MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
33 SCRA 554 (1970)

The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submitted by the contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the testamentary
disposition should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the testatrix
repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an attempt on her part to
give such properties as devises to the designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be
in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of devises.

The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is that part of the testator's property
which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a
negative prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary for
each property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of
Article 1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.

FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina
is the appellee while the others were the appellants
1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million) which included real and personal properties and shares
of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the deceased’s estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her testamentary disposition where she devised and bequeathed
specific real properties comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and Tomas were to receive more
than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised of cash and/or properties specifically given to
them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash/properties to complete their respective
legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate where Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907 NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is
impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will substantially result
in a distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC

ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case

HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by
which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and
literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and
complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for
the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors’ proposition for partition cannot be given effect.

ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition. In her will, the decedent noted that after commanding that
upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in
accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir
among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or
by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executor’s project of partition as the oppositors were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and
assigned to them by the decedent in her will and the differential to complete their legitimes were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and
Tomas, who were obviously favored by the decedent in her will.

Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court
rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by
the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free
portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially
to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.

EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him", from the death of
her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law

DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly
appears from the whole context of the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already
noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on
account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary
adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them
shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."

COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and partition of the entire estate was made by the testatrix, without her
having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some
properties by will which would call for the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.

CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906
of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining
portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.

       
Austria v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970
By: Maranan, Roland

DOCTRINE: Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the
cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the
will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

Petitioner: RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO

Respondent: HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ,
ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA

FACTS:
 In 1956, Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for probate her last will and testament. The
probate was opposed by the present petitioners and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition
was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
 The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the private respondents, all of whom had been
assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
 More than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without
bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the
petitioner Ruben Austria.
 Finally the petitioners filed a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that
the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these
respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.

ISSUE: Whether such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is
false? - YES

RULING+RATIO:
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads:

The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would
not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.
The tenor of the language used (in the will), the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she
was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The petitioners further
contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have instituted the respondents at all — the basis of the institution
being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs
and the opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring
the petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur:  First, the cause for the
institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that
the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were
indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to the
legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory
heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme.
But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One
fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of
heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.

And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that
the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, still such institution must stand.

Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the
institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not
have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution of
heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang
tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class
of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other
than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her
estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz,
shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this
with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and
Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the
petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy — a result which would subvert the clear wishes of
the decedent.

Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive
an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." 

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of
practically his whole estate, as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the
testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. A probate court has found, by final
judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud,
trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.

Succession - 020
AZNAR v. DUNCAN (1966)

Doctrine: When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an
heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be
annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

Facts: Edward Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will. CFI admitted the will to probate,
and declared that Helen Garcia was his natural child. The declaration was appealed to this Court; affirmed.

Meanwhile, CFI approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the will, which said court found
to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia appealed from the order of approval, and this Court reversed the same on the
ground that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower court
with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said law.
CFI approved the project of partition submitted by the executor, wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between
Lucy Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his natural daughter, and Helen Garcia, who had been
judicially declared as such after his death.
- Basis: Since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled. Hence the properties
passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which
legacies have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees.

Hence this appeal.

The CFI ruled, and appellee maintains, that there has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting
in the annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

Appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition. Considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied
his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in
effect defectively disinherited. Based on Articles 906 and 918 of the Civil Code, Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not
to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.

Issue: WON the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be divided in equal shares, OR the inheritance of Lucy as instituted
heir should be merely reduced

Held/Ratio: Lucy's inheritance should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover Helen's legitime, equivalent to 1/4 of
the entire estate.

Edward Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The
fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration
come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his
estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.

When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even
as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

CFI's order is set aside; case remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew.

