Essence q[ Human Freedom is a fundamental text for und ..

M;tan{Jing HCiclcgger's vi w f ' ck philosophy and its relationship to mod Til philosophy. After a preltminary discussion of . problem of fr cdorn and its relationship to philosoph" HcidcggC'r devotes Part marily to I:h, me n'ing of b jng' in Gr ck m taphvsics, thus providjng the fram.ework for interpretation of Kant's tr atrnent, of fre dam and causality in Part Two.

HEIDEGGER

no other work by Hddcggcr
10 ophy rpretation
I

do we find as detailed a consid ration text. Further, in no other' presented with comparable

or

Kant's pra tical is HCidcgg r s Th se

a

gi'VIlIl

in

tJ1C

present 1etophysics

work

of Aristotl 's

thoroughness.

lrViOU,l)., untranslated lectures
iumm r of 19 O.

were delivered by Heidcgger at the University of Frcibllrg in

irfin Heidegger (1889-1976)
orrant philosophers,
'0))

is now r garded as

Oil

of ,th' twentieth century's most ont mporar)'

whose

work, particularly Beine and Time, has Influenced not only

losophy but also theology, political science and aestheti s. The Athlonc

an Think rs s ries includes several published and forthcoming works by Hcidegger.

tI Sadler, the translator of the work, studied at the Llniven it)' of Syd,~cy and has taugh~ osophy widely at Australian univ rsities. Be is the author of Nietsscl,«: Truth and i?mption and Heideoser and
Tile Essence
Aristotle,

and the translator of Towards a Dejill~rion .

eI Philosophy

'If

Truth, in this seri

Ted Sadler is dviser to the Athlone Contemporary scrips on the translations of works by \Iarlill

EUl'OfJean

Thinkers l lcidegger,

;V1AHT1N

fJI1.JDE.GG

EH

Works published I-ieidegg
1',

THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM
AN INTR()D TID
r

Tou ard the Dejlnili(JlI f.!lPhilosophy

TO PHILOSOPJ-IY

Heirlegger, 'I'll' IE. sence or/hlll! Heidegger, The Essence II Lliunan Freedom
Translated

by Ted

adler

Tln- Towr-r

(:nrnil11l1un llu ilrling, I I York ]\",,,L ] .ondou, :;1:.1 7,'\;\

'>70 1.,<.'.'<].Ill'!lon,.,IIP, ,\ ...

",·W

Y""k, \:Y 11)111'7 (i;O.,

CONTENTS
Grnbl l, 'I 'rans III tor's Foreu-ord

Th i, I·:Ill'! Iish 11·"",1" riou (' Con ti 1\ to" I n l()ll,. Originally published as fum }}he" der 11I,'II,<drfid"'1I "i"i/"'il' ((_,Viuorio I.'ra"khm am \ lain. 19K2
IV link
;0\," ;\

KI"",I. rmnnu e

nil' J Ieruusgabe

dieses \yp\'kcs

I; 11.. 1"

"0"

J ;\TI~Pt 1'\ATIOVES,

1l0ll11

gdiinl~r I

PREIJMINARY

CO SIlJE~\ATJ()NS

All righl" reserved. No I,arl of Ih is I'" hi i""1iou rnnv he' rr-prod un'd or I ransm ill erl ill any lorm or by ""y means, e1er'ln:m;C'!lr II1P(']","i",,1. ;ndmliuJ! photocopviug, rpeordillg Or allY information sl"rag'~ or rotricva] SVSI"J!\. wi: hom pr-r missjnn ill wriling [rum Lilt' publishers, Ikiti.sh Library C,llalogu.ing-in-Public<llinll Dnla A rallL/ague record fortlns book is OI'f<ilablcl/rom the B,.iIL.h LilJl(J/)', l~lJ:'\ iI-I-Uu'I-'39:21-1i (hardback) u lli-I-'l92·1-2 (paperback) Library orCollgn"" Cmn]ngillg'-in-Publkali.oll Daln .ll catatoe H!t'ol'tl.fi:Jl" this bonk i.s (Ii lallablc j1"DIII th« Librarv q/ C01.lf,fn:ss, 1YJ>e<(,( by I\p lim-Catr] I U, n ited, I3w,gay. S"ffol k Prj 1\1",1 nnd bcund ;n GreaL BTi I ain hv \ 1 pc. IInoks 1 .id, Bodm m, Cornwall

~ 1 The Apparent Contradiction between the 'Particular' Question Concerning Lhe Essence of Human Freedom and the 'General' Task of an I n trod uction to Ph iloscphy a) The 'Par ticulari ty' of the Topic and Introduction to Philosophy
I he

' nmeral ity' of an 2

b) Broadening the Question Concerriiug the Essence of Human Freedom towards the Totality of Beings (World and God) ill we Preliminary Discussion of 'Negative' Freedom. Specific Character Philosophical as Distinct. from, cientific Questioning c) Deeper Interpretarion of 'Negative Freedom' as Freedom-from in Terms of the Essence- of I ts Relational Character. Beings in tho Whole Necessarily Included in the Question Concerning H uman Freedom rI) Phi losophy as Hevealing Pa rricu lar Problems theWhole hy Means of Properly ...

of

""
7

onceivcd

PAHT O~E POSITIVE DEFfl\TJTTON OF PIlTl.oSOPH Y FROM THE CO~TENT OF TI-IP. PROBLEM OF F'RE;:EDOM. THE PH013LE:V1OF I-[UMAN FHEI:mOM AX]) THE FCNDAMENTAL Q ESTIO~ OF PHILOSOPHY Chapter Dlle FirSI Bn·ajo"lhrough to the Proper Dimension of the Problem of Freedom in limit, TIU' Connection c:f lhe Problem. a/Freedom u;ilh the Fundamental Problem s c:/ !'vleltlph:~;,'s ~ 2. Philosophy

I :>
1 :>

r ;0;

01 lO g

as Inqui.ring lilt' Hoots

into rhr- V'{hn],·, Going-after-the-Whole

as

~ '1. FOfm<ll-lndicaliw
of 'Trausce ~ Lllruad(·ning

I Jiscussion of 'Posuive FreNlom' by Fl.f'c01lsidpr<llion ",It'll! a l' and 'Prar-t i ra I' Fn'{'dolll ill Ka n [ of tho I'wbJE'1I1 of Freedom withinllw Perspccrive of
i111'

1 "i

Cosmologinol Prvblplll as indicated ill. Llw (,rounding Ch<1r;ICI(!r of 'TmllscC'jldelllal Freedom', Fref,dom Causality - ido\'emem- Bt'illgs as
~tleli 19

'i+ I Jiscussiun of 111t' Q\'oo.of 111f'Fu ndameru al Question.wJph_l' '11 'il l're5E'IlCI" <I) Being <melActuali ty (Being-Presenl). of Bl·illg and (~rrf'k Philosophy's L'ndl'rsranding a) The Character of Preconceprual Forgottenness of Being of Being and the d) The Greek nderstanding of Truth (uk~9E\o..rlioll or the.uaii7.rI.~ I I. ov) as the Most Proper Being (Kupl('.1("lIIa/ila~. (urUVflET(l. The Comprehensive Sf'OPf' of I\ping ((ining after-the-Whole) and the Challeuging' Indiviti.) The correspondence '52 between being and being-true (decoucealment). ~) !I(·ing and Substance. 1111"nquiry I lI('il1l': and b) c) I h.u 0 f die iJllO~ltvol' oocria as the n:opowiu of the dllo~ G 11 era 1 of Spiri lin Hegel as Absolute Presence b) rh·ing and What-Being. Discussionof the Leading QIlPslion/i"O/Il [.ding" ·l.nllllmv).. simplicity (unity) and constant presence.y Ihrough 10 tlu: Fundamental QueJlioll ojPhilo... Presence.oing-I <1-1 lit' Hoots) of Time as the Horizon of I til' l'::udersrandi ng of IIf'ill!! 119 . L' nderstand as III!" (. Connection Betw<"en th e Textual Question and the SIIbsra 111 Question of th e Re la Lion Bel ween Bei ng Qua Bf'i rig-True ive and Beillg Qua Being-Actual (ilvc»yEiijt ov) a) TIle rejection interpretation episremology interpre 1...round of LllP Po. Preconceptual Understanding Word for Being.ing (ooO"i«) as Constant Presence. truth things and truth of sentences (propositional truth).·r il"longs «( Ch"ll.1 Ou:» Possiniliticsand PI"t!S/l pposit ions 28 28 § 6. as 111(' xuprdrrurov ':\\1 in 0 1(1 and Ii".11 ion in tE'rpl"f'ta uon of 0 I!l's placement in 0 and the traditional of being-true as a problem logic and (Schwegler.ll(){:.2Uf'SI iou of PI Ii1050phy as til e (J lies! ion Cone .r ion (lbiliry..<lcs E + Thematic '1. ).~nging Characi r-r "r I 11.· Stands. The simple )6 y) (O:Il](liPCTO.. The thematic discussion of thrbeing-true of (proper) beings (tlti tilw npo.\lan ~ 1 'S.vi Con Iell Is Contents to Book 0.(·ssity of a 1\f'J.Lturesu hi ng from th is vii ~ 5. Leading Question of Philosophy the Being of Beings (li H\ Bv) as I he Question Concerning Basic 29 il) Demonstration of Chapter l O's proper placement in 1300k 0. as lo:uPU. nderstanding of n".irs 0 10) 79 1'10 w~ ..\(·(. The ambiguity in the Greek concept oftruth.Previuusly SlaLUS Discussed . in ChapterOff) or 61 § 7. The Most Proper Bf'ing as the Simple and Constantly Present b) Tbe Ambiguity of oueria as ign of the Hichlless and Crgency of the Unrnastered Problems in rhe Awakening of the nderstanding of 13eing c) Everyday Speech and the Fundamental Presence Meaning of ofJrrio. (Ccnsraru Presence) in the Greek In tcrprerarion jvln\"(~rncnl..1. The Greek 1nrerpretation or B('ing ns lJeing True ill [he Horizon of Being as Constant Presence.dom and I he Tradi I iOII[11 Form nf Ilw I. 'Hnaph.r. '1'1It' I'\m daruen l ill (. fi)'1l0i::. TIlt' Inner Structural Con necuon of 01'10"1« as nupouciu with tvi:pyclu and .natov 61'). Thr. Truth. ..si(".) \Yher . 010 as Keystone lO Book 0 and to Aristotelian Metaphysics in a) Bf'i ng and .<llioll . Qucria as VVbal Is ought and Pre-understood ill the Leading Question of Philosophy 37 e) 73 § R. ill Hf?/lIphy.!lle51ion of Philosophv. WllatBf'irLg.si hi lily of the Essence 01' . Bei ng as II re Problem ~ 10. The Actuality i5 76 The Further Developrneru of rhe Problem of Su bsrance. Bping.HUtlW 6" (Aristotle. The Being Which Is True (akIlOtt.nplary of Be-ing-Truf' tn Four :\k""'11{!5 of tkillg in Aristotle.. Ross).. The Exdusion r"1I.\h'anings of ttlf' OV of ing of Bpi n g Ex".: 0. ()t1C'sLiml of Wlwill('r This C}I<'III. not or knowledge.Il'\\"t'd )'nlerrog.Dt(. The OV ull]O{.Leading (JII<:Sliun 23 56 or Chapter TilT! Till! Leading Question qj"Phl.) as Deconrealrneru.V] overnen t: oooiu as 1tllpoum.. cmM:) as the pr-oper being and its decoucealmeru as the highesl mode of being-true Deconcealment self-presence of the simple as pure and absolute 7() d) The Self-concealed .m n r Frc·". ella 1II'Ill!i 1Ig. Jaeger. ~ !l. Til '" ()uesl ion ah 1(.Cha rael PI" "I' IIw B roarlenorl Prohl . Su hsraut iali t. o fundamental types of being and their v corresponding modes of being-true 65 13) Truth. The erroneous of IWPU./osu(Jhy and [ts QIII'.!u(>~tion or Ilei ng (Fundamental (JIIt'SI ion) and 11o{'Prnhlern of Freedom..~ingthe Le(lding Quesl£oll o/:Vl(!laph). lu: 1 '15 II w Si u. Dr-monstraucn of the Hidden Fumlameutal Meaning of oiJalo. ouoio.l.<.lefUpli}:n'r"s w.rrii ng Ill{" Primordia) Connect ion between SE'ing and Time ~ 1. mal Being-Actual (Beillg-Preselll) or iH ")9 ·~3 The Question of the Being-True of Proper Beings as the Highest and Deepest Question of Aristotle's Iruerpretauon of Being. T .1-'5 ChapIn' Three If .y and Consian I or .: rile .

f I Ill' IInsic' H -ltu iOIlS I'ossihlf' 1I"illl.C(IIIC"'pIS of the l'nderslallrlillg. Thesis of the Third A ntuiorny.I'u!"e. Causality tlirougb Freedom.TIIP Second Analog..hr.pI'Il.IS ill an ('I1('riti('al II~ he' Anrirhetic of Pure R. !-VaX to ~[ii'eerLom ill the Kantiau ")~Iem: IIII' QueMioll q/llre Possibility if glpr!l1RIICI! (IS the Questioll of tlie Possibility 0/ Genuine _vlewph.ppearances of the World as l lniversal Ontological Problem I '5tl .llit I of World. Is Present in the Context of the lnncr Enablement of Experience 11) The Three .'\lIalugy or a) The Problem of Freedom as Originating from the Problem Freedom as a Distinctive Mode of Natural CIIUS.ACrrCA L 1"11 EI':[)O:'l1 ChapUT" One 1:.\nalogy. Toward the Problematic of Freedom as a Kind of ausality b) First Exarninauon of Causality's Orientation 10 the Mode of Being of B ing-Presenl.)' and in Modern Physics. The Connection between Causality in General and Being·Present as a Mode of Being a) The Orientation 0 Causalit in General to the Call alit r of Nature. Two Kinds of Causalitv: atural Causality and the Causality of Freedom.1<'5 o 1':. The FlIlitiaHll'lIlal \ Ir-ani rtg tlw Firs: . of Action.'" fllld IIII' <)lI!'slioll "rTlwir CiIHnwlt'''''~ \nal"gi.lSCI. I. Th .eason in the' I·HI Third Arni nomy "1 Th" \1111101.11. Freedom as Cosmological Idea I'~1 14'f 11+ and I I') 1 I'} ~ I.2uestion Concerning the Possibi lit ' of (~enuille Metaphysics ~ 22. The ite of the Question of Freedom ill the Problem the Possibility of l~xpPrience as the (.'.\n.nd('r. 1'0 unded in 1he Quesuon (J r the I':Sse11(.ssenc of Event and of ihe Possibility of Its Perc prion 'Lit' 123 h) I~xcllrsus: on E..P.Karuian (Statistics) Conception at Characterizing Its Fundamental ~ 17.'IH'. The S 'stematic of Fre dom according to Kant 139 Succession ami olThat IYhieb Modes of till' Intra Temporality Is 112 a) The 'ystematic Site as.\lodes of Time (Permancn Simulmneity) !'r"sPIlI . A:\' IJ PH.' of A IIimate and ~ 20."s: Xaiural Causality ~ 2').:SI )I~.f 146 n ) 'I'll" First \ I mlogy: I'PrlUUIlCIl('P and Tune b) Tlw Idea of Freedom as 'Transcendental Cone 'pt of Nature": Absolute hI The ()lIPstiUII\\'(J)'thy \s O('i"IIOIi ofTirn« \!.~sential Analysis and Anal c) 125 128 Tire First Causalitv and Freedom as osmoloeical Problem. Anal sis of the E.ive of he Question: tlw Leading Quesuon "f \ r .'''''p . ample of IflP First .f'Il~'r<l1 ontexrure: Causality and Temporal Succe ion 1Wi 134 Charncterizauon of the Armlogip5 or ExpO"rienccltJ7 a) The Ana logies of Experience as 1\111('5of l 'u ivr-rse l Temporal Dplf'rmin<lLioll of the I~('illg Present 01"1'''.. Permanence Succession 121 123 ~ I~l. The Possibility of Causaluv 1"1'0\1l('h Freedom (Transcendental Freedom) Alongsid« Lite Causali r of Natur ill i.slalldillg) ..11 IWlIl(l1 iC(l1 113 Till' \lIalugi('S Expf'ri('IH'f' as nul's .Tra uscr-nrh-utul I )(·dW'1 JOIl oj t l u. Causality in rhe Sense of Causation Is Running Ahead in Time as Determining Leuing-Follow 99 99 ~ I:)_ Prr-hminar Remark the Sciences a) Causality of Causalitv ill .'rsp"ct. ubstantive and Scope of Questioning Contexture Defining the Direction 139 of d d) TIlt' l Iistiuct iou 1'!'ilwiplC's 1l<'IWt'f'1I Dvnarnical and \1.\:\T E. (.logif's "I' EXlwri"n.'<I'('I'i.\ K .1 i l u. First A Itempt of L1w Quesriouworthiness Nature in th Sci nces 99 and 1002 of Causali I. and Causallty a) PAI~r TWO CAI'SAUTY AND 1.' 11<) a) TIt~. TI".vr"llt (Occurrence) and Temporal Succession. The General Ontological Horizon of the Problem of Fre dom in the Definition of Freedom as a Kind of Causality. rhr..ImO.! ill Time of That Whldlls Pn-seut or or UIP b) I ant's Two Ways to Freedom and the Traditional Problematic of Metaphysics. I" ph ysi rs as (.. I)isC'ussion of th" :\lodl' of Proof uf Illp Analogies 0 Experieure Tllt'i r Foumlatiou from the E.ysir.IS 'p. Probabiluv '.(' 0 r FI'('('dull) eli Q2 The Fuudamental Meaning of the First (Substamiality) and Causality Occurrence.H'1l II> IIII' FOlilldatioJI of rlie Analogi.ngieal :-'Irtll'IIlI'l' tIl t ln.':TA I. 14.Explanation of [he . Temporal nalogy. Action as pt ill the Connection between Cause and 132 1~3 as Expression Inanimate h) Causalitv Causality ~ I (i.\1<111 Fillil!' S[lhjPf'[ .itluccession as the Distinctive Temporal Mode of Causality and Illustrated by the Simultaneity of Cause and Effect c) econd Examination Being of Being-Pres th Sue es ion-Cor of Causality'S Orientation to the Mode of nt in Terms of the Concept. Ef~ CL 136 'ite I DR ~ 21.! THA:-.iii Contents Contents IX ~ ( k S" JI"ililllE tht. .11 n hier. Two I inds u Causality and I 1111' ('11('1.\ on the Problem Causalir as Temporal Relation. rifiN! and 'I Think' 0' Essl'III'(' (l.

Character and Limits of the Problem of Freedom within the Problem of lhe Antinomies <I) Pure Will and Actuality. the 'nd srstanding of Being or 169 or Editor's 4fiem'ord to the German Edition o/July 1~lIglish-Germall.rledg(· to the Prcblem of Human Finitude as uch b) The Displacem nt of the Problem of the Antinomies. The Application of II e niversal Ontologica] (Cosmological) Problematic 10 Man as VVorid-Entity as the Condition of the Possibility of the Manifestness Being of Beings. Freedom as the Causality of Reason: Transcendental Jd a of all T nconditioned Causality. Freedom as Tlllelligible Causality: Transcen~ental I~ea of an nconditioned Causality. The Specific Character Actuality as Fact the Will '011clus 195 19 b) The Fact of the Ethical Law and the Consciousness a) The Resolution of the Probl m of the Antinomies as rioing Beyond the Problem of [finite Knov. Possibi Ii IV and Actualitv F.solving the Problem of the Antinomies or Pure Reason in the :'I leral Law d) The Categoricallmp 'Universal Validity' ~ 28.HallCllillg' of Its Principle b) The Distinct.wl Bl!ing ~ 2(i. Tho ES:Sf'llC(' of' :'I Ian as a Heing of Sense and Rf!HSOI!. The Positive Hesolutioll of th Third Antinomy. Possibilu of Genuine Metaph 'sics. On the Quest.dom 01) Till' Essence of :'IIall (I l urnani find Self HL'spol1sil)ilily ry) s Person (Persoualitv). Freedom 'ausatity: Kant's Binding of the of the 165 203 205 c) Empirical and Intelligible Charact r. 178 179 179 "I' 1i'!(J Persoual itv 11) Tile Two \Yal's 10 Freedom IIlILl the IJisunerion bet wp. The Question on erning a Outside the Appearances and Conditions the Third n tinomy ill Looking Towards Person Resolution of the Causation [or Appearan es of Time. The Limits of the Kantian Discussion of Freedom.x COllie nts Conterus xi h) Tilt' Antithesis of the Third Antinomy. The Practical Reali! . Transcenderual and Practical Fre . Pure Practical Practical I{eason as 190 19:2 19~ a) The D lusion of Couunon Reason in i hr.el' Transcendr-ntal ami Prart leal Fr~edom.f'd. The Acrualuy of l luman (Practical) Freedom in IR2 153 of The Special Character of the Cosmological Ideas ill the Ouesrion lilt.27.e. -.ion of Its Actuality and 160 of I Iuman Fre dom and J ts Acruali IY of Will-gov ·rned of the -reedom or § 2':i. The Consciousness rative. Freedom as the Ground of ~ 29. Practical Freedom as pec?/ic to . The Hesolution of Man as "thically Acting ian L62 The Proper Otuologicai Dimension of Freedom. Preparatory Antinomy of the Third 1':i7 157 or Pun' Reason as Practical. of Freedom b) The Ess 'nee Pure win c) The Actuality IH2 IH5 S 24. The Double Chara tel' of ppeanlllce and We Possibilirv of Two Fundamentall . Glossary: Greek-Ell eiisti Glossary 1981 .2·07 209 215 17~ Chapter 7i~'o '1'1/1'Second IVa)" 10 Freedom in the Kantian vstem. The Distinction Bf'tw('<'(.ion B tween. -- .HUll a' a j~rltio. H ason 's Iuteresi ill Resoh-ing the Antinorn (Negative) DeLer1llinaLions Towards Hesolution a) Freedom as Fact. The Exclusion of Freedom lrom lhe Causality of Lite World-Process c) ~. The Intelligible Characr r as the lode of Causation of Causalit from Freedom. Problem of Freedmn to the Problem of Causality ~ 31). ppearance (Finite Knowledge) and ThingIn-Itself (Infinite Knowledge) as t he K(! to "<. Different Causaliti s in Relation to the Appearanc as Effect d) The Causality RE'ason. The Factuality (Actuality) or Practical Freedom Ethical Praxis arid I he Problem of It 'Experience'. i. The Rootedness of the Question of Being in the Question oncerning the E sence ofHuman Freedom.·<.."".

Oth r footnotes are from the edi tor of the German edition. with the approximate pagination of the German 'Akad 1'n1 ' edition in brackets.'1'01· example.ions. As is also the case in respect of other posthumously published lecture courses by I! ·idegger. The Kant translations used are as follows: This book is a translation of Vom 14'eS(!1"I der menschlichen Freiheit. which re~ rs to the what-ness' or 'essential nature of something.'erman (. nor at any lime did he prepare. this lecture course for publication. since fre dom i not a 'thing. difficulties that are compounded when one is dealing wi til toxts derived from lecture man uscri pts and transcn pts. Information on the origin of th errnan text a printed in tb Ge amiausgabe can b found in Hartmut Tietjen's Afterword to the original dition (pp. London: Macmillan. aft r a preliminary discussion of the problem of fr edorn and its I' lationship to philosoph in general.Translator's Foreioord ·111 TRA SLATOR'S "FOB.1e if Practical Reason. In no other work by Heidegger do we find a com parably detail d consideration of Kant's practical phi losophy as that given in the present te t. are usually translated or paraphrased by Heid gger himself Wher this is not th case. It is wel l-known that Ileidegger s language poses formidable elifficultics for Lhe translator. HOlh translated by Lewis While Beck 111 Immanuel Kalil: Critique if Practical Reason and Other rVrilirl{{s ill Moral Philosoph . truth. th German text does not have the character of a polished work. I have giv n standard English translations in the footnotes.elaph. mith. particularly in Part One. of Chicago Press. It should be kept in mind. hut this practice. 1. A-rilik der praktischen Vernullji: Criliql. However. Norman F emp. references to the Critique if Pure Reason (abbreviated CPH) follow the standard numbering s st m of this parti ular work. 1 have provided an extensive English :. Heidegg r devotes Part On of the curse primarily to the problem of being in Greek metaphysics. in no other work is Heidegger's interpretation of the k y Chapter 10 of Aristoti 's Metaphysics e presented with comparable thoroughness. Insertion or I he original Gerrnall in sq uare brackets within the translation is one Iva' 0(' drawing atten tion to sper if'ic problems.rsik der Siuen. GnIIltLLe{{W1g . 1~H9. tha when I !eidegger uses 'VVesen' in connection with freedom. (!l ::111' iVi. The text is based on a lecture course delivered b Heidegger at the niversity of Freiburg in the summer sern ster of '1930. I have . this providing the framework for his interpretation of KanT's treatment of freedom and causality in Part Two. for the most pan restricting t 11t'1l1 LO especial I.ilso attach d a short Greek-English Glossary. often xhibiting a roughness and stylistic irregularity indi alive of oral presentation. but rath r to an 'occurrence' wh rein the human being activel appropriates' its proper being. ruique qf Pure Reason. and I'ditC"d by Bf'C'k. the' ss n of freedom' does not refer to anything fixed and static. however. remaining faithful to the unfinished nature of the text while givillg due attention to readability. The approximat page numb r of t he German dition are giv n in square brackets at the foot of each page. in such contexts Heidegger wants to convey the original erbal meaning or 'Wesen'. trans. w ho as well as giving bibliographial references sometimes puts supplern ntary material from Ileidegger at the bottom of the page. Einleuung in die Philasophie. Acrorclingly I have sougllL to minimize SlH'1i insert. hicago: Cnin'Tsit). References to and quotations from Kant's writings have been given arcordino to stamlardEnglish translations (occasionally modified).EWOHD Ilighlight_ However. :Vly ran lation attempts to remain as close as possible to l-ieideggel"s actual words. could easil overburden a n already com pie text. 1933. however. III line with most previous translations of Heidegger and other German ph ilosophers I have rendered ·Wesen' as 'essence. The frequent passages of Greek.ant OCCUl'renCf_S of operational terrns and La words whose' etymological interrelauons lleidegger is st pkillg L) or A ritik: der reinen Vernunfi: Immanuel Kant's trans. h does not mean the same thing as the Latin 'essentia'. Foundations oj the Metaphysics vlorals. As the title indi ales the fundamental theme th cours as a whol is th ssence of human fr edom.fjected in the title of this volume. if carried oUL extensively. lossar r which. Inst ad. The reader of the pr sent translation should bear in mind that Heidegger did not originally intend. sigllifi(. and the human being. first published in 1982 (2nd edn 199'1-) as Volume 31 of Martin H idegger's Gesamtausgabe. One translational decision requires specific comment e pecially as it is j'(. Further. while not an infallibl gujd should an wer most queries ns to what (i-erman word is being translated at all parti ular point. 207-8 of this volume).

Werner S. Parvis Emad and Prof. Those things just listed as outside or alongside mall are as familiar to us as man himself. despite every dis in cion and differen e. Everything we know is knOW1)as something that is. ho . Indiar apolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 1985. Ted Sadler August 2001 PRELIM ARY ONSIDEHATIO S . Yet we are also acquainted with that in which. 'nd it is this tin. W ar to treat of freedom.its I '\Yorld' and 'God' are here intended as noucomm iral words [or the totality of Iwings (Ihe specific totality of nature and history: world) and for the groulld of"the totulily (Cod). TIll" th me of thi introduction to philosophy is alread signalled in the title of the lectur ourse. It is the essence of human freedom. 1928. and the 'General' Task if an Introduction to Philosoph). et b '(llre the forces 01" nature and cosmic processes this tiny beirur exhibits a hop less fragility before history with its fates and fortunes an ineluctable powerlessness. and transitory being. powerless. trans. Valuabl comments have also been rec ived from Prof. For assistance in th preparation of this translation I would like to 'hank Dr. De mundi sensibilis atque iruelligibilis forll1a et principiis: Dissertation on the fi'orm and Principles of the "el/sible and Intelligible /If/odd.W. F. Further.. von Hermann.desJ. of human freedom. So w shall be considering man and not animals: not plants not mal rial bodies not th produ ts of craft and technology. The Apparent Contradiction between the Particular Question oncernine the Essence if Human Freedom. fragile. the human being. not works of art not God but man and his freedom. The totality of beings is what we usually call world. [ 1-2J .' If we bring to mind. (mpany. trans. before the immeasurable duration of cosmic processes and 0(" h istory itself all inexorable transitor iness.Mamie Hanlon. and verything t hat is we call a being rein. whose freedom we are gOlng to consider.ondon: Open Court. the totality of known and unknown " beings. is one being among all the others. ever indefinitely. I. trans. To be a being (Seiendes zu seinJ is what ev rything we hav mentioned. at the same time thinking specificall of man it becomes clear iha human beings occupy only a small corner within the totalit '. we shall examine just one of this being's properties .emenl. II these things are spread out before us and we can distinguish various items one from another. and the ground of world is what we commonly call God. all thing ngree. primaril and in th last instance has ill common. ertation and Early Wrilings 0/1 Space. Pluhar. We are to tr 'at of III a 11. Seien. John Handyside in Kant s Inaugural Dis. in Kant's Philo -ophy: ofMaterial Nature.. 19H7. Prolegomena zu einer jeden kilnfiigen 1rttap/~'Ysik: Prolegomena to An. rnor sp ifi all . Hackett Publishing if Judr.~ 1. of whom we are to I rear. Future 'letaphrysics. Paul J8urus (extensiv I revised by James W Ellington). The human being.xrv Translator's Foreword "rilili der ["rteilskraji: Indianapolis: Critiqu.

into different domains. i. This consideration is not meant to decide the issue of whether philosophy is or can be scientific but. ami not by accident. never the mathematical as such. Nature is the concern of mathematical physical theory.2 Preliminar-y: Considerarions !JV I. this is the only fruitful and scientific method for an illlroduction to philosophy. Why this presupposition of the scientific character of philosophy is unjustified we cannot now discuss. etc. In philology we begin by reading and in terpreti ng specific individual literary works and not with phi lology as such or with the literary work as such. History (man) IS the concern of historical systematic cultural science. The history of Frederick the Second IS not medieval history as such. For the intention. It is the method that every science naturally adopts.he problem of freedom .ligone is not classical philology as such. and the universal is always the universality of the various i'culiculars deter. On the con trary.in order to achieve the desired . If every science is necessarily restricted to one and only one particular domain Ihen philosophy clearly cannot be a science and has no right to call itself one. The view that this latter procedure. And yet how do we begin. Originally the totality of beings was called material nature. ]0 be sure. The theory of differenual equations is not.the totality of world and God . there may be particular questions within philosophy. then we arc not at [2-3J [3-5J . WE' treat this topic in particular and not mathematics as a whole. But Lli is assumption is erroneous. . So the task of these lectures is quite in order. the treatm ell I of the problem of human freedom is not philosophy as such. Science divides all these beings . To press forward from a I )"('f\ LJ oe n t 0 f a particu la r problem . mathematics as such.and not its other facu Lies. But an introd uction to phi losophy must from the very beginning attempt to bring the whole II1to view as such. living nature.ong the particular sciences.Instead. provided that philosophy too IS a science mid as such remains bound by the guiding prmciples of scientific method. to seek an understanding of philosophy ill general by immediately diverting into a particular question: this is clearly an impossible undertaking.e.nd ourselves to the examination of one particular question (freedom) which I'or its part is related La one particular beirui (mall) within the totality. We shall consider this one thing only. The Apparenl Contradiction 3 freedom . Likewise. only to show that there are reasoua bIe grau nds for at least q uestion ing an d d isp IItin g this aSSUn1 ption. So in all the sciences: we. not in order to rernam and get lost at this 1[-'\. owing to its scientific character.hegin wi th the particular and concrete. The interpretation of Sophocles' An. Such all opinion has common sense on its side.e. God is the concern of theology.t. accorn plishmen ts. and character-is! irs.l hut this eli ITerenGf' dot'S not imply contrad ict ion or mutual oxr-lusion. But if this is so. ut so that we ran proceed LO the essential and universal.orting the vi w of the whole. Such is the situation. for example in mathematics? We do not start with the theory of differen rial equations but with the calculation of differentials. of mall and that man is a particular being within the totality of h('illgs. il must avoid the danger of losing itself too much in particular questions and thereby dist.icular is diITf'rf'llL LO the univr-rsa. narnelv or the universal contained within It.in trod uctory' general orienuuion to philosophy.loth e lIniversality of philosophical knowledge is in no wayan impossible underlaking.in til is case h uman freedom . of the lOlaLi~r qf us questions . ma. The question concerning the essence of human Freedom is nevertheless not a particular question. From such all introduction we expert to gain a view of philosophy ill gf'lleral. the latter call only concern itself with all beings. An introduction to philosophy rn ust provide a11 ori entation to the most gen era I features 0 [ ph iIosophy. rests 0 n an oth er pres \l ppos ition.CL. From the possibility of thus disputing the scientific character of philosophy we conclude only that it is not so certain that in philosophy we should follow the scien tine procedure of setting out [rom a particular question.IlY people strongly insist upon it. In this way we want to gaill an overview of the entire field of philosophy. to the general. Wi th the topic 'the essence of human freedom' we strictlv bi. which are then distributed am. are opposed to one another. if the topic {)f these lectures is not a particular question. To attempt an introduction to philosophy by way of the question of human freedom. a) The 'Particularity' of the Topic and the 'Generality' of an Introduction to Philosophy The particular IS indeed different. II amely that the question concerning the essence of h oman freedom is a special or particular question. The b part. Since no specific domain of beings is left over for philosophy. We ourselves began by indicating that freedom is a particular prop('n). i."('1.rnined by it. the partiru lar is always the particulari ty of one thing. is also su itab] e and II ecessary for ph iloso phy. and indeed precisely as a whole. The morphology and phYSiOlogy of fungus and moss is not botany as such. Y t treating this topic is supposed to be an introduction to philosophy. To be sure. Perhaps that is COlT{. VVe must therefore always look to the parlind ar if we wish to discover the Ull iversal. arid the means of its realization.

4 Preliminary Consideration» ~ I. i. I. \Vith the question of freedom we leave behind us. hold 10 God and take upon himself tsv demand of God" All such being toward God would be in principle impossible if man did not possess the possibi lit of turning away Irorn God. but are essentially included in it. By this we mean that human action as such is 1I0t pnmarily caused by natural processes.. albeit ini ially only as negative freedom. f'V(>I"ylhing and an . Only then call he seek and a knowledge God.an independence from the 'world'.11 human fortunes" From what was said above we ould call this independence from natur and histor .'-' (J)C'UI"dl<'1" 1 ~nll~·"er des 1'f('/"~i'IIIIII'1i Jahrhunderr. It thus be ornes ('olnpIPL('ly clear: the question concerning the essence 0/ human freedom relates neither 10 a. question arrive at b) Br adening the Question Concerning [he r~ss(. instead of limiting the inquiry it broadens it. Freedom towards the Totalit of Beings (World and (Tod) In the Preliminary Discussion of 'Negative' Freedom" Specific Character of Philosophical as Distinct from Scientific Questioning relation La God. In. If freedom becomes a problem. The Apparenl ill order 10 Contradiction 5 somr-t all ill a position to set out [rom a particular hing universal. this negative freedom of man IS full d fined by specifying what man is indep nderu from and how su h indep ndenc i to b conceived" In earlier int rpretations of fr edam this 'from what' of independence has bee n ex peri nced and problematized in tu 0 e ential dir. 1914" p" ">79.l1ce of H urnan . For world and (}od are not the universal over against man as a particular" Ian is not a particular instance of (Tad in the way that the alpine rose is a particular instance of the essenc of plant or . or better we do IIOl at all enter into. bUL precisely where a primordial cons . the absence of dependence. ctions. "BUl why is the problem It 1" Freed om from" " " is independence from nature.ndc"pendence from natur can be grasped in a more essential way by rf'l[pctll1g that the inner decision and resolve of man is in a ertain reSI ect independent of the necessity which resides 1. from he very outset cannot b treated as a particular question" Among the definitions of the es nc of freedom one has alwa s come to the fore" According to this freedom primarily refers to autonomy" Freedom is freedom from" " " Daz dine i II rEdaz dll an nihte banget und an deme ouch 2 niht enlzangel. a second l1Pgative concept freedom goes LogNher wi th the IIrst. Th problem of freedom.ol!lngf'll. au tonorny ill ":\~l'islt'r E"kltarL 'Yon . But world and God together constitute the totality of what is. which is alway cou linod to a particular domain and inquires into the parti ularity of a universal.e. 7/1l)" l6.eschylus' Prometheus a parti ular i nstancr. involves the denial of dependence on something else" One speaks. Z.. accordingly is not a particular probl m but clearl a universal problem! It do s no concern any particular thing. Irr-cdom means independencefrom God. This definition of the essence of freedom as independence. Volume Two" "5rd edu. A (TOtTI i ng to til is. and in such a way iha h stands in a relationship to world and God.11'11 12 JIUIU'Il unsers herr . World and God are no just accid ntally or coruingen Iy represented in the negative concept ciffreedom.icusness of freedom has been ~"waken ed. But th possibility of turning toward or turning away from alread presupposes a certain independeuce and freedom in relation to (~od. it is by the lawfulness of natural processes and their necessi ty" I. world a ud (Tod.of tragedy" The remo al of lim its I"ads us into the totality of beings. " Ikllau. then we are ne essaril inquiring into the totality of what is. we must necessaril keep in mind that/rom whi Iz man is independ n . aLb it as understood only in this nezative wa . but rather something quite general. therefore. This question is complCLl'ly diflerent to ever .et us see" Not only does the qu stion concerning the essence of human freedom not limit our considerations to a particular domain. ed itr-d by Franz Pfeiffer. If negative freedom is the topic. it removes limits.kind of scienl~fic question. This difference and distinctiven -ss of the question concer ni ng human cf freedom not a particular questioni t this point an onl be rouglll indicated why the problem of freedom. So the lull concept if negaliue freedom amounts to independence a/man/rom world and God" So when \ e tr at of the ssence of human Ir edom. For only if there is such autouorn can man take up a I"('lalionship La God.thing of a regional chara iter. of the negative concept of freedom. But in this way we are not seu. [ hIS ~:OL" b"ound or 2.i ng out [rom a particular to arrive at its universali ty.nctl)' of 'negalivefreedom'" learly then.0r su"cei.] .i"e" when we really refl t upon this doul I independ nee. where the latter i und:rstood as the unital' totality of history and nature. particular nor LO II uniuersai. in the mid t of which man himself is ituated. then world and God necessarily belong to the topic as the 'from what' of independence. (. Not always.

Awkward as the question might be for us. as such. But is this reference to the "olality not one-sided and incomplete? Freedom negatively understood as independence from world (nature and history) and God does show a relationship to these. human knowledge. wh ether it be natural. it is not a question belonging to any of the particular sciences. then his question cannot be a scien tific one. III addition. we must say it. but as all i ntroduction it is necessarily Incomplete. Instead. It will be replied. despite a material lack or restrictiveness. This is un fortunate.. Therefore our planned introduction must take <I olw-sided orientation. indeed many take this as an expression of a critical cast of mind which only inquires into what it can handle and manage. To be sure. we concluded that the problem of lreedom does not encompass eoerytlung. more specifically a relationsh ip of non -dependence or one th ing on uuother. finite. and limited. We must always include this 'independent from what'. Beings in the ·Whole :\f'(~ ssarily Included in the Question Concerning Human Freedom \\(' interpreted negative freedom as independence from world (nature and hist. i. vVhal does this mean:' If we wish to characterize 'independence fro rn . this 'not bound to what'. insofar as we . Not only that.6 Preliminary Considerations § 1. For philosophy is surely not exhausted by the treatment of this one problem. In [9-1 I] r r th is is the case. but only a negative one: world and God as what do not bind the one who is free. which takes philosophizing as nothing but the calculation of business expenses.ory ) and (~od. historical. but we ner-d not go ill to i L..h ing and another is also a relationshi p. Th is ro u gh explanation of negative freedom has a I ready show n that the problem of freedom is not a regionally limited particular question. the essence of nature. But both these questions inquire into the totality and thus have a necessary connection with the most general question concerning the essence of beings <'IS such. somewhere altogether different to the standpoint of every science. ·1'0 begin with. The total itv of beings l8-g] .. If ['very scien ti fj c question and every sci en ce as su c hare iu their r-ssence restricted to a region. We ourselves have already conceded too much to this superficiality in the above discussion of negative freedom. from the very beginnll1g and from the ground up. but it does not properly belong to OUI" topic. tho non-equivalence of OlH' thing and another. philosophy is always piecemeal. So the problem of freedom remains a particular problem within philosophy. if we are really mtent on asking it we necessarily stand. And yet this banal modesty is not only a licence for the utter superficiality and arbitrariness of the common understanding. or divine. as a 1IIIInan endeavour. but its unavoidability can perhaps be justified by referring to the fact that. or whether it incorporates the whole. C") Deeper lnterpr etauon of 'Negative Freedom' as Freedom-from . namely that it leads into the totalitv of beings. we too hastily decided this either-or in favour of negalive lreedom. The question of human freedom indisputably stands alongside these questions as a particular question in comparison with the stili mor and most general question concerning tb e essence 0 f what is as such. The Apparent Contradiction 7 freedom. but it is still a particular problem within philosophy. IS subject to thematic restriction. in Terms of the Essence of Its HelationaI Character. Beside this there are questions concerning the essence of truth. here 'independence Iroru . POl' not Oldy in a quan titative but also in a qualitative sense. is a relationsll ip. The 'from which' was included ill the concept but not as fill explicit topic. we can and must conceive of positive freedom as well. in a quite general way. The primary topi was freedom. Confessing to such limitation and modesty always has a 'sympathetic' effect. whether past.as. history.. present. and if the question concerning human freedom in its proper rneening forces us into the tota Iity of beings as such. marks it out as a speri Iically philosophical question. SI) that negative freedom must be conceived in unity with positive [I"pedom if we wish to decide whether the problem of freedom is a particular question of philosophy among others. no science has the breadth of horizon to cncompass the unitary whole which is intended (albeit unclearly and indefinitely) by the question of freedom.e. We thereby overlooked that. from a consideration of the topic of negative freedom. likewise diffcrcncr.rightly speak of negative freedom. and whatever else is commonly listed when one gives an overview of philosophy. i~ not as such the topic. human. tlren the problem of freedorn. philosophy as knowledge 0(" the totality cannot in all modesty ('l)l!ceive the whole ill one stroke. . its topic may be of exceptional importance. The question concerning the essence of truth is indeed different to the question concerning the essence of freedom. or future. but we have also conceived negative r[epd om inadeq ua tely. How the question of freedom opens up the horizon to the totality was indicated already In the discussion of negative freedom. art. and that it is just this positive concept of freedom which in the first instance marks out the domain of the problem of freedom. standing only at the border of it. 'I'ho eq I] ivaleuce of one t. 'We must have this in view.

Wh iIe the q uestio 11 can cern ing the esse II CE' 0 r l'r!'l'dolTl is difforent Irorn the question concerning the essence of truth. The rlpparen! Contradiction 9 re. wr. for how otherwise are we to ascertam independence? This relationship does not hover somewhere by itself.. Wh en c. but we only discover it by treating man as one element and world as the other element.ho case of e-stahl ish ing a speci fie Iacrually existing rela uonsh ip 1 Iwl W('f'11 speci [ic factually given th ings. therefore. Iike indepsn deuce. J f we proceed according to the negative concept. just this nile and another between which this relatedness obtains. If WE' consider a relaticnsh ip III its essence must we enter into the terms of the relationshi p~ H we were to treat of the essence of di Hereuce. WC' d('ri lie the essence of a relationshi p. we do not. howrvor. 01" this or that God.to be away from . 1.-ssence of man's independence from world and God . the q uestion concerni ng Lhe essence of h lillian freedom themauxes the totality of what is. l n asr-ertaining such a difference we must not only co-think the terms of the relationship (blackboard. 12. [11-12] .. is that is to be established. taking 111P qlwslion of human freedom as our guidelinE'.be in g of the blackboard and the 50.bei ng of the lam p. of this independence we must. ' is a relationship to which there belongs as such a relatedness toworld and God. that ('\"('ry ph ilosoph iral question inq 11 ires ill to the whole. world and (. g. V e are not treating mere!" human freedom. but we seek the essence of the independence of man as such from world and God as such. But does it follow that our planned discussion of freedom (say. from the vpry beginn ing. att cm pi all act. and how. such questioning can be carried through is reserved for later discussion.1. as ill t. lamp) . '). the terms of the relationship. In all ascertaining of relationships the terms must themselves be treated.. . what pertains to the essential content of the relationshi p . it is not a par Lieu lar prohle m.ua! introd uction to ph iloscphy as a whole. In brief.may. what-being. and 1101 JUs I I ho li 111 it or border. This ISobvious. Whether. \i\'hell.And perhaps this also ilfljll ios to t he quest iOI1 con cer 11III g tile essence or tru th. I 2'5 If 0]1 a 11 a lysis of essence uud anal y I ics. then with the question nJilcerning the essence of human freedom we are inquiring into the . Even if that were possi ble we wou Id have to know 'Ill advance u-ha! if. what it (freedom) as such is.how this what-being is i.otherwise the relatedness would hover in mid-air so to speakbut we must go into the related terms themselves. Do we then want to ascertain independence (freedom)? Can we?VVe neither want to do this. The essence of freedom? Three thIngs belong to the clarification of essence. i.l:l"!al:Y Considerations . This means.p hp low pp. as independence) must likewise go into the elements of the relationship? Clearly it must."by 1\111. The word 'relationship' is generally speakillg ambiguous. have to enter iuto these specific IPrlUS of the relationshi p.p Clearly not. We do not seek to establish and prove such a thing as a fact.whole . Di fferen ce.related ness of the one to lll{' other as such. we are t. but just as often th is relatedness together with the terms of the relationship. and from th is we gTaSp their difference. 'i VI/hal we are treating. the. On lhe other hand we do need to have the terrns of the relauonsh ip ill view. and also mto the essence of world and God. precisely for this reason must this 'from what' of independence be brought into consideration. We must hold ill view the terms til ' relation~II f. but concerns rhe. AIthough tilE"' problem of freedom l12-14] :>".8 Prelin7. where the ground of this possihility lies. From these considerations we conclude only the following: that because independence as a negative relationship so to speak detaches itself and n-rnains removed from that which it is independent of. and then 2.. included in the theme. To ascertain the essence of difference it is irrelevant which specific different Lhings we ernplov as examples. inquire into the essence or man. btl l whether they are factually constituted i in this way or that is lwside the point. Sometimes we mean simply rr-latedness as such. nor are we able to.ga rei to every relationship we d istinguish I. is the essence of a relationship. I\u 1 LlI(..od. triangle and moon. would we have to discuss this blackboard and this lamp? Or would we have to consider other eases of difference (house and tree. we cannot dispense with lilern. Instead the reverse follows.e.l as such. We ascertain the so.n itself possi ble.does not pertain to l"eJlection on the essence of the or rc Intioi Ish ip."an5 of Properly Conceived Particular Problems Til us. Accordillgl~'. Ifwe wish to grasp the essence of this relationship.H' rernai ns HII 1Ilad{'{JlHlcy. This irrelevance of the specific content of the respective relational terms does not mean they can be left out of account in clarifying IIIc essence of rela tedness. IIHleed we must.. d) Philosophy as Revealing the V\fholl. Le t us a uern pt to ap p ly th is to 0 ur prob lern.reating of a relationship . p[c. therefore. We do not wan! to decide whe: her this or that individual is independent of this or that world. it does not follow Ihat in examining the essence of independence we can dispense with looking at the 'from which'. is a 'Ilt'ga ti ve' rela tionsh ip.. Since 'independonce from . but the essence of human freedom. we ascertain the d~fference between this blackboard and this lamp 011 the ceiling.~.

However we twist and turn. ~Cf. Metaphysics r 2.VIENTAL Ql'ESTIOS OF PHrLOSOPHY 1 92B/29. we cannot avoid the [act that an introduction to philosophy guided by the problem of freedom takes on a specific and particular orientation.e. In the end this is not an inadequacy.lung in die Philosophie eGA 27: Freiburg lectures ed ited by Otto Saame and lila Saame-Speidel. that of freedom. a semblance of pbilosophy. [14-15] .g. Einlei. as we did in all earlier introductory course. is the opposite of an introdue ion to philosophy. The totality of i phi losopby IS exhi bited in our introduction wi th a q IJ ite speci fie emphasis. sophistry? 4 Heidegger. Aristotle.. IIIis occurs wi thin a particular p(>rsp(>('Ive. Even less does it require any apology. So i I would seem that. the actual totali ty of phi losophy would be grasped only I I' we cou ld treat all possible questions and their perspectives. and then speaking of everything and anytbing without really asking. by appealing to the fragility of all human endeavour. P rhaps the strengen and strike-power r:! philosophizing rests precisely on this. that it reveals the whole only ill properly: grasped particular problems. and not.g. and b 26. Were we to choose til problem of ruth.Preiirrunarv COli side rations lays II 1(' whole of philosophy before us. Perhaps the popular procedure of bnngmg all philosophical questions together in some kind of framework. i. 1996). e. e. Klostermann.' then philosophy as a whole would be shown in a different con figuration and constellation of problems.O~VITHE COi\TENT O' THE PROBLEl\l 0' FREEDOM THE PHOn EM OF I-I MAi\ FHEEDOM A~D THE -FtlNDA. PArt'I' ONE POSITI E DEFINITJO : OF PHILOSOr>I-IY FH. chat of tru th. 1001 b J 7 r.

a luxurv and diversion from the often monotonous and arduous procedure of the scien es? Is philosoph an opportunity of whi h we orr'asional ly avail our elves. independence and th distinctive character or philosophi al questioning in its difference to sin 'e. to widen our view out from th narrow field 01' the particular sciences [or a picture of the whole: For what did we mean when we said that philosophy inquires into the whole? Does this 111('<111 that WE' ju t create a vantage point for ourselves. Howev r. in order that we subsequently remain firmly within it? \. albeit in outl in . rhus 117-IH] . therefore.meresting questions. not sorn arbitrary other person! Or is philosophy only a higher (becaus mol' universal) 0 cupation of the ~piril.concernin freedom. so that we can be lx-uor placed as observers.CH PTER ONE First Breakthrough to the Proper Dimension of the Problem of Freedom in Kant. Going-after-the-Whole as Going-to-the-Boots '\oLwithstanding initial doubts. philosophical or d iscussions and proposi t ions \0\' h jell we have SI. Doubtless this is necessary if philosophy is to quietly occupy itself with all sorts i. We may be confident of being on the right track here.2. Th aim of our discussions was obviously to reassure oursel es about the validity of our chosen task..I pposerllv understood. as Inquiring into liz Whole. The Connection of the Problem of Freedom with the Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics . naturally within a specific perspective.~. Do we reall feel r assured? 'hould we f I reassured. ill a moral way. our intention of providing an introduction to philosophy as a whole by treating the problem of human frf'f'dom is quite in order. better than in the a ll-too-narrow rf'gions of the panicular sciences:' Or does philosophy s concern with the whole mean SOIlIl'lllillg else? I )o(>s it signil"y that it gops 10 our (111'111'001 ? And indeed. In the course of our preliminary consid ration W have already learnt a great deal. nlike the sciences philosophy from the very beginning aims at the whole. Philosoph. 1I0t by ocr-asionall r npplying t o our own case.y(' ourselves not someone else. can th problem of human freedom be simply set before us and demonstrated? Or must we ourselves be led into Lh(" problem.

