This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Pakistan Nuclear Weapons
Pakistan Nuclear Weapons
A Brief History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972. India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities. In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.
On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices. On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation. Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons were actually detonated,
each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal. DEVICE [boosted device?] Fission device Low-yield device Low-yield device Low-yield device Fission device Fission device DATE 28 May 1998 28 May 1998 28 May 1998 28 May 1998 28 May 1998 30 May 1998 not detonated YIELD [announced] 25-36 kiloton 12 kiloton sub-kiloton sub-kiloton sub-kiloton 12 kiloton 12 kiloton YIELD [estimated] total 9-12 kiloton ---4-6 kiloton --
This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.
According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding. These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India. Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over
Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A. Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.
In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile. Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons. Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their nuclear weapons security. Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon. The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in
the development of its uranium enrichment program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.
In the past, China played a major role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and technology elsewhere. According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear facilities. In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation also contributed to Pakistan's efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges. According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively sophisticated in design and lighter than U.S. and Soviet designed first generation warheads. China also provided technical and material support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project had been initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistan's failure to sign the NPT and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused France to terminate assistance. According to the Defense Department report cited above, Pakistan has also acquired nuclear related and dual-use and equipment and materials from the Former Soviet Union and Western Europe.
Intermittent US Sanctions
On several occasions, under the authority of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Pakistan, cutting off economic and military aid as a result of its pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. suspended sanctions each time developments in Afghanistan made Pakistan a strategically important "frontline state," such as the 1981 Soviet occupation and in the war on terrorism.
Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine
Several sources, such as Jane's Intelligence Review and Defense Department reports maintain that Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India, which has superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons.
Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision." Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as evidenced by President Pervez Musharraf's statements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals, he would "respond with full might." These statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons. Aside from these public declarations, Pakistan has not issued an official nuclear doctrine. The organization authorized to make decisions about Pakistan's nuclear posturing is the National Command Authority (NCA) established in Februrary 2000. The NCA is composed of two committees that advise Gen. Musharraf on the development and employment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for wartime command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Research Corporation under the control on of one Nuclear Defense Complex.
FANTAN A-5, Q-5 (NANCHANG)
A-5M is a single-seat, twin-engine supersonic fighter developed by the Nanchang Aircraft Company of China. Of the 60 aircraft of this class acquired by Pakistan, as of mid-1999 only 49 remained in service. Some are reportedly capable of carrying a single 5-20 kT nuclear bomb. It offers enhanced combat performance particularly at low and super-low altitude. It is the latest renovated type equipped with imported navigation and attack systems. It is used mainly to assist ground troops in attacking concentrated targets on land, key transportation points and ships near the coast. It can also intercept and fight enemy aircraft. It has two WP-6 after burning type of turbojet engines, a fuselage 15,65 meters long, a height of 4.33 meters, and a wingspan of 9,68 meters. Its maximum takeoff load is 11,300 kg. It carries a cannon in each wing, mounted near the fuselage, and it can be loaded with air to air weapons. It can carry bombs and canisters in its hold and various kinds of bombs, rockets and spare fuel tanks in the racks under its wings.
GENERAL DATA Country of Origin. People’s Republic of China. Similar Aircraft. Super Etendard, Yak-38 Forger, Mirage F1. Crew. One. Role. Fighter-bomber. Armament. Rockets, missiles, bombs. Dimensions. Length: 54 ft, 10 in (16.74 m). Span: 31 ft, 10 in (9.8 m).
WEFT DESCRIPTION Wings. Mid-mounted, sharply swept-back, and tapered with blunt tips. Wing fences. Engine(s). Two turbojets are located inside the body. Semicircular air intakes. Two exhausts. Fuselage. Thick, flattened, and upward taper to the rear section. Bubble canopy. Pointed nose. Tail. Flats high-mounted on the body, swept-back, and tapered with square tips. Sharply swept-back tail fin with blunt tip. USER COUNTRIES Bangladesh, North Korea, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China.
