JUDGE TRANQUILINO V. RAMOS, COMPLAINANT, VS. RODRIGO C.

BICAD, COURT AIDE, MCTC,

VILLAVERDE-QUEZON, NUEVA VIZCAYA, RESPONDENT.
Facts: December 13, 2001, Judge Tranquilino V. Ramos, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Villaverde-Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
an administrative complaint charging respondent Rodrigo C. Bicad, Court Aide of the MCTC, with grave
misconduct relative to a then pending rape case[1] filed against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 29, docketed as Crim. Case No. 4058.
The RTC promulgated its Decision in Crim. Case No. 4058. The RTC found that respondent had
carnal knowledge of the complainant, but acquitted respondent of the rape charge because the
prosecution failed to prove that respondent used force or intimidation or had carnal knowledge of the 14-
year-old complainant when she was unconscious.
Issue: whether or not the administrative case for grave misconduct filed against respondent should be
dismissed in view of his acquittal in the criminal case for rape.
Held: The OCA found respondent guilty of grave misconduct and recommended the dismissal of
respondent, thus:
The acquittal of respondent in the criminal case does not result in the dismissal of the
administrative case against him. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary to
hold respondent liable is substantial or competent evidence while proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary to convict an accused in a criminal case. Thus, even if respondent in the
administrative case is acquitted in the criminal case, the administrative case may be pursued.
The Court agrees with the finding and recommendation of the OCA. As an employee of the court,
respondent is expected to act with moral uprightness in his professional and private life to keep the
people's respect and faith in the judiciary. The carnal knowledge of a 14-year-old minor by respondent is a
blatant disregard of the Court's standard of morality and decency.

ANTONIO V.A. TAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RUSTICO T. ILAGAN, Regional Election Director, Commission on
Elections, Region XI, Davao City, and SENFORIANO B. ALTERADO, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner, as incumbent city Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") as
Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national
and local elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section
221(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
The Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to
represent the Second District of Davao City in the House of Representatives.
Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the
validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers
of "unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass."
The criminal complaint for "Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of
criminal intent on the part of therein respondents. Still pending is an administrative charge, the case now
before us, instituted in the COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers, including herein petitioner, for
"Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service."
The COMELEC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not an absolution from a criminal charge a bar to an administrative proceeding.
Held: No. the investigation then being conducted by the Ombudsman on the criminal case for falsification
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the
administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely independent proceedings.
Neither would the results in one conclude the other. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a
bar to an administrative prosecution (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Enriquez, 218
SCRA 1), or vice versa. So, also, the dismissal by the COMELEC of SPC Case No. 92-232 on the ground that
the case constituted an electoral protest within the jurisdiction of the HRET and not of the COMELEC
(affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 106452) does not necessarily foreclosure the matter of possible
liability, if warranted, of those who might have improperly acted in the canvass of votes.
DUE PROCESS; THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED BY THE CSC ITSELF DOES NOT
MEAN THAT IT COULD NOT BE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE.
CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001]
FACTS:
On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service Commission that Paitim, Municipal
Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for Cruz after the latter had previously failed
in the said examination three times.
The CSC found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie case exists against you for
DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material
averments of the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal investigation on
the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will
continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the
complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time.
On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation" finding
the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government service
Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V,
Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases
where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the complaint was filed by a
private citizen against the government employee.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as investigator,
complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time.

HELD: NO.
The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an
impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual
findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme
Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. After a careful
examination of the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty as charged. The photograph pasted
over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service
Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said
document is totally different from the signature of Gilda Cruz.
Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as
investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable.
The CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by
it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to
it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code
of 1987.
It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie
case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges. They submitted an
Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that
there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to take
cognizance of the case.

Miguel Singson vs National Labor Relations Commission & Philippine Airlines

Facts:
Singson was an employee of PAL. On 7 Jun 1991, a Japanese national alleged that Singson
extorted money from her ($200.00) by accusing her of having excess baggage; and that to settle the
issue she needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was later investigated and the investigating
committee found him guilty. PAL then dismissed Singson from employment. Singson then filed a case
before NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal, atty’s fees and damages. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in
favor of Singson as he found PAL’s side insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed to the NLRC. The 2nd
Division, composed of Calaycay, Rayala former Arbiter Raul Aquino, of the NLRC took cognizance of the
case. NLRC reversed the decision of Aquino. Singson moved for reconsideration which was denied by
NLRC, this time only Calaycay & Rayala voted.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Singson was denied due process. The SC held that Singson was denied due
process when Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the 2nd Division of the NLRC, in
reviewing PAL’s appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Under Rule VII,
Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall consist of one member from
the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers
and employers sectors, respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and
impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who
are impartial right from the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered
impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself
from any participation in this case. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the
motion for reconsideration of Singson was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of
Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal.
He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of Singson’s right to an
impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.

NOTES:
Requisites of Procedural Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have something to support itself;
(4) the evidence must be substantial;
(5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) the Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

Administrative Due Process Includes

(a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person’s legal right;
(b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant
evidence in his favor;
(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of
competent jurisdiction; and
(d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at
least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties.
Zambales Chromite Mining et al vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be
declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloňa. Gozon
decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of Agri. And Natural
Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his
earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of
Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge to
review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to
administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had
decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM
did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no
evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM.
ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and declared that ZCM had
the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that
the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA
reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded
the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own
contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al
demanded that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due
process.

HELD:
The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had
acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the
officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there
would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased
view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.