No

23?

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(H1SA-TM-X-61634) EOSTLAONCH MEMORANDUM HEFOBT FOB M E R C U R Y - A T I A S NO. 9 ( H A - 9 ) . PART 1: MISSION A N A L Y S I S ( N A S A ) 350 p

no/
POSTLAUNCH MEMORANDUM REPORT
FOR

MERCURY-ATLAS NO. 9 (MA-9)( L 0
PART I - MISSION ANALYSIS

| intervals; declassified

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER Cape Canaveral, Florida

June 2k, 1963

nent contains information affecting the national defense of the
~ MiHlMii. |-

I

VJ • \J i *** » f

contents

POSTLAUNCH MEMORANDUM REPORT
FOR

MERCURY-ATLAS NO. 9 (MA-9) PART I - MISSION ANALYSIS

Idited By:
v

J. H. Boynton, Senior Editor R. G. Arbic

^C. A. Berry, M.D.
rfR.

E. Day

^P. C. Donnelly ,,W. R. Kelly J. P. Mayer ^A. B. Shepard

R. E. Smylie

rt C M S
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0

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0

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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER Cape Canaveral, Florida June 2k, 1963

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section 1.0 MISSION SUMMARY 2.0 INTRODUCTION 3.0 SPACE VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 3.1 Spacecraft Description 3.2 Launch-Vehicle Description Ij-.O TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS U.I Sequence of Flight Events U.2 Flight Trajectory 5.0 SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE 5.1 5.2 5-3 5.U 5-5 5.6 5.7 5.8 Spacecraft Control System Life Support Systems Communications Systems Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems Electrical and Sequential Systems Instrumentation System Heat Protection System Scientific Experiments Page 1-1 2-1 3-1 3-1 3-15 U -1 U-l U-3 5-1 5-1 5-7 5-27 5-28 5-30 5- 33 5 - 3^ 5-38 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-2 6-2 6-2 6-3 6-3 6-U 6-5 7-1 7-1 7 - U-2 7 - 7U 8-1 8-1 8-12

6.0 LAUNCH-VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.U 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 Airframe Propulsion System Propellant Tanking Propellant Utilization Pneumatics Electrical System Flight Control System Guidance Abort Sensing and Implementation System

'....

7.0 ASTRONAUT ACTIVITIES 7-1 Aeromedical Analysis 7.2 Pilot's Performance 7.3 Pilot's Flight Report 8.0 FLIGHT CONTROL AND NETWORK PERFORMANCE 8.1 Flight Control Summary 8.2 Mercury Network Performance

Section 9.0 RECOVERY 9.1 Recovery Plans 9.2 Recovery Operations 9-3 Recovery Aids 10.0 APPENDIX A 10.1 10.2 10.3 10 A 10.5 10.6 11.0 Spacecraft History Launch Procedure Weather Conditions Flight Safety Review Photographic Coverage Postflight Inspection

Page 9-1 9-1 9-2 9-3 10-1 10-1 10-6 10-7 10-9 10-11 10-11+ 11-1

APPETOIX B - ACKWOWLEDGEMEET

I

LIST OF TABLES

Table
3.1-1 3.1-2 4.1-1 4.2-1 5.1.5-1 5.2.1.2-1 5.2.4.1-1 7.1.2.1-1 7.1.2.1-2 7.1.2.1-3 71214 ...7.1.2.1-5 7.1.2.1-6 7.1.2.1-7 7.1.2.2-1 7.1.2.2-2 7.1.2.2-3 7.1.2.2-4 7.1.3.1-1 7.1.3.2-1 7.1.4.1-1 7.1.4.2-1 7.1.5.1-1 SUMMARY OF SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA FOR SPACECRAFT 20 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS MA-9 FUEL USAGE .. .

Page
3-13 3 - l4 4-2 4-5 5-6

POSTFLIGHT ANALYSIS OF LITHIUM-HYDROXIDE CANISTER . . . . 5 - 2 5 BODY-MASS BALANCE SUMMARY PILOT PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES PERTINENT EXCERPTS FROM CLINICAL EXAMINATIONS COMPLETE BLOOD COUNTS COMPARISON OF TYPICAL PREFLIGHT AND POSTFLIGHT URINE VALUES URINE ANALYSIS LOW-RESIDUE DIET AEROMEDICAL COUNTDOWN DETAILED PREFLIGHT HEART-RATE AND RESPIRATION- RATE DATA SUMMARY OF HEART-RATE AND RESPIRATION-RATE DATA DETAILED PREFLIGHT BLOOD-PRESSURE DATA SUMMARY OF BLOOD PRESSURE DATA SUMMARY OF CALIBRATED WORK INFLIGHT SLEEP PERIODS PILOT POSTFLIGHT ACTIVITIES RECORD OF'PILOT'S WEIGHT CHANGES SUMMARY OF TILT STUDIES . 5-26 7-24 7-25 7-26 7-27 7-28 7-30 7-31 7-32 7-33 7-34 7-35 7-36 7-37 7-38 7-39 7 - 40

•GOIinDDMlAL •
Table 7153! ...72111 ...7.2.1.2-1 7.2.1.3-1 7.2.1.5-1 7.2.2.1-1 7.2.2.2-1 7.2.3.2-1 7.2.4.1-1 8.2.1-1 8.2.2-1 8.2.2-2 8.2.3-1 8.2.3-2 8.2.4-1 8.2.5-1 9.1-1 10.5-1 BLOOD CHEMISTRIES PILOT TIME IN SPACECRAFT 20 DURING HANGAR AND LAUNCH COMPLEX TESTS PILOT TRAINING SUMMARY IN THE MERCURY PROCEDURES TRAINER NUMBER 2 AT CAPE CANAVERAL FLYING TIME FROM JANUARY 1 TO LAUNCH DATE PILOT PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES FROM JANUARY 1, 1963 TO LAUNCH DATE SUMMARY OF MAJOR FLIGHT ACTIVITIES PILOT'S EQUIPMENT LIST SUMMARY OF ATTITUDE MANEUVERS CONTROL MODE USAGE ORBITAL INSERTION CONDITIONS AVAILABLE AT MCC COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY COMMAND FUNCTION SUMMARY COMPUTER READOUT OF RADAR TRACKING DATA RADAR TRACKING PERIODS TELEMETRY COVERAGE AIR-43ROUND COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE RECOVERY SHIP AND AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT IN PLANNED LANDING AREAS AMR OPTICAL LAUNCH COVERAGE Page 7 - 4l 7-59 7 - 60 7 - 6l 7-62 7-65 7-71 7-72 7-73 8-20 8-21 8-27 8-28 8-30 8-32 8 - 4l 9-5 10-13

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.0-1 2.0-2 2.0-3 3.0-1 3.0-2 3.1-1 3.2-1 4.2-1 if.2-2 MA-9 astronaut prior to entering the transfer van on the way to the launch complex MA-9 astronaut on the launch-pad gantry prior to flight Ground track for the MA-9 orbital mission MA-9 space vehicle prior to lift-off MA-9 lift-off configuration MA-9 spacecraft and adapter, prior to lift-off Booster engine offset at lift-off Altitude versus longitude profile Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-9 mission launch phase (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 4.2-3 Altitude and range Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle Dynamic pressure and Mach number Longitudinal acceleration along spacecraft Z-axis ... ... 4-9 4-10 4-11 4-12 4-13 Page 2-2 2-3 2 -4 3-1? 3 - 18 3-19 3-20 4-7

Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-9 mission orbital phase (a) Latitude, longitude, and altitude versus time . . (b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle ... 4 - 14 4-20

4.2-4

Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-9 mission reentry phase (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Latitude} longitude, and altitude . . . . . . . . Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle ... Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle ... Dynamic pressure and Mach number Longitudinal deceleration along spacecraft Z-axis 4-26 4-27 4-28 4-29 4-30

^ £ - i ^ 1" AM_F *\F

GOlUriDDMTlAL"
Figure 5.1-3-1 Postf light photograph of amplifier -calibrator power socke't ... ................... Blue ribbon connector showing corrosion RCS auxiliary fuel tank ......... Page

55-55 5-56 5-57 5-58 5-59 5 - 60 5 - 6l . 5-62 5 - 63 5 - 6U 5-64

5.1-3-2 5.1.5-1 5.1.5-2 5.2.1.1-1 5.2.1.2-1 5.2.2.1-1 5.2.3-1 5.2.3.1-1 5.3-1 5.3-5-1 5-3.5-2 5- 4.3-1

................. .....

Solenoid -inlet "B"-nut temperature -time history MA. -9 suit circuit condensate trap Cabin temperature evaluation MA-9 helmet details

............ ^ . ..

........... ...................

Urine and condensate transfer system Liquid transfer syringe

...........

................ ........... ............ ...........

Onboard television system equipment TV picture of spacecraft interior TV picture taken through the window

Comparison of normal retropackage umbilical disconnect squib with one missing main change ........... l6-mm movie camera .......... -. .........

5-65 5-66 5-67 5-68 5-69 5-70

5.6.1-1 5.6.2-1 5.7.1-1 5.7-3-1 5.8.1-1 5.8.1-2

MA-9 programer showing misalinement of faulty gear . . . . Postf light photograph of MA-9 ablation shield Postflight photograph of paint patches Camera for dim -light phenomena experiment ......

.......... . . ......

Typical photograph taken for dim-light photography experiment ....................... Light assembly for ground light experiment ........

5-71 5-72

5.8.2-1 5-8.3-1

Installation of flashing light and geiger counters on retropackage ......................

5-73

Figure 5.8A-1 5.8A-2 5.8.5-1 5.8.6-1 5.8.6-2 5-8.6-3 5.8.6-^
f t

Page Hasselblad 500-C'camera modified for MA-9 mission Infrared photograph taken for U.S. Weather Bureau experiment over Florida peninsula Quadrantal photograph taken for horizon-definition experiment »"V :• • Equipment for flashing-light' experiment ..."...'.. ... 5 - 7^ 5-75 5-76 5-77 5-78 5-79 5 - 80 .5 -.81

Topical history trace of flashing light output ; . . . . Typical horizontal intensity distribution of the flashing light Calculated sighting parameters for flashing-light experiment . ' '..'.... Photograph'of Himalaya Mountains taken with Hasselblad camera . ' Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle in the region of cut-off using launch-vehicle guidance data (a) Space-fixed velocity fb) Space-fixed flight-path angle ..... .. •'. . .

5.8.8-1 6.8-1

6-7 6-8

6.8-2

Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle in t;he region of cut-off using IP 709^ data (a) Space-fixed velocity . . ' ,. . 6-9. (b) Space-fixed flight-path angle . . . . . . . . . . ' " 6 - 1 0

6.-'8-5 7.1.2.2-1 7.1.2.2-2 7.1.2.2-3

Space-fixed flight-path angle versus space-fixed velocity in the region of cut-off Oral temperature probe Installation of oral temperature probe in helmet . . . . MA-9 May l^, 1963, 0 : 2 0 e.s.t. Sample record 7^:0 illustrating nodal beats occurring during canceled launch count down. Recorder speed 25 mm/sec ..'.'..

6-11 7-91 7-92

7-93

COPlPffiENTlAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 7.1.2.2-4 MA-9 16:11:30 - Sample of biosensor record at a range station illustrating one of the frequent occurrences of sinus arrhythmia with wandering of the cardiac pace maker. In this sample, the negative P wave suggests inverse depolarization from the atrioventricular node. Similar changes were observed before Page

i

s

.

7.1.3.1-1

MA-9 12:29:52 - Sample of typical biosensor data received at a range station. Blood pressure,

7 - 95

7.1.3.2-1 7.1.5.1-1 7.1.5.1-2
7.1.5.2-1

7 -96
Tilt studies - heart rate responses ..... Tilt studies - blood pressure responses for MA-9 Exercising device used for calibrated work Calibrated work - MA-9 . . Special equipment storage kit

7 - 97 7 -98 7 - 99 7 - 100 7 - 101 7 - 101

7.1.5.2-2 7.2.2.2*1 7.2.2.2-2
7.2.2.2-3 7.2.3.1-1

7 - 102 7 - 103 7 - 104 7 - 105 7 - 106
Planned landing areas fa) Atlantic Ocean (b) Pacific Ocean .

7.2.3.5-1
7.2.4.2-1 7.2.4.2-2 9.1-1

9-6 9-7 9-8

9.2-1 9.2-2

MA-9 spacecraft in auxiliary flotation collar with line

9- 9"

iNTIAL
Figure 9.2-3 9.2-4 9.3-1 10.3-1 10.5-2-1 10.6-1 • Side hatch being actuated on MA-9 spacecraft Astronaut Cooper egressing from. MA-9 spacecraft Details of landing area 22-1 Wind direction and velocity at launch site AMR engineering sequential tracking camera coverage Postflight photograph of MA-9 spacecraft . . .... Bage 9-10 9- H 9-12 10-17 10-18 10-19

NOTICE

NO. 1:

LIFT-OFF TIMS (2-INCH MOTION) FOR THE MA-9 FLIGHT WAS 8 0 : 3 1 6 A.M. E.S.T. RANGE ZERO TIME WAS ESTABLISHED :41.0 AS 8 0 : 3 A.M. E.S.T. :41 ALL TIMES REFERRED TO IN THIS

REPORT ARE IN ELAPSED TIME IN HR:MIN:SEC FROM RANGE ZERO UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

NO. 2:

THE MA-9 POSTLAUNCH MEMORANDUM REPORT IS IN THREE PARTS, UNDER SEPARATE COVERS, AS FOLLOWS: PART I - MISSION ANALYSIS - CONTAINS AN OVERALL ANALYSIS OF THE MISSION AND PRESENTS A MINIMUM OF DATA. PART II - DATA - CONTAINS COMPLETE TIME HISTORIES OF SPACECRAFT DATA, WITHOUT ANALYSIS. PART III - MISSION TRANSCRIPTS - CONTAINS ESSENTIALLY UNEDITED TRANSCRIPTS OF THE FLIGHT COMMUNICATIONS,, THE PILOT'S POSTFLIGHT SELF-DEBRIEFING, AND THE FORMAL TECHNICAL DEBRIEFING CONDUCTED ONBOARD THE RECOVERY AIRCRAFT CARRIER.

IDEMTVb.

AL 1.0 MISSION SUMMARY

Page 1-1

The MA-9 mission was successful in nearly every respect. The planned launch time of 8:00 a.m. e.s.t. oh May l4, 19&3; was postponed for 1 day because of intermittent digital data in both the azimuth and range channels of the C-band radar at Bermuda. Prior to postponement, the countdown had proceeded as planned until T-60 minutes, when an unscheduled hold of 2 hours and 9 minutes became necessary because of a fuel-pump failure in the diesel engine on the gantry transfer table. After this hold, the countdown was continued until T-13 minutes when the flight was postponed because of the radar problem. The launch operation on May 15, 1963, was "the most efficient conducted to date. Four minutes of unplanned hold time were required to evaluate an external RF interference problem at the guidance central rate station. Weather conditions at the launch site and in the primary landing area were satisfactory. Lift-off occurred at approximately 8:04 a.m. e.s.t. on May 15, 19^3^ 2 hours and 31 minutes after the astronaut entered the spacecraft. Launch-vehicle performance was excellent, and the trajectory parameters displayed at the Mercury Control Center indicated a "go" condition at insertion. A near-perfect orbit was attained, with deviations from planned postposigrade values of space-fixed flight-path angle and velocity of 0.0037° and -1.4 ft/sec, respectively. Both the perigee and apogee of the initial orbit differed from the planned values of 87 and 1^4 nautical miles by 0.2 nautical mile. The decay in perigee and apogee after nearly 22 orbital passes was 1.6 and 7-1 nautical miles, respectively. Spacecraft separation from the launch vehicle was satisfactory and the planned manual turnaround was well executed by the pilot. The performance of the spacecraft systems was excellent for the first 18 orbital passes with the exception that the automatic section of the programer failed at 12:18:19- In addition, several minor problems were encountered with the R and Z calibrations, the drinking-water valve, and the condensate transfer system. Upon contacting Hawaii on the 19th orbital pass, the pilot reported that the 0.05g warning light had come on. Systems checks by the astronaut revealed that the amplifier-calibrator was in the 0.05g configuration and that the ASCS could be used only during reentry. However, planned use of the ASCS for reentry was abandoned at about 33:07:00 when neither the main nor the standby 250 v-amp inverters would supply electrical power to the ASCS bus. The pilot manually initiated the required retrofire and reentry events. He controlled the spacecraft attitudes during retrofire by utilizing the manual proportional system. Because of the ASCS failure, the pilot was also required to conduct the reentry maneuver manually, and he elected to use both the manual proportional and flyby-wire modes during this phase.

Page i - 2
The pilot's performance throughout the mission was excellent, and he adhered closely to the flight plan until the ASCS problems occurred. The pilot had no difficulty in sleeping during the mission, although he woke up several times during the planned rest period and found it necessary to reestablish a comfortable suit temperature. He did not eat and drink as much as was desirable, and he has since commented on the difficulty of performing these functions with the devices that were available to him. Six of the eight planned scientific experiments were successfully conducted during the mission. The balloon drag and visibility experiment was not accomplished because of failure of the balloon to deploy, and the window attenuation experiment was not accomplished because the pilot could not get the standard light source out of the special equipment storage kit. The pilot's control of the spacecraft during retrofire and reentry was excellent and resulted in a landing only k.k nautical miles from the prime recovery ship, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kearsarge. Visual contact was made from the carrier and the. recovery helicopters reached the spacecraft and circled it during its descent. Swimmers were deployed from the helicopters and they immediately attached a flotation collar to the spacecraft. The pilot remained in the spacecraft until it was hoisted aboard the carrier, the hatch had been blown, and the doctors had given him a preliminary examination. The pilot egressed from the spacecraft in good condition kO minutes after landing. A postflight physical examination conducted onboard the recovery ship revealed no evidence of significant degradation of pilot function directly attributable to the space flight. The pilot demonstrated an orthostatic rise in heart rate and fall in blood pressure which was more pronounced than that detected after the MA-8 flight. Although this condition is not an inflight hazard, the implications of this hemodynamic response on return to Ig conditions will have to be given very serious consideration for longer missions. Support activities from all ground elements, including flight control, Mercury Network, and recovery, were excellent and contributed greatly to the successful accomplishment of the mission. Postflight examination of the spacecraft and evaluation of the data collected during the mission have revealed some anomalies, and detailed systems tests have determined the most likely causes of the major problems. Considerable information regarding man's capabilities to perform his assigned tasks during extended periods of time in the space environment has been obtained. Evaluation of the overall mission indicates that a high degree of success was obtained and confirms the accomplishment of all mission objectives.

Page

2-1

2.0

INTRODUCTION

The first manned 1-day mission (MOEM) as a part of the United States' program of space exploration was successfully accomplished on May 15 and May 1.6, 1963- This mission was the fourth manned orbital flight in Project Mercury. It was also the ninth of a series of flights utilizing production Mercury spacecraft and Atlas launch vehicles and, therefore, was designated Mercury-Atlas Mission 9 (MA-9). Astronaut L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., shown in figures 2.0-1 and 2.0-2, was the spacecraft pilot for this flight. The MA-9 space vehicle was launched from the Missile Test Annex at Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 08:OU a.m. e.s.t. on May 15, 1963 The flight ended as planned, after completing nearly 22 orbital passes around the earth, with a successful landing approximately 70 nautical miles southeast of Midway Island in the Pacific Ocean at 06:2^ p.m. e.s.t. on May l6, 1963. Ground tracks for the 22 orbital passes of the MA-9 spacecraft are shown in figure 2.0-3The MA-9 mission was a continuation of a pioneering program to acquire operational experience and information for extended manned orbital space flight. The objectives of the flight were to evaluate the effects on the astronaut of approximately 1 day in orbital flight; to verify that man can function for an extended period in space as a primary operating system of the spacecraft; to evaluate in a manned 1-day mission the combined performance of the astronaut and a Mercury spacecraft specifically modified for the mission; to obtain the astronaut's evaluation of the operational suitability of the spacecraft and supporting elements for extended manned orbital flight; and to assess the effectiveness of the Mercury Worldwide Network and mission support forces during an extended manned orbital flight. Each of these objectives was satisfactorily fulfilled. A preliminary analysis of the significant flight data has been made, and the results are presented in this report. Brief descriptions of the mission, the spacecraft, and the launch vehicle are followed by the performance analyses and supporting data. All major events of the MA-9 mission, beginning with delivery of the spacecraft to the launch site and continuing through recovery and postflight examination, are documented. The graphical information presented herein has been included to support and clarify the text; however, the reader is referred to Part II, Data, for a complete presentation, without analysis, of all MA-9 timehistory flight data. Part III, Mission Transcripts, presents essentially unedited transcripts of the flight communications, the pilot's postflight self-debriefing, and the formal technical debriefing conducted onboard the recovery aircraft carrier.

WTOBMTIAIi

Figure 2.0-1.- MA-9 astronaut prior to entering the transfer van 9Ji«JAep.j^ak%.,kQp.3b]ael launch complex. ie.a.Q.b]e

Page 2-3

Figure 2.0-2.-

MA-9 astronaut on the launch-pad gantry prior to flight.

• CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2-4 Latitude, deg

COMriDCMTIAfe.

EMTIAL • 3.0 SPACE-VEHICLE DESCRIPTION

Page 3 - 1

The MA -9 space vehicle, consisting of the Mercury spacecraft and the Atlas launch vehicle, is shown prior to launch in figure 3-0-1 and at lift-off in figure 3.0-2. 3-1 Spacecraft Description

Spacecraft 20, shown in figure 3-l-lj> was employed for the MA-9 orbital mission and was of a configuration similar to that of spacecraft 16, which was flown for the MA-8 mission. However, certain system modifications were incorporated since the previous flight to save weight, to incorporate new experiments, and to reflect a continuing effort to improve system performance. In addition, other system modifications were incorporated as a direct consequence of extending the flight duration. The modifications that were made to spacecraft 20, including the more significant changes, are listed in the following sections according to the major spacecraft systems to which they apply. Those modifications needed Toecause of the extended mission are noted with an asterisk. Table 3-1-1 presents a summary and breakdown of the approximate number of changes for each system; and the weight and balance data, which accounts for actual flight consumable usages for spacecraft 20, are given in table 3.1-2. 3-1.1 3.1.1.1 Spacecraft control system. Automatic stabilization and control system: 1. The rate stabilization control system was removed.

2. The ASCS rate gyros were operated continuously from the time the ASCS bus was energized until the antenna fairing was separated. 3- The horizon scanners were no longer powered when the gyro switch was in the "cage" or "free" position. A 30-second time delay was added in the horizon- scanner circuit. U. The control -mode selector switch was changed to allow the deenergizing of the automatic reaction control system solenoids when using the manual proportional system for control of the spacecraft. 5- The pitch-attitude gyro was replaced with a gyro incorporating a -3^-° pitch caging capability.

3 -2
6. A "rate indicate" switch with an automatic and manual position was added. In the mnaual position, telemetry and pilot-indicated rates were given continuously; and in the automatic position, the rate indications were cut off from the time of spacecraft separation plus 5 minutes to 10 minutes before retrosequence time. #7- An "out-of-orbit mode" warning light and tone switch were added. This circuit was available from 5 minutes after spacecraft separation until the beginning of retrosequence. 3.1.1.2 Reaction control system: 1. The 1-pound and 6-pound thrusters of the reaction control system (RCS) were replaced with units of an improved design. ^2. The nitrogen tank in the automatic RCS was pressurized to 2,800 psi instead of 2,250 psi, as in previous missions. 3. A special corrosion-deterrent paint was applied to the outside of all hydrogen peroxide (H 0 ) tanks. U. A dual indicator was added to the instrument panel to display to the astronaut the regulated nitrogen pressures in the automatic and manual reaction control system. 5The time-delay relay used in the jettison of HO was

changed to extend the jettison time from 60 seconds to 150 seconds. 61. The wall thickness of the expulsion tubes of the automatic and manual HO tanks was increased from 0.062 inch to 0.125 inch. •"-7. A 15-pound capacity HO with the automatic HO tank. tank was added in parallel

-«8. A manually operated interconnect valve was added to provide the capability to transfer fuel between the automatic and manual HO fuel systems. 9. A drain and purge valve was added to the automatic and manual HO systems. 10. The nitrogen and hydrogen peroxide relief valves were replaced with units of a more reliable type.

Page 3.1.2 3-1.2.1 Life support system. Environmental control system:

3-3

1. The electrical inverters were cooled by using heat sinks and ducted cabin air circulation, rather than the previously used coolant circuit and heat exchanger. *2. The CO adsorption capacity was increased by adding canister. The amount

0.8 pound of lithium hydroxide to the CO

of charcoal in the canister was reduced to 0.2 pound. 3. A provision was added for manually sealing the cabin pressure-relief valve from water leakage at landing. k. The warning light for indicating excess water or low temperature in the suit or cabin heat exchangers was made dependent upon the associated dome temperature. -:;-5- The cabin oxygen-partial-pressure indicator was replaced with a dual indicator displaying cabin 0 partial pressure and suit-circuit CO partial pressure. Also, a warn-

ing light and a tone switch were added to the panel to indicate excessive CO . 6. A redundant coolant-control valve was added in parallel with the existing valve for the suit cooling circuit. Also, these valves and the cabin coolant-control valve were of an improved design. #7- An oxygen bottle containing h pounds of oxygen was added in parallel to the primary oxygen bottle. •;:'8. A 9-pound coolant water tank was added in parallel with the existing 39-P°und coolant water tank. 9. The suit and cabin freon orifices and check valves were replaced with units of an improved design. 10. The primary and secondary oxygen high-pressure regulators were replaced with modified units of an improved design. *L1. The secondary oxygen-supply system had a warning light and tone switch for an indication to the pilot when pressure in the oxygen bottle dropped below 6,500 psi.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3 - k

12. The emergency oxygen rate valve was replaced with one of an improved design. IJ. The pressurization system for the coolant-water supply was provided with gas pressure from the suit circuit only. Ik. The pressure-sensing circuit that was used to cut off the ca~bin fan and energize a warning light indicating low cabin pressure was removed. -"-15. A timer circuit was installed to actuate the waterseparator sponge for a JO-second period every 10 minutes. 16. A "sponge-squeeze" switch and water-separator travel indicator lights were added to the main instrument panel to allow automatic or manual initiation of the water separator and to provide a visual aid for monitoring the separator piston position. 17. The absolute-pressure relief valve was removed from the coolant-water pressurization system. 18. Insulation was added to the CO absorber, and a

deflector was added to the cabin fan outlet to prevent cold air from the cabin heat exchanger from impinging on the CO absorber. 19. A screen was added over the relief port of the negative pressure relief valve to prevent objects from falling into the valve opening. 20. The suit inlet for emergency oxygen flow was repositioned upstream of the suit-circuit CO partial pressure sensor. This change permitted purging of the sensor with 100-percent oxygen to verify its operation. #21. A condensate trap was installed in the suit circuit to aid in removing water. 22. The suit-circuit ducting, from the water separator to the junction of the suit-inlet flexible hose, was insulated to reduce heat loss. 3.1.2.2 Food, water, and waste management: *1. Condensate and urine transfer systems were installed.