MIRAGE III/5 (DASSAULT-BREGUET)
GENERAL DATA Country of Origin. France. Similar Aircraft. Kfir C-2, Viggen, MiG-21 Fishbed, A-4 Skyhawk, Fantan A. Crew. One; trainer--two. Role. Ground-attack, fighter, reconnaissance. Armament. 30-mm cannon, bombs, rockets. Dimensions. Length: Mirage III: 49 ft, 3 in (15.02 m). Mirage 5: 51 ft (15.55 m). Span: 27 ft (8.24 m). WEFT DESCRIPTION Wings. Low-mounted delta wing with pointed tips. Engine(s). One turbojet inside fuselage. Semicircular air intakes are forward of the wing roots below the canopy. Large, single exhaust. Fuselage. Long, slender, and tubular with a pointed nose and a bubble cockpit. Tail. Large, swept-back, and tapered tail fin with a square tip. No tail flats. USER COUNTRIES Argentina, Brazil, Chile (Mirage 5 and 50), Colombia, Egypt, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, Switzerland, Venezuela (Mirage 50), Zaire.
F-16 FIGHTING FALCON (GENERAL DYNAMICS)
Of the 40 F-16 fighter-bomber aircraft originally acquired by Pakistan, 32 remain in service in 3 squadrons. Pakistan has 71 additional F-16s on order, but delivery has been suspended since 1990 by the United States. In early 1994 the Clinton Administration initiated consultations with Congress concerning a proposed one-time sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. Delivery of the planes would be contingent on specific commitments from Pakistan regarding its nuclear program, including a verifiable cap on the production of fissile materials. When Pakistan declined this proposal, in September 1995 the Clinton Administration proposed revisions to the Pressler Amendment to facilitate cooperation with Pakistan n areas such as combatting terrorism and furthering US commercial interests in Pakistan. The US would not deliver the controversial F-16 aircraft or resume an official military supply relationship with Pakistan, but the President decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to other countries and return the proceeds to Pakistan. Pakistan could use the F-16 bombers to drop nuclear weapons on visually acquired targets by improvising the necessary electronic wiring which is omitted from these export models.
GENERAL DATA Country of Origin. USA. Similar Aircraft. F/A-18 Hornet, MiG-29 Fulcrum, Mirage F1. Crew. One; F-16B--two. Role. Multirole ground-attack/fighter. Armament. Cannon, missiles, bombs. Dimensions. Length: 47 ft, 8 in (14.54 m). Span: 31 ft (9.46 m). DESCRIPTION Wings. Mid-mounted, delta-shaped. Missiles are normally mounted at the wing tips. Engine(s). One in body. Oval air intake under the center of the fuselage. Single exhaust. Fuselage. Long, slender body, widens at air intake. Pointed nose. Bubble canopy. Tail. Swept-back, tapered fin with square tip. Flats mid-mounted on the fuselage, deltashaped with square tips, and a slight negative slant. Two belly fins. USER COUNTRIES Bahrain, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, South Korea, Portugal, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, USA, Venezuela.
The Hatf-1 is a single-stage solid-propellant missile with a range of 60 km to 80 km carrying a 500 kg payload, or 350 km with a 100 kg payload. Although the Haft I program was believed to have been halted after three unsuccessful test flights, some of the technology associated with this missile was used in the development of the Haft II program. Some reports claim that a few copies of the missile were produced and are armed with chemical warheads, though Pakistan does not appear to have a chemical weapons capability. In January 1989 a successful launch of an "indigenous multistage rocket into deep space" was said to have reached an altitude of more than 640 km. This test of the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 demonstrated components of the longer-range Hatf-3, of which the Hatf-1 is believed to be the second stage. The very short range Hatf-1 does not have the range to reach beyond the Indian Desert, and would almost certainly be deployed with a conventional rather than nuclear warhead. Reports in 1992 indicate that an improved Hatf 1 with a range of 100 km, known as Hatf 1A, was under development. Although the Hatf-1 program was widely regarded by outside observers as moribund, on 07 February 2000 Pakistan conducted a test of the Hatf-1, which was characterized as "a sequel to several previous tests." This latest test was claimed to represent an improved version of the missile, with a larger payload and an improved range of up to 100 kilometers, versus the 60-80 kilometers initially reported.
