Conflict of Interest Doctrines

August 14, 2018
A.C. No. 12160
BUENA VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., Complainant

vs.
ATTY. AMADO B. DELORIA, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a verified complaint dated March 4, 2005 filed by
1
complainant Buenavista Properties, Inc. (BPI) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against respondent Atty. Amado B. Deloria (Atty. Deloria) for allegedly violating multiple provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which include Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 on
conflict of interest, Rule 12.02, Canon 12 on forum shopping, and Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and
18.04, Canon 18 for failure to file the necessary pleadings on behalf of his client.
The Facts
On May 7, 1992, BPI, a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with La Savoie Development Corporation (LSDC), represented by
2 3
Atty. Deloria, for the development of a parcel of land into a mixed-use commercial and residential
subdivision and for the sale of the subdivided lots. BPI alleged that the plans, applications, and other
documents of LSDC relative thereto were submitted to, processed, and evaluated by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) at the time when Atty. Deloria was one of its
Commissioners. 4
LSDC then sold the subdivided lots, albeit at very low prices. Further, LSDC misrepresented itself5
as the owner of the lots, prompting BPI to demand that LSDC refrain from further selling them.
However, LSDC disregarded BPI's demands; hence, the latter filed a complaint against the former
6 7
for termination of contract, recovery of property and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (civil case) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. With Atty. Deloria as counsel, LSDC filed an answer with
counterclaim and a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to direct BPI
8
to execute the deeds of absolute sale and release the corresponding titles to the lot buyers.
However, LSDC's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was denied. 9
Thereafter, the lot buyers demanded LSDC to release the titles covering the subdivided lots; in turn,
LSDC demanded the same from BPI. However, BPI refused, contending that it was not a party to the
transactions between LSDC and the lot buyers, and that LSDC sold the lots despite its objections.
Eventually, the RTC also denied LSDC's prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction. 10
Subsequently, LSDC, through Atty. Deloria, filed a complaint against BPI before the BLURB to
11
compel the latter to execute the deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles of the subdivided lots,
the same reliefs prayed for in LSDC's answer with counterclaim in the civil case. Meanwhile, BPI
further alleged that in order to shield LSDC from liability, Atty. Deloria convinced the lot buyers that
the former was responsible for the non-delivery of their titles. Thus, several lot buyers
appointed him as counsel to file cases on their behalf against BPI before the HLURB.
12 13
In March 2004, however, lot buyers Spouses Corazon Flores (Corazon) and Roberto Flores
(collectively, Spouses Flores), through their attorney-in-fact Mariano L. Celis, filed a criminal case
14
for estafa against LSDC President Jeanne G. Menguito (Menguito), premised on the latter's
15
misrepresentation that she was the owner of the lot that Corazon purchased. An Information was 16
later filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. 17
Thereafter, Atty. Deloria filed several complaints for delivery of title against BPI before the HLURB
18
on behalf of the lot buyers, which included the case entitled "Marlon Bautista, Luisito V. lngalia, and
Wilfredo Latuja, represented by Atty. Amado B. Deloria, Attorney-in-Fact v. Buenavista Properties,
Inc. and/or Josephine Conde, President" docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-C-03-8-1171. 19
On September 6, 2005, Corazon executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating, among others, that she
20
was induced by a "fixer" to engage the services of Atty. Deloria as her lawyer for the purpose of filing
a case against BPI before the HLURB. She also attested that although Atty. Deloria represented her
before the HLURB, he neglected his duties as counsel by refusing to communicate with her and
failing to file the required pleadings. 21
Finally, BPI alleged that Atty. Deloria made it appear that a certain Madelyn Hesola (Hesola) was
22
the secretary of the President of BPI and in such capacity, received the HLURB's Notice of
Decision of a judgment against BPI, by reason of which Atty. Deloria moved for the issuance of a
23
writ of execution. However, BPI denied that Hesola was its employee, much more the secretary of
24
its President. It likewise alleged that Atty. Deloria misquoted various provisions in the JVA in a
position paper he filed before the HLURB. 25
In view of the foregoing, BPI prayed for the suspension or disbarment of Atty. Deloria for committing
multiple violations of the CPR, to wit: (a) Rule 1.03, for encouraging the lot buyers to file cases
26
against BPI in order to deflect the charges that the lot buyers have against LSDC; (b) Rules
2.03 and 8.02 for convincing the Spouses Flores to withdraw the estafa case against Menguito and
27 28
to appoint him as lawyer to file a case against BPI instead; (c) Rules 1.01 and 10.02 when he
29 30
resorted to lies with respect to the employment of Hesola and for misquoting the JV A in his
pleadings; (d) Rule 1.01 for inducing the lot buyers to file cases against BPI; (e) Rules
15.01 and 15.03 for acting as counsel for LSDC and the lot buyers at the same time; (f) Rule
31 32
12.02 for having filed two (2) cases involving the same parties, issues, facts, and reliefs; (g) Canon
33
17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18, for failing to file the necessary pleadings on behalf of
34 35 36 37
Corazon in the HLURB case; and (h) Rule 6.03 for acting as counsel for LSDC after leaving the
38
government service as HL URB Commissioner. 39
In his defense, Atty. Deloria argued that while the plans of the subdivision project of BPI were
40
submitted to the HLURB in 1992 for evaluation, he wielded no influence to approve the said plans
because the evaluation and approval of subdivision plans were vested with the Commissioner for
Planning. He added that being only one of the four (4) commissioners of the HLURB, which always
acted as a collegial body, he had very limited functions. Moreover, he denied that he resorted to
machinations and "hoodwinked" the lot buyers into engaging him as their lawyer, explaining that he
only wanted to help the fully-paid lot buyers to obtain their tit1es. 41
Atty. Deloria likewise claimed that it was the staff of LSDC who served the Notice of Decision issued
by the HLURB to Hesola. Further, he asserted that Section 7 (b) of Republic Act (RA) No.
6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
42
Employees," which proscribed his appearance before the HLURB within one (1) year from
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, no longer applies to him, considering that he
has retired as HL URB Commissioner thirteen (13) years prior to becoming LSDC's counsel. 43
Finally, he averred that: (a) being an artificial person incapable of experiencing physical suffering or
mental anguish, BPI cannot institute this action; (b) assuming without admitting that it can do so, no
resolution of the Board of Directors of BPI was passed authorizing the filing of this complaint; (c)
LSDC has the authority, under the JVA, to sell lots in the subdivision project; (d) the right to the
delivery of the title of a buyer who has fully paid cannot be affected by any misunderstanding or
litigation between the parties to a JV A; and (e) the complaint is tainted with bad faith, considering
that two (2) days before the filing of the present complaint, the President of BPI informed him of an
imminent disbarment case should he fail to cause the withdrawal of the lot buyers' complaints
against BPI. 44
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated July 20, 2016, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found
45
Atty. Deloria administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.46
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Deloria did not violate Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 8.02 of
the CPR on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, Atty. Deloria was found not guilty of
violating Rules 1.01 and 10.02 of the CPR as BPI failed to show that he had a role in the wrongful
designation of Hesola or that he knowingly misquoted the JVA in a position paper he filed with the
HLURB. 47
However, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Deloria guilty of violating Rules 15.01 and
15.03 of the CPR for representing conflicting interests. Records show that on March 30, 2004,
Corazon filed the estafa case against Menguito, President of LSDC, whose lawyer was Atty. Deloria.
The basis for the estafa charges was Menguito's misrepresentation that she was the owner of the lot
Corazon purchased. Thereafter, or on June 15, 2004, Atty. Deloria, on behalf of Corazon, filed a
complaint for delivery of title with the HLURB against BPI with LSDC as third-party respondent.
Thus, Atty. Deloria simultaneously represented LSDC President Menguito and Corazon, a lot buyer,
who had conflicting interests. Likewise, he represented several lot buyers as complainants in the
HLURB case against BPI while also representing LSDC as third-party respondent therein. The
Investigating Commissioner noted that Atty. Deloria failed to show that he obtained the written
consent of the parties concerned. 48
Similarly, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Deloria liable for violating Rule 12.02 of the
CPR on forum shopping, having prayed in its answer with counterclaim with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the civil case before the RTC that BPI be directed to
execute the deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles covering the subdivided lots, and thereafter,
when the prayer for injunction was denied, filed a complaint before the HLURB praying for the same
reliefs. In fact, the HLURB eventually dismissed the complaint filed before it on the ground of litis
pendentia, finding the presence of all the elements therefore.49
Finally, Atty. Deloria was also found to have violated Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon
18 of the CPR for his failure to file the necessary pleadings for his client and to inform and
communicate with her, as attested to by Corazon in her Sinumpaang Salaysay. 50
As regards the alleged violation of Rule 6.03 of the CPR, the Investigating Commissioner found no
violation thereof, as the proscription under Section 7 (b) of RA 6713 prohibiting a former public
officer from engaging in certain transactions applies only for a period of one (1) year after his/her
resignation, retirement, or separation from office. As Atty. Deloria was engaged as LSDC's counsel
thirteen (13) years after his retirement from HLURB, the prohibition no longer applies to him.
Moreover, BPI failed to prove that Atty. Deloria intervened in any of the transactions where LSDC
was involved during his stint as HLURB Commissioner. 51
Parenthetically, as regards BPI's standing to institute the present case, the Investigating
Commissioner noted that a corporate entity may institute disbarment proceedings, as in this case.
52
In a Resolution dated June 17, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the aforesaid report and
53
recommendation. 54
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not grounds exist to hold Atty. Deloria administratively
liable for any violations of the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious review of the records, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the IBP Board of
Governors that Atty. Deloria should be held administratively liable in this case.
Atty. Deloria represented

