Republic Act No.

7610
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
(Promulgated June 17, 1992)

Note: Please see Republic Act 9231 which amended certain provisions of RA 7610.

ARTICLE I Title, Policy, Principles and Definitions of Terms

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Sec. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State
to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial their development; provide sanctions for their
commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in
situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of the
child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is
unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when such acts against
the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of
the same.

It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely threatened or endangered
by circumstances which affect or will affect their survival and normal development and over which
they have no control.

The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principle of First Call for Children as enunciated
in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote
the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. -

(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition;

(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food
and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child

resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.

(c) "Circumstances which gravely threaten or endanger the survival and normal
development of children" include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Being in a community where there is armed conflict or being affected

by armed conflict-related activities;

(2) Working under conditions hazardous to life, safety and normal which
unduly interfere with their normal development;
 (3) Living in or fending for themselves in the streets of urban or rural areas
without the care of parents or a guardian or basic services needed for a
good quality of life;

(4) Being a member of an indigenous cultural community and/or living

under conditions of extreme poverty or in an area which is
underdeveloped and/or lacks or has inadequate access to basic services
needed for a good quality of life;

(5) Being a victim of a man-made or natural disaster or calamity; or

(6) Circumstances analogous to those above-stated which endanger the

life, safety or normal development of children.

(d) "Comprehensive program against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination" refers
to the coordinated program of services and facilities to protected children against:

(1) Child Prostitution and other sexual abuse;

(2) Child trafficking;

(3) Obscene publications and indecent shows;

(4) Other acts of abuses; and

(5) Circumstances which threaten or endanger the survival and normal

development of children.

ARTICLE II. Program on Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination

Sec. 4. Formulation of the Program. - There shall be a comprehensive program to be formulated, by

the Department of Justice and the Department of Social Welfare and Development in coordination
with other government agencies and private sector concerned, within one (1) year from the effectivity
of this Act, to protect children against child prostitution and other sexual abuse; child trafficking,
obscene publications and indecent shows; other acts of abuse; and circumstances which endanger
child survival and normal development.

ARTICLE III. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse

Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:

(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include,
but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of

written or oral advertisements or other similar means;

(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as

prostitute;

(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a

prostitute; or

(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a

child with intent to engage such child in prostitution.

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
 Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and

(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of
the establishment where the prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort,
place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or which engages in
prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to said
establishment.

Sec. 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. - There is an attempt to commit child prostitution under
Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative of a child, is found alone
with the said child inside the room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle
or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other hidden or secluded area under
circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is about to be exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when
any person is receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club
and other similar establishments. A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the
consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to
commit the crime of child prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case, under the Revised Penal
Code.

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ARTICLE IV. Child Trafficking

Sec. 7. Child Trafficking. - Any person who shall engage in trading and dealing with children
including, but not limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money, or for any other
consideration, or barter, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age.

Sec. 8. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking. - There is an attempt to commit child trafficking under
Section 7 of this Act:

(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason therefor and
without clearance issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development or
written permit or justification from the child's parents or legal guardian;

(b) When a pregnant mother executes an affidavit of consent for adoption for a
consideration

(c) When a person, agency, establishment or child-caring institution recruits women or

couples to bear children for the purpose of child trafficking; or

(d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse, midwife, local civil
registrar or any other person simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking; or

(e) When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families,
hospitals, clinics, nurseries, day-care centers, or other child-during institutions who can
be offered for the purpose of child trafficking.

A penalty lower two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 7
hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit child trafficking under this Act.

ARTICLE V. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows

Sec. 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows. - Any person who shall hire, employ, use,
persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows, whether
live or in video, or model in obscene publications or pornographic materials or to sell or distribute the
said materials shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period.

If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is below twelve (12) years of age, the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a child who shall cause
and/or allow such child to be employed or to participate in an obscene play, scene, act, movie or
show or in any other acts covered by this section shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
medium period.

ARTICLE VI. Other Acts of Abuse

Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development. -

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or
be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.

(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or
under or who in ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel,
motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach
and/or other tourist resort or similar places shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00):
Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any person who is related within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom
and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty.

(c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor to any one prohibited by this
Act to keep or have in his company a minor as provided in the preceding paragraph
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not less than
Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00); Provided, however, That should the perpetrator be
an ascendant, stepparent or guardian of the minor, the penalty to be imposed shall be
prision mayor in its maximum period, a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), and the loss of parental authority over the minor.

(d) Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with the operation of any public or
private place of accommodation, whether for occupancy, food, drink or otherwise,
including residential places, who allows any person to take along with him to such place
or places any minor herein described shall be imposed a penalty of prision mayor in its
medium period and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), and the
loss of the license to operate such a place or establishment.

(e) Any person who shall use, coerce, force or intimidate a street child or any other child
to:

(1) Beg or use begging as a means of living;

(2) Act as conduit or middlemen in drug trafficking or pushing; or

(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.

For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249,
262, paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for
the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries,
respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. The
penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of lasciviousness
with the consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave trade, respectively, shall
be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law when the victim is under twelve (12) years age.

The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be entrusted to the care of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development.

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ARTICLE VII. Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises

Sec. 11. Sanctions of Establishments or Enterprises which Promote, Facilitate, or Conduct Activities
Constituting Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse, Child Trafficking, Obscene Publications and
Indecent Shows, and Other Acts of Abuse. - All establishments and enterprises which promote or
facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent
shows, and other acts of abuse shall be immediately closed and their authority or license to operate
cancelled, without prejudice to the owner or manager thereof being prosecuted under this Act and/or
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws. A sign with the words "off limits" shall be
conspicuously displayed outside the establishments or enterprises by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development for such period which shall not be less than one (1) year, as the
Department may determine. The unauthorized removal of such sign shall be punishable by prision
correccional.

An establishment shall be deemed to promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse,
child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse if the acts
constituting the same occur in the premises of said establishment under this Act or in violation of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. An enterprise such as a sauna, travel agency, or recruitment
agency which; promotes the aforementioned acts as part of a tour for foreign tourists; exhibits
children in a lewd or indecent show; provides child masseurs for adults of the same or opposite sex
and said services include any lascivious conduct with the customers; or solicits children or activities
constituting the aforementioned acts shall be deemed to have committed the acts penalized herein.

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ARTICLE VIII. Working Children

Sec. 12. Employment of Children. - Children below fifteen (15) years of age may be employed except:

(1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or legal
guardian and where only members of the employer's family are employed: Provided,
however, That his employment neither endangers his life, safety and health and morals,
nor impairs his normal development: Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian
shall provide the said minor child with the prescribed primary and/or secondary
education; or

(2) When a child's employment or participation in public & entertainment or information

through cinema, theater, radio or television is essential: Provided, The employment
contract concluded by the child's parent or guardian, with the express agreement of the
child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the Department of Labor and
Employment: Provided, That the following requirements in all instances are strictly
complied with:

(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety and morals of
the child;

(b) the employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation
or discrimination taking into account the system and level of remuneration,
and the duration and arrangement of working time; and

(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval
and supervision of competent authorities, a continuing program for training
and skill acquisition of the child.

In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer shall first
secure, before engaging such child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and Employment
which shall ensure observance of the above requirement.

The Department of Labor and Employment shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the
effective implementation of this Section.

Sec. 13. Non-formal Education for Working Children. - The Department of Education, Culture and
Sports shall promulgate a course design under its non-formal education program aimed at promoting
the intellectual, moral and vocational efficiency of working children who have not undergone or
finished elementary or secondary education. Such course design shall integrate the learning process
deemed most effective under given circumstances.
Sec. 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain Advertisements. - No person shall
employ child models in all commercials or advertisements promoting alcoholic beverages, intoxicating
drinks, tobacco and its byproducts and violence.

Sec. 15. Duty of Employer. - Every employer shall comply with the duties provided for in Articles 108
and 109 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

Sec. 16. Penalties. - Any person who shall violate any provision of this Article shall suffer the penalty
of a fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) but not more than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000) or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more than three (3) years, or
both at the discretion of the court: Provided, That, in case of repeated violations of the provisions of
this Article, the offender's license to operate shall be revoked.

ARTICLE IX. Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities

Sec. 17. Survival, Protection and Development. - In addition to the rights guaranteed to children
under this Act and other existing laws, children of indigenous cultural communities shall be entitled to
protection, survival and development consistent with the customs and traditions of their respective
communities.

Sec. 18. System of and Access to Education. - The Department of Education, Culture and Sports
shall develop and institute an alternative system of education for children of indigenous cultural
communities which culture-specific and relevant to the needs of and the existing situation in their
communities. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall also accredit and support non-
formal but functional indigenous educational programs conducted by non-government organizations
in said communities.

Sec. 19. Health and Nutrition. - The delivery of basic social services in health and nutrition to children
of indigenous cultural communities shall be given priority by all government agencies concerned.
Hospitals and other health institution shall ensure that children of indigenous cultural communities are
given equal attention. In the provision of health and nutrition services to children of indigenous
cultural communities, indigenous health practices shall be respected and recognized.

Sec. 20. Discrimination. - Children of indigenous cultural communities shall not be subjected to any
and all forms of discrimination.

Any person who discriminates against children of indigenous cultural communities shall suffer a
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).

Sec. 21. Participation. - Indigenous cultural communities, through their duly-designated or appointed
representatives shall be involved in planning, decision-making implementation, and evaluation of all
government programs affecting children of indigenous cultural communities. Indigenous institution
shall also be recognized and respected.

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ARTICLE X. Children in Situations of Armed Conflict

Sec. 22. Children as Zones of Peace. - Children are hereby declared as Zones of Peace. It shall be
the responsibility of the State and all other sectors concerned to resolve armed conflicts in order to
promote the goal of children as zones of peace. To attain this objective, the following policies shall be
observed.

(a) Children shall not be the object of attack and shall be entitled to special respect.
They shall be protected from any form of threat, assault, torture or other cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment;

(b) Children shall not be recruited to become members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines of its civilian units or other armed groups, nor be allowed to take part in the
fighting, or used as guides, couriers, or spies;

(c) Delivery of basic social services such as education, primary health and emergency
relief services shall be kept unhampered;

(d) The safety and protection of those who provide services including those involved in
fact-finding missions from both government and non-government institutions shall be
 ensured. They shall not be subjected to undue harassment in the performance of their
work;

(e) Public infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and rural health units shall not be
utilized for military purposes such as command posts, barracks, detachments, and
supply depots; and

(f) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily
separated due to armed conflict.

Sec. 23. Evacuation of Children During Armed Conflict. - Children shall be given priority during
evacuation as a result of armed conflict. Existing community organizations shall be tapped to look
after the safety and well-being of children during evacuation operations. Measures shall be taken to
ensure that children evacuated are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-
being.

Sec. 24. Family Life and Temporary Shelter. - Whenever possible, members of the same family shall
be housed in the same premises and given separate accommodation from other evacuees and
provided with facilities to lead a normal family life. In places of temporary shelter, expectant and
nursing mothers and children shall be given additional food in proportion to their physiological needs.
Whenever feasible, children shall be given opportunities for physical exercise, sports and outdoor
games.

Sec. 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict. - Any child who has
been arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy is
entitled to the following rights;

(a) Separate detention from adults except where families are accommodated as family
units;

(b) Immediate free legal assistance;

(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardians of the child; and

(d) Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development or any responsible member of the
community as determined by the court.

If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings the court should find that the aforesaid child
committed the acts charged against him, the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including
any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the
court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such child to the custody or care of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by the
Government, or duly-licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he has had reached
eighteen (18) years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering
the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the
agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed.

The aforesaid child shall subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or any duly-licensed agency or such other officer as the court may
designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.

The aforesaid child whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same
manner as appeals in criminal cases.

Sec. 26. Monitoring and Reporting of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict. - The chairman of the
barangay affected by the armed conflict shall submit the names of children residing in said barangay
to the municipal social welfare and development officer within twenty-four (24) hours from the
occurrence of the armed conflict.

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ARTICLE XI. Remedial Procedures

Sec. 27. Who May File a Complaint. - Complaints on cases of unlawful acts committed against the
children as enumerated herein may be filed by the following:
 (a) Offended party;

(b) Parents or guardians;

(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;

(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution;

(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development;

(f) Barangay chairman; or

(g) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens where the violation occurred.

Sec. 28. Protective Custody of the Child. - The offended party shall be immediately placed under the
protective custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development pursuant to Executive
Order No. 56, series of 1986. In the regular performance of this function, the officer of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development shall be free from any administrative, civil or criminal liability.
Custody proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603.

Sec. 29. Confidentiality. - At the instance of the offended party, his name may be withheld from the
public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.

It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed materials,
announcer or producer in case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and director of the film
in case of the movie industry, to cause undue and sensationalized publicity of any case of violation of
this Act which results in the moral degradation and suffering of the offended party.

Sec. 30. Special Court Proceedings. - Cases involving violations of this Act shall be heard in the
chambers of the judge of the Regional Trial Court duly designated as Juvenile and Domestic Court.

Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding and with the exception of habeas corpus,
election cases, and cases involving detention prisoners and persons covered by Republic Act No.
4908, all courts shall give preference to the hearing or disposition of cases involving violations of this
Act.

ARTICLE XII. Common Penal Provisions

Sec. 31. Common Penal Provisions. -

(a) The penalty provided under this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the
offender has been previously convicted under this Act;

(b) When the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the officer or

employee thereof who is responsible for the violation of this Act shall suffer the penalty
imposed in its maximum period;

(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the
perpetrator is an ascendant, parent guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the
second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment
which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked;

(d) When the offender is a foreigner, he shall be deported immediately after service of
sentence and forever barred from entry to the country;

(e) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the
offender is a public officer or employee: Provided, however, That if the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal, then the penalty of perpetual or temporary
absolute disqualification shall also be imposed: Provided, finally, That if the penalty
imposed is prision correccional or arresto mayor, the penalty of suspension shall also
be imposed; and

(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash
fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the
rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of his family if the latter is
the perpetrator of the offense.
ARTICLE XIII. Final Provisions

Sec. 32. Rules and Regulations. - Unless otherwise provided in this Act, the Department of Justice, in
coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, shall promulgate rules and
regulations of the effective implementation of this Act.

Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their publication in two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation.

Sec. 33. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act is hereby
authorized to be appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment
into law and thereafter.

Sec. 34. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
remaining provisions not affected thereby shall continue in full force and effect.

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Acts
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 36. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least
two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7658

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE IN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE UNDERTAKINGS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE SECTION 12, ARTICLE VIII OF
R.A. 7610

Sec. 1. Section 12, Article VIII of R.A. No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 12. Employment of Children. - Children below fifteen (15) years of age shall not be employed
except:

1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or legal guardian and
where only members of the employer's family are employed: Provided, however, That his employment neither
endangers his life, safety, health and morals, nor impairs his normal development; Provided, further, That the
parent or legal guardian shall provide the said minor child with the prescribed primary and/or secondary
education; or

2) Where a child's employment or participation in public entertainment or information through

cinema, theater, radio or television is essential: Provided, The employment contract is concluded by the child's
parents or legal guardian, with the express agreement of the child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the
Department of Labor and Employment: and Provided, That the following requirements in all instances are
strictly complied with: cd

(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety, morals and normal development of the
child;

(b) The employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation or discrimination taking
into account the system and level of remuneration, and the duration and arrangement of working time; and

(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and supervision of
competent authorities, a continuing program for training and skills acquisition of the requirements.

In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer shall first secure,
before engaging such child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and Employment which shall ensure
observance of the child. cd i

The Department of Labor and Employment shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the
effective implementation of this Section."

ec. 2. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof contrary to, or
inconsistent with this Act are hereby modified or repealed accordingly.
 Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette
or in at least two (2) national newspapers or general circulation whichever comes earlier.

Approved: November 9, 1993

DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 18

Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7658

By virtue of the provisions of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7658, An Act Prohibiting the Employment
of Children Below Fifteen (15) Years of Age in Public and Private Undertakings, amending Section 12, Article
VIII of Republic Act No. 7610, the following Rules and Regulations governing the employment of children are
hereby issued:

ec. 1. General Prohibition. - Except as otherwise provided in this Rules, children below 15 years of age
shall not be employed, permitted or suffered to work, in any public or private establishments in the Philippines.

Sec. 2. Definition of terms.

a. "Employer" - any parent, legal guardian or producer acting as employer who hires or engages the
services of any child below 15 years of age.

b. "Legal Guardian" - any person duly appointed by a court of competent authority to exercise care
and custody of or parental authority over the person of such child/employee.

c. "Producer" - any individual or group of individuals engaged in the production of movies, films,
motion pictures, shows or advertisements, whether on cinema, theater, radio or television, wherein the services
of such child/employee are hired.

d. "Members of the family" - those persons having family relations referred to under Article 150 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. It shall include the employer parent's or legal guardian's husband or wife,
parents, children, other ascendants or descendants, brothers and sisters whether of full or half blood.

e. "Department" - the Department of Labor and Employment.

Sec. 3. Exceptions and conditions. - The following shall be the only exceptions to the prohibition on the
employment of children below 15 years of age and the conditions for availment of said exceptions:

a. When the child works directly under the sole responsibility of his/her parents or legal guardian
who employs members of his/her family only, under the following conditions:

1. the employment does not endanger the child's life, safety, health and morals;

2. the employment does not impair the child's normal development.

