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DEFENDANT RTC
’
S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP ROBERT E. MANGELS (Bar No. 48291)
rmangels@jmbm.com
MATTHEW D. HINKS (Bar No. 200750)
mhinks@jmbm.com
1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor Los Angeles, California 90067-4308 Telephone: (310) 203-8080 Facsimile: (310) 203-0567 Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT CHRISSIE CARNEL BIXLER; CEDRIC BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2, Plaintiff, v. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE; DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1-25, Defendants. CASE NO. 19STCV29458 [Assigned to Hon. Steven J. Kleifield, Dept. 57]
DEFENDANT RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER
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S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AS TO PLAINTIFFS CARNELL BIXLER, BIXLER-ZAVALA, JANE DOE #1, AND JANE DOE #2
Dept.: 57 Date: October 26, 2020 Time: 10:00 a.m. Action filed: August 22, 2019 Trial date: Not yet set
Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 10/19/2020 05:01 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by S. Bolden,Deputy Clerk
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DEFENDANT RTC
’
S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs ask this Court to adopt a radical position never embraced by any court in the United States
—
i.e.
, that Agreements to submit disputes to religious arbitration are null and void when one of the signatories later decides to leave the religion. As fully briefed in the CSI and CC Reply, this argument runs counter to established principles of contract law and arbitration law, and itself creates an impermissible and unconstitutional separate standard for adjudicating agreements entered into by churches. RTC hereby joins and incorporates by reference CSI and CC
’
s arguments demonstrating that Plaintiffs
’
First Amendment challenge to enforcement of the Agreements fails as a matter of law and of fact. This Reply will address Plaintiffs
’
remaining arguments against enforcement of the Agreements. Given the primacy of the First Amendment argument in Plaintiffs
’
Opposition, RTC recommends the Court read the CSI and CC Reply first, and then this Reply. Setting aside Plaintiffs
’
unsupported First Amendment argument, the Opposition argues that their claims do not fall within the clear scope of the Agreements
’
arbitration provisions. Those provisions, and other terms of the Agreements, demonstrate the unambiguous intent of the parties that they resolve all disputes between them,
“
of any nature,
”
through application of Scientology law and under the
“
exclusive
”
jurisdiction of Scientology arbitrators. Plaintiffs
’
consent was
“
irrevocable
”
and
“
in perpetuity,
”
and any claim filed by them in court would be subject to
“
immediate dismissal.
”
The unmistakable intent of the parties was to resolve any dispute through Scientology arbitration, as required by Church doctrine and as a condition to joining the Church. The Opposition also argues that the Agreements are unenforceable because, supposedly, enforcement would violate
“
public policy
”
and the Agreements are unconscionable. Yet, the Opposition fails to identify any supposed
“
public policy,
”
and fails to refute Defendants
’
case law permitting arbitration of tort claims. With regard to unconscionability, Plaintiffs admit signing the Agreements but state they have no recollection of the circumstances surrounding their execution, and therefore proffer no evidence of procedural unconscionability. As to substantive unconscionability, Plaintiffs assert the requirement that the arbitrators be Scientologists in good standing is unconscionable, while ignoring Defendants
’
cited authority that courts reject
ex ante
claims of arbitrator bias and reject claims of arbitrator bias when the agreements call for a certain class of arbitrators. As a last ditch effort to avoid enforcement of the Agreements, Plaintiffs argue that Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2(c) precludes enforcement of the Agreements because Defendant Masterson cannot seek to compel arbitration. In so asserting, Plaintiffs ignore that they alleged
—
and have argued
—
that Masterson is Defendants
’
agent; therefore, he could seek to compel
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DEFENDANT RTC
’
S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
arbitration. Under such circumstances, Section 1281.2(c) does not prevent arbitration of their claims. Finally, seeking to delay a decision on the Motions, Plaintiffs request to take unspecified and unbounded
“
discovery.
”
They have made no showing that such discovery is necessary or relevant. Their unsubstantiated request should be denied.
II.
RELEVANT FACTS
In their opposing declarations, Plaintiffs offer no testimony concerning the circumstances of signing the Agreements. [JD #1 Decl. ¶ 7; JD #2 Decl. ¶ 7; Carnell Decl. ¶ 6; Bixler Decl. ¶ 6.] None of the Plaintiffs asserts that he or she did not sign the Agreements, and the Opposition affirmatively states that the Plaintiffs entered into the Agreements. [Opp. Br., p. 10.] The Opposition refers to a
“
Rinder Dec.
”
[
E.g.
, Opp. Br., p. 3:2.] However, no
“
Rinder Dec.
”
was served or filed with the Opposition. On March 3, 2020, in responding to a previous motion, Plaintiffs filed a
“
Declaration of Michael Rinder.
”
Without waiving objection to Plaintiffs
’
failure to file a supporting declaration,
1
RTC will assume the March 3, 2020 Rinder Declaration is similar to whatever Plaintiffs intended to file in opposition to the present Motion. Michael Rinder is a paid attacker of Defendants [Supplemental Declaration of Lynn R. Farny ¶ 2] who left the Church thirteen years ago. [March 6, 2020 Declaration of Michael Rinder (
“
Rinder Dec.
”
) ¶ 2.] Mr. Rinder has never seen or participated in a Scientology arbitration, [Supp. Farny Dec. ¶ 3], and his description of
“
procedures
”
for a Scientology arbitration contradicts the plain terms of the Agreements, as set forth in the CSI and CC Reply, and joined and incorporated herein. He does not cite to any instance of Scientology arbitration being conducted as he describes. It is not how the
Garcia
arbitration proceeded.
Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc.
, No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2018 WL 3439638 (M.D. Fla. July 17, 2018) (appeal pending) (
Garcia II
)).
III.
ARGUMENT A.
Plaintiffs Do Not Dispute They Executed Arbitration Agreements that Defendants Can Enforce Under the FAA
As set forth in the CSI and CC Reply, (1) Plaintiffs concede that they entered into the Agreements at issue; (2) CSI, CC, and RTC can enforce the Agreements; and (3) the substantive provisions of the FAA apply to the Agreements. RTC joins in the arguments of CSI and CC
’
s Reply.
B.
The Arbitrability of the Disputes Is Reserved for the Arbitrators
As explained in CSI and CC
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s Reply, under the substantive provisions of the FAA, questions
1
RTC hereby joins and incorporates by reference the Objections to the Declaration of Michael Rinder and the Objections to the Declaration of Robert W. Thompson filed by CSI and CC.