conflicting interests
Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR state:
CANON15-xxx
Rule 15.01 - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable
whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall
forthwith inform the prospective client.
xxxx
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Hornilla v. Salunat, the Court explained the test to determine conflict of interest, to wit:
55
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof. << 56
"The rule against conflict of interest also 'prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or on totally unrelated cases,' since the representation of opposing clients, even in unrelated
cases, 'is tantamount to representing conflicting interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of
double-dealing which the Court cannot allow."' Moreover, the requirement under Rule 15.03 is quite
57
clear. A lawyer must secure the written consent of all concerned parties after a full disclosure of the
facts; failure to do so would subject him to disciplinary action as he would be found guilty of
58 59
representing conflicting interests. 60
In this case, Atty. Deloria represented Menguito, the President of LSDC, in the criminal case
for estafa that the Spouses Flores filed against her. Subsequently, however, Atty. Deloria filed a
1awp++i1
complaint for delivery of title against BPI on behalf of Corazon before the HLURB. As such, Atty.
61
Deloria simultaneously represented Menguito and Corazon despite their conflicting interests,
considering that Corazon's estafa case against Menguito was premised on the latter's and LSDC's
alleged misrepresentation of ownership over the lots sold and LSDC's eventual failure to deliver the
62
title. It must be stressed that it was LSDC that obligated itself to ensure the transfer of the
63
ownership of the purchased lot to Corazon, a lot buyer, pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed
64
between them. Thus, Atty. Deloria's simultaneous representation of Menguito and

