Armor in the Invasion of North Africa

Armor in the invasion of North Africa. Armored School, student research r-port.
1950.
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A RESEARCH REPORT
Prepared at THE ARMORED SCHOOL Fort. Knox Kentucky 1949- 1950

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to
THE ARMORED Fort Knox, Kentucky

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SCHOOL
4HEADQUARTERS

AKAB-4 SUBJECT.: Letter of Transmittal.

22

August

1950

T 0

Comimandant Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Enclosed is an additional Research Study, .armior in the Invasion of North Africa, prepared at The Armored School, Which you for your files. FOR TBE ASSISTAN~T COMMDA T0-

may

retain

Inc 1l a/s

Lt Col, Inf Secretary
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COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS

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REPORT PRE~PARED

BY CCLUVIITTE~ 25, OFFICE ADVANCED CCU RSE
'SCHOOL

THE AM ORE
1949
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1950 ILI,

LI1Ui?~ AT COLONTEL JACK F. * Nf M7AJOR JOFFPE L. GUE~t"ARD
M AJOR

LESLIE J.

TIARNE.S

MAJ OR RALPH N. ROSS MAJOR 1OR0j14AJOR J.%tWS F. R. SEIXTONy

WIL~IA

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CAPTAINT AROLD V. AiMIERS ON P
CAPTAINt JACK P. BRUBAUER
CAPTAIN

JOSEPH K.

GRANT

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 1AY 1950

TAI3LE
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OF CONTENTS

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A PPEIYDICES

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ITTI.Trrining. "morfndum ,Turmbcr 1 (Gori Post) 1ovrment Orders, Shinmwnt 3324 TU. Orders, Ship.nt 3324..)" V.

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FOREWORD The expedition to Safi, venture I ever experienced.. North Africa was the wildest ad-

While the opposition turned out to

be light, the anxiety and suspense were as heavy as I ever felt. We were all so inexperienced..

Men, ammunition and gasoline were loaded together on the same ship. Due to the scarcity of ships of the right type crews

of combat vehicles were not on the same ship with their vehicles. The leaders of both the Army and Navy of the expedition had only one thought--winning the campaign--hence cooperation was superior from start to finish. Regardless of the many discouraging factors, the expedition was a success. This brings out the lesson which I later felt

proved itself to be true so many times--the picture is never really as dark as it can be painted and the enemy has his troubles also and is scared the same as you are.

/s/ Ernest N. Harmon ERIEST N. HAR~ ON MIaj. Gen. (Retired)

Liberty Hall, Woolford, Maryland,

10 February 1950

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PREFACE This report concentrates attention on the use of armor in the invasion of North Africa. It deals primarily with the employment

of the 2d Armored Division landing as part of the Western Task Force. It is about an operation that lasted only a short time and against

indifferent resistance. Since this report deals with the use of armor, the infantry is referred to only as much as is necessary to insure clarity and continuity. No attempt is made to slight the part played by the assaults on the beach and engaged The fact that the infantry played

infantry which made the initial in

the major part of the fighting.

the major role in the report.

the operation does impose certain limitations on

Most of the observer reports and other documents avail-

able deal primarily with the use of infantry. Due to the shortness of the action a great deal of emphasis is placed on the planning stage of the operation. It is possible

that this stage is operation,

the most important single phase of an amphibious the war proved the The

In any event later experiences in

necessity for detailed planning in

an amphibious operation.

actions reported on are small, independent actions. in in an amphibious small actions, operation the initial

It is felt that

employment of armor will be

There are many limitations to writing a report almost eight years after the action occurred. In the early stages of the war

few reports were kept at divisional and lower headquarters. is

There

no after-action report available for the 2d Airmored Division in For the most part no criticism of

this action as there were for later engagements. memories are vague as to small details. This is

the people who were so helpful to the committee but the reader must bear in mind that the people who took part in by means finished with their war experiences. this operation were It is unfortunate

that this report could not have been written soon after the action occurred, Much of the information is from unofficial reports. No

diaries were kept at this time except by higher commanders and these do not fit the purpose of a report of this type. The committee wishes to express its

Acknowled gements,

sincere appreciation to the many individuals who assisted in making this report.

yWVithour their help in sending narratives and personal

files of documents the report could not have been written. Names of those who contributed information and assistance in the preparation of this report: Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes Gol., Ralph J. Butcher Lt, Gen, Lucien K. Truscott Col. Don E. Carleton Maj. Gen, Jonathan W. Anderson Cola Hugh J. Fitzgerald Col. Elton F. Hammond Miaj. Gen, Hobart R. Gay Maj, Gen. Ernest N. Harmon Col, Paul D. Harkins Col, Kent C. Lambert Ma. Gen. Albert W. Kenner Maj. Gen. Isaac D. White Col,. Thomas H. Nixon Brig. Gen. John F. Conklin Lt. Col; Lewis M. Flint Lt. Col. Frank M. Muller Brig. Gen. Walter J., Buller Brig. Gen. Harry H. Semmes Mlaj 4 Norris H. Perkins M,1aj. Alvin T. Netterblad, Col. 3 illiam R, Buster Capt. M.2ax R. M1achinicke

Jr.

CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND On 8 November 1941, elements of the 2d Armored Division began unloading at three locations in FRENCH MOROCCO. Although

the armored units were not to be used in

the actual assault they

were landed early and played a vital part in the actual success of the invasion. This operation was conducted with speed of training and planning which proved an example for all such operations later in

the war when troops were better trained, techniques improved, better and more adequate equipment available, adequate. Before going into the part played by the 2d Armored Division in Operation TORCH it is necessary to show some of the reasons for 1 SEVASTOPOL, and time: for planning more

the "most daring operation- to date in World War II." last Russian stronghold in the CRIEA,

had fallen to the Germans.

President Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were insisting that Russia be kept in fell to the Germans in the war.2 On 20 June 1942 TOBRUK

only one day. 3

The British feared that the

Germans and Japanese would join forces somewhere east of the Red Sea.4 Strategic Considerations The President of the United States and the Prime Miinister of Great Britain had made the decision that our resources would be concentrated first and then Japan. 5 to defeat Germany, the greater and closer enemy, The Middle East was the southern supply route to

the U.S.S.R.

and the main air ferry route to INDIA.

The key to

the Middle East was EGYPT: the best hostile avenue to the Persian Gulf. Here also was the most convenient base for reenforcing any Since Russia was slowly April 1942

threatened part of the Middle Eastern Area. falling back it

was decided at a conference inLONDON in

to do everything practicable to reduce the pressure on the Soviet lest she collapse and the door be opened wide for a complete conquest of EUROPE. At this conference, attended by General George C. Marshall, Harry Hopkins, personal

United States Army Chief of Staff, and Mr. advisor to President Roosevelt, a cross-Channel operation in the code name RCUNDUP.

a tentative target date was set for It was called by

the summer of 1943,

Due to the immediate necessity for an

emergency plan, a diversionary assault on the French coast was planned for a much earlier date. and was to be used "only if This plan was given the name SLEDGEHAIIER such a desperate measure became necessary

to lend a hand toward saving the situation on the Soviet front." June 1942, General Sir Alan F. Brooke,

6

In

Chief of the Imperial General

Staff, came to Washington for a discussion of SLEDGEHATMER and ROUNDUP, and a possible operation in cussions the Allied situation in turn, The German successes in the Mediterranean. During these dis-

NORTH AFRICA took a more serious

AFRICA and along the southeastern porthe Middle

tion of the Soviet front threatened a complete collapse in

East, the loss of the Suez Canal and the vital oil supply in the vicinity of ABADAN. "It was a very black hour."

In July, .General Marshall and Admiral King went to London for further meetings with the British Chiefs of Staff. It was felt that

something must be done immediately to lessen the pressure on the Soviet, whose armies were facing a crisis. especially in Poverty of equipment,

landing craft, and the short period remaining when the

weather would permit a cross-Channel movement of small craft, ruled out the diversionary operation SLEDGEHAMMER for 1942.9 It was therefore decided, with the approval of the President to mount a North African assault at the despite the fact that it meant the abandon-

and the Prime Minister,

earliest possible moment,

ment of both ROUNDUP and SIEDGEHAIMER. called TORCH, American lilitary who was in

This operation was to be

The operation was favored by the British but not the leaders.10 Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was directed on

London planning SLEDGEUHAMER and ROUNDUP,

13 August 1942 to proceed with operation TORCH. fixed for early November. Political Considerations

The target date was

There were two main political considerations to be taken into account by the planners for TORCH,; First was the reactions of the and FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

neutral countries of SPAIN, VICHY FRANCE, SPAIN was pro-xis..

11

She was the main center for Axis Intelligence

and there was more than a strong suspicion that urgently needed material was finding its way Northward across the PYRENNEES. SPAIN

was certainly making available to the Germans radar stations on both sides of the Straits, the southern shore which was in Spanish hands.

The British and American Ambassadors had assured General Franco of our intention to respect SPAINt s rights and sovereignity, and there were indications that the chief anxiety of the Spanish leader was to maintain neutrality, for economic reasons. It might well be, how-

ever, that Axis pressure would prove too strong. It was to guard against such a possibility as this that the Combined Chiefs of Staff deemed it the initial cations, essential to capture CASABLANCA in

stages as an opening for an auxiliary line of communiand decided that considerable forces should be held in against a German on-

readiness to seize SPANISH MOROCCO and hold it slaught. part of
12

The Germans considered it

a serious mistake to occupy any

ORROCCO or ALGERIA unless American or English troops at-

tempted to do so.13 It seemed certain that the Axis would immediately occupy the doing this would be to forestall to establish air and subto

whole of FRANCE and that their aim in

a landing by us on the coast of the MIDI,

marine bases along the French Mediterranean Coast, and above all, attempt to gain control of the French Fleet in fleet was also a problem to be considered. TOULON. The French

1

The second main political consideration was the reaction of the French people in NORTH AFRICA to the invasion, French feeling

had been inflamed against the British because of Axis propaganda using the incidents of MERS, EL KEBIR, DAKAR, SYRIA, and MADAGASCAR. America was still The French

The Americans had apparently escaped this opprobrium. maintaining trade and diplomatic relations with VICHY.

people in

NORTH AFRICA did not have the intense hatred of the Boche in Metropolitan FRANCE. The German Armistice Commissions

that was felt in

NORTH AFRICA were slowly depriving the population of everything and also stripping the armed There was reason to

except the barest necessities of life,

services of the greater part of their equipment.

hope that French resistance would be no more than a gesture to the Gallic sense of honor and that resistance to the Axis would materialize in an effort of the French to retain the shadow of their Liberty.

15

Whether the French greeted us as liberators, or resisted our violation of their neutrality, it was clearly imperative that we should make an impressive display of strength; half to inspire confidence on the one hand, or measures would fail would encourage resistance on the other. Moreover, there was a greater chance of SPAIN maintaining her neutrality if she knew that sltong forces were at hand to counter any sign of hostility. Economic Considerations The main logistical problem was the shortage of landing craft. In early 1942 there were only enough available for one Since the basic plan called for a landing at three lothe British felt the Western landings could not be launched the Mediter-

division. cations,

until at least two or three weeks after the landings in ranean. They estimated that four airplane carriers,

eight auxiliary

carriers, and three battleships would be required for support. 1 7 At least six divisions were required for an action to help Russia at all, Resources of England and the United States were searchthe operation. the United

ed for vessels or barges that could be employed in Outboard motors and marine engines in

pleasure craft in

States were appropriated for this purpose. program for landing craft was agreed upon.

An extensive building This necessitated a heavy

cut back or delay in the construction then under way of certain major combat ships for the Pacific Fleet. Also there were added to the

production program in the United States a great many items which would be required for build-up--hospital setups, communication material, campsdocks,

and a multitude of items to be required for airfields, and depots in

the British Isles for the actual landing and for the

support of our troops once they were ashore.18 Air Force units were already helping Montgomery fight Rommel, Initially this was the only actual committment of American troops that had been made. There was an early plan to send an Armored Patton Jr. but this

Division to AFRICA under Major General George S. was later given up in favor of TORCH.

Generous amounts of material

were being sent to the Middle East. 1 9 The Plan As has been stated before, the directive for TORCH was given to General Eisenhower on 13 August 1942, changeover from planning ROUNDUP TORCH. This necessitated a complete

and SLEDGEHA IER to the planning for

General Eisenhower had been picked because of the known atThe initial plan to employ

titude of the French toward the British. only American forces in the initial

landing had to be modified because

of the shortage of trained American troops available for the operation. The initial target date for TORCH was set for 1 October 1942 As

by the Americans while the British set a date for September 10.

will be seen later, both of these dates were overambitious.

The

main reason for the haste was the known weather conditions off the coast of NORTH AFRICA, which were generally bad all year around, especially in the late fallR Deception was carried out with alterTroops embarking fro the United

nate plans for NORWAY and DAKAR.

States and Britain were to be toldo that they were enroute to reenforce the Middle East, with the possibility of a stop at DAKAR, This would explain light clothes for tropic's, The positive strategical concept of the NORTH AFRICAN operation, was stated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; 1. "Establishment of firm and mutually supported lodgements" (a) between Oran and Tunisia on the Mediterranean, and (b) in French Morocco on the Atlantic, in order to secure bases "for continued and intensified air, ground, and sea
operations."I

2, "Vigorous and rapid exploitation" of these lodgements, in order to acquire complete control" of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and extend offensive operations against the rear of Axis forces to the eastward. 3, "Complete annihilation" of Axis forces now opposing the British forces in the Western Desert, and intensification of air and sea operations against the Axis in the European continent.2 On the negative side, the purpose as we have seen was to deny the economic resources and potential bases in FRENCH NORTH AFRICA to the enemy..21 Not until 9 September, after making detailed arrangements with the Royal and Canadian Navies as to relieving our escorts on trans-Atlantic convoy routes, could Admiral King specify exactly what ships of the United States Navy would be available, In the meantime

D Day was moved on to 8 November; and that was the very latest day

in 1942 for a landing on the iron-bound coast of MOROCCO, because of the aforementioned weather conditions. 2 2 By 9 September Operation TORCH had almost assumed its final form: It was broken down into three principal parts;

1.. TASK FORCE 34, Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, comprising WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE (Admiral Hewitt), with Western Task Force United States Army (Major General G. S. Patton Jr.),. Initially about 35,000 troops to be embarked in the United States, to land on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco and capture Casablanca and Port Lyantey. 2. CENTER NAVAL TASK FORCE, Commodore Thomas Troubridge RN, with Center Task Force United States Army (Major General L. R. Fredenhall). Initially about 39,000 troops, embarked in the United Kingdom, to capture Oran, 3. EASTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE, Rear Admiral Sir H, M. Burrough RN, with Eastern Assault Force (Major General C. W. Comprising about 23,000 British and 60,000 Ryder USA). ,American25roops, embarked in,the United Kingdom, to capture Algiers.
From this point on this report will deal with the Western i Task Force under Major General Patton. About 9:00 AM, 30 July 1942, the late General George S. Patton Jr., who was the Commanding General of the Desert Training Center at Camp Young, California, called in a few of his staff officers including the G-4; and informed them to turn over their duties and be prepared to leave for Washington, D.C., that same day. General Patton accompanied by General Gay, Chief of Staff; Colonel Muller, G-4; and Colonel Conklin, Engineer, departed from Palm Springs, California by air about 3:00 PM, July 30. They arrived in Washington, D.C,, about 8:00 AM the following morning. By about 9:00 AM, they reported to the briefing room in OPD Munitions building, where a map of North Africa was 24 uncovered and general information on proposed plans presented. [It appears from this personal account of Brigadier General Walter J. Muller that General Patton was notified of the TORCH operation before General Eisenhower. Butcher in his book states that many communications were exchanged between London and Washington. PosSibly the OPD in Washington was merely doing advance planning.

The staff of the Western Task Force had actually worked together as the staff of the I Armored Corps and other units during maneuvers and in what, the Desert Training Center. This helped them somecombined operations.

however this was their first

experience in

There were many handicaps,

such as operating on a top secret25basis five different places. Many officers

with a headquarters located in

assigned to the operation were sent to the headquarters without the slightest idea as to their duties, assignment, unit, or where they

were to go.26 Many of the problems will be taken up more in detail in the following chapter. Suffice it to say that immediate action was

necessary and long detailed conferences were out of the question at this level, When the 2d Armored Division returned from the Carolian maneuvers in August 1942, they were ordered to Fort Bragg, North Carolina for intensive training and field maneuvers, From here,

Major General Harmon was ordered to Washington for a secret conference, General Harmon's personal account of his first meeting 2 7

with General Patton emphasizes the manner of giving orders for the operation. ,..I went into a closely guarded suite of rooms and met General Patton studying a map of North Africa. General Patton remarked to me, "Ernie, do you want to go to war?" I replied, "Sure, when do we start?" 28 The 2d Armored Division was going to wart

NIOTES FOP. CHAPTER 1 vol II:

NW. Craven and J.- L.- Cate, The Army Air Forces in F.
TORCH .TQP.OIPTBLAM(
2 Capt.

(Chic.ago;

W.II

1946),'p5.

University of' Chicago Press,

Harry C~ Butcher, USNR, My Three Years With Eisenhower ( New York, Simon & Shuster, 1946). p $, 30,x ci
4 1bid, 5 The

Craven and Cate,
p

p

35.

36.
Arnold,
King (Lippincott,

War Reports of' Marshall,-

1947),

p 1

3

6
7

bid, p 15 4, Terrain

and

Political Study NkTOUSA-MTOUSA (Command and

, ..

General Staf'f' College,

1943),

p

31,
Arnold,

8Q2 ityWar Reports of' Mar.9hall,

King,

pp 153-154.

9bip 156.
10a

ityButcher,
in

entry f'or 14 July 1942,

1 1 Commander

Chief's

Dispatch

to

the .Joint Chief's

of' Staf'f' on

the TORCH Operation (a report prepared 'by General of' the Army Dwight D Eisenhower. Nor~th. Af'rica, The documents section The Armored School).
12

Ibid, p 5.

E3eport f'rom American vice consul Casablanca to Army Military Attache, Taier, radio intercept of' a message f'rom the German Armistice Commission in Casablanca. (Fort Knox, The Armored School docu~ments section).
14

ct

Commander in Chiefs Dispatch, p 3~

5 1 lbid, p 4.

l 6 Tbid, p 5. 17
1 $0p

it cit,

Butcher, p 37*

War Reports

Marshall, Arnold, King, p 157.

Op cit, Craven and

ate, p ,13,

20 Litzenberg, Outline History World WKar II quoting Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive for Commander in Chief Allied Expeditionary Force. Elliott Morrison, Operations in North African Waters (History of US Naval Operations in V II) %l I,. (Atlantic Little Brow n, 1947) p 16.
2 1Samuel 2 2 Ibid,

p 18.

23-

Ibid, p 19.

24 comments Brigadier General alter J. Muller who was G-4 for Western Task Force and spent the entire war as a member of General Pattont s staff. (These comments have been placed on microfilm and are on file in the documents section, The Armored School)
2 5 Ibid.

Personal

Personal interview Major k. J. Netterblad Jr, Aide to Major General Truscott for this operation.

27 Unpublished manuscript 7
commanded the Second

Armored

Iajor General Ernest N. Harmon who Division for the TORCH operation.

CHAPTER 2 PRE-EMBARKATION PHASE Over-all' Planning Sometime during the latter part of the month of August 1942

the Headquarters Western Task Force at Washington, D. C. decided on the task organization of the landing teams and the general scheme of maneuver to be carried out for the invasion of North Africa, The following participating units came from the 2d Armored Division which was stationed at this time at FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA: 41st Armored Infantry Regiment 66th Armored Regiment 67th Armored Regiment 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 17th Armored Engineer Battalion 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Supply Battalion, 2d Armored Division Maintenance Battalion, 2d Armored Division Detachment, 142d Armored Signal Company

The general scheme of maneuver was a three-pronged assault
on the beaches

of PORT LYAUTEY, FEDALA and SAFI with the Task Forces

GOAL POST,

BRUSI[OOD and BLACKSTONE being given the abovQ assignments All forces contained elements of the 2d Armored Division.

respectively.

The purpose of the three-pronged assault was as -follows:
r... The PORT LYAUTEY attack was diversional and calculated

to protect the left flank, while the purpose of the FEDALA and SAFI attacks was a double envelopment of CASABLANCA with the 1 intent of thereby saving the harbor facilities at CASABLANCA.... Included in Major General Hobart R. Gay's letter to this committee was an interesting note on the planning of the SAFI attack: ,.,Sometime early in September perhaps around the 20th, higher authority desired that the attack at SAFI should be Conference on this subject was held in the office abandoned. at this conference were: of the Commanding General of TORCH, Generals Handy, Hull, Streett, and Patton, admiral Hewitt, Colonel Harkins and Colonel Gay, It was discussed and finally decided to eliminate the SAFI operation in which decision all were in agreement except the two latter who voiced feeble proHowever, the matter was taken immediately to the Chief tests. Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, who, without of a moment's hesitation, declared that the SAFI operation would go as planned.... With the actual assault plan decided upon, the organization and plans for individual Sub-Task Forces came next. ... The period of 19-20 September was spent at Headquarters Western Task Force preparing final drafts of estimates and outline plans and seeking information necessary to complete organization and detailed plans for the operations, embarkation and final training.... 3 It is evident that this task was an arduous one. ,,This Sub-Task Force staff was organized on a provisional ... It was not exbasis for control during tactical operations. pected to have administrative functions, except those incident .4 to establishment on shore which would be of a temporary nature...,, In so far as the planning stage regarding the 2d irmored Divisiont s part in this invasion is concerned very little can be found. material

The secrecy dictated necessary security measures

and the only apparent indication that something was afoot was

evidenced by the accelerated training at FORT BRAGG and the continually turning in.and drawing of equipment, Colonel Ralph J. Butchers, G-4 of the 2d Armored Division

during this operation, has this comment to make regarding secrecy in planning: .. ,All of the operational plans and administrative matters connected with the operation were prepared under strictest security requirements, since it was the first active American operation*. Members of the 2d Armored Division were limited in this planning phase to those officers directly concerned and then only to the extent absolutely essential to handle their units. ...No files or notes, personal or otherwise were maintained except as absolutely necessary for official records and or immediate use. These were destroyed or picked up by Division Headquarters and (I believe) turned in with the unit report of the operation to the Adjutant General.. can easily understand your comment that published .*i For example I It was then also. data is extremely limited. do not recall ever seeing or hearing of a "Port Call." General Harmon (then commanding) made several trips to Washington for instructions. From then on everyone entered a daze of work, without exaggerating, which was literally on a 24-hour day, or nothing reduced to writing. 7-day week basis, with little Briefings, decisions, conferences and the like, held in WashNever ington were the source of information and orders. written directives, Division staff planning and orders followed this same pattern..,.5 The supply planning can best be discussed from the original level of "TORCH" Headquarters and followed from that point to see

how the job of supplying the units was c arried out... Supply plays an important part in the success of an amphibious expedition. following plan: Western Task Force Headquarters decided upon the The D Day convoy was combat loaded so that the

vehicles and their crews would be unloaded simultaneously and be available for the assault with all guns blazing. Due to the

limitations of various ships availabei this was not actually atcomplished in that the drivers and vehicles were loaded on one ship;

the crews on another--see Chapter 3 on Loading; A school for Transport Quartermasters was established at NORFOU, VIRGINIA under the supervision of the Staff of the

Amphib-

ious Force, to make sure that the loading would be performed properly, In the Moroccan Expedition it echelons of supply. The first was decided to furnish four

echelon was to consist of three cone

voys based on the following data: a. The first convoy was called the D convoy with an arrival The composition consisted of the assault troops, with the Port of Embarkation as NORFOLK, VIRGINIA1

date of D Day.

combat-unit loaded, b.

The name of

the

second convoy was D plus 5 with an This convoy contained The loading

arrival date set for five days after D Day.

the additional anti-craft and combat engineer troops.

was of an organization_- nit load with troops, supplies and equipment on the same transports, tion This type of loading did not permit debarkaSome ships of

of troops and their equipment simultaneously.

this convoy also included some service troops which were convoy loadedo Loading

along

this line included the troops on one ship and supplies The Port of Embarkation of the D plus

and equipment on another ship.

5 convoy was ITE74 YORK CITY, ITh YORK,
c', The final convoy of this first echelon was called the D This convoy

plus 20 convoy with an arrival date 20 days after D Day.

included the remainder of troops and equipment of the units previously shipped in the other two convoys. In addition it carried

a 90 day supply level for all troops in commercially loaded.

the convoy.

The convoy was

This type loading meant that the equipment and

supplies were crated requiring debarkation at a quay after the ports had been secured. NIVEYORK CITY, i, The Port of Embarkation for this convoy was also YORK.

From reports on the supply situation it was decided to base the supply plan on the theory that supplies were not available locally and that the expedition would take sufficient supplies for a sixtyday period, Ninety-day level was to be maintained by later convoys.

Combat loaded ships of D convoy could not carry supplies for sixty days; hence, careful study was necessary to put aboard ships only the balance to follow in cargo ships. The assault

essential supplies,

troops of D convoy carried rations for 60 days but gasoline for only 15 days. Twelve thousand gallons of gasoline, in five-gallon cans,

were carried in sunk, all

each transport to insure that,

should some ships be

the gasoline supply would not be sent to the bottom, 6 Supply plans in the 2d Armored Division to accomplish the

above schedule as it affected the Division could best be described in the following manner: .. ,Turning in and drawing equipment w s a continuous process beginning at FORT BENNING, during FORT BRt1GG maneuvers, while staged at FORT BRkGG, and at the embarkation ports. Pie had been given high priority early so everyone was more than willing to cooperate. Actually local agencies couldntt do much, so, with prior approval from Aashington, I dealt directly with the large depots and in sorle cases with manufacturers themselves.

You can appreciate what I mean when you visualize complete changing of all tracks, replacing all vehicles (GP) that would have more than 5,000 miles by outloading time, installation of combat tires on 1/4 tons, scout cars and half tracks, replacement of weapons, completing all OVM equipment, and tool sets, in addition to determination of NEE lists for our "teams" (not T/O units) and procurement of the lacking equipment. The bulk of the above had to be done while staged at BRAGG'where alert for African invasion was received. Some of work, primarily weapons replacement, preparations for rail movement and the like, had been done under a previous alert for movement (later found out to be for employment with the British VIII Army), At the Port rations, ammo, POL were drawn together with last minute items. This stuff though drawn in bulk was assembled on our determined basic loads from the individual to the largest vehicle. The biggest single error in this computation was overloading the man, his barracks bag or the vehicle. To guard against this, periodically I required test loads to impress on all ranks with the actual physical limitations existing. It was the most effective way to stop argument,7 It is readily understood from the above why Colonel Butchers describes his situation, "Each commander leaned on the heavy side and it came my way to be the I NO' man,"

Of the supply situation Colonel Butchers continues further: ...there werentt elaborate detailed directives furnished nor did we prepare any, and those we did have long since been turned in or destroyed. Action was simple and direct. If you needed 5,000 tires, you first telephoned the local depot and with their ok, arranged with Akron or some other place for your trucks to go at-a certain time and get them. If you were 'shorton machine guns, tonmmy guns or what not, you flew to Washington, saw (.then) Colonel Nixon in the Munitions Building and he'd tell you where there were a few hundred he wanted to get into Africa, In return for transporting them he'd give you what you were short, I imagine some of our procedures were wasteful. The kindest comment one could make is that records were inadequate for later accounting, Yet at that time results were the only criteria and direct dealing was the only way to obtain

them,....
It is difficult to censure the lack of records when one considers the fact that from start to finish the complete "Torch" operation took but two and one-half months.

Intelligence planning at the high level produced results that assisted each echelon down to platoon leaders of all sub-task forces. For the attack on MOROCCO our troops had beautiful maps.

The French in MOROCCO gave them to us so they could be "invaded." We were given 1/50,000 contour maps in color, and also a commercial road map made by the French tire manufacturer, Michelin. This road

map had been censored by the authorities because it cation of all was found, tity the landing fields and airdromes in

showed the loA copy

the area,

transmitted to the Allies and reproduced in

great quan-

in WASHINGTON.

Unfortunately, the printing in WASHINGTON was government presses

ordered very late and for several weeks all printed nothing else but this chart. secrecy. In addition to these two above, graphic charts, 1/10,000, It

was very hard to maintain

there were detailed hydro-

aerial photographs and 1/10,000 city plans.

Tactical terrain studies of each beachhead as far as 20,000 yards inland were prepared and mimeographed as part of the Intelligence Annex to the Operations Plan, Each platoon leader received

a copy with a set of maps to study on the boat. when crossing the Atlantic. The study was in such detail that each platoon leader he had been there. The maps had

would know the terrain as if

neglected to show an important patch of woods along the NEFIFIK RIVER between the road to MiANSOURIAH and the main highway, approximately 1,000 yards wide; however, and

the terrain-board mentioned

in the following paragraph brought out this feature vividly.

,,n interesting incident took place just as the convoy was preparing to leave HJ2, PTON ROADS. out in side. The USS HENRY nilEN was already

the stream when a small boat bearing a large crate came along a marine officer came aboard with the proper papers for this

crate and after completing the paper transaction the crate was hauled on board, No one knew what the box could contain since all equipment The "extra cargo" was found to contain Immediately

had been loaded at the pier.

a complete built-up terrain map of the invasion area,

steps were taken to assemble all commanders down to battalion level. Through the use of this board, briefing was accomplished that afternoon while waiting for the remainder of the convoy to assemble. Summing up the over-all staff planning phase of this operation General Hobart R. Gay has this interesting comment to make: S. . It would take too long to enumerate the trials and tribulations that confronted the staff, who had spent the previous four or five months developing desert warfare, in their attempt to formulate plans for an amphibious landing; no one knew what air would be available and, if available, how it would be employed; no one knew how tanks could be transported; and the most interesting point of all was that this staff was informed that while LST's were known and some were available, they could not be considered for an ocean trip because of lack of seaworthiness. I make note of this because of what happened later, in that LST's went everywhere, and because, in my opinion if LST' s had been available to "Torch", CAS 1 BL:NCA would have fallen before noon th-t first day. . .10 Training The 2d ,rmored Division received quite a thorough and diverse series of training periods prior to being alerted for the "Torch" operation. To cover the complete training phase of the 2d Armored

Division would be an arduous task commencing with the normal activation training folloed down to and including the LOUISIANA and

CtROLINA Maneuvers just prior to the special training for "Torch". although the above training and especially the Maneuvers did provide immeasurably to the combat efficiency of the division we shall concern ourselves primarily with that training received after the completion of the CAROLINA Maneuvers and just prior to the landings in MOROCCO. This training was along directed lines specifically emphasizing an amphibious operation. Training at FORT BRAGG: The 2d Armored Division was assigned to FORT BRaGG, NORTH

CAROLINA as a temporary station at the completion of the CAROLINi. Maneuvers sometime toward the end of August 1942. speaking, Generally

all units of the division conducted training along lines 67th Armored Regiment. A quotation

similar to the 1st Battalion,

from the regimental history states:. S. . The Regiment assembled and moved into a pine woods on the FORT BRAGG Reservation. After a short period of rest a feverish period of drawing new equipment and intensified training developed to a peak never before imagined. . . . Long hardening road marches were engaged in. An time obstacle course was gone over twice daily and for the first the course contained a great rope ladder-like device which was suspended between two trees at a height of about twenty-five It was a landing net and although comparatively easy to feet. Range work scale and descend it was the novelty of the course. was intensified, each man firing until he had qualified with his individual weapon. The main emphasis, however, was on the firing of vehicular weapons. The great artillery ranges at FORT BRAGG made possible the firing of tank guns for the first time without necessity of having a safety officer check the An elaborate sights of each gun before the round was fired. The gunners now had a chance moving tank course was set up. The Battalion had at to really try out the new gyrostabilizer. The "A" Company command tank. that time one M-5 light tank. was not sure at that time just how all the The crew itself devices operated. Since the battalion anticipated the drawing of these tanks complete for each company; all the M-5 light

tanks in the division were assembled from Division Headquarters, CC"A" and CC"B", Headquarters and "D" Company of the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion. These tanks were placed at the disposal of the Battalion for training purposes until such time as new ones could be drawn. A machine gun course of .50 and .30 caliber was fired by all gunners. The Assault Gun and the Mortar Platoon fired on the artillery range. As each man and officer finished his prescribed firing he was given a seven-day furlough or leave. . . . . . . After the order forming the combat teams arrived, during September; "B" Company, equipped completely with new 1-5 tanks, departed with the 2d Battalion for amphibious maneuvers on the Chesapeake Bay. The remainder of the 1st Battalion at this time engaged in a series of night maneuvers on the A small pond in the division area known as reservation. Night after MOTT LAKE was the focal point of the problems. night the combat team rolled down to one side of the lake, was ferried across by the engineers, established a beachhead on the other side and with the coming of dawn attacked the high ground beyond the beachhead. It was at this time that the morale soared for M.jor General Gebrge S. Patton returned to his old Division to give a speech that indicated that soon he would .. 1 lead them into cambat.. Several small units received diverse special training which is worthy of note. The Maintenance Company, 67th Armored Regiment

began amphibious training in the middle -of September. . , . , Men were sent to NORFOLK, VIRGINIA to school for loading of the different types of ships and water-proofing of vehicles. The remainder of the company spent many long hours training in mock-ups of LST' s and climbing down the side of 12 ships using landing nets . , . . . . The- Service Company of the 67th Armored Regiment in addition to performing its normal function of servicing the Regiment . , also hauled supplies from FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA to the Port of Embarkation at .L:EUPORT NEMS, VIRGINIA. This work proved to be excellent experience for the truck drivers who were soon to cover hundreds of miles in NORTH AFRICA. . . .13

Training at the Port:
The program of training at the Port or at a staging area nearby was far from uniform in that many of the various units of the

sub-task forces involved did not reach the Port in time for such activities other than loading. Some units were sent to a staging

area for final touch-up, this being the exception rather than the rule. The landing team of which the 1st Battalion, 67th Armored

Regiment was a part went through the following sequence of events before the final shove-off:
S. . . The Battalion loaded on trains at FAYETTEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA on the 30th and departed for TNE1PORT NEWS on the 1st of October. Upon arrival in the yards they loaded on the USS BIDDLE and USS ARCTURUS and joined a fleet that was practicing landing the 3d Infantry Division. The Battalion spent four days on the Bay (Chesapeake) but did not participate in the landing operations.. .

