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OF INFINITY

Per M a r t i n - L ~ f Department of Mathematics, University of S t o c k h o l m

Box 6701,

113 85 Stockholm,

Sweden

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na~t~TM KOnMOFOpOBa

25.4.1903

-- 20.10.1987

t47

Intuitive considerations Through the technique of so called lazy evaluation, it has become possible to compute with infinite objects of various kinds. The most typical and wellknown example is that of a stream

(ao~(al,(a2,..o))),

which at any finite stage of its development looks like an initial segment of an ordinary list

( a o , ( a l , ( a 2 ..... ( a n _ l , n i l ) . . . ) ) ) ,

but differs by proceeding indefinitely. Another example is obtained by conceiving of an infinite binary sequence as an infinite composition of two unary constructors

o(](o(...))),

rather than, as is customary, as a function from the set of natural numbers to the two element set. An even simpler example, the simplest possible, in a way, which will play a central role in

the following, is the infinite natural number

s(s~s(...))),

the successor of the successor of the successor of etc. in infinitum. No other mathematical object, if only we can understand it as such, deserves better to be denoted by the traditional infinity symbol ~. I

Introduced by J. Wallis, De Sectionibus Conicis, Nova Methodo Expositis, Tractatus, Oxford, 1655, in the laconic parenthesis (esto enim ~ nota humeri infiniti;), apparently without worrying about its meaningfulness.

I

t48

All the preceding examples are examples of infinite elements of sets. But we may also let sets be infinite, not in the usual sense of containing infinitely many elements, but in the sense of having infinite depth, or proceeding indefinitely, like

A

X(A X(A X . . . ) ) ,

where the set A may itself be infinitely proceeding, or

((...)

+ (...))

+ ((...)

+ (...)).

The latter set is the disjoint union of two sets, each of which is the disjoint union of two sets, each of which is the disjoint union of two sets, etc. in infinitum. It looks very much like the Cantor set. If we can conceive of infinitely proceeding sets, we can certainly also conceive of infinitely proceeding propositions: because of the correspondence between propositions and sets, there is no substantial difference. A typical example is

NNNO..

= ((... o i )

od.)~_t,

the negation of the negation of the negation of etc. in infinitum. Since such an infinitely proceeding proposition has no bottom that you reach in a finite number of steps, it is not at all immediately clear what it should mean for it to be true. Nor does it seem clear whether this particular one ought to come out true or false. (To anticipate matters, on the interpretation that I

shall adopt, it will come out false.) An infinite object of yet another kind is the iterative set, that is, set in the sense of the cumulative hierarchy,

149

It is the singleton set whose only element is the singleton set whose only element is the singleton set etc. in infinitum. such set exists, of course~ No

in the usual cumulative hierarchy,

but it is as simple as possible an example of a nonwellfounded set in the sense of Aczel. nonmathematical 2 Finally, you may even conceive of like the wellknown

examples of infinite objects,

picture of the artist painting his own portrait. When you start thinking about infinite objects, like the

aforementioned ones, you soon realize that they are maybe not so novel creatures after all. We have also old examples, finite decimal fractions like in-

aooala2a3 . . . .

ao + ~o(al

+ ~o(a2 + ~o(a3 + ...)))

**and infinite continued fraction expansions b0 a0 + aI
**

+

bI b2 a2 + a 3 + ...,

which proceed indefinitely in just the same way as the streams of the computer scientist. ~ud we all know the mathematics that

has been developed in order to deal rigorously with these particular infinite objects, namely, calculus, or analysis, in its

P. Aczel, Non-Well-Founded Sets, CSLI Lecture Notes, Number 14, Stanford University, 1988.

2

150

various forms. Originally, Euler, approximately,

from its inception to the time of calculus was really a calthat is, of infinitely like

infinitesimal

culus of infinites and infinitesimals, large and infinitely small quantities,

and I

'

I

2'

I

" ' "

respectively.

But, when it was put on a rigorous basis by Cauchy the infinites and infinitesimals were gradually

and Weierstrass,

eliminated in favour of the notion of limit, earlier introduced by d'Alembert, our notations, although traces of them still remain in some of like

mo l~o

n=o@

lima n , Z

n=l

an, nTylan ,

. . .

Usually,

though, we take great pains to explain that ~

makes

no sense by itself, that is, is no detachable part of the notation for a limit, an infinite sum, product, would have difficulties or the like, and

in interpreting an expression like

(1 + --~)~ .

Only during the period of the last thirty years has there been a resurgence of interest in infinite and infinitesimal numbers as a result of Abraham Robinson's conception of his nonstandard

5 E. No. Eine elementare EinfHhrung in die Nichtstandard-Analysis. intuitionistic On the side. these various forms of analysis are classical theories. Bishop. See also the book by D. InfinitesimalkalkG1. E. lishing Company. PP. ones mentioned in the beginning. 3-43. Laugwitz. and the further references given there. pp.151 analysis. on the one hand. 3 There is also the slightly earlier but less wellknown infinitesimal calculus of Schmieden and Laugwitz. 1958. (Observe that the theory of choice sequences antedates nonstandard analysis by forty years. 5. Erster Tell: Allgemeiae Mengenlehre. Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam. . Brouwer's much more radically novel idea of choice sequences. the straightof analysis in the style of Cauchy forward constructivization and Weierstrass carried out by Bishop. 1-39. Vol. Vol. Non-standard Analysis. Mannheim. 12. Laugwitz. 69. 5 and. Robinson. Mathematische Zeitschrift. New York. North-Holland Pub- 4 C° Schmieden and D. Eine Erweiterung der Infinitesimalrechnung. which succeeds containing the infinity symbol all in making sense of expressions in a much more elementary and constructive way. 4 Otherwise. McGrawHill Book Company. Amsterdam. on the other hand.) The two recent theories that have been contrived precisely for dealing with streams and other infinite objects. 1967. J. 1966. I. 6 L. 1978. Foundations of Constructive Analysis. Sect. BegrHndung der Mengenlehre unabh~ngig vom logischen Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten. for denotational like the are Scott's theory of domains semantics and Aczel's theory of nonwellfounded 3 A. 1918. we have. Broawer. 6 It is one of the purposes of the present work to show that the introduction of choice sequences is an intuitionistic version of the formation of reduced products in nonstandard analysis. Bibliographisches Institut.

