Cape Gloucester:

The Green Inferno

by Bernard C. Nalty
500-pound bombs inland of the row strip of black sand that mea-
n the early morning
of 26 December 1943, beaches, scoring a hit on a fuel sured perhaps 500 yards from one
Marines poised off dump at the Cape Gloucester air- flank to the other, and the leading
the coast of Japan- field complex and igniting a fiery elements of the 3d Battalion, com-
ese-held New Britain geyser that leapt hundreds of feet manded by Lieutenant Colonel
could barely make out the mile- into the air. Twin-engine North William K. Williams, started in-
high bulk of Mount Talawe against American Mitchell B-25 medium land. Two minutes later, Lieu-
a sky growing light with the ap- bombers and Douglas Havoc A-20 tenant Colonel John E. Weber's 1st
proach of dawn. Flame billowed light bombers, attacking from Battalion, on the left of the other
from the guns of American and lower altitude, pounced on the only unit, emerged on Yellow Beach 2,
Australian cruisers and destroyers, Japanese antiaircraft gun rash separated from Yellow I by a thou-
shattering the early morning calm. enough to open fire. sand yards of jungle and embrac-
The men of the 1st Marine Divi- The warships then shifted their ing 700 yard.s of shoreline. Neither
sion, commanded by Major Gen- attention to the assault beaches, battalion encountered organized
eral William H. Rupertus, a veteran and the landing craft carrying the resistance. A smoke screen, which
of expeditionary duty in Haiti and two battalions of Colonel Julian N. later drifted across the beaches and
China and of the recently con- Frisbie's 7th Marines started shore- hampered the approach of later
cluded Guadalcanal campaign, ward. An LCI [Landing Craft, In- waves of landing craft, blinded the
steeled themselves as they waited fantry] mounting multiple rocket Japanese observers on Target Hill
for daylight and the signal to as- launchers took position on the overlooking the beachhead, and no
sault the Yellow Beaches near Cape flank of the first wave bound for defenders manned the trenches
Gloucester in the northwestern part each of the two beaches and un- and log-and-earth bunkers that
of the island. For 90 minutes, the leashed a barrage intended to keep might have raked the assault force
fire support ships blazed away, try- the enemy pinned down after the with fire.
ing to neutralize whole areas rather cruisers and destroyers shifted The Yellow Beaches, on the east
than destroy pinpoint targets, since their fire to avoid endangering the coast of the broad peninsula that
dense jungle concealed most of the assault troops. At 0746, the LCVPs culminated at Cape Gloucester, pro-
individual fortifications and supply [Landing Craft, Vehicles and Per- vided access to the main objective,
dumps. After the day dawned and sonnell of the first wave bound for the two airfields at the northern tip
H-Hour drew near, Army airmen Yellow Beach I grounded on a nar- of the cape. By capturing this air-
joined the preliminary bombard-
ment. Four-engine Consolidated
Liberator 13-24 bombers, flying so
high that the Marines offshore
could barely see them, dropped

On the Cover: A Marine patrol crosses a

flooded stream and probes for the enemy in the
forests of New Britain. Department of De-
fense (LISMC) photo 72290
At left: On 26 December 1943, Marines
wade ashore from beached LSTs passing
through a heavy surf to a narrow beach of
black sand. Inland, beyond a curtain of under-
growth, lie the swamp forest and the Japanese
defenders. Department of Defense (USMC)
photo 68998
 Major General William H. Rupertus
ajor General William H.
Rupertus, who com- spector of constabulary with the
manded the 1st Marine
Division on New Britain, was born
at Washington, D.C., on 14 Novem-
ber 1889 and in June 1913 gradu-
ated from the U.S. Revenue Cutter
Service School of instruction. In-
stead of pursuing a career in this
precursor of the U.S. Coast Guard,
he accepted appointment as a sec-
ond lieutenant in the Marine Corps.
A vigorous advocate of rifle marks-
manship throughout his career, he
became a member of the Marine
Corps Rifle Team in 1915, two years
after entering the service, and won
two major matches. During World
War I, he commanded the Marine
detachment on the USS Florida, as-
signed to the British Grand fleet.
Between the World Wars, he
served in a variety of assignments.
In 1919, he joined the Provisional
Marine Brigade at Port-au-Prince,
field complex, the reinforced 1st attack on the Japanese fortress of Yellow Beaches held the key to the
Marine Division, designated the Rabaul, roughly 300 miles away at New Britain campaign, two sub-
Backhander Task Force, would en-
able Allied airmen to intensify their
Haiti, subsequently becoming in-
Marine-trained gendarmerie and fi-
nally chief of the Port-au-Prince po-
lice force. Rupertus graduated in
June 1926 from the Army Com-
mand and General Staff College at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and in
January of the following year be-
came Inspector of Target Practice
for the Marine Corps. He had two
tours of duty in China and com-
manded a battalion of the 4th Department of Defense (USMC) photo 69010
Marines in Shanghai when the MajGen William H. Rupertus, Coin-
Japanese attacked the city's Chi- tnanding General, 1st Marine Division,
nese defenders in 1937. reads a message of congratulation after
During the Guadalcanal cam- the capture of Airfield No. 2 at Cape
paign, as a brigadier general, he Gloucester, New Britain.
was assistant division commander,
1st Marine Division, personally se- Rupertus led the division on New
lected for the post by Major Gen- Britain and at Peleliu. He died of a
eral Alexander A. Vandegrift, the heart attack at Washington, D.C.,
division commander, whom he suc- on 25 March 1945, and did not see
ceeded when Vandegrift left the di- the surrender of Japan, which he
vision in July 1943. Major General had done so much to bring about.
the northeastern extremity of New sidiary landings also took place: the
Britain. Although the caplure of the first on 15 December at Cape
Merkus on Arawe Bay along the
south coast; and the second on D-
Day, 26 December, at Green Beach
on the northwest coast opposite the
main landing sites.
The first subsidiary landing took
place on 15 December 1943 at dis-
tant Cape Merkus, across the
Arawe channel from the islet of
Arawe. Although it had a limited
purpose—disrupting the movement
of motorized barges and other
small craft that moved men and
supplies along the southern coast of
New Britain and diverting attention
from Cape Gloucester—it neverthe-
2
less encountered stiff resistance. found there. An enemy airman had ing craft as the assault force ap-
Marine amphibian tractor crews reported that the assault force was proached the beach, performing the
used both the new, armored Buffalo approaching Cape Merkus, and same function as the rocket-firing
and the older, slower, and more vul- fighters and bombers from Rabaul LCIs at the Yellow Beaches on the
nerable Alligator to carry soldiers of attacked within two hours of the opposite side of the peninsula. The
the 112th Cavalry, who made the landing. Sporadic air strikes contin- first wave landed at 0748, with two
main landings on Orange Beach at ued throughout December, although others following it ashore. The
the western edge of Cape Merkus. with diminishing ferocity, and the Marines encountered no opposition
Fire from the destroyer USS Con- Japanese shifted troops to meet the as they carved out a beachhead
ynghrnn, supplemented by rocket- threat in the south. 1,200 yards wide and extending 500
equipped DUKWs and a submarine The other secondary landing yards inland. The Stoneface Group
chaser that doubled as a control took place on the morning of 26 De- had the mission of severing the
craft, and a last-minute bombing by cember. The 1,500-man Stoneface coastal trail that passed just west of
B-25s silenced the beach defenses Group—designated Battalion Land- Mount Talawe, thus preventing the
and enabled the Buffaloes to crush ing Team 21 and built around the passage of reinforcements to the
the surviving Japanese machine 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, under Cape Gloucester airfields.
guns that survived the naval and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Mas- The trail net proved difficult to
aerial bombardment. Less successful ters, Sr.—started toward Green find and follow. Villagers cleared
were two diversionary landings by Beach, supported by 5-inch gunfire garden plots, tilled them until the
soldiers paddling ashore in rubber from the American destroyers Reid jungle reclaimed them, and then
boats. Savage fire forced one group and Smith. LCMs [Landing Craft, abandoned the land and moved on,
to turn back short of its objective Medium] carried DUKW amphib- leaving a maze of trails, some faint
east of Orange Beach, but the other ian trucks, driven by soldiers and and others fresh, that led nowhere.
gained a lodgment on Pilelo Island fitted with rocket launchers. The The Japanese were slow, however,
and killed the handful of Japanese DUKWs opened fire from the land- to take advantage of the confusion

3
caused by the tangle of paths. Not
until the early hours of 30 Decem-
ber, did the enemy attack the Green
Beach force. Taking advantage of
heavy rain that muffled sounds and
reduced visibility, the Japanese
closed with the Marines, who called
down mortar fire within 15 yards of
their defensive wire. A battery of
the 11th Marines, reorganized as an
infantry unit because the can-
noneers could not find suitable po-
sitions for their 75mm howitzers,
shored up the defenses. One Marine
in particular, Gunnery Sergeant
Guiseppe Guilano, Jr., seemed to
materialize at critical moments, fir-
ing a light machine gun from the
hip; his heroism earned him the
Navy Cross. Some of the Japanese
succeeded in penetrating the posi-
tion, but a counterattack led by First
Lieutenant Jim G. Paulos of Com-
pany G killed them or drove them
off. The savage fighting cost Com-
bat Team 21 six Marines killed and
17 wounded; at least 89 Japanese
perished, and five surrendered. On
11 January 1944, the reinforced bat-
talion set out to rejoin the division,
the troops moving overland, the
heavy equipment and the wounded
traveling in landing craft.

Department of Defense (usMc) photo 75882

After the fierce battles at Guadal- During the planning of the New Britain operation, Gen Douglas MacArthur, right, in
canal in the South Pacific Area, the command of the Southwest Pacific Area, confers with LtGen Walter Kreuger, left, Ca,,,-
manding General, Sixth U.S. Army, and MajGen Rupertus, whose Marines will assault
1st Marine Division underwent re- the island. At such a meeting, Col Edwin A. Pollock, operations officer of the 1st Marine
habilitation in Australia, which lay Division, advised MacArthur of the opposition of the Marine leaders to a complex scheme
within General MacArthur's South- of maneuver involving Army airborne troops.
west Pacific Area. Once the division
had recovered from the ordeal of commanding the Sixth U.S. Army. ture the airfields at Cape Gloucester.
the Solomon Islands fighting, it But in actual practice, MacArthur Aircraft based there would then
gave MacArthur a trained amphibi- bypassed Blamey and dealt directly support the division when, after a
ous unit that he desperately needed with Kreuger. brief period of recuperation, it at-
to fulfill his ambitions for the cap- When the 1st Marine Division be- tacked Rabaul. The decision to by-
ture of Rabaul. Theoretically, the 1st came available to MacArthur, he pass Rabaul eliminated the landings
Marine Division was subordinate to still intended to seize Rabaul and there, but the Marines would never-
General Sir Thomas Blamey, the break the back of Japanese resis- theless seize the Cape Gloucester
Australian officer in command of tance in the region. Always con- airfields, which seemed essential for
the Allied Land Forces, and cerned about air cover for his am- neutralizing the base.
Blamey's nominal subordinate, phibious operations, MacArthur The initial concept of operations,
Lieutenant General Walter Kreuger, planned to use the Marines to cap- which called for the conquest of

