UP v City Treasurer of Quezon City

Topic: Irreconcilable Inconsistency between two laws with similar subject matter

Facts:

UP entered into a contract of lease with development obligation with ALI in 2006. Leased property now known UP-Ayala Techno
Hub.

Notice of Assessment was issued and was addressed to ALI dated August 23, 2012 informing the company that the property has
been reclassified and assessed for taxation purposes.

In a letter to UP President dated August 22, 2012, the City Assessor Office of of QC informed UP that the Notice of Assessment has
been served to ALI as the liable entity for the RPT.

Statement of Delinquency dated December 5, 2012, the City Treasurer demanded of the payment of RPT for years 2009-2011 and
first 3 qtrs of 2012.

In 2013, City Treasurer sent another Statement of Delinquency to UP Property Holdings and demanded for RPT payment for year
2009-2012 and first 3 qtrs of 2013.

Another Statement of Delinquency was sent to UP demanding for the payment of PRT.

UP President, in his letter to the City Treasurer’s office of QC requested for postponement of any proceedings. He explained that UP
as a National University has been granted tax exemptions under RA 9500(“UP Charter of 2008). The charter provided that the
university is exempt for all taxes and duties vis a vis all revenues and assets used.

Issue:

WON UP is liable for RPT imposed on the leased property to ALI.

Ruling

No, UP is not liable for RPT imposed on the leased property to ALI.

As provided for by the University of the Philippine Charter of 2008, Sec 25. Tax Exemption, states that all revenues and assets of
the University of the Philippines used for educational purposes or in support thereof shall be exempt from all taxes and duties. Also,
Sec 133 of the LGC code provides for the limitation of the taxing power of the LGU which do not extend to the National
Government, Agencies and instrumentalities. Additionally, combined reading of Sections 205 and 234 of the Local Government
Code also provides for removal of the exemption to government instrumentalities when beneficial use of a real property owned by a
government instrumentality is granted to a taxable person. Stated differently, when beneficial use of a real property owned by a
government instrumentality is granted to a taxable person, then the taxable person is not exempted from paying real property tax on
such property.

In the case at bar, the contract of lease entered by UP and ALI, a taxable person, and ALI enjoys the benefit of the leased property,
QC could have imposed the collection of RPT. However, the enactment and passage of Republic Act No. 9500 in 2008 superseded
Sections 205(d) and 234(a) of the Local Government Code 1991. Before the passage of Republic Act No. 9500, there was a need to
determine who had beneficial use of UP’s property before the property may be subjected to real property tax. After the passage of
Republic Act No. 9500, there is no longer a need for the determination of the tax status of the possessor or of the beneficial user to
further ascertain whether UP’s revenue or asset is exempt from tax. Instead, the focal point is “whether UP’s property is used for
educational purposes or in support thereof before the property may be subjected to real property tax.” (See Sec. 25a of RA 9500.)
Republic Act No. 9500 bases UP’ s tax exemption upon compliance with the condition that UP’s revenues and assets must be used
for educational purposes or in support thereof.

Therefore, UP is not liable for RPT imposed on the leased property to ALI.
People v. Almuete
G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976

FACTS:
Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a violation of section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland,
without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five cavans of palay each to her
damage.
The lower held that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe the circumstances under which the cavans of
palay were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests,
and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last normal
harvest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Agricultural Tenancy Law is still applicable after the passing of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code.

HELD:
No. provision in Agricultural Tenancy Law is still applicable after the passing of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.

According to Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the country as contrary to
public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "as a
land reform area". Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share
tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.

In the case presented, the fact that that the code of agrarian reform did not reenact it in the new law section 39 only means that it is
the intention of the legislative body not to punish anymore the tenant’s act of pre-reaping and pre threshing without notice to the
landlord. As a rule, an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain operates as a repeal of anything omitted
which was contain in the old act and not included in the amendatory act. The repeal of law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to
punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law.

Thus, the provision in Agricultural Tenancy Law is still applicable after the passing of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.

David v Commission on Election

provision in Agricultural Tenancy Law is still applicable after the passing of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.

David v Comelec

Facts:

 David, in his capacity as barangay chairman and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay saPilipinas, filed a petition to prohibit
the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997

Meanwhile, Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City chapter also filed petition to seek a Judicial review by certiorari to declare as
unconstitutional' (1) section 43(c)of R.A 7160; (2) COMELEC resolution nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the
barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto; and, (3) the budgetary appropriation of P400 million
contained in Republic Act 8250 (General Appropriations Act of 1997) intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997
barangay elections.
Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the term of office of barangay officials is 5 years. Although the LGC reduced the term of
office of all local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to barangay officials.   As amicus curiae, former
Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr, urges the Court to deny the petitions.

