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NIE 11-5-55 12 July 1955 03252.4

NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11-5-55

AIR DEFENSE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1955-1960

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FUll

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CENTRAL IN'l'ELLlGENOE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NCYrIOE

1. Thls e3timate was dissemmated by the Central Intalllgencc Agenzy. This copy is for the lll!onnat on and use of the reclptent indicated on the front cover and of perSOIl$ under h1s Jurisdiction On a need to know basis. AddU ot:Ull essent dissemlnatlon may be author1zM by the !ollowtng otnc1als within thWr respective departments:

Q. SpecJa.! A.sslstan to the Secretary lor Int.eUigence, tor the Department of

State

b. AsslstanL. Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Cor the Deparbuen of the Anny

c. Director of Naval Intelligence. for tlle Department of the Na,'Y

d. Director of IntelUgence, USAF, for the Departmen of the A1r Force

e. Deputy Dtreetor tor Interugence, Joint Sta.!f, for the Joint Staff

f. Director ot Int.elllgenco, AEO, tor he Atomic Energy Oomrulsslon

g. Assistan Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of InvesUgation

h. Assistan Director for Central Referenoo, CIA. for any other Department or Agency

2. This copy ma,y be retam d, or destroy(Jd by burning In accordancs with app I. cable security regulations, or returned to the oeo ral Int.clligence Agency by arrangemont, w1th tile Otllce of Central RefcreD.ce, ClA.

3. When an es ·im£ltl! Is dlsse:mlnated overseas, the cverseas recipIents may retain it tOl' a period not in excess of one year. At th and ot t.h1s period, the esthnaLo snouid either be d stroyed, rtlt.urned to tbe lorwarcl1ng agency, or permlss.ion shoUld be req ested of the .forwarding agency to re run it in accordance with IAC-D-e9/2, 22 June 1953.

DJ.8TRIEHiTION:

WhJtc HoU5e

Nat!o a.1 Bt-tw1ty Cotulcl l:le~t. or State Dapan_>o ne or D ense

Opera CooI'd1llIl Po Bwrd

Atc:Q1c Rner!;y CO!llal1!ssJon l'ooetul Bureau 0' In e!;tlgat.1oIl

..

AIR DEFENSE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1955 - 1960

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the capabilities of Sino~Sovlet Bloc air defense, and probable trends through 1960.

This estimate does not concern itself with the detailed strategy or tactics that might be employed by US air forces in an attack against the Sino-Sovtet Bloc, nor does it attempt to evaluate the kill probabilities 'of the Bloc air d tense weapons agains attacking aircraft or missiles.' It should aiso be recognized that many of the deficienci of the Bloc air def nse system are common to all air defense systems and should not necessarily be considered as weaknesses unique to the Bloc,

Section I represents the probable Soviet ,appralsal 01 tbe US air threat and Bloc re-

SCOPE

quirements to meet it; Section n estimates the present strength and composition 01 the stno-sovtet air defense 5YS- . tern and SeCtion ill 'estimates the probable future trends of Bloc Air Defense ineluding economic capabllitles Of the BloC to support its air defense system. The estimate in Section ill is based on the assumption that neither domestic or international political factors nor unexpected technological breakthroughs will al ter the general nature of weapons programs as now envisaged in the Bloc and the West.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Air defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc has been undertaken on a hIgh priority. Developmen ts to date have revealed two major areas of air defense concentrations, The most important is a huge area embracing all of European Russia and the European Satellites, In this area is concentrated about 70 percent of the Bloc .Ilghter establishment with associated antiaircraft artillery and radar. The second major area is the Soviet Far East, in which is concentrated about 15 per-

cent of Bloc fighter strength. 'Thus about 85 percent of Bloc air defense forces are concentrated In critical areas COy· ering only approximately 2,000,000 square miles of the total Bloc area of 12,000,000 square miles. Outside of these main concentrations local defenses exist in a tow chosen areas but large portions of the interior and certain border areas may have little or no active air defense, _/Paras. 36-37,42,50-51,118,120, Map III)

'P8P 81!l8:8"8'P

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2. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has large numbers of air defense forces and weapons of which the fighter aircraft units currently appear to be the most formidable. The Soviets have made great. strides in radar development and have large quantities of both obsolescent and modern radar equipment, We estimate there are a total of about 900,000 men actlvely engaged In air defense in the Bloc and that the Bloc has an authorized fighter

. strength of som 14,600 including about 14,000 jets. 1 About 3,800 fighters arc assigned to Fighter AviatioQ of Air Defense (IA-PVO); the remaining figh~s assigned to other organizations also have some air defense 'responsibilities under a "multiple mission" concept, (Paras. 46-51, 70-75, Map III)

3. The USSR bas an integrated passive air defense organization under the control of the MVD. A few cUtes have extensive underground installations. Howeve , we believe the passive defense system does not greatly affect over-all Soviet air de" tense capabiliti. (Paras. 105-109)

Present Over-ell Capabilities

4. Against daylight bomber formations at altitudes between 5,000 and 35,000 leet in clear weather, we believe that Bloc Lighters are now capable of inflicting severe losses against piston bombers and moderate losses against high-speed jet. bombers. Above 35,000 feet altitude this cgLpability would begln to diminish, and above 40,000 feet it would tall of{ markedly. Under circumstances of perslsten visible contrails, these capabni-

'A~t.U(l..) 8~rellgth 1a estimated to be lItJ>Pl:oldm8~1_" e.s percent of auUlorlud (TO&E) lltnmgth but vp.rle3 eoMlde.rnbty ILS new eJreraft are phased In.

2

-

ties would, on the other hand, be marked-

ly increased. Prlm.ary ltmltations would then be the numbers and individual capabilities of fighter interceptor aircraft available. (Paras. 52-57, Appendix C)

5. Although its all-weather air defense capabilities are increasing, the Bloc could offer only limited resistance under condit10M of poor visibility. _(Paras. 51~7, 59-75, Appendb; B)

6. AA gun defenses are most strongly con-

entrated around Moscow and other areas 01 strategic importance. They can provide continuously aimed. fire up to about 45,000 feet under both good and poor visibil! y condinons. However, presently deployed. AA guns probably will' not be capable of a high percentage of kills at these maximum altitudes or very low altitudes, even though controlled by modern fire control equipment. (Paras. 5~3, 6H7, Appendix C, Map III)

7. Although there is no conclusive evidence that surface-to-air guided missiles have been produced and deployed, we estimate lhat the USSR now has some surface-to-air guided missiles, probably concentrated in the Moscow area. These could considerably increase the kill probability against Allied bombers even in bad weather. (Paras. 68-89)

8. Against multip e-pronged pene rations utilizing altitude slacking, diversionary tactics, and electronics countermeasures, we believe the Soviet air defense system is susceptible to serious failures. (Paras. 21-23,27-35,52-104)

9. Against forces penetrating peripheral defended areas at rug speed and minimum altitude the errecuv ness of the dotense would be very low. (Paras. 34, 52- 104,110-111)

lOP SEC!tPJ~

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WQP SECRET.

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10. Future Over.czll Capabilities.: The objectives of Bloc air defense planners are almost centa1nly to: (a) develop and produce in quantity equipment capable of combating the Western air attacks; (b)' rapidly improve the training of air defense units; (c) develop better communications fa.eili ties; (d) improve the airfield network; and (e) improve the air defense organization. In meeting these objectives, the Sino-Soviet Bloc will probably emphasize the de elopment of guided missiles, supersonic all-weather fighters, and improved radar equipment. (Paras. 110-111)

11. In. accordance with these objectives, 'we believe that Bloc' air defenses Will be

"substantialry strengthened' during the period of this estimate. Considerable numbers of fighters of new types will be introduced into operational units, replacing older types; there will be a particularly signlncant increase in the proportion of au-weather fighters. Improved radar equipment will be available, and early

, warning and GCl systems will be extended in to areas which are at present whol y or partially uncovered. New and improved ant aircraft ar,tillery will come into use. Guided missiles with nuclear warheads will probably be developed by 1958, and will become increasingly impo tant in air defense. These develop. ments, and particularly the latter, will greatly increase the kill probability against Allied air attacks and wUl magnity the problems of such attacks. (Paras. 112-125)

• The ~mates In Pl1tllgrapru 1~13 o.r bll.!led on the assumption llillt nclehe.r domestJc IUld tnterDB rona I'>OUtl~ tn.el.Ors nor UIlClq)eCted techDO ogIcal breakth.ro ghS will altM the general natur or WC<lpOn.3 programs &3 now eon.<;aged In the Bloc QDd the W¢$ see also SOOt>& ete BOO\' •

12. Despite t.hese improvements, we- est - mate that Bloc air defenses would fall considerably short of providing air defense of the scale and nature required by the probable Western air capabilities. (Paras. 21-35, 112-125)

13. The estimated Bloc air defense program through 1960 would constitute a substantial but not impossible burden on the Bloc economy. We' oelieve the cost would be such as' to require either a diversion of resource from other military uses or an increase in total military budget such as would probably lead to some reduction in the rate of growth of the economy. Fulll11men t of the electronics requirements of the, progriun would be particularly difficult. (Paras. 126-133, Appendix D)

Defense Capabilities by Region

.

14.. The estimates of regional capab: ities are based upon available evidence a th:.s time. In those areas where there is almost a complete lack of evidence on air defense, e have assumed that air defenses are weak. However, it is possible that air defense forces and installations do exist in these areas,

15. European Satellites, Air defense of the European Satellites (except East Germany) insofar as it depends upon Satellite forces is estimated to be gene ally inferior to that of critical regtons within the USSR. The Batellite air defense forces are generally poorly trained and equipped with obsolescent aircraft and equipment and they would be incapable of meeting air defense; requirements or of preventing tr nstt of Western bomber forces enroute to the USSR Under daylight conditions at altitudes between 5,000

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te0R SRC'?ET .

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and 35,000 feet, they could inflict considerable damage on attacking bomber forces unescorted by fighters. These capabilities would be increased to the extent that Soviet air defense forces were deployed to these areas.

16. Soviet Far East. The concentration of radar, antiaircraft artillery, and figbters in the Soviet Far East make it one of the best defended areas of the USSR. The Kamchatka and the Chukotski regions are less well defended than the Maritime Provinces of the Far East but do have reasonably adequate early warning radar. Because of he operational difficultieS and the limited fighter and AAA forces available in these areas, only limited resist-, ance could be provided. Wc' believe the air defenses of th se areas will be considerably strengthened between now and 1960 but will still be below that of the Maritime Provinces.

17. Kola and Le1lcingrad Areas. These areas are considered to be relatively well defended in terms of forces and equipment. Radar coverage extends eastward' . (rom Kola to approximately 50" East longitude, but the density 01 radar in the eastern part of this area is probably not as great as in otber critical approach areas. We believe it will be considerably strengthened during the period of this estimate.

18. Baltic-Central and Western USSRBlack Sea. Tbese are the most heavily defended regions of the USSR. The major portion of Fighter Aviation of Air Defense; large concentrations of AAA including possible guided missile sites, all of the Iigh ters of the Bal tic and Black Sea {loots, and the bulk of the Soviet tactical air forces are located in this area. It is

estimated that continuous tracking of hostile aircraft can be accomplished throughout t.h1s area since the concentration of radar sites is greater than our assessment of actual requirements.

19. China - North Korea - North Vietftam. Substantial air defense capabilities exist in North Korea, Manchuria, and North China. Along the extreme southern coastal areas the air-defense capabilities are less and in the interior areas are virtually nonexistent. Early warning capabilities are being extended southward along the coast. Air defenses are generally being expanded in the BP.aoghatCanton-Changsha area. The size of the entire region makes the. development of an air defense network a task of great' cli1liculty and expense. Conseq ently we believe that the air defense to be provided the region during the period of this estimate will remain considerably intenor to that attained by the USSR itself.

20. Other Are£1:$. As far as is known there are virtually no air defense forces available along the northern Siberian coastline and very few forces or radar sites in central Siberia. We estimate that practically no air defense capabilities exist in this area except around local critical target areas along the Trans-Siberian railway. In like manner, the southern borders of the Bloc in Central Asia also appear to be practically undefended. We estimate that early warning radar lines will be established along these borders by 1960 and that all air defense forces will be increased. However, we do not believe the USSR will be able to provide a strong air defense system in these areas by 1960 due to the size of the areas and the many problems related to oper tions and logistics.

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TOP SECPET

5

DISCUSSION

i. THE MAGNITUDE OF SINO-SOVlET BLOC AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

Soviet Estimate of the Air Threat

to the Bloc'

21. The intensive buildup 01 Bloc, and partieularly soviet, air defenses since World War II indicates that the USSR Is acutely aware ot the threat posed to the USSR by Western nuclear al power. The Soviet planners recognize that the Bloc Is geographically surrounded by US and Allied air power to such an e 'tent that from present l)t programmed overseas bases, the major portion of the Bloc can be reached by US medium bOt?bers on two-way unretueled missions (See Map 1) and that ·US beavy bombers, or refueled medium bombers. can reach anywhere in the SinoSoviet Bloc either from overseas or from 7.1 bases. They also probably estimate Lhat a large portion ot the Bloc can 00 attacked by refueled fighter bolnbers. llght bombers, and by earner aircrart, and that U8 atr strikes cou d penetrate the B oc at any point.

22. Warning Thncs. Due to the fact ·that the Bloc Is almost surrounded by US bases and !.he ract that US carriers can operate In waters adjacent to Bloc boundaries, the problem Of acrueving adequate warning must appear extremely diffIcult. to the Soviet planners. ThIs problem will become more difficult durIn!> the period Of this estimate, since thO speed of US alrcratt Is increasing at a more rapid rate than the Increase in range of early wilrning radar (See Map 2). Thus, although a minimum or two hours' warning can be achieved by !.he Bloc for a considerable po - tlon of their land a.rea in 1955, by 1960 they would no be able to achieve a maximum Of two hours' warning of attack by atrcratt even lor t.he cen ral area or their territory unless

• Th13 SOvIet estimate 01 the US tr U)re t Is based upe lD10rmauon au1lable to the USSR In o~l"I SOu.rces such as newspapers. mazazlnes, lUll cmclnLs rel~

their early warning zone were extended beyond their rronners at least 750 nautical mUes.