3. the employer parent or legal guardian provides the child with the primary and/or secondary
education prescribed by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.

b. Where the child's employment or participation in public entertainment or information through

cinema, theater, radio or television is essential, provided that:

1. the employment does not involve advertisements or commercials promoting alcoholic beverages,
intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its by-products or exhibiting violence;

2. there is a written contract approved by the Department of Labor and Employment; and

3. the condition prescribed in Section a above are met.

Sec. 5. Pre-employment requirements. - Before an employer engages a child for employment under the
exceptions enumerated above, he/she met first secure a work permit from the Regional Office of the
Department having jurisdiction over the workplace.

The Regional Office shall require the employer to submit the following documents in support of the
application for a work permit:

a. two (2) pictures of the child, one full body and the other showing the child's face, both of which
must be recently taken and recognizable;
 b. the child's Birth Certificate or in its absence, his/her Baptismal Certificate and a joint affidavit of
his/her two nearest kin showing the year he/she was born and a duly authenticated proof of legal guardianship
where the employer is a legal guardian;

c. a certificate of enrollment issued by the school where he/she is currently or last enrolled or a
statement from the parent or legal guardian that the child is attending school;

d. a written undertaking that:

1. measures shall be instituted by the employer to prevent the child's exploitation and discrimination
such as payment of minimum age, hours of work and other terms and conditions required by law; and

2. the employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety, morals and normal development of the
child;

e. a medical certificate showing that the child is fit for employment;

f. a certification of a continuing program for training and skills acquisition approved and supervised
by any competent authority, nearest the place of work, which may be recognized vocational or training school,
the regional or local office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the National Manpower
and Youth Council; and

g. a written contract of employment concluded by the child's parents or legal guardian with the
employer in cases of employment or participation in public entertainment or information through cinema,
theater, radio or television. Said contract shall bear the express agreement of the child concerned, if possible,
and shall state the nature or full description of the job and the justification is essential.

Sec. 5. Hours of Work. - Subject to consultations with the sectors concerned, the Department shall by
appropriate regulations, issue standards governing the hours of work and time of day that children may be
allowed to work.

Sec. 6. Effect on other issuances. - The provisions of existing rules and administrative issuances not
otherwise repealed, modified or inconsistent with this Order shall continue to have full force and effect.

Sec. 7. Penalties. - Any person who shall violate any provision of Article 12 of RA 7658, shall suffer the
penalty of a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) but not more than Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000) or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more than three (3) years, or both at the
discretion of the court: Provided, that in case of repeated violations of the provisions of this Article, the
offender's license to operate shall be revoked.

Sec. 8. Effectivity. - This Rules and Regulations shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publications
in a newspaper of general circulation.

Signed this 12th day of May, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines.

(SGD.) MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR

Secretary

Received by the AS-Records on May 13, 1994 and disseminated on May 3, 1994.

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-second day of July, two thousand three.

Republic Act No. 9262 March 08, 2004

AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR
PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Short Title.- This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004".

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family
and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in
keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines
is a party.

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to,
the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex
object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the
sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together
in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or

emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of
a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any

legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
 (b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the
physical and psychological or emotional distress.

(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and
behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.

(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful
justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly
or indirectly or a combination thereof.

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course
of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a
business or social context is not a dating relationship.

(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a
common child.

(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or voluntary organization accredited
by the DSWD for the purposes of this Act or any other suitable place the resident of which is willing
temporarily to receive the victim.

(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking care
of themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological
children of the victim and other children under her care.

SECTION 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children.

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following acts:

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the
right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his
family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal
or common money, or properties;

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions
or decisions;
 (g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does
not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against
the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against
her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.

SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall
be punished according to the following rules:

(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or
murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code;
those constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting less
serious physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight physical
injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.

Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower than the
prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no
case be lower than arresto mayor.

(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor;

(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;

(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;

(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her
child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00);
(b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to
the court.

SECTION 7. Venue.- The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court
in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the compliant.

SECTION 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting
other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim
from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and
ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. The provisions of the protection order shall be
enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection orders that may be issued under this Act are the barangay
protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO). The
protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;

(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or
permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects from
the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has gathered
his things and escort respondent from the residence;

(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member at
a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or
any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member;

(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal
effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the
petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession
of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's
removal of personal belongings;

(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;

(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support.
Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income
or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same to be
automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the
remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent
or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;

(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order
him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of
license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law
enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the
appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter;

(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property
damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;

(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and

(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the
safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any
designated family or household member consents to such relief.

Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree of legal
separation or annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.

The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from
applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO.

SECTION 9. Who may file Petition for Protection Orders. – A petition for protection order may be filed by any
of the following:

(a) the offended party;

(b) parents or guardians of the offended party;

(c) ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity;

(d) officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local government units (LGUs);
 (e) police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children's desks;

(f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;

(g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner;

(h) At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the violence against
women and their children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed.

SECTION 10. Where to Apply for a Protection Order. – Applications for BPOs shall follow the rules on venue
under Section 409 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its implementing rules and regulations. An
application for a TPO or PPO may be filed in the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, municipal circuit trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the petitioner:
Provided, however, That if a family court exists in the place of residence of the petitioner, the application shall
be filed with that court.

SECTION 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. – The application for a protection order must be in
writing, signed and verified under oath by the applicant. It may be filed as an independent action or as
incidental relief in any civil or criminal case the subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence as
described in this Act. A standard protection order application form, written in English with translation to the
major local languages, shall be made available to facilitate applications for protections order, and shall contain,
among other, the following information:

(a) names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;

(b) description of relationships between petitioner and respondent;

(c) a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;

(d) description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as specified in Section 8 herein;

(e) request for counsel and reasons for such;

(f) request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and

(g) an attestation that there is no pending application for a protection order in another court.

If the applicants is not the victim, the application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting
to (a) the circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the
victim for the filling of the application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life,
it shall be so stated in the application. In such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the
municipality or city over which court has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purpose
of service processing.

An application for protection order filed with a court shall be considered an application for both a TPO and
PPO.

Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the preparation of the application. Law
enforcement agents shall also extend assistance in the application for protection orders in cases brought to their
attention.

SECTION 12. Enforceability of Protection Orders. – All TPOs and PPOs issued under this Act shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines and a violation thereof shall be punishable with a fine ranging from
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.

SECTION 13. Legal Representation of Petitioners for Protection Order. – If the woman or her child requests
in the applications for a protection order for the appointment of counsel because of lack of economic means to
hire a counsel de parte, the court shall immediately direct the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to represent the
petitioner in the hearing on the application. If the PAO determines that the applicant can afford to hire the
services of a counsel de parte, it shall facilitate the legal representation of the petitioner by a counsel de parte.
The lack of access to family or conjugal resources by the applicant, such as when the same are controlled by the
perpetrator, shall qualify the petitioner to legal representation by the PAO.

However, a private counsel offering free legal service is not barred from representing the petitioner.

SECTION 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. - Barangay Protection Orders
(BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a
BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the
basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay
Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect is personal
service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection
order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order
should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be
effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date
of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent
by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall
include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.

SECTION 16. Permanent Protection Orders. – Permanent Protection Order (PPO) refers to protection order
issued by the court after notice and hearing.

Respondents non-appearance despite proper notice, or his lack of a lawyer, or the non-availability of his lawyer
shall not be a ground for rescheduling or postponing the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO. If the
respondents appears without counsel on the date of the hearing on the PPO, the court shall appoint a lawyer for
the respondent and immediately proceed with the hearing. In case the respondent fails to appear despite proper
notice, the court shall allow ex parte presentation of the evidence by the applicant and render judgment on the
basis of the evidence presented. The court shall allow the introduction of any history of abusive conduct of a
respondent even if the same was not directed against the applicant or the person for whom the applicant is
made.

The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO in one (1) day.
Where the court is unable to conduct the hearing within one (1) day and the TPO issued is due to expire, the
court shall continuously extend or renew the TPO for a period of thirty (30) days at each particular time until
final judgment is issued. The extended or renewed TPO may be modified by the court as may be necessary or
applicable to address the needs of the applicant.

The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in Section 8 hereof in a PPO. A PPO shall be
effective until revoked by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued. The court
shall ensure immediate personal service of the PPO on respondent.

The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order on the basis of the lapse of time between the act of
violence and the filing of the application.

Regardless of the conviction or acquittal of the respondent, the Court must determine whether or not the PPO
shall become final. Even in a dismissal, a PPO shall be granted as long as there is no clear showing that the act
from which the order might arise did not exist.

SECTION 17. Notice of Sanction in Protection Orders. – The following statement must be printed in bold-
faced type or in capital letters on the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay or court:

"VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW."

SECTION 18. Mandatory Period For Acting on Applications For Protection Orders – Failure to act on an
application for a protection order within the reglementary period specified in the previous section without
justifiable cause shall render the official or judge administratively liable.

SECTION 19. Legal Separation Cases. – In cases of legal separation, where violence as specified in this Act is
alleged, Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The court shall proceed on the main case and other
incidents of the case as soon as possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order filed by the
petitioner must be conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act.

SECTION 20. Priority of Application for a Protection Order. – Ex parte and adversarial hearings to determine
the basis of applications for a protection order under this Act shall have priority over all other proceedings.
Barangay officials and the courts shall schedule and conduct hearings on applications for a protection order
under this Act above all other business and, if necessary, suspend other proceedings in order to hear
applications for a protection order.

SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. – A complaint for a violation of a BPO issued under this Act
must be filed directly with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial court that
has territorial jurisdiction over the barangay that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be punishable by
imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party
may file for any of the acts committed.

A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the Rules of Court. During trial and upon
judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order as it deems necessary without need of an
application.

Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court punishable
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended
party may file for any of the acts committed.

SECTION 22. Applicability of Protection Orders to Criminal Cases. – The foregoing provisions on protection
orders shall be applicable in impliedly instituted with the criminal actions involving violence against women
and their children.

SECTION 23. Bond to Keep the Peace. – The Court may order any person against whom a protection order is
issued to give a bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person
will not commit the violence sought to be prevented.

Should the respondent fail to give the bond as required, he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case
exceed six (6) months, if he shall have been prosecuted for acts punishable under Section 5(a) to 5(f) and not
exceeding thirty (30) days, if for acts punishable under Section 5(g) to 5(I).

The protection orders referred to in this section are the TPOs and the PPOs issued only by the courts.

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20)
years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

SECTION 25. Public Crime. – Violence against women and their children shall be considered a public offense
which may be prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint by any citizen having personal knowledge of the
circumstances involving the commission of the crime.

SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be
suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.

In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at
the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

SECTION 27. Prohibited Defense. – Being under the influence of alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other mind-
altering substance shall not be a defense under this Act.

SECTION 28. Custody of children. – The woman victim of violence shall be entitled to the custody and
support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old older but with mental or physical disabilities
shall automatically be given to the mother, with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.

A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody of her
children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering
from Battered woman syndrome.

SECTION 29. Duties of Prosecutors/Court Personnel. – Prosecutors and court personnel should observe the
following duties when dealing with victims under this Act:

a) communicate with the victim in a language understood by the woman or her child; and

b) inform the victim of her/his rights including legal remedies available and procedure, and privileges
for indigent litigants.

SECTION 30. Duties of Barangay Officials and Law Enforcers. – Barangay officials and law enforcers shall
have the following duties:
 (a) respond immediately to a call for help or request for assistance or protection of the victim by entering
the necessary whether or not a protection order has been issued and ensure the safety of the victim/s;

(b) confiscate any deadly weapon in the possession of the perpetrator or within plain view;

(c) transport or escort the victim/s to a safe place of their choice or to a clinic or hospital;

(d) assist the victim in removing personal belongs from the house;

(e) assist the barangay officials and other government officers and employees who respond to a call for
help;

(f) ensure the enforcement of the Protection Orders issued by the Punong Barangy or the courts;

(g) arrest the suspected perpetrator wiithout a warrant when any of the acts of violence defined by this
Act is occurring, or when he/she has personal knowledge that any act of abuse has just been committed,
and there is imminent danger to the life or limb of the victim as defined in this Act; and

(h) immediately report the call for assessment or assistance of the DSWD, social Welfare Department of
LGUs or accredited non-government organizations (NGOs).

Any barangay official or law enforcer who fails to report the incident shall be liable for a fine not exceeding
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or whenever applicable criminal, civil or administrative liability.

SECTION 31. Healthcare Provider Response to Abuse – Any healthcare provider, including, but not limited to,
an attending physician, nurse, clinician, barangay health worker, therapist or counselor who suspects abuse or
has been informed by the victim of violence shall:

(a) properly document any of the victim's physical, emotional or psychological injuries;

(b) properly record any of victim's suspicions, observations and circumstances of the examination or
visit;

(c) automatically provide the victim free of charge a medical certificate concerning the examination or
visit;

(d) safeguard the records and make them available to the victim upon request at actual cost; and

(e) provide the victim immediate and adequate notice of rights and remedies provided under this Act,
and services available to them.

SECTION 32. Duties of Other Government Agencies and LGUs – Other government agencies and LGUs shall
establish programs such as, but not limited to, education and information campaign and seminars or symposia
on the nature, causes, incidence and consequences of such violence particularly towards educating the public on
its social impacts.

It shall be the duty of the concerned government agencies and LGU's to ensure the sustained education and
training of their officers and personnel on the prevention of violence against women and their children under the
Act.

SECTION 33. Prohibited Acts. – A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad or the court hearing an application
for a protection order shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence he applicant for a protection
order to compromise or abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection under this Act.
Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where relief is sought under this Act.

Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or judge administratively liable.

SECTION 34. Persons Intervening Exempt from Liability. – In every case of violence against women and their
children as herein defined, any person, private individual or police authority or barangay official who, acting in
accordance with law, responds or intervenes without using violence or restraint greater than necessary to ensure
the safety of the victim, shall not be liable for any criminal, civil or administrative liability resulting therefrom.

SECTION 35. Rights of Victims. – In addition to their rights under existing laws, victims of violence against
women and their children shall have the following rights:

(a) to be treated with respect and dignity;

 (b) to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any public legal
assistance office;

(c) To be entitled to support services form the DSWD and LGUs'

(d) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family Code; and

(e) To be informed of their rights and the services available to them including their right to apply for a
protection order.

SECTION 36. Damages. – Any victim of violence under this Act shall be entitled to actual, compensatory,
moral and exemplary damages.

SECTION 37. Hold Departure Order. – The court shall expedite the process of issuance of a hold departure
order in cases prosecuted under this Act.

SECTION 38. Exemption from Payment of Docket Fee and Other Expenses. – If the victim is an indigent or
there is an immediate necessity due to imminent danger or threat of danger to act on an application for a
protection order, the court shall accept the application without payment of the filing fee and other fees and of
transcript of stenographic notes.

SECTION 39. Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women and Their Children (IAC-VAWC). In
pursuance of the abovementioned policy, there is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council on Violence
Against Women and their children, hereinafter known as the Council, which shall be composed of the following
agencies:

(a) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);

(b) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW);

(c) Civil Service Commission (CSC);

(d) Commission on Human rights (CHR)

(e) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);

(f) Department of Justice (DOJ);

(g) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);

(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);

(i) Department of Health (DOH);

(j) Department of Education (DepEd);

(k) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and

(l) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and projects to eliminate VAW based on their mandates as
well as develop capability programs for their employees to become more sensitive to the needs of their clients.
The Council will also serve as the monitoring body as regards to VAW initiatives.

The Council members may designate their duly authorized representative who shall have a rank not lower than
an assistant secretary or its equivalent. These representatives shall attend Council meetings in their behalf, and
shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget and
accounting rules and regulations.

SECTION 40. Mandatory Programs and Services for Victims. – The DSWD, and LGU's shall provide the
victims temporary shelters, provide counseling, psycho-social services and /or, recovery, rehabilitation
programs and livelihood assistance.

The DOH shall provide medical assistance to victims.

SECTION 41. Counseling and Treatment of Offenders. – The DSWD shall provide rehabilitative counseling
and treatment to perpetrators towards learning constructive ways of coping with anger and emotional outbursts
and reforming their ways. When necessary, the offender shall be ordered by the Court to submit to psychiatric
treatment or confinement.

SECTION 42. Training of Persons Involved in Responding to Violence Against Women and their Children
Cases. – All agencies involved in responding to violence against women and their children cases shall be
required to undergo education and training to acquaint them with:

a. the nature, extend and causes of violence against women and their children;

b. the legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims of violence against women and their children;

c. the services and facilities available to victims or survivors;

d. the legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrest and to offer protection and assistance; and

e. techniques for handling incidents of violence against women and their children that minimize the
likelihood of injury to the officer and promote the safety of the victim or survivor.

The PNP, in coordination with LGU's shall establish an education and training program for police officers and
barangay officials to enable them to properly handle cases of violence against women and their children.

SECTION 43. Entitled to Leave. – Victims under this Act shall be entitled to take a paid leave of absence up to
ten (10) days in addition to other paid leaves under the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
extendible when the necessity arises as specified in the protection order.

Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under this section shall be penalized in accordance
with the provisions of the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Likewise, an employer who
shall prejudice any person for assisting a co-employee who is a victim under this Act shall likewise be liable for
discrimination.

SECTION 44. Confidentiality. – All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their children
including those in the barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and employees and public or private
clinics to hospitals shall respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published,
in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business address, employer, or other identifying
information of a victim or an immediate family member, without the latter's consent, shall be liable to the
contempt power of the court.

Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of not
more than Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

SECTION 45. Funding – The amount necessary to implement the provisions of this Act shall be included in
the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

The Gender and Development (GAD) Budget of the mandated agencies and LGU's shall be used to implement
services for victim of violence against women and their children.

SECTION 46. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within six (6) months from the approval of this Act, the
DOJ, the NCRFW, the DSWD, the DILG, the DOH, and the PNP, and three (3) representatives from NGOs to
be identified by the NCRFW, shall promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of this Act.

SECTION 47. Suppletory Application – For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable
laws, shall have suppletory application.

SECTION 48. Separability Clause. – If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,
the other sections or provisions shall not be affected.

SECTION 49. Repealing Clause – All laws, Presidential decrees, executive orders and rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 50. Effectivity – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its complete publication
in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

JOSE DE VENECIA JR. FRANKLIN DRILON

 Speaker of the House of President of the Senate
Representatives

This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2723 and House Bill Nos. 5516 and 6054, was finally
passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on January 29, 2004 and February 2, 2004, respectively.

ROBERTO P. NAZARENO OSCAR G. YABES

Secretary General Secretary of Senate
House of Represenatives

Approved: March 08, 2004

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines

FIRST DIVISION

JULIUS AMANQUITON, G.R. No. 186080

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

-versus- CORONA,

DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. Promulgated:

August 14, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:
 Petitioner Julius Amanquiton was a purok leader of Barangay Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
As a purok leader and barangay tanod, he was responsible for the maintenance of cleanliness, peace and order
of the community.

At 10:45 p.m. on October 30, 2001, petitioner heard an explosion. He, together with two auxiliary tanod,
Dominador Amante and a certain Cabisudo, proceeded to Sambong Street where the explosion took place.
Thereafter, they saw complainant Leoselie John Bañaga being chased by a certain Gil Gepulane. Upon learning
that Bañaga was the one who threw the pillbox that caused the explosion, petitioner and his companions also
went after him.

On reaching Bañaga’s house, petitioner, Cabisudo and Amante knocked on the door. When no one
answered, they decided to hide some distance away. After five minutes, Bañaga came out of the house. At this
juncture, petitioner and his companions immediately apprehended him. Bañaga's aunt, Marilyn Alimpuyo,
followed them to the barangay hall.

Bañaga was later brought to the police station. On the way to the police station, Gepulane suddenly
appeared from nowhere and boxed Bañaga in the face. This caused petitioner to order Gepulane’s apprehension
along with Bañaga. An incident report was made.

During the investigation, petitioner learned Bañaga had been previously mauled by a group made up of a
certain Raul, Boyet and Cris but failed to identify two others. The mauling was the result of gang trouble in a
certain residental compound in Taguig City. Bañaga’s mauling was recorded in a barangay blotter which read:

10-30-201

Time: 10-15 p.m.

RECORD purposes

Dumating dito sa Barangay Head Quarters si Dossen Bañaga is Alimpuyo 16 years old
student nakatira sa 10 B Kalachuchi St. M.B.T. M.M.

Upang ireklamo yong sumapak sa akin sina Raul[,] Boyet [at] Cris at yong dalawang
sumapak ay hindi ko kilala. Nang yari ito kaninang 10:p.m. araw ng [M]artes taong
kasalukuyan at yong labi ko pumutok at yong kabilang mata ko ay namaga sa bandang
kanan. Ang iyong kaliwang mukha at pati yong likod ko ay may tama sa sapak.

Patunay dito ang aking lagda.

Dossen Banaga (sgd.)

Thereafter, an Information for violation in relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A. 8369 was filed against petitioner,
Amante and Gepulane. The Information read:

The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Julius Amanquiton, Dominador Amante
and Gil Gepulane of the crime of Violations of Section 10 (a) Article VI, Republic Act No. 7610 in relation to
Section 5 (j) of R.A. No. 8369 committed as follows:

That on the 30th day of October, 2001, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in
conspiracy with one another, armed with nightstick, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence, a form of physical abuse, upon the person
of Leoselie John A. [Bañaga], seventeen (17) years old, a minor, by then and there manhandling
him and hitting him with their nightsticks, thus, constituting other acts of child abuse, which is
inimical or prejudicial to child’s development, in violation of the above-mentioned law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On arraignment, petitioner and Amante both pleaded not guilty. Gepulane remains at-
large.

During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. Paulito Cruz, medico-legal
officer of the Taguig-Pateros District Hospital who attended to Bañaga on October 30, 2001, Bañaga himself,
Alimpuyo and Rachelle Bañaga (complainant’s mother).
 The defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Amante and Briccio Cuyos, then deputy chief
barangay tanod of the same barangay. Cuyos testified that the blotter notation entered by Gepulane and Bañaga
was signed in his presence and that they read the contents thereof before affixing their signatures.

On May 10, 2005, the RTC found petitioner and Amante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused JULIUS AMANQUITON and
DOMINADOR AMANTE “GUILTY” beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article VI Sec. 10 (a) of
Republic Act 7610 in relation to Section 3 (j) of Republic Act 8369, hereby sentences accused JULIUS
AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR AMANTE a straight penalty of thirty (30) days of Arresto Menor.

Both accused Julius Amanquiton and Dominador Amante are hereby directed to pay
Leoselie John A. Banaga the following:

1. Actual damages in the amount of P5,000.00;

2. Moral Damages in the amount of P 30,000.00; and
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P 20,000.00.
The case against the accused Gil Gepulane is hereby sent to the ARCHIVES to be revived upon
the arrest of the accused. Let [a] warrant of arrest be issued against him.
SO ORDERED.

Amanquiton’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was given due course. On August 28, 2008, the CA rendered a decision
which affirmed the conviction but increased the penalty. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision
read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional maximum up to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum as maximum. In addition to the
damages already awarded, a fine of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) is hereby solidarily imposed the
proceeds of which shall be administered as a cash fund by the DSWD.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner principally argues that the facts of the case as established did not
constitute a violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7160 and definitely did not prove the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. An accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction
becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty.

The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt was discussed in People v. Berroya:

[Proof beyond reasonable doubt] lies in the fact that in a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the
subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of command;
with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, as therefore as speaking
semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in
a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to
meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction where there is reasonable doubt of guilt. However, proof
beyond reasonable doubt requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.

The RTC and CA hinged their finding of petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt (of the crime of
child abuse) solely on the supposed positive identification by the complainant and his witness (Alimpuyo) of
petitioner and his co-accused as the perpetrators of the crime.

We note Bañaga’s statement that, when he was apprehended by petitioner and Amante, there were many
people around. Yet, the prosecution presented only Bañaga and his aunt, Alimpuyo, as witnesses to the mauling
incident itself. Where were the other people who could have testified, in an unbiased manner, on the alleged
mauling of Bañaga by petitioner and Amante, as supposedly witnessed by Alimpuyo? The testimonies of the
two other prosecution witnesses, Dr. Paulito Cruz and Rachelle Bañaga, did not fortify Bañaga’s claim that
petitioner mauled him, for the following reasons: Dr. Cruz merely attended to Bañaga’s injuries, while Rachelle
testified that she saw Bañaga only after the injuries have been inflicted on him.

We note furthermore that, Bañaga failed to controvert the validity of the barangay blotter he signed
regarding the mauling incident which happened prior to his apprehension by petitioner. Neither did he ever
deny the allegation that he figured in a prior battery by gang members.

All this raises serious doubt on whether Bañaga’s injuries were really inflicted by petitioner, et al., to the
exclusion of other people. In fact, petitioner testified clearly that Gepulane, who had been harboring a grudge
against Bañaga, came out of nowhere and punched Bañaga while the latter was being brought to the police
station. Gepulane, not petitioner, could very well have caused Bañaga's injuries.

Alimpuyo admitted that she did not see who actually caused the bloodied condition of Bañaga’s face because
she had to first put down the baby she was then carrying when the melee started. More importantly, Alimpuyo
stated that she was told by Bañaga that, while he was allegedly being held by the neck by petitioner, others were
hitting him. Alimpuyo was obviously testifying not on what she personally saw but on what Bañaga told her.

While we ordinarily do not interfere with the findings of the lower courts on the trustworthiness
of witnesses, when there appear in the records facts and circumstances of real weight which
might have been overlooked or misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk from its duty to sift
fact from fiction.

We apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in this case. Where the evidence on an
issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the evidence weighs, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of the accused. If inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and will not justify a
conviction.

Time and again, we have held that:

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national
comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the
Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3,
paragraph 2, that “The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including
proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.” This piece of legislation
supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely,
the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the commission of child
abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by which
child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition of child abuse is
expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse under existing laws but
includes also “other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development.”

However, this noble statute should not be used as a sharp sword, ready to be brandished
against an accused even if there is a patent lack of proof to convict him of the crime. The right
of an accused to liberty is as important as a minor’s right not to be subjected to any form of
abuse. Both are enshrined in the Constitution. One need not be sacrificed for the other.

There is no dearth of law, rules and regulations protecting a child from any and all forms
of abuse. While unfortunately, incidents of maltreatment of children abound amidst social ills,
care has to be likewise taken that wayward youths should not be cuddled by a misapplication of
the law. Society, through its laws, should correct the deviant conduct of the youth rather than
take the cudgels for them. Lest we regress to a culture of juvenile delinquency and errant
behavior, laws for the protection of children against abuse should be applied only and strictly to
actual abusers.

The objective of this seemingly catch-all provision on abuses against children will be best
achieved if parameters are set in the law itself, if only to prevent baseless accusations against
innocent individuals. Perhaps the time has come for Congress to review this matter and institute
the safeguards necessary for the attainment of its laudable ends.

We reiterate our ruling in People v. Mamalias:

We emphasize that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to send people
to the gaol but to do justice. The prosecution’s job is to prove that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the defense. Thus, when the evidence of the prosecution is not enough to sustain a
conviction, it must be rejected and the accused absolved and released at once.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 28, 2008 decision and
January 15, 2009 resolution of Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Julius Amanquiton is hereby ACQUITTED of violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA
7160.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Co-accused of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 122996. Amante opted to apply for probation.

Rollo, p. 34.
 An improvised explosive device.

“10-30-201

Time: 10-06 p.m.

RECORD purposes

Nagsadya si Gel Pulane Y Castello 25 yrs. Old Binata may trabaho Tubong Bacolod nakatira sa no.03
Sambong St., M.B.T. Mla.

Upang ireklamo si Neosen (sic) Banaga 14 yrs old Dahil siya ang nakita-naming na naghagis ng
pillbox sa harap ng tricycle na nakaparada sa kahabaan ng sambong.

Patunay dito ang kanyang lagda.”

Gel pulanes (sgd).” Rollo, p. 8.

Dossen Bañaga is the same person as Leoselie John A. Bañaga.

Republic Act.

An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation and for Other Purposes.

Rollo, pp. 52-67.

Resolution dated June 29, 2006. Id., pp. 76-77.

Id., pp. 34-50.

Resolution dated January 15, 2009. Id., p. 51.

CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14 (2).

RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 2.

People v. Fernandez, 434 Phil. 435, 445 (2002).

347 Phil. 410, 423 (1997).

Rollo, p. 90.

Id.

Id., p. 16.

People v. Abarquez, G.R. No. 150762, 20 January 2006, 479 SCRA 225, 239.

People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 633 (1999).

Gonzalo Araneta v. People, G.R. No. 174205, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 323, 332.

People v. Mamalias, 385 Phil. 499, 513-514 (2000).

EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 169430

PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
 PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

PUNO,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

- versus - CORONA,*

CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,**

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

HENRY BIDOC y ROQUE, Promulgated:

Accused-Appellant.

October 31, 2006

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DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00778
dated 6 June 2005 which affirmed in toto the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Luna, Apayao, Branch 26, dated 13 July 2001 in Criminal Cases No. 10-2000 and 11-2000
finding herein appellant Henry Bidoc y Roque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
rape committed against his 14-year old daughter, and sentencing him to suffer the supreme
penalty of death for each count, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, plus moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P70,000.00, and the costs
of the suit.

On 9 May 2000, appellant Roque was charged in two separate Informations with the crime of
rape, as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353 and Republic Act No. 7610, committed against his very own daughter,
on 21 November 1999 and sometime in December 1999, respectively. The two Informations
stated:
 Criminal Case No.10-2000

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, accuses HENRY BIDOC, of the crime
of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the [RPC] as amended by R.A. [No.] 8353
and [R.A. No.] 7610 committed as follows:

That on or about November 21, 1999 at Sitio xxx, Brgy. xxx, [Municipality of] xxx,
[Province of] xxx and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
[appellant] did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and
intimidation and taking advantage as a father over his daughter AAA, 14 years old, succeeded
having sexual intercourse against her will.

Criminal Case No. 11-2000

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, accuses HENRY BIDOC y [Roque] of the
crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by R.A. [No.] 8353 and [R.A. No.] 7610, committed as follows:

That on or about December, 1999 at Sitio xxx, Barangay xxx, [Municipality of] xxx,
{Province of] xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation
and taking advantage as a father over his daughter AAA, 14 years old, succeeded having sexual
intercourse against her will.

On 5 June 2000, the appellant was arraigned in both cases to which he entered a
plea of NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. After pre-trial, a joint trial on
the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the victim; SPO1
Reynante Agculao; and Dr. Thelma Dangao. As rebuttal witness, the prosecution
offered the testimony of the victim’s mother, BBB.

AAA testified that she was only 14 years of age when the first rape incident
happened on 21 November 1999. She narrated that on the said date, she was in their house at
Sitio xxx, Barangay xxx, Municipality of xxx, Province of xxx. At that time, her mother, BBB,
was washing clothes in a brook, which was quite far from their house. Her sister, CCC, who
was then six years old, went with their mother, while her other siblings DDD and EEE, who
were then three and two years old, respectively, were playing outside their house. On that very
moment, when only AAA and her father, herein appellant, were left inside the house, the latter
started kissing her and went on removing her clothes. She resisted but the appellant was much
stronger, hence, despite her resistance, appellant succeeded in undressing her. When she was
already naked, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, did all what he wanted and thereby
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. As a result, she felt so much pain in her
private part. Worse, after satisfying his lust, appellant even threatened to kill her if she will
reveal to anybody what had happened. Terribly frightened and hardly able to comprehend the
situation, she could only cry out in utter helplessness and desperation. When her mother came
back, she did not tell what happened for fear that appellant might carry out his threat.

On the evening of December 1999, AAA was raped for the second time by herein
appellant. On that occasion, only AAA and appellant were present at their house, because her
mother brought her two siblings, DDD and EEE to the hospital located in the Municipality of
xxx, Province of xxx while her other sibling, CCC went to the house of their grandmother. In
their place of residence, they have no neighbor or neighbors near them. The nearest house
could not be seen from their house. When asked how the second rape incident happened, she
narrated that the appellant first removed all her clothing and when she was already naked, while
lying down, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina and kissed her. After the sexual act,
appellant told her not to reveal what happened to anybody or else he will kill her.
 In the early part of January 2000, AAA took chances in going to the PNP Station located
in Kabugao, Apayao, and reported that she was raped twice by the appellant. She was alone
when she reported the incidents to SPO1 Agculao, an investigator of Kabugao Municipal
Police.

SPO1 Agculao corroborated the matter of reporting the two rape incidents to the PNP
Station in Kabugao, Apayao. He testified that on 6 January 2000, AAA voluntarily came to the
police station to report that her own father, herein appellant, had raped her. He then conducted
an investigation at the Investigation Section of PNP Kabugao regarding the complaint of AAA.
The result of the said investigation was reduced into writing. As part of the investigation, he
asked AAA to undergo a medical examination. He brought her to the Rural Health Office for
the medical examination and even made a request to Dr. Dangao for the issuance of a medical
certificate.

At the Rural Health Office, Dr. Dangao, who was then the Rural Health Officer of
Kabugao, Apayao, conducted a medical examination on AAA. She declared in court that her
examination indicated that AAA’s genital area reveals healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 7, and
10 o’clock positions, and the vaginal opening admits one finger with ease. She further avowed
that the said lacerations could have been caused by any penetration, by any hard object or a
man’s penis. She also mentioned in court that those lacerations could have occurred during the
months of November or December 1999.

On the part of the defense, it presented the testimony of the following witnesses: Ruben
Bidoc, John Lawani, Teodoro Lawani, SPO1 Felipe Erving, Julio Bidoc, and herein appellant.

In the testimony of Ruben, the brother of the appellant, he claimed that on the first week
of November 1999, he and the appellant went to Ripang, Conner, Apayao, to work for the
construction of the house of Bongbong Lawani and they only left the said place at the end of
November 1999. He averred that Ripang, Conner, Apayao, is an hour ride away from Sitio xxx
where the incident happened and on the nights of 20 and 21 November 1999, he and the
appellant slept in the house of Bongbong’s father in Ripang, Conner, Apayao. According to
him, on 21 November 1999, the date when the alleged rape incident happened, appellant never
left Ripang. In fact, on the said date, he and appellant were constructing the house of their
cousin, Bongbong Lawani, together with the latter’s father and brother.

John Lawani merely corroborated the testimony of Ruben that the appellant was in
Ripang, Conner, Apayao, working as a carpenter in the house of Bongbong when the alleged
rape incident happened on 21 November 1999. He knew this fact because his house is only
twenty meters away from Bongbong’s house. With respect to the second rape incident, which
had happened sometime in December 1999, he stated that during said month, appellant was
working as a carpenter at Kabetayan Bridge, Kabugao. He was sure of this because he was the
contractor of that bridge, but he was not sure if appellant went home during said month.

