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Draft 3/28/2006

**Chapter 7. The Logic of Necessity and Possibility: ‘Must’ and ‘Might’.
**

“I know what you’re thinking about,” said Tweedledum; “but it isn’t so, nohow.” “Contrariwise,” continued Tweedledee, “if it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn’t, it ain’t. That’s logic.” ⎯ LEWIS CARROLL Alice in Wonderland Chapter Outline 1. 2. 3. Modes of Truth and Modal Logics. ........................................................................................................................1 The Symbolic Language for Modal Propositional Logic. ......................................................................................4 Translation and Symbolization. The English sentence ..........................................................................................6 Exercises.................................................................................................................................................................7 4. Axioms for Modal Logics. .....................................................................................................................................8 Exercises.................................................................................................................................................................9 5. Modal Inference Rules. ........................................................................................................................................11 Exercises...............................................................................................................................................................12 6. Natural Deduction for (T), (B), (S4), and (S5). ....................................................................................................12 Exercises...............................................................................................................................................................20 7. Fallacies................................................................................................................................................................21 Exercises...............................................................................................................................................................25 8. Possible World Semantics. ...................................................................................................................................27 Exercises...............................................................................................................................................................33 8. Theorems. .............................................................................................................................................................34 Exercises...............................................................................................................................................................39 9. Modal Provability Systems and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems....................................................................43 Exercises...............................................................................................................................................................46 10. Philosophical Remarks (Nathan Salmon, U. C. Santa Barbara, with revisions by Mar). .....................................48

**1. Modes of Truth and Modal Logics.
**

Not all intuitively valid arguments can be reached by the symbolic procedures of chapters I-VI. Some intuitive English arguments depend not simply on the truth and falsity of propositions but on their modes of truth and falsity or modalities. For example, consider the argument: (1) It is impossible for Socrates to be philosophizing in both Athens and Sparta at noon today. Socrates is philosophizing in Athens at noon today. Therefore, Socrates isn’t philosophizing in Sparta at noon today. Clearly, the validity of the above argument depends for its validity on the logic of such phrases as ‘it is impossible’ and ‘it is not possible’. By convention it is customary to use the box ‘ ’ for ‘it is necessary that’ and ‘ ’ for ‘it is possible that’. Using ‘P’ to abbreviate ‘Socrates is philosophizing in Athens at noon today’ and ‘Q’ to abbreviate ‘Socrates is philosophizing in Sparta at noon today’, we may symbolize the first premise in two (logically equivalent) ways: (2) ~(P ∧ Q) ~ (P ∧ Q) .

In the above argument impossible refers to what is physically impossible, or what is not possible given what we know about the laws of physics and the physical makeup of human beings and the world. It is not physically possible for Socrates to be in two distant Greek cities, Athens and Sparta, at the same time of noon. Expressed in the language of possible worlds, there is no physically possible world in which Socrates in both in Athens and

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KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7, ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Draft 3/28/2006 Sparta at noon. However, the phrases ‘it is necessary that’ and ‘it is possible that’ are used in quite a variety of ways in English. A second interpretation of modality involves what is morally obligatory, morally impermissible (or forbidden), and morally permissible. Consider the following argument: (3) If it was morally obligatory for Corrie to tell the whole truth to the Nazis about hiding Jews in the attic of her house, then it was permissible for her to do so. However, it was forbidden for Corrie to do so. Therefore, it wasn’t morally obligatory for Corrie to tell the whole truth. Intuitively, a proposition or state of affairs is morally necessary or obligatory for a given person if that person will be at fault unless he or she sees to it that the proposition or state of affairs is or becomes true. Using ‘ ’ for ‘it is obligatory that’, the deontic notions ‘it is permissible that’ (in symbols, ‘<P>’) and ‘it is forbidden that’ (in symbols, ‘[F]’) can be defined, respectively, as: (4) <P>ϕ =df ~ ~ϕ [F]ϕ =df ~ϕ .

The above argument appeals to the intuitive principle that whatever is morally obligatory is morally permissible. (This is sometimes what is meant by the principle that “ought” implies “can”, although this principle sometimes means something different, namely, that what is morally obligatory must be physically or metaphysically possible for the agent to perform. This principle would connect the above modal notion of physical possibility with those of the moral obligation.) Modal notions can therefore be used for the logic of moral obligation and moral permissibility known deontic logic. Notice that the above deontic notions were framed in terms of temporal notions. A third interpretation of modality, temporal logic, involves treating moments of time similar in logical status to possible worlds. Intuitively, something is temporally necessary with regard to the future at a moment of time if it is true at all future times, and temporally possible with regard to the future at a moment of time if it is true at some future time. Similarly, something is temporally necessity with regard to the past at a moment of time if it is true at all past times, and temporally possible with regard to the past at a moment of time if it is true at some past time. These tools can be used to analyze Aristotle’s famous paradox about future contingent propositions. (5) If it is now true that the sea battle will take place tomorrow, then it was always true that the battle will take place tomorrow. If it is now true that the sea battle will not take place tomorrow, then it was always true that the sea battle will not take place tomorrow. Either is now true that the sea battle will take place tomorrow or not. Therefore, either it was always true that the sea battle will take place tomorrow or it was always true that the sea battle will take place tomorrow. Introducing the temporal possibility operators ‘<F>’ for ‘it will be the case that’ and ‘<H>’ for ‘it was the case that’, we can express the future perfect tense ‘it will have been the case that ϕ’ by ‘<F><H>ϕ’. Defining a pair of temporal necessity operators with respect to the future and past in terms of the above temporal possibility operators, we have: ‘[F]ϕ =df ~<F>~ϕ’ and ‘[H]ϕ =df ~ <H>~ ϕ’, standing for, respectively, being temporally necessarily with regard to the future and being temporally necessary with regard to the past. Using these operators, we can formulate axioms about the structure of time such as [H]ϕ →[H][H]ϕ , which talks about the ‘hardness of facts about past’, i.e., that what has always been the case has always been the case that it has always been the case. We can also express interaction principles between the past and future such as ϕ → [F]<H>ϕ , which states, intuitively, that what is presently the case will, at all future times, be a true statement about the past. A fourth interpretation of modality involves logic of knowledge and belief. When Descartes says it is possible that he is being deceived by an evil genius, he does not mean it is possible that he is actually being deceived by the evil genius, but rather that, for all he knows, such a circumstance is conceivable. Intuitively, a proposition is epistemically possible (or conceivable) for a given individual if, for all that individual knows, it is possible. A proposition is epistemically necessity (or conceptually necessary) for the given individual if, for all that individual knows, the proposition is necessary or true in every conceivable circumstance. Using ‘[K]’ for ‘person p knows that’ and ‘<B>’ for ‘person p believes that’, we can express such epistemic principles as ‘knowledge implies true belief’:

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KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7, ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Draft 3/28/2006 [K]ϕ → (ϕ ∧ <B>ϕ) . The logic of knowledge and belief is known as epistemic logic and can help us to capture some of the logical structure of such Cartesian skeptical arguments as the following: (6) If it is possible for Descartes to be radically deceived by an evil genius, then it is possible for the external world not to exist while Descartes is having qualitatively identical perceptual experiences to those he is now having. However, if Descartes knows that the external world exists on the basis of his perceptual experiences, then it is impossible for the external world not to exist while Descartes is having qualitatively identical perceptual experiences to those he is now having. Therefore, if it is possible for Descartes to be deceived by an evil genius, then Descartes not know that the external world exists on the basis of his perceptual experiences. A final intriguing example, involving conceptual necessity and conceivability, is Anselm’s famous ontological argument for the existence of God. Anselm’s second modal version of ontological argument is based on the seemingly innocent premise that God’s existence is at least conceivable. The second modal premise of Anselm’s argument is based on a conceptual analysis of the concept of God. It is based on the intuition that God’s existence, if God exists, isn’t accidental. More precisely, if God exists, then it is inconceivable that God does not exist. The second premise of an Anselmian argument states the above conditional is itself conceptually necessary. The complete argument is as follows: (7) It is conceivable that God exists. It is conceptually necessary that if God exists, then it is inconceivable that God does not exist. Therefore, God exists. We may symbolize the above argument as follows: (8) P . (P → ~ ~P) ∴ P .

Now it is a precise question whether the conclusion of the Anselmian argument follows logically from its premises. It turns out that the conclusion of the above Anselmian argument can be logically derived from its premises within the modal system known as (B) whose characteristic axiom is the Brouwershe Axiom (Robert M. Adams [197?]). The above examples of different interpretations of modality—physical, moral, temporal, epistemic, and conceptual—are not equivalent. Nevertheless all of these interpretations share some common logical features. The logical interrelations of simple modal sentences involving the negation can be displayed in a modified Aristotelian square of opposition as set forth in chapter IV with respect to simple quantifier sentences. This structural similarity is not wholly unanticipated given the Leibnizian notion that necessity involves quantification over all possible worlds and possibility involves quantification over some possible worlds. Relations reminiscent of the classical Aristotelian Square of Opposition are reflected in a Modal Square of Opposition. • • The sentence ‘it is necessary that it is not the case that P’ or ‘it is impossible that P’ is the contradictory of ‘it is possible that P’. The sentence ‘it is possible that it is not the case that P’ is the contradictory of ‘it is necessary that P’.

These pairs of contradictories can be placed on opposing diagonals. As in the Aristotelian square of opposition for simple quantifier sentences, the sentences opposing each other at the top of the square are contraries. • • The sentences ‘it is necessary that P’ and ‘it is impossible that P’ can both be false, but it is not the case that both can be true. The sentences at the bottom of the square are subcontraries. The sentences ‘it is possible that P’ and ‘it is possible that it is not the case that P’ can both be true but it is case that both can be false.

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KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7, ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Draft 3/28/2006 • The subaltern relations can elaborated. For example, if it is necessary that P, then it follows that P is the case; and if P is the case, it follows that P is possible. Similarly, if it is impossible that P, then P is not the case; and if it is not the case that P, it following that it is possible that P is not the case. The subaltern relationships are indicated by downward arrows. P It is necessary that P CONTRARIES ~P It is impossible that P

It is actually true that P

CONTRADICTORIES

It is actually false that P

◊P It is possible that P

SUB-CONTRARIES

◊~P It is possible that not P

Figure 1. An Aristotelian Diamond. Other modal notions can be captured with our symbolism. Contingency is the opposite of necessity: a sentence is contingent if it is neither necessary nor impossible. A sentence is contingently true if it happens to be true but could have been false (alternatively, if is true in the actual world, but is false in some other possible world); a sentence is contingently false if it happens to be false but could have been true (if it is false in the actual world, but is true in some other possible world). The realm of the possible is everything other than the impossible and so includes what is contingently true, contingently false, and necessarily true. Sentences are incompatible if they cannot jointly be true and compatible is it is possible that they be jointly true. Strict implication can also be characterized in terms of modal notions: that P is the case strictly implies that Q is the case if it is impossible for P to be true while Q is false (alternatively, P is incompatible with ~Q; or it is necessary that if P, then Q). P is contingently true P is contingently false P is contingent P and Q are incompatible P and Q are compatible P strictly implies Q P∧◊~P ~P ∧ ◊ P ◊P∧◊~P ~◊ (P ∧ Q) ◊(P ∧ Q) ~◊ (P ∧ ~ Q)

Figure 2. More Modal Notions

**2. The Symbolic Language for Modal Propositional Logic.
**

So far we have been using the new modal operators informally, but we will now formally characterize our symbolic language. The symbolic language with which we shall now deal is that of chapter II with ‘ ’ and ‘◊’ added to its symbols as modal operators. We enrich the class of symbolic sentences to include sentences that are the result of prefixing a symbolic sentence by a modal operator. Thus expression such as ~P ~ ◊ (P ∧ Q) (P → will be counted among the symbolic sentence of our language. P)

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KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7, ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Draft 3/28/2006 To be more explicit, the class of symbolic sentence is exhaustively characterized as follows: (1) Sentence letters are symbolic sentence. (2) If ϕ and ψ are symbolic sentences, then so are: ~ ϕ , (ϕ → ψ) , (ϕ ∧ ψ) , (ϕ ∨ ψ) , and (ϕ ↔ ψ). (3) If ϕ is a symbolic sentence, then so are: and ◊ϕ . The sentences obtained by clause (3) are modal sentences and we shall call the occurrence of ϕ the scope of the modal operator. Symbolic sentences can be parsed into grammatical trees to systematically display all the sub-sentences involved it its construction. Here, in addition to the kinds of nodes of Chapter II, non-branching nodes are also reached by clauses (3). For example, the symbolic sentence ‘( ( P → Q) → ~ ◊ ~ R)’ can be parsed into the following grammatical tree. ( ( P → Q) → ~ ◊ ~ R) ( P→ Q) ( P→ Q) ~◊~R ◊~R ϕ

P P

Q

~R R

Figure 3. A Grammatical Tree Parsing a symbolic sentence into its grammatical tree provides a precise description of its grammatical structure. The above symbolic sentence is a conditional whose antecedent is the sentence formed by prefixing the necessity operator to a conditional whose antecedent is comes from prefixing the necessity operator to ‘P’ and whose consequent is ‘Q’. The consequent of the main conditional is a negation of a sentence that is the result of prefixing the possibility operator to the negation of ‘R’. We shall continue to use the informal conventions of chapters I and II for omitting outer parentheses, replacing pairs of matching parentheses with matching pairs of square brackets, and for resolving questions of scope among the various connectives and operators. Now, in addition, the modal operators ‘ ’ and ‘◊’ and ‘~’ will, by convention, have the narrowest scope; ‘∧’, and ‘∨’ will have narrower scope than ‘→’ and ‘↔’, and, as before, repeated conjunctions or repeated disjunctions are grouped by association to the left. For example, (~P ∧ Q) → [◊(~R ∨ ~ S ∨ ◊T) ∧ ~ P ↔ ◊Q ∧ ~◊( R ∧ S ∧ becomes officially ( (~P ∧ Q) → ((◊((~R ∨ ~ S) ∨ ◊T) ∧ ~ P) ↔ (◊Q ∧ ~◊(( R ∧ S) ∧ ~◊T)))) . ~◊T)]

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St. God exists . God might exist . Thomas Aquinas in Summa Contra Gentiles (part I. For instance. that is. (5) If God is omniscient. God can exist . It is necessary for God to exist . Similarly. The English sentence (1) It is necessary that God exists has a number of stylistic variants in English: Necessarily. God is omniscient and Adam sinned. from a philosophical analysis of the concept of knowledge. Knowledge entails truth: whatever is known is necessarily the case. can create scope ambiguities. God has to exist . when they interact with other operators and connectives. it is necessary that Adam sinner. chapter 67) criticized the above argument for failing to distinguish between the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of the consequent. many philosophers have concluded that whatever is known must be true. Using the modal operators with the sentential connectives of chapters I and II. we can develop stylistic varies of a number of English expressions. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. and (7) If God knew that Adam would sin. God must exist . in his On the Free Choice of Will considers the following objection to free will from Evodius: “Since God foreknew that man would sin. Saint Augustine. Draft 3/28/2006 3. Modal operators.” This principle apparently leads to an argument for theological fatalism from the premise that God. God exists . then. Adam sinned. For example. Therefore. must have known that Adam would sin. then Adam sinned. then it is necessary that Adam sinned. (2) It is possible that God exists may also be expressed with a number of stylistic variants: Possibly. necessarily.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. then Adam sinned if and only if God knew that Adam would sin. If God knew that Adam would sin. It is possible for God to exist . Translation and Symbolization. that which God foreknew must necessarily come to pass. between (6) It is necessary that if God knew that Adam would sin. being omniscient. the expression It is impossible that God exists may be paraphrased as either (3) It is necessary that God fails to exist or (4) It is not possible that God exists . 6 .

