G.R. No.

97995 January 21, 1993

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND B.P. MATA AND CO., INC., respondents.

Roland A. Niedo for petitioner.

Benjamin C. Santos Law Office for respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

Rarely is this Court confronted with a case calling for the delineation in broad strokes of the
distinctions between such closely allied concepts as the quasi-contract called "solutio indebiti" under
the venerable Spanish Civil Code and the species of implied trust denominated "constructive trusts,"
commonly regarded as of Anglo-American origin. Such a case is the one presented to us now which
has highlighted more of the affinity and less of the dissimilarity between the two concepts as to lead
the legal scholar into the error of interchanging the two. Presented below are the factual
circumstances that brought into juxtaposition the twin institutions of the Civil Law quasi-contract and
the Anglo-American trust.

Private Respondent B.P. Mata & Co. Inc. (Mata), is a private corporation engaged in providing goods
and services to shipping companies. Since 1966, it has acted as a manning or crewing agent for
several foreign firms, one of which is Star Kist Foods, Inc., USA (Star Kist). As part of their
agreement, Mata makes advances for the crew's medical expenses, National Seaman's Board fees,
Seaman's Welfare fund, and standby fees and for the crew's basic personal needs. Subsequently,
Mata sends monthly billings to its foreign principal Star Kist, which in turn reimburses Mata by
sending a telegraphic transfer through banks for credit to the latter's account.

Against this background, on February 21, 1975, Security Pacific National Bank (SEPAC) of Los
Angeles which had an agency arrangement with Philippine National Bank (PNB), transmitted a cable
message to the International Department of PNB to pay the amount of US$14,000 to Mata by
crediting the latter's account with the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA), per order of Star Kist.
Upon receipt of this cabled message on February 24, 1975, PNB's International Department noticed
an error and sent a service message to SEPAC Bank. The latter replied with instructions that the
amount of US$14,000 should only be for US$1,400.

On the basis of the cable message dated February 24, 1975 Cashier's Check No. 269522 in the
amount of US$1,400 (P9,772.95) representing reimbursement from Star Kist, was issued by the Star
Kist for the account of Mata on February 25, 1975 through the Insular Bank of Asia and America
(IBAA).

However, fourteen days after or on March 11, 1975, PNB effected another payment through
Cashier's Check No. 270271 in the amount of US$14,000 (P97,878.60) purporting to be another
transmittal of reimbursement from Star Kist, private respondent's foreign principal.

Six years later, or more specifically, on May 13, 1981, PNB requested Mata for refund of US$14,000
(P97,878.60) after it discovered its error in effecting the second payment.
On February 4, 1982, PNB filed a civil case for collection and refund of US$14,000 against Mata
arguing that based on a constructive trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, it has a right to
recover the said amount it erroneously credited to respondent Mata. 1

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the complaint ruling that
the instant case falls squarely under Article 2154 on solutio indebiti and not under Article 1456 on
constructive trust. The lower court ruled out constructive trust, applying strictly the technical
definition of a trust as "a right of property, real or personal, held by one party for the benefit of
another; that there is a fiduciary relation between a trustee and a cestui que trust as regards certain
property, real, personal, money or choses in action." 2

In affirming the lower court, the appellate court added in its opinion that under Article 2154 on solutio
indebiti, the person who makes the payment is the one who commits the mistake vis-a-vis the
recipient who is unaware of such a mistake.  Consequently, recipient is duty bound to return the
3

amount paid by mistake. But the appellate court concluded that petitioner's demand for the return of
US$14,000 cannot prosper because its cause of action had already prescribed under Article 1145,
paragraph 2 of the Civil Code which states:

The following actions must be commenced within six years:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Upon a quasi-contract.

This is because petitioner's complaint was filed only on February 4, 1982, almost seven
years after March 11, 1975 when petitioner mistakenly made payment to private respondent.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari proceeding seeking to annul the decision of the appellate
court on the basis that Mata's obligation to return US$14,000 is governed, in the alternative, by
either Article 1456 on constructive trust or Article 2154 of the Civil Code on quasi-contract. 4

Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:

If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes.

On the other hand, Article 2154 states:

If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly
delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.

Petitioner naturally opts for an interpretation under constructive trust as its action filed on February 4,
1982 can still prosper, as it is well within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years as provided by
Article 1144, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. 5

If it is to be construed as a case of payment by mistake or solutio indebiti, then the prescriptive

period for quasi-contracts of six years applies, as provided by Article 1145. As pointed out by the
appellate court, petitioner's cause of action thereunder shall have prescribed, having been brought
almost seven years after the cause of action accrued. However, even assuming that the instant case
constitutes a constructive trust and prescription has not set in, the present action has already been
barred by laches.

To recall, trusts are either express or implied. While express trusts are created by the intention of the
trustor or of the parties, implied trusts come into being by operation of law.  Implied trusts are those
6

which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent
or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently
of the particular intention of the parties. 7

In turn, implied trusts are subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts.  A resulting trust is a trust
8

raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the
intention of which is found in the nature of the transaction, but not expressed in the deed or
instrument of conveyance.  Examples of resulting trusts are found in Articles 1448 to 1455 of the
9

Civil Code.  On the other hand, a constructive trust is one not created by words either expressly or
10

impliedly, but by construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. An example of a
constructive trust is Article 1456 quoted above. 11

A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense   for in a typical
12

trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is
called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of
the cestui que trust.  A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or
13

generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by
confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary
relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the
property for the beneficiary. 14

In the case at bar, Mata, in receiving the US$14,000 in its account through IBAA, had no intent of
holding the same for a supposed beneficiary or cestui que trust, namely PNB. But under Article
1456, the law construes a trust, namely a constructive trust, for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes, in this case PNB, for reasons of justice and equity.

At this juncture, a historical note on the codal provisions on trust and quasi-contracts is in order.

Originally, under the Spanish Civil Code, there were only two kinds of quasi contracts: negotiorum
gestio and solutio indebiti. But the Code Commission, mindful of the position of the eminent Spanish
jurist, Manresa, that "the number of quasi contracts may be indefinite," added Section 3 entitled
"Other Quasi-Contracts." 15

Moreover, even as Article 2142 of the Civil Code defines a quasi-contract, the succeeding article
provides that: "The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasi-
contracts which may come within the purview of the preceding article." 16

Indubitably, the Civil Code does not confine itself exclusively to the quasi-contracts enumerated from
Articles 2144 to 2175 but is open to the possibility that, absent a pre-existing relationship, there
being neither crime nor quasi-delict, a quasi-contractual relation may be forced upon the parties to
avoid a case of unjust enrichment.  There being no express consent, in the sense of a meeting of
17

minds between the parties, there is no contract to speak of. However, in view of the peculiar
circumstances or factual environment, consent is presumed to the end that a recipient of benefits or
favors resulting from lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts of another may not be unjustly enriched at
the expense of another.
Undoubtedly, the instant case fulfills the indispensable requisites of solutio indebiti as defined in
Article 2154 that something (in this case money) has been received when there was no right to
demand it and (2) the same was unduly delivered through mistake. There is a presumption that there
was a mistake in the payment "if something which had never been due or had already been
paid was delivered; but he from whom the return is claimed may prove that the delivery was made
out of liberality or for any other just cause."
18

In the case at bar, a payment in the corrected amount of US$1,400 through Cashier's Check No.
269522 had already been made by PNB for the account of Mata on February 25, 1975. Strangely,
however, fourteen days later, PNB effected another payment through Cashier's Check No. 270271 in
the amount of US$14,000, this time purporting to be another transmittal of reimbursement from Star
Kist, private respondent's foreign principal.

While the principle of undue enrichment or solutio indebiti, is not new, having been incorporated in
the subject on quasi-contracts in Title XVI of Book IV of the Spanish Civil Code entitled "Obligations
incurred without contract,"  the chapter on Trusts is fairly recent, having been introduced by the
19

Code Commission in 1949. Although the concept of trusts is nowhere to be found in the Spanish
Civil Code, the framers of our present Civil Code incorporated implied trusts, which includes
constructive trusts, on top of quasi-contracts, both of which embody the principle of equity above
strict legalism.
20

In analyzing the law on trusts, it would be instructive to refer to Anglo-American jurisprudence on the
subject. Under American Law, a court of equity does not consider a constructive trustee for all
purposes as though he were in reality a trustee; although it will force him to return the property, it will
not impose upon him the numerous fiduciary obligations ordinarily demanded from a trustee of an
express trust.  It must be borne in mind that in an express trust, the trustee has active duties of
21

management while in a constructive trust, the duty is merely to surrender the property.

Still applying American case law, quasi-contractual obligations give rise to a personal liability
ordinarily enforceable by an action at law, while constructive trusts are enforceable by a proceeding
in equity to compel the defendant to surrender specific property. To be sure, the distinction is more
procedural than substantive. 22

Further reflection on these concepts reveals that a constructive "trust" is as much a misnomer as a
"quasi-contract," so far removed are they from trusts and contracts proper, respectively. In the case
of a constructive trust, as in the case of quasi-contract, a relationship is "forced" by operation of law
upon the parties, not because of any intention on their part but in order to prevent unjust enrichment,
thus giving rise to certain obligations not within the contemplation of the parties. 23

Although we are not quite in accord with the opinion that "the trusts known to American and English
equity jurisprudence are derived from the fidei commissa of the Roman Law,"  it is safe to state that
24

their roots are firmly grounded on such Civil Law principles are expressed in the Latin maxim, "Nemo
cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest,"   particularly the concept of constructive trust.
25

Returning to the instant case, while petitioner may indeed opt to avail of an action to enforce a
constructive trust or the quasi-contract of solutio indebiti, it has been deprived of a choice, for
prescription has effectively blocked quasi-contract as an alternative, leaving only constructive trust
as the feasible option.

Petitioner argues that the lower and appellate courts cannot indulge in semantics by holding that in
Article 1456 the recipient commits the mistake while in Article 2154, the recipient commits no
mistake.   On the other hand, private respondent, invoking the appellate court's reasoning, would
26
impress upon us that under Article 1456, there can be no mutual mistake. Consequently, private
respondent contends that the case at bar is one of solutio indebiti and not a constructive trust.

We agree with petitioner's stand that under Article 1456, the law does not make any distinction since
mutual mistake is a possibility on either side — on the side of either the grantor or the
grantee.  Thus, it was error to conclude that in a constructive trust, only the person obtaining the
27

property commits a mistake. This is because it is also possible that a grantor, like PNB in the case at
hand, may commit the mistake.

Proceeding now to the issue of whether or not petitioner may still claim the US$14,000 it erroneously
paid private respondent under a constructive trust, we rule in the negative. Although we are aware
that only seven (7) years lapsed after petitioner erroneously credited private respondent with the
said amount and that under Article 1144, petitioner is well within the prescriptive period for the
enforcement of a constructive or implied trust, we rule that petitioner's claim cannot prosper since it
is already barred by laches. It is a well-settled rule now that an action to enforce an implied trust,
whether resulting or constructive, may be barred not only by prescription but also by laches. 28

While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches deals with the effect of unreasonable
delay.  It is amazing that it took petitioner almost seven years before it discovered that it had
29

erroneously paid private respondent. Petitioner would attribute its mistake to the heavy volume of
international transactions handled by the Cable and Remittance Division of the International
Department of PNB. Such specious reasoning is not persuasive. It is unbelievable for a bank, and a
government bank at that, which regularly publishes its balanced financial statements annually or
more frequently, by the quarter, to notice its error only seven years later. As a universal bank with
worldwide operations, PNB cannot afford to commit such costly mistakes. Moreover, as between
parties where negligence is imputable to one and not to the other, the former must perforce bear the
consequences of its neglect. Hence, petitioner should bear the cost of its own negligence.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner's claim against private
respondent is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 82670 September 15, 1989

DOMETILA M. ANDRES, doing business under the name and style "IRENE'S WEARING
APPAREL," petitioner,
vs.
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER & TRUST CORPORATION and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Roque A. Tamayo for petitioner.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which,
applying the doctrine of solutio indebiti, reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
CV, Quezon City by deciding in favor of private respondent.

Petitioner, using the business name "Irene's Wearing Apparel," was engaged in the manufacture of
ladies garments, children's wear, men's apparel and linens for local and foreign buyers. Among its
foreign buyers was Facets Funwear, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as FACETS) of the United States.