Corazon sans their written consent after a full disclosure of the facts violated the rules on conflict of
interest.
Moreover, he represented several lot buyers as complainants in HLURB Case No. REM-C-03-8-
1171 against BPI while also representing LSDC as third-party respondent therein. In fact, he even
filed a Position Paper on behalf of both the complainants therein and LSDC. Such dual
65
representation without the written consent of the parties again constitutes a violation of Rules 15.01
and 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, warranting disciplinary action therefor.
Atty. Deloria committed

forum shopping
Likewise, Atty. Deloria violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the CPR on forum shopping, which states:
CANON12-xxx
xxxx
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation
thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal
or certiorari. There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
66
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
or causes of action; and (c) identity of relief sought.67
In the civil case before the RTC, Atty. Deloria, on behalf of LSDC, filed an answer with counterclaim
and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to direct BPI to execute
68
the deeds of absolute sale and release the titles covering the purchased subdivided lots.
Notwithstanding the RTC's denial of LSDC's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
in an Order dated August 11, 1998, as well as the pendency of the main case therein, Atty. Deloria
69
nonetheless lodged a complaint before the HLURB praying for the same relief as that pleaded for in
70
its answer with counterclaim - to compel BPI to execute deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles
over the subdivided lots. Clearly, the elements of litis pendentia are present, considering: (a) the
identity of parties, i.e., BPI and LSDC; (b) identity of rights or causes of action, i.e., BPI and LSDC
being parties to the JV A, from which sprang their respective rights and obligations; and (c) identity
of reliefs sought, i.e., to compel BPI to execute the deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles of the
purchased lots. In fact, the HLURB in its Decision dated September 27, 2000 dismissed LSDC's
71
complaint based on the same ground.
Atty. Deloria neglected his

duties to his client
Finally, Atty. Deloria violated Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, which
state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
In this case, Corazon attested to the fact that Atty, Deloria failed to communicate with and inform
her, as his client, about her complaint against BPI before the HLURB. Likewise, Atty. Deloria failed
to file the required position paper and draft decision before the HLURB. As such, he neglected the
legal matters entrusted to him and failed to serve his client with competence and diligence, for which
he must be clearly held administratively liable.
Penalty imposed upon

Atty. Deloria
In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court explained that the penalty solely for a lawyer's representation of
72
conflicting interests on the basis of jurisprudence is suspension from the practice of law for one (1) to
three (3) years. On the other hand, in the case of Williams v. Enriquez, the Court imposed the
73 74
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months upon the respondent for violating
the rule on· forum shopping. Finally, in Pilapil v. Carillo, the Court suspended a lawyer from the
75
practice of law for six (6) months after finding that he had failed to file a petition for certiorari from the
adverse decision rendered in the case of his client despite the latter's repeated follow-ups. The Court
imposed a similar penalty in Quiachon v. Ramos for respondent's failure to keep the client informed
76
of the status of the case and to promote the client's cause, thereby neglecting the case entrusted to
him.
In view thereof, and under the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that a penalty of
two (2) years suspension from the practice of law would suffice. Further, Atty. Deloria is warned that
a repetition of this and other similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amado B. Deloria is found GUILTY of violating Rules 15.01 and
15.03 of Canon 15, Rule 12.02 of Canon 12, Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
The suspension from the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon receipt by respondent of
this Decision. Respondent is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his
suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in respondent's
personal record as a member of the Philippine Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters, and the office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, Republic Act No. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, As Amended)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

ANDRES B. REYES, JR. ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO

JOSE C. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice
Footnotes
Rollo, pp. 2-9. The said complaint was filed by BPI's authorized representative Delfin V.
1
Cruz, Jr.
2
Id. at 10-16. See also the Addendum to the JVA dated February 19, 1996; id. at 17-20.
3
Also referred to as "La Savioe Development Corporation'' in some parts of the rollo.
4
See rollo, pp. 2-4.
See Contract to Sell executed between LSDC and lot buyer Corazon Flores; id. at 29-30
5
and 232-236.
6
See letters dated August 15, 1997, July 22, 1996, and August J 5, 1996; id. at 21-23.
7
Not attached to the rollo.
8
Dated March 17, 1998. Rollo, pp. 93-103.
9
See id. at 4-5. See also id. at 358.
10
See id.
11
Filed on August 27, 1999. Id. at 104-108.
See the SPAs respectively filed by lot buyers Marlon Bautista, Luisito V. Ingalla, Wilfredo
12
Latuja, Ramon G. Marino, and Corazon Flores; id. at 31-35.
13
See id. at 5. See also id. at 358.
14
See Special Power of Attorney dated March 25, 2004; id. at 68.
See Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation and Affidavit/Complaint dated March 29,

15
2004; id. at 65-67.
16
17
See rollo, p. 191. See also id. at 358-359.
18
Id. at 36-51.
19
Dated December 8, 1994. Id. at 36-40.
20
Id. at 330-331.
21
See id. See also id. at 359.
22
See id. at 6.
Dated July 17, 2001; id.at 69. See also Decision dated June 14, 2001 penned by Legal
23
Services Group Officer-in-Charge Atty. Donna R. Ladao; id. at 70-76.

Dated February 10, 2003. Id. at 77-78.
24
See id. at 6-7.

25
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
26
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
27
legal business.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
28
employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to
give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.
Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
29
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
30
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 15.01 - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
31
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest,
and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15 .03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
32
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Rule 12.02 -A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
33
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
34
trust and confidence reposed in him.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
35
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
36
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
37
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
38
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
See rollo, pp. 6-8. See also id. at 196-210.