After unloading at BALTIMORE, VIRGINIA.

they moved to CAMP PICKETT,

During the two week stay here most of the training

accomplished involved the administrative agencies of the units in clearing up the unfinished details required in the Movement Order. (See Appendix III) . . . Then followed three days of property check. Individual clothing and equipment, organiizational equipment, vehicular spare parts, tools and accessories all were checked and requisitioned. Supply officers checked T/E and TBA for items that they never knew were authorized before. Supply agencies worked night and day. New (radio) frequencies had been assigned and all radios had to be tuned. The artillery, infantry, reconnaissance a nd engineers, divorced from their parent units, had none of the normal equipment that is needed to tune their sets. Thus this work fell on the communication personnel of the 1st Battalion . .15 and they responded perfectly. No further organized training was conducted by the 1st Battalion until the unit was at sea on their way to NORTH AFRICA., Members of the 2d Armored Division that were assigned to Sub-Task Force GOAL POST underwent many trials and tribulations

in

their brief attempt at amphibious maneuvers i

the

CHESPEAKE

BhY under Brigadier General L,. K. Truscott Jr. concerning the amphibious training:

He has this to say

Final Training. Loading was completed on 15 October and the convoy sailed to SOLOMONS ISLAICD in CHESAPEAKE Bi"Y for its final period of training prior to sailing. Dates and areas for this training were announced by Hq "FAF. Plans for the training were based upon these dates end in brief contemplated: one day--boat and net work by individual, ships; one rehearsal in daylight, following operation plan except the-t only a few vehicles of each type would be landed; one rehearsal (night) following operation plan as closely as practical except that only a few vehicles of each type would be landed. The night before the daylight landing was to take, place, I was informed that Adrliral Hewitt had forbidden landing of craft except on one small beach about 150 or 200 yards wide. I conferred with idmiral Kelly, and at my request, he sent a request to hdmir^l Hewitt for consideration which was refused in a reply received the following morning, accordingly, the daylight rehearsal was completely disrupted. We were able to land only the three battalions successively on the one small beach and immediately reembark them. I appealed to admiral Hewitt by telephone and received permission to use all beaches (and more) for the night rehearsal and plans were made accordingly. These plans were seriously disrupted by orders from Naval authorities ordering various ships in to port for "ttopping .offi," tigain I appealed to i,dmiral Hewitt and received permission to complete the exercises planned before any ship would be required to leave the convoy. The change in Naval plans which separated the transports vich required sailing the Sub-Task Force one day earlier than I had been advised seriously hampered training, issue of final orders, and prevented some proposed visits to ships for purposes of addressing pv Final operation ordect-s were issued and final conferences with assault commanders were held on the USS ,lleen the afternoon and everng of 22 0c ober after final departure from the piers.

and

-sonnel.

ApparEntly the 2d Battalion, the units oarticipating in the dat(es involvd follows: coincide.

67th Armored Regiment was among

bove practice lrndings, since the is as

Their mention of this traini111

... After the completion of loading, stowage and checking the USS HARRY LEE and the USS TITANIA left the dock and anchored in the upper portion of the CHESAPEAKE BAY waiting for the convoy to assemble. They remained in this area from the 16th until the 22d during which time the troops made several practice invasion landings without vehicles, using landing nets and assault boats. The practice in the quiet bay waters gave the troops some 6 idea of the difficulties to be expected in actual operations... Training at Sea: The prelude to the embarkation and subsequent sea voyage to NORTH AFRICA took place the afternoon of Friday, 23 October 1942 when ... Ma jor General George S. Patton Jr. called a meeting of all commanders in a large room in one of the warehouses. This included all commanding officers aboard ships as well as all task force and combat team commranders... These commanders returned information that anyone had ... from this meeting with the first had as to where they were going and what they were going to do. This information was not put out, however, nor were the pounds of maps that arrived that day opened until the ships were two days out at sea;... Life aboard ship passed quickly...since the officers had to be There were a multibriefed as soon as the maps were broken down. tude of jobs and the big picture was to be given to the troops as As the officers were briefed in well as their own particular job. the various phases of the operation they held schools for the men. In addition there was a new weapon that had been loaded on at the It was supposed to knock last minute. It was called a Bazooka. out enemy tanks but no one had ever fired it or seen it fired. The Navy, too, had some Classes were held constantly in its use. Experts in the large caliber weapons, the crew of the new weapons. Classes were held Biddle had never seen a .30 caliber machine gun. by the Army instructors for the Navy on these guns.... These guns were to be the anti-aircraft protection of the landing craft in which the Battalion vehicles were to be set on the beach... 1 7

Some of the time on board ship was spent learning about NORTH AFRICA and the language and customs of its people to better facilitate the dealings with civilians.

We had a blue book on a Guide to North ifrica thRt told just how to get along with the Arabs,18 . a Ibandon ship drills and general quarters stations were a daily routine, .. .19 Most tr..ining on board ship followed a similar plan throughout the whole convoy. Sub-Task Force GOAL POST issued a regular detail the daily training orientation training

Training Memorandum which prescribed in hours.

In general this included such subjects as:

lectures, booby traps, customs of inhabitants, camouflage, in naval weapons, training in new weapons (rifle

grenade and rocket

launcher) debarkation, physical training, identification of aircraft and armored vehicles, training. behavior if captured, first aid and signal

A thorough study of this training memorandum (see

.ppendix III) will reveal that the spare time aboard ship was usefully taken care of with planned training. The troops then were ready, the plans and training completed all in the space of 79 short days of 24 long hours each. By direct dealthe

ings, abrupt decisions and accelerated activity throughout, commanders,

staff and troops performed the race against time and

weather with corrmmendable efficiency and with an amazing regard for detail. This chapter has shown, to a degree, the intricate planning

in movement and supply that was necessary plus the varied and detailed training experienced. If the reader is not convinced of

the magnanimity of the job performed, have no doubt of it, Loading.

the writers are sure he will

after considering the following chapter on

This phase too, was included within those SHORT 79 days.

T NCJI S

FOR CHAPTER 2

No. 25,

1Major.G.,enral Hobart R. Gay, Letter to Rese-arch Comittee dated 28 December 1949.

Ibid.

3
Lieutenant General-Lucien K. Truscott Jr., General Truscott's personal file on Sub-Task Force GOAiL POST, passim.

Ibid, pzassim.

5
No" 25, Colonel Ralph J. Butchers, Letter to Research Committee dated 14 N ovember 1949.

6
U. S. Landings in Morocco, a report prepred by the Tactics Department, The armored Force School, (.kpril 1943), pp5-7.

7
Opcit, Letter from Colonel Ralph J. Butchers, Ibid.

9
Major Alvin T. Netterblad Jr., personal interview, November, 1949, 10 Op cit, Letter from Major General Hobart R. Gay. 11 History 67th Armored Regiment, a unit history prepared by members of the 67th Armored Regiment; (Brunswick, Germany: Georg

Westermann, 1945), p 377.
Ibid, p 363.
Ibid, pp 169-1700

Ibid, pp 59-64.

Ibid1, pp 59-64.
16 Op cit, 17 p cit, History 67th Armored Regiment,
1&

Lieutenant General Lucien K. Truscott Jr. pp 169-170.

Ibid, pp 59-64.
19 First Lieutenant John H. Cleveland, January 1950. 20 Op cit, History 67th Armored Regiment, pp 59-64.

personal interview,

CHAPTER 3 LOADING Certain inclusions in the G-4 estimate of plans and requirements prepared by Brigadier General Walter Muller (then Colonel), G-4, Western Task Force, provided for the preparation supplies and equipment at ports of em-

and assembly of troops,

barkation; practice loading for a combat loaded convoy; actual loading and the making of necessary modifications to fit shipping

and operational changes and the embarkation of troops and supplies in accordance with the tactical situation. 1 In the early planning stage, Force were widely scattered. units comprising the Task

Some units were not yet activated when

plans were being made and essential data as to personnel, vehicles, tonnage and measurements was unobtainable. Unit staffs were re-

quired to complete their unit Personnel and Tonnage Tables and Loading Plans based largely on estimates. The planning stage of the 2d Armored Division was initiated while the division was staging at FT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA, loading plans were executed by the Asstt Chief of Staff, G-4, The Colonel

Ralph J, Butcher, (then Lt Col) together with the Special and General Staff Sections, especially with the Division G-3, Based on infor-

mation available to the division, landing teams were formed from elements to be furnished by the 2d Armored Division, and allocations of personnel, vehicles and supplies were determined for each ship

earmarked to transport these elements.. These planIs included the 2 priority for unloading in the landing phase. states, ..'.The Table of Organization for Operation BLACKSTONE was hand tailored to desired invasion teams'. I prepared the equipment portion based on expected needs, always leaning toward the heavy side (that is, as far as Colonel Muller would let me). Then both were pared down by'a constantly varied availability of shipping and boats..', The division staff planning was similar to that planning in Washington; informal, limited attendance at conferences, with direct "yes" or "no" decisions'. Each commander also leaned on the In the later Colonel Butcher

heavy side, the Division G-4 becoming the "no" man.

planning stages, an SOP for landing was finally received by the division and included data from loading ships to debarkation for assault landings
.

Selected officers were sent to the Transport Quartermaster School to study and learn the fundamentals of combat ship loading. Although the officers attending considered it an excellent school, they felt that the many complex duties of a Transport Quartermaster (TQM) could not be fully covered in the short period of two weeks; Upon completion however, the officers returned to the division where they were briefed by the AC of S, G-4, assigned to ships and given

allocations as to when and what was to be loaded on their ships; The desired debarkation priority was also furnished. TOQt s were then

sent to their respective ports to board their assigned ships, secure the necessary nautical data to ascertain their loading plans, compile these plans and await arrival of the landing teams.

While the division plans were being prepared, major problems of a serious nature were confronting the commanders and staffs of higher echelons. The Army and Navy could not agree on the princieach service having different concepts.

ples of combat loading,

The Army had difficulty reconciling the Navy point of view--that assault troops, especially if landed at night, should be very

lightly equipped and supplied, leaving the heavier equipment and supplies to follow later--and the Army desire to get as much as possible ashore in the assault boat waves. the D Day convoy re-

The necessity for combat loadings in quired that all

vessels previously used as transports be altered in As a principle of combat loading, the the

their interior arrangements. essential equipment,

vehicles and supplies must be loaded in

same ship with the assault troops who are to use them.

Supplies the

must be stowed in such a manner that they can be unloaded in

order most likely to be needed to meet tactical situations immediately upon landing. Complications arose as the number of these

transports and the types of landing craft that were to be available were not known to Vice admiral Henry K. the task force, Hewitt, Naval Commander of Only fourteen the operation

up to a few weeks prior to departure,

of the thirty transports and cargo vessels involved in were actually in 1942.

commission and assigned to the command on 1 August

Of the other sixteen, some were enroute from the Pacific and the state of being turned over from Merchant Marine

others were in Service.

6
None were turned over in satisfactory condition.

War Department Orders were issued .on 2 October 1942,

di-

recting movement of certain elements of the 2d Armored Division from FT BRAGG to specific ports of embarkation. Headquarters and

Headquarters Detachment, CCB and attached units in the approximate strength of 56 officers, 1079 enlisted men and 158 vehicles were

7
directed to report to the NORFOLK PORT OF EIBARKATION. Other elements of the Division, including Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment and specific detachthe approximate strength of 17

ments of the 2d armored Division in

officers, 231 enlisted men and 209 vehicles were directed to report to an unannounced port of embarkation (NYPE). As the directed strengths were approximated in WD Orders, Major General Ernest N. Harmon, the Division Commander, was author-

ized to deviate at his discretion, subject only to the limitations of shipping space. Both elements were to proceed from FT BRAGG

upon call of the respective port commanders. The 66th and the 67th Armored Regiments were formed into armored combat teams and assigned to assault forces. .The ist

Battalion, 67th armored Regiment was assigned to the Assault Force BRUSIRJOOD; scheduled to land in the center at FEDALA. 3d Battalions, The 2d and

67th Armored Regiment, were both assigned to the

Assault Force .BLACKSTONE; scheduled to land on the south flank at SAFI. The 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment was assigned to the

Assault Force GOALPOST; scheduled to land on the north flank at

PORT LYAUTY.

The 1st Battalion of the 41st Armored Infantry into three reinforcing infantry companies and

Regiment was split

assigned to each assaulting force, The element organized around Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment was directed to report to FT HAIILTON, INM YORK not later than 10 October 1942, Units

scheduled to ship from NORFOLK, VIRGINIA arrived at staggered intervals during the first few weeks of October. The ist Battalion,

67th Armored Regiment Combat Team departed for NORFOLK on I October 1942 and after several days of participation in landing operations on CHESAPEAKE BAY, moved to CAMP PICKETT, VIRGINIA for a short stay.

The 2d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment Combat Team, arrived at M~WPORT NEWS on 15 October and immediately began loading operations, The Combat Team at CA~iP PICKETT returned on the 20th of October for loading and debarkation at 2INPORT IfLEWS. The 1st Battalion, 66th EWS during the From the

Armored Regiment Combat Team arrived at NEWPORT

third week of October and immediately started loading.

other major element of the 2d Armored Division, the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, party (platoon in a supporting company of infantry and a shore strength) was assigned each of the assault forces.

These elements arrived at their respective ports of embarkation for inclusion in the loading operation during the third week of October.

The elements leaving from NEW YORK were to sail on the sea train (USS LAKEHURST). On 15 October 1942, this ship was ready for On 16 October, crews

loading and naval supplies were taken aboard.

began the loading of 60 days'

ration, type B, and 5 units of fire
9

for each weapon, as specified by unit movement orders, The delay in

the turn-over of a number of ships from the

Merchant Marine Service and the necessary alterations now had adverse affects on the loading plans, The misconception as to im-

characteristics and capacities of the designated ships made it possible to determine the amount of available space. allocation for example, called for some 300 vehicles,

The s.ea train The majority 6 Car-

were 2k-ton trucks, but also included, were 54 medium tanks,

riage, Motor, M-7's and 12 Engineer Bridge Trucks (except for the cargo trucks, the above heavy vehicles were the only equipment of this kind in the Western Task Force), It was determined later that but yet after actual plan-

this ship could handle but 200 vehicles, ning had been completed,

the maximum number of vehicles the sea This changed the entire setup, but it 10 Fur-

train could carry was 156.

was too late to stop movement of the vehicles to the port. ther difficulty was experienced in of landing craft.

ascertaining the number and types

Boat employment plans for the landings were influenced by the following factors:1 Weather and surf conditions to be expected indicated the desireability of landing assault battalions as quickly as possible. Shortage of LCMs required pooling of their craft and restriction to LCM loads.

Uncertainty of beach conditions required delay in landing of armor until the beachhead was established.

the

The nature of the resistance to be expected indicated the desireability of striking with maximum force initially, The landing of aviation personnel and supplies would not be necessary until an airport had been captured, Accordingly, the plan provided for pooling all landing

craft for landing assault elements,

then giving priority of LCM's

and LCV's to the armored landing teams. In the meantime, on 28 September 1942, General Mark Clark,

then Deputy Commander to General Eisenhower, held a meeting of key officers of the Western Task Force, to discuss logistical support At this conference,

of the United States Forces in this operation. it was decided to reduce the level of supply to 12

45 days and the

ammunition level to 10 units of fire.

This decision was not to

be interpreted to change previously formulated loading plans which called for an excess in amounts of supply for initial combat troops.

These troops would move to the theater with whatever amounts of supplies and ammunition the Theater Commander desired. These levels

were to serve as a guide to the Distribution Division to earmark supplies and to the port of embarkation serving the theater to ship supplies to establish and maintain these levels, 16 October, supply, in

13
However, at 1500,

a directive was issued to cut the ration load to

45 dayst

order to allow more ship space for the loading of vehicles This resulted in an almost complete unloading of

and equipment.

rations to determine a balanced ration for 45 dayst supply. change in

A

the amount and type of Class V supply also required un-

loading certain types of ammunition. Another decision made by General Clark was to initially reduce organizational equipment of the Western Task Force by 50 percent. This reduced level could not expect an increase until In order to avoid congestion at the ports and also

after D / 90.

to facilitate loading of the vehicles required by the Task Force, the following solution was agreed upon by Colonel Muller, Force G-4 and Colonel Magruder, Task
15

Service of Supply, War Department:

Units of the Task Force would retain full organizational equipment until after the cargo convoy carrying the mass of that equipment had sailed in order to allow units of the Task Force to

make last minute selections of items to be shipped. Equipment for the units sailing in the D Day and D / 5

convoys would be shipped on those convoys and on the D

/

20 convoy.

Thereafter, equipment for troops sailing in a troop convoy, would be carried in that troop convoy and on the cargo convoy sailing five days later. The Chiefs of Service would remove this excess equipment from the port area unless they could arrange either for its to complete equipment of units sailing later or its maintenance supplies. As the loading phase continued at the and minor problems were numerous and varied. use

inclusion in

NIW

YORK PORT, major

Lieutenant Colonel

Frank M i

Muller (then 1st Lt); TM for the sea train state's

...The vehicles had been loaded at FT BRAGG on rail flat cars in predetermined sequence to facilitate the loading of the ship.. However, due to switching of the flat cars in the port area, this arrangement became jumbled. A string of flats was run along the pier where vehicles were then loaded aboard by use of the ships 100-ton boom, Due to combat loading, this involved considerable switching of flat cars to get the vehicles at the ship's side,...... Vehicles were water-proofed by ordnance specialist teams and was accomplished efficiently.. the loading of anmunition. Some delay was encountered on

To insure completion of the loading on

schedule, civilian labor groups were augmented by military details. In addition to rations and ammunition; IMedical, Ordnance, Quartermaster,

Engineer, Chemical and Signal, Class II and IV supplies amounts predetermined by higher headquarters; gendistributed among the

were loaded in

erally 30 days' supply for landing teams, ships of the landing teams.,

All organic vehicles to be loaded had

their basic loads of ammunition, rations, signal equipment and ordnance spare parts. Vehicular gasoline tanks were 90 percent full.1 6

Because of the large number of vehicles shipped to NEW YORK for the sea train, loading was executed to take maximum advantage of all available space, The tank deck or lower deck was loaded Two

mainly with 2?-ton and Engineer Bridge trucks (Brockways).

jeeps were loaded on top of each bridge truck and trailers were placed in any available space. a s possible, Tanks were placed as close together Some

allowing sufficient space to chain them down.

tanks and other heavy equipment were loaded on the superstructure

deck by use of the shore crane,

keeping in mind that only the ships Inasmuch as the

organic equipment would be available for unloading,

sea train had more cargo space in the forward portion of the ship, adjustment of the water ballast was made to balance the load, with careful conservation of space, after the ship had been loaded. to NORFOLK for inclusion in Even

40 vehicles remained on the docks

These vehicles were shipped by rail 20 convoy.17

the D /

The Transport Quartermasters who loaded out of NORFOIK experienced many of the difficulties NORFOIK, Cargo, encountered in NEN YORK. In

both APA (Auxiliary Personnel, Assault) and AKA (Auxiliary

Assault) ships were loaded by T,4ts of the 2d Armored DiThe loading of an AKA Precise similar

vision and other units of the Task Force.

ship is considerably different from that of the sea train. measurement of space is to LST loading. davitsq beaches,

the criterion, while the sea train is

The APA and AKA ships carried landing barges on

These were used to unload personnel and equipment to the Actual loading operations consisted of calling on the port

of embarkation for items which were then stacked on the dock by type and loaded in accordance with TjiA plans. Supplies arrived in

driblets and were not delivered to the dock sufficiently ahead of time to permit loading prior to embarkation of troops. 1

8

Troop trains were slow and jumbled and the presence of troops aboard ship was a decided hindrance to loading crews. Troops first placed in boarded alphabetically listed but were later unloaded, boat teams and re-embarked. Improper arrival order of

supplies necessitated the shifting of cargo from hold to hold. Ammunition promised for ballast, was late in arriving, causing a return to port, to readjust ship loads after the shakedown cruise in CIESAPEAKE BAY. Ammunition was scheduled to arrive in

cargo lots per vessel, but instead, came in cargo lots per type, necessitating sorting, shifting and stacking prior to loading.1 9 Owing to the hazardous nature of the operation it was

essential that the loss of one ship should not jeopardize the operation. Accordingly, all aviation units, all headquarter and

communications units, and so far as practicable, all armored units were divided between two or more ships. This necessary pre-

scription complicated the preparation of loading plans. One problem always present during loading operations at both NEN YORK and NORFOLK, was the constant pressure of time. a

Due to the rapid decision to assault North African Shores,

minimum of time was allocated to the combat loading of assault units. Attached units, such as the Air Corps, Signal Corps and They had received no

Service Troops,

were attached too late.

amphibious training,

failed to submit personnel and tonnage tables

and equipment arrived at the various piers for loading without advance data being forwarded to TQ I rs. 20 Because of this, officers

charged with loading the ships had not allowed sufficient space on the transports for equipment which commanding officers thought necessary to be loaded. Numerous revisions of the TQM plans were made

and final plans were not completed until completion of loading,

That loading was eventually completed on schedule can be attributed to excellent cooperation and assistance given by port of embarkation officials to TQMs. When all ships were loaded,

the convoy took a shakedown cruise in CHESAPEAKE BAY, adjusted loads where necessary and on 22 October 1942, sailed from NEWPORT NEWS. The sea train sailed on 19 October from IEW YORK and on the 24th of that month, joined up with the elements from NENPORT NEWS to form the first great convoy of the war. The convoy troop lists for the Western Task Force as of 22 October (day before sailing) provided for the shipment of the 2d Armored Division Landing Teams,. plus other special division troops, in the D Day convoy. The remaining units and equipment of

the division were scheduled for shipment on the D t 5 (troops and fast cargo), D / 20 (slow cargo only) and the D

/

40 convoys.

With

exception of the inclusion of two letter companies of the Division Maintenance Battalion, on the D of the division sailed on the D

$
/

20 convoy,, the remainder and bulk 40 and D / 65 convoys to join the CORK FOREST; 18 miles from as

forward elements of the division in RABAT.

A more detailed analysis of the convoy scheduling is

follows and includes landing force assignments of the D Day 21
convoy.

TABLE 1 D DAY CONVOY (Combat Loaded)
T Force IX T BLACKSTONE (Southern Landing Force)

Major General Ernest N. Harmon, Commanding 2d Armored Division Landing Team: Hq, CCB 2d En, 67thArmd Iegt(Reinf) Blat, Co D, 17th Armd Engr Bn Trans Party; lst Party, 2d Blat, Co I, 41st Armd Inf Regt Trans 3d Plat, Btry C, 443d. AAA Bn Co B, 41st Armd Inf Regt Btry C,-78th Armd FA Bn 2d Blat, Co C, 82d Rcn Bn 2d Plat, Co C, 17th Amid Engr Bn 2d Bn Sec, Maint Co, 67th Armd Regt Mod Det,. 48th Armd Med En Shore Party, 2d Blat, Co D, 17th Ard Engr Bn 2dArnored Division Landing Team on sea train: Det, Hq Co, 67th Armd Regt 3d En, 67th Armd Regt (Reinf) (aI~emainder of personnel on transports) Etry B, 14th Armd Fk Bn Prov Engr Bridge Co, 17th Armd Engr Bn 5th Blat, Btry B, 443d AA Bn Dot, Co B, Div Mjaint Bn Med Det, 3d En, 67th Axrmd Regt Det, Div Qi Bn 1st Blat, Co A, Arrmd Sapply Bn Trans Party, Brov Plat, 17th rmd Engr Bn

Detachment

2d Armored Division: HIq and Hq Co,. 2d Armd Div Det, 142d krmd Sig Co

Table 1 (Cont'd)

Force "Y" BUSIHvOOB (Central Landing Force)

Major General J. W, Anderson, Commanding
2d Armored Division Landing Team: 1st Bn, 67th Armd Regt (Reinf) 2d Flat, Btry C4,-443d AAA Bn 4th Plat, EtryC, 443d AAA Bn Co A, 41st Armd Inf Eegt 1st Flat, Co C; 32d Rcn Bn 1st Flat, Co C, l7thArmd Engr Bn Trans Farty, 2d Flat, Co B '17th Armd Engr Bn Trans Farty, ist Flat, Co I, 41st Armd Inf Regt Bet, Maint Co, 67th Armd Regt Btry A, 78th Armd FA Bn Det, 142d Armd Sig Co Med Bet, 48th Armd .Ied En Shore Farty, 1st Flat, Co B, 17th Armd Engr Bn

Force "Z" GOALPST (Northern Landing Force) Major General Lucien K. Truscott, 2d Armored Division Landing Team: st- Bn, 66th grdRet(Rinf) 1st Flat, Btry B, 443.d AAA En 1st Fiat, Btry C, 443 d AA Bn Shore Farty, 3d Plat, Co B, 17th Trans Farty, 3d Plat, Co B, 17th Trans Farty, 3d Flat, Co I, 41st Co C, 141st krmd Inf Regt Btry B, 78th Armd FA Bn 3d Flat, Co C, 82d Rcn Bn 3d Flat, Co C, 17th Armd Engr Bn Bet, Maint Co, 66th Armd Regt Bet, 142d Armd Sig Co. ed Bet, 48th Armd MI En Hq and Hg Co, 67th Armd Regt ( Jr., Commanding

krmd Engr Bn Armd Engr Bn Armd Inf Regt

Bets on sea train)

Those elements of the 2d Armored Division which were assigned to the three sub-task forces were broken down, generally into two groups; a small detachment of men from each unit, together

with the rmajority of vehicles from that unit. wore placod each ship utilized to tranepo:A sisted of the equllpment,.

.board

The other group con-

flemaining

personnel and a few vehicles which were Those vessels, both cargo and

placed aboard troop transports.,

troop transport, which were used almost entirely by various elements of the division were: and Titaria Force; OD The Calvert, Lakehurst (sea train)

assigned to Operation BLkCKSTONE (Southern Landing

SFI); the Arcturus and Biddle assigned to Operation BRUSHand the Penn and Electra

(Central Landing Force; FYDA.LA);

assigned to Operation GOALPCS.T (Northern Landing Force; PORT LYAUTEY). Some elements of the 142d Armored Signal Company and 67th Armored Regiment

the Headquarters and Headquartors Company,

sailed on the Dix and Harris respectively; part of the Southern Landing Force. For a more detailed picture on the breakdown of personnel, vehicles, transports and attachments, refer to Table 2 below.
22

TABLE 2 Composition and Disposition of Those Elements of the 2d Armd Div Participating in Operation "TORCH" a

NO
UNIT Hg 2dirnmd Div Renainder of Div H
Hq~ CCB'

NAIEEOF

FORCE
DESIG X
X.

01 r

TEH

32 1 Plus H CCA (D
1Q0 24

/

TPAISPORT Harris 40 convoy
Calvert;

aTTACHED TO Unattached
Parent Org

5

Operation BLACKSTONE; aForce Designations are: X .Operation GOALPOST, Y . Operation BRUSHWOOD; Z 42

Table 2 (Conttd)

NO

UNIT
67th_
A77

INAME
______t:

OF

FORCE
DESIG X X Y Y Y
Y

1 10

M

VEH

TRANSPORT Lakehurst Harris Arcturus Biddle Biddle
Arcturus Biddle

ATTACME D TO
CCB

Hq Det 67th A.R. 1st Bn 67th A. R HqC HqC7

5 0

10
.0

4V.28 69

CCB Parent Org Parent Org Parent Org
Parent Org

4
Co___A
___1__14_

$1

17 3. 1
20

Co B15 Co C (W'uith remainder of Re -t on D 2d En 67th AtR.: Hq and Hq Co D

CoB____80_

Y

Parent Org

21

Arcturus
convoy
___

Y

Parent Org
______

40
17
20 2

___________

Co

21 14

1 653

T averF
Titaria Calvert Ti taria IX

X
X
X

Pare nt Org
Parent Org Parent Org
Parent Org

4751 ij 1 2

3

11____2_______

76 4oE
19

1

Calvert

X

Parent Org

Det' Co B 2d Bn'Vaint
De uaii dB e
__________

60
2

19 13 0'
2____

1

Titaria akehurst Titaria
Calvert

X

X

x
X
-

Parent Org 2d En 67 ~ Parent 'Org,
Parent Org
_________

0!

Co F (With Remainder of Regt on_ D_$40_
3d 7hAIR.:

y
Xj

_____

Hq and Hq Co Cos G H and' I iMled DEt 3d Bh 67th Det2' 66th Arend Rent,: Hq and Hq Colst Bn Co A .3
_______25.____

21111'

814 b

11.. 0 60 4.3 2 2

ILakehurst X

Lakehurst

Parent Org

,181375

1

AR

'

De aitCo 67th AR

116 6an

2

takehurstjX Lakehurst X Arcturus Y

Arctus

Y

Parent Or g Parent Org Parent Org 3d En 67 AR 3d En 67 AR -Pren-Or ParntOr

16164

10 .
6:

19

0

E'1ectra Penn
Penn
plectra

ZL
Z
Z

aen

r

21 21

0

z
Z_ Z

Parent Org
Parent Org

Co B
___________

3
34.

90
12

Penn
Electra

Pare nthOr

1 :31

Co

Penn

Det Maint Co 66th AR

1.j $

Org Z ",-Parent Z Parent Org

2.

Penn

Parent .Org

(Remainder of 6th AR 'on D740 convoy_______

Table 2 (Cont ,d)

UN4IT Co A st Bn
________4

41st krmdIIf Meatr1O

fI

1AE OF

0

Ell

VEH

TRANSPORT Arcturus
Biddle

FORCE DESIG

ATTACHED .TO .1st En 67 AR 16t En.67 AR dn67AR 2d Bn 67
lst Bn66bAR 1 st En 66 4,R.

1 .11

Co B ls

Coltn1

olsEn0

Co. st n516

lst Plat'Co 3d $n (Trans Part)___________ 2d Peat 'Co I 3d En' (Trans Party n' , 3d Plat Co 13d'

1
1

22 1 15$ 12450 24 22 0 23 1$ 0
24

~Y
Y. X Y Z.

Titaria Calvert Penn Electra Biddle
Calvert
'X

Z

Y X Z

lst

n 67 AR

0
____

22

7on D

0

2d En 67'

AR

Titaria
Penn

2d En 67 AR I-'1s tBn 66 AR
____

(Trans Party) (Remainder. of~ '4st Armid Inf

'Regt
10 3
$

70

cov

Btr,

E
Bn:

13

Lakehurs t
_____

X

2dB67A
_____

Reainder of 14th AFA En on D 78th krind PA Etry A Btr E4 _
$try

40 convo

4.
'r

89LI21
T19'

Biddle
Penn 2Eectra
'sitar'a

Y

2

..... Z

C

'4

-

Ti

19 21

i Z IX{2d

1s t En 67 AR is t En 66 AR lst En 67 A En 67 -AR
______

(Remainder of 7&th AFA En on ID~.40 convoy 92d Armd FA En on D $ 0 convoy______ 82d Rcrn n: Arcturus 7 0 14 1st Plat, Co C 2-y7-~ 0--~ Biddle 01 1. 12 Calvert Titaria 3 2 2d Plat, Co C
'

Y
.Y '

1s t En 67 AR '2d En 67 AR 7A dE X.
X

3PltCoC2

3d C0

38.1'
6
!

10 l 7

Penn Electra

1 st En
___

16tBn__h

'66 AR

Re~ainerof 82d Rcn Bn on D
17t Arrn C ls~a~
__________CoC

convoy)
Arcturus

n

'Y
Y

F
1
0

4+5

fiddle

45
1

3d Plat CoOC lst Plat CoEB (Shore Party) 2d Plat Co E
(TransParty)_______

1 1
'

6

,'Titaria 1 1 Calvert a r Penn
'

7

X
xl
'

1st En 67 AR 1st En 67 AR 2dBn67 AR
2dBn 67 AR st Bn 66 AR lstBn 67 kR

46

0
.0)

iddle
I______

Y Y

1

46

Ei, di

lst

.

.n67AR

Table 2 (C onttld ) NO UUIIT 3 d Plat .Co B Shr Pr 1s t Plat Co D UTans, Party)
2d

10
1 11 1~ 1 1

NAME OF

F ORC
DEL

EVI

VEF{

TRANSPORT
Penn
Titaria

ATTACHED TO
1st Bn 66 AR
2d Bn 67 ARL

4 461. 46

0
0

Z
X

Plat

Co D

(Shore

Party)

0

Titaria Penn Lakehurst Penn

X Z X Z

2d Bn 67 AR 1st Bn 66 AR 3d Bn 67 AR 1s t Bn 66 AR

3d Plat Co D
(Trans Pat-T Pr~ov En ;r Bridge Co Prov Plat (Trans Party Med Det 17th Engr Bn

46 6--215 46
10 0Q

0
.43

0

0

(Remainder of 17th Arrid En r Bn on D

Dix X 40 convoy)--______

3d Bn 47 Inf

142d Arrad Sig Co:______________________ Det 142 Sid Co Il 20 5 1Dix Detl4SiCo 0 6 1 1Penn Det 142d Sig Co 0O 6 1 Titaria Det 142d :Sig Co 0T 6 J. Biddle De't 12dSig Co 50O 10_ Harris
_Reainerof_42

X 3d Bn47 Inf Z *lst Bn 66 AR x 2d Bn67 AR Y 1st Bn 67 AR X 1st Bn 47 Inf Y X l st En 2dtEn 2dB Z___ t En

Sig Co on
'led

D

4

convo

_____________

45th Armd

Bn:____________

Det 48th Mred Bn Det 45th Me'd EBn De 48th %ed En Det 4 nth died Bn Reainder of 48th Det, Div QM
Reniainder of Div
.:I

2{

2

Biddle
Ttrias Aro3

67 AR

3 0TiArtara

67 AR 67 AR
66 AR

h~ed

3

2

En on D

$40

Penn convoyr
5

.

17

4
40 c onvo,

Lakehurs-t
_____________

X

3d En 67 AR7

13n

on D

(The following

information is furnished to give a general

picture of the supply and transportation situation. logistical

Certain of the

-information was

tentative at the time plans were prepared

and of necessity revisions were issued.

made

in accordance with directives

Due to lack of factual data on specific instances where this

overall plan was amended or changed,

this presentation is

based on

the accomplishment of the plan as prepared.) Based on arrival dates at Western Ports, transporting of troops, D Day to D / 95. convoys for the

equipment and supplies were planned from

Four echelons were established for shipments during

23
this period and are grouped as follows: Ist Echelon Convoy: UGF 1 UGF 2 (D Day) (D 5)

UGS 2
2d Echelon Convoy: UGF 3 UGS 3 UGF 4

(D / 20)
(D / 40) (D /45) (D / 65)

3d Echelon Convoy:

UGS 4
4th Echelon Convoy: UGF 5

(D / 70)
(D / 90)

UGS 5

(D / 95)

Each UGS convoy carried supplies for the UGF convoy in its group. After departure of the UGS convoy, equipment left behind re-

verted to the Chiefs of Services after the entire unit to which the equipment belongs had sailed. was made that all For planning purposes, (TBA) the assumption

Table of Basic Allowances

equipment could be

transported for the troops which would be in the theater by D / 95. The D Day convoy consisted of assault troops which were combat loaded in 29 ships. These ships included 12 AP, 10 XAP and

one sea train, with a personnel capacity of 35,000 troops and a cargo capacity of 149,000 tons. The major cargo consisted of supplies varying amounts, but averaging

of all classes for the 35,000 troops in about 30 days' supply.

