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Humanitarian/Disaster
Relief Operations
Joint Warfare Publication 3-52
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JWP 3-52

JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3-52

HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

Joint Warfare Publication 3-52 (JWP 3-52), October 2002 Edition,


is promulgated
as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

Director General
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Joint Doctrine and Concepts

CONDITION OF RELEASE

1. This information is Crown copyright and the intellectual property


rights for this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence
(MOD). No material or information contained in this publication should
be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form
outside MOD establishments except as authorised by both the sponsor
and the MOD where appropriate.

2. This information is released by the United Kingdom Government


to a recipient Government for defence purposes only. It may be
disclosed only within the Defence Department of a recipient
Government, except as otherwise authorised by the MOD.

3. This information may be subject to privately owned rights.


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JWP 3-52

AUTHORISATION
The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre (JDCC), is responsible for publishing Joint
Warfare Publications (JWPs) and Joint Doctrine Pamphlets (JDPs) and maintaining a
hierarchy of such publications. Users wishing to quote JWPs or JDPs as reference
material in other work should confirm with the JDCC Doctrine Editor whether the
particular publication and amendment state remains extant. Comments on factual
accuracy or proposals for amendment should also be directed to the Doctrine Editor at:

The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre


Ministry of Defence
Shrivenham
SWINDON
Wilts SN6 8RF

Telephone number: 01793 787216/7


Facsimile number: 01793 787232
E-mail: doctrine@jdcc.mod.uk
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DISTRIBUTION

Distribution of JWPs is managed by DSDC(L) Llangennech, Mwrwg Road,


Llangennech, Llanelli, Carmarthenshire SA14 8YP. Requests for use of this
publication, or amendments to its distribution, should be referred to DSDC(L).

Telephone number: 01554 822368


Facsimile number: 01554 822350
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JWP 3-52

PREFACE

SCOPE
1. Background. There will be occasions when it will be appropriate to deploy
military assets to assist in a foreign humanitarian emergency or disaster relief effort,
either on a national basis or as part of an international effort. Work resulting from the
post - Op BARWOOD Humanitarian Relief Study (Mozambique) highlighted the lack
of national guidance for the provision of military assistance to foreign humanitarian
emergencies and disaster relief efforts. It was determined that Joint Doctrine was
required in order to provide the necessary guidance.

2. Purpose. The purpose of JWP 3-52 ‘Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations’


is to inform and guide commanders and staff involved in the planning and conduct of
military support to foreign humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in a militarily
benign environment.

3. Context. JWP 3-52 is an important publication in that it supports a particular


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type of operation with specific characteristics, in so much as forces are generated to


specifically support humanitarian/disaster relief efforts in a given disaster situation –
this is the mission.1 Notwithstanding this, the ethos and guidance provided by higher
level publications JWP 0-10 ‘United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational
Operations’ and JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations’ should still be applied together with the
specifics articulated within JWP 3-52. Whilst the scope of this publication does not
cover the provision of humanitarian assistance, i.e. a secondary task undertaken within
the operational area,2 when the mission for generated forces is primarily one of
security, the key tenets are likely to be applicable.

4. Given the nature of the subject matter, JWP 3-52 has been produced in close co-
ordination with other government department (OGD) stakeholders and acknowledges
the input of international and non-governmental organisations (IO and NGO). As such
it should be of value to ‘head-office’ and ‘field-worker’ elements of the Department
for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as well as
being of utility to the wider humanitarian community.

5. Structure. Whilst focussed at the Operational level, JWP 3-52 includes


appropriate strategic and tactical issues and considerations. It provides guidance to
those elements of the MOD and the Joint Force that may be involved in a
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1
For example: Operation BARWOOD in Mozambique (Feb/Mar 00) (Tropical Cyclone) or Operation TELLAR in
Central America (Nov 98) (Hurricane).
2
For example: The provision of humanitarian assistance by ISAF to humanitarian effort in response to the earthquake in
Afghanistan (Mar 02) or by KFOR in response to the KOSOVO refugee crisis.

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JWP 3-52

Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operation (HDRO) and in the planning and provision of


military assistance. The JWP is divided into two parts. Part 1 addresses ‘The Nature
of Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations’ with Chapter 1, aimed specifically at the
JTFC, providing an overview of the operational environment. Chapter 2 addresses the
roles and responsibilities of involved agencies, both national and international to
enable the JTFC and his staff to situate the Joint Force support within the wider
response. Part 2 covers ‘Planning and Conduct’ of HDRO. Chapter 3 provides more
detailed guidance on response methodology, including appropriate capabilities, and
the fundamentals of military support to an international relief effort. Annex 3C
identifies those military capabilities that may be of particular relevance to an HDRO
and should prove useful to DFID and MOD in identifying an appropriate military
response. Chapter 4 highlights the planning process and considers the key military
planning and force generation considerations. Annex 4A and 4B capture the
framework planning process and provide an HDRO Planning Checklist respectively,
both of which should provide a useful ‘handy-billy’ for the busy Joint planner.
LINKAGES
6. JWP 3-52 should be read in conjunction with JDP XX/03 ‘Joint Civil-Military
Co-operation’3 which, once it is published, will provide guidance on civil-military
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interaction in greater detail. If there is potential for evacuation of UK Entitled


Personnel (UKEP) then JWP 3-51 ‘Non-combatant Evacuation Operations’ should be
consulted. JWP 3-45 ‘Media Operations’ contains more detailed guidance on the
conduct of Media Ops and Media handling on operations and JWP 3-80 provides
guidance on ‘Information Operations’.
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3
A Joint Doctrine Pamphlet (JDP) on ‘Joint Civil-Military Co-operation’ is currently under development and is planned
for publication in 2003.

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JWP 3-52

HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

CONTENTS
Page No
Title Page i
Authorisation, Distribution ii
Preface iii
Contents v
Joint Warfare Publications vii
Record of Amendments viii

PART 1 – THE NATURE OF HUMANITARIAN/


DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

Chapter 1 Overview
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Terminology 1-2
Operational Environment 1-3
Characteristics of Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations 1-4
Disaster Types 1-6
Annex 1A - Types of Disaster

Chapter 2 Approach to Humanitarian Emergencies/Disasters

Government Response 2-1


Inter-departmental Processes 2-3
The DFID – MOD/Military Interface 2-3
Financial Issues 2-5
Legal Issues 2-6
Role of the International Community 2-8
Annex 2A - Roles of Key United Nations Agencies and
Members of the International Red Cross Movement

PART 2 – PLANNING AND CONDUCT

Chapter 3 Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster Response

Assessment 3-1
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Civil Response to Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster 3-4

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JWP 3-52

Military Support to Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster


Response 3-8
Key Tenets of Military Support 3-10
Evaluation 3-12
Command and Control 3-13
Annex 3A - Information Necessary for Assessment
Annex 3B - OLRT Immediate Considerations
Annex 3C - Military Capabilities

Chapter 4 Planning

Planning 4-1
Planning Considerations 4-4
Mission Analysis and Estimate Process 4-6
Forces 4-6
Annex 4A - MOD/DFID Planning Process Framework
Annex 4B - HDR Planning Checklist

Glossary of Terms and Definitions


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Glossary of Abbreviations
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JWP 3-52

JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS


The successful prosecution of joint operations requires clearly understood doctrine that
is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national
doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology
and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected
not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop
national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or at all, by NATO
doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the
development of a hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWP).

Joint Doctrine Pamphlets (JDPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions
when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a
foreshortened time scale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or
to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur
when a more comprehensive ‘parent’ publication is under development, but normally
well in advance of its planned publication.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is


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explained in DCI JS 16/2002.


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JWP 3-52

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
Amendment No. Date of Insertion Initials
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viii
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PART 1

THE NATURE OF HUMANITARIAN/


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DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS


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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
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JWP 3-52

CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW
101. The Global physical environment is changing and the consequence of this is
likely to be an increase in environmental failures (droughts, floods, famine).
Increasing pressure on the World’s physical resources linked with an increased interest
from the world media and concern from leading nations and donors make it likely that
UK Armed Forces may be called upon to support humanitarian and disaster relief
efforts more frequently in the future.1

102. Following a humanitarian emergency or disaster, UK military forces may be


required to support the international relief effort in the country or region in which the
emergency or disaster has occurred. Such support could be provided direct from the
UK, from British garrisons abroad, or from ships or other units operating in the
vicinity but is likely to be in support of and at the request of the Department for
International Development (DFID).
103. The requirement for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to be prepared to provide
support to an international humanitarian emergency or disaster relief effort is
mandated in Defence Mission E and specifically tasked within Military Task 20.2
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DEFENCE MISSION E

Peace Support and Humanitarian Assistance Operations

‘To contribute forces to operations designed to prevent, contain and resolve conflict, in support of
international order and humanitarian principles, and to contribute to efforts to deal with humanitarian
crises and disasters.’

MILITARY TASK 20

Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Outside the UK and Overseas Territories

‘Humanitarian crises and disasters, if not addressed rapidly and effectively at an early stage, can
often lead to potentially serious conflicts. When appropriate, and at the request of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office or the Department for International Development, the Armed Forces
contribute to humanitarian and disaster relief operations, either on a national basis or as part of a co-
ordinated international effort.’

104. The utility of military forces to support UK and international relief efforts is an
important function for which UK military forces should be prepared.
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1
The Strategic Context 2000 (The Physical Dimension).
2
Military Task 20 from the JETL (Version 4.1) maintained by JF Trg & Stds, DCJO (OPS SP), PJHQ. This is further
broken down into subordinate tasks throughout the operational levels.

1-1
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JWP 3-52

SECTION I – TERMINOLOGY
105. British Defence Doctrine (BDD) differentiates between support to foreign
emergency/disaster relief efforts, and the provision of humanitarian assistance, based
on the security situation and the mission of the involved military forces, namely:

a. A Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operation (HDRO) is an operation


conducted in a benign posture, to assist humanitarian emergency and/or
disaster relief efforts in a militarily permissive foreign country. HDRO are
conducted by military forces, essentially acting as a ‘sub-contractor’ through
the Department for International Development to the wider foreign relief effort
where support to the foreign relief effort is the military mission. Military
forces will be deployed for a specific task (which will have normally been
specifically costed). Whilst Command and Control remains within the military
chain of command, military forces engaged in HDRO should take direction
and guidance from the co-ordinating humanitarian agency, normally through
DFID. The operating environment should be permissive and thereby enable a
benign force posture to be taken (except for essential asset protection).
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b. Humanitarian Assistance is the provision of humanitarian relief by


military forces deployed for the conduct of combat or security related
operations. In recognising that the provision of humanitarian relief is
principally a function of humanitarian and development agencies, BDD also
recognises that there may be circumstances, especially during combat, when
these agencies are unable to deliver such aid or where there may be an aid
shortfall. Military forces engaged in such activities should, wherever possible,
take advice and overall direction for the provision of humanitarian assistance
from the co-ordinating civilian authority or humanitarian agency and should in
any event hand-over responsibility for the humanitarian task to the appropriate
civilian agency at the earliest opportunity.

106. Other key terms and definitions related to Humanitarian/Disaster Relief


Operations:

a. Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster. A Humanitarian


Emergency/Disaster is a serious disruption of a society’s ability to function
effectively, causing widespread human, material, or environmental losses
which exceed the ability of an affected society to cope using only its own
resources. Disasters are often classified according to their speed of onset, or
according to their cause (natural or man made).
b. Disaster Relief. Disaster Relief is the organised response to alleviate
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the situation resulting from a catastrophe. The aims of disaster relief are to
save life and lessen suffering, limit damage and restore essential services to a

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JWP 3-52

level that enables local authorities to cope. Disaster relief demands the total
integration of the relief effort with the life-support assets and infrastructure
available within the disaster area.

c. Rapid Onset Disaster.3 Rapid Onset Disaster is any disaster that has
not been predicted or if predicted the scale of the disaster is far greater than
anticipated. Examples are hurricanes, earthquakes and floods.

d. Civil-Military Co-operation.4 Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is


the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the
Military Commander and civil actors, including national population and local
authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental
organisations and agencies.

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT


107. Humanitarian Emergencies/Disasters. Disasters are a regular part of global
life, whether caused by acts of nature or acts of man. These events become
humanitarian emergencies when their effects impact on a society or population whose
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inherent resources are insufficient to absorb the impact and deal with the event’s
consequences. Many humanitarian emergencies and disasters are prolonged. Their
effects can be mitigated by international aid and development programmes designed to
address the immediate needs of a stricken population and to build capacity enabling
local society to better cope with humanitarian emergency/disaster situations.

108. Rapid Onset Disasters. Events can occur that have a relatively sharply
defined start, pose an acute, generalised threat to life, livelihoods, or basic societal
well-being and overwhelm local capacity to deal with the effects.5 These types of
humanitarian emergency/disaster are termed Rapid Onset Disasters.6

109. Military Involvement. The engagement of UK military forces in HDRO will


normally be out of the necessity for speed of reaction, including proximity of suitable
resources to the disaster area, the scale of effort required or specialist skills to deal
with the consequences of a humanitarian emergency/disaster. UK military forces will
therefore only normally be engaged in response to Rapid Onset Disasters and normally
at the request of humanitarian organisations and usually through DFID.

110. Unpredictability. Each HDRO will take place in a unique and unpredictable
environment. HDROs will normally be undertaken in a dysfunctional environment
with varying degrees of chaos. There will be a mismatch between necessary resources
3
This is a DFID term. UN OCHA use the term ‘ Sudden Onset Disaster’.
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4
NATO definition as articulated in MC 411/1.
5
This includes a sudden change in circumstances in the midst of a slower onset or protracted emergency/disaster.
6
E.g. An earthquake occurring in the midst of an ongoing humanitarian emergency based on drought/conflict
(Afghanistan Mar 02).

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JWP 3-52

and situational needs, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension. The


government of a stricken state may well be overwhelmed by the effects of the
humanitarian emergency/disaster and paralysed by the scale of the necessary response.

111. Responsibility. Notwithstanding the above, the overall responsibility for all
relief actions rests with the stricken state. UK military forces may undertake a HDRO
to support the relief effort, either bilaterally or as part of a wider international effort, at
the request of DFID following an appeal for assistance by the stricken state.

112. Permissive Environment. Given that HDROs are conducted at the request of
a stricken state, albeit through DFID, and therefore ‘by invitation’, they will to all
intents and purposes be conducted in a permissive environment. Security issues,
including policing functions, remain the responsibility of the stricken state. However,
depending on the internal situation, and taking account of any local tensions and the
functionality of the state security system, there may be a requirement to provide
sufficient security for essential asset protection.
113. Co-ordination Requirement. National bodies and recognised organisations
such as the United Nations (UN), International Federation of Red Cross and Red
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Crescent Societies (IFRC), Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) and a host of


donor organisations, are likely to be involved in international relief efforts to mitigate
the effects of humanitarian emergencies/disasters. Close and early co-ordination by
civil and military authorities, both in UK and in the affected country, is highly
desirable, though there will often be sensitivities involved, and every effort should be
made to conduct, wherever possible, integrated planning. Co-ordination on the ground
will depend on the experience and capability of the affected country and may therefore
be erratic and confused, particularly in the first few days. Notwithstanding this, the
pattern of operations is likely to be influenced significantly by the lead responding
agency.

