-*-) *- $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." %& % $ ,$*-)$*
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." %& % $ '+*(('* )$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." '%& % $ '$*(((*, $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." -%& % $ $ *( -*' $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." %& % $ ,,*) $*+)$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." %& % $ ')*(--*+
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." ,%& % $ ,+*) )*+
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." )%& % $ $'*) *$$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." (%& % $ +'*+ (* $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." %& % $ $*,$)*))$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." %& % $ -*($$* $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& ." +%& % $ '* )(* $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " % % $ ) *--)*( $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " '% % $ -(*,$+*$($
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " +% % $ $$*)( *-'
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " $% % $ ', *$+ *-,$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " (% % $ + (*$+(*- $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " %& % $ +$ * ,$*-,$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " %& % $ ++ * ()* ,$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " '%& % $ +(,*(, *, $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " +%& % $ +) *$+-*( $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " )%& % $ +))* - *)+
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " (%& % $ +),*'-$* -
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " -%& % $ +( * ),* $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " %& % $ +)$* - *+ $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " %& % $ +,)*($ *'-
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " +%& % $ $ $* * ,$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " $%& % $ $' *,,+*' $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " ,%& % $ $ -*-('*(+
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " )%& % $ $ (*$- *+,$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " (%& % $ $' * - *--
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " %& % $ ++$*,+ *) $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " %& % $ + -*,( * $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& " +%& % $ + *(( * $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . % % $ ,(*( -* )