4
western New Britain preliminary to During a routine briefing on 14 who nevertheless had commanded
storming Rabaul, split the 1st Ma- December, just one day before the an infantry regiment in Manchuria.
rine Division, sending Combat landings at Arawe, MacArthur off- When he arrived on New Britain in
Team A (the 5th Marines, rein- handedly asked how the Marines February of that year, Matsuda
forced, less one battalion in reserve) felt about the scheme of maneuver took over the 4th Shipping Com-
against Gasmata on the southern at Cape Gloucester. Colonel Edwin mand, an administrative headquar-
coast of the island, while Combat A. Pollock, the division's operations ters that provided staff officers for
Team C (the 7th Marines, rein- officer, seized the opportunity and the Matsuda Force. His principal
forced) seized a beachhead near the declared that the Marines objected combat units were the under-
principal objective, the airfields on to the plan because it depended on a strength 65th Infantry Brigade—con-
Cape Gloucester. The Army's 503d rapid advance inland by a single re- sisting of the 141st Infantry, battle-
Parachute Infantry would exploit inforced regiment to prevent heavy tested in the conquest of the
the Cape Gloucester beachhead, losses among the lightly armed Philippines, plus artillery and anti-
while Combat Team B (the rein- paratroops. Better, he believed, to aircraft units—and those compo-
forced 1st Marines) provided a re- strengthen the amphibious forces nents of the 51st Division not com-
serve for the operation. than to try for an aerial envelop- mitted to the unsuccessful, defense
Revisions came swiftly, and by ment that might fail or be delayed of New Guinea. Matsuda estab-
late October 1943 the plan no longer by the weather. Although he made lished the headquarters for his
mentioned capturing Rabaul, tacit no comment at the lime, MacArthur jury-rigged force near Kalingi,
acceptance of the modified Allied may well have heeded, what Poliock along the coastal trail northwest of
strategy and also satisfied an objec- said; whatever the reason, Kreuger's Mount Talawe, within five miles of
tion raised by General Rupertus. The staff eliminated the airborne por- the Cape Gloucester airfields, but
division commander had protested tion, directed the two battalions of the location would change to reflect
splitting Combat Team C, and the 1st Marines still with Combat the tactical situation.
Kreuger agreed to employ all three Team B to land immediately after As the year 1943 wore on, the Al-
battalions for the main assault, sub- the assault waves, sustaining the lied threat to New Britain increased.
stituting a battalion from Combat momentum of their attack, and Consequently, General Hitoshi Ima-
Team B, the 1st Marines, for the alerted the division reserve to pro- mura, who commanded the Eighth
landing on the west coast. The air- Area Army from a headquarters at
vide further reinforcement.
borne landing at Cape Gloucester re- Rabaul, assigned the Matsuda Force
mained in the plan, however, even to the 17th Division, under Lieu-
though Rupertus had warned that tenant General Yasushi Sakai, re-
bad weather could delay the drop cently arrived from Shanghai. Four
and jeopardize the Marine battalions A mixture of combat and service convoys were to have carried
already fighting ashore. The altered troops operated in western New Sakai's division, but the second and
version earmarked Army troops for Britain. The 1st and 8th Shipping third lost one ship to submarine tor-
the landing on the southern coast, Regiments used motorized barges to pedoes and another to a mine, while
which Kreuger's staff shifted from shuttle troops and cargo along the air attack damaged a third. Because
Gasmata to Arawe, a site closer to coast from Rabaul to Cape Merkus, of these losses, which claimed some
Allied airfields and farther from Cape Gloucester, and across 1,200 lives, the last convoy did not
Rabaul with its troops and aircraft. Dampier Strait to Rooke Island. For sail, depriving the division of more
Although Combat Team B would longer movements, for example to than 3,000 replacements and service
put one battalion ashore southwest New Guinea, the 5th Sea Transport troops. Sakai deployed the best of
of the airfields, the remaining two Battalion manned a fleet of trawlers his forces to western New Britain,
battalions of the 1st Marines were to and schooners, supplemented by entrusting them to Matsuda's tacti-
follow up the assault on Cape destroyers of the Imperial Japanese cal command.
Gloucester by Combat Team C. The Navy when speed seemed essen-
division reserve, Combat Team A, tial. The troops actually defending
might employ elements of the 5th western New Britain included the The landings at Cape Merkus in
Marines to reinforce the Cape Matsuda Force, established in Sep- mid-December caused Matsuda to
Gloucester landings or conduct op- tember 1943 under the command of shift his troops to meet the threat,
erations against the offshore islands Major General Iwao Matsuda, a but this redeployment did not ac-
west of New Britain. specialist in military transportation, count for the lack of resistance at

5
 which tended to hug the coastline,
increased Matsuda.'s dependence on
barges, but this traffic, hampered by
the American capture of Cape
Merkus, proved vulnerable to air-
craft and later to torpedo craft and
improvised gunboats.
The two battalions that landed
on the Yellow Beaches—Weber's on
the left and Williams's on the
right—crossed the sands in a few
strides, and plunged through a wall
of undergrowth into the damp flat,
where a Marine might be slogging
through knee-deep mud, step into a
hole, and end up, as one on them
said, "damp up to your neck." A
counterattack delivered as the as-
sault waves wallowed through the
damp flat might have inflicted se-
vere casualties, but Matsuda lacked
the vehicles or roads to shift his
troops in time to exploit the terrain.
Although immobile on the ground,
the Japanese retaliated by air.
American radar detected a flight of
enemy aircraft approaching from
Oepartrnent of Oefense (usMc) photo 72833
Rabaul; Army Air Forces P-38s in-
Marines, almost invisible amid the undergrowth, advance through the swamp forest of tercepted, but a few Japanese
New Britain, optimistically called damp flat on the maps they used. bombers evaded the fighters, sank
the destroyer Brownson with two di-
the Yellow Beaches. The Japanese Besides forfeiting the immediate rect hits, and damaged another.
general, familiar with the terrain of advantage of opposing the assault The first enemy bombers arrived
western New Britain, did not be- force at the water's edge, Matsuda's as a squadron of Army B-25s flew
lieve that the Americans would troops suffered the long-term, indi- over the LSTs [Landing Ships, Tank]
en route to attack targets at Borgen
storm these strips of sand extending rect effects of the erosion of Japanese
Bay south of the Yellow Beaches.
only a few yards inland and backed fortunes that began at Guadalcanal
Gunners on board the ships opened
by swamp. Matsuda might have and on New Guinea and continued fire at the aircraft milling overhead,
thought differently had he seen the at New Georgia and Bougainville. mistaking friend for foe, downing
American maps, which labeled the The Allies, in addition, dominated two American bombers, and dam-
area beyond the beaches as "damp the skies over New Britain, blunting aging two others. The survivors,
flat," even though aerial pho- the air attacks on the Cape Merkus shaken by the experience, dropped
tographs taken after preliminary air beachhead and bombing almost at their bombs too soon, hitting the
strikes had revealed no shadow will throughout the island. Although artillery positions of the 11th
within the bomb craters, evidence air strikes caused little measurable Marines at the left flank of Yellow
of a water level high enough to fill damage, save at Rabaul, they de- Beach 1, killing one and wounding
these depressions to the brim. Since moralized the defenders, who al- 14 others. A battalion commander
the airfields were the obvious prize,
ready suffered shortages of supplies in the artillery regiment recalled
Matsuda did not believe that the and medicine because of air and "trying to dig a hole with my
Marines would plunge into the submarine attacks on seagoing con- nose," as the bombs exploded, "try-
muck and risk becoming bogged voys and coastal shipping. An inad- ing to get down into the ground
down short of their goal. equate network of primitive trails, just a little bit further."

6
 By the time of the air action on 7th Marines, under Lieutenant tors pulling the heavier 105mm
the afternoon of D-Day, the 1st Colonel Odell M. Conoley, landed weapons.
Marine Division had already es- and began wading through the Meanwhile, Army trucks loaded
tablished a beachhead. The assault damp flat to take its place between with supplies roiled ashore from the
battalions of the 7th Marines ini- the regiment's 1st and 3d Battal- LSTs. Logistics plans called for these
tially pushed ahead, capturing ions as the beachhead expanded. vehicles to move forward and func-
Target Hill on the left flank, and The next infantry unit, the 1st Bat- tion as mobile supply dumps, but
then paused to await reinforce- talion, 1st Marines, reached Yellow the damp flat proved impassable by
ments. During the day, two more Beach 1 at 1300 to join that regi- wheeled vehicles, and the drivers
battalions arrived. The 3d Battal- ment's 3d Battalion, commanded tended to abandon the trucks to
ion, 1st Marines—designated by Hankins, in advancing on the avoid being left behind when the
Landing Team 31 and led by Lieu- airfields. The 11th Marines, despite shipping moved out, hurried along
tenant Colonel Joseph E Hankins, the accidental bombing, set up its by the threat from Japanese
a Reserve officer who also was a artillery, an operation in which the bombers. Ultimately, Marines had to
crack shooter—came ashore at amphibian tractor played a vital build roads, corduroying them with
0815 on Yellow Beach 1, passed part. Some of the tractors brought logs when necessary, or shift the
through the 3d Battalion, 7th lightweight 75mm howitzers from cargo to amphibian tractors. Despite
Marines, and veered to the north- the LSTs directly to the battery fir- careful planning and hard work on
west to lead the way toward the ing positions; others broke trail D-Day, the convoy sailed with about
airfields. By 0845, the 2d Battalion, through the undergrowth for trac- 100 tons of supplies still on board.