are interpreted as domains and truth every proposition comes out true. as formalized in my type theory. Berlin. 8 are validated in the domain interpretation. Scott. Martin-LGf. But what happens? We indeed get an interpretation of logic satisfying all the usual laws of intuitionistic logic: the only trouble with it is that it trivializes in the sense that it makes every proposition. come out true° The reason is that every the bottom element. op. Napoli. 8 p. Domains for denotational semantics. .))). 577-613. and P. since all the set theoretical laws. even absurdity. domain contains an element. functions from one set to another as approximable mappings in Scott's sense. Now. Intuitionistic Type Theory.152 sets. Edited by M° Nielsen and E. Aczel. 140. Bibliopolis. Vol. The principal aim of domain theory is to make proper mathematical sense of the fixed point operator fix(f) : f(f(f(° . M. domain theory indeed succeeds in making sense of streams and similar infinite objects9 but it does not succeed in interpreting logic in a nontrivial way which harmonizes with the interpretation of sets as domains. We have here yet another example of an infinite object to add to the long list in the beginning. 1984. Automata.. pp. Schmidt. as nonemptiness. elements of a set as points of a domain. like sets. the interpretation of logic might seem as simple as it could possibly be: just stick to the interpretation of propositions as sets. Languages and Programming. Hence. 1982. truth as nonemptiness. SpringerVerlag. etc. etc. Now. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. written in type theoret- 7 D. 7 Of these. namely. cit. if propositions.

id(x) = x ~A (x E A ) by explicit definition in standard type theory.. we can derive fix(id) E A for an arbitrary set A. In particular. fix(id) E N o = S. Thus type theory becomes inconsistent when the formal laws for the fixed point operator are adjoined to it. the formal laws for the fixed point operator that and succeeds in satisfying.153 ical notation. We might try to avoid this inconsistency by only requiring a function from a nonempty set into itself to have a fixed point. also to be thought of as a proposition. On the other hand. if the formal laws for the fixed point operator are adjoined to standard type theory. The previous laws for the fixed point operator then get modified into . Hence. (x ~ A) f(x) e A (x e A) f(x) ~ A fix(f) = f(fix(f)) e A fix(f) E A They say that every approximable mapping from a domain into itself has a fixed point. we can certainly derive l id(x) ~ A (x 6 A). are domain theory seeks to satisfy. for an arbitrary set A.

where s(x) E N (x E N) is the successor function. y ) f ( y ) ) E A.a. we can define the modified fixed point operator by performing an ordinary recursion up to infinity.(x.(x. given the modified fixed point operator.f) = r e c ( ~ . This seems fine.y)f(y)) = rec(s(~).y)f(y)) = f(rec(~. are readily seen to have the same effect as introducing an infinite natural number.f) = rec(~.154 (x ~ A) aEA f(x) 6 A fix(a. That the second rule for the modified fixed point operator becomes satisfied follows from the axiom second recursion equation. governed by the axioms = s(~) ~ N. Indeed. but.a. in turn.s) ~ N.a. and.(x. fix(a. a . conversely. although we no longer get the fixed point of the identity function as an element of the empty set alias .f)) E A.f) (x ~ A) f(x) E A = f(fix(a.y)f(y))) oo = s ( ~ ) E N and the = f(fix(a. fix(a. we can define infinity by putting = fix(O. ( x .f) E A a E A fix(a.f)) ~ A These laws.

On the other follows by instantiation once we allow hand.. nonwellfounded.x. or infinitely proceeding.. Aczel's approach in his theory of nonwellfounded sets is to avoid contradiction in introducing nonwellfounded sets. which is to say that my thoughts have gone rather in the direction of nonstandard arith- . I(N.??}.S(~)) true ~ ~ N.s(x)) t r u e (x E N) is readily proved by mathematical induction in standard type theory.~gs(~)) true follows of course from the definitional. objects. which is in contradiction with it. on the contrary. equal- E N. objects should remain valid for the nonstandard. or wellfounded. which ~ = s(~) ~ N is inadmis- shows that the circular definition sible.155 proof of falsehood. ity ~ = s(~) or intensional. from which N i(N.~. like n= (((. namely. My own intuition has been that. because NI(N. Thus we have reached a contradiction. this would mean giving up the principle of mathematical induction. by giving up the foundation axiom and replacing it by his antifoundation axiom. In the case of arithmetic rather than set theory. the system is still inconsistent. by relaxing the axioms of standard set theory. all the laws for the standard.

we must turn to the theory of choice sequences. ) ) ) is very reminiscent of the fundamental property of a nonstandard model of arithmetic that it contain a natural number which is greater than o. Here fi is a function from Ai+ I to A i. and thereby all sorts of infinite objects. which is greater than all standard natural numbers. Also. A choice sequence O( = fo(f](f2(.. etc.. . that is. for i = 0. How are we then to make proper mathematical sense of the infinite? To get out of the dead end that we have reached. we know nothing about ... The intuition is the following. 2.))) is determined process by a noncircular but nonwel!founded definitional ~I = f I ( ~ 2 )' ~2 = f2(~3 ). . I. that is. a set containing an element a i. where A i is a nonempty set. s(o).o = s ( s ( s ( . the idea of getting the fixed point operator. from the single infinite natural number =. . At the zeroth ~0 except that it belongs to the stage. A 0 is the set to which the choice sequence = ~0 O( belongs.156 metic and analysis. s(s(o)).. In particular.

. Troelstra.fi_1(ai). The information about o( thereby gets refined from fo(O(1) to f o ( f 1 ( ~ 2 ) ) . and get to know that ~I = fI(° (2 )' where o( 2 is an ele- ment of A 2. At this first stage. we get to know that ~i when we ask what element of A 0 that 0 = fo(° (1 )' where ~I belongs to A 1. ~0 is freely variable. 152-160. At the second stage. from which are the choice sequence is obtained by infinite composition. Now. and the references to earlier works given there.. A Chapter of Intuitionistic Mathematics. See particularly Appendix C. Oxford. the definitional process of continues without end. Thus ~ 0 is simply a variable ranging over A O.157 set A O. sequence ~ then gets approximated by fo(f1(. continuous functions on the Baire space.. whereas has become partially determined: it is neither freely variable nor constant but something midway in between.))) as a choice sequence. 9 The only difference is that he has been concerned with the case when the functions. at any finite stage. we can break it off by putting ~ i = ai' where a i The choice is the element which shows the set A i to be nonempty.. which is a standard element of A O. 1977.. ~0 is. pp. think of = s(s(s(. Choice Sequences. definitional process that is. In this way.. S. Clarendon Press..)). This notion of choice sequence is essentially due to Troelstra. Then. we ask what element of A I that 0( I is. as defined by the nonwellfounded 9 A. The reason why the nonwellfoundedness the definition will not lead to any inconsistency is that.

f) as governed by these two rules. I.. obeys the rules where a E A and f(x) E A (x E A). Then fixi(a. = s(~i+1) ~ ~ N E N by the explicit defini- for i = 0.f) = rsc(~i..Y)f(Y)) E A. etc. given fixi(a. I.t58 = n 0 = s(~ 1 ). Thus the and thereby satisfy the axioms for ~ i ' .f) ~ A Conversely. we can define ~ i ~ N by putting ~i = fixi(0's) ~ N i = 0.f)) E A fixi(a. etc. which we have seen to be inconsistent.))) proceeds in the same ticular choice sequence way all the time that seduced us into making the circular defini~ N.f) (x ~ A) f(x) E A = f(fixi+1(a. ° ° I : s(~2)' ~2 : s(~3)' • ~ 6 We are then lead to extend standard type theory by adjoining the axioms { tion ~ = ~0 tion ~ = s(~) ~i ~i ~ N. and to define g N.f) (x ~ A) a E A f(x) ~ A a E A fixi(a..a~(x. make the explicit definition fixi(a. It was only the accidental fact that the par~ = s(s(s(.