In the course of the business transaction between the two, FACETS from time to time remitted
certain amounts of money to petitioner in payment for the items it had purchased. Sometime in
August 1980, FACETS instructed the First National State Bank of New Jersey, Newark, New Jersey,
U.S.A. (hereinafter referred to as FNSB) to transfer $10,000.00 to petitioner via Philippine National
Bank, Sta. Cruz Branch, Manila (hereinafter referred to as PNB).

Acting on said instruction, FNSB instructed private respondent Manufacturers Hanover and Trust
Corporation to effect the above- mentioned transfer through its facilities and to charge the amount to
the account of FNSB with private respondent. Although private respondent was able to send a telex
to PNB to pay petitioner $10,000.00 through the Pilipinas Bank, where petitioner had an account, the
payment was not effected immediately because the payee designated in the telex was only "Wearing
Apparel." Upon query by PNB, private respondent sent PNB another telex dated August 27, 1980
stating that the payment was to be made to "Irene's Wearing Apparel." On August 28, 1980,
petitioner received the remittance of $10,000.00 through Demand Draft No. 225654 of the PNB.

Meanwhile, on August 25, 1980, after learning about the delay in the remittance of the money to
petitioner, FACETS informed FNSB about the situation. On September 8, 1980, unaware that
petitioner had already received the remittance, FACETS informed private respondent about the
delay and at the same time amended its instruction by asking it to effect the payment through the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB) instead of PNB.

Accordingly, private respondent, which was also unaware that petitioner had already received the
remittance of $10,000.00 from PNB instructed the PCIB to pay $10,000.00 to petitioner. Hence, on
September 11, 1980, petitioner received a second $10,000.00 remittance.

Private respondent debited the account of FNSB for the second $10,000.00 remittance effected
through PCIB. However, when FNSB discovered that private respondent had made a duplication of
the remittance, it asked for a recredit of its account in the amount of $10,000.00. Private respondent
complied with the request.

Private respondent asked petitioner for the return of the second remittance of $10,000.00 but the
latter refused to pay. On May 12, 1982 a complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
CV, Quezon City which was decided in favor of petitioner as defendant. The trial court ruled that Art.
2154 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to the case because the second remittance was made
not by mistake but by negligence and petitioner was not unjustly enriched by virtue thereof [Record,
p. 234]. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Art. 2154 is applicable and reversed the RTC
decision. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered in favor of plaintiff-appellant and against defendant-appellee
Domelita (sic) M. Andres, doing business under the name and style "Irene's Wearing
Apparel" to reimburse and/or return to plaintiff-appellant the amount of $10,000.00,
its equivalent in Philippine currency, with interests at the legal rate from the filing of
the complaint on May 12, 1982 until the whole amount is fully paid, plus twenty
percent (20%) of the amount due as attomey's fees; and to pay the costs.

With costs against defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 29-30.]

Thereafter, this petition was filed. The sole issue in this case is whether or not the private
respondent has the right to recover the second $10,000.00 remittance it had delivered to petitioner.
The resolution of this issue would hinge on the applicability of Art. 2154 of the New Civil Code which
provides that:

Art. 2154. If something received when there is no right to demand it, and it was
unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.

This provision is taken from Art. 1895 of the Spanish Civil Code which provided that:

Art. 1895. If a thing is received when there was no right to claim it and which, through
an error, has been unduly delivered, an obligation to restore it arises.

In Velez v. Balzarza, 73 Phil. 630 (1942), the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo explained
the nature of this article thus:

Article 1895 [now Article 2154] of the Civil Code abovequoted, is therefore
applicable. This legal provision, which determines the quasi-contract of solution
indebiti, is one of the concrete manifestations of the ancient principle that no one
shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. In the Roman Law Digest the
maxim was formulated thus: "Jure naturae acquum est, neminem cum alterius
detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem." And the Partidas declared: "Ninguno non
deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Such axiom has grown through
the centuries in legislation, in the science of law and in court decisions. The
lawmaker has found it one of the helpful guides in framing statutes and codes. Thus,
it is unfolded in many articles scattered in the Spanish Civil Code. (See for example,
articles, 360, 361, 464, 647, 648, 797, 1158, 1163, 1295, 1303, 1304, 1893 and
1895, Civil Code.) This time-honored aphorism has also been adopted by jurists in
their study of the conflict of rights. It has been accepted by the courts, which have not
hesitated to apply it when the exigencies of right and equity demanded its assertion.
It is a part of that affluent reservoir of justice upon which judicial discretion draws
whenever the statutory laws are inadequate because they do not speak or do so with
a confused voice. [at p. 632.]

For this article to apply the following requisites must concur: "(1) that he who paid was not under
obligation to do so; and, (2) that payment was made by reason of an essential mistake of fact" [City
of Cebu v. Piccio, 110 Phil. 558, 563 (1960)].
It is undisputed that private respondent delivered the second $10,000.00 remittance. However,
petitioner contends that the doctrine of solutio indebiti, does not apply because its requisites are
absent.

First, it is argued that petitioner had the right to demand and therefore to retain the second
$10,000.00 remittance. It is alleged that even after the two $10,000.00 remittances are credited to
petitioner's receivables from FACETS, the latter allegedly still had a balance of $49,324.00. Hence, it
is argued that the last $10,000.00 remittance being in payment of a pre-existing debt, petitioner was
not thereby unjustly enriched.

The contention is without merit.

The contract of petitioner, as regards the sale of garments and other textile products, was with
FACETS. It was the latter and not private respondent which was indebted to petitioner. On the other
hand, the contract for the transmittal of dollars from the United States to petitioner was entered into
by private respondent with FNSB. Petitioner, although named as the payee was not privy to the
contract of remittance of dollars. Neither was private respondent a party to the contract of sale
between petitioner and FACETS. There being no contractual relation between them, petitioner has
no right to apply the second $10,000.00 remittance delivered by mistake by private respondent to
the outstanding account of FACETS.

Petitioner next contends that the payment by respondent bank of the second $10,000.00 remittance
was not made by mistake but was the result of negligence of its employees. In connection with this
the Court of Appeals made the following finding of facts:

The fact that Facets sent only one remittance of $10,000.00 is not disputed. In the
written interrogatories sent to the First National State Bank of New Jersey through
the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York, Adelaide C. Schachel, the
investigation and reconciliation clerk in the said bank testified that a request to remit
a payment for Facet Funwear Inc. was made in August, 1980. The total amount
which the First National State Bank of New Jersey actually requested the plaintiff-
appellant Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation to remit to Irene's Wearing
Apparel was US $10,000.00. Only one remittance was requested by First National
State Bank of New Jersey as per instruction of Facets Funwear (Exhibit "J", pp. 4-5).

That there was a mistake in the second remittance of US $10,000.00 is borne out by
the fact that both remittances have the same reference invoice number which is 263
80. (Exhibits "A-1- Deposition of Mr. Stanley Panasow" and "A-2-Deposition of Mr.
Stanley Panasow").

Plaintiff-appellant made the second remittance on the wrong assumption that

defendant-appellee did not receive the first remittance of US $10,000.00. [Rollo, pp.
26-27.]

It is evident that the claim of petitioner is anchored on the appreciation of the attendant facts which
petitioner would have this Court review. The Court holds that the finding by the Court of Appeals that
the second $10,000.00 remittance was made by mistake, being based on substantial evidence, is
final and conclusive. The rule regarding questions of fact being raised with this Court in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court has been stated in Remalante v. Tibe,
G.R. No. 59514, February 25, 1988, 158 SCRA 138, thus:
 The rule in this jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. "The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being
conclusive" [Chan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
737, reiterating a long line of decisions]. This Court has emphatically declared that "it
is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over
again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been
committed by the lower court" [Tiongco v. De la Merced, G.R. No. L-24426, July 25,
1974, 58 SCRA 89; Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62482, April 28, 1983,
121 SCRA 865; Baniqued v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-47531, February 20,
1984, 127 SCRA 596]. "Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of
are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as
to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is
not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties" [Santa Ana, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-16394, December
17, 1966, 18 SCRA 9731. [at pp. 144-145.]

Petitioner invokes the equitable principle that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the
wrongful act of a third person, the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss.

The rule is that principles of equity cannot be applied if there is a provision of law specifically
applicable to a case [Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Arciaga, G.R. No. L-29701, March 16, 1987,148
SCRA 433; Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L36958, July 10, 1986, 142 SCRA 587; Rural
Bank of Paranaque, Inc. v. Remolado, G.R. No. 62051, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 409; Cruz v.
Pahati, 98 Phil. 788 (1956)]. Hence, the Court in the case of De Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-20264, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 129, citing Aznar v. Yapdiangco, G.R. No. L-18536, March 31,
1965, 13 SCRA 486, held:

... The common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by
a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his
misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a
case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically
Article 559. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter
must prevail in this jurisdiction. [at p. 135.]

Having shown that Art. 2154 of the Civil Code, which embodies the doctrine of solutio indebiti,
applies in the case at bar, the Court must reject the common law principle invoked by petitioner.

Finally, in her attempt to defeat private respondent's claim, petitioner makes much of the fact that
from the time the second $10,000.00 remittance was made, five hundred and ten days had elapsed
before private respondent demanded the return thereof. Needless to say, private respondent
instituted the complaint for recovery of the second $10,000.00 remittance well within the six years
prescriptive period for actions based upon a quasi-contract [Art. 1145 of the New Civil Code].

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 175540               April 7, 2014

DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO, Petitioner,

vs.
ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that
the Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 31, 2006, adjudging petitioner liable for
1

damages, and the Resolution  dated November 22, 2006, denying petitioner's motion for
2

reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.

The CA's narration of facts is accurate, to wit:

Plaintiff-appellee Zenaida Magud-Logmao is the mother of deceased Arnelito Logmao. Defendant-

appellant Dr. Filoteo Alano is the Executive Director of the National Kidney Institute (NKI).

At around 9:50 in the evening of March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao, then eighteen (18) years old, was
brought to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) in Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors, who
allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near the Farmers’ Market in Cubao, Quezon City.
The patient’s data sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong.
However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr. Paterno F. Cabrera, the surgical resident on-duty at
the Emergency Room of EAMC, stated that the patient is Angelito [Logmao].

Dr. Cabrera reported that [Logmao] was drowsy with alcoholic breath, was conscious and coherent;
that the skull x-ray showed no fracture; that at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning of March 2, 1988,
[Logmao] developed generalized seizures and was managed by the neuro-surgery resident on-duty;
that the condition of [Logmao] progressively deteriorated and he was intubated and ambu-bagging
support was provided; that admission to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and mechanical ventilator
support became necessary, but there was no vacancy at the ICU and all the ventilator units were
being used by other patients; that a resident physician of NKI, who was rotating at EAMC, suggested
that [Logmao] be transferred to NKI; and that after arrangements were made, [Logmao] was
transferred to NKI at 10:10 in the morning.

At the NKI, the name Angelito [Logmao] was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. Lugmoso was
immediately attended to and given the necessary medical treatment. As Lugmoso had no relatives
around, Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant Coordinator, was asked to locate his family by enlisting police
and media assistance. Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Chairman of the Department of Surgery, observed that
the severity of the brain injury of Lugmoso manifested symptoms of brain death. He requested the
Laboratory Section to conduct a tissue typing and tissue cross-matching examination, so that should
Lugmoso expire despite the necessary medical care and management and he would be found to be
a suitable organ donor and his family would consent to organ donation, the organs thus donated
could be detached and transplanted promptly to any compatible beneficiary.

Jennifer Misa verified on the same day, March 2, 1988, from EAMC the identity of Lugmoso and,
upon her request, she was furnished by EAMC a copy of the patient’s date sheet which bears the
name Angelito Lugmoso, with address at Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong. She then contacted several
radio and television stations to request for air time for the purpose of locating the family of Angelito
Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, who was confined at NKI for severe head injury after
allegedly falling from the Cubao overpass, as well as Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District,
whose area of jurisdiction includes Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, for assistance in locating the
relatives of Angelito Lugmoso. Certifications were issued by Channel 4, ABS-CBN and GMA
attesting that the request made by the NKI on March 2, 1988 to air its appeal to locate the family and
relatives of Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong was accommodated. A Certification
was likewise issued by Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong attesting to the
fact that on March 2, 1988, at about 6:00 p.m., Jennifer Misa requested for assistance to
immediately locate the family and relatives of Angelito Lugmoso and that she followed up her
request until March 9, 1988.