SECTION III – CHARACTERISTICS OF


HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS
114. Civil/Humanitarian Lead. The provision of humanitarian and disaster relief
is primarily the domain of civilian agencies. When undertaken, HDROs will generally
be conducted to supplement or complement the relief efforts of the stricken state and
supporting international community, under the direction of DFID as the ‘employing
agency’. The Joint Force will thus provide specific support to particular requirements
in response to an acknowledged ‘humanitarian gap’ between the humanitarian
emergency/disaster needs and relief community resources available to meet them.
HDROs will therefore normally be limited in both scope and duration.
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115. DFID/MOD Approaches. The successful conduct of a HDRO requires DFID


and MOD to work as a team. To achieve the desired results in an appropriate and

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JWP 3-52

timely manner both Departments must recognise the requirements and needs of the
other and should wherever possible take them into account when planning and
decision making. In responding to humanitarian emergencies/disasters DFID will
usually channel its assistance through its traditional partners – the UN, ICRC, Red
Cross/Red Cresent Movement, and NGOs – and wherever possible utilise local and
regional civilian resources. DFID will utilise military assets when the scale and
timeliness of the assistance needed by vulnerable populations cannot be met by
civilian resources alone. Given that all military assets work within particular readiness
criteria, it is important that DFID provides MOD with as much advance warning as
possible, even if the use of military assets is only anticipated. This facilitates the early
provision of informed advice on available military resources and the identification of
potential cost effective relief effort ‘multipliers’, the inclusion of military
representation on the DFID led in-country needs assessment, timely planning (if only
contingency) and suitable force generation (if MOD are ultimately engaged).
However, the early engagement of military assets needs to be considered against the
potential raising of expectations, both national and international, which may then
necessitate the employment of military assets when their use may otherwise have been
unnecessary.
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116. Multinationality. Although the UK has the capability to operate unilaterally, 7


the potential scale of any necessary emergency/disaster response is such that any UK
response is likely to be but part of a wider international relief effort. This international
effort may include other nations’ military forces to varying degrees. Whilst potentially
not part of a formal coalition, there may be opportunities to develop multinational
support from and for other deployed forces, including Host Nation Support (HNS),
logistic support and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). Neighbouring countries
will have to be consulted over a range of issues such as overflight rights or staging of
UK forces.8 All efforts on the ‘ground’ should be co-ordinated with other contributors
in order to generate the desired unity of effort in addressing the needs of the stricken
state.
117. Constraints. UK HDRO will always be subject to political, legal and practical
constraints, including the availability of appropriate assets and most importantly the
needs of the stricken state. These constraints may be influenced to a greater or lesser
extent by the level of national interest at stake and the expectations of the public at
large. DFID and MOD will decide the scale of UK forces committed to a HDRO and
the constraints imposed upon them, including authorised Rules of Engagement (ROE).

118. Media. Media interest in humanitarian emergency/disaster situations may well


be considerable, particularly during the initial emergency phase, and may well have
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7
Contemporary military support to humanitarian emergency/disaster relief is generally offered bi-laterally.
8
A table summarising the main ‘rules’ that should be observed by States in response to international disaster relief
efforts is included within UN OCHA Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (May
1994) – commonly referred to as the ‘OSLO Guidelines’.

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JWP 3-52

induced military involvement. The media will have the ability to make uncensored
live global broadcasts and file instant reports from within the Joint Operations Area
(JOA). There is therefore the risk that politicians, international leaders, the stricken
society and the general public, both at home and abroad, may receive direct and raw
information upon which inappropriate perceptions may be based and unrealistic
expectations raised. To ameliorate this it is necessary to have a coherent and co-
ordinated Media Ops plan linked to the UK Government’s Information Campaign9 and
able to convey the UK’s policy to different audiences. This should be developed in
consultation with the DFID Press Office.

SECTION IV – DISASTER TYPES


119. Disasters are termed natural if caused by uncontrollable forces of nature; and
man made if brought about by human interference. There is however, no operational
significance in the distinction and the same processes would normally be applied to
both disaster types. Disasters can be divided into basic categories:

a. Natural. Which is split into two categories:


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(1) Geological. Earthquakes, tsunamis (tidal waves), volcanoes and


landslides.
(2) Climatic. Tropical cyclones, floods, droughts and wild fires.

b. Man made.
(1) Chemical, industrial or major transport accidents, and
environmental incidents.
(2) Mass Population Movement.

120. Details of the factors contributing to the various disasters and the typical needs
post-disaster onset are at Annex 1A.
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9
See JWP 3-45 ‘Media Operations’, Ch 1, Sect 2 and JWP 3-80 ‘Information Operations’, Ch 1, Sect 2.

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JWP 3-52
ANNEX 1A – TYPES OF DISASTER
1. The following disaster types are listed below in more detail (This list is not exhaustive, but rather more illustrative to
highlight the potential issues.):
a. GEOLOGICAL: Earthquake, Landslides, Tsunamis and Volcanic Eruption.
b. CLIMATIC: Drought, Flood, Tropical Cyclone, Wildfire.

c. MAN-MADE: Chemical and Industrial Accidents, Mass Population Movement.

GEOLOGICAL HAZARDS

Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Earthquake a. Location of settlements a. Physical damage - damage to key a. Hazard a. Earthquake a. Search and rescue.
in seismic areas. structures and infrastructure. mapping. warning and b. Emergency
b. Rigid structures not b. Casualties – Often high, b. Public preparedness medical assistance.
resistant to ground motion. particularly near epicentre or in highly awareness programmes. c. Damage needs and
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c. Dense collections of populated areas. programmes. assessment survey.


buildings with high c. Public Health - Fracture injuries c. Assessing d. Relief assistance.
occupancy. most widespread problem. Secondary reducing e. Emergency
threats due to flooding, contaminated structural provision of food,
water supply, or breakdown in sanitary vulnerability.
water & shelter.
conditions.
f. Repair and
d. Water Supply - severe problems
reconstruction.
likely due to damage to water systems.
g. Economic
recovery.

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JWP 3-52
Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Landslides a. Settlements built on a. Physical damage - anything on top a. Hazard a. Community a. Search and rescue.
steep slopes, soft soils, and of or in the path of landslide will mapping. education. b. Medical assistance.
cliff tops. suffer damage. b. Monitoring. c. Emergency shelter.
b. Settlements built at the b. Casualties - Fatalities due to c. Warning and
base of steep slopes, on landslide. evacuation
mouths of streams from system.
mountain valleys.
c. Roads, communication
lines in mountain areas.
d. Buildings with weak
foundations.
e. Buried pipelines, brittle
pipes.
Tsunamis a. Location of settlements a. Physical infrastructure damage - a. Protection of a. Hazard a. Warning and
(Seismic Sea in low- lying coastal resulting from the initial force of water buildings along mapping, evacuation.
Wave) regions. and follow on flooding. coasts; houses planning b. Search and rescue.
b. Lack of tsunamis b. Casualties and Public Health – on stilts. evacuation routes. c. Medical assistance.
resistant buildings. deaths principally by drowning and b. Building b. Establish
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d. Conduct disaster
c. Lack of timely warning injuries from battering by debris. barriers such as warning systems. assessment.
systems and evacuation c. Contamination by salt water and breakwaters. c. Community e. Water supply and
plans. debris or sewerage may make water education. purification.
d. Lack of public unpotable.
awareness of destructive d. Crops and food supplies - Harvest,
forces of tsunamis. food stocks, livestock farm
implements and fishing boats may be
lost. Land may be rendered infertile
due to salt-water incursion.

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JWP 3-52
Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Volcanic a. Settlements on the a. Settlements, infrastructure and a. Land use a. National a. Warning and
Eruption flanks of volcanoes. agriculture – Complete destruction of planning for volcanic education.
b. Settlements in historic everything in path of pyroclastic, mud settlements emergency plans. b. Medical assistance.
path of lava flows or mud. and lava flows; collapse of structures around b. Volcano c. Search and rescue.
under weight of wet ash, flooding, volcanoes. monitoring and
c. Structures with roof d. Provision of food,
blockage of roads or communication b. Protective warning system.
designs not resistant to ash water and shelter.
accumulation. systems. structural c. Training in
b. Casualties and health - Death from measures. e. Relocate victims.
d. Presence of search and rescue
pyroclastic flows, mudflows and and firefighting. f. Provide financial
combustible materials.
possibly lava flows and toxic gases. assistance.
e. Lack of evacuation plan Injuries from falling rocks, burns,
or warning systems. respiratory difficulties from gas or ash.
c. Crops and food supplies -
Destruction of crops in path of flows,
ash may break tree branches, livestock
may inhale toxic gas or ash; grazing
lands may be contaminated.
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CLIMATIC HAZARDS

Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Droughts a. Location in an arid area a. Reduced income of farmers. a. Drought and a. Development a. Measures for
where dry conditions are b. Reduction of spending on famine early of inter- maintaining food
increased by drought. agriculture. warning system. institutional security; price
b. Subsistence farming. c. Increase in price of staple foods. response plan. stabilisation, food
c. Lack of seed reserves. subsidies, food
d. Increase in inflation rate. distribution.

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JWP 3-52
Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
d. Lack of agricultural e. Loss of livestock. b. Develop livestock
inputs to improve yields. f. Deterioration of nutritional status. programme.
e. Area dependent on g. Famine, illness and death. c. Develop
rainfall weather system. h. Reduction in drinking water supplementary feeding
f. Area of low soil moisture sources. programme.
retention. d. Develop
i. Migration.
g. Lack of resources to complementary water
cope with drought. and health
programmes.
Floods a. Location of settlements a. Physical damage - Structures a. Flood a. Flood a. Search and rescue.
on floodplains. damaged by washing away, impact by control. detection and
b. Medical assistance.
b. Lack of awareness of floating debris and collapsing. warning.
Landslides from saturated soils. c. Disaster assessment.
flooding hazard. b. Development
b. Water supplies - Contamination of of master plan d. Evacuation/
c. Non-resistant buildings
wells and ground water possible. for floodplain relocation.
and foundations.
c. Casualties and public health - management. e. Short term food and
d. High risk Infrastructure
Deaths from drowning but few serious c. Floodplain water supplies.
elements.
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injuries. Possible outbreaks of mapping.


e. Unprotected food stocks, malaria, diarrhoea and viral infections. f. Water purification.
livestock and standing d. Crops and food supplies - Harvests g. Epidemiological
crops. and food stocks may be lost to surveillance.
inundation. h. Temporary shelter.
Tropical a. Settlements located in a. Physical damage - Structures lost a. Risk a. Public a. Evacuation and
cyclones low-lying coastal and and damaged by wind force, flooding, assessment and warning emergency shelter.
adjacent areas. storm surge and landslide. hazard mapping. systems.
b. Search and rescue.
b. Poor communications or b. Casualties and dangers to public b. Land usage b. Evacuation
c. Medical assistance.
warning system. health; may be caused by flying control and plans.
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JWP 3-52
Factors Contributing to Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
warning system. debris, or flooding. Water flood plain plans. d. Water purification.
c. Lightweight structures, contamination may lead to viral management. c. Training and
outbreaks and malaria. e. Re-establish
old construction, poor c. Reduction community logistical and
quality masonry. c. Water supplies - Ground water may and structural participation. communications
d. Infrastructure elements, be contaminated. vulnerability. networks.
fishing boats and maritime d. Crops and food supplies –Standing d. Improved f. Disaster assessment.
industries. crops, food stocks and tree plantations vegetation
ruined. cover. g. Provision of seeds
for planting.
Wildfire a. Location of wildfire a. Effects can be very destructive, a. Hazard a. Fire-fighting a. Provision of fire
prone areas. especially in loss of buildings, timber mapping. resources. fighting resources.
b. Wildfire threat tends to and livestock. b. Accurate risk b. Disaster b. Provision of
be seasonal. b. Recovery from the effects on the assessment. management temporary shelters in
environment may take several years. plan. safe havens.
c. Speed of onset may vary c. Monitoring
depending on the climatic c. Public health - effects of smoke and warning c. If required the
conditions. and burns. systems. provision of smoke
d. Evacuation of d. Fire masks.
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communities may be prevention d. Provision of fire


difficult and dangerous in regulations. spotting transportation.
the face of a major fire e. Seasonal e. Evacuation.
front. mitigation
measures.
f. Public
awareness
programme.

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JWP 3-52
MAN-MADE HAZARDS

Factors Contributing Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
to Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Chemical a. Those persons, a. Physical damage - Damage or a. Development of a. Hazard mapping.
and structures, livestock, destruction may occur to a disaster response b. Hazardous
industrial crops and environment structures and infrastructure. plan. materials
accidents closest to the scene of an Transportation accident damage
identification.
accident are most vehicles and other objects on
vulnerable, large-scale impact. Industrial fires may be c. Inspection of
releases of airborne killed or injured and require chemical plants and
pollutants may spread medical treatment. storage facilities.
for hundreds of b. Casualties - Many people may d. Monitoring of
kilometres. be killed or injured and require toxic waste disposal
b. Lack of safety medical treatment. procedures.
features or lack of c. Environmental - e. Improve
evacuation plan. firefighting capacity.
Contamination of the air, water
c. Unawareness by supply, land, animal life may f. Monitoring
vulnerable persons of occur. pollution levels.
the potential danger.
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g. Capability to
physically contain
pollutants.
h. Prepare and
practice evacuation
plans.
i. Test warning
sirens.

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JWP 3-52
Factors Contributing Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Specific Typical Needs Post-
to Vulnerability Reduction Preparedness Disaster Onset
Mass a. Unwillingness of a. Local destabilisation due to: a. Address causes a. Institutional a. Emergency shelter.
Population responsible authorities to of population education.
• Overbearing on host b. Provision of food and
Movement take measures to movement. b. Community water.
infrastructure.
mitigate vulnerability. b. Famine early education.
• Increased tensions as a result c. Medical assistance.
b. Inability to act to warning system.
of ethnic imbalances. c. Monitoring. d. Support to host
mitigate their own c. Accurate risk
vulnerability. • Impact on economy and infrastructure.
assessment.
c. Limited or late staple food supply. e. Amelioration of
d. Awareness
acknowledgement of b. Increased mortality rate due to impact on host
programmes. population.
their plight by poor food, sanitary and health
International conditions. f. Medium-term food
Community. security measures.
c. Malnutrition.
d. Limited self- g. Medium-term
d. Secondary diseases as a result
sufficiency. feeding programme.
of conditions.
e. No supporting h. Medium-term water
e. Increasing health requirements
infrastructure. and health programmes.
with worsening situation.
f. Limited means to
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generate income and so


purchase life-sustaining
essentials.