7

As the predicament of this truck and its Marine driver demonstrates, wheeled vehicles, like
those supplied by the Army for mobile supply dumps, bog down in the mud of Cape Gloucester.
While reinforcements and cargo
crossed the beach, the Marines ad-
vancing inland encountered the first
serious Japanese resistance. Shortly
after 1000 on 26 December, Hank-
ins's 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,
pushed ahead, advancing in a col-
umn of companies because a
swamp on the left narrowed the
frontage. Fire from camouflaged
bunkers killed Captain Joseph A.
Terzi, commander of Company K,
posthumously awarded the Navy
Cross for heroism while leading the
attack, and his executive officer,
Captain Philip A. Wilheit. The
sturdy bunkers proved impervious
to bazooka rockets, which failed to
detonate in the soft earth covering
the structures, and to fire from
37mm guns, which could not pene-
trate the logs protecting the occu-
pants. An Alligator that had deliv-
ered supplies for Company K fried
to crush one of the bunkers but be-
came wedged between two trees.
Japanese riflemen burst from cover
Department of Defense wsMc) photo
and killed the tractor's two machine
gunners, neither of them protected
by armor, before the driver could sity of the firing increased..
On fl-Day, among the shadows on the jungle floor, Navy corpsmen administer emergency
treatment to a wounded Marine.
8
break free. Again lunging ahead, the
tractor caved in one bunker, silenc-
ing its fire and enabling Marine ri-
flemen to isolate three others and
destroy them in succession, killing
25 Japanese. A platoon of M4 Sher-
man tanks joined the company in
time to lead the advance beyond
this first strongpoint.
Japanese service troops—espe-
cially the men of the 1st Shipping
Engineers and the 1st Debarkation
Unit—provided most of the initial
opposition, but Matsuda had
alerted his nearby infantry units to
converge on the beachhead. One
enemy battalion, under Major
Shinichi Takabe, moved into posi-
tion late on the afternoon of D-Day,
opposite Conoley's 2d Battalion, 7th
Marines, which clung to a crescent-
shaped position, both of its flanks
sharply refused and resting on the
marshland to the rear After sunset,
the darkness beneath the forest
canopy became absolute, pierced
only by muzzle flashes as the inten-
Department of Defense (usMc) photo 69009
 The Japanese clearly were
preparing to counterattack. Cono-
ley's battalion had a dwindling sup-
ply of ammunition, but amphibian
tractors could not begin making
supply runs until it became light
enough for the drivers to avoid tree
roots and fallen trunks as they navi-
gated the damp flat. To aid the bat-
talion in the dangerous period be-
fore the skies grew pale, Lieutenant
Colonel Lewis B. Puller, the execu-
tive officer of the 7th Marines, orga-
nized the men of the regimental
Headquarters and Service Com-
pany into carrying parties to load
themselves down with ammunition
and wade through the dangerous
swamp. One misstep, and a Marine
burdened with bandoliers of rifle
ammunition or containers of mortar
shells could stumble and drown. Department of Defense (UsMc) photo 72599

When Colonel Frisbie, the regimen- The stumps of trees shattered by artillery and the seemingly bottomless mud can sometimes
tal commander, decided to reinforce stymie even an LVT.
Conoley's Marines with Battery D, filled foxholes, the defenders hung vision reserve, Combat Team A,
1st Special Weapons Battalion, on. With the coming of dawn, Tak- Colonel John T. Selden's reinforced
Puller had the men leave their abe's soldiers gravitated toward the 5th Marines. The Army general
37mm guns behind and carry am- right flank of Conoley's unit, per- agreed, sending the 1st and 2d Bat-
munition instead. A guide from haps in a conscious effort to outflank talions, followed a day later by the
Conoley's headquarters met the col-
the position, or possibly forced in 3d Battalion. The division comman-
umn that Puller had pressed into that direction by the fury of the bat- der decided to land the team on
service and began leading them for-
talion's defensive fire. An envelop- Blue Beach, roughly three miles to
ward, when a blinding downpour, ment was in the making when Bat- the right of the Yellow Beaches. The
driven by a monsoon gale, obscured
tery D arrived and moved into the use of Blue Beach would have
landmarks and forced the heavily threatened area, forcing the Japanese placed the 5th Marines closer to
laden Marines to wade blindly on- to break off the action and regroup..
ward, each man clinging to the belt Cape Gloucester and the airfields,
of the one ahead of him. Not until but not every element of Selden's
0805, some twelve hours after the Combat Team A got the word.
column started off , did the men Some units touched down on the
reach their goal, put down their The 1st Marine Division's overall Yellow Beaches instead and had to
loads, and take up their rifles. plan of maneuver called for Colonel move on foot or in vehicles to the
Conoley's Marines had in the Frisbie's Combat Team C, the rein- intended destination.
meantime been fighting for their forced 7th Marines, to hold a beach- While Ru.pertus laid plans to
lives since the storm first struck. A head anchored at Target Hill, while commit the reserve, Whaling's com-
curtain of rain prevented mortar Combat Team B, Colonel William A. bat team advanced toward the Cape
crews from seeing their aiming Whaling's 1st Marines, reinforced Gloucester airfields. The Marines
stakes, indeed, the battalion com- but without the 2d Battalion ashore encountered only sporadic resis-
mander described the men as firing at Green Beach, advanced on the tance at first, but Army Air Forces
"by guess and by God." Mud got on airfields. Because of the buildup in light bombers spotted danger in
the small-arms ammunition, at times preparation for the attack on Cono- their path—a maze of trenches and
jamming rifles and machine guns. ley's battalion, General Rupertus re- bunkers stretching inland from a
Although forced to abandon water- quested that Kreuger release the di- promontory that soon earned the

9
nickname Hell's Point. The Japan- at about the same time, sent his reg- weapons to oppose an attack along
ese had built these defenses to pro- iment's Company A through the coastal trail parallel to shore in-
tect the beaches where Matsuda ex- swamp and jungle to seize the in- stead of over the beach. Advancing
pected the Americans to land. land point of the ridge extending in a drenching rain, the Marines en-
Leading the advance, the 3d Battal- from Hell's Point. Despite the ob- countered a succession of jungle-
ion, 1st Marines, under Lieutenant stacles in its path, Company A covered, mutually supporting posi-
Colonel Hankins, struck the Hell's burst from the jungle at about 1145 tions protected by barbed wire and
Point position on the flank, rather and advanced across a field of tall mines. The hour's wait for tanks
than head-on, but overrunning the grass until stopped by intense paid dividends, as the Shermans,
complex nevertheless would prove Japanese fire. By late afternoon, protected by riflemen, crushed
a deadly task. Whaling abandoned the maneuver. bunkers and destroyed the weapons
Rupertus delayed the attack by Both Company A and the defenders inside. During the fight, Company I
Hankins to provide time for the di- were exhausted and short of arnmu- drifted to its left, and Hankins used
vision reserve, Selden's 5th nition; the Marines withdrew be- Company K, reinforced with a pla-
Marines, to come ashore. On the hind a barrage fired by the 2d Bat- toon of medium tanks, to close the
morning of 28 December, after a talion, 11th Marines, and the gap between the coastal track and
bombardment by the 2d Battalion, Japanese abandoned their positions Hell's Point itself. This unit em-
11th Marines, and strikes by Army after dark. ployed the same tactics as Company
Air Forces A-20s, the assault troops Roughly 15 minutes after Com- I. A rifle squad followed each of the
encountered another delay, waiting pany A assaulted the inland termi- M4 tanks, which cracked open the
for an hour so that an additional nus of the ridge, Company I and the bunkers, twelve in all, and fired in-
platoon of M4 Sherman medium attached tanks collided with the side; the accompanying riflemen
tanks could increase the weight of main defenses, which the Japanese then killed anyone attempting to
the attack. At 1100, Hankins's 3d had modified since the 26 December fight or flee. More than 260 Japanese
Battalion, 1st Marines, moved landings, cutting new gunports in perished in the fighting at Hell's
ahead, Company I and the support- bunkers, hacking fire lanes in the Point, at the cost of 9 Marines killed
ing tanks leading the way. Whaling, undergrowth, and shifting men and and 36 wounded.
With the defenses of Hell's Point
A 75mm pack howitzer of the 11th Marines fires in support of the advance on the Cape shattered, the two battalions of the
Gloucester airfields. 5th Marines, which came ashore on
Department of Defense (uSMc) photo 12203
the morning of 29 December,
joined later that day in the advance
on the airfield. The 1st Battalion,
commanded by Major WiUiam H.
Barba, and the 2d Battalion, under
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis H. Walt,
moved out in a column, Barba's
unit leading the way. In front of the
Marines lay a swamp, described as
only a few inches deep, but the
depth, because of the continuing
downpour, proved as much as five
feet, "making it quite hard," Selden
acknowledged, "for some of the
youngsters who were not much
more than 5 feet in height." The
time lost in wading through the
swamp delayed the attack, and the
leading elements chose a piece of
open and comparatively dry
ground, where they established a
perimeter while the rest of the
force caught up.

11
 Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 1st
Marines, attacking through that reg-
iment's 3d Battalion, encountered
only scattered resistance, mainly
sniper fire, as it pushed along the
coast beyond Hell's Point. Half-
tracks carrying 75mm guns,
medium tanks, artillery, and even a
pair of rocket-firing DUKWs sup-
ported the advance, which brought
the battalion, commanded by Lieu-
tenant Colonel Walker A. Reaves, to
the edge of Airfield No. 2. When
daylight faded on 29 December, the
1st Battalion, 1st Marines, held a
line extending inland from the
coast; on its left were the 3d Battal-
ion, 1st Marines, and the 2d Battal-
ion, 5th Marines, forming a semicir-
cle around the airfield.
The Japanese officer responsible
for defending the airfields, Colonel
Kouki Sumiya of the 53d Infantry,
had fallen back on 29 December,
trading space for time as he gath-
ered his surviving troops for the de-
fense of Razorback Hifi, a ridge run-
ning diagonally across the
southwestern approaches to Airfield
No. 2. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th
Marines, attacked on 30 December
supported by tanks and artillery.
Sumiya's troops had constructed Department of Defense (usMc) photo 71589
some sturdy bunkers, but the chest- On 31 December 1943, the American flag rises beside the wreckage of a Japanese
high grass that covered Razorback bomber after the capture of Airfield No. 2, five days after the 1st Marine Division
Hill did not impede the attackers landed on New Britain.
like the jungle at Hell's Point. The
Japanese fought gallantly to hold Japanese bomber at Airfield No. 2, 12th Defense Battalion. Army avia-
the position, at times stalling the ad- the larger of the airstrips. tion engineers worked around the
vancing Marines, but the defenders The 1st Marine Division thus clock to return Airfield No. 2 to op-
had neither the numbers nor the seized the principal objective of the eration, a task that took until the
firepower to prevail. Typical of the Cape Gloucester fighting, but the end of January 1944. Army aircraft
day's fighting, one platoon of Com- airstrips proved of marginal value based here defended against air at-
pany F from Selden's regiment beat to the Allied forces. Indeed, the tacks for as long as Rabaul remained
back two separate banzai attacks, be- Japanese had already abandoned an active air base and also sup-
fore tanks enabled the Marines to the prewar facility, Airfield No. 1, ported operations on the ground.
shatter the bunkers in their path and which was thickly overgrown with
kill the enemy within. By dusk on tall, coarse kunai grass. Craters from
30 December, the landing force had American bombs pockmarked the
oiiermn the defenses of the airfields, surface of Airfield No. 2, and after
and at noon of the following day its capture Japanese hit-and-run While General Rupertus person-
General Rupertus had the American raiders added a few of their own, ally directed the capture of the air-
flag raised beside the wreckage of a despite antiaircraft fire from the fields, the Assistant Division Com-