0 phll~sophlZe when we begin with a reassurance? Or do we beglll in this way rn order to turn OUI backs on philosophy r. but the concept of positive freedom as such is indefinite. CPI. d iscu ssi OIlS cancer 11in g p hi Ioso ph y in genera I. especially if by positive freedom we provisionally understand the not-negative freedom.\\'l.' He calls it til!' 'power' (If man to 'determine himself from hirnself'. as absolute self-acrivity. R eco II-S ide ration f?!'1'ranscenden. understood negatively.. bu l from [he call ten! 0/ the chosen problem. " determining oneself to. press forward to this full sense.. a breaking loose. .5 ion of 'Pos itiue Freedom' b. but also not positive. IL is no accident that we have proceeded in this way. . Kegative freedom means freedom from . but because Kant occupies a distinctive position ill the history of the problem of freedom. The 'experience' of this wavers and is subject to particular modifications. Kant conceives positive freedom in this Sl'IISP of self-det. While we have distinguished phllosophy fundamentally from the particular sciences.he 'toward-which'.. _.ight from the start? III the end. overcoming constrictive forces and powers. Not only are individual conceptions of positive [reedorn different and ambiguous. For our preparatory discussion we choose (dispensing with any justification) a quite particular conception of positive freedom. . as always a nd "<:1'1"1 . further. casting off fetters. being open for _. The previous definition of philosophy. neither the one nor the other.ent. an~ aim at. to g]\'e to oneself t he law for one's action. VVherever a knowledge of freedom is Hlvakened it is ini tially comprehended in the negative sense.uiring concretely during the e nure.. _. F()rmai-l.uiicalive Discussion 15 gaining. know more. for both of these perta in primarily La the particular sciences.edification from philosopl')' l'llilfHlI('ly we ouly understand philllsophy d.Ieel ure cou rse will open up for us. More precisely. This means to determine on's own actiou purely through oneself.14 Firs: 13realahl'OlIgh § J. J n this way Llw_PC'f"spC'C'tives within which we shall be ilHl. [10'1-191 \20-2IJ . settling down and being reassured? Do we really begin 1..ermination.lal' and 'Practical' Freedom in Kant Our discussion or the topic and its method of treatment has been !"('stricted to the negative concept of freedom. must be a fundamental human experience. tha t of human freedom. This prominence of negative freedom.0 understand philosopny LIZ a POSilWC way from itself. as 'independeuce from'. .the questioning goes LO tile 1'001 of what is questioned.e. But can philosophizing amount to. How this is to occur must be tried outin actual philosophizing. that there is a sure possibility of this. Breaking free. in our earlier C011sid. freedom which is nnt negative. was inadequate. . H 446. i.heoretical knowledge wgelllf'T" with practical applicaLIOII.first time explicitly into a radical connection With til(' lundamcu tal problems of metaphysics. we can only do so from the content of philosophical questioning itself. compulsion.". . J n compari son with this clear and seemingly unambiguous definition of negative freedom.I.~ We make reference precisely to Kant in this connection not just to quote a philosophical opinion. Admittedly this is just an assertion.. Freedom iII the positive sense does not mean the 'away-from . nor rs It theoretical and practical ill the same Lime. To he sure. Formal. allowing onesel/Lo be determined through . There is a particular reason why we could not. This comparison conveys nothing beyond what philosophy is measured against. B <'62.. we have still oriented philosophy in terms or scientif knowledge. the characterization of positive freedom is obscure and ambiguous. oc-negative freedom can mean: I. Kant bri ngs the prob1"!l1 01' freedom for thr. But at the beginning we need an indication of the full sense of philosophy's inquiry into the whole.Indicative Discu. what possibilities there are for distinguishing it from science.eratiolls. by which freedom. . indeed perhaps of the negative as such. however. ill any case we now. positive freedom means Iwing fr e for.. is due to the fact that heing-free is experienced as bec(}{nlng-free from a bond. thus oneself being open lor . as concerning the whole. comes clearly into the light of k Jl ow ledge. \ ·~I~. I~hilosoph~ is not t. . not by empty.. it is not a reassurance if we make it clear to ourselves that our aim and method are quite in order. I L is more pl:imorc:hal than ei ther. How are we to prove it? Clearly. releasem. So now we must attern pt 1.\ ')'H. Perhaps this indicates no more than that we are surely drawing near to a danger-zone more carefully put. positive freedom as the opposite of the negative. The character of philoso1Jhy as inquiring into Lhewhole remains fundamentally inadequate as long as we do not grasp the 'going-afterthe-whole' as a 'going-to-the-roots'. this going-after-the-whole must be grasped as a'going-to-the-root'. but rather t.

spontaneous] . hut the faculty of II ill. Such causality will not. IIIII Ka 111 !lOW spen ks more clearly: 'The preceding explanation or freedDIll is 11I'~alil'e and thr-reforo affords 110 insight into its essence. as an example for discussing the posi iv ioncept of fre dom. from which both positive and negative impulses wenL into philosophy. Freedom as ab clute spontaneity is Ircedom in the cosmological sense: il is a trail cell dental idea. Kant.. But a posit in' ('()rrt'l'pl or rrf'Pc1olll l'lows from it which i so much I he richer " C:I'H \ '5'> k B ')(. therefore. whil practical freedom. The theologirnl discussion.ical Reason. CI'H j\ "j)). not-negativ ) fre dom. was its If (Paul. Christian lheology had developed the problem in its own way. Luther) not uninfluenced by the philosophical discussion. itsel f stand under another ca use determining it in time. First. 'Freedom in the practical sense is the will's independence 0[' coercion through sellSUOUSimpulses'. spontaneously sua sponte. L the beginning of the third section of this work. But is this not PI' cisely th same thing as spontaneity. N gative freedom i mentioned her . But didn't we say that both Kant s concepts of freedom ~ . as required by the law of nature.G I.\ '5. ethics.\· whic]: . Kant thus distinguishes a 'cosmological' from a 'practical concept of fr edorn. independent of any coercion through sensuou impulses. l Iere again 'independellc(~' is men tiorred. therefore. Freedom in this sense is a rure transcendental idea.}62." Freedom in the pnll'l inti St'IISC is independence. 'HIl). spond. We said that Kant conceives freedom as the 'power of selfdetermination' as 'absolute self-activity'. FvulldfllWIH ". B . More precisely. i. WE' must ask how Kant conceives practical (et. by the "11·11I('rrC'f. is a kind of causality of living beings so far as the are rational freedom would be tha property of this causalit r 1. \rVestaled that Kant's doctriue of' Freedom occupies a distinctive position within philosophy. Of course it cannot be d nied that Kant. which is precis >Iy how we characterized IIl'(rflli\'c Ircerlom. in a work devoted to pure unci rstanding (the theoretical facult of man) and not to practical understanding In:pii~l~) in the sense of ethi al action. Neither of these contains an thing negative. But enough of this.{'(." pp.. The haracterization of negative freedom as independence from God already indicates this link between the respective problernatics of th ology and philosophy.'4 Freedom. But l e defillition given of practical freedom undeniably takes this as negativ . thus identical with I he cosmological concept of freedom? Then the latter would be the posiLive cone pt of freedom. is the power 9/' the e(loriginall:on of a tate. h till' transcend ntal and the pra ti 'al . r q( the . This explains what we quoted above as Kant's concept of freedom: 'absolute self-activit " . There is in man a power of lit-If-determination. is b no means identical with that betw n negative and positive fre dom. First we ask abou lreedom in its "pracrical meaning'.an' not llegative: Indeed. would be the negative concept.''' W£L1 here do s not m an arbitrariness and lack of dis ipline.e. however.HC/(lp"_ vsus 1i/1/om/. Hut this is not at all the case. II.' This distinction. what does Kant understand bv cosmological and practical freedom? By Fre dom in its cosmological meaning I understand the power or beginning a state spontaneously. independence from sPllsibility. O'1l:£VOO>:LO give or free I off r.2 . LnEN~. C rtainly. ·iI. I ant writes. jllsl as natural nece.1 can be efrective independently of external causes determinine u .e. \i\le tal e up the Kantian onception of freedom (wi hout now entering into an in erpretation of this) merel . So before we pin Kant down with IhE' quoted definition of practical freedom as independence from sensibility. We do this to obtain a view of the wider perspectives of the problem of freedom and thus of our own task as such.'.. namel th power of s lf-det rrnination. where he treats thematicall of 1rpa~It:. Whal Ihis latter refers to will be discussed [urther Otl.tivity. The whole discussion takes place in the Critique of Pure Reason i.'5 L II 'i(il 'CPR .CI'H . we must ask how he defines practical freedom in the Critique qf Proc.lucal) freedom where he considers athics as a metaphysical problem.pondeo. spons . 1() I 2 (I V. [free] iWCHuse sensibility does no necessitate its action.~'J.originating from oneself. but they do not mean the same thing. thus i. . spontaneity absolute self-a . Prior to him. this Iirst breakthrough into the proper dimension of the problem leads 10 a one-sided narrowing which we will have to onfroru. Augustine. is the property of lip causality of all nO]1r.but ornething lse is aLso mentioned. Kant also explains the practical concept of l'I.:' o f exter ua I "a uses. Ther is a reason for this. It falls instead on II side of positive (more precise I ." s unll. in his definition of practical freedom.u ional beings bv which they are det rmined in their activit).Hi Firs/ IJrea. refers to independence from sensory compulsion. 1\ '):)+. [2t-22J 1 22-:24J .klh/"oll~h . '\IHI. if we look more clos Ly.ll the Fonndaticns c!/ the 1elaphy ic: q/ [orals. Fornud-{ndicatil'e Discussion 17 11I'('('ssaril_y at su·h decisive moments.doln through precisely those factors we initially referred to upon menliorrjrrg the Kantian cone pt of freedom: 'The human will is .

theu 'an th freedom of i hr. namely the challenging character of the problem of' f'n'('cionr. perhaps more clearly.to dispense with a discussion or positive freedom.to itself"" The positive concept of' freedom means autonomy of the will. L t us look more closely." Here it is alre-arlv cle-ar that if a positive concept of freedom is to be obta i ned il will be .(o/J \Yhal have we now obtained from our brief discussion of the positive roncept of freedom? V'Vewanted to clarify the problem of freedom by <Til'illO' a preliminar indication of how the substantiv > problem itself.. posrtive self-legislation or So lite transcendental freedom of the practical is not situated alongside as till" negative. with a difficulty it has always I orne. the sua sponte a&l6~. the latter delimits he un i ersa l psselH'e the I'ormer.e.\ -1)).0 capture what II'l' r-ek. autonom is the self-legislation of a rational will. They are not th same and yet both pertain to that which has the character of self. p. 101 (I".Mooement .jl'l(. we have seen little of III is. TIIU the third section of the Groundwork ofthe [etaphysics 0/ Morals boars the sub-title 'The oncept of Freedom is the K to the Explanation til Autonomy of the vVill. practical concept. / essence or [1'('(>doll1 insofar as the latter stands wu hin till' horizon or philosophical It' ]('sl ion ing. What then is the situation as rf'gards freedom in its transcendental m aning of ahsoluL! spontaneity..ausality . this is already indicated in the negative oncept or Il'f'('dnrn. Autonomy is a kind of absolute spon tanei t '. i. Thus far apparently. llpft~I~. r r thi WNE' the onlv issue we would have 11('('rrablr. Foundations. Broadening if the Problem ofFreedom u uhin the Perspectiue of the Cosmological Problem as Indicated in the Grounding haracter of 'Transcendental Freedom '.. Onlv orr the basis of this essence as absolute spontaneity is autonom possible.. to goi ng-after-the-whole. A bsolu e spoutaneit (transcendental Ireedoru) is not a matter of will and the law the will but of th s If-origination of a state. However..pc!orll ill its transcendental meaning. The practical concept of ru'edom'ls not the neg~Lioll'()r fn. the property of th will to be a lau. This is .n <. 1111(I \.~. and practical freedom is grollndeJ in transcendental FrepdoTl1_ Accordingly. "CI'I{ . For the trivial opinion just mentioned merely alludes to the practical significance which Freedom possesses precisely as a human pmpl'rly. also gces-to-the-roct.. hl/ll/dal. as Kan sa s in the Critique q/ Pure Reason: 'Tt hould especially br. Kan L says: '\lVliat else.. 125-26] . l-oundaru. A certain kind of challenge is involved in this problem. but pmcrical freedom itself divides into rtf'galil'e ann positive.Being as uelz or '. Broadening of the Problem l?! Freedom 19 ami more fruitful'. or or § 4. The possibility of autonomy is Arollnded in spoutaueitv. II. One would thin k that the challenging character of the problem consists in the fact that fre edom is precisely a property of us humans and Ilwl"ei'ore bears on us. . But although there is clearl a relationship between the two. and that the latter harbours t he real OUtT(. 1(12 ( 1\ _ Hfo L). But the issue IS s()IlINlling else. Hh). [fh.II ill be' nul aulonomv . on the other hand. II ')(i l. p. Th is is true..transcendental freedom ." Transcendental practical freedom ~ (will of a rational being) ~ negative independ nee from sensibility I -----? Freedom . upposcd to emergf' from the innertno.['/all'S unto oneself. of that which bas the character of self. indeed all too true (.1I The determination of positive freedom as a utonom involves a specific problem.t8 First Breakthrough § 4. . . concerns a particular being to which there belongs willing. Freedom. of thp difficuhy which ha always beset the qu--st ion of the possibility of Ireedorn'. autonomy. in . i.noted that rh practice I concept nffl'eedolll is based on I h is transcendental idea.. Were there no absolute spontaneity Ihen' would be no autonomy. but th practical as th condi Lion or its possibilit is prior. if il is not the po itive practical as opposed to the negative practical? Is absol u LE' SpOil tarieity nOI the same as autonomy? In both ca es it is a matter of the self. How do they belong together? The self-determination of action as self-legislation is a self-origination of a state in rhe specific domain of the human activity of a rational being. 'Hb). they are not the same. Absolute spontaneity LS the faculty the seLr-origination of a state.

trans endental fr edom also turns up. Freedom as absolute spontaneity: is Iranscenderual freedom.e. VVhat we reptesen through this r presentation of absolute spontaneit lies outside what is experientiall accessible. il. So the problem of this distinctive causality makes it all the more necessary to take up the problpm of causalit as such. as grounded in absolute spontaneit (transcendental freedom). What does this mean? Where in this is the genuine problem to be found? Once again.iofl 0/ a state (series of events) is an uuerly: dffferenl causation than the causality of nature. Kant calls the former absolute sporuaneit: the causality of freedom. Is tb broadening of the problem such that we can now see how philosophy as the goitlg-aher-Lhe-whole' is at the same time a go ing. is that of the problem of causality in generaL. is th question ioncerrung the cause [ rsac-he]' This. Ei'rom this it is cl ar that what is g nuinel problematical in absolute spontaneity is a problem of causalit . what was earlier s.e. That beside. in respect or our ('xplllll<llion of positive freedom in terms of the Kantian distinction. 'Ever thing that happ ns.the-root'? With respect to our first question: that positive freedom involves a broadening of the problem. practical freedom is grounded in transcendental I"n>edom a a distinctive kind of causalitv then positive freedom.e. ')32. That which in this way allows something (a thing) to follow on is for Kant the cause. The perspec11r'1! which is thus opened up by the fundamental broadening brought about by the problem of practi al fr dom.20 Finl Breakthroup.1\. Proceeding in l his lVay. CPH A 5')4. 'the causality of the caus or that which happens or come into heing must itself have come into being.It. the law that a thing given in experience must be caused I)\" aneth r thing. If. all theoretical knowledge of what i. only as the DITasion and impetus for the full unfolding of the problem. and indeed arising from itself. wil h t h e I . The per spec ive is apparent! determined by the problem of th nablement of pta tical fre dom (autonomy). (.1I(1 about the decisive sigmucance of Kant for lhl' problem of Ire dorn r imains valid. CPB A 533. we must now ask three things. Ii of Permanr-nce of Substance... ccordingl. by the positing of autonomy as absolute spontaneit . I l\lIalogy: Principle B ')G() fill. of causation.e. But vee do not regard Kant as the absolute truth. fesenL before us as nature. This law of p I'(llisation. i. indicates a broadening. To be sure these ques ions alread take us outside the Kantian prnblpm. [26-28] 128-29] .PR .wlogy (first edition) as follows.e. all expert nc .'. but rather the causation of a cause. i. of beginning and letting follow. What doe this broadening indicate.h . . practical-positive and negaiv freedom.i.~'4. begins 10 be.. In this way he first question is answered.'2 The possibility of the latter depends on the possibility of the former. Fllrllll'r. and ind ed a fundamental one." This does not m an 'cause of the a use'. i. is subject to the law of causality.e. According to KanL.We have already observed that positiv freedom. Our second question asks about the perspective opened up With this broadening. B '562.n accordance i u. i. Broad fling oj the Problem oj Freedom 2t Consequently. i.aw of RX'ciprocity or Community. the beginning of 'a 'series of ev nts'. harbours within its If the problem of causality as such. presupposes something upon whi h it follows according to a ru!e. Priuciple of r. I ant ees freedom as the poioer (if a specific and distinctive causation. as Kant maintains.e. i. is equivalent to autonomy.. Causality in th sense of absolut spontan ity i. B 561. considered in its practical sense.e. Tl l nalogy." Every causation of a cause for its part follows on from a prior cause.. is formulated by Kant''iin h heading of the Second :\." Absolute spontaneity means to initiate a series of events 'from itself". In this s nse he speaks poin dlyof the 'causalitv of a cause'. and . allowing an ev nt to follow on.. that and how a cause is a cause. IJ 11 I< CPR A '534. Kant asserts this relation between pra tical and transcendental freedom when he says that 'the denial of transcendental freedom [would] involv the elimination of all practical freedom. tha is. in nature lloLhing is the cause of itself. and it i a fundamental one because absolute spontaneity is posited therein as the ground of the practical. l. b th problems involved in what Kant calls absolute spontaneity'. i. Its possibility is grounded in absolute spontaneity (transcendental freedom). in theoretical knowledge of present nature.e. what perspective i opened up? 3. 'an easil r b een. The question of spontaneity. the se{foriginal. This freedom brings us ba ck to another kind of freedom.to. spontaneity means th 'from itself'. for Kant. Do s positive freedom bring about a fundamental broadening of the probl marie? 2. causation in the sense of the absolute self-origination of a series of events is something we do not encounter in exp rience i. goes bond this (transcendere). in accordance with the principle of the und rstanding it must in its turn require a cause'.I"'XI~I(·m·". the causation [ rsachesein] of a cause (causa) is what Kant calls 'causality' [KausaliliilJ (the causality of causa). B 562. to b the origination of an event. CPR A 1l'!9.. .. Conversely.

To stand wid-lin this gueslioll1n. we do not exist in our roots such that we can inquire into these roots and feel this questioning as a burning issue. we stand within this question concerning beings as such. The Questionable Challenging Character ofthe Broadened Problem of Freedom and the Traditional Form of the Leading QuesliOilo/ Philosophy Necessity of a Renewed Interrogasioa of the Leading Question The question concerning beings as such emerged by following the specific content of the problem of freedom. It IS easy to see that the problem or Ihe essence or movement is the presupposition for even posi llg. does not necessarily apply to movement in the sense of grm. It is an occurrence of a nature all its own. for there can be no broader kind of (jlH'slionmg than that concerning bemgs as such. Causation means. IL was precisely Kant who grasped the problem of freedom in this way.pdorn inq u ires in to beings as such. ship. the problem or f'. i. 11('r(' l{ant too completely fails. events.tll!'r-lhe-wholp means goillg-to-the-root. nor as a more general question which just hovers over the particular question concerning freedom. in a more definite way. Since Aristotlel who was the first ami last to grasp the philosophical problem.beings as such.22 Firs! Breakthrough §. namely beings. the question ('ollcerning the essence of human freedom is necessarily built Into the qllt'slion of what beings as such properly are.more remarkable. The QueslI. Whether this is the onf:r perspective for the problem of freedom. not to speak of sclvi llg.illd of possible movement or non-movement varies with the kind of IWIllgs. also bE'loog among these beings. the inquirers. relating to processes. It belongs in the context of that which runs ahead. co what we call mouemeni £11 the broader sense. In each case. i. of the mere shifting of particles or matter. for its pan:' Movement. Rather. what are beings? llH1\'ed or resting §' 5. That the problem of causality "las cerrtral ror him makes this all the. 5. i.ollable Challenging Character 23 Freedom is discussed toitltin [he perspectim: ofcausation.of action and transaction. this means inq uiring into the essence of h uman freedom. It did not emerge as a question upon which the problem of freedom merely borders.causality (causation) as such . Yet does lias broadening out of our problem allow us to see how going· . 'The individual IllolrtelltS of this broadening can again be indicated: practical freedom (aulOJi om y) . a Iter what freedom is in its inner possibility and ground. A journey. are matters we still leave completely open. nor is it a mechanical movement together with a human comportment. Accordingly. origination and outcome. of causation.'l'be [.e. W know little 01' nothing of these matters. whose character is as Iittle known to us as is the essence of the other species of movement. if we wish to illuminate the essence of causation in this way? Only by answering this question can we estimate the scope of the problem of freedom. not because they are in any way inaccessible to us. into a problem.eans to go-after-the-whole. being (as a mode 01" movement).1 nso far as our inq Ui I"y into fr\.e. the question will also concern We can now pose this question [29-:. Where does our inquiry Lake us.root:' ()ne m igh t answer as r0 Uows. plane).'wS(11 i ty. and as a question concerning the whole. Further. occurrences. . process and growth are different to the behaviour of animals and the comportment of human beings.' \I'Ve thus come to our third ljl\{'stiOll. And where are we now? . If we hold to Kant's perspective. is not just a mechanical movement with a machine (rail. causation. and what they are. A nil the problem of movcmcn t.Vidl this question concerning beings as such. If'tting follow on.the leading question if philosophy. are different.1] 1~1-3~J . or of the mere running ahead of a process. emerges as a fundamental d('U'I'l1liIl8lion of that to which we attribute being. ti to (iv. For exam ple. we are asking the very same question which from ancient times has counted as the primary and ultirnate question of philosophy . itt urns out th at not a II movem en t is the same. and insofar as we ourselves.the movements . if we really inquire into the essence of freedom. what is true of so-called mechanical movement. among other things. as buill into the question of 1J{·jllgS as such. origination.being moved as such . for example. ~() our view of the problem of freedom broadens out. concerning what beings ill their breadth and depth actually are. whether there are other and ven more radical perspectives. the question ('Olln'I'll i ng the essence' or human freedom. because the problem is in no way grasped as a problem.vth and degeneration. letting follow on. pbilosophy has not taken a single step forward in this area. but because we exist too superficially. Thus the philosophical situationin regard to the clarification of movement is miserably inadeq uate.e.tra nscen den ta I freedom (absolute spon tanei t y) . Is. Again. in itself <l going· I fJ III ('. On the contrary it has gone backward. The problem of movement is grounded in the question cone rni ng t II(' -ssence of be ings as su ch. Titus to inquire into the essence of human freedom means to make the essence of causality. These m turn can be seen within the events .exemp la ry r'ausality .

From here the leading question asks mor oncis Iy: what are beings as such? This expression 'as such'translat th Latin ut tale. It indicates that that to which it is attached . This question disregards the particular character of beings to embrace all beings whatsoever. To inquire into a being as such means to inquire into i hoc ens qua tale. But if philosophy is a primal and ultimate possibility of human existence as such. iden e wh. So if we consider OUf chosen problem the question of the ss nee nl" human freedom.'r{)relalion 01' philosophy may be confused and erroneous and excite Ill(' grE'atest mistrust.particular being fans under the categor of being. ever . its ssence.can no more be verified from the history of this question than from its inner content. man) but aLI b ings as such what beings are as beings. Instead. It indicat s that what is spoken of is int nd din the pecific respect of it essence: rl ~O oV ij Bv. ledge (Kant). If this is so. that is to say. and in r espect of particular beings the more indefini e and abstract the field b ames. and thus is not at all about /I. How little this is so becomes dear if we look marc closely at the question concerning beings. for 'relevance' to 1i fe is normally understood as adapI fli i011 to the so-called demands of today'. there is still further l'videllce for this. Its so-called 'relevance' to lif thus lacks illlY definite contours. is as old as Western philosOl'hy itself. The being-a-table of a table announces what a table is its what-being. IlO longer just unci ar how going-afterthe-whole is supposed to mean the same as going-to-the-rool. This question of philosophy asks what b ings ar . The inquiry into be ings as such. and corresponds to the Gr ekij. then our thesis of the challenging character of philosophy's questioning of the whole is far from selfevident. as also from every particular being. we can s e that this goingill'l er-t he-whol. Our inquiry into beings also pertains to animals but in relation to them as to \IS this co-concern IS not at . We said that the question impli it in th problem of fr dom the question. but this equivalence is impossible in principle. one wi l] not ne d to persuad it into ~. It is in no way clear how we are to explain and justify our thesis and this in spite 01' th veryday and obvious' idea that philosophy must 'be relevant to lif(". speculative knoll. Yet the di fficulty is precisely that natural pre-philosophical experience and conviction demands what Wc' earlier df'nied of philosophy. The question on erning beings as such does not just inquir into this or that.e does not go-to-the-root. to raise philosophy to the rank of science (or absolute sci nee) as theoretical ac ivity. How can such dis-regarding have the character of a challeng!'? (~oing to Ihe roots. The question concerns not just some beings as such (animal.111 a goin g. in respect of its tablehood. including us ourselves as human beings. whereby nothing in the nature of a challenge can possibly b involved.lioll of beings also inquires into us as beings we annot see in what W(lY iL is supposed to go to our root. especially since the beginning of modern philosophy. opinion. this dis-regarding gencrality is much more a flight from ourselves as a specific kind of being.e.just in resp ct of the fact that they are beings. 35] . but in uch a general way that the question concerning beings as such can no longer be relevant to particular beings. If w SUTV y the history of philosophy we can see that this question never and nowhere leads to grasping philosophy itself as a goingto-the-root. Now this common il/(l. pure contemplation.§' 5. On the contrary. irrespective of whe her they are ani mal or human is not directed at us as such. in respect of the question of beings as such. the concern bas always been. precise I in its fulls ope and significance i. namely to the root of the individual who questions. On the one hand OUT thesis ('orrespolJds to the quite natural vi w that philosophy has to do with man hunself and should have an influence on his activity.the question into which is built the problem of freedom . for thes are likewise beings. Ind ed. When we inquire into beings w also inquire into animals and material nature. What we maintained about the challenging character of the qu scion of beings as such . evaluation or possession. irrespective of whether the are plants or humans or animals or God.root.the table as u h .is not to be taken merely as an arbitrary object of cone prion. the table is to be taken as table. and is therefore anyth ing' but a challenge l32-34] to us. qun tale as employed in the metaphysics of the late !Liddle Ages. It is. But merely [rom the fact that the que. 'nze Queslionable Challenging Character 25 us. It inquires into what pertains most univ rsally to beings in generaL Thus the further we inquir into his question of what beings ar as such. Our discussion of the thesis of the challenging character 0/ philosoph: has brought us b fore a P culiar dil mma.to-the.' as human beings. The linguistic expression as such' is specifically philosophical. the more general. For to inquire into beings as such means dis-regarding all particular beings. as a challenge must take aim at us. that is concerning beings as such. '0 our thesis that going-aftcr-the-whole is goingto-the-root remains an arbitrary assert jon whi -h can III no way be Justified from the substantive content of the question. therefore. as precisely thi being.24 First Breakthroueh . especially on the usual Interpretation of philosophy. instead. '10 be sur.ich canno be asily dismi sed.

speculative knowledge_ Our thesis conforms to so-called natural and pre-philosophical convictions about the esse-nce of philosophy and is presUITlablyconditioned by these from the' start. ask this question. il is nul' prerogative. The Queslioluzble ChallelZ{{ing Character 27 relevance of the full content of the leading question of philosophy has not revealed anyth ing with the character of a challenge. lnstearl. indeed can we even bring it into view. in fact. dot's rh is mean tluu they really and f{f!fl. so long as we have not exhausted the content of this question? Can we exhaust this. of Western philosophy . this is an outrageous and presumptuous statement.)7-38J . At first sight. still more their answers and their various pi irations. l lave we ourselves. 1. indeed. along with a er-rtai n answer. in pr vious treatments of its leading problem') We must mistrust both of these alternatives as they are usually presented to us. this is even a fateful necessi ty for us! Only then ('1111 we arrive at th problematic in which they immediately existed. namely that it concerns all beings as such. provided a particular answer to the question. not so much directly as implicitly throughout their whole work. and also our responsibility. It emerged that just this question. ill brief. as a question which arises in Greek philosophy? Only when and insofar as we have genuinely asked this traditional leading question of philosophy can we decide whether or not ph i1osoph izing necessari Iy in vol ves a challen ge. Tn the history of all essential questions. occurs in their works. to become the murderers of 0111' forefathers. how and why should we reject the leading question? Is this question -ti t6 5v perhaps 'wrongly' posed? What could enable us to make such a judgement? Wha t is the pro per manner 0 f q uestioni ng') I-low is it at all possi ble to pose the question wrongly? '[he totality of beings does indeed demand asking this elementary question as to what beings are as such. namely that Aristotle poses the question . It also contradicts what we ourselves already indicated. can we conclude that this question was genuinely posed? 1 ot at ull. which would distort philosophy into a world-view doctrine. On the other hand our unfolding Fr()lll I he fact that th is question. namely to ask 1I/IIFf! primordially than they did.i t6 ov as the genuine question of philosophy and in so domg saw himself as clarifying what the whole of Greek philosophy before him had been seeking. On the other hand the substantive content of the philosophical question of beings as such says nothing in favour of our thesis. coniemplatio. and we have indicated something of the scope of his question. but is not even posed at all. We have only made it clear that the problem of freedom is built into this question. so long as we do nOI:really ask the question. We can no more proceed according to common convictions.ing question as ultimately adequate. The question was asked b Plato and Aristotle and can be readily identified in their Writings. '111 once again ask this question of Plato and Aristotle . no more than do traditional interpretations of this question.means something else. '1_0be sure.the question.. Should we place our trust mol' in natural convictions about philosophy. but precisely for this reason were not able to work thl'ough to final ir!l Ira nsparency: about what beings are? in our above considerations. but only quote it so to speak. an answer which has since been taken as definitive in the history of Western metaphysics right through to us grand cornpletionin HegeL How then CHn we maintain that this question has not b n posed? Plato and Aristotle did. I nd eed. or more in philosophy's great tradition. asked this question ot at all: we have only summoned it up. to be sure. This Leading question of Western philosophy is not llJrong~rposed. this questioning interprets itself as 13Eo>pia. does not exhibit anything with the character of a challenge.e. i. Why are we unable to accept it? Is it permissible to dismiss the whole great tradition and maintain the laughable opinion that we can and must begin all over again? Yet if we cannot leap out of the tradition.uillel'Y pOSt' til is question? [35-37J ilself. than we can just accept the traditionallead.26 Firs/ Brealilhl"m~h but will demand that it d<'Jl1ollstrates this from and through § f. Aristotle and Plato. But can we really maintain this. owing to its general abstract character. hut ir we merely ascerta in that this question. occur agai II and again in the subsequen t history of philosophy.

'iilying.ioning of the bping of h ings proceed? What is sough in this {~uestionillg:' J list that whicl I deter mines 1 h e sence cf beil1!? It is a [39 OJ \Ye need. but we under tand 'being' also in our comportment to OUl's('lv('s and to others Iike ourselves. But that which is worthy of qu stioning ncompasse ever _ thin~ belongi~lg 10 this question in its otonmost possibility everything implicated ill Its so. ot ani ill our !'lHnponment LO the beings of our external environment do \\'e understnllu L1I11L these beings 'are'. For exam pIE'. Preconceptual nder tanding of Being and Greek Philosophy N70rdfor Being: odaf(J of Preconceptual Understanding Forgottenness of Being s Ba ic a) The Character of 13 ing and he What do s it mean to really ask this question? Nothing else but to allow everything thoughtcu. whi ih s ek wha is primarily and ultimatel worthy of que tioning. including be'. hut ill all 'practical' judging and emplo rrnent of b ings. by e plicit 'is . that we operate in an understanding of 'is'. How then does this que I. so we must seek that which is ask d in it. 6v 1.alled presuppositions. however knowing I hal we do so. Or if. 'has been'. you und rstand the 'i ' and op rate within this understanding. we th reby under tand that this surrounding countryside 'is' wonderful. It inquires into the being of beings. and au in my audienc understand. 7. and 'a!'€" in such and uch a way rather than ill another.lorthy in it to emerge. without. we look around and sa to ourselves. walking through the countryside and stopping or a moment. about what IS sought therein. This being 0(' beings of every ki nd is . It is wonderful just as It is and as it xi tingl reveals itself to us. 'wonderful . or in theoretical reflection upon them. The leading question 'what ar beings?' must be brought to genuin question'il1g. every word of this. lt is 110t 61'S!. and not only and not lor the first time when we employ these linguistic expr ssions. that the topic of the I cture course is human freedom. When we earlier a ked if a treatment of the (special or particular) problem of fre dom can be a genuine introduction to philosophy. To com to the point: what is supposed to be worthy of questioning in the traditional leading question of philosophy rl to ov: What is worth of questioning here is nothing less than that which is actually inquired into. then \V(' understand this 'is. whose fundamental tendency is to question concerning the whole. and 'will be'. But precis Iy in resp t of this quescion.\\' 7. Preconceptual Understanding (?f Being 29 CHAPTEH TWO The Leading Question of Philosophy and Its Questionability. nee ssarily begins by settling down comfortabl in its first stag. Do we understand this. beings as such. by speaking and tall ing about beings. ov. If I say. The sam holds ill r speer of the forms 'was'. We understand something quite definite and w ran easily assure ourselves that what we mean by 'is' is not a stone or a lriangl or a number but simpl 'is'. not into what bl"ings an'. it is not permissible to rest content with initial formulations.0 being. paying any attention to this fact. still without Laking the whole que ion into vi w. upon its initial awakening. nd precisely th question con erning beings as such. without. We constantly hold ourselves and operate in such an understanding of wha 'being' means. Leading Que lion of Philosop/~r (t! rei 0'1') a the Question oncerning the Being ~f eings B qll('Slioning \ hich seeks determinations. and if so l('/l n? \ e understand this at aU times. we understood. Discussion of the Leading Question from Its Own Possibilities and Presuppositions § 6.. Such €'nablement implies clarity about how Ih€' questioning proceeds. this question which goes after the whole. everything worthy to be placed in question. aloud or silentl . It is characteristic of any question that it does not. But what is it hat constitutes beings as beings? Can we call it anything els tha II just beirzt!! The question concerning beings as such is actually directed 1. in ('OlllcIllplative enjoyment of beings.. bu we already do this III all silent omportment to beings. if in listening to this lecture you silent! think to ours 1ves that what I am a ina is incorrect. In what way do w nlrt"ady understand what 'being' means? . We understood 'be as related to the verb 'is'. alread place in question everything belonging 0 its own presupposrtions. What is worth of questioning is pre iSE'1 being. only recall what always happens in our Dasein. It seeks to understand th origin of' our understanding of the being of beings. r Have we thereby exhausted what is worthy of questioning in the leading question? This is a genuine questioning only if It is concerned to discover that which enables the answer. Again not onl and not initial] .

3. but rather 'so-being'. i. 'It is he case that the earth moves around the sun': being as being-true. and since an lllldrTslimding of being is already implicit in the pre-philosophical \'xi$l!'llc-e of man (for otherwise he could not relate to beings at . penetration into every kind of human comportment. ' 1\11<11 lilies . Rather. 'The earth is heavy'.freedom from I to possess sornerhing deception:' ill lts trut h? How is this possible? [41-43] '~~-44] . E. We constantly hold ourselves in such an understanding of being. Yet this fact does not OCCIlT to. l[ we ask what a table is. freedom lrcmdeception.e. it 'exists'.'is'. but rather constantly in all our comportments .I mean Coillp. the deeper becomes our forgetting of this one thing. we understand the being of beings. precoriceptuality. as that to which our Illiderstanding of such things is referred. 'is covered by land and sea': in these latter cases being does not mean 'exists'.stands open for us so to speak. but also. Ieast we ca 11 say that i l is a or .' We all understand being and yet we do not grasp it. us as such. but we are quite unable to indicate [rcrnwhere an answer might be found. and we do understand it when we say 'is'. accident. we ullderstand its being. or-iginary dividedness. This is just an initial indication of the criginary dividedness whereby we understand being as being-present. that in all openness to beings we understand being. it is 110 disproof that we are governed by this understanding of the undifferentiated bei. since phiLI)SIJ/Jhi. we always already understand being as divided. space .that not j ust the beings as such. We thereby refer to the puzzling fact that already. but the being of beings. The earth 'is'. but in all speaki ng wh atsoever we un derstan d beings in th eir so. unspokermess.however clumsy this quest ioning may appear . or . Even if IVI'! are not in a position to give a correct defininon of its essence. but everyone is greatly embarrassed if asked what he really means by 'being' and 'is'. In understanding the being hpings. now and in a particular place. what is sought is the origin of our understanding of being. not-so-being. We do not attend to it at all. i. in some sense the totality of beings) wherein we hold ourselves. as so-being. V e said that the leading question of philosophy inquires into the being of beings. or whether it rather was at a former time.lf'1. undifferentiatedness. as what-being.o. tor otherwise we could not understand it./ Being 31 not first understood when we use words such as 'being'.p<1liul ligu]"f'. posin g t he. so that we must first be reminded of this self-evidency. We can indeed deceive ourselves in trying to ascertain whether. and the more we open ourselves up to beings. We can clarify this originary division in terms of 'is'.. Preconceptuat Understanding 0. now become acquainted with some characteristics of this understanding of being: 1. More precisely. Not only do w IIl1dpfstand and know the being. this means .estion {if Philosophy § 7. as a planet it has 'actuality'. But this deep forgottenness is n. So he question remains as to the ongin of our uliderstanding of being and the 'is'. as well as to the kind of beings which we are not. a particular object exists. Heing must some bow be interpreted. Above all.ot only are we embarrassed for an answer.and -so being.w!'! could say that it is an object of lise. 2. albeit in an implicit way. of use. Not only does everyone understand it while no one properly grasps u. ·k forgotten ness. and as being-true. 8. We begin our existence wi til this forgouenness r:f our understanding 0/ being. must somehow come to light. we nevertheless always air-cady operate within an undersumding of such l h in gs.ng of beings. chat we do not understand being just DOW and agall1. We have. confidently distinguishing this 'is' from 'was'. This much is evid nt. Indeed. 6. it is evidence/or this.30 Leading Qu. . 7. and 'was'. This understanding of being which comes to expression in philosophy rnuuot be invented or thought up by philosophy itself. But we cannot be deceived about the distinction between 'is' and 'was' as such.question of what beings are as such. At every moment we comport ourselves to the kind of beings which we as humans are. and everyone has forgotten that he thereby holds himself in an understanding of being.Ii I) ph ilosophy's u nderstallding of being ex presses what man is in his spact' and spatiality.. moreover.h setting human q ues ti onin g of bei 11 gs over agai nst itsel f. and precisely in our everyday existence. on the contrary. We already operate within knowledge and perception of The regionjrom wher-e we define table and triangleobieci.e. arising thus from 111<1l1'S nature prior to any explicit philosophical thinking. The same applies in respect of ('\'NV being. 5. a t. 'The earth is a planet': being as what-being. Or if wea re asked what a trian glc is. We operate within a preconceptual understanding of being. \l\Iben philosophizing as such breaks out and begins to develop itself 1 It mug. every being that we know as such is . We have forgotten it to such an extent that we have never actually thought about it.ul{! is awakened as a primal actiuuy oj man. etc. we ca 11 use the 'is' am] 'was' and so forth b cause the being of beings is already self-evident to us pnor to all speaking.veryone understands the 'is' and 'being'.dready somehow understood in respect of its being.(. we are not able to explicitly define what we mean by it. whatever it happens to be. the scope of being (all regions beings. Our comportment is carried and governed by this understanding 0/ being.

not that for beings. whet. i. ikewise. to OV mans every xisting thing.philosoph ical existence. b) The Ambiguity of ouain as Sign of the Hichncss and rgenc of the Uumastered Problems in the wakening of he nderstanding of Being The awakening of the understanding of being means understanding beings as such in respect C!t their being. and correspondingly by to K(. onl if one follows the way in which the many intertwined and sl?erningl empty debates about words steer toward this abyss. 'to DV is a collective L name and a regional name. ev r thing bad there is. thus bearing the whole disquie of the primary and ultimate philosophical problems. that which is a bad thing. i. nul by to 6v. by KUKlCt. . in he latter meaning it refers to the existing beings as such. but it belongs to what is bad ill genera!: .6 ov the collective name for all pre ent iwillg'S.g. dearly and properly known. lev rtheless the hiddenness of this understanding of being is such that being must som how or other be illuminated. landing of being in pre tern histor .lutu).l rer preseri L or not. . of the Platonic dialoguE'S. Wllerever philosophizing takes place. how the hov r over it.e. To KUKOV is a collective name and the name of a region. to OV is the participle of the infinitive E val.VVestern philosoph in its d cisive beginnings . or in he singular to OV.~ 7. both inside and outside of philosoph . refers to this realm itself. But wherever beings are experienced through explicitly and deliberately lIlterrogating them as to what they are in some s nse the being of beings is dis used. so is . what the ancient fTreek question ri to OV H('lualiy seeks.. we must rirst bring ouain 1'1·6-'1-7] .illumination. Ior example that this thing we eucouruer is a KUKOV. I . so can he meaning of l hr.the beings as SIl h . as "to KCtK6v is tl](' collective name for everything belonging to the realm of the bad.v. When we n . i.ing. But we are seeking the Greek terminological chara terization for being. is the bi rth of philosoph from th Dasein in mall. that is to say. vVe say. but which just for tills rea.g.e. to all beings insofar as they are determined by beingness [. seen in the light of . run through one another.e. The word 'being' is likewise employ d in the meaning of 1))'('S('llt beings. it leads uso the abyss of a central problem. We inquire into the ancient Greek word for being as such. Initi<lll. wb rein th essence of being bad is int nded.but must b content with a schematic indication.32 Leading Queslion ty'PhiLosophy . something bad. the understanding of being is somehow understood and grasped. as ta OVlCL (npuyj.albeit hidden .()(6v we mean something else. III everyd 1Iy as we II as in v ulgar-p b iloso P h ica I d iseo urse 'be in g' usua IIy IJIl'HIlS Iwillgs. irrespective of wh ther one knows anything about.word 'badness'. TO OVdoes not mean all eXlstltlg beings taken together. i. but the bad as such. i. it. the being. as tbe had thing itself or as badness as such (being bad). However obscure and trivial this distinction and its "OIISant obfuscation may seem. all present bad things. not for that which is. this alwa s means beings. the bad.the present being . In the latter rtlpaning it refers to the bad bemgs as such to all beings insofar as they are determined by badness. 10 6v is like TO 1((1)(OV. '1"1e double rneamng of such words is no accident but has a deep Illt'laphysical reason.e. by which a being is determined as such is the bei ngness of the bemg ouO"iuwi) OVl:O~ The present (existing) bad TIll' bad beings as such Had 11 ess (th at w hi ch consti ttl tes I he bad beings) .of what: Th way in which an i nt Greek philosophy . eiendheilJ.the beingness of beings (being) Xow just as in the case of to KnKQVthe coil ctive meaning and the rc'gional meaning can chang and be confused with one another. Accordingly.anding of bei n. is.e. One can understand the inner greatness. JIOI all presently existillg bad things taken as a whole.0 KUKOV.understands being must b discoverable from its basic word for being. he actually I"xiSlillg bad.ive description. i. this self-d iscovery of the L1 nders tand i11 g of bel n g.. In this way being comes into the sight and view of an understanding which remains quite hidden [rom itself. the being of beings must stand in the . That.i kr-wise.ounter the word 'being' in contemporar as well as in previous philosophical literature. e. ou r Iask must be to hold on to ih is question 'ti IO O\' and dlTive at a preliminary answer. drspitf' the fact that there is no necessitv for It to be. not only is it a present bad lh. by ouaiCt. receives the designation Quain. This awaken iJlg of the underst. When v r and wherever beings are so experienced. but tlH' beings as existing [das Seiend-seiendei. Preconceptual 'nderstanding ofBeing 33 pre. 'v\'e cannot here follow this birth cf philo oph as the all akerung of the under. 'the badness in the world'. Experience of ~eings as beings means that th under tanding of being must somehow come to e pression.however. what a being is when it. or mor precise! . for what falls within the realm of that which is for what we mean bv nil existing thing . although then as now the two meanings. Just. on is not. despite its Iarniliari y III us. The ()-reeks refer to that which is beings. C!l an understanding. also be usr-r] as a colle .

i hat we know the latter's essence. Therefore we must ask about what being means. the n cessit of the question remains. but was able to chall n e the g nius of Plato.till we know. 'will t e etc. and now it is only empty straw which is being threshed.table . h 11 we must con lude that the pre-ph do ophi.. The question concerning being is hidden behind a form which is alien to it. if at the same time we bar the way 1. for that whi h was and still is int nd d by being.it does not follow that questioning and understanding has the same haracter in both cas s. ) Of what then? Th is is the question. We say. i. VVhat LIllis em rges is a bewildering variety of possible meanings lor oocie. The extent to whi ·h this is so 1ra nsf . Philosophy took up the word l rou: its pre-philo ophi ·al usage. And even if the question of what we understand by being is lingui ticall similar to the question concerning ow' understanding of this being. who ha e for all too long unthinkingly taken the well trodden roads.reek is loaded with philosophical terminolog .VVe thus have 110 right LO ill terrogate it as if it were a bing. th path which is remote from ordinal' understanding. (.rJ{'cLiolls Oil this problem. but thai it philosophiz S ill its basic structure and formation. So w must go out and bring the harvest in anew. if it has not becom rusted and blunt through opinions and gossip.e. We. then we must be abl to und rstand something unitary within this diversity.tually th case.e. but rather indicates the richness and unmastered urgency of the problems tliemselues. ? Being in the sense of . not that (. tan ent. 110 we ind ed know this? Or do we lllakE' this appeal on the basis of an obscure intimation that 'being' and 'is' and 'was' are not like the things of which we can say that th yare or were. in di rrprenL degrees to be sure. allanguage 01· the Greeks was already philosophical. nOT i it a sign of slackness in terminology. very readil . It is our fate 0 once again learn tilling and ploughing.. the same outward form as the question concerning beings. deter us from this qlle lion about the meaning of being nam I by pointing out that being cannot be viewed in the same way as a table or a triangle. the triangle a a spatial figure. 1f this could happen so easily. If this word is not just sound and fumes. what does It mean? Ouoiu rou 6vroc.ion: th beingness of beings ISeiendheit des Seiendeni. This is a .as what? The table as an object of use.e. and could only register what was proximally presented to them. 0 we mus follow the philosophical path. Quaiu. means in tran lat. bei ngis not itsel f a beiI\g. and will r main unrecognizable for whoever is used to asking onl about beings. What justif'ication is there however for appealing LO the completely different haracter of being in comparison with beings? This presupposes thal we already know about the diff rent and particular nature of being. in their original n. to dig up the ground so that the dark black earth sees the light of the sun.. 'is 'was'. What. Being as . The word ouoia means many things. as this' and 'thrs . namely this question concerning the meaning of the lundamental word of Greek philosophy. and must cloak itself in. however of the corresponding Greek word. i.. we must try to follow this path. or lx-uer. does this ambiguous word ouciu really mean? Are we apabl of discovering a meaning which the Greeks themselves were unable to e press? Wep not the CiT eks in th same situation as we ourselvesj'We understand 'being'. Yet precisely if we hold fast to this variety of meanings for ouala. We cannot say this. and w ith 1111 artificiality. 'Beingne s IS a er unusual and arlificiallinguistic form that occurs only in the sphere of philosophical reflection. something of the ess nee of being. These are particular lh. just the remarkable fact that we take what is designated by being.ings. we must come to know the field and what it is capable of yielding. The li~hl which was at that time breaking through was so bright that these greal rhiukers were blinded so to speak. beings. even withou being capable of properly grasping it. oeoto is not an art i licial expression which first occurs j 11 philosoph " but belonzs to the vvr-ryday language and speech of the Greeks. Therefore the ambiguity: of this basic word as we find it in Plato and ristotle is not at all an accident. Appealing to the completely dilTerenl r-harar-ter or being in comparison with bt'ings it is [4·7-49J illsisted that questions properly pertaining to beings cannot be simply erred to th e beintr 0 r be ings. i. such that ther seems nothing more to understand or ask about.rst had to be brought ill Ever since that time.e. in the final anal sis. This is a convincing argument. i.0 its interrogation? learly not. The initial great harvest fi. i. \"hat emerges from all this is just that the question concerning being cloaks itself in. The same appl ies to every gelluine language. so much so that Plato and Aristotle.e.34 Leading Qile tion ofPhilo ophy §' r Preconceptual Llrulerstanding oj Being 35 into view. We can only do this if the plough is sharp. were unable to see their way forward.in the end this is JUSL the beings them elves as sue-It. \ hat is supposed to drive us on to further questioning? Just this. o'ain. about whose bein» it is possible and necessary to ask.. But perhaps someone could. on the other hand: the bin of beings I. can w want to know. But being . The h isiury of the basic word of Gr ek philosophy is au exemplary demonstraI ion of the fact that the Greek language is philosophical. ein des SeiendenJ. the history of philosophy has been threshing this harvest.

Preconceptual Understanding ofBeing 37 depelld" 011 I he depth and power of the people who sp ak th language and p. presented on a plate as it were. it first appeared as if we meant that the word oixriu. etc. and thi is sorn thing that could onl occur be ause beingn S8 . Thi fundamental meaning then made the word possible as a technical term for that which is in ended and sought and pre-und rstood in the leading question of philosoph. Because they are pres nt and at band in an exemplary sense.].n the xp rience or' these bing. willi its indicater] fundamental meaning. What is this exemplar character? House and home.ish to hearken to the fundamental meaning of this basic word ouo iu. constaruly preseruine lhemselues. one's pass sian. is overlooked in the philosophical usage of h word. We soon see that in everyday linguistic usage ther is no sharp distinction between beings and being. especially when the result . (wha the Greeks call oixric) estate [AnlOesen. QuO'ia as What Is Sought and Pre-understood Ul the Lea di n 11 Question 0 f Ph iloso phy Hut can we base all interpretation of the concept of being in Greek philosophy on this simple explanation of the ever day meaning of o'O'la? Is it not a viol nt. etc. As constantly attainable they lie close at hand.§' 7. the ever cia m aninz of ouO'in refers to house and home. in ever da understanding of being. We asked how it comes about thai these particular beings . we must pay attention to everyday speech. But the Greeks onl intend this becaus of their precursory understanding of constant presence. a the self-evident and implicit fundamental meaning. not just any beings. B being we mean nothing else but constant presence f'nduring constanc . was simply there. it is precisely the fact that Greek philosophy never explicitly ~1.is nowhere expli illy nunciated ill (Tr ek philosophy? l lowevcr. and just this is what is und 1'stood by beingnes . i. man has long had an ill1plicit understanding 0[' what he means. This ev ryday usage of the word oooic. To he sure..h in it. yet without the right word o(. d) The Self-concealed nderstanding of Being (ouO'ia) as Constant Presence. house and borne. such that the (.UpS what it means by ouoio: that makes it necessary for us to inquire I II to this q II suon.the meaning of being as ronstaru presence . artificial and external approach if w try to vxtract the substantive problem of Gr k philo ophy from an isolated word-meaning.ng. In this case house and horne possessions.house and horne . oph . tern .. of Philo.ce. by oixriu nothing lse is m ant but constant presence [ 'liindige rlruaesenheu J.curring to him. b cause they are constaruly ouainable and at hand in the immediate or proximate environment. In fact.reeks then asked which among the many bf'illgs best deserved this cksignalion. namely the beings tha belong to one.was intended and understood as 'on stant j!l'('·sence. These beings stand at on's disposal because the are fixed and stable. exemplary: in their bei. possessions are constantly attainable. one impli itly understands by the beingness of a being (its b ing). But what about the violence. They are what is closest and in this constant closeness they are present and at hand in a definite sense. house and home the beings over which on has disposal. yet without this coming thematically to expression. but such as are in a certain way. etc. w call possessions. They und rstand constant presence in a pre-understanding. Why do the Greeks use the same word for beings as such that they use for house and home..e. In summary. but which if practiced in the right way and in the [-")2-'54 ] (50-52] .J (:) J:. 000'10: ill ans beings. For the most part. and especially where. Th actual situation wa the rever : the word ucria in its linguistic conn ctions with ov and dvta first arose i. To be sure. for beingness? When we asked in this way. possessions? Wby is precisely this kind if being exern plary? Clearly. -preseru. as in the case of thi fundamental word it is a matter of something ultimate and essential. And what does one understand by being? We shall be able to comprehend this if we succeed in determining what is exemplary about hous and home. were the particular beings which ex mpLified beings as such.become exemplary for beings as such. ist wit.36 Leading Question.prior to he [orruation of the word ouO'ia . arldiclaLity and externality of' our interpretation? ']0 be noted here is mal we have not appealed to etymology for tbe disrlosurc or an tIling origillary from the word. Only OUT German language has a deep and creative philosophical character to compare with the (~reck.a pta ess subject to gH'UL misuse and errors.v ryday ipeech and the Funclamemal :Vleaning or ooein: Presenc II' we I. only because this being corresponds in an exemplary sense to that which. So also in Gr ek. this could only 0 'cur because what is II!('allL b th word already existed: COil lara pre €n. What the Greks address as b ings proper is what lu Ifils this understanding of being as heing-aLway.

and is ever agai. and IS Itself to be grasp d from th is lind erstand in g. The contexture and perspective for the problem of freedom is the question of what beings are. In such an awakening there occurs a speaking-out. we have set out from what is intended in this word's pre. Thus. the undersranding of beillg comes to speak out. which holds itself within the manifestation of beings in and through language.38 '~eading Queslion (?!Philosoph. then we immediately ask about how we conceive a chair. We now see clearly that the chair standing there. and indeed not only or for the first time 'In philosophy. e. but by exhibiting it as a basic word. Our interpretation does not proceed by assembling the meanings of the word from various passages of philosophical \\'Titing. whose essence is to exist in Ianguage. We could say that things have now . the entire history or philosophy shows that this elementary question. steps) h as a purpose.g./! precisely philosophy.e. is not like a stone or a piece of wood from a broken branch. but without prior indication of what it means when e. a chair. this question appears clearly posed and ready for an answer. in order that an answer should become possible? VVhat does being mean? [?rom where do we understand it~ It IS understood in the understanding of being. precisely because it is elementary.g..ing itself named by this word in common usage. however. or more precisely. . Existing in language was grasped by the Greeks as the crucial moment of the essential definition of man. such a topic could occupy an entire lecture course.jlallgI'd in this regard. eoervdav: meaning 0/ olicriu comprehends {he beingness of beings as constant preSCllce.111d Aristotle. ji-DIII where does such. 50 that we can bring to light the innermost problematic of Greek metaphysics. The Greeks experienced this essential character of man as no one else before or after them. [nterpretatian of Mouement. Whal-Being. or in the broader philosophical sense. i. guided by the question of what beings are as such. For they said: IivepO)1to~~QlOV i. what we have said about oualet IS not a final statement. in the awakening of philosophy. I )Pre we must content ourselves with some minimal references to Plato .ding receive its illuminating powe/)~ In which horizon does the IlllrierslCul. or whether we can conceive it at all. is of the very greatest difficulty.. Above all. 8. we must place in question precisely what is most worthy of questioning! We are inquiring into beings as such! And how must we inquire into them.man.6yov lixov. every present being as present. Already in ordinary language the word for being is oOO"io. Jlj a) Being and Movement: auaiet as mlpouaia of the llll:Optvov When we inquire into what constitutes the being of a present thing. insofar as pllilosophy is guided by the question 1:( 1:0 av.e. if we hold fast to this present thing before us. sorne()!w has a chair present before him. in this openness. but the other way round: philosophy aris s from the awakening of an understanding of being.e. in this decisive event of antiquity. everything is II at yet in readiness for asking about what constitutes [he thing's prr-seuce. doo rs. which means house and home. whether natural or artificial) arid if we ask about what constitutes their beingness. Demonstratioa of the Hidden Fundamental Meaning of obaia (Constant Presence) in the Greek. cupboards. elaborated.I'll is P urposivet H'SS does no l <elltach to sue h I'55-56J . also understands being as coJlstan l prese nee. i. How does this question involve a challenge? To make a decision on this problem we must actually pose the leading question. and Being-Aclual (Being-Present) We have set out from the everyday meaning of the word cociu. However. ['54-55J ullderSlan. estate. nut if we disregard the groundless and svnseless question of whether we grasp a psychical image of the chair or til(' actual chair. The Hidden Fundamental I}ean:ing q/ormia 39 right context can also be fruitful. We have taken languag as the primordial revelation of the beings in whose midst man exists . etc.n 1I15U ciently prepared. man is a living being possessed of language. § 8. we now attend to the beings we proximally encounter (the things around us. i. but only prepares us for the philosophical interpretation of the word. If bei ng is understood as coustan t presence. To be sure. Owuuerpretaucn showed that the pre-understanding cd' being contained in 11m. Our interpretation does not amount to an external registration of a word meaning by reference to a dictionary. At this point we are content just with some indications within the contexture and limits of our own questioning. ill the room or in the garden. but that it (and similar things such as tables.and extra-philosophical usage: beings qua house and home. where oixrin is understood from and in the leading question of philosophy. We have not merely seized on the word Qucriu and analysed its meaning.ding of being operate? Before we expressly answer this crucial qll{'stion we must show that and hOI. If. but we have entered into the th. We have taken the word as expressing an essential comportment of man to th e bei n gs 0 r h is constant and mast proximate environment. There is a lot of talk in philosophy about objects and their ohjl"r:tiviLY.)' §..

whitl. it would still be a present chair..\lOV. Hardie and Gaye. or mor accurately. this piece of chalk for some reason (. And yet everywhere and precisely where one cannot shout loudly enough that chairs and ables are things and not just represents ions in us the much proclaimed 'beingin-itself of such things has been stubbornly ignored..movemeu t is a dE'J errnination of 11<lI\lral things IIeed and of beings as such. hange. comes 1. I TIlliS three i'lPXai: on t he one ha nd U1l0~I&VOV on the other hand the indicated Pnv. sir. what ta s the ame throughout the change. •\ristotle carried out this dis ussion in his great le cures 011 'ph sics'. [L is only preparation for this. And even if It had just two legs. ow it is not a great piec of wisdom to stablish this.e. albeit in such a way that. philosophical knowledge of" the <p'0"1:1 ovru.\o.. BuL this still docs not provide an answer to the question of the ki nd of presence possessed by such things.. 3.e... The fundamental nature of movement is ~I:"TUpo}.VI1V. But this.av f.. This is DOL b caus i is constantly in mo ement. Aristotle exhibits the inner necessit if the problem of movement b showing how the primary and ultima e problemati of all previous philosophy presses toward this problem. and 3 refer to the !iv(lvTiu. or as a be ominz-red of the chalk. its 'standing'. albeit a broken one. but only: som thing whose nature belongs in movement an rest.. T'his rhanlCtcrization contributes to our understanding of what and how a "hair is. has a twofold door. Hu L he understood that i r bping-in. Whatever rests is in movement. ~.. It does not therefore. Aristotle inquires into the origin of movement LI1 its intrinsic nature. But we are asking about its way of being simply as there to use. Thus one cannot WIthout going into the essence of movement and movability.h the problem of bei ng. A third prin iple b longs to the inn r possibility of the yevEO"I EK nvo. We can saywh th r i L has a back-rest or not.iol Ko. . . 'rllis latter word is not to b tak n as quivalent to th modern concept of ph. irs 190 a 6. about its wa of being. in problematizing the essenc of mov ment questioning comes into the proximit of the question of being. L is because Aristotle's physics is not nut ural science at all but rather philosophy i. i. £Ioor. rt: th 'rropevov. hut also this. '111'In ('xl('nmi way but determines what and how they are. but not for be reason that Aristotle's physics is primitive and proceeds without mathematics. to . but b cause it annot come into movern nt at all.vo. Indeed something quite crucial is missing. Qllestion qf Philosoph . it do s not happen that a r d thing originates from the rhalk. 2. i. This IS c change from . Hut what else are we supposed to discover about the hair. when it just stand there? That it has f01l1" legs? It could if nee s ary stand on thre . its 'having a stand'. II is imporwill LO r-haracterize objects of use In this way. . of whom we have alread r said that he grasped tile problem of movement for the first time. is upholstered or not. I e all that whi h d termines th inner possibili y of something the aPt"'. But w are asking about what it is not about what it is not. th chalk a singulal' thing. :0 yavEOli. The first book has an introdu tory character.r. If. j)/rysics 191 a -1.: first its bt'illg-.elll if change is to be pos ible. So it is with Aristotle.. there are chairs with just one leg. and secondly this being-white itself.) b ornes red. i. thus it is not an animal or a human. in the pmper ense involve th s· thrco principles: I UllOflf. but the white piece of chalk becomes a red pi ce of chalk not just a toOl: yiYE09uI (rOOt) ana Kill tK 10\:. it rests. It stands. The thematic discussion of movement oc urs in the third.~. principle. run about.'halk. In fact.1 of discuss ion . Aristotelian phvsi 's is not onl not mol' primi ive than modern ph ics but it is the li'llLer's necessary presupposition. So it stands or lies. O"1:&Pl]CYlt..v. howev r it may be constructed and irrespective of whether it is standing or has fallen over.. ~ FO)r Kui ollt. and eighth book of the Physics.vsi s. mouabiluy belongs to the being of that which rests. which does not necessarily involve being. The number five do s nOL and can never rest. dllrllhal IIw r-ont raru-s musi be IWO': trails.o Leadiru. ("VI'e say not onl "rhis hecomes so-and-so". comfortable or uncomfortable. for example. knowledge of presenL things as present. ua molv ·hange as a going-over to something differ J1l to and absent from till' initial state O"1ap11Ot. but it is incomplete. In this connection be discusses the difficulties which face any new treatment of movement.P contraries.e. But what do we ourselves want with all thi ? VVhat is obtained from this advice that the present chair rests? Just that the chair's 'resting'. Hardie and Gaye.. .) " vrisrorl«.01. i. he neither saw nor grasped its imler counection wi t.0 be so-and-so?". indicates th fact that it exists in movern n t. is high or low. 011 the other hand. .) .e. be To L! HllgS. In the latter ase whit does not become red.e.". Ouo !:'ivm. . "1'1''''11 being: [5 5] I ">H-59] . .0"1l\! l'in OE! ilnOK£lcr91ll tt TOlr. even if not expl icitly and thematically. But w said that it rests and w placed particular emphasis on this. The Hidden Fundame mal 1eaning ~r')(1ia o or movement 41 . trans. and indeed it j only one specifically oriented preparation. r. ('Il is clear that there must 1"'11 substratum for tI. we can take this in two wa s: as a hange from white-coloured to red-coloured. then the essence IS rU. i L is necessary to speak of being. .{:VI:OIt.. sun'. in which case it would be lying on its side.. If we ask about the essence of movement'.~'8. To be sure. These must be d~ffe. both substantively and historical] . for actually asking this qur:stion. fifth.i to. problernatize the being of the present chair which stands there. Many things about movement (the essence of movement) are problernatized.