namely that Adam sinned. then it is necessarily possible that Plato is rational. It is impossible that Theatetus is a cyclist if he is not bipedal.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. It is impossible that Plato is not rational. It is impossible for Plato to be risible if he is not rational. The fatalistic argument has true premises only if (8) is interpreted as asserting (6) the necessity of the consequence. • • • • A sentence P is contingent (in symbols. It is neither contingently true nor contingently false that Plato is rational. S: Theatetus is bipedal. (P → Q) (the necessity of the consequence) (A) It is possible that Plato is rational. Draft 3/28/2006 In (6) what is asserted as necessary is the entire conditional ‘if God knew that Adam would sin. A sentence P strictly implies Q (in symbols. If it is possible that Plato is risible. (C) Theatetus could be a cyclist provided he is bipedal. Q: Plato is risible. There is a tendency to read Axiom B as “if ϕ then necessarily ◊ϕ’ and so confuse it with the uncontroversial theorem ‘ (ϕ → ◊ϕ)’. but it is not necessary that Plato is rational. 2. (6) is true but (7) is not. but the fatalistic conclusion only follows if (8) is interpreted as asserting (7) the necessity of the consequent. necessarily Adam sinned is ambiguous between these two readings. if Plato is risible. then it is possible that Plato is rational. then Plato is rational. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. P –3 Q) if it is impossible for P to be true while Q is false. In (7) what is asserted as necessary is only the consequent of the conditional. If it is possible for Theatetus to be cyclist and necessarily if he is a cyclist then he is bipedal. The above argument for theological fatalism therefore commits the fallacy of equivocation between: (9) and (10) P → Q (the necessity of the consequent) EXERCISES 1. If Plato is risible. Symbolize the following sets of sentences using the given the scheme of abbreviation. ∇P) if it is neither necessary nor impossible. then it is necessary that Plato is rational. If Plato is risible. According to the analysis that knowledge implies truth. P: Plato is rational. If a sentence is ambiguous briefly explain the different possible readings. Fill in the following chart by finding expressions using only the connective and operators at the top of the chart equivalent to the expressions in the first column. P and Q are incompatible if ~ ◊ (P ∧ Q). then it is compatible that Theatetus is cyclist and bipedal. 3. P and Q are compatible if ◊ (P ∧ Q). Use the distinction between the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of the consequent to explain why someone might accept Axiom B ‘ϕ → ◊ϕ’ as intuitively obvious while rejecting its logically equivalent form Axiom B◊ ‘◊ ϕ → ϕ’. The English sentence (8) If God knew that Adam would sin. It is contingently true that Plato is rational. R: Theatetus is a cyclist. (B) Necessarily. then Adam sinned’. then. 7 . It is possible that Theatetus is both a cyclist and bipedal.

by logical equivalences noted earlier. the distinctive notions of necessity discussed initially can be accommodated syntactically by formulating distinctive modal axioms. One might be morally obligated to tell the truth but fail to bring it about. I. P is necessarily true P is impossible P is possibly true P is possibly false P is contingently true P is contingently false P is contingent P strictly implies Q P is compatible with Q P is incompatible with Q } {~. Axiom 4. a weakening of the above axiom. Axioms for Modal Logics. Moral obligations can remain unfulfilled. the axiom P→P says that whatever is necessary is also the case. J.’ This axiom. known as the KK thesis. for what is always true is always always true. E. This view. as we have seen above. 8 . ◊} {~. who named the axiom after Brouwer because of its syntactical similarity to the intuitionistic principle of law of double negation introduction: P→~ ~ P . Axiom D (named for deontic logic). Axiom 5 extends this necessity to the modality of possibility: if P is possible. Draft 3/28/2006 { ~. it is an open question of whether it is true that whenever we know something. Feys. can be expressed by the following axiom: P→ P . can also be expressed by: P→ ◊P . The above logical relations capture what is common to the various notions of necessity. This axiom is known as Axiom 4 (named after C. The axiom is actually due to Becker. Another famous axiom is Axiom B.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. Lewis’ fifth axiom for strict implication): ◊P → ◊P . Which. This axiom characterizes what some philosophers have called ‘broadly logical necessity. ∇} 4. Brouwer. in terms of moral necessity and possibility states that what is morally obligatory is morally permissible: P → ◊P . then it is necessary that P is possible. the founder of intuitionism in the philosophy of mathematics. I. With regard to epistemic logic. known as Axiom T is named after a system of modal logic studied by Gödel. Whereas Axiom 4 states that necessary truths are not necessary by accident. we know that we know it. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. For example. Notice that the above axiom is too strong for deontic logic. and von Wright in which tautologies were necessary truths. Some philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga have argued that a notion of metaphysical necessity is best captured by Axiom 5 (named after C. ⎯3} {~. has been used to characterize some systems of temporal logic. named after L. Lewis’ fourth axiom for strict implication). but are instead themselves necessary.

The above axioms turned out to be valid in modal systems with very natural conditions on the relation of modal accessibility or relative possibility: Modal Logic System D System T System B System S4 System S5 Characteristic Axiom P → ◊P P→P P → ◊P P→ P ◊ P → ◊P Named For Deontic Logic Gödel-Feys-von Wright System T Brouwer’s Intuitionistic Double Negation Lewis’ Axiom 4 for Strict Implication Lewis’ Axiom 5 for Strict Implication Accessibility Condition R is serial R is reflexive R is symmetric R is transitive R is euclidean Normal systems of modal logic are those in which the laws of logic. propositions that are either contingently true or contingently false). propositions which are neither necessary nor impossible. Around the 1960s modal logic was being investigated by numerous logicians—including. Kripke’s possible world semantics gave formal expression to the Leibnizian idea that a proposition is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds. Modal logic is the study of the logical structure of these modes of truth. i. (B) The realm of the contingent. (C) The realm of the possible. propositions are necessarily true or necessarily false). i. propositions that are either impossible or contingently false.e. among others.e.e. which characterizes such normal systems.. and contingent if it is neither necessary nor impossible. Rudolf Carnap.e. 9 . (E) The realm of the false. necessarily true or contingent)..e. However. Draft 3/28/2006 Historically. notions like necessity.. EXERCISES. after reading Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. the modern treat of modal logic began around 1912 when C.. In the diagram below locate the following notions in the space of logical possibilities and give plausible English examples of each of the types of propositions.’ and in the 1950s epistemic. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. are assumed to hold. Richard Montague. However. such as modus ponens. In this chapter we will develop natural deduction systems for propositional modal logic and set forth the possible world semantics for them. and the medieval logicians such as Jean Buridan discussed modal notions with great subtlety. I. In a subsequent chapter we’ll set forth these further axioms and the Provability Logic that enables us to capture the propositional modal logic structure of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. (D) The realm of the true. Lewis. proposed various axioms (such as 4 and 5) to find a connective more suitable than the material conditional to express our informal concept of entailment. possible if it is true in some possible world. i. impossibility. Axiom K. deontic and tense-logic interpretations were intensively investigated. Ancient philosophers like Aristotle tried to study their logic. Jackko Hintikka. i. or alternatively. and von Wright. is named after Kripke: (P → Q) → ( P → Q) . or alternatively. propositions which are necessarily true or contingently true. propositions are not impossible.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. 1. (A) The realm of the necessary. and contingency were thought of as modes of truth or ways in which a proposition could be true or false. possibility. Around the 1970s it was noticed that the famous incompleteness theorems of Gödel (1931) were propositional in character and that their logic could be captured in propositional modal logics known as Provability Logics based on Löb’s axiom and Gödel’s well-ordering axiom. it was Saul Kripke’s remarkable paper A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic (1961) published while he was a high school student in Nebraska that presented possible world semantics in an elegant way that ignited decades of logical and philosophical research. doxastic. i. In the 1930s Gödel discussed an interpretation of the modal operator as ‘it is provable in system M that.

10 . (A) ◊P ∧ ◊Q → ◊(P ∧ Q). ( ϕ → ϕ) in Deontic Logic. (B) ϕ → ϕ. Whatever is possibly necessary is necessary. Whatever is impossible might be false. Whatever is possibly necessary is necessary. (C) ϕ → [W]Pϕ. (D) ϕ → ϕ. 6. Symbolically express the following modal theorems. 5. D T B 4 5 P → ◊P P→P P → ◊P P→ P ◊P → ◊P 4. Whatever is possibly possible is possible. (E) Whatever is possible is necessarily possible. (A) A conjunction is necessary if and only if both conjuncts are necessary. (D) Whatever is possible is necessarily possible. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. (E) ϕ → ◊ϕ. Find succinct expressions using only ‘ ’ and “~’ and the relevant sentence letters equivalent to each of the following notions: P is contingently true P is contingently false P is contingent P and Q are incompatible P and Q are compatible P strictly implies Q 3. (C) Whatever is necessary is necessarily necessary. Draft 3/28/2006 TRUE ________ NECESSARY ___________ _____________ __________ 2. ϕ → [H]Fϕ in Temporal Logic. (B) Whatever is necessary is possible. Whatever is logically implied by what is possible is possible. Find succinct equivalent expressions using only ‘◊’ and ‘~’ and the relevant sentence letters. ◊◊ϕ → ◊ϕ in the Logic of Conceivability. Discuss whether the following pairs of axioms are intuitively acceptable in the logics specified. (A) Whatever follows from logically necessary propositions is logically necessary.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. ϕ → ϕ in Epistemic Logic. Express the following generalities as axioms in the language of propositional modal logic. A disjunction is possible if and only if each disjunct is possible. ◊(P ∨ Q) → (◊P ∨ ◊Q) in the Logic of Physical Possibility.

(D) Whatever is known is true. (A) ~ P → (P → Q) Q → (P → Q) (P→ Q) ∨ (Q→ P) (B) (P→Q) → ( P → Q) (P→Q) → (◊P → ◊ Q) (P→Q) ↔ ~◊ (P ∧ ~ Q) (C) ∇P ↔ ~ ( P ∨ ~ ◊ P) ∇P ↔ ∇~P P ↔ (P ∧ ~∇P) 9. then the antecedent is necessary only if the consequent is necessary.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. Try to use the symbolism to capture the interplay of the modal operators. (A) Whatever is physically necessary is actual. Whatever isn’t true couldn’t possibly be known. it would be. Whatever isn’t actual isn’t physically necessary. Intuitively. Whatever is conceivable conceptual necessary is conceptually necessary. and if it were so. Whatever is impermissible is not obligatory. (B) Whatever is obligatory is permissible. ∀α ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ Here the rule of NI allows us to drop an initial box. but as it isn’t. Translate the following theorems into English statements of modal principles.” 5. this rule says that whatever is necessary is also the case. Modal Inference Rules. Whatever was possible with regard to a possible past is possible with regard to the past. then one constituent is possible if and only if the other constituent is possible. it ain’t. Using your own scheme of abbreviation. then the consequent is possible if the antecedent is possible. (C) Whatever will always be the case will always be the case at all future times. This parallelism is not accidental since the semantics for sentential modal logic can be given in terms of quantification over possible worlds. (C) If a biconditional is necessary. Interpret the modal operators in different ways to formulate modal axioms for the following. If a conditional is necessary. it might be. The new rules are intuitively analogous to rules from quantifier logic. To sentential logic of chapter II. we shall add new rules of inference to our original stock and state some derived rules that will be justified later. If a biconditional is necessary. then one constituent is necessary if and only if the other constituent is necessary. (E) Whatever is conceivable is conceivably conceivable. Draft 3/28/2006 (B) If a conditional is necessary. “[I]f it was so. The rules of modal negation [MN] comes in four forms and are analogous to the rules of quantifier negation: ~ ϕ ◊~ϕ ◊~ϕ ~ ϕ ~ ◊ϕ ~ϕ ~ϕ ~ ◊ϕ 11 . 8. create an intriguing and insightful logical symbolization of Tweedledee’s characterization of logic in the quotation from Alice in Wonderland. That’s logic. The rule of necessity instantiation [NI] is analogous to an application of the rule of universal instantiation. 7. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’.

Which of the following inferences come by an application of NI. necessity derivation. An accessible line is now defined as an antecedent line such that there is at most one intervening modal ‘Show’ line of one of the forms 12 . (A) (B) (P → Q) P→Q (P → Q) P ∧ Q P→Q P∧ Q ◊ P → Q◊ ◊ P ◊P→ Q ◊◊P ◊P ◊◊P ~ ◊ P (P → Q) (P → Q) ◊ (P → Q) ◊ (P → Q) P∧ Q ◊P→ Q ◊ P∧◊ Q◊ ◊P→◊ Q ~ (P ↔ Q) (C) ~ (P ∨ Q) ~ ◊ (P → Q) (P → ~◊~P) ◊ ~ (P ∨ Q) P→Q (P → P) ~ ◊ (P ↔Q) ◊ ◊~P 2. To understand these restrictions. 6. χm where the scope ϕ occurs unboxed among χ1 through χm. In addition to the inference rules NI and MN. Necessity derivation appears as follows: Show ϕ χ1 . or (iii) comes by an application of an inference rule other than an admissible strict importation rule to an accessible line. Verify that PG can be derived from NI and the third form of MN. Using the notion that necessity is truth in all possible worlds and possibility is truth in some possible world.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. (S4). ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. In necessity derivation one shows that the scope of the necessity in the ‘Show’ line is necessary by deriving it only from other premises or antecedent lines which are themselves necessary. An antecedent line. (B). or MN? Briefly explain. and vice versa. Natural Deduction for (T). EI. 2. . and vice versa. Intuitively. we first supplement the notion of an antecedent line with that of an accessible line and define the strict importation rules. in two forms. possibility derivation. this rule says that whatever is the case is also possible. we add a new form of derivation known as strict derivation (SD). Strict derivation provides both a -introduction rule. whatever is not possibly true is impossible. analogous to existential instantiation. explain the analogies between the inference rules and forms of derivation in modal logic and the quantifier inference rules UI. analogous to universal derivation. Draft 3/28/2006 Syntactically. these rules work in a way similar to quantifier negation: a negation when passing through an operator changes the operator to its logical dual and negates the scope. and a ◊-elimination rule. Intuitively. we must restrict the lines that may be imported into strict derivations. The basic restrictions are that none of the lines χ1 through χn are (i) premises or (ii) comes by an application of an inference rule to an inaccessible line. To ensure that the strict derivation allows us to derive only necessary truths. as we have defined it. and QN and the form of derivation UD. . EG. EXERCISES 1. The rule of Possibility Generalization [PG] is a derived rule analogous to existential instantiation: ϕ ∃α ϕ ϕ ◊ϕ Here the rule of PG allows us to infer ‘◊ ϕ’ from the sentence that is the scope of the ‘◊’ operator. is a preceding line that is neither boxed nor contains uncancelled ‘Show’. PG. whatever is not necessary is possibly false. and (S5).

The intuitive basis for this rule is based on the modal theorem (P → Q) → (◊ P → ◊ Q) . we shall formulate rules of strict importation for the various modal systems. The foregoing remarks on derivations constitute only an informal introduction. [Such lines will be annotated after boxing and canceling. (The annotation for these strict importation rules will be the line number of the sentence involved and either ‘NI’. The restrictions are the same as those for the first form of strict derivation: none of the lines χ1 through χn are premises or comes by an application of an inference rule to an inaccessible line. ψ are symbolic sentences such that 13 . if ◊ψ occurs as an accessible line. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. • • • • The characteristic strict importation rule for T is NI: when importing an accessible necessity into a strict derivation you drop the initial ‘ ’. or comes by an application of an inference rule other than an admissible strict importation rule to an accessible line. then Show ϕ may occur as a line. ‘PG’. The following is an explicit set of direction for constructing a derivation. ‘ R’. The initial ‘Show’ line is Show ◊ ϕ . S4. then on the next line one may enter ψ as an assumption for possibility derivation [Annotation: Assume (PD)]. R: you may apply R. you prefix a ‘◊’. The characteristic strict importation rule for S4 is accessible line of the form ‘ ϕ’. [Annotation: ‘Premise’] (3) If ϕ. and S5 has NI as a strict importation rule in addition to its characteristic strict importation rule. the rule of repetition. To better understand the restrictions we shall impose. Draft 3/28/2006 Show or Show ◊ϕ . When modal inferences are restricted to the context of strict derivations. With possibility derivation.) The second form of strict derivation is possibility derivation [Annotation: PD]. (1) If ϕ is a symbolic sentence. this form of strict derivation allows us to show a sentence is possibly true by deriving it using necessary truths from a sentence that is itself possible. the rule of repetition. to an accessible line of the form ‘◊ϕ’. Intuitively. to an ϕ The characteristic strict importation rule for S5 is ◊R: you may apply R. The characteristic strict importation rule for B is PG: when importing an accessible line into a strict derivation. these restrictions can be elegantly formulated in terms of restrictions on the rule of repetition into strict derivations.] (2) Any one of the premises may occur as a line. which states that whatever is logically entailed by something possible it itself possible. or ‘◊R’. Each of the modal systems B.