Digested by: Naomi Quimpo (for A2015)

Acain v. IAC (1987)

Facts:
On May 1984, Constantino Acain (petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on the RTC of Cebu City, a petition for the
probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to Acain of letters testamentary. When
Nemesio died, he left a will in which Acain and his siblings were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed
by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents.
Segundo, the brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir, in case Segundo pre-deceases Nemesio,
Segundo’s children would then succeed.
After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents (Virginia Fernandez, legally adopted daughter of
Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: for the
petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; he is merely a universal heir and the Rosa and
Fernandez have been pretirited. Motion was denied.
After the denial, respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
which was subsequently referred to the IAC. The IAC granted the private respondents' petition and ordered the
TC to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio.
His MR having been denied, Acain filed this present petition for the review of IAC’s decision.
Issues:
1. Whether private respondents have been preterited. No for the widow, yes for Fernandez.
2. Whether Acain has legal standing to intervene in the probate proceedings. No.
**3. Whether the probate court went beyond its authority. No.

Ratio/Held:
1. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, there is no preterition, for she is not in the direct line. However,
the same cannot be said for Fernandez. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the
will of the testator. Neither can it be denied that she was not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case
of preterition of the Fernandez. The universal institution of Acain and his siblings to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will.
2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the
estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and
an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate. Acain, at the outset, appears to have an
interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of Fernandez and the
universal institution of heirs, Acain is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for
the probate of the will left by the deceased and must then be dismissed.
**3. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the
due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be
passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue.
The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966; 17 SCRA 449

Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.

Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting
the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line –
were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited
the compulsory heirs.

Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced
heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit
them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case
of ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the
parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of
petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984.

20JUL
[GUTIERREZ, JR., J.]
FACTS
The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister; that
during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament according to the laws of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. An
opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things that
the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void. The petitioner maintains that since the respondent
judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime
which was reserved by the law for him.
ISSUES
[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of a will executed by
an undisputed foreigner.
[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed of Adoracion’s heirs.
RULING
[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided
for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).“It is therefore evident that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended
to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.”
[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (Article 1039, Civil
Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

PAZ GARCIA Vda. de MAPA et.al. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-38972, September 28, 1987

FACTS: On January 16, 1965, the petitoners Paz Garcia Vda. de Mapa et. al. instituted a civil case before the
Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the properties left by Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo from the
estate of Ludovico Hidrosollo which is also subject to a special proceedings in the same court. They claimed
that the deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, in her last will and testament, instituted Ludovico Hidrosollo
as a universal heir with the obligation as a trustee to the residue of her estate and to hold the same in trust for the
petitioners and the private respondents.

The respondents, in their answer, denied the existence of trust and alleged that Ludovico Hidrosollo, as
the surviving spouse of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosllo, became the latter's universal heir when she died without
ascendants or descendants, so that the controverted properties became part of the estate of Ludovico Hidrosollo.
They further alleged that the civil case instituted by the petitioners was barred by an order denying their motion
to intervene in the special proceedings.

In disposing the case, the lower court ruled that a trust was created and the denial order of the
petitioner's motion to intervene did not deprive them to institute a separate civil action to recover what pertains
to them in their own right. The respondents moved for reconsideration but the same was denied prompting them
to file an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Their appeal to the appellate court proved fruitful as the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that there is no trust nor fideicommissary substition
created in the will of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a trust was created.
2. Whether or not the denial order constitutes a bar to the civil case instituted.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there was a trust created. Although the word "trust" itself does not appear
in the will, the testatrix intent to create one is nonetheless demonstrated by the stipulations in her will.

In designating her husband Ludovico Hidrosollo as a sole and universal heir with the obligation to
deliver the properties to the petitioners and private respondents, she intended that the legal title should vest in
him and in significantly referring to petitioners and private respondents as beneficiarios, she intended that the
beneficial or equitable interest over the properties should repose in them.

Article 1443 of the Civil Code also provides that No particular words are required for the creation of an
express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.

However, the trust created by Concepcion should be limited only to the free portion of her estate.