23, Aircraft. The USSR probably estimates that during this period the Bloc could be attacked by Western jet and piston aircratt with radii of action up to 4,000 nautical miles, speeds up to 1,150 knot8. I!,.J:ld operational altitudes up to 64,000 feet. Based upon their own experience and upon know edge 01 US orgamzattoner goals, production capabilities, b dgetary oonsldera tlons. and aircraft. development, the SQvicts could probab y make a raidy accurate estimate of the numbers of US air ralt which would be available for I> rikcs against. the Bloc. We believe that th I; cst1roate might be approximately as to ow :

AIrcraft 1955" IfrS7 1960
HeavY P1ston BomberS 300 ~O
Heavy J~t Bomben II. lew aeo GOO
i~lum P1.ston Bomber 100
Medium Jet. BombeY8 1.000 1,200 '.000
LI ht Jet nombcrs 100 350 3M
Jet. Ftshter Bomool$ 2,050 2,900 3,000
Navy Patrol mbel"S 120 120 100
~arr er-Based A1Tc!"*;rt 8(]0 800 800
TOTAL .... 70 5.:110 MSC (See Appcndi."I: " for pl'Oba91e Sov1c& ~Umat.e 01 pcrtormo.nce cilaracter1$tJt;.$ 01 a1roraH p.ml mtssues IUId (late!! of ava1labll1ty tor eper Uonaol use.)

21. Guided lIfissj~, The So v iets probably could not estimate with any accuracy the numbers of guIded missiles whleh could be employed against them durlng the period of this esumate: however, they could probab y arrive at a fairly good estimate of missile availability in terms 01 total production and. in rome cases, order 01 bat tie. On this basis.

h y probably estimate ~hat US and. red stockpiles would include by 1960 a few longrange missiles IIJ1d several thcusa d of the smaller types, They woutd probab y.estimate that the 10110 ing general categores of guided missues might be available lor use agalns them:

'P8P 81H,PFT

mop fibEOPFOO.

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AlU- War-

Mlle:; tude Mach head

TYPe ~ <ft.) S~ Weight

Short-Range 650 ( sec-sec 45.000 mOJl "',000

Medinm-Range SSOM 1,200 110,000 m2..4 ',000

Long·Rang~ SS(lM 3.000 80.000 ~ 1.200

Long-Rlul.ge SSGM 6,000 50,000 IILS-JI 5,000

Lon,g-Ran,gc SSOM 5,500 8.5,000 mS-4 7,000

Lcmg-R&ng~(Bt\Il1stIc::) 5,500 200nm mJO-20 3.(100

AiJ'-to-.surlaoc 0 f 100 60,000 m25--3 5,000

Mr-to-Underwater OM 20 mO.5 500

They also probably estimato that some of these missues could be launched trom naval vessels and that several carriers, cruisers, and submartnes will be equipp d for such launchIngs.

25. Aircraft Armament and Electronics. Th Soviets probably es imate that. US bombers will have: (a) improv d radar-sighted; macb1ne. guru> with automatlc fire control: .(b) alr-to-atr rockets; (c) air-to-air guided .mlssiles: (d) airborne radar detection and jammlrig equipment; (e) a self-containcd navigational system to operate over all types of terrain and under all weather conditions; <C) lmprovt:!d bombing-navigational radar; and (g) de1ensive radar for detection and fire control,

2-6. Bombs and WarMad.s. Tbe Soviets probably estimate that. all s rike aircraft oo!J.ld carry elther nuc ear or conventional weapons; hOwever, de 'W!ty tac Ics, dictated to some extent by the characteristics of II. spccl1lc aircraft ~ypc, wo d rtx the llmits of the yie cis o{ nuclear weapons which could bo utllized. Dive or tess-bombing could be employed for Ule smalles yield weapons, loft-bombing Cor medium-ytelds, and high alti ude horizontal bomblng ior high-yie d weapon '.

27. Scale and Direction 01 Attacks. The Soviets probably estimate that the US pessesses great 6eribili y in methods and direction of attack. 'They probably esttmate tria the scale and direc ion or attacks might Incrude:" (0.) simultaneous attacks irom all directions by several hundred aircraft; (b) smtained a Lacks over {l period ot several hours from one direction 0 1y; and (c) widely separated s istalncd attacks by individual airCl'a!t from fill directions and a all altitudes

up to 64.000 feet. They probably would anticipate attacks ngains the Bloc by medium bombers from bases in the US, UK, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, TUrkey, North Africa, the Phillppines, Okinawa, Japan, and Alaska. Land-based fighter-bOmber alrcrart could be Launched trom bases in some of tnese areas and from bases in other forward areas, such as South Korea, Fonnosa, and West Germany. (See Map 1). Attacks could aiso be made by heavy bombers and reru ed medium bombers from bases In the US and Canada, and from such torward base areas as Guam, Greenland, and the Azores.

28. The SOviets might expect air attacks launched rrom carrier task forces operating in the Barents S~a, the N_orwegian .sea, the . Med1terrant:!an, and in the westorn Pacific. . TMy probab y calculate that carrier task

10r<}eS could operate 30.0 OQ miles from their coast; lines in these areas which would allow penetration by carrier aircraft. to dlstances up to 800 nautical miles.

2~. '111e Soviets probably expec gulded missiles to be launched against Bloc targets. Medium-rang missiles could be launched from overseas bases and naval vessels; shortrange mlssiles {rom forward U~ overseas bases, surface ships, submarines, and aircraft; and

. possfbly long-range (intercontinental) guided rnisstles trom bases in the continental US and Canada,

Probable Air Defense Requirements to

Meet Estimated Threat

3Q. Introduction. The requirements for an effective Bloc air defense system have be n considered in the Ught 01; (a) the probable So let appraisal of Western capabilities for attacking the B oc; (b) evidence of the type of air detense system already developed by the USSR; (c) US air defense experience and concepts; and (d) the estimated characteristics Of such Bloc air defense equipment as radar, atrcrart, and AAA weapons, Many of the problems Inherent in thc- elncient,lunctiorung o an air defense system have not been evaluated in arriving at these I" quircmcnts. However. w~ believe the air defense requirements

,.

stated herein constitute the most probable objectives of Soviet nlr derense planners tbrough tho period of this estimate. Any great increase over the requtremects stated llllu'ht be considered too costly and an.y large decrease would probably be considered too risky by SovieL authorities. Although It Is possible that the SOviets might plan an air defense system entirely dlfIerent rrom the one envisioned in these requirements, presen SOviet air defense trends indicate that the chances favoring thIs would be slight

31. D teet/on. During the period 01 this estimae we believe the Soviet Bloc will have a requirement. lor an early warning system which will allow' detect on of all types or alrcraft and no'l1balllstic 'guided' missiles at altitudes up to 8 ,000 feeL. Ip terms oJ th p obable .speeds 01 attacking alrcrart and a destrable warning time 0 . 30 mfnutes, the. dis.tances at which early warning is required from Bloc frontiers will vary from 300 nautical rnltes tor present aircraft to 750 nautical miles 'for aircrar and missiles by 1960. To meet the e rcqutrements, the Soviets would hay to (a) extend their early warning Installatlo s beyond tnelr present boundar1cs in certain areas by the use of early warning airera and picket ships, and (b) generally ex-

t d thelr present capabilities by use of improved adar equlpmen and a greater number of sites. A theoretical mtnlmum ot some 600 early warning radar sitc. s would be required to provide two rings around the Bloc.

32. 'l'rack,ing, RtrpOT't..ing, and Command Reactian. In order to provide Q coordinated pic ure Of the air situation in the responsible control centers and to provide continuous de-

ailed lruorma ion on $pecUlc targets, radar eovera e would be required in depth to the major targe areas, In addition, an automalic data processing and con roi system w uld b required to meet t-he demands for more rapid evaluation and transmiss on or da a. This requirement would necessitate at least 350 GC radar sites in the Soviet Bloc, together with greatly improved communications tecuiues 1n general, Including a tots of SOl e 200,000 miles of landlines 01' other secure communicanons channels and an au omatic

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data handling system.. To permit ~enmt command reaction at all levels, a m.ghly centrallzed air de!enso orgAD..i;.ation permitting prompt general direction or all passive and active air defense u.nJts would be required. However. the critical nature or the time element in air defense requires that many ot the operattonal decisions heretofore made by major commanders must be relinqutshed to lower command echelons. This would be highly dependent upon indivj.9ual responsibill y and 1.n1t1.at.ive and woilld neoess-itate'a high levc of indiVidual and uni training tor all air defense organizations.

33. Tdentlficati011. The Soviets will have a requiremen for al} IFF system nlcn ill provide 1dentl!lca ion of friendly aircraft under all condit ons. Such a requirement. would necessttate. some 21,000 IFF sets for

. equipmen 00{ operational illrcratt.

34. Engage-m.ent and Kill. In view of present trends in Soviet air de!enses, th Soviets almes certainly ostimato that they could not rely upon one weapons system alone, and that several would 00 required 101' an acceptable capabil.ty tor interception and kill under night and nil weather conditions, To meet these needs, they will have to greatly improve the performance characteristics o! their interceptor aircraft and AAA weapons. Del ens ve miss es w11l almost certainly be required for use against enemy supersonic 9.lrcraf and miSSU~. Defense against low altitude attacks will require missiles (guided and un-

Ided) in large numbers 1n addition to Improved automatic weapons. The Soviets would probab y estimate the fOllowlng as Bloc operationa weapons requirements tor air dcrcns of he Bloc during the pertod of this estimate:

AW Fighters 10,000

O'lY F1 hU!l'3 .000

J ht AAA welLpona 17.000

Heavy AnUOJrcnre Guns 13,000

Short-Range ShOM 30,.000

Alr-to-Air ouJded M1.ss1 BS 120,000

Roc c r or >t{).o;sU •

(tor low a1t:ttudes) 500.000 1.0 1,000.000

35. Air Facilities. There are now about 1,200 a1rf\elds in the Bloc Suitable Ior fighter op ru-

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O~. However, the So lets probably consider many ot these fields unsuitable to meet. air defense requirements through the period of Llus estimate. They probabJy estimate Ulat many have to be improved and that new fields have to be constructed in peripheral areas and 10 h1g1tly important defense regions. They might require a total 01 some 2,000 a1r:6.elds by 1960, of which about 1,500 would be needed tor air defense and 500 for other operational requirements..

IL PRESENT BLOC AIR DEFENSES

3G. sevier appreciation of the growing Western air and nuclear capabWties is reflected in the Intensive postwar buildup of SOviet air defenses. and th high priority and great resources allocated to th~ fiort. Postwar So et air defense doctrine was greatly tnflueneed by the USSR's evaluation. of USjUK wartim strategic bomblng, Western and {Jerman scient11lc developments Such as radar, jet aircraft and guided m.Issiles, and the air . defense systems developed by the Germans and the Western Powers. Sinetl the war the USSR has ecn the vast growth In the US nut ear and delivery Ctlpabilities. From Jts eraluatfon ot these developments bas emerged new air de ense concepts geared to t.be facts

at the US and Its NATO allies are the chief poten 1al enemies of the USSR, and that the most. Immediate cr t'eal threat they pose to the USSR lies in their extensive apabillties for nuclear air at ack,

37. To mee the postwar air defense requirements of the USSR, the Soviet planners embar cI upon an intensive re-equipment and reorganlzatlon program. Jet in ere ptors and ground radar equipment were the firs rna or

ew items to appear In quantity, At the same lime, the Soviets recognlzcd the need tor 1mproved annaircrart fire control equlpm nt, t1r defense guided mlsslles, an improved system for employment and control of o.ir defense C01"Ce3, and an airfield network sultab e tor use In ttI.r defense.

38, Sovie doctrlne is now clearly showing the impact of nuclear warfare constderauons. nus problem has been under Intensive study It Sovie High Command level and in Soviet

8

stan academies since 194.. Only rece tly, however, hav the SOviets begun to disseminate to the armed rorces and th civil popuiaWon instructions for dealing with nucl at" warfaro. This action became discernible during the latter halt of 1953 and has been more prominent during 195-4 and early 1965. Nuclear warfare COnsiderations are now a conspicuous part of Soviet mllitary doctrine.

Over-oil Organization of Air Defense

39. The organieauon of SO:vJet air defense remained essentially the responsibUity of toe commanders untn 1949, When a more centralized system of alr defcnse was instituted with

pprop tate headqua tel'S and geographic subdlvlslons. Thc Minis ry of De ease is responsible for-active air defense measures w . e passive air defense programming J.s handled a the m1nJ.s erial evel by the Cluef Directorate

, of Local Ail' Defense 'which Ji s bordtnate to the Mlnis ry Of Internal Affairs (MVD).

O. PVO STRANY. 'I"h agency within the Ministry 0 Defense primarily responsIble ror ac Ive air defense is PVO STRANY, lJterally "An ia' Delense of the Country." PVO Y appears to 00 a major operational headquarters co-equal in status with the two

other mtntstry-iever commands: Long-Range Am ion and Airborne Forces. Hs commander-tn-ciuer is probably a Deputy MinISter or Defense lor Air Defense and direct y subordln te to the Minister of-Defense, 'l"hrO gh the various air detense regional commanders he has operational control over fighter alrcrart, AA artUlery, and communlcattons and warning units assigned or made av Hable to PVO STRANY. However, these units remain admtnls ratlvaly subordinate to their respecuve ground, air, or naval services as shown in Chart 1. For example, the fighter units or PVO ,STRANY are admmistratively subordlna to the headquarters called Fighter Aviation or AIr Defense (lA-PVO), which is in tum adrnlrustra Ively subordinate to headquarters of the Air Forees of the Sov t Army.

41. Responslbilit.y for air dercnse has consistently remaJned under ground orce officers, and the CINe Of PVO STRANY has tradl· uonauy been an artilleryman. The air rorces,

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as a hole, have not achieved Independ nt status in the USSR as th.ey have in many Western nations and the IA·PVO has remalned under the command 01 ground rorce commanders at most operational levels. IApva Is traditionaUy commanded by an air omcer but It Is beUeved that operational comIDand 110ws directly from the CINe PVO STRANY to the Commanders of Air Defense Regions rather than through the IA-PVO commander.