39
See Answer dated June 6, 2005; id. at 136-144.

40
See id. at 136-139.

41
Entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS
42
FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED

PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES AND
REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND
TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND
OTHER PURPOSES," approved on February 20, 1989, Section 7 of which states:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of

public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws,
the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official
and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto .. - Public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer,

employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in
any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office
unless expressly allowed by law;
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless

authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise

which has a regular or pending official transaction with their office.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with. in
which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
See rollo, pp. 139-141.
43
See id. at 141-143.

44
Id. at 356-370. Penned by Commissioner Leo B. Malagar.

45
Id. at 370.
46
See id. at 363-365.

47
See id. at 365-366.

48
See id. at 367-368.

49
See id. at 368-369.

50
See id. at 369.
51
See id. at 370.

52
See Notice of Resolution No. XXII-2017-1216; id. at 354-355.

53
See id. at 354.

54
453 Phil. 108 (2003).

55
Id. at lll-112.
56
See Romero v. Evangelista, Jr., A.C. No. 11829, February 26, 2018; citations omitted.
57
See Palacios v. Amara, Jr., A.C. No. 11504, August 1, 2017.

58
See id., citing Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 515 Phil. 296, 306 (2006).

59
See id.
60
Dated June 14, 2004. Rollo, pp. 46-51.

61
See Affidavit/Complaint; id. at 272-273.

62
See id. at 365-366.

63
See id. at 29-30.

64
Dated February 8, 2000. Id. at 80-92.

65
Teodoro Ill v. Gonzales, 702 Phil. 422, 428 (2013), citing Polanco v. Cruz, G.R. No.
66
182426, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 489, 495.
Id.
67
Rollo, pp. 93-103.
68

69
Rollo, pp. 104-108.
70
Id. at 110-118. Penned by Housing and Land Use Arbiter Atty. Gina A. Antonio.
71
505 Phil. 126 (2005), cited in Palacios v. Amora, supra note 58.

72
See id. at 139.

73
769 Phil. 666 (2015).

74
443 Phil. 193(2003).
75
735 Phil. I (2014).

76
July 25, 2017
A.C. No. 1346
PACES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO M. SALANDANAN, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a complaint which Paces Industrial Corporation (Paces) filed against its former lawyer, Atty.
Edgardo M. Salandanan, for allegedly committing malpractice and/or gross misconduct when he
represented conflicting interests.
The procedural and factual antecedents of the instant case are as follows:
Sometime in October 1973, Salandanan became a stockholder of Paces, and later became its
Director, Treasurer, Administrative Officer, Vice-President for Finance, then its counsel. As lawyer
for Paces, he appeared for it in several cases such as in Sisenando Malveda, et al. v. Paces
Corporation (NLRC R-04 Case No. 11-3114-73) and Land & Housing Development Corporation v.
Paces Corporation (Civil Case No. 18791). In the latter case, Salandanan failed to file the Answer,
after filing a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, which the court had denied. As a result, an order of
default was issued against Paces. Salandanan never withdrew his appearance in the case nor
notified Paces to get the services of another lawyer. Subsequently, a decision was rendered against
Paces which later became final and executory.
On December 4, 1973, E.E. Black Ltd., through its counsel, sent a letter to Paces regarding the
latter's outstanding obligation to it in the amount of ₱96,5 l 3.91. In the negotiations that transpired
thereafter, Salandanan was the one who represented Paces. He was likewise entrusted with the
documents relative to the agreement between Paces and E.E. Black Ltd.
Meanwhile, disagreements on various management policies ensued among the stockholders and
officers in the corporation. Eventually, Salandanan and his group were forced to sell out their
shareholdings in the company to the group of Mr. Nicolas C. Balderama on May 27, 1974.
After said sell-out, Salandanan started handling the case between E.E. Black Ltd. and Paces, but
now, representing E.E. Black Ltd. Salandanan then filed a complaint with application for preliminary
attachment against Paces for the collection of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. He later succeeded in
obtaining an order of attachment, writ of attachment, and notices of garnishment to various entities
which Paces had business dealings with.
Thus, Paces filed a complaint against Salandanan. It argued that when he acted as counsel for E.E.
Black Ltd., he represented conflicting interests and utilized, to the full extent, all the information he
had acquired as its stockholder, officer, and lawyer. On the other hand, Salandanan claimed that he
was never employed nor paid as a counsel by Paces. There was no client-lawyer contract between
them. He maintained that his being a lawyer was merely coincidental to his being a stockholder-
officer and did not automatically make him a lawyer of the corporation, particularly with respect to its
account with E.E. Black Ltd. He added that whatever knowledge or information he had obtained on
the operation of Paces only took place in the regular, routinary course of business as him being an
investor, stockholder, and officer, but never as a lawyer of the company.
After a thorough and careful review of the case, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended Salandanan's suspension for one (1) year on November
2, 2011. On September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-
1
120 adopting and approving, with modification, the aforementioned recommendation, thus:
2
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A, " and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that the
Respondent violated the conflict of interest rule, Atty. Edgardo M Salandanan is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.
On August 8, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-413, denying 3
Salandanan's motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XX-2013-120.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provide:
CANON 15 - A LA WYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
Rule 15. 03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS
CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Under the aforecited rules, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the
same action or on totally unrelated cases. Conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents
4
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of
a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of said
duty. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.
5 6
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on the following five (5) rationales: 7
First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty. A
client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such confidence is
an objective important in itself.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal
representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence of the lawyer's
professional judgment or inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the client's behalf,
the client's expectation of effective representation could be compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard confidential information pertaining to it.
Preventing the use of confidential information against the interests of the client to benefit the lawyer's
personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an assumed public purpose, is facilitated
through conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to
make a gift or grant in the lawyer's favor.1âwphi1
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate
presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on both
sides of the litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and compromise adversary
argumentation.
Even the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the
client's confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional
employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client.
Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous
relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the CPR expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." The lawyer's
highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself.
The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the client's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by
any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. 8
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the client. The intent of the law is to
impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests only on matters that he previously
handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated. 9
Here, contrary to Salandanan's futile defense, he sufficiently represented or intervened for Paces in
its negotiations for the payment of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. The letters he sent to the counsel
of E.E. Black Ltd. identified him as the Treasurer of Paces. Previously, he had likewise represented
Paces in two (2) different cases. It is clear, therefore, that his duty had been to fight a cause for
Paces, but it later became his duty to oppose the same for E.E. Black Ltd. His defense for Paces
was eventually opposed by him when he argued for E.E. Black Ltd. Thus, Salandanan had
indisputably obtained knowledge of matters affecting the rights and obligations of Paces which had
been placed in him in unrestricted confidence. The same knowledge led him to the identification of
those attachable properties and business organizations that eventually made the attachment and
garnishment against Paces a success. To allow him to utilize said information for his own personal
interest or for the benefit of E.E. Black Ltd., the adverse party, would be to violate the element of
confidence which lies at the very foundation of a lawyer-client relationship.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would
be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In
the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client
consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with
the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information
gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It 10
behooves lawyers, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. The
11
nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
12
In the absence of the express consent from Paces after full disclosure to it of the conflict of interest,
Salandanan should have either outrightly declined representing and entering his appearance as
counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., or advised E.E. Black Ltd. to simply engage the services of another
lawyer. Unfortunately, he did neither, and must necessarily suffer the dire consequences. 13
Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP's finding that Salandanan
represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable for the same. 14
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Edgardo M.