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . (% % $ -'*,, * -$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . %& % $ - *),-*),$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . %& % $ - *$')* $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . %& % $ ('*'(-*$-

"
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . %& % $ ' '* (*--
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . +%& % $ +,+*'(,*( $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . $%& % $ +, * , *- $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . ,%& % $ $ *+ *, $
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . )%& % $ $ +*(((*'+
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . (%& % $ , * - *--
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . %& % $ $'+*( '*+
+- 0 5 6 3 #& . %& % $ +(,*+ )*$+$
+- 0 5 6 3 #& 2 (%& % $ $-*),$*+($
$ . =3 " # &" '% % $ $ *,-'*)'
$ . =3 " # &" (% % $ $ * -'* -$
$ . =3 " # &" %& % $ $ * ('*- $
$ . =3 " # &" %& % $ $ *' ,* ,$
$ . =3 " # &" $%& % $ $ * +,*) $
$ . =3 " # &" ,%& % $ $ * --*-,$
$ . =3 " # &" )%& % $ $ *- *'+
$ . =3 " # &" (%& % $ $ * ($*$-
$ . =3 " # . -%& % $ - * ))*-)$
$ . =3 " # . %& % $ )'* (* $
$ . =3 " # . %& % $ , * +*- $
$ . =3 " # 2 '% % $ $ * '+*
$ . =3 " # 2 +% % $ *) )* (
$ . =3 " # 2 $% % $ (*-+ *) $
$ . =3 " # 2 (% % $ )*($-*-,$
$ . =3 " # 2 %& % $ )*---*(,$
$ . =3 " # 2 %& % $ ,,* ()*-+
$ . =3 " # 2 '%& % $ *,',*'-
$ . =3 " # 2 +%& % $ ($*,(,* +
$ . =3 " # 2 )%& % $ )'*, *
$ . =3 " # 2 (%& % $ '+*) )*,,
$ . =3 " # 2 -%& % $ (*, *('
$ . =3 " # 2 %& % $ ) * '$*()
$ . =3 " # 2 +%& % $ ) *(- *$
$ . =3 " # 2 $%& % $ $(*+,'*+-$
$ 0 . D 5 !" # 2 %& % $ +-*+, * ,$
$ 0 . D 5 !" # 2 %& % $ '*'-+*(,$
$ 0 . D 5 !" # 2 +%& % $ (* *+,$
$ 0 . D 5 !" # 2 $%& % $ )*---*) $
$ 0 . D 5 !" # 2 ,%& % $ $(* ( *+-
$ 0 . D 5 !" # 2 )%& % $ )-*-( *$+
$ 0 . D 5 !" # 2 (%& % $ '* -+*- $
$ 0 . D 5 !" # 2 %& % $ '$*,) *, $
$ 0 . D 5 !" # 2 +%& % $ , * ( * $
$ 0 . D 5 !" # 2 $%& % $ , * ,*)+
$ & 5 <4 " %& % $ $$*'$ *'(
$ & 5 <4 " ,%& % $ $(*',-* (
$ & 5 <4 " (%& % $ , *+$'*,(
$ & 5 <4 2 ,%& % $ , *($ *( $
$' & 5 /5 << ./ %& % $ ,,* $)* $
$' & 5 /5 << ./ ,%& % $ - *'--*'$$

#
$' & 5 /5 << ./ )%& % $ )*-(-*'(
$' & 5 /5 << ./ (%& % $ )* , * (
$' & 5 /5 << ./ %& % $ )*- -*-(
$' & 5 /5 << ." $%& % $ +*+()*+ $
$' & 5 /5 << " $%& % $ ',*, +*+
$' & 5 /5 << " ,%& % $ +''*'+,*(
$' & 5 /5 << " )%& % $ + '*)- *),
$' & 5 /5 << " (%& % $ ,$-*' '*(,
$' & 5 /5 << " %& % $ , * +(*+ $
$' & 5 /5 << " %& % $ )(*, +*
$' & 5 /5 << " +%& % $ )-*$ )*-+$
$' & 5 /5 << . %& % $ (,* $*--$
$' & 5 /5 << . )%& % $ ),*-$+*)
$' & 5 /5 << . (%& % $ $-*) )*)'$
$' & 5 /5 << . (%& % $ $ * ))*('$
$' & 5 /5 << . %& % $ $ *,$ *-$$
$' & 5 /5 << . %& % $ $+*'+ *+$
$' & 5 /5 << . +%& % $ , * * +