12
 In the meantime, the Japanese de-
fenders, under Colonel Kenshiro
Katayama, commander of the 141st
Infantry, were preparing for an at-
tack of their own. General Matsuda
entrusted three reinforced battalions
to Katayama, who intended to hurl
them against Target Hill, which he
considered the anchor of the beach-
head line. Since Matsuda believed
that roughly 2,500 Marines were
ashore on New Britain, 10 percent of
the actual total, Katayama's force
seemed strong enough for the job
assigned it.
Katayama needed time to gather
his strength, enabling Shepherd to
make the first move, beginning at
mid-morning on 2 January to re-
align his forces. The 1st Battalion,
7th Marines, stood fast in the vicin-
ity of Target Hill, the 2d Battalion re-
mained in place along a stream al-
ready known as Suicide Creek, and
the regiment's 3d Battalion began
pivoting to face generally south.
Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion, 5th
Marines, pushed into the jungle to
come abreast of the 3d Battalion, 7th
Marines, on the inland flank. As the
units pivoted, they had to cross Sui-
cide Creek in order to squeeze out
Department of Defense (USA) photo SC 188250
the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, which
During operations to clear the enemy from the shores of Borgen Bay, BGen Lemuel C. would become Shepherd's reserve.
Shepherd, Jr., (left) the assistant division commander, confers with Cot John 7'. Selden, in The change of direction proved
command of the 5th Marines. extremely difficult in vegetation so
thick that, in the words of one Ma-
mander, Brigadier General Lemuel C. large the beachhead. rine: "You'd step from your line,
Shepherd, Jr., came ashore on Shepherd had sketchy knowledge take say ten paces, and turn around
Day, 26 December, and took com- of Japanese deployment west and to guide on your buddy. And no-
mand of the beachhead. Besides co- south of the Yellow Beaches. Dense body there .... I can tell you, it was a
ordinating the logistics activity there, vegetation concealed streams, very small war, and a very lonely
Shepherd assumed responsibility for swamps, and even ridge lines, as well
business." The Japanese defenders,
expanding the perimeter to the south- as bunkers nd trenches. The progress
moreover, had dug in south of Sui-
west and securing the shores of Bor- toward the airfields seemed to indi- cide Creek, and from these positions
gen Bay. He had a variety of shore cate Japanese weakness in that area they repulsed every attempt to cross
party, engineer, transportation, and and possible strength in the vicinity the stream that day. A stalemate en-
other service troops to handle the of the Yellow Beaches and Borgen sued, as Seabees from Company C,
logistics chores. The ad Battalion of Bay. To resolve the uncertainty about 17th Marines, built a corduroy road
Colonel Selden's 5th Marines—the the enemy's numbers and intentions, through the damp fiat behind the
remaining component of the division Shepherd issued orders on 1 January Yellow Beaches so that tanks could
reserve — arrived on 30 and 31 De- 1944 to probe Japanese defenses be- move forward to punch through the
cember to help the 7th Marines en- ginning the following morning. defenses of Suicide Creek.

13
 Department of Defense (IJSMC) photo 69013
Marines and Sea bees struggle to build a corduroy road leading tanks cannot advance over trails turned into quagmire by the
inland from the beachhead. Without the log surface trucks and unceasing rain.

While the Marine advance stalled the Marines were ready. Although vealed the existence of Aogiri
at Suicide Creek, awaiting the arrival the Japanese supporting fire proved Ridge, an enemy strongpoint un-
of tanks, Katayama attacked Target generally inaccurate, one round known to General Shepherd's intel-
Hill. On the night of 2 January tak- scored a direct hit on a machine-gun ligence section. Observers on Target
ing advantage of the darkness, position, killing two Marines and Hill tried to locate the ridge and the
Japanese infantry cut steps in the wounding the gunner, who kept fir- trail network the enemy was using,
lower slopes so the troops could ing the weapon until someone else but the jungle canopy frustrated
climb more easily. Instead of recon- could take over. This gun fred some their efforts.
noitering the thinly held lines of 5,000 rounds and helped blunt the While the Marines on Target Hill
Company A, 7th Marines, and trying Japanese thrust, which ended by tabulated the results of the fighting
to infiltrate, the enemy followed a dawn of 3 January. Nowhere did the there—patrols discovered 40 bod-
preconceived plan to the letter, ad- Japanese crack the lines of the 1st ies, and cap tured documents, when
vanced up the steps, and at midnight Battalion, 7th Marines, or loosen its translated, listed 46 Japanese killed,
stormed the strongest of the com- grip on Target Hill. 54 wounded, and two missing—
pany's defenses. Japanese mortar The body of a Japanese officer and used field glasses to scan the
barrages fired to soften the defenses killed at Target Hill yielded docu- jungle south of Suicide Creek, the
and screen the approach could not ments that cast new light on the 17th Marines completed the road
conceal the sound of the troops Japanese defenses south of Suicide that would enable medium tanks to
working their way up the hill, and Creek. A crudely drawn map re- test the defenses of that stream.

14
 wounded. Another Marine stepped
forward, but instead of climbing
onto the machine, he walked along-
side, using its bulk for cover as he
manipulated the controls with a
shovel and an axe handle. By dark,
he had finished the job of convert-
ing the impassable bank into a read-
ily negotiated ramp.
On the morning of 4 January, the,
first tank clanked down the ramp
and across the stream. As the Sher-
man emerged on the other side,
Marine riflemen cut down two
Japanese soldiers trying to detonate
Department of Defense (LJSMC) photo 72292
magnetic mines against its sides.
Target Hill, where the Marines repulsed a Japanese counterattack on the night of 2-3 Janu-
Other medium tanks followed, also
ary, dominates the Yellow Beaches, the site of the main landings on 26 December.
accompanied by infantry, and broke
During the afternoon of 3 January a lip of the embankment. Realizing open the bunkers that barred the
trio of Sherman tanks reached the the danger if tanks succeeded in way. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,
creek only to discover that the bank crossing the creek, the Japanese and the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,
dropped off too sharply for them .to opened fire on the bulldozer, surged onward past the creek,
negotiate. The engineers sent for a wounding the driver. A volunteer squeezing out the 2d Battalion, 7th
bulldozer, which arrived, lowered climbed onto the exposed driver's Marines, which crossed in the wake
its blade, and began gouging at the seat and took over until he, too, was of those two units to come abreast
of them on the far right of the line
that closed in on the jungle conceal-
ing Aogiri Ridge. The 1st Battalion,
7th Marines, thereupon joined the
southward advance, tying in with
the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, to
present a four-battalion front that
included the 2d Battalion and 3d
Battalions, 7th Marines.
Once across Suicide Creek, the
Marines groped for Aogiri Ridge,
which for a time simply seemed to
be another name for Hill 150, a ter-
rain feature that appeared on Amer-
ican maps. The advance rapidly
overran the hill, but Japanese resis-
tance in the vicinity did not dimin-
ish. On 7 January, enemy fire
wounded Lieutenant Colonel David
S. MacDougal, commanding officer
of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. His
executive officer, Major Joseph
Skoczylas, took over until he, too,
was wounded. Lieutenant Colonel
Lewis B. Puller, temporarily in com-
mand of the 3d Battalion, 7th
Marines, assumed responsibility for
both battalions until the arrival on

15
 the morning of 8 January of Lieu-
tenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt, re-
cently assigned as executive officer
of the 5th Marines, who took over
the regiment's 3d Battalion.
Upon assuming command of the
battalion, Walt continued th.e previ-
ous day's attack. As his Marines
braved savage fire and thick jungle,
they began moving up a rapidly
steepening slope. As night ap-
proached, the battalion formed a
perimeter and dug in. Random
Japanese fire and sudden skirm.ishes
punctuated the darkness. The na-
ture of the terrain and the deter-
mined resistance convinced Walt
Department of Defense (USMC) photo 72283 that he had found Aogiri Ridge.
From Hell's Point, athwart the route to the airfields, to Suicide Creek near the Yellow Walt's battalion needed the shock
Beaches, medium tanks and infantry team up to shatter the enemy's log and earthen
bunkers. action and firepower of tanks, but
drenching rain, mud, and rampag-
iijg streams stopped the armored
vehicles. The heaviest weapon that
the Marines managed to bring for-
ward was a single 37mm gun, man-
handled into position on the after-
noon of 9 January, While the 11th
Marines hammered the crest of Ao-
gin Ridge, the 1st and 3d Battalions,
7th Marines, probed the flanks of
the position and Walt's 3d Battalion,
5th Marines, pushed ahead in the
center, seizing a narrow segment of
the slope, its apex just short of the
crest. By dusk, said the 1st Marine
Division's special action report,
Walt's men had "reached the limit
of their physical endurance and
morale was low. It was a question of
whether or not they could hold their
hard-earned gains." The crew of the
37mm gun opened fire in support of
the afternoon's final attack, but after
just three rounds, four of the nine
men handling the weapon were
killed or wounded. Walt called for
volunteers; when no one responded,
he and his runner crawled to the
gun and began pushing the weapon
up the incline. Twice more the gun
barked, cutting a swath through the
undergrowth, and a third round of
canister destroyed a machine gun.

16
 Other Marines then took over from munition in doing so. A carrying proved to be the high-water mark
Walt and the runner, with new vol- party scaled the muddy slope with of the counterattack against Aogiri
unteers replacing those cut down by belts and clips for the machine guns Ridge, for the Japanese tide receded
the enemy. The improvised crew and rifles, but there barely was time as the daylight grew brighter. At
kept firing canister rounds every to distribute the ammunition before 0800, when the Marines moved for-
few yards until they had wrestled the Japanese launched the fifth at- ward, they did not encounter even
the weapon to the crest. There the tack of the morning. Marine ar- one living Japanese on the terrain
Marines dug in, as close as ten yards tillery tore into the enemy, as for- feature they renamed Walt's Ridge
to the bunkers the Japanese had ward observers, their vision in honor of their commander, who
built on the crest and reverse slope. obstructed by rain and jungle, ad- received the Navy Cross for his in-
At 0115 on the morning of 10 Jan- justed fire by sound more than by spirational leadership.
uary, the Japanese emerged from sight, moving 105mm concentra- One Japanese stronghold in the
their positions and charged through tions to within 50 yards of the Ma- vicinity of Aogiri Ridge still sur-
a curtain of rain, shouting and fir- rine infantrymen. A Japanese officer vived, a supply dump located along
ing as they came. The Marines emerged from the darkness and ran a trail linking the ridge to Hill 150.
clinging to Aogiri Ridge broke up almost to Walt's foxhole before frag- On 11 January, Lieutenant Colonel
this attack and three others that fol- ments from a shell bursting in the Weber's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,
lowed, firing off almost all their am- trees overhead cut him down. This supported by a pair of half-tracks
and a platoon of light tanks, elimi-
LtCol Lewis W Walt earned the Navy Cross leading an attack up Aogiri Ridge, renamed
Walt's Ridge in his honor.
nated this pocket in four hours of
Department of Defense (U5Mc photo 977113
fighting. Fifteen days of combat
since the landings on 26 December,
had cost the division 180 killed and
636 wounded in action.
The next objective, Hill 660, lay
at the left of General Shepherd's
zone of action, just inland of the
coastal track. The 3d Battalion, 7th
Marines, commanded since 9 Janu-
ary by Lieutenant Colonel Henry
W. Buse, Jr., got the assignment of
seizing the hill. In preparation for
Buse's attack, Captain Joseph W.
Buckley, commander of the
Weapons Company, 7th Marines,
set up a task force to bypass Hill
660 and block the coastal trail be-
yond that objective. Buckley's
group—two platoons of infantry, a
platoon of 37mm guns, two light
tanks, two half-tracks mounting
75mm guns, a platoon of pioneers
from the 17th Marines with a bull-
dozer, and one of the Army's
rocket-firing DUKWs—pushed
through the mud and set up a road.-
block athwart the line of retreat
from Hill 660. The Japanese di-
rected long-range plunging fire
against Buckley's command as it
advanced roughly one mile along
the trail. Because of their flat trajec-
tory, his 75mm and 37mm guns

