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Joint Warfare Publication 3-52
JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3-52 HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS
Joint Warfare Publication 3-52 (JWP 3-52), October 2002 Edition, is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff
Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts
CONDITION OF RELEASE
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1. Background. There will be occasions when it will be appropriate to deploy military assets to assist in a foreign humanitarian emergency or disaster relief effort, either on a national basis or as part of an international effort. Work resulting from the post - Op BARWOOD Humanitarian Relief Study (Mozambique) highlighted the lack of national guidance for the provision of military assistance to foreign humanitarian emergencies and disaster relief efforts. It was determined that Joint Doctrine was required in order to provide the necessary guidance. 2. Purpose. The purpose of JWP 3-52 ‘Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations’ is to inform and guide commanders and staff involved in the planning and conduct of military support to foreign humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in a militarily benign environment. 3. Context. JWP 3-52 is an important publication in that it supports a particular type of operation with specific characteristics, in so much as forces are generated to specifically support humanitarian/disaster relief efforts in a given disaster situation – this is the mission.1 Notwithstanding this, the ethos and guidance provided by higher level publications JWP 0-10 ‘United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations’ and JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations’ should still be applied together with the specifics articulated within JWP 3-52. Whilst the scope of this publication does not cover the provision of humanitarian assistance, i.e. a secondary task undertaken within the operational area,2 when the mission for generated forces is primarily one of security, the key tenets are likely to be applicable. 4. Given the nature of the subject matter, JWP 3-52 has been produced in close coordination with other government department (OGD) stakeholders and acknowledges the input of international and non-governmental organisations (IO and NGO). As such it should be of value to ‘head-office’ and ‘field-worker’ elements of the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as well as being of utility to the wider humanitarian community. 5. Structure. Whilst focussed at the Operational level, JWP 3-52 includes appropriate strategic and tactical issues and considerations. It provides guidance to those elements of the MOD and the Joint Force that may be involved in a
For example: Operation BARWOOD in Mozambique (Feb/Mar 00) (Tropical Cyclone) or Operation TELLAR in Central America (Nov 98) (Hurricane). 2 For example: The provision of humanitarian assistance by ISAF to humanitarian effort in response to the earthquake in Afghanistan (Mar 02) or by KFOR in response to the KOSOVO refugee crisis.
JWP 3-52 Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operation (HDRO) and in the planning and provision of military assistance. The JWP is divided into two parts. Part 1 addresses ‘The Nature of Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations’ with Chapter 1, aimed specifically at the JTFC, providing an overview of the operational environment. Chapter 2 addresses the roles and responsibilities of involved agencies, both national and international to enable the JTFC and his staff to situate the Joint Force support within the wider response. Part 2 covers ‘Planning and Conduct’ of HDRO. Chapter 3 provides more detailed guidance on response methodology, including appropriate capabilities, and the fundamentals of military support to an international relief effort. Annex 3C identifies those military capabilities that may be of particular relevance to an HDRO and should prove useful to DFID and MOD in identifying an appropriate military response. Chapter 4 highlights the planning process and considers the key military planning and force generation considerations. Annex 4A and 4B capture the framework planning process and provide an HDRO Planning Checklist respectively, both of which should provide a useful ‘handy-billy’ for the busy Joint planner.
6. JWP 3-52 should be read in conjunction with JDP XX/03 ‘Joint Civil-Military Co-operation’3 which, once it is published, will provide guidance on civil-military interaction in greater detail. If there is potential for evacuation of UK Entitled Personnel (UKEP) then JWP 3-51 ‘Non-combatant Evacuation Operations’ should be consulted. JWP 3-45 ‘Media Operations’ contains more detailed guidance on the conduct of Media Ops and Media handling on operations and JWP 3-80 provides guidance on ‘Information Operations’.
A Joint Doctrine Pamphlet (JDP) on ‘Joint Civil-Military Co-operation’ is currently under development and is planned for publication in 2003.
HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS
Page No Title Page Authorisation, Distribution Preface Contents Joint Warfare Publications Record of Amendments i ii iii v vii viii
PART 1 – THE NATURE OF HUMANITARIAN/ DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS
Chapter 1 Overview 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-6
Terminology Operational Environment Characteristics of Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations Disaster Types Annex 1A - Types of Disaster Chapter 2 Approach to Humanitarian Emergencies/Disasters
Government Response Inter-departmental Processes The DFID – MOD/Military Interface Financial Issues Legal Issues Role of the International Community Annex 2A - Roles of Key United Nations Agencies and Members of the International Red Cross Movement
2-1 2-3 2-3 2-5 2-6 2-8
PART 2 – PLANNING AND CONDUCT
Chapter 3 Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster Response 3-1 3-4
Assessment Civil Response to Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster
JWP 3-52 Military Support to Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster Response Key Tenets of Military Support Evaluation Command and Control Annex 3A - Information Necessary for Assessment Annex 3B - OLRT Immediate Considerations Annex 3C - Military Capabilities Chapter 4 Planning 4-1 4-4 4-6 4-6
3-8 3-10 3-12 3-13
Planning Planning Considerations Mission Analysis and Estimate Process Forces Annex 4A - MOD/DFID Planning Process Framework Annex 4B - HDR Planning Checklist Glossary of Terms and Definitions Glossary of Abbreviations
JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS
The successful prosecution of joint operations requires clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or at all, by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWP). Joint Doctrine Pamphlets (JDPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a foreshortened time scale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur when a more comprehensive ‘parent’ publication is under development, but normally well in advance of its planned publication. The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is explained in DCI JS 16/2002.
RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
Amendment No. Date of Insertion Initials
THE NATURE OF HUMANITARIAN/ DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW
101. The Global physical environment is changing and the consequence of this is likely to be an increase in environmental failures (droughts, floods, famine). Increasing pressure on the World’s physical resources linked with an increased interest from the world media and concern from leading nations and donors make it likely that UK Armed Forces may be called upon to support humanitarian and disaster relief efforts more frequently in the future.1 102. Following a humanitarian emergency or disaster, UK military forces may be required to support the international relief effort in the country or region in which the emergency or disaster has occurred. Such support could be provided direct from the UK, from British garrisons abroad, or from ships or other units operating in the vicinity but is likely to be in support of and at the request of the Department for International Development (DFID). 103. The requirement for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to be prepared to provide support to an international humanitarian emergency or disaster relief effort is mandated in Defence Mission E and specifically tasked within Military Task 20.2
DEFENCE MISSION E Peace Support and Humanitarian Assistance Operations ‘To contribute forces to operations designed to prevent, contain and resolve conflict, in support of international order and humanitarian principles, and to contribute to efforts to deal with humanitarian crises and disasters.’ MILITARY TASK 20 Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Outside the UK and Overseas Territories ‘Humanitarian crises and disasters, if not addressed rapidly and effectively at an early stage, can often lead to potentially serious conflicts. When appropriate, and at the request of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or the Department for International Development, the Armed Forces contribute to humanitarian and disaster relief operations, either on a national basis or as part of a coordinated international effort.’
104. The utility of military forces to support UK and international relief efforts is an important function for which UK military forces should be prepared.
The Strategic Context 2000 (The Physical Dimension). Military Task 20 from the JETL (Version 4.1) maintained by JF Trg & Stds, DCJO (OPS SP), PJHQ. This is further broken down into subordinate tasks throughout the operational levels.
SECTION I – TERMINOLOGY
105. British Defence Doctrine (BDD) differentiates between support to foreign emergency/disaster relief efforts, and the provision of humanitarian assistance, based on the security situation and the mission of the involved military forces, namely: a. A Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operation (HDRO) is an operation conducted in a benign posture, to assist humanitarian emergency and/or disaster relief efforts in a militarily permissive foreign country. HDRO are conducted by military forces, essentially acting as a ‘sub-contractor’ through the Department for International Development to the wider foreign relief effort where support to the foreign relief effort is the military mission. Military forces will be deployed for a specific task (which will have normally been specifically costed). Whilst Command and Control remains within the military chain of command, military forces engaged in HDRO should take direction and guidance from the co-ordinating humanitarian agency, normally through DFID. The operating environment should be permissive and thereby enable a benign force posture to be taken (except for essential asset protection). b. Humanitarian Assistance is the provision of humanitarian relief by military forces deployed for the conduct of combat or security related operations. In recognising that the provision of humanitarian relief is principally a function of humanitarian and development agencies, BDD also recognises that there may be circumstances, especially during combat, when these agencies are unable to deliver such aid or where there may be an aid shortfall. Military forces engaged in such activities should, wherever possible, take advice and overall direction for the provision of humanitarian assistance from the co-ordinating civilian authority or humanitarian agency and should in any event hand-over responsibility for the humanitarian task to the appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity. 106. Other key terms and definitions related to Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations: a. Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster. A Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster is a serious disruption of a society’s ability to function effectively, causing widespread human, material, or environmental losses which exceed the ability of an affected society to cope using only its own resources. Disasters are often classified according to their speed of onset, or according to their cause (natural or man made). b. Disaster Relief. Disaster Relief is the organised response to alleviate the situation resulting from a catastrophe. The aims of disaster relief are to save life and lessen suffering, limit damage and restore essential services to a
JWP 3-52 level that enables local authorities to cope. Disaster relief demands the total integration of the relief effort with the life-support assets and infrastructure available within the disaster area. c. Rapid Onset Disaster.3 Rapid Onset Disaster is any disaster that has not been predicted or if predicted the scale of the disaster is far greater than anticipated. Examples are hurricanes, earthquakes and floods. d. Civil-Military Co-operation.4 Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the Military Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.
SECTION II – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
107. Humanitarian Emergencies/Disasters. Disasters are a regular part of global life, whether caused by acts of nature or acts of man. These events become humanitarian emergencies when their effects impact on a society or population whose inherent resources are insufficient to absorb the impact and deal with the event’s consequences. Many humanitarian emergencies and disasters are prolonged. Their effects can be mitigated by international aid and development programmes designed to address the immediate needs of a stricken population and to build capacity enabling local society to better cope with humanitarian emergency/disaster situations. 108. Rapid Onset Disasters. Events can occur that have a relatively sharply defined start, pose an acute, generalised threat to life, livelihoods, or basic societal well-being and overwhelm local capacity to deal with the effects.5 These types of humanitarian emergency/disaster are termed Rapid Onset Disasters.6 109. Military Involvement. The engagement of UK military forces in HDRO will normally be out of the necessity for speed of reaction, including proximity of suitable resources to the disaster area, the scale of effort required or specialist skills to deal with the consequences of a humanitarian emergency/disaster. UK military forces will therefore only normally be engaged in response to Rapid Onset Disasters and normally at the request of humanitarian organisations and usually through DFID. 110. Unpredictability. Each HDRO will take place in a unique and unpredictable environment. HDROs will normally be undertaken in a dysfunctional environment with varying degrees of chaos. There will be a mismatch between necessary resources
This is a DFID term. UN OCHA use the term ‘ Sudden Onset Disaster’. NATO definition as articulated in MC 411/1. 5 This includes a sudden change in circumstances in the midst of a slower onset or protracted emergency/disaster. 6 E.g. An earthquake occurring in the midst of an ongoing humanitarian emergency based on drought/conflict (Afghanistan Mar 02).
JWP 3-52 and situational needs, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension. The government of a stricken state may well be overwhelmed by the effects of the humanitarian emergency/disaster and paralysed by the scale of the necessary response. 111. Responsibility. Notwithstanding the above, the overall responsibility for all relief actions rests with the stricken state. UK military forces may undertake a HDRO to support the relief effort, either bilaterally or as part of a wider international effort, at the request of DFID following an appeal for assistance by the stricken state. 112. Permissive Environment. Given that HDROs are conducted at the request of a stricken state, albeit through DFID, and therefore ‘by invitation’, they will to all intents and purposes be conducted in a permissive environment. Security issues, including policing functions, remain the responsibility of the stricken state. However, depending on the internal situation, and taking account of any local tensions and the functionality of the state security system, there may be a requirement to provide sufficient security for essential asset protection. 113. Co-ordination Requirement. National bodies and recognised organisations such as the United Nations (UN), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) and a host of donor organisations, are likely to be involved in international relief efforts to mitigate the effects of humanitarian emergencies/disasters. Close and early co-ordination by civil and military authorities, both in UK and in the affected country, is highly desirable, though there will often be sensitivities involved, and every effort should be made to conduct, wherever possible, integrated planning. Co-ordination on the ground will depend on the experience and capability of the affected country and may therefore be erratic and confused, particularly in the first few days. Notwithstanding this, the pattern of operations is likely to be influenced significantly by the lead responding agency.