] (4) If ϕ is a symbolic sentence such that Show ϕ occurs as a line. then ϕ may occur as the next line. that is. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. a preceding line that is neither boxed nor contains uncancelled ‘Show’ and is such that there is at most one intervening ‘Show’ line of the form Show or Show ◊ϕ . [Annotation: the line number of the modal sentence involved and ‘Assume (PD)’. if ϕ is a symbolic sentence such that Show ~ ϕ occurs as a line.] ϕ 14 .KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. [The annotation should refer to line numbers of the preceding lines involved and the inference rule employed. then ϕ may occur as the next line.] (5) If ϕ is a symbolic sentence such that Show ◊ ϕ occurs as a line.] (ii) of modal logic applied to accessible lines that is. [Annotation: ‘Assume (ID)’. Draft 3/28/2006 Show (ϕ → ψ) occurs as a line. then ψ may occur as the next line provided that ◊ψ is an accessible line. then ~ϕ may occur as the next line.] (6) A symbolic sentence may occur as a line if it follows by an inference rule (i) of sentential logic applied to antecedent lines. that is. preceding lines which neither are boxed nor contain uncancelled ‘Show’. [Annotation: ‘Assume (CD)’. antecedent lines for which there is at most one intervening modal ‘Show’ line [The annotation should refer to line numbers of the preceding lines involved and the inference rule employed.

to be entered together with the relevant line numbers in line in which ‘Show’ is cancelled. or by an application of an inference rule other than an admissible strict importation rule to an accessible line antecedent to the displayed occurrence of Show ϕ . by verifying the claim made above that the Possibility Generalization [PG] can be derived from Necessity Instantiation and the third form of Modal Negation. and (7).KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. ϕ is of the form (ψ1 →ψ2) and ψ2 occurs unboxed among occurs unboxed among χ1 through χn and χ1 was not introduced by an assumption for Possibility Derivation. A symbolic sentence ϕ is said to be derivable from given symbolic sentences in modal system Σ if. (iii). ‘CD. (iii) (iv) for some sentence χ.and (iv) are. ϕ is of the form ψ or ◊ψ and ψ occurs unboxed among χ1 through χn and none of χ1 through χn are premises or comes by an application of an inference rule to an inaccessible line. parts (i). respectively. Draft 3/28/2006 (7) When the following arrangement of lines has appeared: Show ϕ χ1 . ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Further. both χ and its negation occur unboxed among χ1 through χn and χ1 was not introduced by an assumption for Possibility Derivation. χn where none of the χ1 through χn contains uncancelled ‘Show and either (i) (ii) ϕ occurs unboxed among χ1 through χn and χ1 was not introduced by an assumption for Possibility Derivation. Applications of the above clauses are familiar except for clauses (5). ‘DD’. annotations for clause (6). (6) part (ii). a complete derivation from those premises can be constructed in which Show ϕ occurs as an unboxed line. part (ii).] A derivation is said to be complete if each of its lines either is boxed or contains cancelled ‘Show’. We can illustrate clause 6. (ii). we mean that one of those lines is either ϕ or ϕ preceded by ‘Show’. [When we say that a symbolic sentence ϕ occurs among certain lines. by using only clauses (1) (6) and the importation rules for Σ. P ∴ ◊P 15 . . then one may simultaneously cancel the displayed occurrence of ‘Show’ and box all subsequent lines. . and ‘SD’. ‘ID’.

Show Q ` 4. 7. Show Q Premise Premise (P →Q) P Show Q To complete the necessity derivation began in line 4. SD 2. Hence. 7. MN 4. once entered. 3. we can carry out the syntactical manipulations using the rules of sentential logic and MN.7 have only come from accessible lines by a strict importation rule. 2. 4. NI 3. 6 MP (P →Q) P Show Q P→Q P Q 16 . 2. 3. Show Q Premise Premise 7. 3. Dropping the initial boxes upon entering into a strict derivation. The restriction on strict derivation. 1. it is necessary to repeat the initial ‘Show’ line and then take care not to enter any premises or apply inferences rules to premises that might only be true in the actual world and not in an arbitrary world as required if we are to show a sentence to be necessary. we are justified in concluding that ‘Q’ holds in all possible worlds. 2. To employ a strict derivation. 6 ID Assume (ID) Premise 2. 3. we can now complete the derivation by boxing and canceling the first ‘Show’ line by direct derivation: 1. 5. necessity derivation. allows us to conclude that ‘ Q’ upon deriving ‘Q’. 4. 6 MP (P →Q) P Show Q P→Q P Q We can box and cancel line 4 by strict derivation because we have derived the scope of the symbolic sentence in line 4 and the lines 5 . 2. 4. (P → Q) . Notice that the premises. is that we are only allowed to use as lines in the derivation sentences that are themselves necessary. NI 3. we enter the premises. NI 5. P ∴ Q After entering a ‘Show’ line for the conclusion. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. 4. and then apply MP. DD Premise Premise 7. 5. NI An annotated derivation in modal system T of the following symbolic argument will illustrate clause (7) for a strict derivation in the form of a universal derivation. Returning to the above example. Intuitively. 3. 6. NI 5. 5. 1. If we are able to derive ‘Q’ in an arbitrary possible world from sentences that are themselves necessary. we use two applications of the strict importation rule for T. the first form of strict derivation (necessity derivation) amounts to showing ‘ Q’ by deriving ‘Q’ in an arbitrary possible world.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. SD 2. Draft 3/28/2006 Show ◊ P ~◊ P P ~P ~P 1. therefore. the first form of strict derivation. prevent the initial ‘Show’ line from being boxed and cancelled by strict derivation. which is NI. 6.

Draft 3/28/2006 At this point. 2. readers are encouraged to construct a derivation for axiom K (P → Q) → ( P → Q) to test their grasp of accessibility. Show Q Premise Premise 3. a world in which ‘P’ is true. NI 5. is used to construct derivations of the form ‘◊ϕ’ and involved the clause for entering in assumptions for possibility derivation. Assume (PD) (P →Q) ◊P Show ◊ Q P The remainder of the derivation is similar to the previous one. Whereas the strict importation rule for the modal system T is NI. the internal box represents a derivation of a sentence ‘Q’ in a particular possible world. in contrast to the above example. As before. 3. we repeat the initial ‘Show’ line so we can successfully complete a strict derivation. Therefore. Show Q 4. Assume (PD) 2. Consider the symbolic argument: (P → Q) . (P → ~ ◊ ~ P) ∴ P Then the derivation can be constructed along the following lines: 17 . 2. we enter the premises. Here. 3. 6. strict importation by NI. 5. and the difference between conditional and strict derivation. namely. To illustrate this rule. we may symbolize the Anselmian argument as follows: ◊P . 4. The assumption ‘P’ comes from ‘◊P’ by possibility instantiation to an accessible line. 5. we shall construct a derivation for the Anselmian modal ontological argument set forth above. 7. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. 4. possibility derivation. Letting ‘P’ abbreviate the sentence ‘God exists’. SD 3. 1. we are only justified in concluding ‘◊Q’.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. once we derive ‘Q’. 6 MP (P →Q) ◊P Show ◊ Q P P→Q Q Readers are encouraged to check their grasp of making an assumption for a possibility derivation and the difference between conditional and strict derivation by constructing a derivation for ◊ (P ∨ Q) ∴ ~◊P → ◊Q . ◊ P ∴ ◊ Q After the ‘Show’ line for the conclusion. the strict importation rule for the system B is PG. DD Premise Premise 7. The second form of strict derivation. 1.

12 ID Assume (ID) Premise Premise 8. Draft 3/28/2006 1. 6. 3. To show the theorem we assume its antecedent and show its consequent. 18 . ‘ P’. which is the strict importation rule for B. 4. NI 5. 3. with repeated applications of the rule of strict importation. In applying the rule of strict importation. MN The strict importation rule characteristic of B occurs in line 10. Show (P → Q) → ( P→ Q) Q Assume (CD) Q) Assume (CD) (P → Q) Show ( P → Show Show P→ P Q To show the consequent of line 4. namely. 10. which is simply the rule of repetition applied to sentences of the form ‘ ϕ’.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. we can in effect. Here the consequent is a modal sentence. SD 4. given an accessible line ϕ. 4. The reader may have observed that we could have derived an even stronger conclusion for the Anselmian argument. 8. we can in B infer ‘ ◊ϕ’ and so when entering into a strict derivation. Show P ~P (P → ~◊~ P) ◊P Show ◊ ~ ◊~P P P → ~ ◊ ~P ~ ◊ ~P Show ◊~P ~ ~ ◊ ~P ~ ◊ ~◊~ P ~~◊~P 5. 6 MP 11. Therefore. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. 6. 5. 11. 1. however. We enter the ‘Show’ line for its scope and then continue by the strategic hints for showing a conditional. 5. 12. Prefixing ‘ ◊’ and then dropping the initial ‘ ’ is simply PG. we passed over only one uncancelled ‘Show’ in line 6 below of the form ‘Show ϕ’ or ‘Show ◊ϕ’. 2. To show this modal statement we will use strict derivation in the form of necessity derivation. SD 2. Assume (PD) 2. Why is the strict importation rule for B PG? Recall the characteristic axiom for B is ‘ϕ → ◊ϕ’. pass over multiple ‘Show’ lines for strict derivations. 9. PG 10. Notice. To illustrate the strict importation rule for the modal system S4. we construct a derivation for ∴ (P → Q) → ( P→ Q) . we use strict derivation in the form of necessity derivation. This is possible with two applications of the strict importation rule for T and the strict importation rule for S4. DN 9. 7. we intuitively eliminate the initial ‘ ’ and simply infer ‘◊ϕ’. 2.

If it is possible that God exists. 5. These derivations can be tedious due to the various restrictions. we can in S5 infer ‘ ◊ϕ’. The following argument is valid in the modal system S5. R 7.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. ◊P→◊ P ∴P 1. prefixing and then dropping a ‘ ’ cancel each other. Show Q) 3. we may in S4 infer ϕ. the strict importation rule for S5 turns out to be R◊. Draft 3/28/2006 (P → Q) → ( P→ Q) Q 1. SD 6. Notice that from a sentence ϕ. we wish to construct a derivation in S5 that illustrates the strict importation rule ◊R. we may only import sentences into a strict derivation that are necessary. 2. 3. 9. Therefore. Therefore. 3 MP 2. 4. God exists. CD Assume (CD) 5. 2. 6. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Lastly. given an accessible line ◊ϕ. 6. 8. Thus. 8. the rule of repetition applied to sentences of the form ‘◊ϕ’. MN P P Why is the strict importation rule for S5 the rule of repetition applied to sentences of the form ‘◊ϕ’? Recall the characteristic axiom for S5 is ‘◊ϕ → ◊ϕ’. We can make the derivation easier with theorems that are characteristic of the various systems of modal logic and justifying the rule for Interchange of Equivalence. However. Show P ~P ◊P ◊P→◊ ◊ P ◊ ~P Show ~ ◊ ~P ~ P ~◊ P 5. we drop the initial ‘ ’ and carry out the derivation using sentential logic and perhaps MN. 19 . 10 ID Assume (ID) Premise Premise 2. MN 7. When entering into a strict derivation. we drop the initial ‘ ’ and so we infer ‘◊ϕ’. ◊P . 5. 4. and so the strict importation rule for S4 is simply the rule of repetition applied to sentences of the form ‘ ϕ’. ◊R 9. CD Assume (CD) 11. PG 9. In the next section. 9. Syntactically. SD 8. 3. 7. then God has the greatest form of existence possible. Alvin Plantinga’s modal version of an ontological argument is based on the intuition that God exists if and only if God is the greatest possible being and that if God is the greatest possible being. NI 2. that it is necessary that God exists. 8 MP (P → Q) Show ( P → Show P Show P→ Q P P→Q Q Intuitively. 7. SD 6. this means that when we import a sentence into a strict derivation. then it is possible that it is necessary that God exists. namely. we first show why the various restrictions as set forth in the characterization of a derivation are required. 10. (12) It is at least possible that God exists.

you may need to reenter the ‘Show’ line to commence a strict derivation. Hint 1: After entering the ‘Show’ line for the conclusion and taking any useful assumptions. use strict derivation in the form of a necessity derivation. (A) ◊ P ∴ ◊P (B) (P → ~◊~P) ∴ ◊P → P (C) (P ∧ Q) ∴ ◊P ∧ ◊ Q (D) (P ∨ ◊ Q) ∴ P ∨ ◊Q (E) (◊P → Q) ∴ (P → Q) 4. Hint 5. use strict derivation in the form of possibility derivation. (Q → S) ∴ (E) P ↔ Q ∴ ~◊~P → ~◊~Q 3. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. enter the premises. Hint 3: To show a sentence of the form ‘ ϕ’. Draft 3/28/2006 EXERCISES In constructing modal derivations. (P → R) . (Q → R) . ~◊P ∴ Q (C) P ∨ ◊Q ∴ (P ∨ ◊ Q) (D) (P ∨ Q) . ◊P ∴ P (B) (P ↔ ◊ P) ∴ ◊P → P (C) ◊~P . (A) P ∴ (Q → P) (B) P → Q ∴ P → (R → Q) (C) (P → Q) ∴ (R → (P → Q)) (D) ∴ P ↔ P (E) ∴ ◊P ↔ ◊◊P 5. 1. (~P → ~◊P) ∴ ~P (D) ∴ P ↔ ◊ P (E) ∴ ◊P ↔ ◊P (R ∨ S) 20 . Hint 2: If your initial ‘Show’ line is a modal statement. If you have an iterated modal statement as an accessible line. Construct S4-derivations for the following. Construct S5-derivations for the following. (A) (P ↔ P) . i.e. (A) P→ ◊ P in T (B) ◊P → P in B (C) ◊◊P → ◊P in S4 (D) ◊ P → P in S5 2.. Hint4. Construct T-derivations for the following. you may need to get a contradiction for indirect derivation by modal negation.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. judiciously choose from the accessible lines of the form ‘◊ψ’ to get an assumption for possibility derivation that will enable you to derive ϕ. (A) (P → Q) . that is derive ϕ from other necessary truths. Construct derivations for the following. To show a sentence of the form ‘◊ϕ’. ~◊R ∴ ~P (B) (P ∨ Q) . the following strategic hints may be useful. Construct B-derivations for the following.

(D) Taking the conclusion of exercise (C) as a premise.” (G → ~ ◊ ~G) “Therefore. Recall that a fallacy is a procedure that permits the validation of a false English argument. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. its non-existence. its nonexistence. construct an S5-derivation for the conclusion that it is necessary that God exists if it is possible that God exists: ◊G → G .” ∴ ◊G → G (C) Construct an S4-derivation for the following argument taken from Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo where he writes: “But as to whatever can be conceived. For the purpose of this exercise. it cannot be nonexistent. that is.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. Therefore. (B) Construct a B-derivation for the following argument: “No one. if that than which a greater cannot be thought can even be thought. derive the conclusion that it is necessary that if God’s existence is possible then God exists: (◊G → G) . would be impossible. we construct modal derivations of the following Anselmian modal arguments. we have as a second premise: P .doubts that if it [that than which a greater cannot be thought] did exist. God does not exist. Hence. however... an argument whose premises are true sentences of English and whose conclusion is a false sentence of English (or at least are regarded so for the sake of argument). Therefore. Here we show that the neglect of the various new restrictions on modal derivation would lead to fallacies. we allow ourselves to use the letter ‘G’ for the proposition ‘God exists. (E) Construct an S5-derivation for the argument: It is necessary that if God exists then it is necessary that God exists. For otherwise it would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought. In the directions for constructing a modal derivation. 7. From these two premises. God is a being than which none greater can be conceived. either in actuality or in the understanding. then God necessarily has all perfections. a number of restrictions appear whose significance is not perhaps immediately obvious. statements denying that God has various perfections: ( ◊G ∧ ~G → ◊ ~P) If. Draft 3/28/2006 6. In this exercise. would be possible. either in reality or in the understanding. It is possible that God exists. it is necessary that God exists. but does not exist—if there were such a being. 21 .” This first premise is actually a schema since Anselm substitutes for the statement denying that God has existence. It is possible that God does not exist.’ (A) Construct a T-derivation for the following argument: It is necessary that if God exists then it is necessary that God exists. namely ‘ (◊G → G)’. Fallacies.