42. The rorocs 0 PVO STRANY are probably Wlified at the regional defense level under regional air defense commanders, We belie e that the air defense regiOns correspond Ii nerally with the major industrial and mili- , tary areas 0 the USSR The commander 01

8- region p~obably controls all units of control and warning, lA-PVO, and antiaircratt at Ulery forces· igned to PVO S~ as well as other elements Of the AImy and Navy b ving air d feme functions in hls region. In addition, h probably coordinates the air defense activities of the passive defense units,

e border guards 01 the MVD, and the ground observe units, He appears to be directly responsible to a major con 1"01 headquarters ror coordinat on and control of all air defense acl;!v1tles In his region. There are probably two such headquarters: one In Khabarovsk and one in oscow, Lower organizatronat lovel~ oj PVO STRANY ha e probably been unlftcd be ow the regional air detense level Into subregional organizations. Operational eaannets ot responsibility are belle cd to be as I:ndJcated in Ch.a II.

~3. 11le Soviet Navy is responsible for the <1~fense, Including alr dercnse, of the sea approaches, the coasts, and major ports and naval bases Of the USSR. The PVO organiza-

Ion of the Navy, operating within the vario s fleets wille} exercise regional control, receives Ioplevcl direction rom PVO STRANY. There are also PVO dcpar ments in the headquarters of t·be .Ai r and tillery Forces ot the Soviet Army in Moscow which are believed to main. teln coordination with PVO STRANY. pVO helldqutlrt rs elements atso xist at each Group or Forces and Military District headquarters and at subordinate levels tor the pur-

o

pose of coordinating atr defense activities in the ground and air units of the Soviet Army in Ute field.

44. The European Satcl1i'lts, North Korea, and Oommunlst China have Independent air defense systems modeled after the USSR's and Integrated Into the Soviet sy tern. The major control centers are located in t.he respective cap tals. 1'hus early warning inIormation can be passed laterally among the Satellites or the air defense regions of the USSR as well as vertically to the cen ral air defense control headquarters 'n MOSCOw,

45. Air defense ot SOT,;'iet mllltnry es ablishments In he Satclli~ and occ pled areas is the responsibility of the respect ve Oro ps of Forces nd is provided from the antla craft Arfillery, tactical air armies, and ear y warn- . Ing units assigned to ~hese commanders, At . present 1 ere-Is lit tl~ eyid nee of unJ.1led. com- . mand of Soviet teITitorJal and Sa~ite air defense forces, as such, although operauona con 1'0 channels and possrcty command channels for air defense are probably in the process of tablishment at the present nne. By the Warsaw Agreemen or 14 May 1955, 8. combined lllmtary command (or the USSR and Evrop an satennes was established under Marshal Konev with headquarters in Moscow. This combined command will almost certainly provide an administrative framework for more effective control and integration ot air de-

ense forces,

46. Air Dejense Pcrll<>nna. Sino-Soviet, Bloc actlve air defense units are estimated to cornprlsc about 880,000 personnel:

Fighter A atlQn' A.AA

PVO JUglom; and Con rol centers PVO HQ. and adm.

SlUT

Oround Observer Unlt.s

Rttdar lnslallatlon$ TOTAL

VIet.
Euro- MInh.,
l'e:\'l orth
Sml- Korea,
J;Hoc OSSR U~ China
28B,600 220,000 39,900 2s:Wo
445,100 293,000 77.300 7~.aoO
62,000 52.,000 2,000 8.000
2,'150 1.500 500 7S() W,OOO' N.A. N.A. N.A.

34,000 22.000 7.lOO 6,000

~ S8MOO 127,000 17.250

, , • See pa~e 12 ro~ (ootnotes.

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" TOP SECEE?'

In addition, there are substantial numbers o.t Iull-tlme local observers and passive air detense personnel; all men and women between the ages of 18 and 50 are subject to this service.

Bloc Fighter Organization, Strength,

and Equipment

47. Orgatri2at.ion, Fighter aircraft of the USSR comprise 28D regiments of which 123 are in tactlcal avtation, 102 in lA-PVC, and 55 in the Na\'al Aviation. In addition there are 64 regtments in the saieiute Army and Fleet Air Forccs and 49 in the Norlh Korean and Chinese Army and Fleet Fo.rces. Geographic dis ribution or fight r regiments Is estimated as ollows:

. S()Vlet Unlts Northwestern USSR We3tem USSR ~ot.rnl 'USSR CauCMUS

E3&t ce.o t.nU

SOTlot Far East

East. 1':uroPC

East O.erma.ny Poland

SOViet. ZOoe Au.stda Hun8ary

RumlUlla

Num-oe.r ot Regiments

'M' 62 30 36 19 64 a~

20 a 6 3 3

other B ex; Uolts
Balsarla 11
CzecllosloyaJclll 14
&&It Germany e
Htmgary II
Polllncl 19
Rum anJ a G
Chlna 42
North ItOI'1: 7
A.I ba.n.I.a lrQUlldl"on
TOT.'\!, 31)3 48. Tlre t s-rvo. Those fighters known to be uncle PVO STRANY are ass gned to lA-PVO,

FOOtno~ from P3£:,C 10.

'lncludes L~-PVO (77.100) And CghWr elements ot TacU J Air Artn.les. Mllltary blat-r1el A1r Fore s, and Naval hvlaUon.

• There 18 lnsufliclent evidence t() penn.I~ further aUbdJv1s)oD by r.~or.raph1() areas,

12

with an authorlzed strength estimated at 3,.800 aircraft. The baste operutaonnt unit. 0.1 IA·PVO Is the division made up normally 01 three regiments. The dlv1s1on Is Ute basic command echelon '10r centro; or actual intercept opera tions. The divisions In tum are subordinate to air armies or unidontifled tlg)lters rorma ttons,

19. The remainder of So t operational fighter a' craft are assigned to units of (a) the actrcat air armies amJ.-milltary district air rorees, and (b) No.vni Aviation. These forces operate under a "multtple mission • concept. which includes an air defense role.

50. Strenqth. ruul DeplClymlmt - Mid·1955. Thc· estimated over-all autho.r1ze4 (TOllE)

. strength or Bloc fighter rorces Is 'l4,6oo airerar while actual strengths are estimated at about 12,400 llghtor atrcrart.' Soviet fiShter torees with an authorized strength Of 10,400 consutute over 75 percent or the total Bloc fighter TO&E strength.

51. The largest number of fighter units in the Bloc are deployed in the Western USSR.G Moot ct th prinCipal target and approach areas to the US are covered by presently dep cyed fighter forces with tile exception 0.1 the North Central. No.rth Eastern, and Central Aslan border areas. Dlstributio.n 01 authorized cro 8cE) fighter str ngth within the Bloc 1:; as roiows:

let. Piston
nay AW Toeal
Eastern :Europe 3.,3.20 .0 300 :1,660
S07 et Western Fro Or 2..570 iO 2,610
SO.,l t Northwest ~20 30 ~50
M05COW and Approacl1es 1,7'70 UO 1,.890
BouUl Ce t I FronUcr 1..,10 4() I,5SO
Unll M'.a 330 330
BJbertan BaJ.Jc.a..I An 100 100
Far E33t ArC Ul70 30 2.000
Ml\J1cbuna-Chlna-
Nortb Kore"a 1..530 200 1,820
T(YfIlL 13,710 300 590 H.IIOO • A(tual rcr Ct str gills average 6Pproldm teJ..9' S percent or TOdtB. alt.hOQgh this varlas con~lderabl.Y as new e.J.rCn>rt are phB3ed in. (See Appel til.><; B tor e<$tLmatc ot strength hJ' ye r.)

'Sec M p m tor deploymenL of n.Jr dtfcllS() equlpm IJ~.

'rQIl SFCRF"'I

/

TOP SECRET

52. The Soviet fighter forces are now all equipped with jet fighters and the keystone of presen t programs elsewhere In the Bloc is the re-eqUipmen~ of fight.eT forces with Jet fight;.. ers, At present, only 50 piston fighters (actual strength) remain in the European SatelUtes. Poland Is completely equipped with the FAOOT. There was a reorganlsatlon 'of the Bast German A1r Force In 1954 but lJttle increase in strength and no indication of resumption of Jet tramlng. In the Far East, Communlst Chmese-North korean actual fighter strength Increased from 1,050 to 1,220 while TOokE aircraft streng h Increased from 1,330 to 1,584 during tho period 1 January 1954 to 1 ApTil 1955. As a result. 01 a series Of redeployments, the bUlk of th Chinese Jet Ogh ers are now concentrated in the Shanghai area; and the forces in Manchuria have been reduced.

• &3. EqUipment. Prese t Bloc fighter forces are primarily equlpped with two types of alrcra!t whIch from a performance standpoint can be used Ior air defense: FRESCO (l'vlla- 17) and three versions of FAGOT ( G-15). Whi.le tnese are all employed as day interceptors, some of the FRESCO's are now equJpp d w th AI (AIr Interceptor) radar. The FAGOT could also carry AI radar but, it Is unlLlteJy that this conversion will be made. (See Ap.~d1x: C {or pcrtormanc characteristics or

hese fighters.)

P1. Both of the above types are armed with :?3mm or a combination of 23mm and 37m.m l~' All oC these guns have a relat vely low rnuzzlc velocity of 2,250 ft./sec. The FAGO"r 1.5 equipped with a gun sight which is equivslent to the USAF K-14 with manual range input. Some models ot the FRESCO are equip ed with his sigh but. i is aiso probable that some have sights with radar ranging.

55. Two new fighter types have r ently been observed in considerable numbers. Both were t-win jet swept-wtog fighters of whJch one, the FLMlHLIGHT, is probab y an all-weath r 6ghter and the other, the . ARMER, appears to be capable of level llight speeds in ex ess 01 . {aeh 1. Both of these aircrar are estlmated to be in sertal production and a ew ot

13

each are estimated to be in operational units .• The FARMER Is belJeved to have a radar range type gunslgbt, The ~HLIGHT 13 esumated to be equipped with two large caliber guns, probably 37mm. It IS also possible that some models carry air-to-air rockets. Th 6.re control system ot the FLASHLIGIrI' almost c rtalnly Includes an airborne intercept radar with probable search ranges up to 16 nautical miles and lock-on ranges up to 10 na tical miles.'

56. The over- all effectiveness or present soviet. interceptor forces is probably limited by the number or AI-equjpped Intercepto s. thCl low cyclic ra e and muzzle velocity of the guns, and he limited fire control capabilit.y. In addrtton.. the F AOOT 15 limited to some . d.~ee by undesirable illght. characteristics at hJgh peed and I:>y low duratton of ·tire. Th FAGOT MS a good degree of e1Iectlveness under visual Intercep conditions against current B-47 jet bombers. The FRESCO and FAR 1ER Will be more effective against jet bombers due to their htgher speed, ability to ini late diving attacks, and greater stability nt. higher speeds. The AI equipped FLASH· LIGHT Wi I be considerably more effective than he earlier AI equipped fighter (possibly FRESCO) against jet bombers under all weather conditions duo to better armament, and be ter fire control and AI search capabn-

i y.8

57. A.irborne Radar. There Is conslderable evidence ot ernp oyment of AI radar and reo cent slgl tings tend to confirm t.bat it is installed in the FRESCO and almost certa.1n.1y is Ins aueo In the FLASHLIOHT. We belleve It could also e Installed In th FAGOT. Al hough ther no evidence of taU warning radar on Sovi t fighters, we estimate they co d be so equipped. P!' sent Soviet air. borne IFF SRO quJpm nt is slmllar in performance to he lJS MARK TIl system. It appears to op ra e I.nslde the 153-187 Me band

• See Append C for per ocma.nce cha~~krlatles of Bloo Jlghtcrs.

'AI ro.dnr ranges Ilr unCle,r lItudY and are sub. jeeL to, reviston.

• ec 1\p enql~ B tal" e.ztlmated nlm\b r- III operaUOllal Wl.I ts,

TOP SECFET.

TOP SFCBEL

employed by the MARK m but has 28 ldentificAtion putse groups compared to six for the MARK ill. This set when combined witb the interrogator responder "FISHNET" will provide a r~ble Ident1.ftcaUon system but has a low traffic handling capactty. TbJs system could be used to extend the Gel range control ot fighters. So'9iet naval IFF compatible With "FISHNET" has atso been observed.

.. ,_r'

Antiaircraft Artillery

58. The Soviets continue to place considerable emphasis upon A.A artl1l~. Technical and admln1strntlv control or AAA units IS provided by the M.n1n Directorate 01 Artlllory Forces 01 the Sov:let Army .. However, the commander-ln-chler or PVO STRANY has a large· number of AAA unlts under his oper-'. aUonal control, 'an -probably coordinates the efforts 01 A.AA elements attaChed to ground, naval, and air components Which contrfbute to the mlsslon of PVO STRANY but. are not subordinate to it. OperalionaIly, AA artillery units p bably come under the control of lhe PVO commanders of the regional and subregional headquarte s as do units or lA-PVO . Warnmg information from radar sites Is passed to a centro center and pertinent AAA fire dlrectlon canter .which alerts the AA artnle.ry. Usually, a system or zones from the control enter Is set up, SO that when 0. target. reaches a certain line AAA 1.9 alerted for action.

59. AA OU11$. Two slgn.iflcan~ post-wend War n developments in hea AA guns have been noted, Tbe lOOmm gun, now standard, was irs observed in Moscow in 951. It may be opera red manually or by remote can. trot, A new heavy gun 01 a.t. least 122mm cal1~r was first seen uncovered In the 1955 May Day parade in Moscow. It is estimated to have an effectIvo ceiling 01 trom 40,OnO to 45,000 feet with conven ional projec ties. Despite its altltude advantage over the 100mm gun, It is possible that the latest. heavy g\U1 may not be widely used, particularly 11 operatlonal qu nti cs of guided mtssues become a'l'a.Hable in the near ruture. (Sce Appe.ndlx

14

C for- operational performance c.h.aractel1.stics of AA guns.)

60. The 85mm AA gun ~ was the standard SoViet Mavy weapon trom 1939 until the lO~mm gun appe-ared. Although considered obsolescent, It Is still deployed wldely throughout the Soviet Bloc both In tM PVO and In !1eJd dh1.s.lons. These guru are being turned over to secondary and SateWl.e detenses as SOOn as they can be replaced with the lOOmm. We estimate that..the 100mm gun, director and aasocfated "Wffil''l'''' radar' as a weapons system can engage subscruc aerial targets w1thl.n t.he range ot the gun it.scl!. A Sim.ilar fire control syst.c.m probab y will be used With the new 122mm gun.