Hel"ore entering into this problem in more detail. Yet we have already seen that what we attnbuted to ouaiu is in fact only expressed in nnpoucriu: nnpa means 'next to' 'b ing adjacent' in a series. nor by appealing a what is dire tly and express I intended in everyday usage of the word. To be noted is that becoming and origination basically m an: obtaining iwing. The Greeks understood beiugnes in the sense 0/ constant presence.e.. being imrn diately pre ent. b ingnes-s. i. is conceived as the disappearance of one colour and the appearanc of another. trans. and thus a connection between being and constancy. one can also sa that if an:ouoia-7tnpouotu means absence-pres nee.recks rim[ this a lrnost natural meaning of being.a while piece of halk becoming a red piece of chalk .(' change by its sur-r-essiv« "bst"lI('" and presence': trans. of what we call 'becornin« in the narrower ense . i.' can not eVf'11 l59-6tJ i61-62J .e. ouoia at bottom means presence. Tpc")1tOV liE lIVU UAAOV OUK i'HIUYKUiov. coming 0 so-and-so-being.lis oriented to absence and presence .) r lardie It would. That the interpretation and description of pcrul3oA.aYf>. At I'irst. Change in colour.n:upo\Jcriu and that only for this reason can {l1louaiu express deprivation. For he moment w hold to th meaning of ouain in its possible modifications as absence and presence.involves constant struggle. This formal linguis ic objection appears irrefutable. thus 'es once-hood'. i.IS three. no more ar required. V e would completely close ourselves off h'(1I1l he correct interpretation of the (. i. we must note the i1l11'Iications of Lhe quoted passag for our task of interpreting the fundamenLal word ouO"in. It is evident that rhange involves being-other.. and (.e ."yc. is of sign ificance for us in t several respects. presence ill g neral. oiiaiu. something remains: ~ltvOV. Phy<ir:s 1!ll a ') r_ ("YI'I in another way or putting it I his is not necessary". i.wheth r or not this is made explicit . mere sharply: JWllQUain) . oixrin a the nnpouoin of til di5o~ u7touO\Q The nupouein which is explicitly set off against anouoia presupposes the primordial napol)aia. to overlook the fact that tJ1C clarification or this particular kind or understanding .11('(" 1). rf ouain involves absence and presence.indeed hal this was.(o suffices as it for the possibility of change that one thing displaces another. it cannot be refuted at a linguistic level. in a i n·. occln. which itself consists of Iwo princi ples.e. for example. In th case of processes. however. A t least these three (two) apxui are necessary. oj' remaining present and remaining absent. t he C. which wr- !lOW Iormuiate as presonce.K:O. Initially there are two linguistic forms or the familiar word oooic.TT]V ~IETUl3oA. is und rstood as constant presence.) t. that bang is brough about simply by cmouuiu (absence) or nupoocia (presence). '0 we are forced to the thesis that ouaia always means . The interpretation of the essence of movement proceeds through determination of remaining and not-remaining. because our th sis that ouoin means constan presence simply does not rest on such considerations.the undersLanding of something sclf-evid OL yeL also llilgraspf'cl (constant presence. th are the moments of meaning which are immediately intended when Greeks understand ovoio in the usual sense.reek und r tanding of being were 1\"(. be a very great error were we to think that every· tiling has now been clarified. coming into being. so vpry problematic dial Lite . considered in its total COll ext. To b constant (to remain) means to endur III constant presence.e. then ouoin just means eSS'DC hood [Wesenheit]. ("One of due ron t raries will SPFVl' io <.VOv gaTUI TO yap i:"n:povnov tV(lvTiwvnoraiv Tij ana criq. In absen e it is not essence but pI" sence which is lacking. ":\.principles governing the posIn sibility of ~IETU~O/. The Hidden Fundam ntal Ieaning ~!()/)aia 3 opposition.-lain s nse. admittedly. Just how this is possible remains problematic not merely in the sense of a philological diffi 'ulty oncerning the interpretation of Greek philosoph ical concepts. At the same time. already the ca with Plato who speaks of change from [tot hing to bing and uice versa . These forms bring to expression two possible rneaninzs of ouain: ab-senc [Ab-wesenlzeit] and pre-sence [An-wesenheit]' They clear! indicate that the concept. In fact. . So what we ha maintain d is not the case i. (nap) oooic nupoomc /.. This passage." another sense. la k of pres('lIce. but as a fundamental suhsta ntive problem. however. Ph. vVha we intend by the as ert d fundamen al meaning will be discussed below. I Iard ie and (. something whi h hovers over both without being either.i} need not be regarded . sics 1t'l a 6 f. b) Being and What-Being. thr.~.to clearly see and understand this is of ill[' greatesvimportance. a ciu does not mean presence at all.1(uirrapouaiQ.. 'I'h Greeks express presence by xupoucic.8.42 Leadl:n{{ Quest ion of Philosoph .tb re is something which underlies thi hange: imo. To b sure.ilv.

This is shown b r the way that Dionysodorus responds LO :-. . at bottom.\p\'C'rllwll:'ss. The latter: 'Were these (the man beautiful things) oth r than the beautiful itself or one with this? Socrates: I was totall mbarrassed by this qu stion. said ocrates. c) Being and Substance.is spok n of.rcopim. From this. then the problem must be posed and worked through. means onstant presence as the ke which immediate] lllll'll all doors . so that Socrates' answer is n ither intelligible nor valid for the other paru ipants in tl e l'ol1\'e1'sation. wherever we encounter expressions concerning being. The J Iidderi Fundamental tVlellllin{{ rl()uuia 45 discover what. of the b ingness of a bing. and had to admit to myself that it served me right for being so uppish. and expresses the meaning of oucriu more clearly. nupoixriu.g. i. Ell Ihyrkl II us ')O() e 30 j fl. since ant. in that the being' of IlClIlIliful beings is spoken of. is problematic about it.cing results: if napuyF. nupoixriu crops up as a perfectly natural expression.iqui ty the traditional [62-64J 6 65] . their origination and dissolution . Socrates r counts to Crito a philosophical-sophisti ial conversation between Dionysodorus. Plato s r sponse and olution to thi problem.44 Leading Queslion C!/PhilosofJh. asserts two things: l . This presence constitutes the 7 /J"illg-beautiful of the individual thinzs. and indeed for the whole development of" Western ph ilosophy untill-lf~gel_ A I any r-vent. For this reason th ir questions and answers move hither and III itiler in seeming disorder. e.g. that nevertl: -less.). Socrates perchan e Dionysodorus because 1.apoucriu is employed. Dionysodorus now took Socrates at his word and ask d him. however. i. If the being. On th contrary. 'if an ox comes to stand alongside YOll. Nevertheless. 'many.as if. that the way in which the proper being of b ings is to be grasped from presence remains incom prehsnsible. napoucrill is not necessarily oriented to unoucria as a counter-concept. In th relevant passage/ aerates tells of his own ontribution to this conversation: 'And I asked Cleinias wh he wa laughing in this wa over the . now stand beside you (n. .then he rollo". In this way Plato wants to show that the situation in respect of this ncpoueic i. found no way out (uno 6. n:apEcHlv.'here occurs and quite naturally so.and whatIwillg of an i dividual being onsists in its presence.most beautiful and serious things'. be hast and superficial to take our thesis that ouaiu bing.terl obscure. we have obtained a crucial guid el ine for the int rpretation or Greek philosophy. beauly is present in each of them. stubbornly juxtaposed to this.a1IE1Ilt)?' Socrates thesis tha bing-beautiful.VEtal 0'0\ . I would therefore like to quote a very striking example from a Platonic dialogue the Euthydemus. The relevant passage can be fairly easily lifted out and treated on its own.y § 8. It is only posed and made explicit. ('. It would. that beautiful things are distinct from beauty. Euthydemus. content. I replied to the question by saying that "the individual b autiful things are omething different to the b autiful itself.in the crucial answer of Socrates . However.e. in everyone of them something of (like) beaut is present" '. It IS no the question of what distinguishes beautiful things from ugly things. th word that is important to us. In doing this j must forgo describing the situation of the dialogue. the interlocking and overlaying of the two conversations as well as the course. .. on the other hand we find. as from many other passages we can con lude that precisely where the pllre so-being and what-being of things .beautiful of a beautiful th ing is su pposed to consist in the pres nee of beau . this word n. nd if it is not self-evident. and indeed in the sense if being as presence. but of how we are to understand the being-beautiful of these individual beautiful things. then how can there be many beautiful things? Socrates' answer. becomes a problem. Here . a cording to So rates' report: Have ou.vidence of bing. and intention of th work. For what question is under consideration here? It is the 'question 'on rning what beautiful things ar .rather than. Heing-beautiful (beauty) pertains to ever beautiful thinz as beautiful. Ikspite ever thing this 'presence' is ut. Dionysodorus.B. Substantiality and Constant Presen '€' Th Further Plato. But how? If beautiful things are different [rom being-beautiful then they are not themselves beautiful. On the on hand we dis over th much proclaimed self. Is the problem olved in this 1"IlY? Kat at all. nupoucia stands simply for oilcria. napelvul. or more generally that he so. is anything but sel l-evident. nor i it used only in such contexts.e. 'ocrates ever seen a beautiful thing?' 'Indeed'. and of many kinds. I'his is shown by the fact that precisely where lilt' oucrio of the ov. Or if the being-beautiful of many things is the same as this (beauty}. Development of the Problem of Being as the Problem or Su bstance. and is present beside YOIl arc you then an ox? And are you.. it merely sufficed to insert the meaning 'constant presence'. Cleinias and tesippus.. the being-beautiful of existing beautiful Ihings.e. my dear Diouysodorus'.O(Tates. leads to obvious nonsense.

e. as e. d) Being and Actuality The Inn r tructural (Being-Present).g. To conceive !\vi:P. that which stands under. preci Sf' IY where he presses forward into 11lL' gelluine depths of the essence of movement. existentia. Thus the expression U7tOKEiIlEVOV very often stands for (J1tO~I&VOV. 1 ut we can at least provide some indications of how the rigidified problem of substance can be loosened up.vov. absence and pI" sence. It would. innermost The content oj the concept 0/ substance has the character of an en..'I decisive poin . in I ant .ens in actu. l lowevcr. ) vertheless. and precisely in regard to antiquity. ow ver. Our thesis that being means constant presence an itself be d mOJ]strated from the problematic. a being insofar as it is merel r possible.e. For example. we cannot pHSS over the question of whether and how the concep of actuali ('"iSlpnce in the traditional sense. ( iod is. i. that whi h is fi d 0 to speak. ens in potentia. discussions. g The Hidden Fundamental 'ieaninlf of oia]« 7 conception. a nd in such a way that. \t e arc only saying that their questioning of beings proceeds WI t. where the latter means ('hangf'. How th n is thi actuality of the a tual to be compr hended? What do['s ~vtpyEla mean in its substantive m aning not just accordinz to the dir-tionary? Does this und rstanding of being support our more general r-Iairn that bing mean .\ ristotle).g. W can imm diatel see that no progTess can be made if we remain at the level of linguisti . we have already een how ristotle develops lhf' problem of IJring in terms of the problem of movement. have We already encountered this &no in the Aristotelian interpretation of movement. w must inquire into he philosophical term to which it corresponds. Being means being-present. 3.that is 'he qUf'stion. Conn ction of oucria as ncpoocio with eV&pYEla and ctualitas the Greek concept of Summarizing what we have so far aid concernlllg bing (oucria) thr e things emerg : 1. has nothing to do with this.onstant presence? What does tvcpYEla ha e to do with constant presence? \"'e certainly cannot discover this without f'lltprillg into the ancient Greek problematic or being (Plato and . Substantia: id quod substat. 1~lIt our thesis fads at . a being in so far as it is actually present. namely if we focus on the nuce pt of beIng predorn inaru in ordinary employment or the word [65-67] 'hciIlg'. is oriented to Ttapol)cria.involves the fundamental m aning of oixria as constant pI' sene . 'Actuality' r TVirklicMeit] is a translation of the Latin word actualuas . 2. ratione.1Ii II the horizon of this understanding of' bei ng. i. Now it is \'pry si g!! i fj('a II L th a L AI' istotl e. Keia9ul. \1"(' saw that this is onlv' one of the meanings of beirie belonging LO the originary tructur of the concept of bing in ever 'day understanding.. substance as the proper bpi_llgness of a being. as a philosophi al xpression tor existence. r. qf constant presence. ~lcTa~oAil. or better as substantiality. To compr h nd what is problematic in the word 'actuality'. This cannot be demonstrat d here. the earth is. and deaelopment if the problem q/ being has been governed by the lact that oiJcriu is comprehended as substance. being as distinct from not-being. that the problem of being LOok the Ior m of the problem of substance and led all further questioning in this dire tion. The traditional onception of ouo-iu as substance likewise involve the primordial meaning of oooiu qua nupcucin. \mocr!(l(JlO:. as dis inct from an ell. roughly [67-68] . that which is preserved through all changes of properties and thus through the transformation of the thing.Change involves the disappearance of something and t l He appearance of scmethinz else: altO oic and ltupou(Jia. What t\'EP'YW1 means. Arter all this. OV rn 'aTIS actual beings as distinct from dUVUIlE! mere possi ble bei ngs. in a similar manner as Dionysodorus' argumentation in respecL of nnpoucin.i. especially since we do not maintain that the (. 6v. Our word' nerg' in the sense of force. a tualit .. beautiful beings as such. the fundamental meaning of oiioiu Il1 the sense of ltapoucria till remains obscure.tiur£ng remaining. Bei ng in the sen e of actuality: 'Io b sure.e. The interpretation of movement as a fundamental characteristic of beings is oriented to cmo\Jcrluand nnpo oiu. The first s ructural moment is the imo~II'. is no accident. being-present is something totally different from 'force. actualiias is itself the Latin translation of the Gre k word cvtpyeta. therefore be a fundamental misunderstanding of the problem of b('ing were we to pose it as exclusively or primarily the problem of (lclllality.(Wl as fore b trays an external and superficial understanding of t he concept. avails himself of Lite r'ollcepts eVEPYEia and IiUV(LIlIl.46 Leading Quesl£ulZ qf Philosoph~y . exists or is actual.reeks explicitl recognized thi und rsianding of being and made it into a thematic problem. The attempt to clarify the what-b ill 0' of beings e. i. cvepyeiq. That this occurred.. The original impulses thereto can <dread I be found in Plato and Aristotle. Heing or not-b ing .

:-.eingjinished. The word evtpy€lU stems from apyov. tvtP. in wood. KUTU to Hetap".}·sil'S lpyov.tand actuality from th a t of a tualization. he does not mean that we grasp a pseudo-actuality or "SCI" below pp.!pstion concerns the wa in which toorkhood must be conceived if it is to '\[\1I0UI1 e the being of beings. which following the long tradition of philosophy (including Kant) we so routinely employ today these fundamental concepts of being arise for the first tim in Aristotle's treatment of the problem of movement. these discussions concerning form and matter contiuu and prolif rat without vel' appropriating the standpoint. It is from here that we must seek the way to a proper philosophical interpretation of that aspect of nstotle's doctrine of' being which has been so Ill.. This is the doctrine of "All and doo.lflll1eanS a self-holding in producedness and there-standingness. work [Werk). /' 1l&'tU(}oA1l 1tupouaia tvtpYEIU -. To do the history of philosophy in this way would be analogous to deriving our interpretation of Kant from what a journalist wrot at th 1924 Kant jubilee. The workhood of work is the essence of work..0 clarify the essence if actuality unless one previously indicates what actualization is suppo d to mean.)'opli'y to that which proximally grasped s' 8.ng brought to stand forth from here to th re. or even asking about it. This common in . The workhood of work consists in its /.from the heights achieved by these two thinkers. see the workhood of work not in terms of its origin. lfJ in particular. the being-present if a being as actually: pre eru. the Gre ks also s e theinten tion of the work.. People think it particularly characteristic of Aristotle that 11(' brought idea (form). in the pre ence 0/ its look. J is not a matter of the embodiment form in substance.2JJ.. not necessaril 10 the sense of being produced rather than growing up by and of itself. i. BuvullLt. and abov all Aristotle. means more precisely. IOEu. interp eted and deformed '. does not l"f'cognize the childishness which it attributes to both Plato and Aristotle. and 011 i\!Te/n. back to mau. the (]cLUaliLyof a Lhing consists in the actualization of its form. nd [he'll one wonders about how a piritual' form can be located in something Illatprial.to the level of compilers and schools . thnt we do not have an absolute intui tion of this but only see an apP{'al'ance.. The form of the chair.lil means producedness. These concepts of actuality and possibility. Above all.(EW t h ro ugh no:pourric. The tp. Actua.. The Greeks.e. [68-69] I [jY-71 J . which simultaneously clarifies the connection between the philosophi al /pre-philosophical meaning of actuality and the understanding of being as constant pres nc ..in the producedness of the l>roduc hing. In th usual ronce-pl.A()~. and simply repeats everything that has b en said sin e philosophy declined . 011 UIP OV 14: o\" ." or or W111'n Kant goes on to ay that we do not know the thing-in-itself. to be now standing there. would lead us too far afi ld. what is he situation with respect to this actualization of form in mal er (whereby the actuality of the thing is to be secured)? First. And what does this mean? Being r. and. Rather. of matter and form. as such. oixriu. which one can find in any decent textbook.g. ElBo. located by Plato in a super sensible world. 0.(' j\ risrorh- rhat attention has been diverted far away from the genuine problem. which is precisely~o· llie ca e. ')1 fT. 0 I'l. If-holcling (self-maintaining) in the activity of work. however. and to what degree t ie connection betwe n !lvepy&ta and nupoociu is there d moristrated. and often with seemingly just reference to Aristotle's words.. I owever. To show what occurs there. which the craftsman must previously i magi lie in his mind doo. consists in the nnpoorriu '!l lite ErOO~. . So producedness means there-standingness [Da-stehendheil].. is actualized in matter. £v fpyov. Further. to bel. nor of th process of production of beings. in work."i b Iil~ahrt8i:<. Leading Quest£on qf Phi/o. L(.:pyov Ti. within which dBo~ and UA11 are supposed to illurninats the actualit of the real. I choose a shorter way of clarifying th fundamental meaning of tvI\PY&LU. 1!II:re-Sllll1dingfl. e. t O.erpreta 'ion of Aristotle s philosoph. its directednass-to but they do not regard this as the decisiv and essential moment.ess as the presence if its Look.48 spf'Rking.in 11 wt tel'.s.h same as producedness. And again..i011.}U a 21: TO '(UP . The answer is that pr cisely the Look AlIssehen] of the thing comes to expression in its producedness.eady and (ini~he~ is ..t that which res_ide. the underst~dillg is directed towards the inner content of producedness. this fails (. nor in terms of the person who sets the work into motion. but in the moment of being finish d and readyf To be sure. and tvi:p'ff. it is not an interpretation of the Greek concept of actuality unless it has been shown that the Greeks under . and 0 I. r and the things themselves. \'Ve can now easil see how the crucial moment ~ through: the presence of the finished thing as such. H)4. The Hidden Fundamental Meanin{! rf oiaia 49 IS attributed IS (mourrio.

" On 'being is not a real predicate'. hat is. we thereb obtain an in ight into the basic con iept of the Platonic doctrine of being: toea. that is. the 'oncept of €VEPYWl as well as the later cone pt of actuaiuas (actuality) determined by this..fllolog_y (I rans.wheth r as prod uct of craft or as genuine art work . Hofstadrer. from an earl date and for a long urne. If we direct! . That beings as such 11(\\·('the character of app arance just means tha We beillg of beings is understood as self-showing. and the 'what' of something is given in its look. If that which is present (the beings themselves) is conceived as appearance. i. logether with its guiding knowledge. This int rpr!'tation of the Kantian concept of appearance.r something that is only hall' a tual.ouain . Truth.To grasp the Platonic doctrine of being as the 'doctrine ideas if this oncept is taken purely do ographi ally is admittedly an error. Par! One. We must.reek concept of being . V e attempted 0 validate this thesis by an interpret<ILion of the (. The Previously Discussed Meanings of Being and the Exemplary 'tatus of Being-True if or or Our propo d elaboration of the leading question of m taphysics through to the fundamental question proceeds from the thesis tha being means roustant presence. It expresses thr. is actual. th sam time. wh n we tall about I" ant and others in the usual glib way.50 Leading Queslion fir Philosopher (j'o §' 9. In discussing the concept of tvepYI':t(l reference has iIlready be n made to Kant's concept of appearance. it is we who belong to the debris rubbed off from the spirit of his ory. this means nothing else but thar the actuality of the actual consists ill us character as appearance.. However. \Ve cannot PIller now into a discussion of ot he-r Iundarneu tal words of Greek ontology ami their broad i IT) plications. III Actuality means a connection with sensation. does not initially confirm our thesis of 'constant presenc ' as the fundamental meaning of b >lng in (~reek philosophy.pla s an ess n tial role in the formation of the Gre k concept of being mus be clarified in terms of the fundamental attitudes of Greek Dasein.actuality of th actual.hV11 stood for knowledge as a whole. The latter is th wa beings present [priisentierenl themsel es and are pre ent [anwesend]. it was not his doing. but it signiri's all I. how ver. E. thVll neither mean technique as practical activity nor islirnired to craft knowledge. i.. our interpretation returns to chat \\'Ilieh stood within the horizon of their understanding of being.'noteworth is that. Metaphysics 0 10) a) Wh r the Inquir Stands.e. if we do not play games with words crudely attempting to derive actuality [/lfTirklichkeit] from working (J17irken]. everything that follows depends upon the validit of this interpT"!'l1l1ioll. a: KQPUfJraWv ov (AriSlotle. go s b yond what i expr ssly sUlled by Kant and the Greeks. it is we who are at fault. CPR A 21tl. lik wise forgo discussing how a sufficiently concrete interpretation of this determination of the essence of actuality upport what we have just aid . ask whether and how Kant himself expli itly interpr t d and dC'termined the actuality of actual beings we can discover the following statement in the Criuque if Pure Rea on: 'That which is bound up with Ihe material conditions of experience.in its principal meanings. simply for the making manifest. Clpiu·ly. or .IWhat these attitudes show is the wrenching things and forms from and in the f arfulness [FurchtbarkeitJ of existenc rUhe)' expose the lies about the cheerfulness Greek Dasein. £ISo<. Truth.. with sensation.e. into the full d termining determinedness of the self-showing beings themselveS1B-ant has the same understanding of being as Greek philosoph. Chapter One. That work in its workhood and producedn s as nil . as demanded by the fundamental question. as being-en ounter d. For Plato.speciaU)". Presence The Greek Interpretation cif Bein. B 220. 1982). III the look of a thing there resides its presence (being). In summary. we can say that the Aristotelian concept for the. as presence. th re can be no baSIS for unfolding a connection b tween being -Inri lime. It was not his fault.g as Being. likewise our earlier illlf'rpretation of the Gr ek concept of being. dl. II or § 9.()e.e. [71-L] I72-H] . if the primordial eonnectiop between th concept of appearance and the radically conceived problem of being had to remain hiddell}lnst ad. [f this interpretation of heing as constant presence is not {"on·pel. Bloomi ng:ton: Indiana [ nivr-rsity Press.. then we immediat Iy become aware of the inner structural connection between the philosophical concept sVEpyetU and oocrin as rrapoucria.slrugglt· nround Llw presence beings. but rather immerse ourselves in the Greek conception and interpretation of i::pyov as such.)/"oducin{! in Ihe hrende> I sense. into tho prE'sellce of a look. see [Ii'idegger·s 1927 lectures. The 611 dJr. f ('oncerlJll1g K' ant s concept or appearance. Being. being means what-b ing. The Basic J~/"IJhli'1li 0/ Ph(·/IonL. Being. of beings. Lhe word .True in the Horizon Being as Con tant Pre en e. A Ihert. Presence 51 .. appear is to come into view i.

It has thus come about that Aristotle's genuine problematic ha:. 'the chalk is present' . Accordingl . this interpretation of the history of metaphysics. We shall se that. perhaps in respons to a claim that we have onl imagin d it. the meaning of beingtrue is included in all the oth rs. We now want to say that. Again. if we enunciate these !<CI11C'!IC('S with a spe ific emphasis . Moreover. When we say 'the chalk is a material thing'..e. Being-true is therefore an specially comprehensive meaning of bing. We shall show hour the Greek concept of Iwil iff·llue IS a lid' UI7( erstoo . especiall AristotI's doctrine ther of. So we unfold the leading question of metaphysics in the dire cion of the fundamental question (being and time) not because the Gr eks already (albeit implicitly) understood being in terms of ime. so that ever instance of genuine philosophy is on the same level as regards greatness and smallness earlier philosophy has a onstant (albeit hidden) influence on our conternporar e istence. Our thesis that ooo-iu means constant pres 'nee.now that) em 0 u crt CL . can never itself ground the problem of bing and time. of th substantive connections. In respect of being-true however. but "Iso because the Greek doctrine of being-true. togeth r with the subsequent tradition of West rn metaphysics is of greaL significance for our problem.I shall now briefly attempt all im rpretation of being-true. the relevant featur s of Greek ontology can only be discovered if we have already assured ourselves. VVhen we say 'the .1CUpO ocin what-being (possibility) Plato: nnpoixrin being-presen (actualit ) tV6PYillU t being-true ? epyov 1Cupoucria. Of course. i. w also refer to the being of the chalk but in this case not to anything arbitrary. [7')-77J [74--75] . arious investigations have shown me that und rstanding th first three meanings depends OJ) clarifying the fourth. Ll]('11 heing means being-present (actuality). We have interpreted the Greek concepts of being corre ponding to the lirsr three of these meanings of being and have shown them to be grounded in 'constant presence'. we have thus far given no proof. so-and-so-being (now this . understand being in terms of time. thus the so-and-so-being of the chalk: it is so-and-so. ()ur interpretation of being-true.as will b shown . We have limited ourselves to a pur Iy s stematic-substantive haracterization of the understanding of being. We. Let us e 'plain this once again by an e ample: 'the chalk is whit '. 1<'01' ven if for sam reason or other our interpretation of Creek ontology could not be carried through.. We shall not enter into the inner connection between Hegelian rnetaphysics and G-reek philosoph. In such cases the most convenil'll~ wEly out is to alter the text so that it can correspond to the common !l)llilion and cause no embarrassment. tn terms: 9i constant presence. However. namely bing-true as that which is intended by emphasis.'the chal is whi ' 'the chalk is a 1l1uINiai thing'.the what-being of the chalk. special] since we have followed the Greek concept of being only in some aspects. so . but serves merely to illustrate the unfolding of the problem. but a necessary what-being. rather to what must belong to it for it to be what i is. The 'is white' expresses the white-being. the being-a-thing th being-pres nt.then b r this emphasis we also intend a specific kind of being. -. remarking only that this would be too difficult and involved. tbe light of time must come into view. but simply because . Tnah. We spoke of the original dividedness of being. If we try to grasp the Greek concept of being. in a philosophical mann r. its implications do not e tend this far.·balk is'. w can never rely on the authority of Plato or Kant to ground a thesis or problem. the history of metaphysics provides us with mol' than just examples. be ell comprehensivel misurid rstood. Wherever being becomes thematic. what w have asserted as th fundamental orientation of the understanding of being could be exhibi ed from our own immediat comportment towards beings. This so-and-so does not necessaril pertain to it. Apart from the fact that progress does not exist in philosophy. not only because we run up against the common opinion of being-true. which aims to show that this 00 1"C'hIlI'S to th indicated fundamental meaning. will proceed by refer nee to a particular Aristotelian text.now 11lE'(I11 the be ing-l rue.we humans must. which we further clarified in t rrns of the various meanings of is'.52 Leading Queslion 9/ Philo ophy 9. it is true . This being is not an arbitrar so-and-so-being. We can conclude this subtantively from what w have just seen. this is not a matter of acquiring external historical knowledge. lieing. In what way does the as erted fundamental meaning of constant presence also apply to being-true? What connection can we see between b[·ing-true and being as uch? '10 hibit this connection i difficult. Even without emphasis. in altered form. has been interpreted in terms of this same ommon (·o'l!'eplion. But history offers us mar than a pi ture of earlier and superseded stages oftbought. for it could also be red or green. the Greek concept of being is still pr s nt in Hegel's metaphysics. Presence 53 et al though Greek metaphysics <IS such..

stinguished.e. or only into those beings and their being wllich manifest themselves precisely as proper beings [das eigentliche Sf'it'/Ide]? Clearly. i. Tredcnnick. n I<UOOt. within the categories. Why not? The 0'1 Kuru o"llj..118er. more clearly.$s<". 1 K{li The ov or the cat.0 possible and betng-aclual. 1028 a I_ is something closely 7. Only slowly was this clari ty attained. it is is 1101 determinate in its being but is sometimes such and sometimes so. is concerned only with I lit' 0\1 of the categories and with the ov KCttCt i0VCtj.. 6'1 ror..oyor. The OV of the Ku"t11"(opiUl itself multiple. place.rUL rap "to 0"\)P. 3 "to OV Kala. For if the (. is ri to Ov. e. (discourse) concerning beings. &!&o~. H. in respect of being-irueand The inquiry into the ov tI 6v must already be dear about the various meanings of the 0'1. and pOP!Pfl. the being of beings which just happen to be such-andsuch at a particular time.. but it also refers to a diversity within one of these meanings. thus also proper being.o))(.. (the second meaning of being) and the 0'1 rot. g t6 ov KCtla OUj. where he oul11r1es the thematic field of philosophy in terms of the four indicated 1lle<'IIlings of OV. I (VII-X). he excludes the 01' KUta O"ujJ~&~T]K6<. excluded? To put the matter briefly: truth and falsity pertain to knowledge of beings.1!0 " . Being-true pertains to grasping beings in thought.6v lCuffCtoro. beings in respect of their contingency.. eings b being-false. The four modes in which we understand that which is. 6J"llflE<. The chalk lies here on the lectern: nOD.Kai \V&u8o~. Now Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes. are as follows.f v a. Aristotle identifies four ways. in the proper sense. O Beings as such are addressed m various ways. must this philosophy inquire into all lour modes of bemg.. beings as they show themselves in the categories. To formulate the matter in traditional terms. this present thing here: category of the tooe tt. [77-78J 1 7K-79J . which do not immediately coincide with the fourfold structure of being given above. At this point. The exclusion of the second and the fourth 111('<111 ings of being is thus g uite in order and immediately convincing. to the il. that "ro OY UY&lUl 1to:U. which are treated later ill the central books of t.). 6. we understand being in various ways.u. beings proper which are here intended.. V.1I character not of the beings themselves a but of their deterrnmat ion in thought. '111!Iapliysi('s E 4. their so-and-so-being. No explanation is given as to why just these.1I'. Aristotle calls this r~t.e.especially the first category.Ll so doing.• 11elaphysics E 2.he 1etaphJ·-sics.cs Z and H. Z.1.l~Ej3l1K6r. WE' have learnt that the leading problem of ancienlmetaphysics. uA. or. being-red. while . philosophy is concerned only with the latter. what is important for us is that being-true is expticuly ideruified as one if these four meanings.e..e. such that one can again inquire into a is rrpffinllr. Being white.g. therefore.1' It is not. !O~6 b 21: 'It seems thai the accidenta! the non-existent'.lLV tVtpYEIUV .nlo what beings philosophy I" "to OV Kurd t6. 56vo. as knowledge of beings as such.T)8er.aphysics E 4· in First a general preview of the substantive problem. 6'1. And why is the 0\1 c. that 'being is said in many ways'. CtA. n "tOU !-ITl QV10C. jJT]0'1. Kunnopiar. Sriende].) .54 Leading Question C?fPhilosophy . are di. i. nor does Aristotle explain the principles [or distinguishing them.egories . the pmblem of being-true (truth and falsity) belongs in logic and episterncllJgy.lj3ej3T]KOr. Such clarity was originally lacking. IVlet.I-l1V xul 8\1EpyeHlv. 7i'uth 11]lISI Presence 55 The b) Four Meanings of BeUlg in Aristotle. being-white. the philosophy which inquires as such actually are. it does not refer to anything constantly present. and accordingly also that which is not. Thus Aristotle says: !J}aiVl'. ow 1tOA. crXi]I-IO:ta rdrv Kar11Y0PlroV(nir.is treated by Aristotle in Metaphysi. Being.6PIO'"(QV. not to beings themselves.beings in respect of their being4. i. Why does Aristotle exclude the second and fourth meanings? We have already indicated that these are senses of being wherein the being of proper beings.~&~11KOr. i.e. Byyut. Ouly we first and the third meanings remain. and these alone. as formulated by Aristotle.pct' (' being were clarified by reference to proper beings it should 0 be possible to clarify the essence of non-proper beings [das uneigentliche i.e.but to something that occurs at one time only to disappear. nOL in metaphysics. fourth meaning of (the being) from the field of metaphysics. LO be of a certain quality: xoicv. This is the way Aristotle proceeds in Metaphysics E (VI).uor. 'xc!usion of the ov (b~ &/dlOfu. What is inquired into is the 6v IJ 61'./ s 9.b. especially wherever he is introducing a fundamental problem of metaphysics. oLuvoiat. is itself ambiguousOn the one hand it signifies the diverse meanings of being.. trans. not 1tEpar. For example: 'this chalk is white'.i. this chalk. row '" iH<'lapi!y~ics t. i.. to propositions. does not manifest itself. \j!'L<1physics. UpOll which all the [ll hITs are founded .. and even Aristotle is content just to factually distinguish these four meanings. 6. a primary being.

I"kl. to say flatly: 'This chapter does not bC'long here'.· ~oss translation read: 'The terms "being" and "non.: 'substance '~ .l6crt aA118€u€1 )ltv 6 to 5\1J PI1~1 svov ciou svot. in the strictest sense. (79-80] [H()-H1] .ll1l1{<. so hat he who thinks that what is divided is divided. 1i:'dl!l 1912.vuVlia.56 Leading Que 'lion ofPhiiosoph .o~. unaltered reprinl h']. \\. einer Ge dlichte seiner ''''III'lrl. fljlEUat(u ot 6 tVQvliOJ<. devoid of all connections'.' chw gll"r.1. which concerns actualit as such is quite clear from the fact that the OV aAl19t\. according to our own in rpretation.being" are employed ItrSII\ wlIII referenee 10 the categories. t the close of the prop rly ('(. This is externally inriiraLf'd by the fact that it stands a the end of th book.. iv. TOUtOJV t6. . is treated in Metaphvsics 0..Lristotetes: Cirlllldt.\U) as the fundamental meaning of the actuality of that which is properly actual.'19£<. 18'~6---47. . This depends. Book E> pres nts e\lcP'Yeia (evn:AtXt. the question 0/' the relation between being qua being-true and being qua being-actual.svEpyEia tallv. because ther can be none.i ']'11(> l'xplicit theme is the OV (cb\.) aAl.:alilv these . c "iHetapli_ysin 0 R. while he whose thought is contrary to the real condition of the obj ct is in error. lOOt xupuorrrra ~ ov 6. 0\1) Book 0 concludes with Chapter 10. p.\lelaph_ysik. being as being-true. " n'.}3. of these.)ielaphysik des A. to whom we owe a valuable Hegelian commentary on th Metaphysics. Then when do what we call truth and falsit exist or not exist?17 to 6i. I()'}()b 2. to denote truth and falsity. next /'}01110lf'). chirhte del' . et for the traditional. H The transla t io n here is by Tredr-nriick or form is acrunluy': (rnodified.!" Werner Jaeger. exOJvii to. IOSl <l 34--h G. uAllf1t\. is introduced as even more proper than the ev£py€iq./ 57 the OV KUta 00VU). 'Yap crKl:lItEOV il roirro ri AErOj. . (! 1 rails.ichte. earlier in E4.. \'. xopuorutn ov 0. which itsel f begins as follows: End St 10 OVAEYETUI to 1. every beginner in philosophy knows that the problem of truth belongs to logi and not to metaph sics especiall not to a treatise concerned with the fundamental probl m of metaphysics. Vol. that this chapter on b ing-true canIlOL belong to 0.fI>lelaphysi('. There is no difficulty in assuming this to be the case.tlrl am \Iain ('\finerva) 1960. a Ithough its overall content is indisputabl 'Aristotelian someone must haw added rt later. c) Th matic Discussion of the OVcb\. ics which discusses the being of proper beings. . being in th sense of possibility and actuality.ld. 186.l€V.1(nU xni too\l 1(Ut11"(OPlooV..e. or more precisely. and secondly with reference to the potency or <lr'l.j.llV Kai evtp.. and ihirdl in the sense of true and false' [Trans. which contradi ts ev rything that pre des it and everything we know of Aristotle.0f . Furthermor . there is no problem here at all.lItral hook of the 'lelaph sic . Therefore." nlike Titus unmodified Trerlennick translation puts 'LI1 the strictest sense' in par'nwith the note This appears to contradict Vl.'. IV£UO~. upon their being united or divided. is right. Aeyo"l€\lOV IVF. and to the potentiality or actuali or nonpoten iality and non-a tuality.e..ij..]. p. as also for the most recent interpretation and treatment of thi Chapter 10.1 pi'!crtJal xni to cru'YKt. See also Jaeger. but al 0. IV. or that what is united is united. Jat'gf'r. Jaegt·r.l£vov (J\)YKda9cu. tudien eur: Elllu·il'kh"'. ~('rli n 1923. the author of a very valuable study of the composition of the Aristotelian iVletaphy~ic 2(1 is convinced by chwegl r's view 'So th chapter just stands there. Ii11..It is thus immediate! clear that this chapter i OI1L~Or place and does not belong where we discover it. Such considerations lead Schwegler.1. i.110&<. . . . constant presence must b attributed. Th relevant lines II tI.TSo~ . The being proper is the 6v ev€pyciq.< 0 10.f!sge. or Aristotle's Metaphysics is not a continuously composed work but a ('olleNion of self-contained treatises which belong together because of their affiliated content.. 3. Furthermore. Being Trulh Presence .v.e.UOO<.tO O£Kata OU\la~11 ~v£P'Y€taV \I i. those beings properly deserving of the name are 11 oooiu Kai to t.:gllll{!..What is going on here. npanlUtil 110'1:' sanv ii OUKBrYn 'to @~ 0. Studien zur Elllwl'cA'lrmgs/?I!. Aristotle takes up a topic from logic i. But it is just possible 10 Illl<-rprel 1C11pU. "'I'll(' I hps~'s." We can see how th textual question if the correct po itioning of thi fina: chapter of Book 0 also raises the substantive problem of the meaning of being-true itself. Iii The terms 'being and not-being' are used not only with reference to til categories. . . in the case of the objects.AI19£<.nUTit (with Jaeger) as "in the common est sense"'. '" vols.i.as the KUPlrotalOvOVin Metaph. ov.J) cru'YKda9Ul tj SIl]Pl1a(jUl.~ 9. had explicitly excluded from the dOl1win of first philosoph . Connection B tween the T xtual Question and the Substantive Question of the Relation B tween Being Qua Being-True and Being Qua Being-Actual (eVEp"(£Lq. . 'Sics 0 10 and the Qu stion of Wheth r This Cbapt r Belongs to Book 0. III£USO\.lDleles.outo S'tni tooV npQr~laTOJv Ii emi n.111 Ov to !ltv KUla td aX1lj.'" 0 i is Book 0 of Aristotle's Metaphy.~or after all.(I:IUV. a topic which he himself.Iristotetes. Those beings to which. Tredennick.