As to the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that since the denial order was anchored primarily on
the non-existence of or the ineffectivity of the fidecommissary substitution and did not resolve the issue on trust
alleged by the petitioners, such order cannot be considered as an adjudication on the merits of petitioner's claim
against the estate. Hence it is not barred.

Even assuming that a fideicommissary substitution was created, such substitution cannot be give effect
because Article 863 of the Civil Code requires that such substitution must not go beyond one degree from the
heir originally instituted. The petitioners and private respondents are merely sobrinos of the fiduciary or first
heir.

RAMIREZ VS. VDA DE RAMIREZ

G.R. NO. L-27952            FEBRUARY 15, 1982
ABAD SANTOS, J.

PARTIES OF THE CASE:

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, ADMINISTRATRIX (PETITIONER-APPELLEE)
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., OPPOSITORS, JORGE AND ROBERTO RAMIREZ (LEGATEES, OPPOSITORS-
APPELLANTS)

KEYWORD: USUFRUCT LAND IN FAVOR OF A FOREIGNER AS STATED IN THE FILIPINO’S WILL

FACTS: JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, A FILIPINO NATIONAL, DIED IN SPAIN ON DECEMBER 11, 1964, WITH ONLY HIS WIDOW (A
FRENCH NATIONAL LIVING IN PARIS) AS COMPULSORY HEIR. HIS WILL WAS ADMITTED TO PROBATE BY THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH X, ON JULY 27, 1965 BY MARIA LUISA PALACIOS WHO WAS APPOINTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE
ESTATE. THE PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARIES ARE AS FOLLOWS: HIS WIDOW MARCELLE DEMORON DE RAMIREZ; HIS TWO
GRANDNEPHEWS ROBERTO AND JORGE RAMIREZ; AND HIS COMPANION WANDA DE WROBLESKI.

ON JUNE 23, 1966, THE ADMINISTRATRIX SUBMITTED A PROJECT OF PARTITION AS FOLLOWS: THE PROPERTY OF THE DECEASED
IS TO BE DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. ONE PART SHALL GO TO THE WIDOW 'EN PLENO DOMINIO" IN SATISFACTION OF HER LEGITIME;
THE OTHER PART OR "FREE PORTION" SHALL GO TO JORGE AND ROBERTO RAMIREZ "EN NUDA PROPRIEDAD." FURTHERMORE,
ONE THIRD (1/3) OF THE FREE PORTION IS CHARGED WITH THE WIDOW'S USUFRUCT AND THE REMAINING TWO-THIRDS (2/3) WITH
A USUFRUCT IN FAVOR OF WANDA (AN AUSTRIAN LIVING IN SPAIN).

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF A USUFRUCT OVER REAL PROPERTY IN THE PHILIPPINES IN FAVOR OF WANDA WROBLESKI,
WHO IS AN ALIEN, VIOLATES SECTION 5, ARTICLE III OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

HELD: NO. IT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

RATIO: THE APPELLANTS CLAIM THAT THE USUFRUCT OVER REAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE IN FAVOR OF WANDA IS VOID
BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST THE ACQUISITION OF LANDS BY ALIENS.

THE 1935 CONSTITUTION WHICH IS CONTROLLING PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:

SEC. 5. SAVE IN CASES OF HEREDITARY SUCCESSION, NO PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND SHALL BE TRANSFERRED OR ASSIGNED
EXCEPT TO INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS, OR ASSOCIATIONS QUALIFIED TO ACQUIRE OR HOLD LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN
THE PHILIPPINES. (ART. XIII.)

THE COURT A QUO UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE USUFRUCT GIVEN TO WANDA ON THE GROUND THAT THE CONSTITUTION
COVERS NOT ONLY SUCCESSION BY OPERATION OF LAW BUT ALSO TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION. WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION WHICH ENABLES ALIENS TO ACQUIRE PRIVATE LANDS DOES NOT EXTEND TO TESTAMENTARY
SUCCESSION FOR OTHERWISE THE PROHIBITION WILL BE FOR NAUGHT AND MEANINGLESS. ANY ALIEN WOULD BE ABLE TO
CIRCUMVENT THE PROHIBITION BY PAYING MONEY TO A PHILIPPINE LANDOWNER IN EXCHANGE FOR A DEVISE OF A PIECE OF LAND.

