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Pro-regime change (Mubarak goes now.

) Anti-regime change (Mubarak stays til autumn)

Bring a reasonable (counter-)prop about Mubarak If the pro-regime change side doesn’t do
standing down now and giving interim control to something reasonable in the interim period, score
the neutral and awesome army to prevent chaos. the cheap points quickly there.

Mubarak cannot hold on Mubarak can hold on.

1. Govt needs tacit acceptance. Can’t force people 1. Mubarak has support. Working, older,
to go to work. Mubarak relied on fear and middle class, ‘tough on crime’, hates
repression to attain this acceptance. The chaos, memory of 70s violence. Willing to
fear’s gone, so even if he remains accept repression for security. Still
nominally president there’s no support for supports him; see recent clashes between
his govt. pro- and anti-Mubarak people.
2. Govt lost monopoly on violence and therefore 2. Holding your breath longer. Can’t protest for
needs to go. The army has been unwilling to months. Once protests stop as Mubarak
use violence. Security forces have been clings on, things will be relatively quiet,
unable to use it effectively. Protesters can repress/imprison minority that’s really
loot. People formed vigilante anti-crime adamant about those few months.
brigades. 3. The protests are actually quite small. At peak
3. Holding on means losing vital U.S. aid. U.S. is few hundred thousand. That’s under 5%
doing review of billions military aid that’s of Cairo’s population. Similar protests
vital to the Mubarak regime as it ‘bribes’ that were successful (Kiev, Ukraine;
the crucial support of the army. Will Tbilisi, Georgia; Tunis) had one-third of
withdraw in case of (excessive) violence the population there at peak. Most days,
by Mubarak. Any holding on to power Cairo’s protests were comparable to
will require violent repression. London student protests.
4. Waiting until Autumn is bad. Mubarak has 4. Waiting until Autumn is good. Hasty
banned opposition parties, imprisoned elections disadvantage legitimate but
rival candidates, cracked down on unorganised protesters versus existing
opposition funding, and rigged elections. well-organised Islamist groups.
Waiting gives him time to do just that and International focus and pressure on Egypt
put someone from his camp in power. makes sure it will be fair.

Situation post-Mubarak will be nicer. Situation post-Mubarak will be worse.

1. No Backlash. Mubarak has no real power 1. Backlash. After revolutionary regime change,
base or supporters, he is a divide-and-rule tends to be a violent backlash against
dictator based in the largely neutral and previous govt supporters. French rev,
still-popular army. Islam binds people, see Russian rev. But also in Ukraine after the
protesters for- and against stopping for Orange rev. Opposing fronts are young
prayer in Cairo protests. urban unemployed (protesters) vs older
2. Extremism. People resort to extremism and rural employed (Mubarak). Need the latter
terrorism if they see no legitimate way to for economy.
express feelings. See rise in domestic 2. Extremism. Protests are unorganised, no
terrorism in Egypt, rise in Egyptian clear leadership. Only existing structures
recruits Al Qaida. Mubarak’s repression post-Mubarak is Muslim Brotherhood,
caused more extremism. With democracy, will grow, as they are only stable factor
people have legitimate avenue for feelings and people flee to stable factors in chaos.
and will not be extremist. Leads to Islamic extremism.
3. Democracy can work. After dictator falls, 3. Democracy will not work. After dictator falls
nationalist ‘for Egypt’ coalition and people retreat to existing social structures
consensus politics. Criteria for that in general as society disintegrates. These
happening: (1) no ethnic/religious based on rigid structures do not change
stratification (Yes: 90% of Egypt is ‘just like religion. Example: Iraq and ethnic
Muslim’), and (2) strong military holding parties. Democracy based on
violence back (Yes: military neutral and religious/ethnic factions does not work,
popular), (3) not an oil/resource recipe for disaster, see Iraq. In Egypt,
economy. Example: South Africa post- factions are the rural/urban divide, and
apartheid and ANC consensus, Japan religious structures (Copts, Islam). Will
post-WW2 and LDP consensus. have Iraq-like situation with violence.
Counterexamples like Iraq or African 4. Cannot deliver on economy. Mubarak is not
countries do not fit criteria. ‘evil’ on economy. New govt won’t be
4. Economy. Main problem is unemployment; able to do much better. Still corruption,
Mubarak clique controls economy, need still problem of young urban
to bribe govt officials for everything. unemployment. Freedom doesn’t
Getting rid of clique will enable magically create jobs.
prosperity. International investment and 5. Copts. The Coptic minority (10-20% of
FDI possible once evil govt that demands population) supports Mubarak, Coptic
a cut is gone. pope issued statement supporting him.
5. Copts. The Coptic minority (10-20% of Mubarak is secular dictator keeping
population) was repressed during ethnic/religious tensions under control.
Mubarak regime, no religious freedom, Coptic minority will be repressed under
second class citizens, no government new regime as there is no dictator keeping
positions. Coalitions of different groups Islamist tendencies under control. New
necessary for new democratic govt, govt will have to strike deal with Islamists
enables Copts to have real influence and and allow more Islamism, even if not
emancipate. totally Islamist.

Regional politics Regional politics

1. Egypt re-engages in finding solution for Israel. 1. Egypt closes the Arab front on Israel. Israel
Currently Egypt is ‘outcast’ in likes Mubarak, stable security partner, esp.
negotiations on Israel, as it is the only for Gaza. New Egypt govt will have to
country with a peace treaty and seen as cater to widespread radical anti-Israel
traitor to Arab cause. Important partner sentiment, either directly or through
for negotiations as they can bridge the concessions to radical Islamists in
West/Arab/Israel polarisation. But coalition government. Triggers Israeli
Mubarak is seen as too pro-Israel in Arab security reflex, then less willing to do
world to carry legitimacy there. Second, a concessions on security/control of
less repressive regime would be willing to occupied territories. Egyptian re-
open borders with Gaza: Mubarak is too engagement with panarab cause reinforces
afraid of the destabilising effects of other countries in radical antizionism.
opening borders with Gaza for aid. Conclusion: polarisation, war, no peace.
2. Egyptian democratization will spread around. 2. No spread, and if it spreads, it’s bad. 1. Won’t
Tunesia spread to Egypt, Egypt will spread to oil-Arab countries because they
spread democracy even further as people bribe population with oil money.
are inspired and lose fear. Self-reinforcing 2. Syria/Jordan revolutions will be violent
thing in the region: can help each other. because they lack Egypt’s indept. army.