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CHAPTER 2 – APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN


EMERGENCIES/DISASTERS

SECTION I – GOVERNMENT RESPONSE


Department for International Development
201. The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government
department responsible for provision of humanitarian assistance to people affected by
disasters overseas. It plays this role in close co-ordination with the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Home Office
whose support may be requested in specific circumstances. The purpose of DFID’s
humanitarian assistance policy1 is to:

a. save lives and relieve suffering;


b. hasten recovery, and protect and rebuild livelihoods and communities;

c. reduce vulnerability to future crisis.


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202. Within DFID the lead responsibility for dealing with Rapid Onset Disaster
relief rests with the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD). This
is done in close collaboration with DFID geographical departments and overseas
offices. CHAD maintains an emergency response capability through an Operations
Team (CHAD OT), operating on a round-the-clock basis throughout the year. A duty
officer provides out-of-hours cover, but during a major crisis the headquarters is
staffed on a 24-hour basis. The core team can be supplemented by a larger roster of
humanitarian experts on a call-down arrangement. Humanitarian emergency/disaster
relief operations are controlled from the CHAD operations room in London. CHAD
OT participates in regular training, liaison and briefing, with the Permanent Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ) and Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ).
CHAD(DFID) PRINCIPAL TASK

For many developing countries, the ability to promote development and reduce poverty is regularly
affected by conflict, by natural disasters and by those created by human action or inaction. The
CHAD principal task is
‘to prevent conflict and disasters, or to mitigate their effects’.
203. DFID’s priority is to improve and strengthen international disaster response
capacity under the overall co-ordination of the United Nations (UN). This mechanism
is described in Chapter 3. It is DFID policy to integrate disaster preparedness and
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1
As set out in DFID’s White Paper on International Development (1997) – ‘Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for
the 21st Century’.

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response work into their country and thematic programmes where possible. This
allows for better transition from the emergency phase to recovery, rehabilitation and
reconstruction.

204. DFID has established arrangements with Other Government Departments


(OGD) to facilitate rapid disaster response. This includes the FCO who assist in
global surveillance of disasters; the Home Office, with whom they have an
arrangement for the deployment of UK Fire and Rescue personnel; and the MOD for
the deployment of military assets.

205. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The FCO holds overall political
responsibility for engagement with other nations. MOD support to a DFID response to
a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation takes place within this overall political
responsibility. The FCO is responsible for obtaining political approval for UK military
deployment into other nation states, including the stricken state. Political advice on
the circumstances for a potential Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operation (HDRO) will
be provided by the FCO, including aircraft routing and negotiating diplomatic
clearance requests for over-flight, staging and the operation of a Forward Mounting
Base (FMB), if necessary. Assistance will be provided in the provision of visa (which
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may be required at short notice) and in the arrangements for the provision of Host
Nation Support (HNS) and local resources for the support of the Joint Task Force
(JTF).
206. HM’s Representative. British Embassies, High Commissions and DFID
Country Offices play a key role in providing early information of emerging crises and
situation assessments following disasters. Their links with host Governments and in-
country humanitarian agencies makes them an important information source and part
of the co-ordination system in the affected country. They may also be able to facilitate
some UK disaster response activities, including local procurement of relief goods
funded by DFID.
207. Ministry of Defence. In conducting HDRO, the MOD operates in support of
the lead government department (DFID). Such support to humanitarian
emergency/disaster response is undertaken on an ‘as requested’ basis and within means
and capability of core military capacity and readiness. This principle will help to
ensure that any necessary military support is made by ‘demand pull’ rather than
‘supply push’. Notwithstanding the onus lying with DFID to request MOD assistance,
the MOD must anticipate likely requests at the onset of any humanitarian /disaster
situation and should offer timely advice on suitability and availability of military
support.

208. Military in a Subordinate Role. DFID’s primacy is a key feature of HDRO,


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and thus it is important that the balance of responsibilities between military and

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disaster response staffs is understood by all those involved when planning and
executing such operations.

SECTION II – INTERDEPARTMENTAL PROCESSES

Requests for Assistance


209. Requests by a foreign government for assistance will normally be made
through HM’s Representative in the respective country and/or the UN Resident
Representative. The UN or HM’s Representative may forward any request and
recommendations for UK response to DFID and/or the FCO. This will be based on
available information and consultation with other donors and humanitarian agencies in
order to make an assessment of need. DFID will consider any recommendations it
receives in light of all the information it gathers from its various sources.

210. Requests for military assistance should be initiated as follows:

a. A direct request from DFID to MOD. In a request of this nature DFID


becomes the budgeting authority and co-ordinates all British aid for disaster
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relief.

b. A request from the FCO to the MOD. Whilst a less likely route, DFID
would still lead, including co-ordination of funding, and require consultation.
This would most likely be as part of a UN or multinational initiative.
211. Evacuation. In circumstances where UK ‘entitled persons’ are at risk as a
result of a disaster, the FCO may request military assistance to conduct a Non-
combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) of UK entitled persons from the affected area.
The Embassy/High Commission’s Civil Contingency Plan (CCP) would be used as the
basis for any evacuation. UK military assistance would be arranged in accordance
with JWP 3-51 ‘Non-combatant Evacuation Operations’.

SECTION III – THE DFID-MOD/MILITARY INTERFACE


212. There is no template solution to disaster response and military involvement
will depend on the individual circumstances as a disaster emerges. The critical issue is
the timely identification of the potential requirement for military support to DFID’s
response to a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation.

213. Initial Contact. As a crisis emerges, CHAD OT (Crisis Response and


Monitoring Unit (CRMU)) will alert the CHAD Humanitarian Programmes Team and
advise on the potential requirement for the deployment of military assets in support of
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a disaster response effort. The CHAD Civil-Military Advisor will make initial contact

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with the appropriate MOD Secretariat Regional Desk (MOD point of contact (POC))2
to register the possibility of a formal request for military support. Should a crisis
emerge out of working hours then the nominated CHAD Liaison Officer (LO) to MOD
will make contact through the MOD Resident Clerk. The following information will
be relevant and may be requested/exchanged:

a. Disposition and availability of relevant assets either in UK or regionally,

b. Nature of envisioned military mission and tasking of military assets.

214. Focal Point of Contact. DFID’s focal POC/LO to the MOD will normally be
the CHAD Civil-Military Advisor,3 will be located with the CHAD OT emergency
response planning team and will provide continuous liaison/feedback to the MOD
POC4 on the emerging disaster situation.

215. Approval. Once DFID make a formal request for the use of military assets
and MOD approve military assistance then direct liaison can take place with PJHQ.
Liaison with PJHQ will initially be through J3 Ops Support5 and a CHAD Military
LO. Subsequently there may be a requirement for ongoing liaison between CHAD
and various PJHQ Divisions, especially J2, J4 and J5. It may also be appropriate for a
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CHAD LO to become a temporary member of any PJHQ Contingency Planning Team


(CPT)/Operations Team (OT).
216. Go/No Go. Subject to Financial Policy advice, PJHQ through the MOD POC
should provide detailed costings of the military deployment to DFID, through the
CHAD LO to MOD, including MOD ‘recce’ and ‘P Info’ requirements. Based on
these costings and reassessment of the disaster situation, DFID will take a decision on
the cost effectiveness and appropriateness of the use of military assets and will inform
MOD accordingly.

217. Assessment/Recce. The requirement for the conduct a CHAD OT field


assessment and/or the deployment of a PJHQ Operational and Liaison Recce Team
(OLRT) will be determined as the disaster situation develops. Should either occur, the
exchange of an appropriately qualified LO should normally take place. Further details
are at Chapter 3, Section I. The tasking of air or space reconnaissance separately or in
conjunction with a ground assessment may add clarity to a confused situation and
should be considered early.

2
The default fallback contact is the appropriate MOD Directorate Regional Desk.
3
In the event of the Civil Military Adviser being unavailable or contact being made out of working hours a member of
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the CHAD OT will be designated POC for initial liaison with the MOD.
4
This will normally be the MOD Secretariat Regional Desk unless out of working hours when the MOD Resident Clerk
will become the POC.
5
The DFID/CHAD Liaison officer is the SO2 J3 (Ops Spt) CIMIC.

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SECTION IV – FINANCIAL ISSUES


Introduction

218. Notwithstanding Defence Mission E and Military Task 20, support to


international response to humanitarian emergencies/disasters is not MOD core
business and is therefore unfunded. Costs for such support fall to the department that
takes/has the policy lead (usually DFID). The exception to this is the diversion of in-
area military assets for the immediate saving of lives.

219. The production of cost estimates should be an integral part of the operational
planning process; it is therefore important for the costing process to match the pace of
operational planning. The costing process for HDRO, whilst similar to any other
operation, is likely to be influenced by the need for speed, a customer/supplier
relationship with DFID, and close political, media and public attention. The estimated
cost of the use of military assets is likely to be a critical factor in DFID’s decision on
whether, or not, to engage military support for a particular disaster.
220. Charging Policy and Offsets. Director Finance Policy6 (D Fin Pol) is the lead
authority with respect to levels of charge and offsets. Costs submitted to DFID should
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normally be on a ‘no-loss’ basis. This approach ensures that the defence budget does
not suffer as a result of unscheduled activity and that it makes no gains either. No-loss
costs cover those additional costs that would not have been incurred if the support had
not been undertaken. The determination of charging policy, including the scope for
offsets, and the basis of the best estimates of the cost to complete requested tasking
should be transparent and aim at a quick desk-level understanding with DFID.
However, whilst ‘best’ cost estimates are provided to aid decision making, the eventual
charge to DFID is normally on the basis of ‘actuals’.
221. Rapid Costings. PJHQ J8 has responsibility for initiating and co-ordinating
the HDRO cost estimate when PJHQ has lead planning responsibility. 7
Notwithstanding time constraints, Top-level Budget (TLB) holders and the Defence
Transport and Movements Agency (DTMA) should wherever possible be included in
the process and receive timely planning information from PJHQ J5/J3 as appropriate.
The dissemination of current planning assumptions will ensure coherence of the cost
estimate baseline across the process. The resulting submission to MOD should
include the consolidated cost estimate and any associated caveats.8 The production of
rapid and accurate cost estimates is an iterative process requiring a suitable balance of
urgency and reliability. The following factors will effect the reliability of a cost
estimate:
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6
In consultation with the appropriate regional secretariat.
7
Single Service Commands have responsibility when leading single Service HDROs.
8
In submitting cost estimates, costing staffs should NOT automatically deduct potential offsets but rather highlight them
for MOD consideration.

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JWP 3-52

a. Urgency of requirement.

b. Precision of the requirement.

c. Planning assumptions (based on the nature of the mission, anticipated


duration, location, current location/status of assets, and the availability of Host
Nation or other support in theatre).

d. Inclusion of caveats (‘health warnings’ based on the planning


assumptions).

222. Financial Accounting. In order for MOD to seek appropriate reimbursement


on costs which otherwise would not have been incurred it is essential that all costs
associated with any HDRO are captured. The cost capture process is co-ordinated and
managed centrally by D Fin Pol who will issue a Financial Instruction once a HDRO
is declared. Whilst the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) is delegated financial
authority for an HDRO, a Civil Secretary will normally be appointed and deployed to
assist in the financial management of the operation. He should be consulted in the first
instance, prior to the commitment of expenditure, for advice on financial and
contractual matters. Based on advice from the Civil Secretary, the JTFC will normally
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issue operation specific financial delegations with authorisation to commit


expenditure. The costs of a HDRO will fall into two categories, namely ‘In’ and ‘Out
of’ theatre costs. In-theatre costs are the responsibility of the Chief of Joint
Operations (CJO) and will be captured by use of a UIN administered by the Civil
Secretary. Out-of-theatre costs are the direct responsibility of spending TLBs.

SECTION V – LEGAL ISSUES


223. The main legal issue in the conduct of HDRO is the legal basis that underpins
the operation. HDRO are likely to be at the invitation of a Host Nation or pursuant to
a United Nations Security Council Resolution. Commanders at all levels should be
aware of the precise legal basis for the operation as this will determine the level of
force which is permissible under the Rules of Engagement (ROE) to complete the
mission. Commanders should also be aware of the legal constraints on the operation,
which are usually set out in CJO’s Directive.

Status of Forces Agreement


224. It may be the case that no standing Status of Forces (SOFA) exists with the
government of a stricken state or that other existing arrangements do not cover the
requirement. In such circumstances (MOD) PJHQ J4 HNS will seek to secure
appropriate jurisdictional arrangements over deployed military personnel and MOD
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civilians. Given the limited warning-time associated with disaster response and the
imperative of timely reaction, agreement will normally be achieved, in the first

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instance, by means of an Exchange of Letters with the government of the stricken


state. Wherever possible these arrangements should be in place before deployment
commences. If it is anticipated that there are likely to be Forward Mounting Bases
(FMBs), or other staging areas, which are in ‘third’ countries, separate arrangements
will need to be made with each such country.

225. The following issues should be addressed (the list is not exhaustive) in the
formulation of any SOFA:9

a. Status of personnel including privileges and immunities.

b. Jurisdictional arrangements.

c. Exemption from taxes and duties.

d. Exemption from immigration controls and import regulations.

e. Wearing of uniforms.
f. Issues and carriage of personal weapons and ROE (for self-defence).
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g. Use of UK vehicles and validity of UK driving permits.


h. Freedom of movement in connection with the conduct of HDRO.

i. Understanding on the resolution of claims and liabilities.


j. Investigation of accidents.

k. Provision of and Payment Regime for Host Nation Support. (This is


normally better dealt with in a separate Implementing Arrangement completed
under the umbrella of the main SOFA/MOU).

226. Visas. Notwithstanding the potential negotiations on the status of UK forces,


which may take some time, the early identification of visa requirements is essential.
FCO guidance should be sought (through MOD Sec(O)) PJHQ POL/OPS) at the first
indication of the potential conduct of an HDRO. This is particularly important if using
a ‘third country’ FMB or other staging area.

227. Rules of Engagement. By definition HDRO are conducted in a benign


posture within a permissive environment. If it is necessary for military personnel to be
armed (with either firearm or baton) the appropriate ROE will be authorised and
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9
The time available may not allow for a SOFA to be negotiated. Accordingly, these issues should be included in the
negotiated document which may take the form of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Military
Technical/Implementing Arrangements and Exchanges of letters between governments.