'. he goes even further than Schwegler. then one must deny the possibility that the OV 0. un.3-84J . The second procedure IS adopted by chw gler and especially by Iaeger. Th is KUplootCna must therefore be removed. Studien zur EII/Il·ickll1f1~.e. But whi le being-true is always in tended by the ('opllla. . J" "ger. interpreting being-true as proper being. but that this OV is taken as xopuotutn. but in the Sf'llSP ()f" what-being.Tl0f.lllu'irkl(lll~s~esrhidll('. Jaeger se s the main 'external' hindrance to accepting Chapter lOin the fact that the OV uA:rIOtc. hat beings as being-true are understood as the most proper beings. Jaeger believes that Aristotl .' 'If anyone w re to suppor th placement of 010 on the ground that only here is the KUplOrnlTlI OV attained.. could be referred to as the most prop r being. but it is not the cas that he 'opula for the most part I1"l ans is Irll(. KUptoomta DV. "Presence . and thus there is no basis for d<liming that &AI1E1t:<. like Jaeger. reinterpreting it. but simply in Greek terms. which is completely in order at this point. problems treated in the chapter and book respecti el r."ling. tudien ::/1. IT. 2. Jaeger. so that it COil forms to the presupposed COIl tent of the chapter. but be au e it alwa doe.58 f_eading Question q/Philosoph § 9. h . that th opula mostly means being-tru is like saying hat pillS 2 mostl comes to 4.s. Iaeger holds to the same conception of Kuplrotata: I( puorurn OV 'is the most common meaning of being.).. There are two alternatives here: 1. This is not because the copula only seldom has thi 1I1('. the most frequent ll1f'alling of being in veryday usage'. And it is plain that this is th esse or the copula. and epistemology (Schwegler.OU . so-being being-present. 'To me this is very improbable. P: '>2. MelapItX'. I maintain by contrast. and sees it as the genuine culmination of 0 and of Aristotle's Metaphy~ics as such. Ross).We must illqllireillto what fundamental meaning of being makes it possible as well as necessary to treat being-true in the context of being-actual. p. and besides. The first procedure is to be found in the most recent treatment b Ross: seclusi: an post ~i. himself add d it as an appendix.. relates to a problem if logic and as su h doe not b long to the overall theme of 0. i.v (a34) transponendar" There is not the slightest justification for such a violent intervention in the text. not only supposedl relates to the prin ipal theme. indicates tha: Greek metaphysic 'fundamental conception if being here come to its jirsl and ultimate radical expres ion. I. whe h r explicitly or nolo To say. he would misunderstand th wording. It IS just that the xupuirrnrn is anomalous vis-a-vis the presupposed content of U~E'chapter. r l' one assumes from the start that 010. 'I'he fact that Aris otle closes with 010. Lhe thesis that 'is' mostly means being-trtle. The non ous int rpretation of IwplcirrlI1:!l resulting from this in terpretation If.r" What can w say about this i w? There is no vid n for il in Aristotle. [81-83] [. . despite this chapter's disconnectedness with the book as a whole.. . Thus it is deal" that the apparently ext rnal question concerning the placement of Chapter lOin Book 0 'an only be resolv d b going into "Jaeger.~eschirllle. Schwegler'S commentary simply bypasses the KVptrotUra. he would be thinking in an . the doubts concerning this ("()IIJl(>(. Truth. B"forc answ ring this question and thus positively establishing the inner 11(>re~sary connection between 010 and 0. That the 'is' for the most part functions as the copula is r'orreet.ristotelian.111U£<.("lI (Hos<.I" 59 Schwegler. and indeed such i hat being-true constitutes the most proper meal1lng of being. Being. \'01.J aeger wants to say tr at w Jnoever maintams that Aristo I in 010 con eives being-true as the most proper being does not understand what KUp\rotUm means. especiall considering the manner in which Aristotl 's chapters and books are composed and constructed .Jaeger's opinion be 'ames all the more curious when to justify the rejection of ChapterlO's placement in 0. II) Th r je cion of 0 lO's placement in 0 and the traditional in terpretauon of being-true as a problem of logi. Only someone who uncritically accepts long-standing traditional platitudes about Aristotle could regard this as un. and it will strike everyone else likewise. We shall begin by discussing the argumentation dir cted against the tmpH:Otata.1·. Oxford 192. however. being~true. will! .A rrstote 1· ian way. . striking it altog ther out of the text. There is no substantive basis lot. since i l concerns the DV Cti.hwgf'r.tionmust be briefly dealt with. thinks not just in properly Aristotelian terms. 5~. What this implies can he seen from his translation of the Metaph sics where he ranslates xupuirrurn by mainly': being is 'mainly' addressed a being-true.. moreover has a concept of being quite foreign to Aristotle. being' is for the most part not under tood in this way. one adopts Schwegler's view that a chapter on logic could not substantively belong in the iVlelap/~ ics then for 'he sak of ousistency one should not attribute the adclition of this chapter to Aristotle himself. that an one who conceives 010 as belonging to 0. QV as Kuploorarov means being in its usual lit(· ~: AriswLit'.

foreign.In the Rhetoric r2 Aristotle says: ecr.e... ']")w thematic discussion of the being-true of (prop r) beings (t. in this same sense. Here too it would be senseless to translate KUPlCtl1:U1:ql 'the as lIsnal'.27 There are three things in the SOIlI which toge 'her make up th KUPIU. Metaphysics is in 110 way concerned with what is is common or normal. and will. in Chapter 010. The latt r issue pIa s no substantive role within it at all.a'iofh1<JtC. The KUptcOrU1:u not to be haken: it stands firm. r 2. Aristotle uses KUPlOV the sense of what is common or usual. 1 139 a 17 r. not \ )'isLode's straightforward clai m is that being-true constitutes the most proper being of being.OV propern ss. what is in ended is not primarily frequency of use but ju t th word itself in its proper meaning. this does not apply to bing-true. b ristotle.! J" 11:!6-87] .: the master.api/. ad ro KUA. It would be complete! llol1sensical to translate KUptCl r as usual' . 6pE~I.1]geiw. Above all however.KUpLOC.-!'I'll d to do the right and proper thing. is most nobl and best.is often mplo ed by Aristotl to distingu. while the transferred meaning.. is less frequent. n (llJ6~iC. tiEl (mOU6U~01a 6iKaLU T n:pCH'tEIVoto. in general striving to be nobl nobody will censure him a an goi t.26 However. that being-true as such announces the most proper e sence of hpUlg.0 ICOPIOV thus means the main or primary linguistic usage. KupiCtlC.. announ ing is Aristotle's intention not only to treat being-true WIthin his metaphysics. this must be I standing! To be sure.epe( 1:0U'WVljlilUUtoV o&oi. (Jaq>ij IlEV ltold 1:0 KUplll... However awkward. accordingly. at olw:. Aristotle.i:rt"CtTOv r refers. But in the primary and proper use of language is common because it is proper.lli troy 1l:PUYllut<ov). Kal CtA. Aristotle says that ethics is th €JtllJ'r~~ll1 rrOAlUICT]. Trulh. Kupi<oC. This problem arises where he consistent] ' and VidLOIIUlcl/l'all Ethics [ 8. J'. Kuplc. of knowledge.E~mJ}l. Rlretori« . in connection with th problem of friendship and man's self-love: Ei yap ne. Jaeger is right to maintain that K6plOvcan mean the most common or usual. the most proper good the good simpl and as such. This prop r meaning is also the most frequently occurring meaning. KupiCtlC.ish from KUl"ti11E1:UqlOpuv. alld ~'9. The 1 ss common or unusual employment of language is. also requires it ~£VIKU. means po. ap·Ii..flYS.Ctl OOV €K€IV(l 1:1l0£CtlPTIIlEVU Kui ropioflCtl A.master.. nd y t precisely su ch a man possesses proper self-love: IlfrA. KUplOC. . not the other way around.. In Book 6 of the l ichomachean Ethics w read: Tpia 8~ €onv i» rl] 'l'UX.e. But we must insist that. 140+ b I r. If a man is always con.'j.nCtlV TIl crcOqlpovu i.(Cl06v or cupuotntov ayu96v.rae.60 Leading Que (ion if Philosoph.vil. neither in nv this context nor anywhere else to Irequcnc ' of employment. [84-86] . tb owner of something. is also employed by Aristotle in the meaning of 'the usual" in accordanc with the meaning of KUptO:.. The ambiguit in the Greek concept of truth: truth of things and truth of sentences (propositional truth). thougbt. t1 {)1tOtaoiiv CtUu troy KUto. To be sure K6pIOV. a word in its proper meaning i as distinct from a word in its transferred meaning. It is [or this reason that chwegler and Jaeger omit any linguistic evidence for their arbitrary interpretations. Rhetoric l1 I'~()'1· 6. &'peTac.Etul 1:uutOU T<]J KUpICtl1:arq:J. OV what a being prop rly is. Pre ience 61 employment. the possessor.e. to th degree that Its words make clear what is meant. proper science which as such ncompasses and guides all human action. rt ~) Demonstration of hapterlO's proper placem nt in Book 0. IlUA. KOPlU 7tpa~£Ctl... In respect of the employment of language therefore.MI he appropriates for for himself what. And again in Book 1.TIt cracpij dvcu 25 every eli OUTse pos esses excellence. Ethics Z 2. I 161'h 2'i-31 . Kupi<o:. substantively sppaking. belong here. upen. pertains to a word. . 109+ 11 25 ff.I. hut to interpret his as the most proper mode of being and to clos his treatise on prop r being precisely in this wa r. Aristotle speaks in l\IIelaphysics 010 of proper beings. taken in its characteristic and proper meaning: when KupiCtlC.unusual non-standard words. Th proper meaning is the reason for frequency in language use. hat which predominates t or rules.AOV alvm ljlilrL\lwc. is inwardly bound to what is most ssential and proper in himself.l!:HU a n:o.. irher in vulgar usage or in Aristo 1 . of CtKp6la1:QV u.U TO. IlE1:mpO . this is the Em(J1:~"'T1 K:UPICtl1:0:1:11/9 the highest and most for i. . NidLQmflCheall r 2.OV K euu1:cji £pl1tOtoi'to. In a manner completely in line with this latter passage. Kat x. gain in Book 9 Aristotle h . etaphors and provincial expressions. i. Thus Aristotle speaks. We must ther fore ask what KUPlOV means elsewhere within Aristotle's philosophical terminology.Virlmmacheall Ethic A I.e. unusual. etc. Thus the primary and proper meaning of KUpl. i. . that whi ih is proper in action i knowledge: perception. if discourse is not to be vulgar. 1JI&~&1. Being. 1:UIlIi. denoted by 1:0 ~€vI1C6v..vouC.

and what Aristotle must have thought. How the assertion can be jusrified is shown in 010. for reasons we do not need to enter into now..~ . none of that. i. that it does not at all concern being-true as pertaining to conceptual thought and assertion. Being-true is the bing-true of the llpay!!c(t(ov the things.{. namel being-true. nd it is maintained that the being-true of beings constitutes the most proper being of beings. i not truth as pertaining to knowledge of beings is not a property of propositions. rKt.OK~ tcrnv Kai il lilaip£cru.62 Leading QueSl£ in._lllyoverlooked? The commentators and those who cite them have. On the contra!" wh r('\'('1" the deepest problemati is attained th re remains..e.Analysis and synthesis pertain to the thinking of beings.9to:. How does this relate to the proper being of beings? It must first b hown that : b being of beings also remains the theme in 010.~. of the "oyor.. expecting that with such miserable qualifications we can decide which additions the text requires. this cannot properly belong here. does not concern opinion of .. Can an doubt r main as to whether this hapter belongs to Book 0. The theme is the being-true of beings. but there is reading and r ading. whether we ar adequately prepared for seeing what is in front of us. whetlw)" we measure up to the problematic or not. This also applie to all subsequ nt philosophy. how ver. but being-true pertams simpl to th beings thems Iv s. 0 after introducing the iiAT. Being. it is not the being-true of thought but onl the beings themselves. and that being-true is drawn into this guiding theme.'IO being-true is applicable to the existing things this themselves.. I 02~ a ). ev rything will he carried through with perfect transpar ncy. Presen e 63 xplici ly treats of proper being (evi:pY6ICL. in the main book of his Metaphysics a chapter which treats of truth from the ~ ry firs senten . nothing changes the fundamental untenability of such a procedure.orgenheil]not its h ighesl devr-lopm I "'. unhiddcnness [l'nIJer/. I () i he § 9. despite its alleged unconnected less. in order that they may be true and about th being-true itself which is thus made possible.orT) qJlAocrolpia. thus is not a prop rty of onceptual thought of things.Olle did not. also read the chapter and interpreted it.e. Truth. about beings.e. Basil Blackwell. 10'51 b 2. i.VO[<. ultimately their being-true and its possibility. not to the actual beinos which are thought. which is inquired into. . lelopli -sirs E . tv o LQ. hy John :"I>lacC(ll'lrri and Edward letaphvsics e 10. but rather the fundamental problem of metaphysics. h asks about how beings in themselves must b . as such.15 not at all unconnected to the rest of the book.e.t. 8' ou"tOOt.Jtt£OV OE WU onoo:. overall or in detail. Oxford. are left aside. In 010. fiIpEt£ov. v. Being (Lnd Time. aurou to. So if Aris ode includes. Aristotle immediately says: robro. book which brings th leading question of Greek m taphysics to . IOQ7 h 29 If . w read in E 4: IbtEi 8t ~ crU!!1tA. has not even been able to take up and make fruitful what the Greek treatment of lhe problem of truth achieved. This is wha happens in the case of Schw gler.nt? Must not the chapter necessarily belong there: The r-hapter . If this is the SItuation. despite all acuity uf quest iou i !lg. Th question is wh th r we read in the right way. i. but it is itself the latter's most radical problem. ov ihepov 6v "troY fin' tv "to Kupiro~. Thus not only is the problem situa ed complete] within th domain of np(. thus also being-true and being-false. Irrespective of its crudity or refinement. In short the chapter is concerned to unfold the proof of til€' thesis that being-true constitutes the most proper being 0/ proper beings. Being is in any ase self-evident and does not need to be placed in question.cr l-14!iuegger. whether we understand the probl ms of being and truth and their interconne tion in a sufficientl primordial manner whether we are thus able to move within the horizon of the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato. The problem of truth is known to b long to logic." ~I .~1 namely the categories. 0 does not address problems of logic or epistemology at all. a/Philosophy i. But how ·ould th real theme of the chapter be so crudely and stubbor. OUK "tOro:. I ranslared \lJiJJlIson. that wh ich is true. Indeed subequoru philosoph. Certainly. a hapter that ilssens and discusses a connection b tween being and truth. ~ 'H. just add it on.ov. "tOu"to Ii' tni "trovnpa"). i. and certainly . as that which most a properly is.in Book 0. thus they and all their properties. \\ hal Lben do the (. < rom the first senten 'e of the chapter it is evid nt that the theme differs utterly from what it has traditionally and uncritically been taken to be. as in Book 0 as a whole. s to the latter. Or whether we rush at the philosophical tradition with worn-out philosophical concepts and their pseudo-problems. to be sure. . What therefor is the basic deficien y in th common interpretation of this chapter? It stems from the fact that the Greek understanding of the essence of truth is just as littl interrogated as is the Greek understanding of being.r-.uin. by lrulh:lH 'AAl19w.reeks understand pre-philosophicall and philo~()phiCHlly.\ri~l.~.Jtpay~l(lm. ulna.£V'rEAExElQ). til n w certainly 11<I\'eno right to assume that in one hapter from one book. the greatest obscuri ty.~ [87-88] IHH-90] .J th b ings themselves must be considered in relation to what makes them possibl as beings.). 1962."Iewp"} sirs • .

this ambiguity in the concept qf truth is overlooked. When is that.but exists where something is lacking in truth. the primordial in s nse. Bu L since th primv is 6v. but to beings themselves. Thus when tru h is nothing but til higliesL possible and most proper presence. but constitutes the most proper being of beings: Ct)"lO~t. is can CtAIl9i]C. i. insofar as the knowledge which grasps beings in their unvei ledness unhiddenness.t]9tc.I/elapliysics 0 10. means 1. which is true in i.."i When does truth exist and when does it not. this is. What now is the situation in regard to the . is also for its part 'true. is the beings thernselv s. How can being-true belong to the being of beings? W11at is being-true itself. can constitute the most proper being of beings. Hoss. but is the means by which w human preserve and secur truth i.e. is no longer taken seriously. such that ht'ings can b au i. i.01£a9ul aATJ~ af. in Greek terms.. [90-91J [~)2-93J .i("S0 10. At the begimling of Chapter 10.) be called true in the derivative sense. u) The correspondence Two rundamental between being and being-true (deconcealment). where something IS.ounter-concept of truth. 10'51 b 6 IT:'II is not because WE'" th ink truly Lital you are pale. d) The Greek " 9. that which (the AOYOC. untruth? ntruth i not just hiddenness but distortion. the d con ealment of beings: UA1]9EUelv.. but where this som sthing presents itself as what it is not. Thus when lhistotl inquires into the unhiddenness of beings. and what does trut.e.6 CtAl]9i:C. V as Kupuiltu1"oV And clearl .. but brought out from hiddenness. nderstanrling The Being Whi h Is 'hue (Ct.\. Here too LlI!' problem stands within the illumination provid d by the natural 01' "vl'l"yday understanding of being.tyO)lEVOV.' ntruth exists wh r th re is indeed unhiddenness. communicate and preserve the unhidd nness of beillg . Being Truth.64 Leading Question of Philo oph. theprobl m of truth is not a problem concerning knowledge and conception. i. dA. deconcealed? When can beings be proper! true as such:' Answ r: when very possibility of the untruth of beings is in ever respect excluded.. A£UKOV'ivul C{au A£UKOC. . that which t'I/. J shall sketch OUl he Ari totelian treatment of "j\. along with the Greek understanding of bing. et di tortion predominates. . e ana liul to 0'£ dVUI A€U1COV ol qJuvn. for the Greeks.l]9EUet also grounded ill the Ct.0 Ct/. th natural and proper way of inquiring IllLO truth. then truth exists.ll!lap").roirro li~l£tc.A. So alread and from the outset truth as unhiddenness does not pertain to the knowledg and conception of beings. we cannot expect this highest point of the Gr k OllLologica I problernauc to show. grasping of the deconcealed as such.e. chat which can be addressed as the deconcealed. Aristotle makes it perfectly clear that the issue is th being-true of beings: OU yap Iha t iWdC. mode of t pes of being and their corresponding being-true \VhUl solution to this problem does ristotle provide? After everything lJlal has be n aid..Al10&~ as he lost Proper Being ov) (KUP\{OtUToV 6v). rhai vou are pale. How is that po sible? Answer: wh n being-true constitutes what is most propel' about being as such. II)') I b '} f..e. Presence of Truth (aA#. . proper being-true. 'AAll9EUEIcannot be said of beings themselves. a di ffer1'111 c1laral'tcr to that of the (7r ek problema i in general.and indeed a necessar one an ambigui to which we must hold fast if w want to get anywhere with the problem of truth.lj9s0Cl (unveils). trans. CtA119sC. but without this illumination irsl'lf being larified.e.\. rather. when are beings such that they can be true? How must the being of beings be.c. i.ll9tc. i. Thus n)'l1e~ and dA~eWl contain an ambiguit . to be deconcealing. that.e. It onl becomes this in a secondary sense. such that it can belong to the being of beings? Aristotle must ask thes questions if he wants to show that being-true no only belongs to beings.&y6~I£vOV ii ~1&iJ6oc. .e. beings are I5v ('x}"'19tc.l19suo~l£v.h thereby man? An w r: when truth belongs to being. it is such as to appropriate. not just any arbitrary deconcealment of arbitrary beings. but because you are pale we who say this have the truth . From the very beginning. The Most Proper Being as the imple and onstantl Present :\ rj~totle now poses the problem+nor' EatlV il OUKEcru . This is a metaphysical question of the purest kind and has nothlllg to do with socalled epistemology. But what is being? Answer: ionstant presence. Th proposition is not what is primarily true in the sense of unhiddenness. ordial Greek understanding of the essence of truth. I owever.onl Q Ov. A corresponding distinction can also be made between falsity and untruth.:h:. the pri rncrdial sense. the ov.~' CtA.the beautiful is also this . i. ill Aristotle's speci fie treatmen t. beings as deconceal d 2. into the truth of beings.a) as Deconcealment 65 hidden. For untruth is not simply non-truth .

So Aristotle sa s clearly and simply at the end of Metaphysics a 1: bmcn:ov d>~ EXEI TaU BivUI. OAl1eEiu~.7 it is akin to non-being.66 Leading Question 9!Philosoph or' §. '" llclaph:y. but the truth of prop r being i. bUL not a proper being. to b sur. still a being.m:OKEiflEVOV 111I"tns iJ1tO~I~VOV.. As the being of what-being (materiality of he (·haI k). of the proper truttt oj proper beuurs. Ross.v yap Eivu. Aristotle pos s tb problem of how the being of beings makes it possible for beings to be true i. Presence 67 the problem only in its main leatures. 1 /(Itapln 'sirs E 2. and "rrot-h ing·· is being not comhined hut. l026 b 2 ]. tvtpycw is proper b ing in the sense of self-bolding in constant presence. Chalk does not need to b white. in a derivative sense. Being.uity. the white-b ing of the chalk. The earlier sections introduce the probJem.lPE011IlQl. more than on . Proper being-true thus belongs to proper beings.Eio) Elva!. aAIlOi. The latter goes together with being. are utterly astollishing. this QV Kata cruJlPEj3T]l(6~ is such that it just happen to occur on a particular occasion. it must be shown how truth.e. 6' nei 0\ ~Pl1tal Kat CtOOVuta uuVt&9i'jVlll. this correspondence between modes of deconcealment and kinds of beings is clear and obvious. This is..~ cb~ to e vlll. The connection between being and trutli mu l come into view from cansideration.. and clarity. that which properly exists is the OV tvcpyeiq. Seco dly truth is the deconcealrnent of beings and only 011 the basis of and in relation to this deconcealment can truth apply. The mode of being of beings determines the mode of their possible deconoealment. In this interpr tation w can dis over tangible evidence for our gt'llPral thesis on being. 96J . trans. while an kinds of things may change an existing' piece of chalk. th n he mus set out from the question of the bing of proper beings. IT one grasps and holds fast to th essence of the Gr ek cone pt of truth.' This is just the interpr ration of the what-being and so-beingof bl'illgs.tel. th materiality of an existing piece of chalk does not just occur now and again. On the other hand. A ristotle begins the thematic discussion by clarifying and defining thes different mod s of being: sl oil to. and others are alw'lYs separated and cannot be combined. But we recall that (. de oneealed. Three things should be borne in mind in relation t. The thematic treatment of the problem begins at 1051 b 9 and continues until 10'52 a 4.e. i. the most proper being. What then does being mean with respect to the materially exi ting chalk as such i.lcr8ul ana rrA. in El 10.ic discussion as well as his brevity. [93--94-] ig.. ta 6' tv5tXEtUl tilvavtia to ~li. What is the proper being-true of beings? It should now be clear that the problem became unavoidable for Aristotle and the Gr eks only af erthe leading question rl TO OV was awakened.e. This is obvious. As already mentioned.. First. Thus (JuYKeicr8ul means not just togeth mess in the ense .!~ cruyKf. (JuYKEicrOat. in 010. for example. Chalk and materiality are here Milvatov oLUlpeGi'jvU\.i tun to O"UYKf.!aw) as th ground of the I)ossibi Iit)' of assertoric truth. ouv-xsiuevov with the \J1{oKci~levov. 19t~ OV is the KUp\Omnov 1 QV. Aristotle says: iloovatov UUVtEOi'jVUl. impossib]e LO separate. there are some things that rna or rna not happen to th chalk. For example. It is impossible.When consid ring the overall classification of heillg. deceitfulness. A lull interpretation would take US too far afield and would presupposl' a thorough familiarity with the Aristotelian metaphysics. the ljJaVal or KUtUljJUVUI ro ilA. prop r truth.Tl0t~.O\hffi Kai Tilt. cru~I-j3EPT]K6<. Thirdly.!EVOV.. B contrast. By the same token being-deceitful and being-chalk can never possess this togetherness. it is precisely b cause the essence of truth is the deconcealment of beings that the various kinds of truth are determined b: the various kinds of beings. can n ver belong to the halk. The problem does not concern any arbitrary kind of truth of any arbitrar being. "being" i being combined a 11(1 "11(·. as such constitute the proper being qf beings. to say 'the chalk deceives. but is a <nY'{Kci). to that which determines and onceiv s beings: OA110eOE1V.. What is discussed after a 4 are implicatipns.. B th sam token. 9. 1051 h 9 J'f: 'If some lilings are always combined and r-anuot I. FOT if his hesis is that the 6J.e.r of combination or of separation. he materiality of th chalk? It means to be togetherwith and in this togetherness to be one. i. It is our claim that.i. '-Tile deconcealment of beings is governed by their mode of being. while others -In· (""pabl" pi Lil c. bei ng m eans togetherness. in an unveiling determination of the chalk. if this correspondence comes to clear expression with the Greeks this reflects their fundamental conception of truth as the truth of beings (deconc alment).e. to IS!'. We have thus alread sketched out the course of discussion ill 010.o this problem. in accordance with the being of these beings. ins parable from the halk.· '{'paraled. fli:v ch:i uOYKElTat Kui ilouvata IilCJ.VVe hay previoHSly treated the most important matters: the thesis.Ival ro ).. we discovered a kind of being of which Aristotle remarks: Gy")'o~ n toU ~nl 6VtO~.6 as each thing is in respect of being so it is in respect of truth (d concealment). VVecan also see why Aristotl unfolds this problem in the particular dir ction be does. Truth.. a .i\·CII the profundity of the problem ri totle's construction of the lllP)llal.crf)al xnl EV slvm to <:it ~I~ f.e. (. the framework questiolling the truth of things (rrpay). i.

determined in its what-b ing as Lhis and this. This change can be regarded as an occurrence. Thus they are not exposed to the possibility of untruth. he begins with non-proper beings. it just happens. and Here it is crucial to noti e that each of these kind of being has its own specific way of not-being or absence. VVf> conceal and distort it in what it is and so we deceive ourselves and (llhc'rs.-.·ering.e.e.']{J same being in its so-b ing. Presence 69 of co-given ness but constant co-presence. i. By sallle LOken. When and how does the unveiLing (truth) of nODconstant or accidental b ings 0 cur? The deconcealment of the accidental does no always occur. I rr·dplillick.e. and quite apart from any The change in human conception. beings are not at one lim uncovered and at another time covered up. If one does not. To be sure. according to its nature..(1 Kat 0 AOYO.68 Leading Question a/Philosophy §' 9. I. and it is possible at one lim!' to be right and at another wrong'. sorneon has in the meantime painted the chalk white. whi h itself grasps truth.levovf what-being? The decono cealment of the \ hat-b ing of beings is onstant.eVu are not absolutely and in every respect immune to the possibiliLy of distortion. one cannot make even the first step towards understanding this decisiv passage 1!1 risto le.:. with beings whose being is most remote from the essence of being as constant presence. halk and d c itfuln ss form a onstant non-toge herness. and indeed precise! doe not occur when the accidental is how it is. 'The beauriful thiugs and ih b auriful. The truth of accidental beings is non-constant 0 dWL one and th am ass rtion. according to its own essence.. from the very outset.(O~ fXetV ou LlIp '" T Plato. but il leads astray. Our assertion has become fals i. re ertheless. and that beings themselves can change independently of our onception of them? We se this chalk and say the halk is white. it becomes untrue precisely because we hold fast to our true assertion. then OUI" true assertion without any doing on our own part. can. . not primarily our own doing if from time to time we err and think wrongly. The essence of accidental beings is such that its truth is not always what it wants to be .poucriu. I( [96-97) 7-99J . namel red. w preserve this truth and go home with it. the chalk. Seen from the sid of beings. is always found tog ther with parti . at evStXE-ralOti: ~1i:VaATjlh:6EIV 6 K 6-ri: 6i. the chalk is revealed (dC'("OIlccaled) to be. the accidental. V e now hav two basi kinds of being: cruYK"€lcrOUI cruJ. trans. i.:. Truth. W hold fast to this true a sertion.e. llI£u!iecr{)U1. This is a true ass rtion because it takes up what this chalk is in its nnhiddenness. sometimes that. B contrast. W ar I d into rror. has become untrue. su h that man oth r determinations are f'ssPIlLiall excluded from it. to the question of how th being-tru and deconcealment (uncoveredness) corresponding to these different kinds of being is possible. It is. i. Th us 1tEpi of: ta MuvCtm a/J. merely through the beings thernsel s and their way of being as som times this sometimes that. 'white' 'on als what. the same opinion or the same statement comes to be false ~'~lfJ true. Yet the OlY'(Kei. nything with the way of being of the i}UYKeiPEI'Ov an essential relation towbat has canna I belong to it. be deconcealed at one Lime and distorted at another time. it is not always what it is. How then can the deconcealment of the accidental be such that. In our as ertion. Truth becomes untruth.oyo~becomes \jJe1. it no longer unveils but I. Not onl do we cover this up. the chalk can Il ver contain su h a thing within itself and nothing of this sort call 0 ur to it. The pnssi hi lily th LIS arises of attributing to i l something which does not belong. that deconcealmen can itself turn into untruth.alher disLorts.e. or if for some other reason the chalk has changed colour. Kat CIA-flail 001. the in orr ct assertion 'th chalk is red' can b come lllll"o. The 1. Indeed.UOtO~. realize that being means onstant presence.ular d terminations uch <1S mui erialit and extension.truth.113e1311KEval. i. We can meet and talk about the obj ct. If how ver. HNU{)h sics 0 11). Eutnydemus. but because \\"[' clai!!1 to say something true about the chalk we present it as what it is 1\01. So at an time the deconcealment 01· [1](' accidental." Finally there is that which is not constantly present but someti mes preseCJt and sometimes absent. whether IN make use of it or not. i. i.1i:v oov -rCtevoExo~leva fJ Ulrrll yiyv£-rul lV&uB~. He begins by interpreting the deeoncealment of those beings which can be sometimes this. tho possi bi lity of distortion. the what-being of the chalk is never such that it could hange through th determination 'deceitful' becoming applicable to it.e.e. The one must b constantly absent from the other. 10')1 b 1'5 !T: 'As regards the class of things which admit of hutll contrary states. by vir u of its own intrinsic nature can change quit illdependent! of us. What about the truth of the crUYKEiJ. as unveiled in their what-being. Since the essence of the truth of the ac idental involve th constant possibilit of untruth it is not itself proper truth. Being.'eal and sometirn conceal. rra. Aristotle does not explain the ground of the possibility for this change. Onl after Aristotle has defined these kinds of bing (what-being and so-being) does he proceed to the genuine problem. 1CepiJ. an sometime rc.l011~ not only does it become incorrect. therefore.{'. The chalk is what it is only through the con tant co-prs nee or materiality. describing i in our imagmation.

. and not because what belongs together wul: it is constantly revealed but b ause the simpl does no admit of logetherness at all.e.l€vo. Being. Pre ence 4l 71 41 yiYV£TalHe j.l£VOV.og ther it is constantly d con ealed.acruvfle-m. And how does he inquire? It is now ('il'ar that the question mus be: what is the most proper truth which (lhsolutely excludes the possibility of distortion? When does this occur'! The last kind of being considered was a crU"yK£t). [99-100] [ I 00-1 02 J . aile! its determination of materiality. He/uph... a mode of being to which there belongs the most proper being-truer The latter must be defined by the being of the most proper beings. i. The deconcea!Jnent of the sill1pit. (mAu. and in r spect of that with which it does not belong it is constantly distorted. t6 elvat... al'19tr.0-6\10£1:0\1. this question must be formulated as follows.oVis a U:rrAOUVthe reverse applies: every urclouv is a t'LSlaipetOv indeed in the highest and proper sense.~" : t \\·hal he had said arlier was Cbu:rr£p slvrn.. " Alewplt_~ ics 0 10. The deconcealrnent of the simple can n ver be distorted by something not belonging to the simple. ill addition to the various modes of bemg already discussed. trans. i rlQ"uv9£ta. for ill the case of the CtltAOUV only is there no possibility of s paration not bill nothing can b found which belongs together in the first place. "When. low it is of crucial importance for the content and problem of 010 as a whol that. that the more proper the being of beings the purer and more constant is their presence. Since it is not possibl for this d concealment to change over to distortion.l£VOV and hen to the corresponding deconcealment but he inquirf's first into decon eaJm nt.1051 h 33: 'h ing in the en e of trut.in other words and more pointedly..lf. ( {Ht &Al'ad taUla aA'10ij Kai 1jI£1. UVYKeij. evertheless. the rn thodology change. 'll<}"J[CP .vCll.. The deconcealrnent of the simple completel exdudes the possibility of untruth.. Tredermick.Ilwipe-ra.~')() a 26 and b 6 ff.. This is because beings are constantly present as what they are revealed to he . Yet as tong as truth as uch remains related to the pos ibili y of untruth. Briefly and positively.lEVU are ii. in order to then de ermme their being . the chalk e. Trerlannick.hings which cannot be otherwise SaHlI" opinion is no' sometimes true and sometimes false.. I.(:mAd)as the proper being and its deconcealment as the highest mode of being-true We can see.. the o.<ic· .to IlAI19{. e 1(). therefore. . IjI£UOOr.BlUip£t. no ouv. The simple (liliLalp£to. cruYKEij.r. the being of to lite OVYKEij. Unl this latter can constitute the proper being of b lngs.I3luip£tll. rile no very Cr.-.70 Leading Questioll ofPhilosoph: "{() aA110ilr.. Is there then a kind of being-true which as such cannot be relat d to untruth. '. to now. but this latter lies outside of truth.r.. as such ·IS therefore the highest possible mode of being-true. trans.h·{ap/ty.vdA. olhOlr..h". which. nothing else is involved which could define it. . The only possible opposite to this kind of de . i. precisely b caus the distortion too is constant.66va'tUotatpeOijvUl. u h deconcealment not only never dWllges over into distortion but does not even hav any relation to th la\ler. § 9.g. and tb Bt r.. Is there.e. so trans. in order to define this being-true itself as the most proper being of the most proper beings.l0ii. the pure simple is deconcealed in what it is. but t he same opinions always true or always alse'. p) Truth implicity (unity) and constant presen e. the simple.e. be distortion or untruth. in the case .e.lP€P11KOtQ... Is there anything which resists separation of its moments to H a still greater degree than such cases of constant and necessary cobelonging? Clearly there is namely where there is no togetherness at all.of the 0.oncealment is Llnl\P('Olwealrnent [ nenlborgenheil]. all tlu: 'ou! r 6. the deconcealmen L of what-being still involves a possible distortion. which absolutely: eludes the possibility of distortion? In line with the foregoing development of the problem. a superior kind of truth belongs to the what-being of beings.110ilr.irs .10'51 b 15 f: 'As regard· the are 11('lIl1l'r is being·. however. Another example would be a diagollal and its Incommensurability with the side of a quare. Ill' dops not proceed from th being of the o\)~IPE~llKOr. can never. therefore. precisely in r spect of the question concerning the most proper being-tru . fiOllVutCl Olalp€Oi. i. This is what Aristotle refers to a 6.10. It is never manifest as this or that but purely in Itself as itself. So the investigation pro 'eeds as follows: crUj. This deconceaLment cannot change over to distortion. Tredennick . the more does deconcealment belong to beings as such and the more distortion is ruled out.So in respect of that with which it b longs l. V. .'iVUI6 cbr. by ontrast. This is the next question to be addressed. Truth. as that which is most proper about proper beings. th re is no possibility of separation in the determination of the being in question. Ari totl do s not begin b inquiring into the being of proper beings in order to then discuss their haract risti being-true but he immediate] inquires into the being-erue of proper b ings. according \0 ns OWI1 nature. • \. i..mivOEta can be grasped as ta urrlfi. At two points within his preparatory discussion Aristotle says: 1 OUtOlr. it is not the proper and highest truth. 11)31 b 12: 'Just as truth is not ihe sam in these case . \ riSLllll~.

li. 1 The arrM are most concisely ~ in 010. Being. Likee wis« when Aristotle characterizes the qJavul to CtA. I. Being does not just sometimes belong to beings and sometimes not. j . And what is this which universally belongs to beings as such? It is being itself.993 b 28 f: 'The first principles I r ue above ('v"[:oil hing else-'. This pres nc is absolute!' unrnediated. 995 h I I. The closer we come to what is simple. that which in its inner nature is most primordially manifest and thus most purely present.VU1.AOV apxi] .e. '~cr 'o1et. TOW what doe Aristotle say about proper beings. Tredennick. is the most primordial knowledge. It is tb highest and most orizinal kind of presence. the closer do we come to principles. the cm. OUI more radical conception of th problem IJl<.a_ avu1lCaiov elvrn aAllfh:O'Tata~. KULUq>UVUI O.TroV &ei 6vToovapx.~l~ 'planation) in the usual sense but in the ('ilSl' or the cmM a et€po~ tp6rro~ (different approach) is necessary..t1tAOOCtt!..lOSt h ')1) r: 'Wilh resper-t .72 Leadin~ Question ofPhilosoptiy ~' 9.!!f'l1 u I.e. These principles ol' proper beings. 1\!"'"phy~ir. That the deconcealment of the simple is nothing other than an exemplary pres nee can be seen from what Aristotle identifies as the specific mode of accessibility belonging to the simple. at bottom does deconcealment mean? W dillS COllie to the second thesi . i. However this completely unrnediatad constan presence of itself. trans. . (inquir ) or th8o.C'ived 1) Deconcealment of the simple as pure and absolute self-presence hapter Aristotle sa s: la til q>UOEI >uvf. 2. but on ly in qJuvut. t proper being. .Ad are the most proper beings.I( l'I. nothing can int rven .e.e.. that the essenc of the mos proper truth is nothing but constant presence.l1lAOUV: lhis is a Ol'yeiv. to all things which a re sserices and [1 ()3--1 05J .ponutu rravt(1)V." Sill'll slI'nple grasping is the only possible mode of acce s to that which 111 the same «' . it can only be addressed as itself and not as something Is. In saying something about such a thing w make an assertion. and as such it is the primary and ultimate ground of the possibility of v ry actual and cone ivable being.0 ClltAOUO''tEpOV.': trans. does it mean to say that the most simple is the most. The simple is grasped in its deconcealment only through simple illsjl{>ctioll i. we attribute whiteness to the chalk. 1059 b 35. this unmediatsd presellcP is prior to all otb T presence. We claim the white thing to be this or that. is nothing else but the high€' f and mo. It O remains to show more precisely: 1. i. cannot be further analysed. Furtber.45 which is sirnpl I' more primordial that is more of a principle. (lP'x:f))? Tae. is the apxui. simplicit unity. being itself as such is what is most true and decon(.46 But the qu stion concerning beings as such precisely as knowledge of the ground of beings. the conceiving of an accidentally (contingen ly) existing thing as that which it reveals itself to be.U"laphysi('s Il 1. Being is the simple itself.49 q i. Let us first recall the deconcealrnent of b ings in the pro imal sense i. since the simple does not admit of analysis. If. That which is most simpl is also that which is most prop r in beings. the more I'. not iI ('ollC'l"i\'ing of the simple as something else. it is always already unveiled. Being as such.1 Z 17. there is no KUTUq>clVQI respect of th simplex.. the more primordial th deconcealment of th deconcealed. . A6'Yo~ is a 1((llUq>o. ristotle indicate as much In 010. i. 'vlelaphysics K I. if beings are to be discoverable and determinable at all being !IIIlS/ be ('ollslaI'lLly deconcealed. ac ordlngly. The deeoncealment of the simple is the pres nee of th simple in and of itself.a touching. thus the simplest. and if furthermore. 1012'5 b Fr. ips must necessarily be '": l!clap/~)sirs 0 1(1. nd what is tb is proper deconcealment? Deconc alment is the rnanifestness of something which can present itself as itself. we attribute something to the chalk. 1'01 . a simp! grasping not a cone ptualization.d belor' everything else.('all. ~:. th thesis that the e sence of proper 1m/Ii is nothing but absoiutely constant presence. Ther can no longer be ~ilT1lcH. true and deconcealed? Wha . this proper being-true is nothing but absolutely constant presenc . \lVhat. Tredr-nu ir-k. into their oni! (principle) 01' nirirn (ground).lph rsics E t. the beings th mselves onsidered purely in their bing.. if this deconcealment is the highest and most prop r.e. £o-nv OItEP slvcl 1I Kui tVEP"fEi(t. i. only if we do not allow anything else to intervene. e. that ristotl takes the (mAd as the most proper beings.lJelflphy. what is being? This ques ion inquires into the inner possibility of beings as such. Let us recall the leading question of philosophy: ti to 6v. i.ll0E~ of the i'. then the beings which are properly true are the most proper beings: th aAllet~ ov is the KUpu:in:U'cov v.aIIS Ihal. The more primordially we know.pal ni atrial Kui oPXai. aUlO to 6v. Pre ence 73 proper being-true.g. it can only be named.e.'. ow ristotle says that ~l(iA. Truth. about h beings which hav constant presence as their ground (principle.. or things . 1:0 Howev r. but belongs to them constantly and b fore e erything else .e.A118E~. OUI discours . this most constant and purest presence. Being as such stands in decmlc -alment.(. 104t b 9 r. \lVhether or not we actuall conceive and illlt"ITogRte being.

every possibility of becoming-other.. This der.. i.e. remains fundamentally inadequate. in order to counter the possible view that.l). before actuality. 1027 b 25 ff.vlOi~ llpaYllacr!V(tv olavoi~). The exclusion occurs beca i the mode of being of the 6. To be sure. In a word: e lOis not a rlll"!'ig\l appendix. . ysics K 8." it refers to beings) reveal anything completely autonomous in beings themselves: &. of There is also a r to the aA. as il.11geo.. that 010 discusses a fundamental aspect of Ih{" whol.thematic question. q/1 hiLosophy . etc.. including the fundam~'ntal conception or truth as deconcealment.9€usw001( ~.~. The topic of Book 0 is 5iJ\la~ll~ and lvtp'Y£w.which. " cr J"Helap"riCs E 4. or something else intended .. the to 0\1 &..)'WtQV the character as of &. The question concerning being-true /Infolds as the fundamental problem of the proper being of being themselves and as such stands in the closest possible rela ion to what was treated In the foregoing chapters of Book 0. At the same time it should be did dear that the way Aristotle develops the problem of being-true has nothing LO do with logic or epistemology.rov npll"Hlo:rrov(n:spi to. We do say."11f.. does indeed concern ~1tl . KeysLone to Book 0 and to Aristotelian Metaphysics in General I Ouct' rhis thematic content of 010 has been brought to light through an illtf'rpretation informed by t. Truth..e.. On the other every aJ. however.. this conception of truth is not just Aristotel ian. is ruled out.he Greek understanding of being and truth. bu L rather the keyston« oj Book e.74 Leading Qu.5' Actuality is prior and primary with respect ~01\ to possihirlty. of \l01101r. How is this connection between being and being-true possible? Only now do we discover the dimensions of the problem.. The however.. although 0 I 0 does indeed relate LOe it does not actually belong to this book... i. l.. i.. r illJui.. which according to Its essence completely excludes everything not yeL or no longer present. then this highest truth of the simple is the most proper being of the most proper beings.he simple is nothing else but the purest presence. one would have to find it surprising if KtJPlOltUtQV not appear where it does.tV not excluded because it is tains to a subjective condition but because it is a matter here of the of being-true and being-distorted which can change over to one an This o."TJ8eUelV v00r. Proper beings are those which exclude every possible change. v. either is this latter the proper theme. ij9stll of the v6.. '0 either (perhaps N to an editorial error) the exclusion is somehow wrong. prior to everything else (as constant).. This &'... Thus possibility is primary and prior. vith OUlvOta.a there is an u.tv question IS not itself determmed in beings. possibility and actuality as fundamental modes of being..ic50 [ lU6-IORJ R. At bottom. l10S-1061 . oot tv Ihavoit. this can only be maintained on the basis of the spf'cifically Greek approach to the problem of being.. the l5ul\lota.pH.:leuelv.e..r. In eto there ts concentrated the III OS! radical conception Clfthe basic problem.9to.110eus. blll sirnplv Greek. Chapter E 4?" Only now in can we see why the &.unClll:8 I Greek we have gained some insight into the meani ng of being-true as constant presence. the truth of I5Ulvotadoes not (even where.~2 Yet also in the case of the {m/..~. if e. Let me provide yet ano her indication of the unambiguously positive connection between 0'10 and 0. But Aristotle maintains the contrary position: rrpo1spoV tvtPYWJ OUVU)1scO. it is said . Presence 75 presen ts itself purely as its .rrM . 1J."110gUE.estion."TJge~ will no longer be found ov disLurbing. But we already indicated that being-true is always 00intended with the copula..0"I0. which itself is the (·Plllw u r the en Li e lVIetaphysics. As !Tldir·<llC'd<It the outset.0euElvis not at all bound to proper beings. as a.s simply what it is. For the &'...o/lcealment is just lite pure presence if the simple in itselj. KL. the KuptciHUtO\l is OV. 9.. Il<1ifwphysics E I~. Being. 1027 b 27 rr. We have become familiar with the leading question \[) [rom the textual question " cr a lso M etaph.9£0.'laphY.ij9stu of the o:n:Aa."119130. act and being. On the contrary. absolute presence. We are in the habit of saying that for something to be actual. The later deformation of the problem in terms of subject-object. 1065 b 21 I'L .. the ever more comprehensive exclusion of lhl' possibility of untruth from truth.is there 0\1 OV ceived as the O:A1l9tr. It is shown that proper being is tvtP'Y£Ul..11. wi 11 be treated at a point. 1049 b "i... If the simple in this way constitutes that which is most proper to beings.If. c) "["11(' ()uestion [Jeepest 0! 0 (IS of the Being-True of Proper Beings as the Highest and Qu_estion of Aristotle's Interpretation of Being.. and if the deconcealmeru of t. it must first be possible.. What about the exclusion of the ov 1'!J.. This is not to be entered nuo now.

vVhat thi ul imately the Greeks did not show..) (~ 2-SH) II 1. hi/osol'hy transl ared p. 993 b I9 f: 'Ph i1050phy is righ tly ea lled a know ledg1O'of ITuth'i •• ! /!~n'Of1h"'"/ I~h"o. 1977.1'. philosophy not the theory of truth eonsidererl as knowledge. Trerlennick.uaLit if Spirit in Hegel as Absolute Presence of 511 bscq lien L philosophical qu stioning are brought to a full and uni fled ll'f'Sl'IlIHlioll. . h~' A.~. nor was it but it is'. I llegd's fundameruat metaphysical thesis can be se n in his statement: '111 Illy "I('W.. (' translated bv A.wlogy of Spirit..~)Xfnrd. is time. of Valli!'!! (Parr . l legel. The . It does no suffice to place in truth [AnschauungswahrheitJ prior to ass rtoric truth if the truth intuition itself remains unclarified.pryLhlng turns on grasping and expressing the True not only as Suhs[[lilce. Miller. that th took true as the proper being of prop r beings.elu8U1 Til" llllA. Mi ller Two of I-legel's Enc rclopaedia of the ()xrord Clar . but it is it presen e which stands by itself and through itself in self-r fleeted duration.tens us how to understand being as such. • 'If \'anl/'e. So how does Hegel conceive the being of beings qua spirit or the ac'uali~Y'or thi actual? 'Th pirit . i. from the v ry beginning. . but that this interpretation of being comes to clear e pression precisely where \ estern rnetaph sics attain its genuine fulfilment. 'Eternit will not be.. '" !)h"IIOIIl".76 Leadina Question if Philosoph. e\./ology of Spirit. but rather the absolute subject.the most sublime Notion'. a presence of the highest onstan y. which itself mak s J-n ss and self-abidillgness possible. i. who raises the problematic of Western metaphysics into a new dimension Another thing to remember is that this understanding of being as CODstant presen e not only continued from antiquity right through to Kant. subjectivity in th lUoilerll sense of the concept relates to that which has the character of the J [das Ichlichei. pp.which must proceed from problematic of being and time. p.<ophy . with Hegel. § 10.. is eternal"l)() the way of b ing of the spirit is eternity. i. the light of the same. fl.. [lOY-liD] . The connections we have exhi require a much deeper clarification . but is knowledge of i. 36.. 9-11l. is expressed in the representation of the Absolute as 'pirit .e. p. Truth must be clarified in such a that the necessary subordination of assertoric truth to primordial can also be comprehended. We carr now close this e cursus and return 0 the main topic. . But for Hegel. 0' €Xtl !Cui . although It is illdl·c·d the case that su bstantiali ty constitutes the being of beings. i.dctualit if tpiru.UJJ"'CdLICY and presence. in Hegel 77 of npci:rnl ((HAo(JQ(pia as the question of what b ings are. or that ubstance is essentially ubj ct. 14. they did not develop the question of being to level of th fundamental que tion. !arendon /'1 11··W'1.61l This is no the pI' sence of the momentary now which immediately flows awav nor is it just lasting presence in the usual sense of what continues to endure.10.. l)hl'IlfJrlIt'. in to beings in respect of their C..OUOlpiuv t1tl(Jt~llT]v tii~ I'll. ab clute presence' [absoLute Gegeruvart). understanding of being illuminates all steps of the inquiry. ss. I"rom this brief discussion of Hegel we conclude two things: 1. To extent we have obtained substantiv insights from this reflection emerge at the appropriate point later.59 Hegel means the proper beings..~Metaphysics trans. The source chi illumination. To b sure. in ord r [or the being of beings to be fully comprehended b concei ed as subjectiuic . which can grasp all otherness of beings from itself as the mediation of its selfothering. Thus Aristotle sa : op9ci)(. which an be justified onl by the exposition of the s stem its('l I..e. " . -. into the deconccallnent of beings. and how.'/ 'That the True i actual only as system. uhsli:1llliality must its tf. The ACl.' I'· ~.. where the basi approach of Gre k philosophy.1. This qu inquires into the being of bei ngs. 'If va/un:. Phi/osoph:v eN"lre). l' '.\'. .61 'th ternal [is] .<!'The spiritual alone is the actual. i.~.. It is quite prop r to call philosophy knowledge of truth. ndon Press 1970 .. because they remained at the level of leading question.\\'.e. PIrr'lIomf!t1oiotzy of Spirit. n::.. but equally as 'ubject.. VVhat has been clearl demonstrated is tha th Greeks saw primarily as pertaining to beings themselves. Accordingly. P: 10. knowledg of b ings a such in their unhiddenness. At this stag what we need to firmly in mind is just the natural and selj~evidenl way in which the grasp being as constant presence.e.6 KUA.V. I egel.g What this means is that. 14. th pur self-grasping of the totalit ' of beings which in and for itself grasps th whole multiplicity of beings as such. the being of thes beingsb ings as spirit [Geist) . Neither was this shown subseq for everything becam covered up by pseudo-questions such that problem was los sight of altogether. ..<. however. subjectivity is not the I-ness [Ichheit] of the familiar mpirical egos of individual finite persons. 1. Phenomell%ff"y 0/ Spirit. togeth T with the ess ntial motiveS '.

furth rrnore.leadin« question. At the outset when we had only the rough leading question 'what are beings?' befor us.th challenge is supposed to resid in something other than mere questioning as questioning. if we are to grasp th problem of freedom precisely as the problem of metaphysics and SO be adequately prepared for its discussion.aus the whole of VVestern metaph sics has ull!'ritically held fast to it? Or may and must we ask what is happening wh{'11 being is so unproblematicall understood as constant presence. 2. nee srrnp Iy be . CHAPTER THREE \Yorking the Leading Question of Metaphysics Through to the Fundamental Question of Philosophy the leading qu stion of V estern philosophy teased out the mol' primordial questions contained therein.the only UII~\\"('l' which . 2. Hegel's metaphysics retains a conscious inner connection to the Greeks.presence and constancy . Precisely be-cause this interpretation of the actuality of th actual is expressed as the overcoming of being qua substance. and must we accept lhls so -eviide: 'If' . to experience the challenging character of philosophical questioning. as becam plain. al 0 understands being as constant presence. this demonstration that being means constant pres nee has to do with a challenge. with this question about the understanding of h(·jog.'ti. Th following series of questions arose: ti to ov. if we are 0 understand what means for philosophy to go-after.vident that it does not even announce itself as an answ r to a question. but even this possibility is now foreclosed if namel . leading question of metaphysics . This is what must OCCllI if w are to really ask the leading question.ould bring us to a k more radicall " Is it real! so self('\'~dt'n 1 that being is understood as constan t presence. and finally. The essence of an answer is to resolve the question to which it responds. being. the leading question awaken d a mor primordial questioning. We attempted to do this by posing two questions: 1. an flnswcr which app aI'S so self. dug more more iruo th content of the leading ques ion. It was a matter of really asking this question. we have xhausted our questioning? . not just in the veryday existence of man and not just at th beginning of Greek metaphysics but in the whole history of Western philosophy. What does the question ask about? (beingJ.. Perhaps we have asked the leading question more primordially but in so doing precisely done away with it Not only. and indeed. what are What ar beings as such? VVhat are b ings in respect of their being? is being) What is being understood as? We have. hut we hay We have not only id ntified . VVe thereby arrived at an answer. and thereby dug out primordial question. For we our elve ar b ings and as such we ar co-involved in this questioning. wnmarizing OUT entire discussion of he fundamental meaning of ouain. How is being understood? (constant pres n e). if we are. so to speak.nkling of how such questioning could go to our roots. But II OW. Hilt how do w know that with this thoughtworth gues ion contained III i hr. just as was previously the case have we no xperienced the cbalLenging character of the question. not ju t at an arbitral' private opinion but at an answer continually given by Western m taphysics.he-whole. we can no longer see what this understanding of being. [ 111-112] [11 ')-114J . To b sure. We have thus ceeded in answering the question as to how being is und rstood. we can see that even a fleeting look into he world of the great think rs places us before one simple and forceful fa·t: the understanding of being. 'to 6v . Has our gues ioning Teall come alive in this wa ? We ha e indeed answered these more primordial questions. hould we be conten with this IIlISpok('1l answer'? Is this answer . Bing is understood in term of constant fll·(>senc~~'. is ori nted CO being as presence and constancy.78 Leading Questioll o/Philosophy b grasping substance more radically as subje it. This understanding owes its larity to the illumination provided by the span implicit understanding of presence and constancy. at least we bad some i.· after we have shown that the questioning of beings means understanding presence and constanc .inquires into the being beings.

. On th contrary. take us a long way from the self. This fundam ntal question is: what is the es euce 0/ time. 'SlC. such that it can expend this lighl and . onstant presence herefor . And with the catchcry 'being and time' we have ventured the into this abyss. i. nd yet o inquire into lime. . in ow' comportment 0 beings.al is likewise not book itself but that the reader becomes aware of the fundamental 0 rene of Western metaphysics. Being. r ceives its 1I111f'I' (. who brought the leading question of philosoph)' to its first authentic awakeni. Only now does the question 'one riling beings obtain its II rldl srop(' ill the fundamental question of being and time. Plato and Aristotle. a question whi h [ ll(j-It?] .ical question i.e. do's not mean understanding the [ 11 of time. Being and Time . the now.. such. and also into being. 'constant'? Constan y means endurance. whether in ordinary understanding or in explicit ontological problematics of philosophy.what .'. which once set storm over us. First. such hat we now stand in utter darkness. now? What is time itself. what is the theme of the question concerning beings? Answer: being. from whose perspective the leading question itself ~p!JeaI'S crude and inad quate. light is time itself. The leading question . though not as superfluous. In saying being is understood as constant presen we have not answered the ing question but have brougbt it befor the ab S5 of its own que:51. that which is now. this distinction which.dom is a genujnely philosoph. Even less is it a particular philosophy whose revolutionar mood might appeal to cont mporary outh. all. and thus also do illlll1P III ies t' . which dis tin tion itself allows the theme or the Leading question to be more sharply determined. A whole world of interconnected and equally essenual questions opens up. that the original leading ques~IDtI. we discov red the questionability of the leading question. B ing and time is not at aU a novel Y nor is it a so-called philosophical standpoint.JI}U~ ability. or it is onl from the problematic of being and time that we can ask wh being is understood. being? How do being and lime come into llzi primordial relation? What this relation? What do s time mean? What does being mean? What. constan Iy ill now. as what IS being understood? Answer as constant presence. Within illumination which allows being to be understood as constant the light which exp nds this illumination . likewise Kant and Hegel and vel' philosoph r. . The Fundamental Question of PJzilosoph 81 § 11.80 {Forking the Leading Question '!!Metaph.cssity. The Fundamental Question ~lPhilosop/~ as the Question the Primordial Connection between Being and Time If being stands in the illumination of constan y and presence.(.there is a book of this title. what light is the source of this illumination? Presenc IS a character of lime. Doe erern I th!· jlurported challenging character or the authenti"call posed leading (PH'l>lioll now become visible? For the latter is th third of the three ql. does being and time mean? These questions. Moreover. ill order to show that the problem o{ rr(><. This was expressed tbrough two questions.. It is not a novelt . allows us to always already understand being.e. ~. lacking support and bearings. for already the an ients inquired into the essence of time.ng by reference to oixrio were alsoespecially Aristotle . '1'1If' 'and' is the actual crux of the problem. I ow we see that this problematiC also rebounds upon the indicated questions and their answers. 11. What is cru i. why time precisely in just one of its moments. the present.the first to inquire into the essence of time. LL ISonly now from our insight into the understanding of bing and into the connection be w en bing and time. illlO the question which inquires into the 'and' of being and time and rhus into the ground oj both. And in r spect of the fir t question we must still ask about the conditions of the possibility of the distinction b tween being and beings. lnd ed just those great thinkers.. proximally and for the most part. ions con tame d t herei receive tneir full que nona biliIty.He heings:> . The answers to these questions propelled us forward into the problematic of b ing and time. the m taphysics of our whole existence.. econeUy.IP~ti{)IIS[rom which we proceeded. i. occurrence over which individual books have no power but before which everything lse must ubmit.which seemed to have come from nowher in particular.must itself be transformed into the fundamental question. But this book-title such is just as irrel vant as man 0 hers.itself becomes visible. always enduring in every The now is likewise a determination of time. from the specific t mporal moment of the present (presence).vident. rohlf'1ll of 'being and time'. Both being and time remained hidden in ~l('ir innermost relation and so remained also in subsequ nt philosoph. that it grounds being and such tha: the question of beillE{ as the leading question of metaphysics can and must be unfolded wil hin this horizon? Pressing forward from the leading ques ion to the fundamental question. means the whole present. to exist within the understanding of being? o the fundamental question broaden out the whole questionability of the leadin{! que tion. Constant presence refers to concurrence in ever now. is understood in the \ How does time come to perform this illumination? Why precisely . How does th problernati of being and time help to illuminate the essence of the distinction b tween being and beings.