61. Pro:dmity F1I.Scs, The Soviets are fully capante of developing the necessary etectronlcs components and vacuum tubes lor use In proximity fuses. They ·have. acquired many thousands of Ia model American VT fuses. DUIi g the period of this estimate, they should be able to produce quan Itdes 01 proximity fuses for use In the air de ense system.

62. AutOmatic Weapons. The S7:tnm M1939 guo as been the standard Soviet. light antiaircraft weapon but it is now being replaced by a 57mm automatic weapon. The 37mm probably will be encountered in increasing numbers in the SAtellite torces as it is phased o t. of Soviet units. The 5'7m.m automatic is designed to engage subsonic aircran up to

15,000- 8,000 teet, The angular t:racklng

rate is not. known. It is considered like\y that a radar-director fire centro; system has been provided in addition to on-carrtage mechanlcal sights lor all-weather operation. A mechanical on-carriage sight wourd Iimlt ts eff~ct've ceiling to about. 6,000 t et. A high cycllc ra te (500 to 600 rpm. per barre) 30mm m ubarre] automatic gun is expected to become n standard low altitude an iaircraft, weapo .

63. The standard machine gun assigned to So 'let AAA units has been tbe 12.7mm Degtyarev M1938, but it too is flcing replaced. The replacement weapon is a 14. nun machine gun wnicn Is available in single, dual, and quadruple mounts.

','

'i'QP Ii'FCRE'Y

TOR sECRET

.,.$.,

61. Searchlights. Soviet searchlights vary in diameter {rom 4Qcm (15.7 In.) to 200cm (79 ln.). Some of the 200cm diameter searchUgbts probably have radar units as Integra; parts ot the mount.

65. UnguUkd Rockets. During World War II the Soviet torces used ground-to-ground rock-

. eta lor defense against low level aircrart at.. tacks, but with little elIectiveness. Soviet. interest in developing unguided rockets lor antiaircraft defense was probably increased by the avallabU1ty of German scientists and rocket developments which were exploited after World War n. The Tallun, 11 Gennan unguided rocket designed tor strategtc defenses, probably formed tho basis tor Sovi t. research projects. A two-stage; high-level rocket. developed by Gen:nJ:U1S in tho USSR, called "~th,". has also been reported, and we have

. indications that. it. could be available nOW In J.i.mlted 'quanu les, Barrage-type rockets tor \lSIO against low lavel attack.~ could be in 8. la te stage Of deve opment and possibly available In limited quantities In 1957. A !irc control system for unguided AA rockets will probably be a modiCication at that now used w1th the 100mm .f\A guns.

66. A..!A Strenqth: and Deplcyr7ien:t. It is dif-

euu to determine the auocatton of AAA .weapons. M~ow is apparently the fu'.st to be supplied with new weapons. As th Y become available In greater numbers, theyar allocated to 0 her important areas In t.he So. vlet Un! n and tinaJly to the SateUite eountries. !'her is some indication th t the Soviets are now strengthenlng A.A.A defenses ot occupied airfields in the European SatelIlles. The 1a k 01 adeqnatc AAA defenses at su h aldie ds has been a de iciency Of pos War S091d. cereuses. We estimate that the USSR now } as about 13,850 operational AA glUlS,includlng 50 122mm guns, 3,WO mOmm guns, 2,900 85nun guns, and 7,900 37mm and S7mm guns, TIler are large stockpiles of serv ceaole 37mm and 85mm AA guns.

67. Heavy AA guns are deployed in some 286 regtrnents of wrucn 172 are in Soviet forces, 44 In European Satellite forces, and 70 In the As! n Bloc forces. In addition, light AAA units are d ployed throughout the armed for-

15

ces 01 the Bloc in regiments of AA.A dtvtslon.s, A.AA regiments and battalions of line divislons and corps, and batteries of heavy tank and sel..f-propelled gun regiments. (For geographic deployment of AA guns, see paragraph 121, page 25).

68. Ouided MusUes. Based OD the equipment, facilities, and personnel connected with German World War U developments and upon' Intellig-ence on subsequent activities in the USSR, it is es imated tbat_.the USSR could now have an improved version of the WassertaJ] with the tollowlng aractertstlcs: range 30,00~5,OOO yards alutu<le 50,000 teet, a two r dar mid-co rse guidance system with a sernlactive terminal homing, and a warhead under 690 pou ds, This would .slgnl!icantJy Increase the kill probabilities against Allied bombers, even in bad esther. In July 1953, an Installattor; was -"lighted in the'Moscow area which may have been a guidetl mfssne launching site. Between m1d-1954 and the present approximately 23 more such si have been observ d ln the Moscow area plus one in the Leningrad area.

69. Other tl an ese installatiOns there is no evidence available concerning actual S0- viet deploymer, or guided missiles for air defense at c present time. Nevertheless, we estimate that he Soviets do na e S() e surrace-to-atr guided missiles in operational usc at the present tme and Qlat they could have an air-to-air missile.

Control and Worning

70. Organization. The SSR has an extensive warning and control system, although t e precise me-ans by which the various e emen ts find levels are integrated or the precise cleos'gnation or units are not known. Top-level centro ls probably exercised from Moscow through til beadqua tors of PYO STRANY. The contra and w rning organizatlcn Of PYO STRANY probably corresponds to the regional and subrcgtona PYO crgaruzanon and provides ever-au ooordlnat on ot AAA forces, fighter forces, and control and warning at these various le 01.<;.

TOR SECRE ..

,. ·~r

71. In addition to warning units of PVO STRANY, tactical atr elements ot the Army and Navy have their own organizational radar whlch Is operated for the control and protectJon of Ute.ir respective forces. For air dclenre purposes, tnese radar units are also ava1lable to PVO STRANY and are probably Inl.egTatcd at the same geographic organization levels as the control and warning units. Each air dlvision also has its own divisional OCI radar for control of Interceptors, which results in considerable dupllcation or radar and probably accounts to some degree for the blgh radar denslty in many regions. Pro_bab y on of the greatest weaknesses or the Soviet airdeCense system has be n a lack of adequate deccntrallz uo of command rtsponsibillties below the regional or subregional' headquarters causing duplication of radar and loss of Umc·1r>. command reaction. A present, intercepts by fighters are largely controlled by the di'iSional radar 'but the &'1lets are probably now in Lhe process of decentralliing to permit con rol ot interceptions by Individual radar .

72. Equipment. Soviet radar has s eadlly Improved from the native World War II PEGMATIT and RUS 2 EW rada s operating in !.he 70 Me band. In 1949 !.he DUMBO radar appeared whlc was essentially an improvement at the earlier Soviet World war n radars. In 1951, a Sov et version of the US antiaircraft llre control radar SCR-S8, deslgnated ''WHIFF,'' began to appear in quantity. Al· win 1951, a new SoviGt EW and GCl ground V-beam radar designa ted "TOKEN" Similar to the us AN/CPS-6B, was first observed. In 1953, two dille en EW type antennae arrays wee observed in the SSR and in Czechoslovakla, designated "GAGE" and "WOODGAGE," respectively. A hCight-flnding radar dcslgna d "PA'ITYCAKE" appeared at. the same tunc. In 1952, a new EW radar designated "KN E~EST" and opera 1ng on 73 MC bega to rep ace the older "DUMBO" radar and in 1953, a new antenna, d signaled "FISHNET," was identified as an IFF antenna whicn, in conjunction w1th the airborne transponder SRO, forms an IFF system comparable to the 1K III system used by the AJ· lic.~ in World WaJ: n.

6

73. '!'he fOllowing estimate of Sovi t radar capabilit.i.es is based largely on the composite characterlstlca or the DUMBO, TOKEN, and KNIFEREST radars, which are in most widespread use a~ the present time. We estimate Utat the capabilities ot the Sino-Soviot. Bloc early warning radars ar uch that the maximum alt.1t.ude coverage extends above "\5,000 teet and may extend to about 60 000 feet, depending on factors such as range, size, and aspect o! target. Tll.o ranges at which Block F;W radars provide coverage With a 50 percent probabUity of detection are estimated to fall within the lIm.Its Indicated in the folowing table:

Altit.ude (teet)

EARLY WARNrn'O Ra.ng

B-47 size
25.000 l00-1IiO
3!i,OOO 12S-160 13&-200
~5,OOO 1~'70 H~lO 4D-70
!i5,OOO 12$-.180 14 210 llrnlt.ed 74. The ranges at. which Bloc radars prov de OCl coverage are estimated to fall within the 1m1ts Indtcatcd in the table below. To eJIcct intercept on at bomber detection ranges, Sov· Iet gbter a.i.rcra!t would require transponder beacons In order to permit tracking the Soviet fighters as well as the in rueling bombers. The USSR has the capability to unnze transponder beacons.

OROUND CON"I'ROL INTImCEPT

AI l~ud (teet)

15,000 !!!i,COO -45,000 55.000

60-90

'10-110

75-85 80-120

7~lOO II 125

7 no 96-125

SO-SO 25-10 llmlted

75. Nu11tOOr$ and Deployment. The Bloc has cam d out a massive pes war radar constru - tion program. At present it is est mated to have 0 rat onal some 1.(Y15 early warning and GCI radar, including no less than 150 TOKEN t.ype.s and 2S or the new Gel radars. In addition, wo estimate th y now have some 600 fire control radars and abou 1.000 sur-

WQP SFCPE~

face IFF interrogators. The early warn1ng and shipboard GCI radars have been general- 11 deployed t.hroughout. the Bloc wit.h th0 malor concentration being in the European Satellites, Western USSR, and the Maritime ProVinOOS ot the Ftu: East. In the West., a radar cnaln extending from the Barents Sea to the Caspian ea provides radar coverage ot the Western USSR and the European Sate)· utes. In the Far East., radar coverage extends from the Bering Straits area south to Rainan Island in the South China Sea wi h t.h exception of a few isolated gaps. In the course of ormal operations, Soviet naval units provide Incidental extension of this

. early warning chain. (See Paragraph 118, .page 24., for deployment ~f radar by region.)

76. Ground Observer P~l.$. Th USSR also has wha IS betieved to be a very. ~t.ensive gr9und observer system, whiCh consists of the. nava observer units (SmS) manned by So- . net naval personnel and the VNOB, a joint Army/civilian agency within the USSR, (which also operates radar) and corresponding Satclllt.e organizations. Tbe exact number of observation posts operated by these organjzattons is no known.

Com mu n icotions

'no OrgaTlization. Th precise na ure of the Sov ct eomm mea ions system is not known, bu 0 the basis of the North Kore~Manehurta network, both landUne and radio communlcatlons are employed bet.ween early warning sta ions, alrUeJd GCr stations, and control centers. More modern UHF qu 1>ment is now known to be in use in some areas.

78. In order to accornpllsh the control and coordina Ion funct on, a knowledge ot tl e air sItuation thin and adjacent to the air defense eglon or subregion is necessary, and It is therefore probable that the early warning stations channe their r ports, perhaps through subregional centers, to the regional co !.rol' cer ten> where major operational decislons are made. Filter centers are probably employed in con unction with subregional centers to coordinate the visual and radar Information and eliminate duplications or erroneous mrormsuon, Control center s prob-

17

ably exist at the reg onai ana subregional headquarters and at the Central PVO headquarters. In addltion, control centers are p obably required at each fighter dlv1s1on headquarters and at all AAA organizational levels.

79. Communications pertaining to nosure alr traffic ar probably reported from the early warning radar site to tb subregion 1, and area h adquarters. Coordination between local AAA and fighter rorees is probably accomplished on an Information basis at the subregional control center, perhaps by assignment Of liaison personnel. Major command dectsions, however, probably occur at the regional center with declstons being passed down to the AAA and .fil{hter units through the fighter control center. At the same time, information .IS. probably passed iaterally be··t.ween re ional headquarters and vertically to

he area headquarters. We esttmate that

th re life approximately 240-260 control centers in he Soviet BlOC air defense system consisting of the following:

Area DeCense Centers Region. Co rol Centers

S bre&ional COIl Lrol Center S()..90

Dlvlslo! Con rol Gel'l~r3 USSR 91

Dlvl.:;lonal Control centers

(l:;uropean S I.cWfcs) 17

Djv1slon~ Control centers

CA.:;IQD Bloc) 18

80. Air-Ground CommU7t cations Equipment. Until recent y. the Soviets primarlly ut.illzcd HF eq ipmen tor air-ground communications. The standard oommunlcat ODS installation ill Soviet fighters was an improved vers on of World War n equipment. We believe that mts eq ipment has been supplemelted beginning in 1952 by roar-channel VHF equlpmen. The ground equipment has been emp oyed In mobile trucks containing one or more transmitters and as many as four receivers, covering uretow, medium, and high freq ency bands. A VHF ransmltter and receiver between 100 and l~O MC now has been added to this system, To date there is no Indication ot changing Lbe air-ground equipment to UHF.

'WOP S FC n FT,

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81. Ground Cammunit:atil)71.$ Equipment. For ground communications, tho Soviets use ordinary and Wgb speed telegraph, radio, Wephone, teletype, and fncs1mUe and mult1plex radio telephone 10 both mllltary and civil needs. The land lines are ma1nly concentrated in European Russia, thinning considerab y north of Moscow, Leningrad, and in the Southern Urals, and East into Siberia which haS only one main route With several subord.lnate branch lines. High, medium, and low powered transmitters tor high speed telegraphy and ordinary voice communJcations in hO low, medium, and high trequency 30 KC to 30 MC range are scattered thickly through the European Soviet areas. They pro de \.he sole means of rapid comm ntca-

· t1ori:s In many areas which are sparsely settled or where cllmatlc conditions m~e it Impossr-

· bte or. difficUlt to niatntaln land llnes.

· .

.• 4~'

82. Whil there is no eviden e of 'Soviet use Of scatter techniques in long distance communications systems, there are strong Indtcaticns that they art aware of the usefulness ot these tochniques, and their advantage of lower susceptibility to jamming and intercep We estimate that the USSR has the capabtnty to develop such systems and may have them in current operation.

83. DUring the past few years, ~e USSR has been using UHF relay station equipment. This eq pment provides up to 16 vole or 48 teletype subcarriers, It may be used in mobile Instarlattons lor extreme flexibiUty or may be sited at permanent locutions. Operational ranges up to about. 5() nau leal miles are possible, depending upon the mtervenlng terrain. Recent reports indlcate this type of equipment has been Ins ailed in . ast Germany and Is tuncttoning in an air warning ne wWch is believed to b linked to Installatdons in other Bloc countries.

