February 2011

U.S. Housing and Mortgage Trends
Summary

Overview
In November, the CoreLogic repeat sales home price index fell 5.1% from a year ago, the fourth consecutive monthly decline. The decreases in home prices have spread to 45 states, up from 18 just six months ago when home prices were increasing moderately. The downturn in home prices is clearly being driven by weak sales, an excess supply of unsold homes and larger impact from distressed sales. During 2010 CoreLogic estimates1 home sales totaled 3.6 million, down 12% from 4.1 million in 2009 (Figure 1A). Sales remain extremely low relative to the last decade as sales last year were more than 50% below the level in 2005 and about 33% below the level in 2000. Although it’s been widely reported that the National Association of Realtors’s (NAR) existing home sales data fell only 5% to 4.9 million in 2010, down from 5.2 million in 2009 and flat relative to 2008, the CoreLogic data indicates otherwise. Figure 1B illustrates that the CoreLogic existing home sales data did not experience an increase in 2009 and that sales fell again slightly in 2010.
FIGURE 1A: TOTAL HOME SALES
9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0

In 2010, home sales declined to the lowest level since the collapse in the housing market. The CoreLogic research indicates that the most popular measure of existing home sales is overstated by 15% to 20% (Figures 1A – 1B). The rapid price declines are being driven by huge supply/ demand imbalances and the rising impact of distressed sales. If current trends persist, home prices are expected to be down – over 10% year-over-year by Spring (Figures 2 – 4B). The weakness in the refinance market is heavily driven by the lack of equity, but tighter credit underwriting will keep some borrowers on the sidelines (Figures 5 – 7C).

Millions

5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2000 2001 2002 2003' 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

FIGURE 1B: EXISTING HOME SALES
NAR Total Existing Home Sales NSA 8.0 7.0 6.0 Millions 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 CoreLogic Total Existing Home Sales NSA

Source: CoreLogic and National Association of Realtors (NAR) non-seasonally adjusted (NSA) existing home sales.

Footnote

1 Based on full year sales data through November and December estimate based on preview data.
© 2011 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.

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February 2011

Historically, the CoreLogic existing sales data have covered about 85% to 90% of all NAR’s existing home sales data. However, in 2006 NAR’s sales data became elevated relative to the CoreLogic, MBA, HMDA and Census sales related data, and that trend has continued and become more pronounced through 2010. There are several reasons for the divergence, including benchmarking drift, more sales going through MLS systems due to consolidation and a lower share of for sale by owners (FSBO)2 home sales. Net, NAR’s existing home sales data are overstated by about 15% to 20%. During 2010, the distressed sale share rose to 28%, up from 27% in 2009 and 20% in 2008. Although the distressed sale share did not exhibit much movement on an annual basis, the sources of distress shifted somewhat. The REO share of sales fell from 22% to 21% while the short sale share increased from 6% to 7%. Although that is a small compositional shift, it does have an impact on prices as short sale prices are typically more than 1.5 times the average REO price3. Not only did the composition shift, but so did average prices. Last year, the average non-distressed price increased 7% to $241,500, reflecting the impact of the tax credit and the changing mix of transactions, especially on the upper end of the price distribution. However, the average price for REOs fell 1% to $140,600, while the average short sale price fell 2% to $215,300 (Figure 2). The rise of distressed sales and weakness of sales at the lower end of the price distribution is having an impact on the low priced tier of the repeat sales index (Figure 3). As of November, the low priced tier was down 7% year-overyear, compared to an 8% increase as of just 6 months ago. The high priced tier is also experiencing a decline, but at only 3% the drop is modest so far.
FIGURE 2: AVERAGE PRICES BY TYPE OF TRANSACTION
Resale Avg Price $270,000 Resale and Short Sale Average Price $260,000 $250,000 $240,000 $230,000 $220,000 $120,000 $210,000 $200,000 Jan-08 Jun-08 Dec-08 Jun-09 Dec-09 Jun-10 $110,000 $100,000 Nov-10 Short Sale Avg Price REO Sale Avg Price

FIGURE 3: HOME PRICES BY TIER
Low Priced Tier 10.0% 5.0% Percent Change from Year Ago 0.0% -5.0% -10.0% -15.0% -20.0% -25.0% Jan-08 High Priced Tier

Jun-08

Dec-08

Jun-09

Dec-09

Jun-10

Nov-10

The net impact of the changes in composition and prices led to an increase in the distressed price discount, which measures the difference between average distressed prices and non-distressed prices. The discount increased to 37% in 2010, up from 26% and 30% in 2008 and 2009, respectively. During the last six months, the discount is at the largest it has been during the downturn. The combination of a higher share of distressed sales and a larger discount has put more downward pressure on home prices, especially since the summer when both moderately increased.