Show P → ~ P 5. premises cannot enter into strict derivations. Draft 3/28/2006 Consider the following argument: If Descartes is thinking. P→Q . Where is the fallacy in the following attempted derivation? 22 . Assume (PD) 8. it is necessary that roses are red. SD Premise 2. S 5. it does not follow from either of these premises together with the premise that Descartes is thinking. SD 8. Show ◊ Q 2. While is intuitively true that Descartes exists if he is thinking. P 4. ◊P∧~P ∴ ◊Q Here the premise does not contain a contradiction. Descartes is thinking. it is necessary that Descartes exists. Q Q 4. 9. Therefore. Therefore. 7. Consider the argument: Roses could be violet. S 7. Instead asserts that it is contingently false that roses are violet. Therefore. Intuitively. The conclusion is intuitively false: while roses could be violet. CD 2. ◊ P ∧ ~ P 3. P → Q 3. ◊ P 4. is possible that roses are violets. 8. and perhaps it is even necessary that if Descartes is thinking. However. then Descartes exists. P ∴ Where is the fallacy in the following attempted derivation? 1. but they aren’t. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. 6. ~P Show ◊ Q Show Q P ~P 6. 9 ID 3. SD Premise Premise 2.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. that it is necessary that Descartes exists. The following argument is false assuming it is only contingently true that roses are red: Roses are red and violets are blue. One of the restrictions on strict derivation is that premises cannot be among its the lines that are boxed to establish it. Where is the fallacy in the following attempted derivation? 1. it could not be that roses are violets. 4 MP Here the fallacy occurs in line 8: you cannot box and cancel by direct derivation if the derivation begins with an assumption for possibility derivation. then Descartes exists. Show 2. premises are true in the actual world but may not be true in every possible world. Therefore. 3 MP Q The fallacy occurs in the attempt to box and cancel by strict derivation.

The following argument is intuitively valid: It is possible that Schödinger’s cat is dead. premises are true in the actual world but may not be true in every possible world. it is possible that Schödinger’s cat is dead. Therefore. DD Premise 4. it is possible that Schrödinger’s cat is both dead and alive. one may box and cancel by either direct derivation or indirect derivation even after beginning a necessity derivation. PG 5. the argument obtained subsuming two separate possibility statements under a single possibility operator is clearly invalid: It is possible that Schrödinger’s cat is dead. 2. P ∴ Where is the fallacy in the following attempted derivation? 1. 4. Therefore. Therefore. Therefore. 3. P 3. Assume (PG) P P Here the fallacy occurs in line 4. The lines of a strict derivation cannot come by the application of an inference rule other than strict importation to an accessible line. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. 4. DD Premise 2. Draft 3/28/2006 P∧Q ∴ 1. S P P∧Q Show P P The fallacy occurs in line 3 when attempting to box and cancel by strict derivation. Therefore. One may not box and cancel by indirect derivation if the derivation begins with an assumption for possibility derivation. And the following argument is also intuitively valid: It is possible that Schrödinger’s cat is dead or alive. Intuitively. SD 3. The following English argument is false assuming that the premise is a true future contingent proposition: The sea battle will happen. ◊ Q ∴ ◊ (P ∧ Q) Where is the fallacy in the following attempted derivation? 23 . However. it is necessary that the sea battle will happen. it is possible that Schrödinger’s cat is dead or alive. or it is possible that Schrödinger’s cat is alive. Another restriction on strict derivation is that its boxed lines must not contain lines that were derived from inference rules applied to premises. 5. Show 2. It is possible Schrödinger’s cat is alive. 3. or it is possible that Schrödinger’s cat is alive. SD 2. premises or any lines that were derived from them cannot enter into strict derivations. ◊ P .KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. Show P ◊P Show P P 4. In contrast.

rather than. Draft 3/28/2006 1. SD 3. 6. In a strict derivation. Therefore. line 6. ◊ P ∴ ◊Q → P Fermat’s famous “last theorem” was finally proved by Andrew Wiles in 1995. 4.” The following English argument is intuitively invalid (i. DD Premise Premise 7. Show ◊ (P ∧ Q) 2. ◊P ◊Q Show ◊ (P ∧ Q) P Q P∧Q 4. P Q 4. Show ◊ Q 5. Therefore. we interpret Q as “it is conceivable. ‘false’) if we interpret the possibility modal operators epistemically. P→Q . that is. Assume (PD) 2. It is possible that God is dead. Where is the fallacy in the following attempted derivation? 24 . Assume (PD) 3. 5. Notice that line 6 comes from an application of an inference rules to the premise in line 2 and so violates the above restriction. then everything is permitted. 3. In 1637 Fermat read Diophantus’ Arithmetic. Hence. none of the boxed lines may come from an application of an inference rule to an inaccessible line. the above argument could be validated if we allow ourselves to assume Axiom 5. If God is dead. a 3rd century treatise and noted on the margins “dividing a cube into two cubes. 6 ADJ The restriction on entering as assumption for possibility derivation states that such an assumption must occur immediately after the uncancelled ‘Show’ line. DD Premise Premise 6. Consider next the following more intricate fallacious argument. I have found a remarkable proof of this fact. or in general an nth power of two nth powers. Assume (PD) 5. 7. and so the various ways of interpreting the epistemic modalities can become more intricate. epistemically. SD 2. : It is possible that it is necessary that Fermat’s Last Theorem is true.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. is impossible if n is larger than 2. if Fermat might have been right. Show ◊ Q 2.” This led to the search of the elusive proof of what became known as “Fermat’s last theorem. ◊ P 4. but the margin is too narrow to contain it. 5 MP Here the fallacy occurs in the attempt to box and cancel by strict derivation in line 4. 6. it is possible that everything is permitted..e. ◊P ∴ ◊Q Where is the fallacy in the following attempted derivation? 1. or by an application of an inference rule other than an admissible strict importation rule to an accessible line. then Fermat’s Last Theorem is true. the second application of entering as assumption for PD is fallacious. P → Q 3. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Fermat might be true”. It turns out that if we interpret the modal operators metaphysically. for all we know that.

Show ◊ Q → P 4. One cannot box and cancel a direct derivation. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. the sentence in line 3 is not a modal sentence with an initial conceivability operator. DD Premise 5. the new restrictions set forth in our official syntactical characterization of the natural deduction systems for modal propositional logic. “false”) English arguments. it is possible that the Four-Color Map Theorem is false. Identify all the fallacies steps in the following attempted derivations for intuitively fallacious (i. Show ◊ Q → P 2. but a conditional sentence. ◊ P 3. 25 .e.. EXERCISES 1. Assume (PD) Here the fallacy occurs in the line 3. The reason is that line 4 was introduced by an assumption for possibility derivation. 4. Assume (PD) 4. ◊◊P ∴ ◊P This argument can be validated assuming Axiom 4 of system S4. CD 2. One may enter an assumption for possibility derivation only after a ‘Show’ line of the form ‘Show ◊ϕ’. in part. The above examples justify. Draft 3/28/2006 1. 5.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. However. 3. ◊◊P Show ◊ P ◊P 3. The following exercises are designed to reinforce your grasp of the various restrictions. DD 2. Consider finally the English argument: It is possible that it is possible the Four-Color Map Theorem is false. Can you identify the fallacy in the following attempted derivation? 1. Therefore. One of the new restrictions on direct derivation for ‘Show ϕ’ is that ϕ occurs unboxed among subsequent lines χ1 through χn and χ1 but was not introduced by an assumption for Possibility Derivation. NI The fallacy occurs in line 4. DD Premise 4. P P 3. We shall see how these restrictions are related to the characteristic axioms of the various modal systems when we set forth the semantics for propositional modal logic in the next section. Show ◊ P 2. but not in weaker systems. Accurately state the restriction or restrictions that are violated and explain why how the restriction has been violated in the particular case. One may enter an assumption for possibility derivation only after a ‘Show’ line of the form ‘Show ◊ϕ’.

4. Show P ~P Show ~P ~P ~◊ P ◊P 7. 4. Show P ◊P Show ~P → P P Show P ~P P 5. Draft 3/28/2006 (A) Clearly the following argument involves a fallacious wishful thinking. ID Assume (ID) 6. 3. NI 6. Show (P ∧ Q) 7. 4. 5 ID Assume (ID) Assume (PD) 1. P∧ 1. 3. R 4. S 2. 7. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. DD Premise 4. 2. It is possible that I will win the lottery. 2. Show P 2. 2. 5. 6. R 3. DD Premise 4. necessarily. 7. 3. 8. SD 2. Therefore. 6. ◊P ∴ P Where are the fallacies committed in the following three attempted derivations? 1. ◊P Show P ~P P 3. Assume (PD) 6.8. 3. 5. 4.8. 5. both that evil exists and that God exists. I will win the lottery. CD 3. MP (B) Evil exists and it is necessary that God exists. 7 ADJ Q ∴ (P ∧ Q) P∧ Q P Q Show (P ∧ Q) P Q P∧Q 26 . 5. S 3.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. 6. Therefore. 3. ID Assume (ID) 4. 7. ID Premise 2. MN Premise 1.

(C) Allowing boxing and canceling by CD when the derivation begins with an assumption for possibility derivation. where W is a set of possible worlds. (1) If ϕ is a sentence letter S. we can represent a possible world by a subset of sentence letters. The intuitively use of possible worlds to provide the semantics for sentential modal was due to Kripke’s elegant formalization of this Leibnizian idea. 5. Intuitively. then it is possible that Theatetus is both sitting and standing. if |= β ψ then |= β ψ . then |= β ϕ if. Stripping away inessentials.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. a possible world tells us for each sentence letter whether it is true or false in that world. 3. and a sentence is possible if it is true is some possible world. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. 8. and only if.. (2) If ϕ is a ~ ψ.e. 6 ADJ 2. A sentence is true if it is true in the actual world. SD 3. if it is possible that Theatetus is standing. Draft 3/28/2006 (C) It is possible that Theatetus is sitting. Therefore. A modal structure M is an ordered triple <W. 7. CD Assume (CD) Premise 7. then 27 . ‘false’) English argument. Assume (PD) 2. However. then |= β ϕ if. Possible World Semantics. and only if. Show ◊ Q → ◊ (P ∧ Q) ◊Q ◊P Show ◊ (P ∧ Q) P Q P∧Q 4. it is not the case that |= β ψ (3) If ϕ is (ψ → χ). Assume (PD) 5. (D) Allowing a necessity derivation to commence with an assumption for possibility derivation. We can exhaustively characterize the notion of the truth of a sentence in a possible world β |= β ϕ . R is a relation on W x W known as the accessibility relation or the relative possibility relation. 2. 6. ◊P ∴ ◊ Q → ◊ (P∧ Q) 1. R. If ϕ is (ψ ∧ χ). a sentence is necessary if it is true in every possible world. then |= β ϕ if. and α is a distinguished element of W known as the actual world. (E) Allowing an assumption for possibility derivation to be entered into a strict derivation but not immediately after the relevant uncancelled ‘Show’ line. (B) Allowing the application of a strict importation law to an inaccessible line. Show that allowing the following violations of the restrictions would result in the validation of a fallacious (i. α>. S ∈ β. (A) Allowing the result of applying inference rules to premises into strict derivations. and only if. 4.

R βγ and |= γ ψ . The various modal systems can be characterized by the axioms that are valid in them. and only if. Draft 3/28/2006 |= β ϕ if. D T B 4 5 ϕ → ◊ϕ ϕ→ϕ ϕ→ ϕ→ ◊ϕ → ◊ϕ ◊ϕ ϕ R R R R R is serial is reflexive is symmetric is transitive is Euclidean ∀α∃β R αβ ∀α R αα ∀α∀β( R αβ ⇒ R βα) ∀α∀β∀γ( R αβ & R βγ ⇒ R αγ) ∀α∀β∀γ (R αβ & R αγ ⇒ R βγ) Figure 3. Properties of Accessibility and Modal Axioms. and only if. for every γ in W. |= β ψ and |= β ψ . If ϕ is (ψ ∨ χ). If ϕ is (ψ ↔ χ). and the unduly 28 . the Gödel-Feyes-von Wright logic T. If ϕ is ◊ψ. and only if. The next clauses give the crucial truth clauses for necessity and possibility: (4) If ϕ is ψ. R is a partial ordering if R is reflexive and transitive. then |= β ϕ if. This will be the case if the rule of modus ponens and Axiom K (named in honor of Kripke) are valid: (P → Q) → ( P → Q) . and only if. S5. then |= γ ψ . for some γ in W. We say that a relation R is a series if R is serial. then |= β ϕ if. R is an equivalence relation if R is reflexive and Euclidean. if R βγ. The four most famous modal logics are C. Lewis’ S4. We can conveniently summarize the above systems of modal logic in a chart. R is a similarity if R is reflexive and symmetric. I. Axiom K expresses the intuition that necessary truths imply only necessary truths. So far these truth clauses of the familiar ones for classical propositional logic. R is a reflexivity if R is reflexive. Systems of modal logic are normal when everything derivable from necessary truths are themselves necessary. |= β ψ if and only if |= β ψ . It turns out that the axioms of modal logic discussed above are validated when natural conditions are imposed on the accessibility or relative possibility relation R. either |= β ψ or |= β ψ (or both) . We obtain different systems of modal logic when various conditions are placed on the accessibility or relative possibility relation R. then |= β ϕ if.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. The smallest normal modal logic system K contains axiom K. and only if. then |= β ϕ if. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’.

and S4. 29 . directly or indirectly. Characteristic Modal Axioms and Conditions of Accessibility. 4. System T System B System S4 System S5 KT KTB KT4 KTE = KT4B = KD4B Deontic D Deontic S4 Deontic S5 KD KD4 KD4E Figure 6. Axiom B requires that R be symmetric and 4 requires that R be transitive. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. neither of which contains the other. S5 contains S4 and B. The logical relationships among the above systems of modal logic can be set forth in a diagram (due to Krister Segerberg who omits KD5 and K45). and transitive). S5 B S4 . which in turn. T . reflexive. D . contains D. A convenient way of describing these modal logics is by their Lemmon code listing the axioms valid in them. For example. The Deontic system D contains both K and D. Systems S5. Therefore. Deontic Systems and Corresponding Lemmon Codes.. As before. and B to be valid. a modal logic is included in another if it is connected to it. We can represent these containment relations in a diagram in which downward paths represent containment. System System D System T System B System S4 System S5 Named After Deontic Logic Gödel-Feys-von Wright System T Brouwersche System Lewis’ S4 for Strict Implication Lewis’ S5 for Strict Implication Axiom P → ◊P P→P P→ P→ ◊P→ ◊P P ◊P Code KD KT KTB KT4 KTE Accessibility D T B 4 E R is a seriality R is a reflexivity R is a similarity R is a partial ordering R is an equivalence relation Figure 4. hence. Notice that relationships of containment among the modal systems follow from the logic of relations. S5 could also be specified by requiring axioms T. S5 and B also contain their respective characteristic axioms.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. symmetric. S4 and B all contain system T.e. Logical Containment Among Standard Modal Systems. Various deontic modal systems can also be characterized by their axioms (Lemmon code). Figure 5. Draft 3/28/2006 neglected Brouwersche system B. S5 = KTE = KT4B = KD4B. by an upward path. System S5 with axioms T and E require R be an equivalence relation (i. All these systems contain K and T.