Hatf-2 / Shadoz
The Hatf-2 is a two-stage solid-propellant missile with a range of 280 km carrying a 500 kg payload, or - 450 km carrying a 300 kg payload. The Hatf-2 was based on a stack of two Hatf-1 stages stacked. These missiles are believed to be product of French Eridan sounding rocket technology acquired by Pakistan and developed with Chinese assistance. Eridan was a two-stage rocket able to send a 250 kg payload to more than 300 km altitude, or a 130 kg payload to more than 425 km altitude. A total of 17 Eridan rockets were launched by France between 1968 and 1979. This sounding rocket had a liftoff mass of 2,127 kg, and was just shy of 10 meters long. It is believed that the Haft II program has been halted due to technical problems. Reports of a missile program known as Shadoz (King Hawk) are believed to refer to the Hatf 2 project. The Pakistani's allegedly shelved this system because of problems with guidance and control systems. Another consideration may have been the purchase from China of the M-11 missiles with similar capabilities. Pakistan's SUPARCO (Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission) developed a space launch vehicle to place a future Pakistani satellite into low earth orbit. In January 1989, Delhi domestic radio reported that a Pakistani newspaper, Dawn, had announced a successful launch of an "indigenous multistage rocket into deep space." The rocket was said to have reached an altitude of more than 640 km.(1) Two months later, Agence France Press reported that Pakistan had manufactured a rocket booster with a range of 640 km that was to be tested in Autumn of 1989; however, no such test is believed to have occurred.(2) According to a detailed report in a trade weekly publication, State Department officials said that the January 1989 test was the test of the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2, which were announced in February 1989. The report said that the Hatf-2 is the first stage of a planned multistage rocket to have a maximum range of 600 km.(3) In a possible reference to the same rockets, in May 1990, SUPARCO announced that the "test firing of two versions of scientific rockets ha[d] been successfully carried out."(4)
Designation Range km Length meters Width meters Payload kg. Weight kg. Guidance Hatf-ll 280 9.75 0.82 500 5,500 Inertial
Hatf-3 / Shaheen-I / M-11
In 1987 China concluded a deal with Pakistan to sell M-11 missiles and launchers. China delivered unassembled M-11 missiles (300 km/500 kg) to Pakistan in 1993.(1) More than 30 M-11s may be in storage at Pakistan's Sargodha air force base west of Lahore.(2) Other reports suggest that as many as 84 such missiles are deployed at the Sargodha Air Base. (3) In the early 1980s China is widely reported to have provided Pakistan with the blueprints for a 1966 design of a U-235 nuclear-implosion device, of the type used in the warhead that China flew on a DF-2A missile during its fourth nuclear test on 27 October 1966. This missile warhead was reported to weigh about 1,300 kilograms with a yield of about 12-25 kt. This warhead design would be too large to be carried on an M-11. Pakistan is believed to have a capability to deploy a nuclear warhead using plutonium and weighing around 500 kilograms. The missile has a separating warhead, making it desirable as a nuclear-weapons delivery system. The M-11 does not have the range to reach beyond the Indian Desert to threaten New Delhi or other large population centers. In 1991 the United States imposed economic sanctions, based on US law, against both China and Pakistan for China’s transfer of M-11 missile-related equipment. The sanctions were lifted against China in 1992. On 25 August 1993 the United States imposed "Category Two" sanctions against certain Chinese and Pakistani entities that were involved in an M-11 missile-related transfer, which is prohibited under US law. Category Two sanctions -- which are imposed if the transfer "involves certain items in the MTCR (Missile Control Technology Regime) Annex which contribute to missile development" - require "denial of new export licenses for MTCR Annex items...and denial of US government contracts relating to MTCR Annex items with the sanctioned entities for two years." The sanctions were lifted against China in 1994, when China reaffirmed its 1992 commitment to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR] and made a number of new, related commitments. However, China remains Pakistan’s principal supplier of missile-related technology. The sanctions against Pakistan were not lifted until they expired in 1995. This missile project is managed by the National Defence Complex (NDC), a subsidiary of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) which was formed in 1993. The Shaheen missile program was initiated in 1995 and assigned to the NDC. The Shaheen project used the resources that were available within the various other institutions in Pakistan, supplemented with infrastructure created at the National Development Complex for capabilities which were not available elsewhere in Pakistan. The facilities of SUPARCO were utilized in the Shaheen project, along with the facilities of industry in Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Gujrat and other cities. Missile components from these various facilities were brought to the NDC for final integration.
