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Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables Author(s): Stephen D. Krasner Source: International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, International Regimes (Spring, 1982), pp. 185-205 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520 Accessed: 05/11/2009 08:41
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Structuralcauses and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables
Stephen D. Krasner

This volume explores the concept of internationalregimes. International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making proceduresaroundwhich actor expectations converge in a given issue-area. As a startingpoint, regimes have been conceptualized as interveningvariables standingbetween basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavioron the other. This formulationraises two basic questions:first, what is the relationshipbetween basic causal factors such as power, interest, and values, and regimes? Second, what is the relationshipbetween regimes and relatedoutcomes and behavior?The firstquestion is relatedto a number relations. But debates aboutthe natureof international of basic paradigmatic for the purposes of this volume the second is equally or more important.It raises the issue of whether regimes make any difference. The articlesin this volume offer three approachesto the issue of regime significance.The essays of OranYoung, and RaymondHopkins and Donald Puchala see regimes as a pervasive characteristicof the internationalsystem. No patternedbehaviorcan sustain itself for any length of time without generating a congruent regime. Regimes and behavior are inextricably linked. In contrast, Susan Strangearguesthat regimeis a misleadingconcept that obscures basic economic andpower relationships.Strange,representing what is probably the modal position for internationalrelations scholars, elaborates a conventional structuralcritiquethat rejects any significantrole for principles, norms, rules, and decision-makingprocedures. Most of the authors in this volume adopt a third position, which can be labeled "modified structural." They accept the basic analytic assumptions of
International Organization 36, 2, Spring 1982 0020-8183/82/020185-21 $1.50 ? 1982 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

185

p. Robert Keohane. This usage is consistent with other recent formulations.p. using a somewhat differentterminology. 1977). Nye. Charles Lipson. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Co- lumbiaUniversity Press.refers to the importanceof rules and institutions in internationalsociety where rules refer to "general imperativeprinciples which requireor authorizeprescribedclasses of persons or groupsto behave in prescribedways. and proceduresthat regularizebehavior Haas arguesthat a regimeencompasses a mutually and control its effects. p. This orientationis most explicitly elaboratedin the essays of Arthur Stein. power-maximizingstates acting in an anarchic environment. it also informsthe analyses presented by John Ruggie.usage and custom. which posit an internationalsystem of functionally symmetrical. 54. Brown. Norms are standardsof behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. and rectitude. internationalregimes may have a significantimpact even in an anarchic world. 553. "TechnologicalSelf-Reliancefor Latin America:the OAS Contribution. and norms. Keohane notes that a basic analytic distinction must be made between regimes and 1 Robert 0.Keohane and that Nye. Rules are specific prescriptionsor proscriptions for action.186 International Organization structuralrealist approaches. and knowledge-that have been used to explain the developmentof regimes. 3Hedley Bull. Principlesare beliefs of fact." ternational Organization 34. Definingregimesand regimechange Regimes can be defined as sets of implicitor explicit principles."1I coherent set of procedures. and Robert Jervis. rules. interpreting. Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little.' '3 Institutionsfor Bull help to secure adherenceto rules by formulating. norms. political power. legitimating. 2 InErnst Haas. for instance. enforcing. rules. Keohane and Joseph S. define regimes as "sets of governingarrangements" include "networks of rules. Regimes must be understood as something more than temporary arrangements that change with every shift in power or interests. diffuse norms and principles. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for makingand implementingcollective choice. and behaviorand outcomes. 4 (Autumn 1980). 19. and BenjaminCohen. . communicating.norms. The thirdsection examines five basic causal factors-egoistic self-interest. administering. The first section of this introductiondevelops definitionsof regime and regimechange. causation. But they maintain that under certain restrictive conditions involving the failure of individualaction to secure Pareto-optimaloutcomes. 1977). and decision-makingprocedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of internationalrelations.2Hedley Bull.and adaptingthem. The following section investigatesvarious approachesto the relationshipbetween regimes.

357. 1979). 1979)."6It is the infusionof behaviorwith principlesand norms that distinguishes regime-governed activity in the internationalsystem from more conventionalactivity. For instance. But it is often much more than that. Towards Professionalism in International Theory (New York: Free Press. reciprocity. 78.by its permanence. guidedexclusively by narrowcalculationsof interest. These rules. is a regime. Systems and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley. the utility functionthat is being maximizedmust embody some sense of generalobligation.'4 For instance.short-termpower maximization (especially not destroying an essential actor). provided that principles and norms are unaltered." arrangements.Jervis argues that the concept of regimes "implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation. The Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Waltz's conception of the balance of power. There may be many rules and decision-makingprocedures that are consistent with the same principles and norms. When states accept reciprocity they will sacrifice short-terminterests with the expectation that other actors will reciprocate in the future. such as "do not bomb sanctuaries. Morton Kaplan. even if they are not under a specific obligationto do so.to be a net benefit on both sides. p. Kenneth Waltz. but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-runself-interest. 66-69. Principles and norms provide the basic definingcharacteristicsof a regime. 23. Over time. As interest and power changed. regime-governed behavior must not be based solely on short-termcalculationsof interest. This formulation is similar to Fred Hirsch's brilliant discussion of friendship. behavior changed. 4 5 .The purpose of regimes is to facilitate agreements. Kaplan's conception.: Addison-Wesley. Since regimes encompass principlesand norms. One such principle. Agreements are ad hoc. the friendship 'transaction'can be presumed. and rules and procedures on the other. 73. A fundamentaldistinctionmust be made between principlesand norms on the one hand. Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes. in which he states: "Friendship contains an element of direct mutualexchange and to this extent is akinto privateeconomic good. in which equilibriumrequires commitmentto rules that constrainimmediate.Structural causes and regime consequences 187 agreements. Similarly. often "one-shot. p. Kaplan. At any moment of time. This has meant a change in the rules governingbalance-of-payments adjustment. is emphasized in Jervis's analysis of security regimes. he contends that the restraints that have applied in Korea and other limited wars should not be considereda regime. though. BenjaminCohen points out that there has been a substantial increase in private bank financing during the 1970s. 1957). the exchange is very unlikely to be reciprocallybalanced.but Robert Jervis's contribution to this volume. Mass.5 Similarly. pp."were based purely on short-termcalculations of interest. 6 Fred Hirsch. 1976). is not a regime. Theory of International Relations (Reading. in which states are driven by systemic pressures to repetitive balancing behavior. p.

