DIMAKUTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHIILPPINES, G.R. No.

206513, October 30, 2015

FACTS:
On September 24, 2005, in the City of Las Piñas, accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit a lascivious conduct upon the person of one AAA, who was then a sixteen-
year-old minor, by then and there embracing her, touching her breast and private part against her will and
without her consent and the act complained of is prejudicial to the physical and psychological development of
the complainant. After trial, the RTC promulgated its Decision which convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing, among other things, that
even assuming he committed the acts imputed, still there is no evidence showing that the same were done
without the victim’s consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence upon her. The CA rendered a
Decision adopting the recommendation of the OSG. Petitioner received a copy of CA Decision on July 6, 2012.
Instead of further appealing the case, he filed on July 23, 2012 before the CA a manifestation with motion to
allow him to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail the benefits of Probation Law. 
HELD:
No. Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits granting an application for probation if an appeal from the
sentence of conviction has been perfected by the accused. In this case, petitioner appealed the trial court’s
judgment of conviction before the CA alleging that it was error on the part of the trial court to have found him
guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610. Accused already perfected his
appeal and it is late in the day to avail the benefits of probation.

PETRALBA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, 200 SCRA 644

FACTS:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision * of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on
October 5, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 9390 entitled "The People of the Philippines vs. Richard V. Petralba"
convicting herein petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated December 15, 1987 denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

Richard V. Petralba was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Treasury of Alcoy Cebu on October 23,
1979. Fourteen (14) months after designation, petitioner's cashbook balance was audited by Auditors
Constantino Alagar and Rene Flores. He was found short of P28,107.00, Petitioner, theretofore, was charged
with, and convicted of, 31 counts of "Malversation of Public Funds," "Illegal Use of Public Funds" and
"Falsification of Public Documents." Petitioner was granted probation and continued his function as Municipal
Treasurer of Alcoy Cebu, from December 23, 1980 until he was succeeded by Mrs. Lilia Suico on March 15,
1981.

Petitioner's cash and accounts from the period of December 23, 1980 to March 15, 1981 were audited by Leticia
Trazo and Flora Pacana. Petitioner was found short in the amount of P50,447.06.
The respondent Court found that the vouchers disallowed by the Trazo team in the amount of P22,119.19 were
either supported by invoices or receipts or duly signed by respective payees. Thus, the amount of P6,978.22 out
of the P29,098.19 remained unaccounted for.

Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner dated December 15, 1987. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the petitioner was properly audited and whether exhibits "10" to "11-m" were included in the
settlement of the account of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the petitioner has adduced evidence to prove that the missing funds were not put to his
personal use.
HELD:

The above allegations are devoid of any merit. According to the Court, Exhibit "4" was prepared by the
petitioner to apprise Suico of his transactions from January 1, 1981 to March 15,1981. Due to the in veracity of
Exhibit "4", an audit was performed, the result of which is listed in Exhibit "H". Evidently, Exhibit "4" is self-
serving and unreliable and, therefore, cannot prevail over the official findings of the Trazo team contained in
Exhibit "H". Besides, petitioner himself acknowledged and signed the official findings of the Trazo team. He is
estopped from impugning the veracity of Exhibit "H".

Equally baseless is the claim of the petitioner that Sandiganbayan did not consider his Exhibit "l1 " to "l1-M". It
is admitted by petitioner that Exhibit "l1 " to "l1-M" were among the vouchers listed in Exhibits "2-A" and "2-
B" allowed by the Alagar team and by the Trazo team. (Memorandum for the accused, p. 11). Auditor Alagar
declared that Exhibits "2-A" and "2-B" were taken into account during his audit. (Decision of Sandiganbayan, p.
7, Rollo, p. 58). Thus, the amount appearing in Exhibit its "11" to "11-M" was included in the amount of
P22,119.97 allowed by the Trazo team in reducing the original unaccounted amount of P50,447.06 to
P29,098.19. (Exhibit "8-B").

Petitioner alleges that Exhibit "2", indicating a total of P10,296.47, should total P10,371.47.1âwphi1 His
argument is based on the non- inclusion of the amount of P75.00. However, a perusal of Annex "B" of
petitioner's Reply (Rollo, p. 126) indicates that the name of creditor opposite the amount of P75.00 was erased,
and the same was not presented by petitioner as part of his Exhibit "7". Thus, the Trazo team did not commit
any abuse of discretion in their failure to credit P75.00.