Gas and oil ire carried in

drums and cans.

TBA equipment shipped, hicles were included in

averaged about 40 percent, the cargo..

All wheeled ve-

The required ship tons of cargo

for the 30 dayst supply for 35,000 troops amounted to 49,000 tons and the TBA for the same number of troops amounted to 245,000 tons. Of the requirements, was fully met.. The first only the 49,000 tons of the 30 days' supply

Requirements for TBA were short by 100,000 tons. follow-up was the D / 5 convoy which was organi-

zation unit loaded.

This shipment included service troops princi-

pally with additional field artillery and anti-aircraft troops. Troops, supplies and equipment were loaded on the same transport, but not so as to permit a simultaneous debarkation of troops and their equipment. 32,000 troops. This convoy consisted. of nine transports carrying The cargo capacity of the transports and the cargo

ships amounted to

148,000

tons with the major cargo consisting of

about 30 days' supplies of all classes for the 32,000 troops aboard. TBA equipment averaged about 40 percent. Also carried were cargo

handling equipment and gasoline facilities for 40,000 barrels of gasoline. Tonnage requirements for this shipment amounted to 45,000

tons for the 30 days' supply items and 244,000 tons for TBA equipment. Ship tons of cargo shipped was only 148,000, leaving a This

deficit of 121,000 tons of TBA equipment for this convoy. convoy landed at CASABLANCA on 18 November 1942. The D /

20 convoy for Western Task Force was primarily a to be commercially loaded. Equip-

cargo shipment and was the first

ment and supplies were crated for debarkation after a port had been

47

secured.

It

was comprised of one tanker and 25 cargo ships having The principle cargo consisted of 60 days' the theater, Additional 5 con-

275,000 tons capacity.

supply for the 67,000 troops already in

TBA equipment for troops that sailed in the D Day and D / voys was included, allowances.

bringing their level to about 75 percent of full

Gasoline and oil drums were shipped along with gaso-

line tanks and pipe lines for storage of 240,000 barrels of gasoline. About 7,000 tons of coal in bags were shipped in all this convoy and subsequent UGS

plans were made for further coal shipments in convoys.

The required tonnage for this convoy was 188,000 tons for This tonnage figure was

the 60 days' supply for the 67,000 troops. met, and in addition,

87,000 tons of back-log shipping was trans-

ported,

reducing the cumulative unshipped balance to 179,000 tons. The 2d echelon convoy comprised of UGF 3 and UGS 3, was set

for D / 40 and D / 45.

The D / 40 (UGF 3) consisted of 11 transports, UGF 3 had a

one sea train and two tankers for Western Task Force.

personnel capacity of 23,000 troops and a cargo capacity of 17,000 tons on the sea train and 23,000 tons on the transports. cargo consisted of 10 days' type C rations, and one unit of fire for troops in UGF 3. The major

5 days' type K rations Also carried was 25 perthis shipment. Tonnage

cent of the TBA equipment for the troops in

requirements exceeded the capacities of this convoy as illustrated by the shipment of only 40,000 tons against 161,000 tons required, Elements, but not the entire remainder of the 2d Armored Division

sailed in this convoy,

The D / 45 (UGS 3)

convoy for

estern Task Force conThe entire convoy for the

sisted of 27 cargo ships and one tanker. theater consisted of

45

cargo and tanker ships; this number being

based on the navy agreement to escort up to convoy. No troops were transported.

45 ships in a cargo

The cargo capacity of the 27 Cargo consisted principally

cargo ships amounted to 297,000 tons.

of supply of all classes for 30 dayst including 7 1/2 units of fire for all at this time. troops in the theater which was approximately 90,000

The inclusion of TBA equipment for troops in UGF

1, 2 and 3 brought the totals up to about 85 percent of the authorized, Gas and oil were shipped in this convoy also and it was deall

termined that these items of class III would be shipped in subsequent convoys.

The shipment of 297,000. tons included the

90,000 tons required for the 30 days' supply for the 90,000 troops and in addition made up 207,000 tons of back-log shipping which had

increased due to equipment being left behind by UGS 2. The 3d echelon convoy; UGF 4 and UGS 4, comprised the D / and D / 70 shipments. The D / 65

65 convoy included 10 transports and

one sea train for Western Task Force, with a capacity of 25,000 troops and 42,000 ship tons of cargo. were replacements. Five thousand of the troops it was assumed that an The

For planning purposes,

equivalent number were dead or evacuated from the theater.

major cargo consisted of 15 days' rations and one unit of fire for troops in this convoy. TBA equipment for these troops averaged about 40 per-

cent.

Tonnage requirements again exceeded the cargo shipped leaving

49

a cumulative unshipped balance of 151,000 tons.

The remainder of

the 2d Armored Division was transported in this convoy, No troops were transported on the D

$

70 convoy.

This con-

voy was comprised of 25 cargo ships having a cargo capacity of 275,000 tons. The major items of cargo included 45 days supply of all

classes for all troops in the theater.

TBA shipments brought the General pur-

total to 90 percent of overall authorized allowances.

pose vehicles were carried in this and subsequent convoys based on the assumption that the Task Force could receive and assemble vehicles by the time this convoy arrived. was established near the NYPE. A pool of these vehicles

The cumulative unshipped balance

amounted to 69,000 tons after departure of this convoy. The 4th echelon convoy (UGF 5 and UGS 5) was scheduled for D

/

90 and D

/ 95.

The D / 90 convoy included 10 transports and one The transports had a troop carrying The cargo

sea train for Western Task Force,

capacity of 21,000 of which 5,000 were replacements. capacity of all supply of all

ships totaled 38,000 tons and included 45 dayst classes for troops aboard, TBA equipment for these There re-

troops amounted to about 50 percent of that authorized. mained a 42,000 ton cumulative balance at this time.

The D / 95 convoy included 25 cargo ships for Western Task Force and was capable of carrying 275,000 tons, The cargo consisted

of 45 dayst of automatic supply of Class I and III and the Class II and IV supplies as requisitioned by the Task Force Commander. V supplies were also shipped. TBA equipment shipped for UGF 5 Class

50

brought the total up to 100 percent. shipped in this convoy and it

A total of 212,000 tons was

accomplished the filling of the back-

log of requirements established for the period through D / 95.
cumulative balance of a plus 19,000 tons was thus created'. A

A

74 day level of supply in the theater was established after arrival
of tis convoy;

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3
1

Personal Commvnents of Brigadier General Walter J. Muller.

Lieutenant Colonel F. N. Muller, "Part I, Armiored Cavalry Journal, Volume LV I, No. 4 (July-August 1947) p 3.
3 Personal

Comments of Colonel Ralph J. Butcher, G-4,

2d

Armored Division.
4

0p cit, Muller,

F.

Mi..,

Lieutenant Colonel, p 3.

$amiiuol Elliot Mklorison, Oerations in North African Waters, (History of US Naval Operations in World War II), Vol II (Atlanta; Little, Brown and Comp any 1947) p 27....
6 1

ibid. p 26. War Department, Movement Orders, Shipment 3324, WD 370.5 OB-S-E-M1, dated October 2, 1942. 324-!,,-WD 370.5

(10-1-42)

8War Department, M~ovement Orders Shipent (9-31-42) OB-S-E-M1,, dated October 2, 942 .

9O
10

ct, Muller,

F. V., Lieutenant Colonel, p 4.

Ibid, p

3.
Operations

Lieutenant General Lucien K .Truscott, Jr, ofSub Task Force Goal-post, undated, Sec I p 3,

11

emorandum for General Hull,. Subject: l2War Department, Mv Special Operation, 5 SPO PP, dated September 29, 1942.

13War Department, Memorandum for the Distribution Division,
Subject: Level of Supply, Task Force A,. dated October 1, Lieutenant Colonel,, p 4.

1942.

O.,ci~t, Iuller, F. MO.,

l ar Deprtment, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, Subject: Transportation of Equipment and Maintenance for a Special Operation, dated October 6, l9420 Ib6Opcit, Muller, F. Z., Lieutenant Colonel, p 4.

171b

d,

p

4*c

17
19

Ibid, p 4.
Ibid, p 5. in Morrocco, Tactics Department, The Armored

20U Landigs
2 1

Force School, April 1943, p 11. Hadquarters, October 22, 1942. Task Force A, Memorandum to OPD, dated

22Loading Plans, Operation Blackstone, dated October 1942.
23

Brushwood and Goalpost,

Convoy Plan,

SOS,

Logistical Requirements from D Day to

D

95,

undated.

CHAPTER 4 OCEAN MOVEMENT The loading of the Western Task Force at NORFOLK, Va, was finally completed on the 24th of October 1942 and it set sail on that date for the invasion of French Morrocco. the NORFOLK, The armada moved out of

Va, harbor through the swept and buoyed channel in a

very efficient and orderly manner. The convoy consisted of about 100 ships led by the cruiser AUGUSTA under the commnand of Admiral Hewitt. All transports were

grouped in the center of the formation with battleships on each corner and with cruisers and destroyers around these transports.. There were about forty destroyers that formed the circle around the transports. The aircraft carriers followed and all in all it was a

formidable formation. The ships sailed in a column of lines and each ship was about and from front to rear..

800 yards froci the one on the right and left

The convoy was sailing under complete blackout conditions on a zig zag course and the danger of ships colliding with each other was always 1 present., No one except the highest commanders of the task force knew what the plans of the task force were until the force was well out to sea. The plans were then disseminated to all officers and men aboard Additional messages were transmitted between ships at sea At sea, blinker was one means of communications by day

the ships.

by guard mail,

nd a rninmum of colored lights at night,

Code flags by day sigOccasionally

nalled changes of course and conditions of ships, etc..

2
a destroyer was used as a messenger boat,

Everyone was kept busy

reading the vast amount of intelligence material on hand and studying the plans of the coming operation, General Plan of Attack The general plan of attack for Task Force Western IAORROeCO, hours. The mission of the Task Force was as follows: To seize and secure the Port of CASAI"IBINCA as a base for future operations to the north and northeast. to effect, under phase: The scheme of- maneuver for the first cover of darkness, three surprise landings, supported after dayTo eliminate or cripple the enemy air light by naval gunfire. force by surprise dawn ,ttacks. To secure by dark of D day at least one airdrome as a base for land based planes. Beginning at D - 3 clays, three submarine reconnaissance patrols were to operate off the main landing beaches; FEDALh, ScFI, and There wivas also one submarine patrol off CASABLNCA PORT LYAUT'EY. and one off D.AKAR to .keep track of enemy shipping. The aveal Covering Group, consisting of the battleship MkSSACHUSEITS and one cruiser division, was to destroy hostile naval units in or near CjSxABItNCA by gunfire and the hostile batteries at EL HZkREK and OUKYSHh capable of ranging on the FEDALA BEACHS. The kir Group, consisting of the R AGER and four smaller aircraft carriers, was to assist the covering group, and destroy (180 planes wore stacked in the enemy aircraft and submarines. RAiNGER whereas she was supposed to hold only 85. The Fire Supp-ort Groups was to furnish Naval gunfire support Navy ships had two instructions in addition to to the lanlings. gunfire support; first, to fire on any illuminated searchlights, second to return the fire of any shore batteries that fired on them. The Transport Group was to land troops, equipment and supplies on the three beaches, 3

34 w.as to attack

D

Day was

November

8th and H hour was at 0400

"o

Training Aboard Ship During the voyage, carried out on each ship. training of the individual soldier was Some ships rigged up rope ladders and some The men received daily

had rope cargo nets strung up on the ships. exercise by climbing these ladders and nets.

Task Force GOiAPCBT conducted training in

such subjects as camouflage,

booby traps, respect of customs of the inhabitants, weapons, debarkation drills, captured, and first

identification of friendly aircraft, aid. (Appendix 3)

behavior if

This same type of training was conducted on the ships of Task Force BIECKSTONE and can be reasonably assumed that the same training was conducted on the ships of Task Force BRUSHvOOD. An AGF observer for Task Force BLACKSTONE, reports that no

provisions for exercising all troops daily was made aboard the troopship LYONS. after 10 days at sea, on the 18th and 19th of October,

the LYONS stopped at COVE POINT and held short periods of calesthentics for the troops. Practically all deck space on the LYONS was taken up

by craft or deck loads. Some new weapons were issued to troops aboard the transports. The 2.36 inch rocket launcher, with ammunition, time. No one knew how to shoot it was first seen at this

and furthermore

no one knew how to

employ the weapon.

Some commanders made every effort to acquaint the off the ship at floating debris.

men with the weapon by firing it

New radios were issued to some units aboard ship,. The radio operators were not familiar with the operation of the new sets, and

due to the restriction of radio silence, checked or calibrated.

the sets could not be

Selection of the Beachheads There are three main ports in MORROCCO; CASABLANCA, SAFI, and PORT LYAUTEY, in the order of their importance. is CASABLANCA, The main port

There are two small beaches near CASABLANCA (AIN

DIAB and AIN SEBA,) but these are subjected to rough swell and surf, and are too near the CASABLANCA coastal batteries. FEDALA, 10 miles to the north, is good. protection against the surf and swell. could be attacked from the rear. The port of SAFI could be attacked frontally, because it was not well defended, and there were several beaches in the immediate vicinity of the city. PORT LYAUTEY is a river port 6 miles inland, on the river SEBOU. There is a beach called Mi-IDIA beach north and south of the The beach at

The BAY of FEDALA is a From FEDALA, CASABLANCA

river mouth and an attack could be made from these beaches, Thousands of photographs were taken by British reconnaissance planes over a period of a year and provided a good lot of hydrographic information and enabled the amphibious staff to choose the most feasable beaches. Photographs of the coastline from sea level These sea level photos would have

were wanted but never obtained.

enabled the assaulting forces to identify beaches and other landmarks at night,

Sub-Task Forces The assault elements of Task Force three separate SubTask Forces.

34 were divided into
Sub-Task Force YOKE

They were:.

(BRJS1iNOOD)

caommanded by Major General J. W. Anderson; Sub-Task
commanded by Brigadier General L; K. Truscott;

Force ZED (GOALPOT)

and Sub-Task Force XF AY (BLACKSTONE) commanded by Major General Ep N. Harmon. Sub-Task Force Yoke (BRUSHOO) This Sub-Task Force was under the command of Major General J. W, Anderson and consisted of troops from the 3d Infantry Division and a battalion landing team from the 2d Armored Division. It had the mission of affecting the main landing on the and initiate operations to capture

FEDALA BEACHES, secure FEDALA, CASABLANCA from the rear.

The naval gunfire support was to be furnished by the cruiser BROO, LYN and destroyers. They were to silence the French coastal

batteries at CAPE FEDA'LA and SIDI MOHOHLIED BEN CHE RGUI (FORT BLONDIN.) The Flagship AUGUSTA. would also be present to assist in support of the landings. The detailed plan for the operation was this: two regiments were to go ashore, one regiment and an armored landing team consisting of the 1st battalion 67th Armored Regiment to remain in floating reserve. Each of the two assault regiments had two batthe gunfire

talions in the assault,

which were to land at H hour, and one battalion in reserve) wrhich was to land at H $ 3 hours, 6

57

Sub-Task Force Zed (GOALPCT) This Sub-Task Force was under the command of Brigadier Gencral L. K..: Truscott and consisted of troops from the 9th Infantry Division and one armored landing group, from the 2d Armored Division.. This group had the mission of capturing and securing. use as

1,EIzTA BEACH and the airport at PORT LYAUTEY, to insure its

a base for our planes not later than noon of D Day; to capture and hold PORT LYAUTEY; subsequently to capture and secure the airport at SALE; finally to protect the north flank., The attached troops for this operation consisted of: Detachment, Ground Air SupportCommand. Detac hme nt; Engineer Battalion, (Topo)." Detachment, Signal Company. Detachment, Broadcasting Station. Counterintelligence Group. PI Group,. Civil Government Personnel. The naval gunfire support was to be provided by the battle-

ship TEXAS,

cruiser SAVAJ<hAH, and destroyers.

They had the mission coastal de-

of neutralizing the French FORT OF TE

KASBA and its

fenses on the high ground commanding the LEIMIA BEACHES. The armored landing team was to land inside the breakwater at PORT LYAUTEY, where there would be no surf, imediately north of the KASBA FORT as soon as the FORT was taken; then to proceed south along the coastal highway to take the airports at RABAT SALE.
Sub-Task Force Xra

7

(BlCKSTONE

This Sub-Task Force was under the command of Major General Ernest N. Harmon and consisted of troops from the

47th

Infantry

Regiment,

9th Infantry Division, two platoons (one to each assault

battalion) of the 70th Light Tank Battalion, and the 2d Armored Division landing team. The force had the mission of securing SAFI, and the airdrome east of town; insure the unloading of the armored elements aboard the sea train LiKEHURST; secure the crossing over the OUED ER REBIA, order to insure participation of this force in BLANCA and, finally, to prevent the garrison at in

the capture of CASALMARRAKECH from re-

inforcing CASABLANCA. The attached troops to this Sub-Task Force consisted of about the same as for Sub-Task Force GOALPCOT. The gunfire support for this Force was to be provided by the cruisers NEW YORK and PHILADELPHIA, and destroyers. They were to

silence the French coastal batteries north of the port, Pre-Invasion Training After loading at NE PORT 1IWS was completed, Force BLACKSTONE, the ships of

went to the upper part of the CHESAPEAKE BAY for the movement from ship to shore prior

a short period of training in to sailing.

The Navy Amphibious staff worked out complete details

for the entire trip and these details amounted to approximately the size of a Sears and Roebuck catalog in thickness. On arrival in the

rendezvous area, Major General Harmon reported to Admiral Davidson on his flagship, the cruiser PHILADELPHIA, Admiral Davidson suggested

that they forget the greater part of what was written in the voluminous notes and that they closet themselves in his stateroom and work

odt together the details of the expedition

They stayed there for

48

hours arguing and wrestling with the problem. General Harmon says that his main concern at that time was

to obtain training in small boats,

debarking from the ships,

forming waves in The

and the moving in

an orderly fashion to the shore.

Force anchored within a mile of the peaceful shore of CHESAPEAKE BAY and as evening came the lighthouse on shore gave them a beacon from which to guide their movements 4 arrived at the objective in In spite of this, only one boat This was

the first

practice exercise. It

the boat that General Harmon was in. in the third wave.

was supposed to have been

The remainder of the waves were scattered up took until noon of the next day to get them

and down the coast and it back to the ships..

This was very discouraging and showed up the in-

experience of the young sailors and coxwains and many other defects in training. was still The attempt on the second night] while a little better,

highly unsatisfactory.

The plan for a third exercise had

to be cancelled and the ships sailed down the harbor on the evening of the 23rd to rendezvous iith harbor at ,EWPORT i2EWS. the remainder of the expedition in the

Air Suooort
The air problem in this operation was crucial. The Western

Task Force was to approach a coast where the French had an estimated 168 planes operational at airfields very handy to the shore. This

coast might also be within striking range of the larger Axis bombers. The only possible means of providing air poiwer to this amphibious

60

operation was by aircraft carriers' short of carriers in October 1942, INGTON, YORKTCdN,

The United States was very The Japanese had sunk the LEXand damaged the SAR.ATOGA and commission. U.S.S.

WASP and HORNET,

ENTERPRISE; none of the new FSSEK class were in

RANGER, the only large carrier in the Atlantic Fleet, became the flagship of Rear Admiral Ernest D. McWhorter, "TORCH" air group. commander of the

The new SANGAMI-ON class of four escort carriers

converted from tankers, was thrown into the operation with less than one-half the normal shakedown training. Their inclusion with the for even after con-

air group also helped to solve the fuel problem,

version they retained an enormous oil capacity with plenty to spare for other ships. Aill together the RzJMER and her four consorts

ccrried to MOROCCO 28 Grurman

avenger Torpedo bombers (TBF), 36
(SBD), and 108 Wvildcat fighter planes

Douglas Dauntless dive-bombers (F4F-4), in

addition to ferrying over 76 US Army P-40s for basing was captured. Most of the

at the CASABLANCA airdrome as soon as it pilots were untried in combat. RNGERIS

(ir Group

9, the best

trained; only reported on board the ship on the 3d October: Naval Operations

10

Between the 3d and 11th October the Navy sent the covering group consisting of the battleship TUSCALOOSA and 7JICHITA, 'MSSACHUSETTS, the heavy cruisers to CASCO BAY and they later The air group

and four destroyers,

joined the convoy on the 25th October for the voyage.

along with one oiler and nine destroyers was sent to BERMUDA for

training.. The three attack groups;. the covering group, the air group and the assault group all rendezvoued about 450 miles SSE of CAPE RACE and continued on their way,. When complete, Task Force

34 covered a span of ocean roughly twenty by thirty miles, The route followed by Task Force 34 was planned to give the impression that it was just a troop convoy bound for England (Figure 1.) It actually zigzagged all over the atlantic Ocean in order to miss Actually, several Portugese and Spanish vessels

any neutral shipping.

were encountered on November 7 and one or two had prize crews placed on board to prevent their broadcasting the convoy position. On 23 October 1942, a meeting was called by Admiral Hewitt of about 150 naval and military leaders at NORFOLK in order to go over the main attack plan of the operation, The Navy's mission was stated

along with the Airts mission and then General Patton, who was in command of the Army troops, got up and called upon the Navy to remem-

ber Farragut, and predicted that all the elaborate landing plans would break down in the first five minutes, after which the Army would take over and win through. He said

,..Never in history has the Navy landed an Army at the If you land us anywhere within fifty planned time and place. miles of FEDALA and one week of D Day, I1ll go ahead and win....We shall attack for sixty days, and then, if we have to, for sixty more. If we go forward with desperation, if we go forward with utmost speed and fight, these people cannot stand against us....11 On the 30-31 October the speed of the convoy was reduced to eight knots and the capital ships were refueled with complete success. This was accomplished by having the oiler come along side, make fast 62

N~ew'

AZQR

TRAC)K
a

OF WESTER~N NAVAL TASK FORCE 24 Oc-rO6ERI.9 t O. MsER 1042
CHARTr#Y CTF 34

4

BASE 0, ON
i

ACTONRI

EPOR~T

AL tTh AcT4L

:i

i

and pump oil through large hoses into the tanks of the ship being refuelled. On 4 November the Task Force was nearing the coast of Africa and the weather started to get bad. The wind was rising from the By 6 November the doubtful if the

northwest and the sea started to run very heavily. heavy seas reported off the Moroccan coast made it forces could be landed there.

Admiral Hewitt had to consider one of

the alternate plans of landing the assault forces inside the Mediterranean. At midnight 6-7 November, Admiral Hewitt decided to continue

with the original plan.

That night the sea moderated.

The weather on 7 November was overcast, with a light wind from the northeast, and the sea running a moderate ground swell. daybreak the SAFI attack group left the convoy and the rest of the Task Force feinted toward the straits of GIBRALTER, and 1700Z, Between 1300Z At

Companies K and L were transferred from the IYONS to the respectively, by means of LCVP's, This

destroyers BERMNADOU and COLE,

was accomplished at sea while the vessels kept steaming at 5 knots. No one was lost. At 1600 on 7 November the northern and center attack groups parted for their respective landing places. arrived at itts The northern attack group

planned position off MEDIA at 2400, the southern

group made SAFI at 2345, and the center group was at FEDALA at 2353. However some difficulty developed in these groups reaching their exact areas assigned as the transport areas. Two of the three groups

were

brought into the transport areas by emergencgy turns which were

very confusing on a dark and foggy night.- This-confusion delayed the unloadirng of the assault groups., On November 7th, the day before the attack General Patton of the force. An extract

had instrutions. read to all members follows:

,It is not now known whether the French African Army, composed of both white and colored troops, will contest our landing. It is regrettable the necessity of fighting the gallant French who are, at heart, sympathetic toward us, but Howall resistance by whomever offered must be destroyed. ever, when any of the French soldiers seek to surrender, you will accept it and treat them with the respect due a brave opponent and future ally.° Remember, the French are not Nazi or Japs. few days and nights after you get ashore,, During the first you must work unceasingly, regardless of sleep, regardless of A pint of sweat will save a gallon of blood. food. Attack by day and night to the limit of human endurance, and then continue the attack. The eyes of the world are watching us; the heart of Inerica beats for us; God is with us, On our victory depends the f~eedcm or slavery of the human race, We shall surely win.....

N1OTES FOR CH1APTER 4 MT~anus cript written by Maj..
2 Observcrs

Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, p 8,

Blackstone,

Nov. 8

Report on- Landing Operations of Task Force - 13 icl, by M~aj. James Y. Adams, p 3, app III. TA S, Tac. Dept,, Fort

3 U. S.. Landings in French Morocco,

Knox, Kentucky, p 7-8.

'Adams, Observers Report,
%SaruelElliot Mvorrison, 0
(History of US Naval Operations

cit,
W' II

p 2, app III. in North African Waters
vol II,.

erations

inV

Atlantic

Little

Brown,

194.7,

p 26.

6SLandings in Morocco,
7bd

'2 cit,

p 9.

p

9-10.
ssm*

$Thid ,
9 Muaj . 10

Gen,

Harracon, op cit, p 9.

Mlorrison, Operations in North African Waters,
p4l.

cit,

p 31.

llibid,
12

Ibidc

1II.
a ci,

3 1 US

Landings in 11orocco,

p 12,.

CHAPTER

5

FEDALA AND- C5ASBLANCA At 2357,

7 November the convoy reached its assigned area
Preparations were underway for the landing

off FEDALA (Figure 2).

of the American forces who were to seize FEDALA (Figure

3),

and

move south to CASABLANCA, the key to the liberation of FRENCH MOROCCO. Conditions were ideal, in The Sea, normally very turbulent

this area, was smooth and even the ground swells were exception-

ally small,

1

Signal lights at FEDALA and CASABLANCA intended for a

French convoy moving out of CASABLANCA were a' welcome beacon to the

Navy that had moved the immense convoy across the ATLANTIC.
Eisernhower's messagej the LOIO

General

radio announcement of the invasion,

and President Roosevelt's address had keynoted American feeling. Hov would the French react?

Would

there be a fight?

The Landing Flan Implementing landing plans soon absorbed the complete attention of ev:ryone. Major General Jonathon Anderson, Commanding

General of the 3d Infantry Division, was in forces (code name BRUSHVFO0D).

command of the landing

His landing team consisted of the 3d

Division reinforced by the Light Tank Battalion, 67th Armored

Regi-

ment

of the Second Armorod Division; the 2d Battalion, 20th Engiand the

neers; the 36th Engineer Regiment; Artillery Battalion (Figure 4).

436th

Anti-Aircraft

For coordination purposes beaches

were designated by colors.

Red and Blue Beaches were north of Principal beaches were in depth, with a

FEDALA,. and Yellow Beach to the south.

part of one continuous sandy beach 4001 to 500' gradient of about ly to 40a, Rocks,

reefs and other obstructions

to the approach divided the shore into five beaches practical for landing. These were designated as Red 1, Red 2, Red 3, and Blue One mile west of POINT FEDALA was Yellow Beach, and H Hour was set at

1 and Blue 2.

three miles east of POINT BLONDIN was Blue 3. 0400, 8 November, That is,

landing craft were to cross the line of

departure at that time.

Landings were to begin simultaneously on

all principal beaches 3 (Figure 2). The transport area was six to eight miles off the beaches (Figure 2). The first line of ships was made up of four destroyers

with the mission of escorting landing craft to the line of departure. The next line, consisting of four transports, JEFFERSON, THE LEONARD WViOD,

CABROL and DICKIAN, were loaded with the assault waves.

Back of these were the successive waves of reserves and supply ships. First to be landed were four scout boats with a crew of a Chief Specialist and four enlisted men. trained at LITTLE. CREEK, USA, and Ensign J. J. VIRGINIA, These men had been extensively by ist Lt. Lloyd L. Peddicord,

Bill, USN.

Their mission was to mark the

beaches by use of infra-red signal lights. Four hours were allowed for loading of landing craft and movement to the line of departure. fifty landing craft. Each assault ship was to load

Some of the landing craft were aboard the

No \(1

A ir

1Poricc P hotois

O,// IK'~a~p- the '-ir
lCFI942, \'it1 legends addedI by\ p1hOt( inh\ R \.1. rcc( )lissnc ISSNCCi)ehL 14 Sc 1 )tcmbe I. Nria t a li'i t )S Ihse f'it I Cd toge~t her, were fiunistud to te fire s111 )port Ship)s ad~ Sp)otter planes, inl order to lR ptidryof (apc art at helpt) ;ir(,&t kit nilicmiItIand 1 )revcnt firing Ml churches and other civilian A itts ivol tLinks, is seen at to\\ ecr part o- Idtio. Tlhe lbeach~es shO\\'ri are Red and Rved z.Ilo IVedtla , ( ecrnan \rinisice (:(oimVissit)I1, w\as an objecti'e (of thet assault trOmps tlet \Miramiar, headt~tiartcrs tdich

~

tc rl)recr s.

r

z:

TRANS POR TJ ;.O JN,,O

J.

'E

S

E.

IUTLE4I E

0.LL. SCOTT
1 qervR

vs

O A6'RoLL

L. too'iO wit A'6S
514iA(9Sdtr

d L("RRHYn
L u .L0 1
)

FLOArI(t'K RE CEAtJ

2 EEtO

LA1tCD oq GALL 0

®_. L.I

PL-Aqd

FOR

Ff4/-A/,'

LAt/1) N6

o'o qoo
' r

Yo!.
Ly

/94.Zu

numfjes s(AP

ships in

which

thoeir assault load

was

riding, however, in some

cases landing boats from the second, third or fourth line of ships were to pick up their troop loads from boats of thc first line, etc, This was apparently necessary because of a shortage of the proper type of shipping. It proved to be a -weak link in the well-laid plans. the First and Second Battalions reinforced, were to land This is

Landing Teams One and Two,

respective3ly of the 7th Infantry Regiment,

on Red Beaches 2 and 3 respectively, just east of FEDALA.

a sandy open beach extending from the sea jetty east of FEDALA on the west to a rocky cape on the east, and is about one mile in length:, Landing Team One was to clear out any small arms fire on the beach, then turn to the right (west) and clear out the town of FEDALA and capture POINT FEDALA, on which were located oil tanks, search lights, a three gun battery of 90 mmn guns and a 2 gun 75 mm. battery (Figure Landing Team Two was to move inland a mile or so, swing south and capture everrthing on the east bark of the CUED (river) 1ELILAH. two teams were to be assisted by the 3rd Reconnaissance Troop and Company L of the 7th Infantry Regiment. The 3rd Reconnaissance Troop was to land at H Hour on Yellow Beach (west of mouth of CUED LnLixH), which is west of FEDkLiA, attack These

3).

FEDALA from the west, and seize the bridge over the OUED
which is on the main

ViMLLAH,
Company

highway

from FEDALAH

to C~BkS}LANCA.

L (7th Infantry) was to land on Yellow Beach at H plus 60 and assist the Reconnaissance Troop in- the capture of the 90 mm. battery on the west of POINT FEDAIA.

Landing Team Throee (3rd Battalion less Company L, 7th Infantry) was to land on Red 2 at H plus 70 and support either Team One or Two. Landing Teams One and Two, the First and Second Battalions were to land on Landing

respectively, of the 30th Infantry Reinforced,

Beaches Blue 1 and 2 respectively (Figure 2) at H Hour.

Team Two was to capture the coast defenses at POINT BLONDIN and the highway and railroad over the OUED NtFIFIKAH, a river running Landing

into the ocean about five miles east of FEDALA (Figure 2),

Team One was to advance straight inland as rapidly as possible and seize the high ground about five miles inland, 30th was to land at H Hour on Blue Beach 3, Company L of the

about two miles east of

the mouth of the OUED NEFIFIKaH and swing to the southwest and assist Landing Team Two. was in The 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry, less Company L

reserve and was to land on Red 3 at H Hour plus 90 minutes. The 15th Infantry, the ist Battalion Landing Team of the and the 2nd Battalion of the

67th Armored Regiment (light tanks), 20th Engineers were in

floating reserve with instructions to land

on the Red Beaches on call.

Operations plans stated that ships were to be closed up and in position upon arrival at debarkation points. Because of naviga-

tional difficulties,

instead of heading into the transport area in two right

the same formation in which the crossing had been made,

obliques of about 45

0

were given.

The ships were then stopped dead

in

the water.

The result was that in many instances where boats

from one ship were assigned to take combat loads from another, the ooxswains were unable to locate the ships from which they were supposed to get their loads, Where troops were landing on boats that

were part of the equipment of the particular ship they had traveled on, they were coordinated at the start, but where boats were sent from one ship to get troops from another ship for the first wave, there was great confusion. Boat crews' were drifting aimlessly from
,

transport to transport, megaphoning, "Is this the ANCON?" the LEONARD WOOD?".

"Is this

Even the navigator on the BIDDLE was unable to Signal lights

locate the BLISS, which was entirely out of position, flashed, craft. It It

would have been a field day for enemy air or surface

would have been difficult to distinguish between friend

6
or foe. Fortunately no challenge was immediately forthcoming. Due to the above, and the fact that the troops were inexperienced in loading into landing craft from the ships, considergetting landing craft started shoreward. Amphibious scouts

able delay was encountered in It

was necessary to delay H Hour' thirty minutes.

who were to mark beaches encountered difficulties and there was considerable confusion as to beach identification. Major Weaver, in

charge of scouts, got permission to go in and do what he could about guiding troops to proper beaches. He got the first and second waves

started right, but the third wave missed him completely and landed all the way from POINT FEDALA to CASABLNCA. Many boats landed on

rocks and reefs, and were lost,

70

Despite difficulties Landing Team One of the 7th Infantry began landing on Red 3 (instead of Red 2 as planned) at about 0500. Many boats were lost on the reefs which separated Red 2 and Red 3. Shortly after the landings began enemy searchlights focused on the beaches, but fortunately a patrol boat was able to shoot these out

Sith 50 cal. machine gun fire. Artillery batteries and machine gun fire from POINT BLONDIN and POINT FEDALA hit the beaches at dawn causing considerable confusion. However, the landing was opposed by only one company of who were poorly equipped and surrendered after Landing Team One landed all of its elements

Sengalese Soldiers, firing a few rounds.

and took its objective.