'IS we unfolded the leading question it emerged that the question of \]("ill~ il~L'1f leads to the question of time.1 First: in what way does positive freedom signify a f mental broadening of our problem? Our answer referred to auton absolute spontaneity. it is the ordinary conception of time which bas or II I K--12() 1 . which even seem to be the ones which are emphasized..sk rirslabouL the essence of being and then about the essence of time. Seccndlv: what perspective does this open up? Answer: absolute spontaneity. The 'and'signifies a 1Jn'n1nTl'l. So everything begins over again with the fundamental question. Time does not have the same universality as being. I\II! .e. time counts as something which Just it! rd wh ich as such is suscepu ble of philosophical examination and 1·{·UrTli<lll. We three thiIlgS. because the question being has not been posed III it radical way. but also by the 'here' as producedness [He. I[ this . But time and space are not the same. We can now see ilion' clearly that ill inquiring into the essence of being we are compelled to illquire into the essence of time.. of a quite distinctive sort. now that the questionworthiness of the leading question has been released into fundamental question. we must be deal' over what we wish to place question and in what way. above p. Why do we not with equal legitimacy speak of being and space. especially when we recall the everyday concept of being and the way it goes over into philosophy? Presence.we cfE'llerallv refer to this together with something else. n)- § 12. If really want to question..the more obli does questioning become.in. 1. It stems from the usual r'OIICeption of time. On the contrary. i. We have therefore (dready encountered theca-belonging of being and time.§' 12. Therefore we must .rs..IS not an external relation which merely juxtap two things. then it must equiprimordially from the essence of being and the essence of time. Possibility of 'l(·(·II. space. i. number. and if being is the broadest determinstion 'which encompasses everything that is. We inq uire nei ther into being by itsel r nor into Lime by itsel f.her with . then this broadest determination is related to something which just exists alongside it. by Dionysodorus in the Euthydemus dialogue. But secondly. Why. having forgotten that we can experience it through genuine questioning.-~estf!lltheilJ. cr. Ian as Site 0/ Fundamental QuesliO"n 83 goes-after-the-whole while at the same time going-to-the-root. and the more primordial questions we come know. Thirdly: does this perspective allow us to experience the sophical going-after-the-whole as a going-to-our-roots? We now grasp perspective of the leading question by working through the Iundam question (being and time).lkroSpare. albeit an initially obvious one. the pl'esent: the being of the present is here determined not only by the now. Perhaps we shall not experience at all as long as we are merely looking. e. i. if it is rather a primordial relation.82 H/ork.. do we not even see the possibi lity of such experience? Because all we have shown is that the leading question to the fundamental question.' .pac('.positive freedom. u.constant presence . in gen questioning we can only experience the possibility of this challenge. 'vVe have simply let the matter stand as previously with the case of the leading question. ·We can only exp. rather into their I {)t: 'I()rwin" (Inc! what originates therefrom. The schema for this perspective has come view: being and time -I time . But we still cannot discover the challenging character of the q ing of the fundamental question..g. possibility.e. (IIIan as Ow Site if the Fundamentai { uder: tanding 0/ Being as the Ground ofthe the Essence 0/ tVIall Question. Upon closer inspection. as there-standingness [Da-stehendheit]' The latter contain spatial determinations. and movement. toget..being . for no one will dispute that C(lllslal}('Yand presence are in some sense temporal.W_ co-belongingness 0/ being and lime/rom the ground of their essence. So if we inquire into being and time. causality. 0 focusing the problem of being upon the relation between being and time amounts to narrowing the primordial scope of the problem. as its sister so to speak. 'Io identify and the fundamental question is not the same as asking it. The more primordial the question knowll. which comes to expression m the usual juxtaposition nf space and time.. _ and time are mterwoven with one another. \s ('.111 easily be shown. however.g the Leading Question qfiVlelaphysics . the and-relation between the elements. beings. the question.beings such . \Vhal are we inquiring into when we inquire ina time? Time .erience their Co ~ ro-Iw 1(J lI{{i ng by exam in ing their respective essences. 21l. Bill hitherto. The abbreviated formula is: being and The question concerns the 'and'.e. Nei do we merely inquire in to them simultaneously. the primordia! problem of lime has never been treated. the stronger becomes the illusion that this knowing is already tioning. more we come to know.. this is just an assertion.

translated by R. 'Augustine. of mall to that contained in the leading qu stion? This is indeed . ipsarn melior cum tempera metier. J hi per haps SlgnLfy a . however. So taining that the leading question also concerns man does not mean all rnu h.L • . 'ian as ite qfFllIuLam. For it is clear that th question of man is included the general qu stion of what beings are a su h. More generally. h<1IIC'lIgl":' to man. in psy hology. but fundamentally . Thus Ari LOde <'zfi6vurov E1V(l! x. nee is of particular importan e 0 us her . are the loci of time.. non ea praeterierunt. If we inquire into mall in terms of our question of b ing and time. it is this: time is not to b found somewh re other like a thing among things. I lrohlellllllic of bing and time forces us to th q uestion of man..e. This questioning 0/ man/rom the eround if the fundamental question is what alone makes possible all philosophical questioning of man. On th other hand. On the other hand. Kant. Still.belongs to man.~. prior to our actual unfolding of leading question.I I questum f!J man. medicine. Penguin. f' WI" WIS. even if we now e tablish this from the connection between and Lime. L I I . we dis-regarding man as such in questioning beings in the whole. ' . Book XI. tempora metior . man. when we really unfold it into the fundamental question. The question of the Iram work of th leading question is all alsoquestioning of man . ip.} . .22~ a 26. A. but inlO mall insofar as l. .S. Even where man is treated in philosophical anthropology it remains unclear in what way marl is interrogated and in what way this interrogation is philosoph ieal. but a plague.the ground of the rno t radicalized ontological 1/"01111'111 .g.. ian too must bE' questioned along with all other beings. ..ph.O"eClionem. 1961./-' . When the III . among other things. I Tile questioning of man and 'the question concerning man' are by no IlW<lJlS till' same. TI' we disregard details and ask what constant! said of time.. a a mode of comportment of human subject. i..2 Time could not be if soul were not'. If we inquire' the essence of time we must inquire into the essence of the human The fundamental question concerning being and time forces us into question concerning the human being." eaas (0 lie oes t..84 Workinl{ the Leading Question oj 1ela.e. only IS It different. Confessions. Soul. the human subject. but iA ours Iv s. The properly posed question qf heing thus Ihe 'l'll'~!' WI! . But we reached this point before. the questioning of man which proceeds from the ground of the fundamental r~" 'stion dol'S not serve just to complete th answer to th leading queslIon.l:hibit any challenging character.efZlaL Que lion 85 determined the direction of its questioning. 1 e ea lust 11 or'('\ipy ourselves wiLh ques ioning? If we gelluinely ask the leading 'jIlI'S[ ion . So altho ugh Ihe i n vestiga tions of ti me by ugustine.. Pine-Coffin. so. Kant conceives time th form of OUI inner perc ption.I'i'i_ question into the fundamerual que tion of being and lime a . 1/('11'1"(/("'/ •I . cum illas praeterieruu.e. 110(. (. that die traditional treatments of time vide us with important clues.. for we ar inq just as much into plants and animals and every kind of being. meus... the question beings. " • ("i-1~f' i. concerning l U:! e. including the answers as to its essence. Augusline says in his onJessions: In 1£. worth.p6vov IJIUX'~<. all kinds of anthropological studies are undertaken e. Ind sed we must say that all philosophical anthropology stands outside the question of man which can only emerge from the ground of th fundamental question of metaphysics. p dagogy. as posed within Une differ [1 i 121-123J . r. p. as ki IS Illg It as t:he man.?. are we at the sam point as earlier in our considera Or is the question of man as necessuated by our development oj the le£Ul. I' . IN do not ask within the horizon if the Leading question but/rom..its asks about. spirit. Likewise. and of tb essen e of titTle. spirit. If we take man as one being among others.15. do I measure the times . 276 (translation slightly modi fied). theology. concerrung oeuig an d Li tune. but also in regard to Its content and basic probl matico 1111. the frameu ork if tile leading question. hut is II1111Voidabl in developing the ground of the I ading question for til{" i"uncimn!:'IlLal question. .e. and not the thing itself which makes impre sion as it passes and moves into the past'.ar(" we. lCS . Physics 6 I.l to gellllll1e Iy as'k t he leadiIng question ratner tnan . arne.' }2. th y ar ject to the fundam ntal deficiency that the proceed without an orien tation to th problem of being. The questioning of man from the ground of the fundamental qu stion is not only a different kind of questioning in regard to the ord r of problems. Nowadays. Aristotle. I' '. manet. . sence .'.. I· . \ e ahead saw that question does not €. . we :nquire into man not just as a beinz within the multiplicity of beings.111111 . quam res praetereuntes til te et. A Ir ad this is no longer a fashion. It remains true. When I measure time it is the impression that I measure. ~ri] oUcrll<. and legel are of undoubted importance. am metier prae eniem. the ground If the fundamental question. i. a challenge that cannot be sidestepped but must be "lJrhlf'~'rI.ime ..' 'In you. leads the question of man. IJ . ut fiere!. rernauung unuun t hi question. . we inquire illl!) I1Im1 u-ithin. inquiring into man within thefram work of the leading question is just an incidental inquirin into man.

7 • (11/ lI'hl("h ~oes beyond anything that man's everyday sel f-q uesuon ing call tile 1111. I tI sotn quesuons concermng man. \Ol olily clops tlus kind of qcestioning. In inquiring into being we are not asking ill all ilrbimll:Y way afier arbitrary properties of man but we are inquiring into SOll)l'Lllillg specific in man.tAIjOEt..·C\ON. H then the question of time is inseparshle from the question concerning being and the understanding of being. 6. its scope.e.86 Jif/orking the Leading Question oj Leraphysics to §' 12. We can now see that we mixed characteristics of being and characteristicscfthe understanding of Did this occur because it was just a preliminary orientation. Rathel·. . f' I I·· . NIall. i.damental Qilestion 87 fundamental question. The particular way we are inquiring into time is a prescribed by the question of being. i. its penetration. this is a great deal.e. or does it another reason? Is the understanding of being connected closely with what it understands. undifferentiatedness..f. but this becomes unauoidabie. being undifferentiated and yet divided. only the fifth and eighth apply to being itself.0 allY beings whatsoever. pp.. quite apart from its connection with time.. If man did not possess an understanding of being. When we inquire into being and the understanding of being. But is the relation between being and the understanding being so straightforward that what holds for being also holds for understanding of being. the understanding elf being is the ground 0/ the possibility of the essence of man. r. precisely being! Is this quite different to what holds when we understand and know beings? Clearly."illg(tlw understanding of being). then not only (Ire we compelled in general to inquire into man. its preconceptuali. allOW. lf being and beings are not the same.ad!ll~ question of ph ilosophv. in cl u din g his comporlment to himself. 3. but this not the question of the essence of time as such. According~y.v characteristic of man which he possesses along with many other IJ["ofwrLi s. one tiling is certain. or more preclsey. into the 'and'. if the question: 0/ lime is even the K!"fJund of the problem if the question of being. 70 n·. 80 its originary dividedness. The question conceruing experience of time is a psychological-anthropological question. In the root and rooting of our being human as such the leading question presses forward from its ownrnost fundamental content. in the sense that It is presen t everywbere.. the possibility q/lhe ground 0/ the essence of man. but oldy the problem of 'experience of time' that has to do with man. Above however. its freedom from tion.. Its forgottenness. Not only does the understanding of being perv. Ii l·olII/JOl"tmenl of man . compelled 10 inquire into the essence oj lime thus iruo the essence f!/mal1~ 'Time and man? Certainly! Yet time and these are not the same. such that being is id sntical with its e deeoncealment? So that the question of being as such can only be posed ill q II iri n gin to th I" un derstan di ng of being (deconcealing)? So chat must grasp the fundam ntal question as meaning: the understanding being and lime? These questions can only be answered through f substantive discussion of the problem of being.. but we are i into time because.. i.HIe a 11 comportments to beings. man is not just 'time'. 5. which is the way Kant IJ It illHltely understands the matter..e. The question concerning the ground of the essence of man has thereby already become inevitable.ty. would be impossible in his essence. we cannot InqUire into Lime.. as the r. What then do we already know about being~ Just those things indicated in OUT introductory discussion of the understanding of being. ley are Q1WSlioliS concerning the ground of his essence. 2. we must inquire into lime in such a way that we can S("E' iL as the ground of the possibility of the understanding of being. l125-126j . as required by the inner content of :hp . be could not be 'he' himself. it is not the problem 01" tim ~ itself. he couLd not comport toward himself as a being he could not say '1' and 'you'. To be sure. and its belongingness to man. in light of time. but it is the condition qf the possibility of any comportment 1. But all this forgets that we are not inquiring into time in any old nor are we inquiring into the experience of time. 4. could not be a person.. in general and pruvisional terms. its nnspokenness. [0 but also it is a questioning of ~. but has many other' ties'. 1. bu tit pervades all h is com portments e to bei ngs. and in so far as. and in end it is also essential.e. being is understood hom time. his understanding of being.I. Man as Site of Fun. m just any arbitrary way. 1:1. and the question of the essence of [Ull(' . This is especially so when WI' IIlquirc into the co-belongingncss of being and time. 7. by what we already know this question. inquire into man in a way q urte fJI-(olg"lI man's everyday self-raflection. . Even if we leave open the inner connection between being and understanding of being. namely that we have problem of being only through the understanding of being:1 the understanding of being is. The question of the essence of b.e.round 0/. there must be difference. and from the very beginning. The latter is nOL an arbilnu·. But if we look more closely we can see that things pertain to the understanding of being rather than to being as At best. on u"'Ati lind . i. So while this questioning of man is indeed unavoidable. ~Ul then Lime is not something that occurs only in man. it is one-sided: man is itlterrogated only in his relation to time. ar. i.

We an now see more clearly.each of us partake of time. In short. where there is 'still time' or 'no more p{l~Sl'SS [121-1-129] ..gthe Leading Question c!f ietaphysirs § f J. questioning of beings in the whole. Our discussions concerning the challenging character of the question of ht'illg have not been concerned with he possible practical-moral application of philosophical propositions by individual human b ings. in which he understanding of being encompasses all beings. such that the individual will not om into question.ioni ng of man b yond man as he ordinarily appears to be. however milch we radicalize the 1 ading ~'fl. that this is a que ing of man in the ground of his essence. and the purely formal reason that every universal implicates its lars.88 IIf/orkil1. lor does the fundamental question involve fitly serious ritalll'Tlge. But the leading questiou canno b substantively unfolded in any more primordial wa than into the problem of being and time.. b ut uc h th at time as _ III PHd] ('<lSf' our ime individualizes each one of us 0 his own self? Time t always lime..e. The leading qu does not initially and directly pertain to man. about whether and how it enables the fundamental condition of Ihe possibility of human e is ence . In the end. as a going-after-the-whole is also going-to. i harbours within itself the possibility of chall nge to man. that questioning of the leading question is a questioning of bemgs in whole and Dot specifically a questioning of man. including the g . we must be implicated in some way. We hav our time with one ana her. Freedom IS a t I~ Being-therf [Da-seinJ\ ftllld. L1 any case I see no further possibility. Al hough we can see how the question of being and time connects Lh!' question of man.e. Challenging 'baracter 0/ the Question 89 bring into view. but if its qu is radical it rebounds on man and overpowers him in his ground. that the questioning of question itself leads to the questioning of man: . or is i l much more that we ourselves are pOSS('slwd by rime? And this not just in the indefinite sense tha w cannot I. which genuinely only through radicalizaiion of lire leading question. but only with whether and how the question itself i. it is here that the challenge must announce itself. ~J placed in question.e. Thus. 3. this so in respect of very human questioning. disr garding particular human . the und rstanding which allows man to comport himself toward beings the whole. L Irat we cannot escap ItS r tt ('5. The omprehensioe Scope qf Being (Going-ajter-lhe-fPhole) and the Challenging Individualization (Going-lo-tlze-Roots) of Time a the Horizon ofthe nderstanding 0/ Being !3eing and time: with the problem or being in mind. It takes man into g uestion in ground of his essence.such that we can cast it 011 .the understanding or b-ing. a challenge which does not com from outside but up from the ground of his essence.II will? Or do we each of us possess our own proper portion of time? 1)0 wr. in the questioning demanded therein involves a challenge. If anywhere at all. The hallenging haracter cf the Question a/Being (Fundamental Queslion) and the Problem qf Freedom. Do w all u ill some loose way .'0 time is supposedly the broad t breadlh.lJt""'J_ questions.. where til is lime'. in his roots. It IS only a challenge in general i. 1. our quest.e. The condition of this breadth is supposed to b tim . We can only say thai. and this questioning is itsetf sinudtaneousiy directed 10 the of the possibility of being human.. we cannot s e how we ourselves are "1-'. thus inquires into man in gen ral. i. 'Th 1I'oblf'11lof being and time is so general that it does not as such pertain to ~lte individual.the-roots.our time my time . which proceeds within the framework of the leading question. i. it concerns nobod trl PIJl'llclilar. Bu whai and where is time? VVher do s time belong? To whom does it bpIQl!g<' E\'~'r\'b()dv has his time. how vel'. Being is lhp broadest horizon of all ac ual and thinkable beinzs.\kl' lp· . i.lIJ1ental qu estion if the latter is the general problem of bing and lilltC' w(' can treat it quit objectively and irrespe live or whether it concerllS man."'-'lJlJ . we are inquiring into Lime. ave 0 f· u me. With th fundamental question. insofar as it is we who pose L. But this questioning of man is directed to man's essential ground. r Man I \lVe are inquiring into the possibilit ' of the understanding of bing' into the possibility of the understanding of being in its emir scope. we inquire into the totality beings..

and your and our time. The faller has. This indi idualization is the condition the possibilit for the division in the distinction betw en person community.e.'l'dom is built into lh. rather the content the question of philosophy . The third of three preliminary questions has thus been answered. neces leads to the indiuidualizarioa residing in lime itself. i. as pertaining to everyone yet to nobody particular. The theme and its manner of treatment in this lecture course are such that an introduction to philosophy can now be attempted.un/olded usetf into the fundamental question (being and lime).~ 1J. In the ground of essential unity. this questioning is itself compreb nsiue and challenging.g. i. but man in his individualization. t. But if temporalit is at bottom individualization. when propprly posed. that it is built into the leading and fundamental questions of metaphysics. in case the individual as mdividual. for is never primordially universal. as unfolded from the leading question philosophy. . We now know the context of our theme.i \ 'ti 't() (Iv freedom being-there constant presence being beings as such beings movement causality absolute spontaneity autonomy positive freedom negative freedom human freedom . lrob1l'rllfl.uiiJilil_r of a challenge. W can see that the question concerning the essence of human freedom." We ask d: 1. Does this questioning :lH\'P t he character of a chan ng ? The inner connection or th se three ul'.in the greatest breadth for the problem of and tim as unfolded from the leading question to the fundamental tion of philosophy. temporality the essence of lime . in its basic content.e. Preci e1 when we obta. Challenging Character if the Question 91 time'. which is ach case individualized to itself. it coricen trates breadth in he question concerning man's individualization. Again. after-the-whole is a going-to-th -roots of ever individual.vill remain hidden. r The necessary preparations for treating our main theme have thus been finally completed. '" 0 long as w do not see that Lime fulfils its essence as temporal by in each ase individualizing the human being to himself. The comprehensive scope 0/ being is one and the with the challenging individualization if lime. In lis very C(}~. but not as the parricularization of a universal. truth or art.e leading question of philosophy. Not man on of many presen L cases. but from the ground of the ess nc of e ist nce.(.ing the essence oj human Ji. does the problem. i. and according to its inner cont nt.he concept of positive freedom involve a fundamental broad ning of 2. then the question being and lime as such in accordance with its 0W11 content. [I'S( t 31] . not e. precisely when we really obtain this and do not talk about it. as it did at firs and for a long time subsequently. We can now see that in the essence if time ilsetj there individualization. Yet the theme is particular.tt'nf.tic) being and time time / . precisely freedom.this fondamentaL question shows that philosophizing involves the /O. come to focus on individual as su h. Does not his most primordial of the fundamental question. cr abovs-. is a going-after-the-whole. subsequen ly and by way of a useful application.e.. is also a goiug-to-our-roots. which simultaneously.e. invol e the possibility of a challenge a challenge constant unfailing in its target? This challenge is all the more threatening appearing. pr. being and time are such that. to only general significance. 0 while time as horizon of beiJlg possesses the broadest breadth.demands a questioning whose more radical broadening implies an ever more certain focus on the '/iduai a indiuidual. question. when the are plac d question.90 11/orking the Leading Question (if 1elaphysic . not in the external sens of private xist DC . What perspective does it open up? 3. i. Time is always in a h case my time. placing that indioidual in. 20 and R2. [iolls now reveals that the que lion concern.t i 'to OV .

This field seems so lead defined that we can dispense with any lengthy discussion. is philosophically entral? How do we know freedom must be conceived primaril in the ontext of causality? We se n that this is one way of inquiring into freedom.. still.d if the possibility of Dasein. and when toward the illumination of its essence. if! its essence he more primordial than man. according to the new th sis. we must assure ourselves of the field into which always be looking when inquiring into freedom. With this in mind we an establi h. but is superordinate and governing in relation t. IllJnmll "rrcf'dorn now no long r means freedom as a property of man. _ for th fa t that we take up differen definitions does not explicit! cate eith r the region where freedom b longs or how it is situated in region. the p rsp ctiv would also be diff rent.. and thus the ground of the possibility of understandIllf!. as something prior even to being and lime. of inquiring into chis. but.. thus making man Il(~ssiblc. therefore.o the whole. w must poss th diversity and breadth of a horizon. our previous considerations we are no longer unfamiliar with It: ne freedom as freedom from . if the fundamental problem of philosophy must be view d from this persp ctive then il is irrelevant whether Kant was correc to interpret freedom within the rramework of causa Iity. 'With respect to the hema. the leading question of metaphysics is grounded in.. 1f our investigation of th ess IlC of human freedom is to keep steady course. we above all be clear about where we situate fre dom prior to the appli of any further perspectives. The correctness and necessitv of this r~. But if We flf€' seeking out freedom as the groUlld of the possibility of existence. Man I ollly all administrator of freedom. and being as such.cLion can be established only from the content of essence. From the outset. edam Our them is human freedom in its essenc . At the (J\ll~("l.. hut man as II I'o. The theme is human freedom. are grounded in freedom. How do we know that this particular interpretation. But our unfolding of horizon for the problem of freedom relied 011 Kant's interpretation of problem. i. the problem of freedom is brought into connection with then and only then does this lead into he further perspective which ourselves have opened up. At rate w must put a qualification on our previous considerations..92 "f/arkin/{ the Leading Question ofMelllphysics § 14. we can already see tb whole domain th problem of freedom in all its dimensions. significant it may be. involve a :'ioir-Ill redirection of our gaze. But we are entitled to assume that this is the only and necessary way of unfolding problem. IWHlg in its whole breadth and fullness. positive freedom as freedom for . mov ment. Freedom is not some particular thing among and alongside other things.dir(. we ha e obtained something of the sort through our previous discussions. in such a way that through man. Yet the nature of man is so enigmatic that this on Iy indicates how totally indefinite and directionless our inquiry is. causality. If. If freedom were to b defined differently th outset. If bear the above s h rna in mind.li(y of freedom. Ihi~ in~ight remains operativ for aLL subsequent inuesugauon. w must effect a complete repositioning 0/freedom. Where and bow do we find the obj ct? To be sure. he can nly let-be th fr edom \\"hidl is accorded to him. oncerning the rundamental direction of our essential questioning that the essence of freedom on~y comes into view if we seek. Even if he was not correct in this. then man. In respec of freedom. 14.eslian if the Essence ofFr. thus fre dom in respect of man. This too has until now been I ft unsnec . What i his? In fixing the direction of our inquir into essen e... Su-itchuu: the Perspective ofthe Ouestion 93 ~. 011 the contrary.111of freedom. our introduction must guide essential insight to the )lan' 'where' we are to e k out freedom and which defines our standIJOint. witching the Perspective ofthe Question: the Leading Question C!lMetap/~ysics as Grounded in the Qu. L t us recall our provisional h rna of persp tives for the probl(. it as the groun. If it were only a matter of determining and discovering some insignificant property of man..e. il is crucial that we' have illsight into essence prior to ('very concrete r-Iarifieation and determination. we could hope to achie e rh is b running through all man's possibilities. It now IUJnS out that the course of these earlier discussions was by no means arbimu). the direction of our essential inquiry into the essence of human freedom can only be communicated in th form of a thesis. Indeed. and that If this is the situation. This crucial leading (if essential insight mUSL initially.sihi. In Ike knOll'inf{ of essence however. th !"OOL ~)f be-iug and Lime. not only we admit the possi bility of various perspe ives on freedom.. th whole ('OlllingPllcy of freedom becomes visible. lhell. as grounded in his [133-1 ')5] . the question concerning the essence offreedom: BUL if our essential questioning must take this direction. our whole ori nta ion becomes dubiou . It is a matter then. . 50 that what now emerges is that the problem 0/freedom is not built into the leading andfundamerual problems of philosophy..fi'eedom must itself. I r freedom is the ground of the possibilit of existence.. Human freedom is the fre dorn that bn'aks throllgh in man and takes him tip unto its If. as Kant.

something awesome [ heu. he is that particular being through.if. if freedom becomes the ground of the prohlem. Seen from the ground of his ssence in freedom. is experienoeama and knowable only in concrete questioning. in we view man metaphysically. I shall briefl indi a e admittedly in what seem to b arbitrary formulas. At the same time.. Man i awesome in a way that god can never be. At the beginning of these lectures. would be unfruitful to engag in further discussions or to put f".est£ofl 0/ Letaphysic . Ian is that b ing in whose ownrnost being and essential there occur the understanding cd' being.. in a history whose occurr nces lie outside the cour e of given . revealed. but this latter god is the ungenuine creation of roan.v(. or causality a probl€'m of freedom. Man is not the image of a god conceived in the sense of the absolutely bourgeois.d or 0111 a superficial view:' All these questions reflect upon the rllrrda))\('l\lal problem of philosophy. Just one thing is clear.~. fragile.14. If we view man in this way .. First of ali. forgo developing th complicated programme of questions which lie hidden under this heading. the problematic which I see hidden in the zeneral heading. from time to time. .e. This awesome be' that we I' ally know and are can only be as the most finite of all beings. grounded in the freedom of hi xistence. the relation between causality and freedom raises the '111cstioll of \ h ther freedom is a problem of causalit . we man as one being among others as a small. the greatness of finitude been downgraded through a false and deceptive infinity. Still. If the latter. upon bei. on the oth r hand freedom for . for a god must be utterly other. The 11 ces it of controversy is all the more pressing if we ourselves grasp freedom as the grollnd of the possibility of exist nee.':' Can it be shown how freedom. and how it sets itself to work as philosophy.ng and the understanding reedorn r n] i)Pi uo- "'.and this is the view forced upon us by fundamental content of the leading question of philosophy . The onnecuon betwe 11 cause and groUlld is uncertain.94 Worlc£ng the Leading Qu. a which forces us into constant dialogue with the philosophers. in its essence. :' \lYher is the prillionlial unity of this dual structure to be found? Is this a 1110reprimol"di. in wrliculHr with Kant We remember that Kant was the Erst to see the ~robklll of freedom in its most radical philosophical consequences.1". th n. is on the on hand fr<'(>dOlIl from . it is here that th central problem of possibility' 0/ truth as decancealment resides. succeed in letting it b the ground. which leads to the same goal. the question now arises as to how we can arrive at where our essential questioning lead us. i. powerless and or being 0 cup ing a tiny corner within th totality of b ings. does the groUJld of c"ist"IJI"C mean? How do w encount r. we again bring the problem of into the perspe ti e of the problem of causality.lI!1ilinriz(' ourselves philosophically freedom. is the sit wh re beings in th become revealed.. thus as the occasion and possibility of the separation of beings in diversity. .erlich] and remarkable becomes -lear. namely that man exists as bing in whom the being of beings thus beings in the whole.. provided that we understand selves w no longer move along the path of egoistic r flection upon our We now stand in our own essence. how must freedom b onceived? Can it be conceived such that ':'(' I'a n see from its essence how freedom can be both negative and posill\'!. which b such announce themselu s. such that we no longer able to reconcile finitude and greatness. r freedom here? This is one way to with the metaphvsical problem of 1!t1l\"('ver I have chosen another way. We therefore ask: what does the existence of man mean? Wha. and the conciseness of our conceptual clarification.MlU'''wt further hypotheses concerning this metaphysical experience of What this is. this is not in order to provide historical knowledge of earlier opinions but in order to understand that problf'tlls such as ours have their gen uine vitality on ly in such historical controv('t-sy. bllt rather in controversy and dialogue. My concern is that you travel a certain distance along the genui. We pla e the following consideration under the qu. L Il'itching the Per pectioe of/he Que tion 95 existence upon and in this freedom. In entering into controversy with KaJJt.ite general heading of causality and freedom. If we do 1101 unfold the probl m of freedom in a monologically free ref! ecuon.n road of 'reseal' h' albeit with the risk that. for the concrete unfolding and dev lopment of th problem of freedom. What does it mean to say that freedom is the ground of the possibility ofman's existence? Freedom is only revealed as this ground when our way of questioning.. the convergence of opposing elements within the sphere of beings. you will lose your vi w of the whole. For a long time. Man. where all psychology breaks down. such that he Lose' himself in the truly metaphysical greatness of his essence and thus precisely wins himself his exist ntial uniqueness.'i'" ev('nts. l--Iow(. has the possibility of ing into this his own ground.

PART TWO CA SALIT'y AND FREEDOM TH\'\[SCE DENTAL AND PRACTICAL FREEDOM rN KANT .

CHAPTER ONE

Causality and Freedom as Cosmological Problem. The First Way to Freedom in the Kantian System: the Question of the Possibility of Experience as the Question of the Possibility of Genuine Metaphysics

Is freedom a problem of causality, or is causality a problem of freedom'? We must at once ask more fully whether this either-or is relevant at all i.e, even if th problem of causality turns out to be the probl m of freedorn, is freedom itself adequately conceived in this way? Does the essence of freedom ultimately amoun t to its status as ground of the problem of causality? If so, is it sufficient to conceive causality in the foregoing fashion? It is not! Must we not conceiv freedom more radically and not merel as a kind of causality preci ely if it is the ground of the problem of causality? Where can we find directives for a return to the more primordial essence? Kant must have had compelling reasons for bringillg freedom into such an intimate relationship with causalityMoreover, from our own thesis we cal) see that this connection b tween causality and fr edam originates from the inner content of the problem and not from a mere standpoint. The content of the fundamental question led us to Ireedom as the grou.nd of the possibilit of Dasein which IS where the understanding of being OCCurs.Freedom r veals its 1£ a ground. But cause (cau a) is its If a kind of ground.

§ 15. Preliminary
(I) Causali

Remark

Oil

the Problem of

'ausalit

in the ciences of Animate and

)' as Expression of the Questionworthiness Inanimate ature in the Sciences

the problem of fr edorn in .onnection with causalit , it is upon us to give some definite indi ation of what w m an by I'f!llsality and of til problems it poses. I shall attempt a concrete orientation to rallsality by reference LO the Kant.ian treatment of the problem, where
Hl('Illtlbpllt

!I wo Lake up

1139-140]

tOO

Causalit

and Freedom as Cusmological Problem which are not importaru for us her', in we 100 k m ore close J y a I Kan t's con ce pti on of the scope of the problem is required, research aud inquiry we all science has nature 011 the one hand, and to histor on

.~ 15. Preliminary

Remark

Oil

the Problem

101

various historical motives (Lei bu i7., H ume). Before causality som indication in a twofold aspect. The main str ams relatinsr to other.

110

.\)udy rea ll possessed the necessal'Y means for this discussion. Th • . for graspi.ng this enigmatic problem, and for ('orrectl.v srtuat:1\,," it. wer lacking. Only one thing became clear, namely that histor. "'I~ lodav do not know what histor is, indeed do not even know what 1111 , • IS required to arrive at this knowledge. It is obvious that one does JiO( ('vell know IOh it OCCU1'S that people borrow an opinion from a pllilo~ophy professor whom they mee by chance, or who happ ns to be a
lwLllOds

Natur . Processes Ca use and Effect Causality ?

l Iistory (man and works of man) Occurrences Ca use an d Effect Causality ?

Today, in these two main streams of scientific research, causality become problematic in quite distincti e ways. If we look from outside the div rsity of investigations, which are no longer capable of surveyed b the individual researcher in his discipline if we observe organization of the scienc 5 in societies, institutes, and congresses, if see the pace with which one result is overtaken by another and translated into so-call d praxis, it app aI'S that the onl thing we still need to know th extent and means of thi gigantic busin ss. Inde d w still need know just this, in order to combat the inner ruin. For ever thing, brought within the process of a self-perpetuating t hnique, only tains itself when the inner necessity and simple force of genuine have died out. Despite this almost technical progr s of scientific resear h, and this llourishing s ieruific industry, the sciences of nature and history are more fundamentally questionable today than ever before. Tbe rnisrelation between routinely produced results on the one hand, and the uncertainty and obscurity of fundamental concepts on the other hand, has never been so great. Again, it has ne er been so lear, for hose who an see at an rate, how th spirit can become confused pow rless, arid rootless, yet at I he sa rn e ti me ho ld the world in bated breath with an aval anche 0 f results. 1 do not know how many really grasp this situation and can read the signs. I .et rnr- cornrnen t on something . eern ingl:v external. A l the end of April, the German 1Iistorical Conf renee took place in Halle, Tbere was a discussion about whether history is a science or an art. But

colleague. \\'hal is the r ason lor this catastrophi situation, the seriousness or which is not diminished by the fact tha all these helpless types calrnl ' contiuue their detailed work the very next day? The reason is Dot that we are unable to define the essence of historical science, but that the historical occurrence as such despite the multiplicit of events, does not announce itself with Wlifying force, so that its e sential chara ter remain rnisinLerpreted and concealed by worn-out th aries of his orical sci nee, The historical occurrence as such cannot announce itself if it does not encounter an experience that brings it to larity, an e p rience that can illuminate the historicality of history, It must hereb be decided whether history is only a sequence of causall onnected facts and influences, or whether the causality of the historical occurrence must be grasped in a completely different way. The problem of causality is not a r condite ques ion omehow conjured up in philosophy. It concerns the inn rrnost nee ssity of OUT relationship to the his orical as such and thus to th science of history (philology in the broader sense). The same applies to th other direction of scientific inquir '. the science of nature, whether it be about the lifeless (physics and chernis ry) or about living nature (biolog ). It is said that the new ph sical Lheories - th Ie trical th ory of matter, th theor of relativity and the qualllum theory - have undermined the hitherto binding law of causalit . Thf' traditional onception or the process-character of material processes has IW('ome problematic. Ther is no possibility of a n w positive definitio!] of nature such that the II w inquiries and new knowledge can obtain ~ gPllllilH' grounding. The 'am applies in re p ct of the ssence of orgal1IS)]I, i.o. tho essence of life the fundamental conception of the way of hpi fig 0 I' those be'mgs which, we say, live and die. To ropeat, ca usal ity is not a remote free-tloating concept but expre se (he i'lllermo.l questionabilay q/ the constitution. 0/ animate and inanimate !!aIU,.!!. Bill man himself, standing ill the mids or nature and bound to he ()('l"UITP!l('(> of i history, totters and searches III this questional il ity and dislrc·ss. t the same time, philosoph is familiar with the perspective [141-143]

102

Causalitx

and Freedom as Casmoiogical

Problem

§' 15. Preliminary

Remart: on the Problem

:103

implied by the concretely understood problem of causality in history and nature. But precisely this universal confusion, which makes everything shaky and fragile, is the proper time of philosophy. It would be narve for a moment to wish it otherwise, but it would be just as shortsighted think of 'saving' this time through a system of philosophy. On the trary, it is a matter of maintaining the genuinely experienced experienceable distress. It is a matter of ensuring that this looming tionability, th precursor of great things, is not circumvented th cheap answers and supersti [ions. It is unnecessary, therefore, to provide you with further assurances the theme of this introduction to philosophy grows out from, and at same time reflects back on, the great directions of research into and history, directions in which you yourselves stand through .LlL<:"""""".1'j ship of various faculties of the university. Philosophizing is here no activity serving private needs or edification but stands at the centre of work which you have set down - or have claimed to set down yourself. 'Vith these comments on the sciences of nature and history we did want to confirm e.g. various errors and deficiencies 111 the sciences, nor failure of philosophy, nor anything that could justify mutual accusati Rather, all these are forebodings and signs of the real shocks and placements suffered by our whole existence, In the face of which individual can only try not to miss the new voices, difficult to hear as are. It would be wrong to think that any individual could tear all down by himself This would only result in the disaster of all which changes overnight into unendurable tyranny. But it is just important to beware of accepting anything and everything without tinction, i.e, of becoming the victim of empty public opinion. What are seeking is not the mediocre but the centre, the steadfast silence before the inner complexity and relationality of the essential, which can never be captured in formulas and can never be saved by just knocking down its opposite. b) Causality in . loder n Physics. Probability (Statistics) and Causality \ hat then is causality? To begin with we wish to hear what Kartl: says concern ing ca usal ity, and this for several reasons. First because he brings causality and freedom in to special relationshi p, then because he conceives causal ity primarily as the causal ity of natu re, which leads

l"lI!ldamental difficulties for the causality of his lory. Further, because . . ('o]llemporary philosophical discussion concerning the probl~m 0.1 causal i I.V in psychology it is said that the Kantian concl:'ptlOn rs illmkqllate. Finally, because the Kantian problem of causality leads \!It(l <l contexture with which we are already familiar, i.e, that or the (,O!lJ.1('('lio[1etween being and time. For in the Kantian conception 0/ b (al/salllY it is the relation. to lime that is immediately strik ing, even dlOUgll the problem is not followed through to its ultimate Implications. So we must first concretely exhibit the Kantian approach to the problem
10
ill

of causality. A comment is n~cessary on the terribly confused discussions concerning the problem of causality in modern physics and their meaning for philosophy. The confusion has resulted from a talking-past-one-another, which itself is due to the fact that the real question has been seen in neither physics nor philosophy. The physicists say that the law of causality can now be seen not to be an u priori principle of thought, and that, accordingly, this law can only be assessed through experience and physicalistic thought. 'Contemporary physicists no long€]' doubt that whether causality is complete can only be decided through experience, i.e. they no longer doubt that causality is not an a priori necessity of thought." This latter remark naturally alludes to the Kantian conception of causality, whereby the first thing to be said is that Kant nowhere claims the law of causality as an a priori necessity of thought. VVhat Kant does say is that the fundamental principle of causality as natural law can never be grounded in experience but is the condition of the possibility of experience of nature as such. The philosophers, on the other hand, adopt a superior attitude vis-a-vis the claims of physics: whatever physicisL~ might say about the law of causality they do not, so the philosophers declare, possess the requisite means for grasping the problem of causality!\either of these two positions is acceptable. The philosophical appeal to tlw a priori is just as dubious as the physicalistic fixation on f'>qwrip)](·c is confused. In the end both claims are correct, and yet nei lhf'r possesses sufficient dati ty and radicalism to see the crucial prnhlclll I,] what sense has the law of causality become dubious for modern pltvsi('s:J 'Classical dynamics is governed by the unconditional principle tl!;!1 Knowledgp or a SLaLe or affairs (the position and speed material

or

,I

I

1~f/"

1'. Jordall. 'Kausaluai und Stat //(if/ .. " X\'( !9127), p. I (J') ff.

isr ik ill dr-r mnder

neu

Physik'. in Die .Valllru·i.:;-

[143-[44]

II4-1-145J

~ 16. i. the definition of causality must also change.Val. in order to ascertain causality this or that instance. '()uantpllmecnanik unci 'l-atiSlik'. . This can only provide us ~'V1th clues. of course. but IS determinable only at a mid-point. and differell! ronceptions of.1'1\. is to problematize ! -r possibi. In A: 'principle of productiori'j'' in B: 'principle of succession In lime.e." It is thus already clear with the advance of our observations. Natural processes. ~I. we must mistrust the overhasty protestations of phi losophy.this is not decided.as such. We shall proceed from Kant. '(. LP 1\ . a natural process experienceable by us. and IS certainly not decidable by to Kant. Born. and if calls this law the principle of causality. i.\ 177 f_ . (.104 Causality and Freedom. that Illl~(1 . So what does this mean? For the physicist. as 'regards their existence. p 239.CUSSWIl. of our knowledge and expe methods.all . with sta probability. It is true that. 'Kausali l. phySICS points to the n redefining causality.me.\ 11'19 rr. and why it necessary . stand under definite rules of det rminability. The Kantian Conception 0/ 'ausality: l05 particles) at anyone moment lorever determines the course of a system. and if so how? is the question physics forgets to ask. Their lawfulness is not dynamical and conti causal. Kant treats of causality in the 'Second Analogy'. and one must possess this knowledge prior to all . Motion does not occur continuously there are leaps and gaps. V . _ • For dl is question w must in turn obtain the proper basts for dU. 'nature' as accessl~Ie t~ us. Movements are not subject to unarn . rules winch are not derived from accidental or frequently occurring relations of experience.l(')lla tl c. that its task. the correctness and primordiality of which are always subject to renewed assessment. while not fo .127). that although a determining causality applies at macroscopic level of natural processes. Atomic physics has demonstrated that physical magnitudes are uniformly distributed in nature. ausaliiy' and Temporal Succession Before asking about whether the causal law is 10gica~ly' necessary. )11hv is itself guider! by the true vitality of its most au Ihentic phi osr . • CPI\. Or must this also first be ascertained. i. it permissible to dismiss the content of its contemporary problems as called empirical material. . how it is possible. ascertaining. sense <> . Here it becomes quite clear that defining causality means the possible ways in which its presence can be established. this is not so at the mi level. subject a priori to rules determining their relation to one another in one time'. On the other hand. . Although we should mistrust physics' claims to authority. relations between present ap~earances In tl. but which is decided by sophy all too quickly. forwbich it alone has the means. (1S Cosmological Problem .. this prrnciple in~he first (A) and second (B) edilions. The law governing elementary natural processes is different. But causality is must already be clear prior to ascertaining its preseace non-presence. p. in Die .8 In B:'All M. But what this a priori is. one must already know what one understands causality. c1 causality means nothing else than indicating how its existence or existence can be experimentally ascertained.it lind Statisi ik in der modernen R9- [148-149] . CP1I 1\ 2')) . in accordance with the law of causality'.I. corresponding to as processes (the movements or the planets).hty of physics and Its object. however. provided. i. \ I '." claimed.e.lssemr-liajtefl Physik'. Thus the 'general principle' or the Analogies of Experience is given in the first edition as follows: 'All appearances are. presupposPs s{)11H'thing upon which it follows according to a rule. this is how physics understands the law of causality. the Analogies ate a specific set of principles relating to 'the ex~stence of appearances'.\ 11'19. pt ' § 16. In Kant's terminology. P: Jordan.e. J (1).' In A." One of these rules provides the Second Analogy" Kant has different titles for.. at the level of those atomic structures which are today as the elementary physicalistic processes. begins to be. the being-present e of beings. for these might point towards new de of the essence of nature as such. we must b <Tetsome idea of what causality means . narnelv the fundamental contexture in which causality belongs. 11 2'i2 fr. determination. that is. but which determine ill advance what belongs to the possibility of a natural process as such.\ I . First Auempl at Characterizing the Karuiari Conception if ausaluy' and Its Fundamental Contexture.llrll. his conception of Ihp prillci pip is: 'Everything that happens.PI\ . and ""bether this kind of questioning concerning its validity has any "1 ..

We therefore see the. Th law of causality yi<~lds a fu IIda men tal principle of temporal sion. So to bring about" to effect.. in which the sequence possible'. B 21t). [which is] non-transitory and ing'. at the same time bringing to light the more primordial dimension of the relati onsh i P between causali ty an d freedom. and indeed one mode three modes of time are duration suecession. 1147. What kind temporal eharacteristics are these latter. neither does time How. Ii 'SH. Kant says that 'different times are not simul but successive'i " Time 'constantly flows'. " el'a 1\ 177. " CI'H A 183.and - yet it remains a '1/("(['"siOiI. On the other hand Kant emphasizes: 'If we ascribe succession to itself. we must think yet another time. CPR. I I That would lead to an infinite regress. there is no succession in such. we enter into a consideration of the Analogies " CPH B 232. try to grasp the entire problem if the AnalOgies of Experience in its genuine core. but belong in time itself? Does tern succession belong to time itself? Does time itself contain a succession limes (nows)? There is an opposition here: time itself is constant. i. past. and in relalion to which causality is conceived)? Our first attempt at characterizing the Kantian conception of causality has already brought us to the centre of major questions and difficulties. but not time itself . means to follow. H Can it be that simultaneity and succession aye not tions of that which is in time. The Analogies [or. ~ sililUllHlleiIY.OJ CPR A 31. rather. [II ss. that this time' has be same character. don between causality and temporal succession. The cause-effect relation thus involves and outcome: the following-on of one thing from another. Hut what does temporal sion mean? Literally. and how do they relate to the so-called modes of time (to which temporal succession belongs. . /1/IW. j . so that Wf' can comprehend the contexture of the principle of causality. Its 'constancy' is just this i. but the succession of that which is In time.e. " CPR A 144."r. and thus what we should more precisely understand by 'temporal succession' and 'principle of temporal succession'.~ nOi ofExperience 107 alterations take place in conformity cause and effect'. which Kant conceives as temporal successron. . requires more extensive preparation than we have been able to undertake. the cause lets something fo and thus is itself prior. B 226. For example. it means that one time follows-on from time. we do so with all necessary reserve.ng. addressing the most central problematic of philosophy.. ( 149--1 [1'5U-152J . A gf'neral overview is not at all sufficient. That brought about we also call the outcome. but rather abides . therefore. But Kant further says: 'Simultaneity and succession are the only lions in time'. A 182. and atl lO r"!'. ~I. This connection firmly borne in mind if we are to understand Kant's elucidation of essence of causality. "CPR A 41. An outcome is something follows from something else. General Characterisation if the Analogies r:if Experience If of Experience. Clearly. For this we must. .. to deall'Oll('reLely with the text. a problem from the central part of the Critique qf Pure Reason. As the effecting of the effect.'l 'Time itself does not alter.l<f l~llll[ calls temporal others.106 Causality and Freedom as Cosmological Problem s 17. and future. 'The or § 17.1 is a mode r:if time and how do these modes relate to ~IJ(' allother? Are they at the same level or does one have priority? 'What kind of modalization of time is involved here? Why just these three IllOtks! The three modes of time are seem. as Kant does without argument." with the law of the uass t away or alter. If. 'The existence of what is transitory away in time.ingly different to the three parIS of time generally recognized. Causality is itself related to temporal succession. i. We must now observe more closely how Kant deals With these problems. B 226. and is therefore sible . we wish.e- succession a mode of time.. How does ca come into a relationship with temporal succession? What does succession mean? A cause is always the cause of an effect.presupposing. present. albeit not by means of a thematically conlInuous interpretation. Causality means temporal succession. but only something which is in rr So temporal succession does not mean a sequencE' of times belonging time itself.

in the unitary perceivin. are 111 Temporal succession. insofar as they co-exist. we wish to obtain an initial view their essence. CPR . CPR A 18:2. but they differ simply through their position in the sequence. The first mode is permanence.Present of That 'Which Is Presen lin the Con text of th e Inner Enablernent of Experience oJ ions..e. f1 " U>J\ II 2 I H. 0 perception has priority over another. sin. is the third simultaneity. yet at the same time more definitely. hear the sound outside. § 17. Perceptions come into a sequential relationship with one another. These perceptions are occurrences in man. i. . of the necessary . tl!eu pr('cise!y the essence of this experience must exhibi t a mu Itiplici tv \\'hirl1 is connected or needful of connectedness. feel the heat. as a way which the object exists. They do not. reciprocity. of causality is oriented. three Analogies of Experience correspond to these three modes.!~ We can express this somewhat more freely. essence of this mode of accessibility is defined in terms of the i possibility of experience. 'All substances. the possibility experience consists solely in the representation of the necessary conn ". .d? In the perceivedness of a perception. For example I now see the chalk. The Analogy is oriented to duration: the principle of the permanence of stance: 'All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the itself. it is evident that they follow-on from one another. stand in th going community. before.ply as the beings they are. sound. pi i 0)\. What does 'universal temporal determination' here? Why are the Analogies necessary as rules of universal determination? By addressing this latter question.. The necessity of the Analogies is grounded in the essence cf ezperietu Experience is the way present beings become accessible to man.t'" 'All substances. a knowledge which determines an object through perceptions. How does Kant discover such a thing in experience? 'Experience is an empiricaL knowledge.apprehension . to which the principle mode oftime. then this reveals itsel f as having come together in and through th~ s{'quenct' of perceptions. as mental occurrences. knowledge is primarily receptive. This receiving . The Analogies oj Experience of what 109 pC'ITf'pi i. If we take what is perceived as such in its percPiv0dness. Taken as such. a letting-standover-against. 'In all changes of appearances su permanent. This wilt enable us to proceed to the specific content of Second Analogy.i" ote Kant does not simply say that the possibility (essence) of experience sists in the necessary connection of perceptions.occurs through perceptions as determined by sensory sensations. This is not just a sequence or si. considered merely in their respective what !It'~S. that is. The cbalk and the heat and the noise and the 1('('1 orn. that IS.?" This means that the bei. connectedness is gIven in .\ 194 B )')9 ~ [1')3-1'55] .' 1(.multaneity of perceiving as comporting in the broader sense.. . its quantum in nature is neither increased nor The Third Analogy is oriented to the third mode of time. 'consciousness'.. and are thus after.. What kind of necessary connections are these? Why do they constitute the primp condition of the inner possibility of experience? 1f the possibiluv of experience depends on the representation of necessary C'Olmections. initially have nothmg whatever to do with e-ach other.usaLity and Freedom as Cosmological Problem a) The Analogies of Expenence as Rules of niversal Temporal Determ ination of the Being.'" VVhat is basical1y stated in these Analogies? The principles rules. In this sense 'perceptions come together only in accidental order'. What is regulated by these rules? They are rules of universal poral determination. by inquiring into e... _"'CPH B :21.ngs (objects) themselves are only knowable insofar as they somehow show and give themselves . but it is also a corresponding coming-into-connection (assembly) of the various lhings perceived in perception: chalk. '~CPH i\ 21 L 1'1 CPB R 256.B. heat.In respect of what thus shows itself.: CI'H H 219. in mutual interaccion. look at the lectern. "CPR B 224.. as they can be perceived to co-exist in space. Where is all Lhis assemb]. III oll!(')' words: if experience of beings is understood merely in terms of perl'(.108 Ca. underlying necessity oj the Analogies. Kant says: 'Experience is possible only the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions. that is. possess a deterrn inate and necessary relationship to one another. . Rather. or simultaneous with one another. sirn the principle of simultaneity according to the laws of reciprocal community.u The 'succession in our apprehension [is] always one and the same' . . lectern. and the transitory as its mere determination. in respect of the determination of the object in its objectivity.

110

ausality and Freedom as Cosmological

Problem

.§ 17. The Analogies

ofExperience

111

the apprehensions belonging to it, then these beings can only be con as having come together. Why is ihis not the end of th matter? because factical experience is never just an assembly of various el and further, because ill experience we are not at all cognitively 0 perceptions as mental occurrences in temporal succession. So to what we oriented? To the beings themselves as announced in perception, i what appears in all its diversity (and indeed in respect of its present), to the connections between these present things. Experi always already places us before a unity of present beings. Ex not know led ge of perceptions, b U L 'kn owledge of obj ects thro ugh t.ions'.2~ It represents 'the relation m the existence of the manifold, it comes to be constructed in the time [of being perceived] but as it objectively in time'.25 What is experienced in experience is more than a mere assembly perceptions. Rather, what is experienced is the unity of present their being-present: in short, nature. 'B), nature (in the empirical we understand the connection of appearances as regards their e .. If experience is always the experience of nature, appearances must already represent the unity of what is present. What IS the origin of particular representation? Since perceptions give only an assembly; unity and connection cannot be provided by them. Further, since claims that knowledge (experience) IS constituted by perception thought (sensibility and understanding), this unity can only from thought, or from a determinate unitary connection between tion and thought. But it is clear that thlnking alone cannot define unity of the presence of that which is present. How then is this supposed to be possible? The presence of something present is always a presence in time. unity oj nature is therefore primarily determined as the ~milyand lion if that. which is present in time. But precisely this determinate ilion in time, and the temporal relation between present beings, cannot construed independently of thought. Nor can we directly perceive temporal det errnination of something present in the context of the tary temporal relations of nature. That would require reading off temporal position of everything present from absolute time, which would presuppose that we could perceive time itself absolutely and as

is impossible. In his discussion of [he A nalogies, that 'absolute time is not all object percep· . I· 1, rhat 'time itself cannot be'.2~' ow time cannot bv itself be per· llUI. • J rein,d."" 'Time cannot be perceived in itself, and what precedes and what l(!Ilows (·anllot, therefore, by relation to it, be empirically rleterm i ned in
\,"w/

Kanl rep(,aledly emphasizes

1.01[>' 'I'h is, however, I

or

tile obJPct. Wlli'lt is the ultimate reason for this? Kant. did not and could not expresslv provide the reason,. for he lacked a metaphysics of Dasein.'1 .There is only one time in which all different times must be located, not as coexist.ent but. as in succession to one another.'~2 Temporal detenninatl.on, and thus the unity of tilt" presence of the present, i.e. nature, is neither perceivable nor a priori construable, but can only be ascertained through the empirical measurement of time, where both thought and perception play a role. This requires ascertaining in advance those temporal determinations which express the temporal relations of what is present. Empirical temporal relations are only determinable from the pure temporal relations which constitute the possibility of nature as such, whatever the factical course of nature happens to be. Now Kant calls the Analogies of Experience, i.e, the principles to which causality (Second Analogy) also belongs. transcendental determinations of time. They contain the rules of the necessary temporal determinacion of everything present, 'without which even empirical determination of time would be impossible'.'; Through these rules we can 'anticipate experience',~1 i.e. it is not the factical course of experience in its factical constellations that we can allticipaLe, but rather what is prior to every factical occurrence insofar as it is natured These rules of transcendental determination of time - which are not rules of pure thought - delineate the comprehensive unity of the natural totality, giving the form of all possible concrete connections belwl'en perceivable things. These connections no longer pertain to the :-ourse mental occurrences, but to that which appears in perception IHsMar as this is already presented under pure temporal determinations.

,

~~l

or

~: U'II .\ 21-'}, H 26,2. (;I'I~ B 21() ... C.l'I~ 1\ 22~: ,

('.
.I

IfJbt,·", 'If

I'U I" >I 1it)" - [init udc - iluman existence. cr. Heidegger, Kant and th« l/1!/(lphysi{·.I, rrauslated by James S, Churchi 11, Blcumingtou, Indiana ':" vrsuv I'r r- ss .I 96)
III!J,. 1"111

.:,.(;1'1\ B 2~ \

cr. B 257.

"CPR B 219. II CPl\ B 419. • CPR. A 21 ri. B .:!G? ", [ 155--1

;' LI'I\.'\ I ·r.o B .: CI)I~ i\ 217, B 2G t <:1'11. t\ 217, B 264 .

~H

232.