Unsold Inventory and Prices
In addition to the elevated distressed activity, another major source of downward pressure on prices is the visible supply of homes. Given NAR home sales data are inflated, this means that NAR months’ supply data are too low. Using NAR and Census inventory of unsold homes and CoreLogic home sales data reveals that the months’ supply of visible inventory was 16 months in November,

FIGURE 4A: MONTHS SUPPLY REMAINS VERY HIGH
Home Prices Percent Change From Year Ago - Left Axis Months Supply - Right Axis 20.0% Percentage Change from Year Ago 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% -5.0% -10.0% -15.0% -20.0% Jun-06 Jun-07 Dec-07 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jan-05 Jun-05 Dec-05 Dec-06 Jun-08 Dec-08 Dec-09 Nov-10 20.0 18.0 16.0 14.0 Months Supply 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0

$180,000 $170,000 REO Sale Average Price $160,000 $150,000 $140,000 $130,000

Footnote

2 Benchmark drift refers to the decennial benchmarking of sales, which was last completed in 2004 and is used to relate the NAR’s sample of MLS sales data they survey to the universe NAR is measuring. 3 This is partly due to the difference in geographic composition and types of properties of short sales vs. REO sales, but even after adjusting for those differences, there are still wide pricing disparities due to the duration of distress and property condition.
© 2011 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.

2

February 2011

the highest level since February 2009 when prices were declining 20% on a year-over-year basis (Figure 4A). Although it depends on the market and real estate cycle, typically a reading of 6 to 7 months is considered normal. Clearly the months’ supply was depressed during the impact of the tax credit, but as soon as it expired the months’ supply increased to an average of 15 months, up from an average of 10 months during the tax creditinduced sales spike. To gain a better sense of where prices are headed given that months’ supply is very high, we produced a simple regression of monthly year ago home price changes on months’ supply for 2005 to YTD Nov 2010 (Figure 4B). The relationship is linear and tight, which makes sense because prices are determined by the balance between the
FIGURE 4B: HIGH INVENTORY IMPLIES MATERIAL WEAKNESS IN PRICES
20.0 18.0 16.0 Visible Months' Supply 14.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 -25.0% -15.0% -5.0% 5.0% 15.0% 25.0% Home Prices Percent Change From Year Ago Jan/Feb and July-Nov 2010

FIGURE 5: GAP BETWEEN REFI SHARE OF APPLICATIONS AND REFI SHARE OF ORIGINATIONS
10.0 5.0 0.0 -5.0 -10.0 -15.0 -20.0

Jun-02

Dec-02

Jun-06

Jun-04

Dec-03

Dec-05

Jun-09

Jun-03

Jun-05

Jun-07

Dec-01

Jun-08

Dec-06

Dec-08

Dec-04

Origination Demand and the Shifting Credit Box
Given the high unsold supply, the key question is what will demand for credit look like during the rest of 201 In the 1? refinance space, the refi share of applications remained above 70% in December, which is high by historical standards and indicates there is strong refinancing demand. Over 50% of outstanding mortgages have rates that are 100 basis points above current rates, so many of these borrowers can increase their cash flow by refinancing. The demand for refinances can be analyzed over time by looking at the differences in the refi share of originations and applications. Over the last decade, the average refi share of applications was 6 percentage points lower than the average refi share of originations. As the market deteriorated, however, the relationship has changed and now the refi share of applications exceeds the refi share of originations by 6 percentage points (Figure 5). The last time the difference broached zero was in late 2001, which indicates a latency of demand for refinances that occurs during recessions or housing distress. Why is the latent refinance demand being unmet? As stated in previous editions of this publication, the answer is negative equity, which is currently the most important force in the housing market. The lack of equity has led to a dearth of sales and is a large obstacle to refinancing. Recent trends in state-level refinance shares provide a clear example. Bifurcating the states into the top 5 negative equity states5 vs. the remaining states reveals that the average refinance share for the top 5 negative equity states has generally been in the mid 50s and relatively flat between 2005 and 2010. However, in the remaining states the refi share soars from 47% in 2006 to 74% at

demand for homes (proxied by sales) and the inventory ratio for homes (proxied by the months supply). The regression indicates that prices respond by about two percentage points for every one unit change in months’ supply. However, there are several outliers (highlighted in red) which all occurred in 2010, after the tax credit expired or where the impact of the tax credit was minimized4. These outliers stand out because they represent the transition period to a post tax credit environment where the months’ supply immediately increases, but prices will take months to adjust. The post tax credit supply adjustment process is the major factor currently driving prices downward and the regression indicates prices should be declining at roughly -15% year-over-year rate given the current level of months’ supply.