$$ # " # ./ +% % $ -+*) -*)
$$ # " # ./ (%& % $ $)*$ *, $
$$ # " # ./ %& % $ , *+))*(,$
$$ # " # . '%& % $ $ *),,*'+$
$$ # " # . +%& % $ ) * (+*,,$
$$ # " # . )%& % $ ,)*$,$* +
$$ # " # . (%& % $ ) * '* +
$$ # " # . -%& % $ $ *$ )*) $
$$ # " # . $%& % $ $'* + *,-
$$ # " # . )%& % $ $ *'-$*,,$
$$ # " # . (%& % $ ,$* +* -
$$ # " # . %& % $ ) *( +*-(
$$ # " # . %& % $ )'*,',* '
$$ # " # . +%& % $ ( * +-*)-
$$ # " # . $%& % $ ),*''-*' $
$( & # " # &" $% % $ ( * ''*($
$( & # " # &" (% % $ ( *'('*--
$( & # " # &" %& % $ ,+*$ -*+ $
$( & # " # ./ %& % $ ,-*- +*)($
$( & # " # ./ '%& % $ )(* *,($
$( & # " # ./ +%& % $ '*+$ * ,
$( & # " # ./ )%& % $ $-*$ +*)'$
$( & # " # ./ (%& % $ +* ''*+
$( & # " # ./ -%& % $ )'*+')* '$
$( & # " # ./ %& % $ --*+()*-'$
$( & # " # ./ %& % $ --*$ ,*$($
$( & # " # ./ +%& % $ * - *$'$
$( & # " # ./ $%& % $ *()(*+
$( & # " # ./ (%& % $ ',*$ '* ,
$( & # " # ./ %& % $ *($$*$'$
$( & # " # " '% % $ +-*,-(*$ $
$( & # " # " +% % $ +(* ) *,+$
$( & # " # " $% % $ $,* ''* )$
$( & # " # " (% % $ ,+*)($*- $
$( & # " # " %& % $ '(*+$ *
$( & # " # " %& % $ '+* '* )$
$( & # " # " '%& % $ + *$+ *,
$( & # " # " +%& % $ + * ,*-$
$( & # " # " )%& % $ ',*(,'*'
$( & # " # " (%& % $ ))*'$$*) $
$( & # " # . -%& % $ ,*( '* $
$( & # " # . %& % $ ,*( ,*( $
$( & # " # . ,%& % $ ($*) *-,$
$( & # " # . )%& % $ ('*$ *(-
$( & # " # 2 +%& % $ -(*,' *'
$( & # " # 2 )%& % $ --* -*,,
$- > < # " # 2 %& % $ -*)-$*--$
$- > < # " # 2 %& % $ +*(( *, $
$- > < # " # 2 +%& % $ '* '-*'-
$- > < # " # 2 $%& % $ +*$',*+,$
$- > < # " # 2 ,%& % $ '* ,-*(-
$- > < # " # 2 )%& % $ $)*+ ,*,+
$- > < # " # 2 (%& % $ - *) )*'-
$- > < # " # 2 %& % $ * * +$
$- > < # " # 2 %& % $ *$+'*,+$
$- > < # " # 2 +%& % $ ''* -$* $
$- > < # " # 2 $%& % $ ''* -$* $
, & @ #" 2 (%& % $ ,(*++(*
, 7 . )%& % $ $)*(,,*)$
, 7 . (%& % $ ) *+)+* $
, 7 . -%& % $ ( *(--*-)$
, 7 . %& % $ )(*,( * $
, 7 . %& % $ -(* $'*)
, 7 . +%& % $ )(*) +* ($
, 7 . ,%& % $ $'*$' *,-
, 7 . )%& % $ $(* $+*-
, 7 /4 )%& % $ ,+*,$,*('$
, 7 /4 +%& % $ $(*,$+*,,
, 7 %& % $ $-*) -* $
, 7 ./ '%& % $ $(*-' *)-
, 7 ./ +%& % $ '*$ $*-,$
, 7 ." '%& % $ ) * -(*$ $
, 7 . %& % $ ))* $*)
, 7 . %& % $ ) *) +*)+$
, 7 . +%& % $ $$* )-*+
, 7 . )%& % $ )$*+ *(
, 7 2 (%& % $ $(*(- *
, 7 2 %& % $ +'*'))*-)
, 7 2 %& % $ )$*)- *'
, 7 2 +%& % $ ,-* ($*+)$
, 7 2 $%& % $ ) *$' *$ $
, 7 2 ,%& % $ ) *($)*,$
, 7 2 )%& % $ ) *+' *+
, 7 2 (%& % $ -)*'$(* $
, 7 2 %& % $ -+*- (* '$
, 7 2 %& % $ -$*,-$*+'$
, 7 2 +%& % $ -(* (* $
,) &; " ." %& % $ $+* +(*)-$
,) &; " ." %& % $ $)* *()
,) &; " ." +%& % $ $)* ''*')
,) &; " ." $%& % $ $)* -,*$)
,) &; " ." ,%& % $ $'*,),*$)
,) &; " ." )%& % $ $'* ( *()
,) &; " ." %& % $ $ *,)'* -$