[I 'Hi-I. 58]

112

Causality

and Freedom as CosmoLogical Problem

§' 17. The Analogies

if Experience

13

This anticipation is the representing spoken of by Kant in the principl of the Analogies. Universal temporal determination by disposing over the possible modes of being-in-time of whatever factically given iII perception. b) The Three Modes of Time (Permanence, Succession and Sirnu tLCU[lell as Modes of the Intra-Temporal ity of That Which Is Present Now we can better understand why these three Analogies, as governing the prior temporal determination of that which is are oriented to the mode, if lime. Being-present and the unity means precisely presence (being-present) in time, i.e. umty and rninability of the contexture of those temporal relations which thing present (as something 'in time') can and must possess. ingly, modes of time signify not so much an alteration of time as but are ways in which present appearances 'are in time'. In brief, of time are not basic features of time as such (present, past, future) are modes if the irura-temporalicy 0/ that which is present. The mode - permanence - expresses the relationship of appearances 'to itself, as a magnitude',5~ i.e. it measures the duration in time of which is present ..The second mode - succession - expresses the ship between present things in time as a sequence (of nows); under this sequential aspect, every present thing follows on from thing else present. Thel.hird mode - simultaneity - expresses the tionship of tha which is present to time as a summation if present." o time IS viewed here in three ways: as magnitude, as sequence, summation. The extent to which tirne can and must be so viewed question we must pass over for the moment. One can compare the 'The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of nderstanding", where it out that the categories, the table of categories, the table of judgements, in general logic, are also at work in this characterization of time as 'content', 'ordering',. 'summation'.'? Why then does I ant, where he the relations to time of beillgs which exist in time, speak simply temporal relations? Because, for Kant, time is nothing Ise but wherein the manifold con tent of inner and outer perception is

, -:nr is seell exclusively in its relationship to thai which is within time. lit I I· d ./'. " ., h 'rhuS (rJll pCll"a. re .atlons are mo yl.cat.l.Ollsof the relation 01 tune to l, .at ,hieb is within time. The strength of Kant's problematic, but also Its ". its ["('side . tlhi conception'>8 0, tune. 'f'" )11 us IUlll .

r) The Distinction

between Dynamical

and Mathematical

Principles

To CO!llpl~'wour general characterization

of the Analogies of Experience, ,ITe [!lllst mention yet another - not immediately com.prehensible description which Kant gives of these principles, He calls them dynamical as distinct from mathematical principles. Kant also uses this distinction to divide the categories. The distinction pertains not so much to the character of the principles as such but more to their application, to the way they make possible that to which they are applied (perceivability, deternunability in presence). ' ow all categories are divided into two classes' the mathematical, which deal with the unity of synthesis in the conception of objects, and the dynamical,. which concern the synthetic unity in the conception of the existence of objects. ,,'l The mathematical principles and categories relate to the perceptualsubstantive aspect of appearances, i.e., in the terminology of Kant and earlier metaphysics, the real.'1fJHere the real does not mean, as it does in today's corrupted usage, the actual, but that which belongs to the res, the SUbstantive constituting content. The mathematical principles give the substance of things, the essentia. In Kant's problematic, the mathematical principles are those ontological principles which define the esseruia of a being. Since ancient times, however, essenua has been distinguished from exisleruia (being-present, or in Karitian terminology, existence). TOW When> appearances are determined simply in respect of their presence (e:r:i.slefUia), i.e, not in respect of their substantive content, Kant calls the dl'terrn ill ing pri nci pies dynamical. Ifthe Analogies 0 f Experi ence be Ion g to the dYllamical principles, this allows us to see their location within the ~O!li.{'X.l 01" uaditional metaphysics. I should mention here that Kant., ollowlng Leibniz, developed the ontological problem of presence in ('Oil il('C' I i . . . 01, wrt 'I! mat 0 I' w hat-' bei 1 'lng, anr 'I in any case wit tlrout ~pOSlDg t Ile
Ir'I)IS~'rr.lt. "'.' ,lhis sense is not pfir~:lOrdial tim.e. Cf.He.idegger, Being and ~7'J .I'l :'((1 h_l .101m :VlacqliafTl€, and I'.dward Robinson, BaSIl Blackwell, Oxford,
~Ij

....

Time,
1962,

'" CPI';, A 21? 13262. '., CPH A 215, B 262. "CPH A 145, B 11l4-5.

cr

Hf'idegg("r,

Knill (HId II",

Problem qfl\reu,ph),.ic$, §

~,,,;,·'."."ue ofPractical R'<IISQI', p. 2?9 (V, 186): es" ,<,1>0' ..1". pp. 29 ff. on tit e varrous rneanmgs
P'i.l~at

('

,

.

.. , . cf ·IS (what-being,

. that-bell1g;

f!J·/."len.lia).

[159-161]

114

Causa.Lity and Freedom as CosmoLogical Problem

§ 18. From the Example

of the FirSI Analogy

115

fundam ntal question concerning the origin of this distinction what-being and that-being) or placing his own problem within dim nsion of the radically conceived problem of bing. I mention because in our discussion of the problem of freedom we shall come precise] this question concern i ng the origin of what- and that-being, possi bility and actuali ty. From a metaphysical point of view, the of freedom has its centre here. and not in the problem of causality. Freedom is to be discussed within the context of causality. What is essenc of causality? How do's Kant determine th essence of What is he problematic within which this definition of ess nee Running ahead a little we can say that it is the question c n possibility of experience. Experience is the only way in which man knowledg of bing. The question of the possibility of fini is thus the question concerning the essence of the finitude of The problem of causality, and thus also the problem of freedom, within this context. Ultimately, thisis the primary and ultimate the only primordial and genuine context, of the problem of f-r~,cn.~ .... : b sure this does not mean that h probl rn of freedom mus be to the problem of causality. Causality i not wha most primordially tains to the finitude of existence. I'he latter is not by any means to b one ived from e perience, from knowledge from the theoretical even from the practical. So where is the deepe l e sence of mart 's be sough~' Just in the understanding of being in the occurrence of These are questions which arise when we inquire into the proper sion of the problem of human freedom. More concretely then, and view to workillg through the problem: how must. the highest the finitude of existence be in errogated, and in which direction be unfolded, in order that a concrete guideline for the problem of can merg? d) The Analogies of Experience as Rules of the Basic Relations Possible Being-in-Time of That Whi h Is Present of

I~~is Ibe' conn lion b tween this latter problem and the problems of .' . lil\' and freedom. Cil.IS.a . In the Analogi s, I ant formulat s rul s which are always prer prt'sl'lltr>d in every human experience, rules which hold up, for every e nssibk f'xpenence, the fundamental relations of the possible being-inII . . rill1!' 0 r L!\(IL Whi h IS presen r, r.e. w hilC h a'11 the encoun tered being to be nc . i .ow unders[Uor! in the contexture ofus being-present. These rules embody that Qspec[ (/ the understanding if being which pertains to the being-present of that which is present (nature). As the most g neral Iaws of natur ,they set forth what na me is as uch. They are laws which natural science can never di cover, pr is Iy b caus th y must alwa b pr upposed and pr _wldersLOod in all scientifi qu stioning concerning pecific natural law. As the Second Analogy, the principle of causalit is therefore a rule of transcendental determination of time. The problem of causality thus pertains' 0 the being-present of that which is present, and to the objective determinability of the latter. To see this clearly is of the greatest significrulce for understanding the contexture into which the problem of freedom is fore d when Kant brings it together with causality and when he rnak s a basic distin tion between the causality of freedom and natural eausalit . It is still pr cisely ausality: - causality as oriented to th contexture of the being-present of that II hich. is pre ent. \ must now attempt, departing from the guideline provided by our general discussion of th Analogies, to unfold the concrete problem of the econd Analogy. However, in order that the latter's specific characteristics may come to light, we shall begin by treating the First Analogy. This procedul"l~is really unavoidable, for the First Analogy, in a certain sense provides the Icundation for the 0 hers.
diSCI ~.,

.

§ 18. lJi"ctlSSiofl qf the Mode ofPmc{ of the Analogies of Experience and 'J'heLr Foundation from the Example ofthe Fir lAnalogy. The Fundamental [eanine of the First Analogy a) The First Analogy: P rmanence and Time

Solving the preliminary question oncerning the Kantian definition the essence if causalit means interpreting his doctrine of the /1 [f Experience. Our general characterization of the latter has been eluded, ultimately by treating them as dynamical principles and in of the distinction between the mathematical and dynamical e.ristentiaj. 1.n Kan tian term inology, the 'Analogies' cir .umscrib problem of the being-present of that which is preselll. What we must

;;~ ',\11 d P(Jr-f1r<lll!"eS con Lain the permanenL (su bstance) as the object itself, . l' I'd I Ii" tra ,'1 ory as '. Ulf'l"e rIeterrmnauon, ,11SI ILS tnat IS, as a way . w hiic 1 ine In 1l o 111"1"1 f'\ISIs.,fl
" CPI\ .\ I KL

[16~_1 53]

to a clarification of the inner possibility and necessity princi pIe. that the transitory is nothing but determination of its ex. pH bt)"!' 'l CPR . Time is the substratum of everything we encounter in experience. CPR 41> CPH 47 CPR A 185.U-"'W This can only be done by showing what belongs to the very nn'''-''lL''' (essence) of experi nee in general. 'I'h First nalog in particular is concern d he necessity 0 f p rrrnanence I!1 the perman nt.l'lstfinQI econdly.. which has to be UC. A 11'14 B 227 1M: B 227: 184. 'This p rmalwnce is simpl the mode in which we repre ent to ours lv s the existelJcf' of things in th [field of] experience..e. Kant is concerned not only with the explicit presentation of principle. PH . for these temporal relations can only be' if lim itself constantly endures and abide.~I:lions br-tween that which is present. it is the pure intuition. one experience in this principle."n'lhing r-xperienceable. '" ·I'H A I HG.. without pressing forward to an standing.with the primary succession of apprehension. Q.anl~etj appearances'Y' It is just that the philosopher xpresses himself more definitely. from the very beginning. is i en in the stream of p rceptions.. in accordanc the binding character of what proceeds from the beings themselves their specific being-present. of the subject proper'.-1-2 To begin with.u. thus the whole multiplicity of . The proofs of all three nalogies begin r('cisely her . and says 'th. B 227."'~ To be sure. which must be accidental but rather binding and nece sary. From the Example if lite First AnaLo({ 117 The First nalog IS called th 'prin iple of permanence'. Indeed it is seldom placed where it truly belongs. Prom this alone ~ve 'ould never discover whether just one unitary obje t or rather a u cession of these.~I I nowhere find even attempt at a proof of this obvious] 'S nth tic proposition. [165-166] . p WhaL do we find when we res rict ourselves to the sequence of erceptions~ In this case we simply have constant change. It is not this or that occurrence of permanence. that what is permanent is th object itself. temporal relations) is only possible if. Time expresses permanence as such. A I 4. B 229. . grounded ill the ess lice of exp ri nee. i. Only where there is perman nee can there also be duration a the m asur of being-present in time. 'of ev r-abiding istence.% One rests content with this. not only philosophers but even the common un ing. som thing which turns out to b th primal form of perman nee: time. tb possibility of experience presupposes a substratum in th reaJ to which all temporal determination must be referred. How does the proof proceed? Let us recall the two aspectS experience: the manifold of perc ption as the mere assembly of elements. Kant that 'in all ages.presupposing that time itself is perceivable. The First nalogy (thus also the other formulates one of the necessary modes of connection (modes of unity) . A t 85. The succession of apprehension already refers to SOlTI thing p rmanent. but equally with iLS corr ct demonstration. II h a decision concerning succession and simultaneit (i. the essence of succession and simultaneity as relations of being-in-time already implies the necessary grounding in something permanent.. something in respect of which he indicat d relations are modes.' .e.e. th genuine given in appearance.roughout all changes in the world remains.?" Permanence is the presupposed horizon for our definition and repre ntation of what v r \VI' ('11(' Oll!lter as present. assembl d !lec . More precisely. the connection. still needful of onnection. Thus the demonstration of this '('SS'J' LV of' p rmanence must likewise set out from the rn rei). hav r cogniz d this permanence as a substratum of all cn.116 ausaiity and Freedom as CosmoLogicaL Problem § J 8. all to demonstrate te "~<fHHIIldillg all hange and modification.. i. riecessi . in the appearances. rnanirDld of apprehension. Indeed. but the sity of the permanent in aL1experience.B 228.I. at the head of those laws of which are pure and completely a priori. we res riel ourselves to the treatment in the first (A). This is the necessar condition or the po sibility of all unit in th onne tion of P reep ions . The irst Analogy is to be demonstrated. B 227. which is always already spread out before our view. i. Change and simultaneity are comparable and determinable only in errns of time . But this is not so.substanc . . What is there in it to strate? First.. xpresses the ne iessity. and only the ac ·id nts chang '.. experience is grounded in something permanent and abiding. B 228. Consequently. Something p rmanent is given in each and appearan . 'for in empirical knowledge the need of jelt'. 'that in all appearances there is something permanent.CPR >.

exist in time and stand in the contextual unity of their being-present. just as with proofs in Kant. Time itself is what is primordially permanent. So tlwn' must be a rule according to which something pf'rmanent is (·olliailled in evervthing which appears as subject. present beings themselves as accessible to man. If this were the case. and the t'tlll("('pLiollof understanding on the other hand. time is !lOL directly perceivable.e. All philosophicai interpretation is destruction. it LSbecaus Kant did not problernatize a sufficiently primordial manner the finitude of man. On the contrary. and for which. th us also the fundamental re lationsh ip b 'tween thern as the essence of the relationship between subject and object. and as determining the specific h)(". 2. LSnot to deny other i\ll'Jllselves. he develops the 'ritique ofPure Reason. Its necessity is demonstrated from the essence of appI'<tI'<Illce. It.' not only for the external reason that you lack a complete knowledge Kant's theories and discussions.1T1declare Kant's proofs COITN·t and leave thej1l ." .. but also those of the deduction. Now i. upon whose ground he must take them. The permanellt is the substratum of all apl)earances. Front the Example of the First Analogy H9 b) The Questionworthy FOlllldanoll of the Analogies: the Association of Time and 'J Think' ( nderstanding) m an ncritical Approach to the Essence of Man as Finite ubject In the end. VVhy is this so? Briefly stated.ate. All appearances. The basic way of defining someLhing as something is by the determination of a subject through a predu. However precisely one formulates Kantian proofs. indeed they will remain incomprehensible.. Neither the principles nor transcen den tal deduction are necessary in the form Kan t takes them. the from which. remains unclarified.11 h ieh tbey w ~>"t a foundation uncritically presupposed bv Kanl. such that the foundations can emerge. you win not demonstrations of the Analogies irnmediately clear in either in content or their rigour. especially since Kant himself lays much upon his proofs. This infact is the situation in respect of the Kantian proofs. and only the proofs of the principles. does have the pseudo-philological aim of presenting the 'correct' Kantis nothing of the sort. and In Kant's there is a peculiar affinity between the proofs of the principles and proofs of the transcendental deduction. from Llw unit). T'hat this inner structural connection between time and the 1 as 'I rh i 11k' (II n derstand ing). This nnt mr-an that one c. Already in purely stylistic terms.118 ausaLi4r and Freedom as Cosmological Problem § 18. however. 13ul ri me can not be perceived absolutely. however. and so we can understand why these principles are called 'analogies'. This.. it is the uncritical and unclarified juxtaposition of both in an uncritical apprcach to the essence of man as finite subject. and radicalization. This r ule ts the principle of the pE'rmall'·IH·(' of 51! bsta nrr-. in short that transcendence is not sufficiently determined to really become a problem . Iime bi rids to itsel f all determination of the unity of beings-in-ti me. The Logical Structure of the Allalogies of Experience and the Question of Their Character as Analogies We wish to repeat once again the main steps in the proof of the fundamental principles.e. i. because they stern from an inadequate examination and tial determination of the situation upon which and for which the problematic is grounded. Any proof possesses validity only if it is necessarw a whole.e. and if this necessity IS made comprehensible.'Lions of things. i. and the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding. else it is nothing at all. if the necessity of Kant-ian proofs were ungrounded. But as the perman'i t:11 r. mere chatter that repeats more laboriously was said ill simpler and better fashion by the author himself. so that we can see the foundation UpO. Kant's proofs of the Analogies. i. As that wlwl"t'ill everything present is placed. then not only could their much stringency not be maintained. they do not gam in rigour unless one has already stood their necessity. wh ich is not equivalen L LO sCE'pticism. it means that we must make these proofs <l"('llllillf'l'y transparent. . Still more precisely. thus in the unity of temporal determination. in and for itself. of III our case it is the conception of time on he one hand. such that thf' primordial unity of the being-present of that which is present is grounded in permanence. while those who link themselves with Kant the rigour of his proof procedures. but even their possibility would be· ful. which. and such that the ~ubj('(·l appears as substance.t that the pI·esuppositions requued by Kant for the validity of his proofs untenable. of rime and 1Ilf" ') think'. which hensibil1ty does not have to rest upon theoretical proof. show this is the task of a Kant interpretation. It is tbe cOl1reption of the relationship between time and the 'I think' (undersHlnciillg).this is the basic reason for the substantive difficulty of understanding e.g. [1{i1l-169] c) The Analogies of 'xperience they harbour a problem. but has internal grounds about brief remark is necessary. More fundamentally. troversy. 1.

120 Causality and Freedom a8 Cosmological Problem § 18. '>(l 'po errnanence •IS th us a necessary condition .' d) The Fundamental Meaning of the First Analogy. previous metaphysics proceeded as fo ontological statements were proven by rational-logical means."''''''' 0/ that which is present (existenlia). i. So only something which endures can be altered. B 122. but because it is a condition of . to each other'. Permanence (Substantiality) and Causality We can already see from this how permanence emerges also as the condition of the possibility of the causal relation. In another sense. The rei be~een predicate and subject corresponds to the relationship accident (as something encountered in time) and substance. It is thus evident that the permanent within appearances. '. which only now can be conceived in the proper manner. is a change. everything without the experience of these objects would not Itself be possible is ut:'L.'?' A sequence of different states one after another.~'i An alteration. •" CPR A 179 r. 2. or as Kant says. B 23[.ements'. [171-172] . B 2. . but of O]J. What is determinable here is only the way s must be if it is to be at all experienceable in its existence. o"therwisethere would be nothing but total displacement of o. and in relation LO.. one ending and another beginning. but rather the necessity. substantia et accidens. This is quite clear from the way Kant concludes his discussion of the First Analogy. the fourth can be rnathen ' determined. in respect to the objects of experience. belonging to experience.'>I nell so milch because it contains a relation. B 259 r. community (reciprocity of acting and suffpring).I'R A !-l(l. B 91'i_ . From the Example of t. <llld dependence (cause and effect). b) of the groWld to its consequence. as permanent. there are analogies in mathematics as well as III phil An analogy is a correspondence of something with something. therefore.. In matt . causalill. Transition. c) of the divided knowledge and of the members of the division. For it is only upon the basis of. H!8. not : the essence of exp rience.111 l"el<ltiollS: inherence and subsistence. and hkewise completed transitions and alterations involve the simultaneity of that ~vhich has been completed. all four groups of pnnciples ponding to the four classes of categories are analogies. 106 . iJ " r. The Analogy does not assert the being-present of su but providestbe a priori rule for seeking the permanent in an app The Analogies are ontological principles concern ing thenp.. itself involves a succession... is 'the substratum. here the " TOW. -0 On the other hand.. substance.cdy ontical conclusions.~(. Alteration.ne thing by another. and as )(an t says. since they pond to the four logical Iorrns of possi ble representational The four aspects in terms of which the various forms of jU"·"'·>'''''''' (categories) and the princi ples. \ r. the correspondence of one rolation with another. something permanent. relations (Wolff). analogies are correspondences between two quantitative relations proportion. are constructed in correspondence. The must exist as determinable and underlying .In temporal terms.. These ontological statements do imply the being-present of the corresponding ontical. permanence (substance) is a relation. that a transition from one state to another can be perceived. . reality. " Ci'H An. quality. They are 'a) of the predicate to the subject. f" . of all df'tC'nn' rna t:Ions or time'. 'only the permanent (substance) is altered'. This involves a deterrniriation of the essence of the ontoloaical . r. IIlg to Kant. is only perceivable if. CI'H A 10'17 II 2"j() . Analogies in mathematics amount to constitutive d ation." CPH A 213. These ontological principles led dire.vV> can now see why these kinds of prinr-i ple are called analogies. something perrnanan: is experienced. uccession and simultaneity are the basic relallous of possible pure determination of time. In philosophy it is not a matter of quantitative.he First AnaLogy 12t . on the other hand. Ci'H A 187. and indeed emerges as relauon. As 11 category. of the determinate encounteraoum that which is ontologically intended In the principle. beforehand.'0 •. taken together. from the traditional division of judgements (forms of judgement) lor mal logic: quantity.e. however. 1\ 230 . more cisely. 'Alteration is a way of existing which follows upon another way of existing of the same object.'. is a sequence of states 'of one and the same object'. modality.30 <:1'1\ .t:I>:::o<U1 The necessity belonging to experience is conditioned. He considers the concept of alteration.~2 The guideline is the table of judgements. If three values are givell. An example of the First Analogy is the correspondence be ween relations: predicate to subject and accident to substance.e the 'relations of thought in juc4. ~.'" "'_.t'H A IX]. grounded in contingency: of experience: if finite man exists..

following question arises. succession. permanence belongs to everything experien eable is actually de:ml!lDCllfl! b th essence of experience for very thing e perientiall a determined in advance as inner-temporal.dIU1S!O:-P. a rising up from nothing and disappearance into nothing. and so also i the e sene of possible movement provisionall d terrnined: succesS1011 is on! alteration. the principle can be formulated a follows: 'All change (succession) of appearances is merely alteration"?' Succession is just this and not an absolute origination and passing away of substance. i.2:'2 CPH f\ 2')'1. The transitions are successions and sequences of beings and non-beings such that these do not ju t change but u ceed one anothc-r from the ground of something permanent. t17 17'>1 ."" For the Second Analogy deals with occurrences as such. If freedom is itself a kind of causality. it would be sar to completely remove the problem of freedom from the of causality. pI' supposes somel. the link between th econd and First Analogies is still closer in B. is groullded in the First Analogy. B J'3Z. for prior to the actual proof Kant formulates the preceding principle' in a way which allows its relation to the econd Analogy to more clearly emerge.e.:verything that happens. r. Indeed.I""LIUI'I ality in the broader sense of permanence. The SecorzdAnalogy.hing upon which it follows according to a rule.t'ICI'-. ow in re peet of th connection betroeen permanence and causality. a fact not significance for the formation and orientation of the understanding bing. processes) Is pn~sibl(" this que tion no longer concerns just the possibility of the . CI'H .1 B 212: " CPH.:cpa 1.l22 Causality and Freedom as Cosmological Probl In § 19. In B Kant takes up the concept discussed at the end of the proof of the First Analogy. <\naly is of the Essence of Event and of the Pos ibility of Its Perception 1\: ·f..atcd experience of one's ownmost self-being self-hood and self-consta! press the idea of perrnanenc . while an indication has also been given as to how the t. The encounter with the man nt. Thincs of this kind. that is. begins 0 be.tt_ relation treat d in th Second Analog' as a r lation of temporal sion.'s~ B: '. is constantly verified within xperienc its If. Temporal Succession and ausalirr 123 under which alone appearall . an If Wf' now ask how experience of oc rurrences as such (i..e. 189. and to positively define a new more primordial domain problems. possess its own temporality and own permanence which determines th historicality of human (the essence of history in the proper sense) in a manner fun differen 0 the determination of the process-chara t r of present Further. in kind of permanence is it grounded? The perman nc of the acting Can this permanence be conceived as the temporal endurance of which is present (nature)? If not..'~' The fundamental meaning (!l {he First Analogy has thus b en ited. In more ontological terms the r lation of the First Analogy to the Second is already determined in the First Analogy from the ssential determination of the 'genuine object' of experience (nature). a) Event (Occurrence) and Temporal Succession.es are determinable as things or objects in possible exp rience. we must how the problem of causality is conne ted with h problem of "U. i. Permanence has in every case an inn r connection to time. Occurrence. In di cussing the Second we must always keep the First Analogy in mind i. which succession announces itself proximally as change begmning and nding.. is the temporal character of what is free in its ess nee such causality is primarily decisive for its existence? II not. VVear referr d to something which is always al1"(>ad)" resent prior to all conception. but also the constantly ".'~· From the A version it is clear that the problem is about relating an ncountered event ba k to something determining. Since the First Analogy requires th prior r presentauon of something permanent in all change. reason) is not in time? Or does the personality of the the being-human of the human. CI'I\ H .e. constituting the ent Wp P('I"('C'inJIII experience.\11 alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection or cause and eff ct. and thu also the idea of substanc realm or our most proximate everyday: comportment 10 beings. It is here that the finitude of p xp("rit'IH"(" nounces itsel f.\ IHl) . We have in this way an orientation concerning the mode of proof of he Analogies and fundamental character... is It enough simply to say that the person (i. The Second AnalOg)' § 19. We recall that proper beings are those which are constantly ible constantly presen .e.

and what follows on is the conditioned. For Kant. h~l)pl' n . !11 each case it . possible? We must first look more precisely at what is enced. upon that which can be followed on from. but the fundamental character or being-present as a contexture eines Zusam. for the main task is to determine just what is to hi' ~l!hi('C'ted to the analytic. On the other hand. which determining its essence. not just of acquainting ourselves with principle of causality. Again we ask: how IS experience of occurrences as such.analytic is the gl"'Oundmg of essence. but ill relation what is already present it is the earlier. r!"reptioll an event involves not only the presupposition of something ~l'e("('di lg it: but the. We shall shortly encounter this problem of time again. Analysis belongs here to analytic as understood by Kant.~ibili~'Y. essential determination.. however..happens at a particular lime. as following on. this has nothing to do with a superficial concept of description. the anaLytic of the essence 9/event and its possible OJanifestness in an experience has shown the necessity of a rule. such that given state follows on from a prior state. Nothing ever arises from empty time. the proof of this jJTocf'cds differently. By demonstrating inner pos. i. that there is underlYIng permanent thing which merely changes states. 62 Accordingly. When and how is this completely set forth? . but of grounding this in its essence. Knowledge of the matters themselves 11tusl lll"<'(·(. n(' w ish to briefl enter into t his question.63 actually happens 'begins to be'. The discussion of this principle by the Engbsh empiricist Hume became an important impetus for Kant's own philosophizing. the law as familiar and constantly applied. ". What we encounter in perception is thus only experiellceable as an event if it is already represented according to a rule referring back to something that conditions it.ng would be described. but knowing if I advance that this follows on from earlier. The or SecolldAnalogy 125 being-present of that which is prpst·nt. as if the event were described simply as a thi. mere valteratiou'i'" This means. this not-having-been is not absolute. to something from which the event necessarily follows. 'formerly' 110t. So our analysis of the essence of an event and its perception has brought forth what belongs to its inner possibility. but rather. As with the First Analogy.menhangsl So how is expenence of processes possible? through a rul of pure temporal deterrn ination. This involves seeing the CQIlnections by means of a specific method of investigation and research. however. then il is proven that causality belongs to the ofexperience as such. ir it is sh ow n tha t causality alone makes possible ence ofprocesses. reflection on hO\I\' we [L77-178J . What follows on can alL onl. presupposition I ~f somethiJ~g rt'LrosF~ectively encol1lllNeO In the present event. according to the Analogy. not in Kant. which can be expressed the 'principle of succession in time. i. but since belongs to the essence of an event as such. not known essence. However.251: When we speak of analysis here. to its essential content. \IV' must proceed therefore according to Kant's conception 01 IIH' matter.e. To be noted is that setting the task of the analytic does not ItSI'1iC!cf'o1l1plishanything.e. for his misunderstanding of transcendence leads him 10 St't' tile' primary given in the succession of apprehensions within a prf'S('IHsubject. CPH A 201 B 2'~fi '" cpa A 20fi: B . i. What 'event'? An event occurs when 'something actually happens..'" sitow itsel f as such if the perception of th e directly encouu tererl ohj(>('[ fllready looks back upon what went before. which rule is nothing but the Second Analogy. This beginniJlg to be (to be is not an origination from nothing. always from a fuifilLed time. into the inner possibilities ofwhat belol"lf(s (0 the essential content of experience. but not truly grounded. b) Excursus: on Essential Analysis and Analytic 'i' CPR B 232. but without spinning out [THill\. as the genu me obj ct of ence. However. Accord in gl • the full .e. a method possessing its own specific lawfulness.\f·(·ording 10 what we have indicated above. but from which the presently existing arose.de >verything else. basically as inquiry into origin. It is a matter. not just reading off the being-present of essential properties. it is always co-perceived perceiving an event. The given always somehow ~1l0Ullces itself as following on from something. i. Perception of the given thus involves laking-ilHldvance according to a definite rule. Among other things. in relation to thing already present. which is precisely what we are concerned to do. of 0 processes.. This relation can be very indefinite and multifaceted.e. ccnsiderarions over method. an event is not just something that a ~ s v. The given announces itself as having arisen in fulfilled time. III accordance with the law of it y'.e. therefore. Thus perceiving an event means not just perceiving something as occurs. Experience involves the perception of 'events'. In this way the essence causality is itself brought to light. not something empty..124 Causalit and Freedom as Cosmological Problem s 19. i. What begins to be.

. 'cience and scien e alone according to its ownmost int ntion be oriented to finalit . Our analysis of the essence of 'event'. precisely we arrive at the fundamental rnetaph sical context of Kant's problem freedom: causalit and its essence. 3. thus to increase possibility of substantive understanding. .. this happens at a particular point. condemns it to finality. the ll'llOle. And i IS 11S n It . . The levels do represent a fixed and final sequence of steps. This air ad means that analysis of essence is not de rip ion in th usual sense. mere description is ou of the question. What w thu hav in view i nothing pres nt lik a bar scafi'olding into which we build omething. their context and necessity. It is not at all possible to clarify the essence of event without air ady having this primonlial contexture in view· we cannot take one step forward without bearing in mind the essence of appearance finite knowledge.ity as the / ori{t:in if structurauon. The conn ctions b tween these were not Furth r discussed. 2.or is it the Lln"l. i. The e ondAnalogy 127 gain access to thes matters. We three levels: I . In our duction we 0 casionallv halted to clarify our path. . r lease from he one-sided [ixi ng of the valid and knowable. If we stili emplo the fatal word description' in regard to essential analysis. . defining the essence of event is not such a 'description' but rather a questioning back into the inner possibility of event. means resolution..126 Causalit and Freedom as Cosmological Problem § 19. determination of the ground of inner possibility of what-b ing. determination of what-being. there i a danger of ss ntial knowl dg r duced to a technique of teaching and learning. . the clarification of essence.( ref"cJ"C'IU·P La .· s the preliminary leap into the totality of existenre. The illumination of ssenc requir 's transformation.e. to the research gramme of a school. but always a movement and forth. toda more than entrenched. Philosophy. pro{"('edillg from th earnestness of thrownn S5 [Grundakl del" hopf'risrhell Handlung der Philosophie aus dem Ernst der Geuorfenheit]. bu the loosening 1I. It is not like enumerating the properties and moments of ornelhing present. For example. determination of inner possibility of what-being. is constant transformation . th other hand. for the essen ce of 'event' riC)Ps not lead us back just to some arbitrary pia . U<U<lCQI istics of essential knowledge. iL is the fundamental deed of the creative activit of philosoph.xlure if the cognitive structure. departing from what we encounter in temporal succession. a return to the ground of the co-belonging of what belongs tog th r.. ~n. but because philosophy itself. But the question is: how does essence and essential contexture [Wesenszusammenhang] exhibit itself? We can say. such that essential knowledge is reduced to affair of scientific inquir .but to fr lorn as the lI~l('rrng<lli\(' ground of the possibility of event. Since analysis of essence concerns contexts of possibility and enablernent. however. tha the first level provides a key to the next levels. description is the determining comportment that holds itself wholly to what presents itself. cience itself can never get beyond this except insofar as new borders are set for it by a new definition of essential constitution of its domain. To s e this one must free from erroneous opinions which. while cientifi· knowl dge is only ary. negatively. dissection. on how we remove them from un UUlut:~IU::lfl!lll is not irrelevant. i.LLI. a gradual transformation which does Dot permit any Il1:latLtJ'l There is prevalent today a peculiar misrecognition of he essential knowledge. uch reflection serves to reassure usin our methOd must alwa s be undertaken where we are truly all the way.·(·lC'ti at tlw manner or tlunkins. i. Stressing the 'descriptiv ' character of essential analysis simply expresses the necessity of holding to wbat essence gives as essence. inquired into the essence of appearance. U osop I· 'nca I controversy are mac Ie In tj. What can we conclude for our questioning? Preparation and orientation dllJpr in ('very case of description. in its tioning and knowing. Indeed.p ~fh~ ("()!lfe. It remembered.not principally because changes in its so-called results. return to its un. As we und rstand it. The primary and ultimate d('P]si nns 0 f P 1·1 . that it does not do so in the manner of something present. this is because.. for vulgar understanding.UI moments brought tog ther in accidental fashion without . not defined by itself.('111 into [IAO-IR2] . If we now reflect anew on path and method.e.\Ilah·[ je is not resolution and splitting up into pieces. Accorciing to this. thus already in the first lecture we briefly alluded to the .e. Our questioning is on tautly dire ited to th e sence of human dorn. ( iomam. The m i interpretation of the knowledge or essence is partly due to haracterization as essential anal sis and essential description. is a transforming. nor will we go into them now. BUl analysis of essenc is not like the meaning of a word ill to Its elernen ts. for it necessarily operates in a domain. But the real situation is the rev rse. The context of our question requires a gOllig al"lcr-Lhe-whole as a going-to-our-roots. while the third level reflects back on the first two. finitude and transcend nee. cientific knowl dge is final. philosophical knowledge ess nces is final and ultimate. arialvsis IS defilled from the task of an analytic if essence. som principal features of \\·l1il"h were already recognized by Kant and followed in his works. susp nsion. This kind of anal tic is d'r(.

cha:·acter of an. 0 ive. do not involve any succession. In the casP of the house nothing 'happens' . the succession of apprehensions is not "rbi'l'arv bUI fixed.elation in the Sense of Causation Is Ru.. the experience of succession in the per events. What is the situation in the case of the ship sailing down the river? One might initially think that here the succession of apprehensions has the same character as in the case of the house. succession of appearances... In the construction of the house. LI'I\ 0\ 19:2. [IS1-185] . somethiug whi. To be sure. The Secon. . '. In perceiving the house.:" 111 tllf' perception of events. by following the ship through the individual points of its movement downstream. 11 is true that the succession of apprehensions is not bound to an objrclivr. ThE' question is now whether the succession of apprehensions is also arbitrary in this case.ng" present.e. and perception of a ship sailing past me down the river. the succession of apprehensions is arbitrary only against the background of the binding character of the ordered constellation of elements making up the present bouse.1 CPR A 192. Causality 111 'rime as What we are conscious of in perception and experience IS at first j multiplicity of apprehensions succeeding one another.H11. But there is an difference.128 CalL~ahfyand Freedom as Cosmological Problem .. have the. my perceptions can proceed the roof to the basement or vice versa. present occurrences.PII the revealing of a present house and the rev aling of a present p\"rn l. on the other hand. the properties determinations of the house. i..e. c) Causality as Temporal H.it just 'stands' or 'rests'. CPH A 192 f. likewise from left to right or versa. seems like a confused mass of opinions. of 'an appearance.r. i. [3 2'~2. . 1\. docS not involve. Kant sets off this kind of perception from others by considering cases.li.ior I can also begin my apprehension of the ship at the stern or bow or masthead or bulwarks.liM Why is th succession of apprehensions arbitrary this case? Because the appeal"ances themselves. . initially given is a succession of apprehensions. How do I perceive this occurrence? Clearly. On the other haud. In both cases. standpoints doctrines. The brelt'f ill which the perceptions succeed one another in apprehension is in this ill~lance deter mined.% What gives ' initially arbitrary and reversible succession the unity of a binding irreversible succession? How is the experience of the binding objective succession. and to this order apprehension is bound down. It d. For if rnv apprehension of the house begins at the roof.a successl~n. a before and after. B 23H.. By what is it fixed then? One will say: by the objective I~ Ill' ". the percep ion of a house situated directly in front of me.. CI'H A 193. possible? In considering this question we must always bear in that it pertains not to (indeterminate) perceptions as such but to the perception of events. we <:""~U"'!'lHII something as actually occurring. but this succession is itself arbitrary'i'" In percelvmg an event. H 2:'7. which contains an occunence'. In other words..e. which IS by no means the experience Kant bas in mind . Rather.\ intentron here IS obviously Just to hIghhght the dllference bclW(. but in that case I am limiting myself just to the perception of the ship and its present properties. The b 'lng-present of the house.M What is perceived is the occurrence in its bei. in what way it obtains a 'relation to an object' . no particular succession of apprehensions JIll.ch follows on from thing else.G'19. From the standpoint of Kant.n ning Ahead Determining Letting-Follow SlIcc('ssiO!l in the object itself." CPI{ A 197. Since there .. In experiencing the ship 1110Vlllg downstream.:' Ci'H . 'In the series of these perceptions there was thus no definite specifying at what point I must begin 1Il order to connect the fold empirically.\ 192. of the ship in its movement.i er. ihe succession of apprehensions still has a binding character. 'It IS im possi hle that III the apprehension of this appearance the ship should fir~l be pPTceived lower down in the stream and afterwards higher up. the question anses as to how the subjective succession of occurrences becomes. event.. There is succession here. what Kant intends is perception of the ship sailing down the river. the roof comes last. in the unuy of its properties. and in the completed house it remains at the top. B 237. i. 1low we fix these points and distinguish them from one another is here a rnat..oes not. however. to thos who merely learn philosophy and u like a business. B 237. . for the house is not an event. I do not take this as the b~ginning or foundation of the house.tC'l"of secondary importance.'SSilrv. What follows on is nOL determined by our perception but : determines perception. we perceive the ship at a POilli more downstream than where we perceived it a moment ear l..dAnalogy 129 precisely here that there reigns the greatest and simplest un which. B 231'1.

Can time do this? Does it involve a lawfulness in respect of succession? It indeed for I can arriv at a later time onl by way of an earlier While I can think of something which comes later without att.the character of the succession of apprehensions . 'cannot be derived from the appearances 0 absolute time.7. sllCcessiolls) in order that we may orient ourselves. relation. Instead.. Cosmological Problem. r\eidlN does the proof of the Second Analogy clear! exhibit the analogical chara ter of th principle of causality. However. . fI 572. conceiv d by Kant as a fundamental relation which belongs to the nature of understanding and is expressed as be logical relation of ground and consequence. Yet time in itself is absolute. .e. its necessity is grounded in the fact that it is a necessary element oj the whole that makes experience as such possible. of. However. j' its oerng. CPR A I)'H. An occurrence i ]101 .' ·/Ilinary transcendental represeruauon. time as su h as the totality of positions of intra-temporal beings)s d terrnined in can never be imm diately given. . The subsequent time cannot be without the earlier But does the reverse apply? Time is an irreversible uccession i.endil~ its character as later-than." this Law is already the condipl1' II . we can conclude rrolJ1 the whole ontext that. 'Ibis relation is temporal in the Sense that causality (a causation) mean.derioed from the logical principle 0/ eround. but is a specific unity of temporally guided perception and thought which determines what i perceived. which begins to be at a particular time. 'principle of the causal relation in the s qu nee of appearances' is ground of the possibilit of experiencing the succession of app arances their context as present. ap sions occur in temporal order. As such a relation.WO relations is involved.ng the mner difficulty of the Kantian position. Ev 11 when {1O • • ""1H'o\Jllwrevents WIt. as with the First Analog..PR CPJ\ A 191' n. .71 i. 'Succession' is a relation which represent in acivaJ]ce. the principle 0/ causality cannot be logically.• -I /I re q dWIl t-. and Iik the apprehensions belongs to the subject.er in terms of causalit ." It is thus clear that the causal law as develops it her is not just something w appl LO encountered e ents 1'1 IJ " cr l' CPR A 200.1 R A 200. . sion as procession.e. [ Itl7-18BJ . we' . Thus what Kant sa s with his principle of causality to this: ev ry appearance having th character of a temporal event. Nothing ever lollows 0]1 lrom something which absolutely was not.. Th earlier time necessarily deter subsequent time. we saw that this determination of essence Il> rPilC·!JI·r! through a determination ofthe inner possibilic (essence) cf :~/NI"/e/IIT as the jt'nile human knoll.. I . i. of a process IS experienceable only as always related to what went b fore as determining. The econdAnalogy 131 temporal succession of the processes themselves.. nl whose conn ction i indeterminate.. but which I'S determined in its relationai character as a temporal. I cannot conceiv it precisely as later reference to what preced d it. i..S. succession is pre-r present d in and for all xperiential represemaLion (perception and thought). r. So if an intra-temporal occurrence is to be rlPtpl-m'lll in ex peri n .HI original an'. bUL by virtue of what is this ord r Time is admitt d1 subj ctiv ..N5. as a mode of being-in-time. thus the successions of processes.. B '24"'> i\ Z()2. H ... This expenenc is neither just logical determination of objects. H 24·". 19.is possible. a corresponden ce between I.this determination must hold to the direction of ".e. running ahead in time as determining leuing follou) on such that what runs ahead is itself an event lhal refers hack to something artier that determines it. rr. we.130 ausality: and Freedom a . . However. h'In w hiIC hi·we are unable to orient curse yes. Th proof thus begins in a way which corresponds to the First Absolute time 'is not an object of perception . rau aliI)" necessarily involves the temporal character as this going before. Thus the rule: in occurs we encounter the condition from which it follows n cessarily. lnstead the . nor just the apprehension of representations as subjective occurrences in time. To be sure. presupposes something that ahead of it in time and determines it as that which follows on. \'\ h'1\('n·r follows on depends on something which /1:(l. a circurnstanc refle ti.. The t mporal positions of anDe. it definite direction.7d lthough time is giv n the intra-temporal b ings in their total temporal determination is not But if th temporal succ ssion of apprehension is \. and as such makes possible th experience of intra-temporal occurrences. Just as a consequence necessarily implies a ground so what occurs later in temporal succession is a causal consequence of what occurs earlier. n 0/ the possibilil oj us at all encountering events a su h.. .0 have a time itself.tr~ln . ~. we must still understand what e\l" D]!("()Unt. 11 2'1·7.present.0 what is causality? It is a relation which does not just occur in time. wherein every being encountered in experience is must indicate how th perception of something objective .Ledge cJ that which is pre ent in the (')11/(' .e. What is decisive in this case is likewise a relation. "''''_ Each and every determination of"a specific factual connection IS by this law. .

.. The clarifir . But he question at on arises as to what {.low is the univ rsal essence of c.. p R4. 7lDO Kinds of Causalit ': Natura! Causality and the 'ausality of Freedom" The General Ontological Horizon f!lthe Problem cf Freedom in the Definition 0/ Freedom as a Kind of ·'ausality.7b· ow that whi h. p. provides rea lit to'. psychical. \\'hal Iwwre C!! l3eing The d finition of th ess n of e perien e as finite knowledge gives provisional defini Won of the essence of possi ble objects of experience. 157 (V. This is indeed the case.HId sometimes to freedom? . But freedom i the fundamental condition of the possibility of Ih(.L. "' Cridqut! r:if Prartical Reason. How call pure con epts of the understanding have a eategorial function for a (supersensible) being? What is the unschematic pre entation and fulfilment here. gets encountered in experience as present (in the texture of its being-pres nt) is what Kant calls nature.""!1 means in this context. 175 (\'. "" Critique cf Pracucat Reason.' 'Freedom as a ert of certain causes of appearances'j'" 'freedom as a kind of "a'U""u.d.. these two kinds of causality mutually incompatible concepts'...T . Thus the existence of lililli.ltllrp. . 1" 17 Prolegomena lJelaph' sics. with what justification? If justification is lacking. causality cannot here mean natural ity out of freedom. or whatever els ).. schema.~\ CPR A 211.. IH (IV 44} p. example. 10). acting person. \0\\ one could say that I ant. " Critique of Practical Reason. (\'. This alone is crucial for our substantive unfolding of the problem of freedom.ificance. This questionability pertains not only to Kant's treatment of the probl m but leads to a question of fundamental sign. [ 189-1 [ 19()-192] . by his mphasis 011 ih df/Terence b tw en llHtund causality and Llw causality of freedom.r on th one hand.. '1 atural necessity IS the condition a ording to which ffici nt causes are deterrnined'i " I< ant dis . p. But this intention do s not in any v"ay ~<)lvp tile' problem J n fact. (T . which r"''''''?'iIII specification as either natural causalir or the causalit of freedom.'rn~~wlllll na ural causality' from 'causality through freedom'.I"""... where nature means th being-present of chat which is present (whether ph sical.144). B 259 r. obviously wants to stress Lh(.. and schernatized category. Clearly.nK-frpe) itself takes on the fundamental chararacteristic of beingprpSf'lIl. on the other hand.81 The expression 'causality out of freedom' indicates that freedom oriented to cau ality. !J). why does he proc ed in this way? V'lhat influence has Kant's approach to the probl m of ausaLity and the categories exerted on the problem of freedom as such? These questions follow on from on another. Tu 0 Kinds of au alilY :133 §20. PI" 120-21. a ss ntially determined from the unity of the contexture of the present of that which is present.". such that it pertains sometimes to .Hlsality to be defined? Obviously in a way that gi es both natural ausa1it)· and th causality of freedom their respective proper ent] lenJ(~lIls. Thi LIHIIS lrcedom into its complete opposite. u " the e senee of causality from its necessary role in experi nee thus cerns th causality of nature. The following problems then arise. everything without which the experi nee of objects would not itselfb possibl is nee ssary.t32 Causalit and Freedom as Cosmological Problem. 47).. 1" Prolegomena. '1)1!1"Fc rltararter of the ethical person as opposed to the thing 01' Il. it clops not e ven engage with the problem. 171 J).. 1 11'1)...1) The Orientation of Causalit in General to the Ca usa lit. WhllCl" practical reason .. The Connection beuoeen Cousaiity' in General and Being"Presem itt a lHode .'WN '. r or Natur Toward the Problematic of 10'1' edom as a Kind of Causalit does causa Ii ty mean generally. To nature there belongs a definite . prccisel r through the characterization of freedom as causality (alll('it as one kind th r of) is can eioed basicall as being-pre eru. or if there is the concept of causality is fundamerually alllbiguous: mere category of natu. Kant can only mean causalit in a general sense. § 20. If the causality of freedom is clefin d in terms of this univ rsal causation then freedom (as bei.. in the context of the Third Analog Kant sa s: In re'p at to objects of experience.. or why is this not necessary here? Did J ant anywhere earn' through thi defini ion of the universal essence of causality? If not: does he in the end employ a universal concept of causality derived primarily from natural necessity? If so. for as Kant sa s.l Future i" Critique ofPractical Reason. Preface (V. to /j. p.. ausality as fre dom . ~~jiher ther is no more general and higher categor of 'ausality Lhan these two. 121 not . then the way of being of causation becomes characterized as being-present. If the definition of causality in g neral is oriented to th causality of nature. "' L'ruiqlW of Prnctiral R eason. in the sens of ethical action.~2 So with th con pt 'causality out freedom'. calls freedom 'a supersensible object of the category of causality'. p. ing to its essence. 201 (V.

Ttoo Kind of 'ausatiiy 135 which con rns the fact that the way of bing of man annot be d fined a~ being-pres nt." An effect must always be simultaneous with the causation of its cause. Preface ( . Sine he fuils to pose the oncerning the particular toa of being of beings t hich are free. ow the stove. as cause. is simultaneous with its effect. i. I soon see since I cannot think without a category. bow does he resolve this difficulty? First an example of the simultaneity of cause and effect. lacks metaphysical ground for the problem of fr edam.t being. thus to define the causality of from the ground of natural causality. . Here there is no serial succession in time b tween cause and effect. 160)./i'reedom as Cosmological Problem .'. despite everything. we wish to con ider briefly som thing Kant adds to hIS /II(') . The two are necessarily simultaneous. C)JH A 202. this necessary simultaneity does not contravene the essential role of terrrporal succession in th causal r lation. insofar as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason.Hh). 209 (Y.). I must first seek out the in reason's idea of freedom..ia] h re. B J48. how ver. IlIp\' miglll be simultaneous . which i at . p. So Kant.the relationship between the one as cause ']1)(1 111(' other as effect con tin ues to hold. already in his treatment of fre dam as causality.ririqll(' ofPractical Reason. It turns out.uccession as th istinctive Temporal Mode of Causality and Illustrated by the imultaneity of Cause and Effect We must first clarify Kant's standpoint in such a way that we can see fundamental metaphysical problem underiying his interpretation of dom as a kind if causality. . 13M7 f. This will provide an 0!1!10Illll\ity for mO. So [hill we may see what is cru .. intended by temporal succession. and if it is also true that Kant takes freedom as primary and ultimate in philosophy ('The concept of freedom. Only insofar as causes continue to exist in their ('ausation can there be any effects. Th yare simultaneous. The r ason Kant does not arrive the required determination is that. b) First Examination of Causality's Orientation to the Mode of Being Being-Pres nt-in.e. According to this definition.20. The way of I~eing of man r mains at le8lt und t rrnined and underdeterrnined. and yet the law is valid. However small the spfI!( or rime between cause and effect . which he equates actuality and existence as such. Kan L be-gins with an objection to his own definition of causality as the determining letting-follow-on by something t mporally prior. In other words. hat 'th principl of tb ausal r Iation among appearances' is not limited to th serial succession of appearances but also pertains to their simultaneity.ng a number of basic concepts im por[(1[1 t for what follows. This in i b cause he does not recognize and d velop th universal problem being. We have seen that Kant is inclined to natural causality as causality itself. Thi is he category of causalit ." Critique 0/ Practical Reason. which takes the causal principle as a prin iple of temporal slIccession. "'. he does not treat causalit of fre dam primordially and in its own terms.e. nam I the conn ction between tlnl causality (iruerpreted as causality: it eif) an.134 ausality and . -. [ t92-1 [ 1!:J1-195J . 1 1A. Critique of Practical Reason.re explicitly defini. i. if being-present. he treats the logical problem at the level of the problem of present beings." Thus temporal succession cannot be the unique and infallible empirical criterion for a caust-effect relation. room is warm whil the outer air is cool. he not unfold the metaphysical problem of freedom in a primordial manneC If this is so.~~ Kant's orientation of causation to being-present. clis('lIs~i()Ils of his proof of the econd Analogy. p.. On the ontrarv. lS5). cause and effect can be simultaneous.~. . is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason . I look around for the cause. the heat of the room. p. Since Kant holds exclusively to the concept of cau ality as temporal succession. :~ CPI\ .d being-present as a ~ Il )(k (.'118 Kant commeuts that in fact 'the great majority of natural auses are imultaneous with their effects and that the before-after relation onl indicates that 'the cause cannot 'achi ve its complete effect in one moment'. 196 (V. and find a beat d stove. B 247 . i\{'\'ertheless. means that he ees freedom and ioithui the horizon. is a grav deficienc not to be remedied subsequent external supplementation. then he must have reasons for letting the q uestion of the essence of human freedom finish with the positing of freedom as the self-legislation of pra tical rea 011. If the causation of the cause were to cease to be immediately prior to the ffect there could be no ff ct at all. whi h In this cont xt. it is only hy bringing this simultaneitv to light that we can unders and what is proper! . where so~ thing fundamental is at stake. The latter necessaril intersects wi til I ill' duration of the presence of ca use and effect.\ JU2. th ause is prior and the effect is subsequent. For this relationship.'M The cept of causality always contains a relation to a law which determines existence of the many in their relation to one another'.it might be vanishingly small. <:1'1\ t\ 203.

is ontologically orieflted. [ 195-t [196-198J .e.'JI 'Plato found the chief insta nces of his ideas ill the field of the practical. Kant does not mean that the cause must disappear the effect occurs.". This IS not just a point about f{alll·S use of language but has implications of a fundamental nature. is itself distinguished from act' in lhe sense of ethical action. pertains to the direction of a sequence. Action as the Succession-Concept in the Connection between Cause and Effect This conception of causality leads to a concept of importance probJem of occurrences in general.. First the 'practical man' who possessesabilities of a certain kind and knows how to apply them at the right moment. which event hf'loll. i. rela: ion of the subject of causality to its effect' . 344). even when si m \11 taneo us wi th the effect. A 2D3.~()" I.. Ar tion by no a IIW:tll~ primarily pertains to ethical comportment and moral/unmoral aCll\<it. then the concept of free moral action. as in the Latin agere .ffecll1. praxis c II cushiun.e.in nature. therefore. in what rests upon rreeciorn.s.gs to the oecurrence. In this context. B 37 t. Wh a t is crucia I to 'succession ' mod e of time is not the dura Li n a nd speed 0 r a seq uenee of even ts.Occurrences can now be defined as isolated events but as related back to what precedes them as causes. '.136 Causality and Freedomas Cosmological Problem ~'. finishing. not to it.0 art for' 1\<1 Ill. and not-being . causation is a relation specifically directed to that lets follow on. refers to the connection between the one as and the other as subsequent.W'i.343). B H28. It is a broader concept than doing -facere ~ which is a particular kind of action. p. ::: (.opus. other-being. iar just to rational activity.of a ball muking u hollow in 'H 'jJ ion is related essentially to freedom. B 251).lle concept of action is more precisely d fined.s character as process. nor Just to mental acl ivi ty. CPH A ROO. of 'voluntary' action. 'Action signifies Lht.l/. For Kant. ." In the Prolegomena he speaks of the constant action of rnauer. § '53: p. the human being. so that action is taken merely Il1 the ethical sense. the directi on of a sequen ce does not ex cl ude the simu Itaneous presence cause and effect.9(1.% In the Second na logy of the Critique qf Pure Rea. marl" precisely to the irreuersibiiity of serial. We often make use of the word for this. The connection pertains to present th ings in so-being. but not every action is a doing. I'rnle/<oIllCI. In the sense distinctive to causality. action means the same as effecting.1/ iqu« oj Judgeni . In this therefore.. i. Kant employs the expression <lnd roncept of 'natural action'. it is Oriented to just that kind of being which does not apply to an ethically acting being..9'i further claiming that every natural cause 'must have begun to act'. order. mora l-practieal com portrnent. and perl!1. Kan t incl udes this latter meaning in his e. 'subject' here does not mean 'J'. that is..v. there is action also where no work is produced . I mean everything that is possible through freedom .1 i 0 11' is much m ore the expression for effecting in gene ral. This has hcpn [requently overlooked in the interpretation of Kant. but unidirecti onal irreversi ble successi on.insprimarily to natural occurrences. and of occurrences pertaining to beings in particular: the concept of action. but rather that which is already present as underlying as the ".!!€tV. i. Secondly praxis and action in the specific sense of ethical action.g~ Every doing is an action. Accordingly. CPH. 84 (1'·.2o. For Ka 11t. the sense of being-present. " However.effectus. (ltp6. [. the same token. In other words.the work . above pp.. Tioo Kiruls of Causality 137 all times determinable. whereby meal) 'the practical' in two senses. LPH A 'i'H n 'i7'i ~. the cause. and cannot become subsequent to the effect. llpli~lC. precisely as action. f>rnleWJI"Ilena § 53. c) Second Examination of Causality's Orientation to the Mode of Being Being-Present in Terms of the Concept of Action. 'By the practical. 'Doing' in the sense of constructing. 'deed'.97 Action is not simply a h'IPPf'lli llg. For Kant. is trovertibly prior. or at least to a fateful indefiniteness. fl'5 note (n·. B 248 f. CPH A 'it4. concepL of the practical. Tills means that the existence of man ~ irrespective of whether a clear distinction is made between the factually existing moral person and the things of nature ~ remains subject to a fundamentally erroneous ontological definition. If action has the general meaning of effecting (bringing about). This more precise determmation of the character of succession as and sequential direction allows us to see the connection between and effect more clearly. It refers l also to the occurrences of animate and especially inanimate nature. lin fl. or as Kant likes to say. 'self' or ·pprson'. succession as a of time is quite compatible with simultaneity of cause and effect. a particular kind of effecting and e. to carry something out). but o uniquely directed order in the presence of the one and the other. succession does not mean jUst thing after another in order of their appearance and disappearance. making. but is a process that itself contains an event.'qJ ". Sf"·' Kant's exam pie. But this is 110t qll ite the case and action do not altogether eoi ncide. to being in.nt § +3.>< :-Of'(" (:I'H A .