Footnote

4 The outliers represent January and February, July - November 2010. 5 These are Nevada, Arizona, Florida, Michigan and California.
© 2011 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.

Dec-09

Dec-07

Jun-10 Sep-10

Jan-01

Jun-01

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February 2011

FIGURE 6: REFINANCE SHARE OF ORIGINATIONS
Top 5 Negative Equity States 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% Percentage 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% Remaining States

mortgage application activity as of late January, purchase originations are not expected to increase relative to recent history during 201 The meager purchase outlook is 1. not only driven by weak demand, but also by increasing headwinds in the price of credit because banks have tightened their underwriting criteria. The tighter underwriting environment is most transparent in the owner-occupied purchase originations, where the typical first time or trade-up buyers reside. Figure 7A represents the two most popular purchase mortgage segments, the 75% to 80% LTV bucket (typically conventional financing) and the 95% to 100% LTV bucket (typically FHA). In 2000, before the market really took off, both segments were roughly in the same proportion. As the market heated up, the 75% to 80% segment nearly doubled, rising from 23% of the purchase share in 2000 to 45% in 2005. This segment’s rise reflects the boom in 1st lien purchase loans that were backed by silent seconds6 so these were actually higher risk loans than they appeared at the time. Once the market collapsed and silent seconds financing dried up, the 75% to 80%
FIGURE 7B: FICO DISTRIBUTION OF 75%-80% LTV
2005 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0%
<500 500 520 540 560 580 600 620 640 660 680 700 720 740 760 780 800+ - 519 - 539 - 559 - 579 - 599 - 619 - 639 - 659 - 679 - 699 - 719 - 739 - 759 - 779 - 799

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

In the purchase mortgage space, the large impact of negative equity is clear as illustrated by the divergence of sales activity in high vs. low negative equity zip codes. Purchase mortgage originations have flat lined over the last 18 months and, given the still very low

FIGURE 7A: SHIFT IN ORIGINATIONS FROM LOW LTV TO HIGH LTV
75% to 80% Originations
Percentage of Total Owner Occupied Originations

95% to 100% LTV Originations

50.0% 45.0% 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

LTV segment’s share of originations fell from 45% in 2005 to the mid teens by 2010. Meanwhile, when the housing market began to collapse, the previously dormant FHA segment boomed and the result was the large rise in the 95% to 100% LTV loans, which increased from 12% in 2005 to over 46% in 2010. Not only did the LTV segments shift, but so did the credit characteristics within each segment. As the market collapsed, the credit box tightened in 75% to 80% LTV loans, but it expanded in the 95% to 100% segment. In the 75% to 80% segment, FICO scores of less than 700 fell from 18% of all originations in 2005 to 2% in 2010

Footnote

6 While the LTV reflects the total LTV at origination, CoreLogic databases do not capture silent 2nds that the lenders were unaware of at the time and this was very prevalent in the mid 2000s.
© 2011 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.

Percentage of Originations

the peak in 2009 (Figure 6). It is also interesting to note that during 2006/07 the refi share in the top 5 states was about 8 percentage points higher than the remaining states – this reflects the peak frenzy in cash out refi’s in the then-booming states. The rapid price increases led to increases in equity, which elevated cash out refi activity, and then the process simply reversed. In 2009 and 2010, the top 5 states had refi shares that were on average 14 percentage points lower than the remaining states. The high levels of negative equity in the top 5 states has led to a 20 percentage point swing in the refi share differential between the top 5 states and the rest of the US. Although there are other economic factors in these high negative equity states that hinder refinancing, negative equity is the main obstacle.