,) &; " ." %& % $ $,* ,-*)-$
,) &; " " $% % $ , *, *-,
,) &; " " (% % $ $$*-,,*-,
,) &; " " -%& % $ $ * ('*$
,) &; " " %& % $ $ *)- *+
,) &; " " %& % $ $$*, ,* ,
,) &; " 2 )%& % $ ,+*'($*''
,) &; " 2 -%& % $ )* ' * (
,) &; " 2 %& % $ ,(*($ *,-
,) &; " 2 %& % $ )$*),+*$(
,) &; " 2 +%& % $ $'*'-+* $$
,) &; " 2 $%& % $ $ * '(* '
,) &; " 2 ,%& % $ )(*)()*-'
,) &; " 2 )%& % $ ,$* ))*)$$
,) &; " 2 (%& % $ +*',,*, $
,) &; " 2 %& % $ * +*, $
,) &; " 2 +%& % $ --*+(+*( $
,- 1# 1# 4 " " +% % $ ,)* ),*+ $
,- 1# 1# 4 " " $% % $ ,-*$' *
,- 1# 1# 4 " " (% % $ $(*' +*(
,- 1# 1# 4 " " +%& % $ , * ))*,
,- 1# 1# 4 " " )%& % $ ( * (,*-($
,- 1# 1# 4 " " %& % $ $,*' '*(+$
,- 1# 1# 4 " 2 -%& % $ ) * '* +
) & 5 0 & & (%& % $ $ *' -*+
) & 5 0 & & %& % $ $$* + *, $
) & 5 0 & &" +%& % $ $ *$' * ,
) & 5 0 & &" )%& % $ ( *)--*$
) & 5 0 & &" (%& % $ $'*,( *$($
) & 5 0 & &" -%& % $ *,+ *)'$
) & 5 0 & &" %& % $ ('* $,* ,
) & 5 0 & &" %& % $ ) *+('*
) & 5 0 & &" +%& % $ (+*' -*,($
) & 5 0 & &" $%& % $ -*(,$*,($
) & 5 0 & &" ,%& % $ *'- * '$
) & 5 0 & &" )%& % $ *+ *''$
) & 5 0 & &" (%& % $ '*+-,*-
) & 5 0 & / % % $ $'*+$ * '$
) & 5 0 & / '% % $ $ *'- *, $
) & 5 0 & / +% % $ $ *$$(*-+$
) & 5 0 & / $% % $ $ *+$-* +
) & "= # " # " % % $ $-* ,,*$$$
) & "= # " # " +% % $ -,*-+'*-
) & "= # " # " $% % $ $'*+,-*)$
) & "= # " # " (% % $ ,-* +*(
) & "= # " # 2 $%& % $ )'*$ *(
) & "= # " # 2 ,%& % $ *)' *(+$
) & "= # " # 2 )%& % $ ) *+ +*+
) & "= # " # 2 (%& % $ )+*' * -$
) & "= # " # 2 %& % $ )-*,,-*'+$
) & "= # " # 2 %& % $ ((*- )*'$
) & "= # " # 2 +%& % $ -+* $'*' $
)$ =3 " # . (%& % $ +*)$$*$$$
)$ =3 " # . -%& % $ *+ '*) $
)$ =3 " # . %& % $ *$+$* $$
)$ =3 " # ./ (%& % $ *+-)*( $
)$ =3 " # ./ -%& % $ ) *( -* +
)$ =3 " # ./ %& % $ -)*+ (*,-
)$ =3 " # ./ %& % $ ,+*-+,*)-
)$ =3 " # ./ +%& % $ $$*$( *+-
)$ =3 " # ./ ,%& % $ -'*$-)* ,$
)$ =3 " # " % % $ ,+*(+)*,,$
)$ =3 " # " '% % $ ))(*''$* '$
)$ =3 " # " +% % $ ( (*$, *,+$
)$ =3 " # " $% % $ - '*$ *)-
)$ =3 " # " (% % $ -(+*) (*(+
)$ =3 " # " %& % $ -((*) * -
)$ =3 " # " %& % $ - -*$,)*$-
)$ =3 " # " '%& % $ - $* $* ,$
)$ =3 " # " +%& % $ (- *+),*),$
)$ =3 " # " )%& % $ )))* ((*) $
)$ =3 " # " (%& % $ (' *+, *,,$
)$ =3 " # " -%& % $ - )*,,+*(,$
)$ =3 " # " %& % $ ( *-' *'-
)$ =3 " # " %& % $ ( *','*)-
)$ =3 " # " +%& % $ , ,*-+(* $
)$ =3 " # " $%& % $ ,(-*+ ,*$,$
)$ =3 " # " ,%& % $ $-+*,) *+-
)$ =3 " # " )%& % $ $--*-),*$ $
)$ =3 " # " (%& % $ ,,'*' *, $
)$ =3 " # " %& % $ ) -*+)+*)+
)$ =3 " # " %& % $ +-)*)+)*+$
)$ =3 " # " +%& % $ $ +*+$ *(,
)$ =3 " # " $%& % $ $ +*,)-* -
)$ =3 " # . %& % $ ,*($)*) $
)$ =3 " # . '%& % $ -*($ *( $
)$ =3 " # . +%& % $ +*' (*-,$
)$ =3 " # . (%& % $ -'*-$'* -
)$ =3 " # . -%& % $ - *+-,*+-