" Ruggie avers. have arguedthat the and economic order should be redistribution basic normsof the international and efficiency. There is a fundamentaldifference between viewing changes in rules as indications of change within the regime and viewing these changesas indicationsof changebetweenregimes. in Ruggie's terms. For instance. and conditioned on the behavior of borrowing countries. They see the changes in rules equity. At Americaninsistence the concept of graduation was formallyintroducedinto the GATTArticles afterthe Tokyo Round.there is either a change to a new regime or a disappearanceof regimes from a given issue-area. recent revisions in the Articles of Agreementof the General Agreementon Tariffs and Trade (GATT)provide for special and differentialtreatmentfor countries have instituted less developed countries(LDCs). All industrialized generalizedsystems of preferences for LDCs. in the area of internationaltrade. The change from orthodox liberal principles and norms before World War II to embeddedliberalprinciples and norms after World War II was. on the other hand. not nondiscrimination as changes of the regime because they identify these changes with basic changes in principle. "We know deviations from regimes. Embedded liberalism prescribes state action to contain domestic social and economic dislocations generated by markets.but by the intentionalityand ac- . Ruggie contends that the distinctionbetween orthodox and embeddedliberalisminvolves differencesover norms and principles. holds that as countries become more developed they will accept Graduation rules consistent with liberal principles. Northern representatives have chosen to interpret special and differential treatment of developing countries as a change within the regime. Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself. the industrializednations have treated these alterations in the rules as temporarydeparturesnecessitated by the peculiar circumstances of poorer areas. However.The it does not meanthat there has been a fundamental basic norm of the regime remainsthe same: access to balance-of-payments financingshould be controlled. Orthodox and embedded liberalismdefine different regimes. When normsand principlesare abandoned.188 International Organization change in the regime. "not simply by acts that are undertaken.The differencehinges on assessments of whetherprinciplesand norms have changedas well. Such assessments are never easy because they cannot be based on objective behavioralobservations. Hence. Changes in the latter may be interpretedin differentways. the most-favored-nation of all parties. Such rules violate one of the treatment basic norms of the liberalpostwar order. Fundamentalpolitical argumentsare more concerned with norms and principlesthan with rules and procedures. economic regimesthat took place in the 1970swere norm-governed They did not alter the basic principles and norms of the embedded liberal regime that has been in place since the 1940s. John Ruggiearguesthat in generalthe changes in international changes. a "revolutionary"change. For instance. Speakers for the ThirdWorld. Orthodoxliberalismendorses increasing the scope of the market.

change of a redecision-making gime involves alterationof norms and principles. Iran violated principles and norms. European-derived visited. BASIC CAUSAL VARIABLES -a REGIMES BEHAVIOR RELATED AND OUTCOMES Figure 1 Regimesdo not arise of theirown accord. rules. 4 (Autumn1981)for a similarpoint. Special and differential treatment for developing countries is an indicationthat the liberal regime has weakened. and decision-making procedures of a regime become less coherent." InternationalOrganization35. 380.and weakeningof a regime involves incoherence amongthe components of the regime or inconsistency between the regime and relatedbehavior. It assumed that regimes could be conceived of as interveningvariables standingbetween basic causal variables (most prominently. and procedures. 8 to 7John Ruggie'scontribution this volume. rules. p. norms. the seizure of American diplomats by groups sanctioned by the Iraniangovernment is a basic challenge to the regime itself. not just rules and procedures. change within a regime involves alterations of rules and procedures. the assassinationof diplomatsby terrorists. norms. perhapsmore courage than this editor possesses. then a regime has weakened. The use of diplomatic cover by spies. In contrast. it is necessary to distinguishthe weakening of a regime from changes within or between regimes. even if it has not been replaced by something else. the furtive natureof these activities indicates that basic principles and norms are not being directly challenged. . The first attemptto analyze regimes thus assumed the following set of causal relationships(see Figure 1). "InternationalTheory Reprevailing. They are not merely epiphenomenal. but not of norms or principles. However. power and interests)and outcomes and behavior. This project began with a simple causal schematic. to answer this question in the negative.Structural causes and regime consequences 189 ceptability attributed to those acts in the context of an intersubjective frameworkof meaning. See Richard Rosecrance. If the principles."7 Finally. Once in place they do affect related behavior and outcomes. Do regimesmatter? It would take some courage. or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles. and the failureto provide adequatelocal police protection are all indicationsthat the classic regime protectingforeign envoys has weakened. They are not regardedas ends in themselves.8 In sum. the buggingof embassies. relationsthat rejects the Iran's behaviormay be rooted in an Islamic view of international regime.

persistentpatternof humanbehavior. 9 Susan Strange's contribution to this volume. N. or firms. the reigninganalyticconceptualizationfor economics. The actors may be individuals. selfseeking egoistic individuals. cause of behavior in the internationalsystem. Nowhere is this more evident than in the image of the market. "All those internationalarrangements dignified by the label regime are only too easily upset when power or the perceptionof nationalinterest either the balance of bargaining (or both together) change among those states who negotiate them.The underlyingcausal schematic is one that sees a direct connection between changes in basic causal factors (whether economic or political) and changes in behavior and outcomes. pp. These orientationsare resistantto the contention that principles. . but entirely on the fact that the correspondingtype of social action is in the natureof the case best adaptedto the normalinterests of the actors as they themselves are aware of them. if not misleading. and interaction. They are merely epiphenomenal. In this volume Susan Strange represents the first orientation. Strangeargues that the concept is pernicious because it obfuscates and obscures the interests and power relationshipsthat are the proximate. Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press. and three basic orientations can be distinguished. or their impact on outcomes and related behavior is regarded as trivial. She has grave reservationsabout the value of the notion of regimes. 30. Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets (Englewood Cliffs. And Grotiansees regimes as much more pervasive.norms. Strange'sposition is consistent with prevailingintellectualorientations orientationsconceptualize for analyzingsocial phenomena. not just the ultimate.J. if they can be said to exist at all. but only under fairly restrictive conditions. The conventionalstructuralviews the regimeconcept as useless. there is no general agreement on this point. Regimes are excluded completely. as inherentattributesof any complex.: Prentice-Hall.These structural a world of rational self-seeking actors. specialization in buying and selling. or classes. 1977). 8-9. 10Cyril Belshaw. They function in a system or environment that is defined by their own interests. nor do they rest on custom. or states. 1965)."9 Regimes. p. However. 487.'"'" The marketis a world of atomized. or groups. A marketis characterizedby impersonalitybetween buyers and sellers. rules. p.10Max Weber states that in the market "social actions are not determinedby orientationto any sort of norm which is held to be valid. and exchange based upon prices set in terms of a common medium of exchange. Modified structuralsuggests that regimes may matter. and decision-makingprocedures have a significantimpact on outcomes and behavior. 11Max Weber. The second causal arrowimplies that regimes do matter. power. have little or no impact. the most successful of the social sciences.190 International Organization The independentimpactof regimes is a central analytic issue.