SECTION III – CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS
114. Civil/Humanitarian Lead. The provision of humanitarian and disaster relief is primarily the domain of civilian agencies. When undertaken, HDROs will generally be conducted to supplement or complement the relief efforts of the stricken state and supporting international community, under the direction of DFID as the ‘employing agency’. The Joint Force will thus provide specific support to particular requirements in response to an acknowledged ‘humanitarian gap’ between the humanitarian emergency/disaster needs and relief community resources available to meet them. HDROs will therefore normally be limited in both scope and duration. 115. DFID/MOD Approaches. The successful conduct of a HDRO requires DFID and MOD to work as a team. To achieve the desired results in an appropriate and 1-4
JWP 3-52 timely manner both Departments must recognise the requirements and needs of the other and should wherever possible take them into account when planning and decision making. In responding to humanitarian emergencies/disasters DFID will usually channel its assistance through its traditional partners – the UN, ICRC, Red Cross/Red Cresent Movement, and NGOs – and wherever possible utilise local and regional civilian resources. DFID will utilise military assets when the scale and timeliness of the assistance needed by vulnerable populations cannot be met by civilian resources alone. Given that all military assets work within particular readiness criteria, it is important that DFID provides MOD with as much advance warning as possible, even if the use of military assets is only anticipated. This facilitates the early provision of informed advice on available military resources and the identification of potential cost effective relief effort ‘multipliers’, the inclusion of military representation on the DFID led in-country needs assessment, timely planning (if only contingency) and suitable force generation (if MOD are ultimately engaged). However, the early engagement of military assets needs to be considered against the potential raising of expectations, both national and international, which may then necessitate the employment of military assets when their use may otherwise have been unnecessary. 116. Multinationality. Although the UK has the capability to operate unilaterally, 7 the potential scale of any necessary emergency/disaster response is such that any UK response is likely to be but part of a wider international relief effort. This international effort may include other nations’ military forces to varying degrees. Whilst potentially not part of a formal coalition, there may be opportunities to develop multinational support from and for other deployed forces, including Host Nation Support (HNS), logistic support and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). Neighbouring countries will have to be consulted over a range of issues such as overflight rights or staging of UK forces.8 All efforts on the ‘ground’ should be co-ordinated with other contributors in order to generate the desired unity of effort in addressing the needs of the stricken state. 117. Constraints. UK HDRO will always be subject to political, legal and practical constraints, including the availability of appropriate assets and most importantly the needs of the stricken state. These constraints may be influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the level of national interest at stake and the expectations of the public at large. DFID and MOD will decide the scale of UK forces committed to a HDRO and the constraints imposed upon them, including authorised Rules of Engagement (ROE). 118. Media. Media interest in humanitarian emergency/disaster situations may well be considerable, particularly during the initial emergency phase, and may well have
Contemporary military support to humanitarian emergency/disaster relief is generally offered bi-laterally. A table summarising the main ‘rules’ that should be observed by States in response to international disaster relief efforts is included within UN OCHA Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (May 1994) – commonly referred to as the ‘OSLO Guidelines’.
JWP 3-52 induced military involvement. The media will have the ability to make uncensored live global broadcasts and file instant reports from within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). There is therefore the risk that politicians, international leaders, the stricken society and the general public, both at home and abroad, may receive direct and raw information upon which inappropriate perceptions may be based and unrealistic expectations raised. To ameliorate this it is necessary to have a coherent and coordinated Media Ops plan linked to the UK Government’s Information Campaign9 and able to convey the UK’s policy to different audiences. This should be developed in consultation with the DFID Press Office.
SECTION IV – DISASTER TYPES
119. Disasters are termed natural if caused by uncontrollable forces of nature; and man made if brought about by human interference. There is however, no operational significance in the distinction and the same processes would normally be applied to both disaster types. Disasters can be divided into basic categories: a. Natural. Which is split into two categories: (1) Geological. Earthquakes, tsunamis (tidal waves), volcanoes and landslides. (2) b. Climatic. Tropical cyclones, floods, droughts and wild fires.
Man made. (1) Chemical, industrial or major transport accidents, and environmental incidents. (2) Mass Population Movement.
120. Details of the factors contributing to the various disasters and the typical needs post-disaster onset are at Annex 1A.
See JWP 3-45 ‘Media Operations’, Ch 1, Sect 2 and JWP 3-80 ‘Information Operations’, Ch 1, Sect 2.
ANNEX 1A – TYPES OF DISASTER
1. The following disaster types are listed below in more detail (This list is not exhaustive, but rather more illustrative to highlight the potential issues.): a. b. c. GEOLOGICAL: Earthquake, Landslides, Tsunamis and Volcanic Eruption. CLIMATIC: Drought, Flood, Tropical Cyclone, Wildfire. MAN-MADE: Chemical and Industrial Accidents, Mass Population Movement.
Factors Contributing to Vulnerability Earthquake a. Location of settlements in seismic areas. b. Rigid structures not resistant to ground motion. c. Dense collections of buildings with high occupancy. Typical Adverse Effects a. Physical damage - damage to key structures and infrastructure. b. Casualties – Often high, particularly near epicentre or in highly populated areas. c. Public Health - Fracture injuries most widespread problem. Secondary threats due to flooding, contaminated water supply, or breakdown in sanitary conditions. d. Water Supply - severe problems likely due to damage to water systems. Possible Risk Reduction a. Hazard mapping. b. Public awareness programmes. c. Assessing reducing structural vulnerability. Specific Preparedness a. Earthquake warning and preparedness programmes. Typical Needs PostDisaster Onset a. Search and rescue. b. Emergency medical assistance. c. Damage needs and assessment survey. d. Relief assistance. e. Emergency provision of food, water & shelter. f. Repair and reconstruction. g. Economic recovery.
Factors Contributing to Vulnerability Landslides a. Settlements built on steep slopes, soft soils, and cliff tops. b. Settlements built at the base of steep slopes, on mouths of streams from mountain valleys. c. Roads, communication lines in mountain areas. d. Buildings with weak foundations. e. Buried pipelines, brittle pipes. a. Location of settlements in low- lying coastal regions. b. Lack of tsunamis resistant buildings. c. Lack of timely warning systems and evacuation plans. d. Lack of public awareness of destructive forces of tsunamis. Typical Adverse Effects a. Physical damage - anything on top of or in the path of landslide will suffer damage. b. Casualties - Fatalities due to landslide. Possible Risk Reduction a. Hazard mapping. Specific Preparedness a. Community education. b. Monitoring. c. Warning and evacuation system. Typical Needs PostDisaster Onset a. Search and rescue. b. Medical assistance. c. Emergency shelter.
Tsunamis (Seismic Sea Wave)
a. Physical infrastructure damage resulting from the initial force of water and follow on flooding. b. Casualties and Public Health – deaths principally by drowning and injuries from battering by debris. c. Contamination by salt water and debris or sewerage may make water unpotable. d. Crops and food supplies - Harvest, food stocks, livestock farm implements and fishing boats may be lost. Land may be rendered infertile due to salt-water incursion.
a. Protection of buildings along coasts; houses on stilts. b. Building barriers such as breakwaters.
a. Hazard mapping, planning evacuation routes. b. Establish warning systems. c. Community education.
a. Warning and evacuation. b. Search and rescue. c. Medical assistance. d. Conduct disaster assessment. e. Water supply and purification.
Factors Contributing to Vulnerability Volcanic Eruption a. Settlements on the flanks of volcanoes. b. Settlements in historic path of lava flows or mud. c. Structures with roof designs not resistant to ash accumulation. d. Presence of combustible materials. e. Lack of evacuation plan or warning systems. Typical Adverse Effects a. Settlements, infrastructure and agriculture – Complete destruction of everything in path of pyroclastic, mud and lava flows; collapse of structures under weight of wet ash, flooding, blockage of roads or communication systems. b. Casualties and health - Death from pyroclastic flows, mudflows and possibly lava flows and toxic gases. Injuries from falling rocks, burns, respiratory difficulties from gas or ash. c. Crops and food supplies Destruction of crops in path of flows, ash may break tree branches, livestock may inhale toxic gas or ash; grazing lands may be contaminated. Possible Risk Reduction a. Land use planning for settlements around volcanoes. b. Protective structural measures. Specific Preparedness a. National volcanic emergency plans. b. Volcano monitoring and warning system. c. Training in search and rescue and firefighting. Typical Needs PostDisaster Onset a. Warning and education. b. Medical assistance. c. Search and rescue. d. Provision of food, water and shelter. e. Relocate victims. f. Provide financial assistance.
Factors Contributing to Vulnerability Droughts a. Location in an arid area where dry conditions are increased by drought. b. Subsistence farming. c. Lack of seed reserves. Typical Adverse Effects a. Reduced income of farmers. b. Reduction of spending on agriculture. c. Increase in price of staple foods. d. Increase in inflation rate. Possible Risk Reduction a. Drought and famine early warning system. Specific Preparedness a. Development of interinstitutional response plan. Typical Needs PostDisaster Onset a. Measures for maintaining food security; price stabilisation, food subsidies, food distribution.
Factors Contributing to Vulnerability d. Lack of agricultural inputs to improve yields. e. Area dependent on rainfall weather system. f. Area of low soil moisture retention. g. Lack of resources to cope with drought. Floods a. Location of settlements on floodplains. b. Lack of awareness of flooding hazard. c. Non-resistant buildings and foundations. d. High risk Infrastructure elements. e. Unprotected food stocks, livestock and standing crops. Tropical cyclones a. Settlements located in low-lying coastal and adjacent areas. b. Poor communications or warning system. Typical Adverse Effects e. Loss of livestock. f. Deterioration of nutritional status. g. Famine, illness and death. h. Reduction in drinking water sources. i. Migration. Possible Risk Reduction Specific Preparedness Typical Needs PostDisaster Onset b. Develop livestock programme. c. Develop supplementary feeding programme. d. Develop complementary water and health programmes. a. Search and rescue. b. Medical assistance. c. Disaster assessment. d. Evacuation/ relocation. e. Short term food and water supplies. f. Water purification. g. Epidemiological surveillance. h. Temporary shelter. a. Risk a. Public assessment and warning hazard mapping. systems. b. Land usage control and b. Evacuation plans. a. Evacuation and emergency shelter. b. Search and rescue. c. Medical assistance.
a. Physical damage - Structures damaged by washing away, impact by floating debris and collapsing. Landslides from saturated soils. b. Water supplies - Contamination of wells and ground water possible. c. Casualties and public health Deaths from drowning but few serious injuries. Possible outbreaks of malaria, diarrhoea and viral infections. d. Crops and food supplies - Harvests and food stocks may be lost to inundation. a. Physical damage - Structures lost and damaged by wind force, flooding, storm surge and landslide. b. Casualties and dangers to public health; may be caused by flying
a. Flood control.
a. Flood detection and warning. b. Development of master plan for floodplain management. c. Floodplain mapping.
Factors Contributing to Vulnerability warning system. c. Lightweight structures, old construction, poor quality masonry. d. Infrastructure elements, fishing boats and maritime industries. a. Location of wildfire prone areas. b. Wildfire threat tends to be seasonal. c. Speed of onset may vary depending on the climatic conditions. d. Evacuation of communities may be difficult and dangerous in the face of a major fire front. Typical Adverse Effects debris, or flooding. Water contamination may lead to viral outbreaks and malaria. Possible Risk Reduction flood plain management. Specific Preparedness plans. c. Training and community participation. Typical Needs PostDisaster Onset d. Water purification. e. Re-establish logistical and communications networks. f. Disaster assessment. g. Provision of seeds for planting. a. Fire-fighting resources. b. Disaster management plan. a. Provision of fire fighting resources. b. Provision of temporary shelters in safe havens. c. If required the provision of smoke masks. d. Provision of fire spotting transportation. e. Evacuation.
c. Reduction c. Water supplies - Ground water may and structural be contaminated. vulnerability. d. Crops and food supplies –Standing crops, food stocks and tree plantations ruined. a. Effects can be very destructive, especially in loss of buildings, timber and livestock. b. Recovery from the effects on the environment may take several years. c. Public health - effects of smoke and burns. d. Improved vegetation cover. a. Hazard mapping. b. Accurate risk assessment. c. Monitoring and warning systems. d. Fire prevention regulations. e. Seasonal mitigation measures. f. Public awareness programme.
JWP 3-52 MAN-MADE HAZARDS
Factors Contributing to Vulnerability Chemical and industrial accidents a. Those persons, structures, livestock, crops and environment closest to the scene of an accident are most vulnerable, large-scale releases of airborne pollutants may spread for hundreds of kilometres. b. Lack of safety features or lack of evacuation plan. c. Unawareness by vulnerable persons of the potential danger. Typical Adverse Effects a. Physical damage - Damage or destruction may occur to structures and infrastructure. Transportation accident damage vehicles and other objects on impact. Industrial fires may be killed or injured and require medical treatment. b. Casualties - Many people may be killed or injured and require medical treatment. c. Environmental Contamination of the air, water supply, land, animal life may occur. Possible Risk Reduction a. Development of a disaster response plan. Specific Preparedness a. Hazard mapping. b. Hazardous materials identification. c. Inspection of chemical plants and storage facilities. d. Monitoring of toxic waste disposal procedures. e. Improve firefighting capacity. f. Monitoring pollution levels. g. Capability to physically contain pollutants. h. Prepare and practice evacuation plans. i. Test warning sirens. Typical Needs PostDisaster Onset
Factors Contributing to Vulnerability Mass Population Movement Typical Adverse Effects Possible Risk Reduction a. Address causes of population movement. b. Famine early warning system. c. Accurate risk assessment. d. Awareness programmes. Specific Preparedness a. Institutional education. b. Community education. c. Monitoring. Typical Needs PostDisaster Onset a. Emergency shelter. b. Provision of food and water. c. Medical assistance. d. Support to host infrastructure. e. Amelioration of impact on host population. f. Medium-term food security measures. g. Medium-term feeding programme. h. Medium-term water and health programmes.
a. Unwillingness of a. Local destabilisation due to: responsible authorities to • Overbearing on host take measures to infrastructure. mitigate vulnerability. • Increased tensions as a result b. Inability to act to of ethnic imbalances. mitigate their own vulnerability. • Impact on economy and staple food supply. c. Limited or late acknowledgement of their plight by International Community. d. Limited selfsufficiency. e. No supporting infrastructure. f. Limited means to generate income and so purchase life-sustaining essentials. b. Increased mortality rate due to poor food, sanitary and health conditions. c. Malnutrition. d. Secondary diseases as a result of conditions. e. Increasing health requirements with worsening situation.
CHAPTER 2 – APPROACH TO HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES/DISASTERS
SECTION I – GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Department for International Development 201. The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for provision of humanitarian assistance to people affected by disasters overseas. It plays this role in close co-ordination with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Home Office whose support may be requested in specific circumstances. The purpose of DFID’s humanitarian assistance policy1 is to: a. b. c. save lives and relieve suffering; hasten recovery, and protect and rebuild livelihoods and communities; reduce vulnerability to future crisis.