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supporting Guidance Card10 issued. PJHQ11 will be responsible for providing a draft
ROE profile and submission, and for providing advice at the operational and military
strategic level, on the military, legal and secretariat aspects of ROE. The nominated
commander is responsible for the promulgation of authorised ROE profiles to theatre.
Careful consideration should be given to the crafting of ROE and account should be
taken of the legal basis for the operation, the prevailing security conditions, Host
Nation capabilities and arrangements and any Host Nation agreements on the
provision of security.

SECTION VI – ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY


228. The humanitarian consequences of natural, environmental catastrophes and
industrial accidents often exceed the coping mechanisms and aid resources of single
countries. A number of UN organisations and NGOs may have been working in a
country on long-term development projects, in near emergency/disaster conditions, for
some time prior to the rapid onset of disaster. The humanitarian consequences of such
a precipitous event may easily overwhelm in-country coping mechanisms and require
a shift in focus by those development agencies from development to emergency relief.
The scale is also likely to require additional international interventions to provide
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relief to the stricken population. A mechanism for international disaster response


exists under the co-ordination of the UN. This consists of four main elements:
a. National response. The response from the affected nation itself
includes the Government and local community organisations that work in
support of it in times of crisis. Most lives are saved in the first few hours
following a disaster with the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
often playing a key role. These are locally established organisations that can
mobilise immediately following a disaster to assist civil authorities with search
and rescue efforts and the distribution of relief items. Individual national
societies are supported by the International Federation of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) from its Geneva headquarters.

b. UN response. The United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of


Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) plays a central co-ordinating role. Other
relevant UN agencies include: UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food
Programme (WFP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World
Health Organisation (WHO). Many of these organisations are already
involved in longer-term projects around the world. When a disaster occurs,
they are expected to gear up their activities to provide immediate humanitarian
assistance to those in need.
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10
In accordance with JSP 398.
11
Although drafts may also be produced by single-Service Commands.

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c. Non-governmental Organisation response. A number of international


Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as Oxfam, Save the Children,
Medecins Sans Frontieres, and others, frequently respond to disaster situations.
The most effective are often those agencies that are already established in the
stricken state.

d. Donors. Donor governments provide funding, in-kind assistance,


technical personnel and sometimes, operational support such as logistics and
communications, for the above efforts.

Details of the emergency response roles of key UN agencies and members of the
International Red Cross movement are at Annex 2A.
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ANNEX 2A – ROLES OF KEY UNITED NATIONS


AGENCIES AND MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
RED CROSS MOVEMENT
2A1. Details of the emergency response roles of key UN agencies and members of
the International Red Cross movement are detailed below:

United Nations Development Programme


2A2. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) focuses primarily on the
development related aspects of disaster risks, and on providing technical assistance to
institution building in all aspects of disaster management and mitigation. This
includes:

a. Incorporating long term risk reduction and preparedness measures in


normal development planning and programmes;

b. Reviewing the impact of large settlements of refugees or displaced


persons on development;
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c. Providing technical assistance to the authorities managing major


emergency assistance operation of extended duration;
d. Assisting in the planning and implementation of post disaster
reconstruction and transition to recovery.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees


2A3. The aim of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
emergency response is to provide protection to ‘persons of concern’ and ensure that
the necessary assistance reaches them in time. With regard to material assistance,
UNHCR’s goal is the survival of refugees through ensuring adequate basic and
supplementary food supplies, health care, shelter, water and sanitary facilities, clothing
and essential community services.

United Nations Children’s Fund


2A4. In emergency situations, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) focuses
on providing special protection and care of affected women as well as children and
extends assistance to them. UNICEF aims to reinforce the capacity of families to
provide appropriate care to children and to reunite families by supporting national and
local governmental.
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World Food Programme


2A5. World Food Programme’s (WFP) role in an emergency includes:

a. Providing advice and assistance to the government, other concerned


agencies and local authorities in assessing possible requirements for
emergency food aid;

b. Providing food aid to meet emergency food needs;

c. Helping to mobilise, and ensure co-ordination in the planning and


delivery of, food assistance from all sources.

World Health Organisation


2A6. In an emergency, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has responsibility for:

a. Ensuring that health needs are properly assessed and are reflected in
requests for international assistance;

b. Ensuring that humanitarian assistance applies the best health practices,


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reflects the Country’s health priorities and respects its capacities;

c. Supporting epidemiological surveillance and disease outbreak response;


d. Playing its mandated role in international health co-ordination:
mobilising national and international heath expertise, facilitating collaboration
between national and international partners and co-ordinating external
assistance.

International Organization for Migration


2A7. In emergencies involving large-scale movement of people, the International
Office for Migration (IOM) provide a range of services including counselling,
document processing, medical examination, transportation, language training and
integration assistance. These services are offered to vulnerable populations in need of
evacuation, resettlement or return in the initial phases of an emergency and in the
transition to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Food and Agriculture Organisation

2A8. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) responds to food and
agricultural emergencies through:

a. Providing early warning of food emergencies;


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b. Assessing needs and formulating and implementing programmes for


agricultural relief and rehabilitation;

c. Strengthening local capacities to reduce vulnerability to food and


agricultural emergencies.

The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement


2A9. The Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is composed of three elements:

a. The National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies. National societies


act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the
humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief,
health and social programmes.

b. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent


Societies. The Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) is the
world’s largest humanitarian organisation. It co-ordinates and directs
international assistance to victims of natural and technological disasters, to
refugees and in health emergencies. The Federation’s strength is the network
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of National Societies which enables it to reach individual communities at the


local level.

c. The International Committee of the Red Cross. The International


Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) acts in cases of conflict both internally
and internationally to:
(1) Ensure that the Geneva Conventions are observed by parties to the
conflict.

(2) Assure/provide protection, medical care and material relief


assistance to victims of the conflict.

(3) Organise tracing services to identify and re-establish


communication between family members who have become separated,
as well as tracing and visiting prisoners.
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PART 2

PLANNING AND CONDUCT


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CHAPTER 3 – HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY/DISASTER


RESPONSE
301. Disaster Response. Disaster response can be divided into three stages, each
demanding different types of assistance:

a. Stage 1 - Immediate Life Saving Phase. Search and Rescue, and


Medical First Aid.

b. Stage 2 - Stabilisation Phase. Life preserving relief operations such as


the delivery of aid to prevent the situation deteriorating.

c. Stage 3 - General Recovery Phase. Rehabilitation and reconstruction.

However, these stages are unlikely to be discrete and will often need to be undertaken
concurrently requiring a flexible response.

Time-Line and Scale


302. The time-line and scale of health, nutritional and infrastructure problems that
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normally occur after the physical impact of a disaster are important factors in
assessing the most appropriate assistance to be provided. In most cases donors
provide humanitarian assistance through civilian agencies, whose experience, cost-
effectiveness, reliability and ability to connect relief to development are superior to the
military.
303. Evaluation of past disasters suggest that however urgent the crisis, time and
effort spent on initial assessment results in a better designed, co-ordinated and more
cost effective relief effort. Disasters often seriously disrupt such local infrastructure as
transport (including airport landing and cargo handling capacity), communications,
food supply and shelter provision. Under these circumstances, relief supplies and
personnel (often unfamiliar with the area) sent into a disaster zone without a request
based on a sound assessment can hinder rather than help; this can cost further lives
through enthusiastic, but possibly inappropriate or inadequate response. An early
assessment of the nature and extent of the disaster and the type of aid needed is an
essential requirement.

SECTION I - ASSESSMENT
304. Early assessment of the nature and extent of a humanitarian
emergency/disaster and the type of relief required is an essential element of any
response. The overall purpose of an assessment is to provide information and to make
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recommendations that will enable timely decisions on appropriate response to a

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humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. Three types of information need to be


collected:

a. Situational Information: Situational information details the magnitude


of the disaster and the extent of its impact on both the population and the
infrastructure of society.

b. Needs Information: Needs information identifies resources and


services for immediate emergency measures to save and sustain the lives of the
affected population.

c. Planning Information: Planning information is required on the region


to assess potential courses of action.

305. Several factors contribute to the design of a successful and accurate assessment
including: identifying the user/identifying the information needed/timing of the
assessment/use of recognised terminology. Key amongst these factors are:

a. Distinguishing between Emergency and Chronic Needs. Virtually all


developing countries have longstanding chronic needs in most, if not all,
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sectors.1 Assessment teams must differentiate between what is normal for the
location and what is occurring as a result of the disaster so that the relief effort
can be directed to those most in need.
b. Assess Needs and Vulnerabilities in Relation to Capacities. ‘Needs’
are immediate requirements for survival. ‘Vulnerabilities’ are potential areas
for harm and include factors that increase the risks to the affected population.
Needs are assessed after an emergency has occurred, whereas vulnerabilities
can be assessed both before and during an emergency. Needs are expressed in
terms of requirements (food, water, shelter, etc); vulnerabilities are expressed
in terms of their origins (physical/material, social/organisational, or
motivational/attitudinal). The solution to needs and vulnerabilities are
‘capacities’. Capacities are means and resources that can be mobilised by the
affected population to meet their own needs and reduce vulnerability.
Assessing vulnerabilities and capacities as well as needs provides a way of:

(1) Preventing a widening of the emergency in which today’s


vulnerabilities become tomorrow’s needs.
(2) Targeting assistance to the most vulnerable groups.

(3) Effecting a sustainable recovery based on local resources and


institutions.
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1
‘Sector’ is a term used to describe Humanitarian Relief activities within a functional area, such as Water & Sanitation
(WATSAN), Shelter, Medical, Food, Logistics and Communication. Each of these areas is a ‘sector’.

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306. The government of the stricken state bears primary responsibility for disaster
assessment and will normally accomplish an initial needs assessment, conducted by
national or local authorities within 12-72 hours depending on access to the disaster
site. However, in the case of major disasters the national authority may often request
international help from the United Nations (UN) (e.g. the UN Organisation for the Co-
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) can mobilise its UN Disaster
Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) mechanism) or from donor nations.

307. In parallel with this process, an initial broad appraisal will also be made by
HM's Representative in order to advise the Department for International Development
(DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the facts and any
recommended action. Based on this information and information from a wide variety
of other sources2 an initial assessment will be made by DFID’s Conflict and
Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD). If it is apparent that UK military
assets may be required then Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) participation within
the assessment should be a priority in order to facilitate the timeliest support.3 A
detailed breakdown of the information necessary for assessment is at Annex 3A.

308. Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department Operations Team Field


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Assessment. Following this initial assessment, if deemed necessary or requested, a


CHAD Operations Team (OT), made up of a small team of relevant experts, can be
deployed to conduct a field assessment. Where military assistance is envisaged,
military representation within the CHAD OT would be extremely beneficial and
serves two purposes:

a. Firstly, after the full nature of the humanitarian problem is established,


the PJHQ officer would advise the DFID team leader of potential military
capabilities that could be utilised to support relief effort.

b. Secondly, the officer would inform the Ministry of Defence (MOD) of


the ongoing situation so that detailed contingency planning and costing could
take place in the UK to help inform the strategic decision making process and
expedite any military response deemed appropriate.

309. Operational and Liaison Reconnaissance Team Deployment. Alternatively,


if the initial disaster assessment determined that the situation was such that the scale
and immediacy of any necessary military support to the relief effort warranted
immediate ‘military’ assessment then a PJHQ Operational and Liaison Reconnaissance
Recce Team (OLRT) should be dispatched. This could be done independently with a
DFID/CHAD LO to provide humanitarian disaster advice or as part of the OT field
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2
E.g. Disaster warning organisations, internet sites, information from in-country humanitarian actors.
3
PJHQ representation will be provided by J3 Ops Support.

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assessment. Immediate considerations for a Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operation


(HDRO) OLRT deployment are at Annex 3B.

310. In advance of a potential HDRO, in order to avoid raising public expectations


about, and media pressure for, a military response, military involvement within the
disaster assessment process should be carried out with a low media profile, and be co-
ordinated with DFID/CHAD.

SECTION II – CIVIL RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN


EMERGENCY/DISASTER
311. Responsibility for distress relief for oversees disaster victims rests with the
governments concerned. However, along with multilateral and bilateral agencies, the
UK may play a part in this process. This would normally be through DFID/CHAD in
either a direct or indirect role. In the direct role this may involve the deployment of a
CHAD OT to the disaster site, or in the indirect role, this may involve the sponsorship
of approved Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) to assist in disaster relief.
312. DFID/CHAD Disaster Response Mechanism. DFID/CHAD receives
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information from a variety of sources, following crises, which are analysed quickly
and decisions taken on whether an UK response is necessary. Such responses would
normally form part of an internationally co-ordinated response. There may, however,
be cases, e.g. British Overseas Territories, where it is necessary to undertake direct UK
led intervention.

313. There are four key steps in DFID/CHAD’s response to a rapid onset disaster:
a. Initial information gathering and assessment. The onset of new
emergency events are monitored through the internet, media, and contact with
humanitarian agencies and in-country contacts. DFID/CHAD have early
warning systems through subscription to meteorological forecast and
geological services. Once DFID/CHAD is aware of a disaster, further
information is sought through:

(1) DFID overseas offices.

(2) UK Diplomatic Missions.

(3) Red Cross (IFRC/ICRC) situation reports.

(4) UN OCHA situation reports.


(5) Reports from reputable NGOs.
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(6) Media (including internet) sources.

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b. Appraisal and Development of Response Strategy. Based on


information collected, a decision is taken as to whether the adverse event is a
‘disaster’ to which DFID/CHAD might respond, based on the severity of
impact and magnitude of response. DFID/CHAD, at this point or later, may
decide to send out an assessment team to better determine immediate needs.
The decision on whether DFID/CHAD should respond is based on setting the
magnitude of the disaster against an assessment of the coping capacity of the
affected country’s disaster response systems. This is based on:

(1) Information contained in the sources listed above.

(2) Whether there is an Official Appeal for Assistance by the Red


Cross, UN OCHA or stricken state.

(3) The poverty status of the country (i.e. there is a lower threshold to
respond where the country is poor and overwhelmed by the disaster).

c. Response. In proceeding immediately to implement action, the relevant


UK Diplomatic Mission and DFID Regional Department are consulted. In
exceptional cases of extreme urgency this may not always be possible (e.g.
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when a situation demands an immediate response outside normal working


hours, i.e. weekends, very late evening or early morning, or when the time
difference between the field and the UK makes it impractical). Responses are
in the form of:
(1) Cash contributions to the UN agencies, Red Cross or NGOs: this
is the most common form of response.

(2) Contribution of technical personnel for needs assessment and co-


ordination: experts with a broad range of skills are dispatched when
required from DFID/CHAD, complemented by personnel from
established call down arrangements (including search and rescue
personnel, emergency health personnel, infrastructure repair and other
humanitarian experts).