Company A of this team captured the

MIRAVAR HOTEL at 0630 hours with nine members of the German Armistice Commission and many documents and other data, including up to date troop disposition of every French unit in Morocco, Other documents

included complete data on railroads, spurs, cubic capacity of warehouses for raw materials, and a complete description of all French of-

ficers and their attitude toward the German government. mission saved the American Army a great deal of work."9 After capture of the HOTEL MIRAMAR,

"Hitler t s

Landing Team One proceeded

through the town of FEDALA in an attempt to outflank the battery of two 75 mm. guns that was placing effective fire on Red Beaches. 90 mm. battery had been put out of action by our Destroyers, silencing the 75's. but The

naval fire was not successful in

The guns were the

finally captured by a company of Landing Team One,

but in

Maneuver Company A of the team suffered several casualties from naval gun fire. Personnel of 90

bmm. battery

surrendered to this team.

Landing Teara Two encountering the same loading and landing difficulties as Team One, 3 as planned. landed at Blue Beach 3 instead of Red Beach

This team assisted Landing Team Two of the 30th which the capture of POINT BLONDIN, reached at about 100OO, and then having

was making good progress in proceeded to its encountered little

objective which it resistance.

No troops were landed at Yellow Beach.

Company L of the 7th and later

Regiment landed about five miles northeast of FEDALA,

joined the 3d Battalion which had come ashore and moved into an assembly area. The 3d Reconnaissance Troop landed on Red Beach in the

late morning and participated in teries. It is

the attack on the POINT FEDALA bat-

believed that the failure of these two units to land a delay in the reducing of the POINT F&DALA

as scheduled resulted in

batteries with resulting casualties on the beaches. Teams One and Two of the 30th Regiment landed on their respective beaches in after initial approximately five waves. Principal difficulties

loading confusion resulted from boats crashing on rocks Team Two, because of delay, landed

and reefs bordering the beaches.

EFIFIKAH and proceeded to the after daylight at the mouth of the OUED N capture of POINT BLONDIN fwhich mounted batteries of four 138.6 guns, being assisted in the end by Red Team Two (7th), on the wrong beach. BROOKLYN at 0617.. Uwhich had landed

This battery had been heavily engaged by the Blue Tearas were successful in capturing all of

their objectives early in dug in in

th, day and by night the Regiment had

the hill.s and east of POINT BLONDIN.

The 15th was ordered ashore about 1100 and at about
General Patton ordered that all

1600

Infantry and Engineers be put ashore on the beaches at about MFIFIKAH to FEDAIA were d"-

that night.. Artillery fire ceased to fall 09C, but beaches and the road from

CUD

strafed and baebed during the day by planes from the CASABLANCA AIRPORT.

At least one burst of small bombs was dropped on landing boats
Our

during the forenoon, but there were no reported casualties.

naval air seemed to devote most of its activities to gaining general air control, wrhich it effectively did, but as a result, was able to

fly few air combat patrols. 10 came very annoying.

The few French planes that were up be-

The 67th Armored Battalion Landing Team made the crossing on the ARCTURUS, which carried about 2/3 of their vehicles and about 100 men; and the BIDDI, which had 1/3 of the vehicles and the reThey awakened to the tune of heavy firing on and in their capacity of a floating reserve

mainder of the troops.
the morning of the to land on orders,

8th

they were able to get a good view of the landing

and some of the naval action. At 1600, Richard E. on the 8th, the Battalion Commanding Officer, went ashore to a cormaanders' meeting.

MIajor

Nelson,

He took Battalion

with him Captain W6ishard, his S-4 and Lieutenant Veenstra, Liaison Officer

Lieutenant Veenstra returned to the ship at about

1800 with instructions that the battalion was to start unloading

irrunediateiy.

This prove .d to be quite a..n una r,-kin

By this tie

the loss of almost half of the available landing craft was being seriously felt. AROTURUS, One platoon of Company

k

was unloaded from the

and landed on Red Beach,

The platoon lead by Lieutenant

Walters was moved to the heights overlooking FEALA but did not con11 tact the enemy during the night. (Figure 4.) By 1700, D day, 8 November, 4o7 of the 7,750 officers and men, almost

19,870

embarked on the twelve transports had been

and

cargo vessels

of the landing force,

landed..

FEDALA, POINT BLODIN, and Amer-

the area betwvfeen the CUED lELLAR and the CUED NEFIFIKAH were in

ican hands.
it

Plans for the movement to CASABLNCA were being made and Percentages,

was apparent that our troops were there to stay. the whole story.

however, do not tell

Although the four ships in

which the assault waves were landed, and the JOSEPH HUVIS had approximately

90/1

of their troops ashore, the remaining ships had landed

very few troops and the total was far behind schedule. The principal difficulty had been the expending of landing craft. Inexperrience, darkness and the falling tide, were the prin-

cipal causes of boat losses, but even after the tide turned at 0744,

8 November, boats continued to be lost,

Additional time was wasted

by the temporary abandonmyrent of boats under air strafing or artillery fire.. Abandoned boats were frequently wrecked or broached on the Altogether, between 137 and 160 of Of the

beaches by the incoming tide..

347

landing boats were expondd, the greay' mao.jority on D Day. boat losses,

only two or thrce were the result of direct hits by

enemy batteries,.

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Beginning at about noon or D Day, 1 tndirvs

weru concernorder

trated on areas within the FEAIA harbor and on Red Beach in

to better control the small boat traffic and conserve our dwindling supply of landing craft. This, of course, upset the plans of com-

manders

and considerable criticism was leveled at Commander Jamis on, Later General Pattonts comment that "Red" Jamison

the beachmaster.

had "Saved the whole Goddamned operation",
12

showed the true value of

the beachmaster's decision. Another factor which had seriously hampered the landing operations was the fact that all troops were seriously overloaded. So

much so that many troops lost their lives in

the surf at the beaches

for the sole reason that they were unable to regain their feet after being knocked over by the waves, Others perished when they fell into Further

the sea while disembarking to get into their landing boats.

evidence of overloading was that excess equipment was discarded on the beaches and quays, along the streets of town and across the hillsides. Loads wore as follows: Enlisted Iran fu11 .field less roll Judes change of socks and underclothes, toilet aticles.) 11/3 days K ration (Boxed) Entrenching tool Weapons (Rifle, BAR, TSG) a rib breakTrench knife (1-1917, er ;vreen hitting the ground) 2 canteens full of water Helmet or 32 Ammunition (18 clips Il, clips 103, or 10-20 rd magazines for BAR, or 15-30 rd clips for TSG) Grenades (,-s many as desired - men drew then when unloaded, hence carried @ 6) Officer - IMlussette bag (rith change of socks, underwear, toilet articles) and belt, 11/3 days K ration (boxed) Map case Trench knife 2 canteens full of water Field glasses and compass TSG and 15-30 rd clips of ammunition (some carried only 20 rd clips) Gas mask Helmet Grenades MIG or mortar ammunition (to be dropped on beach)

Enlisted MIan -. .,_.

-

(Contd.)

Gas mask Field glasses, wire cutters, etc. To XCO - 2 chests of MG arnmunition or equivalent mortar amm.,.unition (to be dropped on beach) Table is taken from Landngs inMorco. It is believed that men in leading waves should carry as This is a difficult problem, but care Arrangements must be made to

little equipment as possible.

should be taken not to overload mnen. get their equipment to thoe

as soon after landing as possible. D Plus 1

During the night of the 8th, Landing Team One (1st Battalion, 7th Infantry) was relieved by the 2nd Battalion, 20th Engineers and went into Division reserve. The 15th Infantry moved to the southwest

and went into position on the left of the 7th Infantry, which had moved to position across the OUD TAELLAH. attack for CAA.SABLrANCA jumped off! By 0730, 9 November, the

Light resistance consisting of

mounted patrols was encouintered during the morning and this contineeod until afternoon when leading units came within the range of the fixed defenses around CASASBLiC, at which time some scattered The enemy at this time was

artillery fire was recoived (Figure 5).

largely preoccupied with preparing defensive positions in the CASABLANC A area,

At

about 1400 hours the forward movement was halted

by Major General Anderson because he lacked necessary supplies and ammunition with which to mako an alU-out effort to take CASABLANCA.
Supplies were coming up very slowly because of shortage of heavy transport vehicles and the inability carry great enough quantities. of jeeps and

1/12

ton trucks to

The 30th Infantry, holding the general line of the CUED NBEFIFIKAH, received continuous light attacks along the CUED NEFIFIKAH by elements of the

lst Chausseurs D1 Afriue, which was

equipped with armored car, 50 calibre machine guns and approxima<tely 20 obsolete Renault tanks.

13

This unit had left RIABAT at 1000 on the

8th and continued to harry the 30th until the cessation of hostilities. The threat, however, was not serious -and no

American

tanks were moved

to that sector. On the morning of the 9th, a French pilot brought the ARCTLIRUS into the FED ALA harbor to urload elem: ents of the 67th Tank
Jj

Battalion which vere loaded on the boat.

This was a difficult piece

of

navigation, but was finally accomplished

with

the assistance of Unloading of thne

the two

landing

craft acting as tugs (See Figure 3).

battalion then oroceded at a more rapid rate from the hRCTURUS and with the additional landing craft thus made available to the BIDDLE, the landing of the team was completed in the the late afternoon, By 1900

9th of Novemboer, the 67th Light Tank Battalion Tean was in the

assembly area betw, een the railroad and the inland road just east of CUED

17 ELLAH

(Figure 5)o

At

this time orders were received to secure The Bat-

crossings of the CUED DELL~x1 .from possible infiltration,

talion was immediately moved to positions east of the river in the vicinity of the bridges and small security detachments were posted west of the river. Principal difficulties during the move resulted No enemy was encountered (Figure

from blackout operations.

5).

D Plus 2

At 1600, 10 November, the battalion was moved into position
just east of the QUED YELLAH near the inland road. Its mission was

to defend against possible movement against FEDALA pending employment in the coordinated attack against CASABLANCA. A "desert-spread"

formation was adopted and anti-aircraft guns were spotted on high ground. One platoon of Company A was sent forward to assist the 15th This platoon was involved in minor operations,

moving on the highway.

but encountered no armor (Figure 5). On the morning of 10 November, the 7th and 15th Regimental

Landing Teams continued the advance southwest toward CASABLANCA.They soon gained contact -ith enemiy patrols and from that time until the Armistice, they were in constant contact with the enemy. 7th Landing Team, advancing on the right and machine gun fire, and its The

received heavy small arms

right flank received bombardment from

two French destroyers operating just out of the entrance to CASA15 BLTAICA HARBOR. By nightfall the 7th Landing Team was in position along the eastern. outskirts of C.ASABLANCA. One company of the 15th

Infantry was held up at a crossroad southeast of CASABLANCA for a considerable time during the morning. This company had

14

men The

killed, including the company cormm.Tnder, and 10 men injured.

advance was continued and by nightfall the team had occupied the high ground south and southeast of the city QUL.LD and BLID OULAD CI-LUK. CHUK IL iL0UK

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The main bridges leading into CASABLaCA had been mined and there were a number of road blocks erected on the main highways leading into the city. On the whole, enemy activity on the 10th

was negligible and consisted principally of patrol operations and artillery fire from CASABLANCA. batteries and AA guns. The artillery fire was from fixed

The French apparently used no mobile artillery. D Plus 3

During the night of the 10th the 67th received orders to move into assembly positions southeast of CASABLANCA and be prepared to participate in a coordinated attack on the city on the morning of the 11th. H Hour was set at 0730 instead of dawn in 16 order to insure per-

fect coordination

The attack was to be made by the 7th and 15th and was to be supposition, and

Regimental Combat Teams and the 67th Tank Team, ported by naval dive bombers.

All concerned were in

the attack was ready to jump off when orders to cease fire and halt in position were received. were in The French had surrendered. Naval planes

the air and considerable difficulty was encountered in heading

them off in time to prevent their attack on the known artillery position in the CASABLANCA area. It was, however, a close thing. Had the French delayed their

surrender only a few minutes, the action would have been started and would have undoubtedly been costly to both sides. close the thing really was, To indicate how

Brigadier General i-rthur R. Wilson t s

report on the operation says:

On the morning of Nov. 11,° the order to cease firing was given by Gen._ Patton at the 3rd Division command post. Although there had been many faults in communication especially from ship to shore, all elements of the command received the order before H hour. The cruisers and destroyers received it about 15 minutes before they were ready to open fire. A coordinated attack had been carefully worked out. At that time RLG Is 7 and 15 supported by light tank and medium artillery and the Armored Landing Team were in the eastern and southern outskirts of Casablanca prepared to attack, The French artillery positions had been definitely located and arrangements had been made for support from naval dive bombers. The cruisers and destroyers of our Navy were to complete destruction of all French naval craft. At 0519 the following message was sent from Gen. Patton to Adm. Hewett. "Urgent. Enemy may capitulate in next few hours stop. Please make arrangements to cause irmmediate cessation of air and naval gun fire action receipt of message from the text of which follows immediately after this message,." At 0700 the following message was sent. "Urgent to Augusta. Cease Firing immediately. Acknowledge immediately. Patton." At that time Gen. Patton was at the cormmand post of the 3rd Division. There were only 30 minutes to go until H Hour which was -nnounded at 0730. As soon as the Army capitulated the following message was sent by Adm. Hewett at 0755. "For Patton from Hewett. Please send following to commander French Naval Forces Casablanca. tReport whether you intend forcing me destroy your ship and. shore installations and spill the blood of your people. The decision is your individual responsibity. If you join your Army in capitulation, report whether any mine fields exist to prevent my enterilng Casablanca and send pilot to my flagship .. immediately: Adm. Hewett, Commanding U.S. Naval Forces. Some difficulty was encountered in getting the message to Adm. Michelier, who commanded the French Naval Forces in the Casablanca area. But he finally sent word that the Navy would surrender and he would attend an Armistice conference. At 0805, Gen. Patton sent a message to Adm. Hewett requesting that he or his representative come to the Miramar Hotel, FedalAh, to attend a discussion of the Armistice terms. In order to gain time (while the Armistice terms were being discussed) in appraising the condition of the port of Casablanca as a result of naval bombardment, Gen. Patton sent a party headed by Brig. Arthur Wilson to that city which indluded one captain and one Lt. Commander of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Air Forces WTF, and a few other officers. They called upon the division commander of the French Division occupying Casablanca, paid their respects, secured his entire cooperation, including

the immediate detail of army trucks to assist in clearing the supplies from the docks at Fedalah. A conference was, then held with the Chief of Staff, Contre-Adm, Missolffle, who assigned a naval captain, a merchant marine officer, and a member of the harbor board to inspect the harbor with our naval officers in order to estimate the number of ships which could be docked. A reconnaissance was made of the airfield at the same time and a message was sent to the carriers 'to By 1600 the land their planes on the Casablanca airfield. party had returned to Fedalah, and had made a complete report of the condition of the port, The Armistice Conference was still continuing. It ended about 1800 hours. The occupation of CASABLANCA was orderly and few incidents occurred. General Patton ordered troops to move in imrriediately

following the French surrender,

His orders were to move into town The occupation was

and to attack anyone who tried to interfere, completed by 1130 and CASABLANCA was in

American hands. the 67th Tank Bat-

During this movement into CASABLANCA,

talion Team, which had had practically no enemy contact, received several interesting assigniments. Company A was given the mission

of occupying CASABLANCA AIRPORT, which they did with no difficulty. Company B guarded the captured French batteries and set up several road blocks with tanks in town. The only real excitement occurred

when a Navy Avenger plane dropped a message stating that a French unit was moving southwest from the CASABLANCA area. Company B was sent to investigate, incident. A platoon of

and captured the unit without

This force was a weapons company of the RICHN INFANTRIE

COLONIAL DU iOPRAQU trying to escape (Figure 5). Although direct contact with the enemy was infrequent and enemy defenses were generally poorly organized and defended, a wealth

of incidents occurred, some tragic and same amusing;

In his book

OPERATIONS IN NORTH AMEiRICAN WATERS (October 1942-1943) Samuel Eliot Morrison cites several of these incidents, which are quoted:

Some of the landing teams that missed the right beach had strange adventures. Four landing craft carrying 113 officers and men of a Headquarters Military Police Company took off from the transport WILLIAM S. BIDDLE after nightfall and missed Beach Yellow, where they were supposed to land. Two of the boats entered the roadstead of Casablanca and hailed a French Patrol vessel, thinking she was one of ours, to ask the way. She opened up with machine guns, killed the M.P. Company Commander, sank both boats and took the survivors prisoner, The most fantastic adventure befell Ensign Harry A. Storts and a crew of coastguardsmen from the transport JOSEPH T. DICKMAN. With a support boat borrowed from another transport they were tryingly, shortly after 0400 to excort three amphtracs to Beach Blue 2. These were experimental versions of the LVT, improved models of which in 1943-1945 served in many amphibious operations in the Pacific. The LVTts were supposed to get themselves and their crews ashore under their own power. But they frequently broke down and had drifted so far away from their destination by daylight that Ens, Storts was ordered to conduct them back along the coast and to land at the nearest available beach. He joined forces with two landing craft carrying anti-aircraft half-track batteries. They picked out a beach some ten or twelve miles east of Sherki and landed there at 1945, being strafed by an enemy plane during the process. Behind this beach were French troops, who made their presence felt at once. Ens. Storts's landing forces, which amounted to 32 army and 9 Navy and Coast Guard personnel, dug in, set up their "Buck Rogers" guns, and stood seige. French strafing planes appeared every half-hour until dark, and killed five men, but the survivors used their guns to such good purpose that several French armored cars were driven off o After dark, two men put off in a rubber boat to intercept a destroyer, while Ens. Storts and four others set out on foot for Fedalah, hoping to make contact with the American landing forces. The 29 men left behind shifted their position from the beach to a near-by concrete pig-pen. "That pen sure looked good", said one of the coastguardsmen, "we crowded right in with the pigs and didn't mind the company at all," And they held out for two days until their ammunition was spent. The rubber boats never caught their destroyer, but eventually returned to the Fleet. Ens. Storts and his party what with losing their way and taking cover from French planes, took Sunday night and all of Monday to reach an Army command post near Fedalah. After resting they wore provided by the 30th Infantry with a

half-track, a 75 rm. gun and a rescue squad. Off they rolled Tuesday morning 10 Nov.., guided by Ens. Storts. On the way they captured ten French soldiers and took them along, only to find that those they were seeking to rescue on the beach had themselves been captured. So back they turned toward Fedalah, everyone on board the half-track. On the way they were neatly ambushed by 150 native troops led by French officers, who wounded or killed nearly everyone in the party, including most of the French prisoners, The captors conducted the surviving Americans to a French first-aid station at Bouznika, where their wounds were dressed. A French officer then loaded them on a farm truck, with the red cross painted on the hood, in order to take them to Rabat for questioning, One mile from Bouznika, the truck was strafed and disabled by an American plane, which did not see the red cross in time, and three more of the French were killed. The survivors walked back to Bouznika, carrying their wounded, and were then shipped by truck to Boulhaut, 14 m iles inland, Next day Armistice Day - a man came in saying the fighting was over, A priest conducted Ens. Storts and one other survivor of the original amphibian party to Fedalah, where they reported on board ship. Such are the hazards of amphibious warfare, Of the numerous adventures enjoyed by the army landing teams, two will suffice. One, whose objective was the railroad bridge over the Oued Nefifikah, halted an early morning train and pulled off it 75 very surprised French soldiers going on leave to Casablanca. A unit of the 7th Infantry that landed before daylight made straight for the Hotel Miramar, headquarters of the German Armistice Commission. ,According to one story, the Germans were about to make a getaway in cars, and all but one of the four officers, as well as six enlisted men, were captured while running were sent on board across the golf course to catch a plane,.They German the transport ANCON and brought to the U,S.; the first prisoners to be taken by U.S. forces on land. One of the German cars came in handy for a plan that Col, The French Wilbur of Gen. Patton' s staff had very much at heart, Gen. Bethouart had been a fellow student of his at the famous Ecole de Guerre. Assuming that Bethouart had the military command at Casablanca (°which was incorrect), Wilbur thought that-if he could only contact his ANCIEN COMARADE and explain matters, the French would join us instead of resisting. Accordingly, he went ashore with the assault troops, commandeered a captured German car, and with a soldier as chauffeur and an impressed guide dashed through the lines to the French military headquarters at Casablanca, There he was coldly informed that the Navy was in
command. This gallant escapade seems mildly ridiculous in view

of the fact that Bethouart had been working on our side for weeks a good example of the faulty cooperation between American civilian agencies and the armed forces,

Despite all difficulties, in which inexperience was the major factor, 7,750 troops and a good deal of equipment were landed at Fedalah on D day, 8 Nov.; and by nightfall Maj. Gen. Anderson's 3rd Division had attained all objectives set down in the attack plan. American troops had control of the town, the harbor, bridges over the rivers at each end of the area and the high ridges that commanded the town and beaches. Yet the story of this debarkation is only part of the picture, even at Fedalah. Twice on 8 Nov. while the landings were going on, the French Navy at Casablanca tried to break up the operations, and they could have easily done so but for the effective work of the United States Navy. Enemy Strength and Attitude The following forces were encountered by the 3d Division during the action: Cavalry Patrols Five battalions of infantry Two battalions of field artillery (75mm,); of four guns each. One battery, 105mm. howitzer Two batteries, 155mm, each of three

batteries

Five batteries, 75mm,. AT., two guns per battery Light armored units amounting to about 3 companies of old type Renault and Hotchkiss tanks numbering about 20 in all. (Two were captured and 4 destroyed; 5 were found broken down.) Curtiss-type pursuit planes Several 25mm. anti-tank guns Coast defense guns at POINT BLONDIN (4 - 138mm,)

4

90mm. guns POINT FEDALA; 2, 75mm,

guns POINT FEDALA

Naval gun fire from French destroyers1 7

Although these forves were considerable in number, they were generally equipped with antiquated weapons and their entire activity was characterized by piece-meal commitment; that is? where they were committed at all. In fact at no time during the operation did the Enemy artillery was their

French offer determined ground resistance. greatest force.

The batteries at POINT FEDALA and POINT BLONDIN were

effectively employed and were responsible for much of the confusion on the beaches. Had the French used their mobile artillery and avail-

able ground forces as effectively, we would have encountered considerably more difficulty in approaching CASABLANCA.

French resistance as a whole was not nearly as determined as it could have been. This can be accounted for in part by the sur-

prise landing and partly by the fact that the desire of the French to fight the Americans was lacking. They fought because they had orders they were ready to join us,

to, but immediately upon surrender,

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5

'Appendix
2

#2

this report.

Chapter

#4 this report.

of Operations in North Africa, a report prepared of Staff, U,S, Army by Brigadier General Arthur R, for the Chief Wilson. Officer participated in the landings at Fedala as a member of General George Pattonts Staff, p 2. Operations in North African Waters, June 1942-1943, a book prepared by 'Capt. Samuel Elliott Morrison, Naval Reserve Historian,
4

3 Report

p 58.
5Wilson,
6

Op cit, p 3.

1bid, p 4.

Landings-in Morocco, prepared by the Tactics Department, The Armored School, Ft, Knox, Ky., in 1943, p 19, id,
9

7 U.S.

p

22.

'ilson,

Op cit, p 6.

10

Tbid, p"7.

Max R. Capt., C.O. Co B, 67th Armored Regiment. "Machinicke, Presently assigned The Armored School, Ft. Knox, Ky. Information obtained in interview.
12

Morrison,

Op cit, p 80.

1 3 1Wilson,

p

cit

p 8-9. Op cit, interview.

Capt., Machinicke, 15 Wilson,
Oaccit,

p 9.0 Jr., Commanding General

6ar

as I Knew It, George S. Patton, p

Landing in Morocco,
1 7 Wilson,

9.
?-t, p 11,

0

CHAPTER 6 TASK FORCE BLACKSTONE At about 2300 hours, Saturday, 7 November 1942, the convoy

carrying Task Force BLACKSTONE arrived off the NORTH WEST AFRICAN port of SAFI. The French garrison in SAFI was apparently not aware on

of the impending attack as the lighthouse in. the port was still at the time the convoy arrived. 0200 hours,

This light stayed on until about

Sunday, 8 November 1942.1 8 November 1942.2 In order to

H Hour was set at 0430 hours,

minimize losses should the anchored convoy be attacked by enemy submarines, Major General Ernest N. Harmon, the Task Force Commander,

had decided to embark the assault waves into their landing craft as early as possible, Consequently, the assault troops started to load 3 into landing craft at midnight. What was the mission that was to be performed by these troops? Task Force BLACKSTONE was actually given three separate missions. Its first task was to seize a beachhead at the port of SAFI secondly, the Task

and to secure the port for future operations;

Force was to drive north and secure a crossing over the OUM ER RBIA RIVER, and, lastly, they were to assist in the reduction of the city

of CASABLANCA by attacking it

from the south. 4

To carry out this mission, General Harmon divided the operation into three specific phases, The first phase was the landing

itself.

It

included the initial

landing of the assault troops and

a drive inland to a radial depth of 5000 yards from the beaches. Once the troops had gained the initial toe hold of 5000 yards, they

were to continue to drive inland until a beachhead of 10,000 yards had been established, operation. This was called the beachhead phase of the

The third phase of the operation was known as the future operations that followed

operations phase and was to encompass all

the establishment of the 10,000 yard beachhead.5 The troops available for the accomplishment of this mission consisted of one regiment of infantry, the 47th from the 9th Infantry Division, a force designated as the 2d Armored Division Landing Team and the sea train (the supply ship USS LAKEHURST) which carried There were

additional heavy elements of the 2d Armored Division.

also several additional units, or attachments, to the above forces which brought the overall strength of the Task Force up to 327 Officers and 6,091 Enlisted Men. of all types. The Task Force had a total of 779 vehicles

7

For the landing phase of the operation four beaches had been selected. (See Figures 6 and 7); These beaches were designated which

as RED BEACH,

just north of the port, BLUE and GREEN BEACHES, and

vere within the port area, south of the port.

ELLOU BEACH, which was eight miles the largest

All of these beaches were very small,

being only 300 yards wide. To get a complete picture of the operation it is necessary

to examine the landing plans and missions of the various parts of

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the Task Force., initial

As one would expect in

an amphibious

operation, the

landings were to be made by the infantry elements assigned However, some light tanks were attached to the infan-

to the command,

try to be landed with the assault waves. For the assault landings the 47th Infantry Regiment was organized into three battalion landing teams. as the ist Battalion Landing Team (1st BLT), These teams were designated the 2d Battalion Landing Further,

Team (2d BLT),

and the 3d Battalion Landing Team (3d BLT).

two companies from the 3d Battalion were to be landed directly frcm two destroyers onto the docks of SAFI within minutes of the time that the assault troops crossed the beaches. Companies K and L, from the

3d Battalion, were assigned the mission of landing on the SAFI docks. Company K, on the destroyer USS BERNADOU, was to enter the harbor of SAFI and debark at about H

/ 15 minutes.

The mission of

this company was to proceed south, avoiding the NATIVE CITY, and to capture, or destroy, the anti-aircraft battery located at the OLD They were then to continue on and capture the Company K was further charged with the

PORTUGUESE FORT. BARRACKS.

° (See Figure 6).

task of preventing a French battery, which was supposed to be 3000 yards south of SAFI, from moving to the north or east. As a final requirement, (See Figure 8).

this company was also to establish and defend Tank elements of

road blocks to the south and southeast of SAFI.

the Ist BLT were to give all assistance possible to this company. Company L, on the destroyer USS COLE, was to enter the harbor of SAFI and debark at about H / 30 minutes. to seize the harbor installations, After debarking it was

locate and destroy any enemy within

89

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the port area and prevent the burning or destruction of the docks and the various dock facilities. It is interesting to note that stocks

this company was also given the mission of seizing any and all of gasoline that might be within the port area. The ist 10

BLT with an attached platoon of light tanks (from

the 70th Light Tank Battalion) was to land on RED and BLUE BEACHES at

H Hour.

(0430,

Sunday,

8 Nov 42).. Immediately after landing they

were to capture or destroy, the 75mm gun emplacements east of RED BEACH. (See Figure 8). They were also to secure the high ground

overlooking the beaches and then to continue their attack inland until the beachhead was extended to a radial depth of 10,000 yards. The 2d BLT with an attached platoon of light tanks 70th Light Tank Battalion) was to land on YELLO establish a beachhead, of SAFI. (from the

BEACH at H Hour, the capture

and then move north to assist in

(See Figure 9).

They were to leave sufficient force at elements of the 2d

YELLOW BEACH to cover the landing of the initial Armored Landing Team.
12

The 3d BLT (-Co's L & K) was to relmain afloat as the regimental reserve. No plans were made for its initial commitment.
13

The armored elements of the Task Force were designated as the Task Force reserve. Landing Team in The general plan was to land the 2d Armored being unloaded with

the area that would permit its Therefore,

the greatest rapidity.14

this landing team was ordered Regardless of

to be prepared to land at SAFI or at YELLOW BEACH. where they landed they were to assist in

the capture of SAFI.15

P2.
Tw

SAFr

(QdditionctI)

MP11-JLE:

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To

YELL~O

The decision as to where and when they would land was to be made by the Commanding General of the Task Force.. The sea train was to land on orders from Task Force Headquarters;, It was planned to unload all vehicles and personnel on

board the sea train at dock side in SAFE.. necessitated by the fact that all

16

Such planning was

of the medium tanks of the Task

Force were on this ship and the landing craft available at the time could not handle these heavy vehicles., It should be noted at this time that there was some hope

that the landings at SAFI would be unopposed by the French. sequently, all

17

Con-

troops were enjoined not to open fire until such 18 time as resistance was met. Bases on this hope of no opposition, plans were made to land all the initial assault waves, All landings in elements of the Task Force, on the docks of SAFI, other than

the SAFI area were to be covered by the The Gunnery Officers of

fires from two destroyers and one cruiser.

the ships concerned were to prepare fire plans to cover all known French batteries and other installations within the SAFI area. Furthermore, shore fire control parties were to go ashore with the

assault waves to direct naval gunfire on targets of opportunity. As with the assaulting troops, unless the French fired first, l naval gunfire would not be opened
1 9

Air support for the landings was also to be provided by the Navy, The primary mission of the Naval Air Arm was to protect the Beginning at daylight on D Day

convoy and to gain air -superiority.,

(.0659 hours) the air was to perform secondary missions of observing
naval gunfire and reconnaissance. They were to pay particular at-

tention to the movement of French reserves fromM tiOGADOR, MAZAGAN and MARRAKECK 20 (See Figure 9).

As formerly stated, there was a hope that the French would not oppose the landings and that all hold their fire until fired upon4 concerned had been ordered to This order must have caused the

commanders of the various units much concern, especially after studying the intelligence reports on the strengths and locations of the French garrisons in the area. As of 8 September 1942 the

French were reported to have one light tank battalion and one infantry battalion (one company) in SAFI. Reserves, within supporting dis-

tance, consisted of two armored groups,

five infantry battalions,

three cavalry battalions, two light artillery battalions and supporting air craft. The bulk of these reserves were located at MARRAKECH, 21 about 97 miles from SAFI. (See Figures 8 and 9). The reader will remember that the assault troops started loading into their landing craft at about midnight, and that H Hour was set for 0430 hours, same period it doing. At 0320 hours the Commander of the French garrison in SAFI received the message, "Danger", from "Marine au Maroe." At 0340 8 November. 7-8 November, During this

might be well to see what the French in SAFI were

hours a second message was received from the "Chief of Staff" which stated, "Alert for the Division of MARRAKECH.." At 0350 hours a third

92

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2M~oOccan

1I BLT, 4-17 th

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Forces O
as of

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FORCEDBLACKS WIVE
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(+IC4)

Agadir
4

5CAIL E I:-z,o000q 00°°

alert message was received, this one coining from the Naval Head-

quarters

at CASABLANCA.

Very shortly after receiving the first

alert

Commander Deuve, the garrison commander, alerted his command for the defense of SAFI. the garrison in action. Using the time of the first alert we find that

SAFI had one hour and ten minutes to prepare for

At
on board,

042$ hours the USS BERNADOU, with Company K, sailed into SAFI harbor.

47th Infantry,

As the EERNADOU entered the har-

bor the French opened fire. just off the PETITE JETTEE. that she was aground, J RVIBE, fires in

At 0430 hours the BERN1ADOU ran aground (See Figure 1). In spite of the fact

the BERT.NADOU,

supported by the destroyer USS

returned the French fire and within six. minutes the French the area were silenced or at least ceased. 23 For the men

of Task Force BLACKST01 the war was on--the landing was to be opposed. Although the BERDTADOU was grounded it disembark the infantrymen on board. all was still possible to

However, due to the fact that took nearly an

troops had to go down a single landing net it

hour to complete the disembarkation,

In the mean time the USS COLE,

with Company L, 47th Infantry, on board, steamed into the harbor at

0500 hours and berthed at the PHOSPHAVE DOCK.

The infantry dis-

embarked immediately and took over their 'duties of guarding the port area, 24 By about 0530 hours Company K was completely ashore and they were moving out to accomplish their mission.

While the BERN ADOU and the COLE were discharging their passengers, as it were, an artillery duel took place between the French

battery of 130mm guns at POINTE de la TOUR and the battleship USS IVEW YORK. The French opened fire to seaward at 0440 hours and were YORK. The first salvo fired The

immediately taken under fire by the NE

by the battleship destroyed the French fire direction center. battery continued in until it action, though its

fire was now very inaccurate,. At this time, due to the

had fired about one hundred rounds.

improved accuracy of the guns of the NEW YORK, to abandon their positions. 2 The first
5

the French gunners had

assault wave,

consisting of elements of the 1st

BLT and the platoon of light tanks which were attached to the 1st BLT, hit BLUE and GREEN BEACHES at 0530 hours. The tanks were

landed on GREEN BEACH which turned out to be quite a blessing to the riflemen of Company K. started out on its The reader will recall that Company K had As the tail of the

mission at about 0530 hours.