202. Within DFID the lead responsibility for dealing with Rapid Onset Disaster relief rests with the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD). This is done in close collaboration with DFID geographical departments and overseas offices. CHAD maintains an emergency response capability through an Operations Team (CHAD OT), operating on a round-the-clock basis throughout the year. A duty officer provides out-of-hours cover, but during a major crisis the headquarters is staffed on a 24-hour basis. The core team can be supplemented by a larger roster of humanitarian experts on a call-down arrangement. Humanitarian emergency/disaster relief operations are controlled from the CHAD operations room in London. CHAD OT participates in regular training, liaison and briefing, with the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ).
CHAD(DFID) PRINCIPAL TASK For many developing countries, the ability to promote development and reduce poverty is regularly affected by conflict, by natural disasters and by those created by human action or inaction. The CHAD principal task is ‘to prevent conflict and disasters, or to mitigate their effects’.
203. DFID’s priority is to improve and strengthen international disaster response capacity under the overall co-ordination of the United Nations (UN). This mechanism is described in Chapter 3. It is DFID policy to integrate disaster preparedness and
As set out in DFID’s White Paper on International Development (1997) – ‘Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century’.
JWP 3-52 response work into their country and thematic programmes where possible. This allows for better transition from the emergency phase to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. 204. DFID has established arrangements with Other Government Departments (OGD) to facilitate rapid disaster response. This includes the FCO who assist in global surveillance of disasters; the Home Office, with whom they have an arrangement for the deployment of UK Fire and Rescue personnel; and the MOD for the deployment of military assets. 205. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The FCO holds overall political responsibility for engagement with other nations. MOD support to a DFID response to a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation takes place within this overall political responsibility. The FCO is responsible for obtaining political approval for UK military deployment into other nation states, including the stricken state. Political advice on the circumstances for a potential Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operation (HDRO) will be provided by the FCO, including aircraft routing and negotiating diplomatic clearance requests for over-flight, staging and the operation of a Forward Mounting Base (FMB), if necessary. Assistance will be provided in the provision of visa (which may be required at short notice) and in the arrangements for the provision of Host Nation Support (HNS) and local resources for the support of the Joint Task Force (JTF). 206. HM’s Representative. British Embassies, High Commissions and DFID Country Offices play a key role in providing early information of emerging crises and situation assessments following disasters. Their links with host Governments and incountry humanitarian agencies makes them an important information source and part of the co-ordination system in the affected country. They may also be able to facilitate some UK disaster response activities, including local procurement of relief goods funded by DFID. 207. Ministry of Defence. In conducting HDRO, the MOD operates in support of the lead government department (DFID). Such support to humanitarian emergency/disaster response is undertaken on an ‘as requested’ basis and within means and capability of core military capacity and readiness. This principle will help to ensure that any necessary military support is made by ‘demand pull’ rather than ‘supply push’. Notwithstanding the onus lying with DFID to request MOD assistance, the MOD must anticipate likely requests at the onset of any humanitarian /disaster situation and should offer timely advice on suitability and availability of military support. 208. Military in a Subordinate Role. DFID’s primacy is a key feature of HDRO, and thus it is important that the balance of responsibilities between military and
JWP 3-52 disaster response staffs is understood by all those involved when planning and executing such operations.
SECTION II – INTERDEPARTMENTAL PROCESSES
Requests for Assistance 209. Requests by a foreign government for assistance will normally be made through HM’s Representative in the respective country and/or the UN Resident Representative. The UN or HM’s Representative may forward any request and recommendations for UK response to DFID and/or the FCO. This will be based on available information and consultation with other donors and humanitarian agencies in order to make an assessment of need. DFID will consider any recommendations it receives in light of all the information it gathers from its various sources. 210. Requests for military assistance should be initiated as follows: a. A direct request from DFID to MOD. In a request of this nature DFID becomes the budgeting authority and co-ordinates all British aid for disaster relief. b. A request from the FCO to the MOD. Whilst a less likely route, DFID would still lead, including co-ordination of funding, and require consultation. This would most likely be as part of a UN or multinational initiative. 211. Evacuation. In circumstances where UK ‘entitled persons’ are at risk as a result of a disaster, the FCO may request military assistance to conduct a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) of UK entitled persons from the affected area. The Embassy/High Commission’s Civil Contingency Plan (CCP) would be used as the basis for any evacuation. UK military assistance would be arranged in accordance with JWP 3-51 ‘Non-combatant Evacuation Operations’.
SECTION III – THE DFID-MOD/MILITARY INTERFACE
212. There is no template solution to disaster response and military involvement will depend on the individual circumstances as a disaster emerges. The critical issue is the timely identification of the potential requirement for military support to DFID’s response to a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. 213. Initial Contact. As a crisis emerges, CHAD OT (Crisis Response and Monitoring Unit (CRMU)) will alert the CHAD Humanitarian Programmes Team and advise on the potential requirement for the deployment of military assets in support of a disaster response effort. The CHAD Civil-Military Advisor will make initial contact
JWP 3-52 with the appropriate MOD Secretariat Regional Desk (MOD point of contact (POC))2 to register the possibility of a formal request for military support. Should a crisis emerge out of working hours then the nominated CHAD Liaison Officer (LO) to MOD will make contact through the MOD Resident Clerk. The following information will be relevant and may be requested/exchanged: a. b. Disposition and availability of relevant assets either in UK or regionally, Nature of envisioned military mission and tasking of military assets.
214. Focal Point of Contact. DFID’s focal POC/LO to the MOD will normally be the CHAD Civil-Military Advisor,3 will be located with the CHAD OT emergency response planning team and will provide continuous liaison/feedback to the MOD POC4 on the emerging disaster situation. 215. Approval. Once DFID make a formal request for the use of military assets and MOD approve military assistance then direct liaison can take place with PJHQ. Liaison with PJHQ will initially be through J3 Ops Support5 and a CHAD Military LO. Subsequently there may be a requirement for ongoing liaison between CHAD and various PJHQ Divisions, especially J2, J4 and J5. It may also be appropriate for a CHAD LO to become a temporary member of any PJHQ Contingency Planning Team (CPT)/Operations Team (OT). 216. Go/No Go. Subject to Financial Policy advice, PJHQ through the MOD POC should provide detailed costings of the military deployment to DFID, through the CHAD LO to MOD, including MOD ‘recce’ and ‘P Info’ requirements. Based on these costings and reassessment of the disaster situation, DFID will take a decision on the cost effectiveness and appropriateness of the use of military assets and will inform MOD accordingly. 217. Assessment/Recce. The requirement for the conduct a CHAD OT field assessment and/or the deployment of a PJHQ Operational and Liaison Recce Team (OLRT) will be determined as the disaster situation develops. Should either occur, the exchange of an appropriately qualified LO should normally take place. Further details are at Chapter 3, Section I. The tasking of air or space reconnaissance separately or in conjunction with a ground assessment may add clarity to a confused situation and should be considered early.
The default fallback contact is the appropriate MOD Directorate Regional Desk. In the event of the Civil Military Adviser being unavailable or contact being made out of working hours a member of the CHAD OT will be designated POC for initial liaison with the MOD. 4 This will normally be the MOD Secretariat Regional Desk unless out of working hours when the MOD Resident Clerk will become the POC. 5 The DFID/CHAD Liaison officer is the SO2 J3 (Ops Spt) CIMIC.
SECTION IV – FINANCIAL ISSUES
Introduction 218. Notwithstanding Defence Mission E and Military Task 20, support to international response to humanitarian emergencies/disasters is not MOD core business and is therefore unfunded. Costs for such support fall to the department that takes/has the policy lead (usually DFID). The exception to this is the diversion of inarea military assets for the immediate saving of lives. 219. The production of cost estimates should be an integral part of the operational planning process; it is therefore important for the costing process to match the pace of operational planning. The costing process for HDRO, whilst similar to any other operation, is likely to be influenced by the need for speed, a customer/supplier relationship with DFID, and close political, media and public attention. The estimated cost of the use of military assets is likely to be a critical factor in DFID’s decision on whether, or not, to engage military support for a particular disaster. 220. Charging Policy and Offsets. Director Finance Policy6 (D Fin Pol) is the lead authority with respect to levels of charge and offsets. Costs submitted to DFID should normally be on a ‘no-loss’ basis. This approach ensures that the defence budget does not suffer as a result of unscheduled activity and that it makes no gains either. No-loss costs cover those additional costs that would not have been incurred if the support had not been undertaken. The determination of charging policy, including the scope for offsets, and the basis of the best estimates of the cost to complete requested tasking should be transparent and aim at a quick desk-level understanding with DFID. However, whilst ‘best’ cost estimates are provided to aid decision making, the eventual charge to DFID is normally on the basis of ‘actuals’. 221. Rapid Costings. PJHQ J8 has responsibility for initiating and co-ordinating the HDRO cost estimate when PJHQ has lead planning responsibility. 7 Notwithstanding time constraints, Top-level Budget (TLB) holders and the Defence Transport and Movements Agency (DTMA) should wherever possible be included in the process and receive timely planning information from PJHQ J5/J3 as appropriate. The dissemination of current planning assumptions will ensure coherence of the cost estimate baseline across the process. The resulting submission to MOD should include the consolidated cost estimate and any associated caveats.8 The production of rapid and accurate cost estimates is an iterative process requiring a suitable balance of urgency and reliability. The following factors will effect the reliability of a cost estimate:
In consultation with the appropriate regional secretariat. Single Service Commands have responsibility when leading single Service HDROs. 8 In submitting cost estimates, costing staffs should NOT automatically deduct potential offsets but rather highlight them for MOD consideration.
JWP 3-52 a. b. Urgency of requirement. Precision of the requirement.
c. Planning assumptions (based on the nature of the mission, anticipated duration, location, current location/status of assets, and the availability of Host Nation or other support in theatre). d. Inclusion of caveats (‘health warnings’ based on the planning assumptions). 222. Financial Accounting. In order for MOD to seek appropriate reimbursement on costs which otherwise would not have been incurred it is essential that all costs associated with any HDRO are captured. The cost capture process is co-ordinated and managed centrally by D Fin Pol who will issue a Financial Instruction once a HDRO is declared. Whilst the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) is delegated financial authority for an HDRO, a Civil Secretary will normally be appointed and deployed to assist in the financial management of the operation. He should be consulted in the first instance, prior to the commitment of expenditure, for advice on financial and contractual matters. Based on advice from the Civil Secretary, the JTFC will normally issue operation specific financial delegations with authorisation to commit expenditure. The costs of a HDRO will fall into two categories, namely ‘In’ and ‘Out of’ theatre costs. In-theatre costs are the responsibility of the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) and will be captured by use of a UIN administered by the Civil Secretary. Out-of-theatre costs are the direct responsibility of spending TLBs.
SECTION V – LEGAL ISSUES
223. The main legal issue in the conduct of HDRO is the legal basis that underpins the operation. HDRO are likely to be at the invitation of a Host Nation or pursuant to a United Nations Security Council Resolution. Commanders at all levels should be aware of the precise legal basis for the operation as this will determine the level of force which is permissible under the Rules of Engagement (ROE) to complete the mission. Commanders should also be aware of the legal constraints on the operation, which are usually set out in CJO’s Directive. Status of Forces Agreement 224. It may be the case that no standing Status of Forces (SOFA) exists with the government of a stricken state or that other existing arrangements do not cover the requirement. In such circumstances (MOD) PJHQ J4 HNS will seek to secure appropriate jurisdictional arrangements over deployed military personnel and MOD civilians. Given the limited warning-time associated with disaster response and the imperative of timely reaction, agreement will normally be achieved, in the first
JWP 3-52 instance, by means of an Exchange of Letters with the government of the stricken state. Wherever possible these arrangements should be in place before deployment commences. If it is anticipated that there are likely to be Forward Mounting Bases (FMBs), or other staging areas, which are in ‘third’ countries, separate arrangements will need to be made with each such country. 225. The following issues should be addressed (the list is not exhaustive) in the formulation of any SOFA:9 a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. Status of personnel including privileges and immunities. Jurisdictional arrangements. Exemption from taxes and duties. Exemption from immigration controls and import regulations. Wearing of uniforms. Issues and carriage of personal weapons and ROE (for self-defence). Use of UK vehicles and validity of UK driving permits. Freedom of movement in connection with the conduct of HDRO. Understanding on the resolution of claims and liabilities. Investigation of accidents.
k. Provision of and Payment Regime for Host Nation Support. (This is normally better dealt with in a separate Implementing Arrangement completed under the umbrella of the main SOFA/MOU). 226. Visas. Notwithstanding the potential negotiations on the status of UK forces, which may take some time, the early identification of visa requirements is essential. FCO guidance should be sought (through MOD Sec(O)) PJHQ POL/OPS) at the first indication of the potential conduct of an HDRO. This is particularly important if using a ‘third country’ FMB or other staging area. 227. Rules of Engagement. By definition HDRO are conducted in a benign posture within a permissive environment. If it is necessary for military personnel to be armed (with either firearm or baton) the appropriate ROE will be authorised and
The time available may not allow for a SOFA to be negotiated. Accordingly, these issues should be included in the negotiated document which may take the form of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Military Technical/Implementing Arrangements and Exchanges of letters between governments.
JWP 3-52 supporting Guidance Card10 issued. PJHQ11 will be responsible for providing a draft ROE profile and submission, and for providing advice at the operational and military strategic level, on the military, legal and secretariat aspects of ROE. The nominated commander is responsible for the promulgation of authorised ROE profiles to theatre. Careful consideration should be given to the crafting of ROE and account should be taken of the legal basis for the operation, the prevailing security conditions, Host Nation capabilities and arrangements and any Host Nation agreements on the provision of security.