Here the accessibility R αβ “possible world β is accessible to possible world α’ is represented by an arrow from a circle representing α to a circle representing β. R αβ α β Figure 9. Picasso's Electric Chair One way to visualize how the conditions on the accessibility relation validate their respective axioms is use the definitions of ‘ ’ and ‘◊’ in terms of possible worlds and use directed graphs from chapter IV to represent the accessibility relation R. B = KTB KDB S5 = KT5 S4 = KD 4 K 4B D K 45 T = KT KB KD4 DK5 K 45 D =KD K5 K4 K Figure 8. 30 . Draft 3/28/2006 S5 S4 dS5 T dS4 K5 K4 D K Figure 7. Directed Graphs to Represent Accessibility. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. here is a more elaborated version of his chair including the deontic modal logics. “Picasso's Chair”.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. In honor of Segerberg.

R αα ∀α∀β( R αβ ⇒ R βα) ∀α∀β∀γ( R αβ & R βγ ⇒ R αγ) ∀α∀β∀γ (R αβ & R αγ ⇒ R βγ) ∀α Figure 10 Relational Properties and Directed Graphs. If R were transitive. All indirect paths have a shortcut. By the definition of the truth for ‘◊ψ’. Symmetry. We can use directed graphs together with the truth clause for the ‘ ’ as truth in all possible worlds and the truth clause for ‘◊’ as truth in some possible world to intuitively see why the requiring the accessibility or relative possibility relation to have one of the standard properties validates its corresponding axioms. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. All of reflexivity. symmetry. symmetry. since P is true in α to P would be true in γ. Draft 3/28/2006 We can. Then its antecedent ‘ ϕ’ is true but its consequent ‘ ϕ ~ ϕ So by a generalized form of modal negation. But then. 31 . if the accessibility or relative possibility transitive. So hen there is a two-legged indirect path from α to β and from β to γ. ϕ ϕ ~ ϕ ◊◊ ~ ϕ α ϕ ϕ ◊~ϕ β ‘ ϕ’ is true in all worlds accessible from α. using the directed graphs from the theory of relations. We will show that the accessibility relation cannot be transitive. Being Euclidean implies transitivity. Every world has a loop. requires that all accessibility arrows are double arrows. then there would be a direct arrow from α to γ. there is a direct arrow from α to γ. Transitivity requires that for every indirect path of accessibility arrows from α to β and from β to γ. Seriality requires that every world is a tail of an arrow. and reflexivity assuming seriality.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. All arrows are double arrows. For example. we have that ψ must be true in all worlds accessible from α including β. we have that ψ is true in some world β accessible to α. is invalid. which is a contradiction. translate properties of accessibility relations into geometric properties of directed graphs. for example. For suppose ϕ→ ϕ ϕ’ is false in α. which is a special case of a double arrow. Notice now that ‘◊ ~ϕ’ is true in possible world β. Assume that the above axiom fails. This means that there is a possible world γ accessible from β in which ‘~ϕ’ is true. the latter is equivalent to ◊◊ ~ ϕ . Reflexivity requires that every world be accessible to itself and so every world has a loop. ‘◊◊ ~ ϕ’ is true in some world β accessible from α. R R R R R is serial is reflexive is symmetric is transitive is Euclidean ∀α∃β R αβ Every world is a tail. and transitivity assuming seriality. and by the definition of the truth of ‘ ψ’. So both ‘ ϕ’ and ‘◊◊ ~ ϕ’ are true in α. then the axiom 4 is valid.

This demonstration is carried out in the meta-language. 13. then axiom 4 is valid. ‘if… then’. UD 10. 17. CD Assume (CD) 11. def. def. DD 9. 16. CD Assume (CD) 19. ‘and’. def. 10. 13 ADJ 2. If Axioms 4 Fails the Accessibility Relation Cannot be Transitive. 7. if axiom 4 fails to be valid. 15. By contraposition. def. UI. if the accessibility relation R is required to be transitive. 2. 19. 5. CD Assume (CD) 4. ‘&’. 8. ϕ) 8. 6. 9. UI 17. respectively. ‘E’. → Premise 6. 4. the logical demonstration is no more complicated than a derivation in the theory of relations. 12. 18 MP ∀α∀β∀γ( R αβ & R βγ ⇒ R αγ) ϕ Show |= α ϕ ⇒ |= α |= α ϕ ∀β ∈ W (R αβ ⇒ |= β ϕ) ϕ Show |= α Show ∀β ∈ W (R αβ ⇒ |= β Show R αβ ⇒ |= β ϕ R αβ Show |= β ϕ Show ∀γ ∈ W (R βγ ⇒ |= γβ ϕ) Show R αβγ ⇒ |= γβ ϕ Show |= γβ ϕ R βγ |= γβ ϕ R αβ & R βγ R αβ & R βγ ⇒ R αγ R αγ R αγ ⇒ |= γβ ϕ 32 . and ‘is an element of’. Show |= α ϕ → ϕ 3. 3. ‘some’. we can rigorously demonstrate that if R is transitive. UD 16. UI. then the accessibility relation R R cannot be transitive. 12. 11. Therefore. Once the truth clauses are unpacked.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. We use the use the symbols ‘∀’. 14. 15 MP 5. 18. Draft 3/28/2006 ϕ ~ϕ ϕ ~ ϕ ◊◊ ~ ϕ α ϕ ◊~ϕ β γ Figure 11. UI 14. 7. ‘⇒’ and ‘∈’in the meta-language for ‘all’. Using the definition of truth in a modal system set forth above. A complete meta-linguistic derivation of axiom 4 from the various clauses of the definition of truth and the premise stating the transitivity of the accessibility relation is as follows: 1. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. then axiom 4 is valid.

We abbreviate the derivation by boxing and cancel once we obtain the definitional equivalent of what needs to be shown and we cite the relevant definition upon boxing and canceling. we assume its antecedent is true in an arbitrary possible world α and then show that its consequent must also be true in that possible world. Next we use the clause for the truth of necessary statements. [G][G]ϕ → [G]ϕ [Hint: see exercise 4 below for 4C. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. According to the tensed theory of time championed by the philosopher C. 5. There are different axiomatizations for different philosophical conception of time. holds that only the present is real and the past and the future are unreal. D. is symmetric if axiom B is valid. . then the corresponding condition on R must fails to hold. Prior. Then demonstrate that if each of the axioms is assumed to be invalid.] (D) [F]ϕ → <F>ϕ. (E) ϕ → [F]<H>ϕ. is transitive if axiom 4 is valid. a champion of intuitionism). the past is real and the present moves up the tree of possible futures turning the unreal future into the real past. Demonstrate that the following axioms require the corresponding conditions on R. Proceeding in this fashion. [H] (ϕ → ψ) → ([H]ϕ → [H] ψ) (B) [F]ϕ → [F][F]ϕ. Broad.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. 2. we attempt to show the conditional in the scope of the universal quantifier. Since the antecedent is a necessary sentence. An elegant result due to Lemmon and Scott (1977) states a correspondence between conditions on R and axioms of the generalized form: ◊h i ϕ→ 33 j k ◊ϕ . is symmetric and transitive if E is valid. EXERCISES 1. What do the following axioms express about the structure of time? (A) [F] (ϕ → ψ) → ([F]ϕ → [F] ψ). we use the definition of truth for conditionals. Give a reading of his axiom in temporal logic: ( (P→ P)→P)→ (◊ P →P) . [G]ϕ → [G][G]ϕ (C) [F][F]ϕ → [F]ϕ. To show the conditional in the meta-language. (B) (C) (D) (E) R R R R R is reflexive if axiom T is valid. we may assume that sentence is true in all worlds accessible to α.] 3. due to A. N. Provide both an intuitive diagrammatic justification and a more rigorous derivation in the meta-language to establish that (A) R is a serial if axiom D is valid. [H]ϕ → <H>ϕ [Hint: seriality toward the future says there is no last moment of time]. Another theory. 4. R is point reflexive R is dense R is convergent Formulate each of the conditions on R in terms of a directed graph. DC T 4 C Converse D Necessitation T Converse 4 Convergent ◊ϕ → ϕ→ ϕ ϕ ∀α∀β∀γ (R αβ & R αγ ⇒ β = γ) ( ϕ → ϕ) ◊ ϕ → ◊ϕ C R αβ ⇒ R ββ) ∀α∀β[ R αβ ⇒ ∃γ (R αγ & R γβ)] ∀α∀β∀γ[ R αβ & R αγ ⇒ ∃η (R αη & R γη)] ∀α∀β( R is unique. ϕ → [H]<F>ϕ [Hint: these are the interaction theorems. is the relative possibility or accessibility relation in a modal system. known as presentism. Draft 3/28/2006 To show that axiom 4 is valid assuming the premise the R is transitive. we ultimately get to statements in the theory of relations. Prior’s axiomatization of temporal logic known as the Diodorean System consists of KT4 and the following Axiom Dum (named after the philosopher Michael Dummett. To show this universal sentence.

Another interpretation of the ‘ ’ is provability. R ΄of two relations R and R ΄ is defined as R ° R ΄αβ =df ∃γ (R αγ & R ΄γβ). 8.e. If R is the relation of being a parent. and finite (i. j... (W) ( ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ . there is a model that satisfies the entire infinite set). T501 and T502 state modal derivation principles.) It is interesting to note that being ‘finite’ cannot be expressed in a sentence of first-order logic. i. if R is the relation of being a sister and R ΄ is the relation of being a parent.e. k as indicated in the chart yield the standard axioms. Theorems. The Gödel-Löb Provability System = K4W.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. ° Here the composition R Verify that the values for h. Draft 3/28/2006 Here ◊m and n represents m diamonds and n boxes in a row. Axiom K. T538 T560 P → ◊P P→P ◊P P ◊P (D Axiom) (T Axiom) (B Axiom) (4 Axiom) (5 Axiom) T570 P → T580 P→ T590 ◊P → Next we list some theorem common to all the modal systems we have been discussing. where Axiom W (standing for “well-ordering”). respectively.e. then R ° R ΄ is the relation of being an aunt.e. First we list the characteristic axioms for various modal systems. For example.. then R ° R = R 2 is the relation of being a grandparent.. 34 . T501. expresses the principle that justifies strict derivation in the form of necessity derivation: whatever is entailed by a necessary truth is necessary. Give an informal argument to show that W requires the accessibility relation to be transitive. i. This follows from the compactness metatheorem that states that any infinite set of sentences that is finitely satisfiable (i. indirect paths of R chains terminate in a finite number of steps. irreflexive. any finite subset has a model) must also be satisfiable (i. T502 is the basis for possibility derivation: whatever is logically entailed by something possible is itself possible. and R 1 = R. The corresponding condition on R imposed by the generalized axiom is given by R hαβ & R jαγ ⇒ ∃η( R iβη & R kγη) . and R ° R ° R = R 3 is the relation of being a great-grandparent. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. R 0αβ if and only if α = β. and that the standard condition on R for each of the axioms is equivalent to the one specified by the Lemmon Scott Generalized Correspondence theorem: h B 4 5 C 0 0 1 1 i 0 1 0 1 j 1 2 1 1 k 1 0 1 1 Symmetry Transitivity Euclidean Convergence Standard Condition on R R αβ ⇒ R βα) ∀α∀β∀γ( R αβ & R βγ ⇒ R αγ) ∀α∀β∀γ (R αβ & R αγ ⇒ R βγ) R αβ & R αγ ⇒ ∃η( R βη & R γη) ∀α∀β( 5. R 0 is the identity relation.

T507 ◊(P ∨ Q) ↔ ◊ P ∨ ◊ Q T508 (P ∧ Q) ↔ P∧ Q T509 ◊(P ∧ Q) → ◊ P ∧ ◊ Q T510 P∨ Q→ (P ∨ Q) T511 (◊ P → ◊ Q) → ◊ (P → Q) T512 ( P → T513 T514 Q) → ◊ (P → Q) Q) (P ↔ Q) → ( P ↔ (P ↔ Q) → (◊P ↔ ◊Q) P T515 ~ P → ~ T516 (P ∨ Q) → ◊P ∨ Q T517 ~◊P → ~P T518 (◊P → T519 (◊P → T520 (◊P → Q) → (P → Q) Q) Q) → ( P → Q) → (◊P → ◊ Q) T521 (~◊P ∧ ◊Q) → ◊(~P ∧ Q) The following theorems are modal counterparts to consequentia mirabilis: T522 (~ P → P) ↔ P T523 (◊~P → P) ↔ P 35 . Draft 3/28/2006 (P → Q) → ( P → T501 T502 Q) (P → Q) → (◊ P → ◊ Q) Theorems T503-T506 express the laws of modal negation: T503 ~ P↔◊~P ~P T504 ~ ◊ P ↔ T505 P↔~◊~P ~P T506 ◊ P ↔ ~ In addition to T501 and T502 above. T507-T520 state laws of modal distribution that are valid in all systems of normal modal logic. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7.

if it were the case that P. then it would be the case that Q). T542 ~ (P → Q) ↔ ◊(P ∧ ~Q) T543 ~◊(P ∧ Q) ↔ T544 (P → ~ Q) (P → Q) ↔ ~◊(P ∧ ~Q) (P → Q) ∧ (P → ~Q) T545 ~◊P ↔ T546 ~◊P ∧ ~◊Q → (P ↔ Q) T547 ◊(P → Q) ↔ ( P → ◊Q) 36 . ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. T544 states the equivalence of two characterizations of strict implication. Theorems T533 and T535 state principles—transitivity and strengthening—that hold for strict implications but which do not hold for counterfactual conditionals (that is.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. conditionals of the form. Draft 3/28/2006 T524 (◊P → ~P) ↔ ~P T525 (P → ~P) ↔ ~P T526 (P → ~◊P) ↔ ~P T527 (~P → P) ↔ P Analogues to theorems T229 and T230 in monadic quantifier logic (which we may call the “Drinking Theorems” after a joke by Smullyan) are T theorems despite the nested modal operators: T529 ◊(◊P →P) T530 ◊(P → P) Corresponding to quantifier theorems T234-T247 are the modal theorems T534-T547. T533 T534 T535 T536 T537 T538 (P → Q) → (P ∧ R → Q) [(P → Q) ∧ ( Q→ R) → (P → R)] (P → Q) ∧ (P ↔ Q) ∧ (P → Q) ∧ P → ◊P (Q → R) → (Q ↔ R) → (P → R) → (P → R) (P ↔ R) (P → Q ∧ R) T539 ( P ∧ ◊Q) → ◊(P ∧ Q) T540 T541 (P → Q) ∧ ◊(P ∧ R) → ◊(Q ∧ R) (P → Q ∨ R) → (P → Q)∨ ◊(P ∧ R) Theorems T542-T547 concern strict implication.