On August 25, 1996, R. Jeffrey Smith of The Washington Post reported that U.S. intelligence officials were concerned that a partially completed factory in the suburbs of Rawalpindi would be ready in a year or two to produce "precise duplicates" of the M-11. The National Intelligence Estimate, said to the basis for the report, also stated that Pakistan may have developed nuclear warheads for the M-11, according to Smith.(4) The public record does not disclose a consistent basis for application of the "Hatf-3" nomenclature to a specific missile system. On 03 July 1997 Pakistan conducted a missile test that unofficial press reports claimed was an 800-km range Hatf-3 missile [the nomenclature associated with this test was never offially confirmed]. The test followed an uproar in Pakistan over the alleged deployment of 250-kilometre range Prithvi (Earth) missiles by rival India on Pakistan's border. While Indian sources asserted that the missile was a Chinese M-9, US analysts concluded that the missile was most likely an improved M-11. Very little additional information is available on this alleged launch. The Indian Test of the Agni II IRBM was conducted 11 April 1999. Pakistan responded on 14 Apr 1999 with a test firing of its Ghauri II missile from the Jhelum region in northeast Pakistan. Dr. Samar Mubarik Mand, in charge of the Shaheen project, left for China and returned home on 14 April 1999. Then, on 15 April 1999, a successful test of Shaheen was conducted. Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission said it tested a single stage IRBM called the Shaheen for the first time. Said to have a range of 750 km., it was fired from Sonmiani, a coastal site near Karachi. Officials said the missile can carry a 1 metric ton payload. The 15 April 1999 test marked the debut of the "Shaheen" [a royal white falcon] nomenclature in Pakistan's missile inventory, as well as the genesis of some confusion concerning Pakistan's missile imports from China. The claimed 750 km range of the Shaheen is roughly double the standard range of the Hatf-3/M-11, and is consistent with the range of the much large Chinese M-9. Unconfirmed reports have suggested that China may have transferred a small number of M-9 missiles to Pakistan, in addition to the wellestablished transfer of M-11 missiles. In any event, the still photos and video released by Pakistan of the "Shaheen" missile are clearly the M-9, not the M-11, and the Shaheen Transporter Erector Launcher [TEL] is clearly a modified version of the M-11 TEL. The two "Shaheen" missiles displayed in the military parade were apparently the improved longer-range CSS-7 Mod 2, rather than the original Mod 1 exported to Pakistan in the early 1990s.