Page

3-5

2. The nylon drinking-tut)e assembly from the 39-pound coolant water tank was removed. #3- An expulsion-type drinking-water container was added. The tank contained a transfer fitting to provide the capability of transferring condensate to the tank after the drinking water was consumed. 3.1.2.3 Pull-pressure suit: 1. The sealing technique for the faceplate on the helmet was changed from pneumatic to mechanical. In addition, small velcro tape patches for attaching the oral temperature pro"be to the right earcup, radiation film badges attached to the helmet shell, and an improved helmet tiedown system were installed. 2. The torso section of the pressure suit was modified in the shoulder and wrist areas. In addition, the boots were made a permanent part of the torso assembly, and they were provided with improved ventilation. 3- A poppet-type valve was added to the suit-inlet ventilation fitting to prevent water from entering the suit should the astronaut leave the spacecraft and enter the water after landing. h. An additional locking feature was added at the glove-to-torso connection to prevent accidental disengagement. •"•5. A urine transfer fitting was added to the suit.

6. The lifevest pack was moved to the front of the lower left leg since this was a m©re convenient location. 7- Items carried in pockets on the suit included a handkerchief, pocket folding knife, biomedical injectors, heavy-duty scissors, and a mechanical pencil. 3.1.2.^ Personal equipment: 1. The navigation yaw reticle was deleted.

2. An opaque window cover was added to the spacecraft window, and the red window filter and the map case were removed.

3- A work-table and storage space assembly was added in front of the main instrument panel pedestal. U. The flashlight, the food container, the knife mounted on the spacecraft structure, and the waste container were removed. *5- An exercising device of the type used during the MA-6 flight was added. 6. 3.1.3 The rear-view mirror was removed.

Communications system.1. The hardline cable which allowed operation of the voice communications system outside of the spacecraft was deleted. 2. Nitrogen gas pressure from the manual RCS was used to deploy the HP recovery antenna. 3- The fingers were removed from the bicone antenna to improve communications while in the attitude-free driftingflight mode. *k. The back-up UHF voice transmitter-receiver was removed. 5- The capability for ground command of the telemetrysystem and radar-beacon operation was incorporated. 6. The HP voice transmitter was disabled from the time of antenna-fairing separation to the time of HF recovery antenna deployment to prevent damage to the voice system. 7. A switch was added to allow the pilot to disable the UHF power amplifier for increased reliability of the UHF transmitter-receiver system. 8. A slow-scan television system was added for real-time observation of the pilot and spacecraft environment. The TV transmitter was also available as a backup to the T^VI transmitter. 9- The phase-shifter switch was removed, and the phase shifter was controlled by a relay such that it was on whenever the C-band beacon was on. Phase-shifter power was changed from the ASCS bus to the fans bus.

Page

3-7

10. Deployment of the HF orMtal antenna was effected by only one bellows motor, 10 seconds after spacecraft separation. 11. A control unit was added to allow the pilot to set a high volume on his receiver with a minimum of side tone while transmitting. 12. The miniaturized helmet microphone was modified to include noise rejection characteristics. The helmet was also modified to include two miniaturized earphones in each earpiece. J.lA Mechanical and -pyrotechnic systems. *1. The periscope was removed, and a spring-loaded device was used to close umbilical door. 2. The SOFAR bomb on the main parachute riser was set to detonate at a depth of 3,000 feet. 3. The main and reserve parachute deployment bags were modified for increased reliability. U. The landing-bag release system was modified to improve its reliability. 5. A redesigned survival kit pan was installed.

6. One of the two squibs in the retropackage explosive jettison bolt was disarmed because it contained a ground loop circuit. 73.1.5 The explosive-actuated hatch actuator cap was vented.

Electrical and sequential systems.1. A redundant 3-volt power supply was added for instrumentation reference. It could be actuated by the astronaut for an instrumentation reference of flight-critical items in case of failure of the primary 3-volt power supply. 2. The eight day correlation clock was removed.

3- The satellite clock was powered by the 2^ v d-c main bus rather than the isolated bus. ^. An "off" position was added to the instrument-panel warning-light circuit to turn off all lights except those for the satellite clock for improved pilot dark adaptation.

iV711 r UL/IMl 1 lALi

page 3 - 8

. OOHriDCNTIAL

5. The main inverters were replaced with those of an improved design having superior thermal characteristics and a greater efficiency. #6. In order to provide increased power for the longer MA-9 mission, five 3^000 watt-hour and one 1,500 watt-hour batteries were flown in spacecraft 20 instead of the three 3,000 watt-hour and the three 1,500 watt-hour batteries flown in spacecraft l6 (NLA-8). 7- The fire retro, green telelite was made dependent on the ignition of all three retrorockets rather than being dependent on the ignition of the third retrorocket, as was the case for spacecraft 16. 8. A switch was added to provide the astronaut with the capability of turning off the flashing recovery light to conserve power during daylight hours. 9. An auxiliary portable light was installed for the astronaut's use during flight. 10. A switch was added to allow turning the prelanding buses back on once the landing relay timed out to permit postlanding blood-pressure and EGG recordings. 11. A tower-jettison arm relay was added in the towerjettison circuit to prevent inadvertent firing of the towerjettison rocket. 12. A green telelite was provided to give the astronaut an indication of umbilical door closure, and a red telelite was provided to indicate when the door was open. The door position was also monitored by telemetry. 13. A tower-separation abort-interlock relay was added on the 2h- v d-c isolated squib bus. If an abort signal were to be received by the spacecraft and power from the main squib bus were lost, initiation of retropackage jettison would occur when spacecraft separation was sensed. Tower-jettison rocket ignition would occur when tower-clamp-ring separation was sensed. 1^. Both the main and isolated bus circuits for the retrorocket ignition squibs were controlled by the retrofire arm circuit. This change was made to improve the switching arrangement for the astronaut. Only the main squib-bus circuits were so controlled on spacecraft 16.

Page 3 - 9 *"-;

15. The automatic retrofire arm feature was made functional for all retrosequence modes except manual retrofire, with or without attitude permission. As a result,, whenever the pilot elected to ignite the retrorockets using the retrofire switch, the retrorocket arm switch had to "be in manual position. 16. The Mayday circuit was powered from the main bus; it was powered from the main squib bus on spacecraft 16. IT- A rescue aids switch was rewired to provide the astronaut with the capability of manually extending the HF recovery antenna after landing. 18. Three diodes were put in series with the flashing light to prevent damage to the light, because the light was powered by the 6-volt isolated bus, rather than its own self-contained battery. 19. A resistor was added to the command input circuit of the programer to reduce the programer's susceptibility to transient voltage spikes. 20. A standby inverter automatic tone generator was added to indicate automatic switching of the inverter to either a-c bus. 21. The emergency reserve parachute deployment and the emergency landing-bag-deployment circuits were powered through switch fuses. 22. The satellite clock, pilot, and ground command retrosequence signals were powered through a common fuse switch. 23. An emergency spacecraft separation bolt relay was added in the spacecraft-separation pull-ring circuitry to allow the pilot to fire the escape rocket with isolated bus power only. 2^-. Two spacecraft-separation-sensor relays were added to the isolated squib bus. One relay improved the reliability of the maximum-altitude sensor and the other was used in the tower-separation abort-interlock relay circuitry. 25- Automatic 21,000-foot drogue-parachute deployment was made more reliable by paralleling the main and isolated squib arming circuits.

Page

3-10

3.1.6

Instrumentation system.1. A switch was added to provide the astronaut with the capability to remove electrical power from the R- and Z-calibration relays. This switch would be used to stop calibrations should the programer fail 1;o perform this function as planned. 2. The HF telemetry system was deleted from the spacecraft.

3. The low-level commutator and temperature-survey pickups were removed from the spacecraft. ^4-. Several timing functions were added to the programer. In spacecraft 1 6 its only function was programing the water., squeezer operation. 5. The frequency of the voltage-controlled oscillator for the automatic-solenoid malfunction detector was changed to 3-9 kc to provide better tape-recording reproduction of this function. 6. The "A" package of the instrumentation system was modified to protect the d-c amplifiers from over voltage and to provide for a better reading of the 115 v a-c fans bus. 7- The oxygen-quantity indicator was expressed in percent. Maximum indication was 250 percent on primary and 125 percent on secondary. 8. The R- and Z-calibration signals were no longer initiated only on ground command. They were initiated when the telemetry transmitter was energized through the command link and when the tape recorder was programed. 9. The tape-recorder operation was no longer completely It was modified to run at a speed of rr inch

continuous.

per second, giving a longer recording capability, and its operation was either off, programed, or continuous, as selected by the pilot. 10. A three-position switch with off, continuous, and ground-command positions was added for astronaut control of telemetry transmitter operation. 11. The astronaut-observer camera was replaced with a self-contained, hand-held moving-picture camera. This camera was a l6-mm type that could be mounted on the instrument panel for observation of the pilot or on a special bracket to photograph through the window.

12. The retrorocket temperature sensor was moved from the right to the bottom retrorocket. 13. The low-fuel-pressure -warning switch was changed from a 1,580-psi switch to a 2,200-psi switch, and the automatic ECS high-pressure transducer range was 0 to 3,500 psi. 1^. The cabin and heat exchanger dome temperature light and tone alarm replaced the excess cabin and suit excess water light and tone alarm. 15. Suit outlet temperature was sensed by the body temperature sensor when the sensor was not measuring body temperature. Temperature range of the sensor was 75° F to 108° F. 16. Temperature sensors were installed in all three fuel tanks, and the temperatures were displayed on an instrumentpanel indicator. 17. Standby inverter and cabin heat-exchanger outlet temperatures were telemetered to the ground. 18. The blood-pressure-measuring system controller was changed to provide easier gain adjustment. 3.1.7 Heat-protection system. 1. Six bolts were added to the ablation heat shield to retain the shingle portion of the shield in case of delamination at landing. 2. In addition to the previously flown rectangular paint patch, two new types of paint were added for evaluation. 3.1.8 Experiments.1. A tethered balloon similar to that flown during the MA-7 mission was packaged in the antenna canister. 2. A self-contained flashing beacon was installed on the retropackage. 3- Two geiger counters, a dosimeter, four film badges, and a Schaeffer radiation package were installed on or in the spacecraft to determine radiation exposure during the flight.

Page

3-12 U. A special 35-™m camera was added for use in photographing the zodiacal light and the airglow layer. 5. A special 70-rnm Hasselblad camera was added for use in taking general color photographs, infrared weather photographs, and horizon definition photographs.

Page

3-13

TABLE 3.1-1.- SUMMARY OF SPACECRAFT SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS

System

Number of changes (a)

Spacecraft control system: Automatic stabilization and control system Reaction control system Life support system: Environmental control system Food, water , and waste management systems Full -pressure suit Personal equipment Communications systems Mechanical and pyrotechnic systems Electrical and sequential systems Instrumentation system: Telemetry and sensor systems Instrument panels and consoles Heat protection system Scientific experiments Total

10 19 31 7 7 6 15

8
35 16 5^
2

5

215

The total is not an accurate indication of the total number of spacecraft modifications, since the nature of certain system interfaces requires that some changes be repeated for more than one system. In addition, because of this repetition in some areas and the fact that some modifications which are counted only once can reasonably apply to another system, the numbers in the column should be regarded as approximate and only a gross indication of the degree of modification for any given system.

Page 3 TABLE 3.1-2.- WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA FOR SPACECRAFT 20

Parameter

Lift-off

Orbital phase

Reentry phase 2,681. U5

At main parachute Postlanding deployment 2,563.89
2 , ^-00 . ^3

Weight, Ib . . . . Center -of -gravity station along: X-axis, in. . . Y-axis, in. . . Z-axis, in. . . Moments of inertia around : Roll axis, I , 2 Z slug-ft ... Pitch axis * I V, , 2 slug-ft . . .
Yaw axi s , I ,

\, 330. 82 3,033-35

-0.13 -0.28

-0.21

-0.20 -0.15

-0.20 -0.15
122 . 22

-0.49 -0.06

-0.1U
120.82

167.81

12^.68

119.63

365.8

298.9

280.9

27^.8

269.5

7,900.6

653.0

563.0

^
571-3

1+38.7

slug-ft2 . . .

7,90^.0

656.8

505.5

W8.1

11/H7

Page

3-15

3-2

Launch-Vehicle Description

The MA- 9 launch vehicle, the Atlas 130D, vas an Atlas series D missile modified for the mission as on previous Mercury- At las flights. A general launch- vehicle description may "be found in the NASA Project Mercury Working Paper No. 223A, "Manned One-Day Mission Mercury Spacecraft Specification Document. " The MA-9 launch vehicle was very similar to the one used for the MA-8 mission, and only necessary changes were made. The following is a summary of the detailed configuration changes from the MA-8 launch vehicle, the Atlas 11JD. (1) A plastic liner was incorporated in the wear-ring area of the turbopump to guard against a possible failure resulting from excessive rubbing. (2) A temperature sensor was added to the head- suppress ion valve, which is located on the sustainer engine housing, to determine the temperature of the head suppression valve during flight and required the installation of three wires to the harness, a resistor, and two wires to the telemetry package. (3) The clips, which are used to attach the shroud to the forging that holds the yaw activator, were modified so that the clips would not ride the radius of the vernier engine gimbal shaft. The mount for the secondary range-safety command battery was redesigned to reduce weight and provide greater ease in manufacturing. (5) A redundant circuit, including instrumentation, was provided in the engine relay box to improve the reliability of the sustainerignition-stage control-valve circuit. (6) The power pickoff point for the telemetry and instrumentation system was changed from the power plug to the changeover switch. This change provided the telemetry system with a 115 -volt (a-c) ^-00-cycle instrumentation point which would not interfere with the guidance system. (7) The lox overfill probe was relocated and redesignated "Sequence II Level Probe." This modification provided for a repeatable method of determining the proper level at ignition start by maintaining the lox level at this probe. (8) A printed circuit board in the programer canister was redesigned to remove the possibility of a locating pin's shorting a transistor on the circuit board.

Page 3 - 16

CONFIDENTIAL

(9) The event times for the flight programer were changed to be compatible vith the staging discretes of the latest launch trajectory. (a) (b) BECO - 132.9 sec instead of 129-9 sec

Sustainer pitch program duration - 13-5 sec instead of 16. U sec Initiation of guidance after BECO - 22.5 sec instead of 2^.0 sec SECO - 303.6 sec instead of 305.1 sec

(c)

(d)

(10) To reduce the possibility of an undesirable lift-off clockwise roll transient, the booster-engine yaw actuators were offset (see fig. 3-2-1) as follows to produce a counter-clockwise roll moment: Booster-engine no. 1 - yaw actuator lengthened by 0.0^ ± 0.02 inch Booster-engine no. 2 - yaw actuator shortened by 0.0^ ± 0.02 inch The offsets were checked by the usual level method and by using a new alinement jig supplied by the engine contractor. (11) The temperature sensor in the sustainer-engine lubricant tank was relocated to the aft 20 percent of the tank to provide a temperature study of the lubricant as it is consumed. (12) A redundant path to ground was provided for the shielding in the autopilot harness. (13) The boat cover in the sustainer engine area was restrained by a spring which had a tensile strength approximately twice that of the spring used in the MA-8 launch vehicle. This change was made to provide better thermal protection of wiring harnesses. A preflight purge of the boattail area with 100-percent gaseous. nitrogen was incorporated to reduce the possibility of fire. (15) The propellent utilization (PU) manometer was calibrated for the Atlas-D tank, rather than for the Atlas-C configuration. ( 6 A microswitch which indicates full lox-valve travel was rewired 1) to permit inclusion in the ignition-stage sequence circuit to reduce the possibility of a lox-pump failure. ( 7 The wiring technique for the autopilot in the flight control 1) section was modified to improve its overall reliability. These units were replaced at the factory prior to delivery of the launch vehicle to the launch site.

SOMflDCNTIAL

Page 3-17

Figure 3.0-1.-

COHriPfMTIAl •

MA-9 space vehicle prior to launch.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3-18

Figure 3-^2^K,JVW^-.W^y^off

configuration.

3MEIPENTIAL

Page 3-19

Figure 3.1-1.-

MA-9 spacecraft and adapter prior to lift-off,

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3-20

Previous position

Offset position

Figure 3.2-l!€®fjftfSISi!6Rf"offset

at lift-off

Page k - 1

k.O

TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS

Sequence of Flight Events
The times at which the major events of the MA-9 mission occurred are given in table U.l-1.

Page h - 2

TABLE IK 1-1.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Q

Event

ELanned time , hr :min : sec Launch phase

Actual time, Difference , hr:min:sec sec

Booster engine cut-off (BECO) Tower release Escape rocket ignition Sustainer-engine cut-off (SECO) discrete signal Tail -off complete

0:21. 00:28 00:02:35.6 00:02:35.6

00:02:12. !<• 00:02:36.3 00:02:36.3 00:05:03.0 00:05:03.2

-OA 0.7
0.7

.

(b) 00:05:0^.5
Orbital phase

-1.3

S/pacecraft separation Retrofire sequence initiation Retrorocket no. 1 (left) Retrorocket no. 2 (bottom) Retrorocket no. 3 (right) Retrorocket assembly jettison

00:05:05.5 33:58:5^.1 33:59:25.1 33:59:30.1 33:59:35.1 3*1:00:25.1 Reentry phase

00:05:05.3 33:58:59 33:59:30 33:59:35 33:59:^ J>k:OQ:hk

-0.2 ^.9 ^.9 ^.9
C

l8.9 c^- 9

Communications blackout 0.05g relay actuation Drogue parachute deployment Main parachute deployment Spacecraft landing

3^:07:56.1 3^:08:36.1 3^:13:53.1 3^:15:21.1 3^:19:56.1

3lv:08:17 (e) 3^:1^:03 3^:15:33 3li:19:lj.9

20.9d(l)

n.99d(-9) (g)

Preflight calculated, based on nominal Atlas performance. Planned trajectory times are based on tail-off-complete conditions, rather than SECO conditions. Ketrorocket assembly jettisoned manually. Difference between the actual and the postflight-calculated reentry event times, shown in parentheses, is based on actual insertion parameters.
e

Q.05g sequence disabled prior to retrofire. f Drogue parachute deployment initiated manually.

^Landing time could not be established accurately.

Page h - 3

k-,2

Flight Trajectory

The trajectory for the MA-9 flight is discussed in three convenient phases: launch, orbital, and reentry. In all trajectory figures, the trajectories marked "planned" are preflight-calculated nominal trajectories and the trajectories marked "actual" are based on Mercury network tracking data. The altitude-longitude profile for the entire flight is presented in figure U.2-1. A comparison of the planned and actual trajectory parameters is given in table ^.2-1. The differences between the planned and actual flight trajectory parameters are a result of the actual cut-off conditions being slightly different than the planned conditions and the atmospheric density profile on the day of the actual flight being different from that assumed for the preflight-calculated trajectories. The launch trajectory data shown in figure ^-.2-2 are based on the real-time output of the Range Safety Impact Predictor Computer (lP-709^-), which used Azusa MK II and Cape Canaveral FPS-16 radars, and the General Electric-Burroughs (launch-vehicle guidance) computer. The data from these tracking facilities were used during the time periods listed in the following table: Facility Cape Canaveral FPS-16 Azusa MK II General Electric -Burroughs Elapsed time, minrsec
.0 to 00: 36

00:36 to 01:0^ 01:0^ to 05:55

The orbital portion of the trajectory, shown in figure k.2-3, was derived by starting with the spacecraft position and velocity vector obtained at the beginning of the second pass over Bermuda, as determined by the Goddard computer using Mercury network tracking data. The Bermuda vector was integrated backward along the flight trajectory to orbital insertion and forward to the time of the Cape Canaveral vector at the end of the l8th pass. The Cape Canaveral vector was then integrated forward to the start of retrorocket ignition in the 22nd pass. These integrated values were in good agreement with the values measured by the launchvehicle guidance system at orbital insertion. They were also in good agreement with the position and velocity vectors determined by the Goddard computer for passes near Eglin Air Force Base, Florida (end of 3rd pass), Eglin Air Force Base (updated at end of 13th pass), and Cape Canaveral (end of l8th pass); thus the validity of the integrated orbital portion of the flight trajectory was established.

CONFIDENTIAL"

Page

The orbital lifetime of the spacecraft, bas.ed on the 1959 ARDC atmosphere, was calculated to be 92 passes. After nearly 22 passes, the decay in apogee was 7-1 nautical miles and the decay in perigee was 1.6 nautical miles. The reentry portion of the trajectory, shown in figure 4-.2-4, was derived by starting with the spacecraft position and velocity vector, as determined by the Goddard computer, obtained at the end of the l8th orbital pass near Cape Canaveral, Florida. Integrating forward along the flight path to retrorocket ignition and, after introducing nominal retrofire conditions, continuing the integration through space•craft landing yielded the reentry trajectory. Nominal retrofire conditions include a retrorocket total impulse of 38,975 l^-sec at spacecraft attitudes of -34° in pitch and 0° in roll and yaw. The spacecraft weight at retrofire was estimated to be 2,979 pounds by using data obtained from the. Mercury network stations. The times of communications blackout and main-parachute deployment from the integrated reentry trajectory were in good agreement with data from the Mercury network stations and the spacecraft onboard measurements. In addition, the landing point from the integrated trajectory was in good agreement with the retrieval point reported by the recovery ship. The agreement in these events serve to confirm the validity of the integrated reentry portion of the flight trajectory.

Page k - 5 TABLE IK 2-1.- COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS

Condition

Planned

Actual

Difference
1

Cut-off conditions (including tail-off) Range time min°sec Geodetic latitude , deg North Longitude deg West Altitude feet Altitude nautical miles Space -fixed velocity, ft/sec Space -fixed flight -path Space -fixed heading angle, deg East of North 3014,5 05:0*4-. 5 30.4323 72.5023 528,l4-02 87.0 437.7 25,715.3 0.0016 303.2 05:03.2 30.1t857 72.5178 529,735

. ..

87.2
437.7 25,714.0 O.OQli-7 77-5510

. ..

-1-3 -00:01.3 0.053U 0.0155 1,333 0.2 0 -1.3

0.0031 0.0601

77.4909

Postposigrade firing conditions Range time sec Range time mint sec . . . . . . . . Geodetic latitude, deg North . . . Longitude deg West Altitude feet Altitude nautical miles Range, nautical miles Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec . . . Space-fixed flight-path angle, des .. Space-fixed heading angle, deg East of North

306.5
05:06.5 30.11-621 72.3552 528,434

306.3 05:06.3 30.5315 72.2897 529,793

87.0
445.5 25,736.3 -0.0014

87.2
1+49.8 25,734.9 0.0023 77.6731

-0.2 -00:00.2 0.0694 -0.0655 1,359 0.2

4.3
.-1.140 0 3 . 0 7 0 1 3 . 0 6

77.5695
100.1

Orbital parameters Perigee altitude, statute miles . . Perigee altitude, nautical miles Apogee altitude , statute miles . . Apogee altitude, nautical miles . . Period, min:sec Inclination angle deg

87.0

10 3 0,

165.7 i44.o 88:1(4 32.52

87.2 165.9

144.2 88:45 32.55

0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 00:01 0.03

Page 4 .- 6

TABLE 4.2-1.- COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS - Concluded Condition Planned Maximum conditions Altitude, nautical miles . . . . Space -fixed velocity, ft/sec . . Earth-fixed velocity, ft/sec . . Exit dynamic pressure, Ib/sq. ft .
165-T 144.0 25,736 2k, 420 a7 7 8 ' 969 165-9 144.2
0.2 0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -0.1

Actual

Difference

.
Reentry dynamic pressure, Ib/sq. ft

7-6

25,735 24,419 7-6 974 7.6
446
b

-5 0

443
Landing point 27°26- N.; 176 °27- w.

3

Latitude, degimin Longitude, degrmin

27°20' N. • 176°26' w.

-06' N. -01' W.

Based on atmosphere at Cape Canaveral below 30 nautical miles and 1959 ARDC model atmosphere above 30 nautical miles. "Actual" landing coordinates shown in table were those resulting from the trajectory integration. The retrieval point after landing was reported as 27°22.6' N. and 176°35.3' W. by the recovery ship. (See section 9-0.)

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5. 0 SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE

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§ 5-

The spacecraft as an entity performed adequately. Some system anomalies were experienced, and analyses of these are discussed in the following paragraphs. Also discussed, from an overall mission viewpoint, are the spacecraft systems' general performance. In addition, a description of each spacecraft system is presented. This description is presented in terms of the major changes made since the MA-8 mission, and reference should be made to section 3-1, Spacecraft Description, for a listing of all significant spacecraft changes. 5-1 Spacecraft Control System

All spacecraft control system components functioned normally until approximately 28:3^:3^.> at which time the 0.05g relay circuit was actuated. The astronaut did not report this event on the onboard tape until approximately 28:59-'00. The .reason for this delay in reporting was twofold: 1. The control mode at the time of 0. 05g relay activation was manual proportional with gyros caged, and 2. The spacecraft warning lights switch was in the off position because the astronaut was engaged in taking photographs. When the warning lights switch was placed in the dim position, the 0.05g green light was noted. From 28:3^:3^ until the end of the mission, the amplifier-calibrator (amp-cal) was locked in the 0.05g configuration. Operation of the automatic stabilization and control system in this configuration resulted in damping about the pitch and yaw axes and in a -12°/sec rate command in the roll axis unless one of the manual control modes was selected. 5-1.1 System description.- The spacecraft control system is designed to provide stabilization and orientation of the spacecraft from immediately following spacecraft—launch-vehicle separation until deployment of the main parachute. The system is capable of operation in the following modes: 1. Automatic stabilization and control system (ASCS) with alternatives of orientation, orbit, and auxiliary damping modes. 2. Fly-by-wire (FB¥), which is an electrical "on-off" command of the automatic reaction control system (RCS) thrusters initiated by the astronaut's control stick. Astronaut's choice of high and low thrusters or low thrusters only (FEW low) is available. 3. Manual proportional (MP), which is a mechanical command of the manual RCS thrusters initiated by the astronaut's control stick.
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page 5 - 2
Modes 1 and 2 utilize the automatic ECS fuel supply, while mode 3 utilizes the manual RCS fuel supply. Combinations of modes 1 and 3 or 2 and 3-are available to provide "double authority" at the astronaut's discretion. Major changes made to the control system since the previous mission are as follows: the vertical attitude gyro was modified to provide the capability to cage and uncage at -3^°, which simplified the astronaut's task in alining the gyros to retroattitude (orbit attitude); the rate stabilization and control system (RSCS) was removed to reduce weight; the ASCS rate gyros were rewired to run continuously when the ASCS was powered up until antenna fairing separation; the ASCS mode switch was changed to provide a means of deenergizing the automatic RCS solenoid circuitry; a horizon-scanner power circuit was incorporated into the attitude gyro switch, which powered up the scanners only when in the "slave" position; and a JO-second time delay was added to the horizon-scanner slaving circuitry to allow time for scanner warm-up. 5.1.2 Performance analysis.- The performance of the spacecraft control system was completely satisfactory during the first l8 orbital passes. Outputs of the gyros and the horizon scanners agreed to within 2° during the periods of scanner slaving. The ASCS orbit mode limit cycles in the pitch, roll, and yaw axes were relatively balanced; that is, there were an equal number of pulses on both sides of attitude gyro null. For the greater portion of operation in the ASCS mode, the yaw-axis limit cycle reached +10° in periods of less than 3 minutes. However, more activity in this axis was expected because of the cross-coupling effect between the roll and yaw slaving circuitry. The average limits of the roll axis cycle were ±8.5% and the limits of the pitch axis cycle were +7°. As was noted during the MA-8 mission, pulse durations were not sufficient to limit the orbit cycle to within the more desirable ±5.5°- However, this condition is not considered to be detrimental and does not appreciably increase fuel consumption. At 28:3^:3^; the 0.05g relay circuit actuated and locked in. At approximately 29:^9tOO? "the astronaut powered up the ASCS bus and verified that the amplifier-calibrator was in the 0.05g configuration by noting that the attitude indicators would not respond to spacecraft attitude changes. He then made a reentry roll rate check at about 31:17'-00 and verified that the ASCS would function normally in the 0.05g logic circuit during reentry. However, planned use of the ASCS for reentry was abandoned at about 33:07:00 when it became evident that the ASCS bus was not receiving power from either the ASCS a-c main inverter or the standby a-c inverter.