The law of the continuity of all alteration grounded in the essence of time (intra-temporality). onglnar. but emphasized as such. . There is no such thing as a sudden occurrence u.if freedom. from our differences with Kant. Thus to the Prolegomena. this sho1ild not b taken in an external and rigid sense. "" CPR A 544. still happens time betw en th Instants and thus b longs to the entire time of ation. The Systematic a) The Svsternati ue cf Freedom according to Kant Defining the Direction ite as 'ubstantive Contexture and cope of Questioning What has thus far not been shown is where Kant situates freedom. I..99 as broad a meaning here as 'action'.1IYI on the basis of permanence. and in what way this occurs. It a lId e to man so su bstantive jssues an d stantrve j Pltl·llulllcl. . which substantive contextures of problems and motives lead Kant to the problem of freedom. B -572. for only thus can we assess how causality (the location of which in Kant's probl m we have id ntified) relates to freedom. every 'action' and 'force'. The S stematic Site 0/ Freedom 139 cause. The concept 0/ causality: thus enters into the definiuon offreedom: Thus grasp ever more learly the general ontological horizon ill which situates the problem r. 'ince thus Involves an effected occurrence. which states might exist in two instants. of th connection The implications of a correct understanding of the Kantian action for the problem of freedom are now plain 0 see...". p. Every transition from state to another. i. t the same time he continues to emphaSIze that freedom is a kind of causality. C • • rerers t 0 a 'free act ' as an . does not arise from some other origin but is its If an 'origin'. But this is not the onl and not the properly crucial reason for our need to clarify the sue ({ the problem of freedom in Kant's system.\ becom iug hidden or distorted.' COllcepts of action and continuity are read off primarily from the being-pre ent of corporeal things. It gives the ontoiogical determinations of the "" Protegomena. are cause and effe t .. 2. The character of" natural occurrences as movement is alteration. he defin s the ssence of alteration more precisely. Rather. For when r . Tbis new moment was co-intend d all along. cf the being-present of that which occur a present. One can consult Kan s OWll remark on Ihe pri()l"ity of th is domain of beings in his intuitive presen tation of the caLf'gories.a If' . ubj ct' has just event is conditioned and contains an action.. The action of the ethical person is an original effecting. In other words. th action matter is continuous. iI·HILl1ry an' d pr seruauon .r~licJll:q break out from prior nothingness.. This discussion of th concept of action provides us with a further final characterization of the ontological horizon of the Kantian of freedom.WU"'!iI during th whole time or the alteration. in th fact time does not consist of (ever so small) parts. This will allow us to show how th positive side of The Ka1ltian problem can be appropriated alb it with modifications. the occurrences ~ccllr 011the basi of the prmanent and in the mode ontinuous ac iOD. horizon of the general concept of caus and ff ct as determined il through natural causalit . Kant had a strong tend n )' LO architec onic. Th r all fundamental reason is that we ourselves clarified the problem if"freedom by suuating il within the perspective of the fundamental problem of metaphy.' actron. as Kant sa s in the nor . What is thus far missing? (OIlWI"/lII"(' or § 21. The _ tematic site of« probthai substanuue contexture lI'hich is dictated b the direction and [2{JO-201 ] . just in ofar as freedom is a causalicy. We do not pose this question with a view to historical COlnlnrison.].e. Wh r he discusses causality in general. In our transition from the First to the Second Analogy. we wish to clarify the specificit of Oll!" Own problematic. \VII('II WI. guided in ~('I hv traditional conceptual schemata. But whil this greatly facilitated )11 .. i. the mode of being hr presupposes is that of nature. We obviously requir a criterion here. i.! !.~_ 'concepts of succession . COllccption of Kant." speak here of the site of [I' edom in Kant's system..138 Causaluy and Freedom as Cosmological Problem §' 21. . We have already verified Ihi.. The ation of matter is not an effecting. "1 (I\'. For this reason every cause of an alteration testifies to its callSB. lIil t I· torces It wit hin liS . We lllUSl now ask how our own locating of the problem of fre dom relates to that of Kant. as the time of the 'o-belonging of that which is presen t. saw how Kant explicated the essenc of possibl movement as nll' . by that the possibility of alteration is grounded in the continuity of causality of action.. whi h alwa s at the same Limp signify agreement of a sort. An adequate account of Kant's conception of the essence of causali ly has n ow been gi veil. H r too lime is th guid line for definition of continuit . and indeed as the time of nature.. 'Io Iw sure.)8). as if th system were a (I"pi! structure with compartments for each and every problem and conI'Ppl. At the end of Kant's discussion of the Analogy.h. ics. .

in manner of Kierkegaard's critique of Heg 1.o the eSSIi'Il'(' We find in Kant a radical or met aph sics means to determine its . i. ~What led Kant to this q ues ion? othing less than the question of the possibility of traditional metaphysics. philosophy does not become stantively rooted in the for of its problem when one m r ly .l1t'teenth-century Ieo-Kantianism.KOcr)JO~) is the object of eostrJo!ogy. that owing to the universal ground from which Kant defines problematic of philosophy as such. God (oeo. i. Today.. within the lem of finite human Imowledge of present beings th mselv s. therefore.... SO mu h so that he no longer sees this problem. the problem of metaphysics is a long from achieving th transparency and primordialit required to eria . So does Kant situate freedom. the thret> above-mentioned disciplines together Utah. oul (II'Uxi'J) is thE' object of ps chology. [201 11) kant's Two Ways to Freedom and the Traditional Problematic Metaphy ics. We not do this just to obtain a broader knowledge of th Kantian IJ. World as the totality of present natun. non-empirical knowledg is r~li()lI<l1 knowledge. up ({el1uinf: metaphysics: rational psy hology. The Systematic I:U: 0/ Freedom 1. This is simply the entire substantive contexture the philosophical problematic which. metaphysical questions concerning soul. world.) is the object of theology. I lIdpt'SLood 111 this sense. First.e. From the perspective of this fundamental question of philosophy.. 'I'h!. But it it pre isely this onnection which remains problematic for Kant himself. i... 'God'. i.. to which Kant remains oriented in his ruique d fines these upersen ible beings under tb three headings 'soul' 'world'. and still less does he possess the means for awak ning it. in this area especially.tet is also the q uestion concerning th primordial possibility and necessity of the rnanifesrness of being. knowledge of those beings which lie out beyond that which is experientially accessible.1LUV' . the inner deficiencies th following presentation have still another cause.vo ways to freedom converge in the problem of metaphysics as such. not just th ir empirically 'ontingent charact rISli(·s._ inst ad according to rough guidelines. V\lba the eo-Kantians saw in Kant wa a particular theory of knowledge.41 of cope if questioning.. A traditionally understood metaphysics means knowl dge of supersensible beings. Kant's lWO ways to the problem of freedom are as follows. these two way to freedom are necessary for him.. its simplicity. and God aim to dpfillP the essence of these.. to whi h they oppos d a purportedly different theory. Kant's t.e.what are beings?is not d veloped into the fundamental question: what is being? The lat. till iOil al theo logy 'If) inquire [2(J3-204. The 'ite of the Qu stion of Freedom in the Problem of the Possibility of Experience as the Question Concerning the Possibility of GenUiJle letaphysics redefinition of the essence of ontology. indep ndently of experienc . For traditional metaph sics. indeslru(·tibility and immortality.. Soul understood in respect of what especially concerns man. This opposition was then enthusiastically taken up by t\ eo-Scholasticism. but in order to layout the perspective of philosophical questioning richer and more primordial manner. however. For this never a matter of a so-called correct interpretation of Kant.t' __ We saw that the Kantian problem of causality is to be located prllnliUil within the problem of the possibility of experi nc . By he same token.denounces the idea of sv~..140 Cau aluv and Freedom as Cosmological Problem § 21. i is quite wrong to set Kant over against the Greeks (especially Aristotle) in the manner of ni.. These two problems belong together within the of metaphysi a1 problems. However. a reclerillition without which (for example) Hegel's ontology would not ha\'e been possible.. knowledge proceeding from plUe reason alone. Of course. and God as the ground and author of all beings. The reason for this is that also in the case of Kant the traditional leading question of mtaphysi . of crucial importance to see two things. -ith any complete thematic interpretation and nnooe. which we cannot the present time remove..reek approa h to th question of being.e. Traditional metaph 'sics.e..e. world (totality of nature . i. In accordance with how it is in case seen and approached. is very different from philosophizing 'systematic' way. Th first proceeds by way of the context within which th problem of causality was discussed: the possibility of experience asfinite knowledge ofbeings.] int. hlT'!' thought proceeds from concepts alone. must dispense . rational cosmology. defines the direction and scope of a pro Possessing a s stem in the external sense or trying to classif and nn''' ) _ purportedly frozen knowledge. with th Kantian problematic in a positiv and critical manner... such that also from this side access to Greek though t became obstructed. And yet this redefinition is on the whol a ren wal of the (.. that Kant is led to problem of freedom from two utterly different contextures of pro Secondly.. from what substantive contexture does problem of freedom emerge? Does the domain of this problem necessary connection with the possibility of experience? Is it the compl tely different? '10 understand and engage with the Kantian problem of freedom. It is now a matter of exhibiting them.s .

and kind of need the respond to. millmg the capacity of pure reason for a total knowledge of beings.. ideas can he nwlted: r('Sp('(. B 1160 _ A ':i67 f. No\\> was Kant's mnerrnost conviction that metaphysi s. son. I. as questioning in three indicated directions. and then later. narn ty tbat of tilt CllI'isliallity. in its 'principles'. thus in the totality of its being and essellce. However uncomfortable circumstance rna be for earlier and contemporar interpretation of no sleight of hand can alter it or diminish Its significance: Kant sees grounding of metaphysics p:recisel a a return to human nature. these questions are answerable.in asking about the world. Only in this way does he turn to human natur . 1111 "'" CP}\ 1322. bul 0]1 i he other hand It do s not follow that (as is commonly believ d l1o. i.. CI'I\ A ..insofar as the conept determines a priori not only the scop of its manifold content. appropriateness. (2) in the repre entation of the manifold of obje ts in appearance. rrtrcism in Kantian sense m ans d terrnining the essence of metaphysics. thus marking it off against what does not belong to it drawing boundarie and limits . The requisite question concerning man can be neither nor epistemological. Kant says Ihill human nature.Kant must ground the three directionl and domains of questioning by returning to human nature. or as Kant calls them.l'H B 2].nl()JII. the ground of foundation of m taphysics r mains un rtain and indefinite.ibl empirical knowledg ev r attains. (3) r. three basic directions of rf'presentation by ideas.. reason looks to the unity and completeness o of what is representable and of that toward which man comports himself. t lI se qu estions WIllC h It IS ~~'''''':UH by iiS' own need to answer as best i can .PH . What is specific abou th se questions? \\'h 1'1 I does reason have 'in mind' with these questions? The question of Ihe illllTlortalit of the soul r pre nts the soul in ths compl teness of its unity. world. i. Ever idea has the general characteristic of repl'('st'nting something. he do s not interpret human nature radicall r from itself bu alread sees it from the perspective of the thre indicat d domain whicll have been made self-evident to him by the tradition. In this r presel1t:<Hiol1f the totality.III} SO the problems arise as whether. method of Kant's grounding. as determined through reason 'projects' the questIons concerning God. This is not in an way a philosophically necessary appr~ach. nor can it be a phenomenology of consciousness experience nor anthropology. from time Lime. and in what degree. such metaphysical questions 'arise from the nature of universal human . 'ideas'. The manifold of all possible relations of representations can be reduced to thl"l'(' basic kinds: 'The relations which are to be found ill all our represenL<lli()nsare (1) relation to the subject· (Q) r lation to objects. According to Kant.without ever completely reaching it.2 . The que don of God as author of the world brings before us the ultimate totality of being. is a 'natural disposit.. What is involved here is a particular approach to mall. . ....?l f. and soul.. how belong to th ground of human nature. and indestructibility.104 Th id as ontain a certain completeness to which no pos.e. reason is concerned with the totality of pre pnl beings in its beginning and end.. CPR A 8.of th form of the whole . Representation always r lares to something. from the nature of man. 102 M an "s pur reason prOJ cts . However concepts which represen t th e totality belong speci fi cally LO reason which is th faculty or power of r pr 5 nting som thing in its orizin and outcome. The problem of Ulan post'S d i Hi iulties which are still hardly beginning to da v~n O~l us. {. the idea is 'the concept provided by reason . In them reason aims onl at a sy ternatic unity. The specific character of this i of man can be adequat 1y defined only on the basis of a prior and taneous radical clarification of the task it serves: the task of IU'~Ml""LJ~"''''' itself On cannot eagerly busy oneself with epistemology or the phe. concern ones If with metaphysics. either as ftppl'<lrallces or as obje ts of though in gen ral. thus depends on the primordiality. In what way are these questions I:!:fll)WruIi! in universal human nature? How does Kant justify his assertion? He so simpl by alluding to human nature itself. L' i. representations of the general nature (what-ness) of things are conrep IS. but also the positions which the parts occupy relativ Iy to one another' . Despite the assurance with wblClllll Kant carries out his 'critique' in the narrower s nse. to which it seeks to approximate the unity that is empiricaLly possibl .142 'ausalit and Fr tdom as Cosmologi at Probl In... Accordingl . as well as its validity. B 390 .1 of (1) in respect of the representation of the su bjecL. B 595 f. Reason unifies these principles through concepts of reason. For Kant. lU\ CPR B 22. enology of ionsciousnesa or anthropolog . and completeness of interpreta ion of man III relation to the foundation of metaphysics. 21. In other words. In any case and this is now the irucial matter . Kant attempts 0 ground.ion'I'" of man. simplicity.IIII.'l0~ With the three traditional areas of metaphysical questioning in mind.adfl'yS)the essence of mall can be left undefined. The YSl malic ite ofFreedom 143 inner possibility.xpivsiv. why the are asked.. [2116-207J .

II. From these basic kinds of possi ble re-pr sen ti ng there emerge three. One might thus tempted to think that ultimately man is not genuinely free at all.144 Causaliry and Freedom as Cosmological Problem §' 22. Thus Kant says.. We must now show more precisely how the problem of freedom arises ji-otn and as the problem 0/ toorld. This latter.classes of ideas representations of something in regard to Its totality. One thing may be assumed in advance: ·if freedom belongs in the context of the problem of world. not only that Kan[ understands the metaphysical problem of freedom as a cosmological problem. Causality Through Freedom 145 in res pect of the represen ration o r a II thi ngs whatsoever. The usual list is Ciod.~'CI.. world. therefore.'O'1 a rift m what pure reason as such must necessarily posit. Freedom as 'osm..freedom is forced into close connection with natural causality. The problem of freedom arises in the context of the problem 0/ world.]>1\ A ?')7. and immortality'. Ideas are concepts of pure reason. itself has priority vis-a-vis the other cosmologlCalldeas. immediate . In the case of the representation of objects as appearances. we can say that freedom is a distinctive mode o/n. that the end freedom belongs exclusi·vely to the Inglzesl essence of all ess i. If this were not so. :'I. This is so even if freedom is understood as a specific species of causality distinct/rom natural causality. It IS cruci ally iIn po rta n L to sec where th e id ("8 0 f freedom IS 51 ·[Itill genUIl1e metaphysics. overlooking the fact I . Ul101. the second . [20Y-21I] CPR. they are representations governed by the fundamental principle of reason in its capacity as 'the principle of unconditioned unitf. i.. as an idea essentially related to the totality of nature. God. Lit I1S the rota lily of prE'sen t beings as accessible to fini te huIIlatl knowledge..aluraL causality. Since freedom is 'psychological concept'. It is rational psychology which concerns itself the 'thinking subject' as represented by ideas.ological Idea a) The Problem of Freedom as Originating from the Problem of Freedom as a Distinctive Mode of Iatural Causality We said that the first way to the question: 0/ freedom is by way 0/ problem of the possibility of experience as the question 0/ the sibility if metaphysics. Instead. The . Fr-eedom. II 407: B 4'54: CPII.. Yet we seek for it there in vain.. the idea of fre dam will be encountered in psychologia nuionalis.connection with this derivation of three possible kinds representation by ideas Kant mentions the three traditional disci of metaphysica specialis. reason demands the represen tati on 0 f the absol ute tota Iity of the synthesis of appearances. § 22.lO~ Reason applies this principle i. in a 110te to the third section ~ One of the Transcendental Dialectic ('System of Transcendental ~de./reedom.l~·): ·Vlelaphysics has as the proper object of its inquiries three ideas L1nly.first unC01~_~ the unconditioned totality and unity of the subject. 4()7 B 4')3 .. if world is the totality of appearances in their succession.anH·tf'Tas principle that 'there emerge various forms of opposition and dlssf'llsion '. Freedom is properly. it is just blindness and lack of unrlPrst<lnding to enthuse over a pure absol ute reason..--1Ill" the unity and totality of the manifold of appearanoes (which know to be a succession of conditions and conditioned)..e. thus of the genuine subject in he subj ity and I-ness of man. £reedolll belongs wh re we least expect it: it is a cosmological idea. r Ilook 111 vir-w of these statements by Kant.the idea of freedom. as the genuine and proper encompasses the three indicated disciplines. 107 It is clear. and if the experientially accessible unity of appearances IS determined by natural causality. So it is prf'cisely when the principle of reason manifests itself ami exhibits Its e!.'1. then. Uod. the latter itself plays a determinative role in the definition. For when something is defined by distinguishing it from something else. But here also we seek for it in vain. there would be no possibility of conceiving it as a cosmological idea. the third UUUO\I_PI the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought whatsoever.e. 1(. app •. II 395 note. When we consider reason in this representational activity..'10 ". t\ 407.a rs 'I{ (. 'we are presented with a new phenomenon of human reason' This is a natural 'conflict or antinomy of pure 1"(>11son'. B 434. . Instead of world there rrecdom.::. In brief. Causality through. i. 'so III ': im In orta Ii ty. The problem qf must therefore belong in one of these disciplines.e. ' ing freedom of the will as a faculty of the soul. Freedom would then be a theological idea belonging in the theologia rasionalis. the representation of the unconditioned completeness of the unity of that which is present. but t~at . i. understanding 'world' in Kan t's sense as the 'total ity of appearances' (nature and cosmos).e. soul. Which discipline of ideas) is this? VVeare acquainted with freedom as the basio condition and of the ethically acting person.n each of the three areas of representation.

'The cosmological ideas deal. it does not apply in history. Cosmological Problem .he broad Sf'IlSP.~ fin itude of man i. therefore with th totalit of the regressivf"synthesis proceeding in aruecedenua. B ·H)2.e. 407.. it proceNI backward in th directi n of condition and not forward in the direr! ion of consequences. '.' II as in cas s illegitimate . In its representing (i. ausalii Through. Thus the histor of the present is a contradiction ill terms.\ '~09.PI{ \ ~I I.. ubsequent to a historical event. this relates 0 events. II . reason insists on goi ng bark from one condition to another until it arrives at (he unconditioned. Kant s lack of attention to (and at bottom.\ . in accordance with their origin. ind ed..II' to the determination of the under tanding? CPR CPR II> CPR 111 CPR III .1'1\ . I~ of uncondition~ What appears ill cOllsequences Illcidentally. of the causal relationship.n the breakdown of We con lude not only that pure reason is finite.)i. this on ly proves that fini tude is essen ti a I to man rather than something contingent or arbitrary which just happens to atta h to Kant emphasizes tbat it is only from lire understanding that pure scenderrtal concepts can arise: Reason does not reallv zenerate any cept. 111(' II 11('0 11(1 it ioried un ity of this seq uence. 112 Seeking to overcome limits. (.1-7>8..II'> When a reason represe'nts the cornpletenes of the sequence of condi tions. while this applies to th processes of corporeal nature. the entire /1111 o(c(!llditions.. for a historical occurrence is understood essentiallv from its consequences. ibiluy. A representation !II. The contexture of the sequ nee (the relation of lh{' nlllditi()lled to the condition) is defin d by h conditioned having h~'('11 (·'IIIS(·d. i. a sp ificall. of present things. n .. R 43'3 r.~.B '1-')0. though still. and consequently the absoLutely unconditioned (through \\')1il.. not the af f.146 'ausalit and Freedom a. _Cl'1{ . but the future in its pos. In its demand for absolute to tali ty. . and so to endea xt nd It be ond the limi ts of the empirical.arance simply as the domain.Ii'> In the domain exp rience (knowledg of objects as appearances) the employment of understanding is announced in the principles of experience.e.2G.Ji·llili~aliolZ. 409. diss nsion'. Thlls Lilt' principle of reason is ' hat if the conditioned is given. (. B '~. re IflVO ves Occurrences. This is because the historical past is not defined through its position in the bygone.its being-present.!'sSiOlt of events. his ignoranc of) this differ ntly onstituted dimenSIon of beings is indirect evidence for his taking the domain of appp..I·Tlone the condition d has been possibl ) is also given.e. 22. \\"dl <ls("l'ncllO SOlll('lhillg" unconditioned. i. thus a . VVl1at does it mean for reason to apply its 'principle unit" . reason is riot I'll all. Freedom 147 that what I ant s concept of reason announces is precisely the . The most it can do is to free a concept of understanding from unavoidable limitations of possible experience. thus representing 'the absolute f ~ lIb A A A r\ 464. . gen uine an exist only if human knowledge i ssentially subject to these and if the attempt to transgress them results i.. 'because for the complete comprehension of what is given in appearance we need consider only the grounds. but that th reason (the ideas) do not immediately relate to aocessibl beings as Rather.direct d ont xture of conditions and caliri i I iOlTcd.~I I.e.H. The consequences of a historical event cannot be understood merel a following on in time._ . hnl"W'>""'" a long way from overcoming . in of its relation 0 the mpirical'. On the contrary. as i L is tak 11 to be by and xternal interpretations. by the causation of the conditions through the causalit willdl nl lows a s~quellce of appearall e to follow on. not in con equenua=" During OUr rlis("lIssion of the principle of causality we saw that in its d mamical meanillg. 1I . [212-2Hl . a mark of infinit . i. natur in t. the con epts of reason i ately relate onl to the understanding. 11"1..e. What i her determinative is not just anything oc urrmg. its oncepts) reason is only seemingly superior to the understanding as genuine facult of concepts. I ._. The situation is reall the other way the representing of reason is an illegi tirnate transgression of the finitude of understanding. as the laws of the unity of contexture (synthesis) of the manifold of appearances..111" contexture is '['I Iarter . Nor do s this become a mark of infinity by bing nece sary 10 human nature as Instead. solely in order to prescribe to und rstanding its direction towards a certain unit '. but through its future. b) Th Idea of Freedom a Transcendental Absolute Natura] Causality oncept of arure': ) ]1'f'r{lTWC the multiplicity of hat which is preserll in 1.. alteration t h sueI' .finitude.Pres nting signifies transgr sion of limits immoderation thus is a mark of finitude. the equential 0' urr nee of appear~IIC("5. To principles there belong the Analogies. i. . Thus what reason refers to here is precisely the unity and compiCl('lII'SS or this sequence.

This kind of representation leads to the r II ..1l5 Each doctrine can b supported on grounds equall valid and necessary to those which support . which seeks to the given and givable unity of ap-p-earances in its completeness. Kant makes TIll" sf'r'ond 496. \ . To explain these appearances i is necessary Lo ass me that there is also another causality that of fr dom.. something transcendental. is to something whi b a priori makes possible the totality of app arances.h laws of natur . . is produced by the and belongs to th es ential determinations of nature as uch. ['215-2161 . albeit somewhat roughly.' I. This is a representation 'an originary action'. Ij)\cIClless of the ongm of an appearance I~. This is the antinomy in reason's concept of the unconditioned totality of the origin of an appearance.! when unfolded in the •. t thus on rns th represenuuion. Kant's first freedom. B 44. '0"' cr.. it is a concept of nature that possible experience.. the concept of causality. concept of reason of this uncondi tinned causality.~ CPl{ A ·1-20 1'1'. g 448.."9 of an ac ion effecti e from itself afree action.e. Freedom as a causalit is r lated to the po sible totality f!f sequences of a. in r sp ct of their causal conditionedness.~21. . Its opposite. II H2 Fr. concept oJ nature ' -un We have thus traversed. something unconditioned and pertaining to the completeness the contextur of the being-pres nt of appearances.27.21. Fol lowing the proofs. B 449.II~ The renri~<:~·n. '" Cf. veri after close examination. CPH A 420. general.. but retains this..:U'II:\ 4.l" Freedom does not thereby lose the character concept of nature. the same time. . It is the aim of the transcendental antirhelic to exhibit this antagonism as ess ntial to human reason itself. leadi ng to a concept which Kant grasps as transcenden tal freedorll.n~ by reason of an unconditioned call ali10r is the r presentation of a ation which returns not just to sorneth ing prior as its own particular but to the absolute beginning of the sequence. CPR A 42(). B 3094. B +49. precisely as broadened out and up to the unconditioned. inc they are opposed to one another subsl<1!ILiH'ly. .' L 'There is no freedom. Freedom is nothing oth r than absolute natural causality. l' CI'H . IJI. I is a representation of freedom in the scendentai sense. B 44-3. Pure human reason remains 'unavoidably subj t' to their antagonism. The inner dissen ion of pur reason leading to the transcendental idea of freedom is treated by Kant under the heading of 'th Third Antinomy. proof which are meant to show tha both are equally tru and f I' lU. i.. Each. Kant himself fittingly says. The confli ting doctrines pertain not just to any arbitrary questions.n'ss·. cr .: Li'I\ .lIlv groullded in pUTe reason. _ rorlll or prnposl Ions. '~21.e.'oidabl(> illusion'. This broadening out. brings to light an ant. This wa reflects nih r histori al influences on Kant nor private considerations. the stand in w permanent and nee ssar antagonism. but ra her the substanti-ve connection oeuoeens idea of freedom and the problem of the possibility: 0/finite knoialede« . produces a conflict between doctrin and count rdoC!r i nc.. i. Kant provides proofs for each of the two ~lalplllPIILs. ontradicts the first. Kant calls thes conflic ing doctrines 'ps udo-rational . a 'Ir/'1n_~.. B 525.. The osmological idea of th I" CPR A 415. What representing of reason accomplishes is onl a broadening out to unconditioned. and as what. posited. everything in the world takes place solely in f\c-rnnlancc wit. r:l'H A +22. Ii 447 f.\ +1').-pnn"111 .n nerrr-arr . bnL 10 qllestions which human reason must necessarily onr-ounter in its ro".. hiLe making equally justifi d laims to truth.148 Causality and Freedom as Cosmological Problem .114 they an be neither confirmed nor refuted by experience..B +48 IT.).tJ8!: onis rrt within reason itself. J~1 10 ow ll1g two statements: ('0)1 § 23. i.{. of the completeness of all appearances in respect 0/ their origin. which he calls the 'Thesis'. .121 Each of the conflicting doctrines involves 'a natural and ~ll. ~. CI'H i\ H-~rr. B 449.. however. seems to bear 11](' r-lr-ar stamp of truth. this way to freedom shows bow. The Two Kinds qf Causality and the Antithetic the Third Anlinomy of Pure Reason ausality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances in the world can one and all be derived. statement which Kant caLls the ntithesis'. au ality and the Antithetic 149 completen 55 in the origin a ion of an appearan' '.B 57'2./.. . The idea of freedom is the representation of something ical.' The concept that is properly represented in the idea of freedom. the idea 0/ transcendental freedom... . CPH A 544. See also A .

However. the transc ndental freedom which goes be -ond the series natural causes. its ons quellces would also hav alwa s been. the causa Jon he caus must owe its existence itself.e. Kant gives a more precis ization of the concept of freedom. What i presented is only the necessity.)I~1 In brief. al ontological concept.e. which is mainly empirical's'?" What is the meaning of this distinclion Iwl ween the trans endental and the psyclwlogical concept of freedDlIl. the universal ontological concept is as such necessarily implicated in th regional concept. instead.\ HH. It is by no means the case that Kant posits being-free as characteristic of something essentially spiritual. a facult of rlit' sOld. the statemen t under consideration. Il" I CPR A 44G. proo/S Ill1l indirect i. Ior the {'Ulnpn'!it"IISibilily of tilt" world as tota lity of appearances.1111('. it must.1I ause suffici ntly determined a priori. 'But the law of nature is just this. if this prior bad always b en. leads to the problem of 'free action'. (:PH A +49.through freedom determinau. i. W shall come back to this all-important thesis of Kant. B +72.1'1\. Instead the being-present of that which is present. Kant raises the further question of \\'h<llis proved in the proof. at the same time analysing the proof of the Thesis implies for the being of the world. of an absolute '(. On the ther hand. the only probl rn is whether to a cept absolut spontaneity within. CPR A 44'1-. and in relation to. The Possi bi li ty of Ca usal ity through Freedom (Trail scenden tal longs ide the Causality of Nature in the Explanation of the of ih World as niversal Ont. or 'I'll 1)(> sure.' 111 th psychologi al oncept there is r presented a soul. In his 'Obs rvation' on th Thesis. The sequence of appearances can never be without chi.e. 81lC11l' lUJ'"·'--''''' how he understands the 'first beginning' . B . psychological freedom a regional one.oncept of that l)1l' • 11. If it is itself to initial a sequence of appearances go'ver1l8J. the transcend ntal concept of freedom uris(>sill nonnection with the question of the completeness of appearan es preselll b ings in gen ral) irrespective of then' content. properly viewed. Thus. . is really a universal ontological problem within the ontology of the beingpre ent q/ that which is present. HO\ sudl u causality is possible can no more be grasped than can the possibility of IIHIliral causality. they b gin b assumurg the opposite of what 1S mamtained. For Kant.ologi al Problem IT there is no other kind of causality besid 5 natural causality. by natural laws. i solely this: wh ther w must admit a power of poruaneously: beginning a series of successive things or states. causation of an occurrence is always itself something occurring such refers back to something still earlier.150 . :Fo1'otherwis . . i. the problem offreedom. th being of that whi 11is present in its totality (world).'lI. \\lp ean already 5 e that with the fundamental transformation of the ontnlogicai problem the problem of freedom also changes.lR to what preced d it. that nothing takes place unt.'ll'l Btl just this Law of causality leads to no first beginning. and of the freedom of the will in particular. . II H4. natural ausality cannot the only causality. Now this prior state mus' itself b something that in time and thus previously was not. The problem. The law of causality contradicts itself in what it and implies. Thus Kant says: 'What has always so greatl embarrassed speculative r ason in dealing with the question of freedom of the will.se-quence. ausalit and the Aruuheti l51 '?bservation on th Thesis all~ Antithesis . in resp t of the n c ssary repres ntation complet ness of the origin of appearances. a) The Thesis of the Third Antinomy. be ~il'r:1/ 10 u. and then treats this within the horizon of b jng-present. and constitutes the genuine difficulty in the ps chological concept of freedom. itself and as such.~ spectively. is its strictly transcendental aspect.~'21. Such causation. namely w:iU. Ther is thus no firs: beginning in series of cause s. The. the concept of transcendental freedom doe S not bv any "\lIS ronstitut the whole ontent of the ps cl ological . The latter is a specific being which we do not encotllltN in the mer representation of a pres nt being.H7.'ausa lit and Freedom as Cosmological Problem . 12 1H-220J . 0 no suffici ntly cause.. and does not relate specifically to willgoverned or spiritual being. u' Cf. such absolute origination from Itself is absolute fancily. For also ill this latter case we must be content to pSlilblish thai it is necessar as the condition of the possibility of ('Xpl'riPII('C'and its objects. B 'H6. Transcendental rrecdolll is a uruuer. It is necessary to assume another kind of whose causation is such that the cause is no longer d terrnin d by thing prior. III IIis '()bs("rvatioll' on tJ If' Thesis.n. Every beginning is r lative". then thing that occurs presupposes a prior state from which it inevitably according to a law.

which have the 'power of acting Out freedom . also liberates from the guideline of all rules. The truth of the Antithesis plac s cognition under the constant burden of having to seek ever higher for the beginning.~ ere to th e proorf is i di IS III irect.t does not exclude the possi ity that something occurred prior to it. On the other hand. 'ausality and the Antithetic 153 b gilming i. but to complete law lessness. Again. who also (with some exceptions) explained the world by go' beyond th sequence of natural causes to a first mover. then causality itself. natural causality. and nature as such would ceas to be. B +71'1. ill . At the same time. In th .ng. and if lawfulnes b longs necessarily to the es ence of appearances (that which is present). without however. absolutel r begins.e. ince the unit of experien e at all times makes Ill. since transcendental freedom is contrary to h law of causality.. this is the abso origination .':. Kant shows how a proponent of thl' all-em bra ing power of nature would def nd this view against th doctrine of freedom. . For learly. wb implied is only that sometbing can begin quite spontaneously v. B 'PH.. the antagonism brlwec'l1 the two. the illusion of freedom is overcome. of a world-crigin out of freedom. then> is no diffi ult in accepting that chang!" has L III CPH +50.. absolute spontaneity. Kant th us wants to say that the cont nt of the ThesiS. Above all it Aristotle.e. while it is indeed liberation from compulsion. But if there is no lawfulness governing this being. which can never be present. a eecurring action. It is possible. allows [or the possibilit of freely a~ beings within th domain of presen occurrences.an empty t h oug ht-entrty. since substances have alwa s r'xi tNI in the world. i. Everything that Occurs is determined by the all-en ompassi. origination. if freedom wer a kind of lawfulne s it would be nothing else than precisely nature. There is. as beginn ing of t hernse Ives'.thin course of present occurrences. is attested and affirmed in the diverse modifications by rcrnrnon human r ason. To be sure.e. Freedom. It begins by assuming th truth of its opposite.'m In concluding.causal! bu not temporal! . It is vitall irnportan to see that the Thesis and its proof are quite iii accordance with the principles of purl" reason and do not involve anythiJ1f forced or artificial. This self-origination does not have to be absolute beginning 'according to time'. nothing ists but nature. If for example I now fr ly rise from my chair.e. will be evident. no such thing as freedom. m CPR A '!·so. 'For this resolution and act of mine do not form part of the su sion of purely na ural ffects.. tt admit present things. time. that is. B 475. r.» 111- '.'f'f'ssary till" permru1ence of substance i. since the power of spontaneously beginning a temporal series 11-. his T is precise I a onfirrnation of tb4 requirements of reason. £pm~I€Vov. the movement of this unmoved mover does not reduce indeed has nothing whatever to do with. The same applies to the Antithesis. as express d in representing an unconditioncompleteness of th origin of appearances. Kant mak s a historical ref r nc to the philosophers antiquity. consequently. .KiVT]toV. the determining return to prior states.Proces .1 This proof in other words. there would be nothing that could further deLermine it according to constant laws. :~' CPR A +4'j. This causation itself. substances.: . .of a series of events in world. as equally true and provable. III his 'Observation' on the Antithesis. be n demonstrated (although how this occurs remains unknown) 'it _ now also permissible for us to admit within the course of th wOrJi di fferent series . i. The Exclusion b) The ntithesis of the Third Antinomy. If fl'· edom were to enter into the causality of tbe worldprocess. For as an nh olute beginning. nothing decided here as to the human or non-human statu of such b ings. fr edom d molish s the law of the determination of OCClllTPnces i. . is a bei. of Freedom from the Causality of the WQrld. B '~75. who proceeded in way. 'CPR A +47. I)roo[ of the Antithesis: 'If there is freedom in the transcendental sense. as a special kind of causality'. If the proof of the Anillilesis now proves the truth of the Thesis' Opposlte. [221-223J . and knowledge can comfortably bear its burden b safeguarding the constant and lawful unity of experience.''.' H . necessita . !(IVe! cll(. however.iccor danc WI th 1 aws 0 I' nature.\!llililesis: There is no Ir edorn. Once brought into being however. as letting-followon. i.ng power of nature.ri. then transcendental freedom invol es a causation .mean. the Thesis." I~~ rfh ererore.. this would not amount to a different causality. with the 1tprotov KlVOi)v Cr. which asserts the opposite upon equal! sound grounds.152 Causalic and Freedom (L~ roo mological Problem § 2J. on the other hand. everything in the world takes plat' solei. the world remains go erned h.e.. ogether with its mod of proof. Ra in accordanc with the universal ontological COliC pt of action.

!Lilf"r. B 'H9. For in this case alteration' too would have to be rejected.1'1\ :\ -H5. B '~93. present of those ultimate ends [immortality. I L does not hold out the possibilit of ognition arriving at a fixed point of rest. H . world God). 'For were you not assured by eXjperloi1 ence that al teration actually occurs. CPH A '~6'). what pertains 0 being-human as such. r II/ Am I free.. VVhat do w as human beings take to this internal dissension of reason as cons antly confronts us? Do we r main uninvol ed? Do our favour one side. (:1'1\ A H"i.1'i9 The conflict just pr sented pertains quite generall beings. Th onne tion of the Thesis with the general interest of human beings only indicates that if human beings 'w re summoned to action. The concepts of reason i.e. B 1)1)3. ~lO!1sibilit and thus of morality. (PH A +51. the other hand. A '~6"'. initially at least. 'no one can be blamed On for.~9? I" Cr. as arising from the 'natural (lisposition' of man. Reason's In rest in Resolving the Antinom o Thesis and r ntithesis are equally I cessary. To b sure the possibilit of uch an in linit regress cannot be made comprehensible But such incorn prehensibi l i L • is no reason for dismissing this 'enigma' • na me'. which aims at resolving rather removing the antinorn be raises the followina qu tions.e. but wha human b ings take an in qua humans. een objecti ely how v r this do S not give the Thesis greater credibility than the ntithesis but only indicat s that human reason is incapable. l'egards all knowledge as belonging to a system.~ 2}. CPH A 463. '1"11(' eonte t of our probl m r quir s that we must here dispense with all\" Ilwrongh e arrtination of the antinomie a. ril. pecial haracter or the Cosmological Ideas in th of th Possibilit of Genuine Ietaph: si s. but man remains 'alwa s with one foot in the alr.e.e.7 c) The. CPH '\ ·P+. God] towards which all ndeavours of reason mu t ultirnatelv cOllverge. m CPH A +'il. While general theoretical and practical i 11 teres LS naturally favour he Thesis. The Antithesis demands a restless search for ever-receding callses. this play of th merely speculative reason' between Thesis and Antithesis 'would disappear like a dream'. a sian which cannot be simply torn out of human nature and a"UJU"I. a speculative ill(('resL is involved. LI<. Cl 'I{ :\ +6(i I:! +9'~."7 Not onl do pur reason harbour this diss nsion within itself bu Ille diHering attitudes to this diss nsion can make valid points against 0111' auot her. forms a natural recoinmendation for the assertions of the Thesis'. squall true. we shall not be concerned with the question of whether l 1{. we decide for freedom as the condition of the possibility of ""l 0 a certain moral interest is rhibi ed r.. I'"~CPH r:- (.~79.154 Causality and Freedom as Cosmological Problem . of an unprejudic d aluation of its own inner di S u ion. just because it is reall no ground at all becausE' it cannot guarante anything primary and originary. presenting for trial the two 'on ending panies'.1 a priori the possibility of such a ceaseless sequence of being not-being. Causality and the Antithetic 155 likewise alwaj s e isted thus that there is no First beginning. 1l. B I)()~ r. 12:H-225] .l'l~ ow sine 'human reason is by nature architectonic'T'" i. 1'1{. to the degree tha we want a satisfying answer (not (lbtainabJ ou the side of the Antithesis) to the question concerning the totaliLY of that which is present. you wou ld never be able to excOI~tati~. Their antagomsm is a dissension within reason itself.". freedom.. however.I'15 This means that the main direction of metaphysical questioning. tip Antithesis does not enjoy sur h popularit . as its possi bi Iity would be offensive'. and if so which?!'>!! By oUI interests' Kant does not arbitrar needs and wishes. B 'l91. and provabl . To th se b ings there b longs the indi idual human as a pnS!seIDl:~ item of the world-totalit . 1'>'/ / U.ICIIiI What is called for is a more thorough investigation of its origin. Il ~.2.!" At the same time. and human beings 'would choose their principles e elusively in accordance wi th practical interests'. the ideas (soul. ill deciding fOT the Thesis. n·. like ower beings. CPH :\ 407. H 10. 1\ I:' CPR A 47+.. i. 'the architectonic in teres of reason . CPR A 'If') r. much I ss be prohibit d from. or is every· tiling compelled by natural necessity? Deciding in [avour of the Thesis is a decision for freedom.r'll Thus the ground of the Antithesis. Kant pmsues this course of inquiry. am led by the hand of nature and fate'. B ')1)2. but not freedom as mer lack of compulsion. developed b Kant. 'annot serve to erect a complete edifice of knowledge. More sIH'I·iicallv. I~ I) )3. i given by the Thesis. For an individual person the disput wheth r a presenl being can by itself initiate a sequence of becom s the question of wh ther I am fr in rnv actions or. i.91..

To sure. H the antagonism continues nevertheless. it. we feel that something is wrong. of the condition of the givenness of the whole S('lIUI'tlc(' of conditions. '49 §' 2-+. against one another. Were this an tagonism to rest on an Illusion.e(\olH as a cosmological 1l<llUrai dint tile to the problem of freedom. but the representing of totality.is precisely possible object of experience.e. the whole series of Its conditions is also giVen. What interests us is solely the position of the of freedom with in metaphysics. what is intended in th cosmological ideas .nd sharply display their mutual antagonism. CP!~ A 476. their antagonism is resolved III such a way possible unity of the two ~ causality from freedom and natural ("atl~. II . i. But on the other hand. However. problematic arises as the antinomy of a cosmologlca] idea. although this may be respect of the psycbological and theological ideas.lSo. We are acquainted the object itself. I-\eanng this principle. does not mean scepticism.he sceptica! method. However. I . na ure .cosmos. it is crK[~\I!l'. it LS already a matte!" of basic significance that Kant.v !l11i ljllite apan from the prospect of a possible resolution of the antagonism..nom. Why is this The object of the cosmological ideas is the totality of appearances. do not hold fast to hat to which they relate as cosmological ideas (appearances). however. for one pl"OnOUDCe 'impudent boasting' and 'extravagant self-conceit"~ it to to so I a 1\ problems. the cosmological idea of freedom thereby on a distinctive and privileged status (vis-a-vis the psychological theological ideas) such that the task of resolving its inner cannot be avoided.r Towards Resolution ofthe a) '1'he DelUSIOn of Common Reason in the Handling of Its Pr inci pie The transcendental concept of freedom originates within an ideaformation whereby reason applies its principle of necessary representation. B 504. insisting that these ultimate q uesti ons of reason ve instead for a more modest attitude. and the questions which now from these ideas relate precisely the completeness of the synthesis of experience. however. namely of the 1"('laliOlI 01" the givemlp. it would resolve itself in such a way that what he ides' represent could be drawn positively into the possihility of xperieoce. and especia lly not to the manner in which the object of these ideas is given. Seen in this light freedom would be unconditioned causality What prinCIple does reason apply? If the conditioned is given. in the Alll!LIiC'lic. tb is mea \\S that idea does not remain as the counter-concept to causality. We only have the intimation lbal thr. There IS much here that does not occur to us at 1['·ISI· . If we reflect on the matter.11 .e. we can discover the key LO the r85OIution and origination of their an tagonism. What is given here as known must also provide measure for evaluating the ideas and the way their objects are given.n1tI!I knowledge of the absolute totality of the originating sequence of appearance. nor addiction to doubt. It could be that these ideas..sets these arguments of reason.. their antagonism must be resolved. 'These ideas must presuppose the object gIven. CI'H A ':i1l7.is at least not unthinkable.Pll condition and conditioned.156 'ausaluy and Freedom as Cosmoiogical Problem o\'crrO\1llllg § 24. of re. <. although we aro unable LO specify precisely what this is. Preparatory it. In what sense is this so? The principle speaks of condition and conditioned.first way to freedora can brought into unity: Wilh the second toav: The problem of freedom belongs to the problem of world. this completeness of that which is present in its being-present never empirically given. Instead. even less despair at the possibility of truth. This idea-formation pertains to the multiplicity of objects as a sequence of synthesis and as ever-progressing from conditioned to condition. when we simply enunciate tile prJl\Clp Ie. i. i.principle somehow involves a delusion. cosmological ideas cannot be carried through. Instead shall inquire into the probl m's primordial rootedness in the essen~:: human existence.e. He calls this t. Instead. 1101 HI . which. ILS f uu content. Only in this Ivay call the antagonism be resolved. I ••• cr.ss of the conditioned to the givenness of the eondiLin)! iii II1 . is always possible. for and from any given thing. But it speaks of more. the totality as cannot be given and intuitively presented.H 53'i l227-229J . There is an obvious temptation thereto.simply attentive looking at the fact of opposition. it does not apply to cosmological ideas. in the genuine meaning of the word . II< [n. only thus can its possible false pr~surpositions come to light. whol e seq\lf'tlc~'. of the relation hrlw(. Preparatory (Negative) Determinations Third Anti. In regard ega/i've) Determinations 157 these antinomies~H' necessary as such. and how the . 50rn!' way must be found for . in the way they arise and create contradictions. such that both sides of the argument come into view a. or whether they are only made necessary by Kant s approach to reason and human existence.

this IS already delusion and fa lsil Ication. I1I1111CI.in the rrnnor premise of the argument. this conclusion can be seen as [231-'23 1 . so also is its whole se . without being recog1I1/. we belie e our elves capable of immediately understand' and appl iJlgthis principle. 'rllis letting-giv of appearances stands under definite conditions. conditioned. It is purely lo i al po tulate. different they rna. Common reason takes the purC'1vontological relationship betw en con pts as equivalent to the onti('<11 r('\ationship between the givenness of an actually existing conditioned <111<1 its condition. as they are in themselves.· that appearances are encountered in spac and time.Sl'llL8tiol1.e. i. of the argument by which r ason omes to its cosmological ideas. Such talk of the givenness of something conditioned and of condition not only remains indefinite. '[hi 1 l1ing-out goes further. This lctting-glvP is subject to definite conditions. i. to appearances. What enables accepting belongs to the I '(. That which enables is earlier Til ll• and prior to what is enabl d. Beings are given to us on] a' self showing. illcluding those' which enable us to have all a cepcing TI'1'(. of such a SOl' that verything we rllCOllnte!' shows its If within space and time.~ ~hat does this commonness consist 111~ I he iomrnon IS the mdifferen I. all things are thrown together and treated as equival nt. It is simply taken for granted that the speaker (the bUJl'lan being) is acquainted with things as they are and i thus in a position to decide over what is condition d and conditioning. is a matter of cognitive determinations as such. the unconditioned.e. 0111" of which is the idea of freedom. the principle cannot claim that the wbole series of conditions is given along with the condition d. Preparatory egative) Determinations 159 evertheless.e. Now LI10 conditioned is given as something that originates (follows on) from SOI1IC'lhillgelse. th n what enables accepting r5·" sl also hav the character of intuition. The relationship between condition and conditioned fundamentally different to the rela ionship between the givenness something conditioned and the givenness of its conditions. things within space and time.158 Causality and Freedom as Cosmological Problem §' 24. om bing or oth I' xists. given conditioned and its condition. . The concept of conditioned alread refers to a ondition. but makes it appear self-evid nt that human b iogs know the things (beings) unconditionall . i. What does it mean for common rea~ to apply the principle to the giuenness of the conditioned? SomethiDI conditioned is giv n. All relations atta hing to Lhe beings we encounter are therefore predetermined as temporal relaliollS. The nabling intuiting must in uit in (Id"allcc that which it is to rep res nt. In order to once again briefly exhibit this levelling out of differences. a we see the common procedure of reason in th conception and employment of thi principl . b li~ve t:his. '0 the unconditioned of such a series is also given th absulllLt'ly orig-inary causation.. i. If this being exists 81. In spealcinl of snvenness the tohat and where and hou of this givenness remain unin· terrogated. mote cisel .e. if the anditioned is given in and as app arance. This applies irrespective of what is given condition d ind ed irrespective of wheth I' anything is giv n at all i.II("f' of accepting. then what conditions it also exists. let us consider the principle in its function as first premise of an argument. Provided on Iy that the com mon proced ure (l! rr-uson lias become transparent to itself.. this series is onl ever given successively in time. Rather. the latter • an ontica l-factical relationship within the temporal occurrence of evn"". llla~ i~ ~~rnmon reaso:1. howeve.('d HS meaning this . actual] be. we mLISL have alreed rea hed [langen] them and encountered thurn as beings. Since comm~~n ~s takes hings fot w'_ they are not. is actually present in its totality. the are Il10cies of human representation. an intui ion.dwly at tributed to things-in-th mselves is now transferred. onl as appparances. of conditions. How does reason make this principl ornmon or indiffer nt? We said quite generally that this principle speaks of conditioned and con tion. is also given.e. and illllllLaneously with.hings ill themselves which could also b pres nt next to.e. How ver pr is Iy because It is a purely lOgi postulate it can say nothing factical about the relationship between. Ir edom.admittedly.~'. VVhat is f. Rather. It can claim only that the givenness of something conditioned implies the necessit of a series of conditions leading up to it. The existing being is th r b taken as a thing-in-itself I.J at knowledge of beings. The latter art' not t.e. This also appli s to the relation between th encountered giv nness of the ccnditicned and the givenness of the conditions. conditions and the unconditioned its If must certainly xist.t'. to a series of conditions. this does not mean that the unity of the temporal relations of the conditioned to its condition is alread 'co-gi en. the former' Iogi al-conc ptual relationship which exists only in thought.O'lOr. In no way does the logical pos imply tha if something conditioned is given. so cht' who]' series of its conditions.ence. Consequently. i. This fundamental difference is the first thing that common Tea overlooks and levels out. PI' cisely Ihis b(·jng is now taken as appearance . of the A. wi lhou t attending to the conditions of its possi ble given ness. That is. i.. We. If the condition d is giv n. the complete series of. with equal hI!iiU'iollstlf'sS. Common reason does not see that for beings to be given to us for us to arrive [edangel7. If accepting is intuition. i.