DF-11 / M-11 / CSS-7
In July 1997 Pakistan allegedly test-fired an 800 km missile. The Pakistani Government acknowledged that a missile had been tested, but did not identify its range. Indian sources assert the missile was a Chinese M-9. American analysts, however, have concluded that the missile was possibly an improved M-11. Very little information is available on this alleged launch, and considerable confusion extends to the Pakistani nomeclature for this missile. In early June 1998 a leading Pakistani scientist Dr. Samar Mubarik Mund, director General of the National Development complex, stated that Pakistan was prepared to test fire the medium range Shaheen-I missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads up to 700 kilometers. The public record does not disclose a consistent basis for application of the "Hatf-3" nomenclature to a specific missile system. On 03 July 1997 Pakistan conducted a missile test that unofficial press reports claimed was an 800-km range Hatf-3 missile [the nomenclature associated with this test was never offially confirmed]. The test followed an uproar in Pakistan over the alleged deployment of 250-kilometre range Prithvi (Earth) missiles by rival India on Pakistan's border. While Indian sources asserted that the missile was a Chinese M-9, US analysts concluded that the missile was most likely an improved M-11. Very little additional information is available on this alleged launch. The Shaheen-I missile is probably a version of China's M-9 missile, which Islamabad may have acquired in 1991 but had kept under wraps for fear of sanctions. Pakistan is believed to have a capability to deploy a nuclear warhead weighing around 500 kilograms. If its ascribed range/payload curve proves out, the Hatf-4 / Shaheen would have sufficient range from relatively secure positions west of the border with India. The public debut of the "Shaheen" [a royal white falcon] in Pakistan's missile inventory came with a highly publicized flight test on 15 April 1999, which added to the confusion concerning Pakistan's missile imports from China. The claimed 750 km range of the Shaheen is roughly double the standard range of the Hatf-3/M-11, and is consistent with the range of the much large Chinese M-9. However, the still photos and video released by Pakistan of the "Shaheen" missile are clearly the M-9, not the M-11, and the Shaheen Transporter Erector Launcher [TEL] is clearly a modified version of the M-11 TEL.
Shaheen-II / Hatf-6 / Ghaznavi
The Shaheen-II was test-fired on March 9, 2004. The Pakistani military issued a statement saying, "Pakistan today successfully carried out the maiden test fire of the Shaheen 2 surface-to-surface ballistic missile." In an interview with an English daily in Islamabad, the director General of the National Development Complex [and a member of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission - PAEC] Dr. Samar Mubarik Mund said work is in progress on the long range Shaheen-II which can travel 2000 kilometres. He said the missile would be ready for testing by the end of 1998, though it was not launched until early 2004. A pair of Shaheen-II ballistic missiles were displayed during the Pakistan Day parade in Islamabad on 23 March 2000. One of the missiles was carried on a 12-wheel Transporter Erector Launcher, while the other missile was carried on a Missile Transporter. These vehicles, based on a common chassis, are evidently significantly larger than the 8-wheel launcher used by the Shaheen, though they use a similar cab. During the parade, it was claimed that the Shaheen-II surface-to-surface missile had a range of 2,000 kilometers [over 1400 miles]. The Shaheen-II is evidently a Pakistani version of the Chinese M-18, which was originally shown at the 1987 Beijing air show as a two-stage missile with 1000 kms range carrying a 400-500 kilogram payload. This M-18 missile had the longest range of any of the current M-series missiles. The Shaheen series of missiles are evidently based imported from China by the PAEC's National Development Complex. The Shaheen, which was tested with considerable publicity on 15 April 1999, is evidently the Chinese M-11 which Pakistan purchased in the early 1990s. The Shaheen-II would appear to represent the Chinese M-18, although it is questionable whether Pakistan has actually obtained these missiles from China. There is no present indication that China has transferred such missiles to Pakistan. Pakistan has announced that development efforts are underway on a longer-range missile, designated the Ghaznavi, although no details of this system's proposed characteristics have been made public.
In the early 1980s China is widely reported to have provided Pakistan with the blueprints for a 1966 design of a U-235 nuclearimplosion device, of the type used in the warhead that China flew on a DF-2A missile during its fourth nuclear test on 27 October 1966. This missile warhead was reported to weigh about 1,300 kilograms with a yield of 12-25 kt. This warhead design would be too large to be carried on an M-11, which does not have the range to reach beyond the Indian Desert to threaten New Delhi or other large population centers. The Ghauri missile represents both an opportunity to use heavier uranium bombs on ballistic missiles, as well as to deliver nuclear warheads to targets across much of India. The Ghauri missile was developed by the Kahuta-based Khan Research Laboratories, led by Dr. A.Q. Khan, which is responsible for uranium weapons development. Pakistan has stated that the range and payload capacity of the missile will be upgraded. Pakistan claimed that the missile had "no relevance" to China's M11 missile, and analysis suggests that it appears to be a derivative of the North Korean Nodong design.