THIS OPINION NOTWITHSTANDING, WE UPHOLD THE USUFRUCT IN FAVOR OF WANDA BECAUSE A USUFRUCT, ALBEIT A REAL
RIGHT, DOES NOT VEST TITLE TO THE LAND IN THE USUFRUCTUARY AND IT IS THE VESTING OF TITLE TO LAND IN FAVOR OF
ALIENS WHICH IS PROSCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ IS HEREBY ORDERED DISTRIBUTED AS
FOLLOWS:

ONE-HALF (1/2) THEREOF TO HIS WIDOW AS HER LEGITIME;

ONE-HALF (1/2) THEREOF WHICH IS THE FREE PORTION TO ROBERTO AND JORGE RAMIREZ IN NAKED OWNERSHIP AND THE
USUFRUCT TO WANDA DE WROBLESKI WITH A SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION IN FAVOR OF JUAN PABLO JANKOWSKI AND HORACE V.
RAMIREZ.

THE DISTRIBUTION HEREIN ORDERED SUPERSEDES THAT OF THE COURT A QUO. NO SPECIAL PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS. SO
ORDERED

Crisologo vs Singson
Crisologo vs Singson

Facts:

Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's death death—whether this happens before or after that
of Donya Leona's death—Consolacion's share shall belong to the brothers of the Donya Leona. 

Issue:

Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.

Held:

No, it is not fideicommissary substitution.

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of heirs provided for therein
is not expressly made of the o f ideicommissa kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee,
during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof
being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death—whether
this happens before or after that of the testatrix—her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix. 

Designation of heirs; Purpose of fideicommissary substitution.—It is of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that
an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate
bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. 

The last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion
Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it
happens before or after that of the testatrix. 

EMETERIO A. RODRIGUEZ (in substitution of

RUFINO A. RODRIGUEZ, who died during the
pendency of this case in the Court of Appeals), and
JOSE AYALA, executors-petitioners, v. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and PETRA RODRIGUEZ,
ANTONIA RODRIGUEZ and ROSA RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. L-28734. March 28, 1969
27 SCRA 546
Ponente: Fernando, J.
FACTS:
Doña Margarita Rodriguez left a last will and testament leaving no compulsory heirs or forced heirs
and, consequently was free to dispose of her properties even to strangers at will as provided in her will. The
testatrix made letters of trusteeship to petitioners, who were the executors under the will. The said last will and
testament was legalized by virtue of the resolution or order of the Court of First Instance of Manila without the
appellant’s opposition in, hence the extrinsic validity of the will was substantially not in question. The executor
also presented a project of partition and the same was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila, again
without the opposition of the appellants. Hence, the intrinsic validity of the will could never be again
questioned.
the trust created by the testatrix was then objected to by private respondents, who claimed to be first
cousins of the deceased. Such an objection was overruled by the lower court which granted letters of trusteeship
to petitioners, who were the executors under the will. Such an order of the lower court was appealed by
respondent to the Court of Appeals, which, in the original decision affirmed the action taken by the Court of
First Instance.
The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents resulted in a resolution which set aside its
previous decision and modified the judgment appealed from insofar as the validity of the provision of clause 10
of the will creating the trusteeship was concerned. The disputed clause reads thus:
 "Ang lahat ng pag-aaring nasasabi Clausulang ito (hindi kasama ang ‘generator’ at automobile) hindi
maisasanla o maipagbibili kailan man, maliban sa pag-aaring nasa Quezon Boulevard, Maynila, na
maaring isanla kung walang pondo sa gagamitin sa ipagpapaigi or ipagpapagawa ng panibago at
alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon"
The Court of Appeals held that the above "perpetual prohibition to alienate" the property mentioned,
constitutes a clear violation of Article 867 and Article 870 of the Civil Code. The trust in question is then a
nullity for being in violation of the aforestated rules. There being then no institution of heirs as regards the
properties covered by the trust, the Court of Appeals held that "there should be intestate succession concerning
the same, with the nearest relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the properties in accordance with the law
on intestacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trust in question should be annulled as being in violation of the rules against perpetuities and
the limitation on the prohibition for the alienation of the property left by the deceased.
RULING:
No. It does not admit of doubt that in the disputed clause the testatrix did make clear her purpose not to
mortgage or to sell forevermore (kailan man) certain properties left by her. There would seem then some
justification for the Court of Appeals in the challenged resolution to deny force and effect to such a wish
considering that "a perpetual prohibition to alienate" is by the Civil Code forbidden. The more controlling
provision, however, as already made mention of is supplied by Article 870. Its terms are clear: "The
dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
The codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks categorically. What is declared void is
the testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period. In the interim, such a provision
does not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot be stricken down. The wishes of the testatrix constitute the
law. Her will must be given effect. This is so even if there could be an element of uncertainty insofar as the
ascertainment thereof is concerned. In the language of a Civil Code provision: "If a testamentary disposition
admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be
operative shall be preferred.
Respect for the will of a testator as expressed in his last testamentary disposition, constitutes the
principal basis of the rules which the law prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the clauses of the will;
the words and provisions therein written must be plainly construed in order to avoid a violation of his intentions
and real purpose. The will of the testator clearly and explicitly stated must be respected and complied with as an
inviolable law among the parties in interest.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that petitioners could not challenge the provision in question. It
had no right to vindicate. Such a right may never arise. The twenty-year period is still with us. What would
transpire thereafter is still locked up in the inscrutable future, beyond the power of mere mortals to foretell. At
any rate, We cannot anticipate. Nor should We. We do not possess the power either of conferring a cause of
action to a party when, under the circumstances disclosed, it had none.

