FAS Military Affairs Network

Chinese Nuclear Forces

DF-3
China began work on a missile that could target the continental United States in November 1961. The projected DF-3 ICBM was to have a 10,000 km range, using the liquid oxygen and kerosene propellants used in the Soviet R-7 and the US Atlas. However, technical setbacks and the economic crisis produced by the Great Leap Forward slowed the project, and in 1963 the DF-3 ICBM was canceled, with the DF-3 designation devolving to the DF-3 MRBM program.

DF-5
The Chinese flight tested a vehicle with ICBM characteristics to a reduced range in September 1971. The earliest possible IOC for an ICBM based on this vehicle was projected by US intelligence in 1972 as being late 1974, but more likely a year or two later. Development problems evidently precluded initial deployment of the DF-5 as an operational ICBM, but the space-launch version referred to by the Chinese as the FB-1 (Fengbao-Tempest) - was used as the booster for a series of five satellite shots that began in July 1975 and concluded in December 1976. The rocket uses four first-stage gimballed engines and one second-stage engine, all of which burn N2O4/UDMH. The Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in the western Soviet Union and the United States. The absence of any space shots between January 1978 and September 1981 may well have related to DF-5 testing as China prepared for the long range testing of its experimental ICBM. Four partial range tests were reported in 1979: 7 January, 15 July, 21 August, and 4 September, and there might have been one in October. The final test shot was fired in February 1980. By 1980 China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the Cultural Revolution and had some spectacular successes in its strategic weapons program. Preparation for full-range tests base exercises at the Shuangchengzi site and ship exercises in the Yellow Sea began in March 1980. Finally, on 18 and 21 May, two long-range shots were made into the Pacific Ocean, where it was recovered by a naval task force. There seems to be agreement that the first shot was a success, traveling approximately 6,000 miles from the launch site to an area bounded by the Gilbert Islands, the Solomons, Fiji, and the New Hebrides, with splash-down occurring at 0230 Greenwich mean time. The second shot may well have been a failure, coming down perhaps 800 miles off course. When the DF-5 was first tested in September 1971, it had a range of 10,000 to 12,000 kms which allowed it to threaten the western portions of the United States. Beginning in 1983 the Chinese inaugurated the improved DF-5A, with an increased of over 13,000 km and a more accurate guidance system. The DF-5A upgrade increased the throw-weight of the system from 3,000 kg to 3,200 kg. As with the DF-4, initially the DF-5 was stored in a horizontal position in tunnels under high mountains, and are launched immediately outside the mouth of the tunnel. The missiles must be moved into the open and fueled prior to firing, an operational mode dubbed chu men fang pao (shooting a firecracker outside the front door), with the fueling operation apparently requiring about two hours. The initial deployment of a pair of DF-5s in silos in Central China was completed in 1981. That portion of the DF-5A force that is deployed in silos could be maintained in a ready-to-fire status. In order to enhance the survivability of these missiles, China has constructed a large number of decoy silos which consist of shallow holes excavations with headworks that resemble operational silos.

For many years almost all sources credited China as having only four DF-5s deployed in silos, including the authoritative 1992 treatement by John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, which asserted that as of 1992 only four DF-5 missiles on alert. However, more recent estimates suggest that some 8-11 were deployed as of 1995, and that at least 13 missiles were deployed at the end of 1997. According to the National Air Intelligence Center, as of 1998 the deployed DF-5 force consisted of "fewer than 25" missiles. As of early 1999 the total deployed DF-5 force was generally estimated at about 20 missiles. By mid-2000 some sources suggested that the total force was as many as 24 deployed missiles ["Inside The Ring" By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough Washington Times July 28, 2000]. Although it is widely reported that the 5-megaton nuclear warheads for the DF-5/CSS-4 nuclear missiles are not "mated" to the missiles, but rather stored nearby, some sources suggest that US intelligence does not have a high confidence understanding of this question ["Inside The Ring" By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough Washington Times July 28, 2000]. Although it might be assumed that the DF-5 deployment complex would include a nuclear weapons storage area, it is not evident that technical intelligence could identify signatures to determine the precise whereabouts of such a small number of nuclear weapons. R&D on multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) was initiated as early as 1970. On 20 September 1981 China launched three scientific satellites into space orbit from a single booster, and many in the West mistakenly regarded this as indicating that China might possess the technology to develop multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). But the launch tested neither a MRV nor a MIRV, and indeed one of the three satellites was merely attached to the tail-deck of the second stage. The current force of DF-5A missiles is deployed with single warhead, but in November 1983 China inaugurated a DF-5 modification program to arm these ICBMs with MIRVed warheads. Technical difficulties, however, have stalled the program. The DF-5A, able to strike targets in the continental United States (CONUS), was the designated recipient of the MIRVs, although there is no evidence that they have been deployed. Some sources claim that at least four DF-5As have already been MIRVed, though it is generally asserted that while MIRVing may occur within the next few years no DF-5s have yet been fitted with MIRVed warheads. Based on the DF-5A throwweight and warhead shroud the missile could be equipped with a six reentry vehicles with each RV weighing 600 kgs (the size of the single warhead on the DF-21). The DF-5A second stage apparently has four vernier engines which reportedly fire for 190 seconds after the main missile engine cuts off. Thus the DF5A could direct a warhead bus over a fairly large arc covering an array of aim points. But the exact status of this program cannot be confirmed based on open sources.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology CALT Second Artillery Corps Luoning Wuzhai Xuanhua Tongdao Three Stages 32.6 3.35 183,000 Storable liquid Inertial 1971 1981 Silo 12,000 - 15,000

Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Range (km)

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 3,000 - 3,200 (kg) Warhead Yield CEP Launch Preparation Time 2 MT 500 - 3,500 meters 30-60 minutes

DF-6
In March 1965 the First Academy (Carrier Rocket Research Academy) proposed a plan to build "four types of missiles in eight years" (banian sidan). On 31 December 1965 the scope of this plan was enlarged with a fifth missile, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS). This system would launches a warhead into very low orbit, less than 100 miles above earth. Before completion of first orbit, a retro-rocket retards the speed of the warhead, which hits the target with only a few minutes warning. Based on reports that the Soviet Union was developing a FOBS, China undertook a study of a three-stage DF-6, which would achive a FOBS capability by adding a third stage to the DF-5. In August 1970 it was planned that the DF-6 become operational by 1974. However by 30 October 1973 technical problems intervened forcing the cancellation of the DF-6.

DF-22
The DF-14 program, initiated in October 1973, was to be a two-stage storable liquid propellant missile capable of delivering a 700kg payload over 8,000km. The relatively small DF-14 was intended to be road-mobile, with a rapid targeting fire control system. The DF-14 program was delayed in September 1975 by the higher priority DF-4 and DF5 programs. And on 31 August 1978 the DF-14 resumed under the new name DF-22 [also known as Project 202]. However in 1984 the Central Military Commission ordered a shift from liquid to solid rocketry and a slowdown of the DF14/22 project, based in part on the breakthrough in large-diameter solid rocket motors achieved in December 1993. By the beginning of 1995 the DF-14/22 was cancelled, ending China's liquid-propellant ballistic missile development efforts.