CONFIDi

Page
The attitude gyro output signals, as noted both orb telemetry and the onboard attitude indicators, showed random; drifting in pitch and yaw at approximately 32:16:00. The gyros were in the caged configuration at this time, since the capability to uncage had been removed by the premature 0.05g signal. When the ASCS bus was powered at 32:48:30, the yaw-gyro output signal was erratic for 6 minutes. During this same period, the rollgyro signal moved off of the cage null. This drift in indicator readings continued off and on about all axes for the remainder of the flight. 5.1.3 Postflight analysis.- Postflight analysis of the amp-cal revealed that the circular power plug on the amp-cal was burned, as shown in figure 5-1-3-1. Direct shorts between the 115-volt a-c, 24-volt d-c, and the logic ground pins were evident. A close visual inspection of the plug showed the presence of water and evidence of corrosion. For a discussion of possible sources of this water, see section 5-2, Life Support System. Tests were conducted in the laboratory and attempts were made to duplicate the shorting condition by saturating a plug with condensate water and then applying voltage. Continuous arcing formed between the pins resulted in charring of the connector, but a permanent short between the pins was not achieved. However, it is believed that, under zero-g and with a nearly continuous source of moisture at the plug, the pins would short and burn repeatedly under a constant cycling of power. Corrosion was also found in the oval blue ribbon connector that contains the 0.05g circuitry as shown in figure 5-1-3-2. Postflight resistance measurements of this connector indicate that a conducting path was present between the pins where corrosion existed and could have caused the premature 0.05g condition. The internal face of the male portion of the connector was cleaned and dried after several samples of the corrosion were taken. A new plug was then installed, and the amp-cal was subjected to a series of tests. Operation of the unit was satisfactory in all modes, including the 0.05g function. Without supplying power to the circuit, several drops of condensate water were then placed on the connector in the area from which the corrosion had been removed. When power was subsequently applied, the 0.05g relay circuit did, in fact, actuate. Detailed testing of the amp-cal repeater section revealed no signs of malfunction. It can only be speculated that the gyro repeaters received intermittent input voltages from the shorted power plug. The pin (see fig. 5-1-3-1) that furnished the normal 115-volt a-c signal to the attitude gyro repeaters and amplifiers is directly adjacent to the pins that were found to have burned and supposedly shorted.

page 5 - *

OOMTDDPiTIAL

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The shorting and charring of the power plug and the 0.05g relay • circuit actuation occurred independently; however, both malfunctions apparently resulted from the presence of moisture. 5-1.^ Control system -utilization.Immediately after spacecraft

separation at 00:05:0^, the astronaut switched to the auxiliary damping mode for k seconds. At 00:05:1? he began to execute the yaw turnaround maneuver by using the fly-by-wire low thrusters. By 00:08:33> the turnaround maneuver was completed and the control system was placed in the ASCS orbit mode. This mode was employed for approximately 15 percent of the time that spacecraft power was utilized. Fly-by-wire low was used for extended maneuvers and experiments almost exclusively throughout the mission; and, therefore, a minimum usage of the automatic RCS fuel supply resulted. Only one automatic high thruster was actuated during the orbital phase of the mission, except for the momentary high thruster action in the auxiliary damping mode after spacecraft separation. The negative roll high thrust unit was utilized prior to retrofire during the epecial 0.05g test at about 31:17:00.
Attitudes for retrofire were maintained by using the manual proportional mode, with fly-by-wire high and low ready as a backup. The astronaut maintained the spacecraft attitudes extremely well during the retrofire period, as was evidenced by the spacecraft's proximity to the planned landing position. Control during reentry was maintained by using the manual proportional and fly-by-wire modes simultaneously. The maximum thrust of ^9 pounds about the pitch and yaw axes was used by the astronaut in maintaining control during reentry. 5.1.5 Reaction control system.- The major changes made to the reaction control system (RCS) since the previous mission include the addition of a 15-pound capacity hydrogen-peroxide tank (see fig. 5-1-5-1) in parallel to the automatic system, the removal of poppets and springs from the check valve at the outlet of each fuel tank, the incorporation of an RCS interconnect valve between the automatic and manual fuel system, the installation of a main instrument panel indicator to enable the astronaut to monitor regulated nitrogen pressure for both the fuel systems, and an increase in the wall thickness of the expulsion tubes for the fuel tanks from 0.062 inch to 0.125 inch. An analysis of the onboard data confirmed the astronaut's report of satisfactory performance of the RCS throughout the flight. One instance of thruster "tail-off" in the yaw-right manual thruster was noted by the astronaut. The incident occurred approximately 13 hours after lift-off during a flight period

-fiDMflDENTIAL

-

for which no onboard data are available. A postlaunch evaluation of this minor anomaly indicates no reason for this action. The astronaut reported that he had intended to use FEW for reentry but that the FEW pitch-up high thruster was slow to light off, and therefore, he selected manual proportional. An analysis of the onboard data indicates that the FEW pitchup high-thruster command was maintained only 0.2 second and that thruster operation for this brief period was normal. This short pulse duration, in conjunction with the fact that there had been no previous use of the high thruster to achieve thrust chamber warm-up, probably reduced the pilot's confidence in the FEW mode and led him to elect "double authority" control during reentry. The amount of fuel used during the mission is shown in table 5-1-5-1- Approximately 7 pounds of manual fuel and 21 pounds of automatic fuel were jettisoned after reentry. Fuel supply pressure readings varied during the mission because of cabin temperature changes, with the automatic system transducer being affected the most. Fuel jettison was initiated after reentry as planned at approximately 3^:15:55- The total time required to jettison the remaining fuel from the automatic and manual systems was approximately 1 minute and 33 seconds. The RCS interconnect valve was utilized to permit the manual system fuel to jettison through the automatic system pitch and yaw high thrust chambers. Solenoid-valve inlet temperatures for the 1-pound yaw-left, the 1-pound pitch-down, and the 1-pound roll-clockwise thrust chamber assemblies in the automatic RCS were measured during the flight and are shown in figure 5-1-5-2. The maximum temperature at the solenoid inlet recorded during the orbital phase was approximately 103° F. This temperature was measured for the 1-pound roll-clockwise thruster at 11:20:00. The minimum temperature recorded was approximately 53° F and was measured for the 1-pound pitch-down thruster at approximately 22:30:00.

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Page 5 - 7
5.2 Life Support Systems The life support system group includes the environmental control system; the pressure-suit assembly; and the water, food, and waste management system. In the following sections, these systems are described and their performance during the MA-9 mission is discussed. In addition, a discussion of the physiological aspects of the life support system performance is presented. 5.2.1 Environmental control system.- The environmental control system (ECS) controls the pressure and temperature of the astronaut's pressure suit and of the spacecraft cabin and provides breathing oxygen for the astronaut. The ECS automatically maintains the pressure of the spacecraft and pressure suit at approximately 5-1 psia. Oxygen makeup for cabin leakage and astronaut consumption is supplied from three high-pressure gaseous oxygen containers. Respired carbon dioxide (C0p) is removed from the suit ECS circuit by a chemical reaction with lithium hydroxide (LiOH). Cabin and suit temperatures are controlled by a waterevaporation process in the cabin and suit heat exchangers. The rate of heat removal is controlled by the astronaut's manipulation of individual coolant control valves (CCV) for the suit and cabin heat exchangers. These valves regulate the quantity of water entering the heat exchangers in such a manner that the suit and cabin environmental temperatures can be maintained within comfortable limits. The ECS maintained nominal values during the entire mission. The only major problem area was the difficulty encountered by the astronaut in stabilizing the suit heat- ex changer dome temperature by adjustment of the CCV. The fluctuations in the dome temperature did not appreciably affect the suit inlet temperature, which was in the range of 60° to 65° F for the major portion of the mission. 5-2.1.1 System description: The ECS was originally designed for an l8-orbital-pass capability, but three major changes from the ECS configuration used in the previous mission (MA.-8) were required for a mission of longer duration. A second bottle containing 4 pounds of oxygen was installed in parallel with the primary oxygen bottle. This addition increased the previous total oxygen supply, including the primary and a secondary source, by 50 percent. The quantity of LiOH was increased from 4.6 pounds to 5-^ pounds, and the amount of charcoal was decreased from 1 pound to 0 . pound. Also, an auxiliary LiOH canister was .2 utilized in the suit outlet line during manned prelaunch tests to conserve the LiOH in the flight canister. An additional tank with a nominal capacity of 9 pounds of coolant water was installed to complement the original 39-P°un(i capacity tank. This new tank was serviced before launch with 9-3 pounds of water.

5 -8
In addition to system changes to accommodate the extended flight, other modifications from the spacecraft 16 (MA-8) configuration were required to improve system performance. The major changes in this category are discussed in the following paragraphs. Because of the partial blockage problem experience in MA-8, a suit bypass CCV was installed in parallel with the existing CCV for redundancy. A condensate trap, shown in figure 5-2.1.1-1, was installed at the suit-inlet port to extract free condensate water which would adhere to the inner wall of the water separator and thus escape extraction. The inner wall of this trap was a wicking material, which has the property of passing water, but not gas, when the material is wet. The cabin-pressure relief valve was equipped with a water sealing device to enable the astronaut to lock this valve and prevent sea water from entering the spacecraft after landing. A sensor for measuring carbon-dioxide partial pressure (PCO ) was installed in the suit circuit to indicate CO actuate a warning tone and light at a PCO concentration and

value of 8 mm Hg.

The suit inlet for emergency oxygen flow was repositioned upstream of the PCO sensor, and thereby permitted a purging of the PCO sensor with 100-percent oxygen to verify its operation. The the and The the for 5.2.1.2 suit-circuit, from the water-separator to the junction with suit-inlet flexible hose, was insulated to reduce, heat loss; the LiOH canister was insulated to minimize condensation. dome temperature, which was monitored by the astronaut during MA-8 mission, was also monitored on telemetry and recorded MA-9.

System performance: The analysis of the ECS performance during the MA-9 mission was dependent upon the results of preflight tests, real-time telemetry data, the pilot's inflight voice reports, onboard recorded data, and postflight inspection and test results. Launch phase: The suit-inlet temperature was 55° F at astronaut insertion into the spacecraft and gradually increased to 6l° F during the freon cooling period prior to lift-off. The oxygen partial pressure (PO ) readout for the cabin was 0.6 psi below total cabin pressure after the cabin was purged with oxygen at the launch site. A gas analysis at this time indicated 98-percent 0 at a cabin pressure of 1^.9 psia. At lift-off,

5 -9
the PO was O.k- psi below cabin pressure. Measurements during amplifier

the countdown did not indicate a change in the PO

calibration. The telemetry readout (percent full scale) from the PCO sensor was negative during the countdown period. This negative value is normal and results from the logarithmic voltage output characteristic of the sensor; that is, the zero reference of the sensor corresponds to a finite level of PCCL. The ECS operated normally during powered flight, and the cabin pressure held at 5-5 psia. The dome temperatures of both heat exchangers decreased during powered flight. This decrease indicates a rapid response of the cooling circuits upon reaching altitudes at which the water would boil at lower temperatures and pressures. Orbital phase: The PO at orbital insertion was 0.3 psi below

cabin pressure. The cabin pressure decayed to 5-1- psi at approximately 03:00:00, at which time cabin-pressure regulation began. The cabin pressure, which is influenced by cabin temperature, varied between 5-0 and 5-2 psi during the orbital phase. This range of pressure is within the specified tolerance of the cabin-pressure regulator. Calculations of total oxygen consumption show that 2.18 pounds of oxygen were used from 03:05:00 to 3^:05:00. These calculations were based on tabulated data for primary oxygen bottle pressure and estimates of bottle temperature. The time of 03:05:00 was chosen to correspond to the estimated time at which cabin pressure regulation began. Postflight analysis of the LiOH canister revealed that 2.90 pounds of CO were absorbed in the canister. This CO was produced during the launch attempt

on May lU, the successful launch period of May 15, the mission orbital phase, and, of minor significance, the major simulated launch and the simulated flight. Based on a total canister usage time of ^-2. h hours and neglecting the small amount of C0p produced during the simulated flight and launch, the average astronaut C0? production rate was 26l cc/min. Chemical analysis of the two auxiliary canisters used in series with the flight canister during the countdown shows average C0? rates of 26k cc/min and 285 cc/min. Since these rates are of the same order of magnitude as that calculated for the flight canister,

Page 5 - 1 0 it is concluded that the C0p rate of 26l cc/min is believable for the orbital period. Since the faceplate was estimated by the astronaut to have been open approximately one-third of this time, an undetermined amount of CO escaped into the cabin. This CO would raise the cabin PCO_ reading and leak overboard. Since there was no measurement of PCO? in the cabin, it is impossible to estimate from a systems standpoint the quantity of COp that was lost when the faceplate was open. An estimate of the maximum PCO^ in the cabin based on physiological considerations is contained later in this section. Based on this estimate, a negligible amount of C0p was lost through the open faceplate. In any case, the figure of 26l cc/min for the average CO^ production rate is a minimum value. The cabin-leakage rate determined several days prior to the first launch attempt was ^85 cc/min at 19.7 psia and 70° F. This leakage rate was determined by a stabilized flowmeter measurement. Subsequent to this check the hatch was removed and replaced several times. A brief leakage check on the day of the launch showed no detectable leakage. This check, however, was quite gross and has no particular significance. A gross leakage-rate determination after launch was obtained from the reading of cabin pressure decay from relief-valve seal-off pressure to the point when cabin-pressure regulation began. This determination showed a leakage of 510 cc/min corrected to 19.7 psia and 70° F. Extrapolating the prelaunch leakage determination from the sealevel condition to the orbital condition shows that the equivalent cabin leakage rate during the orbital period would be 0.528 X 10 Ib/min. This leakage rate is determined by computing the equivalent orifice area required to leak the ^-85 cc/min at sea level and then using this area to compute the choked orifice flow during the orbital period. Based on the average C0? production rate and a respiratory quotient (RQ) of 0.83., as noted in a later paragraph, the astronaut oxygen consumption from 03:05:00 to 3^:05:00 would be 1.84 pounds. The leakage for the same period based on extrapolated precount measurements amounts to 0.98 pound. The sum of computed astronaut consumption and computed leakage rate is therefore 2.82 pounds as compared with the calculated bottle depletion of 2.18 pounds.

Page 5 - 1 1

A high level of confidence should be placed in the calculations of total oxygen usage and astronaut metabolic consumption. The values for leakage rate are based on prelaunch measurements, and the equivalent orifice areas to produce these leakage rates are very small. It is possible that any given leakage area could change after the measurement, which would, of course, alter the leakage rate. Therefore, it is concluded that the leakage rate decreased after the prelaunch measurement. From cabin pressure decay data, there is evidence that a reduction in leakage occurred soon after the first hour of flight. The average oxygen-leakage rate, based on the difference in computed total usage and computed astronaut consumption, is 0.183 x 10 pound per minute. In addition to the oxygen leakage, there probably was a small quantity of CO and water vapor leakage which would depend on the partial pressures of these parameters in the cabin. At 1:35:00, the astronaut opened the hose clamp on the condensatetrap water-outlet line. He did not observe water flowing through the transparent line and closed the clamp, as planned, after about 30 minutes. At 8:00:00, the astronaut again removed the clamp and soon observed the flow of condensate water. The trap remained in operation until approximately 12:22:00, when the clamp was again closed. The clamp was reopened at 26:56:00 for a 6-minute period. Although it had been planned to use the trap more extensively during the flight, failure of the condensate transfer pump prompted the astronaut's decision to discontinue its use. This action was taken to minimize the possibility of water leakage through the condensate tank vent into the cabin. The astronaut observed that the water separator cycled throughout the flight. The fact that water flowed from the condensate trap, which is downstream from the water separator, indicated that the water separator was not efficiently removing condensate. Data from prelaunch and postflight tests, as well as results from previous missions, support a belief that water can move freely around the sponge in the water separator under weightless conditions, thereby reducing its water removal effectiveness. At approximately 06:22:00, the astronaut began the cabin temperature evaluation by turning off the cabin fan and coolant-water flow to the cabin heat exchanger. At this time the cabin temperature was oscillating slowly between 90° and 95° F, as shown in figure 5-2.1.2-1. The maximum cabin temperature observed during the period of evaluation was 103° F, which occurred during a powered-up condition, and the minimum temperature was 8^-° F, which occurred during an extended period while the spacecraft was powered down. The cabin temperature during the experiment oscillated approximately ±5° F, and the temperature trend was influenced by the cycling of electrical power and sun-light heat loads. The

Page 5 - 1 2 average cabin temperature during the evaluation was 90° F. At 32:05:00 the astronaut terminated the evaluation and turned on the cabin cooling system, as planned, in preparation for reentry.. The cooling system responded rapidly, as evidenced by a drop in the cabin-heat-exchanger outlet temperature. At 52:15:00, a marked increase occurred in the PCOp level, which reached 2 . mm Hg by 32:45:00. Prior to 32:15:00, the .8 PCOp was less than 0.1 mm Hg. At 32:44:20, the astronaut selected the emergency rate mode of 0? flow to purge the PCO transducer and test its readout validity. This mode was in operation for 25.5 seconds. The PCO decreased to approximately 1.9 mm Hg at 32:44:56 thereby verifying the validity of the readout. The PCO? again continued to rise gradually until 33:59:30, which is the exact time of ignition for the first retrorocket. At this time, the PCO? indication decreased sharply to shown that rapidly as bration of a negative voltage output. Test experience has the sensor indication will not normally change as it did during this brief period. Postflight calithe PCOp sensor did not indicate a significant

shift in its calibration. The LiOH canister has been tested extensively under normal gravity conditions,- and the operational life of the 5-4-pound charge of LiOH was well established. Prior to astronaut insertion on the day of the launch, the effective life of the LiOH canister had been reduced by approximately 8 hours because of usage during systems tests conducted for the unsuccessful and successful launch attempts of May l4 and 15, respectively. Calculations made after the launch attempt indicated that the canister capability was sufficient to accommodate the mission with at least a 3-hour margin. Consequently, it was known that PCO might build up during the latter part of the mission, since the useful life of the canister is defined as time required to reach a PC02 level of 8 mm Hg, rather than the time to the first indication of C02 buildup. Postflight chemical analysis of the canisters (table 5.2.11.2-1) indicates that the astronaut's carbon dioxide production was below the design level of 400 cc/min and that there was 2.18 pounds of LiOH remaining in the canister. However, postflight analysis showed that some channeling of flow occurred in the flight canister. This channeling of flow could explain the indicated PCO buildup.

"CONFIDENTIAL

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5-13

The suit heat-exchanger dome temperature is the measurement used by the astronaut to evaluate the operation of the cooling circuit. The astronaut made a considerable number of adjustments to the suit CCV, but he was unable to attain stabilization of this temperature. The requirement for this frequent adjustment presented the major anomaly in the ECS performance during the mission. The dome temperature, which ideally should be maintained between ^0° F to 55° F, is a function of the coolantwater flow and the heat load on the heat exchanger. The heat load can be affected by the astronaut's activity level, the helmet-visor position, and the cabin temperature. The dome temperature is, by nature, sensitive to small changes in the coolant-water flow rate, and the resulting dome-temperature changes can be rapid. However, the suit-inlet temperature was relatively stable and not appreciably affected by the dometemperature fluctuations. The average suit-inlet temperature for the entire mission was from 6° F to 15° F lower than those experienced during any previous flight. The cooling water used during the flight was determined by post.flight testing to be 23.38 pounds. The average coolant-flow rate for both the cabin and suit circuits was approximately 0.6 Ib/hr. This rate was determined by using estimates of CCV settings obtained from the onboard voice transcripts and postflight measurements of coolant water remaining in the system. The astronaut reported that suit pressure was at times slightly negative with respect to cabin pressure and that it was necessary to breathe deeply occasionally to correct this condition. This action causes the demand regulator to supply oxygen to the suit circuit and, therefore, increase the pressure. This condition could be corrected for operation with the faceplate closed by decreasing the negative pressure required to activate the demand regulator. A configuration using lower negative pressure was tested early in the ECS development program, and it was discovered that operation with the faceplate open caused inadvertent operation of the demand regulator and, therefore, excess oxygen usage. Reentry phase: The ECS operation during reentry and landing was normal. The snorkels actuated automatically at 3^-: 15:25 at an altitude of 18,500 feet. The astronaut reported that he was comfortable during the postlanding phase. The flapper diaphram of the cabin-air outflow valve, which is normally open after the water-sealing device in the cabin pressurerelief valve has been engaged, would ordinarily be closed by the water pressure. However, a small quantity of sea water reported to have entered the cabin upon landing could have passed through this valve prior to the closing of the diaphram.

Page 5 -

5.2.1.3

Results and conclusions: The only major anomaly in the ECS was the inability of the astronaut to stabilize the suit heatexchanger-dome temperature. A possible solution for this problem is presently under investigation. In all other respects, the operation of the system was satisfactory. The results of the cabin temperature evlauation show that cabin cooling of the Mercury spacecraft is not required during a powered-down condition. Since the astronaut observed water flow from the condensate trap, it must be concluded that an unknown percentage of condensate bypasses the water separator in a zero "g" environment. Because of the configuration of the condensate trap, it can be further concluded that the condensate water is transported along the walls of the ducting. Unlike the MA.-8 mission, the postflight calibration of the CCV's . showed no significant shift in the flow rate for a given valve setting from the preflight calibration. Prior to flight, the CCV's in the MA-9 spacecraft had been thoroughly cleaned, and their lubrication procedure had been improved. In addition, the coolant water was passed through a 0.15 micron filter before being transferred to the coolant water tank.

5.2.2

Pressure-suit assembly.- The Project Mercury pressure-suit assembly utilized on the MA-9 flight differed considerably from those used in previous flights. The areas in which changes or modifications were made are discussed in the following paragraphs. Helmet: On previous flights the helmets utilized a pneumatic system for sealing the helmet faceplate, which has been described in previous reports. The MA-9 helmet (see fig. 5.2.2.1-1) utilized a newly developed mechanical sealing system which considerably increased the reliability and operating lifetime of the system. The mechanical faceplate-sealing system consists of a pivot and crank mechanism which required that a bail (semicircular member) be manually rotated from the top-of-the-head ' ' position to the front-down position. As the faceplate assumes the down position, the bail rotation actuates a gear mechanism in the pivot housing. A crank, in turn,, is rotated to the rear by the gear mechanism which brings the faceplate back and the sides in against a sealing gasket. This action effects a complete pressure-tight seal. Other changes to the helmet include the addition of small velcro tape patches for attaching the oral temperature probe to the right ear cup and the radiation film badges to the helmet shell.

5.2.2.1

Page 5 - 15 5-2.2.2 Torso: Improvements and changes were made to the torso section of the pressure suit to provide increased comfort, performance, and mobility when pressurized. These are listed as follows: (1) The shoulder areas were rebuilt to utilize a combination sliding cable system and tapered convolute mobility design. (2) The wrist areas of the gloves were modified by adding a "link net" material, which eliminated the need for wrist restraint straps. (j) Improved foot ventilation was incorporated by the inclusion of vent channel innersoles into the boots. The boots were also made a permanent part of the torso assembly. The suit-inlet ventilation fitting was modified to incorporate a poppet type valve which automatically closes when the ECS hose nozzle is disconnected from the fitting. This would prevent water from entering the suit should the astronaut leave the spacecraft after a water landing. The helmet tiedown system incorporated a modified pulley and buckle mechanism. This modification allowed adjustment of the helmet rise by the astronaut in the event of suit pressurization. The glove-to-torso disconnect bearings were modified to incorporate an additional locking feature to prevent accidental disengagement. At the interface with the urine transfer system, a fitting was added to accomodate the urine transfer valve. The lifevest pack, previously mounted in the front upper chest area of the suit, was moved to a more convenient location on the front of the lower left leg. Accessories carried in pockets on the suit included a hankerchief, pocket folding knife, biomedical injectors, heavy-duty- scissors, and a mechanical pencil. 5.2.2.3 Suit performance: The suit performed satisfactorily throughout the flight. The astronaut stated that suit ventilation was excellent and that in the zero-g environment the presence of the suit was barely noticeable. The only problem noted was some discomfort around the knees because of pressure points in the suit at this body location. This discomfort apparently resulted from a somewhat tight fitting before the flight. Although the discomfort could be relieved by stretching the legs, the fitting of the suit at this location will receive closer attention in future missions. Water and waste management systems.- Three considerations made it necessary to change the configuration of the urine, condensate, and drinking-water systems from those flown in previous missions to accomodate the MA-9 mission requirements. First, it was possible that the condensate tank was spilling water into the cabin through the tank vent. In zero-g conditions, liquid adheres to

5-2.3

CONFIDENTIAL'

Page 5 - 16

GOPiriDDNTIAIj

the tank walls and creeps out of any wall opening, for example,, the tank vent. In addition, more recent estimates of condensate generation for the MA.-9 mission exceeded the condensate tank capacity of a"bout U pounds. Second, the capacity of the suit internal urine reservoir was insufficient to store the urine output estimated for the MA.-9 mission. In addition, it was a medical requirement that urine specimens representing various phases of the flight be collected for analysis. Third, the extended flight duration made it necessary to provide additional water for drinking and food preparation. Figure 5-2.3-1 is a schematic diagram of the MA.-9 urine and condensate system. 5.2.3.1 System description: A total of 10 pounds of potable water was aboard in the survival-kit package and a separate drinking-.water tank. The survival kit contained a polyethylene bag which was filled with 5.5 pounds of water. The drinking-water tank, with a 4.5-pound capacity, was the primary drinking-water supply and was located to the immediate right of the astronaut's head. It consisted of two separate synthetic-rubber bladders, one to contain the water and the other to pressurize the system. The bladders were mounted in a rectangular metal container equipped with a drinking tube and mouthpiece, a pressurizing hand pump, and a safety relief valve. To .drink, the astronaut would operate the pump to build up a pressure of approximately 2 psi in the container. He would then open the mouthpiece valve to extract water from the system. The mouthpiece valve snaps closed when the unit is withdrawn from the mouth. A transfer fitting was connected to the drinking-water tank to provide the capability of transferring condensate water into the tank after the drinking water was consumed. Four urine storage bags with a total combined capacity of 13 pounds were installed beneath the astronaut's couch. These bags were each connected to individual urine transfer fittings located on the right-hand console. The containers were in, two assemblies, one 7-pound-capacity bag mounted under the left side of the astronaut's couch and three 2-pound-capacity bags mounted under the right side. The bags were constructed of neoprene-coated nylon enclosed in an aluminized nylon-twill bag. Each bag was evacuated to a pressure of 6.7 psia prior to launch to remove entrapped air which, unless removed, would expand upon cabin pressure reduction. Each bag contained neomycin sulfate to prevent urine decomposition prior to analysis. A 60-cc capacity syringe pump (see fig. 5-2.3-1-1) was provided on a bracket located to the astronaut's left for urine transfer. The syringe pump inlet hose was attached to the suit urine collection bag through a connector on the astronaut's suit. The syringe outlet hose was connected to a protected needle