Another defense witness, Teodoro, also testified that the appellant had worked as a
carpenter in the house of Bongbong in the month of November 1999. He was not sure however
if appellant stayed there during the entire month of November 1999.

SPO1 Felipe Erving asserted he noticed AAA was staying in the house of her
grandfather since the opening of the schoolyear until the months of November and December
1999. He knew this fact because his house is only one hundred meters away from the house of
Julio, the father of the appellant, and whenever he was home, he always saw AAA in her
grandfather’s place. On 3 January 2000, he alleged that AAA came to their house and asked for
help, because her father had whipped and slapped her. He brought her to the barangay captain,
but the latter was not around so he told AAA to just wait for the captain. Instead of waiting, she
left. He stressed that there is a distance of one and one-half kilometers between the house of the
appellant and that of Julio, a distance of two kilometers between appellant’s house to that of his
house, and the nearest house to the house of the appellant is one hundred meters away.
Nonetheless, he divulged in court that during the whole month of November and December
1999, he was not in Sitio xxx because he was assigned at the PNP Station of Kabugao, Apayao.
 Julio substantiated the declaration of SPO1 Erving that her granddaughter, AAA stayed
in his house during the schoolyear until November and December 1999. Nevertheless, he stated
that during weekends, AAA goes back to the house of her parents and on his cross-examination,
he attested that as a Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) maintenance man, he
stayed at work the whole day and even ate his lunch on his worksite. Hence, most of the time,
he did not know what was going on in his house because he was out for work the whole day.

Appellant was the final witness presented by the defense. The justification offered by
him by way of exculpation, was both denial and alibi. He denied having committed the
offenses charged against him. He claimed that from the first week until the last week of
November 1999 he was at Ripang, Conner, Apayao, together with his brother, working as a
carpenter in the construction of Bongbong’s house, while in the month of December 1999, he
was at Barangay Kabetayan, Kabugao, Apayao, also working as a carpenter in the construction
of a bridge. According to appellant, her daughter was motivated in filing the present cases
against him to get even with him because he slapped her on 3 January 2000 in front of her
“barkadas” and he even threatened to kill her for fear that she might get pregnant because of her
going out at night and coming home late. However, during his cross-examination, he admitted
that AAA goes home whenever his wife fetches the former.

To refute the aforesaid testimony of the accused, the prosecution presented BBB, the
wife of the appellant and the mother of AAA. In her testimony, she disclosed that appellant left
their house in the month of August (no year was stated) but during the months of November and
December 1999, her husband, herein appellant, was at their house in Sitio xxx, Barangay xxx,
Municipality of xxx, Province of xxx. She also mentioned that her daughter AAA often came
home to their house during said months and she alternately slept in her grandfather’s house and
in their house. She further attested that whenever AAA came home, appellant was in their
house. When the court asked her, she affirmed that appellant did not work during said months.

On 13 July 2001, after consideration of the respective evidence of the prosecution and
defense, the trial court rendered the assailed Joint Decision convicting the appellant for two
counts of rape, the decretal portion of which reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the [appellant], HENRY BIDOC y ROQUE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
two (2) counts of rape charged against him, this court hereby sentences said [appellant] to suffer the
Supreme Penalty of DEATH in each of the case filed against him.

The [appellant] is further ordered to indemnify the victim [AAA] the amount of
SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity plus moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00), all in
Philippine Currency, and the costs of the suit.

The records of this case were originally transmitted before this Court on automatic
review.

In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors, viz:

I. The trial court gravely erred in convicting appellant of two counts of rape not on the
basis of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence but rather on the weakness of the
defense’s evidence.

II. The trial court gravely erred in not considering the Information in Criminal Case No. 11-2000
as insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for failure of the prosecution to state the precise date
of commission of the alleged rape, it being an essential element of the crime charged.

Pursuant to People v. Mateo, the records of the present case were transferred to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, taking into consideration the assignment of errors
stated by the appellant in his Appellant’s Brief and after a thorough study of the records of the
case, rendered a Decision on 6 June 2005, affirming in toto the Joint Decision of the RTC of
Luna, Apayao. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed [J]oint [D]ecision of Branch 26 of the RTC of Luna, Apayao, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Pursuant to A.M. No. 5-03-SC, let this case be certified to and elevated to the Hon.
Supreme Court for further review.

Aggrieved, appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 27 June 2005, which was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 17 August 2005 for lack of merit.

The case was then certified and elevated to this Court for further review.

On 27 September 2005, this Court resolved to accept the present case and to require the
parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. The Office of the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that it will no longer file any
supplemental briefs, but instead, it will merely adopt its Appellee’s Brief filed on 25 March
2003. Correspondingly, appellant filed a Manifestation in lieu of supplemental brief
manifesting he will merely adopt his Appellant’s Brief where his innocence had been
assiduously discussed.

After a careful review of the records of this case, this Court affirms appellant’s conviction.

In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by these principles: First, the prosecution has
to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt or that degree of proof that,
to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. Second, unless there are special reasons, the
findings of trial courts, especially regarding the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Third, the disposition of rape cases are governed
by the following guidelines: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult
to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution, and (3) the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense.

In the case at bar, appellant contends that the court a quo gravely erred in convicting him
for two counts of rape based not on the strength of prosecution’s evidence but on the weakness
of his defense. This Court finds such contention untenable.

It is settled that when a woman, moreso if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she
says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed and if her testimony meets
the test of credibility, that is sufficient to convict the accused. As in this case, when AAA
testified in court, her testimony described in details the hideous experiences suffered by her on
21 November 1999 and sometime in December 1999 in the hands of her own father. In her
narration on the manner of how the appellant took advantage of her, she never wavered in her
testimonies. In fact, she even exemplified the details of the incident without flourish and
innuendo.

As the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision, that even before AAA faced the court,
she had courageously reported the incidents when she went to the police station and made her
statement before SPO1 Agculao. She later retold and described the same incidents clearly
before Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge Pinera Biden when she went through an
interrogation during the preliminary investigation, and once again, when she narrated her
dreadful experience before the court a quo during her direct and cross-examinations. All her
statements had been consistent and to the point.

The trial court also noted that AAA testified on the incidents in a clear and
straightforward manner. Additionally, the court a quo found AAA’s testimony very categorical
and her statements were corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Dangao, the Municipal
Health Officer who conducted the medical examination on her. In the testimony of Dr. Dangao,
she declared to have found healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 7, and 10 o’clock notch on the
private part of AAA, which could have been caused by the penetration to the body of any hard
object, more particularly a man’s penis. She also avowed that such penetration could have
occurred during the months of November or December 1999, which coincides to the dates the
rape incidents happened. It has been said that when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent
with the medical findings, sufficient basis exists to warrant a conclusion that the essential
requisite of carnal knowledge has thereby been established. Hence, such testimony of Dr.
Dangao strengthens even more the claim of rape by AAA against herein appellant.

As compared to the evidence presented by the prosecution, the bare denial and alibi
offered by the appellant as a defense cannot hold water. It is well-settled that denial is an
intrinsically weak defense, which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credibility. A mere denial, like alibi, constitutes self-serving negative evidence, which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters. For alibi to succeed as a defense, the accused must establish by
clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of
the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.

As can be gleaned from the records of this case, appellant’s argument centered only on
the fact that it was impossible for him to commit the crime of rape against his daughter because
on the alleged dates the incidents of rape happened, to wit: (1) on 21 November 1999 he was at
Ripang, Conner, Apayao, working as a carpenter for the construction of the house of Bongbong;
in fact, he was there the whole month of November; and (2) in December 1999 he was at
Barangay Kabetayan, Kabugao, Apayao, working also as a carpenter for the construction of
Kabetayan Bridge, and such claims of the appellant were corroborated by other defense
witnesses. However, as correctly ruled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, appellant
failed to present convincing proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis during the aforementioned dates when the separate acts of rape were committed.

From the records of the case, it appeared that Ripang, Conner, Apayao, is only an hour
ride away from the place where the incident of rape happened on 21 November 1999. Hence, it
was very much possible for the appellant to be present at the locus criminis, which is the place
of his residence considering that it is very accessible by land transportation being along the
national highway. Besides, 21 November 1999 fell on a Sunday, which fact was overlooked by
the appellant and his witnesses; therefore, appellant could have gone home for a weekend
vacation. In addition, the testimonies of his co-workers in Ripang, Conner, Apayao, revealed
that they were not sure if appellant never went home during the months of November. With
respect to the claim of appellant that in December 1999 he was at Barangay Kabetayan, so it
was impossible for him to have committed the crime of rape as charged against him by his
daughter, the same was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. In fact, even his own
witness was not sure if he stayed at his place of work the entire month of December. Therefore,
appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

While denial is a legitimate defense in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot
overcome the categorical testimony of the victim. It is an established rule that an affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially so when it comes from a credible
witness. It is hornbook doctrine that the positive and categorical testimony of a rape victim-
daughter, identifying her own father as the one who sexually attacked her, prevails over his bare
denial. No daughter will charge a father, especially a good father, with rape. The charge is not
only embarrassing to the victim and the family. It means death to the head of the family. A
father so charged cannot exculpate himself by a bare-bone denial.

At any rate, the appellant’s bare denials, which were unsubstantiated by convincing
evidence, were not sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of the commission of the crimes.
Even the witnesses for the defense could not categorically pinpoint the whereabouts of the
appellant on the specific dates the crimes of rape were committed. Furthermore, BBB, the
mother of AAA and appellant’s wife, on her rebuttal testimony, emphatically affirmed in court
that the appellant was in their house at Sitio xxx on the said dates of the commission of the
crimes of rape because appellant did not work during the months of November and December.
Consequently, the defense was not able to cast any doubt on the credibility of AAA’s
testimony.

As to appellant’s contention that her daughter accused him of the crime of rape because
he slapped and whipped her in front of her “barkadas,” the same is unjustifiable. In
previous cases, this Court held that parental punishment or disciplinary chastisement is not
enough reason for a daughter in a Filipino family to falsely accuse her father of rape. She
would not subject herself to an examination of her private parts, undergo the trauma and
humiliation of public trial, and embarrass herself with the need to narrate in detail how she was
raped if she was not in fact raped. It takes depravity for a young girl to concoct a tale of
defloration, which would put her own father on death row, drag herself and the rest of her
family to a lifetime of shame, and make them the object of gossip among their classmates and
friends.

Given the foregoing, this Court is convinced that the trial court correctly convicted the
accused for two counts of rape and such conviction was not based on the weakness of defense
evidence as the appellant claimed it to be, but on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution. The straightforward testimony given by AAA, corroborated with the testimonies
of SPO1 Agculao and Dr. Dangao, were sufficient to convict the appellant. Besides, appellant’s
defense was not able to destroy the truthfulness and the credibility of AAA’s testimony and the
testimonies of her witnesses.

With regard to the second assignment of error by the appellant that the trial court gravely
erred in not considering the Information in Criminal Case No. 11-2000 as insufficient to support
a judgment of conviction for failure of the prosecution to state the precise date of the
commission of the crime of rape, the same lacks merit.

The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, it is
not essential that it be alleged in the information with ultimate precision. Section 11 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that it is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when
time is a material ingredient of the offense, but that the act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the
information or complaint will permit. The exact date of the commission is not an essential
element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman
without her consent. In this case, the prosecution adequately proved the fact of sexual
intercourse by appellant against the will of AAA sometime in December 1999. The veracity of
the rape charge is not dependent on the time of the commission of the offense but on the
credibility of the offended party.

This Court also affirms the imposition of the supreme penalty of death by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. In this case, AAA’s minority and her relationship to the appellant
have been properly alleged in the two Informations charging appellant with the crime of rape.
While appellant admitted the existence of the Live Birth Certificate of AAA, he denied its
contents because the first name of AAA in the said Birth Certificate lacks the letter “R.” The
contents, however, of the Birth Certificate of AAA was properly proven during trial, that is the
name appearing in the said Birth Certificate and AAA is the same. All the other information in
the said Birth Certificate like the date of birth, name of the parents and address match the
information testified to by AAA during trial. Hence, AAA’s minority and her relationship to
the appellant have not only been properly alleged in the Information but likewise it was also
proven during trial.

All told, the prosecution was able to prove that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the two counts of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353. Taking into consideration the presence of the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship as stated under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, the same have been properly alleged in the two Informations charging the appellant of the
crime of rape and have been proven during trial, thus, this Court has no option but to impose on
the appellant the supreme penalty of death, thereby affirming the Decision by both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.

With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as, “An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,” signed into law on 24 June 2006, the
imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited. The law provides:

Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. - Accordingly,

Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise
known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No.
Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death
Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death
penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not
make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose

sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

Accordingly, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance

with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346, and as provided under Section 3 of the said law, the
appellant shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

This Court likewise affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, to AAA in accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano, which
states:

As to damages, [this Court] held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending
qualifying aggravating circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the
civil indemnity for the victim shall be P75,000. Thus, the trial court’s award of P75,000
as civil indemnity is in line with existing case law. Also, in rape cases moral damages are
awarded without need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial court’s award of
P50,000 as moral damages should also be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence
on qualified rape. Lastly, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 is also called for, by
way of public example, and to protect the young from sexual abuse.

It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still
heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.

Finally, this Court modifies the award of moral and exemplary damages by the trial court
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The trial court merely imposes the sum of P70,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages. To conform to the ruling in People v. Sambrano, this Court
hereby orders the appellant to indemnify the victim, AAA P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in each of the cases.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CR-H.C. No. 00778 dated 6 June 2005 finding appellant Henry Bidoc y Roque guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the two counts of rape committed against his 14-year old daughter is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of moral and exemplary damages in
each of the cases shall be P75,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. In view, however, of
Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the cases filed against him
without the benefit of parole. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
 Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
*
On leave.
**
On leave.

Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis with Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria
Tirona and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.; concurring, rollo, pp. 3-19.

Penned by Executive Judge Quirino M. Andaya, CA rollo, pp. 18-29.

Otherwise known as, “The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.”

Otherwise known as, “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation, and
Discrimination Act.”

This is pursuant to the ruling of this Court in the case of People of the Philippines vs.
Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 12 September 2006, wherein this Court has resolved to withhold the
real name of the victim-survivor and to use fictitious initials instead to represent her in its decisions.
Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to
establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members,
shall not be disclosed. The names of such victims, and of their immediate family members other than
the accused, shall appear as “AAA,” “BBB,” “CCC,” and so on. Addresses shall appear as “xxx” as in
“No. xxx Street, xxx District, City of xxx.”

The Supreme Court took note of the legal mandate on the utmost confidentiality
of proceedings involving violence against women and children set forth in Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 7610,
otherwise known as, Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act; Sec. 44 of R.A. No. 9262, otherwise known as, Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004; and Sec. 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as, Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children
effective November 15, 2004.

Id.

CA rollo, p. 10.

Id. at 11.

TSN, 21 November 2000, pp. 11-28.

Id.

Id.

RTC Records, Vol. 1, p. 4; TSN, 21 November 2000, pp. 1-11.

TSN, 8 January 2001, pp. 1-12.

TSN, 19 February 2001, pp. 1-9.

TSN, 20 March 2001, pp. 1-7.

Id. at 8-13.

TSN, 19 February 2001, pp. 10-16.

Id. at 16-19.

TSN, 26 April 2001, pp. 1-10.

 Id. at 11-15.

CA rollo, pp. 28-29.

G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

Rollo, p. 18.

People v. Lou, G.R. No. 146803, 14 January 2004, 419 SCRA 345, 348.

People v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 142431, 14 January 2004, 419 SCRA 307, 313.

People v. Luceriano, G.R. No. 145223, 11 February 2004, 422 SCRA 486, 491.

People v. Muros, G.R. No. 142511, 16 February 2004, 423 SCRA 69, 81.

People v. Aaron, G.R. Nos. 136300-02, 24 September 2002, 389 SCRA 526,535.

People v. Magtibay, G.R. No. 142985, 6 August 2002, 386 SCRA 332, 348.

People v. Ortizuella, G.R. No. 135675, 23 June 2004, 432 SCRA 574, 584.

People v. Abaño, G.R. No. 142728, 23 January 2002, 374 SCRA 431, 443.

People v. Abellano, G.R. No. 146468, 13 November 2002, 391 SCRA 612, 617.

People v. Villanueva, G.R. Nos. 146464-67, 15 November 2002, 391 SCRA 718, 730.

Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission.

People v. Escaño, G.R. Nos. 140218-23, 13 February 2002, 376 SCRA 670, 700-701.

People v. Escultor, G.R. Nos. 149366-67, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 651, 660.

RTC Records, Vol. 1, p. 46.

TSN, 21 November 2000, pp. 11-28.

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.- Rape is committed:

1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Article 266-B. Penalties. x x x.

xxxx

The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; x x x.

People v. Nicanor Salome, G.R. No. 169077, 31 August 2006; People v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236, 31 August 2006; People
v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, 31 August 2006.

G.R. No. 143708, 24 February 2003, 398 SCRA 106, 117.

People v. Nicanor Salome, supra note 41; People v. Quiachon, supra note 41.

Id.

RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS

.

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule.— Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the
examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It
shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.
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Sec. 2. Objectives.— The objectives of this Rule are to create and maintain an environment that will
allow children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage children
to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.
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Sec. 3. Construction of the Rule.— This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the best
interests of the child and to promote maximum accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice to
the constitutional rights of the accused.