17
 Department of Defense (LJSMc) photo 71520
Advancing past I-Jill 660, a task force under Capt Joseph W Buckley the emplacement on the right and the half-track mounted 75mm gun
cuts the line of retreat for the Japanese defenders. The 37mm gun in on the left drove the attacking enemy back with heavy casualties.

could not destroy the enemy's auto- Gaunt, weary, hollow-eyed, machine gunner PFC George C. Miller carries his
matic weapons, but the Marines weapon to the rear after 19 days of heavy fighting while beating back the Japan-
succeeded in forcing the hostile ese counterattack at i-Jill 660. This moving photograph was taken by Marine
gunners to keep their heads down. Corps combat photographer Sgt Robert R. Brenner.
Department of Defense (LJsMc) photo 72273
As they advanced, Buckley's men
unreeled telephone wire to main-
tain contact with higher headquar-
ters. Once the roadblock was in
place and camouflaged, the captain
requested that a truck bring hot
meals for his men. When the vehicle
bogged down, he sent the bulldozer
to push it free.
After aerial bombardment and
preparatory artillery fire, Buse's
battalion started up the hill at about
0930 on 13 January. His supporting
tanks could not negotiate the
ravines that scarred the hillside. In-
deed, the going became so steep
that riflemen sometimes had to
sling arms, seize handholds among
the vines, and pull themselves up-

18
ward. The Japanese suddenly Merkus, an installation that did not fantry teams found and destroyed
opened fire from hurriedly dug figure in American plans. A series most of the bunkers. Having elimi-
trenches at the crest, pinning down of concealed bunkers, boasting inte- nated the source of harassing fire,
the Marines climbing toward them grated fields of fire, held the lightly the troops pulled back after de-
until mortar fire silenced the enemy armed cavalrymen in check, as the stroying a tank immobilized by a
weapons, which lacked overhead defenders directed harassing fire at thrown track so that the enemy
cover. Buse's riflemen followed the beachhead. could not use it as a pillbox. An-
closely behind the mortar barrage, Because the cavalry unit lacked other tank, trapped in a crater, also
scattering the defenders, some of heavy weapons, a call went out for was earmarked for destruction, but
whom tried to escape along the those of the 1st Marine Division's Army engineers managed to free it
coastal trail, where Buckley's task tanks that had remained behind at and bring it back.
force waited to cut them down. Finschhafen, New Guinea, because The attack on 16 January broke
Apparently delayed by torrential armor enough was already churn- the back of Japanese resistance. Ko-
rain, the Japanese did not counter- ing up the mud of Cape Gloucester. mon ordered a retreat to the vicin-
attack Hill 660 until 16 January. Company B, 1st Marine Tank Battal- ity of the airstrip, but the 112th
Roughly two companies of ion, with 18 M5A1 light tanks Cavalry launched an attack that
Katayama's troops stormed up the mounting 37mm guns, and the 2d caught the slowly moving defend-
southwestern slope only to be Battalion, 158th Infantry arrived at ers and inflicted further casualties.
By the time the enemy dug in to
slaughtered by mortar, artillery. and Cape Merkus, moved into position
small-arms fire. Many of those by 15 January and attacked on the defend the airfield, which the
lucky enough to survive tried to following day. A squadron of Army Americans had no intention of seiz-
break through Buckley's roadblock, Air Forces B-24s dropped 1,000- ing, Komori's men had suffered 116
where 48 of the enemy perished. pound bombs on the jungle-covered killed, 117 wounded, 14 dead of
With the capture of Hill 660, the defenses, B-25s followed up, and disease, and another 80 too ill to
nature of the campaign changed. mortars and artillery joined in the fight. The Japanese hung on despite
The assault phase had captured its bombardment, after which two pla- sickness and starvation, until 24
objective and eliminated the possi- toons of tanks, ten vehicles in all, February, when Komori received
bility of a Japanese counterattack and two companies of infantry orders to join in a general retreat by
against the airfield complex. Next, surged forward. Some of the tanks Matsucla Force.
the Marines would repulse the bogged down in the rain-soaked Across the island, after the victo-
Japanese who harassed the sec- soil, and tank retrievers had to pull ries at Walt's Ridge and Hill 660,
ondary beachhead at Cape Merkus them free. Despite mud and nearly the 5th Marines concentrated on
and secure the mountainous, jungle- impenetrable thickets, the tank-in- seizing control of the shores of Bor-
covered interior of Cape Gloucestei
south of the airfields and between
the Green and Yellow Beaches.

At Cape Merkus on the south

coast of western New Britain, the
fighting proved desultory in com-
parison to the violent struggle in
the vicinity of Cape Gloucester. The
Japanese in the south remained con-
tent to take advantage of the dense
jungle and contain the 112th Cav-
alry on the Cape Merkus peninsula.
Major Shinjiro Komori, the Japanese
commander there, believed that the
landing force intended to capture
an abandoned airfield at Cape

19
 gen Bay, immediately to the east.
Major Barba's 1st Battalion fol-
lowed the coastal trail until 20 Janu-
ary, when the column collided with
a Japanese stronghold at Natamo
Point. Translations of documats
captured earlier in the fighting re-
vealed that at least one platoon,
supported by automatic weapons
had dug in there. Artillery and air
strikes failed to suppress the Japan-
ese fire, demonstrating that the cap-
tured papers were sadly out of date,
since at least a company—armed
with 20mm, 37mm, and 75mm
weapons—checked the advance.
Marine reinforcements, including
medium tanks, arrived in landing
craft on 23 January, and that after- Department of Defense (USMc) photo 75970

noon, supported by artillery and a Ma] William H. Barba's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, prepares to outflank the Japanese de-
fenses along the Natamo River.
rocket-firing DUKW, Companies C
and D overran Natamo Point. The
An officer of Ma] Gordon D. Gayle's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, displays a captured Japanese
battalion commander then dis- flag from a window of the structure that served as the headquarters of MaJGen Jwao Matsuda.
patched patrols inland along the Department of Defense (USA) photo sc 188246
west bank of the Natamo River to
outflank the strong positions on the
east bank near the mouth of the
stream. While the Marines were ex-
ecuting this maneuver, the Japanese
abandoned their prepared defenses
and retreated eastward.
Success at Cape Gloucester and
Borgen Bay enabled the 5th Marines
to probe the trails leading inland to-
ward the village of Magairapua,
where Katayama once had his
headquarters, and beyond. Ele-
ments of the regiment's 1st and 2d
Battalions and of the 2d Battalion,
1st Marines—temporarily attached
to the 5th Marines—led the way
into the interior as one element in
an effort to trap the enemy troops
still in western New Britain.
In another part of this effort,
Company L, 1st Marines, led by
Captain Ronald 1. Slay, pursued the
Japanese retreating from Cape
Gloucester toward Mount Talawe.
Slay and his Marines crossed the
mountain's eastern slope, threaded
their away through a cluster of
lesser outcroppings like Mount

20

The capture of Matsuda's headquarters provides Marine intelli-
gence with a harvest of documents, which the enemy buried rather
Langila, and in the saddle between
Mounts Talawe and Tangi encoun-
tered four unoccupied. bunkers situ-
ated to defend the junction of the
track they had been following with
another trail running east and west.
The company had found the main
east-west route from Sag Sag on the
coast to the village of Agulupella
and ultimately to Natamo Point on
the northern coast.
To exploit the discovery, a com-
posite patrol from the 1st Marines,
under the command of Captain
Nickolai Stevenson, pushed south
along that trail Slay had followed,
while a composite company from the
7th Marines, under Captain Preston
S. Parish, landed at Sag Sag on the
Department of Defense (IJSMC) photo 77642
than burned, presumably to avoid smoke that might attract ar-
tillery fire or air strikes.
west coast and advanced along the the Japanese mortars that had
east-west track. An Australian re- scourged his company during the
serve officer, William C. Wiedeman, action, the enemy emerged from
who had been an Episcopal mission- cover and attempted to pursue, a
ary at Sag Sag, served as Parish's bold but foolish move that exposed
guide and contact with the native the troops to deadly fire that
populace. When determined opposi- cleared the way for an advance to
tion stopped Stevenson short of the the trail junction. Hunt and Parish
trail junction near Mount Talawe, joined forces and probed farther,
Captain George ITS. Hunt's Company only to be stopped by a Japanese
K, 1st Marines, renewed the attack. ambush. At this point, Major
On 28 January, Hunt concluded William J. Piper, Jr., the executive
he had brought the Japanese to bay officer of the 3d Battalion, 7th
and attacked. For three hours that Marines, assumed command, re-
afternoon, his Marines tried unsuc- newed the pursuit on 30 January,
cessfully to break though a line of and discovered the enemy had fled.
bunkers concealed by jungle growth, Shortly afterward Piper's combined
losing 15 killed or wqunded. When patrol made contact with those dis-
Hunt withdrew beyond reach of patched inland by the 5th Marines.
21