1ENTIAL

Page 5 - 1?

assembly which could be inserted into the desired urine transfer fitting located on the right-hand console. Pumping the syringe causes urine to flow from the suit bag to the desired storage bag beneath the couch. At the completion of urine transfer, the protected needle is withdrawn from the urine transfer fitting, and the rubber diaphragm within the fitting automatically seals. The condensate collection system was capable of storing up to 12.36 pounds of condensate in permanently installed containers and 6 pounds of condensate in small 1-pound plastic bag containers, giving a total storage capacity of over 18.36 pounds. The condensate collection components are the squeezer-type water separator, a condensate trap, the ^(--pound-capacity condensate tank, a 3-86-pound-capacity bag installed under the head rest, and the 4.5-pound potable water tank, which could be utilized after its contents were depleted. A new vent was extended into the condensate tank interior as a standpipe. The interior, or tank side, of the standpipe was coated with a non-wetting silicone material to prevent water from creeping up the standpipe and out the vent under zero-g conditions. A separate transfer syringe, similar to that in the urine transfer system, was mounted on the left side above the astronaut's head. The inlet of the syringe was connected to the 4-pound-capacity condensate tank. This syringe could be used to transfer water from the 4-pound capacity condensate tank to either the 3-86-poundcapacity bag or the 4.5-pound~capacity drinking-water tank. The condensate water was to collect initially in the 4-pound- capacity condensate tank from both the water separator and the condensate trap and then be transferred to the 3-86-pound-capacity bag under the couch headrest. After the 3-86-pound-capacity bag under the couch was filled, the condensate was then to be transferred to the 4.5-pound-capacity drinking-water tank, if the drinking water had been consumed. After these three containers were filled, the procedure would then be to transfer additional condensate to 1-pound plastic bags included in the special equipment storage kit. These plastic bags could be filled in the same manner as that used when adding water to the food packets. 5.2.3.2 Systems performance: The 4.5-pound-capacity water tank operated satisfactorily, except for the drinking-water mouthpiece. The astronaut reported that the mouthpiece leaked about the valve body when he opened it to add water to the dehydrated-food bags. A postflight failure analysis of the valve revealed that if any back pressure, such as that created when filling the food bags, is imposed at the valve outlet, it would leak between the valve locknut and the mouthpiece (fig. 5-2.3-1). This leakage could

Page 5 - 18 Toe minimized by holding the mouthpiece tightly against the locknut. If the mouthpiece was only partially opened and not held against the locknut, it would leak at a very high rate. The same test performed on a stock valve revealed similar performance. The astronaut reported satisfactory operation of the urine transfer system, except for the time required to transfer a urine sample from the suit to the urine "bags. This time increment results from the restriction to the flow of fluid caused by the small bore of the hypodermic needle used in conjunction with the transfer fittings. A quick disconnect arrangement could be used to overcome this problem. At the end of the mission, 1126 grams or 2.48 pounds of urine were removed from the urine collection "bags. At 7:^0:18, approximately 300 cc of water was pumped to the 3.86-pound-capacity condensate bag. Later in the mission, the astronaut transferred some additional condensate to this bag. He noted, however, that he could get very little fluid into the bag because of back pressure on the pump. He then drank all of the wateri he could from the 4.5-pound drinkingwater tank, relocated the needle to the drinking-water-tank inlet transfer fitting, and pumped several times into this tank. He then relocated the needle to the 3-86-pound-capacity bag transfer fitting and tried again to pump water into this bag, but with no success. He noted that the pump seemed completely jammed. He then attempted to relocate the needle to the drinking-water tank transfer fitting, but the transferfitting needle guide of the 3-86-pound-capacity bag unscrewed from its base and remained firmly affixed over the-needle. Therefore, it was impossible to insert the needle into any other transfer fitting. He then unsuccessfully attempted to transfer condensate into the 1-pound plastic bags. These events occurred at approximately 27:50:00. The syringe pump stem is made with serrations on its surface which indicate pump stroke capacity in cubic centimeters. Because of the orientation of the syringe in relation"to the astronaut, a considerable side load was placed on the plunger stem each time it was actuated. This load caused a severe broaching action between the serrated plunger stem and its metal guide. The broaching action generated metal chips and slivers, which migrated past the pump plunger, entered the system and clogged the transfer needle, thereby preventing fluid flow. The syringe pump operated normally when these metal particles were flushed out after the flight.

VV1 f .7!

Page 5-19 The malfunction of the 3-86-pound-capacity bag transfer fitting was caused by a failure to get the proper seating of a set screw between the fitting parts. The fitting consists of a base and a needle guide which screw together to retain the rubber diaphragm. The needle guide external male threads mate with female threads in the nylon cover shield of the transfer needle. When the diaphragm was replaced prior to flight, the set screw was not set firmly enough to prevent relative motion between the fitting base and needle guide. Friction between the needle guide threads and the nylon cover threads would have been great enough to cause the fitting-needle guj.de to stay with the transfer needle when disengagement was attempted. It is possible that the 3-86-poundcapacity bag evidently got some air into it after the evacuation had been performed. The expansion of this air during ascent could have reduced the capacity of the bag in orbit. The total condensate recovered after the mission was 4.2 pounds, assuming that all of the water in the 4.5-pound-capacity drinkingwater tank was condensate. The condensate removed from this tank amounted to 2.4 pounds. In addition, 0.7 pound of condensate was removed from the 3.86-pound-capacity bag, and 1.1 pounds of condensate was removed from the 4-pound-capacity condensate tank. 5-2.4 5.2.4.1 Thermal and water balance analyses.Metabolic analysis: The average metabolic heat production during the mission may be calculated quite accurately from the amount of carbon dioxide (COp) absorbed in the lithium hydroxide (LiOH) canister. The rate of COp absorption during the mission, including that experienced prior to both lift-off attempts, was 26l cc/min at standard temperature and pressure (STP). One correction to this figure would be the COp lost through cabin leakage. With the faceplate closed, the partial pressure of C0p in the cabin would be zero. However, the astronaut had his faceplate open at times during the flight, and some COp will have been lost directly to the cabin. It is not possible to determine accurately the average COp partial pressure in the cabin during the flight, but the amount was most likely well below 10 mm Hg. Therefore, the leakage rate of C0p probably did not exceed 2 cc/min (STP). Assuming a normal respiratory quotient (RQ) of 0.83, the average metabolic heat production was 92 kilocalories/hr (kcal/hr), or 370 B.t.u./hr. The astronaut's surface area is

GQNFIDENTIAlr

Page 5 - 2 0
• j

1.83 m } and his heat production per unit area was, there2 2 fore, 50 kcal/m -hr, or 200 B.t.u./m -hr- These values are 2 lower than the 57-kcal/m -hr figure estimated prior to flight on the basis of C0p absorption in the' canisters used during previous Mercury flights. The average inflight metabolic rate was equal to that of a nonfasting subject seated quietly at rest on the ground. This rate would be lower during sleep and higher during activity. There was no instrumentation available for recording these variations. From the assumed RQ of O.Sj, total oxygen consumption by the astronaut during the orbital: phase of the mission was 2.05 pounds, which corresponds to a usage rate of 301 cc/min (STP). This value has been used in a previous section for the computation of cabin leakage. Since the cabin ECS fan was turned off for most of the flight, convective heat exchange between the pressure suit surface and the cabin gas was undoubtedly lower than with the fan operating. The mean cabin temperature of 90° F was comparable to the astronaut's mean skin temperature of about 95° F. Taken together, these factors indicate that the astronaut's heat loss to the cabin must have been small. If it is assumed that half the heat taken up by the ventilating oxygen between the suit-inlet and outlet ports was extracted from the astronaut's skin^ then the remainder of the metabolic heat production must have been dissipated in the vaporization of moisture from the lungs and from the skin. Convective cooling would then account for about 12 kcal/hr, and the latent heat of vaporization would account for 80 kcal/hr. This latter figure is equivalent to a body-water vapor loss of 0.3 Ib/hr, or 11.0 pounds for the total time spent in the spacecraft during the mission. The astronaut was sweating throughout the flight, which is confirmed by his comment that he was usually warm.
Oral temperatures of the astronaut taken in the spacecraft during the mission were as follows: Time Oral temperature , 9F

T-15 min

1:10:00
6:00:00

97-5 98-5
100 0. 100 0.

10:25:00
12:25:00 23:50:00

99-0

98.0

No significant correlation could be found between the temperatures of the astronaut and the cabin or with the times during which the condensate trap was or was not operating. A

Page 5 - 2 1 calculation of the metabolic rate at specific times during the flight was not possible because of insufficient instrumentation. It is likely that the two readings of 100.0° F are related to the combined effects of a mild sustained heat stress and moderate physical activity during the early part of the flight. Further analysis of the thermal condition of the astronaut is not possible because of the absence of detailed data for cabin environmental conditions and metabolic, rates. It can be said that the deep body temperature did not vary from normal sufficiently to impair the astronaut's inflight performance. However, the astronaut's skin temperature and sweat rate were at somewhat higher levels than those considered to be ideal for a suited pilot over this period of time. The estimate of 11.0 pounds for body-water vapor loss, calculated from the thermal balance, can be verified by a calculation of the vapor loss from body-mass balance if all of the relevant data are accurately known. The major unknown is the intake of drinking water. The astronaut was not certain that he emptied his ^^-pound-capacity drinking-water tank before adding condensate to this tank. The mass balance of the astronaut is given in table 5.2.4.1-1. The maximum possible body-water vapor loss is seen to be 10.1 pounds. The actual loss would be less than this value by the difference between 4.5 pounds and the amount that was actually drunk from the drinking-water tank. At recovery of the spacecraft, 2.4 pounds of water were present in the tank, and some of this was condensate. The minimum value for consumption of drinking water from the tank is therefore 2.1 pounds, and the actual consumption was probably nearer to 4.5 pounds. The amount for body water vapor loss, calculated from the mass balance, is less by at least 0-9 pound than the value calculated from heat exchange. The heat-exchange value of 11.0 pounds is calculated on the assumption that all water evaporated from the skin came from sweat. During the time that the condensate trap was turned off, primarily the entire period after 12:14:00, free water must have passed into the suit and been absorbed by the astronaut's undergarment. This water was subsequently evaporated into the ventilating gas and, therefore, reduced the need for sweat production. This regenerative cooling has been observed during various simulations and experiments in the altitude chamber, where the free water condensed out by the suit-circuit heat exchanger was allowed to pass back into the suit. Since some water must have passed into the suit, the total body water vapor loss (maximum, 10.1 Ib) will have been less than the amount predicted from the thermal balance (ll Ib.). The astronaut was not able to differentiate between the degrees of wetness

INriDENTLIL"

Page 5 - 2 2 of his skin and undergarment when the condensate trap was clamped off and when it was in operation. The pilot did state that he was somewhat cooler and more comfortable when the condensate trap was operating. His undergarment was apparently wet at all times during the flight. Total water input into the suit circuit also included approximately 1 pound of water liberated from the lithium hydroxide canister. Total water recovery from the system should have been 11.1 pounds. Of this quantity, the following amounts were recovered and measured: Container 3. 86 -pound -capacity condensate bags U-pound-capacity condensate tank Lithium hydroxide canister Water, Ib
0.7 1.1 0.2

This tabulation leaves 9-1 pounds of water which can only be accounted for as follows: Source Condensate pumped into drinkingwater tank, maximum
Residual water left in the undergarment and space suit (estimated minimum figure from previous laboratory experiment)3 Water lost into spacecraft from the condensate tank and leaking valves Water loss from cabin ECS circuit during ventilation with ambient air after snorkels open during reentry Residual water in suit environmental control system Not measured. Values not yet available. 'Negligible and cannot be calculated from present data.

Water, Ib

2.0 (b)

(c) (d)

d

Cannot be meaningfully calculated because of inaccuracies.

Page 5 - 2 J It is emphasized that the computations of thermal and vater balance is subject to considerable inaccuracy because of the lack of specific measurements of some of the variables. The various locations of water and rates of vater loss given above could account for the total water input of a maximum of 11.1 pounds to the suit circuit of the environmental control system. 5.2.4.2 Food and water consumption: The astronaut's total food consumption during the flight was as follows: Time when eaten, hr:min:sec 06:32:15 0^:53:58 06:32:15 26:1^:^2 Amount, gm Value, kcal

Item One bacon square One container of dessert cubes One -third packet of dehydrated beef pot roast Two fruit cakes One container of peanut butter sandwiches Totals

5

19

88

429

11: 16: 04

1

32

26: 14:42 28:29:41

2k

92
124 696

28:29:41

_22_
146

Although the astronaut was not hungry, he found that the food he ate tasted good. He wanted to try the freezedehydrated foods and juices, but he was unable to put sufficient water into the food reconstitution bags because of leakage from the drinking water valve. The valve was tested after the flight and found to leak freely when the nozzle was at intermediate positions between off and fully open. There was, therefore, an inadequate pressure head to fill the food bags with water.

Page 5 - 2^

During the flight the astronaut noticed that the packet containing "beef sandwiches was full of floating crumbs and did not open it. The tapes of the cube food dispensers were a source of considerable trouble under weightless conditions. When the empty containers were stored after use in the desk, the tapes fluttered around each time the desk lid was opened. The caloric value of the food eaten in flight was less than that needed to balance caloric expenditure, but adequate to prevent ketosis. The astronaut was dehydrated at the end of the flight. This dehydration was evident from his complaints of thirstiness in the last two orbital passes, from the water-balance figures given previously, and from his• clinical condition at the postflight medical examination (see the aeromedical analysis section). The final flight plan called for the astronaut to drink all of the water from his survival kit, if necessary. Had this been done, the majority of the water deficit would have been covered, since there'was a further ^.9 pounds of water available in the survival-kit bag at the end of the flight. There were three reasons why this water was not used appreciably: 1. A real thirst was not experienced until the last two orbital passes, when the astronaut was preoccupied with systems problems. 2. He experienced some difficulty with a valve similar to that on the drinking-water tank which made him reluctant to spend too much time in freeing the tube from its fastened position. J. He did not wish to take too much water from the survival kit in case he should need it after landing. It is possible that this dehydration played a significant part in the cardiovascular symptoms of near-syncope exhibited by the astronaut upon leaving the spacecraft. This phenomenon is discussed in greater detail in the aeromedical analysis section.

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Page 5 - 2 6

TABLE 5.2 A.1-1.- BODY-MASS BALANCE SUMMARY

Source

Weight, Ib

Available for output as vapor Maximum water intake from drinking water tank Survival-kit water Food Oxygen (assuming an RQ of 0.8j)
Body weight loss Total

^•5
1.2

0.3
2.2

7-0 15-2

Not available for output as vapor Urine Carbon dioxide Total

2.6 2.5

5-1
10.1

Difference, maxim-urn water vapor loss from body

5 - 27

5-'3

Communications Systems

Performance of the spacecraft communications systems was excellent during the MA-9 mission. The major modifications to these systems since the previous mission include removal of the low-power UKF voice transmitter-receiver, the addition of the capability to disable the UHF power amplifier, the addition of a slow-scan TV system (see fig. 5-3-1) for flight evaluation and the capability to use the TV transmitter as a backup to the TM transmitter, and changing the extending-mechanism pressure source for the HF recovery (whip) antenna from a gas generator to the onboard manual RCS nitrogen supply. 5.3-1 Voice communications.- The performance of the voice communications equipment was excellent. Acquisition and loss of UHF communications occurred, as expected, at about line-of-sight ranges. Good-quality HF communications between the Coastal Sentry Quebec (CSQ) command ship and the astronaut were established during the 20th and 21st orbital passes and maintained several minutes before and after line of sight, which is equivalent to a slant range of about 1,500 nautical miles. An HF voice transmitter-receiver test was conducted by the astronaut utilizing the HF dipole antenna. The test was initiated near the end of the 19th pass when the spacecraft was just north of Panama. The stations that reported receiving the HF signals were Mercury Control Center (MCC)) Hangar S; Point Arguello, California (CAL)> Guaymas, Mexico (GYM.); Corpus Christi, Texas ( E ) Grand Turk TX; Island in the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR), Grand Bahama Island (GBl)} White Sands, New Mexico; and Houston, Texas. The spacecraft attitude appeared to have had little effect on signal reception; however, the data obtained during this test are presently being evaluated. The astronaut reported that he found it desirable to maintain his UHF volume control at a higher setting than normal. Investigation of the need for this high setting is continuing. The HF and UHF voice equipment was tested after the flight and found to be in satisfactory condition. Radar beacons.- Performance of the C- and S-band radar beacons was satisfactory. As in all previous missions, instances of amplitude and slight frequency modulation were experienced on the C-band beacon. This condition is not serious and is caused by the phase shifter and, at times, by poor antenna orientation resulting from the spacecraft's being in attitude-free drifting flight. The beacons were found to be satisfactory in postflight tests. Location aids.- Recovery forces reported that transmissions from all recovery beacons were received. (See section 9-2, Recovery Operations.) HF voice communication equipment was not utilized by the astronaut during recovery. All recovery communications equipment was checked after the flight and found to be satisfactory.

5-3-2

5-3-3

Page 5 - 2 8 5.3.4 Command receiver. - Operation of the command receiver was normal throughout the mission with the exception of spurious command carrier reception from 03:35:00 to 03:38:00, 11:24:00 to 11:27:00, and 27:10:40 to 27:13:20. Between 27:10:40 and 27:13:20, eight all-channel indications with signal strengths from — to 2 microvolts were noted. These time periods of spurious command receiver reception correspond to the time during the 3rd, 8th, and l8th passes when the spacecraft was in the vicinity of the west coast of Africa. The receiver was tested after the flight and found to be within specification requirements. Investigation to determine the cause of these indications is continuing. 5.3.5 Television system. - Operation of the television transmitter was satisfactory, and good-quality signal strength was received by the ground station in both the television and telemetry modes of operation. However, the quality of the pictures received was unsatisfactory. Pictures taken of the astronaut and objects inside the spacecraft were of poor quality because of insufficient light for the lens arrangement used. An example of the best quality picture of the astronaut that was received is shown in figures 5-3-5-1- Most of the pictures taken of objects outside the spacecraft were also unsatisfactory, and it is believed that too much sunlight was the cause of this quality degradation. The system appears to be capable of indicating cloud coverage and even land masses under proper lighting conditions. The picture shown in figure 5-3-5-2 was transmitted over Cape Canaveral during the 19th orbital pass and is one of the better examples of TV photographs taken through the window. 5- 4 Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems Although the mechanical and pyrotechnic systems performed satisfactorily, two anomalies were noted. The spacecraft window was coated on the inside surface of the outer pane with an unknown substance, and the three retropackage umbilicals and one spacecraft-to-adapter umbilical failed to separate from the spacecraft. All other components, in this system group apparently performed their function as planned. 5.4.1 Recovery sequence.- The recovery sequence system was not changed from that used on the MA-8 mission, and the sequence was conducted satisfactorily. Parachutes.- The performance of the drogue and main parachutes upon deployment was satisfactory. Neither the drogue nor the main parachute was recovered for postflight inspection, but the astronaut reported that both parachutes were deployed cleanly and were undamaged during descent. The only difference in the parachute system from that flown in MA-8 was a minor

5.4.2

Page 5 - 2 9

modification to the main and reserve parachute deployment bags to provide greater resistance to tearing. Since the bag was not recovered, an examination to determine if the modification was effective was not possible. The drogue parachute was deployed manually at a pressure altitude of 38,100 ft, standard day conditions. The main parachute was deployed automatically at a pressure altitude of ' 0 3 0 ft, 1,0 standard day conditions. This altitude is within the specification value of 1 , 0 ± 750 feet. 060 5A.3 Rockets and pyrotechnics.- A postflight examination of the spacecraft and an analysis of the pertinent data indicate that all rockets and pyrotechnics, with the exception of the umbilical- disconnect explosive squibs, functioned normally. It cannot be determined whether certain pyrotechnics actually ignited (such as redundant clamp-ring bolts and tower-jettison igniter) since the available information shows only that the resulting function was satisfactory. The three retropackage umbilicals and one of the two spacecraft-to-adapter umbilicals failed to separate from the spacecraft and were still attached to the spacecraft during the postflight inspection. Subsequent investigation has revealed that nine of the ten umbilical squibs, two for each of the five umbilical disconnects, were from the same lot. The investigation has also shown that each of the unused squibs from this lot was loaded with only 18 milligrams of lead styphnate. The proper load (see fig. 5.^.3-1) is 108 milligrams of lead styphnate and, with proper loading, ignition of one of the two squibs, is sufficient to separate an umbilical. The postflight investigation indicated that all bridgewires in the recovered squibs had apparently been electrically ignited, indicating that an ignition signal had been sent. Based upon these results, it is concluded that the umbilicals failed to separate from the spacecraft because the squibs were not loaded with a sufficient amount of explosive. One of the two spacecraft-to-adapter umbilicals had one squib from a different lot, and this umbilical separated cleanly from the spacecraft. Postflight tests of squibs in the lot from which the good flight squib had been taken indicated that each unit in this lot contained the proper amount of explosive charge. Explosive-actuated hatch.- The explosive-actuated side hatch was operated after the spacecraft was placed on board the recovery ship. Hatch actuation was normal although the outer pane of the spacecraft window was fractured at the time of actuation. In addition, the outer skin of the pressure vessel was cracked in two places, and these cracks may have occurred at the time of actuation. Since neither the skin nor the window was cracked before flight, and since the hatch imparts considerable energy to the spacecraft structure, these anomalies are not considered to be a problem and no investigation is planned.

5.^.Jf

5.^.5

Spacecraft window. - The astronaut reported that the spacecraft window was coated with some type of substance that caused the window to have a frosted appearance under oblique lighting conditions. This coating was on the inside surface of the outer pane. A postflight analysis of the surface failed to show anything that could cause this coating and the investigation is continuing. Landing-shock attenuation system.- The MA-9 landing-shock attenuation system differed from the MA-8 configuration in that the pressure tank of the landing-bag actuation system was altered in shape and moved to the opposite side of the spacecraft to make room for the hydrogen' peroxide fuel tank that was added to the RCS, and the check valve on the ground checkout port was, deleted. landing bag.- The landing bag was deployed at a pressure altitude of 9,500 feet, and the system performed normally, as evidenced by the astronaut's statements and from postflight examination. The postflight examination of the bag revealed some small tears and rips, but they were of a minor nature. The straps and cables were not damaged beyond that normally expected. Ablation shield and main pressure bulkhead. - The ablation shield appeared to be intact, and only minor circumferential cracks were noted. The fiber glass protective shield had been scarred by the heat-shield lugs, indicating-that minor recontact, less than in previous flights, haS occurred. The main pressure bulkhead did not exhibit any visible damage. A more detailed discussion of heat-shield performance is contained in section 5-7Flotation. - Reports and photographs from the recovery forces and the astronaut indicate that the spacecraft righted itself quickly and floated at the proper attitude once the parachutes had been jettisoned. 5-5 Electrical and Sequential Systems

5-^.6

5-^.6.1

5-^.6.2

5.^.7

5.5.1

Electrical system.- The major modifications to the electrical system of the MA-9 spacecraft since the previous mission include the replacement of the two 1,500 watt-hour standby batteries with two 3^000 watt-hour batteries to increase the available electrical energy, the -replacement of the main inverters with more efficient units which also had improved starting and cooling characteristics, the addition of a standby-inverter automatic tone generator to indicate automatic switching of the inverter to either a-c bus, the addition of a switch to allow repowering of certain buses after landing to permit postlanding recordings of bloodpressure and EGG readings, and the addition of an on-off switch in the flashing recovery light circuit.

Page 5 - 3 1 All electrical system components operated satisfactorily throughout the flight. Voltage and current profiles were as expected with the exception of those from the electrically shorted ASCS bus. Energy consumption was measured at V? percent of that available, and usage is apportioned as follows: Mission phase Countdown, May lh, 1963 Countdown, May 15, 1963 Lift-off through recovery Total power consumed Power derived during postflight discharge Total spacecraft power available Energy consumed, watt-hours

257 189 7,620

8,7^8

l6,Qik

The short circuit of the ASCS bus is covered in detail in section 5-l> Spacecraft Control System, and the results produced by the short circuit are described below. All electrical a-c inverters operated normally during the flight until 33:02:^5; at which time the ASCS bus voltage dropped from approximately its normal level of 115 v a-c to nearly zero. The astronaut noted at this time that the faulty inverter circuit appeared to be cycling on and off. He made several electrical checks and noted an indication of about 1*4-0 volts at the ASCS a-c bus. He then switched the ASCS bus to the off position, thereby powering down both the main and standby 250 v-amp inverters. He subsequently placed the inverter switch in the standby position and powered the ASCS bus with that inverter. When the standby inverter failed to start, he replaced the switch to the off position and did not attempt to repower the ASCS bus except for three brief checks of the circuit during the final orbital pass. A postflight inspection and analysis of both inverters showed that each was operating properly. However, a short circuit with a resistance of about 1.5 ohms was measured at the power plug in the ASCS circuit. When the ASCS inverter was exposed to this short during postflight testing, the voltage dropped from Il6 to 3 volts. The voltage-sensing relay on the inverter output that applies the voltage to the ASCS bus immediately began a cycling operation of dropping out and pulling in.as the short circuit was alternately applied and removed from the inverter output

At

5

32

CONFIDENTIAL*
circuit. The large inductance associated with the output impedance of the inverter, along with the high rate of current change, resulted in large 600-volt spikes that shorted the parallel diode (peak inverse voltage rating of 300 volts) across the voltage sensing relay. With this diode shorted, the relay stabilized in its deenergized state and caused the standby inverter automatically to begin powering the shorted bus at 3 volts. The standby inverter warning light came on at this time. During this test, the standby inverter would not come up to full power because of the short circuit which was present at the power plug. Because this circuit failure could be easily duplicated in the laboratory following the flight, it is believed a short circuit which prevented their proper operation could have existed in flight and that no malfunction of the inverters was present at any time during the flight. Additional laboratory tests show that the 1^0-volt a-c meter reading reported by the astronaut resulted from operation of the inverter under the unusual remaining load in the circuit, which consisted of a 100,000-ohm resistor in parallel with a diode other than the one which was shorted.