118. and prepared to resort to force. a world of sovereign states seeking to maximize their interest and power. The game of chicken is the game-theoreticanalog.ultimately able to depend only on themselves. individualistic could not possibly provide the necessary level of coordination..D. especiallychapters5 and6.is most clearly reflected in the essays of Keohane and Stein. to 15 Vinod K. See his "Hangingby a Thread:International System. diss. The recent work of Kenneth Waltz exemplifiesthis orientation. can only be one small step removed from the underlyingpower capabilities that sustain them. The prisoners' dilemmais the classic game-theoreticexample.. Theory of International Relations. therefore. 1950-1979. Keohane posits that in the internationalsystem regimes derive from voluntary agreementsamong juridically equal actors. States are assumed to act in their own self-interest.Structural causes and regime consequences 191 The marketis a powerfulmetaphorfor many argumentsin the literature of political science. Haas and others in this volume suggest that regimes may have significantimpact in a calculationsof interest highlycomplex world in whichad hoc." 14 In a world of sovereign states the basic functionof regimes is to coordinate state behavior to achieve desired outcomes in particularissue-areas. at a maximum.At a minimumthey "seek their own preservationand. . 330 and 300. 1. 13 Ibid. Regimes. 14 Robert0. Stein also argues that regimes may have an autonomouseffect on outcomes when purelyautonomousbehaviorcould lead to disastrousresultsfor both parties. not least internationalrelations. Stein states that the "conceptualization of regimes developed here is rooted in the classic characterizationof international politics as relationsbetween sovereign entities dedicatedto their own self-preservation. the definingcharacteristic of the internationalsystem is that its component parts (states) are functionally similar and interact in an anarchic environment. pp.there is a general movement toward a world of complex inter12 Waltz. When power distributionschange.13 The second orientationto regimes.For Waltz."''2 other states in the system. for Waltz. chap. Stein's contributions this volume. Both of these authors start from a conventional structural realist perspective. p. StanfordUniversity.drive for They are constrainedonly by theirinteractionwith universaldomination. This conventionalstructuralist view for the realistschool has its analogin Marxistanalysisto studiesthat focus exclusively on technologyandeconomic structure. behaviorwill also change. Aggarwalemphasizesthis point." Ph.If. Keohane's and Arthur A. modifiedstructural. Behavioris.International systems are distinguishedonly by differingdistributionsof relative capabilities among actors. Stein and Keohane posit that regimes can have an impact when Pareto-optimaloutcomes could not be achieved throughuncoordinatedindividualcalculations of self-interest. RegimeChangein the Textile/Apparel 1981.a function of the distribution of power among states and the position of each particularstate. as many have argued.15 Such coordination is attractive under several circumstances.

even those.which sees regimes as a pervasive phenomenonof all political systems.and dangerous world. It suggests that the first cut should be amendedas in Figure 2. that are traditionally looked upon as clear-cut examples of anarchy. which is "too limited for explainingan increasinglycomplex. regimes cannot be relevant for zero-sum situations in which states act to maximize the difference between their utilities and those of others. Hopkins and Puchalaconclude that "regimes exist in all areas of internationalrelations. 270.'6 The thirdapproachto regimes. regimes may be significant(path b). Thus. modifiedstructuralism.In the Marxisttraditionthis positionhas its analogin many structuralMarxistwritings. interdependent. which more closely approximateszero-sum games than do most economic issueareas.sees regimes emergingand having a significant impact. Pure power motivationspreclude regimes. 18 Ibid..norms. but under circumstances that are not purely conflictual.which emphasizethe importance the state and ideologyas institutions of that act to rationalizeand legitimatefundamental economic structures. and OranYoung.These two essays are stronglyinformedby the Grotian tradition. Oran Young argues that patternedbehavior inevitably generates con16 The modifiedstructural arguments presentedin this volumeare based upon a realistanalysis of international relations. Statesmen nearly always perceive themselves as constrainedby principles. such as major power rivalry.where individualdecision makingleads to suboptimaloutcomes. b BASIC CAUSALVARIABLES * REGIMES b . the second orientation. reflects a fundarelationsthan the two structuralarmentallydifferentview of international gumentsjust described. p. and 7 rules that prescribe and proscribe varieties of behavior."' The concept of regime. p. they argue. . moves beyond a realist perspective.RELATED BEHAVIOR R ANDOUTCOMES a Figure2 For most situationsthere is a direct link between basic causal variablesand related behavior (path a). 17 to RaymondHopkinsand Donald Puchala'scontribution this volume.192 International Organization dependence. most clearly elaboratedin the essays of RaymondHopkins and Donald Puchala. Jervis points to the paucity of regimes in the security area. 245."''8Hopkins and Puchala apply their argumentnot only to an issuearea where one mightexpect communalitiesof interest (food) but also to one generally thought of as being much more unambiguouslyconflictual(colonialism). However. then the numberof areas in which regimescan matteris growing. but only under restrictive conditions.