Sec. 4. Definitions.—

(a) A “child witness” is any person who at the time of giving testimony is below the age of eighteen
(18) years. In child abuse cases, a child includes one over eighteen (18) years but is found by the court as
unable to fully take care of himself or protect himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.

(b) “Child abuse” means physical, psychological or sexual abuse and criminal neglect as defined in
Republic Act No. 7610 and other related laws.

(c) “Facilitator” means a person appointed by the court to pose questions to a child.

(d) “Record regarding a child” or “record” means any photograph, videotape, audiotape, film,
handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic recording, computer data or printout, or other
memorialization, including any court document, pleading, or any copy or reproduction of any of the
foregoing, that contains the name, description, address, school or any other personal identifying
information about a child or his family and that is produced or maintained by a public agency, private
agency or individual.

(e) A “guardian ad litem” is a person appointed by the court where the case is pending for a child
who is a victim of, accused of, or a witness to a crime to protect the best interests of the said child.

(f) A “support person” is a person chosen by the child to accompany him to testify at or attend a
judicial proceeding or deposition to provide emotional support for him.

(g) “Best interests of the child” means the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most
congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to his
physical, psychological, and emotional development. It also means the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the child.

(h) “Developmental level” refers to the specific growth phase in which most individuals are
expected to behave and function in relation to the advancement of their physical, socio-emotional,
cognitive, and moral abilities.
 (i) “In-depth investigative interview” or “disclosure interview” is an inquiry or proceeding conducted
by duly trained members of a multi-disciplinary team or representatives of law enforcement or child
protective services for the purpose of determining whether child abuse has been committed.

Sec. 5. Guardian ad litem.—

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(a) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a victim of, accused of, or a
witness to a crime to promote the best interests of the child. In making the appointment, the court shall
consider the background of the guardian ad litem and his familiarity with the judicial process, social
service programs, and child development, giving preference to the parents of the child, if qualified. The
guardian ad litem may be a member of the Philippine Bar. A person who is a witness in any proceeding
involving the child cannot be appointed as a guardian ad litem.
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(b) The guardian ad litem:
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(1) shall attend all interviews, depositions, hearings, and trial proceedings in which a child
participates;
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(2) shall make recommendations to the court concerning the welfare of the child;

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(3) shall have access to all reports, evaluations, and records necessary to effectively advocate
for the child, except privileged communications;

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(4) shall marshal and coordinate the delivery of resources and special services to the child;

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(5) shall explain, in language understandable to the child, all legal proceedings, including
police investigations, in which the child is involved;

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(6) shall assist the child and his family in coping with the emotional effects of crime and
subsequent criminal or non-criminal proceedings in which the child is involved;

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(7) may remain with the child while the child waits to testify;

..
(8) may interview witnesses; and

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(9) may request additional examinations by medical or mental health professionals if there is a
compelling need therefor.

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(c) The guardian ad litem shall be notified of all proceedings but shall not participate in the trial.
However, he may file motions pursuant to Sections 9, 10, 25, 26, 27 and 31(c). If the guardian ad litem is
a lawyer, he may object during trial that questions asked of the child are not appropriate to his
developmental level.

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(d) The guardian ad litem may communicate concerns regarding the child to the court through an
officer of the court designated for that purpose.

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 (e) The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding concerning any information,
statement, or opinion received from the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad litem, unless the
court finds it necessary to promote the best interests of the child.

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(f) The guardian ad litem shall be presumed to have acted in good faith in compliance with his
duties described in Sub-section (b).

Sec. 6. Competency.— Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall
conduct a competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.

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(a) Proof of necessity.— A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity
of competency examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency
examination.

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(b) Burden of proof.— To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of
proof lies on the party challenging his competence.

(c) Persons allowed at competency examination.— Only the following are allowed to attend a
competency examination:

(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;

(2) The counsel for the parties;

(3) The guardian ad litem;

(4) One or more support persons for the child; and

(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his
absence.

(d) Conduct of examination.— Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only
by the judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in his
discretion, ask the child.

(e) Developmentally appropriate questions.— The questions asked at the competency examination
shall be appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child; shall not be related to the issues at
trial; and shall focus on the ability of the child to remember, communicate, distinguish between truth
and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify truthfully.

(f) Continuing duty to assess competence.— The court has the duty of continuously assessing the
competence of the child throughout his testimony.

Sec. 7. Oath or affirmation.— Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the
truth.

Sec. 8. Examination of a child witness.— The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing
or any proceeding shall be done in open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may,
however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this Rule.

Sec. 9. Interpreter for child.—

 (a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino language or is unable to communicate
in said languages due to his developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or other similar reason, an
interpreter whom the child can understand and who understands the child may be appointed by the
court, motu proprio or upon motion, to interpret for the child.

(b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the only person who can serve as an
interpreter for the child, he shall not be disqualified and may serve as the interpreter of the child. The
interpreter, however, who is also a witness, shall testify ahead of the child.

(c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a true and accurate interpretation.

Sec. 10. Facilitator to pose questions to child.—

(a) The court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint a facilitator if it determines that the child
is unable to understand or respond to questions asked. The facilitator may be a child psychologist,
psychiatrist, social worker, guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent, or relative.

(b) If the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels for the parties shall pose questions to
the child only through the facilitator. The questions shall either be in the words used by counsel or, if
the child is not likely to understand the same, in words that are comprehensible to the child and which
convey the meaning intended by counsel.

(c) The facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose questions to the child according to the
meaning intended by counsel.

Sec. 11. Support persons.—

(a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a deposition shall have the right to be
accompanied by one or two persons of his own choosing to provide him emotional support.

(1) Both support persons shall remain within the view of the child during his testimony.

(2) One of the support persons may accompany the child to the witness stand, provided the
support person does not completely obscure the child from the view of the opposing party, judge,
or hearing officer.

(3) The court may allow the support person to hold the hand of the child or take other
appropriate steps to provide emotional support to the child in the course of the proceedings.

(4) The court shall instruct the support persons not to prompt, sway, or influence the child
during his testimony.

(b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness, the court may disapprove the choice
if it is sufficiently established that the attendance of the support person during the testimony of the child
would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of the testimony of the child.

(c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by the court, his testimony shall be
presented ahead of the testimony of the child.

Sec. 12. Waiting area for child witnesses.— The courts are encouraged to provide a waiting area
for children that is separate from waiting areas used by other persons. The waiting area for children
should be furnished so as to make a child comfortable.

Sec. 13. Courtroom environment.— To create a more comfortable environment for the child, the
court may, in its discretion, direct and supervise the location, movement and deportment of all persons
in the courtroom including the parties, their counsel, child, witnesses, support persons, guardian ad
litem, facilitator, and court personnel. The child may be allowed to testify from a place other than the
witness chair. The witness chair or other place from which the child testifies may be turned to facilitate
his testimony but the opposing party and his counsel must have a frontal or profile view of the child
during the testimony of the child. The witness chair or other place from which the child testifies may
also be rearranged to allow the child to see the opposing party and his counsel, if he chooses to look at
them, without turning his body or leaving the witness stand. The judge need not wear his judicial robe.

Nothing in this section or any other provision of law, except official in-court identification
provisions, shall be construed to require a child to look at the accused.
 Accommodations for the child under this section need not be supported by a finding of trauma to
the child.

Sec. 14. Testimony during appropriate hours.— The court may order that the testimony of the
child should be taken during a time of day when the child is well-rested.

Sec. 15. Recess during testimony.—

The child may be allowed reasonable periods of relief while undergoing direct, cross, re-direct, and
re-cross examinations as often as necessary depending on his developmental level.

Sec. 16. Testimonial aids.— The court shall permit a child to use dolls, anatomically-correct dolls,
puppets, drawings, mannequins, or any other appropriate demonstrative device to assist him in his
testimony.

Sec. 17. Emotional security item.— While testifying, a child shall be allowed to have an item of his
own choosing such as a blanket, toy, or doll.

Sec. 18. Approaching the witness.— The court may prohibit a counsel from approaching a child if
it appears that the child is fearful of or intimidated by the counsel.

Sec. 19. Mode of questioning.— The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so
as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth; (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form
appropriate to the developmental level of the child; (3) protect children from harassment or undue
embarrassment; and (4) avoid waste of time.

The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.

Sec. 20. Leading questions.— The court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of
a child if the same will further the interests of justice.

Sec. 21. Objections to questions.— Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not
to mislead, confuse, frighten, or intimidate the child.

Sec. 22. Corroboration.— Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His
testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment
subject to the standard of proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.

Sec. 23. Excluding the public.— When a child testifies, the court may order the exclusion from the
courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case.
Such an order may be made to protect the right to privacy of the child or if the court determines on the
record that requiring the child to testify in open court would cause psychological harm to him, hinder
the ascertainment of truth, or result in his inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment,
fear, or timidity. In making its order, the court shall consider the developmental level of the child, the
nature of the crime, the nature of his testimony regarding the crime, his relationship to the accused and
to persons attending the trial, his desires, and the interests of his parents or legal guardian. The court
may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during trial is
of such character as to be offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, on motion of the
accused, exclude the public from trial, except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.

Sec. 24. Persons prohibited from entering and leaving courtroom.— The court may order that
persons attending the trial shall not enter or leave the courtroom during the testimony of the child.

Sec. 25. Live-link television testimony in criminal cases where the child is a victim or a witness.—

(a) The prosecutor, counsel or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the testimony of
the child be taken in a room outside the courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by live-link
television.

Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult the prosecutor
or counsel and shall defer to the judgment of the prosecutor or counsel regarding the necessity of
applying for an order. In case the guardian ad litem is convinced that the decision of the prosecutor or
counsel not to apply will cause the child serious emotional trauma, he himself may apply for the order.

The person seeking such an order shall apply at least five (5) days before the trial date, unless the
court finds on the record that the need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable.
 (b) The court may motu proprio hear and determine, with notice to the parties, the need for taking
the testimony of the child through live-link television.

(c) The judge may question the child in chambers, or in some comfortable place other than the
courtroom, in the presence of the support person, guardian ad litem, prosecutor, and counsel for the
parties. The questions of the judge shall not be related to the issues at trial but to the feelings of the
child about testifying in the courtroom.

(d) The judge may exclude any person, including the accused, whose presence or conduct causes
fear to the child.

(e) The court shall issue an order granting or denying the use of live-link television and stating the
reasons therefor. It shall consider the following factors:

(1) The age and level of development of the child;

(2) His physical and mental health, including any mental or physical disability;

(3) Any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced by him;

(4) The nature of the alleged abuse;

(5) Any threats against the child;

(6) His relationship with the accused or adverse party;

(7) His reaction to any prior encounters with the accused in court or elsewhere;

(8) His reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was discussed with him by parents or
professionals;

(9) Specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the days prior to testifying;

(10) Testimony of expert or lay witnesses;

(11) The custodial situation of the child and the attitude of the members of his family
regarding the events about which he will testify; and

(12) Other relevant factors, such as court atmosphere and formalities of court procedure.

(f) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television if there is a
substantial likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from testifying in the presence of the accused,
his counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be. The trauma must be of a kind which would impair the
completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of the child.

(g) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live-link television:

(1) The child shall testify in a room separate from the courtroom in the presence of the
guardian ad litem; one or both of his support persons; the facilitator and interpreter, if any; a court
officer appointed by the court; persons necessary to operate the closed-circuit television
equipment; and other persons whose presence are determined by the court to be necessary to the
welfare and well-being of the child;

(2) The judge, prosecutor, accused, and counsel for the parties shall be in the courtroom. The
testimony of the child shall be transmitted by live-link television into the courtroom for viewing
and hearing by the judge, prosecutor, counsel for the parties, accused, victim, and the public unless
excluded.

(3) If it is necessary for the child to identify the accused at trial, the court may allow the child
to enter the courtroom for the limited purpose of identifying the accused, or the court may allow
the child to identify the accused by observing the image of the latter on a television monitor.

(4) The court may set other conditions and limitations on the taking of the testimony that it
finds just and appropriate, taking into consideration the best interests of the child.
 (h) The testimony of the child shall be preserved on videotape, digital disc, or other similar devices
which shall be made part of the court record and shall be subject to a protective order as provided in
Section 31(b).

Sec. 26. Screens, one-way mirrors, and other devices to shield child from accused.—

(a) The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the chair of the child or
that a screen or other device be placed in the courtroom in such a manner that the child cannot see the
accused while testifying. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this Section, he shall
consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third paragraphs of Section 25(a) of
this Rule. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons and describing the approved courtroom
arrangement.

(b) If the court grants an application to shield the child from the accused while testifying in the
courtroom, the courtroom shall be arranged to enable the accused to view the child.

Sec. 27. Videotaped deposition.—

(a) The prosecutor, counsel, or guardian ad litem may apply for an order that a deposition be taken
of the testimony of the child and that it be recorded and preserved on videotape. Before the guardian
ad litem applies for an order under this Section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject
to the second and third paragraphs of Section 25(a).

(b) If the court finds that the child will not be able to testify in open court at trial, it shall issue an
order that the deposition of the child be taken and preserved by videotape.

(c) The judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of a child. Objections to deposition
testimony or evidence, or parts thereof, and the grounds for the objection shall be stated and shall be
ruled upon at the time of the taking of the deposition. The other persons who may be permitted to be
present at the proceeding are:

(1) The prosecutor;

(2) The defense counsel;

(3) The guardian ad litem;

(4) The accused, subject to sub-section (e);

(5) Other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare
and well-being of the child;

(6) One or both of his support persons, the facilitator and interpreter, if any;

(7) The court stenographer; and

(8) Persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment.

(d) The rights of the accused during trial, especially the right to counsel and to confront and cross-
examine the child, shall not be violated during the deposition.

(e) If the order of the court is based on evidence that the child is unable to testify in the physical
presence of the accused, the court may direct the latter to be excluded from the room in which the
deposition is conducted. In case of exclusion of the accused, the court shall order that the testimony of
the child be taken by live-link television in accordance with Section 25 of this Rule. If the accused is
excluded from the deposition, it is not necessary that the child be able to view an image of the accused.

(f) The videotaped deposition shall be preserved and stenographically recorded. The videotape and
the stenographic notes shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court where the case is pending for
safekeeping and shall be made a part of the record.

(g) The court may set other conditions on the taking of the deposition that it finds just and
appropriate, taking into consideration the best interests of the child, the constitutional rights of the
accused, and other relevant factors.

(h) The videotaped deposition and stenographic notes shall be subject to a protective order as
provided in Section 31(b).
 (i) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is unable to testify for a reason stated in
Section 25(f) of this Rule, or is unavailable for any reason described in Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may admit into evidence the videotaped deposition of the child in
lieu of his testimony at the trial. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons therefor.

(j) After the original videotaping but before or during trial, any party may file any motion for
additional videotaping on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The court may order an additional
videotaped deposition to receive the newly discovered evidence.

Sec. 28. Hearsay exception in child abuse cases.— A statement made by a child describing any act
or attempted act of child abuse, not otherwise admissible under the hearsay rule, may be admitted in
evidence in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding subject to the following rules:

(a) Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its proponent shall make known to the adverse
party the intention to offer such statement and its particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to
object. If the child is available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party, require the child to be
present at the presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-examination by the adverse party. When
the child is unavailable, the fact of such circumstance must be proved by the proponent.

(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement, the court shall consider the time,
content and circumstances thereof which provide sufficient indicia of reliability. It shall consider the
following factors:

(1) Whether there is a motive to lie;

(2) The general character of the declarant child;

(3) Whether more than one person heard the statement;

(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous;

(5) The timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant child and witness;

(6) Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of the declarant child;

(7) The possibility of faulty recollection of the declarant child is remote; and

(8) The circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no reason to suppose
the declarant child misrepresented the involvement of the accused.

(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following situations:

(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness, or will be
exposed to severe psychological injury; or

(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure
his attendance by process or other reasonable means.

(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if
corroborated by other admissible evidence.

Sec. 29. Admissibility of videotaped and audiotaped in-depth investigative or disclosure interviews
in child abuse cases.— The court may admit videotape and audiotape in-depth investigative or
disclosure interviews as evidence, under the following conditions:

(a) The child witness is unable to testify in court on grounds and under conditions established
under Section 28 (c).

(b) The interview of the child was conducted by duly trained members of a multidisciplinary team
or representatives of law enforcement or child protective services in situations where child abuse is
suspected so as to determine whether child abuse occurred.

(c) The party offering the videotape or audiotape must prove that:

(1) the videotape or audiotape discloses the identity of all individuals present and at all times
includes their images and voices;
 (2) the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make
a particular statement or is clearly shown to be the statement of the child and not the product of
improper suggestion;

(3) the videotape and audiotape machine or device was capable of recording testimony;

(4) the person operating the device was competent to operate it;

(5) the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct; and

(6) it has been duly preserved.

The individual conducting the interview of the child shall be available at trial for examination by
any party. Before the videotape or audiotape is offered in evidence, all parties shall be afforded an
opportunity to view or listen to it and shall be furnished a copy of a written transcript of the
proceedings.

The fact that an investigative interview is not videotaped or audiotaped as required by this Section
shall not by itself constitute a basis to exclude from evidence out-of-court statements or testimony of the
child. It may, however, be considered in determining the reliability of the statements of the child
describing abuse.

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Sec. 30. Sexual abuse shield rule.—
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(a) Inadmissible evidence.— The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding
involving alleged child sexual abuse:
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(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and
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(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.
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(b) Exception.— Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to prove
that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence shall be
admissible.