On March 3, 1988, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, Dr. Ona was informed that Lugmoso had
been pronounced brain dead by Dr. Abdias V. Aquino, a neurologist, and by Dr. Antonio Rafael, a
neurosurgeon and attending physician of Lugmoso, and that a repeat electroencephalogram (EEG)
was in progress to confirm the diagnosis of brain death. Two hours later, Dr. Ona was informed that
the EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing, thereby confirming that Lugmoso was brain dead. Upon
learning that Lugmoso was a suitable organ donor and that some NKI patients awaiting organ
donation had blood and tissue types compatible with Lugmoso, Dr. Ona inquired from Jennifer Misa
whether the relatives of Lugmoso had been located so that the necessary consent for organ
donation could be obtained. As the extensive search for the relatives of Lugmoso yielded no positive
result and time being of the essence in the success of organ transplantation, Dr. Ona requested Dr.
Filoteo A. Alano, Executive Director of NKI, to authorize the removal of specific organs from the body
of Lugmoso for transplantation purposes. Dr. Ona likewise instructed Dr. Rose Marie Rosete-Liquete
to secure permission for the planned organ retrieval and transplantation from the Medico-Legal
Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), on the assumption that the incident which lead
to the brain injury and death of Lugmoso was a medico legal case.

On March 3, 1988, Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a Memorandum, which reads as follows:

This is in connection with the use of the human organs or any portion or portions of the human body
of the deceased patient, identified as a certain Mr. Angelito Lugmoso who was brought to the
National Kidney Institute on March 2, 1988 from the East Avenue Medical Center.

As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due
to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted all reasonable efforts
to locate the relatives or next of kin of the said deceased patient such as appeal through the radios
and television as well as through police and other government agencies and that the NBI [Medico-
Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case.

If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349
as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department of Surgery
to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to
transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and
survive.

A Certification dated March 10, 1988 was issued by Dr. Maximo Reyes, Medico-Legal Officer of the
NBI, stating that he received a telephone call from Dr. Liquete on March 3, 1988 at 9:15 a.m.
regarding the case of Lugmoso, who was declared brain dead; that despite efforts to locate the
latter’s relatives, no one responded; that Dr. Liquete sought from him a second opinion for organ
retrieval for donation purposes even in the absence of consent from the family of the deceased; and
that he verbally agreed to organ retrieval.

At 3:45 in the afternoon of March 3, 1988, a medical team, composed of Dr. Enrique Ona, as
principal surgeon, Drs. Manuel Chua-Chiaco, Jr., Rose Marie Rosete-Liquete, Aurea Ambrosio,
Ludivino de Guzman, Mary Litonjua, Jaime Velasquez, Ricardo Fernando, and Myrna Mendoza,
removed the heart, kidneys, pancreas, liver and spleen of Lugmoso. The medical team then
transplanted a kidney and the pancreas of Lugmoso to Lee Tan Hoc and the other kidney of
Lugmoso to Alexis Ambustan. The transplant operation was completed at around 11:00 o’clock in
the evening of March 3, 1988.

On March 4, 1988, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, Head of the Cadaver Organ Retrieval Effort (CORE)
program of NKI, made arrangements with La Funeraria Oro for the embalmment of the cadaver of
Lugmoso good for a period of fifteen (15) days to afford NKI more time to continue searching for the
relatives of the latter. On the same day, Roberto Ortega, Funeral Consultant of La Funeraria Oro,
sent a request for autopsy to the NBI. The Autopsy Report and Certification of Post-Mortem
Examination issued by the NBI stated that the cause of death of Lugmoso was intracranial
hemorrhage secondary to skull fracture.

On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing its successful double organ
transplantation. Aida Doromal, a cousin of plaintiff, heard the news aired on television that the donor
was an eighteen (18) year old boy whose remains were at La Funeraria Oro in Quezon City. As the
name of the donor sounded like Arnelito Logmao, Aida informed plaintiff of the news report.

It appears that on March 3, 1988, Arlen Logmao, a brother of Arnelito, who was then a resident of
17-C San Pedro Street, Mandaluyong, reported to Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District,
Mandaluyong that the latter did not return home after seeing a movie in Cubao, Quezon City, as
evidenced by a Certification issued by said Station; and that the relatives of Arnelito were likewise
informed that the latter was missing. Upon receiving the news from Aida, plaintiff and her other
children went to La Funeraria Oro, where they saw Arnelito inside a cheap casket.

On April 29, 1988, plaintiff filed with the court a quo a complaint for damages against Dr. Emmanuel
Lenon, Taurean Protectors Agency, represented by its Proprietor, Celso Santiago, National Kidney
Institute, represented by its Director, Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Jennifer Misa, Dr. Maximo Reyes, Dr.
Enrique T. Ona, Dr. Manuel Chua-Chiaco, Jr., Dr. Rose Marie O. Rosete-Liquete, Dr. Aurea Z.
Ambrosio, Dr. Ludivino de Guzman, Dr. Mary Litonjua, Dr. Jaime Velasquez, Dr. Ricardo Fernando,
Dr. Myrna Mendoza, Lee Tan Koc, Alexis Ambustan, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, La Funeraria Oro, Inc.,
represented by its President, German E. Ortega, Roberto Ortega alias Bobby Ortega, Dr. Mariano B.
Cueva, Jr., John Doe, Peter Doe, and Alex Doe in connection with the death of her son Arnelito.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to remove the organs of Arnelito while the latter was still
alive and that they concealed his true identity.

On January 17, 2000, the court a quo rendered judgment finding only Dr. Filoteo Alano liable for
damages to plaintiff and dismissing the complaint against the other defendants for lack of legal
basis.3

After finding petitioner liable for a quasi-delict, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC)
ordered petitioner to pay respondent ₱188,740.90 as actual damages; ₱500,000.00 as moral
damages; ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages; ₱300,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs of suit.
Petitioner appealed to the CA.

On March 31, 2006, the CA issued its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION by DELETING the
award of ₱188,740.90 as actual damages and REDUCING the award of moral damages to
₱250,000.00, the award of exemplary damages to ₱200,000.00 and the award of attorney's fees to
₱100,000.00.

SO ORDERED. 4

Petitioner then elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, where the
following issues are presented for resolution:

A. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE

PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN HOLDING PETITIONER
DR. FILOTEO ALANO LIABLE FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ACT OF THE PETITIONER IS NOT
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE NOR IS THERE ANY FINDING THAT THE ACT OF THE
PETITIONER WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY OR DAMAGE ALLEGEDLY
SUSTAINED BY RESPONDENT ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO.

B. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING AND/OR

FAILING TO DECLARE THAT PETITIONER DR. ALANO ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND
PURSUANT TO LAW WHEN HE ISSUED THE AUTHORIZATION TO REMOVE AND
RETRIEVE THE ORGANS OF ANGELITO LUGMOSO (LATER IDENTIFIED TO BE IN
FACT ARNELITO LOGMAO) CONSIDERING THAT NO NEGLIGENCE CAN BE
ATTRIBUTED OR IMPUTED ON HIM IN HIS PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT MANDATED BY
LAW.

C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING

RESPONDENT ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES THAT ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND ARE CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE. 5

The first two issues boil down to the question of whether respondent's sufferings were brought about
by petitioner's alleged negligence in granting authorization for the removal or retrieval of the internal
organs of respondent's son who had been declared brain dead.

Petitioner maintains that when he gave authorization for the removal of some of the internal organs
to be transplanted to other patients, he did so in accordance with the letter of the law, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 349, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 856, i.e., giving his subordinates
instructions to exert all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of respondent's son. In
fact, announcements were made through radio and television, the assistance of police authorities
was sought, and the NBI Medico-Legal Section was notified. Thus, petitioner insists that he should
not be held responsible for any damage allegedly suffered by respondent due to the death of her son
and the removal of her son’s internal organs for transplant purposes.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that there was negligence on petitioner's part
when he failed to ensure that reasonable time had elapsed to locate the relatives of the deceased
before giving the authorization to remove said deceased's internal organs for transplant purposes.
However, a close examination of the records of this case would reveal that this case falls under one
of the exceptions to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, are binding on this Court. There are some important circumstances that the lower
courts failed to consider in ascertaining whether it was the actions of petitioner that brought about
the sufferings of respondent. 6
The Memorandum dated March 3, 1988 issued by petitioner, stated thus:

As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due
to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted all reasonable efforts
to locate the relatives or next-of-kin of the said deceased patient, such as appeal through the radios
and television, as well as through police and other government agencies and that the NBI [Medico-
Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case.

If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349
as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department of Surgery
to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to
transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and
survive.7

A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates to "make certain"
that "all reasonable efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even enumerating ways in
which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also clearly
stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the deceased
was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law had been complied with. Such
instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all
reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his directives
any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF the Department
of Surgery has complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have been
faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the doctors in the Department of Surgery to
comprehend the instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the
requirements of the law.

Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the case, the doctors and personnel of
NKI disseminated notices of the death of respondent's son to the media and sought the assistance
of the appropriate police authorities as early as March 2, 1988, even before petitioner issued the
Memorandum. Prior to performing the procedure for retrieval of the deceased's internal organs, the
doctors concerned also the sought the opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.

Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications
intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the
sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.

If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's death because the notices did not
properly state the name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner's door. The trial
and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who had the opportunity to ascertain the name of
the deceased, who recorded the wrong information regarding the deceased's identity to NKI. The
NKI could not have obtained the information about his name from the patient, because as found by
the lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to the NKI.

Ultimately, it is respondent's failure to adduce adequate evidence that doomed this case.  As stated
1âwphi1

in Otero v. Tan,  "[i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of
8

proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent."  Here, there is to
9

proof that, indeed, the period of around 24 hours from the time notices were disseminated, cannot
be considered as reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to present any expert witness to
prove that given the medical technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980's, the doctors could
or should have waited longer before harvesting the internal organs for transplantation.
Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the lower court. Finding petitioner liable for
damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the internal organs of the deceased were
removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by
respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the
Court find evidence on record to show that respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful
state in which she found her son's lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31,
2006, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against petitioner is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See concurring opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Certified True Copy

WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
Third Division
April 23, 2014
G.R. No. 180440               December 5, 2012

DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD. And FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO
INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For this Court’s resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007,
1 

affirming the Decision of Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case
2 

No. 96-1367 dated 21 February 2006, dismissing for lack of merit herein petitioner Dr. Genevieve L.
Huang’s Complaint for Damages. Assailed as well is the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated 53 

November 2007 denying for lack of merit petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed on 28 August 1996 by petitioner Dr.
Genevieve L. Huang against herein respondents Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI) and Dusit Thani
4  5 

Public Co., Ltd. (DTPCI), as owners of Dusit Thani Hotel Manila (Dusit Hotel); and co-respondent
6  7 

First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corporation (First Lepanto), as insurer of the aforesaid hotel. The
8 

said Complaint was premised on the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff, in
the untimely putting off all the lights within the hotel’s swimming pool area, as well as the locking of
the main entrance door of the area, prompting petitioner to grope for a way out. While doing so, a
folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing her serious brain injury. The negligence was
allegedly compounded by respondents PHI and DTPCI’s failure to render prompt and adequate
medical assistance.