States are rarifiedabstractions. t BEHAVIOR PATTERNED RELATED Figure 3 Patternedbehaviorreflectingcalculationsof interesttends to lead to the creation of regimes. and principles. Even the balance of power. embedded in a -broadersocial environmentthat nurtures and sustains the conditions necessary for its functioning. because action there is based purely upon individualcalculation without regard to the behavior of others. or can be depicted as in Figure 3. not an analytic assumption. embodying rules. offers a counter to structural realism of either the conventional or the modified form. Karl Deutsch's 1957 study of inte19 BuLl. the third orientationdoes regard the market as a regime. 5. and the connections in the patternare understood. Sovereignty is a behavioral variable. Force does not occupy a singularlyimportantplace in internationalpolitics. While the modifiedstructuralapproachdoes not view the perfect market as a regime. It rejects the assumption that the internationalsystem is composed of sovereign states limitedonly by the balance of power. Elites act within a communications net. If the observer finds a patternof interrelatedactivity. then there must be some form of norms and procedures. Security and state survival are not the only objectives.A marketcannot be sustainedby calculationsof self-interestalone. The Anarchical Society. and regimes reinforce patternedbehavior.The abilityof states to control movements across their borders and to maintaindominance over all aspects of the internationalsystem is limited. Functionalismsaw the possibility of eroding sovereignty throughthe multiplicationof particularistic interests across nationalboundaries. in Ruggie'sterms. Patterns of behavior that persist over extended periods are infused with normativesignificance.and Young drawupon. chap. This leads to conventionalizedbehaviorin which there is some expectation of rebuke for deviating from ongoing practices. regarded by conventional structuralrealist analysts as a purely conflictual situation. This minimalistGrotianorientationhas informeda numberof theoretical postulates developed duringthe postwar period. .Elites have transnational well as national ties. Hopkins and Puchala suggest that elites are the practical actors in internaas tional relations. which transcendsnational boundaries.Structural causes and regime consequences 193 vergentexpectations. REGIMES BASIC CAUSAL VARIABLES . The Grotiantraditionthat Hopkinsand Puchala. Rather. Conventionalizedbehavior generates recognized norms. norms.'9The causal schema suggested by a Grotianorientationeither closely parallelsthe firstcut shown in Figure 1. It must be. can be treated as a regime.

Foresight and Understanding: An Enquiry into the Aims of Science (New is York: HarperTorchbooks.StephenToulmin writes that "any dynamical theory involves some explicit or implicit referenceto a standardcase or 'paradigm. see regimes as matteringonly when independentdecision making leads to undesired outcomes. 1961). in the course of events. Grotianperspectives accept regimes as a fundamentalpart of all patternedhumaninteraction. 64-65. bodies may be expected to move. 1 (March 1974). In sum. Adherents of a Grotian perspective accept regimes as a pervasive and significantphenomenon in the internationalsystem.norms. 22 Stephen Toulmin.made a distinction Some authorsassociated with between security communitiesand anarchy. conventional structural arguments do not take regimes seriously: if basic causal variableschange. pp. Finally.'This paradigmspecifies the manner in which. the second major issue posed by a schematic that sees re20 RelaSee Arend Lijphart. Keohane and Nye's discussion of complex interdependence rejects the assumptionsof the primacyof force and issue hierarchyassumed by a realist perspective. Toulmin'suse of the term paradigm similarto . for Explanations regimedevelopment For those authors who see regimes as something more than epiphenomena. the concept is not precludedby a realist perspective.from a Grotian perspective.194 International Organization gration." It is From a realist deviationfrom that movementwhich needs to be explained. as what one's basic assumption is about the normal state of internationalaffairs. rules.20 have posited a web of interdependencethat the concept of transnationalism makes any emphasison sovereigntyanalyticallymisleadingand normatively questionable.2'Ernst Haas points out that what he calls organic theories-eco-environmentalism. Regimes have no independent impact on behavior. and Cohen indicate. 56-57. Keohane. 21 Keohane and Nye. Stein. regimes are phenomenathat need to be explained. 8. The issue is not so much whether one accepts the possibility of principles. with its emphasis on societal communication. Power and Interdependence. for the development of this argument."The Structureof the TheoreticalRevolutionin International tions. eco-reformism. Lipson. representedhere by a numberof adherentsof a realist approachto international relations. Adherents of a structural realist orientationsee regimes as a phenomenonwhose presence cannot be assumed and whose existence requirescareful explanation. and decision-makingproceduresaffecting outcomes and behavior. regimes will also change. Modified structuralarguments. But. Regimes are much more easily encompassed by a Grotianworldview.and egalitarianism-deny conventionalpower-orientedassumptions. they are data to be described.including behavior in the internationalsystem.especially chap." International Studies Quarterly 18.22 perspective.pp. and it is the definitionof the standardcase that identifiesthe basic theoreticalorientation.The two "standardcases" are fundamentallydifferent. as the argumentsmade by Jervis.