SECTION VI – ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
228. The humanitarian consequences of natural, environmental catastrophes and industrial accidents often exceed the coping mechanisms and aid resources of single countries. A number of UN organisations and NGOs may have been working in a country on long-term development projects, in near emergency/disaster conditions, for some time prior to the rapid onset of disaster. The humanitarian consequences of such a precipitous event may easily overwhelm in-country coping mechanisms and require a shift in focus by those development agencies from development to emergency relief. The scale is also likely to require additional international interventions to provide relief to the stricken population. A mechanism for international disaster response exists under the co-ordination of the UN. This consists of four main elements: a. National response. The response from the affected nation itself includes the Government and local community organisations that work in support of it in times of crisis. Most lives are saved in the first few hours following a disaster with the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies often playing a key role. These are locally established organisations that can mobilise immediately following a disaster to assist civil authorities with search and rescue efforts and the distribution of relief items. Individual national societies are supported by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) from its Geneva headquarters. b. UN response. The United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) plays a central co-ordinating role. Other relevant UN agencies include: UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Health Organisation (WHO). Many of these organisations are already involved in longer-term projects around the world. When a disaster occurs, they are expected to gear up their activities to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to those in need.
In accordance with JSP 398. Although drafts may also be produced by single-Service Commands.
JWP 3-52 c. Non-governmental Organisation response. A number of international Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as Oxfam, Save the Children, Medecins Sans Frontieres, and others, frequently respond to disaster situations. The most effective are often those agencies that are already established in the stricken state. d. Donors. Donor governments provide funding, in-kind assistance, technical personnel and sometimes, operational support such as logistics and communications, for the above efforts. Details of the emergency response roles of key UN agencies and members of the International Red Cross movement are at Annex 2A.
ANNEX 2A – ROLES OF KEY UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS MOVEMENT
2A1. Details of the emergency response roles of key UN agencies and members of the International Red Cross movement are detailed below: United Nations Development Programme 2A2. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) focuses primarily on the development related aspects of disaster risks, and on providing technical assistance to institution building in all aspects of disaster management and mitigation. This includes: a. Incorporating long term risk reduction and preparedness measures in normal development planning and programmes; b. Reviewing the impact of large settlements of refugees or displaced persons on development; c. Providing technical assistance to the authorities managing major emergency assistance operation of extended duration; d. Assisting in the planning and implementation of post disaster reconstruction and transition to recovery. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2A3. The aim of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) emergency response is to provide protection to ‘persons of concern’ and ensure that the necessary assistance reaches them in time. With regard to material assistance, UNHCR’s goal is the survival of refugees through ensuring adequate basic and supplementary food supplies, health care, shelter, water and sanitary facilities, clothing and essential community services. United Nations Children’s Fund 2A4. In emergency situations, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) focuses on providing special protection and care of affected women as well as children and extends assistance to them. UNICEF aims to reinforce the capacity of families to provide appropriate care to children and to reunite families by supporting national and local governmental.
JWP 3-52 World Food Programme 2A5. World Food Programme’s (WFP) role in an emergency includes: a. Providing advice and assistance to the government, other concerned agencies and local authorities in assessing possible requirements for emergency food aid; b. Providing food aid to meet emergency food needs;
c. Helping to mobilise, and ensure co-ordination in the planning and delivery of, food assistance from all sources. World Health Organisation 2A6. In an emergency, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has responsibility for: a. Ensuring that health needs are properly assessed and are reflected in requests for international assistance; b. Ensuring that humanitarian assistance applies the best health practices, reflects the Country’s health priorities and respects its capacities; c. Supporting epidemiological surveillance and disease outbreak response;
d. Playing its mandated role in international health co-ordination: mobilising national and international heath expertise, facilitating collaboration between national and international partners and co-ordinating external assistance. International Organization for Migration 2A7. In emergencies involving large-scale movement of people, the International Office for Migration (IOM) provide a range of services including counselling, document processing, medical examination, transportation, language training and integration assistance. These services are offered to vulnerable populations in need of evacuation, resettlement or return in the initial phases of an emergency and in the transition to rehabilitation and reconstruction. Food and Agriculture Organisation 2A8. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) responds to food and agricultural emergencies through: a. Providing early warning of food emergencies;
JWP 3-52 b. Assessing needs and formulating and implementing programmes for agricultural relief and rehabilitation; c. Strengthening local capacities to reduce vulnerability to food and agricultural emergencies. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 2A9. The Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is composed of three elements: a. The National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies. National societies act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief, health and social programmes. b. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) is the world’s largest humanitarian organisation. It co-ordinates and directs international assistance to victims of natural and technological disasters, to refugees and in health emergencies. The Federation’s strength is the network of National Societies which enables it to reach individual communities at the local level. c. The International Committee of the Red Cross. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) acts in cases of conflict both internally and internationally to: (1) Ensure that the Geneva Conventions are observed by parties to the conflict. (2) Assure/provide protection, medical care and material relief assistance to victims of the conflict. (3) Organise tracing services to identify and re-establish communication between family members who have become separated, as well as tracing and visiting prisoners.
PLANNING AND CONDUCT
CHAPTER 3 – HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY/DISASTER RESPONSE
301. Disaster Response. Disaster response can be divided into three stages, each demanding different types of assistance: a. Stage 1 - Immediate Life Saving Phase. Search and Rescue, and Medical First Aid. b. Stage 2 - Stabilisation Phase. Life preserving relief operations such as the delivery of aid to prevent the situation deteriorating. c. Stage 3 - General Recovery Phase. Rehabilitation and reconstruction.
However, these stages are unlikely to be discrete and will often need to be undertaken concurrently requiring a flexible response. Time-Line and Scale 302. The time-line and scale of health, nutritional and infrastructure problems that normally occur after the physical impact of a disaster are important factors in assessing the most appropriate assistance to be provided. In most cases donors provide humanitarian assistance through civilian agencies, whose experience, costeffectiveness, reliability and ability to connect relief to development are superior to the military. 303. Evaluation of past disasters suggest that however urgent the crisis, time and effort spent on initial assessment results in a better designed, co-ordinated and more cost effective relief effort. Disasters often seriously disrupt such local infrastructure as transport (including airport landing and cargo handling capacity), communications, food supply and shelter provision. Under these circumstances, relief supplies and personnel (often unfamiliar with the area) sent into a disaster zone without a request based on a sound assessment can hinder rather than help; this can cost further lives through enthusiastic, but possibly inappropriate or inadequate response. An early assessment of the nature and extent of the disaster and the type of aid needed is an essential requirement.
SECTION I - ASSESSMENT
304. Early assessment of the nature and extent of a humanitarian emergency/disaster and the type of relief required is an essential element of any response. The overall purpose of an assessment is to provide information and to make recommendations that will enable timely decisions on appropriate response to a
JWP 3-52 humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. Three types of information need to be collected: a. Situational Information: Situational information details the magnitude of the disaster and the extent of its impact on both the population and the infrastructure of society. b. Needs Information: Needs information identifies resources and services for immediate emergency measures to save and sustain the lives of the affected population. c. Planning Information: Planning information is required on the region to assess potential courses of action. 305. Several factors contribute to the design of a successful and accurate assessment including: identifying the user/identifying the information needed/timing of the assessment/use of recognised terminology. Key amongst these factors are: a. Distinguishing between Emergency and Chronic Needs. Virtually all developing countries have longstanding chronic needs in most, if not all, sectors.1 Assessment teams must differentiate between what is normal for the location and what is occurring as a result of the disaster so that the relief effort can be directed to those most in need. b. Assess Needs and Vulnerabilities in Relation to Capacities. ‘Needs’ are immediate requirements for survival. ‘Vulnerabilities’ are potential areas for harm and include factors that increase the risks to the affected population. Needs are assessed after an emergency has occurred, whereas vulnerabilities can be assessed both before and during an emergency. Needs are expressed in terms of requirements (food, water, shelter, etc); vulnerabilities are expressed in terms of their origins (physical/material, social/organisational, or motivational/attitudinal). The solution to needs and vulnerabilities are ‘capacities’. Capacities are means and resources that can be mobilised by the affected population to meet their own needs and reduce vulnerability. Assessing vulnerabilities and capacities as well as needs provides a way of: (1) Preventing a widening of the emergency in which today’s vulnerabilities become tomorrow’s needs. (2) Targeting assistance to the most vulnerable groups.
(3) Effecting a sustainable recovery based on local resources and institutions.
‘Sector’ is a term used to describe Humanitarian Relief activities within a functional area, such as Water & Sanitation (WATSAN), Shelter, Medical, Food, Logistics and Communication. Each of these areas is a ‘sector’.
JWP 3-52 306. The government of the stricken state bears primary responsibility for disaster assessment and will normally accomplish an initial needs assessment, conducted by national or local authorities within 12-72 hours depending on access to the disaster site. However, in the case of major disasters the national authority may often request international help from the United Nations (UN) (e.g. the UN Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) can mobilise its UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) mechanism) or from donor nations. 307. In parallel with this process, an initial broad appraisal will also be made by HM's Representative in order to advise the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the facts and any recommended action. Based on this information and information from a wide variety of other sources2 an initial assessment will be made by DFID’s Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD). If it is apparent that UK military assets may be required then Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) participation within the assessment should be a priority in order to facilitate the timeliest support.3 A detailed breakdown of the information necessary for assessment is at Annex 3A. 308. Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department Operations Team Field Assessment. Following this initial assessment, if deemed necessary or requested, a CHAD Operations Team (OT), made up of a small team of relevant experts, can be deployed to conduct a field assessment. Where military assistance is envisaged, military representation within the CHAD OT would be extremely beneficial and serves two purposes: a. Firstly, after the full nature of the humanitarian problem is established, the PJHQ officer would advise the DFID team leader of potential military capabilities that could be utilised to support relief effort. b. Secondly, the officer would inform the Ministry of Defence (MOD) of the ongoing situation so that detailed contingency planning and costing could take place in the UK to help inform the strategic decision making process and expedite any military response deemed appropriate. 309. Operational and Liaison Reconnaissance Team Deployment. Alternatively, if the initial disaster assessment determined that the situation was such that the scale and immediacy of any necessary military support to the relief effort warranted immediate ‘military’ assessment then a PJHQ Operational and Liaison Reconnaissance Recce Team (OLRT) should be dispatched. This could be done independently with a DFID/CHAD LO to provide humanitarian disaster advice or as part of the OT field
E.g. Disaster warning organisations, internet sites, information from in-country humanitarian actors. PJHQ representation will be provided by J3 Ops Support.
JWP 3-52 assessment. Immediate considerations for a Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operation (HDRO) OLRT deployment are at Annex 3B. 310. In advance of a potential HDRO, in order to avoid raising public expectations about, and media pressure for, a military response, military involvement within the disaster assessment process should be carried out with a low media profile, and be coordinated with DFID/CHAD.
SECTION II – CIVIL RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY/DISASTER
311. Responsibility for distress relief for oversees disaster victims rests with the governments concerned. However, along with multilateral and bilateral agencies, the UK may play a part in this process. This would normally be through DFID/CHAD in either a direct or indirect role. In the direct role this may involve the deployment of a CHAD OT to the disaster site, or in the indirect role, this may involve the sponsorship of approved Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) to assist in disaster relief. 312. DFID/CHAD Disaster Response Mechanism. DFID/CHAD receives information from a variety of sources, following crises, which are analysed quickly and decisions taken on whether an UK response is necessary. Such responses would normally form part of an internationally co-ordinated response. There may, however, be cases, e.g. British Overseas Territories, where it is necessary to undertake direct UK led intervention. 313. There are four key steps in DFID/CHAD’s response to a rapid onset disaster: a. Initial information gathering and assessment. The onset of new emergency events are monitored through the internet, media, and contact with humanitarian agencies and in-country contacts. DFID/CHAD have early warning systems through subscription to meteorological forecast and geological services. Once DFID/CHAD is aware of a disaster, further information is sought through: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) DFID overseas offices. UK Diplomatic Missions. Red Cross (IFRC/ICRC) situation reports. UN OCHA situation reports. Reports from reputable NGOs. Media (including internet) sources.
JWP 3-52 b. Appraisal and Development of Response Strategy. Based on information collected, a decision is taken as to whether the adverse event is a ‘disaster’ to which DFID/CHAD might respond, based on the severity of impact and magnitude of response. DFID/CHAD, at this point or later, may decide to send out an assessment team to better determine immediate needs. The decision on whether DFID/CHAD should respond is based on setting the magnitude of the disaster against an assessment of the coping capacity of the affected country’s disaster response systems. This is based on: (1) Information contained in the sources listed above.