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

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February 2011

Percentage of Originations

(Figure 7B). Currently the bulk of loans in the 75% to 80% LTV segment are in the 780+ category, which account for over 60% of all loans, compared to just 25% in 2005. Both the lower volumes and the credit tightening in the 75% to 80% LTV segment reflects the more conservative underwriting by conventional lenders and the GSEs. In the 95% to 100% high LTV category typically dominated by FHA, the exact opposite trend occurred as borrowers with FICOs between 620 and 700 increased from only 6% in 2005 to 23% in 2010 (Figure 7C). Although lending to borrowers with lower credit scores clearly expanded in the high LTV category, there is an invisible line at the 620 category that used to demarcate prime and subprime, and below that there is virtually no activity. Interestingly, while the rise in average FHA FICO score has garnered some attention, it masks distributional issues such as the disappearing sub 600 lending and the large rise in FHA FICO borrowers with scores in the 600s, which has skewed the FICO distribution for the high LTV segment. Much of the risk has shifted from the conventional space to the FHA segment, but this is unsustainable longer-term. In the meantime, both FHA and the GSE’s have adjusted their pricing to reflect the increased risk in the market, which makes it more expensive for borrowers to finance a home purchase or refinance. Bottom line, negative equity will remain a huge drag on purchase and refinance activity. Moreover, there will be increased headwinds on borrowers’ abilities to obtain financing because loans will become more expensive as the market normalizes and begins to more appropriately price for risk.

FIGURE 7C: FICO DISTRIBUTION OF 95%-100% LTV ORIGINATIONS
2005 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

<500 500 520 540 560 580 600 620 640 660 680 700 720 740 760 780 800+ - 519 - 539 - 559 - 579 - 599 - 619 - 639 - 659 - 679 - 699 - 719 - 739 - 759 - 779 - 799

© 2011 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.

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February 2011

ANNUALIZED SALES
Non-Distressed Sales 10000 Total Sales

DISTRESSED SALES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES
Short Sales pct 40 35 Reo Sales pct

Units in Thousands

8000

30
6000

25 20

4000

15 10

2000

5
Jan-06 May-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 May-08 Jan-09 May-09 Jan-10 Sept-06 May-07 Sep-08 Sep-09 May-10 Sep-07 Nov-10

0
Jul-04 May-05 Apr-03 Oct-05 Mar-06 Aug-06 Feb-09 Jul-09 Jan-02 Jun-02 Feb-04 Dec-04 Jan-07 Jun-07 Sep-03 Apr-08 Dec-09 Jun-10 Nov-02 Nov-07 Sep-08 Nov-10

0

TOTAL SALES BY YEAR
2007 600 2008 2009 2010

HPI M O M BY YEAR
2007 3 2 2008 2009 2010

500 Units in Thousands

1
400

0 -1 -2 -3

300

200

100

-4 -5
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

0

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

HOME PRICE TRENDS
HPI YoY 20 15 10 5
YoY

MORTGAGE PERFORMANCE
HPI YoY Excluding Distressed HPI MoM 4 3
90 Days + DQ and Foreclosure %

90 Days + DQ Pct 10

Foreclosure Pct

REO Pct 1.0

2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5
Apr-03 Sep-03 Jul-04 Dec-04 Mar-06 Jan-07 Jun-07 Nov-07 Apr-08 Feb-04 May-05 Sep-08 Jan-02 Jun-02 Nov-02 Aug-06 Dec-09 Oct-05 Feb-09 May-10 Nov-10 Jul-09

8

0.8

0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25

6

0.6

Jan-07

Jul-04

Feb-04

Dec-04

May-05

Mar-06

Aug-06

Nov-02

Nov-07

Sep-03

Apr-08

Oct-05

Jun-02

Jun-07

Sep-08

Feb-09

Jul-09

Jan-10

Jan-02

Apr-03

FILINGS AND SERIOUS DELINQUENCIES
90 Days + DQ Pct 10 Pre-foreclosure Filings (Th Units) 250

MONTHS SUPPLY DISTRESSED HOMES
20

8
90 Days + DQ %

200

15

6

150

10

4

100
5

2

50
0
Mar-07 May-06 Aug-07 Jan-06 Oct-06 Jan-08 May-08 Oct-08 Mar-09 Aug-09 Jan-10 Jun-10

May-10

Nov-10

0
Jan-02 Jun-02 Nov-02 Jul-04 Oct-05 Aug-06 Apr-08 Sep-08 Dec-04 May-05 Mar-06 Jan-07 Jun-07 Nov-07 Feb-09 Jul-09 Dec-09 Apr-03 Sep-03 Feb-04 May-10 Nov-10

0

Nov-10

© 2011 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.

