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Spec-pro-Assignment 1

Juris Doctor (University of San Jose-Recoletos)

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SUMALINOG, APRIL B. Special Proceedings (Saturday 3:30 – 5:30 PM)

ASSIGNMENT_COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

TEOFILO GABATAN VS CA
G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009

Facts: Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as
Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was
declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC,
respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same
from her deceased mother, HermogenaGabatanEvero (Hermogena). Respondent further
claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife,
LaureanaClarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5
was entrusted to his brother, TeofiloGabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for
administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the
return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same
but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject property.
According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and
CatalinoAcantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondent’s demands for
them to vacate the same.

In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the
daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the
rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934
and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely:
Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their
heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open,
public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners
for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the
exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis
and CatalinoAcantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the
husband of Teofilo’s daughter while the latter is just a caretaker.

On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, On April
28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC. the CA
declared that respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established
during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial
court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as
when the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale5 executed by Macaria
Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena
was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan.

Issue: Whether or not he ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property was correct

Held:No. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over
the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only
in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,14 this Court ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This
doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals.

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SUMALINOG, APRIL B. Special Proceedings (Saturday 3:30 – 5:30 PM)

ASSIGNMENT_COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

MONTAÑER vs. SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT,

G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009

Facts: Petitioner Luisa KhoMontañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer,

Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioners Alejandro
Montañer, Jr., LillibethMontañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are their
children. On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.

On August 19, 2005, private respondents LilingDisangcopan and her daughter,

AlmahleenLiling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of
properties before the Shari’a District Court. 7 In the said complaint, private respondents
made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late
Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4)
LilingDisangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) AlmahleenLiling S. Montañer is the
daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties
comprising the estate of the decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District
Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent;
and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the
Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr.,
because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount
of docket fees; and (3) private respondents’ complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks
to establish filiation between AlmahleenLiling S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to
Article 175 of the Family Code.

On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’
complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased
Muslims.

In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its
order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005. The district court allowed private respondents
to adduce further evidence. In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the
Shari’a District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of
further evidence, and pre-trial conference.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Shari’a District Court – Marawi City did not acquire
jurisdiction over "the estates and properties of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr." which is
not a natural or juridical person with capacity to be sued

Held: Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from
being a party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the
settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has
definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions
of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference.
A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are
either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party
seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,"36 has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite
adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not
being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement
of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities,
and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.

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SUMALINOG, APRIL B. Special Proceedings (Saturday 3:30 – 5:30 PM)

ASSIGNMENT_COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court
has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the
fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s
heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact
of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private respondent
AlmahleenLiling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

SALUDO vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS

G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006

Facts: Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American
Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country
Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino
citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent
AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing
credit and other credit facilities and allied services.

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner
Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first
dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card
to pay her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor
occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the
Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to
attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from
respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay
its balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the
corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late
payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were
canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.

Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental
anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as
a result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to
pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further,
they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the
latter, respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that
venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They
alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding
the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as
evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he
executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at
Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's

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ASSIGNMENT_COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.

He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and
unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time
of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this
particular fact.

As a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution

including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to
the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an
office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the
community tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.

In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses
interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents'
affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid.

Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the
Order dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the
court a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon
respondents' posting of a bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary
restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from conducting
further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.

On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents'
petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo
to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and
enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss
the complaint.

The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents
is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal
actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.

Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not
one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner
Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of
venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Issue: Whether the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was
improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 because not one of the parties,
including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time
of filing of the complaint.

Held: Yes, the appellate court committed reversible error. Petitioner Saludo's
complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As
such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

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SUMALINOG, APRIL B. Special Proceedings (Saturday 3:30 – 5:30 PM)

ASSIGNMENT_COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on
venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning.

"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that
the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the
greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the
maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the
term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for
it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more
permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a
given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the
Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving
stateless persons.

In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary."

In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising
his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for
doing business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays
physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places.
Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G.
Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually,
personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.

COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS

CASE TITLE:

EUSEBIO vs. EUSEBIO, G.R. No. L-8409, December 28, 1956 and FULE vs. CA, L-
40502, November 29, 1976

As to the Case filed:

Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment
as administrator of the estate of his father, Virginia G. Fule filed a petition for letters of
administration, alleging Amado G. Garcia died intestate

Applicable Law to both cases:

Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be

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ASSIGNMENT_COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Applicable issue in both cases:

What the word “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the
situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.

Ruling in the case of Eusebio:

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San
Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that
he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile
is gained". If Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice,
for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom
of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein
permanently. Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and
had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to
whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have
manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. The aforementioned house and lot were
bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the
very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable. It is well settled that "domicile is not
commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled
with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home."

In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to
appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid
improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and
dismissed appellee's petition.

Ruling in the case of Fule:

We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual
residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like, the
terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature —
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense.

The term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.