DF-31
The newest generation of Chinese strategic missile, including the Dong Feng-31, will narrow the gap between current Chinese, US and Russian ballistic missile designs. This system is a solid-fueled, three-stage mobile missile with a range of 8000 km carrying a 700 kg, one-megaton warhead. The DF-31 limited-range ICBM will give China a major strike capability that will be difficult to counterattack at any stage of its operation, from pre-flight mobile operations through terminal flight phases. As with the JL-1/DF-21 combination, the DF-31 and JL-2 are land-based and sea-based variants of the same missile. The cancelled DF-25 conventionally armed IRBM was to have been based on the first two stages of the DF-31, and the DF-41 long-range ICBM will use these two stages with a large-diameter third stage. Development of these missiles was accelerated following the successful test of their common 2m-diameter solid rocket motor in late 1983. The missile is apparently comparable in size and performance to the American TRIDENT C-4 long-range multiple-warhead three-stage solid fuel missile missile that is launched from submerged submarines. The DF-31 has a range of about 5,000 miles, sufficient to hit targets along the entire West Coast of the United States and in several northern Rocky Mountain states. It is believed to incorporate design aspects similar to those of current generation Russian missiles. These could include upgraded mobility for the transporter-erector launcher [TEL], advanced materials for the booster and payload, use of penetration aids such as decoys or chaff, and an improved solid propellant. The DF-31 is being jointly developed by China Aerospace Corporation, the research institute of the 2d Artillery Corps, and other scientific research organizations. In March 1991 the CMC assigned the task of developing and testing the DF-31 to the Second Artillery Corps, since the new missile was expected to have a limited operational capability as soon as its design was finalized. The DF-31 development program is highly ambitious, and has presented Beijing with substantial challenges. China has experienced difficulties in casting the large solid fuel motors for the DF-31, and ensuring an adequate seal between the fuel and the booster casing. The DF-31 is in the late stage of development following various delays, and is expected to be deployed about the turn of the century, based on the recent completion of silo construction at the Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center. As of 1996 it was expected that the DF-31 would enter full service by 1998. By 1999 it was evident that operational deployment of the DF-31 was expected as early as 2002 or 2003. The details of the testing history of the DF-31 remain obscure. While the open source literature contains a number of references to tests associated with the DF-31 program, as of 1998 the National Air Intelligence Center characterized the DF-31 as "not yet tested." Given the evident challenges associated with the DF-31 program, and the variety of operational missiles that are expected to derive from this development effort, it is plausible that there have been a number of flight tests of components associated with the DF-31 prior to an all-up full range test of the complete DF-31 missile.

It is reported that the new missile was test-fired for the first time on 29 April 1992. Because of quality problems in its components, the missile exploded after launch. The second launch also failed due to similar problems. Subsequently four other missiles were test-fired successfully, beginning in June 1995. Tests on 10 November 1995 and 10 January 1996 possibly included endoatmospheric reentry decoys. The fourth successful flight test of the DF-31 was conducted on December 28, 1996 from the Shanxi base in central China. The missile was observed on a launch pad at Wuzhai in mid-October 1997, and a flight test was conducted soon thereafter. In October 1997 the DF-31 also underwent tests simulating launch from nuclear-missile-submarine tubes. An "ejection" (soft launch) test was conducted in December 1998. On 02 August 1999 China successfully tested a DF-31 launched from the PLA Second Artillery base in Wuzhai Prefecture (Shanxi Province), with impact point somewhere in Lop Nor (Xinjiang Province). Chinese preparations for the DF-31 test began during the second half of 1998. The US deployed the tracking ship USS Observation Island to the Western Pacific to monitor the launch, but the PRC missile was not fired seaward. The 50th Anniversary National Day parade on 01 October 1999, the largest in the past half a century, featured advanced weapons and equipment involving 11,000 soldiers in 17 ground phalanxes and 25 vehicles formations, and ten echelons consisting of 132 warplanes. The DF-31 was included in the parade, though it was in a large cannister that completely enclosed the missile. Once DF-31 deployment begins, China is expected to decommission its CSS-3 ICBMs. China will then be on its way to a ballistic missile force based around road-mobile systems which will greatly improve Chinese nuclear ballistic missile survivability and will complicate the task of defeating the Chinese threat. Improved mobility is needed for the DF-31 TEL. Currently this TEL is probably restricted to improved surfaces. Improved chassis features will in turn improve off-road capabilities, increasing the number of potential deployment locations. Such improvements will increase system survivability by making the missile more difficult to locate. US intelligence has photographed a Belarussian six-axle mobile missile TEL [transporter-erector launcher] at the DF-31 production facility in Nanyuan, near Beijing. The Belarussian MAZ launcher is the chassis used for former Soviet SS-20 intermediaterange ballistic missiles. The mobility of the MAZ vehicle is significantly better than that of heavy Chinese vehicles. It is unlikely the Chinese will simply convert the Belarussian launcher to a DF-31 launcher, but rather they would probably will adopt some of its features, including all-wheel independent suspension, higher ground clearance, drivercontrolled central tire-inflation systems, and large tires. The Chinese will probably reverse-engineer the MAZ vehicle to better understand its superior characteristics, which can then be incorporated into the existing DF-31 TEL [transporter-erector launcher] design to enhance its mobility and performance.

The DF-41, a 3-stage 12,000km-range missile similar to the American Minuteman and the Russian Topol SS-25, will apparently be developed using the first two stages of the DF-31 along with a much larger third stage. The larger third stage and longer range of the DF-41 is made possible by the fact that, unlike the DF-31, the size of the DF-41 is not constrained by the requirement that it be fitted into a submarine launch tube. The cancelled 1,700km-range DF-25 ground mobile missile was developed using the first two stages of the DF-31.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Range (km) Academy of Rocket Motors Technology - ARMT Second Artillery Corps Tai-Hang Wuzhai Three Stage 10+ 2.0 20,000+ Solid Inertial 29 April 1992 2000 Mobile 3,000 - 8,000

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 700 kg (kg) Warhead Yield CEP (meters) Launch Preparation Time 1 @ 0.35 - 1.0 MT or 3 @ 50-100 KT 300-500 ?? 10-15 minutes