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A party intending to offer such evidence must:

(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial, specifically describing the
evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause, requires a
different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and

(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at least three (3) days before the
hearing of the motion.

Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing in chambers and afford the
child, his guardian ad litem, the parties, and their counsel a right to attend and be heard. The motion
and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal and protected by a protective order
set forth in Section 31(b). The child shall not be required to testify at the hearing in chambers except
with his consent.

Sec. 31. Protection of privacy and safety.—

(a) Confidentiality of records.— Any record regarding a child shall be confidential and kept under
seal. Except upon written request and order of the court, a record shall only be released to the
following:

(1) Members of the court staff for administrative use;

(2) The prosecuting attorney;

(3) Defense counsel;

 (4) The guardian ad litem;

(5) Agents of investigating law enforcement agencies; and

(6) Other persons as determined by the court.

(b) Protective order.— Any videotape or audiotape of a child that is part of the court record shall
be under a protective order that provides as follows:

(1) Tapes may be viewed only by parties, their counsel, their expert witness, and the guardian
ad litem.

(2) No tape, or any portion thereof, shall be divulged by any person mentioned in Sub-section
(a) to any other person, except as necessary for the trial.

(3) No person shall be granted access to the tape, its transcription or any part thereof unless he
signs a written affirmation that he has received and read a copy of the protective order; that he
submits to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the protective order; and that in case of
violation thereof, he will be subject to the contempt power of the court.

(4) Each of the tape cassettes and transcripts thereof made available to the parties, their
counsel, and respective agents shall bear the following cautionary notice:
“This object or document and the contents thereof are subject to a protective
order issued by the court in (case title), (case number). They shall not be examined,
inspected, read, viewed, or copied by any person, or disclosed to any person, except
as provided in the protective order. No additional copies of the tape or any of its
portion shall be made, given, sold, or shown to any person without prior court
order. Any person violating such protective order is subject to the contempt power of
the court and other penalties prescribed by law.”

(5) No tape shall be given, loaned, sold, or shown to any person except as ordered by the court.

(6) Within thirty (30) days from receipt, all copies of the tape and any transcripts thereof shall
be returned to the clerk of court for safekeeping unless the period is extended by the court on
motion of a party.

(7) This protective order shall remain in full force and effect until further order of the court.

(c) Additional protective orders.— The court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, the
child, his parents, legal guardian, or the guardian ad litem, issue additional orders to protect the privacy
of the child.

(d) Publication of identity contemptuous.— Whoever publishes or causes to be published in any

format the name, address, telephone number, school, or other identifying information of a child who is
or is alleged to be a victim or accused of a crime or a witness thereof, or an immediate family of the
child shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.

(e) Physical safety of child; exclusion of evidence.— A child has a right at any court proceeding not
to testify regarding personal identifying information, including his name, address, telephone number,
school, and other information that could endanger his physical safety or his family. The court may,
however, require the child to testify regarding personal identifying information in the interest of justice.

(f) Destruction of videotapes and audiotapes.— Any videotape or audiotape of a child produced
under the provisions of this Rule or otherwise made part of the court record shall be destroyed after
five (5) years have elapsed from the date of entry of judgment.

(g) Records of youthful offender.— Where a youthful offender has been charged before any city or
provincial prosecutor or before any municipal judge and the charges have been ordered dropped, all
the records of the case shall be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly
to anyone for any purpose whatsoever.

Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or dismisses the case or
commits him to an institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to Chapter 3 of P. D. No. 603, all
the records of his case shall also be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone except to determine if a defendant may have his sentence suspended under Article
192 of P. D. No. 603 or if he may be granted probation under the provisions of P. D. No. 968 or to
enforce his civil liability, if said liability has been imposed in the criminal action. The youthful offender
concerned shall not be held under any provision of law to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or
misrepresentation by reason of his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in
response to any inquiry made to him for any purpose.

“Records” within the meaning of this Sub-section shall include those which may be in the files of
the National Bureau of Investigation and with any police department or government agency which may
have been involved in the case. (Art. 200, P. D. No. 603)

Sec. 32. Applicability of ordinary rules.— The provisions of the Rules of Court on deposition,
conditional examination of witnesses, and evidence shall be applied in a suppletory character.

Sec. 33. Effectivity.— This Rule shall take effect on December 15, 2000 following its publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Child discipline or child

abuse?
By Chato Olivas-Gallo
pinayjustice@yahoo.com

"My husband had an electric wire at home, about three feet

long. He used it like a whip whenever he wanted to discipline
our children," said Cory, who came to my office for legal
consultation. "When my son was in the first grade, my husband
disciplined him by having him stay inside a drum for a half
day," she added.

"My father told me when I was a child that my voice was ugly.
Each time I sang, he made me shut up," narrated Maria, 24 years
old. She has been singing with a band for four years already,
and her voice was exceptionally good. But until now, when she
recalled how her father put her down as a child, she still felt the
pain of his words.

It is easy for us to say that the acts committed by Cory's

husband are abusive. However, in Maria's situation, we would
usually brush it aside as something that she should have
outgrown. Yet, the fact that the emotional pain has stayed with
her shows that she is likewise a victim of emotional abuse.
How then do we distinguish between child abuse and child
discipline? Here are some guidelines.

(1) Does it cause humiliation?

A child is entitled to the same dignity as an adult. Yet some people

treat children as though they have lesser rights to human dignity.
According to the Philippine law against child abuse (Republic Act
No. 7610), abuse includes "Any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
the child as a human being." This is consistent with the
international definition of child abuse.

When a child is humiliated publicly, it is abusive. True discipline

is conducted in private, with a positive purpose and goal.
According to the Los Angeles Country's Frequently asked
questions about child abuse, "Discipline is designed to help
children control and change their behavior. Its purpose is to
encourage moral, physical and intellectual development and a
sense of responsibility in children. Ultimately, older children will
do the right thing, not because they fear external reprisal, but
because they have internalized a standard initially presented by
parents and other caretakers, and children gain self-confidence and
a positive self-image."

(2) Is it related to the offense?

Women empowerment

I am reproducing below the salient parts of Republic Act No. 9710 , otherwise known as the "The Magna
Carta of Women" and approved on August 14, 2009, that legal advocates should know, with the sterling hope
that the new law, unlike many of the unfortunate laws in the legal archives of the Philippines, would not be
derisively remembered for being honored more in breach than in obedience to its letter and spirit.

X x x.

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - Recognizing that the economic, political, and sociocultural realities affect
women's current condition, the State affirms the role of women in nation building and ensures the substantive
equality of women and men. It shall promote empowerment of women and pursue equal opportunities for
women and men and ensure equal access to resources and to development results and outcome. Further, the
State realizes that equality of men and women entails the abolition of the unequal structures and practices that
perpetuate discrimination and inequality.

X x x.

The State condemns discrimination against women in all its forms and pursues by all appropriate means and
without delay the policy of eliminating discrimination against women in keeping with the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and other international instruments
consistent with Philippine law. The State shall accord women the rights, protection, and opportunities available
to every member of society.

The State affirms women's rights as human rights and shall intensify its efforts to fulfill its duties under
international and domestic law to recognize, respect, protect, fulfill, and promote all human rights and
fundamental freedoms of women, especially marginalized women, in the economic, social, political, cultural,
and other fields without distinction or discrimination on account of class, age, sex, gender, language, ethnicity,
religion, ideology, disability, education, and status. The State shall provide the necessary mechanisms to
enforce women's rights and adopt and undertake all legal measures necessary to foster and promote the equal
opportunity for women to participate in and contribute to the development of the political, economic, social, and
cultural realms.

The State, in ensuring the full integration of women's concerns in the mainstream of development, shall provide
ample opportunities to enhance and develop their skills, acquire productive employment and contribute to their
families and communities to the fullest of their capabilities.

In pursuance of this policy, the State reaffirms the right of women in all sectors to participate in policy
formulation. planning, organization, implementation, management, monitoring, and evaluation of all programs,
projects, and services. It shall support policies, researches, technology, and training programs and other support
services such as financing, production, and marketing to encourage active participation of women in national
development.

Section 3. Principles of Human Rights of Women. - Human rights are universal and inalienable. All people in
the world are entitled to them. The universality of human rights is encompassed in the words of Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that all human beings are free and equal in dignity and
rights.

Human rights are indivisible. Human rights are inherent to the dignity of every human being whether they relate
to civil, cultural, economic, political, or social issues.

Human rights are interdependent and interrelated. The fulfillment of one right often depends, wholly or in part,
upon the fulfillment of others.

All individuals are equal as human beings by virtue of the inherent dignity of each human person. No one,
therefore, should suffer discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender, age, language, sexual orientation, race,
color, religion, political, or other opinion, national, social, or geographical origin, disability, property, birth, or
other status as established by human rights standards.

All people have the right to participate in and access information relating to the decision- making processes that
affect their lives and well-being. Rights-based approaches require a high degree of participation by
communities, civil society, minorities, women, young people, indigenous peoples, and other identified groups.

States and other duty-bearers are answerable for the observance of human rights. They have to comply with the
legal norms and standards enshrined in international human rights instruments in accordance with the Philippine
Constitution. Where they fail to do so, aggrieved rights-holders are entitled to institute proceedings for
appropriate redress before a competent court or other adjudicator in accordance with the rules and procedures
provided by law.

Section 4. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) "Women Empowerment" refers to the provision, availability, and accessibility of opportunities, services, and
observance of human rights which enable women to actively participate and contribute to the political,
economic, social, and cultural development of the nation as well as those which shall provide them equal access
to ownership, management, and control of production, and of material and informational resources and benefits
in the family, community, and society.

(b) "Discrimination Against Women" refers to any gender-based distinction, exclusion, or restriction which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by women, irrespective
of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field.
It includes any act or omission, including by law; policy, administrative measure, or practice, that directly or
indirectly excludes or restricts women in the recognition and promotion of their rights and their access to and
enjoyment of opportunities, benefits, or privileges.

A measure or practice of general application is discrimination against women if it fails to provide for
mechanisms to offset or address sex or gender-based disadvantages or limitations of women, as a result of
which women are denied or restricted in the recognition and protection of their rights and in their access to and
enjoyment of opportunities, benefits, or privileges; or women, more than men, are shown to have suffered the
greater adverse effects of those measures or practices.

Provided, finally, That discrimination compounded by or intersecting with other grounds, status, or condition,
such as ethnicity, age, poverty, or religion shall be considered discrimination against women under this Act.

X x x.

(e) "Substantive Equality" refers to the full and equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms contemplated under this
Act. It encompasses de jure and de facto equality and also equality in outcomes.

(f) "Gender Equality" refers to the principle asserting the equality of men and women and their right to enjoy
equal conditions realizing their full human potentials to contribute to and benefit from the results of
development, and with the State recognizing that all human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights.

(g) "Gender Equity" refers to the policies, instruments, programs, services, and actions that address the
disadvantaged position of women in society by providing preferential treatment and affirmative action. Such
temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be
considered discriminatory but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate
standards. These measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment
have been achieved.

(h) "Gender and Development (GAD)" refers to the development perspective and process that are participatory
and empowering, equitable, sustainable, free from violence, respectful of human rights, supportive of self-
determination and actualization of human potentials. It seeks to achieve gender equality as a fundamental value
that should be reflected in development choices; seeks to transform society's social, economic, and political
structures and questions the validity of the gender roles they ascribed to women and men; contends that women
are active agents of development and not just passive recipients of development assistance; and stresses the
need of women to organize themselves and participate in political processes to strengthen their legal rights.

(i) "Gender Mainstreaming" refers to the strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and
experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and
programs in all political, economic, and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality
is not perpetuated. It is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action,
including legislation, policies, or programs in all areas and at all levels.

X x x.

(k) "Violence Against Women" refers to any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in,
physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. It shall be understood to
encompass, but not limited to, the following:

(1) Physical, sexual, psychological, and economic violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual
abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, and other traditional practices
harmful to women, non-spousal violence, and violence related to exploitation;

(2) Physical, sexual, and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual
abuse, sexual harassment, and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in
women, and prostitution; and

(3) Physical, sexual, and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.

It also includes acts of violence against women as defused in Republic Acts No. 9208 and 9262.

X x x.
Section 5. The State as the Primary Duty-Bearer. - The State, as the primary duty-bearer, shall:

(a) Refrain from discriminating against women and violating their rights;
(b) Protect women against discrimination and from violation of their rights by private corporations, entities, and
individuals; and
(c) Promote and fulfill the rights of women in all spheres, including their rights to substantive equality and non-
discrimination.

The State shall fulfill these duties through law, policy, regulatory instruments, administrative guidelines, and
other appropriate measures, including temporary special measures.

Recognizing the interrelation of the human rights of women, the State shall take measures and establish
mechanisms to promote the coherent and integrated implementation, and enforcement of this Act and related
laws, policies, or other measures to effectively stop discrimination against and advance the rights of women.

The State shall keep abreast with and be guided by progressive developments in human rights of women under
international law and design of policies, laws, and other measures to promote the objectives of this Act.

X x x.

Section 9. Protection from Violence. - The State shall ensure that all women shall be protected from all forms of
violence as provided for in existing laws. Agencies of government shall give priority to the defense and
protection of women against gender-based offenses and help women attain justice and healing.

Towards this end, measures to prosecute and reform offenders shall likewise be pursued.

(a) Within the next five (5) years, there shall be an incremental increase in the recruitment and training of
women in the police force, forensics and medico-legal, legal services, and social work services availed of by
women who are victims of gender-related offenses until fifty percent (50%) of the personnel thereof shall be
women.

(b) Women shall have the right to protection and security in situations of armed conflict and militarization.
Towards this end, they shall be protected from all forms of gender-based violence, particularly rape and other
forms of sexual abuse, and all forms of violence in situations of armed conflict. The State shall observe
international standards for the protection of civilian population in circumstances of emergency and armed
conflict. It shall not force women, especially indigenous peoples, to abandon their lands, territories, and means
of subsistence, or relocate them in special centers for military purposes under any discriminatory condition.

(c) All government personnel involved in the protection and defense of women against gender-based violence
shall undergo a mandatory training on human rights and gender sensitivity pursuant to this Act.

(d) All local government units shall establish a Violence Against Women's Desk in every barangay to ensure
that violence against women cases are fully addressed in a gender-responsive manner.

Section 10. Women Affected by Disasters, Calamities, and Other Crisis Situations. - Women have the right to
protection and security in times of disasters, calamities, and other crisis situations especially in all phases of
relief, recovery, rehabilitation, and construction efforts. The State shall provide for immediate humanitarian
assistance, allocation of resources, and early resettlement, if necessary. It shall also address the particular needs
of women from a gender perspective to ensure their full protection from sexual exploitation and other sexual
and gender- based violence committed against them. Responses to disaster situations shall include the provision
of services, such as psychosocial support, livelihood support, education, psychological health, and
comprehensive health services, including protection during pregnancy.

Section 11. Participation and Representation. - The State shall undertake temporary special measures to
accelerate the participation and equitable representation of women in all spheres of society particularly in the
decision-making and policy-making processes in government and private entities to fully realize their role as
agents and beneficiaries of development.

The State shall institute the following affirmative action mechanisms so that women can participate
meaningfully in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of policies, plans, and programs for national,
regional, and local development:

(a) Empowerment within the Civil Service. - Within the next five (5) years, the number of women in third (3rd)
level positions in government shall be incrementally increased to achieve a fifty-fifty (50-50) gender balance;

(b) Development Councils and Planning Bodies. - To ensure the participation of women in all levels of
development planning and program implementation, at least forty percent (40%) of membership of all
development councils from the regional, provincial, city, municipal and barangay levels shall
be composed of women;

(c) Other Policy and Decision-Making Bodies. - Women's groups shall also be represented in international,
national, and local special and decision-making bodies;

(d) International Bodies. - The State shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the opportunity of women, on
equal terms with men and without any discrimination, to represent their governments at the international level
and to participate in the work of international organizations;

(e) Integration of Women in Political Parties. - The State shall provide incentives to political parties with
women's agenda. It shall likewise encourage the integration of women in their leadership hierarchy, internal
policy-making structures, appointive, and electoral nominating processes; and

(f) Private Sector. - The State shall take measures to encourage women leadership in the private sector in the
form of incentives.

X x x.

Section 13. Equal Access and Elimination of Discrimination in Education, Scholarships, and Training. - (a) The
State shall ensure that gender stereotypes and images in educational materials and curricula are adequately and
appropriately revised. Gender-sensitive language shall be used at all times. Capacity-building on gender and
development (GAD), peace and human rights, education for teachers, and all those involved in the education
sector shall be pursued toward this end. Partnerships between and among players of the education sector,
including the private sector, churches, and faith groups shall be encouraged.

(b) Enrollment of women in nontraditional skills training in vocational and tertiary levels shall be encouraged.

(c) Expulsion and non-readmission of women faculty due to pregnant;- outside of marriage shall be outlawed.
No school shall turn out or refuse admission to a female student solely on the account of her having contracted
pregnancy outside of marriage during her term in school.

X x x.

Section 16. Nondiscriminatory and Nonderogatory Portrayal of Women in Media and Film. - The State shall
formulate policies and programs for the advancement of women in collaboration with government and
nongovernment media-related organizations. It shall likewise endeavor to raise the consciousness of the general
public in recognizing the dignity of women and the role and contribution of women in the family; community,
and the society through the strategic use of mass media.