5-5-2

Sequential system.- The major modifications to the sequential system of the MA.-9 spacecraft include rewiring of the pilot's abort circuitry to prevent inadvertent ignition of the towerjettison rocket motor, rewiring of the retrorocket arm switch to provide the capability of disarming both the main and isolated retrorocket squibs with automatic bypass at retrograde signal, rewiring of the."fire-retro" green telelite to make it dependent on the ignition of all three retrorockets, and paralleling the no. 1 and no. 2 main parachute arming circuits to increase reliability in arming the 21,000 ft drogue parachute barostats. The sequential system operated satisfactorily throughout the mission, except for the premature 0.05g signal from the amplifier-calibrator, which is discussed in section 5-1- This signal caused the sequential system to remove power from the attitude gyros, the automatic retrosequence circuitry, the automatic retropackage jettison circuitry, and the retrorocket telelites. Since these functions were latched out,' the pilot was forced to use the emergency retrofire circuitry and to jettison the retropackage manually. Since the antenna canister was not recovered, the failure of the balloon deployment mechanism cannot be explained. Onboard telemetry verifies that the squib firing relay used in deploying the balloon was properly actuated. A more detailed explanation of this failure can be found in section 5-8

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5-33

5. 6

Instrumentation System

The instrumentation system monitors certain parameters relating to specific equipment in the spacecraft, and, in general, the data are either displayed to the astronaut or transmitted to the ground, or "both. The data transmitted are also recorded on the onboard tape recorder along with additional data vhich are neither displayed nor transmitted. 5.6.1 System description.- The major changes made to the MA-9 instrumentation system include deleting the high frequency telemetry system and the low-level temperature survey; adding switches to allow the astronaut to select continuous, off, or ground command for the telemetry transmitter and continuous, off, or program for the onboard tape recorder; adding a switch to allow the astronaut to remove power from the R- and Z-calibration relays in the event the programer failed to perform this function; 7 changing the speed of the onboard tape recorder from ITT inches per second (ips) to T? ips to increase recording time; and adding a new type programer which was to perform the following functions: 1. One minute of "on" time of the onboard tape recorder every 10 minutes of elapsed time, with 15 seconds each of Z- and R-calibrations during the last 30 seconds of the sixth cycle. 2. Six minutes of "on" time of the telemetry transmitter together with 15 seconds each of R- and Z-calibrations after a telemetry "on" command from the ground has been received. 3. Six minutes of "on" time of the C-band beacon together with 15 seconds each of R- and Z-calibrations after a C-band beacon "on" command from the ground has been received. U. Six minutes of "on" time of the S-band beacon together with 15 seconds each of R- and Z-calibrations after an S-band beacon "on" command from the ground has been received. In addition, the astronaut observer camera was replaced with a l6-mm movie camera, which is shown in figure 5-6.1-1. The l6-mm camera was a magazine loaded unit which was internally powered by fourteen R-^-01 mercury cells. The camera could be hand held by the pilot, mounted on the instrument panel to photograph the pilot, or mounted at the window to photograph objects outside the spacecraft. Three magazines of film were provided. Two magazines were each loaded with approximately 120 feet of Eastman Ecktachrome film and they were to be used for pilot observer, general, and reentry photography. The

Page third magazine was loaded with approximately 90 feet of Eastman Linograph Sheirburst film, and it was to "be used to photograph the balloon. Two lenses were also provided with the camera. One lens was a Fairchild fixed-focus f/2.0 2-mm wide angle lens with a l6o° field of view, which was to be used for pilot observer, balloon, and reentry photography. The other lens was a Leitz Wetzlar Elmar f/2.8 50-mm telephoto lens, which was to be used for balloon tracking and general photography. 5-6.2 System performance.- The oxygen partial pressure (P00) reading d 1 was approximately ^ psi lower than the indicated cabin pressure at lift-off. A gradual decrease in the PCL sensor indication occurred until a reading of 1 psi lower than cabin pressure was present by the 12th .orbital pass. Data derived during the 0 purge in the launch countdown and during exposure to ambient air immediately following landing indicate that this sensor operated normally throughout the flight. A postflight check of the sensor revealed that it was dried out and would not be expected to respond to variations in oxygen partial pressure. Although the P0p sensor is believed not to have malfunctioned, investigations are continuing. Two sets of R and Z calibrations occurred at the end of the first orbital pass. Four more sets occurred at the end of the second pass before the astronaut placed the programer R and Z calibration switch to off. The switch was turned back to the automatic position at the beginning of the third pass and the R and Z calibrations were normal for the remainder of the flight. It should be noted that, prior to flight, the possibility was recognized of improper operation in the "B" section of the programer, which schedules the R- and Z-calibration commands, was sensitive to spurious signals at the main power input. Since these signals could cause repetitive R and Z calibrations, a resistor was added to the command input circuitry to reduce the programer's susceptability to transient voltage spikes, and a switch was added to provide the astronaut the capability to remove power from the R- and Z-calibration relays in the event the programer failed to operate properly. Although it is believed that one or more voltage transients caused the programer to cycle improperly, the exact nature or source of the transients is not known, and further studies are being conducted. During the 1^-th or 15th orbital pass, the respiration rate and depth readout became erratic. This condition continued throughout the remainder of the flight. The sensor was found "loose"

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when the astronaut was desuited aboard the recovery ship. A postflight check of the harness disclosed a failed solder joint for one of the wires to the side impedance pneumograph electrode. Initial playback of the onboard tape indicated that the tape recorder failed to operate in the program mode after 1 : 8 1 . 21:9 Recorder operation in the continuous and vox-record modes was normal throughout the mission. A postflight test of the programer indicated that the "A" section, which controls the program mode of recording, was completely inoperative. Visual inspection of the programer revealed that the "A" section was inoperative because the mechanical timer was jammed. This jamming was caused by a misalined gear, which resulted from a broken gear shaft. The misalined gear is shown in figure 5-6-2-1. At retrofire, the indicated carbon dioxide partial pressure decreased rapidly from 3-0 mm Hg to zero. Postflight testing 'revealed a J-percent calibration shift which would not account for the inflight occurrence. However, methods have been found for. duplicating the sudden drop in PCCU, but these findings as yet have not been correlated with realistic conditions- which could exist in the spacecraft. Investigations to determine the cause of this problem are continuing. Immediately after retrofire, the indicated temperature of the 150 v-amp inverter decreased from 120° F to 86° F in 35 seconds. The indicated temperature then increased slowly, followed by a slow decrease just prior to drogue parachute deployment. About 30 seconds after drogue deployment, the indicated temperature increased rapidly to 120° F. The temperature of the 250 v-amp standby inverter also increased momentarily at this time by about 6° F. The indicated readings are considered to have been valid, since the sensors involved were found to be intact and operating normally. Although the possibility exists that free water in the cabin at retrofire could have been deposited on or near these sensors, thereby reducing the local temperature suddenly, this thesis cannot be confirmed and further investigations are presently in progress. At 3^-:09:24, there was dropout in the voltage control oscillator (VCO) outputs for the balloon experiment and for the roll, pitch, and yaw stick positions. This dropout lasted until 3^:12:51, at which time the stick position outputs returned to normal. Postflight testing on the stick position VCO's revealed, however, that they were functioning normally. The balloon experiment VCO could not be tested because it was in the antenna canister, which was not recovered at landing. Because all of the associated spacecraft components, except the retropackage and the antenna canister, which were not recovered, functioned normally during postflight tests, no explanation can be found for the dropout of these signals.

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5-36 5-7 Heat Protection System

The spacecraft heat-protection system performed satisfactorily as in previous missions. Detailed discussion is presented in the following paragraphs. 5-7-1 Heat shield.- The materials and construction of the heat shield were the same as those for heat shields used on previous orbital missions with the exception that six "bolts were installed in a circle having a radius of 1^ inches from the center of the heat shield to aid in retaining the shingle portion of the shield at landing in case of "bond-line separation. These bolts were ^ inch in diameter and O.Qkk inch in length, had 28 Universal National fine threads to the inch, and were constructed of high-temperature corrosion-resistent steel. Postflight examination revealed only minor cracks in the ablation laminate. A section through the center of the shield indicated that the bond line had separated, but that it had been held within the tolerance of the bolt installations. The separated area was not nearly as extensive as that evident on the MA-8 heat shield, and the surfaces of the separation region were smooth. No large cracks were observed to emanate from the separated bond-line area, as has occurred in the previous two flights. During reentry, the heat shield provided satisfactory thermal protection, as on all previous orbital missions. The extended time of exposure of the heat shield to the space environment did not result in any noticeable effects regarding the heatshield performance. As expected, the stagnation point appears to have been close to the center of the shield, as evidenced by the usual glass droplet streaks that extend out from this point. (See fig. 5-7-l-'l- ) The reentry heating appeared to be uniform over the shield, as indicated by 10 core samples taken at various locations. Char depth measurements of these samples indicated normal heating, and these values varied from O.J to O.J5 inch as in previous missions. A bond-line temperature measurement was made in flight at approximately the geometric center of the shield. The maximum temperature experienced at this location was Ul5° F and occurred a short time after main parachute deployment. This value is in agreement with previous bond-line temperature measurements. During the orbital phase, the heat-shield showed a fairly steady temperature increase from 60° F at insertion to 90° F just before reentry.

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The measured weight loss of the heat shield was 15-3^ pounds, which is comparable to that which was measured following previous orbital missions.

5-7-2

Afterbody. - No temperature measurements were made on the
conical and cylindrical sections of the spacecraft. Postf light examination of the shingles revealed no areas where adverse heating occurred.

5-7-3

Paint patch evaluation.- Three individual types of white paint coatings were applied to a Rene ' 4l shingle on the conical section, as shown in figure 3 • 1-1 • Each patch was 6 inches square and approximately h mils in thickness. The three types of pigments were titanium dioxide, zinc oxide, and zirconium oxide. The coatings were applied with a thermaldrying binder and cured with a special application to obtain better adhesion and color characteristics . Previous attempts to obtain similar results were not successful, probably because an air-drying binder was used. Postflight inspection revealed that all three coatings were discolored. The titanium dioxide and zinc oxide coatings remained bonded to the shingle; however, the zirconium oxide coating exhibited extensive peeling. (See fig. 5-7-3-1- ) The paint patches did not experience erosion, as was evident on previous flights. Further laboratory investigations are necessary before a conclusion can be reached regarding discoloration and flaking.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5 ~ 5.8 Scientific Experiments A number of experiments and scientific observations were planned for the MA-9 mission. These experiments were concerned with atmospheric drag measurements, visual acquisition and tracking effectiveness, various photographic exercises, cosmic radiation measurements, and general pilot observations. The results of this experimental effort, which utilized equipment or materials not normally associated with the basic spacecraft operation, are briefly summarized in the following paragraphs. 5-8.1 Dim-light photography. • - The dim-light photography experiment was intended to provide photographic data on two phenomena, which are best observed from outside the earth's atmosphere. These phenomena are the so-called zodiacal light and the night airglow. Photographs of the zodiacal light would help to determine its exact origin, geometric distribution, and relationship to solar radiation and flare activity. Data on the airglow would provide further information on the solarenergy conversion processes occurring in the upper atmosphere.
Observations of the zodiacal light are partially obscured or become impossible when viewed through the atmosphere because of absorption and scattering. For example, measurements of the brightness of the zodiacal light within 30° °f ^he sun have not been possible because of the interference of twilight. Space flights provide an excellent opportunity to view the bright night airglow band in profile. Some data were collected during the MA.- 7 mission on the altitude and brightness of the airglow layer above the earth by observing and timing the passage of a star through it. The photographs planned for the MA.- 9 mission were intended to provide\ further information on the brightness, structure, and altitude of this airglow band. The camera used in this experiemnt was a semi-automatic 35-mm hand-held instrument fitted with a fast lens which is shown in figure 5-8.1-1. The square aperture of the shutter limited the speed of the lens to an equivalent of f/0. 95- Its controls were simplified so that operation by the pilot in a pressure suit would be facilitated. Exposures were manually timed by depressing a trip button for the duration of the exposure. For aiming purposes, three small supports or "feet," capped with silicone rubber, were provided to assist in maintining the camera in a fixed position relative to the spacecraft window. The camera field of view was 35° total angle, with little vignetting over the field. Ansco H 529 emulsion film, having a film speed of 200, was used for the experiment.

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With the spacecraft in retroattitude, the camera was to be held against the window so that the nominal position of the earth's horizon would "be 5° below the center of the frame. Dim-light photography was performed on the night side of the l6th orbital pass with all cabin lights out. Just prior to sunset,, the spacecraft was oriented into the plane of the ecliptic and flown on automatic attitude control throughout the zodical- light photography period. This sequence was started just after sunset and several photographs, varying in exposure duration from one to 30 seconds, were taken. The initiation and conclusion of all exposures were planned to be voice-marked on the onboard tape to time the duration of each exposure. A total of 17 exposures were made of the zodiacal light during this mission. Upon completion of the zodiacal-light photographs, the gyro switch was placed in the slave position and the spacecraft was slowly reoriented to orbit attitude. Throughout the remainder of the night period, five series, each containing a 2-minute, a JO-second, and a 10-second exposure, were made of the horizon and airglow layer. A total of 15 exposures were made in this series. Two 30-second and two 1-second exposures were made of the western horizon when the spacecraft was passing over the terminator at sunrise. Since much of the analysis depends on conducting microdensitometry of the film, it is premature at this time to present conclusions for this experiment. A general summary of the photographs obtained, however, is available. In the zodiacal-light sequence, the first two frames showed exposures of dim light, and all exposures contain stars. The photographs, however, are generally underexposed and will be of limited value for analysis. Because of the strong gradient in the zodiacallight intensity near the sun, either a small delay in beginning the photography sequence or improper camera aiming would result in underexposure of the film. A delay of 2 minutes in beginning the exposures, an 8° e'rror in aiming the camera, or a combination of the two could decrease the light intensity by a factor of 10. Because of the known variance in spacecraft attitude when in the automatic control mode, some attitude misalinement would naturally be expected. The astronaut also stated that the message he transmitted over Zanzibar on the 16th orbital pass delayed him somewhat in preparing for the dim-light experiment, and preliminary data indicate that the sequence was not begun until 1 minute ^0 seconds after sunset. However, the star patterns appearing in the zodiacal-light photographs should provide a reference from which camera sighting can be accurately reconstructed.

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The exposures in each of the five series of -airglow photographs were all of usable quality. Figure 5-8.1-2 is a representative photograph of this series, shoving the thin "band of the airglow layer just above the horizon. Some of the 2-minute exposures are slightly blurred by rates in roll and pitch, but most of the 10-second exposures are quite sharp, vith the airglow layer located near the base of the photograph. Preliminary measurements of the angular thickness of the airglow layer indicate that the layer is about 5-5° in thickness. The four exposures made at sunrise were all overexposed. 5.8.2 Ground-light experiment.- The ground-light experiment was designed to evaluate the operational problems associated with visual acquisition from space of earth-based lights and to compare the observed brightness with predicted values. This type of information is necessary to determine the feasibility of using ground lights as navigation fixes during future space missions. The light assembly used for this experiment was a pulsed xenonarc type consisting of three sections of six lamps each as shown in figure 5-8.2-1. The lamps were mounted in a shallow open-top box above a polished reflective surface. The circuit was operated by a 50-cycle three-phase electrical power supply, and the lamps in each section flashed 50 times a second with an input of 27-5 watt-seconds per flash per lamp. Based on a if-0-kilowatt nominal input to the lamp power supply, the computed average intensity of the light was estimated to be approximately 1 0 0 0 candles in the hemisphere above the light. 2,0 The light was located in the Republic of South Africa, 6 miles east of the town Bloemfontein, which is at 29°06' S latitude, 26cl8' E longitude, and k,k^>k feet in elevation. With the spacecraft at an attitude of -^0° in pitch and 0° in roll and yaw, the light would first come into view at about 8:23:00 and a slant range of 320 nautical miles with an estimated intensity of about a 2.8-magnitude star. The lamp was turned on at 8:21:56 and turned off at 8 2 : 6 :50. The weather was reported on the ground as having been completely clear at that time. The light was seen by the astronaut prior to moonrise during his pass over this area. By moving away from and back to a fixed attitude, the pilot was readily able to reacquire the light. The pilot estimated that when the light came into view, it was equal to about a third-magnitude star. It was in sight for 30 to ^0 seconds before it faded out at which time the intensity of the light was between Uth and 5th magnitude in brightness. The experiment produced approximately the same sighting results as predicted.

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^ge 5 - M

The astronaut considered the light of sufficient brightness to be used as a navigation landmark if adequate sighting information were to be made available. He stated, however, that the distinctive U-shaped light pattern of the town of Bloemfontein was a very helpful factor in identifying the light; the light from the town was about as visible as the test light and both faded from view at the same time. He stated that a flashing light would have been much more distinctive, and he "believed that a pattern of flashing lights would have been even more distinguishable. The pilot's observations of the ground light also show that, for any use of a lighted landmark as a navigation aid, the rapid passage over the ground (involving angular tracking rates of as high as l80°/minute) requires that instrument readings be made very conveniently and rapidly. An attempt to use the extinction photometer for this experiment was unsuccessful.

5.8.3

Radiation studies.- Instrumentation was placed aboard the spacecraft to measure and record the amount of radiation encountered on the flight. These measurements are needed to verify theoretical flux estimates and shielding calculations. and to ascertain the dose received by the astronaut. Two major types of radiation are present within the Mercury orbital altitude range: Protons which are naturally present in the lower Van Allen belt and electrons which were produced by decaying fission nuclei from the atomic explosion of July 1962. These radiations are most pronounced for the spacecraft's orbit in an area over the South Atlantic between the coasts of South America and Africa because of an anomaly in the earth's magnetic field at that location. Two Geiger counters were mounted on the retropackage (see fig. 5-8.3-1) to measure the electron flux incident on the vehicle. One counter surveyed a hemispherical area about an axis alined along the 195° yaw and -lit-00 pitch attitudes, relative to the spacecraft axes. The other counter was collimated to view a solid angle of approximately 0.8 steradian along the spacecraft's Z-axis. The latter counter, coupled with vehicle attitude information, was included to provide Information on the directionality of the electron flux. The tubes in both counters had a mass concentration in the wall
i~\

of 90 ilO mg/cm and were filled with a low-pressure, neon-argon, and halogen mixture. The uncollimated tube had, in addition, a 1-mm tungsten shield to allow passage of primarily high-energy electrons. Although Geiger tubes are sensitive to protons, the

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count rates recorded were expected to result primarily in electrons, since the electron flux is several orders of magnitude higher than proton flux in the geographical region in question. A high-voltage power supply maintained an operating plateau of approximately 550 volts. Power to the tubes was controlled by a toggle switch on the main instrument panel. The voltage output, proportional to the count rate, was multiplexed and stored on the onboard magnetic tape. Radiation inside the spacecraft was monitored by a selfindicating ionization chamber placed on the interior of the egress hatch, which represents a region of minimum shielding. The ion chamber, combined with outside flux measurements, was intended to yield information on the minimum shielding characteristics of the spacecraft and permit an estimate of the dosage received by the astronaut. Electron-sensitive film badges were placed in the astronaut's helmet and on his underwear, in the vicinity of the chest and the right thigh, to measure the received dosage. A nuclear emulsion package was mounted behind the instrument console to register the proton dosage. Since the data were recorded on the onboard tape, it was necessary to have the tape recorder on during periods of measurement. During passage through the magnetic anomaly for orbital passes 5, 7, and 8, the switch was turned to the "on" position, and the magnetic tape recorder turned to "continuous." Background readings were obtained on the l6th, l8th, and 19th orbital passes. The ion chamber was placed on the hatch within 1 hour after lift-off and remained there until it was stowed just prior to retrofire. A postflight reading of this sensor was obtained on the ground. For the other radiation monitors, no astronaut participation was required. These items were recovered and are being analyzed by the U. S. Naval School of Aviation Medicine for evaluation. Appreciable count rates from the Geiger tubes were obtained, as expected, on the 7th orbital pass. The spacecraft was in ASCS orbit attitude during the pass through the anomaly and should give information on the electron flux and directions relative to the spacecraft. However, at the time of this writing, considerable data reduction and interpretation remain to be accomplished before any quantitative statements can be made on the electrons in this anomaly.

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The reading on the ion chamber appears to be consistent with the film-badge results; however, this comparison must be verified by further analysis of the electron energy spectrum. The reported doses recorded by the film badges located on the pilot were well below the physiologically harmful level and are as follows:

Location
Right thigh Right chest Left chest Helmet (inside)

Dose, millirad

13

12

Although the above values are less than the expected level, further analysis is necessary before any definite conclusion can be made. Assignment of the proton component of the total dose awaits radiation emulsion package development and track analysis, a process that involves several weeks. 5.8.4 Infrared weather photography.- The infrared photography experiment was designed to obtain exposures of the earth and clouds on infrared film for the National Weather Satellite Center of the U. S. Weather Bureau. This photography in the spectral region from 660 to 900 millimicrons is an extension of the photographic measurements of the visible spectrum obtained during the MA-8 flight. The Hasselblad camera, Model 500C, used for this experiment is shown in figure 5-8.4-1. The infrared film and the special Wratten filters used were fitted into a film magazine for this experiment. The lens was an 80-mm Zeiss Planar f/2.8 with six coated elements. Several modifications were made to the camera controls for easier operation in the spacecraft. The camera back contained size 120 film, and the image dimensions on the film are 2 by 2 inches.

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The infrared spectrum from 660 to 900 millimicrons wavelength: was divided into three parts by inserting filters in the camera' so that sections of the image were photographed through each of-, the three filters. Kodak Wratten gelatin filters measuring 2-1/4 by 3/4 inches each were mounted in vertical strips in a ' thin metal holder, which was located in front of the film plane. The filters are listed in the following table. The lower boundary of each spectral region is defined by the filter transmission and the upper boundary is limited by the film sensitivity.

Wavelength, millimicrons
660 to 900 730 to 900 810 to 900

Filter
W-70 and 1 .0 neutral density

W-88A and 0.9 neutral density W-87C

A neutral density filter was added to the W-70 and W-88A filter sections to obtain the same light attenuation through these filters as was obtained through the more opaque W-87C filter. The filters appear in the photographs in the order listed in the table, with the W-70 filter section on the left, the W-88A in the center, and the W-87C on the right. Kodak high-speed infrared film was used and coated on a regular base support (0.005 inch thick). The film is sensitive through the visible region of the spectrum and in the infrared to approximately 900 millimicrons, with the highest sensitivity in the region from 770 to 84o millimicrons. The filters absorbed all the light from the visible spectrum and transmitted to the film only the infrared wavelengths. The ASA daylight-exposure index is 80 without filters. A shutter speed of 1/125-second and a lens aperture setting of f/5.6 was used for these exposures. A series of l6 infrared photographs were taken by the astronaut over the southern part of the United States and the southern part of Africa near the end of the 17th and beginning of the l8th orbital passes, starting at an elapsed time of 26:38:00. Figure 5-8.4-2 is representative of the photographs obtained for this experiment. Geographic locations can be determined accurately from landmarks in the first ten pictures where clouds do not obscure the earth. These pictures showed that clouds covered most of the Pacific coast of Worth America. Cloudiness, which was associated with a low-pressure area over Oklahoma, covered most of the lower Mississippi River Valley region and

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also obscured landmarks. There were scattered cumulus clouds over Florida and Georgia, and some cirrus and cumulus clouds were present over the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean. Very clear conditions prevailed eastward from California to eastern New Mexico. Times for the last six pictures which were taken over Africa have not been determined with certainty, "but the last picture was taken not later than 2 : 9 0 . 71:0 Terrain features appear differently in infrared light wavelengths than in the visible wavelengths. Green vegetation has a high reflectivity, while coniferous forests have a relatively low reflectivity. Bare soil and rock generally have a high reflectivity. Clouds composed of ice crystals and water droplets reflect infrared light very well in the spectral region studied. Water surfaces reflect very little and they appear as very dark areas. The photographic contrast between clouds and water, and land and water is very high because their differences in infrared reflectivity are large. This fact is well illustrated in pictures showing clouds over the Pacific Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic Ocean. The photographic contrast between land and water is also very high, as shown in pictures of Baja California, the Gulf States coastline, and the Florida and Georgia seacoasts-. A visual examination of the pictures shows that the photographic contrast may be somewhat higher through the ¥-70 filter section than in the W-88A and V-87C. Densitometric measurements will be made later in the laboratory in an attempt to confirm these observations. The relative brightness of selected areas will be determined also when density measurements on the negatives are made. Detecting clouds over land areas in the 660 to 900 millimicron region of the infrared spectrum is difficult because the reflectivity of both is high. The spectral sensitivity of the sensor should be restricted to the general region of 550 to 750 millimicrons as a compromise to counter the adverse effects of scattering by molecules and aerosols at shorter visible wavelengths and the low contrast effects at infrared wavelengths. However, the use of infrared wavelengths to show clouds over water and to detect coastlines appears to be superior to the use of visible wavelengths. 5.8.5 Horizon-definition photography.- The objective of the horizondefinition experiment was to study further the earth's sunlit limb to determine the reliability with which it can be used for navigational sightings during the terminal phase of advanced

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space missions. Results from the experiment conducted during the MA-9 flight were intended to extend the data previously obtained during the MA-7 mission on the relative elevations of the earth's limb as -photographed through blue and red filters. Past results indicate that this variation in earth-limb height was dependent upon the scattering angle of the incident sunlight. Therefore, a time-extended series of pictures embracing most of the daylight period of an orbital pass was desired. It was also desired to obtain a group of photographs taken over a brief time.period in four quadrantal directions relative to that of the sun. Accurately timed photographs of the earth horizon including the setting moon were also requested to provide a reference for measuring the altitude or elevation of the limb. These photographs were made with the Hasselblad camera, previously described in section 5.8A. A lens setting of f/8 and a shutter speed of 1/125 second was used. A filter sandwich consisting of a no. 92 (red) Wratten filter central panel and two no. i - B (blue) filter side panels were mounted immediately )7 ahead of the film plane. A narrow, opaque bar extended through the center of the red filter to hold the filter flat. Linagraph Shellburst film was used for the experiment. A planned series of photographs of the earth's horizon throughout the daylight portion of an orbital pass was not performed during the 21st orbital pass, as programed, because of the spacecraft control system malfunction. The quadrant photographs and photographs of the moon-earth limb were taken as planned. A total of 11 exposures were made, 8 quadrantal photographs (2 of each quadrant) and 3 moon-set earth-limb photographs. Because of an unforeseen difficulty in loading the modified camera back and a consequent inadvertent exposure of the film to light from a red safe-light, some background "light-struck" damage was incurred by the film prior to flight. Careful initial inspection of the film indicated that six of the eight quadrantal exposures and two of the three moon-set pictures are usable for quantitative study. The film includes two good sets of step-wedge sensitometric exposures for calibration, one before the flight and one after. Correction for the inadvertent background can be made, at least where it is of moderate density. Since these densitometric exposures were made with a calibrated source, a radiance value for the observed limb can be eventually obtained from the data. The MA-9 results in this regard, constitute a significant advance beyond the photography of the MA-T flight.

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Two of the three moon-set photographs seem suitable for measurement, probably by microdensitometric means. The lack of precise time correlation for these pictures reduces the significance of their measurement. Hgure 5-8.5-1 shows an enlargement of one of eight quadrantal photographs taken during flight. As shown by this figure, each photograph affords two adjacent regions for comparison of the bounds of the earth's atmosphere, as photographed in red and blue light. Quantitative interpretation of these photographs will be reported when the measurements and their evaluation have been accomplished. 5.8.6 Flashing light experiment.- Visual acquisition of a target vehicle in a space environment is being considered as a part of the operational procedure to be used for rendezvous in advanced manned space missions. The purpose of the flashing light experiment was to determine the ability of the pilot to acquire a light of known intensity under operational conditions similar to those associated with rendezvous. This experiment would also provide a means of substantiating estimates of the light intensity that is required to provide a signal of suitable intensity for easy acquisition. The combination of weight, shape, light intensity, and ejection conditions of.the beacon and the operational procedures of the experiment were selected to provide a wide range of sighting conditions. The beacon was designed to appear as conspicuous as a second-magnitude star at a distance of approximately 8 nautical miles. The flashing light was a 5-75-inch-<J.iameter spherical assembly with two xenon-gas discharge lamps located at opposite poles. The beacon, its container, and the ejection mechanism were designed and built by NASA. The flashing-light equipment is shown in figure 5-8.6-1, with two switch holding devices that were not present in flight. The beacon was painted flat white to aid in obtaining a suitable thermal balance, and it weighed 10 pounds. The lamps flashed simultaneously at a rate of approximately once per second. The power supply was a group of mercury batteries connected in series. The energy delivered to each lamp was approximately k watt-seconds per flash. A typical time history of the light output of a single lamp is shown in figure 5.8.6-2. The housing for the beacon was mounted on the retropackage as shown in figure 5.8.3-1. With planned spacecraft attitudes of -20° in pitch and 0° in roll and yaw, the beacon would be ejected in a direction parallel to the -88C pitch direction at an ejection velocity of 9-7 ft/sec. The beacon initially moves downward and then ahead of the spacecraft when ejected in this direction.