is an external = s(c'° i+1) sequence of nonstandard natural numbers satisfying ~ i N. that is. if A(x) is a set for x G N. It is important that ~ i g N.. It is natural to refer to fixi(a.f) as the indexed fixed point operator.. I. lead of course to a contradiction.f) and the axioms for ~ i are formally equi- valent. etc. then lim A(x) = A ( ~ ) X= is a set. x E N. Since substitution is defined so as to com- . (Vx E N)(~(s(x)) <~(x)) which is in contradiction with the principle of mathematical induction. i = 0. 1. because the axioms for a corresponding internal sequence. etc. and most importantly. then lim a(x) = a ( ~ ) X=~ if a(x) ~ A(x) for ~ A(~). For instance. Observe that the presence of ~ ~ N allows us to get a closed notation for the limit of an internal sequence of mathematical objects of whatever kind. (x) = s(~(s(x))) e N (x ~ N). i = O. since they entail true. Thus the limit operation lim X= is expressed simply as the literal for the variable x which substitution of the infinity symbol ~ tends to infinity. Likewise.159 rules for fixi(a.

. i = s ( ~ i + 1 ) E N. = a E N.0 = a E N. For instance.(x. lim (a(x) + b(x)) = a ( ~ ) + b(~) = lim a(x) + lim b(x) E Q holds by definition. from the axiom E N.160 mute with every other operation. in type theoretical notation. -. I ~ . that limits always exist standard approach to analysis. a -. This example shows two virtues of the nonnamely. we get inversely ~i+I = Pd(~i) ~ N. Let the predecessor and cut off subtraction functions be defined as usual by the recursion equations I pd(a) pd(O) pd(s(a)) = 0 E N.a.y)pd(y)) Then. where Q is the set of rational numbers. = rec(a. b(x) ~ Q for x ~ N.s ( b ) = pd(a b ) E N.(x.y)x) E N. that is. this means that the limit operif a(x) E Q and then ation also automatically does so. and can be expressed simply by substituting the infinity symbol for the variable which tends to infinity.b : rec(b.O.

etc. But the successor so that we can conclude sJ(o) ~ s J ( ~ i + j) true. So. true i+3 function is for arbitrary monotonic. etc. it we still need infinitely many axioms to characterize proved that each ~ . is an infinite natural number in the sense of nonstandard exceeds arithmetic. (x E N). I. although we can manage with a single new constant. by instantiation.161 Iterated use of the latter equation yields ~i = Pd(~i-1) . 0 ~ x true Indeed. 1. I. The latter equalities. Thus it is enough to introduce infinite number ~EN and require it to satisfy equalities - si(o) = pdi(~) = s(pdi÷ 1(~)) = s(~to si÷1(0)) e N. = s(~i+1) E N. etc. are equivalent = si(pdi(~)) = si(~ ... there On the other hand. from the axioms ~ i .. pdi(~) = ~-si(O) E N the single the definitional for i = 0. w h i c h is to say that it we have all standard natural numbers. i and j = 0. it. I. From the axioms ~ i is readily = s(~i+1) E N for i = O. etc. and hence.. 0 ~ . in ~urn. .si(O)) m N for i = O..

. ( fi-1 f0 fl fi fi+1 or.. where i = O. Therefore we have sJ(o)~o0 i true is infinite for all j = O. system of nonempty A 1 < . in the system T of standard type theory.. I. in the formal notation. to the picture . sets Ai ~ Ai+ I < .162 follow the definitional . The case that we shall be especially ested in is when I N< A i set. ai ~ Ai . I. a projective A0 ( extension of type t heor F. etc. ~ equalities = S j (c~i+ j ) E N.. inter- I corresponding N( S A i = N. which shows that each ~ i in the sense of nonstandard arithmetic. ~a i = 0 EN... fi(xi~1) E A i (xi+ I E Ai+ 1).. etc. Nonstandard Let there be given.... ..< S S N~ 8 N( 8 . fi(xi+1) = s(xi+ I) E N (xi+ I ~ N ) .

. fini(Xi+11.Xini_1) set (Xil E All. xi+ini÷1 ) E Ail. namely.Xini_1). . xi+ini+1))~ in all cases for xi+11 E Ai÷11..... . ...-.163 In the most general case.. which means that fi1(xi+11........xi+ini+1). xi+Ini+ I ) E Aini(fi1(xi+11. and Ai+Ini+1(xi+11 ~ ... xi+Ini+ I .. xi+ini÷ I as a sequence of functions of several variables mapping the context at stage i+I into the context at stage i. ..Xini_2))Then xi = x i I'''" .. xi+ini+1_1).fini I ~xi+11. 'xi+Ini+1 ) ........ Aini(Xil... Xini_ I ~ Aini_1(Xil.o. fini_1(xi+11. . .Xin i is to be interpreted as a sequence of variables.. . . fi(xi+1) = fi1(xi÷11 .. ..~. ... . which is to say that Ail set..9 Xin i E Aini(Xil . each A i need not be just a single set but a whole context Xil E Ail. as the sequence of variables occurring in that context..... .

S. p. etc.. extend the system T of standard type theory by adjoining the axioms for a single choice sequence that is. and call the extension T ~ .. 1.. I given projective ~i E A i. I. i = fi ( ~ i+I ) E A i The new axioms limit of the for i = 0. With this amount of vector notation.164 a i = ail ..'aini_1 ) that is. o ain i E Ain i(a il. may be interpreted as saying that the projective system of nonempty sets is itself nonempty. as an instance of the context at stage i = O. . Troelstra. This is a counterpart of the so called countable saturation principle of nonstandard analysis. 154... and shall continue to consider in the following. cit.aini as a sequence of elements ail E Ail. ... ~ = f0(fl(f2(. etc. I0 choice sequences instead of just a Now.° ))). the general case can be re- duced notationally to the special case that I started by considering. It is natural to speak with Troelstra of the general case as that of a network of interdependent single one.. op. which makes it natural to refer 10 A.

1986.fj_1(xj)... S° Albeverio. . J. I. Hoegh-Krohn. observe first that. Academic Press. where Tj is the finite extension of T obtained by adjoining the 2j+I axioms ~j e A j. the judgement which of O~ i by each occurrence is provable in T from the assumption The stage j up to which you need to go must of course be at least as great as the maximum of the indices of the constants ~i that occur in the judgement in question. theory T? This question is an- swered by the following Lemma (proof theoretic). Lindstrum.)) xj E Aj.. { 11 o~j_ I E Aj_ I . is obtained from it by replacing fi(fi+1(. p. 46. R. E. It may even have to be strictly greater... New York. and T. a judgement is provable if and only if it is provable in Tj at some stage j = O. at some stage j = O. Fenstad. I. etc.. 11 extension but also as the saturation How is provability to provability in the nonstandard extension T ~ related in the standard lemma. O(j_ I : f j _ 1 ( ~ j ) E Aj_ I. of a proof. A judgement is provable in T ~ if and only if. etc. To prove the necessity because in T ~ of the finiteness of the condition. Nonstandard Methods in Stochastic Analysis and Mathematical Physics.165 to T ~ not only as the nonstandard of T.