Petitioner’s version of the antecedents of this case is as follows:

On 11 June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her friend,
petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the hotel’s swimming pool facility. They started
bathing at around 5:00 p.m. At around 7:00 p.m., the hotel’s swimming pool attendant informed them
that the swimming pool area was about to be closed. The two subsequently proceeded to the
shower room adjacent to the swimming pool to take a shower and dress up. However, when they
came out of the bathroom, the entire swimming pool area was already pitch black and there was no
longer any person around but the two of them. They carefully walked towards the main door leading
to the hotel but, to their surprise, the door was locked.
9

Petitioner and Delia waited for 10 more minutes near the door hoping someone would come to their
rescue but they waited in vain. Delia became anxious about their situation so petitioner began to
walk around to look for a house phone. Delia followed petitioner. After some time, petitioner saw a
phone behind the lifeguard’s counter. While slowly walking towards the phone, a hard and heavy
object, which later turned out to be the folding wooden counter top, fell on petitioner’s head that
knocked her down almost unconscious. 10

Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the hotel telephone operator of the
incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance door of the swimming pool area
but it took them at least 20 to 30 minutes to get inside. When the door was finally opened, three
hotel chambermaids assisted petitioner by placing an ice pack and applying some ointment on her
head. After petitioner had slightly recovered, she requested to be assisted to the hotel’s coffee shop
to have some rest. Petitioner demanded the services of the hotel physician. 11

Dr. Violeta Dalumpines (Dr. Dalumpines) arrived. She approached petitioner and introduced herself
as the hotel physician. However, instead of immediately providing the needed medical assistance,
Dr. Dalumpines presented a "Waiver" and demanded that it be signed by petitioner, otherwise, the
hotel management will not render her any assistance. Petitioner refused to do so. 12

After eating her dinner and having rested for a while, petitioner left the hotel’s coffee shop and went
home. Thereupon, petitioner started to feel extraordinary dizziness accompanied by an
uncomfortable feeling in her stomach, which lasted until the following day. Petitioner was
constrained to stay at home, thus, missing all her important appointments with her patients. She also
began experiencing "on" and "off" severe headaches that caused her three (3) sleepless nights. 13

Petitioner, thus, decided to consult a certain Dr. Perry Noble (Dr. Noble), a neurologist from Makati
Medical Center, who required her to have an X-ray and a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
tests. The MRI Report dated 23 August 1995 revealed the following findings:
14  15 

CONSULTATION REPORT:

MRI examination of the brain shows scattered areas of intraparenchymal contusions and involving
mainly the left middle and posterior temporal and slightly the right anterior temporal lobe.

Other small areas of contusions with suggestive pertechiae are seen in the left fronto-parietal, left
parieto-occipital and with deep frontal periventricular subcortical and cortical regions. There is no
mass effect nor signs of localized hemorrhagic extravasation.

The ventricles are not enlarged, quite symmetrical without shifts or deformities; the peripheral sulci
are within normal limits.

The C-P angles, petromastoids, sella, extrasellar and retro orbital areas appear normal.

The brainstem is unremarkable.

IMPRESSION: Scattered small intraparenchymal contusions mainly involving the left middle-
posterior temporal lobe and also right medial anterior temporal, both deep frontal subcortical, left
parieto-occipital subcortical and cortical regions. Ischemic etiology not ruled out. No localized intra -
or extracerebral hemorrhage. 16

Petitioner claimed that the aforesaid MRI result clearly showed that her head was bruised. Based
also on the same MRI result, Dr. Noble told her that she has a very serious brain injury. In view
thereof, Dr. Noble prescribed the necessary medicine for her condition. 17

Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Ofelia Adapon, also a neurologist from Makati Medical
Center, who required her to undergo an Electroencephalogram examination (EEG) to measure the
electrostatic in her brain. Based on its result, Dr. Ofelia Adapon informed her that she has a serious
18  19 

condition—a permanent one. Dr. Ofelia Adapon similarly prescribed medicines for her brain injury. 20

Petitioner’s condition did not get better. Hence, sometime in September 1995, she consulted another
neuro-surgeon by the name of Dr. Renato Sibayan (Dr. Sibayan), who required her to have an X-ray
test. According to petitioner, Dr. Sibayan’s finding was the same as those of the previous doctors
21 

that she had consulted—she has a serious brain injury. 22

By reason of the unfortunate 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotel’s swimming pool area, petitioner
also started to feel losing her memory, which greatly affected and disrupted the practice of her
chosen profession. Thus, on 25 October 1995, petitioner, through counsel, sent a demand letter to
23  24 

respondents PHI and DTPCI seeking payment of an amount not less than P100,000,000.00
representing loss of earnings on her remaining life span. But, petitioner’s demand was unheeded.

In November 1995, petitioner went to the United States of America (USA) for further medical
treatment. She consulted a certain Dr. Gerald Steinberg and a certain Dr. Joel Dokson from Mount
25 

Sinai Hospital who both found that she has "post traumatic-post concussion/contusion cephalgias-
vascular and neuralgia." She was then prescribed to take some medications for severe pain and to
26 

undergo physical therapy. Her condition did not improve so she returned to the Philippines. 27

Petitioner, once again, consulted Dr. Sibayan, who simply told her to just relax and to continue
taking her medicines. Petitioner also consulted other neurologists, who all advised her to just
continue her medications and to undergo physical therapy for her neck pain. 28

Sometime in 1996, petitioner consulted as well a certain Dr. Victor Lopez (Dr. Lopez), an
ophthalmologist from the Makati Medical Center, because of her poor vision, which she has
experienced for several months. Petitioner’s Eye Report dated 5 March 1996 issued by Dr. Lopez
29  30 

stated: "IMPRESSION: Posterior vitreous detachment, right eye of floaters." Dr. Lopez told petitioner
that her detached eye is permanent and very serious. Dr. Lopez then prescribed an eye drop to
petitioner. 31

For petitioner’s frustration to dissipate and to regain her former strength and physical well-being, she
consulted another neuro-surgeon from Makati Medical Center by the name of Dr. Leopoldo P.
Pardo, Jr. (Dr. Pardo, Jr.). She disclosed to Dr. Pardo, Jr. that at the age of 18 she suffered a stroke
32 

due to mitral valve disease and that she was given treatments, which also resulted in
thrombocytopenia. In Dr. Pardo, Jr.’s medical evaluation of petitioner dated 15 May 1996, he made
33 

the following diagnosis and opinion:

DIAGNOSIS AND OPINION:

This patient sustained a severe head injury in (sic) 11 June 1995 and as a result of which she
developed the following injuries:

1. Cerebral Concussion and Contusion

2. Post-traumatic Epilepsy

3. Post-concussional Syndrome

4. Minimal Brain Dysfunction

5. Cervical Sprain, chronic recurrent

It is my opinion that the symptoms she complained of in the foregoing history are all related to and a
result of the injury sustained on 11 June 1995.
It is further my opinion that the above diagnosis and complaints do materially affect her duties and
functions as a practicing physician and dermatologist, and that she will require treatment for an
undetermined period of time.

The percentage of disability is not calculated at this time and will require further evaluation and
observation. 34

Dr. Pardo, Jr. then advised petitioner to continue her medications. 35

Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Tenchavez for her follow-up EEG. He similarly prescribed
36  37 

medicine for petitioner’s deep brain injury. He also gave her pain killer for her headache and advised
her to undergo physical therapy. Her symptoms, however, persisted all the more. 38

In 1999, petitioner consulted another neurologist at the Makati Medical Center by the name of Dr.
Martesio Perez (Dr. Perez) because of severe fleeting pains in her head, arms and legs; difficulty in
concentration; and warm sensation of the legs, which symptoms also occurred after the 11 June
1995 incident. Upon examination, Dr. Perez observed that petitioner has been experiencing severe
pains and she has a slight difficulty in concentration. He likewise noted that there was a slight spasm
of petitioner’s neck muscle but, otherwise, there was no objective neurologic finding. The rest of
petitioner’s neurologic examination was essentially normal. 39

Dr. Perez’s neurologic evaluation of petitioner reflected, among others: (1) petitioner’s past medical
40 

history, which includes, among others, mitral valve stenosis; (2) an interpretation of petitioner’s EEG
results in October 1995 and in January 1999, i.e., the first EEG showed sharp waves seen bilaterally
more on the left while the second one was normal; and (3) interpretation of petitioner’s second MRI
result, i.e., petitioner has a permanent damage in the brain, which can happen either after a head
injury or after a stroke. Dr. Perez concluded that petitioner has post-traumatic or post concussion
syndrome. 41

Respondents, on the other hand, denied all the material allegations of petitioner and, in turn,
countered the latter’s statement of facts, thus:

According to respondents PHI and DTPCI, a sufficient notice had been posted on the glass door of
the hotel leading to the swimming pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel guests, that
the swimming pool area is open only from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. Though the hotel’s swimming pool
42 

area is open only between the aforestated time, the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m. for,
(1) security reasons; (2) housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool
surroundings; and (3) people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmer’s World Gym adjacent to
the swimming pool area, which was then open until 10:00 p.m., to have a good view of the hotel’s
swimming pool. Even granting that the lights in the hotel’s swimming pool area were turned off, it
would not render the area completely dark as the Slimmer’s World Gym near it was well-illuminated. 43

Further, on 11 June 1995, at round 7:00 p.m., the hotel’s swimming pool attendant advised petitioner
and Delia to take their showers as it was already closing time. Afterwards, at around 7:40 p.m.,
Pearlie Benedicto-Lipana (Ms. Pearlie), the hotel staff nurse, who was at the hotel clinic located at
the mezzanine floor, received a call from the hotel telephone operator informing her that there was a
guest requiring medical assistance at the hotel’s swimming pool area located one floor above the
clinic.
44

Immediately, Ms. Pearlie got hold of her medical kit and hurriedly went to the hotel’s swimming pool
area. There she saw Delia and petitioner, who told her that she was hit on the head by a folding
wooden counter top. Although petitioner looked normal as there was no indication of any blood or
bruise on her head, Ms. Pearlie still asked her if she needed any medical attention to which
petitioner replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and she did not need any medical attention.
Petitioner, instead, requested for a hirudoid cream to which Ms. Pearlie acceded. 45

At about 8:00 p.m., after attending to petitioner, Ms. Pearlie went back to the hotel clinic to inform Dr.
Dalumpines of the incident at the hotel’s swimming pool area. But before she could do that, Dr.
Dalumpines had already chanced upon Delia and petitioner at the hotel’s coffee shop and the latter
reported to Dr. Dalumpines that her head was hit by a folding wooden counter top while she was
inside the hotel’s swimming pool area. When asked by Dr. Dalumpines how she was, petitioner
responded she is a doctor, she was fine and she was already attended to by the hotel nurse, who
went at the hotel’s swimming pool area right after the accident. Dr. Dalumpines then called Ms.
Pearlie to verify the same, which the latter confirmed. 46

Afterwards, Dr. Dalumpines went back to petitioner and checked the latter’s condition. Petitioner
insisted that she was fine and that the hirudoid cream was enough. Having been assured that
everything was fine, Dr. Dalumpines requested petitioner to execute a handwritten
certification regarding the incident that occurred that night. Dr. Dalumpines then suggested to
47 

petitioner to have an X-ray test. Petitioner replied that it was not necessary. Petitioner also refused
further medical attention.48

On 13 June 1995, petitioner called up Dr. Dalumpines. The call, however, had nothing to do with the
11 June 1995 incident. Instead, petitioner merely engaged in small talk with Dr. Dalumpines while
having her daily massage. The two talked about petitioner’s personal matters, i.e., past medical
history, differences with siblings and family over inheritance and difficulty in practice. Petitioner even
disclosed to Dr. Dalumpines that she once fell from a horse; that she had a stroke; had hysterectomy
and is incapable of having children for her uterus had already been removed; that she had blood
disorder, particularly lack of platelets, that can cause bleeding; and she had an "on" and "off"
headaches. Petitioner oftentimes called Dr. Dalumpines at the hotel clinic to discuss topics similar to
those discussed during their 13 June 1995 conversation. 49

Also, during one of their telephone conversations, petitioner requested for a certification regarding
the 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotel’s swimming pool area. Dr. Dalumpines accordingly issued
Certification dated 7 September 1995, which states that: 50

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was called to attend to an accident at
the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June 1995.

Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the folding countertop fell on her
head when she lifted it to enter the lifeguard’s counter to use the phone. She asked for Hirudoid.

The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpines at the Coffee Shop. After narrating the poolside
incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines’ offer of assistance, she reiterated that the Hirudoid cream
was enough and that petitioner being a doctor herself, knew her condition and she was all right.

This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever purpose it may serve, 7
September 1995 at Makati City. (Emphasis supplied).
51 

Petitioner personally picked up the afore-quoted Certification at the hotel clinic without any objection
as to its contents.
52
From 11 June 1995 until 7 September 1995, the hotel clinic never received any complaint from
petitioner regarding the latter’s condition. The hotel itself neither received any written complaint from
petitioner.
53

After trial, the court a quo in its Decision dated 21 February 2006 dismissed petitioner’s Complaint
for lack of merit.