84. l1u!omatic COmputation and Data HancUing Equipment .. Soviet equipment known to be avallable (or this p rpose includes land lines, low, medium, and high !r qu Dey radio links, multichannel microwave radio llnks, and television or broad-band radio llnks. This TV link equipment could be employed to transmit. data very rapidly or even transmit

18

.TV pictures of compI te status boards: Processing of data lor transmission by any ot the abcve mentioned systems would greatly increase data handllng CQP~1l1tle.s. Computers would play an important role in such a system. The USSR Is d veloping, and may now have in operation automat c computation and datahandling devices.

&5. Radio Na1rigation Equipment. 'l'he Soviets are pI ci.ng beavy reliance upon ground and airborne radio direction, finding aids_lor the major portion of their air navigation, ineluding' approach and landing. Soviet. and Satellite territory and airfields are well supplied with ground dlr cucn finders, omnlbeacons, and rotating beacons. Requir rnents stlll exist Cor more precise navigation and landirig aids. . There is considerable evidence of d veiopment work being accomplished to provide a more precise localizer' in the VHF' Or UHF band and incorporating distance measurtns equipment. Ground Iocat d VHF direction finding facilities are available. There is a standard landing procedure tor fighters which uses a medium rrequency homing beacon and a marker beacon at each airfield. Reo ntJy several OCA type radar'S have b n sJ.ghted a som airfields. We estimate installations will be made at key fighter fields.

Electronic Countermeasures

86. Active Jamming EqUipment. The current Soviet capability Cor Seriously dlsrupung We:> ern long-range communications and radio navlgation systems gives t.hem a hlgh capability tor ammlng such radio communicat ons and navigation systems as may be used n an air attack against the Soviet Bloc. Research is now being conducted on magnetrons, suitable Cor jamming In the S and X band, as we as the decimeter ranges but we have no intorma ion of any equipment that

ilizes t.l es magnetrons. Tho USSR pro ably has a capab1l1ty Jor electronlc jamming' ip thro gh 12,000 megacycles and possibly

rough 46,000 megacycles.

87. PCJ.$sive CountCTmCa.sure Equipment. We bave evldence ot extensrve Soviet Interest in the electronics Intercept. and analysis equipment. We olso have evidence thal electronic

~QP SECRET

reconnaissance is being conducted by the Soviets. We estimate thal the USSR will make exte nve use of chaff 1n elec ronic warfare. Tho Soviets have a so 1ndj ated Interes in An lradar coatings and at least. 0 e Oerman sclentist concerned with World War 11 radar camouflage may till be in the USSR.

88. Soviet Vulnerability to ELect'l"Qlltc Countermcc.sur8$. The Soviets arc ware Of t.he #fecuveness of countermeasures' against radar and have the capability of developing de ces which would make the1r equlpmen less vul-

nerabtc t.o [ammin or spoofing. It. no

presen ly possible to cs Ima the exen of d velopment and/or current 1nco poration of sucn reatures in opera ional equipment, KnoWn sovtet low and l!gh frequency communicauon cq riprn nt, ground and airborne, is. susceptible to' tne usu types of jamming. Their en ployment : 0 VHF ror alr/ground communication WOuld mak jamming more d·fficull. Increased Sovet employment of h.lghly directional microwave po t-to-poin oommunlca Ion equipment has also greatly reduced their vulnerability to jamming.

89. Conventional Sovle radio navlgation aids such as omnldlrecuonar anding and route beacons are individually susc pLible to longrange jamming. All other systems or aids known to be used by lhe Soviets, suitable for fight.er opera ion, are vulnerable to bo h spoofing and jamming. The active and pa.~.sive electronic missUc guidance systems esttmated to be in existence are also all susceptib to electronic countermeasures.

Air Facilities

90. During the last several years, the SSR

as pu gr at emphasis on aid eld development, particularly in perimeter areas, S1nce 1950 airtield construction has been extended in the Khnbnrovsk VlndJvostok area and north-eastward to the Chukotski Pen1nsula, thus strengthening the perimeter network ot al:rf\elds. Recent COIlS rucuon act.iv:lties have also taken place in th Murmansk-Leningrad areas, the Baltic States, South Ukraine, Crimea, and caucesra. A general tmpro ement. of airfields along th.e Far East supply Une and the construcuon of better racnmes

19

at. civj airports have also been noted, 1t. is believed that runway construction inside the Soviet Union has been extensive in recent. years, and apparently mlntmum requirements for concrete runw ys at om bases have been standardized a 5,900 to 6,000 teet lor fighters and Iight bombers and 7,900 to 8,200 or medium bombers.

91. In nearly all areas Of prob ble op ations, there appear to be adequate net. ..... orks of airfields tor U • employment -ot present B.loc fighter forces. The prtnctpai exceptions are 1n tho nor heastern and no th central Siberian areas. In he nortneastem area, extcnsrve ope a ions at the pre en lime would probably still entail the use 01 substandard fields even though a fielt! construction has been In progress in the Chukotskl rea since 1952. n the north central area, add t onal

-Improved airfields would also be req Ired even· . though some airfield cons rue ion 1 as been carried out along tl e Arctlc coastline 1n the past few y ars, Thus, tor optimum air defense coverage, extensive additional airfield construction in these areas is required through the period of his esuma .

92. The xisting airfield net in the European USSR and Sa ell.i~ affords an adequate fighter base capac1 y (or present atrcrart, but 1ri a major war bases In some sector might not provide sufficient flexibility 01 fighter forces for air defense In addition to meeting the increased n eds of OLhC4 ypes 01 aircraft. Tbe need tor greater ilex1bUity in certain areas is apparonuy recognized by the Sovleta, since new airfield construction is still taking place in the Sat llites, where the number of major . airfields Increased during 19~ tram 98 to 112. There are at present 20 additional airfields under construction, of which 17 are in Poland. Three new runways were added in East Germany and theN) ar indicat.lons that mer will be built in 1955. Wock contmues on Gross Dollln Ule new airfield near Derlln, With an 11,000 loot runway. In C~echoslovakla, four long grass strips have been added, bringing th total of this type to nlne, In several ot the Satellites, there bave been signs of reactivation of rormer grass landing grounds and two oC the "forest landing grounds' in East

TOP SEGRB,£?

20

Germany were used tor the first. Ume in rna- quant-ities 01 jet fuel to a reserve stomic pro-

ncuvers. gram; and (d) J.I.nlited base storage facilit.ies.

93. Estimated nv9.1lnbillty of airfields of over <1,000 teet in length in the Sino-Soviet Bloc is as follows:

Soviet Western FTontler IGZ

SOnet NorUlwest S!)

M~w and Approaches 179

South ~tta1 FronUez- 114

Un! Met' 55

Biberla-Ba1.k:al Area 55

Far Eaat Area 14!)

TOTAL IN SOVmT UNION '1~

Eastern Europe 241

Asian Bloc 208

TOTAL 1,202

logistic Support, MaintcnancEt, and

Training

94. The technical supply-system is well organized to meet Soviet air defense requirements. Since antlalrcrart installations, n1rftelds. and radar stations are located adjacent to populated areas and main transporta ion and communications llnes to most areas, t e major So.ie~ problems of logiS~ic support arise in connection with the peripheral areas, par iculatly the northern and northeastern Siberian areas and in CommWllst China Norlh Korea, and orth Vietnam whe e adequate transpor taticn facilities do not e. t. These problems lie mainly in the transportation of parts, and in t.he av9.1l11bllity, transport, and storage oC jet fuels.

95. Very little tnrorma ion is available on the exact location 01 jet fuel torage points or the amount or rue stored. It is known tbat Jet fuel in large q a tit.les Ls tored at the refinenes, at regional dlstrlbutlon points, and a air army central fuel depots. In addition, llmited amounts or mel are stored on the operational atrftclds. The over-all availability of jc fuel Is believed to limi the amoun of flying accomptls ed at. the present. time to Sl.!V n hours per fighter pilot per mon h. We beUeve this llmltat on is probably due to: (a)

ranspor tatton dcflcle cles: (b) increased requirements due to rapid buitd-up of Soviet jet forces; (c) \.he allocation of consld Tab e

96. Intelligence Is lacldng lor a complete appraisal or the Soviet military aviation matntenanc system as it atrects fighter aircraft, although certain limitation are Indlcated. The maintenance system Is highly centralized and controlled. with rigid definitions of duties and responsibuttaes which might be cumbersome and 6Ubject to breakdown in time of war. Inspection requiremenLs are excessive and technical personnel are not used in the moot economical manner. On the other band, the level of trainlng of technicAl personnel seems to be good and technical manuals are adequ teo Historical evidence Indicates soviet maintenance capabilities during and immediately a ter World War n were substantially lower than those o! the us. Since that time, there appear to have: been slow but steady imp ovornc t, probably 1nft enced to a large degree, by the retention In the service of trained maintenance specialists and the introduc ion of the jet fighter which is aster to mainta .

97. It is estimated that a current servlceabil- 1 y rate lor pres t jet fighters on the order of 85 percen t of assigned aircrar can be achieved under normal operating condition .. s. FOr tactical fighter units an init.ial maximum serviceability rate ot B -95 percent could be cbtamed to owing a complete or partial stand-down. ThiS rate could be maintained tor the fi.st day or two 0 intensive operations but would probably decline to around 50 percent tnrou h the sixth or seven h day, followed by n gradual build p to around 60-65 percent sustained rate. Ini ial maximum servtccabtlity rate or air defense t\gt ters would probably be arou d 95 percent since these forces are held in a scrm-stand-down condit.ion until committed. Alter commltme ,the serv ceability rate or these fighters would probably drop below that of act-cal fighters due to recovery at alternative bases, caust g increased lorristic and maintenance p obtems, ~ new and comp lea ed all-weather fight rs are Introduce ,U: e [nlt 1 maximum serviceability Tate will be 10wered conslderably, probably to around 50 percant,

'; ,.

Q"QP SEGRE,.,

TOP sEeREy.

~a. Under extreme cold wea her condluons In the Arctic areas, serviceabUity rates of all types Of equipment will be considerably reduced even though the Soviets have designed. their equipment for low temperatures and nave wide Arctic operational experience. Not only Is maintenance more di:f1}cult., but the logistic problem is magnHled by Increased requirements for heavy clothing and special ground equlpmen , such as heaters and aircraa shelters. Th1s, together with Ole tact UUit the Arctic areas are usually not served by adequate transportation facilities and t.h tact that morale is generally lower will seriously limjt maintenance and serviceability rates.

99. Mllintenance. Soviet elcctrorucs q ipment is similar to Western equipment and cons quently matnten nee problems are probably comparable. Our knowledge or the operatioa of sovte electronics equipment indicates that it is reliable and w ll-maintained.. Soviet equipment has also been c1e.'>igned for use under wide temperat re ranges. Captured Soviot. equipment wh1ch has be n tested has been found to be w'thin current US Joint Army-Navy (JAN) specinca ions.

100. Tra ning. Inte liE' nee currently available is tnsufftcient to perml a sattsfactory assessment or raining of air warning personnel. Conslderably more Information is availJlble cencemlng pilOt training in the USSR. A figh~r pilot. is believed to acquire approximately 100 hours of t1ying time in flying SChool. To t.hjs could be added the DOSAAF' flying time or abo t 45 hours which pilot candidates recelve prior to entering the flying school. in lJ:Je past Soviet and Satellite pnots reported to operational u Its with only about 100 hour fl~ring tim i trainer type nircrart,

t out having own tactical nircraU. and without having received gunnery or nightDying experience. At the present time, however, the Soviet tralni g establishments have B total or some 700 jet figbter aircraft whiCh a e bcicg used for pI' -op rational training. ThL'l type of ralnlng is also carried out to a con.s1derab}' lesser extent in SOIne European SateU1te.~.

'All Union Vohmtary Soclety for cooperat.1on with the AnDy. AVls!.1on. and F1 et,

2

101. Soviet fighter pucts receive only about. seven hours flying time per month after join'; ing an operauonat unit. We believe that approximately 30.3S llghter~ pUot schools exist in the USSR which probably produce an average of 100 pUOLS per school each year or a total. of 3,000 to 8,500 pUots. Jet trnln1ng, however, has been increasingly conducted by the preoperational flying schools and by operational units.

102. The current trai.nlng Pt<1sram of the IAPVO units is not known. Howeve, informa. tlon available for 1950 Indicated that. the tra1n.1ng goals were to acquire ruDy the technlque of interception and destruc ion of large h03tile air tonnatlons through ooordinatton of all atr defense weapons... We estimate that these goals now Include tnterceptton and destruction of single aircraft and small formattens of .je . bombers as. well as large rorma •.. tlons. Night !lying was known to be lll:niCd in 19 () to n.ights when the natural horizon was visible and probably averaged around six hours per pUo annually. AJthough the nlght fiyiog standards have increased considerably since that time, they are s ill probab y well below US standards.

103. We believe that there is no instrument school avnllablc as such in the Air Forces of the Soviet Army, other than that for thc tr In- 1ng or bombardlsr-navtgators in Soviet LongRAnge Aviation. Instrument trainln for fighter pnots is conducted 10 operational units.

104.. In general, trn.lnlnr; in the European and Asiatic Satelljtes is patterned after that in the USSR, but th standards are be Ieved to be lower.

Passive Defense

105. OrganizatiO'n. Passive air defense is carried out by the c vU organization known as

he MPVO which is s bordinate to t.l e MVD.

Each constituent 0. d autonomous republic in the SOvie Union has its own MVD and a directorate Of t MPVO. However, the {PVO directorates have lilt c lrrdependence and receive policy and admintstrative guidance from the All Union MVD in Moscow. The Ml'VO system is well Integrated in the governmental

TOP sFCBE"Q

TOP SSCBE1"

structure or major cities and industrial areas vulnerable to air attacks. Ex1sting civil agencies such as health and tire departments are uUlized to Implement MPVO measures. City o1Ilclals rather than MVD personnel are responsible for di ectin(; local air defense activities. MVD personnel actually enroecc local air defense policies as formulated in Moscow.