1970)."Coordinationneed not be formalizedor institutionalized. [T]hereare times when rational regimesas a form of international self-interested calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision makingin favor of joint decision making. What is the relationshipbetween basic causal factors and regimes?Whatare the conditionsthat lead to regime creation. In this volume the essays by Keohane and especially Stein most fully adopt and elaborate an interest-orientedperspective. The egoist is concerned with the behaviorof others only insofar as that behaviorcan affect the egoist's utility. Stein refers to the provision this as the dilemmaof common interests. A wide varietyof basic causal variableshave been offeredto explainthe development of regimes. it can be resolved through"coordination. and dissipation?Here regimes are treated as the dependent variable. (Chicago:University of ChicagoPress. By egoistic self-interest I refer to the desire to maximizeone's own utilityfunctionwhere that functiondoes not includethe utility of anotherparty.So long as everyone agrees to drive on the rightside of the road. (Stein's concept of collaboration Kuhn's notion of an exemplar. and values."23 Stein elaborates two circumstances under which unconstrainedindividual choice provides incentives for cooperation. 23 to Stein's contribution this volume. p. Stein refers to this as the dilemmaof common aversions. Unconstrainedindividualdecision making may also be eschewed when it would lead to mutuallyundesiredoutcomes and where the choice of one actor is contingenton the choice made by the other:the game of chicken is a prominentexample. The last two are seen as supplementary.Structural causes and regime consequences 195 gimes as interveningvariablesbetween basic causal factors and related outcomes and behavior becomes relevant. 2nd ed. 187. The most prominent in this volume are egoistic self-interest." the active construction of a regime that guides individual decision making. Stein avers that "the same forces of autonomouslycalculated self-interestthat lie at the root of the anarchic internationalsystem also lay the foundationfor international order. Egoistic self-interest regimes is The prevailingexplanationfor the existence of international egoistic self-interest.p. . 316. Its resolutionrequires"collaboration. power. pure power seekers are interested in maximizingthe difference between their power capabilitiesand those of their opponent. See Thomas Kuhn.augmenting forces related to interest. persistence... The Structure of Specific Revolutions. The first occurs when outcomes: prisoner's dilemma and such choice leads to Pareto-suboptimal of collective goods are well-known examples. norms and principles. All contractarian political theories from Hobbes to Rawls are based on egoistic self-interest. political power. In contrast. little more is needed. and more basic knowledge.. 1. habit and custom.

a condition more likely to be found in open political systems operatingunderconditions of complex interdependence.) While Stein employs a game-theoreticorientation.Young arguesthat there are three paths to regime formation:spontaneous. Coordinationmay only requirethe construction of rules. in which regimes are initially forced upon actors by external imposition. Egoistic self-interest is also regarded as an importantdeterminantof regimes by several other authors.moralhazard."24 likely to outweighthe costs of regimeformationand maintenancewhen there is asymmetricinformation. where costs are low. Lipson argues that the differential pattern of acceptance of liberal rules in the internationaltradingregime is a function of differentialcosts of adjustmentacross industrial sectors. Similarly. in which regimes are formed by explicit agreements.and imposed. p. He is primarilyconcerned with the demand for regimes. If these rules are not informedby any proximateprinciplesor norms. 24 . and the spillover into other arenas is substantial. in which regimes emerge from the converging expectations of many individualactions.potentialdishonesty. Haas makes interconnectednessa central element of his analysis: regimes are designed to managecomplexity and complexity increases with interconnectedness.196 International Organization conforms with the definition of regimes used here. negotiated. they will not conform to the definitionof regimes set forth earlier. such as costs of organizaThese benefits providedby regimes are tion or of makingside-payments. He maintains that "Regimes can make agreement easier if they provideframeworksfor establishinglegal liability(even if these are not perfect). or reduce other transactionscosts. In addition.the costs of formingregimeswill be lower when there is a high level of formaland informalcommunicationamong states. 338.Hence calculationsof egoistic self-interestemerge as centralelements in most of the articles in this volume. norms. to Keohane's contribution this volume. which echoes Keohane's argumentabout the importanceof issue density. It is not so clear that coordinationinvolves regimes. or high issue density. the conditions under which ad hoc agreements fail to provide Pareto-optimaloutcomes.improvethe quantityand qualityof informationavailable to actors. financingregime Cohen maintainsthat the rules of the balance-of-payments changed in the 1970s because higher oil prices and the petrodollarmarket altered calculations of interest. continued adherence to liberal principles. is similar to arguments made by Haas and by Puchala and Hopkins. This last point.Keohane utilizes insights from microeconomictheories of marketfailure to examine dilemmas of common interests.Puchalaand Hopkins maintainthat regimes are more likely to arise underconditionsof complex interdependence. and rules is high. Jervis posits that regimes in the security arenawill only be formedwhen states accept the status quo. The first two are based on egoistic calculations. the cost of war is high.

.pp. North and Robert Paul Thomas. Otherssee Smithtrying 1978]. In game-theoretic terms power is used to promotejoint maximization. egoistically maintainedeconomic system is only instrumental. 103-104)maintainthat Smithwanted to limitthe folly of government by havingit do as little as possible. 3 [1976]. and standardsfor commodities.See. These values may include increasingpower capabilitiesas well as promotingeconomic or other objectives." Journal of European Economic History 5.pp.ThePassions and the Interests [Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press. and Carlos Diaz-Alejandro. the protectionof infantindustries.chap.Power is used to enhance the values of specific actors within the system. 124-25)have takenthe intermediate choice. Two differentorientationstoward power can be distinguished."DelinkingNorth and South: Unshackledor Unhinged.The first is cosmopolitanand instrumental:power is used to secure optimal outcomes for the system as a whole. Cambridge . For all of these argumentsthe purpose of state action is to furthergeneral societal interests. Economy and Society. The state must create institutionsthat equate public and privaterates of return.Structural causes and regime consequences 2. 1. pp. creatingconditions that prevent predatoryas opposed to marketbehavior. materialistically for instance. Others (see for instance Colin Holmes. 336-37. Power in the service of the common good The first position is represented by a long tradition in classical and neoclassical economics associated with the provision of public goods. there could be no more powerful defense of egoism. the maintenanceof order. But Smith recognized that it was necessary for the state to provide certain collective goods. that is. "The Just Economy:The MoralBasis of the Wealthof Nations." Review of Social Economy 34 (December 1974). "Laissez-fairein Theory and Practice: Britain 1800-1875."Economics from a Biological Viewpoint. Political power 197 The second major basic causal variable used to explain regime development is political power. These included defense. 1973). The hidden hand was Adam Smith's most compellingconstruct: the good of all from the selfishness of each. publicworks. LeonardBillet. for which a to establishconditionsfor a moralsociety that must be based on individual oriented. p. 26 Jack Hirschleifer. 1977]. In game-theoreticterms power is used to maximizeindividualpayoffs. 25 There is a lively debateover preciselyhow muchof a role Smithaccordsto the state. 673. a." in Albert Fishlow et al. The second approachis particularistic potentially consummatory.It is power in the service and of the common good. minimumlevels of welfare.26 Keynesian analysis gives the state a prominentrole in managing macroeconomic variables.Weber.25Economists have pointed to the importance of the state for establishing property rights and enforcing contracts. Some (see for instanceAlbertHirschman. It is power in the service of particular interests. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: UniversityPress. Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy [New York: McGraw-Hill. positionendorsedhere. Douglass C."Journal of Law and Economics 20 (April 1977).

An effective leaderwould have acted as a lender of last resort and provided a market for surplus commodities. The result was economic chaos. rather. Panics.they focus on power as an instrumentthat can be used to enhancethe 27 CharlesP. Manias. Cushioning the undesirable effects of an open system by. b.In The Worldin Depression.28A marketeconomy will maximize the utility of society as a whole. Kindleberger. 1978). like the humanbody. Establishing standards for products. and Great Britainwas willing but unable. Political power is put at the service of the common good. becominga for lender of last resort when private financial institutions become so cautious that their conservatism could destroy global liquidity." p. 6. 92. In the interwarperiod the United States was able but unwillingto assume these burdens. 5.He felt that reasonableintercoursecould only take place in the international system if there was a balance of power. "Governmentand International Trade. 3. for instance. 2. is basically healthy. 4. PrincetonUniversity. for instance. . 28 Charles P. In a more recent statementKindleberger listed the has following functions that states performfor the international tradingsystem: 1. a doctor) may be necessary. and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (New York: Basic Books. Kindleberger'sperspective is still profoundlyliberal. Kindleberger arguesthat the depressionof the 1930scould have been preventedby effective state leadership. July 1978)."Princeton Essays in International Finance (International Finance Section. The market. Constructingpublic works such as docks and domestic transportation systems. Kindleberger. Adam Smithwas less enamouredwith leadership. The purpose of state interventionis to facilitate the creationand maintenanceof an environmentwithinwhich a marketbased on individual calculations of self-interest can flourish. providing adjustment assistance for import-competing -industries. Compensating marketimperfectionsby. Power in the service of particularinterests The articles in this volume are less oriented towardcosmopolitanends. Withoutsuch a balancethe strong would dominate and exploit the weak."Delinking North and South. but occasionally the interventionof some external agent (the state.198 International Organization The contemporaryeconomist who has become most clearly associated with arguments emphasizingthe instrumental role of power for cosmopolitan interestsin the international system is CharlesKindleberger. Providinga national currency that can be used as an international reserve and transactionscurrency. In the absence of such standardsinordinateenergy may be wasted findinginformation about products. Protectingeconomic actors from force. See Diaz-Alejandro.27 Despite its emphasis on political action.

The second line of argumentassociated with power in the service of specific interests investigates the possibility that powerful actors may be able to alterthe pay-offs that confrontother actors or influencethe strategies they choose. norms. No one actor will be willing to provide the collective goods needed to make the regime work smoothly and effectively.Col. Changes in the InternationalSystem (Boulder. A game-theoreticanalogymakes it easier to distinguish between two importantvariants of the viewpoint of power in the service of particularinterests. In this volume Oran Young develops the notion of imposed regimes. This emphasis on the need for asymmetricpower distributions(supplyside considerations)should be contrastedwith Stein's assertions concerning the efficacy of demand. The first assumes that pay-offs are fixed and that an actor's choice of strategyis autonomouslydetermined solely by these pay-offs. 1980). When smaller states perceive that a hegemon is no longer willing to offer a free ride. interests alone can effectively sustain order. The internationalsystem more closely resembles an oligopoly than a perfect market. rules. The second assumes that power can be used to alter pay-offs and influence actor strategy. . Weakeractors may not be able to make autonomous choices. he has elsewhere argued that hegemons play a critical role in supplyingthe collective goods that are needed for regimes to functioneffectively. While Keohane focuses on of the demandfor regimesin his articlein this volume. principles. Holsti et al. on the other hand. but because regimes enhance their own national values. Without leadership. not joint. The values assigned to a particular cell may be changed. The first approachclosely follows the analysis that applies when purely cosmopolitan objectives are at stake. "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes. Stein's analysis. except that political power is used to maximize individual." in Ole R.29Hegemons provide these goods not because they are interested in the well-being of the system as a whole. Dominant actors may explicitly use a combinationof sanctions and incentives to compel other actors to act in conformity with a particularset of 29 Robert 0. suggests that as hegemony declines there will be greater incentives for collaborationbecause collective goods are no longer being provided by the hegemon. Keohane.: Westview. usually states. Here power becomes a much more central concept-the element of compulsionis close at hand. The theory of hegemonic leadership suggests that under conditions of declining hegemony there will be a weakening of regimes. Actors are aware of how their behavior affects others.. there is an incentive to create regimes and the provision of these regimesis a functionof the distribution power. Under certain configurationsof interest. pay-offs.Structural causes and regime consequences 199 utilityof particularactors. 1967-77. For Stein. Hegemonic decline can lead to strongerregimes. they are likely to become paying customers. and decision-making procedurescannot easily be upheld.

and biased in their distributionof values are likely to undergo radicaltransformation when power distributionschange. norms and principlesthat influencethe regime in a particular issue-area but are not directly related to that issue-area can also be regarded as explanations for the creation.Jervis points out that weaker states had little option but to follow the balance of power regimeof the 19th century with its emphasis on the special role of the great powers. 3. not because there is no actor to provide the collective goods needed for efficient regime functioning. Norms and principles To this point in the discussion. diffuse. Whena hegemonicstate acts to influencethe strategyof other actors the of regimeis held hostage to the persistenceof the existing distribution power system. eroded. This set of argumentsabout regime change and hegemonic decline differs from the analysis emerging from a focus on the provision of collective goods for either cosmopolitan or particularisticreasons. norms. and decision-makingprocedures. In all of these cases more powerfulactorscreatedregimesthat served theirparticular purpose. PoliticalCulture.and the Weberian . persistence.30Fred Hirsch has arguedthat 30 For a recent discussion see David Laitin. rules. For instance. BenjaminCohen notes that the specific rules and institutionalarrangements for the Bretton Woods institutions reflected the preferences of the United States much more than those of GreatBritain. and other were compelled to accept them because their pay-offs were manipulatedor their options were limited. opportudominantactors may secure de facto compliance by manipulating nity sets so that weaker actors are compelled to behave in a desired way. The most famous example of such a formulationis Max Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Here a decline in power leads to a change in regimebecause the hegemon is no longer able to control the pay-off matrixor influencethe strategies of the weak. Young argues that imposed orders are likely to disintegrate when there are major shifts in underlyingpower capabilities. "Religion. the in the international regime will collapse.200 International Organization principles. Alternatively. and dissipation of regimes. However. Hopkins and Puchalasuggest that regimesthat are highlypoliticized. If the hegemon's relativecapabilitiesdecline. Weber argues that the rise of capitalismis intimatelyassociated with the evolution of a Calvinistreligious doctrine that fosters hardwork while enjoiningprofligacyand uses worldly success as an indicationof predestinedfate. norms and principleshave been treated as endogenous:they are the critical definingcharacteristicsof any given regime. Keohane posits that in the internationalsystem choices will be constrained in ways that give greaterweight to the preferencesof more powerfulactors. the major European states. the norms of the colonial regime collapsed because the power of its supporter.