Finally. and to hold fast to iL as tbecentre of all further metaphysical probl('rnal irs. Olin' this false presupposition is uncovered. a dialectical opposition. I"!~ 235] . illusion I>CI whi has su h lead' to the antinomies. If this wer the cas in regard to the and Antithesis their antagonism would continue just as b fore. but that it thus hinder itself from coming to selfSo Kant can say that common reason. tbe problc'm of the antinomies was what first led Kant to discover this distinction. I'll The claim of both to be actually provable and must accordingly be reject d. considered in totality. w" can now und rstand why the problem of the antinorni('s was the crucial impetus for his work. and is not made thematic. If.positive and fundamentalpart of the Critique of Pure Reason to delineate the finitude of knowledge in its essence. nall1ely that appearances are taken as things-in-themselves. no·w. i. I~. in Kant's critical discussion of the metaphysica specialis we S('p Ihr. The Thesis ma. However. . it bas not yet been shown that the Thesis and ubstanti ly in error in what they laim as their respectiv is quite possible for a statement to be true even though the advanced [or it are invalid. the supposedly genuine ("(llllradicl. In the doctrine of the antinomies. I The antagonism is rernov d b pointing to its false presupposition. Preparatory: egalive) Determinations :161 biatantly incorrect. B 529. as it employs this principle the formation of cosmological ideas. as WE' saw. 'Ii) 1)[> sure. '~1 ern A 'j01. the primordial origin subject to no further conditions. Clearl then. in this way making plain the basic tendency the ritique of Pure Rea on. na 'UTe cannot possess. l'n c A 'jOG. The problem of pure reason must therefore be recogni7. This distineLion i. '0 b ing the illusion at the basis of both 'La em nts.~.. presupposition overlooks 1h(> fact that as the r. their proofs are found involve an ' rror'. Iatural reason is kIlO\\'11 "" CPH A 5()O. But it is th ta k of th first . The finitude of man is not decided UPOIl.ion becomes a mere apparent antagonism. but bri ng it in to a form that more clearly th antagonism. particular illusion has made them accept a reality none is to be found so that the antagonism amounts to nothing. to lile' natural illusion residing in hilmar nature. for {'). . i. We can thus th The is a saying that the ordered series of causes.Since nature is no being-in-itself it cannot be said to be either ex· finilr or infinite: The presupposition of both Thesis and Antithesis is false. For the solution of this problem requires reflecting on the distinction between appearance and Lhing-in-itself. necessar if purl" reason i to obtain elf-transparenc with rezard to its own genuine possibilities.e. the Antithesis would say that the series of the regr ssive s nthesis of onditions is infinite.tion. II 528.f'd as the probl m of finite knowledge.same fundamental attitude as in hi criti a] consideration of the ITlel(jjJh.e. on an ill usion necessary to COlIlJDOnreason.._ Thesis and A ntithesi .. operat s within a 'quite na:tUl' . This. an only be resolved on the basis of the indicat d distinction betw en appeararlC and thing-in-itself the doctrine of antinomies. the commonness of reason consists in the tha i not onl maintain itself within this indifleren as something evident. this distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself is nothing else than th dis in tion b twe J1 finite aud infinite knowledge. H 524. indp!'d. b) The Distinction Between Appearance (Finite Knowledge) and Thing-in-Its If (Infinite Knowledge) as the I to Resolving the Problem of the Antinomies However. for Ran is indir t proof [or what he had to establish po itively in th transcend ntal aesth ic.the an inomi e. in connection wi h the problem of the rtlliliriariolls or metaphysics as such. . B 5:'4. quite properly given his immediate pur[los!.{i 24._ is foundational for the proofs of both Thesis and Antithesis."":~ir(J generalis (ontology). and then resolving it by reference . the Antithesis that natur is infini teo This kind of opposition is call d a sirnpl contradi . that nature is given to u absolutely and is ahsolutel. with exhibiting the antagonism. The Thesis asserts freedom as unconditioned cau ality.llnpl!'. . This is unambiguousl staled by Kant himself. This a1 0 means that the finitude of human nature must be defined from and in the essence of knowledge. between finite and infinite knowledge.intainl that nature is fini te. "" CPH 1\ 501. therefor .. question must be raised as to the character of this antagonism h""I'ur. MOTe precisely.llJ([(\!lJpntal concept of appearances. we shall ke p to the Third Antinomy (the onl have th LIS far treated).e.160 Causality: and Freedom as Cosmological Problem .152 disput can only be resolved by howing that they are real! q about nothing. absolute '·lstl'IWl'. What kind of opposition do the antinomies To decide this. '[0 understand the <mtagonisJJl in this way (i. The principle. I ant contents himself. is finite.. in accordance With common reason) presupposes that nature IS a thing-in-itself... Both TheSIS and Antithesis are based OLl an illusion and .

we are concerned here with 1. For both statements .I n1nnectiol1s. ll' the Critique of Pure Reason. 'II is shown that L1w pnnci pie is deceptive in I"r. If we follow Kant's first way to freedom.. At the same time. Positive liesoitaion of Third A nunomr 163 common reason b~cal!se it le~~ls out essential differences. i. does not let them emerge as differences. a distinction that itself involves the problem of the finillide of knowledge. They say more than what IS necessary for contradiction: it is thus an \\11\' i §25.he antinomies. wh~t .YSics. which in turn are conceived now ill the sense of absolute (I . If! 'bein g'.attribute to nature something it is not..o anythln~. This finitude must be exhibited. and why does it occur? Can its necessity be seen from the un derstanding of being itself? In wha t way is it necessary? I t is a matter of" bringing thefinitude of man to light beyond the mere finuude 0/ his knowledge. t ia LE'd ness'.ive opposition of the statements does not amount t. but the sllbsHlI\!. ontieal.ng essential begins and ahidE's.162 Causality and Freedom as Cosmological Problem (hi' §25. closer consideration of tlH' oppOSItIOn ren~als that it is not a genuine contradiction. Secondly. only was it necessary to show this more comprehen_ sively and primordially.that naturE' is infini te. now in the sense of finite knowledge. . i. encounter this within the problem of t. its undifferentiatedness. through the consideration of origiJlS. however.e. demonsL:rating the inner n ulli Ly and invalid ity of Ilu. Freedom as the Causality of Reason: Transcendental Idea 0/ an 'ncondiuoned CausalUJi Character and Limits if the Problem of Freedom. that nature is fini te .TIl\' ·judi flert'IIC:e' "I" the understanding of heing.. From where does this originate.e.lughl LIS about this problem? Has what we are seeking. with equally indefiniteness. there is a necessary reference to freedom. but in order to awaken the inner resolve and cOlnposure wherein and within which everythi. proceeds HI two stages. was 0111'" of tl 'l' (·i g-h I ehar aeu-rlst irs W(' (·11 U rnerated. Our way of interpreting the employment of the principle ot reason already provides a direction here. Whae has our discussion of the antinomies t.11('problem of freedom. i. This is the form the problem of world as the basic q uestion of the critical resolution of thf traditional metaphysical discipline of rational cosmology. The antagonism cannot be resolved by placing the truth wholly on either side. then so also does this. I his commonness belongs to the essence of' human reason. become allY more clear? H t he all tagon ism Ill'l \\"(·('11 Thesis and :\ ntithosis is resolved in the manner indicated. First. or is it something essential? If metaphysical questioning belongs to the nature of man.!nJllfl(lillf!: (!llTu!l~ph.ies to purely logical connections IS taken as applicable La purely onu'.lId j1(. Within the' problem of the antinomies. The key to resolving the difficulty is the distinction between appearante: and thing~in-ilself. then a comprehensive il. namely the sys"·"ul/it position 0/ the probiern a/freedom within. the problem or freedom as [2')7-238] ". The resol ution of the an tagornsm.I kilowledge. i. and indeed in' opposing senses: on the one hand freedom exists alongside and in nature. This becomes a problem in connec. BuL what is signified bythe undifferentiated character of both? Is this just an eITOl" of traditional metaphysics.ti~~ with t~e de fill i lion of accessi ble beings and the condi tion of the pOSSI bill ty of then accessi bility. not in order to ascertain its boundaries and limits. pecijic delusion (according to Kant. BuL. The Positive Resolution 0/ the Third Antinomy. but above all this natural commonness had to be exhibit~d as an essential moment of f~nitude.1) ll. on the other hand there is only nature and freedom does not exist. No.lletrating consideration of this book will inevi tably need to focus on lh" proble-m of Finitude . takes the basic problem of the foundation of metaphysics to concern the finitude of man. this is (lit lv a lIf'gativl'" resul t. That is. . A decision is only possible by way of a resolution of the antagonism. . . 1-16. What is it in human nature t hat produces this delusion? We have already indicated what it is: LhE'mode if the understanding a/being. purported opposition.e. necessarily). It was a matter of sbowing what this commonness genulI1cly consists m and why It belongs to natu:ral reason . In this case. SPe' above ]1.? 1'>1 il functions to gellerate the conflicting statements. this origin is such that It can continue to walk abroad in human nature. Not only is the prUlclpe 01" proof for both Thesis and Antithesis deceptive ill this sense.eby showing that the origin of the conflict is such that no such decision can be demanded.. it will be said.'" Illusory dialectical contradiction. within the antagonism between Thesia and Antithesis. the Andnomtes a) The Resolution of the Problem of the Antinomies as Going Beyond the Problem of Finite Knowledge to the Problem of Human Finitude as Such Let us once again consider the problem 0/freedom as it emerges within problem of the antinomies. the context of' Lh« f. '" it is an illusory opposition. within the Problem C!t. What is the significance of ~ erasure of the differences between the logical. and ontologi~ such that these are all understood.

saying uoihiug about their what-content. The analogies are consritut ive ill the second sense. We cannot get beyond the poi~. which itself presents a lawful Only by reaching a positive unity can we grasp the metaphysical of the problem of the antinomies and thus the problem of freedom. Tilt' Hpsolution of the Third Antinomy ill Looklllg Towards Man as El.his. because the COsmOlU. but I t IS not what we actually seek from an authentic understanding of the problem. we can no longer proceed from. Thus the possibility of the unification of the two causalities in relation to one and the same effect depends on whether an effect can permit a double relation £0 causaiicr. i. has been the goal of our discussions.e.e. either of the two alternatives. or remain within.S '" These also are only regula: ive. one and the same effect must be causally determinable in eli rreren t relations. But if one and the same event is to proceed {rom two fundamentally different kinds 01' causality. A posi live resolution of the inner antagonism of reason .e. that every effect withiri the world issues from either nature or freedom. such that the cosmol ideas. we must entertain the possibility that one and the same world-event may be determined by both natural causality and the causality or freedom. in the antinomies would i lSplf be n. i.-'. Therefore.!l:IClllnlll ideas relate specifically to experience.~ t. On the other hand. TIt(' l_)uestioll Concerni. the unity of nature \\. i. t\atul"ul causality is already demonstrated in its rea lity. To be sure. III til!" implications of this regulative validity (which is the on ly kind of ". It is only a regulative principle. I~'\ but only gives a rule for the knowledge of nature in accordance with the idea of completeness. hut a 11 ontological postulate pertaining to the totality of experiential kILO\\·lerlge. i. With this either/or. however. In Kantian terminology: the principle does not anticipate or predetermine what the object is as such. I. in their specific relatedness to the unity of experience. This means that the critique of the principle in its employment by common reason must way for a consideration of its correct form. r-nncern ing presence. It is not a constitutive principle like the Analogies of Experience.h<~lFeedom i posited inl. I hIS 15 the bare resu lt. This. as IIITl'~s<lri!y belonging LO the r-ssr-n tia l COli tent of nature .~.hal is the ultimate of the Problem of the Resolution of the Aruinomies.e. does not mean settling on something absolutely unconditioned as given and givable. in posing the question of a possible positive resolution of the antagonism. became dear that what the principle demands is only the oontlnuol8 return from the given ness of the conditioned to the givellness of a condition. 2.lIlj a~d void: Does problem In fact disappear along with Lhe resolution 0:1 the antinomies' thi.01 ecnstitui ive' is ambiguous.ng a Causation for Appearances Outside the A ppearances and Conditions of Time. 2. origin and motivation of this problem concerning and freedom? Is this problem basically determined by a purelY speculative interest in the ultimate barmony of knowledge. r.~e sense~c transcendental cancel" of nature. This does not involve an ontical interpretation of the totalill". can claim to a positive function within the total problem of the possibility expenence. the question concerns the possibility or odlcrw ise of reason's unification of natural necessity with the causali ty of frer(lorn. They are nOI r-oust itu Live 11111 Lhey are stiil gNlui. ~ayiJlg 110lhing al ail about the objects us such. or is ihere some other interest behind it? However. to the possibility of the uni{y of the two opposing Why is this so? Kant would answer that this is because unity is a principle of human reason as such. For the problem of the unification of nature and freedom to even be posed. and further. '. rather somethingllboUr t hei r moue of pn-sen ceo Const i l U Liv(':l . we remark at once that the present problem must undergo a ill its fac/ico/' implementation This is because the simull<llH'lLy of the two causali Lit'Sis SUd1 that natural causal ity still retai ns the 11Pl1('1"hand.j64 Causality and Freedom (IS Cosmological Problem .ne principles.~'25. The negative character of Kant's consideration of the antinomies now be transformed into something positive. the resolution of antagonism initially has a negative meaning. ow the question arises fl. of the II opposing elements. The principle says nothing concerning the essential structure and constitution of nature.e.ng Person A/lIT al l t.which does not b) The Displacement dil/l/rll"elllclIl l21-U-Q42] . but merely postulates what must occur in the regression. bUI it must lead to thing positive. every bridge towards unification is already broken. which haw not been concerned provid a complete historical report of the Critique of Pure Reason.didi I Y possessed by the prinoi pie) for the positive resolu lion of the !\!llillolllies. on whether the effect can b( und ·rstood in terms of both natural causality and the causality of fref'uom. concern ing wha l conten l. Common reason misrecognizes the character of the principle by it to assert something about things-in-themselves.hically Acti. The problem concerns the resolution of the antagonism between natural caUl< ality and the causali ty of freedom.i have the task of disclosing the sense of the possible unit). Positive Resoluuoa C?/ Third Antinomy 165 it arises.

but only b reference to particular domainf of bing. f)()ssibililY of a unification of th tv 0 causal ities in a purel r h\"jlolhetical. intra-temporal auses also have other causes. of the being-present of that which is present remains the decisive instance. However. For this reason we shall not hear anything substantivelv new in these discussions of Kant.~'25. .. In any as. 'freedom can also occur'.1~6 We see that natural causalit and unit of the manifold of appearances. B 560 fro [24')-2 5] . since Kant undertakes th resoiUlion of the antagoni In II ilh a view to man. Tlw i III portance of the resol u tion of precisely this Th ird Antinomy is Ind I('<ltel bv its more extensive treatment in Kant s text. Since the validity of the prin . ). and then on this · '. the resolution of the antinomies is concerned only to demonstrate the possibilit of the unification of freedom and nature. The approacli and direction of the problem. rr.£ the questions. '''' PH. but we must attend to the kind of' probl matic at work. cr. do ap ances necessarily have causes which are apperu'ances. the problem it: 'extremely subtle and obscure'. nature is taken. CPH . the problem is as follows. the unification of natural causality with the causality of freedom cannot occur through compromising the closed causality of nature. . Can an intra-temporal being a well as ha . however. cerning the possibility or unification can only be about whether. he wall ts to present MIt .l5f For Kant. then I ant's philosophy will be indistinguishabl from the rno t omrnonplac discussions of freedom of th wilL It is characteristic of all vulgar conceptions of philosophy to see only material for Learning and knowing.the specific character of Kant's first way to freedom. or do appearan xist which are related to causes that are not themselves appearances? this is possible. A 537. F\ 564. Instead. CI 1\ A 536 13 -56+.\ 536. It is important to notice.not in an empt and general manner. such that this difference corresponds to difference between two causes in their causation. and • their causation.'IS ttl show the possibilit r of th unification of nil. In this task.166 Causality and Fr edam as Cosmological Problem . The Sill first has a preparator character. it is all important to see the problems.onstru ti e g ncral ontological r flection. presented in this abstract way. which is none other than man as ethically acting person. toward a quite specific being. w have the opportunit or' more concrete! r grasping he essence of a ausalitv of freedom. If one fails to see this. through t mporal uccession. B 565.deter rniria ion. In other words. Positive Re elution of Third Anlinom_y 167 mean. that Kant does not want to disprove the antagonism between the two kinds of causali ty by appealing to the facti cally existing entity possessing the mode of being of man. the question con. despite the lawfulness of nature. then there are causes which in their causation are 0 the sequence of appearances. where the discuse il is divi~led ill 0 three sections.J~ I• thuS til(' III taphysi al possibility of man as a world-entity OurI' again.iple of natural causality i incontrovertibly estab_ lished by Kant hirns If in the Analogies of Experien . and or r-lianlCLerizing the cau arion of his kind of cause. The question conC rning the possible unification of na ural causality with th causalit of freedom is to be discussed in rela ion to this particular being. and indeed precisely in respect causation. What is to be demonstrated about freedom? Within which horizon does the discussion operate? What em rges from all this for the inn r content of the problem of t1 It freedom' Th first hing to be said here is that the existence and possibility of fr edom is not to be pro ed or shown. On the con trary.I'i" The ." He means that th problem cannot be clarified at a g neral ontological level. however. whether fr dom can be 'saved' in the face of another causality which ill already immovably stabushed. We are now in a position to review . What this shows is that the problem. but adds that it will become clear 'in the: cours of its application'. Rather. question concerning the unification of the two causalities is abo.llld IS roue riled at a q ui te general level with the antagonism III 'the Idea hJ tlltallty ill the derivation of cosm ical events from the ir I'flUSes. thus through a t mporal re1a . of the resolution of tM call. but on the basis of our concrete discussions . the method and din'ct ion of questioning. and the field of its solution. This means tha pnovio\lsly obtained concepts such as causation and action will receive a nlnrp prr-r-isr. This problem of resolution determines the genu. I . urc with freedom.. are extra-temporal? Kant himself admits that. since sequences of appearan are themselves causally determined. which th rnselves. that a natur must nee ssaril actually exist. therefore th problem is whether effects (appearances) b seen ill two different ways. and not just the conten t 0. 0 ultimately the. at antinomie steer. as the authoriuuioe in lance: it is a matter of 'saving' freedom in relation to nature. are not formal and external to th content but these alone determine whether the genuine substantiality in the cont nt is philo ophical.ine character and Limits of the problem of freedom." CI'H A ')'')1 I'".

Kant's procedure is LO begin by asking how a being must be if it is to be simultaneously and unitarily determinable through natural ausalityanct causality from fr dom.":' Only now does . the opposite is the case: the discu . To be noted here is that not evpry aCTepling intuiting is receiving.. .9. B '5G(j 1'1". In general ontological terms.r.e. of freedom as a problem of world. and says himself of this S ction: 'J ha e thought it ad . the 'how' of causation the character clearly det rrnines be tela ion of he subject of causation to its \\. The empirical character is that kuofulne s of rallWliioll lJ"hich is empirically accessible in experience.in the ontological constitution of human beings is also defined in the same way as nature i. c) Empirical and Intelligible Character. There is also an accepting which il('('ppts what it. :ow Kant distinguishes two characters.. 11. B -'j70. Positive Resolution of Third rlntinomv 169 next section is beaded: Possihiluv of causality through freedom . tion to man.)'~2. i. the genuin metaph sical resolution rf the problem. 'character' means law of causality necessary rule of the 'how' of causation of the caus . this means the obje tin r lation to the s~bject. Th character governs th kind of conn ctions betw en actions and thus also between effects. provide a concrete treatment of the arne problem by way of an app . espe iall so because this is by no means unambiguous and consistent. a self-giving accepting.&Wll £1 pia.e II111SL m. through causalitv: That causality is thereb modified doel not alter the fact that call ality remains the fundamental ontological haracteristic. Kalil'S critique i not and cannot be radical.'1(". '. as concretely-factually presented in is merely an instance of the universal cosmologicall determined uni lion of both. how v r. the rnetaphy. ~\"II('11 something is called 'empirical' it is concei ed in relation to lis IJlOcip of k nowability. able to gi e this outlin sketch of the olution of our transcenden1:il problem..)3~ fr. for he does oot pose the question of being in a fundamental way. In so doing. . CI'H A '1. This means not only that freedom is posited concept of natur but that the unity of th oncrete human being 81 rational-s nsor entity is metaphysically prescrib d from the cosmologiall: problematic. Instead. effect. however entral for Kant. causalities.. [2'1< 7-248] .e. "" CPH "" CPR "OJ A . TOW Kant .in receiving acceptance. This do s not involve app aling to man as the ground proof for his construction. the causality of llallll·P..P.13567. This means that the problem of freedom. now briefly present the course of Kant' positive re oluuoa ofdie Thini »lnunom . which is. 1". The Double Character of App arance and the Possibility or Two FIIIldamentally Different Causalities in Relation to the ppearance as Effect ']'11(. i unable to occup the crucial position within the problematic of metaph SlCS.ppearance. Let us begin with he first so-called 'em pi rica I' ch aracter .+ IrI t hiIS can t ex t .icient cause must h ave a character . For Kant.11 t lI:l harmony with the universallaw of natural necessity. I is ("lil>i<ltio!"l in its 'how' as belonging to appearance. Something is em pirical if it bplongs to experience.b4 being of man in his totality and authenticity. L savs that .6 rf. the empirical and the intelligible. then it em rges that problem '?f man is drawn into the universal ontological problem. . ex peri ence.lIi2 Only this reference to man signifies nothin more than an xplanatory Iirmation does it becom ornpletely clear that the unit of natural ca ity and causality from freedom.. . Intelligible Character as the Mode of Causation of Causality from Freedom.e. '. Thus Kant heads the final section: 'Explanation of the cosmological i of freedom in its connection with universal natural necessity. ':5+2. this means accessible through e perience wher b we must not forg t that the foundation of finite experi !H'C' is sen ory mtuition s nsibility. above P11. lerna lie oftmditional metaphysics. ical-ontological problem 0/ E. This is no accident. i tence does not breoi through. 0 that we may be the b tter enabled to survey the course whici reason has to adopt in arriving at the solution'. as a. B '\ 70. . gives itself. and this is precisely action. we pa parli('ular attention to certain additional determinations relating to causaliw as such. The essen of experience ronsists in receptivit . how is the causal character of freedom to be more precis ly defined? J ant goes on togive a ccustruction for the resolution of the antinomies. If we use the term 'Existence' [Exislenz] to designate t. of the problem in relation to man is simply an intuitive presenta . A . Let us recall the universal ontological concept of action: 16' 'Th'e relation of the subject of causalit to the eft ct'. Thus what is possibly not-nature. • .. every e :fl. It is of th utmost importanc to und rstand the terminolog her . Mort pre is Iy.1(. ci. i. How is he unity of causality to b conceived in this case? In particular.168 Causalit and Freedom as Co tnological Problem §25. pur intuition. but is held back in the universal and self-evident onwlogical prolJ.

The appearan e. To be sure.\YlIaLC·vPI" In an object of the sense is not itself appearance.his in a universal ontological sense). (" . Likewise. st int Lligibile. is int lligible. independently of en ibility. . 'J 17).Il. wa in which intelligible obj t are known is purely u' CJ. correct as regarct. but is its If. p.. Yet his is not the onl possible ltilld or r lation which can apply to appeal·ances. Thus Kant sa ":' 0 there is nothing 10 jlr('\'!' II I LIS from ascribing to thi transcendental object.mncTla. rnological Problem § 25. The first pertains LO h way in whi h objects apprehended. When d liberate! plays on the ami iguily of the xpr ssion 'intelligible' 'in tellectual .. to say that something is intelligible means that it belongs' parti ular domain of objects.jl('gallv{' \ ·j3H. 1 entitle . It is negatively intelligible and unknown in any further aspect. we would have to hink an understanding that intuits lhiugs immediately. ounter-conc .170 Causalit and Freedom as Co. are wrtlled "intelligible". remains unknown to us. Now it is important to not tha Kant refers to the empirical the sensible and vice versa. he refers to the intelle tual as intelligible and vice versa as e. already in this notknowing we intend and think some hing we do not know: not the app arane!". Positive Resolution of Third.. But th is not in liSe-II" il separate object of knowledge.. to be sure.· Prillrlp. The distinction between empirical and intelligible operates at differen I vels. But as some possible intuition must correspond ttl C\Try obje t. the counter-concept to intelligible is not 'empirical' but 'sensibl '. intellectus. Priu scholis veterurn Phaenomenon.onscious ambiguity in Kant's employment of 'intelligible' and 'intellectual' in relation the causali ty of freedom is due to the circumstance that this kind causation is not accessi ble excl usively to pure i11 tC"11 igence indeoend . S('I" :\ 2'i1 r [24~ 251J . hut the unknown X.. something intellectual. but of such we have not the least concept. content. What it is in it elf.". the second to th object itself.e insof I in(pllig-1b1 ' . The . in OUI passage from the ritique of Reason where he speaks of intellIgible cau alit)' as int llectual. 'i9 IIOlI' (IV. What leads Kant to this distinction between the empirical and intelligible is precisely the gen ral problem of a possible unification of the two causalities. 1. B .('lIse..lelii. But l~oke(~ " l~lOre clOSe~ lllte~ILO"lbl cannot ~t all be this.is the mode of causation qlcausalif from freedom. nOL S('IISiblp but intelligible. Th former was called. for absolllie knowledge.we call already guess . Of this X. How vel'. But ther is another. this is not to obscure anything but to bri ng out the neIOIll'_I. purely substantive reason Kant's displeasing terminology. then.". is the being itself.249 IT. ItlSO ar as t h ey can b represented mere IyJy l h e tllldc. every appearanc stands in an obvious r lation to other appearances which precede and follow it in time. nor of bei Ilgs 0 r the understandi ng to which i should be applied'. whereas intelligible applies to the.. '''' Vis. Anlinom.u. 166 'Obijects. 1(. orr the Form and ()II 1 lu. Se ondly. aranre it: l!:"'lleral.... is causally determined in different respects.. since intelligibility pertains objects.\l'rl({{iol/ p. in its emptin 55.e. I ant sa '5 in his work De mundi sensihi/4 atque inlelligibilisforma et principiis (1770) § 3: 'Objecturn sensualitatis sensibile.rsianding. Intelligible it " mi. Is such an effect at all possible? The giving of an ff ct is always something which hows itself in experience. Ac 'ordingLy. Pml'·. First. but this is so only insofar as the being show itself for human knowledge. alb it in r spect of possible knowability. connected with the way h resolves overarching problem of the two causalities and their unity. '14.. s xisting in rime. Such unification requires that on and the same ffect at one and the same time. nisi per inteLligentiarn "U!1IWll5C_~ dum. object them lv s. E~~trJ~al IS prope~ ascribed to a way of knowing objects.. something which has the character of nnderstanding. a causalirv which is not appearance I. besides the Ijll'llilY ill u-rrn of which it appears.. n. oumenori audiebat' (The object of sensibility is the sensible. To be sure these obje ts are cnaractena through their mode of becoming-known: intelligeruia. as appearance. but it does not amount to real understanding. quod au em nihil continet. knotting toge h r of contextures. He does not himself unravel these b cause he does I ot see an possibility of doing so.. ill its mode of being (intelligence )... CI-'H 1\_. It is what is intelligible ~hO\ll Ilw object (t. that contain nothing save what must be known through intelligence. the latter noumenon..1 qf rite Sensible and Intelligible of :. CPR (I'.ngly the ounter-concept to empirical. B :iGn. we say that 'it' appears.'Y 171 The in.)'1\ I.j rom thi two points are clear. Ihe ('OIlC('pl ~~p . especially 1l0lllllPIIOII sf't· B 30/. This is. th transcendental obje t which must underlie lhl' appparallces.gible character .g. and or pOS'Lll"1" se-nses 01 R ')06.. and to which none of our sensibleintuitions can refer. albeit not as it is in ilself·lt> \' hile the object X is utter! empty it is still. The X is the intelli ibl object. cf.7 Th e in tell i· O"iblc character is therefor the mode of causation of a ause whi h can be :ndf'l"SLOOcl (if at all) only through the understanding.. So th problem is whether an appearance can stand in two fundam ntally different rel a ions. in the schools of the Jlj~ phenomenon.pt. hat which appears..

B ~72. I. 111 . BE"lWO Ii. i. 1l. 'till. The Application of the Universal Ontological (Cosmological) Prob to ian as World-Entity Before Kant brings this result to bear on the human being.hat the distinction between the two causalities functions at a universal ontological level and applies to all beings. rund itioned..\ which appears (X).72 Causalicy: and Freedom as Cosmological Problem §25. but only in will do we nolin' the second'. i. the appeal to human beings remains invalidated. in regard to our own self.I . it is ner:essary to hold fast to he primary sense of absolute knowing as the knOWing which actually produces its object rather than encountering it fl'ady-marle. a circurnstance that has nothmg t. [251 [~"i2-254J . " ]0 l'enllu!li. the mtelligl must have a relationship to the empirical.rdrrmnn. we are at the same time appearances t. which does not at all fit with the essence of infini ty. This means that. essential double character of every appearance.U'I .e. 13 '17). J -III'. appearance as such./ik der reinen "~:l. can be the effect of appearances.1. .n IYrIe J' . We are already aware of tbe ambiguity' of the expression . _ thus proven in principle. Material things too are intelligent. to more precisely exhibit the contexture of the unity of both causalities.hat not only ia connected with other appearances but is also the appearance of :>UI~letru'IIIiP.eflections'.J-O·j.:!7eJ.. we ourselves create our action and factieal bping.jlcI/. Hut th is is not absolutely so. On the other hand. As beings we 'lft. These two fundamentally ferent relations as such provide the possibility for two f"""'u. From th e essence of appearance 111 ere is ded uced the possi. thus making possible an ble origillary action. insofar as it can be related to absolute knowledge (pure intelligence).. thus we cannot ascribe any freedom to its substrate in~el/i{tibili. i. What appf'ars C!lll abo be determined by what does not appear."?'> WE' can conclude two things from these remarks.0 intelligibJ.. and thus the possibility of the applicability of two funda mentally different causalities to one and the same event as effect. so the inLellifl . 1]0.' I! 'On the other hand we cannot attribute any causality to the intelligibili ty of the body. CI'H. Instead.o do with spirits or goblins..cordanc.'. . n. !I is I his knowledge of one's own willing as all 'I will'. the representations of which are precisely perceptual.. The in telligi ble itself possesses the character of understanding.j. B 566 r.e with this double relation. and of the '] am' in . Freedom as Intelligible Causality: Transcendental Idea of an nconditioned Causality. for we do not g'lVe ourselves our therebeing I Da-sein] through our own decision.v.e.hat we ourselves are.()lIen Kants z ur Kr. Kant says that the t'\[O kinds of causality are 'present in all beings.. Must the causation of the cause (which cause is itself appeal"': ance. and the in telligible ground determines 'thollght [ fa: .'l. 'fl. there is the possibility of 'noticmg' our being-lll-itsel{ in a formally 'absolute' sense. h would be a very superficial way of thinking to conclude that. but so is every being whatever.e.o ourselves. causes. or is it impossible this causation to itself be the effect of an mteltigible causality? In t~ case the causation of the empirical cause would be determined in l~ action by something intelligible. 11<>.e. empirical) therefore in turn be appearance.. "~LI. involves the fundamental possibility of a relation both the empirical and the non-empirical.' In one of the extant 'R. . Just as an (lppearance J . i. t. Yet the only intelligences we can notice are those of the will.. I ~11.bility of tIri double relation.t'ipzig . and we do not know it through any predicate. Tn a certain sense.. only falsely absolutized as objects of absolute knowledge. however. Posuioe Resolution a/Third Anti/wm 173 although its effect is to be met with in appearance'r'?" But what is n appearance is intelligible. In ac. I.lei inll. and at the same lime be related 1.. i.170 . for the intelligible is distinguished cisely by its extra-temporal character. Clearly. for they come together in ~ one effect... t h e pure un deIS ta d' .-iollell. d) The Causality of Reason. such t. 'OIng ". by what the appearing is an appearance of From the perspective of appearance. the relatedness of and the same effect to both kinds of causality cannot be a matter of coming mto play after the other. Lilf' i1l1(311igi cause begins from and of itself. since knowl(>dge of things-in-themselves pertains to absolute as opposed to merely finite knowledge. A ·H'j.. he still at a quite general level. but always encounter it as a fi!('L.. To be sure.. those intelligences t.<l"uo:'1lUU different relations of causation in the sense of the empirical and gible characters. lL can stand III relation to other appearances. First.\\-s remains related LO something (X) that never appears."'I CPR A 5')8. we ourselves are infinite beings. for its appearances do not testify to anv intelligence. "CI'II :\ . ot only humans or angels are 'intelligences'. The possibility of the unification of both ca .-jilt" can be the non-appeari ng transcendental ca use of the em pirica I and ~\IlS 1)(' I h cause of one and the same appearance as effect.

I r-annot know mys If in what I am but I an know that I am. we must firIt.. does not appear bu L rather forms itsel r. This is because I always alreadY form. B ')74 114 CI'I\ . Wha.owtedlp . and never prior to thi as something present which determines. and it is tempting to de it hrough th context or it treatment there. defining. knows himself through pure apperc pti. following Kant. but is cisely what is pre-given for us LO be. What we stipulate for our action has in each case an 'ought' character.. not self-consciousness in the formal sense.. This provision of rul i a kind of det rmining. In so far as show themselves only in and for sen ibility.. especially in Kantianism is hopelessly confused. Kant says: Let us apply this [this afor rn ntioned h. Insofar a rvason IS determined through th ought. B 5'74. Th se considerations have led us i nto th regIon where Kant appU_ his general metaphysical r [lections. [2'10-257] . Pure apperception then IIH"HIIS g-ivi. . Thi iould not have occurred if the crucial slgni ficance of OIiT passage had been recognized.QUIIlla 'like all other things in natur . uch a non-ernpiri a1 and 11011receptive inielligible faculcy' is reason. was iclt all sich bill]. distinguishes man... cosmological rather than moral terms. After anaLysing the universal t:ra dental cosmological construction of the possibility of the unity of and fre dom.~ 25. in all thinking and determining. Also in the case of 'lifeless or animal nature we find no ground for thinking that any faculty is ditioned otherwise than in a merely sensible manner.)tICPplS. 'Pure her does not indicate an deficiency or res:tnl.. but is given as such for reason. i. Posuioe Resolution. the I'-being as the 'J think'. human beings. tion but something positive and superior. Vile r mark at one . causing in the broad sens . B 574. It is a d termination from itself rather than from omething else.\ 'i. how Vel'. ~ince all natural things are u. In what way then does it become evident that reason has a causality? In these actions of th 'I think' which w ourselves enact (in this kind of effecting).e. What does Kant mean with this? The concept of apperception plays major role in the Critique I1f Pure Reason.':" i. Man. and indeed 'simply' in xistence lim [JIIseili J. th 0 currence things is conditioned by sense.e. This means taking man just as possibl kind of present bing and obtaining fundamental Kn.e. i.on. but his particular kind of self-knowledge pure apperception'. I am absolutely given to mys If only in the a t of this d terrnining. I h 1I~ tIl<' groulld of the determination of action is the concept: 'The "ought .e. B -'i7h. it involves a different r lation between cause and effect.176 Man is a sp cial kind of natural by vir ue of th fa 1 that he know himself..'li'. is univ rsally represented. To rep!"e nt something 'univer ally m a to repres nt it in :'. Connection with grounds means a relation deterrnin d b a ground as such a grolU1ding. We should rem mber. 'PU1'e apperception means 'actions lind ililler determinations which [man] cannot r gard a impressions of tilt' ·l'lIse '.spea~ here of knowing something tbtt. it is self-knowledge as such.!-\.~(j.Y 175 this 'J will' tha moves I a. man at this level of reflection. " CPH A 'i41'l. w provide rules for th 'acting forces'. . opposed 10 the order of the lawfulness of appearances.~~ CI'H II 157 IT. represented as universall r deterlllillillg. But. just an arbitrary world-entity among others.11. Kant has had this region all the while in view.nL to . they are always deter min d by appearances.: attempt to define this being qurte generally as a world-entity. mental know ledge J to > p rienc. CPR A 546.. But this means that reason is i If a kind of causali y.'\ 5·~7. the ought as rule is a concept.ng oneself to oneself. '''Ought'' expresses a kind of necessity and of CODnect ion with grounds which is found nowher else in the whole of naturt>. lDS4_w.. CI. More pr cisely... xpresses a possible action the ground of which cannot be iv ('I" 5a1 d sscri ption I CP.e. knows all the rest of nature through the senses. that the interpretation of this concept. rounding [Ill of Third AlIlilloln.!l7 Pur apper ption as a tion involves a causality. 1 Call know my existence absolutely in its that'.0. he gives the crucial and most of its essence.IH As appearance man mus have an empirical ". The interpretation and on eption of th l' depends OJ) the essence of 'I-ness' [fchlzeitl Pure apperception is an action which is non-receptive i. m CPR A 5'~6. CPR . Th ought cannot itself Oet'ur. For man is Dot for . an is one of the appearances of ensible world'.174 Causality and Freedom as Cosmological Problem . liM not in wha I am in myself [nicht in dem. B ')74. as oppos d to 'elnll. 'it frames for its If with perf('c. a deterlllillillg letung-Iollow such that what gets det rrnined is not just rereil'f'd and accepted but originates from itself. i. .. however. i.ml~1 app r eption'. Al though Kant does not here discuss the meaning and function of apperception for the of a universal metaphysics. J\ 546.t spontaneity an order of its own according to ideas'. •• _. II ')7'1. h()lV"~ ever.

lnll Irorn our reflections? Freedom is a non-empirical (inteliigible) kind ("(lIIsalily. of natural causality and the causality of freedom. compared WIth that other order of things and that other set of determining grounds which become relevant when he perceives himself as a phenomenon in or world of sense (as he really is also) and submits his causality to cXll. As a causality of reason. as wi th . II -)7'5 r. In the mode of fulfilled enactment.man. In regard to the latter there is no before and after.nlo] determination according to natural laws. not det'erminable. such ought-governed action belongs within the order appearances. rhe being whom we know La be free. Its actio is an effecting. 'Reason in causality is not subject to any conditions of appearance or of time. I~'CPH A ')53. which arises [rom the thematic task of a knowledge of the totality of appearances (world). and. in man as a rational living being. VVhat have we k.. ' ]~l The essence of the causaluy: qf reason has thus been clarified. it is determi . lit respect of the particular appearance (world-entity) which is roan.d-entity which this unity facticaUy exists. or "I Foundations of the J1/Jetaphysics /MoroIs. as determined by a prior representation of what is to ~ place. A nunomy 177 anything but a mere concept. What does 'possibili mean here? It means thinkability.\'(' have arrived at the goal of the first way to freedom.457). B 5H4. Only reason is a 'cause in itself'. man does not even provide the primary and crucial motive for the problem of freedom. reason possesses an empirical as well as an intelligible character. freedom can come into unity: with ill!! Nlusalay ofnalUre. B 58l. and does not fall into any n state in which it was not before. but m logical thinkability.. Kant is concerned merely with the metaphysical possibility of the u . puts ltimself in a different order of things and in a relationship to determining grounds of"an altogether' different."". and as irurinsically related to willtng. mere freedom from contradictions. pure~r cosmological consideraiion of beings wherein man. Positive R esolution of Third. tbiJi means: 'Man. is not an adequa criterion for metaph ysica I possi bi li ty. A 5·1-7 r. is just one being among others and as such has no priority over other beings. But how is something shown to thinkable? By being thought without contradiction? To be sure. In respect to new states. CPH. CPT{ /\ 556. pure causality so to s The elucidation of the universal metaphysical construction of the possi unity of nature and freedom shows that there is indeed a worl.. The essen ti al universal metaph.' Since appearances are not things-in-themselves.ysground oj the possibility if the unity if the uoo causalities lies in W.v'" \. but it is not itself in time. who in this way regards himself as intelligence.)9j .11 PI". [25 [2. intelligible and sensible. cq action t J re grounc I must a Iways be an appearance. kind when he thinks of himself as an intelligence with a will and thus as endowed with causality. We now cortll:lto Kant's second way to freedom. 'I<I . A 556.'I'8'. always the same. acter. B 51H. action occurs in unity with nature.With this conception of the result we remain within the limits of a. neither are they causes' themselves. 'Reason is present in all the actions of men at all times and under all circumstances. as the transcendental idea of unconditioned causality. Tbe empirical character is 'only the sensible schema' of the intelligible cbo.]6i 'Reason is the abiding condition of all those acti of the will under [the guise of which] man appears.e.176 Causality and Freedom as Cosmological Problem till' § 25. i. Indeed. whereas in the case of a merely natUl'~1 .. fact that appeararu:es are determinable as both. Where. . o P: 111 (IV.

10 corresponding fashion. for example.~'26. This essence can be referred to only in the singular. pr isely the direction of the first way not only makes it 1 ar that idea of freedom arises in he course of reason's inner dissension in thinking of the world. For that to occur.albeit from a restricted perspective . the being a person. ((':"("1. and \ 1. wh ther another perspective is possible. U_ Kant. But humanity In Lllis spe ·ific sense does not exhaust the ess nee of man. give the impression that the two ways WIl independently alongside other and that we are now jumping in unmedialed fashion from the to th s condo In a certain sense this is so and in another sense not. The second way is consiLde~rall:>1Ji1 shorter.. But the remains as to whether this is the only possible way of seeing freedom. 164). In fact. the traditional definition of man recogniz s on] two elements: homo animale rationale man as the animal endowed with reason. but also allows us to see . and humanity ref I"S to what is p cific to human b ings rather than to all humans taken collectiv I . Kant employs this expression in a definite terminological meaning. Kant's under~trtllding of humanity is given by the traditional definition. the personality is tha which constitutes the essence of the person as person. but It is not made thematic as a specific characteristic.e. '\lVesay. Book One. Kant himself explicitly tains that the con nt of the cosmological problem of fr edom is just is genuinely problematical ill the problem of freedom.' All these elements go together to define th full eSSellCE' of man.. indeed he does not use it in the plural at all. Personali yand elf-Responsibili y The s!'cond way aims at freedom not as a possible kind of causality in the world but as the specific characteristic of man as a rational being.a fr dom which is quite d~fferenlly situated impossible to reach from the first way itself. The relation to animalit IS c'Olllained in the concept of humanity.n the Limits oj Reason Alone. and if man remains particular being within the world. or of whom it i in any case said that the 'are somebody'. as belonging to the world. Kant does not use the word in this sense. Insofar a mall. the rel. The E 'I he Distinction CHAPTEH TWO ence if Man as a Being if Sense and Reason.U!I_ of the first wa are not irrelevant to it. Between Transcenderual and P rae tical Freedom 179 The Second VVay to Freedom in the Kantian System. New York.ng over to Kant's second wa this is something xterna]. I r anslateri by 'Theodore M_ H. falls under the idea of freedom di Co\'ered along the first way the freedom of man is also alread no iced then'. meaning people who 'are something'. which does not mean that the problems posed ther in aster to master. [ 61-262J . Heason is the second moment. Nian as a Being of en e and Reason . which is In thus goi. But further if there is a wa to fre edom. that at a social gathering various 'personalities' were pres nt. Now what is distinctive to man is his personality. Hoyt Reiigio» IWithi. This is the freedom of To be sure we emphasized that from h p rspective of the first human freedom is Just one case of cosmological freedom. Practical Freedom as Specific to Man as a Rational Being a) The Essence of Man (Humanity) as Person (Perscnality}. To be sure. Section Il . man must be considered otherwise than in the cosmological discussion i. In a certain sense. 1934. For Kant. ' 26. rath r. Harper and R. If this is so the s cond way turns out to be impera i . then what the first way to establishes also holds for the second. animality refers to what is specific to animals. man must be considered precisely in respect of what distinguishes him. In what does the personality of a person consis ? We can understand this if we consider the personality as distinct from the humanity and animal ity of man. It is th us animality which characterizes man as a living being. inde doc ssar . It is. but this does not make up the COillent of what Kant ails humanity. Hudson. humanity that chara '~erizpsman as both a living and a rational being. and to the freedom of man as such.ow. It is thus clear althougb the second way must be considered iII its own t rrns.

distinctively human action. consists precisely in his going beyond himself. we still do not understand the problematic which lies hidden under the heading 'practical freedom' . in personality. il is directed to the c(JlldiLioDs of the possibility of knowing objects as such.. Htl). 19) (V. an under· standmg of his second way depends on paying close attention to the nature of the problematic and not just to the enunciated content. of the human being as queSI pel. p. Possibility and Actuality of Freedom between Just as was the case in rega. Sucll a question is 'transcendental' in Kant's sense. i. the concepL ori eli led to ethical praxis.e. we shall also be unable to grasp the problematic of the first way.e.I 'uunrlations q/lhe !'. speakiJri of the 'humanity in his person'. assuming that we keep in view not just the results of the first way but also and primarily its problematic? The first way asked after freedom by inquiring into the possibility of its unity with the causality of nature.1l as a Being of Sense and Reason 181 realized and gellLlluely defined only in personality. not of actual freedom or of the freedom which actually exists in man. Critique of Pract icat Reason. We would fall into the latter errol' were 'live to content ourselves with establishing that the first way treats freedom in the context of the totalitY of nature. -. but apparently Dot vice versa. consists in self-responsibility Kant xpressly emphasizes that the defin ition of mall as rational animal does not suffice. what we have in view is a self-responsibli being . we understand these distinctions and expressions in a ]!lore definite and lively manner than was possible at the beginning of the jecllire course.. J . 19+ (V. the concept of freedom arises in connection with the ion as to how the totality of appearances can itself be determined. the problem of the second way will be to discuss and demonstrate actually existing freedom as lhl' freedom of the ethically acting human being.1l6).e. from his animality. if this is not exhaustively defined by his humanity. ethical praxis. A fter a 1] our discussions. Reason could be purely theoretical.Wm. i.e. Genuine being-human. such that man'. This makes mall nOt just a rational being but a hei~g.icsof Morais.1}etaphy. 0 Kant also employs the expression 'hlllIlaDtl! Ity' as the formal term for the total and proper essence of man. the personal. [he essence of persall. How do we encound freedom here.e.' If we understand man not as a sensory world-entity. The essence of man. is what Kant calls 'praclical freedom'. i. Sel/-respon. Thus the concept ()f frl't'dom in Kant's firs way is the concept of transcendental freedom. i. Ma. person ali ty? hit b) The Two Ways to Freedom and the Distinction Transcenden ta I an d Praotica 1 Freedom. but with his impulses stemming entirely from sensibility. 457)." . actions were guided by reason. As long as we are lacking in this understanding. the essence of humanitJ itself.r 10 Freedom III . But we still do not understand what is specific to Kant's second way. ity. viewing the human being as a responsible autonomous acting practical nature.e. i.. [26 [264---265 ] . p. .le of accountability: Such a being must be capable of setf-responsibiliiv. Kant himself emphasizes in the Foundations qf the Metap/~rsics of Morals that speculative philosophy' (i.~26.. Oil I be other hand. as person. Accordingly.rd to Kant's first way to freedom. Tbus Kant defines 'personality' as 'that which elevates man above himself as part of the world of sense'~ The essence of man consists of more than just his humanity as the unitJ of reason and sensibility.180 The Second Wa.~ap~b. i. of beine practical for itself.estion merely of the possibility of freedom. where we introduced Kant's two concepts of freedom merely through examples. thus as a concept of theoretical philosophy. for a being can be rational without being capable of arting on behalf of itself. This is so in spite of the fact that the first way appears to be independent of the second. Critique ofPrarticai R . So there It is a qu. as person. Th ~first way treats the possibie freedom ofa present being in generaL. How are we to obtain a better understanding of the specific problematic of the second way? Can the first way give us a gUideline here. the first way.e. the concept of freedom in his second way. the treatment of the problem of the Antinomies) 'clears the way for practical philosophy". the second treats the ac/ual freedom of a specific present being. 111 (TV. p. resides in the person.. when we take man according to his being a person.l. while the second way treats freedom as a concept of practical philosophy. not cosmoiogicaDh but rather in his personality.siMlity is the fundamental kind of being determiniDf .ason.

because of some mental state that rend rs them unaccountable foi their action. By contrast. It will then emerge that no change of standpoint in fact occurs. Since this first way shows that the fre dom of a world. pp. It is only in and from experienc that we can decide aboll the actual practical freedom of human beings. :'6(1 (V. pp.ntity is possible in nature.f 'We could prove freedom to be actual in ourselves and in human nature. an I hese be reconciled? The easiest solution in such cases is to say that the philosopher has changed his standpoint. nam Iy that practical freedom according to Kant sown 1111 1!1 bi gu ous sta tem em. But its possibility baa precisely been decided by the first way to freedom.. Accordingly the conoepli of practical freedom is an 'empincal concept'. i. th latter sta ement comes [ive years (1790) after the first (1785). 4')5). disl incwon between cosmological and practical freedom. We want to define the problem of practical freedom by answering the que tion of wh ther Krult s conflicting statements concerning practical freedom can be reconciled.. . ('fwqlle . yet. which practical freedom at all n. § 91 . That 15. a genuine and substantively necessary overturning is alwas s a sign of inner continuity and thus ian b gra p d only from the whole probl matico Wh n confronted by opposing statements we must always exert ourselves to understand the wlderlying problem. " ( '''''1ique of Judgl'tI/(!IIL. Foundations. Its rea li is objective. as belonging to th bing-pI' sent of ohjects. p.iudgelllelll..' To be sure. These however. What appears. Only one negative point i i'lilially clear.182 The.e. 'matters of faith'. as long a we merel read off results and establish opi nions. In t.he end. b com> questionable. that the actuality of practical freedom is not a problem. we want to indicate /WU the actual freedom if man .Foundanons. V\le are surround d by great diffi . However.ulties.!/. illig belongs among the objects that can be encountered as present 1)1\'01\'('5 jJresellting ill an intuition what was init. f 267. that pra tical freedom is a 'fact'. The AclUaLi{y of Human (Practical) Freedom Th Factuality a) Freedom as Fact. the possibility of th freedom of the p rson in the ont xt of the animal nature of man is also demonstrated. :. matters of [act. the question arises as LO the sense in. ther are some exceptions. to demonstra te the possibility of practical freedom is unnecessary. It is irnpossibl to demonstrate practice 1 freedom as someth ing actua 1. 4R). becomes a problem. Not oilly no we not know how th a tual freedom of man is to be determin d we rio not even know how to inquir into this. fr edam is a fae-t.68] . p. Actualu ofHuman (Practical) Freedom 183 .~27.g.e. Th second way to freedom thus loses all point and sense.can be interrogated: Freedom is not an empirical conc pt of experi n e. as with cosmological freedom we can inquire only into its possibility.61 (\I. uc-t i (IV. [. But if there is inde d a second way to freedoJl1. to be a smooth and obvioUS . thus as cxperienceabl .§ 91. p. proves thoroughly duhious as soon as we remember that philosophizing is here going on.. It is a matter therefore. What is a fact? 1 ant di tingui he thr e kind of 'knowable things': 'matters of opinion. § 91. 469). ( 'ru "fill! of Judgemenl.g_ a house) is a [act. this is the same kind of task _ showing tha human being at m at. This means. then it (e. of exhibiting fr edom as a fact in human beings.iall just cone ptually . then." Practical freedom cannot b proved as omething actual '. econd f4i~y/. uch things do happen and Kant's philosopb i rich in 'overturnings'. To be sure." If we can demonstrate what we represent as OC('llrring among present objects i. But Kant denies thief 'This [practical] freedom is not an empirical concept. what has to be decided is whether it is actual or not. 4(7) . It is the same in the case of £reedo~ for it often happens that people who could act freely do not do so in faO\ e. 103~+ (IV. Freedom as a fact. 36[! (V. The Practical Reality of Freedom How can the actual freedom of the person hecorn a problem? When something actual becomes as uch a problem. and practical he dom as not an empirical concept. What is l'p'll ill a representation i its whet-content. Forrnall speaking.s I . 461:1).as distinct from the possibility of a world-entity's freedom in general . DemonstraLing that somell' . is 11ot an em pi rical concept. ( ctuality) of Pra ·tical 1"1' dom in 'thicaI Praxis and the Problem of Its 'Experience'. wh re Kant treats of a practical freedom unconsid red in the first way. not all humans do eat meat. such • question can only be settled if the actuality in question is exhibited and made accessible. call be proved'. a th is stateIlwllL runs up against Kant's contrary claim. in the lritique cf Judgement.8 Res facti (l'aCls) are 'obj ects for con ce pts whose objective rea lity [among presen t obj!'cl. cannot be comprehended b "the disastrous method of he common understanding which wants to hold up different results against each other.0 Freedom §27.

henc in experi nee.ll The problem 'if actualfreedom is th us to demon trate its actuality. ·~fi9). Kant explicit] says of the idea of fn. The reality of freedom requires another kind of actuality than that e hibited b natural objects. h factu. I f Here w have at the same time 11n illdienlion of the direction in which the problem of actual freedom. 0 fa do not e ist only 111 the domain of the experience of present nat things. Her Kant maintaina that there are data of both theoretical and practical reason.e. III In an' case the proof of the objectivity of the real must always be intuitive presentation. But intuitive presentatio~ can also occur through pur r ason. It means demon trating the kind 0/ actualit 0/freedom and its mode of intuitive validation. Kant d. i to be sought. +Hl).e.. its what-content can be found in the actual objects of spatio-ternporal experience.~ ('. 27. our preparation for he problem of eh Antinomies. i.' So this thesis claims tha what we represent cone P uall under freed can b presented in a corresponding intuition. i . and must b included among th cibilia.especially since Kant says that the idea of freedom is exhibited in experience. For belongs to the essence of an idea to go be ond all experience.. therefore. Actuaiii C?i Human (Practical) Freedom 185 represented: the presentation of the uruv rsal thought in an immediate r presenting of a orresponding pre ent indiuidual thing. 'i612(V. Earlier. i. p. Bu Kant xplicitly ays there are intuitive presentations other than those of experience. some actual rasr of being-fre . The repr senting and hinking of pra tical [rr-edom can always be e hibited through ps hological experien ·e. 'I(. [. what is represented in the concept of the essence of freedom. The reality of th idea or I"l'('dorn. there also occurs the act of representing freedom. Experience always gives too litt! But freedom is an idea: by freedom we understand unconditioned causcrAt ity. p.nO-272] . Freedom can very well be a fact without being an empi .. this intuition what is thought in the idea of freedom cannot be experience. such an interpretation of Kant would b quite' erroneous. PI'. that is. Freedom possesses practical reality. as a contexture of 0' urrences of m ntal a ts. Clearly.alin' (!llhis . the reality of freedom must b capable of intuitive presentation in a mode other than that applicable for natural things. One could give th whole problem a twist that would lead to a simple solution.e. . yet is still factual.'0'> -I. When Kant says that 'we c~lIld not prove freedom to be actual in ourselves and in human nature'.ws indeed say that the idea of freedom is a fact.fact is precisely the crucial problem. Bu t Lhis is omething different to pointing out. but rath r that 'the idea of freedom is a fa t. bringing somethinc to givenness.e. We can now und rstand Kant's statern nt that 'among the matters of fact' lhl're is also tbe id a of freedom..r1Olo: 'Among all the ideas of pure reason this is the only one whose object is a rna t r of fact. that in our representing. To the new concept of factuality there corresponds a neIII durinr 0_ concept of experience. S 91. 362 (V. One ould point out that Kant does not say hat freedom is a faCt. are by no means inconsistent with another. There ar different ways of giving. p.e. from experience. 469). the reality of freedom is not an objective reality. This representing is a fact whi·h says nothing about the '" Critique rif Judgemellt. Dot be intuitiv Iy presentable in e 'P rience. l\nwever. /·'J/If1f!mioll<. i. The factualit corresponding to the idea f!tfreedom is that 0/ praxis. The kind of intuitive presentation most familiar to us is experience whe her one's own or as m diated by others. The second way poses the problem of actual freedom. This m ans that it is a fact that we have the idea of freedom.(1 . ['ILl iI(' exhibited as actual through practical laws of pure reason'. tha freedom is a fact and that freedom . 469). i. tionedness b yond anything experienceable. that even an idea 01 reason is to be found among the matters of fact: the idea of freedom. We experience the reality of freedom in practical will-governed action. one could sa that the obi tivity of freedom differs from th objectivi of natural things. If fre dom is not like this. However. if one conceives a tuality (as Kan t does here) as objective actuality." this means onl that freedom cannot be experienc d in th manner of a natural thing. The reality of a natural thing is in every case objective. the ideas which con eive of a totality and of uncondj. p. [ow Kant says: 'It is very remarkable. concept. can be stablished in a tual a ions.'.184 The lecond ff7a. not an empirical con ept. § 91. it still remains unclear how this non-experientiaUy demonstrable jaclualilY (actuality) of freedom is to be understood. of till" actuality of freedom. ~ct\laliLY of what is repr sented.. summarize. In principle.-[rIC/I1f! o/Judgemelll. 562 (V. i. whose reality. '~69).. S 91. lhrnugll practical laws of pure reason'. " Critique ojJllfigerl'WIlI. as a specific kind of causality . reedom is a fa t. § 91. we heard of peculiQ representations. Alternatively. and ind ed from the th oretical or practical data of the same'._y to Freedom . aa idea cannot be intuitively presented. its objectiv reality is pra tical in respect of its objectivuy. but this means precisely thnt what 1S conceptually represent d (objectively intend d) in this Idea call be intuitively presented as actual. Critiqlle QjJudgem<'fll. The two assertions. however. . )62 (V.