LtCo! Lewis H. Puller, left, and Ma] William J. Piper discuss the route of a patrol from the
village of Agulupella to Gilnit on the Itni River, a two-week operation.
Thus far, a vigorous pursuit along
the coast and on the inland trails had
failed to ensnare the Japanese. The
Marines captured Matsuda's aban-
doned headquarters in the shadow
of Mount Talawe and a cache of doc-
uments that the enemy buried rather
Marine patrols, such as Puller's trek to Gilnit, depended on bearers recruited from the
villages of western New Britain who were thoroughly familiar with the local trail net.
Department of Defense (UsMc) photo 77436
than burned, perhaps because smoke
would almost certainly bring air
strikes or artillery fire, but the Japan-
ese general and his troops escaped.
Where had Matsuda Force gone? depended heavily on supplies
Since a trail net led from the dropped from airplanes. Piper Cubs
vicinity of Mount Talawe to the capable at best of carrying two cases
Department of Defense (USMC) photo 72836.
22
south, General Shepherd concluded
that Matsuda was headed in that
direction. The assistant division
commander therefore organized a
composite battalion of six rein-
forced rifle companies, some 3,900
officers and men in all, which Gen-
eral Rupertus entrusted to Lieu-
tenant Colonel Puller. This patrol.
was to advance from Agulupella on
the east-west track, down the so-
called Government Trail all the way
to Gilnit, a village on the Itni River,
inland of Cape Bushing on New
Britain's southern coast. Before
Puller could set out, information
discovered at Matsuda's former
headquarters and translated re-
vealed that the enemy actually was
retreating to the northeast. As a re-
sult, Rupertus detached the re-
cently arrived 1st Battalion, 5th
Marines, and reduced Puller's
force from almost 4,000 to fewer
than 400, still too many to be sup-
plied by the 150 native bearers as-
signed to the column for the march
through the jungle to Gilnit.
During the trek, Puller's Marines
of rations in addition to the pilot. and
observer, deposited their loads at vil-
lages along the way, and Fifth Air
Force B-17s dropped cargo by the ton.
Supplies delivered from the sky
made the patrol possible but did little
to ameliorate the discomfort of the
Marines slogging through the mud..
Despite this assistance from the
air, the march to Gilnit taxed the in-
genuity of the Marines involved and
hardened them for future action.
This toughening-up seemed espe-
cially desirable to Puller, who had
led many a patrol during the Ameri-
can intervention in Nicaragua, 1927-
1933. The division's supply clerks,
aware of the officer's disdain for
creature comforts, were startled by
requisitions from the patrol for hun-
dreds of bottles of insect repellent.
Puller had his reasons, however. Ac- Merkus beachhead and then of committing Sato's troops to the
cording to one veteran of the Gilnit headed toward the north coast, be- defense of Hill 660, Matsuda di-
operation, "We were always soaked ginning on 16 February. rected him to delay the elements of
and everything we owned was like- To the west, Company B, 1st the 5th Marines and 1st Marines
wise, and that lotion made the best Marines, boarded landing craft on that were converging over the in-
damned sI:uff to start a fire with that 12 February and crossed the land trail net. Sato succeeded in
your ever saw." Dampier Strait to occupy Rooke Is- checking the Hunt patrol on 28 Jan-
As Puller's Marines pushed to- land, some fifteen miles from the uary and buying time for Matsuda's
ward Gilnit on the Itni River, they coast of New Britain. The division's retreat, not to the south, but, as the
killed perhaps 75 Japanese and cap- intelligence specialists concluded documents captured at the general's
tured one straggler, along with correctly that the garrison had de- abandoned headquarters confirmed,
some weapons and odds and ends parted. Indeed, the transfer began along the northern coast, with the
of equipment. An abandoned pack on 6 December 1943, roughly three 51st Reconnaissance Regiment initially
contained an American flag, proba- weeks before the landings at Cape serving as the rear guard.
bly captured by a soldier of the Gloucester, when Colonel Jiro Sato Once the Marines, realized what
141st Infantry during Japan's con- and half of his 500-man 51st Recon- Matsuda had in mind, cutting the
quest of the Philippines. After naissance Regiment, sailed off to line of retreat assumed the highest
reaching Gilnit, the patrol fanned Cape Bushing. Sato then led his priority, as demonstrated by the
out but encountered no opposition. command up the Itni River and withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 5th
Puller's Marines made contact with joined the main body of the Matsuda Marines, from the Puller patrol on
an Army patrol from the Cape Force east of Mount Talawe. Instead the very eve of the march toward
On 12 February 1944, infantrymen of Company B, from LtCol Rooke Island, west of New Britain, but find that the Japanese
Walker A. Reavess 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, advance inland on have withdrawn.
Department of Defense (usMc) photo 79151

24
 Gilnit. As early as 3 February, Ru- Eniwetok Atolls in the Marshall Is- had prevailed after the limited
pertus concluded that the Japanese lands, as the Central Pacific offen- American attack on 16 January had
could no longer mount a counterat- sive gathered momentum. Further sent Komori's troops reeling back
tack on the airfields and began de- to complicate Japanese strategy, car- beyond the airstrip. At Augitni, a
voting all his energy and resources rier strikes proved that Truk had be- village east of the Aria River south-
to destroying the retreating Japan- come too vulnerable to continue west of Iboki Point, Komori re-
.ese. The division commander chose serving as a major naval base. The ported to Colonel Sato of the 51st
Selden's 5th Marines, now restored enemy, conscious of the threat to his Reconnaissance Regiment, which had
to three-battalion strength, to con- inner perimeter that was developing concluded the rear-guard action
duct the pursuit. While Petras and to the north, decided to pull back that enabled the Matsuda Force to
his light aircraft scouted the coastal his fleet units from Truk and his air- cross the stream and take the trail
track, landing craft stood ready to craft from Rabaul. On 19 February— through Augitni to Linga Linga and
embark elements of the regiment just two days after the Americans eastward along the coast. When the
and position them to cut off and de- invaded Eniwetok—Japanese fight- two commands met, Sato broke out
ers at Rabaul took off for the last
stroy the Matsuda Force. Bad weather a supply of sake he had been carry-
hampered Selden's Marines; clouds time to challenge an American air ing, and the officers exchanged
concealed the enemy from aerial raid. When the bombers returned on toasts well into the night.
observation, and a boiling surf the following day, not a single oper- Meanwhile, Captain Kiyomatsu
ruled out landings over certain ahonal Japanese fighter remained at Terunuma organized a task force
beaches. With about 5,000 Marines, the airfields there. built around the 1st Battalion, 54th
and some Army dog handlers and The defense of Rabaul now de- Infantry, and prepared to defend. the
their animals, the colonel rotated pended exclusively on ground Talasea area near the base of the
his battalions, sending out fresh forces. Lieutenant General Yusashi Willaumez Peninsula against a pos-
troops each day and using 10 LCMs Sakai, in command of the 77th Divi- sible landing by the pursuing
in attempts to leapfrog the retreat- sion, received orders to scrap his Marines. The Terunuma Force had
ing Japanese. "With few exceptions, plan to dig in near Cape Hoskins the mission of holding out long
men were not called upon to make and instead proceed to Rabaul. The enough for Matsuda Force to slip
marches on two successive days," general believed that supplies past on the way to Rabaul. On 6
Selden recalled. "After a one-day enough had been positioned along March, the leading elements of Mat-
hike, they either remained at that the trail net to enable at least the suda's column reached the base of
camp for three or four days or most vigorous of Matsuda's troops the Willaumez Peninsula, and Ko-
made the next jump by LCMs." At to stay ahead of the Marines and mori, leading the way for Sato's
any point along the coastal track, reach the fortress. The remaining rear guard, started from Augitni to-
the enemy might have concealed self-propelled barges could carry ward Linga Linga.
himself in the dense jungle and heavy equipment and. those troops
sprung a deadly ambush, but he most needed to defend Rabaul, as
did not. Selden, for instance, ex- well as the sick and wounded. The By coincidence, 6 March was the
pected a battle for the Japanese sup- retreat, however, promised to be an day chosen for the reinforced 5th
ply point at Iboki Point, but the ordeal for the Japanese. Selden had Marines, now commanded by
enemy faded away. Instead of en- alread.y demonstrated how swiftly Colonel Oliver P. Smith, to land on
countering resistance by a deter- the Marines could move, taking ad- the west coast of the Willaumez
mined and skillful rear guard, the vantage of American control of the Peninsula midway between base
5th Marines found only stragglers, skies and the coastal waters, and a and tip. The intelligence section of
some of them sick or wounded. two-week march separated the division headquarters believed that
Nevertheless, the regimental com- nearest of Matsuda's soldiers from Japanese strength between Talasea,
mander could take pride in main- their destination. Attrition would the site of a crude airstrip, and
taining unremitting pressure on be heavy, but those who could con- Cape Hoskins, across Kimbe Bay
the retreating enemy "without loss tribute the least to the defense of from Wiliaumez Peninsula, equaled
or even having a man wounded" Rabaul seemed the likeliest to fall
that of the Smith's command, but
and occupying Iboki Point on 24 by the wayside. that most of the enemy troops de-
February. The Japanese forces retreating to
fended Cape Hoskins. The intelli-
Meanwhile, American amphibi- Rabaul included the defenders of gence estimate proved correct, for
ous forces had seized Kwa.jalein and Cape Merkus, where a stalemate Sakai had been preparing a last-

25
ditch defense of Cape Hoskins, principally natives who had boat unit, took command of the col.-
when word arrived to retreat all the worked at a plantation that Mars- lection of small craft, some of them
way to Rabaul. land had operated in the area before manned by his soldiers and the oth-
To discover the extent of Japan- the war, confirmed Marine esti- ers by sailors. A storm buffeted the
ese preparations in the immediate •mates of Terunuma's aggregate formation, and after the seas grew
vicinity of Volupai, a reconnais- force—some 600 men, two thirds of calm, the boat carrying the Army
sance team landed from a torpedo them located near Talasea, armed air liaison party broke down. Major
boat at Bagum, a village about nine with mortars and artillery. Gordon D. Gayle, the new comman-
miles from Red Beach, the site cho- Bristol Beauforts of the Royal der of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
sen for the assault landing. Flight Australian Air Force based at Kin- who already was behind schedule,
Lieutenant C. I-I. Rodney Marsland wina Island bombed the Volupai- risked further delay by taking the
of the Royal Australian Air Force, Talasea region for three days and disabled craft in tow. Gayle felt that
First Lieutenant John D. Bradbeer then conducted a last-minute strike Combat Team A's need for the liai-
—the division's chief scout, who to compensate for the absence of son party's radio equipment justi-
had participated in three similar re- naval gunfire. Smith's force, desig- fied his action.
connaissance patrols of the Cape nated Landing Team A, loaded into At 0835 on 6 March, the first of
Gloucester area before the 26 De- a small flotilla of landing craft, es- the amphibian tractors carrying the
cember invasion—and two native corted by torpedo boats, and set out assault troops clawed their way
bearers remained ashore for 24 from Iboki Point. Lieutenant onto Red Beach. During the move-
hours and learned that Red Beach Colonel Robert Amory, JE, an Army ment shoreward, Sherman tanks in
was lightly defended. Their sources, officer in command of an engineer Army LCMs opened fire with ma-

26
 other three continued in column.
chine guns and stood ready to direct While Company B of Gayle's bat-
their 75mm weapons against any The tank in the lead lost momen- talion followed the trail toward the
Japanese gunner who might oppose tum on a muddy rise, and two plantation, Company G kept pace,
the landing. Aside from hard-to- Japanese soldiers carrying land crossing the western shoulder of
pinpoint small-arms fire, the oppo- mines burst from cover to attack it. Little Mount Worn. Five Army Air
sition consisted mainly of barrages Riflemen of Company E cut down Forces P-39s from Airfield No. 2 at
from mortars, screened by the ter- one of them, but the other deto- Cape Gloucester arrived overhead
rain from the flat-trajectory cannon nated his mine against the vehicle, to support Gayle's attack, but the
of the tanks. When Japanese mortar killing himself and a Marine who pilots could not locate the troops
shells began bursting among the ap- tried to stop him. The explosion below and instead bombed Cape
proaching landing craft, Captain jammed the turret and stunned the Hoskins, where there was no dan-
Theodore A. Petras, at the controls crewmen, who were further ger of hitting the Marines. Even
of one of the division's Piper Cubs, shaken, but not wounded, when an without the aerial attack, the 2d
dived low over the mortar positionsantitank grenade exploded against Battalion, 5th Marines, overran the
and dropped hand grenades from the armor. The damaged Sherman plantation by dusk and dug in for
the supply he carried on all his got out of the way; when the other the night; the unit counted the bod-
flights. Natives had warned Mars- two tanks had passed, it returned ies of 35 Japanese killed during the
land and Bradbeer of a machine-gun to the trail only to hit a mine that day's fighting.
nest dominating the beach from the disabled it. On D-Day, Combat Team A lost
slopes of Little Mount Worn, but the Despite the loss of two tanks, one 13 killed and 71 wounded, with ar-
men of the 1st Battalion, 5th temporarily immobilized on the tillery batteries rather than rifle
Marines, leading the way, found it beach and the other out of action per- companies suffering the greater
abandoned and encountered no se- manently, Gayle's battalion contin- number of casualties. The 2d Battal-
rious opposition as they dug in to ued its advance. During the fighting ion, 11th Marines, set up its 75mm
protect the beachhead. on the approaches to the Volupai co- pack howitzers on the open beach,
Meanwhile, Gayle's Marines conut plantation, the body of a Japan- exposed to fire from the 90mm mor-
pressed their attack, with four ese soldier yielded a map showing tars upon which Petras had ineffec-
medium tanks supporting Com- enemy dispositions around Talasea. tually showered his hand grenades.
pany E as it tried to pu.sh farther in- By mid-afternoon, Smith's regimental Some of the corpsmen at Red Beach,
land. One of the Shermans bogged intelligence section was disseminat- who went to the assistance of
down almost immediately in the ing the information, which proved wounded artillerymen, became ca-
soft sand of Red Beach, but the valuable in future operations. sualties themselves. Nine of the
Marines killed on 6 March were
At Volupai, as on Cape Gloucester, sand, triad, and land mines—sometimes carried by
members of the artillery unit, along
Japanese soldiers who detonated them against the sides of the vehicle—could immobilize
even the Sherman M4 medium tank.
with 29 of the wounded. Neverthe-
Department of Defenac (USMc) photo 79868 less, the gunners succeeded in reg-
istering their fires in the afternoon
and harassing the enemy through-
out the night.
While the Marines prepared to
renew the attack on the second day,
Terunuma deployed his troops to
oppose them and keep open the line
of retreat of the Matsuda Force. In
doing so, the Japanese commander
fell back from his prepared posi-
tions on the fringes of Volupai Plan-
tation—including the mortar pits
that had raised such havoc with the
2d Battalion, 11th Marines—and
dugin on the northwest slopes of
Mount Schleuther, overlooking the
trail leading from the plantation to