106. Deceptum: In Korea, talse road convoy were employed at night. to lure United Nations aircraft into flak traps or hanglng cable defenses. Dummy aircraft, airfields, and field guns were also noted. To d te tner have been no obscrvauons Of camouflage on a mass area basis such as canst uc ion Or slmulat on thrOugh radar camouflage of false cities, factories, and lakes. However, these techniques were used b he Germans during World War II, a.nd i 'mus be assum'E!d'lJ1at the Soviets are aware of this pot.e~tlal1ty. Sorne sites have been observ d ill the USSR and in som of Ute Satellites which m y be dummy airfields, but no replicas of large elaborate airfields have been noted.

107. Aircraft Dispersal. In combat areas during World War n, tile general Soviet prac Ice was to avoid high concent-rations of aircraft on a partdcular field. The necessary operationai concentrations wit-hln a given sector was aeni vcd by using satellite fields around a major airfield, The CUrl' n PI' cnee of ut • lizing natural surface airfields even where adequate hard surface runways are avallab e Indicates that ttl Russ <IDS are still dispersalconscious, Furthermore, the ability to use natural surface airfields Is a tremendous asset to a dispersal concept ev n tho gh some malntenance and operational problems may be magnilled. By us' g a mass take-off tecnnique, the SOvIet air forces have demonstrated an ability to evacuate a regiment of fighter aircraft from a natural surface field within Q period Of. three minutes. al hough several hours advance notice may have been give . A current practice of the Soviet a COl'CQS is to bas one or two fighter regiments at one field. DurIng wartime, in areas subject to air attack, It UJ probable that no more than one fi hter regiment ill be bas d a anyone !leld.

22

108. Underground tnstauauons. SOme pertpheral cities such as Vladivostok, Baku, and Bevastopcl ha e retained ¥td improv d elaborate defensive tunnel systems constructed durIng World War II. Some alrftelds in the Far East are equlpped with underground storage space and repair shops. and there have been several reports Of underground hangar construction in Germany, Poland, and Rumanla; Underground command posts and filter centers have been reported in ll~ngary and Bulgaria and I is assumed thai similar Installstions exist in rna or clues and defense centers thro gnout thc SovIet Bloc. Extensive underg ound Ins allations (or the protec Ion ot population groups are believed to exist. in only a few major cities.

109. Tra~nit g. Passive defense agalns air a tack is included in training 'programs

. thru ghout the Soviet rorces. field manuals and pamphlets are published for troop issue. and defense against chemical attack is included in school curricula. Reeen maneu-

en; in East Germany hay in uded defensive tactics against. atomic weapons and indicate t·hat Soviet mllltary Ieaders are ware of the problems ot s rvival in atom c warfare. There is no known organization within Ute milltary forces charged soiciy t.h bactertologtca warfa e defense but it is probably lha tne. mill ary medical organlza on has this respons billty. Troop training stresses dJsclpline wi h regard to avotdlng water, foods uffs, and areas of contamination.' The curran issue gas mask is believed to a1' oro adequate pro-

ec .io agatns BW Aerosols.

Ill. TRENDS I BLOC AIR DEFENSES

THROUGH 1960 10

110. The Bioc, and parttcularly he USSR, is continuing Its intensive efforts to improve the existing air defense system in order to cope with the growing Western capabilities. (See Sec ion 1). Th objec tves of the Bloc a~

"The llmaL<: 'thl non are based on the

assumpt on that neither domestic or Internnuona polltleal factors nor unexpected tech"01~1 ;u br llltthrou Its wUl a.lter tne ener!l.1 nature 01 I"'N\J)On prOgmms Il$ now Tlv1$aged. In be Bloc and 111 W·.

do.fense planners during 1955-1960 will almost certa1n~ be to: (a) develop and produce in quantity equipment wJth pertormanee charactertst1cs capable of com.batlng the Western air threat; (b) rapld1y improve the tratnlng 01 air defense units; (C) develop better communications faclllt1es; (d) Improve and Increase tale number 01 alrtlelds; and ( ) improve their atr defense organizatlon,

111. To meet these objectives would be a task or such magujtude as to require a major effort during the 19Sfr-1900 period. Achievement of a higb degree 01 effectiveness would require a very large scale program 01 research, development, and prod ction in order to keep pace with Western developments. II OW' estimate or their a.na.iy is of the air derense problem is sound, the Soviets will probably seek to do the fOllowing:

. ct. Develop all-weather . interceptor aircralt with airborne intercept equ pment able to opera te from low altitudes to 6.1,000 feet and at speeds better than 1,150 knots;

b. Develop lmpro c<l AA rockets arid missiles;

c. Develop an early warning system arou d the entire S1no-SovJet Bloc; to provide early warnIng as far out as 750 miles from Bloc border at altitudes up to 80,000 feet;

d. Develop airborne early arning a' crart and assocla too equipment;

e. Develop a more o.ffoct.h'e communlca Ions system, and provide more land lines;

[, Develop an integrated automau data handli.ng system;

g. con Inuously train persona 1 to operate all elements of the ai defense system;

fl. "Improve III d enlarge cxisung airfields and construct. new nirflelds'

£. Modily the command policy of the air defense organlz.ation to pennit operational dectstons at lower levels:

;. Impi-cwe range and altitude capabt ities or GeT radar: and

k, D velop countermeasures equipme t to render nostile navigational and bombing radar lnetrect.1ve and to prevent jamming of lhe radar and communications equipment of the Bloc alr defense sy stern.

Trends in Strength and Equipment

112. NtJD FI!)hter T1/Pcs. The USSR will probably introduce additional new day and all-weather fighter type$ during the periOd of this estt.l1late as indicated in Appendix B. As these new fighters are phased In. t.he older types will be dropped from the order 01 batUe so that all FAGOTS will probably be replaced by 1957. We estimate Ule FRESCO wUJ probably be further developed, i! not so already, by tho lnSt.aJlation 01 an 8,000 lb.-thrus~ engine and will con tin ue to be used. throughou t the period of this estimate but in reduced numbers by 1960. By 1960, we' OOI1eve the Bloc will have both day and all-weather fighters With peeds up to 860 knot.!, tJme to climb to 10,000 ret Of about two mlnutes, and eomba ceUings up to 62,000 feet: (See Appendix C for estimated .perrormancc characteristics of . new fighters.) .

1 3. Ouer-ou. Fighter Strength Through 1960. We estimate that thore will probably bc Only a modest increase in authortaed Bloc fighter .strength from some .14,600 in 1955 to 15,530 in 1960. However, a tar mo e signi1icant increase probably take place in the proper. t on of all-weather figbters, whicn we estimate will grow from 300 in 1955 to 6,100 by 1960. ~timated total TO&E .strengths by year are

IlS Io tows: 11 .

USSR
19~e 1957 . 1M3 HIS9 l~SO
.1et Day 9,5()() B.l00 --
6,900 4,300 6,100
Jet AW 1,000 2.500 3.800 4,500 ",600
~rol>Can Satellites
. Jet Day :2,5lO 2.{80 2,380 2,100 1,880
Jet AW 0 100 200 400 '100 Mnnchurla-Chlna-Kotcl\'

P1.st.on 100 100

Jet Dny 1,570 ,7ro

let. AW W 100

TOTAUI 14,830 15,130

A W 1.030 2. 700

Da,y 13,600 12,11'30 11.080 10,450 9. 30

'w bt!Ueve a small VI ~ Mfuh Air l'otee ... HI be developed dlU"l.ng the perlod of th.I3 estimate.

100 00 100
1,700 1.570 1,3~
200 350 &00
15,2S0 15,.400 15,530
UOO 4.950 6,100 u F1)r ~lrc gth by type ana PhM1D.g In ot alrcratt, ISiCC J\ppend1x B.

TOp SECRE"

T.QP Ii'EC~Ii:T

114, Future Radar Coverage. On the basis at observed trmds in SOviet radar developmeat and deployment, we estimate that the USSR will gradually replace many of its present radars with Unproved radars. By 1960 the range coverage capabllities of Sov1et. EW and GCl radars w1l1 probably be increased by as much as 50 percent (within propagation llmIts) over the ranges llsted in the table In paragraph '13, Against a B-47 size target EW coverage will probably extend to 100.000 teet by 1960 and GCl coverage could extent to as much as 85,000 teet.

115. Estimated Soviet alr defense programs through 1960 would provide operational radar S}J ollows:

MltJ- MJd- ·M1d- Mid- MJd-- Mld,J
EQulpme.n~ 1956 1966 Ul57 19l1S 1959 1960
---_ ----
TOKHN . -450 S2s 500 GOO 800 600
70 MC '!'ype:I eoo G!iO 700 675 6GoS 550
N~w EW 2!i 75 150 200
New OCI 25 1 .. 0 lOO .(00 400 -400
FIre Control 600 650 700 C561) (.0() ~OO
New Fire
Control 25 200 -400 GOO 800 !lOO
IFF Inter-
rag. tor 1,000 1,250 1,500 1,700 1.900 2,000 116. Priority deployment Of the radar indicated above will probably be made to the Western and Southwestern rron iers Of Bloc territory rrom Murnlllrulk to the Casp an Sea, in t.he Maritim Provinces of the Far East, and

24

perhaps to a few internal areas. As improved equipment appear' in these high priortty locations, th .shill. or prc.sently available TOKEN t.ypes to lower priority areas DOW covered by obsolete equipment, will also result-In the improvement 01 detection capabilities in those areas, As the avera go detection range 01 Soviot radar is increased by t.be build-up of TOKEN strength and the introduction oC improved radar types the general dispos tion of the equipment may be expected to pread in order to realize the lull advantage or the increase 10 range capability,

117. Sue a spread should enable more complete covers e to be afforded Arctic ar as wher pe etraung aircrart cnroute to Importan target .areas mig t be c. pected to enter Communist territory. Jncreased detection coverage oC the south -ccntrat USSR border area adjacent to Iran and' .Paklstan might also be an lclpated, and an increased flow of rada into C ina is also to be expected. We beli ve thai by 1958 sufficient TOKEN radar will be availab e 0 provide compi te coverage i thc area between Ha1nan Island and S angnal. Tracking facilities to back up the improved coastal detect On capabul y W1ll probably appear first. in a zone some 100-150 miles inland rrom the coast, and in toe v1cln1ty 0 Important inland clues sucn as Hankow and Chan sna.

118, Radar Deployment, Es imated geographic deploymen of Bloc early warning and ground control intercept. radar is as follows:

Ar Esllmated N'um.ber 01 Radar
19S5 1~6 J~a7 1968 1959 lS6()
Ea4t.em Europe 300 SOO 300 300 300 300
Sov'let Weucro }lronUer 150 1'15 200 200 200 200
80m No thweJ t. 50 75 100 12S l2~ 125
M 'cow and AVllroacli 175 17 2X)O 200 200 200
80utb C ntral FronUer 6() 75 100 J2S 25 125
Vrttl 25 SO 100 125 125 125
Slbe rlrul Baikal 0 5 100 125 140- 150
Far Ea.3t. 1~!) 2.00 2()0 200 200 200
MAllchurla. ClUna, KoreA 130 245 325 31'S tOO "2~
TOTAL 1,075 1.325 1.~~ 1,750 l.815 1,850
" ~'iiP Ii; iii Iiil iHi rp" us. Commumcations. Considerable Improvement In Soviet air defense communications is probable through 1960, as the USSR has dlsplayed considerable technolOgical capabilities

. in t.his 11e1d. Automatic data handling

eqtrlpment. may be used in some crit-ical areas although we consider It unlikely that the USSR will have an integrated country-wide system in operaucn by H160.

120. A.ntiaircraft ArtiUery. The Sov:lets apparenUy stlU plan to place considerable reIianee on AA art.illery. W estdmate that the fOUowing new weapons will become avaUable through 1960:

2S

low-yi d nuclear warhead, and a maximum e.ffective range on the order 01 100 nautical miles.

122. A!,r-to-air guided missiles may become operational as tighter armament during the period 01 this estimate. Altl10ugh there is no ev:ldenco ot a Sov:let air-to-air missile program, it. Is es lmated that the USSR now has the capabilit.y to produce a missile wi b t following characteristtcs: range.In tile order Of 5,000 yards varying with release llltitude, supersonic, ·1n1rarod homing, weight 175 pounds, and a 25-30 pound warhead. Such

Weapon

MUm

Max. Vert.!cal EUee. Velocity

A", able. RlU)ge FL. Ceiling Ft. Ft. Sec..

Rate or Fire ~

. Aru.lt.1-bartel.lcd

30mm l05B

18..000

Ungulc1ed Hig.hU!~el Rocke

(Zenith) 19~UI~'1

OTer CO.OOO

Ubgu1cied Lo",-

Len 1 Rocket M lIl' 6 p»e's.r by 1000

5,000 3,600
50.000 .,000
to burn-
CO,OOO oat
nloc1ty EstImated deployment of AA guns through 1960 Is as follows: (See table on page 26)

121. Guidec:llt!tsslles. It is highJy likoly that the USSR w1lI place increasing reliance on guided missues tor air defense use." During 1957-1958, we estimate that series production could begin on 11 surface-to-air missUe with terminal homing, a maximum eficctive range o! f>O,OOO yards at GO,OOO foot. alti udc and a warhead on tho order o! 500 pounds. The low.yield nuclear wllrhead pro~bly a allable for this missile in 1958 would greatly increase the kill prObability as well as the problems of attack. Sometime after 1960 the Soviets could ha;e a lurth r irnpro Cd surrace-to-atr mlsslle wit.h terminal homing equipment. a

., See N1E 11-4-M ~50'(1 ~ Cap~ruUes -.ad Probable ProF-nun! in the Oulded MlssU" Field." Ilnted 6 October .t9M for a detau<!d cstJ.mal.e.

\nop

a missile would be llm1ted to tan cone at.tacks under generally rair weather conditions 11 the

ttack altitude, The FRESCO could be modified to carry tour such missiles wlt.h mrrarcc homing and be operational now. BUring the period 195'" 1958, the range of this missile could be increased to epproxtmately 10,000 yards and might not be limited to tail cone attacks. By 195&-1960 a completely new air-toair miss e with a sem1acUve terminal homing system, a warhead Of about f>O pounds and an effective range or approximately 10,000 yards varying with release al 1 ude could be ready for series production. 11 thts mlssllc does not appear untU the latter part of the 19 8-1960 period, an 'active homing head COUld be incorporated.