MoM

4

0.4

2

0.2

0

0.0

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February 2011

NATIONAL SUMMARY
Dec 2009
Total Sales* -New Sales* -Existing Sales* -REO Sales* -Short Sales * Distressed Sales Share HPI MoM HPI YoY HPI MoM Excluding Distressed HPI YoY Excluding Distressed 90 Days + DQ Pct Foreclosure Pct REO Pct Pre-foreclosure Filings* Total Auction Filings* Negative Equity Share Negative Equity* Months Supply SDQ Homes
321 28 204 64 23 26.9% -0.7% -2.9% -0.6% -4.2% 8.3% 3.0% 0.6% 196 104 n/a n/a 11.10

Jan 2010
231 17 140 55 17 30.9% -1.5% 0.0% -0.8% -2.4% 8.5% 3.1% 0.6% 188 101 23.7% 11,277 15.70

Feb 2010
254 20 155 59 18 30.4% -1.5% 1.4% -0.9% -1.5% 8.5% 3.1% 0.6% 185 103 n/a n/a 14.20

Mar 2010
354 27 223 75 25 28.5% 0.4% 3.1% -0.1% -0.4% 8.3% 3.1% 0.6% 185 104 n/a n/a 9.96

April 2010
383 29 251 73 27 26.1% 1.5% 4.1% 0.5% 0.2% 8.2% 3.1% 0.6% 188 110 23.0% 10,971 9.05

May 2010
379 30 253 67 27 24.7% 1.5% 4.2% 0.9% 0.2% 8.1% 3.1% 0.6% 182 113 n/a n/a 9.13

June 2010
411 40 269 69 31 24.3% 0.8% 2.7% 0.5% -0.5% 8.0% 3.1% 0.6% 171 114 n/a n/a 8.24

July 2010
286 19 183 60 21 28.6% -0.2% 0.8% 0.4% -0.8% 7.9% 3.2% 0.6% 166 112 22.5% 10,785 11.70

Aug 2010
296 21 187 64 22 28.9% -0.9% -0.9% -0.3% -1.3% 7.9% 3.3% 0.7% 171 115 n/a n/a 11.30

Sep 2010
277 21 173 60 21 29.4% -1.5% -2.3% -0.8% -1.9% 7.9% 3.3% 0.7% 174 114 n/a n/a 12.00

Oct 2010
242 18 153 51 18 28.7% -1.4% -3.4% -0.8% -2.2% 7.9% 3.3% 0.7% 173 113 22.6% 10,820 13.70

Nov 2010
205 16 127 45 16 29.8% -1.7% -5.1% -0.3% -2.2% 7.9% 3.5% 0.7% 160 101 n/a n/a 16.10

2007
5,496 895 4,226 273 65 6.4% -0.8% -4.7% -0.5% -2.3% 2.4% 0.9% 0.4% 1,095 602 23.1% n/a 2.34

2008
4,323 547 2,893 710 139 19.9% -1.6% -13.7% -1.0% -9.4% 4.1% 1.6% 0.7% 1,916 1,029 23.1% n/a 5.14

2009
4,082 366 2,571 876 234 27.7% -0.2% -12.6% -0.4% -9.1% 6.8% 2.6% 0.6% 2,421 1,108 23.4% 11,307 8.87

* Thousands of Units

TOP 25 CBSA SUMMARY NOVEMBER 2010
Total Distressed Sales Short Sales YoY Sales Shares Change
274 666 274 153 199 354 866 592 56 175 189 216 429 356 253 n/a 98 364 94 53 138 452 447 60 632 24.7% 43.1% 40.9% 8.8% 23.3% 29.7% 55.3% 61.3% 24.1% 29.0% 23.6% 33.4% 35.1% 45.3% 35.8% 4.2% 27.0% 43.0% 22.4% 51.1% 28.8% 57.2% 45.8% 9.4% 62.6% -56.5% -29.1% -50.6% -41.0% -45.6% -51.1% -18.6% -43.0% -66.6% -40.8% -35.8% -28.6% -23.0% -33.5% -33.4% -65.1% -39.0% -25.6% -57.9% -70.7% -33.6% -12.7% -23.0% -55.3% -24.3%

Total Sales Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA Nassau-Suffolk, NY St. Louis, MO-IL Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA Baltimore-Towson, MD Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL Edison-New Brunswick, NJ Las Vegas-Paradise, NV
2,885 4,687 2,880 3,559 4,848 2,684 6,899 3,660 1,544 3,836 2,058 2,757 3,145 1,997 1,561 812 2,540 2,223 1,317 977 1,795 2,538 2,818 1,122 3,616

REO Sales
440 1,352 905 161 931 442 2,948 1,651 316 936 297 706 676 548 306 27 587 591 201 446 379 999 845 46 1,630