(3) In kind or operational assistance from DFID/CHAD: In certain


circumstances assistance in kind may be more effective than money for
local purchase but equally, goods purchased locally or in the region may
be preferable. The latter would avoid excessive transport costs from UK
and help local economies; they will also be useful at once and
traumatised victims may find them more acceptable. DFID/CHAD
maintains the capacity for rapid direct response through call down and
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contingency arrangements. DFID/CHAD has call down arrangements


for air chartering services and provision of humanitarian information

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services. DFID/CHAD has capacity to deploy trucking convoys and


airfield handling equipment. DFID/CHAD maintains stockpiles of relief
items for rapid deployment (e.g. tents, plastic sheeting, vehicles,
communication equipment).

In deciding how to respond, preference is given to using the Red Cross and UN
OCHA to channel the initial response. Funding to NGOs with a track record in
the area affected, or with a special competence particularly needed, is also
considered. Direct operational response is less common, as the aim is to build
capacity of the local or international humanitarian system. The decision to
respond operationally is taken if there are deemed to be serious gaps in
operational resources available locally or regionally. For example, if specialist
items are required and it is cost effective to supply them.

d. Transition to Rehabilitation and Recovery. After the immediate


disaster response phase is over, DFID/CHAD, in liaison with regional
departments, considers the case for support in the transition to rehabilitation
and recovery.
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Other Considerations
314. In providing humanitarian assistance to disaster affected populations, DFID
works in conjunction with, and seeks to support, the international disaster response
system. In determining the balance between different forms of disaster relief, speed to
meet assessed life preserving needs and value for money will be important
considerations.

315. Key Mechanisms of the International Disaster Response System. The


organisational environment in large disasters can often appear confused. A wide
variety of organisations with differing roles and mandates often rush to the scene of
the disaster. Any UN procedures and preferred operating procedures will be subject to
‘local forces’ and therefore the resultant UN ‘structure’ has the potential to suffer from
inefficiency and incoherence. However, whilst structures may appear ad hoc, they will
generally be based on the same principles. It is essential that the UK’s assistance takes
account of the in-country response being mounted. The key mechanisms which the
UN utilises to deal with disaster management are:
a. The UN Resident Co-ordinator. In most countries where the UN
system is present, overall co-ordination of UN activities falls primarily to the
UN Resident Co-ordinator (RC), in consultation with the relevant UN
agencies. In most cases, the Resident Representative of UN Development
Programme (UN DP) is designated as the UN RC. The UN RC will usually
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also be responsible for co-ordinating UN humanitarian assistance. Before a


disaster occurs, the UN RC co-ordinates preparedness and mitigation activities;

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monitors and provides early warning of potential emergency situations; leads


contingency planning; and chairs the UN Disaster Management Team. Unless
otherwise designated, the UN RC will continue to lead and co-ordinate the UN
inter-agency disaster response, acting as Humanitarian Co-ordinator. If an
emergency becomes particularly large or complex, a separate Humanitarian
Co-ordinator may be appointed by the UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator
(ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC),
based in New York.

b. UN Lead Agency. In instances where one UN agency is providing the


majority of UN humanitarian assistance, it may be appointed as the Lead
Agency and its representative as the Humanitarian Co-ordinator.

c. UN Disaster Management Team. The UN General Assembly has


mandated that a UN Disaster Management Team (UN DMT) is formed in
every disaster/emergency prone country. The UN DMT is chaired by the UN
RC. Composition depends on circumstances of each country. It normally
includes representatives of key UN agencies (if present), UN DP, UN
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health
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Organisation (WHO), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the


Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). The main purpose of the UN DMT
is to prepare and ensure a prompt, effective and concerted response, and
promote co-ordinated UN assistance to the stricken state Government for post-
emergency recovery. During an emergency, the UN DMT is the main in-
country mechanism by which international agencies co-ordinate policies and
programmes of humanitarian assistance in support of the national authorities.

d. UN Office of the Co-ordinator for Humanitarian Affairs. The UN


Office of the Co-ordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has a mandated
role for co-ordination in a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation, however,
not every responding actor, including UN agencies, will want to be co-
ordinated. UN OCHA responds to such disasters in the following ways:

(1) Disaster Response System. A 24 hours a day, seven days a week


Disaster Response System operates from Geneva to help co-ordinate the
actions of the international community in responding to disasters. It
monitors field situations to identify natural disasters, environmental
emergencies, and industrial accidents, and is in close contact with UN
RCs throughout the world.

(2) Situation Reports. As soon as UN OCHA is alerted to a disaster,


its response system is triggered. The Situation Report is the main co-
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ordinating tool, providing the international community with detailed

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information on the evolving disaster situation, including damage caused,


actions taken, assistance needs and international aid being provided.

(3) Field Co-ordination. If required, UN OCHA can field a UN


Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) team to assist on the
ground in damage/needs assessment and the co-ordination of relief
activities during the initial phase. It can help establish an On-site
Operations Co-ordination Centre (OSOCC) or Humanitarian Ops Centre
(HOC) to support the local emergency management authority in co-
ordinating the operational activities of international relief agencies at the
disaster site. UN OCHA can also help establish secure and reliable
telecommunications during the emergency phase, and identify and meet
the need for technical logistics resources (such as office support,
transport, telecommunications and co-ordination centre infrastructure) to
support field co-ordination.
(4) International Appeals. On request from the government of a
stricken state, UN OCHA launches an appeal for international
assistance, urging the international community to cover the identified
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relief needs.
e. UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination System. The aim of the
UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) system is to meet
international needs for early information during the first phase of a sudden
onset emergency. UN OCHA is able to deploy UNDAC teams at short notice
for these purposes. UNDAC teams support the UN RC/Humanitarian Co-
ordinator or local Government following predefined methods for the collection
of information on needs for international disaster relief assistance. The teams
may also provide structures for co-ordinating support during the first phase of
a sudden onset emergency.

SECTION III –MILITARY SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN


EMERGENCY/DISASTER RESPONSE
316. UK military assets are not specifically designed for HDRO. However, the
ability of UK Forces to task-organise to perform such operations is recognised.
Employing UK military capabilities may not be the most efficient or cheapest means
of response, but in certain situations UK Forces may be the only actor capable of
bringing a particular capability to bear rapidly. Annex 3C details the inherent
capabilities of UK military forces that may be of appropriate use in the undertaking of
HDRO in support of UK’s response to a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation.
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317. In principle, military assets should be considered only when civilian capacities
have been or will become over-stretched, and in certain circumstances, where the use

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of military assets may be more cost-effective in overall terms. The composition of


forces committed in support of foreign disaster relief efforts will vary depending on
circumstances of the disaster, the state of civilian coping mechanisms and on the stage
of the disaster at which Service support to the relief effort can take effect.

318. Provision of Support by UK Forces Overseas. Commanders of UK Forces


overseas,4 even when obligated by treaty or other technical agreement, should
normally secure HM’s Representative’s authority to act. However, where formal
concurrence would involve unacceptable delay, immediate emergency life-saving
relief5 may be offered at the Commander’s discretion subject to safety imperatives.
HM’s Representative should be informed of any support undertaken and covering
financial authority obtained from DFID as soon as possible to determine the
demarcation between immediate emergency life-saving relief and core first-aid
disaster relief, and resulting financial responsibility. In obtaining appropriate authority
to proceed, DFID, through HM’s Representative, will give advice on initial costs
which may be expended. Other than the provision of necessary immediate emergency
life-saving relief, individual units should not undertake support to disaster relief efforts
without the authority of the MOD who will liaise with DFID/CHAD through the
Overseas Secretariat. All proposals of support to disaster relief efforts should be
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reported to MOD by signal.6

319. Military Involvement in Disaster Response. As discussed at paragraph 301,


disaster response can be broadly divided into three stages, namely Immediate Life
Saving, Stabilisation and General Recovery. Acknowledging the sentiments above, it
will normally be the first two stages that may warrant the involvement of military
forces. Within a military response in support of international disaster relief efforts, it
is possible to split HDROs generically into four phases, namely:

a. Phase 1 – Reconnaissance/Assessment/Survey.

b. Phase 2 – Stabilisation of life-threatening situation.


c. Phase 3 – Restoration of infrastructure sufficient to enable stricken state
coping capacities to assume full responsibility for the subsequent mitigation of
the disaster effects.

4
This includes those forces permanently stationed overseas (e.g. Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas) and those deployed
temporarily on operations or exercise (e.g. APT(N)).
5
Immediate Emergency Life Saving Relief is the provision of small scale supplies (e.g. food, clothing, medical and
accommodation stores) and services (e.g. rescue, urgent works, transport and necessary equipment), which are needed as
a matter of extreme urgency to save life or to limit physical damage and prevent serious suffering. These may be
resourced from available Service sources provided that Service requirements are not compromised. Any such relief
should not exceed one week’s supplies and should normally be provisioned from on-the-spot stores.
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6
Any proposal by a Commander to offer support to disaster relief efforts from Service sources abroad are to be reported
by signal to the MOD, through the chain of command, using the Subject Indicator Code (SIC) EFO. The signal should
indicate the scope of the proposed aid, the estimated cost, and whether the concurrence of HM’s Representative has been
obtained.

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d. Phase 4 – Prepare for withdrawal and assumption of tasks, undertaken


by UK military tasks, by stricken state coping mechanisms.

However, given the potential concurrency of the various stages to disaster response, it
is possible that the phases of any military support to disaster response will also have to
be undertaken concurrently.

320. Cost Effectiveness. Following the immediate relief stage there may be a need
to provide transitional rehabilitation support and later reconstruction assistance to steer
the affected country towards recovery. DFID will determine the UK’s involvement in
the post-disaster phases. It is unlikely that the military will have a role in post-disaster
assistance but if this is required the cost of military involvement and extent of their
role will be agreed by DFID and the MOD.

321. Specific Support Requirements. Notwithstanding the specifics of individual


missions, military HDRO should support the mitigation of the disaster impact such
that overburdened disaster coping mechanisms are able to recover and thereby enable
the stricken state to take full control of the subsequent disaster relief and recovery
effort. The specific requirements for military support will be very situation dependent
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and will be determined by a number of variables:

a. Type and scale of the disaster.


b. Location of the disaster.

c. Impact of the disaster on stricken state coping mechanisms.


d. Civil contributions to international relief effort.

e. Assessed shortfall between disaster response and victims’ needs.

SECTION IV – KEY TENETS OF MILITARY SUPPORT


322. Empowerment. In undertaking support to disaster relief efforts the overriding
emphasis should be the empowerment of the stricken state and the supporting
international relief effort to meet the needs of the disaster victims. The established
government should be in charge and be seen to be so. The amount of support and
advice necessary to achieve this will vary but the stricken state should have
responsibility for the strategy, end-state and setting the priorities for meeting the needs
of its people. This mindset respects the stricken state’s ultimate responsibility for
disaster response, attests to the government’s authority in time of crisis and potential
dubiety, and will help to keep the military mission limited to the provision of support
to the disaster relief effort.
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323. Scope of the Military Role. Notwithstanding specific missions, under all but
exceptional circumstances, UK Forces will be deployed in support of disaster relief
efforts and should therefore not assume leadership of the overall disaster response.
This does not preclude UK Forces supporting civil Command and Control (C2) or
providing C2 infrastructure when necessary. However, wherever possible, maximum
use of established infrastructure should be made in order to preclude UK Forces
becoming a hub upon which other responding agencies become reliant, thereby
creating the potential for longer-term dependency and making it more difficult to
redeploy at the appropriate moment. The generic military role is to support and enable
the effort to relieve emergency needs until such time as disaster coping capacities no
longer require UK military support. This decision will be taken by DFID in
consultation with MOD. The direction of military activities on the ground will be
determined by the senior DFID representative and the JTFC. Should circumstances
require a substantial review of the envisaged operation and/or are likely to incur
significant extra costs, then guidance should be sought from DFID and MOD in
London.
324. Presentation. In disaster situations there may well be underlying tensions
which may be exacerbated by the intervention of UK Forces. To reduce this potential
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effect it will be necessary to communicate a clear, simple and repeated intent for the
Joint Task Force (JTF) which will ensure that the purpose and scope of UK actions are
understood by all involved actors, ranging from the stricken state government through
humanitarian actors to JTF personnel. Transparency of intent and operation will be
crucial to a successful co-ordination process.
325. Media Handling. Media handling in theatre will need a careful and sensitive
approach. It is almost inevitable that the conduct of HDRO by UK military forces will
become a focus for the UK media, some of whom may well have been transported to
theatre by military assets. This is not inconsistent with DFID having the overall media
lead, but DFID should be kept fully abreast of what is being done. Whilst following
agreed media lines, media handling in theatre should avoid giving the impression that
the UK military is the ‘only game in town’. It should expound a ‘hand in glove’
approach to humanitarian emergency/disaster response, recognising that UK military
assets are present in support of other agencies, normally DFID, responding to the relief
effort. The dignity of the stricken population should be borne in mind at all times.
326. Continuum of Effort. Within the international relief response there will be a
continuum of effort throughout the 3 stages of a humanitarian emergency/disaster (see
Para 301). The objective of military support should be to move this continuum
forward from immediate life saving towards conditions that may allow reconstruction,
enabling ‘marginal self-sufficiency’ but not becoming entangled in long-term
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infrastructure projects. The aim should be to assist but not create dependency or false
expectations.

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327. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to
the common objective of relieving human suffering, between military and civilian
actors and between various military contingents, in response to a humanitarian
emergency/disaster situation. In contributing to this the commander must identify
DFID’s main effort in support of the international response and allocate his resources
accordingly, as well as maintaining sight of the UK’s end-state.

328. Civil-Military Co-operation and Co-ordination. Within HDRO civil-


military co-operation and co-ordination is crucial and can usually only be achieved by
dialogue and consensus and not command (in the military sense). It will be pivotal to
the success of the integration of various elements, both civil and military, into the
overall relief operation. Except in extremis, there should be little or no need to
establish Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Centres. The key to successful civil-
military co-operation and co-ordination is for UK military operations centres to ‘plug
into’ existing civil co-ordination infrastructure to enable those responsible for the
effort to interface directly in solving the problem. Civil-military co-operation and co-
ordination should enhance the ability of both civil and military leaders to prioritise,
allocate, and undertake appropriate tasks, with a view to withdrawing military forces
as soon as disaster coping mechanisms have recovered. This should help to keep the
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HDRO limited to providing support to the relief effort and preclude the inadvertent
creation of a parallel military relief effort setting its own priorities. It should therefore
help to establish and maintain the necessary unity of effort.

SECTION V – EVALUATION
329. The evaluation of the humanitarian response, including military support, to a
humanitarian emergency/disaster will help gauge the effectiveness of the relief effort
in meeting victim’s needs and provide an underlying basis for quantifying progress in
moving the continuum of effort forward.