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Page 5 - A8

CONFIDENTIAL

As part of the development of the light assembly, it was subjected to various qualification tests. In particular, several methods of obtaining a measure of the light intensity were used to establish the characteristics of the beacon. Measurements in a simulated space environment indicated an effective life of . approximately 10 hours. Intensity was measured at the National Bureau, of Standards and documented. Measurements made at the National Bureau of Standards showed that, in general, the light output distribution was reasonably uniform, with an average value of about 12.1 candle-seconds per flash. Using a value of 0.2 for the Blondel-Rey constant for threshold viewing, a value of 60.5 candles is obtained as the equivalent effective steady-light intensity. There were some sighting angles, approximately 80° cones centered on the axis passing through both lamps, when only one lamp was in view and the total observable light was below average. In these directions the effective intensity was about 46 candles. A typical horizontal intensity distribution, indicating some of the low intensity directions near 0° and 180°, was obtained at the National Bureau of Standards and is shown in figure 5-8.6-3- The average effective intensity of 60.5 candles would correspond to a second-magnitude star at a distance of 7-3_ nautical miles, using the commonly accepted 7
r

value of 3-3 light.

x

10

lumens per square meter for a second-magnitude

Some comparison sightings of the flashing beacon and a steady light, with the use of neutral density filters to simulate a distance of 8.7 nautical miles for the beacon and second-magnitude star for the steady light, were made by several observers. The observers were in agreement that, when not looking directly at the lights, the flashing light was as conspicuous as the steady light. Measurements were made by comparison sightings using a known, fixed-intensity light and by comparison to stars in air-to-air sightings in which the flight astronaut participated. The results of preflight air-to-air sightings at a distance of approximately 25,000 feet indicated that the beacon seemed equivalent to a first-magnitude star at a range of 5 or 6 nautical miles and to a second-magnitude star at a range of 7 or 8 nautical miles. The beacon became lost to sight at a distance of l8 nautical miles and could not be reacquired until the distance was reduced to 15 nautical miles. Under daylight conditions, the maximum range at which the light was visible was from 2 to 2— nautical miles. The orientation of the beacon was such that

the low region of effective intensity (average 46 candles) would have been viewed during these flight tests.

The beacon was deployed, as programed, approximately 15 minutes prior to sunset on the 3rd orbital pass at 3:25:38. The readout of both the horizon scanners and attitude gyros showed that the beacon was deployed at the planned spacecraft pitch attitude of -20°il° and attitudes in roll and yaw very close to zero. After deployment, the astronaut yawed the spacecraft l 0 to 8° view the light, which had gone ahead of the spacecraft. The separation of the beacon from the spacecraft was calculated using a drag coefficient of 2 for both the beacon and the spacecraft and the atmospheric density from "The ARDC Model Atmosphere, 1959-" Measurements of separation, distance between the spacecraft and the beacon could not be obtained and all distances are based on calculations using these parameters. The calculated sighting parameters, range to the beacon and elevation angle with respect to local horizontal, are shown in figure 5-8.6-U. They are shown as bands, which reflect the limits of -19° and -21° in pitch attitude at deployment. The beacon was not acquired by the astronaut on the first night pass after deployment. The astronaut's comments on celestial sightings during this time indicated that the spacecraft was probably not oriented closely enough to the l80° yaw position for the light to be in his field of view because he experienced difficulty in establishing the 180° yaw attitude during this first attempt at night. Upon going into the second night pass after deployment, the correct spacecraft yaw attitude of l80° had already been established. The light was first acquired as a steady reddishbrown light when it was still in sunlight but far enough below the local horizontal that it was seen against the dark earth background. At this time, the range was calculated to be approximately 3 nautical miles. After a brief period, the light ceased to appear steady in source and commenced to flash at about the intended frequency. At 1 hour and 46 minutes after the light had been deployed, the astronaut rated its intensity at approximately that of a second-magnitude star. However, the beacon's range was calculated to have been approximately 4 nautical miles at this time, which, based on preflight tests, would normally correspond to a brightness of one star magnitude greater than was observed. During the second night, the astronaut was able to move the spacecraft off and back in attitude and then readily reacquire the light. During a period when the beacon was calculated to be between 7— and 9 miles away, the astronaut rated the light as not very bright but discernible, about of the order of a third-magnitude star. This rating again was about one magnitude dimmer than that expected from preflight tests.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5 - 50

GOMlDEMnAL

During the third night period, at 3 hours 25 minutes after deployment and at a range calculated to "be betveen 9^ and 1 ^ 11— nautical miles, the light was rated as very veak and just "barely discernible. This rating indicated again that the beacon was not as bright as expected. The astronaut also estimated distances as well as brightness; and since there were no distance cues other than those related to previous aircraft sightings, he consistently estimated distances that were too great. The sightings were made with all spacecraft internal lights turned off. An attempt to sight the beacon during the daylight period after the first night period, when the calculated minimum range was less than 2 nautical miles, was unsuccessful. Although, at other times, stars were seen during the daytime, none were seen during the daylight period in which the astronaut was trying to acquire the light. In general, it was found that the flash of the light made it easily distinguishable from stars. The "beacon's intensity appeared to be adequate for acquisition up to distances of about 8 nautical miles at night. 5.8.7 Tethered balloon experiment.- A JO-inch-diameter mylar sphere was packaged in the antenna canister of the spacecraft and was to be ejected, inflated, and tethered at the end of a 100-foot nylon line for one orbital pass. However, the balloon failed to deploy and the experiment was not accomplished. This experiment was intended to provide further information about the atmospheric density through the altitude profile of the Mercury spacecraft, which ranged from 8k to 1^6 nautical miles. Atmospheric density was to be computed by determining the drag of the balloon, as measured by the pull of the tether on a straingage balance located at the bottom of the balloon canister. The equipment configuration for the experiment was nearly identical to that included in the MA-7 spacecraft for a similar experiment except that the balloon was painted fluorescent orange and it was constructed by laminating a T--mil-thick metalized plastic sheet to a —-mil-thick clear plastic -sheet. The l6-mm camera (see fig. 5-6.1-1) was mounted in the spacecraft so that photographic coverage of the balloon's motions could be obtained.

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5-51

The pilot attempted to deploy the balloon on two occasions during the 6th orbital pass without success. A postflight investigation has verified the integrity of the balloon deployment circuit through the R-calibration function, since R-calibration signals were recorded in flight. The failure in the deployment circuit, therefore, had to occur beyond this point. Failure of the deployment squibs to ignite if they were energized seems unlikely, since squibs from the same lot as used on this flight have been test-ignited a number of times without a single failure. Furthermore, two of these squibs were connected in parallel and numerous tests had proven that either of these squibs would release the balloon canister latch and permit balloon deployment. Since the antenna canister was not recovered after the flight, it was impossible to complete the investigation of this anomaly. General celestial observations.- The pilot reported that on several orbital passes he entered the daylight phase with his spacecraft oriented toward the sky away from both the earth and sun. Under these daylight conditions, he reported that he was able to see stars. With his eyes well dark-adapted, he reported that the day time sky appeared lighter than the night sky and that there was a loss of about 2. to 2.— magnitudes in visible stars between the day and night side of the ear~ch. The question then arises as to why there was a reduction in his ability to see fainter stars during the day under these circumstances. It is not reasonable to think this loss of the fainter stars was due to light absorption, since this limitation should have been detected by previous scientific investigation. The possibility arises that this loss may have been a brightening of the background due to light scattering by small particles in the upper atmosphere. Preliminary analysis indicates, however, that the required particle density is approximately 100 particles per square centimeter in a column that does not extend above an altitude of 300 kilometers. Micrometeoroid impact measurements during previous satellite studies indicate a particle concentration far below this level. This observation might also have been a result of light scattered by the window. The pilot reported that a film had been deposited on the inside of the outer pane during the launch phase. However, he stated that he felt that the lighter daytime sky could not be accounted for by light scattering on the window. Light scattering on the window would not be likely to produce an even distribution of illumination throughout the sky. Instead, it would

^ W l ™ M. M.mJEtl.v M. tt^^j C ^

Page 5 - 5 2 tend to fall in patterns that would "be easily discernible to the pilot. Furthermore, since the spacecraft was drifting, the amount of light falling on the window should be varying continuously, but the pilot stated that the lightness of the sky appeared uniform. Therefore, it appears unlikely that this observation can be accounted for by scattered light on -the window. The best explanation for this brightening of the sky is the o presence of a general 6300 A emission region above the spaceo craft. The height of the 6300 A dayglow is not know, but may occur in the F-region of the atmosphere which is at an altitude of about 250 kilometers. Preliminary estimates indicate that o the visible emission of the 6300 A dayglow could increase the brightness of the day sky about 3 times above the level of the night sky. This hypothesis agrees reasonable well with the pilot's estimate of the reduction in light intensity of stars visible during daylight. All of the astronauts have reported the presence of a so-called haze layer on the night side of an orbital pass. This term appears to be a misnomer, since the phenomenon probably involves a region of concentrated airglow emission in the 100-kilometer region of the atmosphere. The effect of weakening a star's intensity as it passes through this region could be caused by a loss of visibility, with respect to the increased brightness of the airglow foreground, as readily as if it were caused by the presence of a haze or attenuating layer. Present evidence supports the former explanation, since measurements of the height of the layer agree with that of the night airglow layer. The pilot also reported observing a brownish glow in an eastnortheasterly direction above his orbital altitude at an elapsed time between 17:25:00 and 17:30:00. At this time, the spacecraft was just above the east coast of South America in the vicinity of Belem, Brazil. Thus, the phenomenon occurred in the tropics not far from the geomagnetic equator. The glow appeared as a patch with an approximate angular size equal to the spacecraft window, rather than a layer, and the observation seems to be similar to that reported over the Indian Ocean during the MA-8 mission. Postflight calculations indicate that the o phenomenon was caused by the integrated effect of a 6300 A cloud of about 3,000 kilometers in horizontal extent. If the typical vertical thickness is assumed to be about 50 kilometers, then the integrated intensity of the cloud seen edge-on would be about 18,000 rayleighs, about the intensity required to give a visual impression of a light brownish nature.

Page

5-53

The pilot also reported that at about 20 seconds after sunset, a whitish arch extending some 15° or so above the horizon appears above the sun. Two possible explanations of this arch exist: 1. It could be the outer corona of the sun.

2. It might be associated with a concentration of dust around the earth - a sort of terrestrial "zodiacal light." Approximately 1 minute after sunset, the pilot detected the zodiacal light. At this time, the spacecraft window was probably significantly illuminated by the bright remnants of the orbital twilight. The ability of the pilot to detect the zodiacal light above the window foreground suggests that it must have been brighter than the orbital twilight. This is as it should be at angular distances from the sun of 6° to 10°, which was probably the minimum observed distance. The fact that the light was concentrated along the ecliptic established it as truly "zodiacal light." Thirty general purpose color photographs were taken on this mission by using the 70-mm Hasselblad camera described in section 5-8.4. The exposures were made without a filter on ultraspeed Anscochrome (FPC 289) by using a lens setting of f/l6 and a shutter speed of 1/250 second. Photographic coverage of portions of northern Africa, Arabia and the India-BurmaChina area was obtained. A number of very good exposures of the Himalayas with excellent resolution were obtained. Figure 5-8.8-1 is an example of these photographs. Some photographs of the western Pacific and of the Indian Ocean areas were also taken. In general, the quality and resolution of these photographs were excellent, and the resolution of terrain features of the best of the MA-9 photographs compare favorably to that of the Viking infrared photographs. Interestingly enough, however, no cultural features whatsoever can be seen on these color photographs. Even the city of Calcutta, India, could not be identified, although the quality of the photograph was excellent. A complete analysis of these photographs will require a considerable amount of time; however, a preliminary analysis indicates that this film-camera combination is capable of yielding photographic information which could be useful for geological, topographical, and meteorological purposes. All of the photographs, even if slightly overexposed, contain some usable information.

CONFIDENTIAL-

ONFIDENTIAL

Page

5-54

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

Figure 5.8.8-1.- Photograph of Himalaya Moi

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* £ W f ^ P T l ~ - M * 1 B H ! ^ 6. 0 LAUNCH-VEHICLE PERFORMANCE All launch-vehicle systems performed satisfactorily. items are noted for information. 6.1 Air frame

Page

6-1

The following

The structural integrity of the launch-vehicle airframe was satisfaotorily maintained throughout powered flight. Booster staging and spacecraft separation were satisfactory. Launch-vehicle axial accelerations of 6.83g at booster engine cut-off (BECO) and 7-55g a"t sustainer engine cut-off (SECO) were indicated. These accelerations were approximately the same as those experienced on previous Mercury-Atlas launches. A launch-vehicle longitudinal oscillation of 5 cps, experienced on previous flights, occurred during lift-off and was essentially damped out approximately 25 seconds after lift-off. Maximum peak-to-peak variations during this time period were 0.90g and occurred between 1 and 2 seconds following lift-off. Dynamic oscillations caused by propellant slosh occurred between 88 and 108 seconds after lift-off. These oscillations are discussed in section 6.7. Ambient pressure in the adapter area decreased normally from atmospheric pressure at lift-off to zero at approximately 105 seconds of flight. In addition, the most severe pressure variations occurred., as expected, in the transonic speed range at maximum dynamic pressure. 6.2 Propulsion System As usual, an inert wet-start procedure for starting the booster engines was used. The booster engines were offset 0.2° to correct for the lift-off roll transient experienced in previous Mercury-Atlas launches. This offset effectively reduced the amplitude of the lift-off roll transient to well below that which had been experienced on previous flights. Figure 3.2-1 shows the direction of engine offset. The operation of the propulsion system was satisfactory throughout the flight. Engine thrust rises and decays appeared normal. During the MA-8 mission and for the first time in Project Mercury, the launch-vehicle hold-down period for monitoring engine ignition was eliminated because of a change in the engine start techniques. However, fuel and lox for the MA-8 launch vehicle were off-loaded, which negated the additional burning time afforded by the elimination of the hold-down. For MA-9, the hoId-down procedure was again deleted, but the tanks were not off-loaded. The indicated air temperature of the engine compartment was normal and was ^8° F at lift-off, 56° F at BECO, and 100° F at SECO. A temperature

6 -2

CONFIDENTIAL

probe in the sustainer-engine lubricant tank, vhich was also installed in the engine compartment, was used for the first time in this location. The probe sensed temperatures of 50° F at lift-off, 70° F at BECO, and 9^° F at SECO. This transducer was shielded from thermal radiation and provided a temperature study of the lubricant as it is consumed. 6.3 Propellant Tanking The tanking of EP-1 fuel to the 100-percent probe resulted in a total fuel quantity at 80° F of 1 , 2 gallons, which corresponded to an indi1^8 cated weight increase of 76,500 pounds. Following the countdown for lox tanking, a drop in fuel temperature and a resultant density increase required the addition of 350 pounds of fuel to reestablish the 100-percent level. Final fuel weight, adjusted to include the weighing system calibration, gravity correction, and pressurization gas weight, was 7^,900 pounds. Lox tanking to the 100-percent probe required 1 ^ 0 0 pounds of lox. 7,0 Subcooled topping was added to maintain an indicated lox weight constant at 17^-, 100 pounds. After securing lox tanking, 500 pounds of lox were calculated to have been lost through the vernier-engine bleed valves and the start tank vent. Following final pressurization, the lox level was above the high-level probe for approximately 10 seconds. However, this level was between the high- and low-level probes at ignition because of boil-off. The total weight of the spacecraft and launch vehicle at ignition was 326,^00 pounds. 6.k Propellant Utilization

The propellant utilization (PU) valve operated normally within the dynamic range up to approximately 35 seconds prior to SECO. At this time, the valve followed corrections to near-nominal values over a 10-second period prior to SECO. At this point, the PU valve followed the bias introduced by the capacitance pad. The fuel and lox-head pressure-sensing ports were uncovered at 3-25 and 6.85 seconds, respectively, prior to SECO. Propellant residuals at SECO were calculated to be ^83.6 pounds of lox and 5^0.6 pounds of fuel. 6.5 Pneumatics

The lox- and fuel-tank ullage pressures were within normal operating limits throughout the flight. Booster-tank helium-bottle decay was normal and the sustainer-tank helium bottle maintained adequate pressure.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 -3
The unfiltered bulkhead differential pressure reached a minimum of 5.7 psi approximately 1.5 seconds after 2-inch motion (lift-off). The filtered bulkhead differential pressure measurement vas 8.3 psi. These values are well above the level required to initiate an abort signal, since this signal is only generated if the bulkhead differential pressure falls below 2.5 ±1.0 psi for 0.125 second. Oscillations at this time were 5 cps, with an amplitude of 7-9 Psi for the unfiltered measurement and 2.7 psi for the filtered measurement. Oscillations were damped out approximately 25 seconds after lift-off. 6. 6 Electrical System

An anomaly in the 115-volt a-c phase A voltage was indicated on telemetry, but this anomaly did not affect associated systems. This voltage measurement at lift-off was Il6.1 v a-c, as compared with the desired value of 115-3 +0'? v a-c. At 201 seconds following lift-off, an oscilla-

tion of approximately 1-percent, peak-to-peak, began in the phase A voltage and continued until 229-7 seconds, when the voltage settled at 115-7 v a-c through SECO. 6. 7 Flight Control System

A small roll transient, resulting from a slight engine misalinement and gas generator exhaust thrust, was present immediately after lift-off. However, the amplitude of the transient was greatly reduced from that of previous flights because of the actuator having been offset following a study of roll transient experienced on the previous Mercury-Atlas launch. The booster-engine offset is described in section 3-2. The roll transient at lift-off was 2.5°/sec, with instantaneous spikes reaching k. 5°/sec. However, no abort signal was generated since the roll rate abort level is 6.^°/sec ±5 percent. The effectiveness of the roll transient correction is indicated by the small roll displacement of 0.6°, peak-to-peak, which actually occurred. Between 88 and 108 seconds after lift-off, dynamic oscillations caused by propellant slosh were noted on the telemetry recordings of flight control parameters, including pitch, roll, and yaw rates. A maximum- roll rate of 3- 5°/sec at a frequency of 1.15 cycles per second was recorded 100 seconds after lift-off. The fuel-slosh oscillations during boosterengine operation occurred for approximately 35 seconds, beginning at 89 seconds after -lift-off and were completely damped out at 8 seconds before BECO. Slosh oscillations of approximately 2 cycles per second were recorded throughout the sustainer phase. These oscillations were approximately l°/sec, peak-to-peak, in amplitude, with a displacement of approximately 0.05°, peak-to-peak.

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page 6 - k

GOffriDCHTIAL .».—
6.8 Guidance

The launch-vehicle radio-guidance system performed veil and guided the sustainer stage to near-nominal cutoff conditions that were veil within the acceptable limits. The radar data were of good quality and exhibited lov noise. The errors at insertion were 1.3 ft/sec low in velocity, 1,333 feet high in altitude, and 0 0 3 ° high in flight-path angle. .01 The guidance-system configuration was similar to that used in the MA-8 mission except that the duration of the second-stage pitch program was reduced by 5-0 seconds, resulting in 10° less pitch-down maneuver, and the ground guidance computer equations were changed. The reduction in the pitch programer duration gives a more efficient trajectory. Hovever, the MA-8 capability of reaching acceptable orbital insertion conditions for a near-nominal trajectory with a loss of closed-loop launch-vehicle guidance steering vas not maintained. A somewhat depressed trajectory was flown throughout the flight. The BECO discrete signal was 0.5 second early, the velocity was high, and the altitude was low at staging. These conditions resulted in SECO being 1. U seconds early. The radar elevation angle at SECO was a nominal 1.^°. The guidance system acquired the track beacon of the launch vehicle in the first radar cube, and lock was continuous from 0 : 1 0 . to 00:40 00:06:07.1 (6k sec after SECO). Rate lock was continuous in all functions from 00:00:58.3 to 00:05:55.7 (53 sec after SECO), except for 0.1 second of bad central rate data 3-7 seconds after BECO. These bad data were caused by the jettisoned booster stage assembly's passing between the ground radar and the airborne transponder. The bad data had no effect on the flight of the launch vehicle, since guidance steering was not initiated until 22.8 seconds later. Closed-loop radar guidance steering started at 0 : 2 3 . with a 00:88 25-percent positive pitch rate and a 30-percent positive yaw rate. This yaw right maneuver corrected a booster-stage roll program error. Thereafter, the commands were smooth and small until 5-5 seconds prior to SECO when 25-percent pitch steering commands were sent to the launch vehicle to correct the error in flight-path angle. Noise in the steering commands was lower than for all previous Mercury-Atlas orbital missions. The ground guidance computer equations had been changed since MA-8 to extrapolate radar data better and to smooth out radar noise. Guidance initiation was started on slant range rather than on time after BECO. Other than these changes, the application of these equations was the same in the normal data mode. The reason for these changes was to give better steering commands in the event of noise resulting in the loss of radar data. In figures 6.8-1 and 6.8-2, the velocity and flight-path angle are shown in the region of sustainer engine cutoff. The launch-vehicle data

Page 6 - 5
are shown in figure 6. 8-1, and the range safety impact predictor computer (I. P. 7 9 0 data are shown in figure 6.8-2 to illustrate the data quality 0* during the time of the go—no-go computations. Both data sources exhibited low noise and the average of these values agrees with the actual flight conditions. One launch vehicle guidance data point was not received by the Goddard computer at 0 : 5 0 . 7 however, a 20-point average was still 00:80; used. Maximum peak-to-peak deviations in the launch-vehicle guidance data were about one-quarter of the magnitude experienced on MA.-4 and MA-8 and about one-half the noise level of MA-5, MA-6, and MA-7. The IP -709^ data noise level was about half that experienced on MA.-4 and MA-8 and about the same as MA-5, MA-6, and MA-7. In figure 6.8-3, "the variation of flight-path angle with velocity is the type of display used by the Flight Dynamics Officer in the Mercury Control Center for the orbital go— no-go decision. Both the launch -vehicle guidance and HP-709^ data indicated acceptable conditions. 6.9 Abort Sensing and Implementation System

The ready status of the abort sensing and implementation system was properly established at 0.8 second prior to lift-off. Telemetry records indicate that the pressure switches operated correctly. Wo system parameters reached the abort level, and no abort command was generated during powered flight. After SECO, the system indicated an abort condition, which is an expected occurrence and results from a decay in the engine fuel pressure. An incomplete listing of the proximity of monitored parametric values to the specified limits for the MA-9 abort system is presented as follows:

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6-6

System parameter Flight control system: Pitch rate Yaw rate Roll rate Tank pressurization system: Lox tank Bulkhead differential pressure Electrical system: Launch-vehicle—spacecraft interface 400-cps power voltage Propulsion system: Booster-engine manifold pressure Sustainer-engine manifold pressure Hydraulic system pressure

Specified abort limits

Maximum MA-9 values

3'/ ec
3%ec
3-5°/sec

< 21.5 psig (boost phase) < 11.0 psig (sustainer phase)

<

2.5+1 psi for 0.125 sec

5.7 psi filtered 8.3 psi unfiltered

loss of elec. continuity

no loss

< 70 +10 v-rms for 0. 125 sec 115.7 v-rms

+25 psia

< 560 ±25 psia < 2,000 +60 psig

CONriDDMTIAtr

ONFIDENTIAL
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page 7-1
7-0 ASTRONAUT ACTIVITIES

This section contains a detailed analysis of the physiological responses of the astronaut, an evaluation of his performance in completing the prescribed flight plan, and a flight report "by the astronaut, The aeromedical analysis documents the preflight medical activities, the inflight responses, and the postflight examinations; and conclusions derived from the analysis of these data are presented. The astronaut's performance is evaluated from the standpoint of his ability to maneuver the spacecraft, manage the operation of the onboard systems, conduct scientific experiments, and in general complete scheduled .activities. This section is concluded with a narrative account by the astronaut of his flight experience and his evaluation of many operational aspects of the mission.

7-1

Aeromedical Analysis

7.1.1

Introduction.- The MA-9 flight represents another step in the serial extension of the observation of man as he functions under the physical stresses of zero gravity, decreased ambient pressure, and a pure oxygen environment, and under the psychological stress of this remarkable experience with the multitude of risks involved. The step-wise extension of the mission durations produces an increasing understanding of man's adaptation to, and toleration of, this new environment. Application of this information enhances the confidence in and understanding of future missions of greater duration. The purpose of this section of the report is to present the qualitative and quantitative medical analysis conducted within the Project Mercury mission framework and thus to indicate the present state of medical efforts in the area of manned space flight. The report is presented chronologically in the three categories of preflight, inflight, and postflight findings. Within each of these broad areas the data are presented in two parts: results of clinical studies, both of a conventional nature and selected special procedures; and results of biosensor monitoring studies. The concluding portion presents a series of special medical studies for the MA-9 mission. The intimate interaction of the pilot and his environmental control system requires that the discussion of the Life Support System (Section 5-2) be considered in conjunction with the Aeromedical Analysis.

CONFIDENTIAL

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7-1.2 7.1.2.1

Preflight observation.Clinical data: Data were evaluated from very thorough medical studies of the pilot, Astronaut L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., conducted immediately prior to his selection for astronaut training in 1959 and from annual examinations since that date. Medical examinations were also conducted both before and after six preflight spacecraft checkout tests and a session in the Mission Control Center procedures trainer, all of which required the pilot to wear the full-pressure space suit. Special examinations to assess the pilot's fitness for flight were conducted 11 and 3 days before launch. The latter examination conducted on May 12, 1963, designated the "Comprehensive Medical Evaluation," was conducted by specialists in internal medicine, ophthalmology, neuropsychiatry, radiology, and aviation medicine. The NASA Flight Surgeon who had examined the pilot for most of the preflight activities conducted the final preflight medical examination on launch morning. The preflight aeromedical procedures and examinations are listed in table 7.1.2.1-1. The astronaut's pertinent medical history is summarized here as background medical data. At age 6 he contracted pneumonia of the left lung, followed by empyema and requiring surgical drainage. He has residual non-symptomatic adhesions and thickening of the left lateral pleura and there is a well healed linear 5 cm scar in the skin at the 9~th posterior intercostal space at the surgical drainage site. Neither complications nor sequellae have occurred as a result of this condition, and repeated pulmonary function studies have been normal. On November 3? I960, a cholecystectomy and incidental appendectomy were performed following X-ray demonstration of cholelithiasis. Full recovery was prompt and no food intolerance or other sequellae have occurred. He has moderate seasonal rhinitis relieved by small doses of common antihistamines. In the three months prior to the MA-9 flight no antihistaminic medication was required. The pilot exhibited a gastrointestinal intolerance, evidenced by cramping abdominal pains, to an oral test dose of morphine sulfate. This reaction is seen in a small percentage of normal people. Other than the foregoing items, the pilot's medical history is not significant. In addition to examinations by physicians, baseline clinical evaluations included an audiogram, an electrocardiogram, a chest X-ray and laboratory studies of blood and urine. The results of these evaluations are found in tables 7-1-2.1-2 through 7.1.2.1-5. For the 3 months prior to the flight, the pilot continued in excellent health with significant abnormalities.