Issue:
WON the RA 7160 (LGC 1991), being a later enacted law, prevails over RA 6679.

Ruling:

Yes, RA 7160 (LGC 1991), being a later enacted law, prevails over RA 6679.

As stated in the constitution, the term of office of elected officials shall be 3 years except for Barangay officials which shall be
determined by law. Also, RA 6679, approved in 1988, provides for a 5-year term of office of the Barangay Official. Subsequently in
1991, RA 7160 (LGC 1991) provides that the term of office of Barangay Official and members of SK shall be for 3 years and also
indicating the composition and the manner of their election.

In the case at bar, the petitioners argued that the term of office of barangay official should be the 5 year term and not the 3 year term
as provided for by the LGC 1991. They claim that RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to the barangay while the LGC1991 is a
law for all government units and that the special law should be applied. However, it has to be noted that the constitution left to
congress the determination of the term of office of Barangay Officials. And that the provision in the LGC 1991, as intended by the
legislative body, specifically mentions the term of office, composition and manner of election of the Barangay Official. LGC being
the later enacted law should be applicable. Also, the current composition of the BLGU is in accordance with the LGC 1991 as to the
composition and the manner of election.

Therefore, RA 7160 (LGC 1991), being a later enacted law, prevails over RA 6679.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v

Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards
environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces and towns.

Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority
to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the
authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators
took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen
permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental
problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:

(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal;

(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and
(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.

 
Issue
WON Laguna Lake Development Authority has jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?

 Held

Yes, LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991.

As for provided by the LLDA charter, Republic Act No. 4850, LLD Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise
such powers. LGC 1991, also provides that municipalities shall have exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal
waters and impose rental fees or charges thereof. Previously enacted special law should prevail over a subsequently enacted general
law.

In the case at bar, the LLDA charter constitutes a special law, while the LGC 1991 is a general law. The Local Government Code of
1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended. The LLDA still has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to
the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. In
addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.

Thus, the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Facts: 

Gaerlan Jr and Catubig were registered candidates for councilors in 8-seat City Council of Dagupan in the 1963
elections. Catubig was proclaimed one of the eight elected councilors while Gaerlan lost his bid.

However, Gaerlan went to Court to challenge Catubig's eligibility for the office on the averment of non-age. Catubig was
below 25 years of ages as of the date of the filing of his certificate of candidacy or date of election or date of assumption
of office.
Catubig claims that the question of age-eligibility should be governed by RA 170 which provides that the elective
members of the Municipal Board shall be qualified electors of the city residents therein for at least one year and not less
than 23 years of age and not RA 2259 which provides that no person shall be a city mayor,
vice mayor or councilor unless he is at least 25 years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election and is
a qualified voter.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 170 should prevail over of RA 2259 (Revised Election Code).

Held:

No, RA 170 should not prevail over of RA 2259.

RA 2259 provides that no person shall be a City Mayor, Vice Mayor or Council unless he is at least 25 years of age,
resident of the city for 1 year prior to his election and is a qualified voter. Also, RA 170 states that elective member of
the Municipality Board shall be qualified electors of the city, residents therein for at least 1 year and not less than 23
year of age. The rule that prior enacted special law prevails over the subsequent general law unless, the intention of the
legislature clear.

In the case at bar, RA 2259 should prevail over RA 170. The petitioner was clearly not eligible since he hasn’t reached
the age qualification as stated under sec 6 of the Revised Election Code. It has to be noted that RA 170 (special law)
took effect in 1950 while RA 2259 (general law) took effect in 1959. The repealing clause provided in RA 2259 clearly
shows that the legislative intent of the congress is to amend or repeal all provisions of special law inconsistent to the
provisions of RA 2259.
Thus, RA 170 should not prevail over RA 2259

CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO and CA

G.R. No. L-23052
January 29, 1968

FACTS: Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue, Manila as he was trying to
board a jeepney, causing injuries which required him to incur medical expenses.

Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health
officer, city treasurer and chief of police.

The CFI of Manila rendered a decision in favor of Teotico and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.

On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the CA, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was
sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal for certiorari by the City of Manila.

ISSUE: WON the provision in the City of Manila Charter prevails over the provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

HELD: 

No, the provision in the City of Manila Charter (special law) does not prevail over the provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(general law).

Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila)

The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable
to the entire Philippines. As a rule previously enacted special law, prevails over general law unless the intent of the legislature is
clear.

In the case at bar, the provision stated in the City of Manila Charter establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of
Manila which only mentions damages or injury to persons or property. On the other hand, the civil code provision states that
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision, which is
more specific and should be applied.