(2) Whether there is an Official Appeal for Assistance by the Red Cross, UN OCHA or stricken state. (3) The poverty status of the country (i.e. there is a lower threshold to respond where the country is poor and overwhelmed by the disaster). c. Response. In proceeding immediately to implement action, the relevant UK Diplomatic Mission and DFID Regional Department are consulted. In exceptional cases of extreme urgency this may not always be possible (e.g. when a situation demands an immediate response outside normal working hours, i.e. weekends, very late evening or early morning, or when the time difference between the field and the UK makes it impractical). Responses are in the form of: (1) Cash contributions to the UN agencies, Red Cross or NGOs: this is the most common form of response. (2) Contribution of technical personnel for needs assessment and coordination: experts with a broad range of skills are dispatched when required from DFID/CHAD, complemented by personnel from established call down arrangements (including search and rescue personnel, emergency health personnel, infrastructure repair and other humanitarian experts). (3) In kind or operational assistance from DFID/CHAD: In certain circumstances assistance in kind may be more effective than money for local purchase but equally, goods purchased locally or in the region may be preferable. The latter would avoid excessive transport costs from UK and help local economies; they will also be useful at once and traumatised victims may find them more acceptable. DFID/CHAD maintains the capacity for rapid direct response through call down and contingency arrangements. DFID/CHAD has call down arrangements for air chartering services and provision of humanitarian information
JWP 3-52 services. DFID/CHAD has capacity to deploy trucking convoys and airfield handling equipment. DFID/CHAD maintains stockpiles of relief items for rapid deployment (e.g. tents, plastic sheeting, vehicles, communication equipment). In deciding how to respond, preference is given to using the Red Cross and UN OCHA to channel the initial response. Funding to NGOs with a track record in the area affected, or with a special competence particularly needed, is also considered. Direct operational response is less common, as the aim is to build capacity of the local or international humanitarian system. The decision to respond operationally is taken if there are deemed to be serious gaps in operational resources available locally or regionally. For example, if specialist items are required and it is cost effective to supply them. d. Transition to Rehabilitation and Recovery. After the immediate disaster response phase is over, DFID/CHAD, in liaison with regional departments, considers the case for support in the transition to rehabilitation and recovery. Other Considerations 314. In providing humanitarian assistance to disaster affected populations, DFID works in conjunction with, and seeks to support, the international disaster response system. In determining the balance between different forms of disaster relief, speed to meet assessed life preserving needs and value for money will be important considerations. 315. Key Mechanisms of the International Disaster Response System. The organisational environment in large disasters can often appear confused. A wide variety of organisations with differing roles and mandates often rush to the scene of the disaster. Any UN procedures and preferred operating procedures will be subject to ‘local forces’ and therefore the resultant UN ‘structure’ has the potential to suffer from inefficiency and incoherence. However, whilst structures may appear ad hoc, they will generally be based on the same principles. It is essential that the UK’s assistance takes account of the in-country response being mounted. The key mechanisms which the UN utilises to deal with disaster management are: a. The UN Resident Co-ordinator. In most countries where the UN system is present, overall co-ordination of UN activities falls primarily to the UN Resident Co-ordinator (RC), in consultation with the relevant UN agencies. In most cases, the Resident Representative of UN Development Programme (UN DP) is designated as the UN RC. The UN RC will usually also be responsible for co-ordinating UN humanitarian assistance. Before a disaster occurs, the UN RC co-ordinates preparedness and mitigation activities;
JWP 3-52 monitors and provides early warning of potential emergency situations; leads contingency planning; and chairs the UN Disaster Management Team. Unless otherwise designated, the UN RC will continue to lead and co-ordinate the UN inter-agency disaster response, acting as Humanitarian Co-ordinator. If an emergency becomes particularly large or complex, a separate Humanitarian Co-ordinator may be appointed by the UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), based in New York. b. UN Lead Agency. In instances where one UN agency is providing the majority of UN humanitarian assistance, it may be appointed as the Lead Agency and its representative as the Humanitarian Co-ordinator. c. UN Disaster Management Team. The UN General Assembly has mandated that a UN Disaster Management Team (UN DMT) is formed in every disaster/emergency prone country. The UN DMT is chaired by the UN RC. Composition depends on circumstances of each country. It normally includes representatives of key UN agencies (if present), UN DP, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organisation (WHO), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). The main purpose of the UN DMT is to prepare and ensure a prompt, effective and concerted response, and promote co-ordinated UN assistance to the stricken state Government for postemergency recovery. During an emergency, the UN DMT is the main incountry mechanism by which international agencies co-ordinate policies and programmes of humanitarian assistance in support of the national authorities. d. UN Office of the Co-ordinator for Humanitarian Affairs. The UN Office of the Co-ordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has a mandated role for co-ordination in a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation, however, not every responding actor, including UN agencies, will want to be coordinated. UN OCHA responds to such disasters in the following ways: (1) Disaster Response System. A 24 hours a day, seven days a week Disaster Response System operates from Geneva to help co-ordinate the actions of the international community in responding to disasters. It monitors field situations to identify natural disasters, environmental emergencies, and industrial accidents, and is in close contact with UN RCs throughout the world. (2) Situation Reports. As soon as UN OCHA is alerted to a disaster, its response system is triggered. The Situation Report is the main coordinating tool, providing the international community with detailed
JWP 3-52 information on the evolving disaster situation, including damage caused, actions taken, assistance needs and international aid being provided. (3) Field Co-ordination. If required, UN OCHA can field a UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) team to assist on the ground in damage/needs assessment and the co-ordination of relief activities during the initial phase. It can help establish an On-site Operations Co-ordination Centre (OSOCC) or Humanitarian Ops Centre (HOC) to support the local emergency management authority in coordinating the operational activities of international relief agencies at the disaster site. UN OCHA can also help establish secure and reliable telecommunications during the emergency phase, and identify and meet the need for technical logistics resources (such as office support, transport, telecommunications and co-ordination centre infrastructure) to support field co-ordination. (4) International Appeals. On request from the government of a stricken state, UN OCHA launches an appeal for international assistance, urging the international community to cover the identified relief needs. e. UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination System. The aim of the UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) system is to meet international needs for early information during the first phase of a sudden onset emergency. UN OCHA is able to deploy UNDAC teams at short notice for these purposes. UNDAC teams support the UN RC/Humanitarian Coordinator or local Government following predefined methods for the collection of information on needs for international disaster relief assistance. The teams may also provide structures for co-ordinating support during the first phase of a sudden onset emergency.
SECTION III –MILITARY SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY/DISASTER RESPONSE
316. UK military assets are not specifically designed for HDRO. However, the ability of UK Forces to task-organise to perform such operations is recognised. Employing UK military capabilities may not be the most efficient or cheapest means of response, but in certain situations UK Forces may be the only actor capable of bringing a particular capability to bear rapidly. Annex 3C details the inherent capabilities of UK military forces that may be of appropriate use in the undertaking of HDRO in support of UK’s response to a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. 317. In principle, military assets should be considered only when civilian capacities have been or will become over-stretched, and in certain circumstances, where the use 3-8
JWP 3-52 of military assets may be more cost-effective in overall terms. The composition of forces committed in support of foreign disaster relief efforts will vary depending on circumstances of the disaster, the state of civilian coping mechanisms and on the stage of the disaster at which Service support to the relief effort can take effect. 318. Provision of Support by UK Forces Overseas. Commanders of UK Forces overseas,4 even when obligated by treaty or other technical agreement, should normally secure HM’s Representative’s authority to act. However, where formal concurrence would involve unacceptable delay, immediate emergency life-saving relief5 may be offered at the Commander’s discretion subject to safety imperatives. HM’s Representative should be informed of any support undertaken and covering financial authority obtained from DFID as soon as possible to determine the demarcation between immediate emergency life-saving relief and core first-aid disaster relief, and resulting financial responsibility. In obtaining appropriate authority to proceed, DFID, through HM’s Representative, will give advice on initial costs which may be expended. Other than the provision of necessary immediate emergency life-saving relief, individual units should not undertake support to disaster relief efforts without the authority of the MOD who will liaise with DFID/CHAD through the Overseas Secretariat. All proposals of support to disaster relief efforts should be reported to MOD by signal.6 319. Military Involvement in Disaster Response. As discussed at paragraph 301, disaster response can be broadly divided into three stages, namely Immediate Life Saving, Stabilisation and General Recovery. Acknowledging the sentiments above, it will normally be the first two stages that may warrant the involvement of military forces. Within a military response in support of international disaster relief efforts, it is possible to split HDROs generically into four phases, namely: a. b. Phase 1 – Reconnaissance/Assessment/Survey. Phase 2 – Stabilisation of life-threatening situation.
c. Phase 3 – Restoration of infrastructure sufficient to enable stricken state coping capacities to assume full responsibility for the subsequent mitigation of the disaster effects.
This includes those forces permanently stationed overseas (e.g. Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas) and those deployed temporarily on operations or exercise (e.g. APT(N)). 5 Immediate Emergency Life Saving Relief is the provision of small scale supplies (e.g. food, clothing, medical and accommodation stores) and services (e.g. rescue, urgent works, transport and necessary equipment), which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency to save life or to limit physical damage and prevent serious suffering. These may be resourced from available Service sources provided that Service requirements are not compromised. Any such relief should not exceed one week’s supplies and should normally be provisioned from on-the-spot stores. 6 Any proposal by a Commander to offer support to disaster relief efforts from Service sources abroad are to be reported by signal to the MOD, through the chain of command, using the Subject Indicator Code (SIC) EFO. The signal should indicate the scope of the proposed aid, the estimated cost, and whether the concurrence of HM’s Representative has been obtained.
JWP 3-52 d. Phase 4 – Prepare for withdrawal and assumption of tasks, undertaken by UK military tasks, by stricken state coping mechanisms. However, given the potential concurrency of the various stages to disaster response, it is possible that the phases of any military support to disaster response will also have to be undertaken concurrently. 320. Cost Effectiveness. Following the immediate relief stage there may be a need to provide transitional rehabilitation support and later reconstruction assistance to steer the affected country towards recovery. DFID will determine the UK’s involvement in the post-disaster phases. It is unlikely that the military will have a role in post-disaster assistance but if this is required the cost of military involvement and extent of their role will be agreed by DFID and the MOD. 321. Specific Support Requirements. Notwithstanding the specifics of individual missions, military HDRO should support the mitigation of the disaster impact such that overburdened disaster coping mechanisms are able to recover and thereby enable the stricken state to take full control of the subsequent disaster relief and recovery effort. The specific requirements for military support will be very situation dependent and will be determined by a number of variables: a. b. c. d. e. Type and scale of the disaster. Location of the disaster. Impact of the disaster on stricken state coping mechanisms. Civil contributions to international relief effort. Assessed shortfall between disaster response and victims’ needs.
SECTION IV – KEY TENETS OF MILITARY SUPPORT
322. Empowerment. In undertaking support to disaster relief efforts the overriding emphasis should be the empowerment of the stricken state and the supporting international relief effort to meet the needs of the disaster victims. The established government should be in charge and be seen to be so. The amount of support and advice necessary to achieve this will vary but the stricken state should have responsibility for the strategy, end-state and setting the priorities for meeting the needs of its people. This mindset respects the stricken state’s ultimate responsibility for disaster response, attests to the government’s authority in time of crisis and potential dubiety, and will help to keep the military mission limited to the provision of support to the disaster relief effort.
JWP 3-52 323. Scope of the Military Role. Notwithstanding specific missions, under all but exceptional circumstances, UK Forces will be deployed in support of disaster relief efforts and should therefore not assume leadership of the overall disaster response. This does not preclude UK Forces supporting civil Command and Control (C2) or providing C2 infrastructure when necessary. However, wherever possible, maximum use of established infrastructure should be made in order to preclude UK Forces becoming a hub upon which other responding agencies become reliant, thereby creating the potential for longer-term dependency and making it more difficult to redeploy at the appropriate moment. The generic military role is to support and enable the effort to relieve emergency needs until such time as disaster coping capacities no longer require UK military support. This decision will be taken by DFID in consultation with MOD. The direction of military activities on the ground will be determined by the senior DFID representative and the JTFC. Should circumstances require a substantial review of the envisaged operation and/or are likely to incur significant extra costs, then guidance should be sought from DFID and MOD in London. 324. Presentation. In disaster situations there may well be underlying tensions which may be exacerbated by the intervention of UK Forces. To reduce this potential effect it will be necessary to communicate a clear, simple and repeated intent for the Joint Task Force (JTF) which will ensure that the purpose and scope of UK actions are understood by all involved actors, ranging from the stricken state government through humanitarian actors to JTF personnel. Transparency of intent and operation will be crucial to a successful co-ordination process. 325. Media Handling. Media handling in theatre will need a careful and sensitive approach. It is almost inevitable that the conduct of HDRO by UK military forces will become a focus for the UK media, some of whom may well have been transported to theatre by military assets. This is not inconsistent with DFID having the overall media lead, but DFID should be kept fully abreast of what is being done. Whilst following agreed media lines, media handling in theatre should avoid giving the impression that the UK military is the ‘only game in town’. It should expound a ‘hand in glove’ approach to humanitarian emergency/disaster response, recognising that UK military assets are present in support of other agencies, normally DFID, responding to the relief effort. The dignity of the stricken population should be borne in mind at all times. 326. Continuum of Effort. Within the international relief response there will be a continuum of effort throughout the 3 stages of a humanitarian emergency/disaster (see Para 301). The objective of military support should be to move this continuum forward from immediate life saving towards conditions that may allow reconstruction, enabling ‘marginal self-sufficiency’ but not becoming entangled in long-term infrastructure projects. The aim should be to assist but not create dependency or false expectations.
JWP 3-52 327. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to the common objective of relieving human suffering, between military and civilian actors and between various military contingents, in response to a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. In contributing to this the commander must identify DFID’s main effort in support of the international response and allocate his resources accordingly, as well as maintaining sight of the UK’s end-state. 328. Civil-Military Co-operation and Co-ordination. Within HDRO civilmilitary co-operation and co-ordination is crucial and can usually only be achieved by dialogue and consensus and not command (in the military sense). It will be pivotal to the success of the integration of various elements, both civil and military, into the overall relief operation. Except in extremis, there should be little or no need to establish Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Centres. The key to successful civilmilitary co-operation and co-ordination is for UK military operations centres to ‘plug into’ existing civil co-ordination infrastructure to enable those responsible for the effort to interface directly in solving the problem. Civil-military co-operation and coordination should enhance the ability of both civil and military leaders to prioritise, allocate, and undertake appropriate tasks, with a view to withdrawing military forces as soon as disaster coping mechanisms have recovered. This should help to keep the HDRO limited to providing support to the relief effort and preclude the inadvertent creation of a parallel military relief effort setting its own priorities. It should therefore help to establish and maintain the necessary unity of effort.