REO Short Sales Sales YoY YoY HPI Change Change MoM
-65.7% -27.9% -45.0% -58.9% -28.7% -56.6% 5.5% -42.0% -67.7% -25.2% -20.2% 8.1% 6.8% -35.8% -25.5% -82.6% -1.8% -34.7% -50.4% -64.4% 0.8% -6.3% -28.0% -54.5% -29.8% -45.5% -22.7% -41.8% -40.0% -37.2% -47.6% -27.6% -38.3% -68.7% -31.9% -10.4% -40.3% -22.7% -31.8% -41.6% n/a -50.3% -13.3% -42.7% -82.3% -25.0% 3.7% -10.4% -59.2% 6.9% -2.2% -1.3% -2.3% 0.6% -0.8% -2.4% -1.2% -0.7% -0.8% -2.1% -1.6% -1.1% -1.6% -0.5% -1.6% 1.8% -0.5% -3.1% -1.0% -1.5% -1.0% -1.3% -1.1% -0.3% -1.7%

HPI YOY
-6.6% -1.7% -6.2% 0.9% 2.5% -1.0% -8.3% 1.7% -3.6% -3.9% -7.6% -3.6% -6.8% -0.3% -4.0% -0.3% -7.6% -2.3% -6.6% -1.9% -7.8% -4.6% -10.6% -3.4% -4.2%

90 Days + DQ Pct
10.5% 9.9% 9.7% 8.3% 5.7% 6.8% 12.2% 14.6% 5.6% 5.2% 6.2% 5.0% 16.8% 8.2% 7.2% 9.9% 5.2% 9.0% 7.1% 7.7% 5.6% 10.4% 19.5% 7.6% 19.7%

PreForeclosure Filings
6,504 5,812 14,467 2,246 1,625 927 8,359 5,247 1,164 3,925 1,767 1,877 2,478 2,041 1,655 929 1,591 2,074 190 1,936 1,622 2,373 1,811 896 5,888

Months Total Negative Supply Auction Equity Distressed Filings Share Homes
2,412 2,448 4,515 518 2,500 1,314 5,180 3,304 1,325 1,609 951 1,153 2,328 1,051 640 307 1,336 1,093 580 1,672 840 1,399 1,910 207 2,683 22.4% 24.7% 31.8% 10.8% 12.0% 28.9% 54.7% 49.5% 17.0% 14.0% 13.9% 22.4% 46.0% 29.7% 17.7% 5.7% 16.5% 31.5% 16.1% 43.5% 15.8% 42.4% 53.3% 12.1% 71.6% n/a 24.7 33 22.5 9.4 20.4 13.6 27.2 23.3 8.6 15.3 8.8 25.4 19 20.5 n/a 9 17.7 23 33.5 12.4 15.9 26.3 24.5 19.4

© 2011 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.

7

February 2011

STATE SUMMARY NOVEMBER 2010
Distressed Sales Shares
13.8% 19.0% 13.3% 51.5% 48.0% 31.3% 18.5% 12.4% 15.3% 36.0% 32.2% 22.0% 9.7% 34.2% 21.9% 18.9% 15.3% 14.2% 11.2% 12.3% 26.3% 8.0% 62.8% 20.1% 28.9% 26.0% 15.9% 17.2% 4.0% 11.3% 19.8% 11.0% 18.4% 60.3% 6.6% 23.4% 11.1% 31.5% 11.2% 22.0% 22.1% n/a 22.1% 20.7% 28.1% 27.5% n/a 22.7% 16.2% n/a 10.9%

State
AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DC DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY

Total Sales
745 1,930 1,452 8,649 26,727 5,421 2,602 291 575 24,158 5,577 882 2,275 2,022 5,007 2,056 1,524 1,783 1,848 2,122 3,116 337 8,244 2,079 4,668 304 801 6,295 752 618 1,163 2,942 1,306 4,519 5,951 8,033 2,588 3,231 5,990 796 2,716 n/a 6,419 19,764 2,853 3,748 n/a 5,236 2,166 168 294

REO Sales
74 308 155 3457 8734 1295 284 27 69 5540 1434 97 148 581 708 326 181 177 161 199 520 17 4987 363 1206 72 88 759 19 43 165 138 166 1933 261 1364 223 797 490 104 453 n/a 1169 3396 588 661 n/a 816 254 14 24

Short Sales
29 58 38 998 4105 402 198 9 19 3145 363 97 73 111 387 62 52 77 46 62 301 10 191 54 145 n/a 39 326 11 27 65 187 74 792 134 519 65 221 183 71 146 n/a 252 693 215 368 n/a 375 96 n/a 8