On this issue, we rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was
at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A
death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death. As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence
by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of
residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased’s residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents
that Amado G. Garcia’s last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion
becomes imperative that the venue for Fule’s petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the CFI of Calamba, Laguna.

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SUMALINOG, APRIL B. Special Proceedings (Saturday 3:30 – 5:30 PM)

ASSIGNMENT_COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

VENTURA vs. VENTURA, 160 SCRA 810

Facts: Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the
appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was
named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of
his estate. Such will was admitted to probate.

Thereafter, Gregorio Ventura died. Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the
corresponding letters testamentary was issued in her favor. She submitted an inventory of
the estate of Gregorio Ventura. She filed her accounts of administration which was opposed
by the spouses the appellees. Oppositions assailed the veracity of the report as not
reflecting the true income of the estate and the expenses which allegedly are not
administration expenses.

Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura filed a motion to remove the executrix Maria
Ventura based on the following grounds: (1) that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that she
has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the inventory;
(3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious relations with
the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to
comply with the Order of the Court requiring her to file her accounts of administration for
the years 1961 to 1963; and (5) that she is with permanent physical defect hindering her
from efficiently performing her duties as an executrix.
On October 5,1965, the court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has
squandered the funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply
with the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts
and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate, removed Maria Ventura as
executrix and administratrix of the estate and appointed in her place Mercedes Ventura and
Gregoria Ventura as joint administratrices of the estate.

Issue: Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified
.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court held in affirmative. However, this issue has become moot
and academic in view of the decision of this Court in related cases.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, “the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious,” and as a result, intestacy follows,
thereby rendering the previous appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and
academic, This would now necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the
following provision:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

“When and to whom letters of administration granted. —If no executor is named in

the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;”

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona
while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura.
The “next of kin” has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent’s property. It is generally said that “the nearest of kin, whose

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ASSIGNMENT_COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.

‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to
preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the
person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving
spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both
interests.

VILLAMOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: MacariaLabingisa Reyes sold a portion of 300 square meters of the lot to the
Spouses Julio and Marina and Villamor for the total amount of P21,000.00. On November 11,
1971, Macaria executed a "Deed of Option" in favor of Villamor in which the remaining 300
square meter portion (TCT No. 39934) of the lot would be sold to Villamor under certain
conditions, one of which:

That the only reason why the Spouses-vendees Julio Villamor and Marina V. Villamor,
agreed to buy the said one-half portion at the above-stated price of about P70.00 per
square meter, is because I, and my husband Roberto Reyes, have agreed to sell and
convey to them the remaining one-half portion still owned by me, whenever the need
of such sale arises, either on our part or on the part of the spouses (Julio) Villamor
and Marina V. Villamor, at the same price of P70.00 per square meter, excluding
whatever improvement may be found the thereon.

According to Macaria, when her husband, Roberto Reyes, retired in 1984, they offered to
repurchase the lot sold by them to the Villamor spouses but Marina Villamor refused and
reminded them instead that the Deed of Option, in fact, gave them the option to purchase
the remaining portion of the lot. The Villamors, on the other hand, claimed that they had
expressed their desire to purchase the remaining 300 square meter portion of the lot but
the Reyeses had been ignoring them. Thus, on July 13, 1987, after conciliation proceedings
in the barangay level failed, they filed a complaint for specific performance against the
Reyeses. Trial Court decided in favour of the Villamors, but this was reversed by the CA.
Present case is a petition for review on certiorari of the CA’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not there was a VALID Deed of Option whereby the private respondents
agreed to sell their lot to petitioners whenever the need of such sale arises, either on our
part (private respondents) or on the part of Julio Villamor and Marina Villamor.

Held: While the Deed of Option was valid, it already lapsed. It is of judicial notice that the
price of real estate in Metro Manila is continuously on the rise. To allow the petitioner to
demand the delivery of the property subject of this case thirteen (13) years or seventeen
(17) years after the execution of the deed at the price of only P70.00 per square meter is
inequitous. For reasons also of equity and in consideration of the fact that the private
respondents have no other decent place to live, this Court, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction is not inclined to grant petitioners' prayer.

COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS

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SUMALINOG, APRIL B. Special Proceedings (Saturday 3:30 – 5:30 PM)

ASSIGNMENT_COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Case Title:
VENTURA vs. VENTURA, 160 SCRA 810, and
VILLAMOR vs. CA, 162 SCRA 574

1. VENTURA vs. VENTURA

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the court cannot set aside the order of preference.

The rules of court provides for the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator.Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: “When and to whom letters of
administration granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve.”

The “next of kin” has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent’s property. It is generally said that “the nearest of kin, whose
interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.
‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.

2. VILLAMOR vs. CA

The general rule that the court cannot set aside the order of preference allows for
exceptions. The order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts
and circumstances of each case.

One exception as presented in the case at bar, thus: “In case the persons who have the
preferential right to be appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve,
administration may be granted to such other person as the court may appoint.”

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