Salandanan from the practice of law for three (3) years effective upon his receipt of this decision,
with a warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and
entered in his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL G. TIJAM

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice
Footnotes
Report and Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero, dated

1
November 2, 2011; rollo, pp. 224-228.
2
Rollo, p. 223.
3
Id. at 231.
4
Orola, et al. v. Atty. Ramos, 717 Phil. 536, 544 (2013).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Samson v. Atty. Era, 714 Phil. 101, 112-113 (2013).
8
Id.
9
Orola, et al. v. Atty. Ramos, supra note 4, at 545.
10
Supra note 7, at 111.
11
Supra note 4.
12
Supra note 7, at 112.
Id. at 113.
13
Orola, et al. v. Atty. Ramos, supra note 4, at 545.

14
ADM. CASE NO. 6876 March 7, 2008
HEIRS OF LYDIO "JERRY" FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME, LEO FALAME and JERRY
FALAME, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
On Petition for Review1 is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame
(complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.
In their Complaint2 against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the
late Lydio "Jerry" Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an action
for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled "Heirs of Emilio
T. Sy, represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio 'Jerry' Falame,
Raleigh Falame and Four (4) John Does," in which Lydio was one of the defendants.3
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the
complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to
file their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a
special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh
Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated
23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property
subject of the first civil case.4
Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of
the defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser
and counsel for his businesses until Lydio's death on 8 September 1996.5
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent
filed a case against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case,
entitled "Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry
A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents
and persons acting in their behalf" and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case)
before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
20241 issued as a consequence of the registration of the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage
on the said property. Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or legal
redemption and damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order.6
Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil
case wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as
an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the spouses Falame's interests are adverse to those of his
former client, Lydio.7
Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the
complaint in the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated
paragraph (d), Section 208 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,9 complainants asserted further.
Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a baseless and fabricated suit which
respondent filed as counsel for complainants' uncle against the heirs of respondent's deceased
client. Specifically, they averred that respondent filed the case for the sole purpose of retaining,
maintaining and/or withholding the possession of the subject property from complainants who are its
true owners. Complainants concluded that respondent violated paragraph (g), Section 2010 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.11
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,12 respondent controverted complainants' allegations. He

emphasizes that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and
on Lydio's behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who paid him the attorney's fees. He also stated
that he signed the jurat in Raleigh's affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first civil case,
believing to the best of his knowledge that there is good ground to support it. Insisting that he did not
betray the confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latter's counsel in the first civil case,
respondent maintained that he did not reveal or use any fact he acquired knowledge of during the
existence of the attorney-client relation in the first civil case as he had never even conferred with nor
talked to Lydio in the first place. Respondent likewise contended that he did not knowingly make any
misleading or untruthful statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did he
employ any means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the case.13
Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or
transaction. Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil
case and his acceptance of the second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case was
not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio
and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at stake. Respondent further
averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses Raleigh and Noemi
Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty Holdings
and Development Corporation, as defendants—a case which arose from the wrongful acts
committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydio's death.14
Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the
IBP had no jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this
administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor as he had died a year
earlier.15
In their Position Paper16 dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against
respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.0317 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that of his former
client, Lydio.18
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and
approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan's report and recommendation for the
dismissal of this administrative case, thus:19
x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyer's oath was violated by the
respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in mind the
prohibition against disclosure of secret information learned in confidence, but there is no
specification in the complaint what secret or information learned in confidence under Civil
Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case No. 5568. In
administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the complainant
must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or confidential information
disclosed or will be disclosed in the professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA
422; 431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint must fail.
In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility about the prohibition against
representation of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of
complainants' position paper stating: With all due respect, it is submitted that respondent
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility" cannot be
countenanced. The reason being that it is an elementary principle of due process to which
the respondent is entitled that only those charged in the complaint can be proved by the
complainants. A charge not specified in the complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.)
x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.
xxx
Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years since the
complainants became owners of Lydio Falame's properties, is a suit against the
complainants, not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but as owners of their respective
aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104; 107-108). The
complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts, rights, obligations and interest of Lydio
Falame on the material possession of the improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil
Case No. A-2694 nor even on such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the second
amended and supplemental complaint which give rise to their cause of action against them.
While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the respondent
committed [the] alleged breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of secret or
confidential information[,] the respondent has shown that he did not commit any violation of
such duties or obligations of an attorney.
It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the respondent for his and
Lydio Falame's defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.
xxx
The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated paragraph (d),
Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and his lawyer's oath when he allegedly betrayed the
trust and confidence of his former client by denying knowledge of the fact that the land was
owned by Lydio Falame and when he did not disclose to the Court that at one time his
present clients categorically declared and unconditionally recognized the full ownership of
the late Lydio Falame and complainant Melba Falame over subject matter of both cases
equally lacks evidentiary basis.
xxx
It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the complaint in Civil Case
No.5568 is baseless or fabricated. It is only the Honorable Court which has the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the subject of an administrative complaint
against the respondent.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint be