The domestic lesson of the 1930s was that societies could not tolerate the consequences of an untrammeled market.32 In this volume. such as hardwork as a service to God.p. p. The Passions and the Interests. World-System 33 Jervis's contribution to this volume. 370. p.Structural causes and regime consequences 201 without precapitalistvalues such as hard work. The Modern (New York: Academic Press. bills of exchange were devised by Jewish bankers duringthe late MiddleAges to avoid violence and extortion from the nobility: safer to carry a piece of paper than to carry specie. and honor. They note.1975).The superstructurerefers to general and diffuse principles and norms that condition the principles and norms operative in a specific issue-area. 4 (July 1978). and Immanuel Wallerstein. self-sacrifice. However. This discussion suggests that there is a hierarchyof regimes. 72. "The Futureof Reviewof Books 27 (20 March1980). the piece of paperhad to be honoredby the recipient. This set of diffuse values.especially pp." Here all dealings were in barter. The importanceof conventions for the use of bills of exchange is reflected in the fact that they were frebasin in the 16th century but they were quently used in the Mediterranean world in Syria where. Intellectualsand the Rise of the New Class. loyalty. Hopkins and Puchala make a distinction between the superstructureand the substructure. the most important diffuse principleis sovereignty."33 analysis of the postwar economic regime argues that it was founded upon principlesof embeddedratherthanorthodoxliberalism.p. Hedley Bull refers to sovereigntyas the conTradition. Such values are critical constraints on self-interested calculations that would too often lead to untrustworthyand dishonest behavior. 1974). was extended from the domestic to the internationalsphere in the Bretton Woods agreements. For the tie betweenbills of exchangeandJewishbankerssee Hirschman.Jervis arguesthat for regimesto develop in the securityareathe greatpowers "must believe that others sharethe value they John Ruggie's highly original place on mutual security and cooperation. In internationalrelations. which permeated the capitalistworld. The Social Limits to Growth. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York:Harper. See also MichaelWalzer. not used at the interface with the non-Mediterranean accordingto Braudel.The Passions and the Interests. Diffuse principlesand norms.3' Financing by various pariah groups around the world offers a clear example of the way in which noneconomic norms have facilitated market activity.This implieda high level of trust and such trust was enhanced by conventions: established practices were reinforced by the exclusionary nature of the group. For anotherdiscussion of noneconomicvalues in the rise of capitalismsee Hirschman. that balance of power in 19thcentury Europe was a diffuse norm that influencedthe nature of the regimefor colonialism. 147.chap. For instance. or gold and silver. condition behavior in specific issue-areas. 11." New York 32 Fernand Braudel. which facilitated surveillance and the applicationof sanctions. for example. 361. . 31 Hirsch."WorldPolitics 30. "two mutually suspicious worlds met face to face. capitalist systems would fall apart. 568-69.

12. They assume legitimacy.they supplementand reinforcepressuresassociated with egoistic self-interest. If the constitutiveprincipleof sovereigntywere altered. are not treated in this volume as exogenous variables capable of generatinga regimeon their own. TheAnarchicalSociety. With a few exceptions. Patternedbehavior accompaniedby shared expectations is likely to become infusedwith normativesignificance:actions based purely on instrumentalcalculationscan come to be regardedas rule-likeor principledbehavior. 8-9. and HayekBull. in fact. Usage and custom will be discussed in this section."The Law of International 34 35 tions (Lex Mercatoria). patterned behavior.34 that it is In this usage sovereignty not an analyticassumption. is a principle influencesthe behaviorof actors. has a strongtendency to lead to shared expectations. have come to pervade the modern internationalsystem. Usage and custom. Assertions by other agencies are subjectto challenge. Usage and custom The last two sets of causal variables affecting regime development are usage and custom. Rather. such as Antarctica.Economy and Society. Lewis. developed out of custom and usage initially generated by self-interest.which emerged out of late medieval Europe. it is difficult to imagine that any other internationalregime would remain unchanged. and knowledge. knowledge in the next. Usage refers to regularpatterns of behavior based on actual practice. the literature to which he refers-Schelling. Our 36 Leon E. 1 (Winter 1978)."Part Law and Commerce12.HaroldBermanand Colin Kaufman. and knowledge. 29. p. 2 (January I. . 4. political power. Namibia.35 is particularlysignificantin the position taken by Hopkins and Puchalaand by Young. act in the internationalsystem. to long-standingpractice. originally generated purely by considerationsof interest or power. pp. ibid.36 In OranYoung's discussion of both spontaneousand imposed regimes. 1 (October1980)andPartII. A great deal of western commercial law.202 International Organization stitutive principleof the present internationalsystem. Young does not make any strong claims for the specific conditions that lead to spontaneous regimes. sovereigntyprevails.. For these authors. The importanceof routinizedbehavior custom. However. Sovereignty designates states as the only actors with unlimited rights to. 70. Weber." Harvard International Law Journal 19. Those areas where sovereignty is not applied are governed by vulnerableregimes or lack regimes altogether. "The Evolutionof the Law Merchant: Commercial Heritage. Practices that began as ad hoc private arrangementslater became the basis for official commerciallaw. and the West Bank. Trakman. The concept of exclurightto sive control within a delimitedgeographicarea and the untrammeled self-help internationally. habits and usage play a significantrole. and diffuse values. Journalof Maritime CommercialTransac1981).