Total Sales YoY Change
-15.6% -33.2% -61.7% -23.4% -27.2% -29.9% -38.2% -57.1% -37.8% -22.4% -42.3% -33.8% -29.6% -23.0% -58.1% -69.5% -56.1% -56.9% -46.9% -73.7% -52.7% -51.7% -35.6% -68.2% -33.2% -58.6% -32.9% -42.1% -20.4% -72.8% -30.9% -64.8% -37.2% -22.8% -60.9% -39.6% -57.8% -28.3% -56.4% -35.8% -51.6% n/a -29.1% -43.8% -34.6% -57.1% n/a -35.6% -70.3% -10.6% -21.0%

REO Sales YoY Change
13.8% -5.8% -45.6% -2.4% -25.9% 14.9% -37.9% -73.5% 13.1% -19.1% -35.5% -11.8% -19.6% 32.3% -60.7% -73.8% -31.7% -40.4% -26.1% -69.4% -52.4% -67.9% -2.7% -69.1% 5.0% -23.4% 14.3% -11.4% -34.5% -65.9% -27.9% -77.2% -16.6% -27.8% -70.0% -30.9% -31.4% 12.4% -45.0% -43.5% -34.3% n/a -15.0% -34.1% -2.6% -44.5% n/a -17.2% -63.0% n/a 0.0%

Short Sales YoY Change
20.8% -13.4% -55.3% -29.6% -22.0% -33.2% -21.7% -55.0% -44.1% -18.5% -36.7% 4.3% -23.2% 13.3% -45.0% -69.3% -47.5% -19.8% -49.5% -89.4% -37.3% 42.9% -69.9% -73.7% -40.3% n/a 14.7% -16.6% -38.9% -66.3% -27.0% -66.4% -17.8% 6.7% -58.3% -40.2% -19.8% -21.9% -41.5% -37.2% -39.9% n/a -9.0% -32.3% 15.6% -47.0% n/a -16.5% -41.8% n/a -20.0%

HPI MoM
-0.5% -0.4% -2.2% -2.8% -1.4% -1.1% -1.4% 1.5% -2.3% -0.8% -1.4% -0.8% -0.1% -1.9% -2.4% 0.8% -0.5% 0.2% -0.3% -2.2% -1.4% 2.8% -2.5% -1.6% -1.2% -1.7% -2.9% -0.2% -0.1% 0.0% -1.5% -0.9% -2.2% -2.1% 1.8% -0.8% -1.3% -1.8% -1.0% -1.4% -0.5% -0.2% -0.6% -1.8% -2.1% -2.4% -1.4% -1.9% -2.7% -2.4% 1.6%

HPI YOY
-0.9% -11.2% -3.7% -10.4% -2.0% -2.9% -2.2% 0.4% -8.0% -8.2% -5.1% -0.9% -1.5% -13.6% -7.5% 1.1% -1.8% -2.8% -4.3% -1.2% -6.0% 8.6% -5.9% -3.8% -8.2% -8.4% -6.3% -2.9% 4.4% -1.3% -2.8% -3.6% -6.3% -4.6% 2.1% -4.9% -4.3% -9.3% -5.9% -1.4% -2.0% -2.3% -4.9% -2.0% -7.8% -3.3% 1.8% -7.4% -6.1% -4.0% 3.7%

90 Days + DQ Pct
2.4% 5.8% 5.0% 10.7% 9.7% 4.7% 6.8% 5.6% 6.5% 18.2% 8.6% 6.9% 4.1% 6.3% 9.0% 6.7% 4.4% 5.2% 6.6% 6.0% 8.0% 6.5% 7.8% 5.2% 4.8% 7.9% 3.5% 5.5% 1.6% 3.1% 5.0% 9.3% 5.5% 17.4% 7.4% 6.9% 5.0% 5.5% 5.5% 8.0% 6.6% 2.8% 6.2% 5.0% 6.0% 4.6% 3.6% 6.0% 4.9% 4.5% 3.0%

PreForeclosure Filings
n/a n/a 1,316 10,394 27,577 3,522 1,250 374 n/a 15,621 19,354 679 758 1,201 8,245 1,889 n/a 690 679 1,676 545 80 5,740 1,128 2,366 n/a 607 4,050 n/a 229 n/a 3,059 496 7,013 2,740 6,026 885 2,470 3,862 629 n/a n/a 1,582 12,506 2,115 873 n/a 4,177 1,913 n/a n/a

Total Auction Filings
78 n/a 567 6,363 15,283 2,041 501 90 n/a 16,437 6,454 419 429 973 3,402 1,685 433 145 282 443 1,441 24 5,532 1,367 1,874 98 170 3,014 105 106 n/a 773 373 3,227 1,151 3,215 619 1,364 1,716 195 1,427 n/a 2,038 7,886 1,301 1,700 n/a 2,303 1,185 29 87