)) by cg i. and. Moreover... in addition to the axioms of T. successively defining ~j-1' Cgj_2.° . we may as well replace it by a variable xj.166 { ~i ~0 ~0 g AO' = fO(~l ) ~ AO' But for the crucial first of these axioms. is an extension of fj_1(~j). and hence of Tj and T ~ . provability in Tj entails provability in T ~ . The sufficiency of the condition is clear. because Tj is an extension of T. Indeed. Observe that the only rules of T. we have access to the axiom ~ j e Aj as well as the definitional equalities ~i = fi(fi+1('''fj-1 (~j)° '')) E A i for 0 ~ i < j. . we have = fi(fi+1('''fj-1(~j )'. in Tj. since T ~ Tj. this is nothing but a sequence of explicit definitions. This proves the necessity of the condition.')) E Aj for 0 ~ i < j. ultimately 6 0 in terms of ~j. so that we can first substitute ~ j for xj and then replace fi(fi+1(. Thus Tj is a definitional extension of the theory which is obtained from T by adjoining the single axiom ~ j e A jo This being the only axiom which governs the constant ~j.. etc. thereby transforming the axiom ~ j ~ Aj into the assumption xj E Aj.

It is thus immaterial exactly what the proper axioms of T are. that is. By means of the lemma.167 that we have used in the course of the proof are the substitution and equality rules. Hence. by the lemma. Transfer principle (proof theoretic). by substitution. the following proof theoretic version of the transfer principle is easily established. The sufficiency of the condition is clear since T ~ extension of T. The proof expression a is of course is an in general nonstandard. but. Also. that aEA is provable in T ~ for some a. by assumption. aj E Aj is provable in T. so is b(aj) E A. Let A be a proposition expressed in the language of T. . assume that A true is provable in T ~ . a = b ( ~ j ) ~ A. where b(xj) ~ A (xj E Aj) is provable in T already. To prove the necessity. Then A can be proved to be true in T ~ if and only if A can be proved to be true in T already.

as compared with when you specify the theory T. when specifying T. . to conclude that T ~ is consistent outright. we can conclude that A true is provable in T already. When specifying the model ~. we can conclude that T ~ tive to T. op. For example. Let M be the standard model of the formal system T of standard type theory. But. there is no difference in the symbols that you put down: the difference is only one of attitude. we need to combine it with the semantic consistency proof for the standard theory T. Martin-L~f. Applying it to the proposition ~= N O . The transfer principle is a consequence of the possibility of approximating a nonstandard proof by a standard one. every expression is to have its usual meaning. whereas. whereas. among the objects in the standard model. This relative consistency proof is of a very elementary nature. there is the set N of natural numbers and the particular natural number O. cit. When specifying M. which is certainly expressed in is consistent rela- the language of T. 69-70. that is. in the theory. it is to be interpreted purely formalistically. 12 Inductive limit i nterpretatio ~ The preceding proof theoretic treatment of the nonstandard extension has an exact model theoretic counterpart.168 Suppressing the proof expression. as standing for itself and not for its meaning. there 12 P.. or intended interpretation. pp. or point of view.

= A type in the sense of M i is a family of types over Ai. and elements contained • in them. ..° ~ fl is that.169 is the set expression N and the numerical ference in attitude the various expression 0. and an object of the type in the sense of M i is a function defined on A i whose value for a certain argument ject of the type in the family corresponding is an ob- to that argument. between them. I. a type which has been made dependent on a variable which varies over Ai. a i ~ Ai for i = 0. The difof is brought about by speaking of objects categories semantical in the one case. as the system of nonempty sets~ or. terminology and notation. fi(xi+1) ~ A i (xi+ I E Ai+ I). that is.~. Mi M/Ai . nonstandard theory. fi-] Ai C fi A0 ( f0 AI ~ Ai+ I ~ fi+] the sequence . of sets. are thought of as objects rather than exin the language of T. namely. etc. The only difference mappings this time. in symbols.. The nonstandard syntactical model is built over the same projective contexts. . more generally. and exprescategories in the other sions of the corresponding case. let M i Using category theoretic be the comma model M over Ai. i pressions rA i set.

and an element of that set in the sense of M i is a function a(x i) E A(x i) (x i e Ai)...170 For example. as the identity function on A i. then f~(A)(xi+ I) = A(fi(xi+1)) (xi+ I E Ai+1).6A 1 simply as x i E A i (x i ~ A i). and it becomes a model of T i by interpreting the constant o(. •i is clearly a nonstandard model of T. an object in the sense of Mi+ I. When passing from A i to M/A i. Here f~ denotes composition with fi" Thus f~ takes an object in i i the sense of M i. that is. a function defined on the set A i. the given projective system of sets is transformed into the injective system of models 1 ~/A° ~ f o M/A] ~ ] ~ .. For instance. . that is. say A(x i) set (x i E A i). i+I ~ . a set in the sense of M i is a family of sets over Ai. that is. if A(x i) set (x i E A i) is a set in the sense of M i. and composes it with fi' which yields a function on Ai+1. f~ ~M/A i ~ ~ / A i + i-I z ] f..

to the definition . app. which is an element of the set f~(A) in the sense of Mi+ I . This is what we proof theoretically as a transto a since. structure Let M~ be its inductive. homomorphism corresponds model theoretically between models° Summing up. property of commuting with every operation.l = fi ( ~ i+I ) E A i ' Thus fi translates Ti+1. a set or direct. fm is the translation i Viewed proof from the theory T i to the theory Ti+ I given by the eqaation ~. since which is translated and thereby composition. and. from M i to Mi+ I. then f~(a)(xi+ 1) = a(fi(xi+1)) E A(fi(xi+l)) (xi+ I ~ Ai+1). modules. or the like. ~i every symbol of T i into the same symbol of into fi(o(i+1). The action of f~ on other types of objects is similar. Now. has the characteristic like T]-. we have indeed to do structures. in our case.171 which is a set in the sense of Mi+1. of an inductive limit. i theoretically. ~ . as compared with groups. According which is a very rich kind of algebraic rings. etc "' f~ is a homomorphism i should expect. if a(x i) E A(x i) (x i E A i) is an element of that set in the sense of M i. = lim M i = lim M/A i --~ limit. except substitution. with an inductive system of algebraic models of type theory. what appears lation between theories.