"38 can providea commongroundfor both what Haas calls mechanical approaches (most conventional social science theories) and organic approaches (egalitarianismand various environmentally oriented arguments). In an earlier study Ernst Haas.Knowledgecan not only enhance the prospects for convergent state behavior. such as quarantineregulations. Knowledge creates a basis for cooperation by illuminatingcomplex interconnections that were not previouslyunderstood. Like usage and custom. 367-68. Young argues that successful imposed orders are bolstered eventually by habits of obedience. Priorto developments such as these. Stein points out that rules concerninghealth.. Behavior that was originallyonly a matterof egoistic self-interest is now buttressed by widely shared norms. not an exogenous. Knowledge The finalvariableused to explain the developmentof regimes is knowledge. defined knowledge as "the sum of technical informationand of theories about that informationwhich commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal. For knowledge to have an independentimpact in the internationalsystem. Young's concept of imposed orders conforms with the definitionof regimeused here. variable." which emphasizes sensitivityto the consequences of the generationof new knowledge. in this volume the most prominentexponent of the importanceof knowledge. nationalhealthregu37 ErnstHaas. the transmissionof yellow fever by mosquitoes. it must be widely accepted by policy makers. such practices are reinforced by the growth of regimes."World Issue-Linkage International 32. Usage leads to shared expectations. .) A patternof behavior initiallyestablished by economic coercion or force may come to be regardedas legitimateby those on whom it has been imposed. (It is not clear that. knowledge is usually treated as an intervening. without these habits. Similarly. 38 Ibid. 368."37In his essay in this volume Haas points to the potentialities inherentin a stance of "cognitive evolutionism.Structural causes and regime consequences 203 is oriented toward a microeconomic perspective focusing on egoistic self-interest. 3 (April 1980). Certain patterns of behavior are first adopted because they promote individualutility. Most Americandrivers (outside New York City) would feel at least a twinge of discomfort at drivingillegally througha red light at an empty intersection. "Why Collaborate? Politics and Regimes. and the use of preventive vaccines. which become infused with principles and norms.pp.were radicallyalteredby new scientific knowledge such as the discovery of the microbe that causes cholera. 5. Once established. p. it can also transcend"prevailIt ing lines of ideologicalcleavage.

The two most prominentexogenous variables are egoistic self-interest. It is catholic in its . which generates new principles and norms. Conclusion In approachingthe two basic questions that guided this exercise-the impact of regimes on related behavior and outcomes. Without consensus. In sum. is associated with shifts in power. After these discoveries. States were extremely sensitive to competitive devaluationand were not confident that domestic monetary policy could provide insulation fromexternaldisturbances. usage and custom and knowledge may contributeto the development of regimes. which usually involves altering rules and procedures within the context of a given set of principlesand norms. dictated by accepted scientific knowledge. revolutionarychange.It was much easier to accept a floatingexchange rate regime in the 1970s because the knowledge and related institutional capacity for controllingmonetaryaggregateshad substantiallyincreased. Benjamin Cohen points out that the fixed exchange rate system agreed to at Bretton Woods was based upon understandingsderived from the interwarexperience and then-currentknowledge about domestic monetaryinstitutionsand structures. In a highlycomplex world. sees regimes as a pervasive facet of social interaction. In contrast.204 International Organization lations were primarilydetermined by political concerns. knowledge can have little impact on regime development in a world of sovereign states. where goals are often ill-definedand many links are possible.mutual acceptance of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) can provide the basis for a regime. and the relationship between basic causal variables and regimes-the essays in this volume reflect two differentorientationsto internationalrelations. the essays in this volume and the literaturein general offer a variety of explanations for the development of regimes. or at least a set of rules. consensual knowledge can greatly facilitate agreementon the deregime. Jervis argues that in the present security arena the possibilities for an arms control regime may depend on whether the Soviet Union and the United States view strategy in the same way. their significance is completely mediated by the power of their adherents. however. Finally. If only some partieshold a particularset of beliefs. usually economic. As an example of evolutionarychange. national behavior was determinedby an international regime. In addition. The Grotianperspective. diffuse values and norms such as sovereignty and private property may condition behavior within specific issueareas. Such knowledgecan light a clear path velopmentof an international in a landscape that would otherwise be murky and undifferentiated. New knowledge can provide the basis for what Hopkins and Puchala call evolutionary change. and political power. which informs the essays of Hopkins and Puchala and of Young. In particular.

Arguments that treat regimes as interveningvariables.which infuses the other essays in this volume.A more serious departurefrom structural when regimes are seen as autonomousvariablesindependentlyaffectingnot only related behaviorand outcomes. is more circumspect. diffuse norms.and internationalorganizations. fall unambiguouslywithin the structural reasoningoccurs realistparadigm. and denies the utility of the regime concept. Lipson. The basic causal variablesthat lead to the creationof regimes are power and interest. power. customs. . and Cohen do press beyond conventional realist orientations. Ruggie. particularbureaucracies. Jervis. For this they are taken to task in Susan Strange's critique. These causal factors may be manifest throughthe behavior of individuals. The basic actors are states. and regard state interests and state power as basic causal variables. The argumentspresented by Stein.as well as states. but also the basic causal variablesthat led to their creation in the first place. The basic analytic assumptions are the same. This line of reasoningis examined in the conclusion to this volume. and knowledge may all play a role in regime formation. The exemplaror standardcase for the realist regimes. However. Keohane. The structuralrealist orientation.Structural causes and regime consequences 205 description of the underlyingcauses of regimes. Regimes arise only under perspectivedoes not includeinternational restrictive conditions characterized by the failure of individual decision makingto secure desired outcomes. the basic parametric constraints for these analyses are identical with those applied by more conventional structural arguments. They reject a narrow structuralanalysis that posits a direct relationshipbetween changes in basic causal variablesand related behavior and outcomes. Interests.

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