DF-41
The three-stage solid-fuel DF-41 is larger than the DF-31 missile, and has a range of up to 12,000 kilometers. While no information has been published concerning the configuration of this missile, the most straightforward path towards its development would be the addition of an enlarged third stage to the DF-31 ICBM. The larger third stage and longer range of the DF-41 is made possible by the fact that, unlike the DF-31, the size of the DF-41 is not constrained by the requirement that it be fitted into a submarine launch tube. The DF-41 strategic weapons system will have a mobile launch capability providing greatly improved survivability compared with previous Chinese intercontinental missiles. It is anticipated that the DF-41 will be delivered to the 2d Artillery around the year 2010. In the absence of flight testing, the final operational configuration of this solid fueled missile remains uncertain, particularly with respect to the length of the third stage. However, this derivative of the DF-31 would be unlikely to have a throwweight in excess of 1000 kgs, and most estimates are in the range of 800 kg. Some estimates anticipate that, as with previous Chinese ICBMs, the DF-41 will carry only a single warhead [with a 0.35 - 1.0 MT yield]. In any event, depending on the weapon's yield, it seems unlikely that China would be able to mount more than a few lower-yield [50-100 KT ?] RVs on this ICBM. The American Minuteman III has 3 RVs and a throwweight of 1100 kgs at 12,900 kms, while the MX Peacekeeper carries 10 RVs and has a throwweight of 3950 kgs at 11,000 kms. Both American missiles carry warheads with yields of a few hundred kilotons.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Three Stage ~15? 2.0 30,000?? Solid Inertial xx 2010? Silo or mobile Academy of Rocket Motors Technology - ARMT Second Artillery Corps

Range (km)

10,000 - 12,000

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 800-1,000 [?] (kg) Warhead Yield CEP (meters) Launch Preparation Time 1 @ 0.35 - 1.0 MT or 3-6 @ 50-100 KT 700 - 800 ?? 3-5 minutes

JL-1 [CSS-N-3]
The JL-1 [CSS-N-3] is a two-stage solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile deployed on the Type-092 Xia class submarines. The Ju Lang-1 [or "Giant Wave-1"] missile is a sea-based variant of the land-based ground-mobile DF-21. JL-1 is ejected from a submerged submarine with the first-stage engine igniting after the missile has emerged from the water. The first successful test of the 1.4m-diameter solid-rocket engine for the JL-1 came in early 1978. The first test launch of the two stage CSS-NX-3 missile took place on 30 April, 1982 from submerged pontoon near Huludao (Yellow Sea). The first successful launch of the JL-1 was achieved on 12 October 1982, from a Golf Class trials submarine, marking a major milestone in a development program that had been initiated in March 1967. The second was launched on 12 October 1982 . The first firing from Xia was in 1985 and was unsuccessful and it was not until 27 September 1988 that a satisfactory launch took place. Although the missile put to sea as early as 1983, it did not become fully operational until the successful test firing from submerged Xia in September 1988.

Specifications
Contractor Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Range (km) Academy of Rocket Motors Technology - ARMT Two Stage 10.7 1.4 14,700 Solid Inertial 12 October 1982 1988 type-092 SSBN 1,700

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 600 (kg) Warhead Yield CEP (meters) CEP (meters) 200-300 KT 300-400

JL-2 (CSS-NX-4)
The new JL-2 (CSS-NX-4) SLBMs will carry either 3 or 4 MIRV (90kT each) or a single warhead with a yield of 250-1000 kT over a range of 8,000km. The missile is the seabased variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile. Development of these missiles was accelerated following the successful test of their common 2m-diameter solid rocket motor in late 1983. The missile is apparently comparable in size and performance to the American TRIDENT C-4 long-range multiple-warhead three-stage solid fuel missile missile that is launched from submerged submarines. The prospects for the deployment of this missile remain obscure, given the protracted development effort of the associated DF-31, the initial deployment of which has slipped from 1998 to around 2003. Also worthy of note is the evident absence of public reports of the start of construction of the Type 094 submarine that would be needed for the JL-2 missile. Construction of this submarine would constitute a leading indicator for the JL-2's deployment schedule, since several years would be required for submarine construction, and probably an additional year or two for shake-down trials of the submarine, and testing of the JL-2 from the submarine.

Specifications
Contractor Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Academy of Rocket Motors Technology - ARMT Three Stage 10+ 2.0 20,000+ Solid Inertial 19 19 Type 094 SSBN

Range (km)

8,000

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 700 kg (kg) Warhead Yield CEP (meters) 3 or 4 MIRV @ 90 kT 1 @ 250-1000 kT 500 ??

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM)
China is developing land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) for theater warfighting and strategic attack. These cruise missiles seem to have a relatively high development priority to ensure that Chinese forces will have greater conventional firepower. Long-range cruise missiles probably will also be used to bolster the viability of Chinese military deterrence. The first LACM design produced probably will be air-launched from Chinese bombers and should be operational early in the next century. China could develop a sea-launched version for use on either submarines or surface combatants. Almost no hard data is available concerning this new weapon system, though various sources have provided fragmentary accounts. Chinese LACM R&D is aided by an aggressive effort to acquire foreign cruise missile technology, particularly from Russia. China also seeks enabling technologies and subsystems from the United States and other foreign countries. It has been reported that that China transported cruise missile production facilities from Russia to a location in the vicinity of Shanghai in 1993, and recruited cruise missile engineering specialists from Russia in 1995 and. It is also reported that China has obtained technical data concerning a Russian cruise missile guidance system. The guidance system represents the most significant challenge for a long-range cruise missile program. China would require an extensive database of accurate topographic information to use terrain comparison (TERCOM) guidance. But TERCOM would probably be relatively ineffective in areas such as the South China Sea, which present few navigational reference points. Published reports suggest that GPS would initially be used as the primary guidance system, possibly to be supplemented subsequently with TERCOM. The potential use of the American GPS system would render this system vulnerable to jamming of the unencrypted civil signal (CA code) from GPS satellites within view of the Chinese area of operations, or to local jamming and spoofing in the target area. Chinese cruise missiles could still find their targets using intertial navigation system [INS] technology, but without GPS updates they would be significantly less accurate.

Project 629 GOLF
Initial Chinese efforts to to create a sea-launched nuclear-missile system used two large Project 629 GOLF missile-armed diesel-electric submarines and seven R-11F liquidpropellant missiles which had been transferred from the USSR in the early 1960's. But work on these sea-launched missiles encountered a vaariety of problems. By the early 1970's China recognized that continuation of the Project 629 effort was pointless. Chinese development of a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine began with a single GOLF class submarine. This conventionally powered ballistic missile boat was committed as a test platform role in developing a new missile of Chinese design. By 1972 US intelligence had evidence of land based ejection facilities as well as construction of an off-shore tube launcher for underwater ejection tests.

Type 09-1
Work started on the Type 09-1 Han class nuclear powered attack submarine in the late 1950s, though the first unit was not completed until 1974. With a fully loaded displacement of 5000 tons, this class is armed with six 533mm torpedoe tubes. The last three boats of the class were erroneously reported to have been lengthened by eight meters to accommodate tubes for six YJ-1 SSM launchers to the rear of the sail. All five units of this class are deployed with the North Sea Fleet. The Han-class SSNs are noted for problems, including high internal radiation levels and an inability to fire missiles while submerged, which compromise their operational effectiveness and their wartime utility against ASW-competent adversaries.