Other types of objects in the sense of M ~ are defined similarly. which we shall need in the following. To take yet another example. whose index j may differ from i. Likewise. a fam- A(X i) (xi E Ai). say B(xj) (xj E Aj). provided a(fjl(Xl)) = b(fkl(Xl)) E A(fil(Xi)) (x I E A I) at some stage 1 ~ max(j. a family of sets over the .. and it is defined to be equal to another such element. an element of the set A(x i) (xi E A i) in the sense of M ~ is a function a(xj) ~ A(fij(xj)) (xj E Aj) for some j ~ i. whose index k>__i may differ from j. and it is defined to be equal to another such set.j). where i have put fik(Xk) = fi(fi+1(~.k) >~ i. say b(x k) ~ A(fik(Xk)) (xk ~ Ak).172 in the sense of M ~ ily of sets is a set in the sense of M i. provided A(fik(Xk)) = B(fjk(Xk)) (xk E Ak) for some k ~ max(i..)) E A i (xk E A k) for the sake of brevity. that is. for some i..fk_1(Xk).

For example. if a(x i) ~ N (x i ~ A i) and b(xj) e N (xj eAj) are two nonstandard natural numbers. I have only explained how the various types are interpreted in M ~ . provided B(fjl(X l). that is.x) (x I e A I. First of all. and it is defined to be equal to another such family. becomes a nonstandard model of the standard theory T by letting every operation of T act pointwise.X) (x k E A k.k) ~ i. x e A(fik(Xk))). then their sum is (a + b)(x k) = a(fik(Xk)) + b(fjk(Xk)) e N (x k e A k) . say C(Xk.x) = C(fkl(X l). x ~ A(fij(xj))) for some j ~ i. with the only extra complication that.173 set A(x i) (xi E A i) in the sense of M ~ two arguments B(xj. M ~ I proceed to verify that M R is a model of T ~ . natural numbers in the sense of M ~ . x e A(fil(X 1))) for some i ~ max(j.x) is a family of sets of (xj ~ Aj. they have to be shifted out to a common later stage before the operation can be applied. So far. whose index k ~ i may differ from j. in general. like in Mi. since the operands begin to exist at different stages.

to be sure. ~i = fi(~i+1 ) E A i become satisfied in M ~ . This is the analogue of the star embedding of classical nonstandard analysis. pp. . the axioms I ~ i E A i.i+S) j = i+I. Every standard object gives rise to a nonstandard object. The action of the other operations of the is similar.j). It only renamely. Clearly. a nonstandard model of the standard theory. op. but it is the standard model. or intended interpretation.174 with k = max(i. cit. 13 A. is indeed a model of T ~ . The interpretation of the constant ~ i x i E A i (x i E Ai). standard theory T on the objects of M ~ mains to verify that the axioms that are proper to T ~ . in order to satisfy the definitional equality ~i we must see to it that fij(xj) = fi(fi+lj(Xj)) E A i (xj ~ Aj) it suffices to take And it is not an = fi ( ~ i+I ) ~ Ai' for some j ~ max(i. namely. 13 For example. of the nonstandard theory. arbitrarily contrived model: it is. is the identity function that govern the choice sequence ~ . Robinson. Thus M ~ = i+I. Hence.. 36-37. the function on A 0 which is constantly equal to the standard object in question.

by invoking the set A i to be nonempty. we can conclude. let A and B be two standard sets. again by substitution. and so on for other types of objects. A(foi(Xi)) that is. A(foi(ai)) = A and B(foi(ai)) = B. that (x i E A i) the element a i which shows that = B(foi(Xi)) at some stage i ~ O. = B(foi(ai)). by substitution. Then. a standard element a of A to the nonstandard (x 0 E A 0) defined by the equation element of A(x 0) a(x 0) = a E A = A(x 0) (x 0 e A0). and assume that their embeddings A(x o) = A (x o E and A o) B(x o) = B (x o e A o) are equal in the sense of M ~ . . A(foi(ai)) On the other hand. This is an embedding of the standard model M into the nonstandard model M ~ o To prove that it is injective.t75 a standard set A gives rise to the nonstandard set A(x o) = A (xo EA0). as an embedding should be.

a proposition in the sense of M ~ . Because of the definition of the standard notion of truth. The star embedding was the last arrow to be explained in the commutative diagram subtheory embedding T-intended interpretation M ~ ~ M~ >T interpretation = !ira M/A i. by symmetry and transitivity. A(x i) prop (x i ~ Ai). such a nonstandard proposition is nonstandardly true if it has a nonstandard proof. if there exists an a(xj) E A(fij(xj)) (xj ~ Aj) at some stage j ~ i. A=B. By definition. Observe also the similarity with the proof of the model theoretic transfer principle given below. The proof of the injectiveness of the star embedding of other types of objects is similar. Because of the identification of propositions and sets. is a propositional or a nonstandard proposition.176 so that. function on some A i. star embedding which summarizes the structure that we have erected. according to which truth is tantamount to the . that is.

But . Once the notion of nonstandard truth has been duly introduced. Let A be a standard proposition. this is clearly equivalent to requiring A(fij(xj)) true (xj E Aj). Then~ by weakening. it is easy enough to establish the follow- ing model theoretic version of the transfer principle. if you prefer. or. Then the embedding of A into the nonstandard model is nonstandardly true if and only if A is true in the standard sense. (Vxj c Aj)A(fij(xj)) true. and suppose true in the standard sense. at some stage j ~ i.177 existence of a proof. by the principle that zruth is preserved under definitional equality. To prove the sufficiency of the condition. A true (x0 E AO). A(x O) true (x 0 ~ AO). Transfer principle (model theoretic). let A(x O) : A (x 0 E A O) be the embedding of the standard proposition A into the nonstandard model. and.

since we have a i E A i at every stage i. we get A(f0i(ai)) by substitution. true Then. by preservation of truth under definitional equality. On the other hand. A(f0i(xi)) true (x i 6 A i) already at stage i = 0. again by the same principle. that is. we can conclude A true as desired. If you compare this proof with the earlier proof of the proof theoretic version of the transfer principle. we get A(f0i(ai)) = A. so that. . assume that A(x 0) (x 0 E A 0) is nonstandardly true. Hence. which shows that A(x 0) (x 0 E A 0) is nonstandardly true.178 f00(x0) = x 0 E A 0 (x 0 E A0). by substituting f0i(ai) for x 0 in the definition of A(x0). that A(f0i(xi)) true (x i E A i) at some stage i ~ 0 . you will see that it is its exact model theoretic counterpart. Conversely.

speaking. . to what extent. as they normally do in intuitionistic model theory. in Kripke semantics.179 Commutation of nonstandard truth and the logical operations Classical nonstandard analysis is built on the highly nonconstructive existence of an ultrafilter extending the Fr@chet One filter of all cofinal subsets of the set of natural numbers° may wonder how we have been able to circumvent this in the preceding construction of the inductive limit model of nonstandard type theory. whereas. loosely exactly how nonstandard is its interpretation of the and the quantifiers. operations is nevertheless and nonstandard is its interpretation of the logical in nonstandard type standard. Now. which roughly amounts to working with the Fr@chet filter itself instead of an ultrafilter extending it. The answer seems to be that. that a nonstandard model is standard in respect of the logical operations is tantamount to saying that nonstandard truth commutes with the logical operations. for instance. And it is easier to construct a nonstandard model if it is allowed to be nonstandard throughout than if it is to be nonstandard in its interpretation of the notion of natural number and at the same time standard in its interpretation of the logical operations. The result is propositional connectives the following. which is to say. the logical operations receive a nonstandard interpretation. however nonconstructive classical nonstandard analysis. theory. It is thus desirable to investigate limit interpretation. in our inductive nonstandard truth com- mutes with the logical operations.

