(Slip Opinion)

 OCTOBER TERM, 2020 1 Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See

United States

 v.

 Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,

 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TANZIN

ET

 

 AL

.

 v.

TANVIR

ET

 

 AL

.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

 

No. 19–71. Argued October 6, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) was enacted in the wake of

Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore.

v.

Smith

, 494 U. S. 872, to provide a remedy to redress Federal Govern-ment violations of the right to free exercise under the First Amend-ment. Respondents are practicing Muslims who sued under RFRA, claiming that federal agents placed them on the No Fly List for refus-ing to act as informants against their religious communities. They sought injunctive relief against the agents in their official capacities and monetary damages against the agents in their individual capaci-ties. As relevant here, the District Court found that RFRA does not permit monetary relief and dismissed their individual-capacity claims. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that RFRA’s remedies provision encompasses money damages against Government officials.

Held

: RFRA’s express remedies provision permits litigants, when appro-priate, to obtain money damages against federal officials in their indi-vidual capacities. Pp. 3–9. (a) RFRA’s text provides that persons may sue and “obtain appro-priate relief against a government,” 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(c), includ-ing an “official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States,” §2000bb–2(1). RFRA supplants the ordinary meaning of “gov-ernment” with a different, express definition that includes “official[s].” It then underscores that “official[s]” are “person[s].” Under RFRA’s definition, relief that can be executed against an “official . . . of the Unites States”

is

 “relief against a government.” This reading is con-firmed by RFRA’s use of the phrase “persons acting under color of law,” which has long been interpreted by this Court in the 42 U. S. C. §1983 context to permit suits against officials in their individual capacities. See,

e.g.

,

Memphis Community School Dist.

 v.

Stachura,

 477 U. S. 299,

 

2 TANZIN

v.

 TANVIR Syllabus 305–306. Pp. 3–5. (b) RFRA’s term “appropriate relief” is “open-ended” on its face; thus, what relief is “ ‘appropriate’ ” is “inherently context dependent.”

Sossamon

 v.

Texas,

 563 U. S. 277, 286. In the context of suits against Government officials, damages have long been awarded as appropriate relief, and though more limited today, they remain an appropriate form of relief. The availability of damages under §1983 is particularly salient here. When Congress first enacted RFRA, the definition of “government” included state and local officials. In order to reinstate the pre-

Smith

 substantive protections of the First Amendment

and

 the right to vindicate those protections by a claim, §2000bb(b), the reme-dies provision must have encompassed at least the same forms of relief authorized by §1983. Because damages claims have always been avail-able under §1983 for clearly established violations of the First Amend-ment, that means RFRA provides, as one avenue for relief, a right to seek damages against Government employees. The presumption in

Sossamon

, 563 U. S. 277, is inapplicable because this case does not in-volve sovereign immunity. Pp. 5–9. 894 F. 3d 449, affirmed. T

HOMAS

, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-bers joined, except B

 ARRETT

, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

 

 Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

 _________________

No. 19–71

 _________________

FNU TANZIN,

ET AL

., PETITIONERS

v.

 MUHAMMAD TANVIR,

ET AL

.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

 

[December 10, 2020]

J

USTICE

T

HOMAS

 delivered the opinion of the Court. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the Federal Government from imposing substan-tial burdens on religious exercise, absent a compelling in-terest pursued through the least restrictive means. 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. §2000bb

et seq.

It also gives a person whose religious exercise has been unlawfully burdened the right to seek “appropriate relief.” The question here is whether “appropriate relief 

 

” includes claims for money damages against Government officials in their individual capacities. We hold that it does. I  A RFRA secures Congress’ view of the right to free exercise under the First Amendment, and it provides a remedy to redress violations of that right. Congress passed the Act in the wake of this Court’s decision in

Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore.

v.

Smith

, 494 U. S. 872, 885– 890 (1990), which held that the First Amendment tolerates neutral, generally applicable laws that burden or prohibit