330. Standards. The use of consistent standards in response to humanitarian


emergencies/disasters should considerably increase effectiveness of the overall relief
effort. Their use will simplify the task of evaluation by eliminating some of the
anomalies, such as varying quality and quantity of humanitarian relief, enable greater
unity of effort and more efficient resource allocation. They will also provide a basis
for accountability and assessment. A set of minimum standards for the delivery of
humanitarian relief already exist in the form of the Sphere Standards.7 UK military
forces supporting DFID in a humanitarian response should be aware of these
standards. Wherever possible, taking account of the local environment, they should be
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7
The Sphere Standards, as part of the Sphere Project, are a set of universal minimum standards in the core areas of
humanitarian relief. The project is supported by the majority of the main NGOs and by the ICRC. Their purpose is to
increase the effectiveness of humanitarian relief and to make humanitarian agencies more accountable.
(http://www.sphereproject.org)

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used as the basis for the provision of support to the relief effort, particularly if
involved in the direct delivery of aid to a stricken population.

331. Measures of Effectiveness. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) should be


agreed, through DFID, with the stricken state and key humanitarian actors. Suitably
crafted MOE8 can help to put a humanitarian emergency/disaster into perspective by
comparing pre-disaster and post-disaster states. MOE should also alert responding
actors to emerging problems, informing decisions on when and where to shift effort or
assets; whether more (or less) support is required and where relief efforts are in
relation to disaster impacts. MOE can assist in establishing and assessing exit criteria
and should be tied into campaign effectiveness analysis.9

SECTION VI – COMMAND AND CONTROL


332. The public interest generated by HDRO and the potential political sensitivities
will ensure that it will be monitored at the highest level. It is likely that DFID, FCO
and MOD will use their own separate chains of command, which are brought together
at ministerial level, where DFID has precedence.
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333. Operational Chain of Command.10 When Ministers have authorised


preparations for a HDRO, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) will appoint a Joint
Commander (Jt Comd), who will exercise Operational Command (OPCOM), to
command the operation. This will normally be the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO),
particularly when PJHQ is the mounting HQ.11 However, there may be occasions
when it is appropriate to appoint a single-Service CinC. The Jt Comd will then
appoint a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), or National Contingent Commander
(NCC) if it is a Multinational operation, who will exercise Operational Control
(OPCON) and will command forces allocated to the operation normally from a Joint
Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) deployed in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The
size and location of the JTFHQ will depend on the situation. The rank of the JTFC
should be determined not only by the scale of the operation but should also take into
account the necessary degree of operational visibility (and perception of UK
commitment to an operation) and the need to deal with other nations senior
representatives. The JTFC should normally be of at least one star rank.
334. DFID/CHAD Representative/Joint Task Force Commander Relationship.
Whilst not in the military chain of command, the senior DFID/CHAD representative

8
For example: Changes in morbidity/mortality rates, if available, are good indicators of progress in relieving human
suffering. The amount of water supplied to a refugee camp (verses the total requirement) or the number of tents erected
(verses people without shelter) are good indicators of the sufficiency of support toward overall relief effort objectives.
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9
See JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations’.
10
For a more detailed explanation refer to JWP 0-10 ‘UK Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations’
(UKOPSDOC).
11
The HQ responsible for deploying, sustaining and recovering the force.

3-13
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JWP 3-52

will be responsible for passing advice on the provision of support to DFID’s disaster
response effort. Whenever possible, either the JTFC or his deputy should collocate
with the senior DFID representative to ensure detailed co-ordination of the military
input to the wider relief effort. However, the JTFC remains responsible for the
execution of the UK military operation.

335. Tactical Command. Normally UK military support to DFID’s disaster


response effort will be of sufficiently small scale that the JTFC will elect to exercise
direct command over assigned forces. However, there may be occasions when a
complete Tactical Command Chain is required. When such occasions occur
Component Commanders (CCs) should be identified early enough to enable maximum
participation in the estimate process.

336. Advance Force Command and Control. Assigned UK forces already


deployed close to the disaster region prior to the initiation of a HDRO should normally
be placed under OPCON of the JTFC as soon as he has the capability to take
command of them.

337. Multinational Command. Because of individual nation’s interests and


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methods of contributing to disaster response efforts, contributions to disaster relief are


generally offered bi-laterally rather than as part of a single multinational operation.
However, close co-operation will be needed with other nations’ military assets, as with
engaged civilian assets, to achieve a better co-ordinated response.
338. Multi-functional Co-ordination. The ability to achieve unity of effort
amongst all responding agencies whether local or international, military or civilian,
within what is an ad hoc coalition, potentially in the face of competing individual
agendas, will be a key factor in a successful outcome to a time-sensitive response to a
humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. Notwithstanding humanitarian principle,
the JTFC will always have to be take national interests into consideration when
undertaking tasks and allocating resources.
339. DFID/MOD Interface. The interface between the DFID and MOD during a
disaster response, and associated relationships, is shown at Figure 3.3:
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3-14
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JWP 3-52

Cabinet Office

FCO MOD DFID

DFID/PJHQ
LO
PJHQ

Supporting
Commands JTFC/UK NCC

Deployed Forces
Political Direction
2
Military C
DIFD Direction
Liaison

Figure 3.3 – Command and Control and Tasking Chain for HDR Operations

340. In certain circumstances, such as when DFID only require strategic sea or air
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transport, the Military tasking chain will shorten as shown at Figure 3.4:

Cabinet Office

FCO MOD DFID

1
PJHQ
Supporting
Commands

Political Direction Deployed Forces


Military C2
DIFD Direction
Liaison

1. PJHQ kept informed in case requirement escalates and commitment becomes a Joint Operation

Figure 3.4 - Command and Control and Tasking Chain for Single Service
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations
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3-15
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3-16
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JWP 3-52

ANNEX 3A – INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR


ASSESSEMENT
General Information
• Type of disaster (earthquake, cyclone etc)?
• Are there expected developments/likely secondary hazards (landslides, floods,
fire, release of toxic substances, civil unrest, conflict, landmines) in the
affected area?
• At what time did the disaster occur (local)?
• What areas affected (geographic)? GIS/map co-ordinates?
• Estimated total population in affected area?
• Does DFID have any programmes in the affected area? If so what are they,
and are all UK and local staff accounted for?
• What population density/settlement pattern building type in that area?
• What current and forecasted local weather conditions?
• Has the government (or is it likely to) formally requested international
assistance (for what)?
Initial Estimate of Impacts
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Population • How many reported: deaths, injured, missing, displaced,


affected homeless?
• What is situation of those affected: coping mechanisms,
accommodation, etc?
Public health • What diseases are endemic, any outbreaks reported?
• What percentage of hospitals functioning, capacity of
these?
Shelter • What extent of housing/shelter damaged?
• What housing type is specific to the affected area? (mud,
stone, high-rise etc).
Water and • What effects on water supply, waste disposal, availability of
sanitation drinking water?
Transport • What means of access to affected areas, road bridge
infrastructure damage?
• Which is the nearest functioning airport(s): what is the
handling capability (type specific)?
• Which is the nearest functioning seaport(s): what is the
handling capability (type specific)?
Food • What impact on food availability and access?
Communications • What are the impacts on power supply?
and power supply • Do local facilities (hospitals/water pumping stations etc)
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have back up generators etc?


• Are landlines/mobile phones functioning?

3A-1
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JWP 3-52

Search and rescue • Has the disaster caused structural collapse (percentage?)?
(SAR) • What type of structures have collapsed (eg. hospitals,
requirements schools, government buildings, multi-storey housing units)?
• What type of materials are they constructed from
(concrete/brick etc)?
• Are the local authorities requesting assistance with SAR?
• Who is conducting/co-ordinating the present rescue effort,
and for how long has this been underway?
Information on Initial Responses
Assessments • What assessments have been made/planned?
• By whom, what outcome?
Government • What has been the Government response so far?
response • Which is the lead Government ministry/body?
• Is there a well-established in-country emergency response
mechanism? Was it effective in previous disasters?
• What is the role of other relevant structures (Military,
Emergency Committee, Civil Defence Structure)?
• What are capabilities of above to respond?
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Other responses • What is the response to date of the humanitarian community


(UN/Red Cross/Donors/NGOs/Other)?
• What are the capabilities of those responding? What are the
gaps (food, water, shelter, clothing)?
• Which is the lead UN agency?
• Is the UN Disaster Management Team present/have they
met/is a disaster plan in place/has it been activated?
• Have any ‘situation reports’ been issued? Has any other
information on the disaster been shared?
Co-ordination • What co-ordination structures are in place for the disaster
(Government/UN/local community)?
Factors affecting • What is the security situation? Is the disaster site(s) safe for
response personnel to operate in?
• What other country specific factors may affect response
(e.g. public holidays)?
• How is the situation being reported in the local and national
media? Are they reliable?
Key In-country Contacts
Following a disaster, DFID/CHAD require details of all relevant in-country contacts
among governmental, UN, Red Cross and non-governmental agencies. This is
required in order to liaise directly and discuss response needs and options. Overseas
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posts can play a key role in providing this information quickly to DFID/CHAD.

3A-2
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JWP 3-52

ANNEX 3B – OPERATIONAL LIAISON AND


RECONNAISSANCE TEAM IMMEDIATE
CONSIDERATIONS
3B1. Should an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) be
deployed, either as part of a larger Department for International Development
(DFID)/Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) Operations Team
(OT) field assessment or independently, the information at Annex 3A should be
available prior to departure. This information will form the baseline for initial
assessment but will need updating on arrival in country to determine the current
gravity of the disaster situation (reducing/worsening) and the capacity of the relief
effort (increasing/reducing) to cope in relation to needs of the stricken population
(increasing/decreasing). These considerations are equally applicable to the military
augmentation to a DFID/CHAD OT assessment team.
3B2. In obtaining updated information the following liaison and factors should be
considered essential:

a. British High Commission/Embassy Liaison. As the UK’s focus


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within a nation state, the British High Commission (BHC)/Embassy should


usually be the starting point for any liaison within the stricken state. The
following information should be able to be provided:

(1) Updated overview of the general situation.


(a) Has the disaster affected bordering countries?

(b) How are they coping?


(c) Is there cross border co-operation?

(2) Existence (and implementation) of in-country disaster


contingency plans.

(3) Stricken nation political position and local sensitivities.


(4) Available transport facilities (Airport/Seaport/Runways/Harbours)
and their proximity to the disaster?

(5) Declared offers of support expected from other nations


(particularly military support).
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3B-1
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JWP 3-52

(6) What assistance can BHC/Embassy offer UK military force


(facilitating accommodation, Host Nation Support (HNS),
communications, interpreters etc)?

(7) Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)/Status of Forces


Agreement (SOFA)/and any legal issues.

(a) Waiver of Customs and Excise levies and charges for


emergency/disaster response related items/facilities etc.

(8) Force protection issues.

(a) Threats from criminality and corruption.

(b) Mine threats from recent/previous conflicts.

(c) Mindset of the stricken population.

(d) Health and Safety.


(9) Media handling guidance (should be done in conjunction with
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DFID as the lead UK department).


b. Stricken State Disaster Relief Agency/Lead Ministry. This may be a
specific government agency dedicated to directing relief operations, especially
in disaster prone countries. The following information should be able to be
provided:
(1) Overview of emergency/disaster situation in terms of scale and
coping capacity.
(2) Overview of the national disaster contingency plan.

(a) How well it has been able to be implemented?

(b) How well it is coping with the scale of the disaster?

(c) Role of national civil emergency services (police, fire,


medical and rescue).

(d) Role of national military forces.

• Constitutional issues on use of military forces.


• Military capabilities.
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• Activities being undertaken in support of the disaster.

3B-2
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JWP 3-52

(e) Identified capability gaps.

(3) How well international relief effort is complementing national


efforts?

(4) Overview of disaster response co-ordination mechanisms.

(a) Co-ordination hierarchy and responsibility.

(5) Idea of any national or local sensitivities, including presence of


foreign military assets.

c. Donor/International Organisation Liaison. If DFID previously had


development programmes running in the stricken country then a DFID Field
Office is likely to be co-located with the BHC/Embassy. When operating
under the direction of DFID, the in-country DFID Field Office should provide
operational level direction and humanitarian advice to the OLRT and any
subsequent deployment of military assets. The DFID Field Office should be
able to provide:
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(1) Overview of humanitarian situation, its extent and any


vulnerabilities to subsequent disaster events.
(a) Available assessments by whom and degree of reliability.

(b) Extent of international response.


(c) Identification of capability gaps.

(2) Overview of disaster response co-ordination mechanisms.

(a) Co-ordination hierarchy and responsibility.

(b) Effectiveness of stricken government, United Nations (UN)


and Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) relationship.

(c) State of in-country disaster contingency plan and level of


coping capacity by the affected state.
(3) Direction on UK relief priorities and UK’s position within the
international relief effort.
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3B-3
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JWP 3-52

(a) Guidance on employment of UK military assets.

(b) Criteria for mission accomplishment and UK military


disengagement.

(4) Direction on media handling.

d. Humanitarian Relief Co-ordination Mechanism. The humanitarian


relief co-ordination mechanism may be one, or indeed a compendium, of the
following:

(1) Humanitarian Relief Co-ordinator (Generally drawn from UN


Development Programme (UN DP)(UN Resident Co-ordinator (UN
RC)). (May be separate in large emergency situations).

(2) Lead UN Agency/Other IO.

(3) UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) System.


e. The following information should be established:
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(1) Overview of humanitarian situation, its extent and any


vulnerabilities to subsequent disaster events.

(a) Available assessments by whom and degree of reliability.


(b) Extent of international response.

(c) Identification of capability gaps.


(2) What are the levels of co-ordination and how are they interacting?

(a) Who is involved in country-wide co-ordination?

• Is any emergency/disaster contingency plan being


implemented? (Is it coping?)

(b) Has co-ordination been devolved to district level?

(c) Is sectoral1 co-ordination taking place?


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1
‘Sector’ is a term used to describe Humanitarian Relief activities such as Water & sanitation (WATSAN), Shelter,
Medical, Food, Logistics and Communication. Each of these areas is a ‘sector’.

3B-4
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JWP 3-52

(3) How is the co-ordination mechanism working?

(a) Who is managing the emergency information from


assessments and assimilating the resultant data. (How is it
shared?)?

(b) Who is setting the humanitarian priorities?

(c) Who is tasking responding assets to meet the set priorities


(How is co-ordination achieved?)?

(d) What centres/ops rooms are running (Joint Logistics


Centre/Disaster Response Ops Room/Displaced Persons Clearing
Centre)?

(e) What co-ordination meeting take place?

(f) How are communications achieved?