For this purpose, the State shall ensure allocation of space; airtime, and resources, strengthen programming,
production, and image-making that appropriately present women's needs, issues, and concerns in all forms of
media, communication, information dissemination, and advertising.

The State, in cooperation with all schools of journalism, information, and communication, as well as the
national media federations and associations, shall require all media organizations and corporations to integrate
into their human resource development components regular training on gender equality and gender-based
discrimination, create and use gender equality guidelines in all aspects of management, training, production,
information, dissemination, communication, and programming; and convene a gender equality committee that
will promote gender mainstreaming as a framework and affirmative action as a strategy, and monitor and
evaluate the implementation of gender equality guidelines.

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times,
provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all
stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity:
Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's
religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions,
and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs,
devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV,
and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be
provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition,
healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the
prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of
women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the
enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

X x x.

Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations. - The State shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations and shall ensure:

(a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or common law relationships referred to under the Family
Code without prejudice to personal or religious beliefs;
(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent. The
betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect;
(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information,
education and means to enable them to exercise these rights;
(d) the same personal rights between spouses or common law spouses including the right to choose freely a
profession and an occupation;
(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property;
(f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether titled or not, and inheritance, whether formal or
customary; and
(g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire, change, or retain their nationality. The State shall ensure
in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall
automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the
husband. Various statutes of other countries concerning dual citizenship that may be enjoyed equally by women
and men shall likewise be considered.
Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That they do not discriminate against women.

Section 20. Food Security and Productive Resources. - The State recognizes the contribution of women to food
production and shall ensure its sustainability and sufficiency with the active participation of women. Towards
this end, the State shall guarantee, at all times, the availability in the market of safe and health-giving food to
satisfy the dietary needs of the population, giving particular attention to the specific needs of poor girl-children
and marginalized women, especially pregnant and lactating mothers and their young children. To further
address this, the State shall ensure:

(a) Right to Food. - The State shall guarantee the availability of food in quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy
the dietary needs of individuals, the physical and economic accessibility for everyone to adequate food that is
culturally acceptable and free from unsafe substances and culturally accepted, and the accurate and substantial
information to the availability of food, including the right to full, accurate, and truthful information about safe
and health-giving foods and how to produce and have regular and easy access to them;

(b) Right to Resources for Food Production. - The State shall guarantee women a vital role in food production
by giving priority to their rights to land, credit, and infrastructure support, technical training, and technological
and marketing assistance. The State shall promote women-friendly technology as a high priority activity in
agriculture and shall promote the right to adequate food by proactively engaging in activities intended to
strengthen access to, utilization of, and receipt of accurate and substantial information on resources and means
to ensure women's livelihood, including food security:

(1) Equal status shall be given to women and men, whether married or not, in the titling of the land and issuance
of stewardship contracts and patents;

(2) Equal treatment shall be given to women and men beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program, wherein the
vested right of a woman agrarian reform beneficiary is defined by a woman's relationship to tillage, i.e., her
direct and indirect contribution to the development of the land;

(3) Customary rights of women to the land, including access to and control of the fruits and benefits, shall be
recognized in circumstances where private ownership is not possible, such as ancestral domain claims:

(4) Information and assistance in claiming rights to the land shall be made available to women at all times;

(5) Equal rights to women to the enjoyment, use, and management of land, water, and other natural resources
within their communities or ancestral domains;

(6) Equal access to the use and management of fisheries and aquatic resources, and all the rights and benefits
accruing to stakeholders in the fishing industry;

(7) Equal status shall be given to women and men in the issuance of stewardship or lease agreements and other
fishery rights that may be granted for the use and management of coastal and aquatic resources. In the same
manner, women's organizations shall be given equal treatment as with other marginalized fishers organizations
in the issuance of stewardship or lease agreements or other fishery rights for the use and management of such
coastal and aquatic resources which may include providing support to women-engaged coastal resources;

(8) There shall be no discrimination against women in the deputization of fish wardens;

(9) Women-friendly and sustainable agriculture technology shall be designed based on accessibility and
viability in consultation with women's organizations;

(10) Access to small farmer-based and controlled seeds production and distribution shall be ensured and
protected;

(11) Indigenous practices of women in seed storage and cultivation shall be recognized, encouraged, and
protected;

(12) Equal rights shall be given to women to be members of farmers' organizations to ensure wider access to
and control of the means of production;

(13) Provide opportunities for empowering women fishers to be involved in the control and management, not
only of the catch and production of aquamarine resources but also, to engage in entrepreneurial activities which
will add value to production and marketing ventures; and

(14) Provide economic opportunities for the indigenous women. particularly access to market for their produce.

In the enforcement of the foregoing, the requirements of law shall be observed at all times.

X x x.

Section 22. Right to Decent Work. - The State shall progressively realize and ensure decent work standards for
women that involve the creation of jobs of acceptable quality in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and
human dignity.

(a) Decent work involves opportunities for work that are productive and fairly remunerative as family living
wage, security in the workplace, and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development
and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns organize, participate in the decisions that
affect their lives, and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.

(b) The State shall further ensure:

(1) Support services and gears to protect them from occupational and health hazards taking into account
women's maternal functions;
(2) Support services that will enable women to balance their family obligations and work responsibilities
including, but not limited to, the establishment of day care centers and breast-feeding stations at the workplace,
and providing maternity leave pursuant to the Labor Code and other pertinent laws;
(3) Membership in unions regardless of status of employment and place of employment; and
(4) Respect for the observance of indigenous peoples' cultural practices even in the workplace.

(c) In recognition of the temporary nature of overseas work, the State shall exert all efforts to address the causes
of out-migration by developing local employment and other economic opportunities for women and by
introducing measures to curb violence and forced and involuntary displacement of local women. The State shall
ensure the protection and promotion of the rights and welfare of migrant women regardless of their work status,
and protect them against discrimination in wages, conditions of work, and employment opportunities in host
countries.

X x x.

Section 27. Social Protection. -

(a) The Social Security System (SSS) and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) shall
support indigenous and community-based social protection schemes.

(b) The State shall institute policies and programs that seek to reduce the poverty and vulnerability to risks and
enhance the social status and rights of the marginalized women by promoting and protecting livelihood and
employment, protecting against hazards and sudden; loss of income, and improving people's capacity to manage
risks.

(c) The State shall endeavor to reduce and eventually eliminate transfer costs of remittances from abroad
through appropriate bilateral and multilateral agreements. It shall likewise provide access to investment
opportunities for remittances in line with national development efforts.

(d) The State shall establish a health insurance program for senior citizens and indigents.

(e) The State shall support women with disabilities on a community-based social protection scheme.

X x x.

Section 30. Women in Especially Difficult Circumstances. - For purposes of this Act, "Women in Especially
Difficult Circumstances" (WEDC) shall refer to victims and survivors of sexual and physical abuse, illegal
recruitment, prostitution, trafficking, armed conflict, women in detention, victims and survivors of rape and
incest, and such other related circumstances which have incapacitated them functionally. Local government
units are therefore mandated to deliver the necessary services and interventions to WEDC under their respective
jurisdictions.

Section 31. Services and Interventions. - WEDC shall be provided with services and interventions as necessary
such as, but not limited to, the following:

(a) Temporary and protective custody;

(b) Medical and dental services;
(c) Psychological evaluation;
(d) Counseling;
(e) Psychiatric evaluation;
(f) Legal services;
(g) Productivity skills capability building;
(h) Livelihood assistance;
(i) Job placement;
(j) Financial assistance: and
(k) Transportation assistance.

Section 32. Protection of Girl-Children. - (a) The State shall pursue measures to eliminate all forms of
discrimination against girl-children in education, health and nutrition, and skills development.

(b) Girl-children shall be protected from all forms of abuse and exploitation.
(c) Equal access of Moro and indigenous girl-children in the Madaris, schools of living culture and traditions,
and the regular schools shall be ensured.
(d) Gender-sensitive curriculum, including legal literacy, books, and curriculum in the Madaris and schools of
living culture and traditions shall be developed.
(e) Sensitivity of regular schools to particular Moro and indigenous practices, such as fasting in the month of
Ramadan, choice of clothing (including the wearing of hijab), and availability of halal food shall be ensured.
Section 33. Protection of Senior Citizens. - The State shall protect women senior citizens from neglect,
abandonment, domestic violence, abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. Towards this end, the State shall
ensure special protective mechanisms and support services against violence, sexual abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination of older women.

X x x.

Section 35. Discrimination Against Women is Prohibited. - Public and private entities and individuals found to
have committed discrimination against women shall be subject to the sanctions provided in Section 41 hereof.
Violations of other rights of women shall be subject to sanctions under pertinent laws and regulations.

X x x.

Section 38. National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW). - The National Commission on
the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) shall be renamed as the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW), the
primary policymaking and coordinating body of the women and gender equality concerns under the Office of
the President. The PCW shall be the overall monitoring body and oversight to ensure the implementation of this
Act. In doing so, the PCW may direct any government agency and instrumentality, as may be necessary, to
report on the implementation of this Act and for them to immediately respond to the problems brought to their
attention in relation to this Act. The PCW shall also lead in ensuring that government agencies are capacitated
on the effective implementation of this Act. The chairperson shall likewise report to the President in Cabinet
meetings on the implementation of this Act.

To the extent possible, the PCW shall influence the systems, processes, and procedures of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government vis-a-vis GAD to ensure the implementation of this Act.

To effectively and efficiently undertake and accomplish its functions, the PCW shall revise its structure and
staffing pattern with the assistance of the Department of Budget and Management.

Section 39. Commission on Human Rights (CHR). - The Commission, acting as the Gender and Development
Ombud, consistent with its mandate, shall undertake measures such as the following:

(a) Monitor with the PCW and other state agencies, among others, in developing indicators and guidelines to
comply with their duties related to the human rights of women, including their right to nondiscrimination
guaranteed under this Act;
(b) Designate one (1) commissioner and/or its Women's Human Rights Center to be primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing programs and activities related to the promotion and protection of the human
rights of women, including the investigations and complaints of discrimination and violations of their rights
brought under this Act and related laws and regulations;
(c) Establish guidelines and mechanisms, among others, that will facilitate access of women to legal remedies
under this Act and related laws, and enhance the protection and promotion of the rights of women, especially
marginalized women;
(d) Assist in the filing of cases against individuals, agencies, institutions, or establishments that violate the
provisions of this Act; and
(e) Recommend to the President of the Philippines or the Civil Service Commission any possible administrative
action based on noncompliance or failure to implement the provisions of this Act.

X x x.

Section 41. Penalties. - Upon finding of the CHR that a department, agency, or instrumentality of government,
government-owned and -controlled corporation, or local government unit has violated any provision of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations, the sanctions under administrative law, civil service, or other
appropriate laws shall be recommended to the Civil Service Commission and/or the Department of the Interior
and Local Government. The person directly responsible for the violation as well as the head of the agency or
local chief executive shall be held liable under this Act.

If the violation is committed by a private entity or individual, the person directly responsible for the violation
shall be liable to pay damages.

Filing a complaint under this Act shall not preclude the offended party from pursuing other remedies available
under the law and to invoke any of the provisions of existing laws especially those recently enacted laws
protecting women and children, including the Women in Development and Nation Building Act (Republic Act
No. 7192), the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
(Republic Act No. 7610), the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 7877), the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8353), the Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998 (Republic Act
No. 8505), the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9208) and the Anti- Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (Republic Act No. 9262). If violence has been proven to be
perpetrated by agents of the State including, but not limited to, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances,
torture, and internal displacements, such shall be considered aggravating offenses with corresponding penalties
depending on the severity of the offenses.

X x x.

Section 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - As the lead agency, the PCW shall, in coordination with the
Commission on Human Rights and all concerned government departments and agencies including, as observers,
both Houses of Congress through the Committee on Youth, Women and Family Relations (Senate) and the
Committee on Women and Gender Equality (House of Representatives) and with the participation of
representatives from nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups with proven track record of
involvement and promotion of the rights and welfare of Filipino women and girls identified by the PCW,
formulate the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of this Act within one hundred eighty (180) days after
its effectivity.
God's Hope for Humanity
October 09, 2006

Magandang umaga po sa inyong lahat. Maayong buntag kaninyong tanan. May I greet with a resounding
Mabuhay all of the delegates from the 11 countries who are gathered here for this 13th Human Life
International Asia Pacific Congress on Faith, Life and Family. Family life is a subject close to my heart; thus, I
have readily accepted the invitation extended to me by His Eminence, Ricardo Cardinal Vidal and Dr. Rene
Josef Bullecer, overall congress chairperson.

Present State of the Family

In our Catholic world, the family, no doubt, plays a pivotal role; its influence is all pervasive. To an individual,
the family is the most important reference group and the core of a person’s alliance system. It is where one finds
security, strength and support. Christian society accords high priority to loyalty to family and kin, family
solidarity and togetherness, as well as concern for family welfare and honor.

In the Philippines, our Constitution, laws and jurisprudence have been traditionally protective of marriage, and
of the family as the basic unit of our society. It is thus my purpose today to discuss how our Constitution, laws
and jurisprudence govern, affect and protect marriage and the family.

Constitutional Provisions on Marriage and the Family

At the outset, let me cite briefly important mandates of our fundamental law on marriage and the family.

Our Constitution commands the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation
of the family. [1] As a policy, it requires the State to recognize the sanctity of family life. Accordingly, it directs
(1) the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution; and (2) the
government to support the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character. [2] Thus, the State “shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.” [3] Notice that the protection is from conception, not from
birth; that is why abortion is outlawed in our country.

The State policy of protecting and strengthening the family has been given meaning and substance through
Article XV. Under this provision, the State is required to recognize the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, the State shall strengthen and actively promote the solidarity and total development of the
family. [4]

The Constitution upholds the right of the spouses to rear a family in accordance with their religious conviction
and the demands of responsible parenthood. [5] Moreover, it provides for (1) the right of children to assistance
—including proper care and nutrition—and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (2) the right of the family to a family living
wage and income; and (3) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them. [6] It even enjoins the family and the State to care for
their elderly members. [7]

Working women are protected by provisions for safe and healthful working conditions that take into account
their maternal functions. They are also provided with facilities and opportunities that could enhance their
welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation. [8]

Family Code Provisions

The Constitutional mandates on marriage and the family are elucidated in the Family Code of the Philippines.
[9] The Code defines marriage as follows:

“Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman, entered into in
accordance with law, for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences and incidents, are
governed by law and are not subject to stipulation x x x.” [10]

Early on, family relations were governed primarily by the Civil Code of the Philippines. [11] Since August 3,
1988, [12] however, its provisions on marriage and family relations were supplanted by the Family Code to
make them more relevant to Filipino customs, values, ideals and current trends in Philippine society. Our
Muslim brethren, on the other hand, are covered by the special provisions of the Muslim Code of Personal
Laws.

The inviolability of marriage is the basis for prohibiting divorce in our jurisdiction. Thus, only legal separation
is recognized in the Philippines . Even in cases in which legal separation is allowed, the law decrees that courts
must first take steps towards reconciling the spouses. Before tackling the issue of separation, the courts must be
fully satisfied that reconciliation is highly improbable. [13]

Article 149 of the Family Code recognizes the family as the foundation of the nation; and as a basic social
institution that public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law; no
customs, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.

Preservation of family harmony as a legal policy is also evident in Article 151 of the Code. This Article
provides that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless the verified complaint or petition
shows that earnest efforts towards a compromise have first been made, but have failed. Without these efforts,
the case must be dismissed. This rule, however, will not apply to cases that may not be the subject of
compromise. [14]

Another measure that protects the family from being torn apart by homelessness is the establishment of a family
home. Under the current provisions, the family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a
family residence and it shall continue as such for as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides there. [15]
In addition, it shall be exempt from foreclosure, forced sale, or attachment, except when the Family Code
provides otherwise. [16]

Significant changes were further introduced by the Code. Thus, (1) the husband and wife now jointly decide
where the family domicile will be established, [17] and they are jointly responsible for the support and
management of the family and household; [18] (2) the administration and enjoyment of the communal or the
conjugal partnership property belong to both spouses jointly, [19] so that any disposition of a conjugal property
by the husband as administrator is void without the written consent of the wife in appropriate cases; and (3)
both spouses jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common children.
[20]

Other Laws that Protect the Family

Still other laws deal with certain aspects of the family and family relations. The Child and Youth Welfare Code
(Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended), for instance, gives special emphasis on children by providing a
basic framework for their development and protection. It defines the rights and the responsibilities of children;
as well as the responsibilities of the family, community, samahan (association), school, church and the State in
ensuring the proper development of children. It likewise presents administrative measures and programs for the
care and treatment of special children; namely, those who have been abandoned, neglected, dependent, working,
physically disabled and emotionally disturbed children, as well as youth offenders.

Measures to protect children are further provided in Republic Act No. 7610, which provides for stronger
deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. This law was amended by
Republic Act No. 7658 to enforce the policy against child labor.

In the rule on evidence, the family is treated as an enclosure for security and spontaneity in communication;
thus, one spouse cannot be compelled to testify against the other in criminal proceedings. Philippine labor laws
also provide family support systems, such as social security, disability benefits, paternity and maternity leaves;
and assistance to families that care for their dependants.

Even our Local Government Code, Republic Act No. 7160 (1991), gives premium to the Filipino family. It
mandates the implementation of family and community welfare and development services by the local
government units under the guidance of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). [21]

Supreme Court Decisions on Psychological Incapacity

In line with the constitutional policy of preserving the family, the Supreme Court has tackled various family
issues. Allow me to relate to you some of these cases.