Specifications
Displacement Length Beam Drought Speed Missiles Torpedoes Units 6 - 533 mm bow tubes 401 402 5,500 ton m m m knots dive

403 404 405

Type 92 Xia
The Chinese designed and built Type-091 HAN class submarine began sea trials in August 1971. The HAN class submarine is a nuclear powered torpedo attack boat. While this class boat greatly improved the Chinese Navy's distant defense capabilities against enemy nuclear equipped surface forces, one of its most significant features was that it served as a stepping stone in the development of a Chinese nuclear powered, submarine launched ballistic missile (SSBN) force. Such a force would enhance Peking's assurance of an effective retaliatory capability, as well as strengthening her deterrent posture. In 1981 China launched the Xia-class SSBN #406, derived from the Han-class SSN, with the hull lengthened to accommodate the missile tubes. The Type-092 became operational in 1983, though missile firings conducted in 1984 and 1985 were unsatisfactory due to fire control problems which were not resoloved until until 1988. The Xia class SSBN was initially armed with 12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3) SLBMs.A major update of the class started in 1995 to fit the new JL-2 SLBM system, with the upgrade expected to be completed in 1998. The JL-2 (CSS-NX-4) SLBMs is reported to carry 3 or 4 MIRV (90kT each) or a single 250kt warhead with a range of 8,000km. Operations have been limited and the Xia has never sailed beyond Chinese regional waters. Despite a potential for operations in the Pacific Ocean, capabilities would be very limited against modern Western or Russian ASW capabilities. A second hull was launched in 1982, but the status of this boat remains uncertain. It is certainly not currently in service, with unsubstantiated reports claiming it was lost in a 1985 accident. A replacement design is under development which will be equiped with the new JL-2 SLBM system.

Specifications
Displacement Length Beam Drought Speed Missiles Torpedoes 6500-8000 ton 120 m 10 m 8m 22 knots dive SLBM - 12 JL-1 or JL-2 6 - 533 mm bow tubes

Type 093
The ONI new Type 93 SSN will be similar to Russian second generation designs such as the Victor III. The launch of the initial unit of this class from the Bohai Shipyard is expected around the year 2000. As with the Song SSK, the new submarine will incorporates a hydrodynamically efficient hull form, a single shaft and a highly skewed 7-bladed propeller. The Type 09-3 it is expected to deploy submerged-launch anti-ship cruise missiles, possibly a follow-on to the C801s, as well as the projecte Land Attack Cruise Missile.

Specifications
Displacement Length Beam Drought Speed ton m m m knots dive

Missiles Torpedoes

LACM 6 - 533 mm bow tubes

Type 94
A new design (type 094) has been planned and is expected to begin production between 2003-2005. Incorporating some Russian technology, the Type 094 is expected to be a dramatic improvement over the sole Xia class SSBN, with improved quieting and sensor systems, and a more reliable propulsion system. Other improvements in sonar, propulsion, training, and the application of quieting techniques will contribute to a significant improvement in the capabilities of China’s submarine fleet. The overall size of the Chinese submarine force will decline as older boats are scrapped and new ones are built at a slower pace. But there is unconfirmed speculation that as many as a dozen of these new boats may be eventually constructed, though other estimates suggest that 4-6 or 6-8 boats may be constructed. Plans to deploy this class of nuclear powered SSBNs are said to have been delayed due to problems with the nuclear reactor power plants. As of late 1999 there is an evident absence of public reports of the start of construction of the Type 094 submarine. Several years would be required for submarine construction, and probably an additional year or two for shake-down trials of the submarine, and testing of the JL-2 from the submarine. Each of the Type 094 SSBNs will mount 16 JL-2 ballistic missiles (DF-31s) with a range of 8000 kms. When deployed, this missile will allow Chinese SSBNs to target portions of the United States for the first time from operating areas located near the Chinese coast. Equipped with the JL-2 missiles, the Type 094 SSBNs would only have to patrol just to the northeast of the Kuril Islands to hold about three-fourths of the United States at risk.

Specifications
Displacement Length Beam Drought Speed Missiles Torpedoes ton m m m knots dive SLBM - 16 JL-2 6 - 533 mm bow tubes

DF-2 / CSS-1
The first Chinese ballistic missile to become operational, designated the CSS-1 by the United States and Dong Feng (DF) or East Wind 2 by the Chinese, was probably a modified R-5 [SS-3] powered by a YF-1 storable-propellant motor. Although the first DF-2 test on 21 March 1962 failed, a successful test flight was conducted on 29 June 1964 following a major redesign of the system which included a reduction of the liftoff thrust from 45.5 tons to 40.5 tons and a reduction in range to 1,050 km. The original DF2 design was modified in 1964, with the new DF-2A having a design range of 1,250 km with a 1,500 kg payload [the 12-KT nuclear warhead weighs 1,290 kg and the reentryvehicle weighs an additional 200 kg]. Test launches continued throughout the period with this system furnishing the delivery vehicle for the first, and to date only, missile delivered test shot, on 27 October 1966 (CHIC 4). The DF-2A became operational with a nuclear warhead in 1966. Following an intensified and apparently successful testing of the DF-2 MRBM in 1966, little activity was observed by US intelligence relating to this system from the fall of 1966 through early 1969. During that time there were occasional exercises and possible indications of a few firings but no firm evidence of troop training. At the Wuvei missile school, no equipment was observed and some type of construction which had begun in 1956 continued at a very slow pace through at least 1969. A few firings from October 1966 through mid-1968 were probably associated with missile modifications. It appeared that the Chinese had no intentions at that time of deploying the DF-2, although it was within their capability,and were beginning to concentrate their resources on developing an IRBM. However, deteriorating border relations with the Soviets in 1968 may have caused the Chinese to rethink their missile strategy for deploying the DF-2. In August 1968, the lull was broken with the appearance of possible DF-2 troop training exercises at the Shuangchengtzu Launch Complex A. On several occasions during the remainder of the year, support equipment was visible at the launch complex. There were 14 confirmed crew-training firings through early 1972. The picture began to change in 1969-1970, as evidence accumulated of renewed DF-2 activity. It appeared reasonably certain that troop training, involving live firings from Shuangchengtzu, and possibly classroom and missile handling instruction at Wuwei, was underway at least by the spring of 1969 if not by August 1968. The Chinese began troop training firings of the DF-2 MRBM system at least by the spring of 1969 in preparation for deployment. Around the time the DF-2 achieved initial operational capability (IOC), the Zhenbao/Demansky Island conflict flared up (March 1969) and then spread from the Ussuri River along the border into Central Asia, raising the prospect of a Soviet strike into China. This prospect was supported by a widespread rumor that the USSR was considering a "surgical strike" on the Chinese nuclear testing facilities in Xinjiang.

The DF-2 was transportable (but not tactically mobile), and Chinese photographs indicate that it was deployed in long caravans consisting of the launcher and its support and fueling vehicles. These same photographs show what appear to be an unusually large number of personnel associated with the launch process. The missile is towed on a flatbed launcher to the site. It is then elevated into its firing position through what appears to be a lengthy and complicated process. Quite likely the DF-2 with its multiple fuel trucks was the subject of a Chinese broadcast which applauded a "fueling squadron" for reducing fueling time from 10 to 6 hours for an undesignated missile. Deployment of this system, begun in 1969-70, appears to have stabilized at about 50 weapons in the mid 1970s. Production of the DF-2A ceased at the beginning of 1970. The DF-2 was removed from the inventory of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) in 1979 and replaced with the more modern DF-3 and DF-21 systems.