Company cleared the PETITE JETTEE, BEACH, it tachment,. became involved in

which was at the head of GREEN

a fire fight with a small French de-

As a result of this fight one Frenchman. was killed and The rest of the detachment surrendered. At

three were wounded.

this time an Arab bystander volunteered to point out the location of a house which contained some fifty French troops. On the strength

of this information two light tanks were ordered to attack the house.. -26 they did and the French defenders beat a hasty retreat. This As dawn broke the advancing troops came under French machine gun and rifle fire and the attack started to bog down, 94 This was

largely due to the fact that this Wai Ameritans.

the first action for the

This lack of aggressiveness is well illustrated by an

account of a small unit action as reported by the French garrison Commander, The ensemble called generally "Front de Mer" includes the house serving as barracks for the sailors, situated to the left of the coastal route to MAZAGAN and, immediately on the other side of the road, a lookout post and two pieces of 75s without even any protection on them. Around these pieces were several, pits for automatic arms (2 machine-guns, 2 automatic rifles). Shortly before 0600, having been warned that the enemy was I had the pieces disarmed and stationed the climbing the cliff, men for the coming defense. About 0600, I heard English spoken all around the immediate vicinity of the position. About 0640, the crew of the northeast machine-gun was encircled and captured by surprise along with the men nearby. Because of the response from the rest of the personnel (6 or 7 men), the enemy did not follow up his gain. 2 7 At 0740 hours landing craft ferrying troops ashore were taken under fire by the two French 75mm guns located in the vicinity of the OLD PORTUGUESE FORT. (See Figure 8). These guns were not

taken under fire by the Navy presumably because Company K was supposed to capture or destroy them, For some reason this company had

28
not reached the FORT as yet. It will be remembered that the 2d Armored Division Landing Team, along with the sea train, had been held in Task Force reserve. Further, that Brigadier General Gaffey, who was commanding Combat Command B, 2d Armored Division, had-been ordered to prepare plans for the employment of the 2d Armored Landing Team either at SAFI or at YELLN BEACH. Since the landing was going so well at SAFI,

General Harmon decided to land the 2d Armored Landing Team at SAFI

95

rather than at YELLOW BEACH. and the first Day.

Consequently, they were ordered ashore

wave went across GREEN BEACH at about 0900 hours,; D

As the tanks of the 2d Armored were coming ashore, the French within SAFI were still putting up a stubborn, but spotty, resistance. the men with they were

According to Commander Deuve, located at FRONT de MER, him at 0900 hours were nearly out of ammunition.. determined to hold out, MARRAKECH 29

However,

hoping that relief would arrive from

Down near the OLD PORTUGUESE FORT the 75mm guns that had fired on our assault boats at 0740 hours resumed their fire at 0910 hours. Again they directed their fire on the landing craft. This A

time, however, the fire was returned by the Naval boat crews.

short time later these two guns were picked up by a naval air observer who directed such accurate naval gunfire on them that the French gunners were forced to abandon the position. To insure that these guns were out of action some of the first 2d Armored tanks ashore were ordered to the vicinity of the Other tanks were ordered to in-

OLD PORTUGUESE FORT to investigate.

vestigate the condition of the 130mm battery at POINTE de la TOUR. At both places the tankers found that naval gunfire had done its work--the positions were abandoned. Due to many delays in
30

lowering and loading their assault

boats the 2d BLT failed to land at the first

YELLW

BEACH at H Hour.

In fact,

wave of the 2d BLT didn t t arrive on the beach until 0943

hours.

(H Hour was at 0430 hours), however,

The landing of the 2d BLT was

unopposed,
hours.31

and the entire landing team was ashore by 1015

31

Back in the town of SAFI the assault troops,

by-passing

small islands of French resistance, had pushed on inland and by 1000 hours had established their initial beachhead of 5000 yards., Ac-

cording to plan they continued their drive on toward their final objective of a 10,000 yard beachhead. The 3d BLT, less Companies L and K, was ordered ashore and given the mission of aiding Company K in the capture of the BARRACKS in the south portion of the town. (See Figures 6 and 8). The bat-

talion landed at 1009 hours and, after assembling, moved out to accomplish its mission. (Note: At this time the 3d BLT consisted of

Company I, a rifle company, and Company M, a heavy weapons company.) As the 3d BLT neared its objective Company I was ordered to attack. the BARRACKS from the north. Company K was already besieging the

BARRACKS from the south, their attack having been stopped by French fire. As ordered., Company I launched its attack but was pinned down

almost at once.

Apparently the attack of this company was not too According to Major

well coordinated with the actions of Company K,

James Y. Adams, an official observer with the Task Force, Company I was stopped by, 'overs from K Company firing from house tops directly across the Barracks." 32 During the course of this battle at the BARPLRCKS, Company K captured a French light tank which was promptly turned into a pillbox

and used against the French. this French tank fell

(It

is

interesting to note just how The driver of the vehicle,.

into our hands.

for reasons unknown, ran into a wall and was knocked unconscious. The remainder of the crew then abandoned the vehicle.) In addition

to this captured French tank one American light tank also took part in this battle, The mortars of Company M went into position at 1440 hours to give additional fire support to the attacking companies. Mortar

fire turned out to be the straw that broke the camel's back, as the thirty-one French defenders of the BARRACKS surrendered at 1500 hours.

33
While the battle at the BARRACKS was taking place the sea

'

train, with the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment on board, sailed into the harbor and berthed at the PHOSPHATE DOCK at 1400 hoursAt about the same time the USS TITANIA, with the remainder of the 2d Armored Landing Team on board, also berthed at the PHOSPHATE DOCK. Both ships started to discharge their cargo of tanks almost immediately. As the armored vehicles were unloaded they were sent to

an assembly area in the vicinity of HORSESHOE HILL (See Figure 7) in the northeastern part of the town,3 4 The unloading of these two ships was not without its problems. On the LAKEHUPST., which carried the sea train elements of the 2d Armored, a winch jammed while lowering a tank to the dock. As it took

approximately fiv4 hours to repair this winch the unloading was slowed down considerably.
''

On the TITANIA it was a broken winch cable that

delayed unloading for some seven hours 35
98

All through the landing operations communications between the units ashore and the Task Force Headquarters on the USS HARRIS were practically non-existant. Therefore, General Harmon moved his

Headquarters into SAFI at 1530 hours and established his command post in the dock area. in Upon landing the General noticed that the the area were generally lacking in initia-

assault troops still tive in in

that they were doing nothing about the many snipers still He accordingly took steps to correct this situation. in some instances, tanks were dispatched to wipe

the town.

Motor patrols and,

out the remaining small pockets of resistance within the town.36 Shortly after BLACKSTONE Headquarters landed a lone French twin-engine bomber flew over the port area. This plane did not

attack the port area and was probably on a reconnaissance mission. The plane was forced down by anti-aircraft fire from the USS BERNADOU and the USS COLE. on D Day. By 1600 hours the 1st BLT had secured its final objective, the 10,000 yard beachhead. landed at SYLLOW BEACH, At 1800 hours the 2d BLT, which had This was the only French plane seen in the air

joined the 1st BLT and took over the southern (The 2d BLT started its northern

sector of the beachhead line. movement on SAFI at 1153 hours.

During their march from the beach
7

to the town they encountered no resistance of any sort.) 3 Just prior to dark, on D Day,

the Navy reported that their

reconnaissance planes had observed no movement by French reserves

from MARRAKECH,

M11iADOR or MVIAZAGAN.

They did report the fact that

there were forty French aircraft on the airfield at MARRA1CH. As night approached, the elements of the 2d Armored,, then ashore, were ordered to move to the vicinity of BOJ GUEDRA.,. twelve Here they were to establish

miles east on the SAFI-MARRAKECH highway.

a security screen to protect the beachhead from any French threat that might develop during the night. At 1800 hours, D Day, General Harmon sent the following message to Admiral Davidson who was in carried Task Force BLACKSTOB3E: SAFI garrison consisted of two batteries Second Foreign Legion Infantry; two companies Second Foreign Legion Infantry; one battery of three 155mm guns (mobile) destroyed by tanks; one battery of four 130mm Naval guns destroyed by Naval Gunfire; one battery of 75mm guns motor drawn captured; two companies of Second Moroccan Infantry and detachments 41st group transmissions radio captured; one platoon of three Renault tanks type FT captured. French reinforcements from MARRAKECH long overdue. Town not fully taken . .as sniping continues. 3 -, and (a) below. During the night of beachhead front. command of the Naval convoy that

8-9

November all was quiet along the

Unloading in SAFI continued although an observer

with the Task Force reported that the unloading accomplished after dark was rather "sporadic," Thc same observer went on to state that

(a) The troops listed in this message do not completely agree with the report made by Commander Deuve who commanded the' SAFI garrison. (See Report of Operations, SAFI, French Morocco, $, 9, 10 Nov 42 (TAS files, doc. No. USA 157)). Commander Deuve 104th Co., 2d Regt. reported that he had the following force: Tirailleurs; Moroccins; 5th Co., 2d Regt. Tirailleurs., Moroccins; one Battery,, 75mm Portee (Foreign Legion); one Battery, 155mm one GPF; one Pltt of FT tanks; one Flat. 75mm guns (Navy); Battery, 130mm guns (Navy); D. A. T. de SAFI (Aerial Defense of the Territory of Safi). Approximate strength of the command-450 personnel. 100

the unloading generally: ... seemed haphazard and utterly confused; the plan made prior to landing could not be fitted to actual condions, and. coupled with a lack of service troops to implement any plan, resulted in chaotic conditions on beaches and docks where supplies and equipment were piled hi h without regard to segregation in dumps or safe-keeping... . 9 The morning of Monday, 9 November 1942, was cloudy with a light rain falling. In spite of the unfavorable weather, a lone

French bomber flew out of the clouds at 0650 hours and attacked the port area. Two bombs and a few incendiaries were dropped before The damage done by this attack was rela-

the plane was shot down. tively light.

The remainder of the morning was quiet. within the area was the unloading of the various

The main activity ships in the port,

Emphasis was placed on the unloading of the armored vehicles from the sea train and the TITANIA. At 1350 hours, Naval air reconnaissance reported that some

fifty French trucks had been spotted moving toward SAFI on the main SAFI-MARRAKECH highway. General Harmon immediately ordered General

40
Gaffey to oppose this force with Combat Command B of the 2d Armored. The Naval air arm was also ordered to attack this column. At 1400 hours this column was bombed and strafed from the air. However, due to the dispersion of the vehicles in the column

the attack was not too successful, A short time later, at 1413 hours, out of SAFI to intercept the French. Combat Command B moved

The light tanks of the 2d

101

Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment were placed in

the lead while the

medium tanks of the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment were held back in Combat Command reserve,

41

Contact with the French was made at 1700 hours just west of EL TLETA (See Figure 9) where a- small enemy force was defending a bridge. Lieutenant Colonel Stokes, with six light tanks, launched

an attack against the defenders of the bridge who quickly surrendered. Fortunately they did not destroy the bridge. The 2d Battalion con-

tinued on into EL TLETA which they found to be lightly defended. EL TLETA was quic]ly cleared of all enemy just prior to dark. The

remainder of the French force withdrew to the foothills of the ATLAS

42
MOUNTAINS to establish a defensive position. approximately twenty-five miles east of SAFI. These positions were

Early on the morning of D / 2 (Tuesday,
defensive positions in

10 Nov 42) the French
LGUNTAINS were at-

the foothills of the ATLAS

tacked by Naval air.
67th Armored Regiment, of EL ,12A,

Shortly after the air attack the 2d Battalion,
attempted to move east into the hills outside by heavy fire from an

This attack was stopped, however,

estimated battalion of French 75mm guns.

The tanks then withdrew

back into EL TLETA.

In preparation for a second attack elements of

the 14th and 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalions fired some 306
rounds of 105mm ammunition into the the French positions. Although

this fire caused the French batteries to cease firing temporarily it did not knock them out nor did it cause them to withdraw from

their positions.

43

It

is

presumed that this failure to drive off

102

or destroy the French artillery accounts for the fact that no new attack was launched against these positions. Returning to the activities in the port of SAFI, moment, it should be noted that all for a

of the vehicles of the 2d Armored

4 Division were finally unloaded from the sea train by 1700 hours.

By 1800 hours all ashore.

combat elements of the 2d Armored Division were

At this time General Harmon,

mwho had had no word from General
decided to move the armor (The 47th Infantry RegiConsequently, early

Patton since the beginning of the operation, north against MAZAGAN and then CASABLI NCA. ment was to be left in

to defend the por-C of SAFI.)

the evening of Tuesday, 10 November 1942, General Harmon issued

an oral order to General Gaffey to march on MAZAGAN as soon as posb-"' sible. At 1900 hours, with the 2d Battalion leading, (See Figure 10). the Combat

Command began its

march to MAZAGAN.

General Harmon had determined that the capture of iMAZAGAN was of utmost importance. p If BLANCA from the south it he was going to have to attack CASA-

was absolutely necessary that he establish This was primarily

a supply base as close to that town as possible.

due to the fact that there was an acute shortage of trucks and that it was not possible to carry sufficient supplies with the column Further, the

to support operations all the way to CASABLANCA.

distance from IMAZAGAN to CASABLANCA was only about forty miles and what few trucks there were could be used to haul more supplies over that relatively short distance than they could if all the way to SAFI and back. they had to travel

103

To establish his base of supplies at MAZAGAN,

which had a

small port, General Harmon decided to use two destroyers as supply ships. One destroyer was loaded with some 300 tons of POL, rations

and water.. The second destroyer was loaded with 300 tons of ammunitions, water and other supplies. These floating supply dumps were to

parallel the march of the Combat Command and were to enter the MAZAGAN port as soon as that city had been captured.4
5

General Harmonts decision to disengage Combat Command B and move north was a risky one.. The overall situation was obscure to

say the least.- His forces were currently in contact with the French some 25 miles east of SAFI and there were additional French forces at MOGADOR and to defend SAFI.

MR

AKRCH that could be moved against the force left

As General Harmon has stated:

... It was a risky thing to leave the port and march out into the great unknown, However, I felt that Colonel Randle could hold the beachhead with his regiment of infantry backed by the gunpower of the naval warships in the harbor and at worst could fight his way to shore and get back on the ships.. So we went right ahead with the original plan, not knowing the fate of the forces to the north. The march on NIAZAGAN during the night of 10-11 November was made without serious incident. At 0430 hours, Wednesday, 11 November,

the advanced elements of Combat Command B reached the outskirts of the town. (See Figure 10). Rather than attempt a night attack on

the town the column was held up and plans were made for a coordinated tank-infantry attack to be made at daybreak--about 0630 hours. 47 As the units to participate in the attack were moving out to their attack positions General Harmon received an urgent message

104

8L,qCKS TONE (- 47IvF) MOVES To ASSEMBLY AREA 0800, // NOV

EJLEMENfTS
E/Z 8RibG6E A T 0620) fl/NoV (3d 5k?.I 67 Arin'd Re .) To

i
r-,QAzq E1'M OW R

fr70vas 7ro AIAZAG AN O63o A~INOV. 42 '

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I/VsN(- 4

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EST y74
CoMMENCILT.T 8 NHOL.4 'NGS

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/80,8 No
180

80

OVE'RLAY

5.:
-

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_SCALE

MAP --NkZAPQCA

32

(Fr °om

&-Q, BLACrS ro1VE for 00"iout 072400 0 Nv)

6-3 19P-

//073

GARRI9SON

CC"B"

OPPOSE'S MA9RRAAECH

q'-1o

NOV. 1~942

M ARRAI (E

Cl-f\\

/0

fron General Patton.

The message was a day old and it

ordered him

to be prepared to attack CASABLANCA from the south at 1100 hours, 11 November.$ General Harmon now had to act and act fast. He had

four and a half hours to capture OUM ER RBIA RIVER at AZE Mv!OUR

MAZAGAN,

secure a crossing over the

resupply his command, move forty

miles to CASABLANCA and launch an attack on that town. Since speed was now vitally important the 3d Battalion of the 67th Armored Regiment, which was the Combat Command reserve, was immediately ordered to by-pass MAZAGAN and to move on AZEMOR.. The mission of the battalion was to seize a crossing over the OUM ER RBIA RIVER and to hold it arrived. This action had no sooner been initiated when a second message was received from General Patton stating that there would be an armistice and that all attacks were to be stopped at once. vital. As General Harmon puts it, Again time was until the rest of the Combat Command

iTkt this moment oar tanks had just

started to move up a gentle slope to attack the town. myself got into our vehicles and whizzed

The staff and

in all

directions trying to

stop the attack before any further killing was done." 50 Very shortlyr after the attack on MAZAGAN was halted the garrison in the town surrendered without firing a shot, 0745 hours. Fifteen minutes later, at 0800 hours, This was at the

11 November,

armistice was declared for Task Force BLACKS TONE.

Thus ended the fighting in FRENCH MOROCCO

105

In closing the book on the landings at SAFI it

is

interesting

to note a quotation from a document prepared by the Headquarters of the 2d Armored Division shortly after the conclusion of the FRENCH MOROCCAN operations. The key to success in landing operations is speed and surprise*...From a study of the French report of the operation, it is evident throughout that the speed and surprise of the attack prevented the employment of certain well organized defensive measures which would otherwise have exacted a severe toll of lives, although it would not have prevented the eventual capture of the port: Armored elements should be landed in a port. The landing of armored elements in small boats on open beaches is impractical and unsound, although the presence of armored elements has a The impractitremendous effect on the success of the operation. cability on landing on open beaches was clearly indicated. Infantry, well supported by mortars and very light artillery, should secure the beachheads,... 5 1 Certainly speed and surprise are essential to the success of any landing made on a hostile shore. Further, the bulk of the troops

making the assault landing will, of necessity, have to be infantrymen. However, the statement that the, "landing of armored elements...on is open to debate; The

open beaches is report itself

impractical and unsound,,,,"

states that,

"the presence of armored elements has a If armored ele-

tremendous effect on the success of the operation."

ments have a tremendous effect on the success of the operation then their use can hardly be considered unsound. In fact, it seems that

every effort should be made to reinforce the assaulting infantry units with some tank elements just as the Ist and 2d BLT's of the 47th

Infantry were reinforced by a platoon of light tanks each. The landings at SAFI were not the only landings made by the 2d Armored Division in the invasion of NORTH AFRICA. 106 On D Day,

8 November 1942, other elements of the division were taking part in
the operations at PORT LAYAUTEY.

NOTES FOR CHiAPTER
1

6

n ublished manuscri t written bZ

Major

General Ernest

N. Harmon. p 9.
2 3

Field Order No. 1, Hq., Harmon, Op cit, p Opcit,

Blackstone,

dtd. 9 Oct 42, p 1,

9.
1, p 1.

Blackstone Field Order No.

5
6

Thid, p 1. Observers Report on Landing Operations of Task Force ov 8-13 Incl.., byMlvlajor James Y. Adams, p 1.

Blackstone?
7

Mlemorandm, Hg., Task Force ""A, Room 2405, Munitions. Building, Washington D. C., dtd. 22 Oct 42, p 5.

8Field Order No. 1, Hq., Blackstone, dtd. 9 Oct 42, p 1
and Revised Field Order No, 1, dtd. li Oct 42, p 1,

9
Op cit, Blackstone Field Order
10

No.

1, p 2.

Ibid,

p 2.

11

1bid, p 3. p3. 1, p 3, dtd.

12 Ibid.

13,city Blackstone Revised Field Order No. General Instructions to Troops, 29 Oct 42, p 2.
15 1

Hq,,

Blackstone,

0p cit, Blackstone Field Order No.
1p

1, p

3.

ci

Blackstone General Instructions to Troops, p 2,

107

III, p

9.

17Op

c it,

Observers Report,

by-Major J: Y. Adams.,

Appendix

'S~pcitBlackstone

Field _Order No: 1; p 3.

' 9 AnneX.No. 3 to Field Order No. 1, Hq., Blackstone, dtd. 9 Oct 42, p 1. 20 Annex No.. 2 to Field, Order No. I, RIq., Blackstone, dtd. 9 Oct 42, .:i

2AnxNo. 1 to Field Order No. 1,Hq , Blackstone, dtd. 4
9 Oct 42, pp 1, 2.

Report, of Operations, SAFI, French Morocco 8, 9 10 Nov 42, by the Commander of the French garrison, Comrnander Deuve, p 2.
23., ad nMrco

2

(Tactical 12.

Dept.,

The Armored

School, Fort Knox,Kentuky7
24 0pct

Observers Report, Major J., Y. Adams, pp 1,2.

25bid, p 2.
2 6 Ibd

p 2. Report of Operations, Commander Deuve, p 3. pp 2, 5:

270p
Opct

Observers Report, Major J. Y. Adams,

z9 ct
3 0 Final

Report of Operations, Commander Deuve,

p 3:

11073OZ,_1942,
31

Report on Operations Blackstone for period 072400CZq. Blackstone, dtd. 2$ ov 4 .p.3.

Ibid, p 3.
320p Observers Report, Major _J. Y. Adams,. p 2.

331idpp 2, 30 3O ctFinal
3 5Harmon,

Report on Operations Blackstone, pp 13, 14.4

p 3,

Op ct

36U.
37

S. Landings in Morocco, pp 13, l4r

0p'cit, Final Report

on .Operations

Blackstone,

p 2.

Op cit,
39

U. S:.. Landings in Morocco, p 14.

0p

cit, Observers Report,, Major J. Y. Adams,. p 6.

0p cit, Final Report on Operations
4 1

Blackstone, pp 4, 5.

Lt. Col. Briand P. Johnson, History 67th Armored Regiment (Brunswick, Germany: Georg Westermann) pp 171,. 231..
42 43

0

it, Observers Report, Op cit,p 171.

Major J. Y., Adams,

p 4.

Johnson,

Op cit, Final Report on Operations Blackstone,

p

3.

450pit, Observers Report, Major J, Y. Adams, p 4. 4666 Harmon, Op cit, p
47
4

1$.

Op cit, Final Report on Operations Blackstone, p 4.
p

$Ibid,

4.

49

Ibid,

P 4.
cit, p
19,

50
51

Harmon, Op

APO 252,

Lessons from Operations Torch, Hq, 2d Armored Division, dtd 26 Dec 42, p 2..

109

CHAPTER 7
LANDINGS AT MEI-DIA-PORT LYAUTEY 8-11 NOVEBER 1942 The forces which landed at MEHDIA-PORT LYAUTEY were commanded

by

Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott Jr.

(then Brigadier

General). (Task Group

The commander of the naval forces,.Northern Attack Group

34.8), was Rear Admiral Monroe

Kelly.

1

This force had

parted company from the main convoy at 071600 November and proceeded to the transport area seven miles off the was late in arriving

WADI SEEOU.2

The convoy

'at the

transport area,
3

about 080030 November General Truscottt's

(Saturday) instead of 072300 as scheduled.

force, Sub-Task Force GOALPCST, was composed-of the 60th Infantry Regiment (Reinforced) Engineers; of the 9th Division; 1st Battalion 540th 2d Armored Division;

1st Battalion 66th Armored Regiment,

and special units, tanks.

a total of 9099 officers and men and 65 light eight transports and protected by Before considering

They were transported in

a battleship,

a cruiser, destroyers and carriers.

the plans and actual landing operations of GOALPCGT this report will review the intelligence picture as known to General Truscott, INTELLIGENCE Missions of $ub-Task Force GOAL'PST: ...Sub Task GOALPOST lands in the vicinity of the CUID SEBOU (80-49). Missions in order of priority: Capture and secure MEHDIA and the airdromue 3km NW of a. PORT LYAUTEY (KENITRA) to insure its use as a base for our planes not later than D Day. b. Capture and hold PORT LYAUTEY (KEITRA). c. Capture and secure the airdrome at SALE. 110

S d, Reconnoiter to E and NE to ga n contact with hostile forces in the area: (60 W Longitude, 35 N Latitude), EL KSAR-EL KBIR-MEKNES-FES-QUEZZANE to protect the North flank and to facilitate the subsequent advance of Task Force A to the East and Northeast .... Terrain and weather played a very large part in lation of the plan of operations. the formu-

The coast of FRENTCH MOROCCO in

the vicinity of WADI SEBOU presented almost unlimited beach sites with suitable gradient, fair exits and absence of obstacles such as reefs. Ridges, wooded with scrub pine, paralleled the ocean. The

exits from these beaches were sandy and difficult for wheeled vehicles, However, inside the SEBOU, there were two beaches suitable

for vehicles; one on the south bank near the coastal defense batteries, > and another further up the river adjacent to the airport.

7

The chief drawback to the coastal beaches was the poor weather with its resultant high surf which was normal for this time of year. fact the weather forecast called for only one or two calm days in this period. Therefore rapid landing on a broad front was indicated. (See Figure 11) were the WADI SEBU, and the lagoon. high In

Critical terrain features ground to its

north and south,

The WADI SEBOU wound

down by PORT LYAUTEY and the KENITRA Airfield enclosing the latter on three sides. On the fourth side was the high ground which extended The river was navigable by

between PORT LYAUTEY and the lagoon. small freighters; but as it

entered the sea between two jetties it

crossed a sand bar which had a depth of water of 191 feet maximum at high water and only 13 feet at low water level. Its banks, other

C

than at the two beaches mentioned above, were precipitous on the

111

ATLANTIC OCEAN
RED

F/IURE]]l
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PLANY
Sub-7skrfce

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.

north and swamoy on the south side,

Across the river,

inside the

jetties, was a boom which had to be breached before vessels could proceed up the river.

9

The lagoon was a formidable obstacle as it wooded, cliffs which merged into soft

was fringed with precipitous, sand rising from the beach. the WADI SEBOU,

Between the north end of the lagoon and was a ridge which on this ridge

a distance of about 1700 yards,

provided the shortest route to the airport.

However,

was situated the KASBA and a concentration of coast defense guns. The KASBA was an old masonry fort which had been built by the Portuguese centuries ago on the edge of a high cliff
10

above the river mouth,

about a mile inside the jetties.

The KASBA and the adjacent defen-

sive area had to be cleared before landing craft could enter the river to land tanks on BRO UN BEACH, port. and before we could advance on the air-

At the lower end of the lagoon the high precipitous ground from the beaches was broken by a neck of loti ground, apthrough which ran the coastal road which Southward from this neck of land

dividing it

proximately 175 yards wide,

here turned inward to PORT LYAUTEY.

the inland cliffs continued for from 5,000 to 7,000 yards although there were roads and trails crossing it at various points. It ap-

peared that a landing should also be made in

the vicinity of this

second avenue of approach and the troops advance astride the coastal 11 Howhighway and then turn North up the East side of the lagoon. ever, this approach would be so easy for the enemy to defend with a sma force that an additional beachhead should be established further to the South in this sector. A good beach was located eight miles South of

112

the river wv;.here it

appeared that exits could be found for vehicles

and enemy defenses would liihcly be weak.

North of the river there

were steep sand dunes and shale slopes leading inland some 1400 yards to a road parallel to the beach. or defenses in this area. There appeared to be no buildings

Inlahnd of the sand dunes there was an area

of rough high ground which cornhandcd the river ard the low ground on the Southern bank, incluiinrg the airport. terrain but it This was probably difficult

could be crossed by infantry and seemed to be of very

great tactical importance to the capture of the coast defense batteries and the airfield. It was clear that some troops should be order to support by fire our These troops should in-

landed to the North of the river in

forces who would be operating to the South.

clude detachments especially s olected for agility and as marksmen, 12 and should be equipped with pack howitzers and $1rm mortars. This high ground continued inland at an average height of 150 feet for approximately 4,000

yards

from the sand dunes; after which it

sloped

down to Highway 206, which crossed the

WADI

SEBU Northeast of PORT the vicinity;

LYAUTmY on the only bridge ever the SBBOU in Thrrmy situation.

The enemy garrison known to be in the

vicinity of PORT LYAUTEY consisted of a regiment of Tirailleurs Morrocains (Hq and three Battalions with twelve 25mm AT guns)j In

addition there was a four-gun 75mm battery of the Foreign Legion; a twelve-gun 75mm AA Group; a Battalion, and a Group of Engineers, and a Transport Company.13 Their known dispositions

were: 1

113

(1) (2)

Beach patrol

units

.Bridge guard NE of PORT LYAUTEY Coast defense garrison at MEDIA AA defense garrison West of KENITRA Airdrome

(3)

(4)
(5)

PORT LYAUTEY garrison, gcnerally in
ilitary Camp Area, PORT LYAUTEY

Reinforcements

could be expected from the folowing localities: SPAkISH MOROC CO Border IE ;PES (two regimental teams and one half

(1) (2)

battalion of tanks).

(3)

RABAT (one half battalion of tanks, about

45 tanks,

and 1,200 mechanized cavalry were reported in RABAT) These reinforcements MlKNES: could arrive at PORT LYAUTEY as follows: 'ToRegimental teams; D plus 4 One half battalion tanks; morning D plus 1 RABAT: One half battalion tanks and 1,200 mechanized cavalry; towards end of D Day It was unlikely that these reinforcements could arrive within 12 hours assault but it was important to be ready to meet them

of our initial with AT guns in

the South, and that a portion of our tanks had been

landed to meet that contingency. Probable courses of enemy action. courses of action were considered and it The various possible enemy was decided that it was ex-

tremely probable that the enemy would defend strongly the two bottleneck exits from the beaches at either end of the lagoon. This would

114

be followed by stiff

resistanc.

further inland with the main French Probable enemy

forces on the high ground just South of the airdrome,

dispositions on this premise were expected to be one infantry company in the area of the coast defense batteries; one infantry platoon at with the remaining one battalion,

the Southern end of the lagoon guarding the defile,

platoons of that company at centers of communication; less two companies, held in

the town of PORT LYAUTEY; and two complete

battalions deployed on the high ground which controls the airdrome from the Southwest.15 In addition to above, there were beach patrols,

a guard at the bridge Northeast of PORT LYAUTEY and perhaps a company North of the river. Our courses of action. There were two alternate plans, each Plan Ao

of which was capable of many variations, which we could adopt. x Land all

forces to the South; assemble them with supporting tanks and The advantages of

artillery and move out as a unit for the airdrome.

this plan were simplicity and landing away from the enemy defenses. The disadvantages were that even when completely assembled we would be approximately the same strength as the enemy. Further it would

take most of D Day to land and assemble and we would run the risk of weather deteriorating and preventing the landing of sufficient forces. Plan B. Land in a number of different areas as close as possible to Then attempt to capture the airfield by speed, surprise

our objective.

and exploiting success wherever achieved. were speed,

Advantages of this plan

surprise, elasticity and the best possible insurance

against deterioration of the weather preventing sufficient forces 115

from landing. risk, required

Its disadvantages were that it

entailed

a considerable

highly

trained troops,

was likely to got out of hand,

and comparative strengths were such that we could not be sure of numerical superiority at any one point. .. ,On balance it is considered that Plan B must be adopted since the weathcr is certarly as grave a danger as any opposition that can be encount, re" from the enemy. Further it is absolutely essential to takea advantage of fair weather in order to get supoly ships across the bar in readiness for arrival our aircraft. Accordingly, the plan has been based on B.... Considerations on use of tanks. The concepts of the use Reasons given

if

of tanks followed very closely present day doctrine.

for not planning to use them on the high ground East of the lagoon in the attack on the coastal defense area were: (1) 7 (2) The area

was

very restricted. that area

Concentration of coast defense guns in probably augmented by mobile field and would

AA

guns,

give

our tanks little

chance of success until by close range small

these guns had been engaged

arms and mortar fire including smoke. (3) Our tanks would be required elsewhere to protect the rear and flanks against enemy reinforcements, including arior, coining from the South. On the other hand, it was stated, our tanks would be invaluable to

support the final infantry assault following the intensive bombardment. "On balance, however, tanks should not be used unless it is

definitely found that our infantry cannot achieve their objective

116

without them."

1

7

Uncertainty of beach conditions required delay in

landing armor until the beachhead was established. OPERATIONAL PLAN Missions to subordinate units. The Battalion Combat Teams

(BCT) of the 60th Regimental Combat Team and supporting units were assigned missions in is accordance with Plan B above. Shown on Figure 11

ccmposition of BCTs,

landing beaches and schematic portrayal of mis, a brief description of those missions as give

sions.. in

Included below is

the Operation Order of Sub-Task Force GOALPOST. 3d BCT (less detachments)

18

land at 040OZ at Beaches RED and

RED 2 with one reinforced rifle company on each beach and execute missions in following priority: (1) (2) Seize initial beachhead.

Occupy high ground on North bank of river opposite i~HDIA and assist 2d BCT by fire.

(3)

Occupy high ground North of river overlooking the airdrome, destroying AA Battery in that position. Cooperate

Destroy by fire any planes on airdrome. with Raider Detachment.

(4)
(5)

Seize bridge over SEBCU NE of PORT LYAUTEY. Reconnoiter to the North and hold enemy North of line shown on Figure 11.

(6)

Assist in

capture of airdrome by crossing detachrubber boats.

ments over the river in

117

2d BCT, with Naval Demolition Party, land at 0400Z on GREEN BEACH and execute missions in (1) following priority:

Assault and capture coast defense batteries at

:,EHDIA

with about two companies.

If

assault is

impractical or fails, capture by assault after naval and air bombardment on call after 0615. (2) Locate obstruction across river. detachment. (3) (4) Seize initial beachhead. Protect demolition

Advance and capture high ground overlooking airdronme, prepared to join coordinated attack on air-

drome at 1100. 1st BCT land one reinforced rifle company each, at BLUE and YELLOW BEACHES at 0400Z, first established: (1) Advance rapidly NE, block Western exit from PORT LYAUTEY and be prepared to join in attack on airdrome at 1100. (2) Reconnoiter to SW or SE to line shown on Figure 11, and hold the enemy S and E of line shown. Raider Detachment, aboard a destroyer, was to proceed up coordinated Land remainder of BCT where beachhead is

the SEBOU as soon as possible after the coast batteries were silenced and the obstruction cleared. The destroyer would support by fire

the advance of the 2d BCT and then after landing the Raider Detachment at the airport support them by fire in the assault on the airport.

540th Engineers were to establish beach parties on GREEN,
BLUE, or YEL0. (as the situ ti-n indicated); furnish minih ijm troops

necessary to assist in retracting boats from RED BEAC

~; organize

shore parties on BROWNN BEI-C H as soon as situation permitted; establish

TV

enclosures in

vicinity of

LUE, GREEN and1 BRQNN BEACHES; assisted by

provide beaches.

for local defense of th e beach -:s,

AA

units on all

order of the Sub-Task Team, L-nd .,.3d Aroa-Led r; ir Force Commander begi_;n. ng about 0750 on beaches to be designated , Rzonnoiter without delay to the S to the (probably BROW), vicinity of RABAT-3kUL, Be proriared to protect the Sub-Task to Force agai:nst host:ile fore:s advanicing from the S or S, participate in the a tack to capture airdrome at PORT LYAUTEY: to capture airdrome in tue vicinity of R -BT-SALE and SIBI-YAHIA, and seize radio station at RAt1iBT-SALE., Reserve. be held out. reserve. As envisioned in Plan B, very little reserve could

oi

The'3d Armored Landing Team (aLT) was considered as a

There was also one reinforced company of 3d BCT ready to of

land on 30 minutes notice and a battaliion of the General Reserve Western Task Force earmarked for this Sub-Task Naval fire su2port.