27
Bitokara village on the coast. As had only enough time to send Com- choked with brush and vines—
soon as he realized what the enemy slowed the Marines, and the sun set
pany C a short distance inland on a
had in mind, Gayle sent Company F with the battalion still on the trail.
trail that passed to the right of Little
uphill to thwart the Japanese plan, Meanwhile, Gayle's 2d Battalion
Mount Worn, en route to the village
while Company E remained on the of Liappo. When the trail petered probed deeper into Terunuma's de-
out among the trees and vines, the fenses. Patrols ranged. ahead on the
trail and built up a base of fire. On
Marines hacked their way forward morning of 8 March and found the
the right flank of the maneuver ele-
until they ran out of daylight short Japanese dug in at Bitokara Mission,
ment, Company F, the weapons pla-
toon burst from the undergrowth of their objective. but the enemy fell back before the
and surprised Japanese machine On 8 March, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines could storm the position.
gunners setting up their weapon, Marines, resumed the advance, Gayle's troops occupied Bitokara
killing them and turning the gun Companies A and B moving on par- and pushed as far as Talasea, taking
against the enemy. The advance of allel paths leading east of Little over the abandoned airstrip. Other
Company F caught the Japanese in Mount Worn. Members of Com- patrols from this battalion started up
mid-deployment and drove them pany A, peering through dense un- the steep slopes of Mount Schleuther
back after killing some 40 of them. dergrowth, saw a figure in a Japan- and collided with Terunuma's main
Gayle's battalion established a ese uniform and opened fire. The strength. Fire from small arms, a
nighttime perimeter that extended person was not a Japanese, how- 90mm mortar, and a 75mm field gun
from Mount Schleuther to the trail ever, but a native wearing clothing killed or wounded 18 Marines.
and embraced a portion of both. discarded by the enemy and serv- Rather than press his attack in the
The action on 7 March repre- ing as a guide for Company B. The gathering darkness, Gayle pulled
sented a departure from plan. Smith first shots triggered an exchange of back from the mountain and dug in
had intended that both Barba and fire that wounded the guide, killed at Bitokara Mission so artillery and
Gayle attack, with the 3d Battalion, one Marine, and wounded a num- mortars could hammer the defenses
5th Marines, commanded since 12 ber of others. Afterward, the ad- throughout the night, but he left one
January by Lieutenant Colonel vance resumed, but once again the company to defend the Talasea
Harold 0. Deakin, assuming re- formidable terrain—muddy ravines airstrip.
sponsibility for the defense of the
beachhead. The landing craft that Cpl Robert J. Hallahan, a member of the 1st Marine Division band, examines the shattered
had carried the assault troops de- remains of a lapanese 75mn gun used in the defense of Mount Schleuther and rigged as a
parted from Red Beach during D- booby trap when the enemy withdrew. Department of Defense (USA) photo SC 260915
Day, some of them carrying the seri-
ously wounded, in order to pick up
the 3d Battalion at Iboki Point and
bring it to Volupai. The day was
waning by the time enough landing
craft were on hand for Deakin's bat-
talion. For the reinforcements to ar-
rive in time for an attack on the
morning of 7 March would require
a dangerous nighttime approach to
Volupai, through uncharted waters
studded with sharp outcroppings of
coral that could lay open the hull of
a landing craft. Rupertus decided
that the risks of such a move out-
weighed the advantages and can-
celed it at the last moment. No boat
started the return voyage to Red
Beach until after dawn on 7 March,
delaying the arrival of Deakin's bat-
talion until late afternoon. On that
day, therefore, Barba's 1st Battalion

28
 Marines, and Army engineers, who
used a 10-ton wrecker to recover
three Sherman tanks that had be-
come mired during the fighting. By
10 March, the trails could support a
further advance. Two days later, el-
ements of Deakin's 3d Battalion, 5th
Marines, having moved inland
from the beachhead, provided a
guard of honor as Colonel Smith
and his executive officer, Lieutenant
Colonel Henry W. Buse, raised over
Bitokara the same flag that had
flown over Airfield No. 2 at Cape
Gloucester.

The flotilla of Army LCMs and

Navy LCTs that supported the Volu-
pai landings inflicted further dam-
age on Japanese coastal traffic, al-
Department of Defense (U5MO photo 69985 ready hard hit by air strikes. On 9
Marines struggle to winch a tractor, and the 105mm howitzer it is towing, out of the mud March, a convoy of landing craft car-
of New Britain. The trails linking Volupai and Talasea proved as impassable for heavy vehi- rying supplies around the tip of the
des as those on Cape Gloucester peninsula for delivery to the advanc-
ing Marines at Talasea spotted four
On the morning of 9 March, Com- the base of the mountain. The 5th enemy barges, beached and sloppily
pany C of Cayle's battalion ad- Marines thus opened a route across camouflaged. An LCT took the
vanced up Mount Schleuther while the Willaumez Peninsula to support barges under fire from its 20mm can-
Companies B and C from Barba's further operations against Mat- non and machine guns, destroying
command cleared the villages suda's line of retreat. Since 6 March, one of the Japanese craft. Later that
around the base. Company G ex- Colonel Smith's force had killed an day, two LCMs used the 37mm gun
pected to encounter intense opposi- estimated 150 Japanese at the cost
of the Marine light tank that each
tion during its part of the coordi- of 17 Marines killed and 114 was carrying, to fire upon another
nated attack, but Terunuma had wounded, most of the casualties barge beached on the peninsula.
decamped from the mountain top, suffered on the first day. The final The enemy tried to make the best
leaving behind one dead, two strag- phase of the fighting that began on possible use of the dwindling num-
glers, and an artillery piece. The Red Beach consisted of securing ber of barges, but the bulk of Mat-
enemy, however, had festooned the Carua Island, abandoned by the suda's troops moved overland,
abandoned 75mm gun with vines Japanese, for American use, a task screened by Terunuma's men dur-
that served as trip wires for a booby finished on 9 March. ing the transit of the base of the
trap. When the Marines hacked at The results of the action at the Willaumez Peninsula. About a hun-
the vines to examine the weapon base of the Willaumez Peninsula dred Japanese dug in at Garilli, but
more closely, they released the firing proved mixed. The grass airstrip at by the time Company K of Deakin's
pin and detonated a round in the Talasea lacked the length to accom- 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, attacked
chamber. Since the Japanese gun modate fighters, but the division's on 11 March, the enemy had fallen
crew had plugged the bore before liaison planes made extensive use back to a new trail block about
fleeing, the resulting explosion rup- of it, landing on either side of the three miles distant. For four days,
tured the breech block and wounded carcass of a Japanese aircraft until the Marines fought a succession of
one of Gayle's men. the wreckage could be hauled away. sharp actions, as the Japanese re-
Besides yielding the dominant The trail net, essentially a web of treated a few hundred yards at a
terrain, Terunuma chose not to de- muddy paths, required long hours time, dragging with them a 75mm
fend any of the villages clustered at of hard work by Company F, 17th gun that anchored each of the

29
blocking positions. On 16 March, for torpedo boats that harried the route to the objective, however, the
Deakin himself joined Company K, surviving Japanese barges. Unfortu- patrol encountered fire from small
arriving in an LCM that also carried nately, on 27 March, the second day arms and mortars, but the Marines
a section of 81mm mortars. The the base was operating, Allied air- had apparently learned their
Japanese turned their cannon sea- craft mistook two of the boats for lessons well, for they succeeded in
ward to deal with this threat but Japanese craft and attacked, killing breaking off the action and escaped
failed to hit the landing craft. five sailors and wounding 18. without suffering casualties.
Shortly after the Marine mortars One of the courses taught at the Meanwhile, the Japanese retreat
landed and went into action, new Garua training center sought continued. Komori's troops, blazing
Terunuma's men again withdrew, to produce amphibious scouts for the trail for Sato's command from
but this time they simply faded the division's future operations. Augitni to the northern coast, en-
away, since the bulk of Matsuda The school's headquarters decided countered a disheartening number
Force had escaped to the east. that a reconnaissance of Cape of hungry stragglers as they
Having secured the Red Beach- Hoskins would serve as a suitable marched toward a supply depot at
Garua Bay-Talasea area, the 5th graduation exercise, since aerial ob- Kandoka, roughly 10 miles west of
Marines dispatched patrols south- servers had seen no sign of enemy the Willaumez Peninsula. Crossing
ward to the base of the Wilaumez activity there. On 13 April, Second the Kuhu River, Komori's soldiers
Peninsula, capturing only the occa- Lieutenant Richard R. Breen, ac- came under ineffectual fire from an
sional straggler and confirming the companied by Lieutenant Marsland American landing craft. The rain-
departure of the main body of Mat- of the Royal Australian Air Force, swollen Via River, broader than the
suda's command. The st Marine embarked with l6 trainees, two na- Kuhu, proved a more serious obsta-
Division established a comfortable tive guides, and a rifle platoon from cle, requiring a detour lasting two
headquarters, training sites, a hos- the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, in a days to reach a point where the
pital that utilized captured stocks of pair of LCMs. While two instructors stream narrowed. Komori's provi-
Japanese medicine, and a rest area stood by in one of the landing craft, sions ran out on 17 March, forcing
that featured swimming off the the platoon established a trail block, the soldiers to subsist on taro, birds
Garua beaches and bathing in hot and the future scouts advanced to- and fish, and vegetables from vil-
springs ashore. The Navy built a ward the Cape Hoskins airfield, no lage garden plots, supplemented by
base on the Willaumez Peninsula longer used by the Japanese. En some welcome coconuts gathered
from a plantation at Linga Linga.
Before the building of a rest area at Garua Bay, with its hot springs and bathing After losing additional time and a
beaches, these Marines relax in one of the crystal clear streams running into the sea dozen lives crossing yet another
from New Britain's mountainous interior.
river, the Kapaluk, Komori's troops
Department of Defense (usMc photo 78381
straggled into Kandoka on the 24th,
only to discover that the food and
other supplies had been carried off
toward Rabaul. Despite this crush-
ing disappointment, Komori
pressed on, his men continuing to
live off the land as best they could.
Five more men drowned in the fast-
moving waters of the Kulu River,
and a native hired as a guide de-
fected. Already weakened physi-
cally, Komori came down with an
attack of malaria, but he forced
himself to continue.
The survivors struggled onward
toward Cape Hoskins and ulti-
mately Rabaul. On 9 April, Easter
Sunday, four half-starved Japanese
wandered onto the San Remo
Plantation, where Gayle's battal-