Draft 3/28/2006 Although C. other T theorems. T538. I. is followed by its logical dual T571. Theorems T573 and T574 are valid in KB. the characteristic axiom for system T. Theorems T576 and T577 are related to Anselmian arguments and can be validated in B. T570 P → ◊P T571 ◊ P → P T572 P → ~◊ ~◊ P T573 (◊P → Q) → (P → Q) 37 . T538 P → ◊P T553 ◊P ∨ ◊~P T554 ~( P ∧ T555 ~P) (P → ~Q) → ( P → ~ Q) T560. their proofs do not require NI as an inference rule. that is. the characteristic axiom for system D. but only NI and ◊R as admissible strict importation rules. the characteristic axiom for system B. T560 P→P T561 P → ◊P T562 T563 T564 ( P → P) (P → ◊ P) P→ P T565 ◊ P → ◊ ◊ P T566 T567 ◊P → ◊ P P→◊ P T570. is followed by its logical dual T561. theorems T548-T552 are corresponding paradoxes of strict implication: T548 ~ (P → Q) → ◊P T549 ~ (P → Q) → ~ Q T550 Q→ (P → Q) (P → Q) (Q → P) T551 ~◊P → T552 ◊(P → Q) ∨ Next we list theorems for the various modal systems. Lewis’s axioms of strict implication were introduced to overcome the paradoxes of material implication. is followed by other theorems of System D.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. other B theorems. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’.

the characteristic theorem of system S4. T580 P→ P T581 ◊◊P → ◊P T582 T583 T584 T585 (P → Q) → (P ∨ Q) → ( P→ (◊ P ∨ Q) Q) ( (P→Q) → R) ( (P → Q) → R) → P↔ P T586 ◊P ↔ ◊◊P Theorem T587 established that the G schema is valid in any normal KB system.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. R. and ◊R as admissible strict importation rules. T590 ◊P → T591 ◊ P → T592 ◊ P → ◊P P ◊P T593 ◊ P → ◊P T594 ◊ P → T595 P→ ◊P ◊P P T596 ◊◊P → 38 . T590 is the characteristic theorem of the system. is followed by its logical dual T581 and other theorems of system S4 (also known as KT4). T588 is an alternative basis for S4. and T571 is its logical dual. Theorems T585 and T586 are the modal reductions laws for S4 :one may collapse any string of iterated uniform operators to a single occurrence of that operator. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. they do not require NI as an inference rule. Theorems T592-T598 are valid in K5. Theorems T582-T584 are valid in K4. that is. Theorems T599-T590 are valid in any normal K5 system. but they may employ NI. Draft 3/28/2006 (P → Q) → (◊P → Q) ◊P P) ∧ ◊P → P P) ∧ ◊P → P T574 T575 ◊ P → T576 T577 (P → (P → T580. T587 ◊ P → T588 ◊P ( P→ Q) (P → Q) → Theorems T590-T595 are theorems of the system S5 (also known as KT5). they do not require NI as an inference rule but only NI and R as admissible strict importation rules. that is.

imply that iterated modalities collapse to the innermost operator. B. Verify the following claims. S4. 3. ϕ is derivable (this 2. Draft 3/28/2006 T597 ( P ∨ Q) → P∨ Q T598 ◊P ∧ ◊Q → ◊(◊P ∧ Q) T599 T600 T601 T602 T603 T604 ( P↔ (◊P ↔ ◊◊P) ( P ↔ ◊ P) (◊P ↔ P↔ P↔ ◊P) P ◊ P P P) T605 ◊ P ↔ ◊ T606 ◊ P ↔ ◊◊ P T607 ◊◊P ↔ ◊◊◊P T608 ◊◊P ↔ ◊ ◊P T609 T610 ◊P ↔ ◊P ↔ ◊◊P ◊P Theorems T611-T612 are the additional modal reduction laws for S5. (C) Show that in each of the modal systems if ϕ is a theorem of classical sentential logic. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. then is known as the rule of necessitation Nec). 362-363) is derivable in each of the modal systems. T611 P↔◊ P ◊P T612 ◊P ↔ EXERCISES 1. Construct T-derivations of the following theorems: (A) T501 (P → Q) → ( P → Q) (B) T502 (P → Q) → (◊P → ◊Q) (C) T541 P → ◊P (D) T542 ( P → P) (E) T523 ◊(P → Q) ∨ (Q → P) 39 . and S5.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. Prove by induction that Interchange of Equivalents (see pp. (B) PG is derivable in each of the modal systems T. (A) K is derivable in T. which also hold in S5. These modal reduction laws together with the modal reduction laws T585 and T586 for S4.

For each of the following pairs of statements. 8. construct a derivation of the following theorem of predicate logic: ∀x R xx ∧ ∀u∀t∀v(R ut ∧ R uv → R tv) ↔ ∀x R xx ∧ ∀x∀y(R xy → R yx) ∧ ∀x∀y∀z(R xy ∧ R yz → R xz) . symmetric. construct a T-derivation of its conclusion from its premises. Construct S5-derivations for the following theorems: (A) T571 ◊ P → P (B) T573 ◊P ∧ ◊Q → ◊(◊P ∧ Q) (C) T574 ◊ P → ◊P (D) T594 P ↔ P (E) T597 ◊P ↔ ◊P 7. one is a theorem. If statement is not a theorem. A relation R is weakly connected if ∀x∀y∀z(Rxy ∧ Rxz → Ryz ∨ Rzy).KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. (A) ∇P ↔ ∇~P 40 . provide an invalidating possible world diagram.: P −3 Q (E) ~ ◊ P . ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Construct S4-derivations for the following theorems: (A) T560 P → P (B) T561 ◊◊P → ◊P (C) T562 (P → Q) → ( P → Q) (D) T563 (P ∨ Q) → ( P ∨ Q) (E) T564 ( (P → Q) → R) → ( (P→Q) → R) 6. (A) ~◊(P ∧ ~Q) ↔ (P −3 Q) (B) (P −3 Q) ∧ (P −3 ~Q) −3 Q (C) (~◊P ∧ ~◊Q) −3 (P 8−3 Q) (D) Q . a statement P is contingent if it is neither necessary nor impossible. that is. (◊P → ◊Q) → (P → Q) (B) (◊P ∧ ◊Q) → ◊(P ∧ Q) . and transitive.: P −3 Q 11. Prove the following theorems about strict implication and strict equivalence in system (T). but the other is not. Prove that a relation R is reflexive and Euclidean if and only if it is reflexive. and conversely. (A) (P → Q) → (◊P → ◊Q) . translate the following axioms about contingency into English. ( P ∧ ◊Q) → ◊(P ∧ Q) 9. and conversely. If a statement is a theorem. Let us add to our systems the following rules: Strict Implication [SI]: From P −3 Q to infer (P → Q). and then provide derivations for the axioms in system (S5). 10. Using the symbol ∇ for the contingency operator. Strict Equivalence [SE]: From P 8−3 Q to infer (P ↔ Q). Construct B-derivations for the following theorems: (A) T550 ◊ P → P (B) T551 P → ◊P (C) T552 (◊P → Q) → (P → Q) (D) T553 (P → Q) → (◊P → Q) (E) T554 ◊ P → ◊P 5. Draft 3/28/2006 4. Intuitively. Construct a semantical derivation in our metalanguage to show that the axiom ( P → Q) ∨ ( Q → P) is valid in any modal structure in which the accessibility relation is weakly connected.

e. Anthony Anderson. If a property F is positive. Pos(F) → ◊∃xFx. and the property of necessary existence. then F entails ~F. i.e. being an essence of an individual. This derivation is left to the reader since it follows from MN and quantifier logic since ‘~◊∃xFx’ implies ‘ ∀x(Fx → ~Fx)’. Let F and H be properties.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. Lemma A 2.e. A property F is an essence of x (in symbols. Pos(F) → ~ Pos(~F). If a property F is positive then its negation is not positive. The argument is based on Leibniz’s notion of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ properties.e. 7 ID Assume (ID) 4. Axiom 0. then property F entails property H (in symbols. Being God-like is a positive property.e. Show ◊∃xFx 4.e. An individual x has necessary existence (in symbols. Something x is God-like if. Gx =df ∀F [ Fx ↔ Pos(F)].. and defines a God-like being having as its essence maximally positive properties. Lemma A. i. 5.e. Whether or not Gödel actually believed it to be a proof. Definition 1. NEx =df ∀F(F Ess x → ∃y Fy). ~◊∃xFx → (F ⇒ ~F). F ⇒ H) if ∀x(Fx → Hx). NE(x)) if every property that is an essence of x is necessarily exemplified in some individual. Definition 3. If it is impossible that F is exemplified. Any property entailed by a positive property is positive. Show Pos(F) → ◊∃xFx 2. i. F Ess x =df ∀H[ Hx ↔ (F ⇒ H)]. This particular formulation of Gödel’s argument is due to C. F Ess x) if it is necessary that x has all properties entailed by F. 6. but one in which the steps can be logically verified. Axiom 2. Axiom 1. every essential property of x is positive and x has every positive property as an essential property. Theorem 1. Pos(F) → Pos(F). CD Assume (CD) 6.. Draft 3/28/2006 (B) ~∇(P ↔ Q) → (∇P → ∇Q) (C) ∇(P → Q) → (~∇P → P) (D) ~∇(P → ∇Q) (E) P ↔ (P ∧ ~∇P) 12. 5. The following reconstruction of Gödel’s ontological proof is an intriguing logical exercise that goes beyond propositional modal logic into second-order modal predicate logic. Axiom 3. it is an illustration of the power of the axiomatic method to clarify the logical relations among complex concepts. Pos(F) → [(F ⇒ H) → Pos(H)]. Pos(F) 3. 1.e.. 7. Axiom 1 The next three definitions define being God-like. i. i.. i. i. Among his extensive unpublished writings. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. then it is necessarily positive. Pos(G).. Any positive property is possibly exemplified. Gödel formalized an intriguing ‘ontological proof’ for the existence of God.. Proof.. ~◊∃xFx F⇒~F Pos(~ F) ~ Pos (~F) 3. Definition 2. i. 41 . and only if.. Axiom 2 2.e. i..

[Hint: From Axioms 2 and 3. Gx → [(G ⇒ H) → Hx]. 3. Show ◊∃xGx 2. i. then being God-like is the essence of x. 5. Next we prove that it is necessary that there is something God-like. we have by Definition 1 that Pos(H)..e.e. [Hint: Suppose that Hx. UD Lemma B Lemma C 4. Pos(G) Pos(G) → ◊∃xGx ◊∃xGx Axiom 3 Theorem 1 3.e. If x is God-like. Gx Show G Ess x Show ∀H[ Hx ↔ (G ⇒ H)] Hx → (G ⇒ H) (G ⇒ H) → Hx Hx ↔ (G ⇒ H) G Ess x 3. Definition of Ess To summarize the argument thus far: Theorem 1 states that any positive property is possibly exemplified. being God-like is possibly exemplified. we have Pos(H). i. CD Assume(CD) 7. If x is God-like. i. 4. i. Pos(NE).KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. 7.. that being God-like is possibly exemplified. Gx → [ Hx → (G ⇒ H)]. 1.. Gx → G Ess x. then any property that x has essentially is implied by x being God-like. i. Show Gx → G Ess x 2.e. It follows that a God-like individual x has property H necessarily by Definition 1. 1. Axiom 3 states that being God-like is a positive property. then any property entailed by x being God-like is an essential property of x. 42 . ◊∃xGx. If x is God-like. 3..e. 4 MP Axiom 4. 6.] Theorem 2. we have that Pos(H). Theorem 2 states that being God-like is the essence of anything that is God-like. Draft 3/28/2006 Corollary 1. Lemma B. Having necessary existence is a positive property. Proof. but anything that is God-like must have all positive properties. from it immediately follows from Theorem 1. 8. From Definition G1.] Lemma C. 4.

correspondingly axiomatized. UI. DD 5. and in particular a good and indubitable meaning. The idea was that intuitionistic truth was defined in terms of proof and provability is a kind of necessity. on which rests all of science. Some cite Gödel’s philosophical views about on the ‘theological worldview’ in a letter to his mother: “We are of course far from being able to confirm scientifically the theological world picture… What I call the theological worldview is the idea. 8. 7. 16. 43 . It is necessary that there is something God-like: Proof. 15. 8. NI 17. some of the most important results in twentieth century logic. The idea that everything has a cause is an exact analogue of the principle that everything has a cause. that the world and everything in it has meaning and reason. ∃xGx ∃xGx ∃xGx) ∃xGx 20. since it has in itself at most a very dubious meaning. DD Axiom 5◊ 16. 18 MP 2. Draft 3/28/2006 Theorem 3. Modal Provability Systems and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. 13. 17. 9. 14. 6. can only be the means to the end of another existence. 4. 19. UI.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. 3. Show 2. EI Axiom 4 Definition 1. BC. ◊ ∃xGx → Show ◊ ∃xGx Show (∃xGx → Show ∃xGx → ∃xGx Gy Pos(NE) NEy ↔ Pos(NE) NEy Gy → G Ess y G Ess y G Ess y → ∃x G) ∃x Gx ◊∃xGx Show ◊ ∃xGx ∃xGx ∃xGx → ∃xGx ∃xGx ∃xGx Whether or not Gödel believed in this unpublished argument is a matter of historical dispute. PD 15. 9.]. NI. Definition 3. 7 SL 9. is possible. whereas he is only engaged in a logical investigation (that is. 13. Gödel wrote up a short note on the embedding intuitionistic logic in modal logic. CD Assume(CD) 6. Assume (PD) 4. 16 MP ∃xGx. etc. 20. 18. 12. 5. it is clear the Gödel held strong convictions about the axiomatic method as a powerful tool for conceptual analysis. in showing that such a proof with classical assumptions [completeness. 12. MP Corollary 1 19. 12 MP 10. 10. SD 14. About the time of his famous Incompleteness Theorems (1931). In the next section. 1.” On either account.” Others cite Oscar Morgenstern’s diary in which he stated that Gödel hesitated to publish his ontological proof for fear it would be thought “that he actually believes in God. It follows immediately that our worldly existence. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. MP Theorem 2 10. 11. we will examine abstract modal versions of Gödel’s celebrated Incompleteness Theorems.

The best-known Provability logic adds an axiom to K known as axiom W (for ‘well-ordering’): ( ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ . that if ϕ were provable. Gödel showed that arithmetic has strong expressive powers. however. assuming that arithmetic is consistent. The general strategy for establishing the consistency of different axiomatic systems exploits a theorem about logic—a piece of meta-mathematics—namely. Hilbert welcomed the new century by listing 23 open problems. This defect was repaired by David Hilbert. We define CONSIS(M) to be the above sentence. after discovering Russell’s paradox in Gottlob Frege’s monumental Gründgesetze der ArithmetikI and II (1893-1903). The second on the list of these challenges was to demonstrate the consistency of the axioms of arithmetic. Russell and Whitehead. he was able to demonstrate an effectively calculable correspondence between sentences of arithmetic and facts about which sentences are and are not provable in Peano Arithmetic. using methods that are formalizable within the syntax of elementary arithmetic. Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem showed that even elementary arithmetic was essentially incomplete insofar as there will always be truths unattainable by proofs for any recursively enumerable set of axioms. that is. then ϕ is already provable in Peano Arithmetic. Modal logic is useful in clarifying our understanding of central results concerning provability in the foundations of mathematics (see. In a lecture to the International Congress of Mathematics in Paris in 1900. that a system being consistent is equivalent to some statement in the system being unprovable. It turns out that these results can be set forth in propositional modal logic in which the ‘ ’ is interpreted as provability. ‘ P’ is interpreted as expressing that ‘P is provable’ in a system M such as Peano arithmetic. the sentence ~ ⊥ says that a contradiction is not provable in system M and so says that M is consistent. which he challenged mathematicians to solve. This claim is too strong if we wish to countenance the possibility that Peano Arithmetic might prove something that is false. answered this questioning the affirmative. Draft 3/28/2006 Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem (1931) is based on constructing a sentence in a formal system that intuitively says. were not altogether clear about the concept of the meta-language in which this reduction was to take place. and in 1954 Martin Löb. namely. W is the more modest claim that if Peano Arithmetic proves a sentence that claims soundness for a given sentence ϕ. but it was not until the 1970s that logicians fully realized that Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems were propositional in character and that the abstract logic of provability could be captured in propositional modal logic. We specify a symbolic language for Gödel-Löb Provability logic as follows. Hilbert’s program lasted until 1931 when Kurt Gödel produced a 25 page technical paper that would make him the most famous logician of the 20th century. Hilbert’s rigorous refinement of the axiomatic method enabled the central questions in the foundations of mathematics to be precisely and rigorously formulated. Boolos (1993)). Russell. Using ‘⊥’ as a constant of provability logic denoting a contradiction. Provabilty logics are systems where the propositional variables range over formulas of some mathematical system such as Peano Arithmetic. Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem showed that it is impossible to prove the consistency of arithmetic. Gödel’s celebrated Incompleteness Theorems were a shocking awakening from the enchantment with Euclidean reductionism.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. Peano Arithmetic does not insist that a proof of ϕ entails ϕ is true unless it already has a proof of ϕ to back up that claim. then ϕ would be true. sought with Alfred North Whitehead in their monumental Principia Mathematica (1910-1913) to reduce mathematics to logic in a paradox-free form and so secure the certainty of mathematics.” In 1950 Leon Henkin asked if the sentence “I am provable” is provable. This remarkable paper drove a logical wedge between the notions of proof and truth conflated since Euclid and at the same time dashed Hilbert’s dreams of a finitary consistency proof for mathematics. Using Gödel numbering as a method for coding arithmetic sentences. Axiom T ‘ ϕ → ϕ’ says that Peano Arithmetic is sound. “I am not provable. thus dashing Hilbert’s hopes for a finitistic proof of the consistency of mathematics. The symbols of this language will be 44 . Intuitively. by emptying of their content and retaining only their formalistic structure. In 1963 Richard Montague made the connection between provability as a box and self-reference. In Provability Logics. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Hilbert believed that the logical paradoxes that occupied Russell were merely due to the semantic content of language and so could be banished by making mathematical statements meaningless.