)$ =3 " # . %& % $ (,*) -*' $
)$ =3 " # . %& % $ ('*' (* -
)$ =3 " # 2 % % $ * -(* )
)$ =3 " # 2 '% % $ - *)) *$-$
)$ =3 " # 2 +% % $ $(*'++* $
)$ =3 " # 2 $% % $ , *' ,* -$
)$ =3 " # 2 (% % $ ,(*) $*$)
)$ =3 " # 2 %& % $ ,$*$ '*)-$
)$ =3 " # 2 '%& % $ $*$),*)-$
)$ =3 " # 2 +%& % $ $*+))* +$
)$ =3 " # 2 )%& % $ ('*(',*$($
)$ =3 " # 2 (%& % $ '$,*- (* -$
)$ =3 " # 2 -%& % $ ' (*) -*$+$
)$ =3 " # 2 %& % $ ,'*'-)* +$
)$ =3 " # 2 %& % $ ,$*'(,* ($
)$ =3 " # 2 +%& % $ *,,'*(
)$ =3 " # 2 $%& % $ $*') * ($
)$ =3 " # 2 ,%& % $ -,*+ )*+,
)$ =3 " # 2 )%& % $ (* +*'
)$ =3 " # 2 (%& % $ *'+$*+'$
)$ =3 " # 2 %& % $ *-$'* $
)$ =3 " # 2 %& % $ $* *,$$
)$ =3 " # 2 +%& % $ +$*-$,*)-
)$ =3 " # 2 $%& % $ +$*-- *+ $
)( #7#4# # " # ./ )%& % $ $-*$-(*,)$
)( #7#4# # " # ./ -%& % $ ) *)+(*(
)( #7#4# # " # ./ %& % $ ,$* ( *)$
)( #7#4# # " # ./ %& % $ ,$* $+*+$
)( #7#4# # " # ./ ,%& % $ ) * $*'$
)( #7#4# # " # ./ )%& % $ *, * )$
)( #7#4# # " # ./ (%& % $ +*( *) $
)( #7#4# # " # ./ %& % $ *)--* +$
)( #7#4# # " # ./ %& % $ *-$ * ($
)( #7#4# # " # " )%& % $ ) *('$* ,
)( #7#4# # " # " ,%& % $ , *+($*$'$
)( #7#4# # " # " )%& % $ $)*)(+* ($
)( #7#4# # " # " (%& % $ $ *,,+*'($
)( #7#4# # " # . ,%& % $ ,-*)'+*$
)( #7#4# # " # . (%& % $ ,+*( ,*' $
)( #7#4# # " # . +%& % $ ) * + *-'$
)( #7#4# # " # . $%& % $ $$*))+* ,
)( #7#4# # " # 2 %& % $ $+*' *'
)( #7#4# # " # 2 %& % $ ,-* ' *
)( #7#4# # " # 2 +%& % $ $ * -)*'
)( #7#4# # " # 2 $%& % $ ,)* -$*))
)- & 6 " 2 )%& % $ ,(* )*,-$
)- & 6 " 2 (%& % $ )-*'+ *''$
)- & 6 " 2 -%& % $ ,(*-$,* $
)- & 6 " 2 %& % $ ($*)'-* $
)- & 6 " 2 %& % $ -'*-' * $
)- & 6 " 2 +%& % $ -)*$,'* $$
)- & 6 " 2 $%& % $ -)* ,(*)$$
)- & 6 " 2 ,%& % $ ),*- (*,(
)- & 6 " 2 )%& % $ (,* )*''
)- & 6 " 2 (%& % $ ,,*)(,*+$$
)- & 6 " 2 %& % $ )'*(+)* '
)- & 6 " 2 %& % $ (+*++)*+,
)- & 6 " 2 +%& % $ (-*, * $
)- & 6 " 2 $%& % $ - *+)+*-(
( =3 !& " %& % $ ))*) * '$
( ! . (% % $ $(* $*+
( ! . %& % $ ,$* -*'+$
( ! . +%& % $ ()*)--* )$
( ! . $%& % $ +*'' *'-
( ! . )%& % $ *)+ *'-
( ! . (%& % $ *' ,*(-
( ! /4 )%& % $ (-* - *
( ! /4 (%& % $ ',*(( *(
( ! /4 -%& % $ +$*'')*$$
( ! /4 %& % $ $'* ,)*$$
( ! /4 +%& % $ ,(*- *,
( ! /4 $%& % $ ('* ,$*$
( ! /4 ,%& % $ ()* $ *
( ! " %& % $ )+*,',*')$
( ! " +%& % $ - *$'$* $
( ! " )%& % $ *,''*$$
( ! " (%& % $ * )'*$$
( ! " -%& % $ * ,(* $
( ! " %& % $ *(-,*$ $
( ! " %& % $ ,* )(*$ $
( ! " +%& % $ $* +*))$
( ! " $%& % $ ,* $'*$ $
( ! " ,%& % $ * (*$ $
( ! " )%& % $ * ,* $
( ! " (%& % $ * +,* $
( ! 79 '% % $ ) *'+'*(
( ! 79 (% % $ ),*)-'*()
( ! 79 %& % $ -(* $,*++$
( ! 79 %& % $ ,*(, *,-$
( ! 79 '%& % $ )* -+*)+$
( ! 79 +%& % $ )*'),*')
( ! 79 )%& % $ ' *$'$* )
( ! 79 (%& % $ +)* , *'
( ! 79 %& % $ +-*$$-*++$