• Is UK equipment compatible?
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(4) How can UK military assets best be integrated into overall effort?
f. Other Country Military Assets in Theatre. Other nations may well
offer military support by way of response in support to international relief
efforts. The following information should wherever possible be obtained from
contributing 3rd party military forces (as and when they arrive in-country):

(1) Capabilities provided.


(2) Intentions on integration into overall response.

(3) Criteria for mission accomplishment and exit strategy (sensitive).

g. Other actions. The following actions should be undertaken if


appropriate:

(1) Visit source of disaster/centre of devastation. Understand scale of


problem and infrastructure damage. (Probably by air with DFID
representative)

(2) Visit logistic chain from warehouse, through transportation chain


to distribution centres.

(3) Visit UK billeting arrangements.


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3B-6
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JWP 3-52
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JWP 3-52
ANNEX 3C – MILITARY CAPABILITIES
UK military forces have certain inherent capabilities that may be of use in a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. The
following capabilities may be appropriate in the undertaking of HDRO in support of UK’s response to such disaster situations,
subject to DFID requirements:

Sector/ Assessment/C2 Comms Search & Infrastructure Support Transport, Supply & Public
Assets Support Rescue Distribution Health/Medical

Joint/ a. OLRT a. Media Ops a. Set-up shelter and a. Movement Control.


Common deployment. support. emergency repairs to
b. Contract Management.
accommodation.
b. C 2 Capability. b. Info Ops
c. Logistic Planning.
c. Liaison support.
teams.
Maritime a. Small boats a. Strategic a. Co-ordination a. Life support repairs to a. Tactical bulk transport a. Small scale
(See
co-ordination. Comms Link. and conduct of power, water and sewage of relief stores and aid. medical assistance
Appendix 1 b. Limited b. Small scale SAR at sea. treatment plants. b. Small boats capability, and triage
to Annex diving provision of b. Co-ordination b. Limited supply of potable both integral and capability.
3C)
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capability. field comms. and conduct of water. specialist. b. Environmental


c. Hydrographic riverine SAR. c. Limited supply of Health Advice.
support. emergency rations.
d. Airspace d. Helicopter Transport.
Coord’n. (subject to platform limits)
e. Helo Landing Sight
preparation/control.
(subject to platform limits)

3C-1
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JWP 3-52
Air a. Airspace /Air a. Airborne a. Co-ordination a. Tactical delivery of a. Casualty
Traffic Control. comms link. and conduct of relief stores and aid. evacuation.
SAR, both fixed
b. Aerial b. Strategic delivery of b. Aeromedical
and rotary wing.
Survey/ Recce. relief stores and aid. evacuation.
c. Airhead Management.
Ground a. Engineer a. Provision a. Provision of potable water, a. Aid distribution a. Environmental
Survey/ Recce. of limited either by well drilling or Health Advice.
b. Stockholding of aid.
b. Engineer comms purification from source.
c. Port management. b. Field Hospital.
infrastructure.
GEO support. b. Route improvement and
maintenance. d. Limited route marking
and traffic control.
c. Repairs and support to
airhead/seaport infrastructure.
d. Limited provision of power.
e. Limited EOD capability.
f. Repairs to power, water and
sewage treatment plants.
g. Emergency bridging
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capability.

3C-2
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JWP 3-52

APPENDIX 3C1 – MARITIME EMERGENCY RELIEF


STORES
1. Introduction. Whilst all ships are capable of supporting humanitarian
emergency/disaster relief efforts, there will be occasions when that inherent capability
needs to be enhanced by the carriage of additional Emergency Relief Stores.

2. Terminology. Previously these relief stores were termed Disaster Relief Packs
(Larger) and Hurricane Relief Packs (Smaller). To avoid confusion caused by
different titles and to recognise the broad utility of the stores, packs have been
renamed as Emergency Relief Stores (ERS).

3. Allocation. There are two scales, large and small. The number of kits needed to
fulfil operational commitments are 4 large-scale and 8 small-scale kits. These will be
allocated to ships by CINCFLEET N3, based on the operational requirement and the
perceived risk of disaster in the operating area. In general, a large ERS kit will be
made available for AFSH, AOR, CVS/LPH/LPD(R)1 deployments and small kits will
be embarked on ships conducting APT(S), APT(N)2 duties and their supporting
tankers. One large and two small-scale kits will be held in the UK for contingencies
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and maintenance.

4. Management and Maintenance. DLogs Portsmouth has responsibility for the


physical management and storage of all ERS. This includes surveying, demanding
and replacing items where necessary prior to issue, and arranging for routine
maintenance to be carried out on machinery.
5. Medical Stores. No specialist medical stores packs will be carried except for those
DD/FF deployed on APT(N) or APT(S) tasks. Details for procedures are contained
within RN Temporary Memoranda. CINCFLEET MED will instruct ships to demand
additional medical modules if required.

6. Review Process. To ensure that ERS are allocated to the correct priority, are
effectively managed and that the content remains relevant, an annual review will be
conducted by CINCFLEET - N3/N4. The point of contact for any queries relating to
ERS and for items to be considered at the review should be sent to SO2 N4 (Log Ops)
in CINCFLEET (NWD 46172).
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1
For example: RFAs Fort Austin/George/Grange/Victoria, HM Ships Ark Royal, Illustrious, Invincible, Ocean, Albion,
Bulwark.
2
Typically frigates and destroyers.

3C1-1
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JWP 3-52

CHAPTER 4 - PLANNING

SECTION I – PLANNING
401. Contingency Planning. The requirement for UK contingency planning for
military involvement in disaster relief operations is determined by the Ministry of
Defence (MOD), in consultation with the Department for International Development
(DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). DFID is the lead
Department of State for disaster relief and humanitarian aid and hence has lead
responsibility for the UK’s response to disasters overseas. It could include one or
more of the following:

a. Civil Plans.

(1) Disaster and Major Incidents Plan. A disaster and major


incident plan is prepared and updated at the request of the FCO by the
Diplomatic Post in the country concerned. These plans are designed to
provide general guidance to HM’s Representative and Staff for the
provision of assistance to UK Entitled Personnel (UKEP).1 In the event
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of a disaster they are designed to work in conjunction with the Civil


Contingency Plan (CCP), prepared by the Diplomatic Post for the
evacuation of UKEPs.2
(2) Stricken State Disaster Plan. In many countries and/or regions
where the risk of natural disaster is high, local planning cells have been
established and eventualities are routinely exercised. These cells are
often developed into a Ministry and/or agency whose mechanisms are
supported by United Nations (UN) and DFID funding and are aimed at
building an indigenous capacity to prevent and/or mitigate the effects of
disaster. Ideally the Ministry/agency should be capable of providing
warning and reporting for a disaster and then form their Country’s focal
point for the international response.

b. Military Plans. Military Contingency Plans are prepared and updated


by the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) on formal direction from MOD.
The level of detail contained in the plan will vary with the assessed likelihood
of its use and its update cycle. In increasing level of detail, the 2 types of plan
are:

1
UKEP are British Citizens, British Overseas Citizens, British Dependent Territories Citizens and others for whom the
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UK has assumed Consular responsibility.


2
See JWP 3-51 ‘Non-combatant Evacuation Operations’.

4-1
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JWP 3-52

(1) Joint Planning Guide. Joint Planning Guides (JPG) contain


general planning data for a particular region, country or type of
operation,3 which can be used as the basis for more detailed planning
during an emerging crisis.

(2) Joint Contingency Plan. Joint Contingency Plans (JCP) will be


prepared for situations where there is a particular likelihood of a crisis or
problem occurring which might affect UK national interests, or when the
anticipated warning time is reduced. In addition to planning data, JCPs
will contain the UK’s strategic objectives and desired end-state, together
with the force capabilities required and deployment options, including
readiness states where appropriate. The JCP will require further
refinement prior to implementation to take account of the situation as a
crisis develops.

402. These civil and military plans are supported by two intelligence publications
prepared and updated by the DIS; Defence Profiles (DP) and Infrastructure Briefing
Memoranda (IBM). The DP includes military intelligence information including local
force composition/capability whilst the IBM covers data such as climate, topography
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and civil infrastructure.


403. Military Planning. In-depth military planning should commence as soon as it
is apparent that military resources will be required to support disaster relief efforts.
Where time permits, regular co-ordination meetings should be held with DFID and
FCO, bringing together all involved departments including the early engagement of
financial departments, to assess the latest information, offer military advice and
highlight developing military requirements.

404. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation. The MOD crisis


management planning process applies to Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations
(HDRO) as it does to other operations. Although hierarchical, much of the sequence
occurs concurrently as an iterative process which can be compressed as required to
address the urgency of the situation. The process and its constituent parts may be
abbreviated for smaller scale operations or curtailed by necessity of time. The process
is outlined below:4
a. As indications of an emerging crisis develop, high-level analysis takes
place at Government Department level and may involve the formation of a
Strategic Planning Group (SPG).5 The output of this analysis will advise the

3
Operations such as NEOs or HDROs.
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4
A fuller explanation can be found in JWP 0-10 ‘UKOPSDOC’ and JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations’.
5
A SPG may be formed at the discretion of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments). The life-span of the SPG
and the periodicity of its meetings will be governed by the situation. It will inevitably be bespoke, its remit and exact
composition being dependent on the scale and nature of a crisis.

4-2
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JWP 3-52

DCMO command chain and form the basis for the Grand Strategic Estimate
(GSE).6 This analysis will also provide initial strategic planning guidance to
PJHQ. DFID as the government lead for UK response to international disaster
relief efforts is likely to take the lead in developing UK’s intent with the MOD
in support.

b. Once agreement on the principle of UK military involvement has been


reached, PJHQ (supported by MOD staff, Front Line Commands (FLCs), Joint
Force Headquarters (JFHQ) and DFID staff) will conduct a Military Strategic
Estimate (MSE). The output of the MSE forms the basis of detailed advice to
Ministers on the military options available, the nature and scale of forces
required, the implications and likely costs and a recommended course of action
(CoA).7

c. Once agreed, a Mission Directive will be issued by the Joint


Commander (Jt Cmd) including a mission statement, commander’s intent,
outline concept of operations and guidance on the composition, deployment,
sustainment and recovery of the force. This enables an Operational Level
Estimate to be conducted by the JTFC and his staff (once nominated) and the
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development of a concept of operations and the Campaign Plan.


405. During the estimate process, deductions may emerge which require early
action in advance of the production of a formal directive, such as the procurement of
shipping and airlift and the deployment of liaison teams. Such preparatory actions
need careful consideration as they may have political, financial, security and
presentational implications, may impact on overall capability or indicate a premature
level of commitment and thereby unnecessarily raise expectations of military
participation in support of disaster relief efforts. With DFID’s lead for UK’s response,
and therefore financial responsibility, the financial issues and costings involved in
military support to UK’s disaster response effort, need to be addressed at an early
stage. MOD’s Financial Policy Directorate, together with PJHQ J8 should be engaged
at the outset of the estimate process.

6
The GSE is a cross-government process and is not therefore the sole responsibility of any single department but will be
formed from a number of contributions. It seeks to facilitate definition of UK’s national intent and objectives in
addressing the crisis situation.
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7
Determination of the preferred course of action will lead to the identification of the required capabilities and will
support any recommendation for a reduction in the Notice to Move (NTM). This may be of particular importance in
support to disaster response efforts where speed of response is a key factor with the significant deterioration of conditions
on the ground with time.

4-3
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JWP 3-52

SECTION II – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS


406. There are a number of key considerations that should be taken into account
when planning HDROs. These are addressed below. In addition, Annex 4B offers a
number of questions that will provide a framework for the planning and conduct of
HDROs, highlighting issues that may need to be addressed. This framework may be
used to facilitate the operational dialogue between ‘humanitarians’ and military forces
that must precede successful and appropriate support to any disaster relief effort.

407. Timeliness. The utility of military HDRO is the ability to deploy quickly once
the decision has been made that the support to the international relief effort and
stricken state coping mechanisms is required. Account must be taken of the Readiness
Preparation Time (RPT) required for the JTF. RPT includes NTM, deployment time
(including re-assembly of equipment) and any training/familiarisation required in the
Joint Operations Area (JOA) prior to the JTF being ready to conduct operations.

408. Budgetary Constraints. As the lead government department for disaster


response, DFID will fund the operation. This funding is based on the provision of a
capability to meet a perceived need based on a humanitarian assessment. The budget
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for the constitution of the force will therefore be tight and force generation will need
to be carefully managed to ensure that capacity additional to requirement is not
overlooked. Conversely, there may be discrete capabilities that can make a significant
impact in the disaster situation and which represent considerable ‘value for money’.
These discrete capabilities should be brought to the attention of DFID during the
planning process.
409. Exit Strategy. A coherent exit strategy should be formulated at an early stage.
This should be based on the assessed ‘humanitarian gap’, i.e. the difference between
needs and disaster response resources, the capacity of the capability being funded by
DFID and delivered by UK military forces in support of the relief effort, and the
amelioration rate of the disaster impact. This may be expressed as a date or the
achievement of certain criteria. However, the exit strategy will need to be constantly
reassessed as the operation progresses. Any potential extension to the operation will
involve funding and concurrency issues which will need to be addressed by both DFID
and MOD, as well as the need to take account of the expectations of the International
Community and the damage that a perceived premature withdrawal could cause to
UK’s reputation.

410. Host Nation Support. The amount of Host Nation Support (HNS) that a
stricken state is able to offer will depend on the type, extent and scale and impact of
any humanitarian emergency/disaster. The requirement to support deployed forces
should not impact on the stricken state’s mechanisms for coping with the humanitarian
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emergency/disaster situation. A deployed force may have to be self-sufficient or


achieve the necessary support regionally. The provision, or lack, of HNS will affect

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JWP 3-52

the size and make-up of the deployed force and therefore raises ‘footprint’ and funding
issues. The availability of HNS should be determined at an early stage.

411. Multi-functional Issues. The response to humanitarian emergencies/disasters


is by its very nature a multifarious business. Co-ordination and liaison will be
complex, involving a number of other agencies including stricken state government,
international organisations (e.g. UN agencies, International Federation of the Red
Cross (IFRC)), international Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) (e.g. Oxfam,
CARE, SCF) and local NGOs (e.g. local Red Cross/Crescent Society). Depending on
the degree of degradation to a stricken state’s coping mechanisms and the degree of
‘humanitarian co-ordination’, it may be necessary for the JTFC to establish direct
liaison in separate areas of government, including local security forces, airspace
control and port authorities, as well as with individual centres of ‘humanitarian co-
ordination’ and other supporting nation’s military forces.