1,350-1,500 190 (Previously thought to be several thousand meters) Diam. (m) 1.32-1.35 15.852-16 Height (m) L. W. (kg) 15,852-16,250 Stage Mass (kg) 15,092 D. W. (kg) 1,780-2,180 Effective: 26,051 (-709) Thrust (Kg f) Actual: 26,760-26,600 Burn time (sec.) 110 Isp. (sec.) Effective: 226 - SL due to vains steering drag loss of 4-5 sec. Actual: 230 Vac.: 264 Thrust Chamb. 1 Fuel TM-185 20% Gasoline 80% Kerosene AK-27I Oxidizer 27% N 2O4 73% HNO3 Iodium Inhibitor Propellant Mass (kg) 12,912 760-987-1,158 Warhead (kg) Type MRBM Range (km) CEP (m)
This missile was first named Hataf-V, later the name was changed to Ghauri, which was approved by the prime minister. The missile was named after the 12th century Afghan
king Shahbuddin Ghauri who captured western parts of India between 1176 and 1182, and captured northern India by defeating Prithvi Raj Chauhan in 1192. The Ghauri name is thus highly symbolic, as "Prithvi" is the name of the Indian short-range ballistic missiles, and Pakistan's "Ghauri" has a much longer range than the Indian missile. On 06 April 1998 Pakistan carried out a successful flight test of the surface-to-surface Hatf-V (Ghauri) missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers (937 miles) and a payload capacity of 700 kg. The missile was tested to hit a target at a range of 1,100 kilometers. The Ghauri was fired from Malute, near the city of Jhelum in northeastern Pakistan, and impacted the target near the southwestern city of Quetta. This is a distance of only some 700 km, significanly less than the claimed range of up to 1,500 km/930 miles. The Indian Test of the Agni II IRBM was conducted 11 April 1999. Pakistan responded on 14 Apr 1999 with a test firing of its Ghauri II missile from the Jhelum region in northeast Pakistan. The vehicle reportedly struck a target in the Baluchistan desert about 1,100 km. away. It would appear that if the missile was fired directly due east, the effect of the earth's rotation would give it a range of 1,240 km. Fired in a southerly direction towards major urban targets in India, it could reach a range of some 950 km - 1,120 km. The US-based stratfor.com intelligence consulting company suggested that Pakistan may have test fired a missile [which could be a Ghauri] on 15 August 2000, when India was celebrating Independence Day. Objects streaking through the skies in Balucistan on that day were perhaps Ghauri-III missile tested by Islamabad, or perhaps they were merely a meteor shower. Developing Nations and Warhead Dynamic Performance Recently, it was suggested that the developing nations missile program warheads would be tumbling about their center of gravity during re-entry, which would then make it difficult to identify. This was because they were not being spun-up along their longitudinal axis prior to re-entry through the atmosphere. A warhead is much like a bullet fired from a rifle barrel. If the barrel is grooved to spin up the bullet along its longitudinal axis it tends to fly through the atmosphere to its target more smoothly and accurately. If the barrel is not built with this capability, the bullet tumbles uncontrollably about its center of gravity throughout its flight in the atmosphere to its target. This tumbling reduces the accuracy of the projectile. This kind of missile warhead tumbling was noted in the ballistic flights of Iraqi's Scud-B, Scud-C/Al-Hussein, Scud-D/Al-Abbas ballistic missiles during the Gulf war. In this particular case all of the warheads remained attached to the Scud derived rocket bodies. The length of the Scud-C and D missile bodies and the failure to spin up either the missile with its warhead or separate the warhead after missile spin up made them extremely unstable and in accurate during re-entry to their target.
Today this is not the case with North Korean derived warhead technology. North Korea successfully demonstrated payload spin up with the satellite launch attempt of the Taep'odong-1 or PAEUTUSAN-1 booster. The Paeutusan-1 solid propellant third stage both demonstrated a near full duration burn and the spin up of the stage and satellite along its longitudinal axis. However, the third stage solid motor ruptured, de-orbiting the satellite, almost immediately after achieving orbital velocity. Therefore, it would be correct to assume that besides North Korea's, No-dong (first stage of Taep'o-dong-1), both Pakistan's Ghauri-II and Iran's Shahab-3 all benefit from this spin-up technology. The Shahab-3/Ghauri-II both apparently spin up the single booster stage and warhead combination starting at about 10 seconds before the termination of the powered flight at 110 seconds. At this point after 110 seconds of powered flight the warhead is then separated from the booster stage to fly on a re-entry trajectory that remains stable to its target. With the addition of GPS targeting the warhead accuracy is greatly enhanced. There are still many in the analytical community that question, perhaps correctly, this suggested accuracy of 190 meters to over one kilometer. There can be no doubt that this spin-up technology does improve the accuracy of these warheads over the previously demonstrated poor capability. Since the warheads are not tumbling it in fact enhances the interceptor sensor signature identification capability verses that of a tumbling warheads signature. Equally revealing is the fact that this is the area where the Iranian Shahab-3 has repeatedly failed in flight test. If the steering vains are not equally positioned correctly or are defective in any way the missile and warhead combination would tumble about its center of gravity out of control destroying the missile. The resulting tumbling warhead whether attached to the remaining missile body or not would in all probability be destroyed during its re-entry. It is known that Iran has and continues to suffer from a steering vain quality control problem for its Shahab-3 ballistic missile that the Germans during WW-II solved and that the United States and former Soviet Union were able to easily resolve with out using specialized coating.
Ghauri-III / Abdali
In late September 1999 it was reported that Pakistan had successfully completed the trials of Ghauri-III missile's engine at Kahuta Research Laboratories. Ghauri-III would cover the range of over 3,000 kilometres. Based on the close connection between the Ghauri and the North Korean Nodong missile, it is reasonable to believe that the Ghauri-III represents a Pakistani derivative of the two-stage North Korean Taepodong-1 missile, which uses the Nodong as a first stage. The existence of a "Ghauri-II" missile is evidently implicit in the "Ghauri-III" nomenclature, although there are no indications to identify or substantiate the existence of such as missile program. In late May 1998 Dawn reported that Pakistan launched two long range missiles, the Abdali and the Ghaznavi, both capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The report said the Abdali missile was fired from from a submarine. The report quoted sources as saying that the missile had a range of 2,500 km. However there has been no confirmation of the missile tests, and Pakistan does not have a submarine that would be suitable for firing such a missile.
On 11 May, the daily Frontier Post publication reported that Pakistan was planning to test-fire a new 4000 km range ballistic missile - Tipu [the fighter] on 28 May 1999, the first anniversary of Pakistan's nuclear tests. No other reports assert the fact of the existence of such a missile, and no test has taken place as of the end of 1999. According to report, the new missile was developed by a team of scientists from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and is capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear payloads. The missile was described as being 12 meters long. This reported length is evidently inconsistent with the reported range of the missile, since Chinese [possibly DF-3A or DF4] and North Korean [TD-2] missile with ranges of several thousand kilometers are several times larger. The utility of a missile in this range class is obscure, since the 1500 km range Ghauri/Hatf-5 ND-1 derivative provides almost complete coverage of India, and politically interesting targets at more than twice this range are rather difficult to identify. Although the existence of a Tipu missile is doubtful, the origins of the "Tipu" nomeclature are interesting, nonetheless. Tipu Sultan was the muslim ruler of Mysore in Srirangapatnam, who was enthroned as the ruler of Mysore on 04 May 1783. He continued the Second Mysore War against the English, and defeated many English generals. His maxim was that "it was far better to live like a lion for a day than to live like a jackal for a hundred years". It is said that Tipu Sultan forced Hindus to convert to Islam, though there is conflicting evidence that these claims are true. When Tipu was killed at the battle of Tipu Khanahally in 1799 the British captured more than 700 rockets. These rockets were taken to England by William Congreve and subsequently "reverse engineered."
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.