Specifications
First Test Firings as of 1972 IOC Range (km) 1963 35-40 1966-1970 1,250

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 1,500 (kg) Warhead Yield CEP (km) Propellant Deployment Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Guidance Launch Preparation Time 12 KT or 3 MT 2-4 Cryogenic Soft Single Stage 20.6 1.65 32,000 Inertial 150-180 minutes

DF-3A / CSS-2
The second booster to emerge from China's program, the CSS-2/DF-3, was designed to be China's first "modern" missile. The first Chinese MRBM, resembled the Soviet R-12 (SS-4) missile in its design and specifications, although Moscow refused to sell the R-12 to China or provide technical data on the system. As with the R-12, the DF-3 used storable liquid propellants and a cluster of four engines with a total lift-off thrust of 64 tons. The development of the missile, which began in September 1958, proved more difficult than expected, and based upon its tactical-technical specifications, this missile had a number of substantial shortcomings. Modifications in 1964 to the design requirement for this missile, which was initially designated the DF-1, resulted in the development of the longer-range DF-3. With a height of approximately 67 feet and a girth of eight feet, the DF-3 was designed to be silo-based rather than transportable. Early firings of the DF-3 were from Shuangchengtzu during 1967 and then moved to Wuchai for longer-range testing in 1969, just as the DF-2 was going into series production. The first photographic evidence of CSS-2 training was obtained by US intelligence in November 1970. This training was conducted at Wuwei is continuing at this time. Live firings of this missile were conducted from a launch facility at Wuchai, southwest of Peking, and possibly represented training exercises beginning in mid-1969. It is probable that China deployed a small number of DF-3 IRBMs beginning in late 1971. Though no firm evidence of such deployments was available at the time, 1972 imagery indicated the probably imminent deployment at two separate locations in China. This second generation Chinese missile improved both range and reaction time. As a silo-deployed missile, the DF-3 rocket would be prefueled, providing much quicker reaction time than the DF-2. The DF-3 provided the first stage for the follow-on CSS-3/DF-4 IRBM. It also provided the first stage of China's first space launch vehicle, dubbed CSL-1 in the West and Changzheng 1 (CZ-I) or Long March 1 by the Chinese. The space booster developed from the DF-3 launched China's first two successful space satellites. In April 1970, the three-stage CZ-1 launched China's first successful space satellite. The first two stages used liquid fuel, the third stage solid propellant. The CZ-1 also launched a satellite in March 1971 the last until 1975, when a new series was begun. There are at least two versions of the DF-3. The initial model had a range of about 2,650 kilometers and carried a single nuclear warhead weighing 2,150 kilograms. During 1983 and 1984 a range extension program on the DF-3 increased the range of the DF-3 to 2,800 km [some sources report the range as up to 4,000 kilometers]. In addition, according to some reports the missiles were modified to carry three nuclear warheads, all probably in the 50-100 kT range, though lower yields have been suggested. Of a total of some 100 DF-3 missiles, about 80 are of the improved DF-3A version which was deployed beginning in 1986.

The DF-3 normally has a range of 2,780 kilometers, with a maximum altitude of 550 kilometers. With depressed trajectory, the DF-3 travels 1,550 kilometers at 100 kilometers altitude. In 1987 China sold several dozen (reportedly between 36 and 60) outmoded DF-3 missiles to Saudi Arabia, minus their nuclear warheads. An estimated 90-120 DF-3s were deployed in the 1980s, and some greater number were manufactured. The CSS-2 is China’s primary regional missile system. A roadtransportable, liquid-fueled IRBM, it can be launched from either permanent launch pads or from portable launch stands. As of late 1997 China had about 40 DF-3 refire-capable launchers at six field garrisons and launch complexes. Many of those launchers are being converted to handle new, solid-fuel DF-21 [CSS-5 Mod 1] launchers and missiles. The number of CSS-2 sites will likely be reduced, since the United States no longer operates bases in the Philippines, and DF-15 [M-9] short-range missiles deployed along the eastern coast can be used to cover targets in Taiwan. The DF-21 deployments have been limited to areas closer to China's borders to ensure adequate target coverage of areas previously covered by the DF-3. In areas deeper inside China, where longer range is necessary for target coverage, DF-3 activities are relatively high, indicating the missile could remain in service in these regions until new missiles such as the DF-21 [CSS-5 Mod 2] are deployed. Once the DF-21 deployments are adequately under way, the CSS-2 will likely be removed completely from service, perhaps by 2002.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology CALT Second Artillery Corps CURRENT BASES Dalong Datong Dengshahe Haiyan Jianshui Kunming Lianxiwang Tonghua Yidu 1966 14-16 1971 3,000 - 4,000 FORMER BASES Dianwei Fengrun Liujikou Xi'an Xuanhua

First Test Firings as of 1972 IOC Range (km)

Throw-weight (kg)

2,000 1 @ 700-3000 KT 3 @ 50-100 KT 3 @ 10-20 KT ??? conventional HE Storable Soft Single Stage 24 2.25 64,000 Inertial 1,000 - 4,000 120-150 minutes

Yield

Propellant Deployment Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Guidance CEP (meters) Launch Preparation Time

DF-4 [the "Chingyu" missile]
The two-stage DF-4 (CSS-3) limited-range ICBM was designed initially to hit the US base at Guam and later modified to increase its range to 4750 kms so as to be able to strike Moscow. The launcher is a DF-3 with an added upper stage designed to provide power for boosting a 2,200 kilogram 3-MT warhead over a range of 5,500-6,000 kilometers. The first tests of this system were conducted from Jianshui [Chingyu] in November 1970 and 1971 to an impact area 2,050 nautical miles away. Continued testing and possible deployment were reported over the succeeding years. The testing programs clearly indicated that China had the potential to deploy a missile capable of reaching European Russia, but only limited deployment occurred. In 1972 US intelligence estimated an IOC for this system as being expected in 1974 or 1975. Series production of the DF-1 and DF-2, along with development of the DF-5 might have stretched China's RDT&E capabilities to the limit, resulting in a low priority for deployment of what may have been a marginally effective missile. Deployment actually began in 1975-76, but only four DF-4s were believed to be in place by 1984; and one report stated that these launchers were without warheads at the time. An estimated 30 DF-4s have been constructed for ballistic missile use. By 1995 between 10 to 16 were deployed, and by 1997 estimates of the deployed force ranged as high as 20 missiles. Two launch configurations exist for the CSS-3: a rollout-to-launch site and an elevate-tolaunch silo. Many of the DF-4s are stored in tunnels under high mountains, and are launched immediately outside the mouth of the tunnel. The missiles must be moved into the open and fueled prior to firing, an operational mode dubbed chu men fang pao (shooting a firecracker outside the front door), with the fueling operation apparently requiring about two hours.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology CALT Second Artillery Corps Da Qaidam Delingha Sundian Tongdao Xiao Qaidam 1970 2 1974-79

First Test Firings as of 1972 IOC

Range (km) Re-entry Vehicle Weight (kg) Yield Propellant Deployment Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Guidance CEP (meters) Launch Preparation Time