dismissed on grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four (4) years after the
alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position paper.21 They likewise assert that the
IBP erred in holding that the instant administrative complaint had been filed out of time since it was
filed on 16 January 2004, or three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second
civil case was filed on 23 October 2000.22 In addition, in their Consolidated Comment (should be
Consolidated Reply),23 complainants invoke the Court's ruling in Frias v. Bautista-Lozada24to support
their contention that administrative complaints against members of the bar do not prescribe.25
In his Comment,26 respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have never been
proven by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases against lawyers, and that complainants have the burden to prove their
accusations as he enjoys the presumption of innocence.27 Respondent likewise asserts that in
accusing him of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only in their
position paper and in the instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.28
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by prescription. As
early as 1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,29 to wit:
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does
the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime,
prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment
proceeding x x x (5 Am. Jur. 434)30
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada31where the
Court held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a
prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers, should be struck down
as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.32
Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs with the
Investigating Commissioner's opinion that some of the charges raised by complainants in their
complaint are unsubstantiated.
There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory pleading, it
was put forward in complainants' position paper filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the
Court. In fact, respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP
and likewise in his comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer
with motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of attorney-client
relationship is the essential element of his defense to the charge of conflict of interest, as articulated
in his subsequent submissions.
The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately apprised of and heard
on the issue. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full
adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial proceedings only become necessary for clarification
when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies.
Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit evidence in support of their arguments.33
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.34 The test is whether, on behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer's duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to
oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop.35 The rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used.36 In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or
merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.37
The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that
representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a
lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter
that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation.
The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.38 In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and
strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree. 39
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an

interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed
should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of
the relation, a lawyer should not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's
confidences acquired in the previous relation.40
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His
highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to
himself.41 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of
the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or
by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.42
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants
in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was
established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him. The case of Hilado v. David43tells
us that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for.44
As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned
the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as
counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the
same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts
which debase respondent's rights as a co-owner.
The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio's death or through the
completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to
advocate a position opposed to that of Lydio.45 Precedents tell us that even after the termination of
his employment, an attorney may not act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his
client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment.46 And while complainants have never
been respondent's clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydio's ownership of it which
respondent maintained in the first civil case.
For representing Raleigh's cause which is adverse to that of his former client—Raleigh's supposed
co-ownership of the subject property— respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Having previously undertaken joint representation of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent should have
diligently studied and anticipated the
potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted.47 Heretofore, respondent is

enjoined to look at any representation situation from "the point of view that there are possible
conflicts"; and further, "to think in terms of impaired loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in
any way will impair loyalty to a client.48 Considering, however, that this is respondent's first offense,
the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher degree of fidelity in
the practice of his profession.49
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting

interests and meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher
degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Acting Chairperson Carpio-Morales, Azcuna*, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* As replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave per

Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
1
Rollo, pp. 691-718.
2
Id. at 1-6; dated 7 January 2004.
3
Id. at 2.
4
Id. at 2-3.
5
Id. at 3.
6
Id. at 33.
7
Id. at 3.
8
It reads as follows:
SEC. 20. Duties of attorneys.- It is the duty of an attorney:
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him,
such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of
fact or law;
9
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
10
SEC. 20. Duties of attorneys.- It is the duty of an attorney:
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or

proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
11
Rollo, p. 5.
12
Id. at 145-170.
13
Id. at 147-154.
14
Id. at 152-154.
15
Id. at 671.
16
Id. at 445-466.
17
It reads:
15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests.
18
Rollo, pp. 455-456.
19
Id. at 666.
20
Id. at 680-689.
21
Supra note 1; dated 5 September 2005.
22
Id. at 716.
23
Id. at 1129-1132; dated 29 November 2006.
24
A.C. No. 6656, 4 May 2006, 489 SCRA 345.
25
Rollo, pp. 1129-1130.
26
Id. at 989-1071; dated 7 July 2006.
27
Id. at 1067-1068.
28
Id. at 1031.
29
126 Phil. 802 (1967).
30
Id. at 806.
31
Supra note 24.
32
Id. at 348.
33
Artezuela v. Maderazo, 431 Phil. 135, 141 (2002).
34
Frias v. Lozada, A.C. No. 6656, 13 December 2005, 477 SCRA 393, 400.
Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, 1st Edition, Copyright 1991,
35
p. 166, citing Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics and U.S. v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500
(1912).
36
Hornilla v. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108, 111 (2003).
37
p. 166, citing Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 (1968) and Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil.
640 (1952).
38
kauffman, kent d., legal ethics, Delmar Learning, Copyright 2004, pp. 174-175, 207.
39
Perez v. De la Torre, A.C. No. 6160, 30 March 2006, 485 SCRA 551.
40
p. 167, citing Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 (1968), Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640
(1952), San Jose v. Cruz, 57 Phil. 79 (1933) and Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 (1949).
41
Id. at 199, citing Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571, 67 L. ed. 802 (1923).
42
Bun Siong Yao v. Aurelio, A.C. No. 7023, 30 March 2006, 485 SCRA 553, 560.
43
84 Phil. 569 (1972).
44
Id. at 576.
45
Gonzaga v. Atty. Villanueva, Jr., 478 Phil. 859 (2004).
Hilado v. David, supra note 43 at 569, 577, citing Brown v. Miller, 52 App. D.C. 330; 286, F.
46
994 and Pierce v. Palmer (1910), 31 R. I. 432; 77 Atl., Ann Cas., 1912 S, 181.
See Florida Bar v. Mastrilli, 614 So. 2d 1081 (Fla 1993), cited in kauffman, kent d., legal
47
ethics, Copyright 2004, p. 164.
Zitrin, richard a. and langford carol m., legal ethics in the practice of law, Matthew Bender
48
and Company, Inc., Second Edition, p. 181.
49
See Hornilla v. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108, 114 (2003).
Ethical rule against conflict of interest; delicadeza
A sample letter to a lawyer to voluntarily inhibit or disqualify himself from a case by reason of delicadeza
and conflict of interest, citing jurisprudence. For legal research purposes of the visitors of this law blog.
X x x, 2011
Urgent - Via Personal Delivery
ATTY. X x x
Xxx
X x x City
(omitted....)
RE : REQUEST TO VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT AND DISQUALIFY
YOUR GOOD SELF AS COUNSEL
Dear Atty. X x x:
In Civil Case No. x x x pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch x x x, of x x x City, under Judge x x
x., you represent us as co-plaintiffs against x x x, past president of x x x, where we are incumbent
directors/officers.
In I.S. No. x x x pending with the Office of the City Prosecutor of x x x City, you act as adverse counsel
against us and you represent the same association and its president x x x against us.
With all due respect to your good self, we humbly believe that you are bound by the ethical rule against
conflict of interest under the Code of Professional Responsibility applicable to the Philippine Bar.
We extensively cite the following jurisprudence for your guidance, thus:
BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT,
respondent. [A.C. No. 5804. July 1, 2003]
X x x.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.”[1] This rule covers not only cases
in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used.[2] Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[3] Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double dealing in the performance thereof.[4]
In this jurisdiction, a corporation’s board of directors is understood to be that body which (1) exercises
all powers provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all business of the corporation; and (3)
controls and holds all property of the corporation.[5] Its members have been characterized as trustees
or directors clothed with a fiduciary character.[6] It is clearly separate and distinct from the corporate
entity itself.
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or
negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a
stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation,
to bring about a redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the
stockholders.[7] This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that in a derivative
suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for the corporation’s
behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be included as a party in the suit.[8]
Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to derivative suits, we come
now to the threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend members of the board of
the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue, the following disquisition is enlightening:
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early cases found joint
representation permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the emerging rule is against dual
representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one of the
defendants. The cases and ethics opinions differ on whether there must be separate representation
from the outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take an active role. Furthermore, this
restriction on dual representation should not be waivable by consent in the usual way; the corporation
should be presumptively incapable of giving valid consent.[9] (underscoring ours)
In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the
corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The interest of the
corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the individual corporate
officials.[10] The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us. After due deliberation on the
wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a
corporation cannot represent members of the same corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit
brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests, which is
prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled “Philippine Public School
Teacher’s Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public School Teacher’s
Assn. (PPSTA), et al.,” was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that
the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he
appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly,
respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his other
client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-
0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By filing the said pleading, he
necessarily entered his appearance therein.[11] Again, this constituted conflict of interests, considering
that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the individual members of the PPSTA, was
brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the corporation.
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering however, that this is
his first offense, we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP Resolution No. XV-2002-230
dated June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish
respondent to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests
and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. He is further
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS, complainants, vs. Atty. MACARIO D.
ARQUILLO, respondent. [En Banc, A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005]
Representing conflicting interests is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Unless all the
affected clients’ written consent is given after a full disclosure of all relevant facts, attorneys guilty of
representing conflicting interests shall as a rule be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
X x x.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
their dealings and transactions with their clients.[7] Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent
conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients’ written consent, given after a full disclosure
of the facts.[8]
When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of
which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is
required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when
the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect
the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge
acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty.[9]
X x x.
X x x. Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should have known that
there was an obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same
side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases in
which Castro was one of the respondents. Indeed, Commissioner Funa correctly enounced:
“As counsel for complainants, [r]espondent had the duty to oppose the Motion to Dismiss filed by Jose
G. Castro. But under the circumstance, it would be impossible since [r]espondent is also the counsel of
Jose G. Castro. And it appears that it was [r]espondent who prepared the Motion to Dismiss, which he
should be opposing [a]s counsel of Jose G. Castro, Respondent had the duty to prove the Complaint
wrong. But Respondent cannot do this because he is the counsel for the complainants. Here lies the
inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is very clear.
“Thus it has been noted
‘The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with vigor and zeal, the client’s claim against
the other and to properly represent the latter in the unrelated action, or, if he can do so, he cannot
avoid being suspected by the defeated client of disloyalty or partiality in favor of the successful client.
The foregoing considerations will strongly tend to deprive the relation of attorney and client of those
special elements which make it one of trust and confidence[.]’ (Legal Ethics, Agpalo, p. 230, 4th ed.; In
re De la Rosa, 21 Phil. 258)”[11]
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that
a lawyer’s representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the
conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be.
It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.[12]
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
two years. Considering, however, prior rulings in cases also involving attorneys representing conflicting
interests, we reduce the suspension to one (1) year.[13]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTY of misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a warning
that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
SO ORDERED.
FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO vs. ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA, Adm. Case No. 6708 (CBD Case No. 01-874),
August 25, 2005
X x x.
The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.
Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: “A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.”
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste.[8] In the course of a lawyer-
client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak
and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence
of the highest degree.[9] It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also
to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
[10]
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is
their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.[11] Developments
in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyer’s conduct lies within
this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client.[12] Thus, if a lawyer’s
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[13] Still another test is whether the
lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment.[14]
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the
lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the
other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one
to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of
the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of
undivided fidelity to both clients.[15]
In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB he
was still the counsel of record of the complainant in the pending ejectment case. We do not sustain
respondent’s theory that since the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases fraught
with different issues, parties, and subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of
opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the
least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the respondent may assert that the complainant
expressly consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to
show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present any written consent of
the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Neither can we accept respondent’s plea that he was duty-bound to handle all the cases referred
to him by AIB, including the personal cases of its officers which had no connection to its corporate
affairs. That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the
part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.[16] Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to
act either as an adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become their client. They have
the right to decline such employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[17] Although there are instances where lawyers cannot decline representation,[18] they
cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one.[19]
X x x.
X x x. It must be noted that the proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter however slight
the adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer’s private activity or in
the performance of a function in a non-professional capacity.[23] In the process of determining whether
there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not certainty, of conflict.
X x x.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba is hereby held GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning
that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. X x x.
IN CLOSING, out of DELICADEZA, we humbly request that you voluntarily INHIBIT OR DISQUALIFY
yourself as counsel in the two (2) aforecited pending cases, or, at least, as adverse counsel against us in
the second case docketed as I.S. No. x x x pending with the Office of the City Prosecutor of x x x City, if
the former is not possible.
We shall anticipate your written reply within three (3) days from receipt hereof.
We hope that the situation will not reach the stage where we might be compelled to formally report the
matter to the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for administration action.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
Xxx
Xxx
Xxx
[1] Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 199 [1999 ed.].
[2] Id., citing Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 [1949]; Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 [1968]; Bautista v.
Barrios, 9 SCRA 695 [1963].
[3] Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, p. 199, citing Pierce v. Palmer, 31 R.I. 432.
[4] Agpalo, Legal Ethics, supra, p. 220, citing In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258 [1914]; Grievance Committee
v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A 2d 82 [1954] and Titania v. Ocampo, 200 SCRA 472 [1991].
[5] CORPORATION CODE, sec. 23.
[6] 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Permanent Ed.) § 8044 (Importance of determining