A true B true A & B true and the two rules of conjunction elimination s A & B true A true A & B true B true are formally derivable in standard type theory. they must be validated by that interpretation. Let A(x i) (xi ~ A i) and . I mean of course that it is absurd that J_ is nonstandardly true. Hence it follows directly from the model theoretic transfer principle that .is nonstandardly false. general. is true. and V . But it can also be checked directly as follows. in commutes with ]_. But _L is a standard proposition. &. The simplest way to prove that nonstandard truth commutes with conjunction is to note that. By saying that nonstandard truth commutes with _[. and 3 .is nonstandardly true if and only if J.180 Theorem. Of all the logical operations. but not with nonstandard truth V. Thus i false. O. since the rule of conjunction introduction. and the inductive limit interpretation is a nonstandard model of it.[. is indeed nonstandardly which is manifestly not the case. that is. that J. Hence A & B is nonstandardly true if and only if A is nonstandardly true and B is nonstandardly true.

& B(fjk(Xk)) that (x k E Ak).181 B(xj) (Xj ~ Aj) be two nonstandard propositions. fil(f!n(Xn)) = f~_(x m )± n and fjm(fmn(Xn)) = fjn(Xn) = fjk(fkn(Xn)) EAj (x n E A n ) . A(fil(fln(X n and B(fjm(fmn(Xn j~ ) true (x n ~ An). that is~ by the definition A(fil(X I ) true (x ! E A I) and B(fjm(X m ) true ( x m E Am ) at some stages I ~ i and m ~ j. Then their nonstandard conjunction is A(fik(Xk)) where k = max(i. Then.m) be a common later stage. respectively. On the other hand. = fik(fkn(Xn )) E A i ~fXn E A n ) ) true (xn E A n ) Hence. by substitution.j). by preservation of truth under definitional equality and . Let n = max(l. that the two nonstandard are nonstandardly truth. conjuncts of nonstandard Suppose true.

m) ~ m a x ( i . which shows that the two nonstandard conjuncts are both nonstandardly true.j). A(fik(fkn(Xn))) & B(fjk(fkn(Xn))) true (xn E A n ) for n = max(1. a E A B(a) true ( 3 x E A)B(x) t r u e ' as well as the strong rules of existence elimination. assume that this is the case. Then.182 conjunction introduction. that is. which is to say that the non- standard conjunction of the two nonstandard propositions is nonstandardly true. A(fil(Xl)) true (x I E A l) with 1 ~ i . Conversely. by conjunction elimination and preservation of truth under definitional equality. and B(fjl(Xl)) true (x I E A l) with 1 ~ j . To complete the proof of the positive part of the theorem. we must convince o~rselves that nonstandard truth also commutes with existence. c ~ (~x ~ A)s(x) o E (3x ~ A)S(x) p(c) E A B(p(c)) true . that A(fik(fkl(Xl))) & B(fjk(fkl(Xl))) true (x I E A l) at some stage I ~ k = max(i. by the definition of nonstandard truth. j ) = k. The simple way to do it is to note that the usual rule of existence introduction.

Let A(xil (xiE Ai) be a nonstandard set. The more laborious direct verification proceeds as follows. if B(a) is nonstandardly true for a nonstandard element a of the nonstandard set A. (xj E Aj). Conversely~ assume that (3 x E A)B(x) is nonstandardly true. By the definition of nonstandard truth. Then the left projection p(c) of that proof in the sense of the nonstandard model is a nonstandard element of the nonstandard set A such that the nonstandard proposition B(p(c)) is nonstandardly true.183 are all derivable in standard type theory. then the nonstandard existential proposition ( S x E A)B(x) is nonstandardly true. this means that it has a nonstandard proof c.x) (xj E Aj. Then B(a) in the sense of the nonstandard model is the nonstandard proposition . Thus nonstandard truth commutes with existence. Quantifying it existentially in the sense of the nonstandard model. Hence. x ~ A(fij(xj))) with j $ i be a nonstandard propositional function over it.x) Let a(x k) E A(fik(Xk)) (x k E A k) with k ~ i be a nonstandard element of the nonstandard set A. so that they must be validated by the nonstandard model. and let B(xj. we get the nonstandard proposition ( ~ x E A(fij(xj)))B(xj.

184 B(fjl(Xl).a(fkl(Xl))) (x I E AI). which shows that the nonstandard exisConversely.P(C(Xk))) true (x k E Ak). by standard existence introduction. I shall make use of the projective system This finishes the . k ) ~ j. (xk ~ A k) Thus we have found a nonstandard element of the nonstandard set A(xi) (xi ~ Ai) which satisfies the nonstandard propositional function B(xj. (Sx for m ~ l E A(fim(Xm)))B(fjm(Xm).a(fkm(Xm))) true (xm E Am ) at some stage m ~ 1. according to the definition of the notion of nonstandard truth. To prove the negative part of the theorem. assume B(fjm(Xm). assume tential proposition is nonstandardly true° that the nonstandard existential proposition is nonstandardly true. that it has a nonstandard proof c(x k) E ( ~ x with k ~ j ~i. E A(fik(Xk)))B(fjk(Xk). Assume it to be true. that is.X) true ( x m ~ = m a x ( j . that is.x) (xj ~ Aj.X) (x k E A k) By the strong rules of existence elimination. where 1 = max(j. we can conclude from this that P(C(Xk)) E A(fik(Xk)) and B(fjk(Xk). Then.k). x ~ A(fij(xj)))o proof of the positive part of the theorem.