4,500 - 7,000 2,000 2-3 MT Storable Hard Two Stage 28 2.25 80,000 Inertial 1,400 - 3,500 60-120 minutes

DF-11 [CSS-7]
The DF-11 (M-11 / CSS-7) is the Chinese replacement for the Scud-series of missiles. As of late 1999 the US estimated that China had deployed 40 DF-11s, with an eventual force goal of as many as 500 short-range missiles by 2005. It was originally shown at the 1987 Beijing air show as a two-stage missile with 1000 kms range carrying a 400-500 kilogram payload. This M-18 missile had the longest range of any of the current M-series missiles. The M-series missiles all use solid fuel, and operational preparation time is short. They are all transported by highly-mobile crosscountry trucks which have the capacity to launch the missiles. Due to MTCR considerations, China exported the M-11 system variant to Pakistan as a single-stage, solid-fueled missile with a range of 120-295 kms carrying a 500 kg (or perhaps 800 kg) warhead. Although the DF-11 has a range of 300 km, the Chinese continued work on a version with a longer range. China's 50th anniversary military parade on 01 October 1999 marked the first public Chinese display of a new version of the M-11 short-range missile, the CSS-7 Mod 2, more commonly known as the M-11 follow-on. The new Mod 2 missile about two meters longer than the Mod 1, and is believed to have a longer range, a larger warhead and greater accuracy than earlier M-11. The accuracy of these missiles will improve in the future if China is able to apply Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance technology to provide highly accurate location information for missile launchers or presurveyed launch sites. China sold at least 34 M-11 missiles to Pakistan in November 1992. US imagery intelligence satellites provided imagery showing M-11 missile canisters being delivered at the Sargodha air base near Lahore, but not the M-11 missiles. But the Clinton Administration said they would need direct photographic proof by spy satellites to determine whether the Chinese sale to Pakistan had occurred, in order to impose Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) sanctions against China for selling missiles to Pakistan. Sanctions were imposed on China in August 1993 for selling missile components to Pakistan that were barred under MTCR. The sanctions were lifted in October 1994 after the Chinese pledged not to sell any more missiles. In 1999 Pakistan displayed two "Shaheen" missiles in a military parade, which were apparently the improved longer-range CSS-7 Mod 2.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Configuration Single Stage Sanjiang Space Group Second Artillery Corps

Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Range (km)

11.25 0.88 6,350 Solid Inertial 19?? ~1995? mobile 300

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 500 (kg) Warhead Yield CEP (meters) Conventional Lethal Radius [soft target] Launch Preparation Time 350 KT or conventional 200 10 meters [crater] 60 meters [unitary] 250 meters [submunition] 30-45 minutes

DF-15 [CSS-6 / M-9]
The DF-15 (CSS-6) , better known by the export name M-9, is a sophisticated solidfueled, single-stage mobile missile, similar in appearance to the US Pershing I-A system. The M-series missiles all use solid fuel, and operational preparation time is short. The DF-15 is expected to be equipped with a variety of warhead types and to become the mainstay of China's sub-strategic missile force. The vertically-launched 9.1 meter long missile has a range of 200-600 kms, carrying a payload of 500 kgs, with a CEP of about 280 meters. The missile uses a strapdown inertial guidance system on the warhead section which guides the trajectory using small thrusters. The missile body is designed to trail behind the separated warhead and provide camouflage for the warhead (which is only one-tenth of the size of the missile body). The DF-15 utilizes a Chinese-developed eight-wheel cross-country Transporter Erector Launcher [TEL] with both launch and transport capacities. These highly-mobile crosscountry trucks have the capacity to launch the missiles. It is coordinated with advanced digital C3I computer system using digital computer-controlled technology and self-test functions to provide an operational preparation time of less than 30 minutes. It has been suggested that in the future the DF-15 will be equipped with a global positioning system that is coordinated with a new-type ring-laser gyroscopic inertialguidance system, coupled to a faster on-board computer system so as to increase the accuracy of the missile's end-segment guidance system to achieve a CEP of 30-45 meters. As the missile has a terminal velocity of over Mach 6 this system may be considered for deep-penetration strike requirements (against underground fortifications). Developed in the 1980s, the DF-15 first appeared in the Beijing Defense Exhibition in 1988. And it is believed that by 1989 China had equipped the Second Artillery with a few of these missiles. China’s DF-15 road-mobile SRBM has been operational since 1995, with an initial force of 40 missiles. By the end of 1999 China had deployed 200 SRBMs and was increasing the force at a rate of 50 missiles per year. As of mid-2000 the PLA had one regimental-sized CSS-6 SRBM unit deployed in southeastern China. This CSS-6 unit was expected to be augmented by a CSS-7 SRBM unit and one additional CSS-6 unit. DF-15 missiles were launched from southern China into the waters off Taiwan in 1995 (six or seven launches) and 1996 (four launches) as part of Beijing’s efforts to dissuade Taiwan from moving toward independence. These launches into specific closure areas near Taiwan demonstrated a degree of accuracy not previously associated with Chinese missiles.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Academy of Rocket Motors Technology - ARMT Second Artillery Corps Leping Nanping Yong'an Single Stage 9.1 1.0 6,200 Solid Inertial 198? 1995 mobile 600

Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Range (km)

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 500 (kg) Warhead Yield CEP (meters) Launch Preparation Time 50-350 KT or conventional 300-600 30 minutes

DF-21 / CSS-5
The DF-21/21A (CSS-5) solid-fueled missile was originally developed as the two-stage JL-1. It was designed for deployment aboard China's SSBN, and it was decided to also develop it as a land-based missile, which was designated as the DF-21. Development of the DF-21 began in 1967 and had its first successful test in May 1985. Shortly thereafter, the DF-21 was deployed into an experimental regiment. Its range was later improved to 1800 kms (DF-21A) carrying a 600 kg warhead with a nuclear capability believed to be 200-300 kt. This mobile system is launched from a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle. It is believed that over 100 DF-21/JL-1 missiles have been built, and as of 1995 some 15 to 20 DF-21 missiles had been deployed, with deployments increasing to some 36 by 1997. Some DF-21s have been reconfigured with conventional warheads for use along China's southern and northwestern borders. From these locations, the DF-21 can hit targets throughout Northern India, the Republics of Central Asia, and most of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. As of late 1997 China had about 40 DF-3 refire-capable launchers at six field garrisons and launch complexes. Many of those launchers are being converted to handle new, solid-fuel DF-21 [CSS-5 Mod 1] launchers and missiles. The number of CSS-2 sites will likely be reduced, since the United States no longer operates bases in the Philippines, and DF-15 [M-9] short-range missiles deployed along the eastern coast can be used to cover targets in Taiwan. The DF-21 deployments have been limited to areas closer to China's borders to ensure adequate target coverage of areas previously covered by the DF-3. In areas deeper inside China, where longer range is necessary for target coverage, DF-3 activities are relatively high, indicating the missile could remain in service in these regions until new missiles such as the DF-21 [CSS-5 Mod 2] are deployed. Once the DF-21 deployments are adequately under way, the CSS-2 will likely be removed completely from service, perhaps by 2002. The July 2000 Japan white paper on defense stated that China had 70 guided missiles capable of reaching Japan and other Asian countries. The white papernoted that China has been gradually replacing the old DF-3 missiles with the newer, more accurate DF-21 missiles. Work is believed to be ongoing to provide this missile with a sophisticated terminal guidance system. According to some reports the Mod 2 version of the CSS-5 will be comparable to the US Pershing II IRBM, employ advanced radar guidance to achieve extremely high accuracy.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Academy of Rocket Motors Technology - ARMT Second Artillery Corps Chuxiong Jianshui