Months Negative Supply Equity Distressed Share Homes
9.4% 10.3% 11.7% 49.0% 31.9% 19.7% 11.9% 15.3% 13.4% 45.7% 28.0% 10.7% 8.7% 24.8% 19.4% 11.2% 11.0% 8.8% 15.8% 14.9% 22.0% 8.1% 37.7% 16.3% 15.7% 28.5% 7.7% 10.5% 7.4% 9.6% 17.9% 15.2% 12.5% 66.9% 7.1% 19.9% 5.9% 15.6% 7.4% 20.0% 14.2% n/a 13.9% 11.2% 20.7% 22.2% n/a 15.0% 13.2% 4.9% 14.0% 2.6 16.6 10.1 13.6 19.7 8 12.5 17.4 17.4 23.8 22.9 13.3 6.8 7.3 33.2 27.1 9.1 13 15.9 24.1 24.8 28.7 13 22.8 8.4 60 5.6 11.7 1.2 11.3 8.2 38.4 10.7 18.6 24.3 12.8 7.8 10.8 13.3 12.9 15.4 n/a 7.5 7.4 9.1 15.2 n/a 13.3 17.1 33.6 7.2

© 2011 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.

8

VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS

Variable
Total Sales New Sales Existing Sales

Definition
The total number of all home-sale transactions during the month. The total number of newly constructed residentail housing units sold during the month. The number of previously constucted homes that were sold to an unaffiliated third party. DOES NOT INCLUDE REO AND SHORT SALES. Number of bank owned properties that were sold to an unaffiliated third party. The number of short sales. A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the sale proceeds fall short of the balance owed on the property's loan. The percentage of the total sales that were a distressed sale (REO or short sale). Percent increase in HPI single family combined series over a month ago. Percent increase in HPI single family combined series over a year ago. Percent increase in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a month ago. Percent increase in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a year ago. The percentage of the overall loan count that are 90 or more days delinquent as of the reporting period. This percentage includes loans that are in foreclosure or REO. The percentage of the overall loan count that is currently in foreclosure as of the reporting period. The count of loans in REO as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period. The number of mortgages where the lender has initiated foreclosure proceedings and it has been made known through public notice (NOD). Auction Filings are the notice of the auction filing that has take place. The variable represents the number of properties were sold at a public auction sale. These are where the lender conducts an auction sale and either 1) accepts a bid where the proceeds are used to repay the debt owed, or 2) takes legal possession of the property. The percentage of mortgages in negative equity. The denominator for the negative equity percent is based on the number of mortgages from the public record. The number of mortgages in negative equity. Negative equity is calculated as the difference between the current value of the property and the origination value of the mortgage. If the mortgage debt is greater than the current value, the property is considered to be in a negative equity position. We estimate current UPB value, not origination value. The months it would take to sell off all homes currently in distress of 90 days delinquency or greater based on the current sales pace. Percent increase in total sales over a year ago. Percent increase in REO sales over a year ago. Percent increase in short sales over a year ago. The count of loans in serious delinquency (90 days +) as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.

REO Sales Short Sales

Distressed Sales Share HPI MoM HPI YoY HPI MoM Excluding Distressed HPI YoY Excluding Distressed 90 Days + DQ Pct

Foreclosure Pct REO Pct Pre-foreclosure Filings Total Auction Filings

Negative Equity Share Negative Equity

Months Supply Distressed Homes

Total Sales YoY Change REO Sales YoY Change Short Sales YoY Change Seriously DQ Pct

About CoreLogic
CoreLogic (NYSE: CLGX) is a leading provider of consumer, financial and property information, analytics and services to business and government. The company combines public, contributory and proprietary data to develop predictive decision analytics and provide business services that bring dynamic insight and transparency to the markets it serves. CoreLogic has built the largest U.S. real estate, mortgage application, fraud, and loan performance databases and is a recognized leading provider of mortgage and automotive credit reporting, property tax, valuation, flood determination, and geospatial analytics and services. More than one million users rely on CoreLogic to assess risk, support underwriting, investment and marketing decisions, prevent fraud, and improve business performance in their daily operations. Formerly the information solutions group of The First American Corporation, CoreLogic began trading under the ticker CLGX on the NYSE on June 2, 2010. The company, headquartered in Santa Ana, Calif., has more than 10,000 employees globally with 2009 revenues of $1.9 billion. For more information visit www.corelogic.com.

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© 2011 CoreLogic All other trademarks are the property of their respective holders. Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission. 01-HOUSINGMRKT-0111-02

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