( ! 79 %& % $ $'*) ,*)-$
( ! 79 +%& % $ $$*-$$*(+$
( ! 79 $%& % $ $,* ) * +$
( ! 79 ,%& % $ $$*+-,* +$
( ! 79 (%& % $ $ * -*$+$
( ! 79 %& % $ '-*- '*,
( ! 79 %& % $ (*,)-*+ $
( ! 79 +%& % $ +* -*+ $
( ! 79 $%& % $ *$)$* $
( ! &" +% % $ +*-(-* '
( ! &" $% % $ --* '*+($
( ! &" (% % $ '*, '* ,$
( ! &" %& % $ '*( $*,,$
( ! &" +%& % $ $* ) *$,$
( ! &" )%& % $ '* + * -
( ! &" (%& % $ '-*) ,* -
( ! &" -%& % $ +'*,),* -
( ! &" $%& % $ $,*) ,* +
( ! &" ,%& % $ $$*$ * +
( ! ./ +%& % $ $'*+ ,* $
( ! ./ (%& % $ , * )*)
( ! ./ -%& % $ $-*)' *$ $
( ! ./ +%& % $ (-*+$ *+ $
( ! ./ $%& % $ ((*,( *- $
( ! ./ ,%& % $ )$*++-*,
( ! ./ )%& % $ , *-+'*,
( ! ./ (%& % $ $'*-$)*-
( ! ./ %& % $ $$*$)-*-
( ! 1 1 %& % $ $ *(- *+$$
( ! 1 1 '%& % $ $$*$ $*) $
( ! ." %& % $ (,*) '* ,
( ! ." '%& % $ -*,+$*(
( ! ." %& % $ ,* - *(
( ! ." +%& % $ )* -)*$,
( ! ." ,%& % $ +*'))*$,
( ! ." )%& % $ )*$) * ,
( ! ." (%& % $ * $ * ,
( ! . '% % $ ('* ++*$
( ! . +% % $ + *(+'* )$
( ! . $% % $ ' * $)*$
( ! . %& % $ ,,* *
( ! . %& % $ ) * )-*,
( ! . '%& % $ ')*+ *'
( ! . +%& % $ )$* )-*-,
( ! . )%& % $ '*)-(*'($
( ! . (%& % $ ,* )'*'($
( ! . -%& % $ ',*( * ($
( ! . %& % $ -*$ $*)'$
( ! . %& % $ (*'$)*,
( ! . +%& % $ +*,(+*+($
( ! . $%& % $ +*, -*+($
( ! . ,%& % $ )*()$*+($
( ! . )%& % $ (*' ,* ($
( ! . (%& % $ - *, ,*$'$
( ! . %& % $ $)*' * $
( ! 2 (% % $ $-* --*,
( ! 2 %& % $ $-*'+ *$
( ! 2 '%& % $ , * ) *$
( ! 2 +%& % $ ( *( $*'-$
( ! 2 )%& % $ $(*+ '*$)$
( ! 2 (%& % $ + * (*)+$
( ! 2 -%& % $ ,$$*,( *$'$
( ! 2 %& % $ )-+*), *(-$
( ! 2 %& % $ ((+*+$'*',
( ! 2 +%& % $ - *'+$*$,
( ! 2 $%& % $ - ,*,,$* ,
( ! 2 ,%& % $ -$ *)-,*-($
( ! 2 )%& % $ -, *--)*-($
( ! 2 (%& % $ -,,*+$'*-($
( ! 2 %& % $ -,)* , *+($
( ! 2 +%& % $ -,-* ('*)'$
( ! / '% % $ ,(*'++*
( ! / +% % $ ),* ++*
( ! / $% % $ +*+ +* $$
( ! / (% % $ (*( $*) $
( ! / %& % $ $ *-+$*($$
( ! / %& % $ ))*-($*)$$
( ! / '%& % $ ((*(()* (
( ! / +%& % $ '*, )* $
( ! / )%& % $ ' * ($*+ $
( ! / (%& % $ ' *-$ *+ $
( ! / -%& % $ ' $* +(*''
( ! / %& % $ ' '*())*('
( ! / %& % $ ' '* '(*)$$
( ! / +%& % $ ' (*',-* (
( ! / $%& % $ - *$)-*' $
( ! / %& % $ -* ,+*)(
( ! / +%& % $ * ($*,)
( ! / $%& % $ *'$+*,-$
() ; # " = />. '% % $ $ *) $*+
() ; # " = />. +% % $ $+* + *,
() ; # " = />. $% % $ $+*'()*' $
() ; # " = />. (% % $ $ *+, *+
() ; # " = />. %& % $ $ *-,)* $
() ; # " = />. %& % $ $ *- +*)$
() ; # " = />. '%& % $ $'*$) *-
() ; # " = />. +%& % $ $ *$'(*(
() ; # " = />. (%& % $ $ *$$ *))$
() ; # " = />. -%& % $ $ *+ (*$)$
() ; # " = />. %& % $ $'*++,*)
() ; # " = />. +%& % $ $-*+''*+)$
() ; # " = />. $%& % $ ,,*+ -*
() ; # " = />. ,%& % $ ,)* +$* $
() ; # " = />. (%& % $ ,,*'',*, $
() ; # " = />. %& % $ ,)* *+

!