Lianxiwang Tonghua Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Range (km) Two Stage 10.7 1.4 14,700 Solid Inertial May 1985 1989-1991 Mobile 1,800

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 600 (kg) Warhead Yield CEP (meters) Launch Preparation Time 200-300 KT 300-400 10-15 minutes

DF-25
The land-based mobile-launch DF-25 is a a two-stage solid-fuel missile with a range of 1,700 kilometers. While the ranges of DF-25 and DF-21 are approximately the same, the nuclear-tipped DF-21 has a throw-weight of 600kg, compared to the conventionally armed DF-25's 2,000kg. The DF-25 is derived by removing the third stage from the three-stage DF-31 and substituting a modified second stage. Potential missions of the DF25 include providing rapid fire support over long distances to defend the Nansha Islands in the South China Sea. In 1996 it was reported that China had abandoned development of the DF-25, even though it had been anticipated to enter service in the 1996 timeframe. This report was apparently correct, since there have subsequently been no indications of the development or deployment of this system. A 1993 report suggesting that the DF-25 may have been a joint project with Iran has remained unconfirmed. The Dongfeng-25 (DF-25 or East Wind 25),

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Range (km) Solid Inertial 19 19 mobile 1,700 Two Stage Academy of Rocket Motors Technology - ARMT Second Artillery Corps

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 2,000 (kg) Warhead CEP (meters) conventional (non-nuclear)

DF-61
In 1975 China adopted a program for creating tactical ballistic missiles for the Ground Troops. The main effort was concentrated on developing the DF-61 liquid-propellant missile with a range of 600-1,000 km. Development of this system was halted because of the connection of the head of the program (General Cheng Jiming, chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission) with the "Gang of Four." The program's objectives were revised in 1980 and targeted on the development of solid-propellant missiles.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Range (km) Re-entry Vehicle Mass (kg) Warhead Yield ) Storable Inertial 19 19 Soft Single Stage Shanghai Academy of Space Technology - SAST Second Artillery Corps

M-7 / 8610
The M-7 missile, also known as the "8610 project," has a range of 180 kilometers with a throw-weight of 500 kilograms. It is generally similar to the American "Lance" and the Russian SS-21 missiles. While its range is longer than these missiles, its warhead capacity is somewhat smaller. Although the other M-series missiles use solid fuel, this missile is derived from the HQ-2 SAM [the Chinese version of the Russia SA-2 GUIDELINE] which uses a storable liquid propellant. As with the other M-series missiles, the M-7's operational preparation time is short, and it is transported by highlymobile cross- country trucks which have the capacity to launch the missiles. The HQ-2 was originally designed as a high-altitude SAM, derived from the Soviet SA-2. The total number of HQ-2 missiles produced is unknown, but the HQ-2 is being retired with some being converted to short-range surface-to-surface missile called M-7.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Range (km) Re-entry Vehicle Mass (kg) Warhead Yield CEP (meters) ) Storable Liquid Inertial 19 19 Soft Single Stage China Chang Feng Mechanics and Electronics Technology - CCF Second Artillery Corps

DF-11 / M-18
The M-18 [DF-11] is the Chinese replacement for the Scud-series of missiles. It was originally shown at the 1987 Beijing air show as a two-stage missile with 1000 kms range carrying a 400-500 kilogram payload. This M-18 missile had the longest range of any of the current M-series missiles. According to some reports the four missiles launched by the Second Artillery Corps on 13 March 1996 were not of the M-9 type, as widely reported, but actually missiles of the M-18 type launched from "No. 2054" base in Hunan Province. Due to MTCR considerations, China exported the M-11 system variant to Pakistan as a single-stage, solid-fueled missile with a range of 120-295 kms carrying a 500 kg (or perhaps 800 kg) warhead. Although the DF-11 has a range of 300 km, the Chinese may be continuing working on the version with a longer range. The accuracy of these missiles will improve in the future if China is able to apply Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance technology. The M-series missiles all use solid fuel, and operational preparation time is short. They are all transported by highly-mobile cross- country trucks which have the capacity to launch the missiles.

Specifications
Contractor Operator Basing Configuration Length [meters] Diameter [meters] Mass [kilograms] Propellant Guidance First Flight IOC Deployment Range (km) Solid Inertial 19?? ?? mobile 1,000-1,200 Two Stage Academy of Rocket Motors Technology - ARMT Second Artillery Corps

Re-entry Vehicle Mass 400-500 (kg) Warhead Yield conventional

Lethal Radius [soft target] CEP (meters)

10 meters [crater] 60 meters [unitary] 250 meters [submunition] 200

Tu-4 BULL
The 4th Independent Regiment came into existence with the delivery of 10 TU-4 BULL propeller medium bombers to Peking in February 1953. In following years three more of these aircraft were acquired from the Soviets. From 1953 until 1971 the 4th IR had only three home bases. The original 10 BULLs remained at Peking from February 1953 until March of that year when they moved to Shihchiachuang Takuotsun. They remained there for one year, moving back to Peking in March 1954. Then in February of 1955 the unit moved to Wukung, its present home base. From 1955 until 1971 all 4th IR aircraft were based at Wukung; however, since mid-1971 the BULLs have been at Nanshui Airfield. Medium bomber crew training began almost immediately upon receipt of BULLs in 1953 and progressed steadily until extensive long-range night bombing training was noted in late 1954. By 1956, BULL crews were considered proficient in medium altitude bombing under instrument flight conditions. In addition to normal training missions, 4th IR aircraft have been used for a variety of secondary missions. BULLs may have been used against Tibetan dissidents, to shadow intruding CHINAT aircraft, in air defense exercises, and for aerial survey missions. Both BULLs and BADGERs have been associated with special weapons programs. In addition to participating in nuclear tests both as drop aircraft and in air sampling roles, BULLs and BADGERs have been photographed in the air-to-surface missile area of the Shuangchengtzu test center. While BULL crews were believed to be highly proficient in both day and night operations, the aircraft was highly vulnerable to virtually all air defense weapons, and was withdrawn from active combat service in the 1970s. China retains some 15 of these aircraft in inventory, now used entirely for training and research. One was fitted with a pylon-mounted disk for AEW radar tests.

Description DESCRIPTION
The Bull is a midwing, four-engine, medium bomber copied from the U.S. B-29A acquired by the USSR in World War II. Bull has two bomb bays centrally located in the fuselage, extending fore and aft of the wing. Defensive armament consists of four turrets located in upper forward, lower forward, lower rear, and tail positions. Although the

Soviets have phased it out as an operational bomber, it is still used for this purpose in the Chinese Air Force.

H-5 [Il-28 BEAGLE (ILYUSHIN)]
The Il 28 was the Soviet Union's standard light bomber, and was in use in all air forces of the Soviet Bloc. These aircraft were produced in China under the nomenclature H-5. Although portion of China's jet light bomber force could be used in a limited strategic role, the H-5's low performance envelope mitigates against its use for strategic bombing. The high-mounted wings have a straight leading edge and forward-tapered trailing edge with blunt tips. Two turbojets are mounted beneath the wings in pods. Pods extend beyond wings’ leading and trailing edges. The fuselage is tubular and cigar-shaped tapering to the rear with a rounded, glassed-in nose and bubble canopy. The tail fin is swept-back and tapered with a blunt tip. Flats are low-mounted on the fin, swept-back, and tapered with blunt tips. A glassed-in tail gunner compartment is to the rear of the tail. The reports of the demise of the H-5 seem somewhat exagerated. It was asserted without citation in 1995 that the H-5 had been withdrawn from service, but the continued presence of the H-5 in the PLAAF inventory is widely attested by subsequent sources.

Specifications
Builder Country Designation Similar Aircraft Type Wing Span Length Height Weight Engine Ceiling Maximum speed Cruising speed Cruise range Internal Fuel Drop Tanks In-Flight Refueling 1175 nm 6400 kg Wingtip tank 266kg of fuel for 24nm range No 12300 meters People's Republic of China (PRC) Hong-5 Beagle Canberra, Yak-28 Brewer Attack 70 ft, 5 in (21.5 m) 57 ft, 11 in (17.6 m)

Payload Crew Sensors

1000kg Three none Cannon: 2 NR-23mm fixed forward, 2 NR-23 23mm in Tail turret. 4 500kg bombs or 2 53VA torp or 12 Type 1 250 kg bombs 1 FAB-3000 (overload) na na Egypt, North Korea (H-5), People’s Republic of China (H-5).

Armament

Inventory Basing Users

H-6 [Tu-16 BADGER]
In January 1959 China received two TU-16 BADGER medium jet bombers from the USSR. China began producing the BADGER at the Hsian Airframe Plant in 1968 and had 32 BADGERs in the operational inventory by 1972. The Japan Defence Agency asserted in its' White Paper, Defence of Japan 1996, that China is no longer operating strategic bombers. BADGER flight activity was first detected by US intelligence in July 1962. Since that time detected flight activity has been sporadic yet increasing. Night flight activity was not noted until 1970. The first confirmation of BADGER bombing training was provided by satellite photography on 13 August 1971 when a BADGER was photographed exiting the Hsingjenpao bomb range. Subsequent COMINT reporting identified BADGER activity that began in 1969 and has continued over this range as bombing training. In the early 1970s intensification of this training coupled with the highest noted altitudes for BADGER activity -- 41,000 feet -- confirmed China's serious intent to develop a strategic strike capability. In addition to normal training missions, 4th IR aircraft have been used for a variety of secondary missions. BADGERs were used extensively in 1970 for air defense exercises in Northeast China. Both BULLs and BADGERs have been associated with special weapons programs. In addition to participating in nuclear tests both as drop aircraft and in air sampling roles, BULLs and BADGERs have been photographed in the air-tosurface missile area of the Shuangchengtzu test center. Proficiency of the BADGER force as a whole was initially assessed by US intelligence as fair for medium to high-level daylight bombing and poor for night operations. The H-6 does not have a low-level capability. With continued training, the BADGER force reached a high degree of proficiency in high altitude bombing under instrument flight conditions. However, the BADGER is extremely vulnerable to modern air defense weapons systems and would have been hard-pressed to survive in the air defense environment over the Soviet Union. China's medium bomber force did not initially have an air to-air refueling capability, though it was within the PRC's technical capability to develop one. By the mid-1990s five Chinese H-6D bombers had been converted into air-refueling tankers to allow China's warplanes to reach well into the South China Sea. The H-6D maritime bomber which carries the YJ-6(c601) anti-ship missiles under its wings and is equiped with sea-searching radar under nose, began development in 1975 and made its first flight in 1981. The wings of the Badger are mid-mounted, swept-back, and tapered with blunt tips. There are fences on top of the wings and its landing gear pods extend beyond the wings’ trailing edges. The Badger's engine(s) are two turbojets mounted in wing roots which

extend beyond the leading and trailing edges of the wing root. The engines also have round air intakes. Its fuselage is long, slender, and bulging where the engines are mounted and tapered to the tail. It has a round, glassed-in nose and a stepped cockpit. The tail is swept-back, tapered fin and flats with blunt tips. The Badger also has a tail gunner compartment. The Badger is used by the CIS, Egypt, Iraq, People’s Republic of China (H-6), Ukraine.

Specifications
Designation Type Builder Wing Span Length Height Weight Engine Ceiling Cruise range Internal Fuel In-Flight Refueling Drop Tanks Payload Crew Sensors RWR Cannon: 1 NR-23mm fixed forward, 3x2 NR-23mm in defensive turrets 2 C602 ASMs externally (no iinternal load) (2790nm) 12 500kg bombs or 6 1000kg bombs internally (2945 nm) Na Na 12300 meters 3100nm 36300 kg No None 8000 kg Hong-6 Badger Bomber

Armament

Inventory Basing

Tu-22M BACKFIRE
In mid-1993, China approached Russia concerning the sale of a number of Tu-22M Backfire strike aircraft to replace its aging H-6 Badger bomber fleet. No other weapon system has caused as much concern as did China's efforts to obtain the long-range Tu22M Backfire bomber. With a a dual use unrefueled range of 4000km, this purchase alone would have substantially upgraded Chinese air coverage of the area around Taiwan or the South China Sea. Though spare parts would become a problem, the mere possession of this system, let alone any production capability, would have constituted a substantial upgrade to the Chinese Air Force. However, reports that China actually purchase four of the 4 Tu-22M [Tu-26] long-range BACKFIRE bombers proved unfounded. The deal apparently foundered due to Russian concerns that the sale of such an advanced aircraft would alter the military balance in the area. Following Russia's rejection to sell any Tu-22M BACKFIRE bombers to China, it remains to be seen whether and how the PLAAF will replace its obsolescent strategic bomber force.

H-9
The PLAAF continues to fly the obsolete H-6 bombers and there is no known bomber replacement development program. Attempts to purchase the Tu-22M from Russia led nowhere, and it remains unclear what plane will replace H-6 bomber, and when. According to some reports a new fighter/bomber project was started in 1995, following Russia's refusal to sell advance bombers to China, and at least a decade would be required for it to enter service. As of 1999 there have been no public reports concerning this program, which may be in abeyance. If this H-9 enters service before 2005, it is unlikely that China would embark on serial production of the JH-7A attack aircraft. The H-9 is said to be similar to the American F-117 in terms of overall performance, and perhaps even physical configuration.

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