hence. The intended interpretations for these expressions are (1) Sentence letters are sentences of Peano Arithmetic.. A system M is Gödelian if ∀ ϕ. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. (2) ⊥ is some designated falsehood such as ‘0 = 1’. The Gödel-Löb Provability logic is Gödelian given axiom W. the provability operator the pair of parentheses. Draft 3/28/2006 P. without or without numerical subscripts. the symbol for the logical constant falsehood (called ‘eet’).KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. ψ) The Löb-Gödel Provability Logic is a provability system type 4 together with the axiom (W) ( ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ . then the following are equivalent: (A) M is reflexive. (4) ‘ ϕ’ is interpreted as saying that sentence ϕ is provable in Peano Arithmetic. M ├− ( ϕ → ϕ) ⇒ M ├− ϕ. (3) If ϕ and ψ are symbolic sentences. Fixed-Point Metatheorem. then there is a sentence G such that 45 . A system M has the Löb property if ∀ϕ. Q. If M is a Löb-Gödel Provability Logic. …. (4) If ϕ is a symbolic sentence. then so is (ϕ → ψ) . ⊥} is tautologically complete. we have a Gödel sentence G that asserts its own provability in system M. Z ⊥ → ). Next we can three equivalent formulations of fixed-point properties within Provability Systems: • • • A system M is self-reflexive if ∀ϕ. the conditional sign. If M is type 4. The sentences of this language are exhaustively characterized by the following clauses: (1) The logical constant ‘⊥’ is a symbolic sentence (2) Sentence letters are symbolic sentences. ( the sentence letters P through Z. R. Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. and so all the other sentential connectives can be defined in terms of them. A provability system M of type 4 consists of the inference rule MP together with the axioms: (K) (4) (ϕ →ψ) → ( ϕ → ϕ→ ϕ . M ├− ( ϕ → ϕ) ⇒ M ├− ϕ . (B) M has the Löb property. and (C) (C) M is Gödelian. Note that {→. We can now state abstract forms of the Gödel Incompleteness Theorems within our modal provability systems. (3) (ϕ →ψ) are conditionals. there exists a sentence σ such that M ├− σ ↔ ( σ → ϕ). then so is (5) ϕ .

4. The following lemma is useful for establishing the metatheorem about self-reference. Hence. 3. then there is a sentence G such that M ├− G ↔ ~ G . 9. 1. then M is Gödelian. EXERCISES. M ├/− G. 10. and if M is consistent. then G is provable. Draft 3/28/2006 M ├− G ↔ ~ G . Annotate the following meta-language justification using the axioms instead of the strict importation rules to establish this lemma. 7. Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem exploits the fact that it is provable that if CONSIS(M) is provable. 5. G is both true and unprovable in M and so M is incomplete. then M ├− ϕ* → ϕ*. and. that if M (of type 4) has the Löb property.G 46 . assuming M is consistent.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. Annotate the following abstract form of Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. then M ├/− CONSIS(M). assuming M is consistent. 6. using lemma A above. then M ├/− G. G is intuitively true. 2. Show. Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. Note that since the Gödel sentence G asserts its own unprovability and it is unprovable in M. Show ( ( ϕ → ϕ) → ( ( ( ( ( ( Show ( ϕ) → ( ( ϕ → ϕ) → ( ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ) ϕ) ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ) ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ) → ( ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ ( ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ) ( ϕ → ϕ) ϕ→ ϕ) ( ϕ → ϕ) ( ϕ → ϕ) → ( ϕ → ϕ) ϕ ( ϕ → ϕ) → ( ϕ→ ϕ ϕ 2. 1. 8. and if M is consistent. 12. 1. 3. Suppose M is a Provability Logic. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Lemma A: If M is of type 4 and ϕ* = ( ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ. Then there is a sentence G such that M ├− G ↔ ~ G . Theorem 1. 11. Show M is consistent & M ├ (G ↔ ~ G) ⇒ M |/. If M is a Löb-Gödel Provability Logic.

3. Draft 3/28/2006 2. Show 2. 6. 7. 15. 14. M├G↔~ G 47 . 4. 8. M is consistent & M ├ (G ↔ ~ G) M is consistent M ├ (G ↔ ~ G) Show M |/-G M├G M├~ G M├ G 4. 10. 5. Lemma B: If M ├− ϕ → ( ϕ → ψ). 7. M ├ ϕ → ( ϕ → ψ) M ├ (ϕ → ( ϕ → ψ)) M ├ ( ϕ → ( ϕ → ψ)) M├( ϕ→( ϕ → ψ)) M├( ϕ→ ϕ) M├ ϕ→ ψ ϕ→ ϕ→ ψ. 5. 4. 7. Annotate the following meta-language derivation to show that 4 is derivable from W and K and so Löb’s Provability System = KW 1. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. then M ├− CONSIS(M) → G. 11. 16. Show M ├ ϕ → ( ϕ → ψ) ⇒ M ├ 2. 1. 8. Show M ├ G ↔ ~ G ⇒ M ├ ~ ⊥ → G 2. ϕ→ ϕ ϕ ( ( ϕ ∧ ϕ) → ϕ ∧ ϕ) → ( ϕ ∧ ϕ) Show (ϕ → ( ( ϕ ∧ ϕ) → ϕ ∧ ϕ)) Show ϕ → ( ( ϕ ∧ ϕ) → ϕ Show ( ϕ ∧ ϕ) → ( ϕ ∧ ϕ) ϕ∧ ϕ ϕ ϕ∧ϕ ϕ → ( ( ϕ ∧ ϕ) → ϕ ∧ ϕ)) ( ( ϕ ∧ ϕ) → ϕ ∧ ϕ)) ( ϕ ∧ ϕ) ϕ∧ ϕ ϕ ϕ ∧ ϕ) ϕ∧ϕ 5. 5. Construct meta-language justifications for the following lemmas. 3. 4. ψ Lemma C: If M ├− G ↔ ~ G. 3. 13. 12. 6. 6. Löb’s Provability System = K4W. 9. then M ├− 1.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7.

. The sentential logic of un-nested modality is known as ‘T’. then if M is consistent. It assigns no special logic to the nesting or iteration of modality.e. U. (2) that whatever is necessary is true. annotate the following proof of the abstract modal form of Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. 6. Show M is consistent ⇒ M |/. 8. to the unnested modal conclusion that 2 + 3 = 5 is not accidental. Modal logic—the logic of what might have been and of what must be—raises difficult issues and questions that remain a matter of significant controversy. there exist numerous rival systems 48 .CONSIS(M) M ├ CONSIS M├~ ⊥ M├~ ⊥→G M├G M |/. System T is the weakest normal system. as opposed. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. 6. Therefore. Whereas the sentential logic of un-nested modality is relatively uncontroversial. say. The principal issue concerning modal sentential logic involves nested modality. something is necessary just in case its denial is impossible and that something is impossible if its denial is necessary). others the blending of the logic of quantification with that of modality. Draft 3/28/2006 3. even if it is true. 3. If M is a system of type 4 and there is a sentence G such that M ├− G ↔ ~ G . 9. wherein some modality is attributed to a state of affairs that is itself already modal. Any deductive apparatus for modal logic that respects these four principles is known as a normal system. Using the lemma (B). Philosophical Remarks (Nathan Salmon. and (4) that whatever is strictly implied by a necessary truth is itself a necessary truth (i.e.CONSIS(M) 2. Theorem 2. then the consequent is also necessary). It is unclear whether the premise entails this nested modal conclusion. then M ├/− CONSIS(M). 7. 5. 7. Then we may say that that T is motivated by four principles: (1) that necessity and possibility are duals (i. 4.G 0 10. 5.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. 4. Santa Barbara. Show M ├ ~ ⊥ → G M ├ ~ G ↔ ( G → ⊥) M ├ G ↔ ( G → ⊥) M├ G→ ⊥ M├~ ⊥→~ G M├~ ⊥→G 6. Consider the following argument: It is mathematically necessary that 2 + 3 =5 . Let us say that the antecedent of a necessary conditional strictly implies the consequent. that 2 + 3 = 5 could not have been merely accidental . with revisions by Mar). (3) that the logical truths of classical and modal logic are necessary truths.. Some of these issues concern modal sentential logic. C. 1. if the antecedent of a necessary conditional is itself necessary. 8. M is consistent M├G↔~ G Show M |/.

Brouwer) and S4 and S5 (named after C. Physical necessity may be seen as a restricted notion of necessity: A proposition p is physically necessary in a world w just in case the laws of the physics of w strictly imply it. and T201. i. System S4 adds the principle that whatever is necessary is such that its necessity is itself necessary: P→ P . I. In the terminology of Kripke. B. according to) which Socrates is a Spartan. then the B principle is verified.e. Draft 3/28/2006 dealing with nested modality. Universal Instantiation. System S5 adds the principle that whatever is possible is such that its possibility is necessary: ◊P → ◊P . in the sense that p is true in every world that is accessible to w and in which the physical laws of w are true. (or equivalently. [What is possible in that world is possible in any world. E. neither of B and S4 includes the other. Universal Derivation. there is least one world w3 that is possible in w2 and in which p is true. With these identifications. the S4 principle is verified. p is true in w3. If accessibility is transitive. (or equivalently. like truth and denotation. A sentence is deemed true with respect to a possible world just in case the proposition expressed is true in that world. yields both the B and S4 principles. And if it is an equivalence relation⎯reflexive. then x and y are exactly alike in every respect. possibility with truth in some possible worlds. together with the basic sentential modal logic T. in much the same way that the logic of ‘all’ and ‘some’ may be based on the logic of ‘and’ and ‘or’. More accurately. respectively. Socrates might have been a Spartan if and only if there is a possible world in (or. is an entire world history that might have obtained. whatever is possibly necessary is necessary). and transitive⎯the S5 principle is verified. this Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals is reflected in the inference rule of Leibniz’ Law. Whereas S5 thus includes T. Recall that the S5 principle. of Quantifier Negation. Each of these three systems builds on T through the addition of a specific principle governing an iterated modality.. a world w2 is said to be accessible to a world w1 if w2 is possible in w1. w2 is a genuine possibility (or. Though any actual physical law is thus physically necessary. Kripke demonstrated a close connection between each of the four main sentential modal logical systems and accessibility. are intensionalized by relativization to a possible world. among others. on one conception. based on Leibniz’ notion of a possible world. In possible-world semantics. Necessity of a proposition is identified with its truth in all possible worlds. the sentential logic of modality is easily derived from the classical logic of ‘all’ and ‘some’. J. L.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. whatever is possibly possible is possible). The most important normal systems that impose a special logic on nested modality are B (named for the intuitionist. symmetric. that if x and y are one and the same object. p is true in every world w2 such that in w1.) Whereas it is physically necessary that the force acting on a physical object is equal to the product of the mass of the object with its acceleration. A possible world. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Lewis’ systems for strict implication). (As mentioned in chapter V. to say that a proposition p is necessary in a world w1 is to say that p is true in every world w2 that is a possible world in w1—i. that same law may be metaphysically contingent. Whereas it is logically necessary that either nine is odd or it is not. The binary relation of accessibility is reflexive in any normal sentential modal logical system. whatever is possibly necessary is the case). for every world w3 that is possible in w2.. relative to) w1. To say that p is necessarily necessary in a world w1 is to say that for every world w2 that is possible in w1. The study of modal logic underwent a quantum leap with the advent of a semantic analysis due to Saul Kripke [1963]. (or equivalently. the classical extensional semantic attributes. It is metaphysically necessary. it is mathematically necessary that nine is indeed odd. The four basic principles of T emerge as analogues. Not all notions of necessity need share the same logic. and arguably also logically necessary. this is neither logically nor mathematically nor metaphysically necessary.] To say that p is necessarily possible in w1 is to say that for every world w2 possible in w1. To say that a proposition p is possible in a world w1 is to say that p is true in at least one world w2 that is possible in (or. there may be a world that is accessible to the actual 49 . and S4. There are many notions of necessity.e. possible relative to) w1. p is true in every world that is possible in any world that is possible in w1. System S5 is the strongest of the four systems under discussion. If accessibility is symmetric. Recall that system B adds the principle that whatever is the case is such that its possibility is necessary: P→ ◊P . This conception of possible world semantics extends straightforwardly to the iteration of modality.

and was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus. But we have so far no reason to suppose that w2 is possible in w3.” There is also an additional perplexity: if the replaced parts were stored in a warehouse and later used to reconstruct the ship. Had there been an additional physical law over and above those that actually obtain (perhaps because of the physical possibility of some universal generalization that does not in fact obtain. it is observed. for the logical question of things that grow. accessible to) w and in which S originated from particular matter m′ that is 90% of m together with 10% different matter. But the argument provides no reason to suppose that accessibility is euclidean. insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the philosophers. it is in fact fallacious. Now in w′. In that case. and the other contending that it was not the same.. without exception. one side holding that the ship remained the same. just in case it is true in every possible world accessible to w. for they took away the old planks as they decayed. there is a world—viz. Draft 3/28/2006 world and in which the law fails.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. and p is metaphysically possible in w just in case p is true in at least one world that is metaphysically possible in w1. there is at least one world (which may or may not bear any special relation to w′) in which p is true. or of the evolution of some species that does not in fact exist).. which—if either—would be the original ship of Theseus? Suppose. so that there is a world w2 that is metaphysically possible in w1 and in which p is true. without exception. w2—that is possible in a world in which w3 is possible and in which p is true. Then there is a world w′ that is metaphysically possible in (i. a given ship S which originated from particular matter m might have originated instead from the same amount of matter but with as many as 10% different molecules. for every possible world w′.. and the actual state of affairs thus physically impossible. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Hence. The same world that is metaphysically possible in (i. putting in new and stronger timber in their place. but could not have originated from matter that differs any more than that. What follows instead is that for every world w3 possible in w1. A proposition is metaphysically necessary in a world w.g. Then there is at least one possible world w (which may or may not bear any special relation to the actual world) in which p is true. such as a bicycle or a ship. that logic does not preclude the prospect that accessibility is intransitive. hence also S5.e. there is a threshold or limit such that the artifact might have originated from matter different from its actual original matter up to that limit. accessible to) one world might be metaphysically impossible in another. might have originated from at least slightly different matter (molecules) from its actual original matter. On the contrary. It does not follow that for every world w3 metaphysically possible in w1. Though many philosophers have been persuaded by this argument. without any loss of generality.. as the logic of physical modality. w2 is likewise possible in w3 is tantamount to the assumption that accessibility is euclidean: ∀x∀y∀z(Rxz ∧ Ryz → Rxy) . the actual world). S might have originated from matter that differs from m′ by as much as 10%. there is a world w″ that is possible in w′ and in which ship S originated from particular matter m″ that is more than 90% the same as m′. that in a world w (perhaps the actual world). there is a world that is metaphysically possible in w3 and in which p is true. the actual physical laws together with the additional law would all be physically necessary. The argument for the S5 principle that whatever is metaphysically possible is metaphysically necessarily so is straightforward: Assume that p is metaphysically possible. but 50 . A binary relation is both reflexive and euclidean if and only if it is an equivalence relation. and could not have originated from the same amount of matter as m while differing from m by more than 10%. Consider the Paradox of the Ship of Theseus goes back to a Greek legend reported by Plutarch: “The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned [from Crete] had thirty oars. Some metaphysicians (including the present writer) maintain that a typical material artifact.e. Suppose p is metaphysically possible in some world w1 (e. This suggests that for each material artifact. This would rule out B. Even metaphysical modality thus involves one crucial restriction: p is metaphysically necessary in a world w just in case p is true in every world that is metaphysically possible in w. It is often maintained that metaphysical necessity is unrestricted necessity. Whether a given world is metaphysically possible or not might be a contingent fact. This would yield the result that the sentential logic of metaphysical modality is S5. w. but could not have originated from altogether different matter. To presuppose that because w2 and w3 are each possible in w1. there is a compelling reason to suppose that metaphysical accessibility is not transitive (let alone an equivalence relation)—or at least. viz. and hence no reason to suppose that there is a world that is possible in every world possible in w1 and in which p is true..

On the contrary. No equally plausible counter-instance to B (as a deductive system governing metaphysical modality) is presently known. it cannot be plausibly argued that such a metaphysic is logically inconsistent. and also when φη is like φζ except for having free occurrences of η where φζ has free occurrences of ζ not within the scope of an occurrence of a modal operator. On this metaphysics of materiality. however. Though it is mathematically necessary that nine is odd. For example. The sentence (0) is true. this is surely a matter of contingent fact—there might have been eight planets instead of nine. identity is governed by Leibniz’s Law stated as a principle of substitutivity: the terms of a true identity statement are everywhere intersubstitutive. A: 9 F : a is odd G : a numbers the planets. specifically: … ζ=η 51 . preserving truth (or salva veritate). it is no necessary truth that the number of planets is odd. Quantifiers and Leibniz’ Law call for special attention in modal logic. But even if the B principle is correct. As far as logic is concerned. A puzzle. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. Draft 3/28/2006 less than 90% of m with more than 10% different matter from m. which is itself possible in w. though w″ is possible in w′. S could not have originated from w″. As soon at the principle is stated. metaphysical accessibility is intransitive. In w. Hence. Nevertheless. According to the logician Willard van Orman Quine. The logic of combining of modality with quantifiers is known as quantified modal logic. whereas (1) is false. Relative to the scheme of abbreviation. the theory in question is obviously coherent. Hence the logic of metaphysical modality is not as strong as S5. the actual world might have been a metaphysically impossible world instead of a metaphysically possible one (even if this prospect is metaphysically impossible). one is confronted with counterexamples. Where a symbolic term ζ stands within a formula φζ within the scope of an occurrence of a modal operator.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. points to a needed restriction on Leibniz’ Law formulated as a principle of substitutivity. The stronger form of Leibniz’s Law given in Chapter V remains operative when neither of the symbolic terms ζ nor η is a definite description. w″ is an impossible (albeit possibly possible) world. But in w. w″ is not possible in w. Opponents may argue that any such metaphysic is not only incorrect but necessarily so. here also it seems that its truth is not required by logic. This yields a counter-instance to the S4 principle that whatever is necessary is necessarily so. A more general form of Leibniz’s Law is employed in this chapter. Leibniz’ Law may be weakened as follows: ζ=η FιyGy FA φζ φη where φη is like φζ except for having free occurrences of η where φζ has free occurrences of ζ. which we will call Quine’s conundrum. whether it is necessarily correct or necessarily incorrect. It is only contingently necessary in w that ship S does not originate from matter m″. or even S4. although there are (let us suppose) exactly nine planets in the solar system. and either ζ or η is a definite description. even though A = ιyGy is true.

Quine argued that such constructions are problematic at best. that it is necessary that nine is odd—seem perfectly counterbalanced by equally good grounds for saying that the oddness is only a contingent feature: it is not necessary that the number of planets is odd. and existential generalization are modified accordingly.e. ∀xFx . Each of these formulas involves quantification across a modal operator into a modal context. being contingently odd) is equally a property of nine. Universal derivation and the rules of existential instantiation. More formally.. Is it a necessary truth about this number that it is odd? Abstracting from any particular manner of specification (or what Frege [1892] called a mode of presentation) of the number. universal instantiation. 52 . perhaps even incoherent. A symbolic formula of the form φ .g. For the number of planets is nine. Draft 3/28/2006 φζ φη where ‘ … ’ represents a string of occurrences of ‘ ’ whose length is unrestricted if neither ζ nor η is a definite description. This choice also excludes as theorems the Barcan formula ∀x Fx → and its converse. only an accidental feature of the number of planets. Possibilist quantification allows the quantifiers to range over all possible individuals with respect to all worlds. there seems to be no coherent answer to the question of whether the number that is both nine and the number of planets satisfies the open formula (2) Fx relative to the scheme of abbreviation displayed above. In stead there is a weakened version of the converse Barcan formula. and is otherwise at least as great as the largest number of occurrences in φζ of symbolic formulas of the form ψ or of the form ◊ψ where ψ is a symbolic formula. allows lets each quantifier range with respect to a world w only over the individuals that exist in w. ∀xFx → ∀x (∃y x = y → Fx) . which is both nine and the number of planets. and vice versa. such that there is a free occurrence of ζ that stands within each (i. hence. ∃x (∃y x = y ∧ Fx) → ∃xFx . the largest number of modal-operator occurrences having the same free occurrence of ζ in their scope). ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. So-called actualist (or internal) quantification. at the same time... as well as a weakened version of the Buridan formula. as well as the Buridan formula. apart from any particular manner of specification. then the grounds for saying that it is a necessary feature of the number that it is odd— viz. Yet Leibniz’ Law prohibits one from consistently saying that oddness is a necessary feature of nine and. any property of the number of planets (e.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. and its converse. ∃x Fx → ∃xFx . Consider the number. which is the alternative employed in this chapter. A choice needs to be made concerning the range of quantification with respect to a given world.

As Arthur Smullyan [1948] noted against Quine. it is not assigned any particular manner of specification of nine (e. it denotes nine but does not specify nine in any particular manner. if any. whereas the result of substituting ‘ιyGy’ is false. the number of planets) is such that it could not have been an even number instead of odd. necessarily.e. since there might have been an even number of planets. since the number in question (nine. i.e. if and only if for every possible world w (i. however. something that uniquely numbers the planets is necessarily odd. Formula (2). leaving (2) in need of interpretation. on the same scheme of abbreviation and under assignment s. with respect to every world accessible to w. a contingent truth is expressed. etc. Semantic theories—like those of Frege [1892]. just in case φ is true.e. The singular proposition about nine that it is odd is true in any possible world in which nine is an odd number (whether or not it numbers the planets in that world). The open formula ‘Fx’ is true relative to the scheme of abbreviation displayed above. if and only if the proposition expressed by Fα .g. The result of substituting ‘A’ for ‘x’ in (2) is true. The other reading of (1) (the “primary occurrence” reading) is given by: ∃x[∀y(Gy ↔ x = y) ∧ Fx] . functions in a manner exactly analogous to (0). and under the assignment of the number of planets as value for the variable ‘x’. a necessary truth is expressed. as the number of planets.) The proposition expressed by ‘Fx’ relative to the scheme of abbreviation displayed above. is a necessary truth. According to Russell’s theory. where α is a symbolic term that denotes the number nine.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. Russell’s [1905] theory of descriptions. the square of three.e. under s. etc. But which proposition is expressed depends on the manner in which the term α specifies nine. The problem is that..e. is true with respect to a world w. Such theories fail to provide a proposition to serve as the content of an open formula like ‘Fx’. and symbolic sentence (1) is subject to an ambiguity of scope.. We are thus at a loss concerning whether the formula ‘Fx’ expresses a necessary truth under that assignment. 53 . If α specifies nine as the number of planets (or as Bill’s favorite odd number. is the value of ‘x’ with respect to w. for every world w accessible to the actual world). and under an assignment s of values to variables.). One reading of the sentence (the Russellian “secondary occurrence” reading) is given by: ∃x[∀y(Gy ↔ x = y) ∧ Fx] .). The matter of interpreting (2) is straightforward on a Russellian theory. This situation appears to render the construction ‘∃x Fx’ without a coherent interpretation. This is false. a symbolic formula of the form Fα .. (Notice. This fails to provide any fact of the matter concerning which item from w. just in case the proposition expressed by φ under assignment s is a proposition that is a necessary truth in w—i. is the proposition about the number in question that it is odd. the individual denoted by the variable ‘x’ with respect to w.. The latter is a singular proposition. something that uniquely numbers the planets is odd. one that is about a particular individual that occurs as a propositional component. and under the assignment of nine as value for the variable ‘x’. i. and under the same assignment of nine as value. If α specifies nine as the successor of eight (or as the predecessor of ten. In particular. When the variable ‘x’ occurring in (2) is assigned the number of planets as its value. Church [1946]. when applied to quantified modal logic. and under an assignment s of values to variables. The insistence that denotation is invariably determined by an accompanying manner of specification leads to a famous problem in modal metaphysics: the so-called problem of cross-world identification. a definite description is not a term. is true on the scheme of abbreviation displayed above. or in some alternative manner). when evaluated under the assignment in question. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. even though each of the two substituends—‘A’ and ‘ιyGy’—denotes nine. i. This is evidently true. though the variable ‘x’ is assigned nine (qua the number of planets) as its value with respect to the actual world. as the successor of eight. and Quine [1950]—that reject singular propositions may not avail themselves of this theoretically elegant and satisfying solution to Quine’s conundrum. is odd in w. Draft 3/28/2006 where φ is a symbolic formula... that Russell’s theory of descriptions plays no role in the interpretation. yields a straightforward solution to this conundrum. representing itself in the proposition.

63-72. Propositions and Attitudes. and Langer. Oxford University Press. and reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. reprinted in Linsky (ed. P. Structure. Oxford University Press.). [1963].” Acta Philosophica Fennica. “On Denoting”.). CA. 113-27. Logic and Knowledge: Essays 19011950.. is that the “problem” of cross-world identification is thereby exposed as a pseudo-problem. is simply the singular proposition about nine that it is odd. Boolos.). in fact. Methods of Logic. “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic. One very significant benefit of countenancing singular propositions. ‘Must’ and ‘Might’. “Some Emendations of Gödel’s Ontological Proof”. Anthony. the proposition expressed by the open formula ‘Fx’ relative to the scheme of abbreviation displayed above. Method and Meaning. 291-303. 58-65. H.) Reference and Modality. That is. Anderson. ed. C. and under the assignment of nine as value for ‘x’. published in Henle. “On Sense and Reference”. Capricorn Books: New York. 31-7). 39-46. Willard van Orman Quine [1943].KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7. References: Alonzo Church [1946]. 41-56. “A Remark Concerning Quine’s Paradox About Modality.) Reference and Modality. Bertrand Russell [1905]. 3-24.” in Salmon and Soames (eds. 1956. Faith and Philosophy 7 (1990). 13. Grim. England (1993). The Logic of Provability. vol. S. pp. reprinted in the Marsh (ed. Gottlob Frege [1892]. Saul Kripke. Liberal Arts Press. “Modality and Description. Mar and Williams (eds. Kallen. Holt. 1952. reprinted from Analisis Filosophico 5-32. 35-43. 54 . 4th edition. 11 (1988). 83-94. Arthur Smullyan [1948]. Oxford University Press. “Notes on Existence and Necessity.. 1990. K. M. Mind. (eds.” Journal of Philosophy. published by Harvard University Press. Oxford University Press. Alonzo Church [1982]. Willard van Orman Quine [1950]. 1951. “A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation”. 1988).). XL (1943). 1971. 16. 1. 1971. in Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege. reprinted in Linsky (ed. Ridgeview: Atascadero. George. Geach and Black.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic (1948. Draft 3/28/2006 There is a question concerning which object from w is to be identified with the actual number of planets? This alleged problem does not even arise once it is recognized that the variable ‘x’ is what Russell called a logically proper name of its value.

.......................................................... See contraries........................................................................................................................................................................ 35 laws of modal negation........ 8 necessity of the consequent........................8 Augustine.........................................33 compatible ............................................... 27 similarity................. Draft 3/28/2006 List of Figures: Figure 1 An Aristotelian Diamond ..........33 Dummett.............4 contingently true........ physical possible world semantics .............. Leon .................................. 45 modal counterparts to the paradoxes of material implication... ....................39 contingently false............................ D...............4 interaction principles................................................................. If Axioms 4 Fails the Accessibility Relation Cannot be Transitive.......................... 5 Principia Mathematica ...... C............ modal scope of the modal operator.............. 5 Prior....... L.. 43 Strict Equivalence............................................ 34 modal reduction laws for KE ..................................4 contraries ....................................................... Peano Arithmetic....................8 fallacy ............... moral necessity of the consequence ................... ...............26 actual world.5.................................. 33 truth of a sentence in a possible world β .... 4 Strict Implication ......3............................... Deontic Systems and Corresponding Lemmon Codes............................................... ..... E........................ See necessity.....21 false English argument .......5 Axiom K....................29 Figure 6............32 Index: accessibility relation.... 27 soundness.................................................................................................................... Figure 3................... 2 partial ordering .................... 35 Lemmon and Scott Generalized Correspondence Theorem.... D.......................................See scope ambiguities................................................................ St.. epistemic equivalence relation .5 Gödel’s ontological proof..................4.............................28 Evodius............... 36 morally necessary ................................................ “Picasso's Chair”................................................................ 27 relative possibility relation .5 laws of modal distribution ....34 conceptually possible................4 contingency operator................................................................................................................................................................... ‘Must’ and ‘Might’.21 Gödel.....................................27 Euclidean Axiom E .............42 incompatible .39 Gödel-Löb Provability System ..................34 grammatical tree ...........................................................KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7................. 35 modal derivation principles...................... 26 weakly connected................... See necessity...................... ... 29 Lewis................. modal temporally necessary ...........................................5............ 34 Lemmon code....................43 Contingency........................................................7 Henkin.................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined........27 Axiom T ....................... Diagram for Accessibility or Relative Possibility Between Possible Worlds.......................................... modal subcontraries .....2 Interchange of Equivalents modal....33 Brouwer.... Thomas...........................................See subcontraries............................................. 8 normal ............. See subalterns............. J............... See necessity.... 26 scope ambiguities ............. 27 paradox about future contingent propositions...... ........................................... Saint .......................................33 Axiom E ........... ................ 39 subaltern ................................ Characteristic Modal Axioms and Conditions of Accessibility...............................26 Aquinas..................... Michael............................................34 Broad.............. Broad.................................5............................................................................... C..... A.......................... temporal tensed theory of time................................................................. 28 Axiom B .. 39 strict implication... Properties of Relations......5....................38 Kripke........8 Axiom 4.................................................... ......................... See necessity.......................5 C............................. N............................................................................. Kurt............ 37 modal reduction laws for S5............................ 39 55 .........4 composition .............. .. 33 provability system M of type 4............................................................................. 27 physically impossible.................. Relational Properties and Directed Graphs.................29 Figure 4.. 28 Axiom 5............................................................................................. 43 Provabilty logics .......................................................... 27 Axiom W............... Figure 2......................................................................................... 37 modal reductions laws for S4 ................................. 5 Löb’s Provability System ............ I......... 28 Axiom D ............................30 Figure 7............................................................ Saul........................................ modal Diodorean System............................... conceptual CONSIS(M)......................................... See necessity......................................... 42 reflexivity ..................................................................................................................... Logical Containment Among Standard Modal Systems.............................30 Figure 8....... 28 Axiom Dum .......................................................................... ...29 Figure 5.............................31 Figure 9............. Error! Bookmark not defined.................33 epistemically necessity......................... 7 series.....

Draft 3/28/2006 56 . ‘Must’ and ‘Might’.KMMS (Third Edition) Chapter 7.

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