?2 = id(?3)' be the choice sequence that it defines. Furthermore. since the implication in the judgement (Vx 0 E A0)A(x0) V ( ~ x 0 ~ Ao)B(x0) 2:) (Vx 0 ~ A0)(A(x 0) V B(x0)) true cannot be reversed. It is nonstandardly true provided ( V x 0 E A O) (A(Xo) V B(Xo)) is true in the standard sense. B(?) is nonstandardly true provided ( V x 0 E Ao)B(x O) is true in the standard sense. Then the nonstandard proposition A(?) is nonstandardly true provided A(x O) is true for x 0 ~ A O. that is. It is nonstandardly true provided ( V x 0 ~ Ao)(A(x O) B(xo)) is true in the standard sense.A 0 id id where A 0 is a fixed nonempty set.. a set containing an element a 0 E A O. let A(x O) and B(x O) be two standard propositional functions of the variable x 0 E A O. in general. in the standard sense. Let ? = ?o = id(?1)' ?1 = id(?2). ~ id AO 4~---. Now. Another example of the failure of nonstandard truth to commute with disjunction will be given later. Hence.185 A0 < id ]IIA 0 ( id . consider the nonstandard disjunctive proposition A(?) V B(?). But the outermost im- . equivalently. Next. ( V x 0 ~ AO)A(x O) is true. consider the nonstandard implicative proposition A(?) ~ B(?).. Likewise. or. nonstandard truth does not commute with disjunction.

since the implication in the judgement (Vx o ~ Ao)(Vx ~ A(xol)~(Xo.186 plication in the judgement ( ~ x o ~ A0)(A(x o) ~ B(x0)) ( ( ~ x 0 E A0)A(x O) ~ ( V x 0 ~ A0)B(Xo)) true cannot be r e v e r s e d . and B(Xo. . and consider the nonstandard proposition ( ~ x E A(?))B(?.x0)) true cannot be reversed. Hence. but not conversely. both in the standard sense. i f A(?) ~ B ( ? ) i s non- standardly true. an arbitrary nonstandard element of A(?) is of the form a(?).x) entails the nonstandard truth of B(?. and B(?. that is. the nonstandard truth of A(?) entails the nonstandard truth of B(?). which shows that nonstandard truth fails to commute with implication. On the other hand. Hence the nonstandard truth of ( V x g A(?)) B(?.X) ( ~ z E (]~x 0 ~ A 0 ) A ( x 0 ) ) ( ~ x 0 E A0)B(x0. a family of sets over AO. but not conversely. it is nonstandardly true provided ( V x 0 ~ A o ) ( ~ x E A(Xo)) B(x0.a(?)) for all nonstandard elements a(?) of A(?).X) a propositional function of the two variables x 0 E A 0 and x E A(x0).a(x0)) is true in the standard sense. i n g e n e r a l . in general.app(z.a(?)) is nonst andardly true provided ( V x 0 E Ao)B(x0.x). and the proof of the theorem is finished. Finally. let A(x 0) be a set depending on the variable x 0 E Ao. Thus nonstandard truth fails to commute with universal quantification. where a(x 0) ~ A(x O) for x 0 E A 0 is a standard function.x) is true in the standard sense. By the definition of nonstandard truth.

In classical nonstandard analysis. .a. do we have Even(si(x)) nor do we have 0dd(si(x)) true (x E N). where a E N.a. We have here another. Even(a) = (7~y E N)I(N.2.y). true (x ~ N).2. we can derive V Odd(~) true this means that the is nonstandardly true. which is to say that the two nonstandard propositions E v e n ( m ) and O d d ( ~ ) are both nonstandardly false. more memorable example of the failure of nonstandard truth to commute with disjunction. Then the judgement Even(x) V Odd(x) true (x E N) is easily proved by induction on x in standard type theory. V 0dd(~) nonstandard proposition E v e n ( ~ ) On the other hand.y + ]). I. Even(w) in the nonstandard extension° Semantically.I87 Miscellaneous examples This is not the place to begin a systematic development of intuitionistic nonstandard analysis. Make the pair of definitions I Hence. etc. Odd(a) = ( 3 y ~ N)I(N. at no stage i = 0. Example I. but a few examples may help to give an idea of what can be done with the nonstandard concepts.. substituting ~ for x.

arbitrary. and 0 d d ( ~ ) Since this choice is anyway left it seems more natural not to force any one of E v e n ( ~ ) to be true. This is made possible by the nonstandard intuitionistic interpretation of disjunction in the present. By the definition of nonstandard truth. which one of them depends on the choice of the ultrafilter extending the Fr~chet filter of cofinal subsets of the set of natural numbers. whose non- standard truth entails the nonstandard truth of A(a) for all infinite a ~ N. To see this. this means that A(si(x)) true (x ~ N) at some stage i = 0. (a) + b = s(a + b) ~ N.t88 one of the two nonstandard propositions Even(~) and 0 d d ( ~ ) is forced to be true. etc. If we define addition of natural numbers by recursion on the first argument. version of nonstandard analysis. so that we can pass to A(si(O) + x) true (x E N) . I~ +b =b~N. we h a v e si(x) = si(o) + x ~ N (x ~ N ) . assume A(~) true. Example 2. Let A(x) (x ~ N) be a standard property of natural numbers. I. Then A ( ~ ) is a nonstandard proposition.

in particular. I. Standard rules of intuiof truth under definitional equality.y) D A(y) true (y E N) D-introduction. si(0) ~ a true. From this.si(0) + x.y) D A(y)) = ( V y E N)(si(0) ~ y D A(y)) = (~y~si(O))A(y) by d e f i n i t i o n . equality.si(0) by 1-elimination tionistic (~y But and + x.y) D A(y)) true. etc.si(0) + x. Since the standard ard interpretation. logical laws continue we can then conclude A(a) true to hold in the nonstand- . let a E N be an arbitrary true.. definitional so t h a t . so that.189 by preservation we get I(N. a g a i n by p r e s e r v a t i o n of tr~tfl under (~/y~ s±(O))A(y) Now. logic now yield ~ N)I(N. which is to say that sJ(0) ~ a true for all j = 0. predicate ~ N)((3x (Vy ~ N)((3x ~ N)I(N. in the sense of nonstand- infinite ard arithmetic.

We already know that each ~ i is infinite. This is easily done in standard type theory by means of the . such that sJ(0) ~ f(sk(x)) true (x E N)o under a Thus an infinite natural number is the image of an ~ i standard number theoretic function which grows beyond all bounds.. a = f(~i for some i = 0. etc. etc. that a = f ( ~ i ) E N is infinite in the sense of nonstandard arithmetic means.. On the other hand. by definition. in turn. but what does an arbitrary infinite a E N look like? By the definition of the nonstandard model. there exists a stage k = 0. this means. Example 4. I. I. By the definition of nonstandard truth. I. where ) ~ N f ( x ) mN (x ~ N ) is a standard number theoretic function. that. etc. Define a propositional function P(x) of the variable x ~ N by the recursion equations f P(o) = J_. that sJ(o) ~ f ( ~ i ) true for all j = 0.. etc. for all j = 0. e(s(x)) = ~P(x). I. Example 3.190 by ~ - and ~-elimination. Thus the nonstandard truth of A ( ~ ) entails that of A(a) for an arbitrary infinite a ~ N.

would be true. the definition P(x) = T(rec(x. I. nega- and we already know that nonstandard truth fails to commute with implication..(x. I. Example 5.))) . etc. This entails that both p(si(O)) p(si(s(O))) are true at that stage..(s(O). Thus. Is P ( ~ ) appears as an endless nonstandardly true or non- standardly false? Suppose it to be nonstandardly true. which is im- is nonstandardly false.J. There is no contra- diction in this: it only shows that nonstandard truth fails to commute with negation. this means that p(si(x)) true (x ~ N) and at some stage i = O. Thus P ( ~ ) = P(s(si(o))) and N p ( s i ( O ) ) = Np(si(o)). Since we have ~ is a nonstandard proposition. P ( ~ i ) is actually nonstandardly false for all i = 0... which comes as no surprise. But p(si(s(O))) so that both p(si(O)) possible. although P ( ~ i ) = P ( s ( ~ i + 1 ) ) = -vP(~i+1). tion is defined by the equation -~A = A ~ J _ .. This being so. In fact. I shall construct a nonstandard element of List(N) which produces the stream of integers (O.191 universe axioms. and P(~) will do. P ( ~ ) sequence of negation signs. etc.y)~y)) E N in the nonstandard extension. Indeed. By definition.(s(s(O)). when it is evaluated lazily.