Force.2 0

The plan was drawn up allocating fire

support of one battleship, one cruiser and three destroyers to the three BCTs with the provisions that one of these destroyers would it went to

follow the 3d Armored Landing Team down the coast if attack RABAT-SALE.

Shore Fire Control Parties (SFCP) were furnished Also air spotters were to be available to Fifteen concentrations were

by the Navy to each BCT,

control the fire of the naval ships.

planned, chiefly on the coast defense batteries and SVI of the airdrome, whoere the greatest resistance was expected. Certain limitations

119

were placed on the naval gunfire support by General Truscott. "He, unfortunately had strong doubts (to some extent justified by of the accuracy of naval gunfire on shore The Fire Support Groups (battleship, cruiser

earlier performances) objectives; . . . 21

and destroyers)

could fire on any enemy batteries firing seaward but Destroyers 22 All

for not more than three minutes without checking fire.

only could fire at any enemy gun firing on approaching boats..

other fires were to be on call from the SFCP or plane spotters on targets of opportunity. Air Support. support. dictate. Force in Naval aviation was to provide the initial air

Its missions were somewhat the same as doctrine today would Initial missions included assisting the center Sub-Task the vicinity of CASABLANCA and protecting the carriers and Support missions provided for isolation of the battlemissions. Provision was also made for missions. These

transports.

field on return from initial

close support missions after return from initial included:

... Attack coast defense batteries at MEHDIA by dive bombing after 0615; attack ammunition dump and AA defense in vicinity of the airdrome; attack by dive bombers and fighters, enemy troops that may impede the advance toward objective.... Army aviation, composed of the 33rd Fighter Group was to be prepared to fly from the carrier on order of Sub-Task Force, airdrome was captured or required by tactical situation. when Its mis-

sions were to destroy hostile planes on the ground or in the air; provide fighter cover for elements of the Sub-Task Force; or execute

120

any of the close support missions assigned naval aviation above. The naval planes consisted of 9 TBFs, 9 SBDs and 12 Fy F-4s aboard

the SANGAIAON while the army planes of the 33rd Group consisted of 77 P-40s aboard the C-FNANGO aviation gasoline and bombs. this ship. When its The CONTESSA contained a cargo of An interesting story is at NENPORT told about that she was

crew discovered,

hNEWS,

to carry such a lethal cargo they jumped ship. Liaison Officer, and got them.

Mr. Leslie, Naval

asked for volunteers from the NORFOLK naval prison, by this time, had missed the convoy so on the 8th of November,

The CONTESSA,

she crossed the ATLANTIC unescorted and made it Logistics. Planning for initial

logistic support was con-

ditioned by the danger of weather preventing continued landings; hence each individual and vehicle in the assault waves was to take with him Detailed plans

sufficient supplies for operation for several days. are covered in subsequent paragraphs. Supplies to be carried ashore included:

1 1/3 rations on

each individual; 2 1/2 rations on each vehicle; 2 1/2 units of fire of ammunition; 90%o full gasoline tanks on all vehicles plus two 5gallon cans per vehicle; two filled canteens of water per individual and two 5-gallon water cans in each boat.26 It was planned to load

additional supplies in each landing boat and as the infantry went ashore they were to take the supplies up on the beach and drop them. These supplies would then be picked up by engineer shore parties and put in dumps.27

121

Evacuation plans covered casualties, burial, salvage, captured material, and Prisoners of

War

Casualties were to be evac-

uated by Army medical personnel to the beaches and from beaches to ships by Naval personnel in empty landing craft. A clearing staThe

tion was to be estabished in dead

the woods North of the lagoon.

were

to be buried by organizations with graves registration by the Chaplains, Salvage was to be for Captured material such

details headed initially

unit use and general salvage to BCT dumps.

as boats and railroad ec u -pr ent nias to be used to influence the situation, and if to be turned in GyENI, BLUE, riot necr ssary, evacuated to BCT dumps.

Ris were

to PFvI enclosures established by 540th Engineers on

and ERG~N BGI2ACS.

Traffic plans dealt maily

with

emphasizing the necessity to maximum

for using the small number of ve.-dcles .landed initially extent to transport amunition

forwiard and casualties to the rear.

Guards were to be posted to limit forward advance of vehicles. Blackout lights only were

to

be used.

M14ainatenance of roads to

assault battalions was the responsibility of attached engineer platoons and organic pioneer sections. The boat employment plan, due to shortage of landing craft, required the pooling of landing boats frn all transports to land This plan

the assault waves from the three leading transports,

was further complicated by the necessity of some boats making as many as five trips to the beach.

122

The overall logistic plan called for continuation of unloading of supplies according to an established priority, weather permitting, was opened. and contemplated the use of BRHiN BEACH as soon as it 28 Operations D Day (Sunday,

8 Nov. 42) the

The convoy, after arriving an hour and a half late in transport area, lost further time in

loading into landing craft.

Navy crews were inexperienced and Army personnel needed more training in unloading in darkness. The landing craft taking

half of the Sub-Task Force staff from CLYMER to ALLEN was lost for four hours. About

0430

they finally boarded the ALLEN and im-

mediately a conference was held in General Truscott t s office to discuss the situation. At this conference it was decided that sur-

prise had been lost as the result of the following: ... (1) The Presidentts speech announcing our mission had been broadcast round the world over an hour before we started to embark, (2) Several French vessels which could have alerted the shore had sailed through our convoy without being stopped. (3) The fact that our convoy arrived an hour and a half late at the transport area causing delay of H Hour made it impossible for the combat teams to arrive at their objectives before daylight as originally planned.., However it was decided to continue the operation as orig-

inally planned and that the two French speaking members of the staff, Colonel Crawford and Major Hamilton, matum to the French Comiander, should carry an ulti-

(Colonel Crawford was killed by

machine gun fire and Major Hamilton was captured.).

123

Meanwhile the unloading had continued. up when ready and were convoyed in guide boats.

The waves formed

near the shore by the three

...The combination of inexperienced landing craft crews, poor navigation, and desperate hurry resulting from the lateness of hour finally turned the debarkation into a hit or miss affair that would have spelled disaster against a well armed enemy intent upon resistance.... 3 1 First contact was at 0523 on PLUE BEACH where a search light was turned on and shots were heard (probably the Scout Boat shooting the light out). Second contact was at 0545 when shots were heard,

a red flare was lighted and a searchlight on the North jetty illuminated Lieutenant Peddicord t s Scout Boat. detail which was to cut the net or boom in was on its way up the river. About this time the

the mouth of the SEBOU

The detail consisted of

14

blue Col. Henney

jackets and two Naval officers and was commanded by Lt. of the Engineers.

At 5-10 minutes of six, machine guns at the foot

of the cliff opened up on the party so vigorously that Colonel Henney ordered the retreat before the mission was completed.32 This report

will now trace the actions of the three Battalion Combat Teams. (See Figure 12). ist BCT. This team landed South of GREEN BEACH, and on They moved

BLUE BEACH rather than on BLUE and YELLQN as planned. inland around the South end of the lagoon.

Reorganizing about

1045, they occupied the initial beachhead and set up road blocks to protect the South flank. These road blocks were attacked by our loss of two anti-tank

French tanks and infantry which resulted in

124

Key:7
NUNN&T~
ID7

7.

\

~KPOUR

7~k
7'
XA \\
7

rct G
r

4OAL P oswq

12

Sli

2K.

YELLOW

squads and French loss of three tanks.

The remainder of the 1st

BCT .. advanced North about 2000 yards along the ridge East of the lagoon, where it noon. was stopped by machine gun and mortar fire about

The hostile machine guns were located and removed by mortar the afternoon. The Battalion dug in and

and Naval gunfire late in

outposted its position for the night.

Just prior to dark, General

Truscott visited the ist BCT and ordered contact with the 2d Battalion, 2000 yards to the North, and an advance at dawn on the airport, He also told ist BCT that the Force Reserve was on'its way to report and that the 3d ALT would take over protection of the South flank. 2d BCT landed on GREEN BEACH at 0540, at which time the surf was 5-7 feet high. KASBA as planned, Lnd the SAVANNAH. Two assault companies advanced toward the but were held up by gunfire from the destroyers "These ships were attempting to silence the two After much

138 mm guns before they could molest the transports."34

confusion the Battalion crossed the lagoon, occupied the high ground South of the lighthouse and cleared the area around the KASBA. this time the Battalion was seriously disorganized. By

Through mis-

understanding of orders, the Battalion initiated its advance toward the airport, before reduction of the KASBA had been completed, and before reorganization had been effected. French infantry supported the vi-

by tanks and artillery counterattacked the 2d Battalion in

cinity of the native village and drove it back to the slopes South and West of the lighthouse. The situation of the 2d Battalion was Severe casualties had been

critical during the late afternoon.

125

sustained,

artillery and anti-tank weapons had not arrived,

and the Quickly

Battalion was in danger of being cut off from the beaches.

gathered reinforcements enabled the Battalion to hold the high ground South of the lighthouse until nightfall, sault the KASBA at dawn the next day. 3d BCT started up the SEBOU by mistake but was stopped and directed to RED 2 by Lieutenant Peddicord.3 5 ..,The Battalion CO, seeing that the fire was coming from the immediate vicinity of the river, decided to land his entire Battalion on RED BEACH. Unfortunately, the landing boats failed to make the corr ct turn and the entire Battalion landed four miles North.... The Battalion moved rapidly inland from the point of landing and by noon occupied Hill 58 overlooking the airport. Exits prevented 2d BCT was ordered to as-

moving the vehicles from the beach until late evening when a road was opened. Artillery reached the Battalion at 2030, but SP mounts Owing to

and AT guns did not arrive until 1400 the following day.

the fact that the rubber boats had been left in the half-tracks at the beach, the Battalion made no serious attempt to cross the river, and dug in on Hill 58. 3d ALT commanded by Brigadier General Harry H. Semmes (then Lieutenant Colonel), had landed by dark on BLUE BEACH with seven light tanks, He was ordered to the South flank to take

command of the infantry and anti-tank elements there with the mission of holding . rench forces South of Route 214 East of the lagoon. Only seven tanks had been landed because there were only seven tank landing craft and these were able to make only one trip due to the surf. 126

Naval gunfire suoport during the day consisted of counter lire as Prescribed in the piana No call fires were used because In the evening a meshim of the situation and

of difficulties or lack of commlunication. sage wia.s sent to admral Kelly informing

requesting air and surface fire support the morning of French conceantrations using plane spot, to SFCPs.

D plus

1 on poor

as commiumications

were

Air support cr-ormed well, all that it w-as called on for
during D Day. ...At 0630 hostile planes, fi.ghters and two-engined bombers, from RPBAT-°iLE a=rfield began to bomb and strafe our landing boats, .bout 20C) minutes later ROL and SAVANNAH were attacked ineffec-ively by two Dewoitone fighters. At 071? Adrrral elly asked for air supportl, and in 17 minutes tine at least 20 from SAYKA1,0N and RANGER were in the area0 By 0900 they Ltf shot down about nine enemy aircraft and scared off the r,FjtThey then attacked the PORT LYEUThTY a-nd RABT-SAl; airfields, to such good purpose that the Nor,,tciern landings were never again disturbed from the

lilrcats

Two major factors which served to slow down the operations the first day were the bre,@kdoin in signal cormmnunication and the Lack

movement of the transports 15 miles out to sea when fired on.

of comunuiications made coordination, control and firC, support extremely difficul-I, The distance to the transports required exces-

sive time for trips by landing craft so that the unloading proceeded slowly. Logistics. was not functioning, A provisional SOS unit had been organized but

127

...Conditions on the beaches during the night presented a scene of undescribable confusion. Surf was rising so that about half the craft landing were not able to retract, Exit from beaches was possible only for track vehicles, vehicles and stores were piling up so fast the shore party could hardly keep them above high water mark. Elements supposed to land on GREEN BEACH or to land later when BRON BEACH might be open were landing on BLUE BEACH, wandering around seeking their respective units in darkness broken only by the glare of naval signal lamps and flashlights to seaward... 3

Operation s D plus 1 (1onda , 9 Nov 42) Ist BCT initiated its advance toward the airport at daylight, and by 0830 was on the high ground South of the Iv'EHDIAPORT LYAUTEY Road. Becoming involved there with hostile forces
the woods to the East, it made no furCompany C;

South of this road and in

ther progress, and remained dug in most of the day.

70th Tank Battalion was detached from 3d ALT about 1430, ordered to join the Ist Battalion to assist its advance on the airport, and arrived about 1630. Naval gunfire and air bombardment of

hostile forces prevented immediate advance, and the Battalion did not renew its advance until 2300, after receipt of further orders from General Truscott directing the advance to be continued. 2d BCT, the night. The KASBA had been strongly reinforced during badly disorganized as a

The 2d Battalion was still

result of the preceding days fight and each company could account for only 30-50 men. Several ineffective attempts were made but without success. French

to seize thL :IUS.A during the day,

attempts to seize OCRFEN BEACH were repulsed and the French detachments were driven from the ridge West of the lagoon. Trenches

128

South of the KASBA were cleared during the day, largely through aid of the detachment, Company L, released fron the Sub-Task Force The Battalion was reorganized

Reserve to the Regimental Commander.

during the night preparatory to renewing the assault the following morning. The Commanding Officer, 60th RCT,- Colonel Frederick Joseph

De Rohan,39 was directed to have the 2d Battalion renew the assault
.on the KASBA at daylight,,

39

and to personally supervise the operation.

3d BCT."- At daylight Monday, the artillery of the 3d BCT
opened fire and silenced machine guns on the hills overlooking the airport. The Battalion remained on Hill

58 during the day, with
Receiving its

reconnaissance to the North and toward the bridge. rubber boats late in the afternoon,

Company I was pushed across the

river to the vicinity of the airport, but withdrew and dug in on the South bank during darkness. 3d ALT. Monday morning Colonel Semmes moved his seven tanks

to the junction of thu lagoon road and the RABAT-PORT LYUTEY.Road and led them into position on position at first light (0630)

foot.

Just after gettig

into

they were attacked by

14

French tanks

of the improved Renault Lodel mounting a short barrel 37 mm gun. These French tanks were from the re~serve at defilac *oesr tons

RABAT,, 41

They took hull

and opened fire at about 100 to 300 yards range,

The F-_- rchi
tanks,

_,r_ cold not penetrate the front ermor of the US light

COL1EI &30!nC later counted six to eight hits on the front s

of his tan,, which placed

O

Kinks -

were

assisted by a naval spotting plane

5-inch1 shells from the SAVAHN-IAH on the French tanks.

129

Four French tanks were destroyed and the rest withdrew.

For his

actions in this engagement, Colonel Semmes received the third cluster to his DSC. About 0815 Company C, 70th Tank Battalion and one sec2

tion of Cannon Company, 60th RCT were attached to 3d ALT.

Two of

the 70th's tanks were knocked out when they were ambushed by French tanks.. The French waited until they could fire at the side of the About 0900 the French

US tanks and secured complete penetrations.

tanks reappeared but were again driven off after several hours running fight. Company C,. 70th Tank Battalion was detached at about 1430 to

assist ist BCT. Air support played a very small part in except in the form of naval spotter planes. this day' s operations

Naval fire support in addition to that covered above consisted of silencing a French battery situated near the bridge NE of PORT LYAUTEY. Logistics and special operations. very bad, On Monday the surf was

some 18 feet high, so that more than 70 landing craft When landing had to stop late in the

were lost on the beaches. afternoon,

the imperative necessity for taking the KASBA and opening The naval detail to

the river the following morning was obvious.

remove the net was again requested and successfully accomplished the mission under fire about 0230. Heavy rains during the latter part

of the night increased confusion and added to discomfort of the men.

130

Operations D
1st DOT.

plus 2

(T,

sdy, 10 Fov 4

As

ordered thle 1st Battalion moved to attack Progress was slow due

toward the airport at 2300, 1 ond-y night to darkness -nd cornsstant enemy fire.

Shortly after the start of

their attack all units of the 1st Battalion lost direction to such an extent teat only Company r was a-ble to find its starting point to be on way back to the

hand to attack next morning with the tanks
Companies C and D had run into

of Company C, 70th Tank Batta.lion.

enemy machine guns near the POhT LYA them out in the dark with bayonct'sz

'UTEY-

LBthII

Road and had taken

Later those two companies had

lost direction and found thmos e2;.vos at daylight near the South edge of tow;n, They had taken many pris oners from the 1st and 7th Regiment It i-as

Tirailleurs Morocai ns .

during this attack that the Battalion
Next morning he was captured,

Commander got separa Led froni his unit. but

later

escaped and made his way back.

45

Some time after daylight,

Company B with Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, attacked toward the airfield and were successful in overlooking it observed te gaining positions on the high ground There the Company Commanders' the river by the airfield.

from the Southwest.

US destroyer already in its

They moved in and joined in 2d BCT.

defense, 105 SP

The 2d Battalion having received its attacked about 0625,

Howitzers during the night,

The attack drove

almost up to the gates of the KASBA where it machine gun and mortar fire from the Fort,

was held up by heavy Dive bomber attack was

coordinated by radio and by flash of smoke shell against the Fort

131

to indicate target.

"Bombers came over, recognized the target and

in four minutes from time of first call placed an accurate bombing attack on the Fort."4 6 This attack was followed immediately by and rounded up prisoners. Our troops were within 100 This

infantry assault and troops moved in Planes were on air alert at the time.

yards of the point of impact of the bombs when they struck.

attack took place at 1050 and upon completion the 2d BCT was ordered by General Truscott to reorganize and seize the high ground to the Northeast. This was accomplished against scattered enemy resistance.

3d BCT crossed Company I over the river on the late afternoon of the 9th, (Monday) however, due to swamp, a very black night and

enemy artillery, the company dug in light. Shortly after daylight,

on the river bank to wait for day-

Tuesday, the company seeing the DALLAS

moving up the river, advanced on the airport and assisted the Raider Detachment from the DALLAS in occupying the airport by about 0800. During the night the remainder of the Battalion had worked East of the airport and attacked the bridge fNortheast of PORT LYAUTEY. The bridge

was heavily guarded by French artillery and machine guns and the 3d Battalion was forced back to the North. This artillery fired on the with 5-inch

DALLAS the following morning but she quickly silenced it guns.

Naval fire support from off shore and dive bombers assisted in

silencing the remainder of the hostile elements in the vicinity of the bridge. "The two Eastern spans of the bridge were blown out by the
7

French at 1007,"4 3d ALT. nore tanks,

During Monday night and early Tuesday morning nine

the Reconnaissance Platoon and one platoon of 443 CA (AA)

132

were landed and joined the 3d ALT' before daylight. occurred un l about 1100 Trhen

No enemy action

about 20 enemy tanks were observed LYAUTEY Road. Six of our tanks were

moving North on the

RABAT-PORI'

sent East of the road into the woods. assault guns.

They were accompanied by two firing position

The other eleven tanks remained in

behind the ridge

West

of the road,

Fourteen French tanks remained

on the road and six went into the woods where they were attacked by our six tanrks and tvwo assault guns. on the road to the South, 0 Naval gunfire The French were driven back

wes

placed on their po-

sition and the French w~rere forced to withdraw to woods further to the South. Again naval gunfire as placed on their position and they IYaone of our tanks were damaged by enemy

were forced to withdraw South. action, It

was estimated thca4t the enemy lost seven tanks, four by our About 1600 four tanks were or-

fire and three byr naval gunfire.

dered to reconnoiter the valley Northeast toward PORT LYAUTEY for possible enemy cavalry troops. No enemy were located and the patrol No

was sent out again and contacted elements of the 1st Battalioin. further action took place, ,ir uop ort played a very important part in reducing the

KASBA as covered above a nd also in

bombing the artillery positions was learned that the PORT MIomyers P-4Os were

North

and East of PORT LYAUTEY.

"WPhen it

LYAUTEY' field was secured Lt. Col. William-1L-. ordered in from the CHEI<ANGO."i9

By 1030 the P-40s were landing on

the airport.

133

Logistics.

With the clearing of the KASBA and the airport the river was opened for 2) could be

and opening of the net across the SEBOU,

traffic and both BROWN BEACH and the airport (BROJw used for landing more troops and supplies.

"During the afternoon

flood tide, S S CONTESSA moved upriver with her cargo of gasoline, bombs and other aviation supplies." 50 The evening was spent in reorganizing and preparing for an attack of PORT LYAUTEY and RABAT-SALE the following morning. 2300, a report from Company B, At

60th RCT in the outskirts of PORT

LYAUTEY stated that the Commanding Officer, 1st Regiment Tirailleurs Morocains had been captured and desired to discuss cessation of hostilities. Arrangements were made for a meeting at 0800 the folAt 0200 a message was received from our G-2, then in

lowing morning. .'

the hands of the French, that Major General Mathenet had orders to cease all resistance, and desired to see General Truscott at any time and place designated to arrange terms. 0800, 11 November 1942. A meeting was arranged for

Orders were issued to cease firing and re-

main in place until further orders. Cessation Of Hostilities At 0800 11 November (Wednesday, D plus 3), the meeting to arrange the cessation of hostilities took place at the KASBA. General Mathenet stated that he had received orders to cease all resistance by direction of IMarshal Petain, and desired to arrange details for termination in local area pending final decision as to terms by higher authority. General Mathenet was informed that so

134

far as we were concerned it was not a question of French surrender; we desired their co-operation and had sought it by every possible means; that our sole purpose was to strike at the common enemy, the Axis Powers, and all who stood with them; that French

units could retain their arms, and could return to barracks in areas not occupied by American troops, pledging only that they would not fight against us again. Agreement was reached on these points, burial of dead, and for occupation each This

and for exchange of prisoners,

and use of the port by American forces.

Except for the latter,

side was to remain generally in the area occupied at the time. oral agreement was to be binding pending arrangement of terms by

51
higher authority. The above agreement successfully concluded the hostilities in the PORT LYAUTEY sector, This report will now concern itself

with conclusions and lessons to be gained from the entire operation.

1.35

NOTES FC1

CHAPTER 7

Operations

Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval in World War II (Boston: Atlantic, Little and Brown,

1947), P 36.
NWadi is used.
31ajor

Arabic for river.

The French,

Oued,

is

sometimes

Carl E. Bledsoe,

"Observer Report".,

p

5

4As o called 60th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), divided
into three Battalion Combat Teams (BCT). "Operations Brigadier General Lucian K. Truscott Jr., Report, Sub-Task Force GOALPOST,"from Nov 42, Appendix E..
5

4y

8-ll

6
7

M1orison,

op cit, History US Naval Operations, 2 WACHES on Figure 11.

p 116.

See BROWIN and BRON

8Truscott,
9

op cit, Operations Report, Appendix B.

lbid, passim. Morison, op cit, History US Naval Operations, p 117. op cit, Oprations Report, Appendix B.

10,

liTruscott,
1 2 13

Ibid, passim. bid, Appendix B. Intelligence Annex to Opn 0 No 1.

' 14bid,
5

ibid, Appendix B. Appendix B. Appendix B. Opn 0 No 1, par 3. par 3f.

16bid,
1 7Ibid,
1 19

Ib,

Ibid, Opn 0 No 1,

20

Ibid, Opn 0 No 1, par 3g. 136

21 22

Morison,

opoit, History US Naval Operations, p 117.
00i

Tru.cott

Operations Report, Annex 4 to Opn 0

No 1, Naval Gunfire Plan.
23 2

Ibid, Operation Order No 1, par 3e(l)(c)

;esley Frank-Craven and Jaines Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II Vol II (Chicago, University of Chicago

press,

191+9

;

'p

75:

2

5Morison,

op cit,

History of US Naval Operations, Operation Report, Admin-0 No 1.

p 11.'

26m
27 2

±ruscott, op cit,

Bledsoe, op cit, Observer Report, p 17.

$Truscott, op cit, Operation Report, Annex 1 to Admin 0 No 1 Bledsoe, o cit, Observer Report, passim:

29

30
31

Ibid, p 5,
Truscott, op cit, Operation Report, p 7, op cit, History of US Naval Operations, p 122.

3 2 Morison,
33

Ibid, p 122.

3
35

Ibid, p 124.
1id, p 122.

3 6 Instructional Phamplet, Department, TAS, 1943, p 16.
37 3

"U S. Landings in Morocco" Tactics

1orison,

op cit, History of US Naval Operations,

p 123.

8Ibid, pp 126-127; and Truscott,

op cit, Operation Report,

p 10. General Harry H. Semmes, Personal Letter to Chief of Committoe No. 25, 30 December 1949.
40 41

3 9Brigadier

bid, passim. Personal

Colonel Percy G. Black; G-2 of Western Task Force, Letter to Lt. Col. Jack F. Willie., 28 February 1950.

137

~Truscott, op ct,. Cpe ration 3d ALT, p 1.

Report, :Item

9,. Operations

43Q

c t,

Ins-tructiona1 Phramplet, p 17,

441'i~dp 3-7..
45 Tr.scott,

op ci 2

GOperat ion Report,

Item 3 , Operations

1st BCT, p 6.
46

Ibd

T Ibid,

Item. 7, Op3ratilas 3d BCT, p 5.

49

4Craven and
p 77.
GT.!oris

Cafe, op olt, Trhe . rnV Air Forces in World Tear II,

on,

ov

-ott, History

of' US

llaval

Operations, p

131,

5 1

Truscott, :op c

-t, Operat ionls

Reoort, p

13.

138~

CHAPTER 8 CON CLUS IONS AND RECCMiENDATIONS Conclus ions Before going into the conclusions to be drawn from this operation, it is well to remember that this operation was across the entire Atlantic Ocean; that inexperienced personnel were being used in their first combat role; that an absolute minimum of time

was available for planning and training; and that equipment was at best inadequate for transporting tanks from ship to shore. Also

the uncertain reaction of the enemy posed problems which are not generally encountered in a landing on a hostile shore. Seldom is

the enemy alerted by a presidential Proclamation prior to the landing. This report indicates that armor should be landed with or soon after the assault waves. The armor-protected fire power and

resultant shock action of armor proved invaluable in this operation. The reason more tanks were not used was primarily due to a shortage of landing craft. iately available. Tanks must land over the beaches and be immnedTo wait for the use of port facilities is both

foolish and dangerous. It is apparent that the mission of armor used with the Initially, and until such time tanks can render close

assault waves should be twofold.

as hostile armor appeared upon the scene, support to the assaulting infantry. automatic weapons.

Primary targets should be

Tanks also could knock down those obstacles

139

erected by the enemy to delay the advance of the infantry. fire could be used, in lieu of artillery fire, to aid in

Tank

the assault

on enemy positions located near the beach.

Once hostile tanks ap-

peared on the battlefield the role of our tanks would be changed from that of support to that of anti-tank. From the study it is not felt that armored divisions should

be employed in the assault phase of a landing on a hostile shore. This is based on the realization that the number of landing craft

that would be required to land an armored division, assaulting a beach, would be prohibitive. The general lack of infantry within

the armored division further precludes its use as the assaulting force. The armored division may well be employed as a floating reserve of a corps or larger unit. When so employed, every effort

should be made by the assaulting troops to capture a port so that the armored units may be unloaded most expeditiously. However, as

the enemy may, and most probably will, destroy or seriously damage all port facilities within the threatened area, plans must be made to land all elements of the division on an open beach. As a re-

serve, the division should be put ashore as early and as rapidly as possible so that it may be quickly available to counter-attack any

enemy reaction to the beachhead or to exploit the initial successes of the assaulting units. To be effective, armor must be able to move. ment requires gasoline in large amounts; All such move-

therefore, means must be

140

made available to the arim orod units ashore to procure their POL
rcqu iro gents, The mere fact that fuel and lubricants are available

on the beach or in port is

3f no avail if

the armored units lack the

necessary cargo vehicles to transport fuel and lubricants forward to the combat elerents.. As currently organized armored units have sufficient administrative vehicles to maintain a Continuous flow of supplies forward These vehicles, or a large portion of them, must be included

in the boat loading plans when an armored unit is to be employed in an amphibious operation. Furthermore, if armored units are to be

employed to their best advantage these vehicles must be given a very high priority in the unloading plan, The lack of administrative vehicles at SAFI could well have curtailed the tactical use of CC B had it been necessary to employ
As it was, the bulk

that force inland rath er than along the coast.

of the supplies necessary to keep CC B operating had to be transported by the Navy on two destroyers--a risky undertaking when one considers that there were enemy submarines in the area.

Arr -iored units of combat comand size and larger are well
adapted to making deep penetrations. hostile resistance is initially weak. very well utilized This is especially true if the

This capability of armor was

by

Major General Harmon

when

he ordered CC B to

move from SAFI to the north to attack MAZAGAN, a distance of about 90 miles through hostile territory against unknown resistance. 141 This

particular action,

(attack on MAZAGAN),

also illustrates several of armored employment such

other capabilities or characteristics
as:

(1)

Leadership.

Armored unit commanders must be highly

aggressive and must be willing to take calculated risks whenever such risks will possibly enable them to accomplish the mission. (2) Surprise. In spite of the noise and dust created sur-

by the movement of large numbers of armored vehicles, prise can be obtained by an alert commander, be obtained in several ways, one of which is

Surprise may to suddenly Sur-

change the direction of attack as was done at SAFI.

prise was further achieved by the movement of the command through hostile territory at night. (3) Mobility. This is Without it, one of the chief characteristics the move to MAIZAGAN could never

of armored units. have been made in

a single night.

The principle of organizing combined arms teams was sketchily followed in it the organization of CC B. When this unit moved on MAZAGAN.

had as major fighting elements,

one light tank battalion, one med-

ium tank battalion, two batteries of artillery and one company of armored infantry. Had the Combat Command encountered strong, stubthis lack of in-

born resistance from a determined French force,

fantry might easily have caused consideravle delay.

142

In the landings at PORT LYAUTEY-EHDIA, in an anti-tank role,

tanks were used

They were also used as an infantry close-

support weapon. It was found that ships were not properly combat loaded. shortage of trained T0;JL's

This was caused by several circumstances;

(Transport quartermasters); shortage of available shipping;. unavoidable changing of plans at high level after the loading had begun; and general lack. of amphibious experience on the part of all personnel concerned. Shore and beach parties were undertrained and

the system for unloading ships was not adequate. Reports examined show that troops in overloaded. the assault waves were New

Radios were not calibrated prior to the landing.

weapons and equipment were issued in insufficient time to allow for training and testing. Many troops "froze" when hearing friendly time.

naval gunfire and friendly artillery for the first

Recommendations If at all possible all troops should have amphibious train-

ing every year. problems.

Tank and infantry units must work together on these artillery it will

This training should include naval gunfire,

fire, and tank fire. pay off.

While overhead fire may be dangerous,

An observer report states that the fire of friendly guns

affected the tankers less than the infantry possibly "due to the fact they (tankers) were more accustomed to the larger guns firing." Tank and infantry radios must be calibrated prir oarting the near shore. There is to de-

no time for this on shipboard due

143

to security restrictions, to fight with in

Troops must have the

eapons they are

sufficient time prior to an operation to become

fully acquainted with them. Units v ere roouired to disperse on several ships, if losses occurred in landing or if so that

ships were sunk at sea, a mini-

mun of service support and combat el..emlents and equipmrrent assured. landis

would When

be the

in practice this dispersion was too thorough.
took place
there

wefas tho natural priority call for combat it was

forces ashore.

Since units were broken up and dispersed, required equipment twhere it

seldom possible to load all readil.y urloaded,

could be

evr whnr:t it en

ws organic to the service units.

Many troops landed as means to operate.
1 a unit s

'Dattle conditions pe rrmitted without their
to always load

The lesson from this woas, and is,

organic equip _mnt on the same ship on zhich the unit travels; such a manner as to expedi te unloading in proper sequence

to load in

at the far shore; and to never separate companies or working teams nor their equipmnt. All equipment should be loaded on almost every ship to prevent if
spipttinxg

all

the

eggs in However,

one baskt t

and the loss of that item

one ship is

sunk.

troops should be loaded with their

equipment so that both hit tho beach together. Shore and beach party specialists continuous.

personnel should be highly trained
This training should be

under one coimnder (Army).

,111 transports

should be prepared to load boats at the rail
rimethod

no maaztter w,,jhat the planed

of unl. aoading

is.

14l-.

Boats should be pooled and under centralized control. trol of these boats, especially at night is essential. should be equipped with TBY radios.. Boat coxswains must be trained personnel. in the initial Time is

Con-

All boats

paramount

unloading stages; every minute should be utilized to

get more equipment ashore. An adequate lighting system to permit unloading at night which is not visible to the enemy so as to endanger the ship, should be provided. order to boats,

and unloading personnel,

Beaches and docks must be kept clear of supplies in unload other supplies.

The loss of time by boats standing off awaitAll cargo must be

ing their turn to unload appeared considerable. moved quickly to less exposed locations,

The huge stocks of supplies

on the beaches and docks not only created a bottleneck but a decided hazard in the event of enemy .ir operations.

Individual equipment of the assault waves should be limited to the bare essentials required for combat. Other equipment can be

moved to these troops after the landing has been effected. Transportation, in especially 2 -ton trucks, must be available

sufficient quantities to clear the beachhead of supplies and supply especially in an its supply

the advance of the exploiting troops on the beach, armored division. lines.

The most vulnerable point of armor is

The same amount of consideration must be given to cargo ve-

hicles as to combat vehicles.

14 5

Transport Quartermasters should be superior officers, thor- oughly trained, and preferably either Transportation Corps or Naval personnel, assisted by Transport Quartermasters of the respective units making the landing. The average officer does not know much

about the combat loading of ships, nor can he learn this in two weeks. TQMas must be experienced maritime personnel; the responThey

sibility is too great to delegate to officers of combat units.

do not have the necessary qualifications to accept this responsibility Such TQV's (maritime) should remain with that ship and load it, unload it, as long as she remains in amphibious operations. easier to teach Transportatio It is much

Corps or Naval personnel the essential

characteristics and requirements of combat units than it is for an army combat officer to learn the characteristics and requirements of efficient loading and unloading of ships. It is essential that the loading phase be definite and that loading plans be based on full knowledge of the characteristics of the assigned ships. It is imperative that these plans once formed,

be adhered to as much as possible; changes result in delay, confusion and inefficient loading. It is also essential that all equip-

ment and supplies be on hand when the actual loading is executed and that all necessary loading preparations have been completed. Troops, supplies, and equipment must be arranged in proper

sequence and amounts per an overall predetermined plan and so scheduled so as to arrive at the area for loading on time. of this principle results in personnel. Disregard

loss of valuable time and a waste of

146

In summation,

the lessons learned from the TORCH operation Such mistakes were frequent in varying

were not altogether new.

forms before this operation and some are even today prevalent in landing operations. A landing operation, whether over the Atlantic

Ocean or a small envelopment along a coast line, presents to a great extent the same problems, amphibious operation. and such problems are not unique to the

These problems can be overcome by thorough An amphibious operation is the majority of all difficult, problems

and conscientious plans. control is

the criterion, however,

so encountered can be solved long before the first beaches. The answer is

troops hit the

training and good sound planning coupled with

violent application.