30
ion had bivouacked after pursuing As the head of Sato's column dis- the time had come for the amphibi-
the enemy eastward from the appeared in the jungle, one of the ous troops to move on to an opera-
Willaumez Peninsula. The Marine division's light airplanes, scouting tion that would make better use of
unit was preparing to pass in re- landing sites for Brush's battalion, their specialized training and
view for the regimental comman- sighted the tail near Linga Linga. equipment. The final action fought
der later that day, when a sentry The pilot, Captain Petras, turned by the Leathernecks took place on
saw the intruders and opened fire. over the controls to Brigadier Gen- 22 April, when an ambush sprung
The ensuing skirmish killed three eral Earl C. Long, also a pilot, by the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
of the enemy. One of the dead sketched the location of the Japan- killed 20 Japanese and resulted in
proved to be Major Komori; his ese, and dropped the map to one of the last Marine fatality of the cam-
pack contained a rusty revolver the troop-laden landing craft. Petras paign. In seizing western New
and a diary describing the suffer- then led the way to an undefended Britain as part of the isolation of
ings of his command. beach, where Brush's Marines Rabaul, the division suffered 310
Colonel Sato, with the rest of the waded ashore and set out in pursuit killed in action and 1,083 wounded,
rear guard for the Matsuda Force, set of Sato. On 30 March, Second Lieu- roughly one-fourth the estimated
out from Augitni on 7 March, one tenant Richard B. Watkins, at the Japanese casualties.
day after Komori, who sent back head of an eight-man patrol, spot- Early in February 1944, after the
word on the 19th that patrols from ted a pair of Japanese, their rifles capture of the Cape Gloucester air-
the 5th Marines had fanned out from slung, who turned out to be mem- fields but before the landing at
the Willaumez Peninsula, where the bers of a 73-man patrol, far too Volupai, General Rupertus, warned
reinforced regiment had landed al- many for Watkins to handle. that his 1st Marine Division might
most two weeks earlier. When Sato Once the enemy column had remain on New Britain indefinitely.
reached Linga Linga and came moved off, Watkins and his men Having the unit tied down for an
across a bivouac abandoned by a hurried to Kandoka, where he re- extended period alarmed the re-
Marine patrol, his force had dwin- ported to Major Brush and obtained cently appointed Commandant of
dled to just 250 men, less than half mortars and machine guns before the Marine Corps, General Vande-
the number that started out. He re- again taking to the trail. Brush fol- grift. "Six months there," he re-
ceived a shock the following day lowed, bringing a reinforced rifle marked, referring to an extended
when American landing craft ap- platoon to increase the Marine fire- commitment in New Britain, "and it
peared as his men prepared to cross power. Meanwhile, the Japanese en- will no longer be a well-trained am-
the Kapaluk River. He immediately countered yet another Marine pa- phibious division." Vandegrift
set up a perimeter to beat back the trol, this one led by Sergeant Frank urged Admiral Ernest J. King, the
expected attack, but the boats were ChEek, which took up a position on Chief of Naval Operations, to help
carrying elements of the 2d Battal- high ground that commanded the pry the division from MacArthur's
ion, 1st Marines, under Major trail. When they heard Chliek's grasp so it could again undertake
Charles H. Brush, Jr. A patrol from group open fire, Watkins and Brush amphibious operations. Admiral
Brush's Company F landed on a hurried to its aid; the resulting Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in
beach beyond Kandoka, the former slaughter killed 55 Japanese, includ- Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, wanted
site of a Japanese supply cache, and ing Colonel Sato, who died sword the division for the impending in-
dispatched one platoon, led by First in hand, but the Marines did not vasion of the Palau Islands, the cap-
Lieutenant William C. Schleip, west- suffer even one casualty. ture of which would protect the
ward along the coastal track, even as On 9 April, the 3d Battalion, 1st flank of MacArthur's advance to
Sato, aware only of the general loca- Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel the Philippines. In order to obtain
tion of the landing, groped eastward Hankins, replaced Brush's 1st Bat- the Marines, Nimitz made the
toward the village. On 26 March, the talion and continued the search for Army's 40th Infantry Division
two collided, the Japanese surpris- enemy stragglers. The bulk of the available to MacArthur, in effect
ing the Marines in the act of crossing Mats uda Force, and whatever sup- swapping a d.ivision capable of tak-
a small stream and pinning them plies it could transport, had by this ing over the New Britain campaign
down for some three hours until the time retreated to Cape Hoskins and for one that could spearhead the
approach of reinforcements from beyond, and Army troops were tak- amphibious offensive against Japan.
Company F forced the enemy to ing over from the Marines. Almost MacArthur, however, briefly re-
break off the action, take to the jun- four months had elapsed since the tained control of one component of
gle, and bypass Kandoka. landing at Cape Gloucester; clearly the Marine division—Company A,

31
1st Tank Battalion. That unit's In a campaign lasting four ing craft—supported the landings,
medium tanks landed on 22 April months, the 1st Marine Division had but the size of the island and the
at Hollandia on the northern coast plunged into the unforgiving jungle lack of fixed coastal defenses limited.
of New Guinea, but a swamp just and overwhelmed a determined and the effectiveness of the various
beyond the beachhead prevented resolute enemy, capturing the Cape forms of naval gunfire. Using supe-
the Shermans from supporting the Gloucester airfields and driving the rior engineering skills, the Marines
advance inland. Japanese from western New Britain. defied swamp and undergrowth to
The commanding general of the A number of factors helped the bring forward tanks that crushed
Army's 40th Infantry Division, Major Marines defeat nature and the enemy emplacements and added to
General Rapp Brush, arrived at New Japanese. Allied control of the air the already formidable American
and the sea provided mobility and firepower. Although photo analysis,
Britain on 10 April to arrange for the
relief. His advance echelon arrived disrupted the coastal barge traffic an art that improved rapidly, misin-
on the 23d and the remainder of the upon which the enemy had to de- terpreted the nature of the damp
division five days later. The 1st Ma- pend for the movement of large flat, Marine intelligence made excel-
rine Division departed in two eche- quantities of supplies, especially lent use of captured Japanese docu.-
lons on 6 April and 4 May. Left be- badly needed medicines, during the ments throughout the campaign. In
hind was the 12th Defense Battalion, retreat to Rabaul. Warships and the last analysis, the courage and en-
which continued to provide antiair- landing craft armed with rockets— durance of the average Marine made
craft defense for the Cape Gloucester supplemented by such improvisa- victory possible, as he braved dis-
airfields until relieved by an Army tions as tanks or rocket-equipped comfort, disease, and violent death
unit late in May. amphibian trucks firing from land- during his time in the green inferno.

32
 Three books have proved essential to
this account of the fighting on New ernard C. Nalty served as a civilian mem-
Britain. Lieutenant Colonel Frank 0.,
Hough, USMCR, dealt at length with the
B ber of the Historical Branch, G-3 Division,
campaign in The Island War: The United HQMC, from October 1956 to September
States Marine Cotps in the Pacific (Philadel- 1961. In collaboration with Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,
phia: 1. 8. Lippincott, 1947). With Major and Edwin T. Turnbladh, he wrote Central Pa-
John Crown, USMCR, he wrote the official cific Drive, volume 3 of the History of U.S. Ma-
Marine Corps historical monograph: The
New Britain Campaign (Washington: His- rine Corps Operations in World War II, and he
torical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, also completed a number of short historical
1952). The third of these essential volumes studies, some of which appeared as articles in
is Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Major Douglas T.
Kane, USMC, Isolation of Raba ui—History Leatherneck or Marine Corps Gazette. He joined the history office of the
of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961, transferring in 1964 to the Air Force history
War II.. vol 2 (Washington: Historical program, from which he retired in January 1994.
Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1963.)
Other valuable sources include: Wes-
ley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate,
eds., The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan,
August 1942-July 1944—The Army Air
Forces in World War II, vol 4 (Washing-
ton: Office of Air Force History, reprint
1983); George McMillan, The Old Breed:
A History of the First Marine Division in
World War II (Washington: Infantry Jour-
nal Press, 1949); John Miller, Jr., The
United States Army in World War II; The
War in the Pacific: CARTWHEEL, The Re-
duction of Rabaul (Washington: Office of
Chief of Military History, 1959); Samuel WORLD WAR II
Eliot Morison, Breaking the Bisrnarcks Bar-
rier, 22 July 1942-2 May 1944—A History
of United States Naval Operations in World
War II, vol 6 (Boston: Little, Brown, and THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the
Company, 1950). World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by
The Marine Corps Gazette printed four the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
articles analyzing aspects of the New Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance
Britain campaign: Lieutenant Colonel
Robert B. Luckey, USMC, "Cannon, Mud, of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.
and Japs," vol 28, no 10 (October 1944); Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by
George McMillan, "Scouting at Cape a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Wafts, in memory of her late husband,
Gloucester," vol 30, no 5 (May 1946); and Thomas M. Waifs, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple
Fletcher Pratt, "Marines Under MacArthur:
Cape Gloucester," vol 31, no 12 (December Heart.
1947); and "Marines Under MacArthur: WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
Wfflaumez," vol 32, no 1 (January 1947). DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS
Of the Marine Corps oral history inter- Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)
views of participants in the New Britain
fighting, the most valuable were with GENERAL EDITOR,
Generals Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., and WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
Edwin A. Pollock and Lieutenant Gener- Benis M. Frank
als Henry W. Buse, Lewis J. Fields, Robert
B. Luckey, and John N. McLaughlin. CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT
Almost three dozen collections of per- George C. MacGillivray
sonal papers deal in one way or another EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, 1-USTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
with the campaign, some of them provid- Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Slephen Hill, Visual Information
ing narratives of varying length and oth- Specialist; Catherine A. Kems, Composition Services Technician
ers photographs or maps. The most en-
lightening commentary came from the Marine Corps Historical Center
papers of Major Sherwood Moran, Building 58, Washington Navy Yard
USMCR, before the war a missionary in Washington, D.C. 20374-5040
Japan and during the fighting an intelli-
gence specialist with the 1st Marine Divi- 1994
sion, who discussed everything from cop- PCN 190 003128 00
ing with the weather to understanding
the motivation of the Japanese soldier.