CONFIDENTIAL

OTIDCMT1AL*

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3

Close supervision of the pilot's food intake began 7 days before the planned flight with special preparation of a normal balanced diet. To reduce the need for defecation during the mission, a low residue diet was followed for 4 days before the launch. This diet was well tolerated, although the pilot did mention that appetite satisfaction was short-lived following the low residue meals. The constituents, both qualitative and quantitative, of this diet are presented in table 7.1.2.1-6. In the month prior to flight, he maintained his physical fitness by daily distance running and calisthenics. The aeromedical countdown, table 7-1-2.1-Tj presents the pilot's activities on launch morning. Compared with the pilots in previous orbital missions, the MA-9 astronaut spent the shortest time (5 hours and 1J minutes) from awakening to lift-off. In spite of a last minute requirement for an earlier insertion, all elements of the aeromedical countdown were accomplished satisfactorily without altering the planned wake-up time. The final prelaunch examination showed a healthy pilot who was ready for the mission. Two minor discrepancies were local skin erythema at the biosensor sites and moderate erythema, edema, and tenderness of the skin over the right sacral prominence. He frequently demonstrates a skin reaction around the sensors for 2k to j6 hours after application, despite the use of microporous surgical tape for fastening these sensors. It should be noted that these sensors were in place for 7 hours during the canceled launch on the preceding day. The skin findings over the sacrum are frequently present following prolonged periods of 4 or more hours on his back in the couch. On the night before the postponed launch of May 1^-, 19^3, the pilot slept well for about two hours and then dozed fitfully for another 3^- hours. He had several dreams related to

problems with the use of the flight plan and the inflight medications and also later reported he did not feel rested. However, on the night before the successful launch, he slept well for 6 hours and no dreams were recalled. Although he did become sleepy during periods of relative inactivity, such as in the transfer van, he did feel adequately rested on launch morning. At no time was a drug administered to induce sleep. 7-1.2.2 Biosensor data: The sources of detailed biosensor data are outlined in tables 7.1.2.2-1 and 7.1.2.2-2. These sources include dynamic tests for evaluation of general physical

page 7
condition, Mercury-Atlas three-orbital-pass simulations and Mercury-Atlas acceleration profiles conducted at the U.S. Naval Aviation Medical Acceleration Laboratory (AMAL) in Johnsville, Pennsylvania, and various spacecraft checkout procedures required during the final stages of preparation for flight. The procedures which were monitored resulted in the largest number of total hours of observation yet available on any one astronaut. This extensive monitoring was possible as a result of his activity as the MA-8 backup pilot and of his participation in three altitude-chamber spacecraft checkout procedures, including the longest such test conducted at Cape Canaveral. The pilot-safety monitoring and data-gathering biosensor system for this mission consisted of two sets of electrocardiograph! c (EGG) leads, the impedance pneumograph, an oral temperature thermistor, and the blood pressure measuring system (BPMS). The details of operation of the biosensor system have been described in previous postlaunch memorandum reports. Because of the increased duration of the MA-9 flight, a change was made from continuous rectal to intermittent oral body-temperature measurement. The basic thermistor was retained with a new covering incorporating velcro. The thermistor and its lead wires remained within the suit. The sensor was attached to the right ear muff inside the helmet where it was readily accessible. The sensor and its location are illustrated in figures 7.1.2.2-1 and 7.1.2.2-2. It was recalibrated to sense a temperature range from 75° to 105°, thereby providing an indication of suit outlet temperature whenever an oral temperature was not being taken. The difference between suit inlet and outlet temperatures was usually 20° F to 30° F. When oral temperature was desired, the pilot placed the small thermistor under his tongue for about 5 minutes. Preflight body temperatures were all within the normal range. The remainder of the biosensor system was the same as that used in MA-8. Preflight biosensor preparation includes careful calibration of the system so that accurate, repeatable determinations are assured. Adjustments are required to compensate for individual variations. This requirement is especially true for the blood pressure measuring system (EPMS). The clinical blood pressure mean values, shown in table 7-1.2.2-3, are of particular interest and indicate that the correlation is valid for this system. The stability of these calibrations was rechecked on several occasions before flight. All systems operated properly during the final preflight preparation period.

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7-5

The preflight biosensor data are presented in tables 7.1.2.2-1 to 7-1.2.2-k. The analysis methods used were both manual and automatic. All respiration minute rates were obtained by 30-second counts made from the continuous direct-recorded analog signal, with sampling intervals either every 3 or every k minutes. Heart rates were determined in the same manner by counting manually; those sets can be readily identified by the relatively low number of values used. The automatic analysis utilizes a general purpose computer to determine the intervals between all the R waves of the EGG complexes in the record, and the reported values are computed from these determinations. The automatically reduced rates are readily identified by the large numbers of values . The validity of both of these methods has been substantiated by repeated cross-correlation of results during the two years of development of the analysis program. Although the data analysis format was arbitrarily selected, the results are fully reproducible and appear to be adequate for the present medical requirements. All blood pressures on record were incorporated in the tables. The most significant aspect of the preflight data is the rather wide range of mean rates, particularly heart rates, which limits the establishment of expected or so-called normal responses . This wide variation is a common phenomenon among healthy individuals and, in this regard, makes it difficult to predict accurately the responses of such a person under conditions similar to those during which the background data are derived. The EGG from the preflight observation period was scanned repeatedly by numerous observers. The collective opinions were that marked normal sinus arrhythmia was present with frequent occurrences of a wandering cardiac pacemaker. At times, sinus node suppression was sufficient to allow activation by the atrio-ventricular (A-V) node with escape and fusion beats. This occurrence was identified by both biphasic and negative P waves of decreased amplitude, and on occasion by changes in the ventricular complexes. There were numerous such beats noted during the countdown of the postponed launch, and there was one brief episode of nodal rhythm during this period. These data are illustrated in figure 7.1.2.2-3 and 7.1.2.2-^4-. There was sinus bradycardia, which, at times, was followed by a sinus-generated beat and, at other times, an A-V nodal-generated escape beat. Other infrequent rhythm alterations were premature atrial and ventricular beats. These preflight data were collected in order to establish the baseline physiological responses of the MA-9 astronaut specifically using the flight biomedical instrumentation.

OOMFIDEMTIAL

page 7 - 6
7.1.3
7.1.3.1

CONFIDENTIAL

Flight observations.Biosensor data: Inflight biomedical monitoring spanned a time interval of 3^ hours, l6 minutes,, and ^3 seconds on this flight. Continuous onboard recording included the first 1 hour and 35 minutes and the last 10 hours and ^5 minutes of flight time until bioplug disconnect. Flight data were programed to be intermittently recorded for 1 minute of every 10 minutes between 1 hour and 39 minutes elapsed time and 23 hours and 32 minutes elapsed time. Recording of physiolgical data through the mid-portion of the flight was erratic and did not follow original plans because of a malfunction of the tape-recorder programer which occurred at approximately 1 : 0 0 and continued throughout the flight. Data during 20:0 the final portion of the flight, from 2 : 0 0 until landing, 40:0 were made possible because the failed programer was overriden by the astronaut's selection of continuous recorder operations. However, sufficient data points were obtained for confident extrapolation of trends of physiologic values during such periods by the astronaut's voice contacts with the ground, use of the vox-record actuation of the tape recorder, or turning the tape recorder temporarily to continuous to document certain inflight experiments. During the period when the astronaut was resting quietly or was asleep, essentially no medical data were obtained on the onboard recorder; consequently mean heart rate values for the entire duration of the flight are probably biased on the high side of a true mean. Data from the onboard recorder have been supplemented by data obtained during network station passes throughout the mission, and an exceptionally valuable short period of recording was obtained onboard the carrier during egress of the astronaut. The inflight responses are summarized in tables 7-1-2.2-2 and 7.1.2.2-4. Hear rate response, including mean rates, was obtained through a computer reduction of the inflight data from the onboard tape recorder. Respiration rates were obtained by the manual counting of 30-second periods every 3 minutes during the period of continuous recording, and from 30-second averages taken at all other short intervals when data were available from the onboard tape recorder. Blood pressures were obtained according to the flight plan with only very minor variations. These values were with few exceptions not recorded on the onboard recorder since the astronaut was generally quiet while sending the blood pressure, and therefore the tape recorder was not operating. However, the values were received at ground stations in every instance and read in real time by medical monitors. The readings were subsequently verified by

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postflight analysis of the tracking-site data. Body temperature was sampled intermittently during the flight with an oral thermistor, which the pilot placed under his tongue on five occasions as planned, and one additional oral temperature was requested and obtained during the flight. Body temperatures obtained in flight and listed below were all within the normal range.

Time

Oral temperature, °F

1:10:00 6:00:00 10:25:00 12:25:00 23:50:00

98-5 100.0 100.0

99.0 98.0

The most noteworthy elements of the physiological parameters recorded during this flight are the evidences which tend to confirm the astronaut's impression of fairly strenuous exercise throughout the major portion of the flight. The overall mean heart rate recorded during the period when the inflight recorder was operative was 89 beats per minute, and the overall respiratory rate recorded from available data was 19 breaths per minute. The significant events of powered flight showed corresponding increases in heart rate and respiratory rate, as has been the case in all manned Mercury flights. The pilot's heart rate at BECO was 1^7 beats per minute; at launch-escape-rocket ignition, 15^ beats per minute; and at SECO, 1^ beats per minute. Within 2 minutes after SECO, heart rate subsided to about 110 beats per minute and then gradually declined over the next 13 minutes to rates of 80 to 100 beats per minute for the remainder of the first orbital pass. Respiratory rate was 28 breaths per minute at BECO, between 25 and 30 breaths per minute through SECO, and then declined to rates of 18 to 20 breaths per minute within the first 15 minutes of weightless flight. During the first orbital period, while the astronaut was becoming accustomed to the weightless environment and was verifying the functional integrity of his control systems^ his heart rate remained at between 80 and 90 beats per minute except for a few short spurts above 100 which generally are related to periods of physical activity. During the second pass his heart rate generally declined to a steady level of about 80 beats per minute with rapid rises to between 100 and 110.beats per minute when the pilot was exerting himself to conduct experiments.

FIDEMTIAL

page 7 8
When the flashing light was deployed at about 3:26:00, his heart rate rose to a sharp peak of 13^- teats per minute and then promptly declined to 95 teats per minute while the pilot was maneuvering the spacecraft in an attempt to sight the flashing light. Heart rate remained stable around 80 beats per minute throughout the remainder of the first 8 hours in space except during periods when the astronaut announced on the tape that he was performing some specific exertion such as emptying the condensate tank or removing equipment from the equipment 'kit. During these intervals, rates would increase to values from 100 beats per minute to as high as 130 beats per minute for very short times. At 8:25:00, the pilot specifically mentioned struggling with his writing desk. At this time, his heart rate was seen to rise to 96 beats per minute and then promptly settled back to its resting rate of about 80. The longer period of observation and the opportunity which this flight afforded to correlate pilot activities with heart and respiratory rates permits tentative appraisal of the effect on these rates of exertion in the orbital spacecraft based on similar physical exertion under equally cramped circumstances at Ig. There does not appear to be a significant difference in terms of pulse rate and respiratory rate response in the two situations. This impression was further borne out in the two planned exercise periods where there was consistent similarity between the response to exercise in orbital flight and the response to exercise in preflight practice sessions, as shown in table 7-1-3-1-1. The respiratory rate sensor became unreliable during the flight. The failure was subsequently traced to a separation of the electrode lead wire from the electrode, which was attached to the left lower chest. The first sign of respiration sensor failure occurred at 7:08:00, and throughout the remainder of the flight, the respiratory rate recording was intermittent. Sometimes it appeared to trace a faithful replica of the pilot's breathing, but at other times it was entirely unreliable or without apparent relationship to respiration. The respiratory rates during the last portion of the flight are tentative rates based on the appearance of the pneumograph waveform during periods when evidence available indicates it was following changes in thoracic volume. Typical signals for properly operating biosensors are illustrated in figure 7-1-3-1-1• During the sleeping period, heart rates recorded on passes over tracking stations were generally as lov as 50 and averaged between 55 and 60 beats per minute. However, when

page 7 - 9
the pilot awoke and announced anything which was recorded on the onboard recorder his heart rate immediately rose to about 80 which is the same value as during his working periods earlier in the flight. After about 23:32:00 and for the remainder of the normal orbital flight, the astronaut's mean heart rate rose to a value of about 100 beats per minute. His first indication of a spacecraft system malfunction occurred at about 28:34:00 when he noticed the 0.05g relay light had come on. Heart rate at this time rose sharply to l48 beats per minute and then rapidly declined to the low of 60 beats per minute and stabilized at a rate of around 100 beats per minute. After a preliminary analysis of the nature of the malfunction indicated by this 0.05g light, the pilot's heart rate varied, with a peak of 142 beats per minute while he was engaged in checking his ASCS system at approximately 30:08:00. Again, the heart rate declined rapidly to its resting level of approximately 100 beats per minute. At about 32:41:00, the pilot was advised to take 5 ing of dextro amphetamine orally which he did very shortly after receiving the advice. A gradual rise in the heart rate can be seen, beginning at 33 hours elapsed time, with rather marked swings in rate between levels as high as l4o beats per minute and lows of about 80 beats per minute throughout the remainder of the flight. The last significant inflight change in heart rate occurred at retrofire when the heart rate rose to l66 beats per minute for no longer than 20 seconds. The heart rates during reentry varied between 120 and l4o beats per minute until drogue parachute deployment when it spiked to 184 beats per minute. It then gradually declined to 164 beats per minute when bioplug disconnect was accomplished subsequent to main parachute deployment. The changes in heart rate throughout this flight seem to fall readily into two categories. The gradual increases in rate with correspondingly gradual returns to normal resting heart rate are seen in response to physical exertion. The peak heart rate which was noted corresponded to levels which would be expected following an equivalent amount of exertion under Ig. A sharper rise of heart rate to high levels in excess of l4o beats per minute is seen as a startle response when the astronaut is evidently emotionally alerted to a highly significant change in his environmental situation. From an electrophysiology standpoint, the EGG was well within normal physiologic limits during the major portion of this flight. The A-V nodal beats noted during the prelaunch period were nearly non-existent during the entire

COMriDDHTIAL

Page 7 - 1 0
3W

^CONFIDENTIAL
hours of flight monitoring. A careful review of the

entire flight revealed that data from both leads of EGG showed periodic changes in the character of the P wave and the P-R interval which are consistent with a wandering pacemaker. There were frequent prolonged sinus pauses during the flight which generally are associated with deep inspiration by'the pilot, and in every instance a sinus beat, rather than a ventricular escape, followed the pause. One period when this rule did not hold was during the sleeping time as the astronaut was passing over the RKV tracking ship. At 17:10:00 and 18:45:00, the medical monitor reported a nodal rhythm which was verified during the postflight examination of the records. Figure 7-1-2.2-4 illustrates this variation. Late in the flight, the sternal EGG lead became rather noisy with a marked fluctuation of the baseline. This fluctuation appeared at times to be synchronous with respiration and at other times to bear little or no relationship to respiratory movements. At this period in the flight, sinus arrhythmia was somewhat more pronounced than it had been early in the flight. A recurrent finding on the record consisted of a simultaneous disruption of the sternal EGG recording with a sharp negative impulse on the relatively insensitive respiratory channel and a sinus pause showing on the side-to-side EGG lead. It is tentatively believed that this characteristic pattern resulted from either a habitual deep sighing breath taken by the pilot or perhaps a repeated stretching motion made in an attempt to relieve his cramped position. Blood pressures did not vary remarkably during the flight from preflight values, as shown in table 7.1.2.2-4. Postflight analysis of the radiation film badges worn by the astronaut revealed a total dose of from 15 to 20 millirads, which is well below the maximum allowable dosage. 7.1.3.2 Clinical observations: The information contained in this section was derived from reviewing the pilot's comments on voice track of the onboard tape, conversations immediately after the flight, and from his answers to a comprehensive list of questions during the medical debriefing on the day following recovery. The noise and increased "g" forces associated with launch were not uncomfortable and caused no problem. Specifically, the pilot stated he felt very little vibration and had no blurring of vision. He attributes this absence of blurring to a slightly thicker' rubber pad which had been added to the couch beneath his helmet. The cessation of powered flight and the onset of weightlessness did not cause vertigo, tumbling

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7 - n

sensations, or other unusual symptoms. The pilot rapidlyadjusted to zero g and described it as "pleasant, extremely relaxing, and a real floating sensation." His observations indicate that vision was entirely normal throughout the flight. He noticed a phenomenon of orientation similar to that reported by the MA-7 pilot. He stated that after SECO and during the first 20 minutes or so of gravity-free flight, he felt the equipment kit located near his right arm was rotated 90°• This phenomenon did not extend to the instrument panel, window, instrument panel compartment or any other structure within the spacecraft, and it was not troublesome. The pilot's body was his reference for orientation to the spacecraft and this relationship was never in question. The astronaut stated that he did not feel particularly hungry for the majority of the time during the flight and ate primarily because it had been scheduled. However, later in the flight he did feel hungry on one occasion and after eating felt better. Because of problems with the food containers and water nozzle during flight, he was unable reconstitute properly the freeze-dehydrated food and could only eat one-third of a package of beef pot roast. Therefore, he subsisted on bite-sized cubed food and bite-sized peanut butter "sandwiches." He avoided the bite-sized beef sandwiches, since they had crumbled in their package. His caloric intake during the flight was only 696 calories of the 2,369 calories available to him at launch. He rapidly tired of the cubed "snack-type" foods and this contributed to his low caloric intake. Typical samples of the food types which were carried aboard for the MA-9 flight are shown in figure 7-1-3.2-1. The astronaut's water intake was also limited. When the condensate transfer system would no longer permit fluid storage in the main condensate bag (3.86 Ib) during the flight, he was forced to put condensate water into one of the drinkingwater tanks before he had consumed all of its contents. Normal operational procedures required the exclusion of condensate water as a drinking-water source. He began drinking small amounts from his survival kit water supply, as planned, but wished to conserve this as much as possible. He was not really thirsty until during the last orbital pass, but he was so busy at this point he did not take time to drink. Because condensate water was placed into the drinking-water tank, in which an unknown amount of drinking water remained, it is impossible to make a valid statement as to his water intake during flight, but he did consume more than 1,500 cc. The drinking water rapidly became unpalatable because of its equilibration with 95° cabin temperature and an alteration of

Up

7 -12
its taste by the plastic "bags in which it was carried. The astronaut stated that he probably would have drunk more liquid, including the dehydrated juices, if he had not experienced difficulty with the mouthpiece of the drinking water tank. At one point during the flight the pilot felt a vague gastric awareness or queasiness, but this feeling rapidly cleared when he ate a little food and drank some water. At no time did he have any nausea, vomiting, or other gastrointestinal problems. He urinated without difficulty several times during flight and stated that bladder sensations were normal. The urine collection and transfer system worked well, and separate urine samples were obtained at four different times during the flight. It did require considerable time and effort to transfer the urine to the storage bags, although not as much as was encountered with the condensate system. The astronaut had a very good sleep the night prior to launch and was as rested as possible. He found, even early in the flight, that when he had no tasks to perform and the spacecraft was oriented such that the earth was not in view from the window, he easily dozed off for brief naps. There were times when he awoke without realizing he had fallen asleep. This dozing did not occur during times when there were tasks to perform or items to see through the window. During the period designated for sleep, he slept only in a series of naps lasting no more than 1 hour each. His total sleep time was about ^-5- hours. He awoke from these 30- to

60-minute naps feeling alert and rested, but 30 to ^5 minutes later he would again doze off. He stated that if there had been another person along to monitor the spacecraft, particularly the ECS functions, he could have slept for much longer periods, but still "no more than k to 6 hours in a day." Table 7-1-3-2-1 lists the estimated inflight sleep periods. He had a brief period of confusion the first time or two that he awoke, not realizing exactly where he was. However, it took him only a very few seconds to become completely awake and oriented. He reported that this brief period of confusion did not occur later in the flight. The pilot stated that he slept "perhaps a little more soundly" than on earth and that he did dream, but he did not remember the contents of the dreams. He did not notice significant changes in dreaming from ground experience.

M. M.J\Li

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Page

7-13

He felt that being strapped into the seat made little difference in his sleep, but he definitely had the feeling he was sleeping sitting up. He noted when he awoke that his arms were floating but in front of him, and because of his concern that he might inadvertently trip a critical switch during sleep, he folded his hands and hooked his thumbs under the helmet restraint cables. He was never startled or alarmed to awaken and see his hands floating in front of his faceplate. The oral temperature probe was easily handled by the pilot. It was necessary to use a small hand mirror to check its position on the right ear muff to be sure it was not extending beyond the helmet, but at no time did it interfere with closing the faceplate. The only real discomfort experienced during the flight was associated with the pressure suit being pulled tightly across the pilot's knees. By the 6th or 7"th orbital pass, his knees were becoming quite uncomfortable. This discomfort was somewhat alleviated by the astronaut's periodically sliding his feet up past the normal foot position into the tower area of the spacecraft. This action permitted straightening of his legs to relieve most of the pressure and also allowed him to pull on the legs of the suit to gain a little slack around his knees. A drug was taken during flight for the first time during a Mercury flight. The astronaut took 5 mg of dextro amphetamine sulfate approximately 1 hour 20 minutes prior to retrofire. He stated that within 20 minutes he felt much more alert and confident and seemed to be "more on top of things. " He then had less tendency to drop off to sleep for short naps for the remainder of the flight. There was no apparent degradation in the pilot's performance following this medication. He also stated that the drug, as far as he could tell, had the same effect^ as test doses taken prior to flight. One of the most aggravating problems during flight was the continuous fluctuation of the suit temperature. The pilot was forced to adjust the suit-circuit coolant-control valve nearly every 15 or 20 minutes, and he was seldom really comfortable. This frequent adjustment also played a role in limiting his sleep. In addition, his suit was very wet since free water was not being sufficiently extracted from the suit ducting leading into the suit. During the last two orbital passes, the PC02 gage was noted to be indicating a rise in the amount of COp in the suit. The

Afc.

page 7 - i4

-CONFIDENTIAL

astronaut actuated the emergency oxygen flow rate for 30 seconds which should have reduced the PCOp reading. It did not seem to change the pilot's onboard reading noticeably, although telemetry signals indicated a slight drop. At this time the pilot closed his faceplate and felt that his respirations were deeper and more rapid. This change in respiration could not be confirmed by postflight examination of respiration and heart .rate recordings. Although he felt more comfortable with the faceplate open,, he kept it closed during the final orbital pass and the reentry as planned. The PCOp gage indicated about 5 mm Hg at reentry. This concentration is not enough to cause symptoms of hypercapnia on the ground, and there was no apparent interference with the pilot's normal functions. 7-1.4 7.1.^.1 Postflight observations.Recovery history: The spacecraft landed in the water about 4.4 miles from the recovery ship, the U.S.S. Kearsarge, and was placed on deck approximately 40 minutes later. In order to gain medical data as early as possible, the NASA Flight Surgeon aboard the recovery ship was equipped with an 8-foot extension cord for the biomedical cable. Immediately after the hatch was opened, this cord was attached to the astronaut's biosensor plug and blood pressure fitting and connected to the spacecraft onboard recorder in order to record blood pressures and EGG before, during, and after egress. This system was extremely effective in deriving post-egress data. The astronaut was then taken to the ship's sick bay where a comprehensive medical examination and preliminary debriefing were performed. The remainder of the debriefing was conducted by the NASA Flight Surgeon in the admiral's in-port cabin. The astronaut spent 48 hours onboard the ship. Details of his activities during this 48-hour period are shown in table 7 1 4 1 1 ...-. 7-1.4.2 Physical examinations: The postflight examination began prior to egress from the spacecraft. Approximately 40 minutes after landing, two measurements of the astronaut's blood pressure were recorded while he was still lying in the spacecraft on the deck of the recovery ship. He was then able to egress from the spacecraft without assistance and stand erect on the deck vhile his blood pressure was again recorded on the onboard tape. Later examination of this 3— minute

record shows that, while still in the spacecraft, the blood

TOM1DENTIAL

Page 7 - 1 5

pressures were 101/65 and 105/87, with a corresponding heart rate of 132 beats per minute. During egress and immediately thereafter while standing upright on the deck, his heart rate rose to 188 beats per minute with atrio-ventricular (A-V) dissociation. At that point, another blood pressure recording was attempted and, although the apparatus appeared to cycle normally, no pressure pulses were seen on the recording. His heart then returned to a normal sinus rhythm with a rate of 92 beats per minute at sensor disconnect. After standing on the deck for approximately a minute, he began to look pale and, although his face was already wet, new beads of perspiration appeared on his forehead. He swayed slightly and whispered, "I think I am going to faint." The cable was immediately disconnected and, with support at each arm, he began to walk away from the spacecraft. After a few steps'and 5 to 10 seconds later, he was able to walk without assistance and to salute the ship's commanding officer. There were no other objective changes of this kind throughout the postflight examination and debriefing period. The astronaut described this episode as, "I felt fine, although somewhat warm, within the spacecraft and continued to feel fine during egress. My legs felt cramped and stiff and I was a little concerned whether or not they would support me. After standing for a few seconds I felt woozy and light-headed and noted 'gunbarreling' of vision similar to that experienced during oxygen lack. Voices were distant and my feet and legs tingled. For the first step or two I could not feel my feet except as a tingling sensation, but with walking the sensations all rapidly cleared. I think I would have fainted if the doctors had. not started my walking when they did." The remainder of the physical examination was conducted in the ship's sick bay and was completed within 2 hours after landing. During desuiting it was noted that the astronaut was soaking wet, presumably with perspiration. His hands had the white, puffy, wrinkled appearance characteristic of prolonged submersion in water. His feet and socks were dry. He complained of being thirsty and his voice was dry and hoarse. He participated actively in the desuiting and examination, but appeared tired and less talkative than usual. His body, and especially his hands, had absorbed the odor of the inside of the pressure suit. The urine collection device was still firmly attached and contained 107 cc of urine. When the soaking wet underwear was removed, the lead wire to the lower left sensor on the chest was seen to be disconnected. It is not known whether

CONFIDENTIAL

page 7 16

CONFIDENTIAL

it separated prior to this time although it appears probable that it was loose, making partial contact and held by the plastic insulation sleeve until the suit was removed. There were some evidences of pressure on the skin at all lateral sensor locations, but no signs of irritation by sensors, paste, or tape. All sensors were securely in place and the electrode paste seemed to have maintained its normal consistency. At the sensor locations on the left lateral chest, there were narrow semicircular marks that looked like a very shallow cut with a sharp blade. These cuts may have been caused by the thin edge of the tape where the rubber sensor disc slightly overlapped it. There were painful and slightly swollen red areas over each patella caused by the pressure suit having been pulled tightly across the anterior knee when the knee was flexed. Other reddened areas were found over each posterior inferior iliac spine and the posterior spinous process of the fifth lumbar vertebra. There was a diffuse redness over the right lateral iliac area, but none on the left. No explanation can be offered for this condition at the present time. Additional findings of note were a bilateral conjunctivitis, which probably resulted from drying of the eyes by the constant oxygen flow and a slight reddening around the left tympanic membrane. He complained that he had a little trouble clearing his left ear during descent. Both ears "crackled" for 6 to 8 hours after recovery as the oxygen in the middle ear was gradually absorbed and replaced with air. This condition is commonly seen in aviators when they have been breathing 100-percent oxygen. Tilt table studies were performed at 1, 3, %-, and 19 hours after landing. At no time did the astronaut have any subjective complaints, nor were objective changes noted except in pulse and blood pressure. Specifically, there were no unusual color changes in the feet, as had been noted following the MA-8 flight. The results of the tilt table studies are tabulated and discussed under Special Studies. The medical findings during the initial recovery examination are shown in table 7.1.2.1-3, and included a blood pressure of 9 / 0 mm Hg while supine, a heart rate of 86 beats per 08 minute, a respiration rate of l6 breaths per minute, a body weight of 139r pounds, and a body temperature of 99.k° F taken orally. Three hours after landing, his urine showed a specific gravity of 1.031, an(i the hematocrit was ^9. These findings, combined with the clinical evaluation,