whether officer a trustee or agent).
[7] Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82 (1911), cited in Gochan v. Young, G.R. No. 131889, 12 March
2001.
[8] Asset Privatization Trust v. CA, 360 Phil. 768 (1998).
[9] Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law: Conflict of Interest, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1339-
1342 (1981), cited in SOLOMON, SCHWARTZ, BAUMAN & WEISS, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY (3rd
ed.) 1129 (1994).
[10] Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corporation, 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affirmed in relevant
part per curiam 532 F. 2d 1118 (7th Circ. 1978), citing Murphy v. Washington American League Baseball
Club, Inc., 116 U.S. App. D.C. 362, 324 F. 2d 394 (1963).
[11] Ong Ching v. Ramolete, 151-A Phil. 509, 514 [1973].

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August 14, 2018

A.C. No. 12160

BUENA VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., Complainant

later filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. 17

government service as HL URB Commissioner. 39

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

Atty. Deloria represented

Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR state:

representing conflicting interests. 60

between them. Thus, Atty. Deloria's simultaneous representation of Menguito and

Atty. Deloria committed

complaint based on the same ground.

Atty. Deloria neglected his

Penalty imposed upon

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

ANDRES B. REYES, JR. ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO

JOSE C. REYES, JR.

Latuja, Ramon G. Marino, and Corazon Flores; id. at 31-35.

See Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation and Affidavit/Complaint dated March 29,

2004; id. at 65-67.

Services Group Officer-in-Charge Atty. Donna R. Ladao; id. at 70-76.

See id. at 6-7.

proceeding or delay any man's cause.

all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

trust and confidence reposed in him.

in connection therewith shall render him liable.

respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

See rollo, pp. 6-8. See also id. at 196-210.

See Answer dated June 6, 2005; id. at 136-144.

See id. at 136-139.

FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of

(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer,

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless

(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

See id. at 141-143.

Id. at 356-370. Penned by Commissioner Leo B. Malagar.

See id. at 363-365.

See id. at 365-366.

See id. at 367-368.

See id. at 368-369.

See id. at 370.

See Notice of Resolution No. XXII-2017-1216; id. at 354-355.

See id. at 354.

453 Phil. 108 (2003).

See Palacios v. Amara, Jr., A.C. No. 11504, August 1, 2017.

See id., citing Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 515 Phil. 296, 306 (2006).

Dated June 14, 2004. Rollo, pp. 46-51.

See Affidavit/Complaint; id. at 272-273.

See id. at 365-366.

See id. at 29-30.

Dated February 8, 2000. Id. at 80-92.

182426, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 489, 495.

Not attached to the rollo.

505 Phil. 126 (2005), cited in Palacios v. Amora, supra note 58.

See id. at 139.

769 Phil. 666 (2015).

735 Phil. I (2014).