() ; #" = />. %& % $ ,(* -*
() ; #" = />. +%& % $ ,-*+( *-$$
() ; #" = />. $%& % $ ,(*(+$*+ $
() ; #" ." '% % $ $+* ,*,-$
() ; #" 2 (%& % $ ,*- -*''$
-+ &#># " # 2 )%& % $ ,)* ,'* ,
-, ? A # " # ./ ,%& % $ ,)*-+ *)'
-, ? A # " # / '% % $ ,+*$$$*'+$
-, ? A # " # / +% % $ ,-*,++*$-$
-, ? A # " # / $% % $ ))* , * +
-, ? A # " # / (% % $ ( * -'*$+
-, ? A # " # / %& % $ ( * --*,,$
-, ? A # " # / %& % $ ( * ,*',$
-, ? A # " # / '%& % $ ( * )(*',$
-, ? A # " # / +%& % $ ( * - *(,$
-, ? A # " # / )%& % $ ('* $$* $
-, ? A # " # / -%& % $ $$*--(*-,$
-, ? A # " # / %& % $ $'*--'*$ $
-( & A # " # . +%& % $ $ * ($*+
-( & A # " # " % % $ ,$*+,'*)$
-( & A # " # " '% % $ ,,*',(* $
-( & A # " # " +% % $ - *) *'-$
-( & A # " # " $% % $ - *) * +$
-( & A # " # " (% % $ ++* * +$
-( & A # " # " %& % $ ,,*+$'* )
-( & A # " # " %& % $ +,*, -*,-$
-( & A # " # " '%& % $ , *- *')
-( & A # " # " +%& % $ ' *+, *$-$
-( & A # " # " )%& % $ ' -*$,+*$'
-( & A # " # " (%& % $ ' -*$'$*,'
-( & A # " # " -%& % $ ' )*) ,* $$
-( & A # " # " %& % $ ' ,*(- *-$$
-( & A # " # " %& % $ ' ,*, * (
-( & A # " # " $%& % $ ' ,*+)(*$(
-( & A # " # " ,%& % $ ' ,*$+ *)'
-( & A # " # " )%& % $ ' ,*$--*)'
-( & A # " # +%& % $ ( *' -*)
-( & A # " # )%& % $ '*'( *+
-( & A # " # (%& % $ *,+)*++$
-( & A # " # -%& % $ - *$+)*)
-( & A # " # %& % $ *($+*,)
-( & A # " # %& % $ ,*)$$*++$
-( & A # " # +%& % $ ' * ,(* +$
-( & A # " # $%& % $ (*$ ,*
-( & A # " # ,%& % $ - * ,,*'
-( & A # " # )%& % $ (+*,- *'
-( & A # " # (%& % $ ))*)+ *,
-( & A # " # %& % $ )(*+'(*,
-( & A # " # %& % $ )-* ''* (
-( & A # " # +%& % $ )-* -$*-)$

"
-( & A # " # ./ % % $ , *'' *-$$
-( & A # " # ./ % % $ -*$ *
-( & A # " # ./ '% % $ +* +'*(+$
-( & A # " # ./ +% % $ - * +* '
-( & A # " # ./ $% % $ '+*-)-*(+$
-( & A # " # ./ (% % $ ')*-+$* +$
-( & A # " # ./ %& % $ $'*$)+*'
-( & A # " # ./ %& % $ ,$*' +*')
-( & A # " # ./ '%& % $ '-*+))* -$
-( & A # " # ./ +%& % $ , * ,*,
-( & A # " # ./ )%& % $ ' -*((+* )
-( & A # " # ./ (%& % $ $$*+$ * -$
-( & A # " # ./ -%& % $ - * *-+$
-( & A # " # ./ %& % $ '))* ,(*-
-( & A # " # ./ %& % $ '$ *,,)*
-( & A # " # ./ +%& % $ --*)('*)-$
-( & A # " # ./ $%& % $ (-*,-(*+)
-( & A # " # ./ ,%& % $ , *-$-* +$
-( & A # " # ./ )%& % $ )'*-)$* +$
-( & A # " # ./ (%& % $ ,*+-'* +$
-( & A # " # ./ %& % $ $)*( *,+$
-( & A # " # ./ %& % $ $)* '*+ $