412. Communications. Successful integration of UK military support to any


international disaster relief effort will centre on information exchange and the need to
communicate. To that end communications support to the operation will need to be
robust and should take account of the depth and breadth of the potential operating area
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and the relative timeliness required of the various forms of communication. Whilst
operational security will not normally be an issue in this type of permissive operation,
there may be a need to pass sensitive data, particularly in less stable conditions. In
addition to the need to communicate within and between military forces, there will be
a critical need to be able to communicate with the civilian actors with whom UK
military forces will need to integrate in order to support the relief effort. Commercial
bearers, particularly within a disaster stricken state should not be relied upon as the
primary means of communication. The identification and provision of military
communications in support of HDRO will be co-ordinated by PJHQ and supported, as
necessary, by the single-Service Commands.
413. Media Operations. Media Operations will be a key facet in HDRO. Ideally,
all involved departments, including the Cabinet Office, should agree a set of media
lines that set out the government’s policy on the disaster response. Within the MOD
this should be undertaken by the News Release Group (NRG). Regular inter-
departmental contact and dissemination of these lines throughout the chain of
command will be necessary to ensure that a coherent message is communicated to the
media and the listening world as a whole. HDROs are dynamic situations and agreed
media lines will need to evolve with the operation to enable personnel to react
appropriately to any media call – any changes to media lines will also need to be
communicated throughout the chain of command. Notwithstanding this, in all but the
most routine factual issues, press statements should be at least co-ordinated and
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wherever possible cleared with the lead department (normally DFID) before being
released.

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SECTION III – MISSION ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE PROCESS


414. Prior to the operation and before decisions on force generation are made, a full
estimate should be conducted. The estimate is based upon information of the
humanitarian emergency/disaster that allows a complete assessment of the disaster
environment and the tasks to be undertaken in support of the relief effort. The force
should be task organised accordingly.

SECTION IV – FORCES
415. Force Generation. Forces will normally be drawn from those assigned to the
Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) which incorporates maritime, land, air and logistic
forces with a wide range of capabilities and are held at NTM ranging from 24 hrs to 30
days. However, there may be small specialist units or sub-units that are outside the
JRRF but which would be able to make a significant impact thereby offering increased
cost-effectiveness.

416. Notice to Move. MOD is the authority for the promulgation of NTM for all
military assets. Early ministerial agreement to a reduction of notice, the redeployment
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of potential responding assets, advance sailing of ships and the recovery of RAF air
transport aircraft may be essential for the timely support to the international disaster
response effort. The cost implications of this should be considered early and the cross-
departmental financial costings should be agreed.

417. Capability Requirements. The composition of a Joint Task Force (JTF) will
normally depend on the tasks identified and agreed with DFID to be conducted in
support of the international disaster relief effort. In addition to C2 (see Chapter 3
Section VI) the following capabilities may be required and should be reflected in the
task organisation:

a. Mobility. The potential degradation to infrastructure caused by


disasters, the possible scale of the affected area, and immediacy of mitigating
effects will mean that the ability to get to where humanitarian and disaster
relief is needed quickly will often be a key enabler. To that end, tactical air
transport and particularly helicopters are likely to be force multipliers, as will
maritime assets, including ships used for tactical bulk transfer, small raiding
craft and hovercraft in littoral or riverine focussed disasters.

b. Protection/Security. Whilst HDRO are conducted in a permissive


environment, a result of the disaster may be increased civil tensions and the
possibility of isolated civil unrest and criminality. Subject to agreed bi-lateral
arrangements and the provision of security by the stricken state (Host Nation
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(HN)), there may be a need to provide suitable security arrangements to secure


high value assets, mission critical equipment and supplies, and the immediate

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JWP 3-52

operating environment, e.g. deployed aircraft, ground support equipment and


aircraft operating areas.

c. Sustainability. HDRO will normally be of short duration thus


minimising the sustainability requirements of the force; nevertheless a detailed
sustainability statement should be produced. In a disaster situation, the
availability of Host Nation Support (HNS) cannot be guaranteed but may be
available to some extent. However, it should be borne in mind that there are
likely to be many other responding civilian and military agencies drawing on
what may be limited HNS resources.

d. Strategic Lift. Appropriate platforms, which may include civil charter


assets, will be required to deploy the force to and from the JOA. Given the
time imperative associated with disaster response, this is likely to be strategic
airlift, particularly when forces are deployed from the UK.
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ANNEX 4A - MOD/DFID PLANNING PROCESS FRAMEWORK


Stricken Deteriorating Disaster Initiate National
Monitor national coping mechanisms
State conditions Breaks Disaster response

HM Rep/ Assessment of Monitor stricken state coping mechanisms/international disaster response effort
FCO Disaster

FCO warn
DFID/CHAD

CHAD OT field
DFID Reg’l DFID/CHAD make DFID assessment (incl MOD
Constant review Execute
DFID Desk/CHAD all source initial PJHQ element)/ support HDRO
OT Monitor assessment drawing in FCO/MOD approve MOD confirmed
request for recce

DFID DFID/MOD
warn agree to initiate
MOD HDRO

DIS
Form Form CDS HDRO
MOD input to
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DIS Monitor Directive


assessment SPG CCT Approved
DCDS(C) Current
CDS
Daily Brief Operations Deploy PJHQ Forces
Planning
review Group LO/OLRT allocated
Directive
situation

PJHQ/ JTFC JTF


Form Form Jt Comd
Campaign Deploy
JTFC CPT OT Directive
Plan

INDICATORS & WARNINGS DECREASING COPING SUFFICIENCY

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ANNEX 4B – HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RELIEF PLANNING CHECKLIST
4B1. This annex offers a number of questions that will provide a framework for the planning and conduct of HDROs,
highlighting issues that may need to be addressed. This framework may be used to facilitate the operational dialogue between
‘humanitarians’ and military forces that must precede successful and appropriate support to any disaster relief effort. It is
formatted along similar lines to the Estimate.
Question/Consideration Supplementary
Situation What information is available? • Has an assessment been conducted?
• Is the information complete?
• On what is it based (substantive or anecdotal)?
• What information gaps are there?
What is the nature of the humanitarian
emergency/disaster?
Are the stricken state response • What is the state of civilian administration, infrastructure,
mechanisms/international relief effort coping and national organs?
with the impact of the emergency/disaster? • Is there a lead ministry/body?
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What is UK’s overall response?


What is UK Armed Forces role in supporting
this response?
Have budgetary and financial planners been • Are planned actions within the budgetary limitations of the
consulted from an early stage? HDRO?
• Are they delivering the most effective ‘value for money’?
• What are the financial freedoms and constraints?

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JWP 3-52
Question/Consideration Supplementary
Mission What is the HDRO mission? • Is it stated in terms of working towards pre-
emergency/disaster status?
• Is the situation at the desired end-state sustainable by the stricken
state and remaining humanitarian organisations contributing to
the international relief effort?
• What are the criteria for mission accomplishment?
Disaster What are the environmental impacts on the • Where and how big is the disaster area?
Environment HDRO? • What is the level of continuing or emerging hazards?
• What is the accessibility to and within the disaster area?
- Roads/bridges?
- Airfields?
- Sea-ports?
- Anchorages and beaches?
• What are the impacts of weather and climate?
- On the humanitarian emergency/disaster situation?
- On aviation and air movement?
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- On Maritime operations?
- On deployed equipment?
- On logistics?

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Question/Consideration Supplementary
Factors/ How has the emergency/disaster impacted • What is the effect on/situation with respect to:
Impacts/ (Effect vs Coping Capacity)? - the population,
Needs - law and order,
- public health,
- housing/shelter,
- water and sanitation,
- transport infrastructure,
- food,
- communications and power supply?
What is the perceived need? • Has a formal request for international assistance been
lodged?
• What has been requested?
Disaster What are International Community • What other agencies are responding?
Response interests/aims? • What is their capability and level of response?
• Is there a lead UN agency?
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• Are there any identifiable capability gaps?


Have the involved civil actors been engaged • Who is setting relief priorities?
to offer appropriate and relevant advice? • Who is tasking responding assets to meet the set priorities?
• How can UK military assets best be integrated into the
overall effort?
• How are contributing actors communicating?

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Question/Consideration Supplementary
What in-theatre co-ordination is required? • What are the humanitarian co-ordination mechanisms,
hierarchy and responsibilities?
• What are the liaison requirements – with the stricken state,
other nations HQs, humanitarian mechanisms?
• Are interpreters required?
How will the HDRO get into theatre? • Can the stricken state infrastructure support the force?
• Is a regional FMB necessary?
What HNS is available? • Can HNS be achieved regionally (from the FMB)?
• How self-sufficient will the force need to be?
• How long will the logistics pipeline be?
Force What are the Force Protection issues? • What needs to be protected and to what level?
Protection • Are ROE appropriate?
• Whilst a nominally permissive environment, do ROE
reflect any civil tensions caused by the disaster, criminality
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and take account of stricken state security capabilities?


• What are the potential health risks to deploying forces?
• What medical support is necessary?
• What is the requirement for inoculations (potentially time
critical)?
• Are there any residual risks from previous conflicts in
terms of UXO?

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JWP 3-52
Question/Consideration Supplementary
Info Ops Is an Information Campaign be necessary? • What Info Ops are necessary to support this?
• How will this tie-in with DFID and UK’s overall response?
• How will it tie-in with the stricken states Information
Campaign?
Time and What are the necessary timelines to meet the
Space humanitarian emergency/disaster response
requirements?
Legal and What is the legal status of the HDRO? • Is there a SOFA in effect/Is there a need for an exchange of
Political letters?
• What are the Regional requirements e.g. FMB, SOFA?
• What are the security implications for the HDRO?
What are the political constraints?
Media What are the media handling principles and • Are these agreed with DFID?
procedures? • Have coherent press lines been agreed?
• Has the media handling requirement been assessed?
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS


British Defence Doctrine
UK’s highest level military doctrine. It discusses issues and fundamental principles
providing a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations. It is authoritative
but requires judgement in application. It represents a statement of the British approach
to military operations. Below this is a hierarchy of subordinate publications.

Campaign Effectiveness Analysis


Analysis conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical level to monitor and assess
the cumulative effects of military actions with respect to centres of gravity in order to
achieve the overall campaign end-state. (JWP 3-00)

Civil Actor
A non-military element potentially impacting on the situation within the Joint
Operations Area.

Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)


The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the Military
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Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as
well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.
(MC 411/1)

Disaster Relief
The organised response to alleviate the situation resulting from a catastrophe, the aims
of which are to save life and lessen suffering, limit damage and restore essential
services to a level that enables local authorities to cope. Disaster relief demands the
total integration of the relief effort with the life-support assets and infrastructure
available within the stricken area. (JWP 3-52)

Emergency Life Saving Relief


The provision of small scale supplies (e.g. food, clothing, medical and subsistence
stores) and services (e.g. rescue, urgent works, transport and necessary equipment)
which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency to save life or to limit physical
damage and prevent serious suffering. These may be resourced from available Service
sources provided that Service requirements are not compromised, should not exceed
one week’s supplies and be provisioned from on-the-spot stores.

Forward Mounting Base (also Deployed Operating Base)


A base established within the operational area, to support operations at Forward
Operating Bases. It will be resourced to a greater level than a Forward Operating
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Base, including C2, logistics and administration support elements. (JWP 0-01.1)

Glossary-1
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JWP 3-52

Front Line Command


The term Front Line Command (FLC) has been adopted to cover support activities,
excluding joint operations and is defined as: ‘the single-Service Command (Fleet,
Land or Strike) responsible for operating, administering or training its forces outside
the requirements of joint operations’. (Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 002/02)

Humanitarian Assistance
The provision of humanitarian relief by military forces deployed for the conduct of
combat or security related operations. (JWP 3-52)

Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster
A serious disruption of a society’s ability to function effectively, causing widespread
human, material, or environmental losses which exceed the ability of an affected
society to cope using only its own resources. (JWP 3-52)

Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations


Operations conducted in a benign posture, to assist humanitarian emergency and/or
disaster relief efforts in a militarily permissive foreign country. (JWP 3-52)
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Humanitarian Gap
The difference between humanitarian emergency/disaster needs and the relief
resources available to meet them. (JWP 3-52)

Joint Operations Area


An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by a higher authority, in which a designated
Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a
specific mission. A Joint Operations area including its defining parameters, such as
time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Task Force Commander


The operational commander of a nominated Joint Force. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Task Force Headquarters


A purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the
operational level by a Joint Task Force Commander. (JWP 0-01.1)

Non-combatant Evacuation Operation


An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign
country to a place of safety. (JWP0-01.1)
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JWP 3-52

Rapid Onset Disaster (Sudden Onset Disaster)


Any disaster that has not been predicted or if predicted the scale of the disaster is far
greater than anticipated. Examples are hurricanes, earthquakes and floods.
(UNOCHA)

Sector (in humanitarian terms)


A term used to describe Humanitarian Relief activities within a functional area, such
as Water and Sanitation, Shelter, Medical, Food, Logistics and Communication. Each
of these is a ‘Sector’. (JWP 3-52)

Stricken State
Any state within which a humanitarian emergency or disaster has occurred.

Stricken Population
The people or peoples of a Stricken State affected by the effects of a humanitarian
emergency or disaster.

Supported Commander
A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by
higher authority. (JWP 0-01.1)
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Supporting Commander
A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a
supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan. (JWP 0-01.1)
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
APT Atlantic Patrol Task

BHC British High Commission

CHAD Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (of DFID)


CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation
CJO Chief of Joint Operations
CMCC Civil-Military Co-ordination Centre
COG Current Operations Group
CPT Contingency Planning Team
CRMU Crisis Response and Monitoring Unit

DCMO Defence Crisis Management Organisation


DFID Department for International Development

ERS Emergency Relief Stores


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FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation


FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FMB Forward Mounting Base

GSE Grand Strategic Estimate

HDR Humanitarian/Disaster Relief


HDRO Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations
HNS Host Nation Support

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross


IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM International Office for Migration

JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters


JOA Joint Operations Area
JRRF Joint Rapid Reaction Force
JTF Joint Task Force
JTFC Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ Joint Task Force Headquarters

LO Liaison Officer
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Abbreviations-1
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JWP 3-52

MOD Ministry of Defence


MOE Measures of Effectiveness
MOU Memoranda of Understanding
MSE Military Strategic Estimate

NCC National Contingent Commander


NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NGO Non-governmental Organisations
NTM Notice to Move

OLRT Operational and Liaison Reconnaissance Team


OPCOM Operational Command
OPCON Operational Control
OT Operations Team

PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters


POC Point of Contact

ROE Rules of Engagement


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RPT Readiness Preparation Time

SAR Search and Rescue


SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SPG Strategic Planning Group

UN United Nations
UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination System
UNDP UN Development Programme
UN DMT UN Disaster Management Team
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF UN Children’s Emergency Fund
UN OCHA UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN RC UN Resident Co-ordinator

WFP World Food Programme


WHO World Health Organisation
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Abbreviations-2