147

APPENDIX I ORDER OF BATTLE I. Friendly Forces a. Western Task Force (1) Armored Units 2d Armored Dvision 70th Tank Battalion 756th Tank Battalion 757th Tank Battalion 603d TD Battalion 609th TD Battalion 702d (2) ID Battalion

Coast Artillery Units 536th Bn CA (AA) (NN)

443d Bn CA (AA) (AW) 676th CA (AA) Btry (Sep)
692d CA (Ali) Btry (Sep) Btry (Sep)

693d CA (AW)

694th CA (AW) Etry (Sep)
695th CA (AW') 697th CA (AWT) Btry (Sep) Btry (Sep)

(3) . Engineer Units
8th Engr Squadron 20th Engr Regt 36th Engr (C) Corps

175th Engr

(GS)

426th Engr Co (dump truck) 540th Engr Shore Regt

(4)

Field Artillery Units 58th FA Bn 62d FA Bn

(5)

Infantry Units 3d Infantry Division
9th Infantry

Division

(6)

Ivedical Unit;, 8th Evac

Hosp

11th Evac Hosp Co A, 36th Amb Bn

(7) Ordnance Units
9th Ord Co (MR) 3d Ord Co (IMMl) 29th Ord Co (1210)

6th Ord Co (1211)
36th Ord Co (MjAMV) 43d Ord En, Hq & Hq Det (1,&S ) 64th Ord Bn, Hq & Hq Det (Ammno)

83d

Ord

Co (M,1)

Tank

185th Ord Co

(Depot)

201st Ord

Co (Depot)

602d Ord Co (Ammo) 603d Ord Co (Ammo)
604th Ord

Co "Ammo)

608th

Ord

Co

( Ammoc)

(8)

Quartermaster

Units

22d ON Regt (Trk) 3d Bn, 22d U~I R~egt Co H, 22d 4JI Regt
Co B, 22d

k:Vi.

Regt

Co C, 22d ZI Regt Co D, 22d QI Regt
Co A, 23d.

i

Regt

1st Bn (less 2 Cols), 58th Hq

WI

Regt I

&

Hq Det, 67th

vI En ('1011)

Co C, 67th QPI Bn
Co D, 67th QVI Bn

94th Q-I, Co (Rhd)
13 8th Wv Co ( Trk ) 144th

CD

Co (Trk)
.,' Bn (Gas

Co D, 208th (9)

Sur))

Reconnaissance Unit 91st Rcn Sqdn

(10)

Signal Units 1st Armd Sig En 71st Sig Co 72d Sig Co

FRIEN DLY ORDER OF BATTLE BY TASK FORCE

a.

Task Force GOtLPG8ST Hq (1)

Task

Force GO.J.''CST

Elements of Task Force GOALPOIST (less Armd Landing

60th Im Regt
60th FA Bn 70th Tank Bn (L) Hcq Det, 540th Engr Shore Regt

1s t Bin, 540th Engr Shore Regt

3 Plats , D Btry, 443d CA Bin (AA AW)
692d CA (AA) Btry (Sep)

694th CA (AA) Btry (Sep) 695th CA (AA)
Btry (Sep)

696th CA (AA) Btry (Sep) 697th CA (AA) Btry

(Sep)

Det, 56th Mded Bin (2)

Armored

Landing Team

Hq Det, 2d Arrnd Div Uq Go, 66th Ammd Regt Co A, 66th Armd Regt Co B, 66th Armd Re~gt Co

C, 41st
Flat,

Armd Inf Regt
I , 41st Armd Inf Regt

3d

Co

Btry B, 78th Armd FA Bn 3d Flat, C-o C, 17th Amd Engr Bin

3d Flat, Co C, 82d krmd Rcn En 1st Plat, Btry B, 443d En CA; (AA kW) 1st Plat, Btry C, 443d En CA (AA AWd) 3d Plat,

Co Co

B., MTaint En

3d Flat, Co D, 17th Armd Engr Bn
3d Flat, B, 17th

Amd

Engr Bn

Det, 66th Engr Topo Co b. Task Force BLACKSTON, Hq~ Task Force BIv CKSTOTZ (1) Elements of Task Force BLACKSTONE (less Airmd Landing Team and Sea Train) 47th In~f Regt

Tyro Flats, 70th Tank En (L)
(2) Armored Landing Team 2d En, 67th Armd Regt

Co

B,

41st

Armd ]inf Regt krmd FA En

Btry

C,78th

Co A, 17th Armd Engr Bn Flat, Co C, 82d Armd Rcn En Flat, Btry C, 443d CA EN (AA A9) Two Flats, Co D,

17th

Armad Engr En

(3)

Sea Train
3d En, 67th Armd Regt EtryT

B,

14th Armd FA En

Co E, 17th Armd E~ngr En

Pl'Iat, Co A, 2d Armad

Sup En
Bn

Co B, 2d Armd

Maint

Blat, Etry B, 443d AS En (AA
c. Task Force

AN7N)

BRUS WOOD

IO0D Hq Task Force BR'JS H'
(1)

Elements of Task Force BEUSITVIMD (less Armd Landing Tbeam) 3d Infantry Division 7th Inf Regft 15th Inf Regt 30th Inf Regt 10th FA En 39th FA En 41st FA En 10th Engr En 36th Engr Regt 2d En, 20th Engr Regt 3d C- En MBP Co Two Flats, 443d En CA (,AA AN) 436th En CA (AA A6)

(2), Armored Landing Team
Ist

En,

67th

Armgd Regt

Co

A, 41st Arrmd Inf Regt

Etry A, 78th Armrd BA

En

Two Flats, 443d En CA (AA AW ) Maint Sec,

78th Armd Regt

Blat, 17th Armd Engr En
2. Enemy Forces

(.FRANCE)

a. SAFI Area (1) SAFI

Two Cols, 2d Foreign Legion Inf
To Btry s, ATO
"No Ca' 1s,

2d

Fore ign

Legion
Riflemen

kirty (8-75mm
mm)

H-ow)

2d

Moroccan

One Etry, 410th Arty Bn (155

One Plat) Light Tanks (3 Renault--type TF) One Naval Coast Defense Btry (4--138mm guns)
One

Naval

Coast

Defense

Btry

(2-7 5mm

guns)

Det Det (2)
Y

(8
(5

men), 41s t Engrs

Radio

men), Air 'darning Service

TU4MECH

One Dpi, 2d Moroccan Riflemen One Bn, 2d Foreign Legion Inf Croup Chasseurs d'Afriiue (no tanks) Awtillery--10 men ;' ith 8 -37m guns & 3-75mm guns

(3)

IIZAGAIz and

AZU1

CURE

One Bn, 2d I.orroccan. Riflemen~ One Co, Senegalese xIf

b.

F~iDALA area

Five IBhs Inf Two Bn' s

, rty

(24 -75mm

guns)

One Btr y, 105mm How Two Etry'Is, 155mnm guns Five Btry' s, One

75mm

AT guns (10

guns)

Btry,

Coast Defense Guns (4-.138.)

One Btry, Coast Defense Guns (4-90mm)

One Naval Coast Defense Btry

(2-75mm

guns)

Three (approx) Cots tanks (total of 20 light tanks)

c.

PORT LYAUTEY area Two Bns M.1oroccan Inf One B try, 410th Arty Bn (155mm) One Btry, Foreign Legion Arty Naval Base Garrison (strength unknown) Tv~jenty (approx) light tanks

APPENDIX II
TERRAIN
4_'A'ALYSIS

The following terrain anlalysis W; estern Task Force zone is

of the area involved in

the

the actual terrain information that was This study

available to that headquarters during the operations. was extracted from "Brief Estimate-Operations

of Task Force A" made

available to this committee by Major General B. N.- Harmon from his personal files.

O

9

52

Terrain.
a, Roadnet. Inasmuch as the railway only serves a limited part of French 1,orocco, the roads wore designed as main system Principal groupings are as follows; of land-communication. 1 n arterial road connecting the Atlantic ports, running m ostlyT along the coast from Agadir northwards, and into Tangier, xcellent roads running inland from ports and serving great inland town of Marrakech, Mdeknes, and Fez. Roads traversing the Atlas Foothills; crossing the Atlas passes. Secondary roads and tracks serving fertile coastal areas. Main Roads--Routes Principales; usually 16 to Will 20 feet wide and designed to take heavy loads. traffic except at bridges and take two-way military Bridge railway crossings which are usually one-vay. hazards as they crossings represent the main military could easily be sabotaged. Secondary Roads--Routes Secondaire; about 1321 feet wide, reasonable heavy duty. Tracks--Pistes--Trails that are cleared and Not usable as a rule during rainy weather. maintained. The Moroccan roadnet is d ense, well maintained, and Only possible exceptionally suitable for ilitary traffic. bottlenecks occur at river crossings where bridges, as a rule, are one-way.

From a defensive point of view the roads provide ways of rapid reinforcement to endangered areas, and in event of successful beachheads, enemy mechanized progress could be retarded by destruction of key bridges, particularly on thle coastal roads and river crossings. The river Oued-Rbia emptying above Mazagan is a serious obstacle, crossed byr high bridges. The remaining rivers are subject to deep water during wrinter mothis only. Heyever, thre crossings of all these, due to deep gorge spanning, are bottlenecks of transport at all seasons, Immndiate objective of an invasion force after landing must be the securing of the vital bridges and thereafter the important crossroads. All Routes Principales are good for twro-wray military traffic. Secondary Routes may be too narrow, for standard American military traffic, Pistes or trails are all oneWay. b. Suitbity

for tars.

From Spanish frontier to Port Lyautey, the ground tends to be swvarruoy. This is typical lowr-lying river country, From Rabat, south to Casablanca is a rapid wtiratershed ith deep wadis. These river valleys are steep and run directly down to the sea. Casablianca south to Safi is a coastal. plain about 75 miles deep and which rises gradually in the east and s outh to the foothills of the Atlas Mountains. South of Safi towNards Mogador the hills approach the sea with a strong outcropping at Agadir. Around Port Lyautey and in the Rabat-1asba Tadle-: ekne;s triangle are oak and arbor Vitae woods. Otherwise the coastal region is cultivated. and the hinterland semi-arid. Tanks should be able to maneuver easily anywhere in the critical areas, as even th)e forests are criss-crossed by a number of roads and innmumerable trails, and water is plentiful along the coast and sufficiently abundant inland.
0.

'stacles. Bridges and deep ravines, mainly those on coastal road ever Cued ella h, Cued Jafifik, Cued Chevrat, Cued Yguem, and Cued Tensift and thae cOued Rbia. The woods in thLe Rabat-Kasba. Tadle-Meknes triangle are not very dense.

Beaches

Rabat-Sale, Port tyadtey
l: Southsido of river, inside of break~water. 8o. Fairly steep gradient as it goes into ship charel. 'Width up to 100 yds, length about 200 yds. Approach to tov.n- steep and over seawtali.

No. 2.

North
long.

side of river inside breakwater. 300 yds. Good approaches to town and fvst way to

Airport.
No.

3.

North

side of Korthern breakwater. Covered at high tide. 300 yds long, 100-200 yds. wide. 4 ft. line 150 yds. inshore. Starts about 6 miles beaches belo,.w cliffs.

No.. 4.

NE

Rabat. Cluster of small Each about 100-200 yds long.,

Covered at high tide,
offshore. ieavy surf.

4 foot line about 75 yds.

No.

5. Starts at mouth of Sebou River and runs S~v, for
about 10 miles. 100 to 500 yds widoe. Dunes up to 100 feutC' high. Iorthern part bac1Is up against Forest and swamp. (During rainy season) 4 foot line about 100 yds. offshore.

iJo..

6..

Starts about 2 miles S Rabat, runs about 6 miles. Broken by cliffs.. Covered at high tide. 4 foot line about 100 yds out.. Heavy surf.. Bluff comes close to shore.. Starts just 1North of Sebou Estuary and runs North a bout 30 miles.. Up to 400 yds wide. 4 foot line about 100 yds offshore.. Backed up by Forest and irrigated Swamp Land.. Heavy surf.

No.

7.

Water approaches: The coast is poorly surveyed 30 foot water is 500 yds offshore,. 12 foot water is 200 yds out. The coast is free from obstructions offshore. Surf conditions and tides: The surf is always heavy but less so during the offshore winds.. The mean tidal range is 5.6 feet. Spring tides rise to 7.4 feet. During a calm, vessels are at times obliged to anchor in order to avoid being drifted on shore by the current setting along the coast to the southward. Note. On tactical maps 1:25,000 Port Lyautey Beaches No. 1 and 2 correspond to Beaches No. 5 and 7 respectively as listed above,

Fedala No. . Starting about 21 miles south of Fedal a and running about 2 miles SWI-lO 0Yds. or less wide. Covered at high tide. 4 foot line about 150 yds offshore.

No. 2.

About 2 miles SVi Fedala, south about 1 m ile.
General characteristics as above. Shoals offshore. Starting 1 miles SW Fedala. About a mile long. Characteristics as in Nos. 1 and 2. One beach divided by rock. Starts- immediately at breakvater, runs NE 1 mile to rock, then another rihile, 4 foot line 300 yards offshore. Heavy surf, probably covered at high tide. One beach divided by rocks offshore.

No. 3.

No 4. No. 5.

Starts lI north of breakwater. Rock in center, each No. 7.* midles part Z mile, 4Efoot line, 300 yds offshore. Heavy No. 6. surf, probably7 covered at high tide, Leachies 4-7 are subject to flanking fire from guns on Cane.

NMo. 8.

Louth of River ifikh. South bank has silted, forming a sturdy beach. About 300 yds long, 200 yds wiide. At tide it is possible to go all the way to railroad and highway bridges, about " mile upstream. Good for spot landings.
Jbou.t 1 mile rE of River Characteristics as in.No

_f

No. 9.

Nfififfh.
1.

2 mile long tremely heavy surf.

'No.

10.

River mouth at vIvansourish. Up to 200 yds long.

About 100 yds wide.

ater aproaches. offshore.

Thirty foot water is

found 1000 yds

-Surf Conditions
March

and Tides. Surf is heavy from November to and moderate at other times. Fedala Bar is sheltered except when w-inds are frorr between. north and west, Tides rise on the average of 7 feet but during sp:rings they rise to 11'- fbet.

SAFI

No.

1.

Starting at base of Jettee Principal ard running south for 150-200 yards. Less than 100 yards twtide Fea 4 y surf 4 Inside Jettees, silted-in area, about 200 yds saret No surf, steep gradient, being adjacent to' dredged area. Starting on North side of Jettee Transverse, about Depth in the center, 200 yds. 500 yards long. Backed up by bluff or cliffs. Light surf. Starting 700 yards, north of Jettee Transversl is about O yards long, 200 yds w.ide. 4 foot line about 150 yds offshore.

No. 2.

No. 3.

No.

4..

Water

All but Beach 2 probably disappear at high tide. approaches. The bay is free from shoals. Anchorage on a bottom of mud and sand is obtainable 1 mile offshore. Eighteen-foot water is found Here the depth is 45 feet. 250 yards offshore. Four-foot water is probably 150 yards offshore when beach is uncovered. Soundings are reported to be of doubtful accuracy.
*

Surf Conditions and tides, The bay is exposed to swell, especially during winter nohths.. This anchorage is reported to hav4 smoother water thyani other anchorages in the area covered, Tides rise on the average 64 feet above the datum plane for soundings; spring tides rise 11 3/4 ft.

~T A DEJPPTNT fT
We shinrrton

COPY

1I-0.

October 2, 1:142

SUTBJICT:
TO:

I

ovement

Orders, Shipment 3324.
Tnitl1s

The Comrnending, Genermls, 2d Arnmored Division; Fort Br~gg, VForth Cr onia

tii

l

.

1o It is desirel thpt '-,aoh Potion ps 15 your responsibility be teken without delay to nrepsr~e for foreign service Pnd to move the units iand detrchraonts listed below to P port of embprket to be rnnomced pt the Such movemort wrill be m' de only only. prover time to interested unon oll of the eppropriefte port- com-xnnder, wh will inform the rgen..cies the concerned of the time end d&te tl pt units end detFchmnn erp; desired port-, tuthori ~d z C ode Comrndc r respon- S)trength . Off Designrtion sibie for irePresent r"t7.2 nn move- end (Shi rment No. T/O Um1it rnd Intter) Stet 0r ment to thie nort V10~ 1 Ve

sgencies

-n

ret

*Fci & Ho~ Det Cora- 3324-A bet Comd "B3" 2d
A rmd. Div

Ft.Brrg ;, N.C.

CGl, 2d Armd Div

7

21

7

17-1 (3.-1-42)

(less
Ft. Bregg, Y1.0. CG, 2d A'rmd 21 277

det) *2d Bri 67th .I md 3Z4-B .Regt (w/'etchd Fled (reirf) ) (less Co F)(lss dots) *Co B, 41st Armd Irf (less dot) 3,324-C

Div

67

17-2?5 (7-1-)

Ft.

rpgg, V.0.

CG(T, 2d A rm d TA V

5 1

164 46.

22

7-27 (3-1~-42)

*1 Plat,

Co I, 41st P!rmd Inf (less) dot)

3324-D

Ft Brp gg,

K.C. CG, 2 d Div

.A rind
Arrnd

(Col 10)

*Btry

C, 78th ArrB 34VF.}regg, FA 13n (less det)
Armd Ron Bn(reinf)
±

11".C.

TA 2d

4

84 44

21

Di~v CGrt, 2d Prmd Div CG, 2d .Prm d '1ivr 2 12 17-37

*2d. Plat, Co, C, 82d 3324-F Fit Brogg,, IT.C,
lolt,

(3,..42 )
1 46

Co

C, 17th 3324-G Ft Brpgg,

11.

8
d

5-217 (Col, 9)}

Arrnd

Enigr Bn

UNCL
Unit

fE
Code Dnsignetion (Shinmgnt ?To. rind letter) Authorized Comnneir 'resnon- Strength siblo for prePresent prret5.on. &movernd V Strtlon 'ment to the 'port W O i

E

lst Plpt, Co D, 17th Armd EngrBn 2d Plpet eo

3324-H

Ft. JBrpefg;,
C. TTC

CG,

2d .Arrnd Div

1

46
46

0

5-2171 (col 9?)

17th

D.

3324-11

Ft. Brreg,
P

CG, 2d

Armnd

1.

0

5-217
('cl 9)

P rmnd- Fngr 3324.-L

I C.

Div
C C, Di v

Bn 3d Pirt, Btry C, 443d Sgep CA Bn (AA) (AW) (II) Ft. Bregg,

'2d

Armnd

1

34

9

Sn-cjp1

5th

Plet,

Btry

C

3324- Y

Ft.

r gg,

443d Sep CA Bn Det,, 1.42d Armnd 3324-YT 3324-0 Ft. Bregg,

CG, 2d P.rmnd Div

1

34

9

Specir'l

CG,

2d
Div

.Arrcd

0

6

3

Sig Co
i Bn 67th Armd Regt (less dets and lessello and ho Co

IT c0
Ft. Eregg,

11-117 (3-1^42)

CG, 2d Div

.rmnd

10 223

0

17.25'
(3.1..42

nt * d Bn Seo Meir Co 67th Arid R~egt" (less dets)

3324-P

Ft. Bre gg;, N{ *C

CG,

2d
Div

Arm d

2.

6

0

7-11.

Prge 4 Col 10

Totel s

56 1079

156

* Comosit! n of deto hmnents will be determnine~l by the Commnding Generre 1, 2d Armd Diva

in issuing, instr,ctinns rnd dissernineting, inform-~ti n to subordinate echelons in conrecti ~n with this ord-r, the greptbst crre will be exercised to divulge only pertinent portions.

referring Major
3.

Code designation (Shipment No, end letter) will be used in to this movtement in iou of unit designption. (For mril eddress, see parograph 5). pl-ced under the commend. 2. All units 'and detrchments In this order fort Generel E. N, Marmon. This officor will perform the duties of P. imxnnder as outlined in Inclosure No. 1 and Ps additionally instructed.

rre

-f

Personnel
Wthere authorized strength, es shown in ppregreonh 1, differs from

a.

rabe o Or~naz onstrength, the riathorized strength will govern. The -ithorized strengths contpinnd in this order e intende d pF r~riy is o ide,, the Commrding. Generel, 2d Armored Division mry, Pt his discretion, Athorize devintioans from these strengths subject onl.y to the limiteti. ,ns of shiryping spece. b., CuIefied pe:;,,onne1 not mrking the movement wvill be reported to the next higher herdi-urr'71rs for disnositionG
C-3 Personnel unrur lifiod for oversees service will be ronortrd to The P~diutent Generpl for disoositV~n, rind will, while i~igdi srosition, be dropped from the rolls of orgernizrtions And Pttechled to local str-tion. complements.

d, Th6 epproprif=.t6 ditinn . f The d.Jut;1nt Genrrels Office (Officers Diva sion or Clessificrtion rnid Enlisted Re~pIG ceeiet Brrench) will. furnish., insof'ar rs prreoticrbi,2 officerr =end enlisted fillers to units on. orll from the Commending Officer of this sinnwnto 4,. This is 9 PEITLNIEE T chrngn of str ti -).

5,; All personnel affected by this order will be informed that they will continue to 'heve meil adrrssod rs et present until r-ePeipt of further Instructions.

6. 11oveme~nt to thr; port will be mr de by motor end rail.
wheoled motor ve hicles will move under thrir own .nowr,.

Orgenic
sre

7T. Direct comrnunioeti.ons is ruthorizr'd, ' n this connection., parngrarh 2, Inclosure No.' 1 (lRhvision of S-ptembrcr 1, 1942).

S. Pertinent pr ts of th. provisions of 'Incloour USo. 1 (Revision of September 1, 1942) trc: rpolicrblc to this movrmrnt es :icoificd below: 4. Reference,
submnitted nr~
prrerrrh 6.

T~eports of shortraes of cruizamE'nt c1rc;-cy
r sr~corgi tim.

t9TY

r prg

b. Delete prrrgrrph.9,

(5).
g, m~rklinpg w-vith the

c, Referenhce srmple. mrrking under prrgrrh 11., nsmeof a zvnecefic port will br, omitted.

d. Delete

Pr rr gr^ nh

12, c, (e6).
substituting, therefor:

Co.

Delete n rrgrrph 15, "15

Perscnnl. NOT to eccompeniy Unit.

t lNo officers, wefieso nitd mno mt assigne d to units in this order will be trr'nsferred hrefrom wivthout prior approvel of the Commr"nding Generr-l of the Tr-sk iPorto to which this ord!Irr pertains, except those belonging to the .following crtrgories:

(1) Those rbsrnt without ler'vr rnd those whoec physicel condition hes been detr-rminnd to b,- such thr't they will be unebleo

to

procerd

oversers with their unit.

!Vy~>~

off°ioprs rrd rnl sted men wrho h~rvc Those 1,v-r.t (2) t -noffi crr crnrdid-tr, schop r spreo'fic clrss peen. finelly selr-cted( tio rttend uzndoer eeuo'r Pllo-;od by thr W.-Ur Dr-nrrt arnt, in rccordrrce writh nrrgrrnhs No. 126, Wr' rDelpr rtmert, 1942. 2 b 4) end 8 d; Ci.r,,

1.-r

wtiho Poply for,
^nd

T.ihoses officers, wrrrernt officers, ^nd n list-d mrvn ero f-AtYt -n urlified for, rnd sire ^ccepnd for Air Crew (flyimnl)
T rFinin g, (4)

?z-1i dc=r Pilot

Enemy nlions a

11i1th rofr~rence to fin^1 selection for officrrs t Cendidnte b. woe ,-1.D. Circul r 126, .Apri. ^nd method of trensfe r of enlisted men, Schools Da Circuzlrr 262, A/ugust 5, 1942. 28. 1942, and ..

c, A,=, soon ss nrcticrble Pfter roceint of wrrning orders furnish to the^ TdJltnry thrcugh intrlligence ch(-rne-s vll. tun> r omrnd rs Ven.-rtrrt, the: nrmrs of indiiduelrs in their Snrvie. Ir_ eJi1 gnc~ rr therrforen ,d orgenazations wiho Prf* doer, to bei noten-,.tielly subversive ccmsi dered unfit for foreign service. The snecific frocts upon which this detiermninrtion is bmse.,d should ho stetrd in ernch 'xse.

7*er

!end

the Vith referePnce to instructions f~'ilitrting d. n~turelztion of non-citi z n m.rmberz of the Army of thfl United Strtes who is invited to desire to beoome citizens of the-- United Sthtes, nttttizn letter ti-is office, June 9, 1942 AG 014.32 (5--30.42) FIA-B, subjF ct, Srving in the? .rmy of the IUited Statr i.Tturlizrtion of Crrte i.n this offler, July 28, 1942,p AG 014.32 (6-24- 42) I~~iSresub.jr-ct rnd letter)

lnon-Citizrns
n
rt

In connedti f ,. not immunized agginst Typhus errivel rt the parts,

with -n-rrgrrrh 16, e (3), (d),o, ersonnel strtions will br so imuniv-d rf1fr tres'ent

re^0d

Seor7et".
9.
a~,

Intutoson

Clothi ng, Es-uipment,

Supplies

r nd Ammnunition.

To be Teke~n from Present Station:

(1) Clothing (w inter only) rnd individurl reeuip~mrnt will be tr kon by ^11 units Ps pry Scri bc d in Teble of 13si c a llowenc s Yo. 21, June 20, 1942, rnd Ch;)ngo No. 1 thercto, a~s modified below: (p) iDeductions:

Ceps,-

winter

Drewers, wool Over: hoes, rotic Comfoters, cotton-fillerd

UNC.4IIE

-

Additi

i:

Glovns, wool on (one nrir ner PA, ^ totrl of two) Shpes, srrvice (one, nhir ner FT' ^ totrl of thrrr) S ocks, 1ight wool (threen r r r r EU , rtot-lI pi of s ix) Blpnke.ts, wool. OD (one nr r ind tvi.du-l, r totel1 of thre e) (Heirniets, stepl, IMl only ill1 br tekrn) (2)

prof er Trblps of B
Unit A nnored Engineer Fe
CA A)44

Orgrri~eti n-1 e,-uipmrnt will be trken rs nrescribed in the ~Pllow~nees .ndioc-ted below rnd rs modifierd b-mow:

T.1B
1?t
5

De 3-1-4a2 6.1-42

Ho.

of
4
2~

hhenges

7-I-42
7-1-42

3 0

(r) Or.i.y she t ps rt- of thy- orgeizeticnrl" ecul pment essentiel Icr C 1(irb t thrt ~e-d for ho7U.seke'i ing enid messing nurpoons wi'l rccomc'm7 . uni. All ot*rr orbenlzrtionrel c rti p -nFer will be m-rked with thf shin" ra nt numrr r'nd lett-r of ech anit end will. re tturnr d ov-er to the loed Fus s Commender for further disposition.« (Sep, orrgr^e:h 9 c b-.o.

Fer

Fnd

(b) Det, 142d Prmored Si~gnr1 comn!-n~y rnd Fie . He Det Coribe-t Commend "B3", 2d !rind Dizv will trko su~ch -prrt of thn orprnizetionrJ. Fruiprnert of the perent unfits rsd~mr n(ec, ssrry by the Copmrmdin-a Officers thrrrof,
(c) The orgrnizeti onrl e-iprnrrt of crrteIn units in this shipmnn~t will be modified rs indicrte d in 7Memorrendr,. SPO" 475, subliet, Distribution of Eri-timrnt, det(e-d Sept~mber 14, 194 2, rnid Sptrmbrr 29, 1942. (d) -ndi The: units in this shinmrnt will tike such rdditinnel. suplies es h-ve be'en authorized for the fo by the Yrr

egzipfl jt~

Den- rtra ert(3) The following i'dditienrl Items 1wil1
B~edsroks

rlso bi, ti kem. i.divi u-l)

or rnrttrrss covers

(two

p-r

Comrrn-ss, wnj ch (one- per ICO, not othe-rrwise ruthoriz-d,

not Techniciens)
rub'- r hip ( one, pr~zr Baer 100 taen) Bprs, raosm vbio, sen dfly typ, (OPC pC.,r indi idurl) IHeednets, reoscuito (one= per individu-T) Gloves, rnosozito (onie prir p er 20 individurls) Goggle s, rbb purpose, cleer lens, with rdditionel colored lnns (one prir n-~r individuel ) Respirrtors , dust (one, rr irdividur.1 not otherwise puthori Ue ) PAnti-grs Crpe (one r~pr individurl) Ointment, n'p otective (one tube pe r it dividuel)} Tmrorgnite , shoe (one tube; per indivi du l )

Boots

-o

-5-

°y

(4)

one~ worreon

~Pers -nnrl i.n this movremernt will be ips follows:
,,Idiori nersonn-l
--

rrmridA

with not morA thin

Pi.stols, rtomrti6~ Odlibrr .45 Gun, sub-me chine Celiber .45

Nne Members of trnk' crewus rnd driers

of sdlf-nrorelled mounts..
w Officers of finld end compeny grede, wrrr-nt officers, EO's of 1st three

Rifles, Cel-iber .30, 1741 Rifles, Celibnr

-

gredes (not Teclnicirns), TPl, now s or ruthorized r piistol under -nd T spreirl list of er-u prnn; now ruthori zerd gun, sulh-m^ chlne, C liber .45 Those VI now ^uthorized rifles, Celiber .30, l-1, under T/ BP

.30 I12903
b.

Other 0K4 of h11 units ex-.rpt "ledicel.

The Chiefs of Supply Services will ship th. followi.nr: Eouipment rnd suplies' in
rccordrncr

with instructi-nis isvued

prt ely.

co The Commending Officer of thr str-t~on listed: in onr-grenh 1 Pbove, upon rceript of further instructi. ens, will shin the repm-- inin4 orgenizrti. orne i tcom ?rnry the ;?nits. eeuipmipnt which does not
d,
Instruct5ins Refrrncn Shirnts to thr Port.

(1)
(2)

Shipments will be nv de to the Ports of F'.mbrrkrt,'on or. cdll
Shipmerts for P specific unit to
TO: PORT

of the Part Commanders,

.6 Port

of Embrrketion

will

be merked es follows:

TRANS

0

P of E FOR: J ., 3324-( enter letter r s r ssigned in p4rer rrh ebovte, en~d Group niumber ^s prenscnribrd in Annox - Inclosure Yo. 2.)
with

(3)

Shirments of r11
rbove(,,

rddressed rs indieted

othe-r eruinmcert r - supplies will be. necifi c rrkirngs in racordrn-.e, -with

instructions issued s nrrtely.

e4. Othe;r Instructions,
eruiemrt trk, . by IDtf hrnic r~ of the orgrni zr tonel indicrte d in pr rgrrenh 9 r (2) (b) rbbve will be m dp 'brthe- Commrn~art~g Two copies of the- lists will be furri shed thu orverU of the per(,nt unit# Gener-l, Services' of Supply, the Port Comm'iid'rs end the Force Co-mrndr.

(1)

A

list

(2) Tho tote l weight-, ou'bege '-nd plr ce of storrege of rni eeutpment end supplies merked for shipmrrt to eeo% Port of Embrrketion for this force will be report(-d to the Commrnding Gen r^1, Services of Supply; the Port Comrnders Pnd the F.orce Coinninder. Seprrrte instructions concorning the locrding of thses units w ill (3) rt. be issued by the Vr r Drpr rtmen

Ammunition end p est control ee uipmrent shipped to the Port, (4) mrerked "TO ACC TRPS" undcer seTprrp te instructions will br: ssiled to tropes prior to dobrkelti.on.
(5) Rptions shipored to the Port, mrrked "FORZ ISSUE", under serrte instructions. will be issued prior to emberketion.

Two covers, (6) gn s mr sk cp rrier of

'erch

protect: ve,

individuri,

ill

bp

crrtied

in

the

individur ll

10. Cost of tr#-ncnort~~tion of troops rnd in(rliduds inrcluding the ns of S,-otinn TTI, Circulrr shipment of things will b-- governe-d by the , 206, W. D. ,19 42

rrovisi

By order of thn Sncre-tr ry

of

1"Tr:

Pssistrnt Chief of Strff

TTOM!'' S T.* ITTA ±fDY,

OFFIC IAL:
s/ J.A. Ulio
J. A. UU@a, Mjor Genera! 1, The .Adjutrmt Generel1. 2 Inclosures
Incl.

Oprrtions ;)ivi sion,

. DG.S .

No.

Inol. No. COPIES FURj'IS 1E.D: The Commending Genelsl1 Army Groun~d Forcens; Srrices of 'Supply; Fourth Servicr Commrnd; Alp for Gpnerr l E. N. IHr rmon;
Chief,

1 - Instructions Applicr'ble to Units Ordered Oversees (:frevis ion, of September 1. 1942) (furnished eddr(essors, stet nns, end units conet~rrd only) 2 - (1Annex)

Armored

Force;

The Chiefs of Supply Servic-s, Srrvilcrs of "upply; The Chief of Trensport- ti.on Corps, Servicps of Supply; The Divisions of the T'r D-prrtment 7 Genprrl. Strff.

Annex to

IM1ovement 0rd~rs, Shipment 3324

UT\

TT

Off
VTO

E1
21

ye 7

Ho& Ho

Det Combtt Cmd "tB" 2d Armnd Div (less det)

7

2d Bnz67th Atmd Regt (w/rtchd Med (roilnf) ) (less Co F 'pnd less 3d Bn 67th Armd Regt (less dets) co B, 41st Armd Inf (less Det,
Pl, Co I,

acts)

17
10

223
223 145

11
0

aet) -4

-0
0

41st Armrd Inf

0
4

22 84 33 45 46 46

Btry C, 78th Amd FA- Bn (less det)

21

2d-P3.. Co
2d P1.

rmd Ron C, 82d A Bn (relnL') (less dpt)

2
1 1 1.

0
7 0 0 9

Co C. 17th Prrnd En3mr Bn (less drt)

1st P1. Co D, 17th 1Prmd Engr Bn
2d Pl. Co D, 17th Armd Fngr Bn 3d P1.
Btry

C, 443d

Sep CA Efn (A))

(1-)

134

Dot 142d Armd Si~g Co 2d Bn Se~c

0
1
-34

6 6
-

1 0

Mr~int

Co 67th Prmd Rr'gt (1rss dot) Tote 1

-9g-.'