SECTION V – EVALUATION
329. The evaluation of the humanitarian response, including military support, to a humanitarian emergency/disaster will help gauge the effectiveness of the relief effort in meeting victim’s needs and provide an underlying basis for quantifying progress in moving the continuum of effort forward. 330. Standards. The use of consistent standards in response to humanitarian emergencies/disasters should considerably increase effectiveness of the overall relief effort. Their use will simplify the task of evaluation by eliminating some of the anomalies, such as varying quality and quantity of humanitarian relief, enable greater unity of effort and more efficient resource allocation. They will also provide a basis for accountability and assessment. A set of minimum standards for the delivery of humanitarian relief already exist in the form of the Sphere Standards.7 UK military forces supporting DFID in a humanitarian response should be aware of these standards. Wherever possible, taking account of the local environment, they should be
The Sphere Standards, as part of the Sphere Project, are a set of universal minimum standards in the core areas of humanitarian relief. The project is supported by the majority of the main NGOs and by the ICRC. Their purpose is to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian relief and to make humanitarian agencies more accountable. (http://www.sphereproject.org)
JWP 3-52 used as the basis for the provision of support to the relief effort, particularly if involved in the direct delivery of aid to a stricken population. 331. Measures of Effectiveness. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) should be agreed, through DFID, with the stricken state and key humanitarian actors. Suitably crafted MOE8 can help to put a humanitarian emergency/disaster into perspective by comparing pre-disaster and post-disaster states. MOE should also alert responding actors to emerging problems, informing decisions on when and where to shift effort or assets; whether more (or less) support is required and where relief efforts are in relation to disaster impacts. MOE can assist in establishing and assessing exit criteria and should be tied into campaign effectiveness analysis.9
SECTION VI – COMMAND AND CONTROL
332. The public interest generated by HDRO and the potential political sensitivities will ensure that it will be monitored at the highest level. It is likely that DFID, FCO and MOD will use their own separate chains of command, which are brought together at ministerial level, where DFID has precedence. 333. Operational Chain of Command.10 When Ministers have authorised preparations for a HDRO, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) will appoint a Joint Commander (Jt Comd), who will exercise Operational Command (OPCOM), to command the operation. This will normally be the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), particularly when PJHQ is the mounting HQ.11 However, there may be occasions when it is appropriate to appoint a single-Service CinC. The Jt Comd will then appoint a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), or National Contingent Commander (NCC) if it is a Multinational operation, who will exercise Operational Control (OPCON) and will command forces allocated to the operation normally from a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) deployed in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The size and location of the JTFHQ will depend on the situation. The rank of the JTFC should be determined not only by the scale of the operation but should also take into account the necessary degree of operational visibility (and perception of UK commitment to an operation) and the need to deal with other nations senior representatives. The JTFC should normally be of at least one star rank. 334. DFID/CHAD Representative/Joint Task Force Commander Relationship. Whilst not in the military chain of command, the senior DFID/CHAD representative
For example: Changes in morbidity/mortality rates, if available, are good indicators of progress in relieving human suffering. The amount of water supplied to a refugee camp (verses the total requirement) or the number of tents erected (verses people without shelter) are good indicators of the sufficiency of support toward overall relief effort objectives. 9 See JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations’. 10 For a more detailed explanation refer to JWP 0-10 ‘UK Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations’ (UKOPSDOC). 11 The HQ responsible for deploying, sustaining and recovering the force.
JWP 3-52 will be responsible for passing advice on the provision of support to DFID’s disaster response effort. Whenever possible, either the JTFC or his deputy should collocate with the senior DFID representative to ensure detailed co-ordination of the military input to the wider relief effort. However, the JTFC remains responsible for the execution of the UK military operation. 335. Tactical Command. Normally UK military support to DFID’s disaster response effort will be of sufficiently small scale that the JTFC will elect to exercise direct command over assigned forces. However, there may be occasions when a complete Tactical Command Chain is required. When such occasions occur Component Commanders (CCs) should be identified early enough to enable maximum participation in the estimate process. 336. Advance Force Command and Control. Assigned UK forces already deployed close to the disaster region prior to the initiation of a HDRO should normally be placed under OPCON of the JTFC as soon as he has the capability to take command of them. 337. Multinational Command. Because of individual nation’s interests and methods of contributing to disaster response efforts, contributions to disaster relief are generally offered bi-laterally rather than as part of a single multinational operation. However, close co-operation will be needed with other nations’ military assets, as with engaged civilian assets, to achieve a better co-ordinated response. 338. Multi-functional Co-ordination. The ability to achieve unity of effort amongst all responding agencies whether local or international, military or civilian, within what is an ad hoc coalition, potentially in the face of competing individual agendas, will be a key factor in a successful outcome to a time-sensitive response to a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. Notwithstanding humanitarian principle, the JTFC will always have to be take national interests into consideration when undertaking tasks and allocating resources. 339. DFID/MOD Interface. The interface between the DFID and MOD during a disaster response, and associated relationships, is shown at Figure 3.3:
Cabinet Office FCO MOD DFID/PJHQ LO PJHQ Supporting Commands JTFC/UK NCC Deployed Forces DFID
Political Direction 2 Military C DIFD Direction Liaison
Figure 3.3 – Command and Control and Tasking Chain for HDR Operations 340. In certain circumstances, such as when DFID only require strategic sea or air transport, the Military tasking chain will shorten as shown at Figure 3.4:
Cabinet Office FCO PJHQ
Political Direction Military C2 DIFD Direction Liaison
1. PJHQ kept informed in case requirement escalates and commitment becomes a Joint Operation
Figure 3.4 - Command and Control and Tasking Chain for Single Service Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations
ANNEX 3A – INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR ASSESSEMENT
• Type of disaster (earthquake, cyclone etc)? • Are there expected developments/likely secondary hazards (landslides, floods, fire, release of toxic substances, civil unrest, conflict, landmines) in the affected area? • At what time did the disaster occur (local)? • What areas affected (geographic)? GIS/map co-ordinates? • Estimated total population in affected area? • Does DFID have any programmes in the affected area? If so what are they, and are all UK and local staff accounted for? • What population density/settlement pattern building type in that area? • What current and forecasted local weather conditions? • Has the government (or is it likely to) formally requested international assistance (for what)?
Initial Estimate of Impacts
Public health Shelter
Water and sanitation Transport infrastructure
Food Communications and power supply
• How many reported: deaths, injured, missing, displaced, homeless? • What is situation of those affected: coping mechanisms, accommodation, etc? • What diseases are endemic, any outbreaks reported? • What percentage of hospitals functioning, capacity of these? • What extent of housing/shelter damaged? • What housing type is specific to the affected area? (mud, stone, high-rise etc). • What effects on water supply, waste disposal, availability of drinking water? • What means of access to affected areas, road bridge damage? • Which is the nearest functioning airport(s): what is the handling capability (type specific)? • Which is the nearest functioning seaport(s): what is the handling capability (type specific)? • What impact on food availability and access? • What are the impacts on power supply? • Do local facilities (hospitals/water pumping stations etc) have back up generators etc? • Are landlines/mobile phones functioning?
JWP 3-52 Search and rescue • Has the disaster caused structural collapse (percentage?)? (SAR) • What type of structures have collapsed (eg. hospitals, requirements schools, government buildings, multi-storey housing units)? • What type of materials are they constructed from (concrete/brick etc)? • Are the local authorities requesting assistance with SAR? • Who is conducting/co-ordinating the present rescue effort, and for how long has this been underway?
Information on Initial Responses
Assessments Government response • • • • • • Other responses • • • • • • Co-ordination Factors affecting response • • • • What assessments have been made/planned? By whom, what outcome? What has been the Government response so far? Which is the lead Government ministry/body? Is there a well-established in-country emergency response mechanism? Was it effective in previous disasters? What is the role of other relevant structures (Military, Emergency Committee, Civil Defence Structure)? What are capabilities of above to respond? What is the response to date of the humanitarian community (UN/Red Cross/Donors/NGOs/Other)? What are the capabilities of those responding? What are the gaps (food, water, shelter, clothing)? Which is the lead UN agency? Is the UN Disaster Management Team present/have they met/is a disaster plan in place/has it been activated? Have any ‘situation reports’ been issued? Has any other information on the disaster been shared? What co-ordination structures are in place for the disaster (Government/UN/local community)? What is the security situation? Is the disaster site(s) safe for personnel to operate in? What other country specific factors may affect response (e.g. public holidays)? How is the situation being reported in the local and national media? Are they reliable?
Key In-country Contacts
Following a disaster, DFID/CHAD require details of all relevant in-country contacts among governmental, UN, Red Cross and non-governmental agencies. This is required in order to liaise directly and discuss response needs and options. Overseas posts can play a key role in providing this information quickly to DFID/CHAD.
ANNEX 3B – OPERATIONAL LIAISON AND RECONNAISSANCE TEAM IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATIONS
3B1. Should an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) be deployed, either as part of a larger Department for International Development (DFID)/Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) Operations Team (OT) field assessment or independently, the information at Annex 3A should be available prior to departure. This information will form the baseline for initial assessment but will need updating on arrival in country to determine the current gravity of the disaster situation (reducing/worsening) and the capacity of the relief effort (increasing/reducing) to cope in relation to needs of the stricken population (increasing/decreasing). These considerations are equally applicable to the military augmentation to a DFID/CHAD OT assessment team. 3B2. In obtaining updated information the following liaison and factors should be considered essential: a. British High Commission/Embassy Liaison. As the UK’s focus within a nation state, the British High Commission (BHC)/Embassy should usually be the starting point for any liaison within the stricken state. The following information should be able to be provided: (1) Updated overview of the general situation. (a) (b) (c) Has the disaster affected bordering countries? How are they coping? Is there cross border co-operation?
(2) Existence (and implementation) of in-country disaster contingency plans. (3) Stricken nation political position and local sensitivities.
(4) Available transport facilities (Airport/Seaport/Runways/Harbours) and their proximity to the disaster? (5) Declared offers of support expected from other nations (particularly military support).
JWP 3-52 (6) What assistance can BHC/Embassy offer UK military force (facilitating accommodation, Host Nation Support (HNS), communications, interpreters etc)? (7) Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)/Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)/and any legal issues. (a) Waiver of Customs and Excise levies and charges for emergency/disaster response related items/facilities etc. (8) Force protection issues. (a) (b) (c) (d) Threats from criminality and corruption. Mine threats from recent/previous conflicts. Mindset of the stricken population. Health and Safety.
(9) Media handling guidance (should be done in conjunction with DFID as the lead UK department). b. Stricken State Disaster Relief Agency/Lead Ministry. This may be a specific government agency dedicated to directing relief operations, especially in disaster prone countries. The following information should be able to be provided: (1) Overview of emergency/disaster situation in terms of scale and coping capacity. (2) Overview of the national disaster contingency plan. (a) (b) How well it has been able to be implemented? How well it is coping with the scale of the disaster?
(c) Role of national civil emergency services (police, fire, medical and rescue). (d) Role of national military forces. • Constitutional issues on use of military forces. • Military capabilities. • Activities being undertaken in support of the disaster.
JWP 3-52 (e) Identified capability gaps.
(3) How well international relief effort is complementing national efforts? (4) Overview of disaster response co-ordination mechanisms. (a) Co-ordination hierarchy and responsibility.
(5) Idea of any national or local sensitivities, including presence of foreign military assets. c. Donor/International Organisation Liaison. If DFID previously had development programmes running in the stricken country then a DFID Field Office is likely to be co-located with the BHC/Embassy. When operating under the direction of DFID, the in-country DFID Field Office should provide operational level direction and humanitarian advice to the OLRT and any subsequent deployment of military assets. The DFID Field Office should be able to provide: (1) Overview of humanitarian situation, its extent and any vulnerabilities to subsequent disaster events. (a) (b) (c) (2) Available assessments by whom and degree of reliability. Extent of international response. Identification of capability gaps.
Overview of disaster response co-ordination mechanisms. (a) Co-ordination hierarchy and responsibility.
(b) Effectiveness of stricken government, United Nations (UN) and Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) relationship. (c) State of in-country disaster contingency plan and level of coping capacity by the affected state. (3) Direction on UK relief priorities and UK’s position within the international relief effort.
JWP 3-52 (a) Guidance on employment of UK military assets.
(b) Criteria for mission accomplishment and UK military disengagement. (4) Direction on media handling.
d. Humanitarian Relief Co-ordination Mechanism. The humanitarian relief co-ordination mechanism may be one, or indeed a compendium, of the following: (1) Humanitarian Relief Co-ordinator (Generally drawn from UN Development Programme (UN DP)(UN Resident Co-ordinator (UN RC)). (May be separate in large emergency situations). (2) (3) e. Lead UN Agency/Other IO. UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) System.
The following information should be established: (1) Overview of humanitarian situation, its extent and any vulnerabilities to subsequent disaster events. (a) (b) (c) (2) Available assessments by whom and degree of reliability. Extent of international response. Identification of capability gaps.
What are the levels of co-ordination and how are they interacting? (a) Who is involved in country-wide co-ordination? • Is any emergency/disaster contingency plan being implemented? (Is it coping?) (b) (c) Has co-ordination been devolved to district level? Is sectoral1 co-ordination taking place?
‘Sector’ is a term used to describe Humanitarian Relief activities such as Water & sanitation (WATSAN), Shelter, Medical, Food, Logistics and Communication. Each of these areas is a ‘sector’.
JWP 3-52 (3) How is the co-ordination mechanism working? (a) Who is managing the emergency information from assessments and assimilating the resultant data. (How is it shared?)? (b) Who is setting the humanitarian priorities?
(c) Who is tasking responding assets to meet the set priorities (How is co-ordination achieved?)? (d) What centres/ops rooms are running (Joint Logistics Centre/Disaster Response Ops Room/Displaced Persons Clearing Centre)? (e) (f) What co-ordination meeting take place? How are communications achieved? • Is UK equipment compatible? (4) How can UK military assets best be integrated into overall effort?
f. Other Country Military Assets in Theatre. Other nations may well offer military support by way of response in support to international relief efforts. The following information should wherever possible be obtained from contributing 3rd party military forces (as and when they arrive in-country): (1) (2) (3) Capabilities provided. Intentions on integration into overall response. Criteria for mission accomplishment and exit strategy (sensitive).
g. Other actions. The following actions should be undertaken if appropriate: (1) Visit source of disaster/centre of devastation. Understand scale of problem and infrastructure damage. (Probably by air with DFID representative) (2) Visit logistic chain from warehouse, through transportation chain to distribution centres. (3) Visit UK billeting arrangements.