The trial court found petitioner’s testimony self-serving, thus, devoid of credibility. Petitioner failed to
present any evidence to substantiate her allegation that the lights in the hotel’s swimming pool area
were shut off at the time of the incident. She did not even present her friend, Delia, to corroborate
her testimony. More so, petitioner’s testimony was contradicted by one of the witnesses presented
by the respondents who positively declared that it has been a normal practice of the hotel
management not to put off the lights until 10:00 p.m. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of
the swimming pool surroundings, including the toilets and counters. Also, the lights were kept on for
security reasons and for the people in the nearby gym to have a good view of the swimming pool
while doing their exercise routine. Besides, there was a remote possibility that the hotel’s swimming
pool area was in complete darkness as the aforesaid gym was then open until 10:00 p.m., and the
lights radiate to the hotel’s swimming pool area. As such, petitioner would not have met the accident
had she only acted with care and caution. 54

The trial court further struck down petitioner’s contention that the hotel management did not extend
medical assistance to her in the aftermath of the accident. Records showed that the hotel
management immediately responded after being notified of the accident. The hotel nurse and the
two chambermaids placed an ice pack on petitioner’s head. They were willing to extend further
emergency assistance but petitioner refused and merely asked for a hirudoid cream. Petitioner even
told them she is a doctor and she was fine. Even the medical services offered by the hotel physician
were turned down by petitioner. Emphatically, petitioner cannot fault the hotel for the injury she
sustained as she herself did not heed the warning that the swimming pool area is open only from
7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. As such, since petitioner’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of her injury, she cannot recover damages. 55

The trial court similarly observed that the records revealed no indication that the head injury
complained of by petitioner was the result of the alleged 11 June 1995 accident. Firstly, petitioner
had a past medical history which might have been the cause of her recurring brain injury. Secondly,
the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995 accident and the
brain damage suffered by petitioner. Even Dr. Perez himself testified that the symptoms being
experienced by petitioner might have been due to factors other than the head trauma she allegedly
suffered. It bears stressing that petitioner had been suffering from different kinds of brain problems
since she was 18 years old, which may have been the cause of the recurring symptoms of head
injury she is experiencing at present. Absent, therefore, of any proof establishing the causal relation
between the injury she allegedly suffered on 11 June 1995 and the head pains she now suffers, her
claim must fail. Thirdly, Dr. Teresita Sanchez’s (Dr. Sanchez) testimony cannot be relied upon since
she testified on the findings and conclusions of persons who were never presented in court. Ergo,
her testimony thereon was hearsay. Fourthly, the medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by
myriads of doctors whom petitioner sought for examination or treatment were neither identified nor
testified to by those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative
value. Even assuming that petitioner suffered head injury as a consequence of the 11 June 1995
accident, she cannot blame anyone but herself for staying at the hotel’s swimming pool area beyond
its closing hours and for lifting the folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her head. 56
For petitioner’s failure to prove that her serious and permanent injury was the result of the 11 June
1995 accident, thus, her claim for actual or compensatory damages, loss of income, moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, must all fail. 57

With regard to respondent First Lepanto’s liability, the trial court ruled that under the contract of
insurance, suffice it to state that absent any cause for any liability against respondents PHI and
DTPCI, respondent First Lepanto cannot be made liable thereon.

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals with the following assignment of
errors: (1) the trial court erred in finding that the testimony of petitioner is self-serving and thus void
of credibility; (2) the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of proximate cause in cases of breach of
contract and even assuming arguendo that the doctrine is applicable, petitioner was able to prove by
sufficient evidence the causal connection between her injuries and respondents PHI and DTPCI’s
negligent act; and (3) the trial court erred in holding that petitioner is not entitled to damages.
58

On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the findings and conclusions
of the trial court.

The Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this wise:

At the outset, it is necessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this case on the theory
that herein respondents PHI and DTPCI are liable for breach of contract or on the theory of quasi-
delict.

xxxx

It cannot be gainsaid that herein petitioner’s use of the hotel’s pool was only upon the invitation of
Delia, the hotel’s registered guest. As such, she cannot claim contractual relationship between her
and the hotel. Since the circumstances of the present case do not evince a contractual relation
between petitioner and respondents, the rules on quasi-delict , thus, govern.

The pertinent provision of Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict."

A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delict or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express
or implied. Thus, to sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI and DTPCI and its
employees were negligent? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner’s
contention.

One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool area’s closing time is 7:00 p.m.. She,
herself, admitted during her testimony that she was well aware of the sign when she and
Delia entered the pool area. Hence, upon knowing, at the outset, of the pool’s closing time,
she took the risk of overstaying when she decided to take shower and leave the area beyond
 the closing hour. In fact, it was only upon the advise of the pool attendants that she
thereafter took her shower.

Two. She admitted, through her certification that she lifted the wooden bar countertop, which
then fell onto her head. The admission in her certificate proves the circumstances
surrounding the occurrence that transpired on the night of 11 June 1995. This is contrary to
her assertion in the complaint and testimony that, while she was passing through the counter
door, she was suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the fact that she
admitted having lifted the counter top, it was her own doing, therefore, that made the counter
top fell on to her head.

Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioner’s assertion that the pool area was totally
dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a telephone at the counter after searching for
one. It must be noted that petitioner and Delia had walked around the pool area with ease
since they were able to proceed to the glass entrance door from shower room, and back to
the counter area where the telephone was located without encountering any untoward
incident. Otherwise, she could have easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped into something
while searching for the telephone. This negates her assertion that the pool area was
completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision.

xxxx

The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that the proximate and
immediate cause of the injury of petitioner was due to her own negligence.

Moreover, petitioner failed to sufficiently substantiate that the medical symptoms she is currently
experiencing are the direct result of the head injury she sustained on 11 June 1995 as was aptly
discussed in the lower court’s findings.

xxxx

It bears stressing that in civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact and
substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it. Hence, for petitioner to
be entitled to damages, she must show that she had suffered an actionable injury. Regrettably,
petitioner failed in this regard. (Emphasis supplied).
59 

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated 5
November 2007.

Hence, this Petition raising the following issues:

(1) Whether or not the findings of fact of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive in this case.

(2) Whether or not herein respondents PHI and DTPCI are responsible by implied contract to
exercise due care for the safety and welfare of the petitioner.

(3) Whether or not the cause of action of the petitioner can be based on both breach of
contract and tort.
 (4) Whether or not it is respondents PHI and DTPCI and its employees who are liable to the
petitioner for negligence, applying the well-established doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and
respondeat superior.

(5) Whether the petitioner’s debilitating and permanent injuries were a result of the accident
she suffered at the hotel on 11 June 1995.

(6) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the payment of damages, attorney’s fees,
interest, and the costs of suit.

(7) Whether or not the respondent insurance company is liable, even directly, to the
petitioner.

(8) Whether or not petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals is pro forma. 60

Petitioner argues that the rule that "findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive and must be
respected on appeal" finds no application herein because this case falls under the jurisprudentially
established exceptions. Moreover, since the rationale behind the afore-mentioned rule is that "the
trial judge is in a vantage point to appreciate the conduct and behavior of the witnesses and has the
unexcelled opportunity to evaluate their testimony," one logical exception to the rule that can be
deduced therefrom is when the judge who decided the case is not the same judge who heard and
tried the case.

Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals in ruling that no contractual relationship existed
between her and respondents PHI and DTPCI since her use of the hotel’s swimming pool facility
was only upon the invitation of the hotel’s registered guest. On the contrary, petitioner maintains that
an implied contract existed between them in view of the fact that the hotel guest status extends to all
those who avail of its services—its patrons and invitees. It follows then that all those who patronize
the hotel and its facilities, including those who are invited to partake of those facilities, like petitioner,
are generally regarded as guests of the hotel. As such, respondents PHI and DTPCI are responsible
by implied contract for the safety and welfare of petitioner while the latter was inside their premises
by exercising due care, which they failed to do.

Petitioner even asserts that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar any liability
for tort since the act that breaks a contract may also be a tort. Hence, the concept of change of
theory of cause of action pointed to by respondents is irrelevant.

Petitioner similarly avows that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior are
applicable in this case. She argues that a person who goes in a hotel without a "bukol" or hematoma
and comes out of it with a "bukol" or hematoma is a clear case of res ipsa loquitur. It was an
accident caused by the fact that the hotel staff was not present to lift the heavy counter top for
petitioner as is normally expected of them because they negligently locked the main entrance door
of the hotel’s swimming pool area. Following the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondents PHI and
DTPCI’s negligence is presumed and it is incumbent upon them to prove otherwise but they failed to
do so. Further, respondents PHI and DTPCI failed to observe all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees, hence, following the doctrine of
respondeat superior, they were liable for the negligent acts of their staff in not verifying if there were
still people inside the swimming pool area before turning off the lights and locking the door. Had
respondents PHI and DTPCI’s employees done so, petitioner would not have been injured. Since
respondents PHI and DTPCI’s negligence need not be proved, the lower courts erred in shifting the
burden to petitioner and, thereafter, holding the hotel and its employees not negligent for petitioner’s
failure to prove their negligence. Moreover, petitioner alleges that there was no contributory
negligence on her part for she did not do anything that could have contributed to her injury. And,
even if there was, the same does not bar recovery.

Petitioner equally declares that the evidence on record, including the objective medical findings, had
firmly established that her permanent debilitating injuries were the direct result of the 11 June 1995
accident inside the hotel’s swimming pool area. This fact has not been totally disputed by the
respondents. Further, the medical experts who had been consulted by petitioner were in unison in
their diagnoses of her condition. Petitioner was also able to prove that the falling of the folding
wooden counter top on her head while she was at the hotel’s swimming pool area was the cause of
her head, eye and neck injuries.

Petitioner reiterates her claim for an award of damages, to wit: actual, including loss of income;
moral, exemplary; as well as attorney’s fees, interest and costs of suit. She states that respondents
PHI and DTPCI are liable for quasi-delict under Articles 19, 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code. At
the same time, they are liable under an implied contract for they have a public duty to give due
courtesy, to exercise reasonable care and to provide safety to hotel guests, patrons and invitees.
Respondent First Lepanto, on the other hand, is directly liable under the express contract of
insurance.

Lastly, petitioner contends that her Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals was not
pro forma for it specifically pointed out the alleged errors in the Court of Appeals Decision.

The instant Petition is devoid of merit.

Primarily, only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts and it is beyond its
61 

function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties. Besides, this Court
62 

adheres to the long standing doctrine that the factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the parties and this Court. Nonetheless, this
63 

Court has, at times, allowed exceptions thereto, to wit:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or
its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the Court of Appeals’ findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
 (i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 64

Upon meticulous perusal of the records, however, this Court finds that none of these exceptions is
obtaining in this case. No such justifiable or compelling reasons exist for this Court to depart from
the general rule. This Court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and adequately supported by the evidence on record.

Also, this Court will not review the factual findings of the trial court simply because the judge who
heard and tried the case was not the same judge who penned the decision. This fact alone does not
diminish the veracity and correctness of the factual findings of the trial court. Indeed, "the efficacy of
65 

a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who
had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual
findings reached by him." In this case, there was none.
66 

It bears stressing that in this jurisdiction there is a disputable presumption that the trial court’s
decision is rendered by the judge in the regular performance of his official duties. While the said
presumption is only disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other evidence.
Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is the presumption that the trial court judge, in
resolving the case and drafting the decision, reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on
record. That the said trial court judge is not the same judge who heard the case and received the
evidence is of little consequence when the records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) are
complete and available for consideration by the former, just like in the present case.
67 

Irrefragably, the fact that the judge who penned the trial court’s decision was not the same judge
who heard the case and received the evidence therein does not render the findings in the said
decision erroneous and unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor of witnesses may sway a trial
court judge in deciding a case, it is not, and should not be, his only consideration. Even more vital for
the trial court judge’s decision are the contents and substance of the witnesses’ testimonies, as
borne out by the TSNs, as well as the object and documentary evidence submitted and made part of
the records of the case. 68

This Court examined the records, including the TSNs, and found no reason to disturb the factual
findings of both lower courts. This Court, thus, upholds their conclusiveness.

In resolving the second and third issues, a determination of the cause of action on which petitioner’s
Complaint for Damages was anchored upon is called for.

Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly on account of their negligence but
not on any breach of contract. Surprisingly, when the case was elevated on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, petitioner had a change of heart and later claimed that an implied contract existed between
her and respondents PHI and DTPCI and that the latter were liable for breach of their obligation to
keep her safe and out of harm. This allegation was never an issue before the trial court. It was not
the cause of action relied upon by the petitioner not until the case was before the Court of Appeals.
Presently, petitioner claims that her cause of action can be based both on quasi-delict and breach of
contract.
A perusal of petitioner’s Complaint evidently shows that her cause of action was based solely on
quasi-delict. Telling are the following allegations in petitioner’s Complaint:

6. THAT, in the evening of 11 June 1995, between the hours from 7:00 to 8:00 o’clock, after
herein petitioner and her friend from New York, Delia, the latter being then a Hotel guest,
were taking their shower after having a dip in the hotel’s swimming pool, without any notice
or warning, the Hotel’s staff put off all the lights within the pool area including the lights on
the hallway and also locked the main entrance door of the pool area, x x x;

7. THAT, Hotel guest Delia started to panic while petitioner pacified her by telling her not to
worry as they would both find their way out. Petitioner knowing that within the area there is a
house phone, started to look around while Delia was following her, eventually petitioner saw
a phone behind the counter x x x, that while slowly moving on towards the phone on a
stooping manner due to the darkness CAUSED BY UNTIMELY AND NEGLIGENTLY
PUTTING OFF WITH THE LIGHTS BY THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS PHI AND DTPCI’S
EMPLOYEE while passing through the open counter door with its Folding Counter Top also
opened, x x x, a hard and heavy object fell onto the head of the petitioner that knocked her
down almost unconscious which hard and heavy object turned out to be the Folding Counter
Top;

8. THAT, Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the Hotel Telephone
Operator about the incident, immediately the hotel staffs (sic) arrived but they were stranded
behind the main door of the pool entrance and it too (sic) them more than twenty (20)
minutes to locate the hotel maintenance employee who holds the key of the said main
entrance door;

9. THAT, when the door was opened, two Hotel Chamber Maids assisted the petitioner to get
out of the counter door. Petitioner being a Physician tried to control her feelings although
groggy and requested for a HURIDOID, a medicine for HEMATOMA, as a huge lump
developed on her head while the two Chamber Maids assisted petitioner by holding the bag
of ice on her head and applying the medicine on the huge lump;

10. THAT, petitioner after having recovered slightly from her nightmare, though still feeling
weak, asked to be assisted to the Hotel Coffee Shop to take a rest but requested for the
hotel’s Physician. Despite her insistent requests, the Dusit Hotel refused to lift a finger to
assists petitioner who was then in distress until a lady approached and introduced herself as
the Hotel’s house Doctor. Instead however of assisting petitioner by asking her what kind of
assistance the Hotel could render, in a DISCOURTEOUS MANNER presented instead a
paper and demanding petitioner to affix her signature telling her that the Hotel Management
would only assists and answer for all expenses incurred if petitioner signs the paper
presented, but she refused and petitioner instead wrote a marginal note on the said paper
stating her reason therefore, said paper later on turned out to be a WAIVER OF RIGHT or
QUIT CLAIM;

xxxx

14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents PHI and DTPCI’s gross
negligence despite medical assistance, petitioner started to feel losing her memory that
greatly affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession x x x.

xxxx
 19. THAT, due to respondents PHI and DTPCI’s gross negligence as being narrated which
caused petitioner to suffer sleepless nights, depression, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, and embarrassment with her Diplomate friends in the profession and
industry, her social standing in the community was greatly affected and hence, respondents
PHI and DTPCI must be imposed the hereunder damages, prayed for x x x and Artile (sic)
2176 and 2199 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines x x x.

xxxx

22. THAT, as to Moral, Exemplary and Actual Damages, as well as petitioner’s Loss of
Income, the amounts are stated in its prayer hereunder. 69

It is clear from petitioner’s allegations that her Complaint for Damages was predicated on the alleged
negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff in the untimely putting off of all the lights within the
hotel’s swimming pool area, as well as the locking of its main door, prompting her to look for a way
out leading to the fall of the folding wooden counter top on her head causing her serious brain injury.
The said negligence was allegedly compounded by respondents PHI and DTPCI’s failure to render
prompt and adequate medical assistance. These allegations in petitioner’s Complaint constitute a
cause of action for quasi-delict, which under the New Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission
which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence. 70

It is evident from petitioner’s Complaint and from her open court testimony that the reliance was on
the alleged tortious acts committed against her by respondents PHI and DTPCI, through their
management and staff. It is now too late in the day to raise the said argument for the first time before
this Court.
71

Petitioner’s belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of action cannot be sanctioned by
this Court. Well-settled is the rule that a party is not allowed to change the theory of the case or the
cause of action on appeal. Matters, theories or arguments not submitted before the trial court cannot
be considered for the first time on appeal or certiorari. When a party adopts a certain theory in the
72 

court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal for to permit him to do so would
not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process. Hence, a party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of
73 

action he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and
cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum
or on appeal. 74

In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences between quasi-
delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct,
substantive and independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the
performance of the contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation. In quasi-
75 

delict, the defense of "good father of a family" is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents,
guardians and employers are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and
proper defense in the selection and supervision of employees. In quasi- delict , there is no
76 

presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the
defendant, otherwise, the former’s complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of contract,
negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the
burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of
the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed. 77

Viewed from the foregoing, petitioner’s change of theory or cause of action from quasi-delict to
breach of contract only on appeal would necessarily cause injustice to respondents PHI and DTPCI.
First, the latter will have no more opportunity to present evidence to contradict petitioner’s new
argument. Second, the burden of proof will be shifted from petitioner to respondents PHI and DTPCI.
Petitioner’s change of theory from quasi-delict to breach ofcontract must be repudiated.

As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the
presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Further, since petitioner’s
78 

case is for quasi-delict , the negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her
action. The burden of proof is upon petitioner. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides
79 

that "burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." It is then up for the
plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the
plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the
defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even presumed that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence. 80

In this case, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner utterly failed
to prove the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI. Other than petitioner’s self-serving
testimony that all the lights in the hotel’s swimming pool area were shut off and the door was locked,
which allegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding wooden counter top fell on
her head causing her injury, no other evidence was presented to substantiate the same. Even her
own companion during the night of the accident inside the hotel’s swimming pool area was never
presented to corroborate her allegations. Moreover, petitioner’s aforesaid allegations were
successfully rebutted by respondents PHI and DTPCI. Here, we quote with conformity the
observation of the trial court, thus:

x x x Besides not being backed up by other supporting evidence, said statement is being
contradicted by the testimony of Engineer Dante L. Costas, who positively declared that it has been
81 

a normal practice of the Hotel management not to put off the lights until 10:00P.M. in order to allow
the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the pool’s surrounding, the toilets and the counters. It was
also confirmed that the lights were kept on for security reasons and so that the people exercising in
the nearby gym may be able to have a good view of the swimming pool. This Court also takes note
that the nearby gymnasium was normally open until 10:00 P.M. so that there was a remote
possibility the pool area was in complete darkness as was alleged by herein petitioner, considering
that the illumination which reflected from the gym. Ergo, considering that the area were sufficient
(sic) illuminated when the alleged incident occurred, there could have been no reason for the
petitioner to have met said accident, much less to have been injured as a consequence thereof, if
she only acted with care and caution, which every ordinary person is expected to do. 82

More telling is the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals, to wit:

Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI and DTPCI and its
employees were negligent? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner’s
contention.

One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool area’s closing time is 7:00 p.m.. She, herself,
admitted during her testimony that she was well aware of the sign when she and Delia entered the
pool area. Hence, upon knowing, at the outset, of the pool’s closing time, she took the risk of
overstaying when she decided to take shower and leave the area beyond the closing hour. In fact, it
was only upon the advise of the pool attendants that she thereafter took her shower.
Two. She admitted, through her certification, that she lifted the wooden bar countertop, which then
fell on to her head. The admission in her certificate proves the circumstances surrounding the
occurrence that transpired on the night of 11 June 1995. This is contrary to her assertion in the
complaint and testimony that, while she was passing through the counter door, she was suddenly
knocked out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the fact that she admitted having lifted the
countertop, it was her own doing, therefore, that made the counter top fell on to her head.

Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioner’s assertion that the pool area was totally dark in
that she herself admitted that she saw a telephone at the counter after searching for one. It must be
noted that petitioner and Delia had walked around the pool area with ease since they were able to
proceed to the glass entrance door from the shower room, and back to the counter area where the
telephone was located without encountering any untoward incident. Otherwise, she could have
easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped into something while searching for the telephone. This
negates her assertion that the pool area was completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision.

xxxx

The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that the proximate and
immediate cause of the injury of petitioner was due to her own negligence. (Emphasis supplied).
83 

Even petitioner’s assertion of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and DTPCI in not rendering
medical assistance to her is preposterous. Her own Complaint affirmed that respondents PHI and
DTPCI afforded medical assistance to her after she met the unfortunate accident inside the hotel’s
swimming pool facility. Below is the portion of petitioner’s Complaint that would contradict her very
own statement, thus:

14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents PHI and DTPCI’s gross
negligence despite medical assistance, petitioner started to feel losing her memory that greatly
affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession. x x x. (Emphasis supplied).
84 

Also, as observed by the trial court, respondents PHI and DTPCI, indeed, extended medical
assistance to petitioner but it was petitioner who refused the same. The trial court stated, thus:

Further, herein petitioner’s asseverations that the Hotel Management did not extend medical
assistance to her in the aftermath of the alleged accident is not true. Again, this statement was not
supported by any evidence other that the sole and self-serving testimony of petitioner. Thus, this
Court cannot take petitioner’s statement as a gospel truth. It bears stressing that the Hotel
Management immediately responded after it received notice of the incident. As a matter of fact, Ms.
Pearlie, the Hotel nurse, with two chambermaids holding an ice bag placed on petitioner’s head
came to the petitioner to extend emergency assistance when she was notified of the incident, but
petitioner merely asked for Hirudoid, saying she was fine, and that she was a doctor and know how
to take care of herself. Also, the Hotel, through its in-house physician, Dr. Dalumpines offered its
medical services to petitioner when they met at the Hotel’s coffee shop, but again petitioner declined
the offer. Moreover, the Hotel as a show of concern for the petitioner’s welfare, shouldered the
expenses for the MRI services performed on petitioner at the Makati Medical Center. Emphatically,
petitioner herself cannot fault the Hotel for the injury she allegedly suffered because she herself did
not heed the warning at the pool to the effect that it was only open from 7:00 to 7:00 P.M. Thus,
when the petitioner’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
shecannot recover damages x x x. 85

With the foregoing, the following were clearly established, to wit: (1) petitioner stayed in the hotel’s
swimming pool facility beyond its closing hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden counter top that
eventually hit her head; and (3) respondents PHI and DTPCI extended medical assistance to her. As
such, no negligence can be attributed either to respondents PHI and DTPCI or to their staff and/or
management. Since the question of negligence is one of fact, this Court is bound by the said factual
findings made by the lower courts. It has been repeatedly held that the trial court's factual findings,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive and binding upon this Court, if they are not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence.
Petitioner has not presented sufficient ground to warrant a deviation from this rule. 86

With regard to petitioner’s contention that the principles of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior
are applicable in this case, this Court holds otherwise.

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself." It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes
the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of
the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of
negligence when direct evidence is lacking. Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there
87 

is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is sufficient proof showing the
conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the creative reason for the said
doctrine disappears. 88

Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management
or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 89

In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff negligently turned off
the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on petitioner’s head
had she not lifted the same. Although the folding wooden counter top is within the exclusive
management or control of respondents PHI and DTPCI, the falling of the same and hitting the head
of petitioner was not due to the negligence of the former. As found by both lower courts, the folding
wooden counter top did not fall on petitioner’s head without any human intervention. Records
showed that petitioner lifted the said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her head.
The same was evidenced by the, (1) 11 June 1995 handwritten certification of petitioner herself; (2)
her Letter dated 30 August 1995 addressed to Mr. Yoshikazu Masuda (Mr. Masuda), General
Manager of Dusit Hotel; and, (3) Certification dated 7 September 1995 issued to her by Dr.
Dalumpines upon her request, which contents she never questioned.

Here, we, respectively, quote the 11 June 1995 handwritten certification of petitioner; her letter to Mr.
Masuda dated 30 August 1995; and Dr. Dalumpines’ Certification dated 7 September 1995, to wit:

Petitioner’s 11 June 1995 Handwritten Certification:

I was requested by Dr. Dalumpines to write that I was assured of assistance should it be necessary
with regard an accident at the pool. x x x The phone was in an enclosed area on a chair – I lifted the
wooden bar counter top which then fell on my head producing a large hematoma x x x. 90

Petitioner’s Letter addressed to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August 1995:

Dear Mr. Masuda,

 xxxx

x x x We searched and saw a phone on a chair behind a towel counter. However, in order to get
behind the counter I had to lift a hinged massive wooden section of the counter which subsequently
fell and knocked me on my head x x x. 91

Dr. Dalumpines’ Certification dated 7 September 1995:

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was called to attend to an accident at
the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June 1995.

Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the folding countertop fell on her
head when she lifted it to enter the lifeguard’s counter to use the phone. She asked for Hirudoid.

The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpnes at the Coffee Shop. After narrating the poolside
incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines’ offer of assistance, she reiterated that the Hirudoid cream
was enough and that petitioner]being a doctor herself, knew her condition and she was all right.

This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever purpose it may serve, 7
September 1995 at Makati City. (Emphasis supplied).
92 

This Court is not unaware that in petitioner’s Complaint and in her open court testimony, her
assertion was, "while she was passing through the counter door, she was suddenly knocked out by a
hard and heavy object, which turned out to be the folding wooden counter top." However, in her
open court testimony, particularly during cross-examination, petitioner confirmed that she made such
statement that "she lifted the hinge massive wooden section of the counter near the swimming
pool." In view thereof, this Court cannot acquiesce petitioner’s theory that her case is one of res ipsa
93 

loquitur as it was sufficiently established how petitioner obtained that "bukol" or "hematoma."

The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any showing that the
employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI were negligent. Since in this case, the trial court and the
appellate court found no negligence on the part of the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI,
thus, the latter cannot also be held liable for negligence and be made to pay the millions of pesos
damages prayed for by petitioner.

The issue on whether petitioner’s debilitating and permanent injuries were the result of the accident
she suffered at the hotel’s swimming pool area on 11 June 1995 is another question of fact, which is
beyond the function of this Court to resolve. More so, this issue has already been properly passed
upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. To repeat, this Court is bound by the factual
findings of the lower courts and there is no cogent reason to depart from the said rule.

The following observations of the trial court are controlling on this matter:

Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which might have been the cause of her recurring brain
injury.

Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995
accident and the brain damage suffered by petitioner. Dr. Perez himself testified that the symptoms
being experienced by petitioner might have been due to factors other than the head trauma she
allegedly suffered. Emphasis must be given to the fact that petitioner had been suffering from
different kinds of brain problems since she was 18 years old, which may have been the cause of the
recurring symptoms of head injury she is experiencing at present.

Thirdly, Dr. Sanchez’s testimony cannot be relied upon since she testified on the findings and
conclusions of persons who were never presented in court. Ergo, her testimony thereon was
hearsay. A witness can testify only with regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge.
Testimonial or documentary evidence is hearsay if it is based, not on the personal knowledge of the
witness, but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. Consequently,
hearsay evidence -- whether objected to or not -- has no probative value. 94

Fourthly, the medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors whom petitioner

sought for examination or treatment were neither identified nor testified to by those who issued them.
Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative value. 1âwphi1

The aforesaid medical reports/evaluations/certifications of different doctors in favor of petitioner

cannot be given probative value and their contents cannot be deemed to constitute proof of the facts
stated therein. It must be stressed that a document or writing which is admitted not as independent
evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts
related therein. In the same vein, the medical certificate which was identified and interpreted in court
95 

by another doctor was not accorded probative value because the doctor who prepared it was not
presented for its identification. Similarly, in this case, since the doctors who examined petitioner
were not presented to testify on their findings, the medical certificates issued on their behalf and
identified by another doctor cannot be admitted as evidence. Since a medical certificate involves an
opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit
unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. Thus, an unverified
96 

and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value. It is precluded because the
party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the
person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented
as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being
mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect and of
no probative value. 97

All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and DTPCI, as well as their
management and staff, they cannot be made Iiable to pay for the millions of damages prayed for by
the petitioner. Since respondents PHI and DTPCI arc not liable, it necessarily follows that
respondent First Lepanto cannot also be made liable under the contract or Insurance.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution or the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007 and 5 November 2007, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, f
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

G.R. No. 200444

SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER, INC. and FELIX Q. RUZ, Petitioners

vs.
ANTONIO SAN ANDRES, Respondent

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not anymore apply to the independent
civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Such actions may be filed at
anytime, provided the plaintiff does not recover twice upon the same act or omission.

The Case

Petitioners Supreme Transportation Liner Inc. and Felix Q. Ruz hereby assail the decision
promulgated on January 27, 2011,  whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment
1

rendered in Civil Case No. T- 2240 on November 24, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco
City dismissing their counterclaim on the ground that to allow their counterclaim was tantamount to
double recovery of damages, considering that the same was not prosecuted in the criminal action
against the respondent's driver.2

Antecedents

The relevant factual background was summarized by the CA thusly:

On November 5, 2002, at around 5:00 in the morning, Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger bus,
Mabel Tours Bus with body number 1896-C and plate Number TB EBJ (old)/TB EVL-648 (new),
owned by [respondent] Antonio San Andres, along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Malabanban
Norte, Candelaria, Quezon, going towards the direction of Manila. While traversing Maharlika
Highway, the Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo it was overtaking. The Mabel Tours Bus
immediately swerved to the left lane but in the process, it hit head-on the Supreme Bus owned and
registered in the name of [petitioner] Supreme Bus Transportation Line, Inc., and driven by
[petitioner] Felix G. Ruz, that was negotiating in the opposite lane. Because of the strong impact of
the incident, the Supreme Bus was pushed to the side of the road and the Mabel Tour Bus
continuously moved until it hit a passenger jeepney that was parked on the side of the road which
later on fell on the canal. Nobody died but all the vehicles were damaged.

Investigation of the incident and photographs of the damaged buses as well as the other two (2)
vehicles were conducted and undertaken by SPO1 Rafael Ausa of Candelaria, Municipal Police
Station.

[Respondent] then brought the Mabel Tours Bus to the RMB Assembler and Body Builder to have it
repaired. The cost of repair was estimated in the amount of One Hundred Forty Four Thousand and
Five Hundred Pesos (Phpl44,500.00).

On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the Court a quo was instituted by
[respondent] Antonio San Andres against [petitioners] alleging actual damage to Mabel Tours Bus
and unrealized profits for the non-use of the Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent repairs in the
amount of ₱144,500.00 and ₱150,000.00, respectively. Claims for attorney's fees of ₱30,000.00,
appearance fee of ₱l,000.00, litigation expenses of ₱20,000.00 and cost of the suit were also lodged
in the complaint.

xxxx

Subsequently, [petitioners] filed their Answer with Counterclaim. They alleged among others that
plaintiff has no cause of action against them; the proximate cause of the vehicular accident is the
reckless imprudence of the [respondent's] driver, Ernesto Belchez operated the Mabel Tours Bus
recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another
vehicle without regard to the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the opposite
direction resulting to head on collision on the lane of defendant Supreme Bus and, at the time of the
accident, [respondent] operated the Mabel Tours Bus outside his franchise and without a registered
plate.

By way of counterclaim, [petitioner] Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc. alleged that it suffered
damages in the aggregate amount of ₱500,000.00 and another ₱l00,000.00 for the medical
expenses of its employees and passengers. The unwarranted filing of the case forced them to
secure the services of a counsel for ₱50,000.00 plus appearance fee of ₱5,000.00 and litigation
expenses in the amount of ₱3,000.00 including traveling expenses.

xxxx

After all the issues have been joined, the case was set for pre-trial conference wherein the parties, in
an effort to amicably settle the case, referred the case to conciliation. The parties, however, failed to
hammer out an amicable settlement. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.

[The parties] presented oral and documentary evidence to support their claims and contentions.
[Respondent] presented himself and Ernesto Belchez who later became a hostile witness. On the
part of [petitioner and Ruz], Felix Ruz, SPOl Rafael B. Ausa and Assistant for Operations of
[petitioner] Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc., Jessi Alvarez, were presented.

In the course of trial, Jessi Alvarez stated that he filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property against Ernesto Belchez before the Court in Candelaria, Quezon.
The case is now terminated and the accused was convicted because of his admission of the crime
charged. In the said criminal complaint, he did not reserve their civil claim or asked (sic) the fiscal to
reserve it, which, if itemized, would also be the amount of their counterclaim in the present civil
action filed by [respondent]. He added that they did not receive any compensation for the civil aspect
of the criminal case, and although the Supreme Bus was covered by insurance, they did not claim
for any reimbursement in connection with the subject incident. 3

Judgment of the RTC

On November 24, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the respondent's complaint as well
as the petitioners' counterclaim,  decreeing:
4

From the foregoing, the instant complaint for damages filed by the plaintiff is hereby dismissed for
having failed to prove liability on the part of the defendant. The counterclaim that was filed by the
defendants hereof is also dismissed for failure to adhere to procedural requirements.

SO ORDERED. 5

The RTC opined that the respondent was not able to prove the petitioners' liability;  and that the
6

petitioners' counterclaim should also be dismissed pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court,  whose pertinent portions the RTC quoted in its judgment as follows:
7

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institute the civil action
prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.

xxxx

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. 8

The RTC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action
precluded their right to recover damages from the respondent through their counterclaim. 9

Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed, submitting that:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE COUNTERCLAIM.

 II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE NO RESERVATION

WAS MADE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 02-253 FILED AGAINST PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S DRIVER
ERNESTO BELCHEZ. 10

Decision of the CA

In the assailed decision promulgated on January 27, 2011,  the CA dismissed the petitioners'
11

appeal, stating that the RTC had correctly ruled that the counterclaim could not prosper because
their recourse was limited to the enforcement of the respondent's subsidiary liability under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code;  that "to allow the counterclaim of [petitioners] is tantamount to
12

double recovery of damages, a prohibition under Article 2177 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 3,
Rule 111 of the Rules;"  and that their failure to reserve the separate civil action meant that their
13

right to recover under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was deemed instituted with the criminal action. 14

The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration through the resolution promulgated on
January 26, 2012. 15

Hence, this appeal.

Issue

The Court is called upon to decide whether or not the petitioners' counterclaim was correctly denied
by the RTC.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not have been dismissed by the RTC and the CA
despite their failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action in the criminal case they had
brought against respondent's driver. However, whether or not they could recover damages upon
their counterclaim presents a different story, as they should first show that they will not recover
damages twice for the same incident.

1.
Petitioners' counterclaim, being in the
nature of an independent civil action,
required no prior reservation

As we see it, the CA concluded that the petitioners' cause of action should be limited to the recovery
of civil liability ex delicto by virtue of their having initiated against the respondent's driver the criminal
complaint for criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA was
seemingly of the opinion that the petitioners' recourse against the respondent was limited to
recovering from him, as the driver's employer, his subsidiary liability under and pursuant to Article
103  of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the CA pointed out that the petitioners' failure to reserve
16

the civil aspect of the criminal case proscribed them from instituting a separate civil action based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Corollary, appellants should have reserved the civil aspect of the criminal case they have filed.
Without so doing, they were deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the
basis of the crime. Therefore, the right of appellants to institute a separate civil case to recover
liability from appellee based under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. Evidently, appellant's cause of action against appellee will be limited to the recovery
of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x
17

The CA thereby erred. It incorrectly appreciated the nature of the petitioners' cause of action as
presented in their counterclaim.

We only need to look at the facts alleged in the petitioners' counterclaim to determine the correct
nature of their cause of action.  The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern the suit are to
18

be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather
by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
19

The counterclaim relevantly reads:

xxxx

5. That the proximate cause of the subject vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the
plaintiffs driver, one ERNESTO BELCHEZ, by operating said Mabel Tours bus recklessly and in
violation of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another vehicle without
regards (sic) to the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the opposite direction
resulting to head on collision (sic) on the lane of defendant's SUPREME bus;

6. That at the time of the accident, plaintiff operated the subject Mabel Tour bus outside his
franchise, hence, in violation of his franchise and allied rules and regulations; operated the same
without registered plate and using the route of another franchise holder; and

COUNTERCLAIM

7. Defendants replead the proceedings (sic) paragraphs as they may be relevant;

8. That as a result of plaintiffs violation of his franchise and gross negligence of his driver, the
defendant's SUPREME bus suffered damage in the aggregate amount of ₱500,000.00; medical
expenses for its employee and passengers in the amount of ₱100,000.00; 20

xxxx

Contrary to the conclusion thereon by the CA, the petitioners' cause of action was upon a quasi-
delict. As such, their counterclaim against the respondent was based on Article 2184,  in relation to
21

Article 2180  and Article 2176,  all of the Civil Code. It is relevant to state that even the RTC itself
22 23

acknowledged that the counterclaim was upon a quasi-delict, as its ratiocination bears out, to wit:

The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may
nonetheless bring an action for damages against the plaintiff under the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned task, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the above-quoted provisions is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal
Code.

However, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action
under the above quoted provisions of the New Civil Code may be brought separately from the
criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must be reserved. 24

Yet, the RTC likewise erred on its outcome because its ratiocination was founded on the obsolete
version of the Rules of Court. By the time when the RTC rendered judgment on November 24, 2008,
the revised relevant rule of procedure had already been promulgated and taken effect,  and it had
25

specifically deleted the erstwhile reservation requirement vis-a-vis the independent civil actions, as
follows:

Section 1. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary dan1ages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (la)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. 1awp++i1

The error committed by the CA emanated from its failure to take into consideration that the omission
of the driver in violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code could give rise not only to the
obligation ex delicto,  but also to the obligation based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of
26

the Civil Code. Under the factual antecedents herein, both obligations rested on the common
element of negligence. Article 2177  of the Civil Code and Section 3,  Rule 111 of the Rules of
27 28

Court allow the injured party to prosecute both criminal and civil actions simultaneously. As clarified
in Casupanan v. Laroya: 29

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only
the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action. (Bold emphasis supplied)

The foregoing notwithstanding, the petitioners as the injured parties have to choose the remedy by
which to enforce their claim in the event of favorable decisions in both actions. This is because
Article 2177 of the Civil Code bars them from recovering damages twice upon the same act or
omission. As ruled in Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco: 30

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender, i.e., ( 1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained
of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil
Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from
the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.

As can be seen, the latest iteration of Rule III, unlike the predecessor, no longer includes the
independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code as requiring prior
reservation to be made in a previously instituted criminal action. Had it been cautious and
circumspect, the RTC could have avoided the error.
 2.
Petitioners should first show that
they would not recover damages
twice from the same act or omission.

Nonetheless, we are constrained not to award outright the damages prayed for by the petitioners in
their counterclaim.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code and the present version of Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, which is the applicable rule of procedure, expressly prohibit double recovery of damages
arising from the same act or omission. The petitioners' allegation that they had not yet recovered
damages from the respondent was not controlling considering that the criminal case against the
respondent's driver had already been concluded. It remains for the petitioners to still demonstrate
that the RTC as the trial court did not award civil damages in the criminal case. Consequently, Civil
Case No. T-2240 should be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, if only to afford to the
petitioners the opportunity to present evidence on their counterclaim subject to the prohibition
against double recovery of damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision

promulgated on January 27, 2011; and REMANDS Civil Case No. T-2240 to the Regional Trial Court
in Tabaco City for further proceedings to allow the petitioners to present evidence on their
counterclaim, subject to the foregoing clarifications.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

G.R. No. 200302

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal   assailing the Decision  promulgated on 31May2011 by the Court of
1 2

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA affirmed the Decision  dated 23 March 2010
3

of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584.
The RTC found appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also
ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno (Cueno). 4

The Facts

Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating with two (2) other persons whose true names, identities and definite
whereabouts have not as

yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously

attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one RONALDO CUENO Y
BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing him repeatedly with bladed weapons, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Ronaldo
Cueno y Bonifacio.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial
conference was terminated on 26 October 2005, and trial on the merits ensued.
The CA summarized the parties’ evidence as follows:

The Prosecution[’s] Evidence

Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno, testified that on September 1, 2005
at around 6:00 p.m., she was in her house located in [sic] Lot 34, Block 4, Sipna Compound, Bagong
Silangan, Quezon City. She was about to leave the house to go to the market when she saw
appellant, his brother Larry Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim by repeatedly stabbing
him. She was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters from the incident. Shocked at what she
had just witnessed, she shouted for help and pleaded the assailants to stop, but they did not stop
stabbing the victim. In her account, she recalled that the assailants, including appellant, used a tres

cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse [bottle]. At one point, the victim
managed to take the knife away from appellant and brandished the same at his attackers.
Thereafter, the victim fell on the ground. Upon seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other
assailants left the scene. Through the help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed the victim to a
hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw appellant together with Larry
Lipata and Rudy Lipata [stab] her father to death in front of their house. She recounted that upon
arriving at home from work on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., her father immediately went
to the house of her aunt Mercelinda Valzado, which was located only a block away from their house,
to ask for malunggay leaves.

Upon coming home from her aunt’s house, the victim was attacked by the Lipatas which prompted
the victim to run away. Thinking that his assailants were no longer around, the victim proceeded to
their [sic] house but then the Lipatas stabbed him to death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight
(8) meters away from the scene. She further testified that she had no knowledge of any reason why
the Lipatas would kill her father, but her father’s death brought her pain and sadness and anger
against the perpetrators of her father’s killing.

The Defense[’s] Evidence

The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant himself. According to appellant, he
was resting in his house in Sipna Compound, Brgy. Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on September 1,
2005 at around 6:00 p.m. when two children, namely John Paul Isip and a certain Rommel, called
him and told him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed to his brother and upon
arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the victim. He instantaneously assisted his brother but the
victim continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to the ground. Thereafter, appellant managed to
grab the knife from the victim and stab the victim. Then he fled from the scene [of the crime]
because he was wounded. Appellant’s sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen, brought him to the Amang
Medical Center for treatment of his stab wound where he was apprehended by police officers. 6

The RTC’s Ruling

The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, he
hypothetically admitted the commission of the crime. Hence, the burden of proving his innocence
shifted to appellant. The RTC found that the defense failed to adequately establish the element of
unlawful aggression on the part of Cueno. There was no actual or imminent danger to the life of
appellant or of his brother Larry. On the contrary, the three Lipata brothers (appellant, Larry, and
Rudy)  employed treachery and took advantage of their superior strength when they attacked Cueno
7

after Cueno left the house of his sister-in-law. Cueno suffered 17 stab wounds on his trunk from the
Lipata brothers. The existence of multiple stab wounds on the trunk of the unarmed Cueno is
inconsistent with appellant’s theory of defense of a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the
prosecution failed to show conclusive proof of evident premeditation.

The dispositive portion of the RTC’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court here[b]y renders judgment
finding the accused GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.

The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the following amounts:

(a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the accused;

(b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by the heirs of Rolando
Cueno, incident to his death plus 12% interest per annum computed from 6 September 2005
until fully paid;

(c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and emotional anguish suffered by the
heirs arising from the death of Rolando Cueno; and

(d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.

The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive imprisonment, subject to the
conditions imposed under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED. 8

Appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal  on 6 April 2010. The
9

RTC granted appellant’s notice in an Order  dated 19 April 2010.

10

The CA’s Ruling

The CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA agreed with the
RTC’s ruling that appellant’s claim of defense of a relative must fail. There was no actual or
imminent threat on the life of appellant or of his brother Larry. There was also no reason for
appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno was outnumbered by the Lipata brothers, three to one. The
requirement of lack of provocation on the part of appellant is negated by the multiple stab wounds
that Cueno sustained.

The CA disagreed with appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to establish treachery. The
CA pointed out that Cueno was not forewarned of any impending threat to his life. Cueno was
unarmed, and went to his sister-in-law’s house to gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on
the other hand, were readily armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and a broken piece of glass from a
Red Horse bottle. The execution of the Lipata brothers’ attack made it impossible for Cueno to
retaliate.

The CA also disagreed with appellant’s contention that there was no abuse of superior strength. The
three Lipata brothers were all armed with bladed weapons when they attacked the unarmed Cueno.
The Lipata brothers refused to stop stabbing Cueno until they saw him unconscious.
The dispositive portion of the CA’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. The
appealed decision of the trial court convicting appellant of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 11

The PAO filed a notice of appeal  on behalf of appellant on 10 June 2011. The CA ordered the
12

immediate elevation of the records to this Court in its 30 June 2011 Resolution. 13

Appellant’s Death Prior to Final Judgment

This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,  noted the records forwarded by the CA and
14

required the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) to confirm the confinement of appellant. The BuCor, in a
letter dated 26 July 2012, informed this Court that there is no record of confinement of appellant as
of date. In a Resolution dated 10 September 2012,  this Court required the Quezon City Jail Warden
15

to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid Prison and to report compliance within ten days from notice.
The Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012,  informed this Court that appellant
16

passed away on 13 February 2011. The former Quezon City Jail Warden wrote to the RTC about
appellant’s demise in a letter dated 23 February 2011. Attached to the 22 October 2012 letter were
photocopies of appellant’s death certificate and medical certificate, as well as the former Quezon
City Jail Warden’s letter.  In a Resolution dated 7 January 2013,  this Court noted the 22 October
17 18

2012 letter from the Quezon City Jail Warden, and required the parties to submit their supplemental
briefs on the civil aspect of the case if they so desire.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18 March 2013,  which stated that it
19

had already exhaustively argued the relevant issues in its appellee’s brief. The PAO, on the other
hand, filed a supplemental brief on 26 March 2013. 20

In view of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s decision, this Court issued a
Resolution dated 25 September 2013 which ordered the PAO "(1) to SUBSTITUTE the legal
representatives of the estate of the deceased appellant as party; and (2) to COMMENT on the civil
liability of appellant within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution."
21

The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant on 29
November 2013.  According to the Public Attorney’s Office-Special and Appealed Cases Service,
22

the relatives of the deceased appellant have not communicated with it since the case was assigned
to its office on 29 September 2010. The PAO sent a letter on 4 November 2013 to Lilia Lipata, who
was appellant’s next of kin per official records. Despite receipt of the letter, the relatives of appellant
still failed to communicate with the PAO.

In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:

xxxx

9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is based solely on the act
complained of, i.e. murder, the same does not survive the death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in
line with the abovecited ruling [People v. Jaime Ayochok, G.R. No. 175784, 25 August 2010, 629
SCRA 324, citing People v. Rogelio Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239],
the death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon.
10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute the legal representatives
of the estate of the deceased as party does not arise. 23

On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the [PAO] shall continue as the
legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate
in the civil aspect of this case."
24

The Court’s Ruling

At the outset, we declare that because of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s
decision, there is no further need to determine appellant’s criminal liability. Appellant’s death has the
effect of extinguishing his criminal liability. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellant’s death with regard to his civil liability. In
1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,  reconciled the differing doctrines on the issue of whether the
25

death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded
that "[u]pon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is
on the criminal."26

We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires
to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate
civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines
against whom the same shall be enforced." 27

We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of action. If the act or
omission complained of arises from quasidelict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to person
or real or personal property, the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.  On the other hand,
28

if the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed
against the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. 29

We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado,
in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by
prescription.  (Emphases supplied)
30

The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the
death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to reflect our
ruling in Bayotas:

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the
independent civil action instituted under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to
enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be.
The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of
an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. 1âwphi1

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially
provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil
action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased.
Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased
Appellant,  Cueno died because of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through
31

deliberate acts.  Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellant’s
32

death on 13 February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal
liability and civil liability ex delicto.

Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence
and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate
of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this
case,"  the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in
33

Bayotas,  require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil
34

action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil
actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict,
are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party
even without reservation.  The separate civil action proceeds independently of the criminal
35

proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence.  The civil action which may thereafter
36

be instituted against the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new
provisions of Section 16 of Rule 3  in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in
37

Rules 86 and 87. 38

Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case
instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case
for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should
file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate
civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade
after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.

However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of
Court for study and recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate amendments to the Rules for
a speedy and inexpensive resolution of such similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the
private offended party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies after conviction by the trial court
but pending appeal.

In Lumantas v. Calapiz,  this Court declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal based on
39

reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused from civil liability ex
delicto which may be proved by preponderance of evidence. This Court’s pronouncement
in Lumantas is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant,
the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should
be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

We also turn to the Code Commission’s justification of its recognition of the possibility of miscarriage
of justice in these cases:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless
instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of
the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot
be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages
suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article
1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil
action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purpose of the imprisonment of or fine
upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will
correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice – a cause for
disillusionment on the part of innumerable persons injured or wronged. 40

In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be recommended by the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules of Court shall aim to provide the aggrieved parties relief, as well as
recognition of their right to indemnity. This reform is of course subject to the policy against double
recovery.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31 May 2011 by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y
Ortiza are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.

Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice