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TRANSPO CASES #1

Philamgem vs. PKS Shippinf Company

Facts:

Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services of respondent
PKS Shipping Company (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of seventy-
five thousand (75,000) bags of cement worth Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-
Five Thousand Pesos (P3,375,000.00). DUMC insured the goods for its full value with
petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Company (Philamgen). During the
transport, the barge where the bags of cement were loaded, sank. Upon demand of
payment by DUMC, Philamgen immediately paid them. Hence, it sought
reimbursement from PKS Shipping but the latter refused.

Issue:

(1) Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

(2) WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry.
Or, WON PKS Shipping is liable.

Held:

(1) PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others,
although for a limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The
regularity of its activities in this area indicates more than just a casual activity on its
part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier change merely because
individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

(2) PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6)
to eight (8) feet and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of
water into the barge’s hatches. The official Certificate of Inspection of the barge
issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise Load Line Certificate would
attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC, common
carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods
due to any of the following causes, among others:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

Baritua vs. Mercader

Facts:

The late Dominador Mercader, a businessman engaged in the buy and sell of dry
goods in Laoang, N. Samar, boarded the bus of herein petitioner JB Line bounded
from Manila to N. Samar. However, while said bus was traversing the Beily Bridge in
N. Samar, the bus fell into the river, as a result, D. Mercader died. Petitioner alleges,
among others, that there is no statement in the complaint of Mercader that he was
issued any passenger-freight ticket.

Issue: WON a contract of carriage existed between petitioners and Mercader. Or,
WON petitioners are liable for the death of Mercader.

Held:

thus. however. it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. 1108. the said pass did not indicate any seat number. 803. private respondents submitted a copy of the boarding pass. D. with due regard for all the circumstances. they used the 1st coupon. such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila. because the bus fell into a river while traversing the Bugko Bailey Bridge. United Airlines.C. the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States. the Fontanillas were issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words “CHECK-IN REQUIRED.m. and (2) What law is applicable. It is supposed to do so by using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. erred in applying the laws of the United States as. If indeed the Fontanillas checked in at the designated time as they claimed. Although he survived the fall. It is true that the tickets were “rewritten” in Washington. The appellate court. however. the Fontanillas were not able to board said flight but instead were able to board United Airlines Flight No. In support of their allegations. is bound to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. Explicitly printed on the boarding pass are the words “Check-In Required. Inc vs.A contract of carriage exists. CA Facts: .A. CA Facts: Respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines.. Petitioners failed to transport D. in the case at bar. PhilAm vs. Mercader to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers. the Philippine Law or the US Law? Held: (1) No. However.” Curiously. Philippine law is the applicable law. the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila.” for United Airlines Flight No. his wife and his son from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles Airport. his wife and his minor son Mychal. he later died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets. Issue: (1) Whether or not private respondents were able to prove with adequate evidence his allegations of breach of contract in bad faith. why then were they not assigned seat numbers? (2) The Philippine Law. by the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy.” tickets for himself. he immediately proceeded to the check-in counter. Fontanilla then bought two (2) additional coupons each for himself. petitioners are liable. Aniceto Fontanilla’s assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a. Although. The Court agreed with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that fateful morning. The Fontanillas proceeded to the US as planned.S. It must be noted that a common carrier. unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. and that Linda Allen punched in something into the computer is specious and not supported by the evidence on record. through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila three (3) “Visit the U.

Laguna Tayabas Bus Company Facts: Herminio L. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers.B. contained in a box. the bus company’s failure to confiscate the baggage cannot be considered as a negligent act. when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary. filed an insurance claim with PHILAMGEN. Municipality of Bay. “according to the circumstances of the (each) case.” Article 1733 qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be “according to all the circumstances of each case. Held: No. thus. loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger. according to all the circumstances of each case …” In the event of loss of goods. common carriers are presumed to have acted negligently. Held: YES. Nocum vs. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. but in accord to the circumstance of the case. Coca-Cola Bottlers filed a claim for damages against FELMAN which it denied.) N.500 cases of 1-litter Coca-Cola softdrinks bottle to be transported from Zamboanga City to Cebu City. Issue: WON FELMAN is liable for loss of the cargo due to its failure to observe the extraordinary diligence required by Art. Nocum was a passenger in appellant’s Bus No. a vessel owned by respondent FELMAN. FELMAN. was injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers. not to speak of his own. the circumstance that must be considered in measuring a common carrier’s duty towards its passengers is the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. Issue: WON the bus company was negligent. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. The Bus Company has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by showing that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers. The sinking of the vessel was due to its unseaworthiness even at the time of its departure from the port of Zamboanga. 1733. 7. It was top-heavy as an excessive amount of cargo was loaded on deck. was not able to rebut this presumption. (Hence.Coca-Cola Bottlers loaded on board MV Asilda. Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code. PHILAMGEN now seeks recourse against FELMAN. . NCC. the shipowner. are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them. The shipment was insured by petitioner PHILAMGEN. The injuries suffered by Nocum were not due to mechanical defects but to the explosion of firecrackers. hence liable for the injuries suffered by Nocum.” In this case. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search. “(c)ommon carriers. The vessel left Zamboanga in a fine weather but the same sank in the waters of Zamboanga del Norte. 120 then making a trip within the barrio of Dita. as in the case at bar. Laguna.

Judge Cornejo of the city court favoured shipper Elite for the recovery of damages from common carrier Compania Maritima. was no longer as a common carrier but as a depository. Elite Shirt Factory contends that the liability of the carrier. When. Cresencia Facts: A passenger jeepney driven by Brigido Avorque smashed into a Meralco post resulting in the death of Vicente Medina. Steam Navigation as third party defendant. but thereafter denied the judgment of execution and set aside its previous decision. no delivery having been made to the consignee as a result? Held: YES. N. and squarely applicable in the instant case: There is need for evidence of circumstances indicating cause or causes for apprehension that the passenger’s baggage is dangerous and that it is failure of the common carrier’s employee to act in the face of such evidence that constitutes the cornerstone of the common carrier’s liability in cases similar to the present one. allegedly damaged. Elite Shirt Factory vs. filed with the City Court of Manila a complaint against Compania Maritima for reimbursement. from the time the shipment was deposited in its warehouse. as in this case. Compañia Maritima. THE REASON: the warehouse in which the cargo was deposited at the time it was burned was owned by the carrier. CFI will have jurisdiction when: the carrier is liable as a common carrier. on the ground that the fire started from the section occupied by such. the ground: Judge had no jurisdiction. if the bodega was owned NOT by Compania Maritima. one of its passengers. it is the City Court which will have jurisdiction and not the CFI. hence. Compañia Maritima. While such cargo was stored in the bodega owned by Compania Maritima. Issue: Does the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on a Court of First instance over admiralty and maritime cases include the suit where the shipper files a claim against the carrier. the jurisdiction of the court of first instance under the specific provision of the Judiciary Act is undeniable. but rather the CFI within its exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. the proceeding in effect is one for a breach of a contract of shipment. itself. a fire broke. the instant case is included in the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFI.B. stored in its bodega but subsequently burned. City court will have jurisdiction when: the common carrier is liable as DEPOSITORY. Hence.Thus. in other jurisdictions. Elite Shirt. The cargo was burned before Compania Maritima could deliver it to the consignees. Medina vs. The latter filed an answer impleading Phil. Hon. as in the instant case. the goods having been landed. Cornejo Facts: Elite Shirt Factory (shipper) delivered to Compania Maritima (common carrier) several cartons of merchandise for shipment to several consignees. Guillermo Cresencia . it is the City Court which has jurisdiction.

1756. and based. but on a breach of the carrier’s contractual obligation to carry his passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual). (2) No. and 1759. continued to be liable to the Commission and the public for the consequences incident to its operation. That duty. Medina’s action for damages is independent of the criminal case filed against Brigido Avorque. by implication. article 1258). while Cangco stepped off the car. may be sold or leased without infringing the certificate issued to the grantee x x x As the sale of the jeepney was admittedly without the approval of the Public Service Commission. On the other hand. the liability of the carrier is not merely subsidiary or secondary. one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. he used a pass. Issue: (1) Who should be held liable for the death of Medina – the registered owner or the absolute owner? (2) WON Rosario Avorque has a subsidiary liability under the RPC for damages arising from her driver’s criminal act. but direct and immediate (Articles 1755. which entitled him to ride upon the company’s train free of charge. Manila Railroad Facts: Jose Cangco was an employee of the Manila Railroad Co. Held: The liability constitutes culpa contractual (Contract of Carriage). Guillermo Cresencia. is its current absolute owner as well as the employer of driver Brigido. being contractual. His arm was badly crashed and lacerated. who is the registered owner and operator thereof. As an employee of the company. for in culpa contractual.is the registered owner of the jeepney as well as the registered operator. she has no subsidiary liability. not on the employer’s subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code. New Civil Code). The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it. The requires the approval of the Public Service Commission in order that a franchise. Issue: Whether the liability of Manila Railroad constitutes culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. Rosario Avorque. or any privilege pertaining thereto. was direct and . the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code. Cangco vs. Held: (1) The registered owner. And it is also for this reason that there is no need of first proving the insolvency of the driver Brigido Avorque before damages can be recovered from the carrier. after the jeepney having been repeatedly sold from one buyer after another. supplied by the company. One day.

Culpa Contractual and Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished: (read from full text) 1. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. N. whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.B. This care has been defined to be. culpa aquiliana. to avoid injury. and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract. as the source of an obligation. those which arise from contract. CA Facts: Private respondent Jesus Samson was a regular co-pilot of PAL. and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract 2. the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who. and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant’s servants. of the age. they made a crash landing at Daet where Samson suffered physical injuries in the head. is not based upon a mere presumption of the master’s negligence in their selection or control. but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances. On the other hand. During one of his flights from Manila to Legazpi with Captain Delfin Bustamante. and that because of the tumor Bustamante has a slow reaction and poor judgment. would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. Test in determining Contributory Negligence of plaintiff: Thompson’s work on negligence—- The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train. the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents. was the cause of it. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person. Issue: .” PAL vs. 3. Contributory Negligence on the part of Cangco: None. by his act or omission. rests upon the fact that in cases of non- contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris. not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally. is that of ordinary or reasonable care. when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact.immediate. sex and condition of the passenger. Samson alleges that the accident was due to the gross negligence of PAL in allowing Bustamante who was suffering from a long standing tumor of the Nasopharynx but was also allowed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration to fly as a co- pilot.

177. the law presumes the employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. Co. the weather was the same as when they left. Sarkies should have a right of action against Mendoza. They were given two tickets both with the name SARKIES appearing therein. the daughter of the spouses Dizon. NCC. while the blue tickets were collected upon boarding the Sarkies bus. Issue: WON. Merceditas. Held: Yes. IAC Facts: The Dizons purchased 6 round trip tickets from Sarkies for a tour to Corregidor form Manila. WON the same carrier is liable for the accident even if Bustamante was not sick.WON PAL was negligent as a common carrier in allowing Bustamante to fly as a First Officer the day of the accident. the boat capsized. The word “Edisco” was however handwritten on the white ticket. and back. it is liable. vs Latham. For having allowed Bustamante to fly as a First Officer on January 8. as an answer. The MV Edisco owned and operated by Mendoza was not registered nor was it licensed to operate as a watercraft. And for the negligence of defendant’s employee. NCC. After about thirty minutes of cruising. it is but fair that Sarkies should have a right of action against Mendoza for reimbursement. the evidence shows that overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at the mangrove was caused by the pilot for which acts the defendant must answer for damages caused thereby. 1755 and 1756. the following was said: . As defined in Art. under the Civil Code. the airplane in the case at bar. 1951. nay injuries and even death to all aboard the plane. Although Article 2181 of the Civil Code is not technically invocable. prejudice. As a result. And this must be so for any omission. died. The Dizons filed a complaint for damages against Sarkies. (Even) assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the tumor did not affect the pilot in managing the plane. passengers and crew members alike. defendant is guilty of gross negligence and therefore should be made liable for the resulting accident. Or. its principle should be applied in favor of Sarkies. 1733. Sarkies Tours Phil vs. Sarkies. In Grand Trunk R. 1732. The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of common carriers is for the safety of passengers as well as for the members of the crew or the complement operating the carrier. among others. the boat leaned towards the starboard. lapse or neglect thereof will certainly result to the damage. included a cross-claim against Mendoza. On return to Manila. At least. Held: YES and YES. The provision of the Civil Code on common carriers is based on Anglo-American Law. The white tickets were collected on board by Julian Mendoza. 63 Me. The law is clear in requiring a common carrier to exercise the highest degree of care in the discharge of its duty and business of carriage and transportation under Art. petitioner is a common carrier. Considering that actual negligence for the drowning of Merceditas was the responsibility of Mendoza.

“Where a railroad company had been compelled to pay a judgment for damages for injuries sustained by a passenger as a result of the maltreatment and misconduct of the conductor…the Court (held) that the servant was liable to his master for all loss and damage sustained by it.” .