RABADILLA vs. CA
G.R. No. 113725, June 06, 2000 – Gem

Facts:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of a parcel of
land. The said Codicil, which was duly probated before the then CFI of Negros Occidental. Pursuant to the
same Codicil, the subject land was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the Transfer Certificate
of Title thereto was issued in his name.Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
Respondent brought a complaintbefore the RTC in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs
violated the conditions of the Codicil.
The plaintiff then prayed for the reconveyance/return of the subject land to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza, because it is alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny
failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a
violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near
descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near
descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the
devised land.

Issue:
WON the testamentary institution of Dr. Rabadilla is a modal institution.

Held:
YES. The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is
in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in
point.From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended
that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed
an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to
the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla’s inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not
complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants. The manner of institution of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Francisco v. Francisco-Alfonso
GR No. 138774, March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent herein, Aida Francisco-Alfonso is the legitimate daughter of decedent Gregorio Francisco.
While petitioners, Regina and Zenaida are two of the illegitimate children of decedent with Julia.

While Gregorio is in the hospital, he confided to Aida that the Certificate Title of his only property is
in the possession of Regina and Zenaida. When Aida confronted the two, they told her that their
father sold the land to them for P25, 000.00. Thus, Aida filed a complaint for annulment of sale. The
RTC ruled that the sale was valid but the CA decided that it was null and void.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the sale is valid.

May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated
contract?

RULING:

No. There was no cause or consideration for the sale making it null and void. The court ruled that it is
incredible for a buy and sell business of ready-to-wear clothes could raise P10,000.00 and earnings in
selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00 for the land. The testimonies of petitioners were
incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale
and as to whether the property was brought below or above its supposed market value. They did not
even present a witness in the sale.

No. Note that the prevailing law during the time of death of Gregorio is the Civil Code and not the
Family Code. Gregorio did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the
only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her father’s
estate. His compulsory heir, Aida, cannot be deprived of her share. Also, the Supreme Court noted
that there was really a plan on the part of Gregorio to deprive his daughter Aida of her share but he
had a change of heart and confided to Aida the certificate of title. Petition is denied.