SECPET

(()
C> 0 0 ~ "" 8 0 ~ 8 ~ s ~
C> 0 ton ~ i
~ ~ ~ .". 0> to
1& ~ ... N N- <D-
....
~ 8 8 8 ~ :& s 0 0 0 C> 0
~ ton Q ~ ~ on
~ "l. .... ... - ... :; • CD ... .... CD
.. N .... ..r ~
.. 8 0 ~ ~ 8 8 0 o. 0 § °
.c C> 0 on ~ :2
toO C>'\. ... ... ". '1. co ...
~ N N cO .... '" c-i .0
.,. ...
. .,
!:! ~ 0 ." 8 s s 0 s: 0 C> 0
0 0 ~ 0 .... c;>
:l- eo ~ «> ~ M '" "t ~ ._
:;j ... ....
~ § 0 0 "" ." ." s 8 ." ." 0
.,. 0 .... .... :~ '" 0 g
0 ~. "" .... ... a. co .... ....
S :J ... en "" :-f
'"
~ .,.,
~ ~ s:- o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ·8 8
on &l ~ ~ '" ~ ~ ~ ~
g "'. .., <'l
c-i c-i c-i ~.
s :xl
~
Zo .., ... 0
2:S: ~ 8 g ~ s § 8 8 S! 8 0 It>
f-o, <>t ... e- '" '" co .... o • "l. ~
:3 ".- .0 ... N .,..
~~ 1;;
~
~ ... "" ... :& ... ~ s: ." ." C> 0
o s 0 C> C> .... 0 "" s ."
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r..~ ~ '" '" ~.
'1 0'
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~ ., C> 0 0 0 C> C> 0 C> 0 8 8
s §. on ~ .. ., ~ C> g . ., 8
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::J ... ... en N ... ~
~ oo
0()
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~ ." ." 0 0 0 :]; Sl 0 ... 0 0
~ ~ i ~ .... ~_ C> If) '" ~
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~ .... N N
~ !3~
l'l .., ]~
8 ." ." ~ 8 s g 8 :5 ." C> ~j
~ 3 '" .... s
s ~ M c- oo .... ... ~. '"?
""
If) -
'" 81il
2:
t' 8 0 ~ 8 ~ 0 0 8 8 ~ 8 --:9
." ~ ~
<C to: ." ... '" '" ~. "'l.
.. ~!n
::!l ... CD
~'d
::l .c :l~
!$ ..0 ~ .~ ~
~ ~
to j 2 ...
~ ~ff ,9 ...
:1 ' ..,
e 0- ~ ~ ~'
S jc -e f <'l o~ cs.Q
~2l. ~ .. n -e OJ l<l .....
U2 .. ~ ~< .. ·0 1! Itl ;;l
~o 0 l': .. .. §~
~ ~;$ Z u£ ~ .. ...
.. a ~ ~~
8- c;§ .,. 0 .. cds ~B ~
.. 4> 3 OJ
e ~.s - .. > gt: ~ .. <I s
~(£. :9 III .....
~ 0 ~ 00 0
U2 IJ) to fl) ;:, '" to r.>Z Z TOE .FeBE1'

27

123. Probable Fut,lTe Guided Missiles for Air peietise. cnaracterts Ics of Soviet missiles hat could be available during the per ad of his Wmate are as fol OW!3:

127. We estima that th cost of th~ estimated ir derense program at the stno-acvret B oc wi be abou 39 bUUon 1951 rubles for lOSS and about 86 blllion l.95 r bles tor 1960.

Warh ad M.1!'.slle
Max. Alt. We Ig)"l I. WeIght
Type Ml8.s11e U 11,(00) IIbs) (lbs) nnnge Ouldance
MOM/W5ij 2S-30 17a 2..5 nm In1rarcd
AAG).tl1958 50 300 I) nm ScmJactlv radar
·..homrng
.v.OMf19a0 SO 350 S nm AcLive r du homing
6AOMlJ~a 50 less IJ1tll'1 30.000 to ' ·Se 1hominll he d
60D 35,000 yds,
SACJM/19!>7 60 !!()O }fE or 5D,OOO ycis. TemUnal bOUlIt1!;
n cl ar
S.'\CJM/UlGO 100 mI. Terminal bomtng
'Maximum Illt tude 01 t,he .Ill1Wle' Ls lImlte-d by ttl ble for
ase during the perl cd 0 r th.Ls estlm so te. 24. We estimate that the USSR mi 'ht have more than 200 surface-to-air rnis Ue sites in 1960.

125. Electron c CO'UlI term ealtU1'es. Sovi t countermeasures capabilities are already lligh and will probably improve. through 1960. We esuma e, lor example, that by 1960' he USSR can have Jamming equipment In operational use for frequency ranges up through 30,000 megacycles.

Economic Impact of Air Defense Program 126. Cost 0/ Air Deiens« 1955-1!J60, The cost. 01 the air defense program which we have estlmated the Sino-Sov1e Bloc le-ade.rs wlll probabJy undertake during thls period, has boon measured in aggTega~ terms. While we recognize that money calculations of Soviet productJon costs and capabilities are only approximations, they do pennlt. the establishment of reasonable magnitudes witb which to weigh th economic signillcnnce of the program. S'tlcb calculations also serve as an indication ot the prtonty and effort which would be required and the possible cUects on other military and industrial programs.

Figure 1 shows how the to al cos at the SinOsoviet Bloc air defcnse program is allocated through time and by prtnclpal alr defense runcnon, Of these tota s, approximately 22 bUron rubles in 195.5 and 3 bUlloD robles in 1960 wou d be ini 1al costs while the remaind r would be operatmg costs.

128: 'The impact or these costs may be Illustrated as follows: if LoW Bloc military expenditures conform to a. 'prevtous estuna~,n the cost of this air defense program would rise from about 22 percent ot the total in 1955 to about 45 percent in 1960; expenditures for other m1lltary programs would have to decline accordingly. 11, on the other hand, expenditures for these 0 her military programs did not. d1m.Inish, but instead rose

.. Mlllta.ry expend.lttU'~ by th'.! USSR dl1rtng the period 1955-1900 were e U~ted 1n Nm 11-3-55 "SOy et capabUltles and Prob b e Sov1et Cour~ ot AcV.on tJttOllg;h 19i1O," publlshed 17 May 19S5. Blnce corI'CSl'>Ol'IdJnc agreed estJm te$ or the m.lUtQry expenditure:> of other Bloe ecuntrtes do no~ e:idst., tentaUve estimates have been madc to:r the pUIIK)$C$ or the above J)aragTllph. Even .$hOuid such U!DtllUvC strmates be proved. to be c:olUlderably in error the eoneiusiona arriY-Cd at

ould Dot be matcrtnJly altered..

28

FIGURE I

ESTIMATED SI~O-SOVIEl BLOC AIR DEFeHSE PROGRAK INITIAL AKD OPERATING COST, 19&~ TO 1960

leo

15

~""""""""""" i'~'~ .~. '. ~. i .~. ~ '1

:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.,.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:. C(mT»n"

.··,·.·.· ... ·,·.·.·t·,·····.··.···

2$

,¥QP .FORET,

TOP SECRET

29

at the rate previously es Irnated for total milItary expenditures by the USSR alone (a It) percent increase by 1960 over 195t), U\() result would be an increase of 40 percent in absolute Bloc military expenditures over the period. (See Figure 2)

129. The burden 01 the air de en e program wouJd not Call equal y upon all countries ot lh Bloc, lowever. Specinlized industrial equipment and trained manpow r for the air detens prC)g'ram would have to be provided primarily by the USSR itseU, with the assistance ot Czechoslovakia, Poland, ~d perhaps Bas Germany and Hungary.

130. This air detense program would const-itut.e a substantia! but not impossible burden upon the B oc economy. "We believe that the cost would be such as to require either a diversicn of resources from other mllitary 1l.5eS. or an increase in the total milltary budget such as would probably lead to some reduction in he rate of growth of the economy,

131. Electronic Equipment and Precision Instru1'Mni.s, The electronics requirements lor the estimated air derense program are very great, Taken together with other mllitary and essential clV1l1an demands they wou d put a nous strain on the Bloc e ectronlcs industry. Estimates, or tuture performance in this industry are necessarily soraewna t te 'uous. It appears hlglly likely. however, t at the Bloc could not carry out. the estimated air defense program Wi .1 out (a) dtvertlng electronics equipmen (rom other military demands or (b) expa.ndlng the elec ronlc industry to t.he limit.') of fea..5:lbility. The latter course would be the more difficult because the rate t which military el ctronlcs produc ion facUities could be expanded migh t be less han the rate applicable to the electronic Industry in gene al, We do not believe that ulfUlment of el ctronics equtrem ts would offer such an obstacle as to make the estimated air de-

rensc program ilnpossible;we are certainrnowever, that i would constitute a very formida.ble dilficulty,

132, A further limitation In the air defense program m y well exist in the precision mechana s m sector in vi w of the tolerances involved and the skilled labor required. For example, the estimated number of gyroscopes required for new equipment in 19 3 was abo 75,000 or which approximately 80 percent. were tor atrcrart use, and !~w. Of these gyroscopes w re 01 tbe degree or precision and miniaturization necessary tor use in guided missiles. By comparison 'the estimated alr defense program 'will continue to demand a least as many gyroscopes lor aircraf use and, in addition. estimated 9Jr defense missile production would equlre 4.,300 gyros in 1954; 15,000 in'1955; 04,000 In 195'7; and 270,000 1960,

33. Other, Equipment. An xaminatlon of Soviet Bloc lndustrlal racniues avnllable to !ulft1l air defense procurement requirements reveals DO other apparent restrictions, Although the total poundage of aircraft and engines required to be produced for the estimated program would increase substantially by 19Em, these demands are within the capacity of the indus ry. Similarly, tbe increase in guided missile production required is probably within the present economic capacity of tl e Bloc. For 0 her air dt?fcnse weapons, the production Increases req ired are considerab y less than or aircraft and guided missiles and are well within the capacities of the present armament tndustrtes. Under current ctrcurnstances or supply. basic materials required for the air deI()J'lSe program arc apparen y no a serious problem to the Bloc. Manpower limitations se m unlikely to place at y general restrictions (In the program, al 0 gh some qualitative problems m1gh develop in th precision e gineertng stills.

'iPQP SEepE.

TOP SFCBE.L,

.30

FIGIIRE 2

RELATIOte BETWEEI! SIIIO-SOVltT BlO TOTAL MILITARY f(PEICOlillRES~ AMD ESTIHATED COST OF AIR DEFEKSE PR06R~, '9~5-19aO

50

25~

Air oeren

200

150

100

y U60-A - If to~"l ilit'Ht c)(~el\dilures arc eld 10 eve i s previolu;!_y e s r lme i ea , [see

fool not to p"ragraph 12&)

1./ 1960--B - I t c e s t 0 ,,1 r mi Illary progra S groN5 15 percent (om 1,}5S to 1960" air

de en~e cort .. r~ Add~d •

. _ ,.

'<COP SE'RET

APPENDIX A

A PRO~ 80VlBT ESTJ.'MAT& OF PHRFORt-WlCl!: cnARACTERLSTlCS OF TJS WEAPONS

1965

Combat Comb t nombload OT
Bomb!!rl; QellLng RadU Warhead we,
---mr- (ru'n) cibs}
B-36 ~,OOO l5()/l5,OO() 3,600 10,000
B-4'1 4.0,00.0' ~50/35.000 ,700 10.000
8-52 47.090· 5OO/~O,OOO 3,000 1.0,000
B.,!;? 46.000 500/18,000 1,000 5,00.0
~G 43,.oO() 5()O/-tO,OOO 1,2.0.0 1.0,000
gb rs
F 6 45,000 525/35,000 400 500
1'-$11 \tD,OOO 52:1/35,000 375 3,000
r-roo 54..000 7(;o/3S,OO.o 3'111 800
F-IOl 53,000 900/35,000 800 1,000
N ..... a.I Al.tcra1t.
AD 30,.000 300/1'1,!JOI) ,.000 3,000
It.J 3.0,000 4.00/35,(100 '150 1.0,000
AJD 4~,OOO 600/4.3.000 ,I5O 8.000
A4D SO,OOO 500(3.5,0.0.0 800 3,000
F3R 45,000 :150/35,.000 700 3,00.0
ill 54,000 800/35,000 e50 3,00.0
P9P_9 55,.000 650ta5,OOO esc 3,00.0
P2V low aJ , 282/s.l, 1..200 11,00.0
SJ)C'ed 1n
OuJdcd II s M.acll No. R nge
'l'e.c;UccLl SSOM 3-4 'I 100
Short-R~e 880M 4S,ODD .0,9 6CJO-.6OO 3,00.0
AIr-to Surtl1ce 50,00.0 2.5-3 . .0 JOO S,OOD TOP

SRCRE'TJ

..

32

APPENDIX A (COntinued)
1!)s7'
Speed :l.t
Combat S~d Combat BO!l1blolld or
Bombers Ceilla,g AlUtude .R,ll(lU Wnrhcad We.
em e 0 Itt) (nm) ( bs)
S:une 1I3 1955
FlS:hl.4:r.s
F-105 55,000 1,100/3 .000 700 3,000
Naval AIr aCt
F8U 515.000 7~0135,000 !>SO 3,000
S1) cd In
GuJded Missl (:3 Mach No. R~ngc
Lonr.-Rang SSOM 50.000 0.8-0.9 5.()(l0 6,000
MedJum-Ran~e 8S0M GO.oOO 2.4 1;200 3,000
1960'
Comb t
Bombers ~dJl (nm)
B..s8 64,000 l,ISMiO,OOO of,OOO 7,01)()
FIghters
Stun as lor l!WI 1S6,OOO 35,000 10 a]

aoO/35,OOO 800
GOols.l. 750
sso/s.r, 1,200
p .d Eo
Mllch No. Bange
3-4 5,000
3-4 3,000
10-.20 5,.500 3,000 30,000 16.000

Improved VI' (

o Ide(l M~!Ie$ Lonl':-Rane-e 880M Long.Rt'nIlC SSOM Lo~-liange

)1, IU3tJe 850M

8S,000 80,000

7,000 12,000

.200 m

3,000

• Onl), 1J103' ..... eapcns 'l.'lUl hlg_her performance n:1J'l nos for 1S15S are &hown .

• Only hose weapons VIIth hlghor per(orm.an cbarscteristdcs thlUl t.h tor 195'7 Ilr sho

~ SECPET.