ANNEX 3C – MILITARY CAPABILITIES
UK military forces have certain inherent capabilities that may be of use in a humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. The following capabilities may be appropriate in the undertaking of HDRO in support of UK’s response to such disaster situations, subject to DFID requirements:
Sector/ Assets Joint/ Common Assessment/C2 Comms Support a. Media Ops support. b. Info Ops support. a. Strategic Comms Link. b. Small scale provision of field comms. a. Co-ordination and conduct of SAR at sea. b. Co-ordination and conduct of riverine SAR. Search & Rescue Infrastructure Support Transport, Supply & Distribution a. Movement Control. b. Contract Management. c. Logistic Planning. Public Health/Medical
a. OLRT deployment. b. C 2 Capability. c. Liaison teams.
a. Set-up shelter and emergency repairs to accommodation.
(See Appendix 1 to Annex 3C)
a. Small boats co-ordination. b. Limited diving capability. c. Hydrographic support. d. Airspace Coord’n.
a. Life support repairs to power, water and sewage treatment plants. b. Limited supply of potable water.
a. Tactical bulk transport of relief stores and aid. b. Small boats capability, both integral and specialist. c. Limited supply of emergency rations. d. Helicopter Transport. (subject to platform limits) e. Helo Landing Sight preparation/control. (subject to platform limits)
a. Small scale medical assistance and triage capability. b. Environmental Health Advice.
Air a. Airspace /Air Traffic Control. b. Aerial Survey/ Recce. Ground a. Engineer Survey/ Recce. b. Engineer GEO support. a. Provision of limited comms infrastructure. a. Airborne comms link. a. Co-ordination and conduct of SAR, both fixed and rotary wing. a. Tactical delivery of relief stores and aid. b. Strategic delivery of relief stores and aid. c. Airhead Management. a. Provision of potable water, either by well drilling or purification from source. b. Route improvement and maintenance. c. Repairs and support to airhead/seaport infrastructure. d. Limited provision of power. e. Limited EOD capability. f. Repairs to power, water and sewage treatment plants. g. Emergency bridging capability. a. Aid distribution b. Stockholding of aid. c. Port management. d. Limited route marking and traffic control. a. Environmental Health Advice. b. Field Hospital. a. Casualty evacuation. b. Aeromedical evacuation.
APPENDIX 3C1 – MARITIME EMERGENCY RELIEF STORES
1. Introduction. Whilst all ships are capable of supporting humanitarian emergency/disaster relief efforts, there will be occasions when that inherent capability needs to be enhanced by the carriage of additional Emergency Relief Stores. 2. Terminology. Previously these relief stores were termed Disaster Relief Packs (Larger) and Hurricane Relief Packs (Smaller). To avoid confusion caused by different titles and to recognise the broad utility of the stores, packs have been renamed as Emergency Relief Stores (ERS). 3. Allocation. There are two scales, large and small. The number of kits needed to fulfil operational commitments are 4 large-scale and 8 small-scale kits. These will be allocated to ships by CINCFLEET N3, based on the operational requirement and the perceived risk of disaster in the operating area. In general, a large ERS kit will be made available for AFSH, AOR, CVS/LPH/LPD(R)1 deployments and small kits will be embarked on ships conducting APT(S), APT(N)2 duties and their supporting tankers. One large and two small-scale kits will be held in the UK for contingencies and maintenance. 4. Management and Maintenance. DLogs Portsmouth has responsibility for the physical management and storage of all ERS. This includes surveying, demanding and replacing items where necessary prior to issue, and arranging for routine maintenance to be carried out on machinery. 5. Medical Stores. No specialist medical stores packs will be carried except for those DD/FF deployed on APT(N) or APT(S) tasks. Details for procedures are contained within RN Temporary Memoranda. CINCFLEET MED will instruct ships to demand additional medical modules if required. 6. Review Process. To ensure that ERS are allocated to the correct priority, are effectively managed and that the content remains relevant, an annual review will be conducted by CINCFLEET - N3/N4. The point of contact for any queries relating to ERS and for items to be considered at the review should be sent to SO2 N4 (Log Ops) in CINCFLEET (NWD 46172).
For example: RFAs Fort Austin/George/Grange/Victoria, HM Ships Ark Royal, Illustrious, Invincible, Ocean, Albion, Bulwark. 2 Typically frigates and destroyers.
CHAPTER 4 - PLANNING
SECTION I – PLANNING
401. Contingency Planning. The requirement for UK contingency planning for military involvement in disaster relief operations is determined by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), in consultation with the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). DFID is the lead Department of State for disaster relief and humanitarian aid and hence has lead responsibility for the UK’s response to disasters overseas. It could include one or more of the following: a. Civil Plans. (1) Disaster and Major Incidents Plan. A disaster and major incident plan is prepared and updated at the request of the FCO by the Diplomatic Post in the country concerned. These plans are designed to provide general guidance to HM’s Representative and Staff for the provision of assistance to UK Entitled Personnel (UKEP).1 In the event of a disaster they are designed to work in conjunction with the Civil Contingency Plan (CCP), prepared by the Diplomatic Post for the evacuation of UKEPs.2 (2) Stricken State Disaster Plan. In many countries and/or regions where the risk of natural disaster is high, local planning cells have been established and eventualities are routinely exercised. These cells are often developed into a Ministry and/or agency whose mechanisms are supported by United Nations (UN) and DFID funding and are aimed at building an indigenous capacity to prevent and/or mitigate the effects of disaster. Ideally the Ministry/agency should be capable of providing warning and reporting for a disaster and then form their Country’s focal point for the international response. b. Military Plans. Military Contingency Plans are prepared and updated by the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) on formal direction from MOD. The level of detail contained in the plan will vary with the assessed likelihood of its use and its update cycle. In increasing level of detail, the 2 types of plan are:
UKEP are British Citizens, British Overseas Citizens, British Dependent Territories Citizens and others for whom the UK has assumed Consular responsibility. 2 See JWP 3-51 ‘Non-combatant Evacuation Operations’.
JWP 3-52 (1) Joint Planning Guide. Joint Planning Guides (JPG) contain general planning data for a particular region, country or type of operation,3 which can be used as the basis for more detailed planning during an emerging crisis. (2) Joint Contingency Plan. Joint Contingency Plans (JCP) will be prepared for situations where there is a particular likelihood of a crisis or problem occurring which might affect UK national interests, or when the anticipated warning time is reduced. In addition to planning data, JCPs will contain the UK’s strategic objectives and desired end-state, together with the force capabilities required and deployment options, including readiness states where appropriate. The JCP will require further refinement prior to implementation to take account of the situation as a crisis develops. 402. These civil and military plans are supported by two intelligence publications prepared and updated by the DIS; Defence Profiles (DP) and Infrastructure Briefing Memoranda (IBM). The DP includes military intelligence information including local force composition/capability whilst the IBM covers data such as climate, topography and civil infrastructure. 403. Military Planning. In-depth military planning should commence as soon as it is apparent that military resources will be required to support disaster relief efforts. Where time permits, regular co-ordination meetings should be held with DFID and FCO, bringing together all involved departments including the early engagement of financial departments, to assess the latest information, offer military advice and highlight developing military requirements. 404. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation. The MOD crisis management planning process applies to Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations (HDRO) as it does to other operations. Although hierarchical, much of the sequence occurs concurrently as an iterative process which can be compressed as required to address the urgency of the situation. The process and its constituent parts may be abbreviated for smaller scale operations or curtailed by necessity of time. The process is outlined below:4 a. As indications of an emerging crisis develop, high-level analysis takes place at Government Department level and may involve the formation of a Strategic Planning Group (SPG).5 The output of this analysis will advise the
Operations such as NEOs or HDROs. A fuller explanation can be found in JWP 0-10 ‘UKOPSDOC’ and JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations’. 5 A SPG may be formed at the discretion of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments). The life-span of the SPG and the periodicity of its meetings will be governed by the situation. It will inevitably be bespoke, its remit and exact composition being dependent on the scale and nature of a crisis.
JWP 3-52 DCMO command chain and form the basis for the Grand Strategic Estimate (GSE).6 This analysis will also provide initial strategic planning guidance to PJHQ. DFID as the government lead for UK response to international disaster relief efforts is likely to take the lead in developing UK’s intent with the MOD in support. b. Once agreement on the principle of UK military involvement has been reached, PJHQ (supported by MOD staff, Front Line Commands (FLCs), Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) and DFID staff) will conduct a Military Strategic Estimate (MSE). The output of the MSE forms the basis of detailed advice to Ministers on the military options available, the nature and scale of forces required, the implications and likely costs and a recommended course of action (CoA).7 c. Once agreed, a Mission Directive will be issued by the Joint Commander (Jt Cmd) including a mission statement, commander’s intent, outline concept of operations and guidance on the composition, deployment, sustainment and recovery of the force. This enables an Operational Level Estimate to be conducted by the JTFC and his staff (once nominated) and the development of a concept of operations and the Campaign Plan. 405. During the estimate process, deductions may emerge which require early action in advance of the production of a formal directive, such as the procurement of shipping and airlift and the deployment of liaison teams. Such preparatory actions need careful consideration as they may have political, financial, security and presentational implications, may impact on overall capability or indicate a premature level of commitment and thereby unnecessarily raise expectations of military participation in support of disaster relief efforts. With DFID’s lead for UK’s response, and therefore financial responsibility, the financial issues and costings involved in military support to UK’s disaster response effort, need to be addressed at an early stage. MOD’s Financial Policy Directorate, together with PJHQ J8 should be engaged at the outset of the estimate process.
The GSE is a cross-government process and is not therefore the sole responsibility of any single department but will be formed from a number of contributions. It seeks to facilitate definition of UK’s national intent and objectives in addressing the crisis situation. 7 Determination of the preferred course of action will lead to the identification of the required capabilities and will support any recommendation for a reduction in the Notice to Move (NTM). This may be of particular importance in support to disaster response efforts where speed of response is a key factor with the significant deterioration of conditions on the ground with time.
SECTION II – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
406. There are a number of key considerations that should be taken into account when planning HDROs. These are addressed below. In addition, Annex 4B offers a number of questions that will provide a framework for the planning and conduct of HDROs, highlighting issues that may need to be addressed. This framework may be used to facilitate the operational dialogue between ‘humanitarians’ and military forces that must precede successful and appropriate support to any disaster relief effort. 407. Timeliness. The utility of military HDRO is the ability to deploy quickly once the decision has been made that the support to the international relief effort and stricken state coping mechanisms is required. Account must be taken of the Readiness Preparation Time (RPT) required for the JTF. RPT includes NTM, deployment time (including re-assembly of equipment) and any training/familiarisation required in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) prior to the JTF being ready to conduct operations. 408. Budgetary Constraints. As the lead government department for disaster response, DFID will fund the operation. This funding is based on the provision of a capability to meet a perceived need based on a humanitarian assessment. The budget for the constitution of the force will therefore be tight and force generation will need to be carefully managed to ensure that capacity additional to requirement is not overlooked. Conversely, there may be discrete capabilities that can make a significant impact in the disaster situation and which represent considerable ‘value for money’. These discrete capabilities should be brought to the attention of DFID during the planning process. 409. Exit Strategy. A coherent exit strategy should be formulated at an early stage. This should be based on the assessed ‘humanitarian gap’, i.e. the difference between needs and disaster response resources, the capacity of the capability being funded by DFID and delivered by UK military forces in support of the relief effort, and the amelioration rate of the disaster impact. This may be expressed as a date or the achievement of certain criteria. However, the exit strategy will need to be constantly reassessed as the operation progresses. Any potential extension to the operation will involve funding and concurrency issues which will need to be addressed by both DFID and MOD, as well as the need to take account of the expectations of the International Community and the damage that a perceived premature withdrawal could cause to UK’s reputation. 410. Host Nation Support. The amount of Host Nation Support (HNS) that a stricken state is able to offer will depend on the type, extent and scale and impact of any humanitarian emergency/disaster. The requirement to support deployed forces should not impact on the stricken state’s mechanisms for coping with the humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. A deployed force may have to be self-sufficient or achieve the necessary support regionally. The provision, or lack, of HNS will affect
JWP 3-52 the size and make-up of the deployed force and therefore raises ‘footprint’ and funding issues. The availability of HNS should be determined at an early stage. 411. Multi-functional Issues. The response to humanitarian emergencies/disasters is by its very nature a multifarious business. Co-ordination and liaison will be complex, involving a number of other agencies including stricken state government, international organisations (e.g. UN agencies, International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC)), international Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) (e.g. Oxfam, CARE, SCF) and local NGOs (e.g. local Red Cross/Crescent Society). Depending on the degree of degradation to a stricken state’s coping mechanisms and the degree of ‘humanitarian co-ordination’, it may be necessary for the JTFC to establish direct liaison in separate areas of government, including local security forces, airspace control and port authorities, as well as with individual centres of ‘humanitarian coordination’ and other supporting nation’s military forces. 412. Communications. Successful integration of UK military support to any international disaster relief effort will centre on information exchange and the need to communicate. To that end communications support to the operation will need to be robust and should take account of the depth and breadth of the potential operating area and the relative timeliness required of the various forms of communication. Whilst operational security will not normally be an issue in this type of permissive operation, there may be a need to pass sensitive data, particularly in less stable conditions. In addition to the need to communicate within and between military forces, there will be a critical need to be able to communicate with the civilian actors with whom UK military forces will need to integrate in order to support the relief effort. Commercial bearers, particularly within a disaster stricken state should not be relied upon as the primary means of communication. The identification and provision of military communications in support of HDRO will be co-ordinated by PJHQ and supported, as necessary, by the single-Service Commands. 413. Media Operations. Media Operations will be a key facet in HDRO. Ideally, all involved departments, including the Cabinet Office, should agree a set of media lines that set out the government’s policy on the disaster response. Within the MOD this should be undertaken by the News Release Group (NRG). Regular interdepartmental contact and dissemination of these lines throughout the chain of command will be necessary to ensure that a coherent message is communicated to the media and the listening world as a whole. HDROs are dynamic situations and agreed media lines will need to evolve with the operation to enable personnel to react appropriately to any media call – any changes to media lines will also need to be communicated throughout the chain of command. Notwithstanding this, in all but the most routine factual issues, press statements should be at least co-ordinated and wherever possible cleared with the lead department (normally DFID) before being released.