Petitioner was able to explain the amount of P22,119.97 out of the shortage of P29,098.19, but he failed to
explain the remaining balance of P6,978.22, thereby giving rise to the conclusion that he had spent such amount
for his personal use.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BAYOTAS, 236 SCRA 239

FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest. The
Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the death of the accused does not excuse him from his
civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the
counsel of the accused claimed that in the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

RULING:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the
Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before the final
judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will be “no party
defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court
stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on
whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will only
survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code
could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the
death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a summary on which cases should
civil liability be extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based
solely on the act complained of.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMOS, 83 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Two criminal cases identical in every respect, except for the fact that they pertain to different editions of the
same textbook, were filed against Socorro C. Ramos, for alleged violations of Act 3134, otherwise known as the
Copyright Law, as amended.
That on or about July to September, 1963, in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, as the proprietor aid general manager of the National Book Store, as enterprise engaged
in the business of publishing, selling and distributing books, did then and there, wilfully and illegaly sell and
distribute spurious and pirated copies of the high school textbook, entitled General Science Today for
Philippine School, First Year, by Gilam, Van Houten and Cornista, said accused knowing that said book was
duly copyrighted by the Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., and was being distributed exclusively by its sister
corporation, Alemar's or Sibal and Sons, Inc.
On September 7, 1965, identical motions to quash 2 were filed by accused Ramos on the ground of prescription,
alleging therein, inter alia, that the delivery of the alleged offense was made as early as July 17, 1963 and all
subsequent knowledge or discoveries of posterior sales and possession of said books by the respondents,
including that involved in the police search of September 4, 1963 were only confirmatory of the first.

The prosecution, also in both cases, filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash that "(t)he crime being a
continuing offense, the statute of limitations begins to run from the completion of the last act or series of acts
which constitute the offense, " and this last act was committed on September 3, 1963. Therefore when the
information was filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed within the two-year period, albeit the last day of the
prescriptive period.

Hon. Jesus De Veyra granted the motion to quash by an order dated October 7, 1965. 

The prosecution appealed the above order to this Court on October 15, 1965. In Criminal Case No. 80006, the
motion to quash was not resolved until December 23, 1965. On this date, Hon. Placido Ramos denied the
motion to quash, and set the arraignment of the accused on January 12, 1966.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Act No. 3326 is applicable.

2. Whether or not the offense has prescribed.

HELD:

1. No. Sec. 1 of Act No. 3326 provides “Violations penalized by special acts shall unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules.” Thus, Act No. 3326 applies
only if the special act does not provide for its own prescriptive period. It has no application here, where
the Copyright Law provides for its own prescriptive period.

2. Yes. The last day for filing the cases is September 2, 1965, considering that 1964 is a leap year.

The resolution of this issue hinges, in turn, on whether February 28, and 29 of a leap year, 1964, should
be counted as one day, as proposed by the prosecution; or as separate days, as alleged by the defense.

This issue which was in 1965 still undetermined is now a settled matter. It was held in 1969 in Namarco
vs. Tuazon  that February 28 and 29 of a leap year should be counted as separate days in computing
periods of prescription. Thus, this Court, speaking thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held
that where the prescriptive period was supposed to commence on December 21, 1955, the filing of the
action on December 21, 1965, was done after the ten-year period has lapsed — since 1960 and 1964
were both leap years and the case was thus filed two (2) days too late. Since this case was filed on
September 3, 1965, it was filed one day too late; considering that the 730th day fell on September 2,
1965 — the year 1964 being a leap year.

In the same case, the court held that If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the
Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree. 

There is no merit in the allegation that the reckoning of the prescriptive period should start from
September 4, 1963. This was the date when the police authorities discovered several pirated books in
accused's store. But the accused was charged, in both Criminal Cases Nos. 80006 and 80007, with
having allegedly sold and distributed  spurious and pirated copies of the textbook in question, not
of illegal possession of the same.

The prosecution's claim that the preliminary investigation proceedings in the Manila City Fiscal's Office
and in the prosecution Division of the Department of Justice interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period, is also without merit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PACIFICADOR, G.R. No. 139405, March 13, 2001
FACTS:
That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,  Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the
Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and therefore, a public
officer, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine Smelters Corporation, a private corporation,
conspiring and confederating with one another and with other individuals, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and
conveyance by the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and
interests over parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is
located including all the reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters
Corporation by virtue of a contract, the terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Government as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value
thereof at that time was P862,150.00 thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted benefits,
advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the government in the amount of
P777,005.50. 
Respondent, and his erstwhile co-accused, Marcelo were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Petitioner contends that, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, the provision of Act No.
3326 on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws is not applicable to the instant criminal case for
the reason that R.A. No. 3019 provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that offenses
committed and punishable under the said law shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the fifteen-year prescriptive period shall be applied in this case.
HELD:
No. Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 195, provides that the
offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears however, that prior to
the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the
prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer
prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg.
195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein
private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten
(10) years from January 6, 1976. 

CABRA vs. PUNO, 70 SCRA 606

FACTS:

Certiorari and prohibition to nullify the Order of respondent Judge dated May 21, 1975, reviving the
Information in Criminal Case No. B-537-74 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Baliwag Branch, and to
prohibit said court from conducting further proceedings on the case.

On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on
September 24, 1974 with respondent court, accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of Falsification of
Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of
sale of a parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground of
prescription of the crime charge, as the said document of sale of Lot No. 378-C was notarized on August 14,
1948, registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948 and as a consequence the original
certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title issued, and since then Eugenio Cabral had
publicly and continuously possessed said property and exercised acts of ownership thereon, which facts are
apparently admitted in the letter of San Diego's lawyer to Cabral on September 17, 1953. After hearing said
motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, in a Resolution dated March 25, 1975, granted the motion to quash and
dismissed the Information on the ground of prescription. The order of dismissal was predicated upon said
court's finding that the factual averments contained in the notion to quash were supported by the evidence.
Private prosecutor, who was not present during the hearing of the motion to quash, filed a motion dated April 8,
1975, for the reconsideration of said Resolution. This was opposed by petitioner on the ground that San Diego
can no longer intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action in April 1974 against the same accused
(Eugenio Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments contained in the criminal Information.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the issue being purely legal and considering that the matter has been amply discuss in the
pleadings.
HELD:

The court agreed with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to
quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 2 Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal
liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of
the Revised Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10) years. 3 Here, San
Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered in the
Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.

More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on
September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations
that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against
Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First Instance.

RECEBIDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 346 SCRA 881

FACTS:

On September 9, 1990, private complainant Caridad Dorol went to the house of her cousin, petitioner Aniceto
Recebido, at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon to redeem her property, an agricultural land located at San Isidro,
Bacon, Sorsogon, which Caridad mortgaged to petitioner sometime in April of 1985.  Petitioner and Caridad did
not execute a document on the mortgage but Caridad instead gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated
June 16, 1973 executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol.

In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad to redeem her property on his claim that she had sold
her property to him in 1979. Caridad maintained and insisted that the transaction between them involving her
property was a mortgage.

Caridad verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon that there exists on its file a Deed of Sale dated
August 13, 1979, allegedly executed by Caridad l in favor of petitioner and that the property was registered in
the latter's name.  After comparison of the specimen signatures of Caridad in other documents with that of the
signature of Caridad on the questioned Deed of Sale, NBI Document Examiner Antonio Magbojas, found that
the latter signature was falsified.

CaridadDorol filed her complaint against petitioner Aniceto with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Legaspi City and its Questioned Documents Division conducted an examination in the original copy of the
Deed of Sale in question allegedly signed by Caridad, particularly her signature affixed thereon.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the information was filed.

HELD:

No. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall "commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, x xx."  In People v.
Reyes, this Court has declared that registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world.   The record is
constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.  All persons are
charged with knowledge of what it contains.

INFANTE vs. WARDEN, 92 Phil. 310

FACTS:
This was a petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental by
Antonio Infante, and the petition having been granted, the Provincial Fiscal has appealed to this Court.

It appears that the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years, four months and one day of
reclusion temporal, which he commenced to served on June 21, 1927, and that on March 6, 1939, after serving
15 years, 7 months and 11 days, he was granted a conditional pardon and released from imprisonment, the
condition being that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."cralavirtua1aw library

On April 25, 1949, Infante was found guilty by the Municipal Court of Bacolod City of driving a jeep without a
license and sentenced to pay a fine of P10 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On July 13,
1950, "by virtue of the authority conferred upon His Excellency, the President, by section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code," the Executive Secretary ordered Infante re- arrested and re-committed to the custody of
the Director of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, for breach of the condition of the aforesaid pardon.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner that section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code upon which he was ordered re-
incarcerated, had been abrogated.
HELD:
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains a repealing clause (article 367),
which expressly repeals among other acts sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It
does not repeal section 64 (i) above quoted. On the contrary, Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
which is subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, in its section 9 expressly preserves the authority conferred upon
the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the President to authorize the arrest and
reincarceration of any person who violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the
enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. In this connection, we observe that section 64 (i) of the
Administrative Code and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code are but a reiteration of Acts Nos. 1524 and
1561, under which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to suffer and to serve the unexpired portion of
the original sentence.
The court’s opinion that article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes violation of a conditional
pardon as an offense, and the power vested in the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code to authorize the recommitment to prison of a violator of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired
portion of his original sentence.

CITY WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL vs. ESTRELLA

FACTS:
In celebration of Law Day on September 18, 1999, IBP volunteer lawyers and law students visited various jails
in Metro Manila. In the City Jail of Manila, they found thirty-four (34) prisoners (Estrella et. al.), whom they
believed were entitled to be released after deducting time allowances for good conduct in the service of their
respective sentences.

Consequently, Estrella et. al.asked Rosendo M. Dial, City Warden of the Manila City Jail, to effect their release
on the ground that they had already served their sentences, less time allowances for good conduct invoking
Arts. 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code.

However, City Warden denied the request of Estrella et. al. on the ground that only the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections can grant them allowances for good conduct under Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code.
Nonetheless, on October 11, 1999, City Warden issued certifications of good behavior to Estrella et. al. stating
that had Estrella et. al. been credited time allowances for good conduct, they should have already been released.
Thereafter, Estrella et. al., represented by the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid, filed in the Supreme Court
a petition for habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court issued the writ of habeas corpus which it made returnable to the Regional Trial Court,
Manila. In his return, City Warden, through the Solicitor General, opposed the release of Estrella et. al., arguing
that while the Director of the Bureau of Corrections no longer exercises authority over city and municipal
prisoners, he remains the sole authority under Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code who can grant time allowances
for good conduct to prisoners.

It turned out that 22 of the 34 prisoners had already been released.

The RTC ruled that the Bureau of Corrections, no longer has the authority to grant good conduct time
allowances to inmates in the provincial, city, and municipal jails (like Estrella et. al.) in view of the enactment
of R.A. No. 6975, otherwise known as the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990,
which places provincial, city, and municipal jails under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Jail
Management.
Hence petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Solicitor General. 

The Solicitor General contends that despite changes in the organizational structure of the prison system, the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections remains the exclusive authority for granting good conduct time
allowances and, therefore, it was error for the lower court to order the release of Estrella et. al. on the basis of
certifications issued by the City Warden as to time allowances for good conduct that Estrella et. al. is entitled
to. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether there is inconsistency between Art. 99 of the RPC and R.A. No. 6975.
2. Who has authority to grant good conduct time allowances, the City Warden or the Bureau of
Corrections?
3. Whether the RTC may rely on the certification of the City Warden as to good conduct time allowances
in ordering the release of prisoners by writ of habeas corpus

RULING:

1. There is no inconsistency between Art. 99 of the RPC and R.A. No. 6975.

Repeals by implication are not favored. To the contrary, every statute must be so interpreted and brought in
accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Interpretare et concordare leqibus est
optimus interpretendi. For there to be an implied repeal, there must be a clear showing of repugnance. The
language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been formerly
enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.

2. In Kabigting v. Director of Prisons (G.R. No. L-12276, Aug. 26, 1958),  it was held that in habeas
corpus proceedings, the trial court has no power to grant the petitioner time allowances for good
conduct” in accordance with Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code it is the Director of the Prisons
(now Bureau of Corrections) who shall grant allowances for good conduct if such good conduct
has been observed by the prisoner concerned.” In People v. Tan (19 SCRA 433 (1967)), it was
emphatically held that a provincial warden cannot grant credit for good conduct to a prisoner and
order his release because Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests the authority to grant prisoners
good conduct time allowances “exclusively in the Director and no one else.” In that case, the
prisoner was under the supervision and control of the provincial warden, but the authority of the
Director to grant good conduct time allowances was upheld. Indeed, there is nothing in R.A. No. 6975
which repeals Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. The RTC committed an error in ordering the release of Estrella et. al. on the basis of the certification
issued by the City Warden in view of Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code vesting the authority to grant
good conduct time allowances solely in the Bureau of Corrections. 

In the first place, the certifications issued by the City Warden lacked data on the dates when Estrella et. al.
started serving sentence. Such data are important because, as has been observed, good conduct time
allowances under Art. 97 may only be earned by prisoners while serving their sentence. While Art. 29 of the
 Revised Penal Code provides that time spent in preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full or four-
fifths in service of sentence, it does not say that the prisoners shall earn the credit for good behavior under
Art. 97 during such period of preventive detention.

The Court is constrained to order the re-arrest of Estrella et. al. This can be done without placing them in
double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense because their re-incarceration is merely a
continuation of the penalties that they had not completely served due to the invalid crediting of good
conduct time allowances in their favor.

SUPRA BAKING vs DIR. OF PRISONS, 28 SCRA 851

FACTS:

Petitioners concededly had been under detention for more than 18 years under the charge of
respondent, Director of Prisons on May 16, 1969.The convicted petitioners were charged of the crime
of rebellion and sentenced each of them to 10 years imprisonment. The decision has since become final.
Previously, on march 31, 1969, petitioners Baking et al. had filed their petition for Habeas corpus. They claimed
that they had been denied the right to a speedy trial. Consequently, on May 24, 1969, after the court render its
conviction for the accused, the petitioners filed a petition for their immediate release on the grounds that
they have already served the 10-year sentences.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Article 97 of the Revised Applicable to detention on prisoners or prisoners who just
serving their preventive imprisonment.

HELD:

The petitioners as detention prisoners, cannot by any stretch of imagination, be said to be serving sentenced
during the period of their preventive imprisonment.

The said detention prisoners are entitled to good conduct allowances if they voluntarily offer in writing to
perform such labor as may be assigned to them. In which case, the credit they receive shall be deducted.
From such sentence as may be imposed upon them in the event of conviction.
In this case, there is no proof that the petitioners have voluntarily offered in writing to perform such labor as
may be assigned to them. Petitioners have not even told that they’ve worked during the period of preventive
imprisonment.

OCCENA VS. ICAMINA, 181 SCRA 851

FACTS: 

Eulogio Occena, herein petitioner, filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against herein private
respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting
words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas," which, freely
translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and
statements of similar import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor.

Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued, at which petitioner,
without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private
prosecutor.
After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay
a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No
damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the facts and circumstances of the
case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages."
Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the decision of the Municipal Trial Court constitutes the final adjudication on the merits
of private respondent's civil liability.

2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private
respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.

HELD:
The court find merit in the petition.

1. The decision of the Municipal Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court cannot be considered
as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent simply because said decision has not
yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the
accused in said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.

2. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable," in relation to
Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the
Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and sentenced to a fine
of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but no civil liability arising from the
felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to
be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual
member of the society or private person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act or omission.
The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil
liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person.
There is here an offended party, hence, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a
barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.

CARPIO vs. DOROJA, 180 SCRA 1

FACTS:
The accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious
Physical Injuries under an amended information punishable under Article 365 of the RPC. 

A writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but was returned unsatisfied due to
the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriff's return.  Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ
of execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle.  The same was denied by the
trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary
liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not "culpa-
contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the reason that complainant
having failed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its decision
which has become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the owner-operator Dionisio Carpio is subsidiarily liable due to insolvency of Edwin Ramirez.

HELD:

Yes. In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal
action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent.

Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party
to the criminal case.  Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal
case as part of the execution proceedings against the employee.