-( & A # " # ." +% % $ -,* , * $
-( & A # " # ." $% % $ '$*' )*)'
-( & A # " # ." (% % $ *--$*) $
-( & A # " # ." %& % $ (*- -*- $
-( & A # " # ." %& % $ ' * , * $$
-( & A # " # ." '%& % $ ,* $,* '
-( & A # " # ." +%& % $ $+*,-+*)(
-( & A # " # ." )%& % $ ) *) +* $$
-( & A # " # ." (%& % $ ,$*+ (*+(
-( & A # " # ." -%& % $ (* +'*)(
-( & A # " # ." %& % $ )*(' *$$$
-( & A # " # ." %& % $ +*,' *+ $
-( & A # " # ." +%& % $ +* ',* $
-( & A # " # ." $%& % $ *-'(*$$$
-( & A # " # ." ,%& % $ '-*$ *,'
-( & A # " # ." )%& % $ , *''(* $$
-( & A # " # ." (%& % $ '+* -$*-(
-( & A # " # ." %& % $ ,)*(-$*($$
-( & A # " # " % % $ ,-* ''*
-( & A # " # " '% % $ ,(*$,'*)
-( & A # " # " +% % $ ,,*+- *- $
-( & A # " # " $% % $ ' *'' *)-$
-( & A # " # " (% % $ $'*) -*
-( & A # " # " %& % $ )+*++-*-+$
-( & A # " # " %& % $ -*(,,*'-$
-( & A # " # " '%& % $ * ,'*(+$
-( & A # " # " +%& % $ -*++(* -$
-( & A # " # " )%& % $ *( *(

#
-( & A # " # " (%& % $ ( *- )*))
-( & A # " # " %& % $ '+* *'+$
-( & A # " # " %& % $ +'*, ,*+-$
-( & A # " # " +%& % $ -,*)-,*)+$
-( & A # " # " ,%& % $ +* ,*(
-( & A # " # " )%& % $ )-*(+(*
-( & A # " # " (%& % $ +,(* +*+
-( & A # " # . ,%& % $ - *$) *(
-( & A # " # . )%& % $ +$* +'*+ $
-( & A # " # . (%& % $ '*)'$* )$
-( & A # " # 2 '% % $ (*' +*++
-( & A # " # 2 -%& % $ '*( ,*-$
-( & A # " # 2 %& % $ *- *+(
-( & A # " # 2 %& % $ )*)((*+'
-( & A # " # 2 +%& % $ *,+'*$$$
-( & A # " # 2 $%& % $ ) *'' *''
-( & A # " # 2 ,%& % $ +$'*+$,*- $
-( & A # " # 2 )%& % $ +'*-( *('
-( & A # " # 2 (%& % $ ') * -* (
-( & A # " # 2 %& % $ -)*, -*
-( & A # " # 2 %& % $ -(*(+(*'-
-( & A # " # 2 +%& % $ $ *$ *-)
-( & A # " # 2 $%& % $ $ *$$)*$-$
7 > 8 " ./ %& % $ $* '-*( $
7 > 8 " ./ +%& % $ +-* $-*,
7 > 8 " ./ $%& % $ +*)(+*, $
7 > 8 " ./ ,%& % $ ( *' * $
7 > 8 " ./ )%& % $ *,'(*( $
7 > 8 " ./ (%& % $ * , *'$
7 > 8 " " -%& % $ $(* ,+*+($
7 > 8 " " %& % $ ,-*') * ($
7 > 8 " " $%& % $ ,)*,' * '$
7 > 8 " " %& % $ )'*) (*-)$
7 > 8 " " %& % $ ,(*+ '*-)
7 > 8 " / +%& % $ $ *), *,($
7 > 8 " / )%& % $ , *- )*+'$
7 > 8 " / (%& % $ ,'*(' *-'$
7 > 8 " / -%& % $ ,(* ,*,($
7 > 8 " / %& % $ ,)* ,'*'($
7 > 8 " / %& % $ ,(*) ,*-($
7 > 8 " / +%& % $ ) * ) * '$
7 > 8 " / $%& % $ , *, $* ,
7 > 8 " / ,%& % $ , * $ * ,
7 > 8 " / )%& % $ , * $+*-
7 > 8 " / (%& % $ ,+*( +*+
7 > 8 " / %& % $ ,$*+)+*+
7 > 8 " / %& % $ ,)*' -*$
7 > 8 " / +%& % $ ,,*')(*-,