To this end. = (~ n)(n.o) = (O. a p P ( y .n) ~ List(N) (I ~ N.n) = app(g(1). . This is a double recursion.O) in the nonstandard extension. which has the solution g(1) = r e c ( l . putting E List(N).f(~2.192 when it is evaluated lazily. . define the standard function f(1. it reduces to the primitive recursion g(O) = ( A n ) n i l e N--~List(N).n) = (n.app(g(1). O ) lazily.f(s(~2).s(n))) e N-~List(N).n).f(~l. ~ e N ) by the pair of equations I g(s(1)) f(O.s(s(o))))) . ( x .s(O))) = (O.s(n))) but.f(l.n) = nil @ List(N). .S(O))) = (O. f(s(1). f(l. we get EN to f(~. . y ) ( k n ) ( n . s ( n ) ) ) ) N-~List(N) in standard type theory.(s(O).o) = f(s(~]). ( ~ n ) n i ! . We can now use the axiom ~ derive f(~. 6 List(N) Evaluating f ( ~ .

He proposes to apply Robinson's nonstandard analysis to interpret number theory extended by a new constant for the infinite number. have such a sequence internally without running into contradiction. externally indexed sequence of elements ~i which satisfy the equations e A(si(O)) I A(n) set (n ~ N). n ~ f f ) I g(O. US-Japan Workshop.g(1. etc. I. f(n. that is. Honolulu. a(n) ~ A(n) (n E N) Then we can construct an ~'l = f(si(O)'° (i+ 1) e A(si(O)) for i = O. May 1987. define first an auxiliary function g(1. 14 The idea of dealing with stream computation by introducing an infinite number is independently due to S. in general.n) = f(n.) To see this. .n) = a(n) E A(n). suppose in the sense of the nonstandard model. (We cannot.x) E A(n) (n E N. g(s(1). 14 Example 6. Let a projective system of nonempty sets of the sort that underlies the inductive limit interpretation be given internally.s(n))) EA(n). Nonstandard normalization. x ~ A(s(n))).n) EA(n) by the equations (l~ N. Goto.193 Thus the stream of integers is produced.

s(n))) which has the solution h(1) = rec(1. This is an external sequence which satisfies ~i = g ( ~ i 'si(O)) = g(s(~i+1). ~ (ITn ~ N)A(n).si(O)) = f(si(O).s(si(O)))) = f(si(O).app(y. ~i+I ) E A(si(O)) as desired.n) E A(n).g(~i+1.(~n)a(n). we can define any other choice sequence as- .(x.si+1(O))) = f(si(O). h(s(1)) = (kn)f(n. This example explains the canonical character of the choice sequence o@ = s(o@1) = s(s(o@2)) = etc° .app(h(1).y)(kn)f(n. once we have access to it. etc.194 This is a double recursion. because. I.n) = app(h(1). where h(1) e (TEn E N)A(n) is defined by the primitive recursion (i ~ N) l h(0) = ( ~ n ) a ( n ) ~ (]Tn ~ N)A(n).g(~i+1.s(n)))) (Tin We can now put i = g ( ~ i 'si(O)) e A(si(O)) N)A(n). for i = O. but it is readily solved in standard type theory by putting g(l.

Albeverio et al.~ Q.. Example 7.n 1. course. see S. op. B(s(n)) = B(r. 65. The universe axioms allow you to do this in standard type theory..(x. Consider now the nonstandard set B ( ~ ) . . p. of To this 15 For a nonstandard version of the Cantor space in classical nonstandard analysis. provided only that it is given internally. cit. integral of a function I shall show how to define the f E B(c.o)-.) + B(n). it suffices to put B(n) = T(rec(n. which is as nonstandard as the set to which it belongs.. Indeed. tions It satisfies the equa(n E N) B(~) = 3(s(~I)) + B ( ~ I) = B(s(oo2)) + B ( s ( ~ 2 ) ) = B(~]) = (B(~ 2) + B(~2)) + ( B ( ~ 2) + B(~2)) Thus B ( ~ ) can be endlessly divided into two equal halves: it is a nonstandard version of the Cantor space. Define by recursion a family of sets B(n) satisfying the equations B(0) = NI. 15 Let Q denote the standard set of rational numbers. with respect to the usual uniform distribution.y)(y + y))).195 sociated with a projective system of nonempty sets.

(~y)app(f.f) : s(n~f) 2n ' that is. by dividing S(n.196 end. These are e a s i l y s o l v e d i n s t a n d a r d type t h e o r y by p u t t i n g S(n. f E B(n)~-~Q) is defined by putting I(n. 0 1 ) .(kx)app(f.f) : a p p ( f . F(s(n)) = (kf)(app(F(n).f) E Q (n E N. S(s(n).f) = app(F(n).f). We can now express the searched for integral of f E B(~)--~Q simply as .j(y))). f E B ( n ) . where F(n) E (B(n)--~Q)--~Q (n ~ N) is defined by the primitive recursion I F(O) = ( k f ) a p p ( f . 0 1 ) .f) by the total number of elements of the set B(n).(~y)app(f.~ Q ) by the recursive equations S(0. The analogue of the sequence of Riemann sums I(n.f) = S(n.f) E Q (n E N.i(x))) + app(F(n). define the sequence of sums S(n.(kx)app(f.j(y)))).i(x))) + S(n.

where g(x) E B(si(x))--~Q is a standard function. the meaning of of the nonstandard --~Q is that f = g(~i ) E B(sl(~i))-~Q = B(~)--~Q. sequence of rational (x E N) : I(~.g(~i)).(~f) 2~ This is a nonstandard quence of rational By the definition f E B(~) rational number. etc.f) Hence = I(si(~i).g(~i)) which is the value at ~ i numbers of the standard l(si(x). At stage j = i. tion is obtained by running l(sJ(0). Let us see what the se- approximations is of which it is the limit.197 I(~.g(sJ-i(0))) Convergence is another matter. the rational the program E q.g(x)) E Q (x E N). I(~. model. . i+I..f) = s. exist from stags i approxima- •his means that the rational approximations and onwards.

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