33

APPENDIX B
ESTIMhTED TO&E STRENGTf[ tr SR f'10HTImS 195~19G()
Mid-HIM Mid-HIM M1d-195'1 Mid- ()Sa Mld-19!)9 M.1d-1geo
o~ 3J)OO 1,500
Prc:;co 5,100 7,000 5,900 1,7()() 300 ~-
PlUmer 2()0 1,000 2~O 3,GOO 4,200 2,9()0
I 957-Day 600 1,800 2.600
l!}!,i).DaJ ~OII
Tota Dajl 10,100 D,5(JO s.io» G~OO (5,300 11,100
h/W
. 191;4 MW (~soo) ·200 ,(00
1955 A/W (Fl~h ) lOll 600 2.500 M.OO 2,000 ,!lOO
lil57 A/W 400 1,600 2,500
1959 A/W 500
Total A./W 300 1,000 2,6()0 3,800 ',.s00 .o!,e.<J(l
Totsl ght.en 10,4()O 10,500 10,000 10.700 10,800 0,000
.. &I' C) 9 S i" C F? If ~

34

APPENDIX C

PERFOFWANCE C'l'IARACTRRmTICS OF SINO-SOVIET BLOC BQtm'Ml!:NT
A1RC1l.AlrT
191)5
Comba~ Combat
,_ radius radllI3
Rate ot Maximum without WIth
c.llin b tl& TIme to .speed ;lt' Combat external external
oS '1 levol altitude 'C' level celling fuel lu.el
(t ,tmln) (mln/it) (kt8) -rm- (nm) '"'"'iiiti))
PAOOT (R.D-'l5) 8,300 &.0/40,000 ~G4 49,000 2iO 380
(5,000 b. lJ\n. t)
FAGOT IY~l) lO.()OO 6.2/40,000 5.80 54,000 225 3.00
16,000 lb, Ul=~t)
FAGOT (VK,..lA) nCl e.o}(O,oOO 591) ,54,000 22.5 300
(7,000 Ib, thrust)
FRESCO 12,2()() 8.0/4.0,000 822 M,OOO 190 nil
(without alter-bur er)
(7,000 lb, torustJ
mESC02 25,400 3.7/40,.000 ,634 5B.DOO na
(with arte r-burn r) a
(7,000 I t.hru:;t)
FARMER' 33,100 2.7/4~,OOO 845 !>8,200 325 na
Twin Jilt
FLASltLIOHT 15,200 5,7/4(),OOO ~O 51,.000 i75 na
Twin Jet
'At combs! welJ!ht.
• Includes use or afterburner lor cl1mb IUld COmbnt
• 4,5 min. wIth external tanb "'DP SFCpF'J>

mop SFCRE'T!

35

1057 1959

(New (Nerw

Day) Day)

1957 (New AW)

1959 (New AW)

Da1 Fighters 1~'1 Armament - 50 2'" - 3" Rock t$ 0:-

• 30mm gun.s oI 1.000 RPM ~

• air-to-air gu1ded ~Ue!l

Firc COlltrol- range onl, radar with automo.tJc computer

All-weather P!ghte-ra ISIS?

Armamcnt - 50 2'" - 3'" Rocket.:s or

4 sOmm InIJ\$ or 1.000 RPM ~ " a1r-to-a1r gulded m1ss1les

Fire Contro1- AI radl\r with search range up to Wnm. a.n.d lock on range ul? to 14nm.

Day and AU-Wt!'Bthcr F1.ghtel'3 1951)

... .nnament-ume lIB for !9!i7 day and AW tiebten.

Fire Contra -AI radar 9111.11 searcll rllIl£C ul) to 24nm. and lock. on ranee u,p to 6run.

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLKRY 1955

EsUm~ted Pertormnn~ Of OperatJooill SOviet M Weapons

MY lbl.eor Est. eft.
Caliber (tIs c Fire (RPr·{) Pro) Wgt (fb$) Celling (tt)
8.5m!ll MH3!) 2.6ZS 1~() 20.2 25,000
35mm Ml944 2,950 15-20 ~ :10,000
l00mm MIIHO' 3,200 25-30 3~.() 35,000
l.22mm 3,300 1.0 55 . .0 40,000-45 • .000
37nun MI939 2,9s() 160-180 1.G ~,500
~'l'mm MI950 3,000 130- 5IJ e.e 15,000
3.500
12.7mm MO Z.OOO 5SO.aoD .lD 1,300
14."mm MO 3,CO() 500 per barr I .16 1.500 'ProX1m1ty fUZC3 could be em loyed willi 'RCl1opons 01 8~ mID 01' lArger.

ESTIMA'l'ED CBARAC'I1l:RISTICS" or AN"I"IAIRCRM'T ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL E~UIPMKNT (~tml\ted to I'ppear in 19.55)

Target type

P Z

00,000 00,000

B--17

Time to cllmb

to 40,000 tt. (min) 2.5 2..0

Ma.xtmwn Sl)eed-

ell level'

(lalots) !I'lO 700

2.5

2..0

80,000 'I'O,OO()

6'70

.'100

Maximum 5J)Ccd' '0,000 r .

(knots) 700' 800 700 SOO

M:L:dmmn spero'

3S,OOO te.

(knot.s) '160 8SO '150 850

Combal ceU1ng

(ft.) GQ,OOO 62,OO() 60.000 62,000

Combllo1. rt.d.!U$

(run)' (with

e:'(t~mtU tuel) ~ 400 400 400

'Combat . ran II 0

. (ntn) (with

exU3rnal fu.el) 1.000 1.000 J,.oOl) 1,000

'It Is ~Uma.ted that the e f.1roratt will be eQWp· ped wHb U\ armament and tire control eqtUIr ment shown to tbe r1g,ht:

All speeds I\:e with thrust augment.allon.

M1lX t:rsclc ~e (,-<is.) Max 6Cl1rob raD&e (,.<4.)

80.000 170.000

WOP SiCBET..

36

APPENDIX D

1. The calculation 01 costs of the air defense program outlined in section 11 ot this esnmate includes all Items which can be dJreCtJy charged to the Bloc air detense prog,rnm over the period of this estimate. In estimating the cos of this complex air detense program, it was necessary to dlstinguiBh bet.ween initial costs and operating costs. Initial costs are those tbat occur only once during the estabIlshrnen of a program and include such items as base fo.clllties, major equipment, spares for stocks and pipeline, initial training, and trans.portauon. Oputallng costs are those expenditur-es whlch recur regularly, representing the consumption 0 . fuel and rnaintenanc pares, the provision and supper; 01 personnel.: and

. the replacement 01 equipmen However,

three types or inl~ial and operating costs were spcctacany omitted from the calculation. The first t.ype includes costs incurred before 1955, such as drone aircraft. and some radar. The second type Includes costs Incurred in providing facil't.ies and services used 10r other purposes as well as air defense • such as commonuse air bases and the superior command struclure. Fina y, certain costs 01 warheads were not included because nuclear Warhead costs were not avai able.

2. In order to rf>.f!ect Changes In weapon systerns and the composi ion and number of opera .ing units, coot dat.a wer or anlZed and summarized at the smallest practical opera-

lonal military unit. For scnedultng. we have taken the numb r of units (t.e., missues, AAA, and aircraft) estimated to be deployed at midy at' as the average number Of units operating in the air de en.se system {or that year. It ls assumed th.at the initial costs were incurred the year prevtous to the £Irs full operating year. • Initial costs of the units {or each category of major equipment and equipment spares were estimated, giving consldera ion to the lower costs associated with the volume of producuon impUecI in this es lma e. It. was assumed hat trained operating units were the gOal of the program. As soon. therefore, as

sufficient major equipment became available from production, an operating unit was scheduled tor actlvanon and provided with a complete set of special and organieatlonal equipmont, Inltlal stocks, and personnel,

3. nus actlvatlon schedul became the basis ot phasing t e initial ~em costs _into a time pattern. The cumulative total of toe various types 01 units activated form the basis lor working up the operating costs. The operating costs, reflecting the consumption of f e s and spare parts, the main tenance Of the establishment and .the· replacement of major equipment were then applied.' Durtng the period of the' esttmate some primary operating units wlll be deactivated. In such cases lhe air defense system is credited: for .hose items t.ha t could properly be carried over to a new unit provided wit.b h.!gher performance major

equipment, .

1. The estimated initial costs ot the program from 1964 to 1960 are detailed in Table 1 by sub-catego lcs 01 programs and similar detail is presented tor estimated operating costs in Table 2. It, should be noted that the initial cool .. exceed total operating costs. Because t c guided missUe program must start from a zero base here is a very large ratio of initial to opera 1ng costs in ilie early years. The ra '0 of 0 her programs - will vary from year to year according to the quantity oC in tial equipment introduced to the air defense program.

5. In Table 3 the air defense program is recast in terms 01 tbe economic sectors upon which tM program must lmpinge 10r the sa tis faction of its requirements, From the

tandpolnt of Investment goods the Importar t tern in the table is the amount 0' total industrial procurement whiCh amounts to 21 bUllon rubles in 1955 and 69 billion rubles in 1960. P It another way~ 21 of the currently estimated 78 bUllon rub es of mil tary industrial goods procurement in 955 is for the air defense program. Aswning that the current level ot hard goods procurement for military

0. ~

TOR SEGBE'll

37

rograms 0 her than air defense will not decline In the aggrega £ over the period oj this esumate, military hard goods procur mcnt

would have to Increase 62 percent rrom 1955 to 1960 to implement the requir d air defense program.

Ti\BL& J
Rs-Umatcd Slno-So'" t B oc All Defense Prngram
Ill.ItJ:u Coot, 1954 to 1960
BIlllOn
19~ 19S!) 19~ 195"1 1~8 1959 1960
-- ------ ---~---,-
Alr~ra1t Program 6.25 6.64 10.67 11.00 14.~7 15.73 18.'11
Air(!r.ltL ArmamC.f\t Pros.s 0.07 0.12 0.21 1.62 2.90 HO 5..56
SPilIC Eneine PToe:;ram .7 1.91 3.31 ...00 U1 .uS) 5.10
Altileld Augmenl.aUon 3.00 . 4..58 4..~ 3.81 . 3.05 3.05 2.29
COIllmSUld and Con rol Program 0.21 0.05 0.03 0.02 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
ommunleatton System·. 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 . MO 0.40
RD.dl\r Pro&n= 1,80 2.00 2,49. l.n: 0,7~ 0.74 0.49
Heavy Oun Program 1~ 2.40 2A.0 2.43 1.3 1.3 0.00
Fire Cont-tol (Heavy Oun) 0.32 0.41 0.-46 0.36 0..38 0.18 0.18
Llsllt Oun Program 0.99 1.15 1.21 1.25 1.1~ O.M 0.00
Fire COD ro1 (L1~ht Gun) 0.00 0.3a 0.72 1.08 1.44 1.~3 1.44
SA Oulded MIMlle Progr.ul1 0.73 2..36 2.90 2.3'2 7.47 8.52 17.30 '.
-- -- -- -- --- -- --
TOTAL 16.8 22..38 2(1.38 2!U!:2 38.04 40.93 L47 Table Z
.&tlm.atcd Slno-8ov1ct Bloc Ale Defense Prog~
Op!!ralJ.Dg Coot, 1954 to 1.960
B11llon 1951 Rubles
19.54 1955 1958 1967 1969 1969 1980
-------- ---- ---- ---- ---
hirera!t PTOElIa.m '1.13 7..81 B..D7 10.SlS 12.25 l!UU 16.W
A1rc.raft Armament Program 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.'17 1.1.\9 3.03
Spare Eng1ne Program 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A1r.Cleld Al.lsmenloaUon 0.00 0.18 0.27 ass 0.78 0.116 1.14
Command and Control Program 0.7ll 0.85 0..87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Comm unJea. ttOll S l'stetn 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.D3 0.03 0.04 0 .. 04
Radat' Program 0.56 0.81 1.M 1..36 1..53 1.112 1.70
Boa vy Oun Program 2.27 2..56 2.72 2..34 2..87 2.35 2.74
Ftte Control UleaV)' Oun) 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.30 OM 0..38 0.3S
LIght Oun Program 2..4.6 a.~ 2..69 2.82 2.91 2.88 3.02
nre Control Wghi Gun) 0,(1) 0.00 0.D3 O,OQ 0.18 0.3'0 0.43
1M Oulded MlsstJc Program 0.00 0.15 0.8S l.2e 1.95 ~9'8 ::1.95
---- -- -- -- ----
TOTAL 13.4.5 15.J9 17.65 2.1.24 24.49 28.59 3Ul ('

HiQP .iRep?"

1-"-

..

38 .

T~S

.EsLJ.mIl~d Slno-Sov1et Bloc AJ.r DefeM ?COCurement by sectors Of Orfg1n. 1954 to 1960

SWon H)51 Rub es

IISO )9S7 1958 1959 19GO

-- -- -- -- -- ----

11..87 1M2 J8.5'1 23..24 25.75 aU2

0.23 US Z.52 0.70 9.78 16.40

2.17 3.43 3.67 3.00 2.76 1 ~

0.3) 0 5 0.63 0.71 0.6 0.58

2.49 5.32 6.M 7.23 8.M ll.~

1.47 a.os L 7iI 2..Gc6 :1..28 5.00

I.JIl 1.83 2.00 2..2a 2.&2 2..84

AJrcc:J.U and Englne Procurement Guided Mls.,Ue Procurement Armament, Procurement AmmunlUon Procurement

Speehll 8lec.tron1e PTOc'UTCID nV F';lbr1catM MeW • N'EC

Fuel&

1'o~ loduatrl.nl Procuremen

Oons ~on and ComtrneUOn M<lt.crla\

TrM$pOriation .

PC1'5Onnel ana Scn1ces TraInIng

Total'

16.93 21.2.5 Z().'ro :w.06 4.6.12 53110 69..37

4.77 5.79 7.02 6..26 6.88 5.90 <>.'7s
0.1~ 0.5{) 0.6'7 0.78 1.OB n· 1.65
6..!18 0,.53 '6..83 7.10 7~ 0.70 6.'19
2.18 2.,44 2.72 2.26 2-22 2..10 2.12
-= .-:-
30:26 37.57 47.03 61.OC G2.S3 69..52 85 8 'Electronlo prccuremen such as grOWld radar, AAA tire control, and ground gu1c111nc.e eqnlpment, wl'IJcll Is not Included In oUler procurement categortes,

",