SECTION III – MISSION ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE PROCESS
414. Prior to the operation and before decisions on force generation are made, a full estimate should be conducted. The estimate is based upon information of the humanitarian emergency/disaster that allows a complete assessment of the disaster environment and the tasks to be undertaken in support of the relief effort. The force should be task organised accordingly.
SECTION IV – FORCES
415. Force Generation. Forces will normally be drawn from those assigned to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) which incorporates maritime, land, air and logistic forces with a wide range of capabilities and are held at NTM ranging from 24 hrs to 30 days. However, there may be small specialist units or sub-units that are outside the JRRF but which would be able to make a significant impact thereby offering increased cost-effectiveness. 416. Notice to Move. MOD is the authority for the promulgation of NTM for all military assets. Early ministerial agreement to a reduction of notice, the redeployment of potential responding assets, advance sailing of ships and the recovery of RAF air transport aircraft may be essential for the timely support to the international disaster response effort. The cost implications of this should be considered early and the crossdepartmental financial costings should be agreed. 417. Capability Requirements. The composition of a Joint Task Force (JTF) will normally depend on the tasks identified and agreed with DFID to be conducted in support of the international disaster relief effort. In addition to C2 (see Chapter 3 Section VI) the following capabilities may be required and should be reflected in the task organisation: a. Mobility. The potential degradation to infrastructure caused by disasters, the possible scale of the affected area, and immediacy of mitigating effects will mean that the ability to get to where humanitarian and disaster relief is needed quickly will often be a key enabler. To that end, tactical air transport and particularly helicopters are likely to be force multipliers, as will maritime assets, including ships used for tactical bulk transfer, small raiding craft and hovercraft in littoral or riverine focussed disasters. b. Protection/Security. Whilst HDRO are conducted in a permissive environment, a result of the disaster may be increased civil tensions and the possibility of isolated civil unrest and criminality. Subject to agreed bi-lateral arrangements and the provision of security by the stricken state (Host Nation (HN)), there may be a need to provide suitable security arrangements to secure high value assets, mission critical equipment and supplies, and the immediate
JWP 3-52 operating environment, e.g. deployed aircraft, ground support equipment and aircraft operating areas. c. Sustainability. HDRO will normally be of short duration thus minimising the sustainability requirements of the force; nevertheless a detailed sustainability statement should be produced. In a disaster situation, the availability of Host Nation Support (HNS) cannot be guaranteed but may be available to some extent. However, it should be borne in mind that there are likely to be many other responding civilian and military agencies drawing on what may be limited HNS resources. d. Strategic Lift. Appropriate platforms, which may include civil charter assets, will be required to deploy the force to and from the JOA. Given the time imperative associated with disaster response, this is likely to be strategic airlift, particularly when forces are deployed from the UK.
ANNEX 4A - MOD/DFID PLANNING PROCESS FRAMEWORK
Stricken State HM Rep/ FCO
Deteriorating conditions Disaster Breaks Initiate National Disaster response Monitor national coping mechanisms
Assessment of Disaster FCO warn DFID/CHAD
Monitor stricken state coping mechanisms/international disaster response effort
DFID Reg’l Desk/CHAD OT Monitor
DFID/CHAD make all source initial assessment
DFID Constant review drawing in FCO/MOD
CHAD OT field assessment (incl PJHQ element)/ approve MOD request for recce
MOD support confirmed
DFID warn MOD
DFID/MOD agree to initiate HDRO
DIS input to assessment
Form SPG DCDS(C) Daily Brief review situation Current Operations Group
Form CCT CDS Planning Directive Form CPT Deploy PJHQ LO/OLRT Form OT
CDS Directive Forces allocated Jt Comd Directive JTFC Campaign Plan
INDICATORS & WARNINGS
DECREASING COPING SUFFICIENCY
ANNEX 4B – HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RELIEF PLANNING CHECKLIST
4B1. This annex offers a number of questions that will provide a framework for the planning and conduct of HDROs, highlighting issues that may need to be addressed. This framework may be used to facilitate the operational dialogue between ‘humanitarians’ and military forces that must precede successful and appropriate support to any disaster relief effort. It is formatted along similar lines to the Estimate. Question/Consideration Situation What information is available? • • • • Supplementary Has an assessment been conducted? Is the information complete? On what is it based (substantive or anecdotal)? What information gaps are there?
What is the nature of the humanitarian emergency/disaster? Are the stricken state response mechanisms/international relief effort coping with the impact of the emergency/disaster? What is UK’s overall response? What is UK Armed Forces role in supporting this response? Have budgetary and financial planners been consulted from an early stage? • Are planned actions within the budgetary limitations of the HDRO? • Are they delivering the most effective ‘value for money’? • What are the financial freedoms and constraints? 4B-1 • What is the state of civilian administration, infrastructure, and national organs? • Is there a lead ministry/body?
JWP 3-52 Question/Consideration Mission What is the HDRO mission? Supplementary • Is it stated in terms of working towards preemergency/disaster status? • Is the situation at the desired end-state sustainable by the stricken state and remaining humanitarian organisations contributing to the international relief effort? • What are the criteria for mission accomplishment? • Where and how big is the disaster area? • What is the level of continuing or emerging hazards? • What is the accessibility to and within the disaster area? - Roads/bridges? - Airfields? - Sea-ports? - Anchorages and beaches? • What are the impacts of weather and climate? - On the humanitarian emergency/disaster situation? - On aviation and air movement? - On Maritime operations? - On deployed equipment? - On logistics?
What are the environmental impacts on the HDRO?
JWP 3-52 Question/Consideration Factors/ Impacts/ Needs How has the emergency/disaster impacted (Effect vs Coping Capacity)? Supplementary • What is the effect on/situation with respect to: - the population, - law and order, - public health, - housing/shelter, - water and sanitation, - transport infrastructure, - food, - communications and power supply? • Has a formal request for international assistance been lodged? • What has been requested? • • • • What other agencies are responding? What is their capability and level of response? Is there a lead UN agency? Are there any identifiable capability gaps?
What is the perceived need?
What are International Community interests/aims?
Have the involved civil actors been engaged to offer appropriate and relevant advice?
• Who is setting relief priorities? • Who is tasking responding assets to meet the set priorities? • How can UK military assets best be integrated into the overall effort? • How are contributing actors communicating?
JWP 3-52 Question/Consideration What in-theatre co-ordination is required? Supplementary • What are the humanitarian co-ordination mechanisms, hierarchy and responsibilities? • What are the liaison requirements – with the stricken state, other nations HQs, humanitarian mechanisms? • Are interpreters required? • Can the stricken state infrastructure support the force? • Is a regional FMB necessary? • Can HNS be achieved regionally (from the FMB)? • How self-sufficient will the force need to be? • How long will the logistics pipeline be? • What needs to be protected and to what level? • Are ROE appropriate? • Whilst a nominally permissive environment, do ROE reflect any civil tensions caused by the disaster, criminality and take account of stricken state security capabilities? • What are the potential health risks to deploying forces? • What medical support is necessary? • What is the requirement for inoculations (potentially time critical)? • Are there any residual risks from previous conflicts in terms of UXO?
How will the HDRO get into theatre? What HNS is available?
What are the Force Protection issues?
JWP 3-52 Question/Consideration Info Ops Is an Information Campaign be necessary? Supplementary • What Info Ops are necessary to support this? • How will this tie-in with DFID and UK’s overall response? • How will it tie-in with the stricken states Information Campaign?
Time and Space Legal and Political
What are the necessary timelines to meet the humanitarian emergency/disaster response requirements? What is the legal status of the HDRO? • Is there a SOFA in effect/Is there a need for an exchange of letters? • What are the Regional requirements e.g. FMB, SOFA? • What are the security implications for the HDRO? • Are these agreed with DFID? • Have coherent press lines been agreed? • Has the media handling requirement been assessed?
What are the political constraints? Media What are the media handling principles and procedures?
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
British Defence Doctrine UK’s highest level military doctrine. It discusses issues and fundamental principles providing a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. It represents a statement of the British approach to military operations. Below this is a hierarchy of subordinate publications. Campaign Effectiveness Analysis Analysis conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical level to monitor and assess the cumulative effects of military actions with respect to centres of gravity in order to achieve the overall campaign end-state. (JWP 3-00) Civil Actor A non-military element potentially impacting on the situation within the Joint Operations Area. Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the Military Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. (MC 411/1) Disaster Relief The organised response to alleviate the situation resulting from a catastrophe, the aims of which are to save life and lessen suffering, limit damage and restore essential services to a level that enables local authorities to cope. Disaster relief demands the total integration of the relief effort with the life-support assets and infrastructure available within the stricken area. (JWP 3-52) Emergency Life Saving Relief The provision of small scale supplies (e.g. food, clothing, medical and subsistence stores) and services (e.g. rescue, urgent works, transport and necessary equipment) which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency to save life or to limit physical damage and prevent serious suffering. These may be resourced from available Service sources provided that Service requirements are not compromised, should not exceed one week’s supplies and be provisioned from on-the-spot stores. Forward Mounting Base (also Deployed Operating Base) A base established within the operational area, to support operations at Forward Operating Bases. It will be resourced to a greater level than a Forward Operating Base, including C2, logistics and administration support elements. (JWP 0-01.1)
JWP 3-52 Front Line Command The term Front Line Command (FLC) has been adopted to cover support activities, excluding joint operations and is defined as: ‘the single-Service Command (Fleet, Land or Strike) responsible for operating, administering or training its forces outside the requirements of joint operations’. (Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 002/02) Humanitarian Assistance The provision of humanitarian relief by military forces deployed for the conduct of combat or security related operations. (JWP 3-52) Humanitarian Emergency/Disaster A serious disruption of a society’s ability to function effectively, causing widespread human, material, or environmental losses which exceed the ability of an affected society to cope using only its own resources. (JWP 3-52) Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations Operations conducted in a benign posture, to assist humanitarian emergency and/or disaster relief efforts in a militarily permissive foreign country. (JWP 3-52) Humanitarian Gap The difference between humanitarian emergency/disaster needs and the relief resources available to meet them. (JWP 3-52) Joint Operations Area An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JWP 0-01.1) Joint Task Force Commander The operational commander of a nominated Joint Force. (JWP 0-01.1) Joint Task Force Headquarters A purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the operational level by a Joint Task Force Commander. (JWP 0-01.1) Non-combatant Evacuation Operation An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (JWP0-01.1)
JWP 3-52 Rapid Onset Disaster (Sudden Onset Disaster) Any disaster that has not been predicted or if predicted the scale of the disaster is far greater than anticipated. Examples are hurricanes, earthquakes and floods. (UNOCHA) Sector (in humanitarian terms) A term used to describe Humanitarian Relief activities within a functional area, such as Water and Sanitation, Shelter, Medical, Food, Logistics and Communication. Each of these is a ‘Sector’. (JWP 3-52) Stricken State Any state within which a humanitarian emergency or disaster has occurred. Stricken Population The people or peoples of a Stricken State affected by the effects of a humanitarian emergency or disaster. Supported Commander A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by higher authority. (JWP 0-01.1) Supporting Commander A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan. (JWP 0-01.1)
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
APT BHC CHAD CIMIC CJO CMCC COG CPT CRMU DCMO DFID ERS FAO FCO FMB GSE HDR HDRO HNS ICRC IFRC IOM JFHQ JOA JRRF JTF JTFC JTFHQ LO Atlantic Patrol Task British High Commission Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (of DFID) Civil-Military Co-operation Chief of Joint Operations Civil-Military Co-ordination Centre Current Operations Group Contingency Planning Team Crisis Response and Monitoring Unit Defence Crisis Management Organisation Department for International Development Emergency Relief Stores Food and Agriculture Organisation Foreign and Commonwealth Office Forward Mounting Base Grand Strategic Estimate Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations Host Nation Support International Committee of the Red Cross International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies International Office for Migration Joint Force Headquarters Joint Operations Area Joint Rapid Reaction Force Joint Task Force Joint Task Force Commander Joint Task Force Headquarters Liaison Officer
JWP 3-52 MOD MOE MOU MSE NCC NEO NGO NTM OLRT OPCOM OPCON OT PJHQ POC ROE RPT SAR SOFA SPG UN UNDAC UNDP UN DMT UNHCR UNICEF UN OCHA UN RC WFP WHO Ministry of Defence Measures of Effectiveness Memoranda of Understanding Military Strategic Estimate National Contingent Commander Non-combatant Evacuation Operation Non-governmental Organisations Notice to Move Operational and Liaison Reconnaissance Team Operational Command Operational Control Operations Team Permanent Joint Headquarters Point of Contact Rules of Engagement Readiness Preparation Time Search and Rescue Status of Forces Agreement Strategic Planning Group United Nations United Nations Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination System UN Development Programme UN Disaster Management Team UN High Commissioner for Refugees UN Children’s Emergency Fund UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs UN Resident Co-ordinator World Food Programme World Health Organisation
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