Baritua v. CA (Mar. 22, 1990)

Abraham F. Sarmiento, J.:

Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.

Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.

CAPTION/PROBLEM: Tricycle collided with bus, tricycle driver died. Bus operator settled with tricycle driver’s estranged wife. A year
later, tricycle driver’s parents sued bus operator for damages alleging that the latter promised to indemnify them for the death of the
son, his funeral expenses and the damaged tricycle (which was allegedly bought with the parents’ money). Who is entitled to the
indemnity – the estranged wife or the parents?

HELD: Tricycle driver’s parents cannot claim because they are not his compulsory heirs. His wife and child are the compulsory heirs.
Spouse concurs with all classes of heirs but parents are compulsory heirs only when decedent dies without a legitimate descendant.

FACTS
 Nov. 7, 1979 - BIENVENIDO Nacario’s tricycle collided with JB Bus No. 80 operated by Jose BARITUA and driven by Edgar
BITANCOR, along the National Highway, San Cayetano, Baao, CamSur.
 Bienvenido and his passenger died because of the accident.
 Bienvenido was survived by his estranged wife ALICIA Baracena (with whom he had a child), and his PARENTS, NICOLAS
and VICTORIA Nacario.
 Mar. 27, 1980 – The bus company’s insurer paid P18,500 to Alicia by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement wherein Alicia
agreed to not to prosecute Baritua and Bitancor for her husband’s death.
o She executed a “Release of Claim” in favor of Baritua, Bitancor, and the insurer releasing them from all claims and
damages resulting from the accident which killed Bienvenido.
 Sep. 2, 1981 – Nicolas and Victoria filed a suit for damages before the CamSur CFI against Baritua and Bitancor.
o Parents alleged that Baritua went to Bienvenido’s wake and promised them indemnity for Bienvenido’s death, the
funeral expenses, and the damaged tricycle (which was bought from money loaned by the parents to their son).
 CFI dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment to Alicia (and the child) extinguished any claim against Baritua et.al.
for the death of Bienvenido since Alicia and her child are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of Bienvenido.
 CA reversed the CFI, holding that:
o The parents brought the case in their personal capacity and not as heirs.
o Alicia could not have validly waived the claim of the parents since she was not the one who suffered such damages.
o The parents were able to establish that they bought the tricycle and Baritua et.al. failed to prove otherwise, hence
they must pay for the damage to the tricycle.
o AWARD: P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for “complete” funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery
lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
 Baritua and Bitancor appealed to the SC.

ISSUE (HELD)
W/N Baritua et.al. are still liable to pay damages to the parents despite the extra-judicial settlement with the wife (NO)

RATIO
 NCC 1231(1): Obligations are extinguished by payment or performance.
 NCC 1240: Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in
interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
 It has been established that Baritua et.al. have paid the claim to Alicia. The question now: Is Alicia entitled to such payment?
 According to NCC 887, No. 2, legitimate parents and ascendants become compulsory heirs in default of legitimate children
and descendants. NCC 985 provides: “In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.”
 On the other hand, NCC 887 also provides that the surviving spouse is also a compulsory heir; and s/he is not excluded by the
legitimate children/descendants or by the legitimate parents/ascendants.
  SC: “It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant.
On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs.”
 Therefore Bienvenido’s compulsory heirs and successors-in-interest are Alicia and the child. Nicolas and Victoria are not
compulsory heirs. Baritua et.al. were therefore correct in settling the claim with Alicia, as she is the widow and the guardian of
Bienvenido’s child.
 Nicolas and Victoria can no longer recover the purchase price of the tricycle and the funeral expenses from Baritua et.al. since
their obligation has been extinguished with the payment to Alicia. Their proper recourse is against the estate of Bienvenido,
since he is the alleged debtor.

DISPOSITION: Petition granted. CA decision set aside, CFI decision reinstated.