GROUP?

2
14 21 19 19 24 11 1 34 0 2 45
1.7

2 Det. Ho & Ho Co, 67th. Prmd Rrgt 1 Co D, 67lth Armd Regt Det. 1 Det. Co E, 67th Armid Regt 1 Co B,41st Armd Inf Det. 1 41st Armnd Inf (less det) 1.P1. Co 0 2d P1. Co C, 82d Armd En Det, 0 Det. 2d P1. Co C, 17th Armnd Pngr Bn Btry C, 443d Sep CA En (AA) (1+M) (M) 1 5th P1. 0 Det, 142d Lrmd S~ig Co 0 2d Bn S~'o T~ri.nt Co 67th A rmnd Regt. Det. ~ ' Totr 1 Group, 2

20

19
22 0 12 1 9 2 0 . 102

I,

NOTE:

158 1079 56 Grrnd Totr l grown, r dd number of g~roup In mr rkilng Pru { nrnt to Indictr ^ soeciflo to Shipment I\Tumer and hotter ( Exrm-ple: 3324-A-1)

UNCLASSWFIEb

(2) Tho units flnd detrchm~ents. in this shi mpnt will tyke such is deeraeid necess-cry by the orgeni rpetionrl end other ruthoriked erruiortent Other'e~uipment, vehicles end Comm-onding. Generrl, 2d l'rmor"Ad Division. s deterrnkned by the Commrnding General, 2d their lords will be shi-ned Prmored Division, rfter consultiltion with the Commrnding Generel, New York Port' oc kmberkction.

rs

r

h

(3)

The following

Pdd~tionel

itemns will rlso be trken:

<)

C

e,.Compass,

11-1Oe_

Bedsroks or covers, mrttress (two per indivi dul) watch (one -orr N3O not otherwise Authorized) not technicirns) !""r Boots; r bber, hip (one ppir per 100 mrn) . Bars, mosquito, snndfly type (one per individuial) , F Heednets, indsruito (one per individurl) Gloves, mosruito (one peir Aer 20 individurls) ce deeir lens, with rdditionel colored Goggles, lens (one pair per individu^el' p5ersonnel.6' Rpspirrtors, dust (one Apr individuel not otherwise. rut' orized)

tnll'nurpose,

01;

1:11ed

(4) P'~rsonnel in this novement will be Prred with not more then one weapon as follows-: Pistols, nutometic Yone M em~bers of terk crewis rnd drivers of self-nrooelled miounts only -Officers of fPld -rd cornp'rry grr-de, wrrr-nt offi cers, NICO's of ' 1st three

I~

cc 1.45

grhdes (not technioirns) Ell now, ruth-.
orized r rPistol tnder T/BI~ or specirl list of e. Mior nt, rnd EM now ruth" orized guans, pub-r,,chine crl-..45 All othe~r R4 of the units --x^(-pt Medicel p'rrsonr'el
,

Rifles, c;-l. 141903

.30

..

b. To Be Shipped to the I
(1)

York ,ew

Port of Einb-rk-tion.

:

Lt~i1

~~

The Curterm~ster Gpn~r^. will shini: (?Br sed on %& officers end men) (a Mprked: 3324-W..C)M-I

60 days' Clpss I supplies, r" tions to be Tyne B (less BRR.AD component; substituting therefor: Type C BTSCTTTT) to include crrdy, tobecoo, toilet erticles, and other items list-d in WVD

Cir.
RE~GR.ADED UNC /SSEI~fIE 15 dte 2 Ma

Vo.

245, 'July 25,

1942.

by 4tthrt

hor6.t~,T

o

Par 2,

' CrculaiI

Xb .

~

i

$

9
(b) Mr rked 3324-QMJ.-TO P CC TRPS

REGRADED (JNGLASSIF'IM by

Authority of Par 2, VTD Circ r 150 dated 28 11by 19 60 G ai.C Cav. TA A

8 deys' rptions, Type C 1 day's rp tions, Type D 4 days' re tions Type K (c) Mprked: 3324.W.QM.~ FOR ISSUE

1 doyts re ttons, Type 0 1 deys t retfinns, Type D 2 dpys t rvptions, Type K

(a) Marked;

3324.W..QM:

III

G~soline V80, 175,000 g--s (to be shipped in 5 gri, contpiners) (2) The Surgon Generpl will ship the following: (1'"sed on 250 officers %'nd men)

Mrsrke d:

3 324-.W-MF D

30 dpys' medic^l sunrl.es (3) The Chief of Chemicrl Wrrfpre Service will ship the .. , '._ following: (a) Marked: 24 Mpsks, (b) Marked: 3324.41-CWS grs, service

3324--W1-VEHiICLE hand, smoke, HC,

340 Grenrdes, (c) Marked:

M8

3324-41 heed, smoke, Hi, M8

340 Grenr des, (4)

The Chief of Ordnence will shin the following: (a) Marked: 3324- W-OR.D-III

Engi ne Oil

(2.'104-A)

SAE 30 in

Bnginr~e Oil (2-104A)'SiF- 50 in et errs Univ Ge'pr Lubr W L-761, Cl I I, S.PE 90 in 25 lb pr ils Grens e GP #1 '(2-.107) in 5 lb.:f c ,ns or Gre~s(,GP #2 (2-108) 25 lb pf~ils in 5 lb clrns or

'1

I rt orns

1200 gal1 12670 g-l 4180 lbs 2030 lbs
275 lbs

ON

IFIED

MFIED

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

by Authority of' Par 2Y, DCi~r ul r 150 dated
TAS

I
200

3M

/4

lb s

5 lb cons or 25 lb n-ils Grpo'se, Wrter Ptlmo #1 (2-.109) in 1 lb c-rns (The items -bove will be nrcked ^s follows: Engine Oil, 12 , lot cpns per cflse Univ Gepr Lubr .. 1 - 25 lb opil pier arse Grepses (extent 6 5 lb arts per arse, or Watet Pump Grease) 1 - 25 lb pril per cpse Wvpter Pumr Grep se - 10 -1 lb cons per case (b) ITEM
Ctg,

10 lb s

Ammunition will be shipoed rierked es-,indiaoted: 3324",W.n 332 4..Deck VEHICLE TOTAL

Ball, Cal. .30 (5 rd/clip) 52, 500 Ctg, Ball, Cal.. .30 (8 rd/clip) 935,424 Ctg, A P & T,Ctel. .30 (belted, 9..1)

52,500
935, 424

105,000
1,870,848

762,500
102,000 70,755 160

762, 500

1,5250000
320,000 141,510 320 160, 80

Ctg, Ball), Ce).. .45 (20/ctn) 12,000 Ctg, AP & T, Ca)l. .50 (linked 9.-1) Shell, HE, 37mm T & AT Gun Shot, AP, 37mm, T & AT Gun Canister, 37mm T & AT Gun Shell, HE, 37mm Ai Gun
Shot,

80
40
2, 700

116,000 70,755 160 80 40

2,700
300
'150

5,400
600

SP,

AG 37mm A

un
8). mm Mort r 81 mm Mlortrr m T~nk Gun 75mmi TvkkrGun

300'.
150 600

Shell, Shell, Shell, Shell,

HE, Light, Smoke, TIP, HE, NC, 75 Smoke, WP,

300

2,550
270
850

6 00 2, 550. 270
850

1,200
5,100 5:40

Shot, AP,

Shell, Shell, Smoke, TM, 105 mm Howitzer Signepl, Ground, Assorted Grrne de, he'n d, frpg,, Mk I11 ) Grene de, hend, ofIfers.5vo, Mk lII .. Grenende, rul1e, AT, M9A 1 Mines, PT, HE, Ml

75 mm Tr'nk Gun HE, 105 mm Howitzer

1,700

2.700 675 250 325 400 583 770

2,700
675 325 400 583, 770

5,400
1, 350 250 650 800

1,166
1,540 3,9F8, 914

In Addition, p m.munition erup1 to the totr]. for each (c) tyne irdiccted, in col, 5, pr grnh 8 b (4) (b) cAbove, will be shipped, mn rked: 3324.IW-0RD-Vl. Ammunition erupl to the totel for erch tyrpe (d) In rdditim), indiopted in col.. 5. t^rcgr rh, 8 b (4) (b) Above will be shipped, r rked:

(5)

The Chi ef of Engineers Marked:

will-ship

the following:

FOR PORT PNGR 7)
insecticide

250
250

- 2 oz cor,
-2

oz bottle, flying insect repellent,

it

I prREGRADIED
7.Ya.CveT

UBsC1ASSIFI D by Authority O~ Par 2, 17D Circular 150 dated. 28 Aay 46. S

SInstructions Reference Shimpnts to

the

Port.

(1) Shipments will be prpred so as to rerch the, New York P-ort of' Embarkation on October 10,1942, but will be shiprncd on cs'll of the Port Commader .only. (2) Shipments for t specific unit will be inerked Ps follows:

TO:

PORT TRf!NTS 0

N Y P of'

BROOKLYN,

11 Y

Enter here, "~ 3324-W" find i-nedirtely und:ernr---th, inclosed in, prrenthesep,, the shipment number rnd letter 'essigned the tretzel unit 332441 to which the eruipment belongs. For exr male:

(1441l-B)
(3)
addressed
above*

as

A 11 other shipments of eruipmen.t and sup-lies will be above, with specific mnarkings Gs indim-'eted in sub-.prrgrrph b

d.

Other Instructions.

(1) One dry's rrti-1ns, Type C; one day's rations, Type D; two drys' rations, Type K rnd 2,1units of fire for individunli md outometic wnpons in the hands of troops will be stored eboerd trpr~snorts so a s to be repdily evailrble during the voyrge. The units of fire for mdividmial arms weepons will be issued to the troops pr~or to debrrkrtion.

Pnd

(2) A list of orgs'nizetionnl i~nd other QutIhorized eruiometh trken by ech unit and detechment srlist of bbher eruipment, vehicles rend their loeds in this shipment w7.ll be mrele by the Conriprding Gorernl, Zd Air-pred Division. Two cooies of the list of eruivment will be furn~ished each, the Commanding Generel,. Services of Supnly send the: Port Comnnnder.

Pnd

(3) The totpi w-eight, cubrgne rrd nl'ce of storrge of ell eruipErb~rkrtior for this ment end supplies nrer-red for shirmernt to the ?-)rt movement will be reported to the Comrrnding Generrl, Services of' supply e nd the Port Commrrnder.

if

(4) S ep^ rpte irnstructions' coney rn lng the will be issued by the Wf-r Depertment. (5)
will 'be plrced aboard shins by the Port to the troops prior to debarkation.

lording
Officer

of the force

Pest control erni-orient shipred to the Port prior to den-rture,

'ngineer

end

will be issued

(6) Two cvr, protective, individual, will be carried in the gas mask cFerriea of etch individual,

O c)

A&&

,_ ..

~7f/~~

V t/C~

U N

.
{.:. ,

n

REGRADED UCIASSIN]D by Authority of r 150 dated 28 E'Iay 460 ~ia Par 2, M C'D

Cost of tr~rsrortption of troops 'end individurls including the 10. shipment of things, will be governed by the provisions of Section NI, Circulpr 206, W.Da,2.942. By order of the Secretpry of Wsar:

THOW4PS T. HA;,DY Assistrnt Chief ofSte.ff Op err~tions Division,W.D.G.S.
OFFICIAL:

s/
J.

J.

A.

Ulio

A . U11:1

Msjor Gen Frn l The Adjutnnt Gener&1. 1.InclosureInc

#1..

-instructions

An-picenble yo

Units Ordered Oversees. (Revisions of Septe'mber 1, 1942) Sti'tion end (furnished Units concerned, only)

Addrpss'hes,

COIES FLJRrISH D:

The

Comme~nding Genrr

is, Army Ground Forces; Services of Sunoly; Fourth Service Commpnd;
Ft.. Bra gg, 'N.C.

The Chief of the A~rmored Force; Distribution Division, SOS; Ple~ns Division, SOS; M'ovements Brsench, Plenm Division, 50 ; The Divisions of'the W~r Deprrtment Generr. Steff. Epch Stp'tlon Listed in p-r~grRph 1, FOR TNFORMlhTION ONLY.

RGRADED

Par 2, WAR DEPPRTI-TIT

MD

TiC LAS

I' IM byr Authority of Circular 150 dated 28 ~ 46. Iva j CAS TAS3

COPY '.____40._ October 10, 1942

Wre shirgton_
370.5 (10-.9-42) OB-.S-E-I' WIVD
SUBJECT: Amiendmnent

No.

1 to Movement Orders,
:Auth: T. A. G. InTitirls___ ___ *Dete: 1N-..lO:.

Shipment 3324-sW TO: The Commending Generals, 2d Armored Division New York Port of Rmbnrkrtion The Chief of Trrnsnortrtion Corgis. Services of Sunnly The Chiefs of Supply Services, Spr'vicew of Supply

Letter, this office, WD 370.5 (9-30-42)03-S. E-sM, October 2, 1942, Movement Orders, Shipment 3324-WV, is imerided vs'follows: Suloject: Change Supply Pnrrgrrph ps follows: a. Under p erpgrnph 9 a (1) Drewers, wool,, b.

(a)

del ete the following:

Add

ptregreph 9 a (l)

(c)

=s follows:

Drawers rend un5Aershirts will be issued on th, following besis: Drnwrrs "rnd undershirts,
Drrwers ,nd undershirts,
c.

cotton. (3 rich rier EJ:A) wool (2 erch ppr EM)

Under 'pregrrrh 9

A

(3)

delete the following:

Anti-gps cerne (1 p er individurl# Ointment, protective (1 -tube per indl.viduel) Imprognite, shoe (1 tube r -r individual) d. Addl nrrgreh 9

P

(5)

rs

follows:

Irnnregn'-ted clothing end e-,uio'ert will ba issued to erch individupl in this riovemrnt on the following basis: 1.suit, outer clothing:
1

(Shirt end Trousers, end leggings)

OD, wool,
*Ill,

suit,

working

(one-piece

herringbone

bes-d on T/BA puthorizetion for units Prid -perms. mneohFaics of sonnel of Armored Divisions on>4

A~F

.l.

Of A ft [1, U

SR

REGRADED U4C LASSIF IUD by Authority of Par 2,..M Ci . 150 dated 28 flay,46.

1daj. Cay.TA, 2 covers, protective, individir 1 1 hood, wool, Droteotire 1 -or, of gloves,cotton, protective 1 tube ointmeont, protectivp 1 tube innognito, shie e. Chpnge th- ~Prroprii'te n-rt of prrgr-nh 9 b (1) rs follows: The Quarter",-'ster Generrl will ship: to

reed

(Breed on 500 Officers end rmen)

f~

Add p~rrt~'ph 9

d

(7)

rs

fbllows:

Units nre Puthorizrpd to tike to ovr-rsers destinption r11 public Pddress ecruipment now in their possession.
By order of thie Sr-cretpry of
TTTOMS T.

Wrr:

Operations
OFF1CIPL:

I!ssist-nt

iPNDY

Chief of Stpf f
Division, 'iN. D. G. S.

sl J. A. Ulio
J.
t.

UL TO

Maor Goner-1

The Adjutent Gener'-1

COPIES -FUJRIB'IS HED:

The

Conrmndi.ng Gener^ls, Lrmy Ground FPorces

Services of Suroly Fourth Service Cor^d Ft. Bragg, N. C. The Chief of the Armored Force Distribution Division, SOS Plpns Division., SOS
M~ovements

Brench', Pl~'ns Division, SOS
of the Wr r Depp rtment

The Divisions

Geneorl Steff Erch Strtion listed in pp'regreph 1, FOR INvFOMVT I1N ONLY.

Uri

gg

REGROAED UNCJASSIAED by Autkir~r y of Par 2, 'Ma j Cav. TAB S Dt 1946. ~TNEW YORK PORT
-

yC-"4
i.

datcu

WPAR DP:RTENT OF EMBJ RKf TIONBROOKLYN, N. Y.

COPY NO

HW,/a js October 6, 1942

SPTP.A, 370.5 SUBJECT: TO

OPD' (TV4) Shioment 3324-VT

Movenent Orders,

H C
.

The Cor iding Genorp1, 2nd -Armored Division, Fort Bra gg, N. Co

Initials s ZO« Data:

T.JO,:
T
t

a.

1.

REFERENCE:

Secret Immedin te Action letter. from, the ,Adjutant Genera 1, WD 27. mmE .d.. (9..30-42)oB.S.E.Mp deteii October 2, 1942, S ubject: As rbove, To: The a s above, and including others. ing General 2. MOVEMENT AND STAGING OF PERS ONN<EL: Confirming telephone instructions of October 5, 1942, from this Headquarters- to iHeacurteirs, 2nd 1Prmored Division, it i8 reruosted that Unit 3324.1V be moved from its p resent statiPcn to Fort Hamilton, New York, stra as to arrive not la ter the n 1600 on October 10, 194.2.
3

,r

PERSOVNNEL PROCEDURPE:

before derprture from The p ersonnel p rocedure to be New York of "Embarkrtion home station is set forth in Sect .on Port of Emberkstion, " a copy of which hp s be en mp iled to the Unit.

'I

rccomiplished

'Reguirtions,

4.

CLOTHTNG AND EQUIPrENT: epuipment euthorized to be taken from officers' foot lockers and bedding rolls, end essentials administrative ecuipment will occompany troop s to the Stagizig Area.

a. Cl-thing and individupl home stations, both berracks bags, field ranges end kitchen equwhfbngnt which is to be carried aboard ship,

b. Al1 1 organizationel eouipment (including vehicles, other tha n tha t referred to in Paragraph 4a, will be shipppd immedietely, by rail, to the Port. Transportation Officer,. New"York Port of Embarkation, Ba y Ridges Long Island, New York, to arrive not later thin October 10th.

c. The Unit Commander i. s recuestod to wite the Fort Transportation cr conteaining organi.zational ec Officer the csar number and cont;nts ofM car~s hxmtof equipment and vehicles, end the route used, immedipte y uo
f'rom
NOTE:
home station.

1MCJRS'BGGEFIDRAGSADKTHNQUPN,

ATENTTON OF THE UNITS IS DIRECTED TO THE FACT T~FT B.RRaCKS BA-GS P.ND EPOS, INIIa~ EL NT BE L .PREN1T E, SH I 7N V rA~ ASKS AND HELMETS , OINTMENT, PROTE

I-so

ITS YDC
T1U TTG 1!EMOP2AADIJ)

.1ETRS SUB41T.PS
GOAL1 POST-

FORCE

21 October 1942

1.

GRBTV L

a. Durirng trig voyrge every ririleble moment miust be devoted to eve irntensive twtining orogrrm to the ernd rli in dividurls of this coilmmnder will be wmentelly end physically prenrred to rchieve VICTORlY regprdless of the hostile resister e, or nr~vettm-) involved, b. Becr-usp of szncce :li t ti ns ebo- rd shin.~ trrinir.g must be de. centrhlized in order thr^t -p11 mon recerive m-xtmiu'n benefits. Crreful Supervision by brittclion rnd hir hc' r cormrders is necessry to echi-evo re ~ired strnderd. co Combet term co imnders f-nd commerndrers of trooos -bor~rd rll ships will conduct schools orch ni:-ht to discuss trrining of the day read mrthods of~ treininp' for following dry. N C.O. instructors us-d should cttend theso schools. d. Instruction wll include the following subj ects: (1) Booby Traps., Lecture i-rnd Deronstrrt' ns. Reference: Altteched rmimeogr%-pWsh ,Wbjfect "Booby Traps" under supervision of Engin~e (2) Respect of Custms~ of the Inh bitnnts. Le'ctures. Refereno.; ttacohed mimeogrrn sheo 3 rgr signed by Hobert R. Gey, Colonel, V enprel Ste~ff Cores. (3) Orientetion Lecture. Reference: 1,ttcched lemorsndum, subject, "Vittd Infon t*_ on*7a uct of U. S. Troops, H~ee doue rters Task Force "A", deted October 15, 1942" and namphlet "North Africa." Plece Posters in (4) Cemouflege Demonstrrtions end Lectures. Prominent Pil ces,. f71res (r Attocshed letter seine subject drted October 13, 1942

(No heading).
(c) (d) (e)
(f)

"Coneel1ment in Fiel d." Cr mnouflr ge Bulletin No. 125. List of Dot s end Don'ts.

Trrining 1.emorendun Flo, 16, Jul~y 1942. (5) Y4eapcns. (Army) Opere-tio,:, Functioningr, end Firing' Gunrnery (ITv). X7 i1d'77 e z~ insrutinwFTFwi 1 include fir ng o -eneb hirm to nnrte -3 wP- pons*- A~n extre crow of soldiers will betreined for each Nedver M:! gun including heevy Crliber end-:,50 Crliber MG. T'here possible Army AM (Recuest cooperetion of Transport Gunnery Officer.) Double crews willb( guns will be mounted on deck to suppTement lT'vrl 111 Guns, trained end essigned erch of-these guns. (6) Individu.wl Trein .ng in the New Wferoons. nmndrs *71-^k Tm dipte steps to see Qmb71F e that they hrve e proper orgenizrtionrl set-up for tho emnployment end trpining Sf' the rigle enti-trnk grenade end rocket grenade units; Fnd for the individ'u ~raining in their use. These wes-pons should- not be conoentrated, but should be ecuelly distributed throughout the Combat Teem. The 6Qcket grenade is- e vrercpon of opportunity, tadding tro-mendous fire power tothe Combat Team. Crews should be -trained in the use of

"Lecture

on" Concerlinent'-

Y~o.

2,"Cetdin

Army

is weapon end it should be employed in oombpt, close up in rear Of the well ¢s -sseult ?letbons where it can be used to supoplement mortrr fireto meet any tenk cittrcks thrt mpy Yhrerten the rssFUlt troons. These wrnO-tns should b-e ssigned to companies rnd emprloyed under the ordere of the Thmrry Gommender. There cre rt present 8 of theso werpons r. signed to ech brttr-lior' (7) Deb-rkrtion Drills. pri od -P 11 units will conduct regalrr a uigti scheduled debrrkrtion drills rt lerst twice e-ch d-y for first five drys rnd once Prch dry therprfter till D Dry. (b) Deberk.^tion drills will be c-inducted Ps follows: 1. Pt r specified time rnd rt cipll from ship's spepkDn system troops will rer~ot to borernn str'tion with r l the ervipnent they. ne

Os

to ce rry

oshore.

lit next signel boet groups for 1st wave will move 2. cuickly from their concedled positions below docks to their assigned nets. Each succeeding; wrve will be brought to the nets in rlike menner. The preoeeding boat group moving out of the wry so as not to interfere with the mover ment in generel. Borst groups must move to 'their essigned zets with no cross tr~ffic and no confusion. 3. A very ereful rnrlysis of ech ship must be mede by rll commernders :to determine the best bort groun steti_ ins, the best ammunition distribution points rnd the best routes of trrffic, (8) Physical Treinin.F Drill on. Nets rnd Celisthenics with '7 P.n will. be set un on higher decks to enrble ets Rifles and Submch th e o clmup dn doyn nets for hrerdening exercises. Troop Commrndlers "e enc-mr~gnd to co)nduct contrsts in nret work, steedle ch-ses rnd rqble fighting -- wrestling . boxing;, etc, 11'ni.m, m of physic'-l training - 2. -hour doily. Individurl combet, rrred nd uinrrrrd should be given snecirl
-rough

Pttrntion.

(9) References:

Identification of Frie~ndly Pirorr ft end IPrrored Vehicles
( )

(b) Task Force

Idontifietion Chrrts. Preinphlet Allied Borco Hendrurrters "Ground Identifi.

etion of A~rmored VehicLost,"

Behaviour if Captured. Reference: v:emorerndum Eeedruartets drt dct <ober 15, 1942. (11) First 11d. Prectiod1 work in terms under superision of 'Medical Officers

"A",

(10)

2. It is believed itht each ship is. sup-plied with certrin Tlotion pidt.. ure Training Films. As Frngerrnts should be mp de with the Executive Officer for the use of such of these-P fims rs rr -ppropriete.
povts besed upon the above progrem..

3. Training Schedules will be nreprred by Troop Oomrirnders of TrrnsInsneotions will be Tw-d drily by Troop
44

Commrnders to determine thrt the treining schedules r re being followed.

Signrl Trrining, a, Treining of cormunietion personnel nborrd rll shins will be ??hsrs

e resnonsibility of rdl Signrl Corps rnd Comunicrtions Officers. the training to, be esnecirlly covered vrer

(1)

Rm dio Oorrtors 3r Use of lnk cr11 sic ns
(b)

- Rrdo Se-curity Use of joint lriny- rvy Proc dure. -r 2

(d)
(e) in nets of 3.or 4.

(c)

Use of joint Aniericrn - British Procedure. Luthentication, Phonetic IAlphebet, Rtdiotellephone operrtion using phonos (EE--A)

connecto'"

(2)
the units.

'Messrge Centrer Personnel., U~se of nil t-rpes of node rnd cipher mreteripKL used by (r)

Training should be towr~rd F'ccurreoy first en~d speed second, (b) Phonetic Alrhr bet, b. Generrl cl~sses of commuriertion personnel rend r11 officers show prorpr methods c be held covering the writing of nessrgeg, !ph-onetic Plhbt event of erpture, rn, distruction of cryptogrmphic rnd signrl eruinment in the complete nderstrnding by ell concerned of the commrunioetion networks to be i. ste led. c. Drily cheok of items of Sz gnr l Fruipmrnt will be neoes s -ry to insure its prop,-r onerrtion urnon lendin~g.

By commirnd of Brig-dier Gener'-l TRUSCOTT:
DOLT E. CPTRLETON, Colonel, Crvrlry Chief of Strff.
OFF IC

LA L: A/
Van H, VAN H. BOND, i.Nr.j or,

-pond
G-3

AC

Infantry,

of S,

".

3q.

RE~GRADED UNCLASSIFIED by Authority of Ciroular 150 dated. 28 r.ay P'ar.2

It is requested tha t a 11. concerned be enjoined to comely with the provisions of secrecy in Peregrnph 3a of the "lkistructi.ons Applicable to Units Ordered Oversees,"(Revision 9-1-42), end of Pa regrtnh ib, pege 11, in Secti , I of the "Enberkation Regultions, New York Port of Em~kto,"1-112 For the .Commending, General:

CALVIN
Colonel,

DeWjVITT, JR.,O

General Siaff Corp s,

Chief of Stuff.
OFF ICTAL: s/ H. Wright H.WR IGHT

Capts in, T, C, Asst. AC of S, OPD._ DIS TRIBUJTION: Local
1 1

CG,
-CG,
-

AGF

SOS
"

12. AC of S, 2.
.1
-

Opns.

G--2 VID G-4
1AUD.

Div,

G.S .

1 - Plans Div, S .0. S. 5 - TA G 5 - CG, End P rmored Div 5 - CG, 4th SC 5 - C of Arnored Force The Surgeon General1 1' 12. C of Ord 12. C of Fin 1 -C of ClkZ of Eng 1 -C Sig 0 1-C 2
-QMG

5

-

C

of

T S erv

C of SS Br C of Army Exr Serv 1 -IG 1 - PING 1 - CG, Ft Bragg, N.C. 1 2.
-

6

-Old

Meh

Rods

Div,

2nd S C

1 - Pass Branch Movements Br 2.-

5 - CO, 1 2. 1

Ft Hamilton, N.Y.

12. Lt Col Rowland

Major Iffllpch
.JAG -Posta

1 Officer
2-

__

SFE
(9-30-42) 0BE-S'-E-M
MovementOrders,

COPY NO* WAR DEPARTMENT We shington

WD 370.5 SUBJECT: TO:

October 2, 1942 Shipment 3324--W :AuthT T: A. G.. In3,1 es______ :Date: l.24

The Comminding Generel8, 2d Armored Divisions;. New York Port of Embirkti on; The Chief of Trpnsportation Corps, Services' of-Supply The Chiefs of Suopiy Services

Lo It is desired ;thpt you take without delry, the Pction for which you are responlsible to prep~re for foreign service end to move the unit end detrchments and vehicles listed below to the New Yok~k Port of Embi'rktion (for further movement- by w~ter trrnsriort-stion) 'so es to r'rri've et .time to be determined by the, port. cenmrnder. The Commend ing Geiaerel, New York Port of Emberk-tidn, will inform the rg~ncies concerned of the time end d-te unit, detrecbments rnd vehicles ocoomn-rying them rre desired Pt the port, Code

Design

-ti on.

Present
Strt1_on

(Shipment N'o,

Commprder responsible for pre-narrrt nn & move"-

Approximr~te

Strengths,

UNIT end letter) ment to the port 0fT'FVTVe Hqs & Hqs C0,0 .3d 3 2~W F.lrrgg, N" C, d Armd 17 -231 209 Bn, 67th Armd Regt (3-1-42) (and other'. stetion Div. w C.l) w,/dets of the 2d Armd or stetions if Div attchd applicstle (8-.-.42)j (Composition end
Sstrengths 'of

de.

trehments to be deterrined by the CG, 2d f rmd Div. )

In issuing instuctions end dissomineing informnrtion to subordinpte echelons in connection With this order, the gr~et~est core will be exercised to divulge only pertinent portions.
Code designation (Shipment-No. rnd letter) will be used in referring to this movement in Aieu of unit design-ption. (For mril Address, see Por.- 5 . 2. The -Commending General, 2d Prmored Divisi.on,E will design-te the commnnder of this shipment And will incform the Cdmmt'nding Generpl, New York Port of Emb-prket.'on, of the rction trken, without. deley.,4his officor will Derform the duties of P force commrrder _Ps outlined in Inclosure #1 ,frd ^s Z 1. additionally ins trusted. , RJAED UNC1I
150 dated. 28 May 1 9 4 6

SIFIED bv, Authority of 'far Z, WD; Circular
,° /.~

fIN O

3. Personnel. The strengths shown in ptr.#l tire eoaproxcimate,-only. The Comnsnding (enersi, 2d Armored. Division, is Puthorized to mpke such adjustments in strength ss he deems necessary within the lifnits imposed by nweilrble shipping speee. 4. This

is o

PERMNENT chrenge of station.

5', All personnel t~ffected by this order will be informed thpt they will continue to hnve mail addressed Ps et present until receipt of' further instructions.
pnd/or motor) rner (ril 6. Movement to: the port will be' mr~de in' the ni! Gener~l, 2d Armored- Division. Pttention invited determined by the Commrdng to W.D. Circular 193, 1942.

In this c-nnection, Direct cormmunicption is puthoriznd, 0. of September 1, 194?). 2, Inclosure #1 (Revision

see prr.

8. Pertinent pr'rts of' the provisions of Inclosure #1 (Revision of' September 1, 1942) are-wo-olieble to this movement re moftified below: Reference per. 6 Reports on shortpges of' eeutpnwent rlreeidy submitt~d need not be, reported P second time. b, c, Delete
Delete

PLO

per.

9, g (5).
,(6)

n pr r. 12,, c

d. Delete per.. 15, "15.

substituting.-therefor:

Personnel YOT to/ eccomipeny Unit.

a. Yo. officers, wrrrent officers or enlisted men of' units rssigned to ur-its in this order will be trensferred therefrom without e~pprov). of' the Commending Generml of the Tosk Force to whicoh this order permins, extent those belonging to the following crtegories:

(1) Th~ose rbsen~t without lerive rind those whose physicrl condition-hre been determined to be such thrt, they will be ur.:ble, to procued. ove-rsees with their unit.
Those werrrnt officers, pnd enlisted men who hr-ve (2) been finelly-selected to Pttend P specific cless rt rrn officer crndidrte school under P ruotr rlloted by the' lr~r Dep~rtment, in Pecordmn with prrrgretphs 2 b (4) rrnd 8 d, Circular No. 126, IPrr Dfepnrtrnent, 1942. Those officers, wrrriynt officers rnd en~i. tedl ien (3) who apply for, Pre Pnund rulified for, end rro rccepted for Air Crew

(flying)

-nd Glider Pilot Trrining.

(4) REGROLDD

Enemy Mliens.

f

NCL S$IFIED by liuthority of Par 2, VMD Circul.ar

150 dated 28 IHay

1946.9Y

(i/{

'b, With ref erpee to finol selection for Offi.cers Grndi datp Schools 7ird method of tr'-nsfier of ernlisted met., s-e W.D. Ciroulr 126, PApril 28, 1942 end T. D, ircu1l~r 262, Pugust 5, 194210.
c. As 'soon rs prrotio~bl( after rpccirt of wrrning orders unit commenders whrough intrlligence oh'-nnels will furnish to the Military -Intelligence Sevice, Wr r Dep-ortmernt, the xrmrs of individurls in their orgirnizrtioris who Pre de-med to be potentiallyysubversive end are therefore consider-d unfit'for foreign service. The specific facts upon which this determinotion is br~sed should be stated in ea.ch, ese.

d. With reference td instrulctiotans 'f rillit-ating the naltur-l . iz~etion of non-citizen members of the firmy of the United Strtes who des ire. to become citzens of the United Stotes, attenrtion is invited to letter,this office, June 9, 1942, AG 014,.32 (5-30-42)A.B, -subject, Naturplizati.on of Certain Non-citizens Serving in the Army of the United States, and letter, this office, -July 28, 1942,EA 014.32 (6-X24-.42)EA..B, same subject ej In connection with per. 16, a (3) (d) personnel not immunized P ainst Typhus st, present stptions will be so immunited after arrivpl at the port. f# In par. 17, b, chang? tho-word "Confidentirl" to repad "Secret".

9, Additional Instructions on Ammuniti on.

Clothing,

Wm~ipment, Surnlies and

a~' To Be Taken from, Present St-ti on. (1) Clothing (winter only) and individual eriimert will be taken by all unitd prescribed in Table of Brsic 1\lower-ces No. 20, 1942, end eharge No. 1.theireto, as modified br-low:

Ps

21,

Juno
)~

(a)

Reductions:; Caps, winter Overshoes,
Comforters, rt

4

~,~~.
.r
.

~

)JI014AZ
A~d~k

.:,

$r

f

ctic-ile

<5A~fl

(b)

Additions:

4, t

Gloves, wool OD (one pair Dnr MA, a total of two pairs) Sho*-s, service. (onP npir per EM, a total of three prirs) Socks, light wool (three pairs p er RM, total of six prs Blankets,wool OD.(onF per individual, a total of three) (Helmets, steel, Mll only will be teken_)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by, Authority of Par' 2, V.'D Citcular 150 dated 28 May 1946..

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