As you may know, the Family Code has introduced an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in
the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage: “psychological incapacity.” Since the effectivity of the
Family Code, our courts have been swamped with petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. To
avoid precipitate and indiscriminate declarations of the nullity of marriages, the Supreme Court had to examine
and evaluate more carefully and minutely every circumstance that might have some bearing on the degree,
extent, and other conditions of psychological incapacity.

To clarify, I must point out that petitions for the declaration of nullity of a marriage pertain to cases in which
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, because of a fatal defect existing at the time it was celebrated.
Thus, a nullity is not equivalent to a divorce, which cuts the bonds of a previously valid marriage. Before
Church Law, the validity of marriage may be contested with a plea of nullity, never with an action for
annulment. The distinction is well-known and rather clear: a marriage decision in favor of nullity is merely a
declaration that the union has been void from its very start on account of either lack or deficiency of canonical
form, the presence of an impediment, and/or a defect in matrimonial consent.

According to Church doctrine, a marriage is either valid or void – never valid, yet voidable. Before Civil law,
however, a marriage may be valid, void or voidable. Hence, Civil Courts render not only decisions of “nullity,”
but also judgments of “annulment,” whereby a valid but voidable marriage is annulled. [22]

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, [23] the Court interpreted psychological incapacity as “no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage x x x.” Many judges and lawyers, however,
found it difficult to apply the novel definition in specific cases.

Thus, the Court had to explain more clearly the nullity of the marriage of Reynaldo and Roridel Molina in
Republic v. Molina. [24] Branding Article 36 as the “most liberal divorce procedure in the world,” the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) had asked the Supreme Court not only to decide the dispute between the spouses,
but also to issue guidelines for determining when psychological incapacity may be used to nullify a marriage.

Thus, the real significance of this Decision, which I was privileged to write on behalf of the High Court, was
not in its refusal to declare the Molina marriage void, but in its formulation of rules for the evaluation of similar
cases. Indeed, among the functions of the Supreme Court is to teach and to open new vistas. To guide the bench,
the bar and the public in interpreting and applying “psychological incapacity” as a ground for declaring
marriages void, the Court thus issued several guidelines, as follows:

“(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

“(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. x x x.

“(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration’ of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their ‘I do’s.’ x x x.

“(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations x x x.

“(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
x x x.

“(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
 same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

“(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x

“(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. x x x.”

Recognizing that Article 36 of the Family Code was rooted in Canon 1095 of the Canon Law,[25] the Court
hewed closely to the Church’s characterization of what constituted a ground to declare a marriage void ab initio.
Derived from Canon Law is the principle that the “psychological incapacity” must be grave, incurable and
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Although this Decision, which I authored, was unanimously carried by the full 15-member Court, it was
criticized by many lawyers for its alleged “strictness.” My standard reply was that Molina was strict only
insofar as Article 36 were to be construed as a divorce law, but reasonable if it was correctly deemed to be a
ground for declaring a marriage void, not “ended” — one that had never been and therefore could not be “cut.”

The guidelines formulated in the Molina case were modified later in the year 2003, when I was not yet Chief
Justice; thus, the Supreme Court amended the rules governing petitions for the declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriages. [26] The provision requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel to
defend marriage was abandoned. I dissented strongly against this amendment. [27]

If I may explain, the Molina guidelines providing for the active participation and intervention of the OSG were
made to ensure that the State acted as defender of marriage in the same way that the defensor vinculi [28] was
required to render opposition actively in church annulment cases. I felt that without the participation of the
OSG, cases decided by the lower courts might no longer be appealed to the Supreme Court; hence, there was
nothing to ensure that the required proof was adduced, or to guard against the parties’ collusion with each other
to have the marriage declared void.

Nonetheless, despite the amendment, I am happy to report that the Court’s strict scrutiny of petitions for
declaration of marriage nullity remained. Our Supreme Court has thus ruled, at least in those cases elevated to
it, that sexual infidelity, perversion, or abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. [29] Neither may one spouse’s emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. [30] These acts must be shown to be manifestations
of a disordered personality, which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
the marital state. They must not be due merely to a spouse’s youth, immaturity [31] or sexual promiscuity.

Judicial Declaration of Nullity of First Marriage

The judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before one may remarry is expressly required by
another new provision in the Family Code, Article 40, which states, as follows:

“ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.”

As writer of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Mercado v. Tan [32] (a criminal case for bigamy), I emphasized
that Article 40 of the Family Code had cast aside the statutory mooring of People v. Mendoza [33] and People
v. Aragon. [34] Both of these latter cases held that there was no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a
marriage. Thus, that declaration is now necessary before a spouse can contract a second marriage. Without it, a
person may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.

This new ruling in Mercado v. Tan was strengthened by Bobis v. Bobis, [35] which was unanimously
promulgated almost on the same day. Bobis held that the subsequent filing of a civil action for the declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage did not constitute a “prejudicial question” and therefore did not suspend the
proceedings in a criminal case for bigamy. The reason was that such declaration, even if obtained, would not
have abated the criminal prosecution for the two marriages. [36]

Strict Scrutiny of Annulment Petitions

Through the years, the Court has consistently upheld the sanctity of marriage and the solidarity of the family by
strictly scrutinizing proceedings for the annulment of marriage or the declaration of its nullity. In cases of
doubt, it has affirmed the wedding’s validity.
In Ancheta v. Ancheta, [37] for example, the Supreme Court expressed alarm at the way the trial court, without
any objection from the public prosecutor, had declared petitioner in default and proceeded with the trial of the
case and the presentation of respondent’s evidence in the absence of the complaining spouse.

Reiterating its ruling in Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, [38] the High Court emphasized that the judiciary was tasked with
the protection of marriage as an inviolable social institution. This judicial objective was not mere pro-forma and
useless talk, but one that required vigilant and zealous protection. The Supreme Court held that the safeguarding
of marriage as a sacred institution required not just the defense of a true and genuine union, but the exposure of
an invalid one as well:

“Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. Whether or not
a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the
whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance,
incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.” [39]

Protection of the Family in Administrative Proceedings

To protect the family, the Supreme Court has leaned on the Constitution and the laws in sanctioning the
officials and employees of the judiciary, as well as members of the legal profession.

In Beso v. Daguman, [40] respondent judge, in violation of Article 23 of the Family Code, solemnized a
marriage outside his jurisdiction and without proper documentation. In this case, the Supreme Court stressed
that an elementary regard for the judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority and for sacredness of laws—
especially those enacted to preserve so sacrosanct a social institution as marriage—should have made the judge
more vigilant in the exercise of his authority as solemnizing officer.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has never hesitated to discipline and impose the severest sanctions on erring
members and employees of the judiciary. In suspending a court stenographer found to have an illicit
relationship with another employee who was married, it held that there was no dichotomy of morality; thus,
court employees should also be judged by their public as well as private morals. [41]

In Narag v. Narag, [42] the High Court stressed that parents had not only rights but also duties toward their
children. Among these duties were to support, educate and instruct them according to right precepts and good
example; and to accord them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance.
The Court likewise reminded Atty. Narag, the respondent husband, that he was obliged to live with his wife; to
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to give her help and support. The moral delinquency that affected
the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, the Court added, included conduct that outraged the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, as when one made a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage. Consequently, Atty. Narag was disbarred from the practice of law.

Family Courts

While on this point, I would like to say a few things regarding the establishment of family courts in the
Philippines . On October 28, 1997, Republic Act No. 8369 (entitled “Family Courts Act of 1997”) was
approved into law. It established family courts, granting them exclusive original jurisdiction over child and
family cases. [43] These courts were envisioned to advance the State policies of protecting the rights and
promoting the welfare of children. In keeping with the mandate of the Constitution and the precepts of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, these courts were tasked to provide a system of
adjudication for youthful offenders, taking into account their peculiar circumstances. Recognizing the sanctity
of family life, the courts are required to preserve the solidarity of the family, as well as to provide procedures
for the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable settlement of family controversies. [44]

In line with the law establishing family courts, their presiding judge and court personnel are required not only to
undergo special training, but also to demonstrate their ability to deal with child and family cases. For this
purpose, the Supreme Court provides a continuing education program on child and family laws, procedure and
other related disciplines. [45]

During all hearings and conciliations of child and family cases, our courts are mandated to promote the child’s
and the family’s dignity and worth as well as to respect their privacy. Records of the cases shall be treated with
utmost confidentiality, and the identity of parties shall not be divulged unless necessary and with authority from
the judge. [46]
In addition, as part of the judiciary’s vision of providing an accessible, inexpensive, efficient and effective
justice system, the Supreme Court promulgated new rules for family court cases on March 15, 2003. These rules
make the family courts more accessible to affected party-litigants.

Marriage and the Family in Other Countries

As the Philippine judiciary continues to pursue efforts to help protect the family, it realizes that, now and then,
courts are confronted with new challenges. While some of these problems stem from our own society, more and
more emanate from changes and developments in other countries. Some of the trends [47] that impact on
families elsewhere around the globe are (1) changes in family structures, (2) demographic ageing, and the (3)
rise of migration. The “negative effects” of these onslaughts require all of us to remain vigilant in protecting our
families.

Changes in Family Structures

During the last 50 years, there has been an evident shift from extended to nuclear families. Also on the rise are
one-person households, as well as cohabitation without marriage. Falling fertility rates, migration, and increases
in divorce rates and the number of older persons are responsible for smaller-size households, which have fallen
to an average of 3.7 persons in East Asia, 4.9 in Southeast Asia, 4.1 in the Caribbean, 5.7 in North Africa and
2.8 in developed regions. Age at first marriage has risen to between the mid to late 20s in all regions of the
world, often as a result of better educational and employment opportunities for women. Further, women are
becoming mothers later in life and are having fewer children. Current fertility rates are 1.57 children per woman
in developed regions, 3.1 in less developed countries, and 5.47 in the least developed countries.

Demographic Aging

On the other hand, lower fertility rates and higher life expectancies account for a bigger group of older persons
within the overall population. Globally, the elderly (60 years and over) will more than triple from 606 million to
2 billion by 2050. In developed regions, 20 per cent of the population are older than 60; by 2050, they shall
have reached 33 per cent. Their share in developing regions will increase from 8 per cent to 20 per cent. (I guess
these statistics are relevant to most of us here in this room. They just mean that our world is getting wiser with
people like us!)

Of course, what is more telling from these data is that support ratios (or the number of working people in
relation to retired persons) have been declining. Ageing also impacts on inter-generational solidarity, housing,
social security systems, care giving and health costs.

Rise of Migration

Today, 175 million people (or 3 per cent of the world’s population) reside outside their country of birth. In fact,
there were 20 million refugees in 2001. The main causes of migration have been violence, discrimination,
natural disasters, and the hope for better economic opportunities.

Migration can be a major stress on family life due to cultural, ethnic, racial and religious differences, and the
lack of integration. Seasonal and internal migration of men, in particular, contributes to higher numbers of
female-headed households around the world. Worse, the trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and
children have increased and have become major activities of organized crime.

These trends challenge not only the ability to fulfill basic human functions of production, reproduction and
socialization; they also test the needs of family members for health, nutrition, shelter, physical and emotional
care, and personal development.

Closing

In the face of these challenges, the Philippines realizes that the family remains to be our single most important
hope in keeping our societies intact and functional. Thus, I believe that safeguarding and enhancing the family’s
well-being is not just a responsibility of the Church and the State. Rather, it is the responsibility of every one
who cares enough to strengthen and promote the solidarity and total development of the family.

As I close, let me lay stress that the union of a man and woman is the most enduring human institution —
honored and encouraged in all cultures and by every religious faith. Ages of experience have taught humanity
that the commitment of a husband and wife to love and to serve each other promotes the welfare of children and
the stability of society.

A legacy that we can give to our children is this cherished value of family-centeredness. We must provide them,
then, with good role models. As they will carry the torch into the next millennium, it is important that we equip
them with the necessary tools to inherit and represent our community. This we can do by defending and
strengthening the family, God’s hope for humanity.

Maraming salamat po. Daghang salamat.

__________

Speech delivered by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban during the 13th Human Life International Asia
Pacific Congress on Faith, Life & Family, held on October 8, 2006, at the Parklane International Hotel in Cebu
City.

[1] CONSTITUTION, Art. XV, Sec. 2.

[2] Id., Art. II, Sec. 12.

[3] Id.

[4] Art. XV, Sec.1.

[5] Article XV, Section 3(1).

[6] Id., Secs. 3(2), 3, 4.

[7] Id., Sec. 4.

[8] Art. XII, Sec.14.

[9] Executive Order No. 209.

[10] The Family Code of the Philippines , Art. 1.

[11] Republic Act No. 386.

[12] Although passed on July 6, 1987, the Code, as provided under Article 256, took effect one year after the
completion of its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

[13] Id., Art. 59.

[14] Under Article 2035 of the Civil Code, the following cases may not be the subject of compromise:

(1) The civil status of persons

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation

(3) Any ground for legal separation

(4) Future support

(5) The jurisdiction of courts

(6) Future legitime

[15] Family Code, Arts. 152, 153 and 154. Under Philippine tax law, the decedent’s family home is specifically
exempted from estate tax. Furthermore, heads of the family are allowed deductions and personal exemptions for
dependents.

[16] Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:

“(1) For non-payment of taxes;

“(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

“(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

“(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.”
[17] FAMILY CODE, Sec. 69.

[18] Id., Arts. 70-71.

[19] Id., Arts. 96 and 124.

[20] Id., Art. 225.

[21] Under the law, the DSWD retains these functions:

(a) Formulation of programs, policies, rules, regulations and standards relative to the
implementation of family and community welfare and development services;

(b) Initiation and administration of pilot or special projects for demonstration of the
corresponding policies, programs, services, strategies, methods, procedures and guidelines prior
to nationwide implementation; and

(c) Evaluation, and provision of technical assistance and consultative services to operating units
and local government welfare departments on program implementation.

[22] Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, Impediments to Canonical Marriage, 196 (2002).

[23] 240 SCRA 20, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.

[24] 268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997.

[25] CANON 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretionary judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

[26] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 15, 2003.

[27] See Panganiban, The Bio-Age Dawns on the Judiciary, 247-267 (2003), for a full discussion of my dissent
on this amended Rule.

[28] Otherwise known as the Defender of the Bond. The pertinent Canons provide:

“Can. 1432. A defender of the bond is to be appointed in the diocese for cases which deal with
the nullity of ordination or the nullity or dissolution of marriage. The defender of the bond is
bound by office to present and expound all that can reasonably be argued against the nullity or
dissolution.

“Can. 1433 In cases in which the presence x x x of the defender of the bond is required, the acts
are invalid if they were not summoned. This does not apply if, although not summoned, they
were in fact present or, having studied the acts, able to fulfil their role at least before the
judgement.

“Can. 1434 Unless otherwise expressly provided:

1° whenever the law directs that the judge is to hear the parties or either of them, the promotor of
justice and the defender of the bond are also to be heard if they are present;

2° whenever, at the submission of a party, the judge is required to decide some matter, the
submission of the promotor of justice or of the defender of the bond engaged in the trial has
equal weight.

“Can. 1435 It is the Bishop’s responsibility to appoint the promotor of justice and defender of the
bond. They are to be clerics or lay persons of good repute, with a doctorate or a licentiate in
canon law, and of proven prudence and zeal for justice.
 “Can. 1436 §1 The same person can hold the office of promotor of justice and defender of the
bond, although not in the same case.

§2 The promotor of justice and the defender of the bond can be appointed for all cases, or for
individual cases. They can be removed by the Bishop for a just reason. [CIC 1983].”

[29] Dedel v. CA, 421 SCRA 461, January 29, 2004.

[30] Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris, GR No. 162368, July 17, 2006; Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, November
26, 2002; Republic v. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425, February 9, 2001.

[31] Hernandez v. CA, 377 Phil. 919, December 8, 1999.

[32] 391 Phil. 809, August 1, 2000.

[33] 95 Phil. 845, September 28, 1954.

[34] 100 Phil. 1033, February 28, 1957.

[35] 391 Phil. 648, July 31, 2000.

[36] See also Beltran v. People, 389 Phil. 447, June 20, 2000.

[37] 424 SCRA 725, March 4, 2004. In Republic v. Dagdag (supra), while the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the marriage therein, it nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as “prematurely
rendered” because the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
before the judgment was rendered.

[38] 355 SCRA 285, March 26, 2001; see also Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, February 13, 1997.

[39] Per Callejo, Sr. J.

[40] 323 SCRA 566, January 28, 2000.

[41] Acebedo v. Arquero, 447 Phil. 76, March 11, 2003.

[42] 353 Phil. 643, June 29, 1998.

[43] SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear and decide the following cases:

“a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not
less than nine (9) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age or where one or more of the
victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is
found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the
accused may have incurred.

“The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the “Child and Youth Welfare Code”;

“b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;

“c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;

“d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating
to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under
different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;

“e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;

“f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the “Family Code of the Philippines “;

“g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent o neglected children,
petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or
restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603,
Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;
 “h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;

“i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;

“j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the “Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,” as amended by Republic Act No.
7658; and

“k) Cases of domestic violence against:

1) Women – which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse
such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman’s personhood, integrity and
freedom movement; and

2) Children – which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation,
violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.

“If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal
proceedings and the corresponding penalties.

“If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case
pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.”

[44] RA 8669, Sec. 2.

[45] Id., Sec.4.

[46] Id., Sec.12.

[47] http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/family/majortrends.htm.