GONriDDFITf

Page

7-17

indicate a moderate dehydration. As has been indicated elsewhere, this dehydration resulted from a reduced intake of food and water during the flight. Detailed results of the blood and urine analyses currently available are contained in tables 7.1.2.1-3 to 7.1.2.1-5. The reversal of the ratio of lymphocytes to polymorphonuclear leukocytes during the week following the flight, without a significant change in the total count, is presently unexplained. This ratio has since returned approximately to unity, but the study of this phenomenon is continuing. A clinical electrocardiogram and a chest X-ray completed the initial postflight examination. The chest X-ray showed no changes when compared with that taken before the flight on May 12, 1963. The EGG showed a moderate rightward shift in the QRS and T axes when compared to that of May 12, 1963. This shift is probably the result of a normal cardiac position change. The astronaut slept very soundly for 9— hours and awoke cheerful and eager to complete the debriefing activities. A brief examination the following day showed that the conjunctival irritation, the hoarseness of his voice, most of the skin pressure marks, and most of the evidence of dehydration had disappeared. The areas of pressure over the knees were still painful and somewhat more swollen than on the previous day. The sharp semicircular marks were still much in evidence and remained visible for several days. Table 7.1.4.2-1 states the pilot's weight loss during several preflight activities and the inflight experience. Intake and output records for the first 2.k hours after recovery indicate a fluid intake of 3^900 cc and a urine output of 5^5 cc. The pilot returned to the launch site on the fourth day following launch and was examined the following morning. The same medical specialists found him to be in excellent health. The only changes noted were the persistent slight erythema and tenderness of both patellae, resulting from the pressure areas in the suit, a continued, rightward shift in the QRS and T axes of the EGG, and a persistence of the previously noted alteration in blood count. The EGG- shift had become less apparent, however. The laboratory studies of blood and urine are contained in tables 7-1-2.1-3 to 2.1.2.1-5. The pilot remained in good health and maintained his high morale following this examination. He participated in debriefing sessions and other postflight activities without further medical change.

lOOMilDBMTAL

Page 7 - 1 8
7.1.5 7-1-5-1 Special studies.Tilt test evaluation: The medical examination performed immediately after the MA-8 recovery suggested an alteration in the pilot's cardiovascular responses to position changes. In order to obtain more quantitative measurements of these responses, an operational tilt procedure was developed for shipboard use. This procedure utilized a Stokes' Litter with cross-bars added for lifting and stabilization. These modifications permitted a tilt of 70° from the horizontal in 3 to 4 seconds. The individual being tested was comfortably secured in the litter, without circulatory interference, by straps across the knees and the upper chest. Heart rate and blood pressure measurements were taken at least every minute on all tests and were chosen as the primary indicators of altered function, in conjunction with observation of visible reactions and subjective comments. Operational use called for minute heart rates calculated from 15-second counts of the right radial pulse with clinical blood pressures taken from the left arm. Greater capability in the Space Medicine Laboratory in Hangar S permitted simultaneous determination of both clinical and BFMS blood pressures and continuous recording of respiration rate and EGG from the biosensor system. Minute heart rates were determined from the directly recorded biosensor data by using 12-second counts made every 30 seconds. Minute respiration rates were determined from 30-second counts made each minute. There were no apparent differences between the clinical and biosensor values, but continuous EGG readings produced interesting additional information. The procedure was carried out in the following manner. After k sets of similar control values, the individual was tilted for 5 minutes and values were sampled at least every minute, then returned to the horizontal position for a recording of at least 4 more sets of similar values. Thus, the minimum time for the complete test was 13 minutes. In order to superimpose a further cardiovascular stress, Flack Tests were used in some of the tilts. This test utilizes a tube with an orifice through which the individual exhales after a maximum inspiration, producing a constant pulmonary overpressure of ^0 mm Hg. The Flack Test lasted 15 seconds and was conducted from 3;j to ^ minutes after the individual was tilted to the 70° position. Preflight results were obtained from 11 tilt tests on the flight astronaut from January 5 to May 10, 1963. Flack Tests were performed with k of the tilts . All of these tilts were performed in conjunction with a spacecraft checkout procedure which required

Page

7-19

at least 2 hours in the spacecraft couch In the semisupine position. The time between the prerun tilts and the procedure varied from 1 to 5 hours because of uncontrollable operational factors. In each case, the postrun tilts were conducted from 5 to 15 minutes after the procedure, and on January 5, 1963, a second postrun tilt was performed 1 hour after the first. The heart rate and blood pressure values are summarized in table 7.1.5-1-1 and illustrated in figures 7.1.5.1-1 and 7.1.5.1-2. The preflight results fall within the ranges reported in the literature. In the prerun period, most heart rates were between 55 and 80 beats per minute. The tilt produced a rise in heart rate varying from 5 to about 20 beats per minute within 30 seconds. This reading gradually increased during the first 2 minutes to rates of 80 and 9° beats per minute, at which point it stabilized. Post-tilt values between 100 and 110 beats per minute occurred after a 6— hour run, which was more than twice as long as any of the other runs. At the beginning of the Flack Test, a bradycardia for 3 or 4 beats usually occurred, followed by an increase in rate to 80 to 90 beats per minute. On several occasions, the maximum observed rates of 110 beats per minute followed a Flack Test. The sudden release of the increased intrathoracic pressure again produced a transient bradycardia followed by an "overshoot" of 10 to 15 beats per minute. Conclusion of the tilt period consistently produced an immediate drop in rate to the pretilt range. Respiration rates were without significant change and are not reported. The increases in diastolic blood pressure were the most' remarkable produced by the tilt. The mean increase was 15 mm Hg, but many of the diastolic pressures rose 20 to 30 mm Hg. An initial systolic drop was followed by a compensatory rise. Post-run tilts produced somewhat more striking blood pressure changes, with narrowing of some pulse pressures to as little as 6 mm Hg. The maximum systolic levels followed Flack Tests, without an assosicated diastolic change of significance. The EGG demonstrated expected alteration of the QRS axis secondary to position change. Decrease in size of the QRS was especially prominent in the chest lead as a consequence of E wave depression. There were sinus pauses with an occasional aberrant complex of ventricular origin. The usual pretilt sinus arrhythmia disappeared with the rate increases. The Flack Test produced dropped beats and occasional premature ventricular contractions during the period after sudden release.

COMriDEMTIAL

page 7 - 20
On no occasion could symptoms of near-syncope be detected. Subjectively, all of these tests were exceedingly welltolerated. Observation of the physical appearance while tilted showed a tendency to bluish mottling of the hands and feet and a tendency to increased filling of the veins of the legs. Postflight results are shown adjacent to the preflight findings in table 7.1.5.1-1- and figures 7.1.5.1-1 and 7.1.5.1-2. It is readily evident that the postflight tilt test no. 1 (conducted approximately 1 hour after landing) found the mean pretilt heart rates 11 beats per minute higher than those for the similar period preflight, and that the tilt produced a greater heart rate response than any of the preflight tilts. Most of the values from tilt test no. 1 were 120 beats per minute (maximum 132 beats per minute) and exceeded any of the maximum values obtained during the 11 preflight tilts. A Flack Test was not felt to be indicated in view of the tilt response. Tilt test no. 2, conducted J hours after landing and 2 hours after no. 1, began from a higher point and showed an even greater rate response; three of the six values were between 1^0 and ikk- beats per minute. Within ^—minutes after the tilt,

the heart rate had declined to 1J2 beats per minute when the Flack Test produced a jump to 1^5 beats per minute. The tilt was ended and subsequent rates were similar to the pretilt rates. Tilt test no. 3, conducted 6f^ hours after landing and 1 3o- hours after no. 2, showed responses very close to the preflight maximums, which are still excessive, but much less so than the previous two tilts. The rates decrease slightly after the Flack Test. Tilt test no. k, initiated 19 hours after landing and 12— hours after no. 3, produced responses very near those obtained before flight with a continued slowing of heart rate after the Flack Test. Unfortunately, simultaneous EGGcould not be recorded with any of these tilts. The blood pressure responses to the postflight tilts were more nearly uniform; therefore only the mean values are graphed. Instead of the preflight systolic drop with prompt compensation and a 15 mm Hg diastolic rise following the tilt, most of the postflight tilts were followed by a systolic drop, a very delayed systolic rise, and little or no change in diastolic levels. Narrowing of pulse pressure to as little as 6 mm Hg was evident in the early postflight tilts. The following table summarizes the pulse-pressure changes:

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7 - 2 1 Pretilt Tilt Tilt test Posttilt Mean I Minimum I MaximumMean I Minimum Maximum Meanl Minimuml Maximum no. Preflight pulse pressure, mm Hg
29

17

4o _

21

6

58

31

10

46

Postflight pulse pressure, mm Hg

1 to 3 4

25 37

10

36

38 38

17 26

6
14

42

29

20 40

46

46

36 50

The blood pressure responses to the final tilt were nearly normal, but still showed a delayed compensation for the systolic drop. Wo visible objective changes occurred and there were no subjective symptoms. In summary, the preflight tilt tests produced expected cardiovascular compensatory reactions insofar as they could be demonstrated by heart rate, blood pressure, and EGG data, and all of these tests were well tolerated. The postflight tilt tests demonstrated the presence of moderate orthostic hypotension, with far greater heart rates required to maintain effective cardiovascular function. Compensation was achieved, however, and the pilot did not even develop near-syncope. Tilt studies of responses after stresses similar to those experienced during flight are not available, and inadequate water intake and weight loss create difficulty in interpreting these results. It is well known that dehydration and decreased blood volume are some of the factors which will decrease cardiovascular stress tolerance.

7.1.5.2

Calibrated work: A device for calibrated work consisting of a short plastic handle and expandable bungee cords (see fig. 7-1-5-2-1) was fixed within the spacecraft near the astronaut's feet. A limiting cable ensured repeatability of handle travel, requiring 65 pounds of force for each full extension. At 2:25:00 and again at 7:4l:00, the astronaut recorded his blood pressure, pulled the device 30 times in as near 30 seconds as possible, and again recorded his blood pressure. The results of these two work periods were compared with 5 such periods performed at normal gravity in the spacecraft and in the procedures trainer. Subjectively the astronaut could tell little difference between the work performed under normal gravity and under zero gravity, the effort under zero gravity being, if anything,

CONFIDENTIAL

slightly easier. During flight he felt his post-work breathing was not as labored and he thought his heart rate returned to pre-work values more rapidly. The data are somewhat, affected by the difficulty he had in freeing the work handle from its restraining clip during flight. Analysis of the data does not show any striking differences between the one gravity and zero gravity work periods. Inflight mean heart rates during the calibrated work period are 2.6 beats per minute higher than preflight, but his inflight mean heart rate before work is 15 beats per minutehigher; therefore this difference is not though to~v be significant, The results are given in table 7-1-3-1-1 and presented graphically in figure 7-1-5.2-2. One preflight heart rate during work was l6o beats per minute. This value occurred at the only time in one of the seven periods that he worked over 0.7 minute and probably reflects the prolongation of the work period rather than indicating a higher work load. During the 18-second recovery period after the test, the preflight mean heart rate is seen to drop to 11 beats per minute over the preflight value, while during the flight it falls to 17 beats per minute over the prework mean. This difference is also not thought to be significant. Blood pressure readings taken before and after work show no significant changes from baseline values. In summary, based on the inadequate evidence obtained during the MA-9 mission, it appears that for brief periods of work following relatively short periods of zero gravity, the cardiovascular system shows no significant changes in heart rate or blood pressure. Subjectively,.calibrated work under zero gravity seems easier, as do most tasks requiring physical effort. 7.1.5.3 Special clinical studies: Retinal photography, urine and plasma electrolyte determinations, and plasma enzyme studies comprise the special clinical studies. The retinal photographs, taken after the flight for comparison with preflight pictures, are not ready at the present time. The preliminary results of the plasma electrolyte determinations are available and appear in table 7-1'5-3-1- If the increase in serum calcium is valid, it is a small change. The results of the urine-electrolyte determination are presented in table 7.1.2.1-5; however, the plasma-enzyme determinations are not yet available. Conclusions.1. There was no evidence of significant degradation of pilot function directly attributable to the space flight. Thirty-four hours of zero gravity were well tolerated and all body functions appeared unaffected during flight.

7-1.6

Page 7 - 2 J 2. For the first 7 to 19 hours after landing, the pilot demonstrated an orthostatic rise in heart rate and fall in blood pressure which was more pronounced than that detected after the MA-8 flight. Although this condition is not an inflight hazard, the implications of this hemodynamic response on return to the Ig condition will have to be given very serious consideration for longer missions. 3- Difficulties with the dehydrated food container, the water nozzle and control of the ECS system interfered with the pilot's ability to maintain an adequate food and fluid intake, thereby causing moderate dehydration. k. Added stresses were placed on the pilot by the constant adjustment required and by the inability of the environmental control system to maintain consistent physiologic conditions within the space suit. 5- Sleep in flight is possible, appears normal, and the evidence does not clearly indicate any change in pattern or overall sleep requirements. It is possible that space flight has a soporific effect. 6. The radiation dose received by the pilot was physiologically insignificant. 7- Wo inflight increase in the frequency of instantaneous heart-rate variations has been documented. Cardiovascular response to normal inflight events and activity appears to be similar to that seen in the Ig environment. 8. There was no physiologically significant amount of COp in the suit circuit during the flight. 9. There is no evidence of abnormal mental responses to an exposure in the space-flight environment for the flight duration involved in this mission. 10. No significant changes have been found in comprehensive preflight and postflight physical examinations. The significance of the laboratory finding of an increase in lymphocytes and reduction in polymorphonuclear leukocytes in spite of a fairly constant total white-blood-cell count is unknown at this time. This finding will be further evaluated.

Page

7-24

TABLE 7.1.2.1-1. - PILOT PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES [Selected activities for which medical study or support was performed!

Date January 5

Activity Altitude-chamber spacecraft checkout Hangar flight simulation

Medical study or support Physical examination before and after Background data (biosensors) Physical examination before and after Background data (biosensors) Low residue diet (3 days) and flight food (2 days) Physical examination Background data (biosensors) Timed urine collection Physical examination, ^5 minutes

March 22-23

April 23

Flight simulation no. 1

May k

T-10 day physical examination Mission simulation (procedures trainer) Launch simulation

May 7

May 8

Physical examination before and after Background data (biosensors) Timed urine collection Physical examination before and after Background data (biosensors) Timed urine collection Begin controlled diet Blood specimen, 50 cc Physical examination before and after Timed urine collection Background data (biosensors) Begin low residue diet

May 10

Flight simulation no. 3

May 11 May 12

T-2 day physical examination Countdown (flight canceled)

Comprehensive medical examination, 2— hours Blood (30 cc) and urine specimen Physical examination before and after Timed urine collection Blood specimen, 30 cc Physical examination Aeromedical countdown Awaken 2:51 a.m. e.s.t. Launch Q:0k a.m. e.s.t.

May Ik

May 15

Flight countdown

1

CONriDENTlAr

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Page 7 - 2 ?

TABLE 7.1.2.1-lj-.- COMPARISON OF TYPICAL PREFLIGHT AND POSTFLIGHT URINE VALUES

Pre flight
Date, 1963 Source Specific gravity

Postflight
Hay 20

May 12

Random sample

Random sample

1.018
6.0

0.019
6.0

pH

Albumen, sugar, acetone, and bile Microscopic

Negative
Few TOG, no RBC, small amounts of amorphous phosphates and mucous, and one hyaline cast

Negative One to 2 WBC/HPF, no RBC, no casts, moderate amount of amorphous phosphates

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7 - 2 8

•ri

Before hangar simule

Simulated flight no

Simulated flight no

Simulated flight no

Simulated flight no

Simulated flight no

Simulated flight no

d tj ^
Comments Low residue diet

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TABLE 7.1.3-2-1.- INFLIGHT SLEEP PERIODS [other unrecorded naps occurred!

Time, c.e.t. 02:10:15 to 02: 11*: 00 05: 1*0: 00 to 05:^5:00 13:50:00 to Ik:k6:00 Ik: 20: 00 to lk:kj:00 15:11:00 15:20:00 to 16:05:00 16:28:11 16:50:00 to 17:50:00 18:20:00 to 18:25:00

Estimated duration, min

Source

k

Onboard tape Astronaut record Onboard tape Astronaut record Onboard tape Astronaut record Onboard tape Astronaut record Astronaut record Astronaut record Onboard tape Onboard tape Onboard tape

5
56
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19=38:39 21:22: kk 27:26:08

Total sleep recorded:

k hours and 9 minutes

Short naps, duration not determined-

Page

7-38

CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 7.I.IK 1-1.- PILOT POSTFLIGHT ACTIVITIES

Date, 1963
May l6

Time, local Midway (a)

Activity

12:25 P-m. 12:55 p.m.
1:09 p.m. 1:12 p.m.

Landing Spacecraft on deck

Blood pressure, recumbent in spacecraft
Egress and blood pressure standing Physical examination begun in recovery ship sick bay First tilt table procedure Examination completed First postflight urination Second tilt table procedure First postflight meal First postflight bowel movement Third tilt table procedure
To bed

1:15 p.m. l:U5 p.m. J:00 p.m.
3:30 p.m.
3: U2 p.m.

U:10 p.m.

5:^5 p.m.
7:11 p.m. 9:30 p.m.

May 17

7:00 a.m. 7:1+0 a.m.

Awakened Fourth tilt table procedure and brief medical examination Breakfast Self-debriefing Technical debriefing Medical debriefing Left recovery ship Comprehensive postflight medical examination at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida

8:00 a.m. 9:00 to 11:00 a.m. 2:00 to 7:00 to 5:00 p.m. 9:00 p.m.

May 18 May 20

1:00 p.m. 9:00 a.m. e. s. t.

To convert times to e.s.t., add 6 hours

Page

7-39

TABLE 7.1.^.2-1.- RECORD OF PILOT'S WEIGHT CHANGES During the J-^eek period prior to flight, the pilot's maximum weight was 1^9r lb and his minimum weight was 1^6 l"b. His weight on launch morning ! was 1^7 lb and his weight on the recovery ship was 139r It.

Date

Activity Pre flight

Duration, hr

Weight loss, lb

January 5, 19^3

Altitude -chamber spacecraft checkout procedure Flight simulation Launch simulation Flight simulation Canceled launch

9

3-5 2.0

April 23, 1963
May 8, 1963 May 10, 1963 May 14, 1963

7

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6 8
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2.0 1-3

May 15/16, 1963

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Page 7 - 4l

TABLE 7.1.5.3-1.- BLOOD CHEMISTRIES JA11 "values must be reverified

Determination

March 12, 1963

May 8, 1963

May 16, 1963 May 17, 1963 May 20, May 12, May 1^, Landing + 24 1963 landing + 2— 1963 1963 hours

hours Calcium, mEq./l Chloride, mEq/1 Protein (total), g/100 ml Pho sphorous , mg/100 ml Sodium mEq./l Potassium, mEq./l
k.YI 4.28
a

l|.60
100 6.0

U.22

4.67

4.56

4.22

105

106 6-3 3-5 151 4.6

104

104

102 6.2

104 6.2

6.0

6.6
k.h
14U 5-2

6-3
4.5 153 5-2

4.2

u.u

4.0
147
5-0

3-4

153

161
5.1*

146 4.9

k.6

This value is particularly in question.

page T - ^2

tJONFIDENTIAL
7.2 Pilot Performance

7.2.1 7.2.1.1

Preflight training.Spacecraft checkout activities: Intensive participation in the preflight checkout activities enabled the pilot to become familiar with the MA-9 spacecraft and launch-vehicle systems. Participation in these activities was particularly important because the pilot had the opportunity to operate and to become familiar with the characteristics of the modified systems and switching procedures peculiar to his own spacecraft. Table 7*2.1.1-1 summarizes the checkout activities in which he spent 73 hours and 50 minutes in the spacecraft. This table does not include the many hours spent by the pilot in preparation, troubleshooting, monitoring tests as an outside observer, and posttest analysis. In addition, as backup to Astronaut Schirra, the pilot spent approximately ^0 hours in the MA-8 spacecraft, which added to his knowledge of the Mercury spacecraft in general. Flight simulation training activities: Table 7.2.1.2-1 summarizes the training activities on the Cape Canaveral procedures trainer from March 15 to May 13, 1963* The pilot spent 33 hours and 30 minutes on the trainer accomplishing ^3 turnaround maneuvers, 62 simulated manual retrofires, 8l simulated systems failures, and 28 manual reentries. In addition, the pilot spent approximately 20 hours on the procedures trainer during the MA-8 preflight period. The pilot spent the majority of his time during these sessions on the detection and circumvention of simulated systems failures and various mission anomalies which would require an abort during the launch phase of the flight. The pilot concentrated on these areas because of their critical importance and because the procedures trainer is best equipped to simulate these phases of the mission. He did, however, spend approximately one-third of his time during these training sessions on the normal flight activities specified in the flight plan and practicing of retrofire and reentry attitude and rate control maneuvers. The pilot also participated in several launch abort and network simulations during which mission rules and operational procedures were extensively used and reviewed.

7.2.1.2

7.2.1.3

Flying proficiency: Throughout the preflight training period, the pilot continued to maintain flying proficiency in highperformance aircraft. He logged 6k hours and 35 minutes in flying time from January 1 to May 10, 1963 (see table 7.2.1.3-1), Flying high-performance aircraft is an important complement to the more direct space-flight preparation activities on the static trainers, because it requires the pilot to maintain the

COMTDONTIAlr

Page

ability to make quick and accurate analyses and decisions under actual operational conditions. 7.2.1.U Systems and operational briefings: The pilot received two series of formal systems briefings which were oriented as much as possible toward the operational requirements of the mission. The first series of briefings required 3 days time during which each spacecraft subsystem was extensively reviewed, while the second series required only 1 day since its purpose was to review recent spacecraft systems modifications. The pilot received two series of briefings on inflight experiments, each series requiring 1 day to complete. During these presentations'1 the experiment, its purpose, its associated equipment, and the operational procedures were discussed, finalized, and integrated into the flight plan. In addition, the pilot spent many more hours with various systems and operations personnel on an informal basis in order to establish optimal operational procedures. 7.2.1.5 Preflight-operations schedule: Table 7-2.1.5-1 summarizes the major activities in which the pilot was involved from January 2, 1963, until launch. In addition to the large amount of time spent in briefings, spacecraft checkout activities, flying, and on the procedures trainers, the pilot was also able to take part in several special training activities. Among these activities were four sessions at the Morehead Planetarium, during which he reviewed the celestial sphere and participated in a simulation of the flashing light experiment; acceleration refamiliarization in the Johnsville centrifuge; and recovery and egress training and survivalequipment exercises. Training analysis: The pilot, like his predecessor, concentrated his major effort in learning the spacecraft' s systems and their operational characteristics. The pilot achieved a high level of skill on the procedures trainer in coping with systems failures and operational anomalies. Particular concentration was placed in developing procedures for accomplishing inflight activities with a minimal expenditure of onboard consumables. The pilot practiced these activities on the trainers only after he knew each system or operation extremely well and all spacecraft system modifications had been completed. He also obtained considerable practice in performing manually such tasks as the turnaround, retrofire, and reentry maneuvers by using the attitude and rate indicators. A good understanding of the spacecraft's control systems was provided

7-2.1.6

CONFIDENTIAL

page 7 - ^

* CONFIDENTIAL

through systems briefing and the use of the transparent gyro simulatior; and the yaw-recognition trainer helped him to prepare for those inflight activities, such as gyro realinement and- flight maneuvering with the use of external references, that are not properly simulated on the Cape Canaveral procedures trainer. The pilot reported that the' one inflight experience for which he was not well prepared was the out-the-window view. Since this view cannot be easily simulated, it was a novel experience to the pilot and did cause him some distraction, but it was not a major problem. Because of experience gained from past Mercury flights, a fairly long preflight period, and a diligent and intensive training program, the pilot reported, and the results verify, that>he was very well prepared for this flight. He reported that, in general, there was a proper proportion of training effort placed upon the different aspects of his mission. The only significant areas of pilot preflight preparation that the pilot believed could be improved or supplemented were: 1. An earlier finalization of systems and attendant operational procedures 2. Additional improved external-reference simulations

3- Additional training on the recognition and observation of celestial bodies k. Less egress training through the top hatch

5. Somewhat more concentration on normal as opposed to emergency procedures during the simulation of the launch phase of the mission on the procedures trainer 7.2.2 7-2.2.1 Flight-plan activities.Flight-plan description and results: The flight plan was designed so that the operational test requirements and approved experiments could be accomplished within a 22-pass mission. The duration of the mission required the scheduling of an 8-hour sleep-rest period. The mission was separated into four phases with go-no-go decisions at the end of the 1st, 7"th, and l6th orbital passes. In order to conserve consumables and still accomplish all of the operational and experimental objectives, the pilot was to refrain from using the automatic stabilization and control system (ASCS) bus and allow the spacecraft to drift for long periods of time. The turnaround maneuver was scheduled to be

Page 7 accomplished manually by the pilot; however, the retrofire and reentry events were to be controlled by the automatic control system. The pilot's adherence to the flight plan was excellent, and almost all of the flight activities were completed as planned. Table 7.2.2.1-1 presents a summary of the major events that occurred during the flight. Up to the time at which a failure involving the automatic stabilization and control system 0.05g relay circuit and the subsequent loss of all ASCS a-c power occurred, all of the major planned events were accomplished at approximately the programed times. Thereafter, the pilot concentrated primarily on checking out the status of systems and isolating the malfunctions that had occurred. However, he still managed to complete most of the flight-plan activities that were scheduled after the malfunctions were noted. The first phase of the mission was accomplished as planned all systems were thoroughly checked out with the exception the fly-by-wire (PBW) high thrusters. A decision was made proceed into the second phase of the mission at the end of 1st orbital pass. and of to the

The second phase was accomplished as planned. The flashing light was deployed at 3:25:38 and shortly thereafter the ASCS a-c bus was powered down. Although the pilot did not observe the flashing beacon during the first night phase after deployment, he was able to make several observations during the next two night phases. The telemetry mode of the TV transmitter was checked over Hawaii and California during the 3^1 orbital pass, and the pilot sent continuouswave code signals to Bermuda during the ^th orbital pass. At 6:22:00, the pilot turned the cabin fan and cabin-coolant flow off, powered up the ASCS a-c bus, and returned the spacecraft to ASCS control. At about 8:21:00, the pilot returned to FBW-low and pitched down for observation of the ground light. After successfully completing this experiment, the spacecraft was returned to ASCS control. At about 0 : 0 0 90:0 the pilot returned to FEW-low and at 9:01:00 and 9:07:00, he attempted without success to deploy the tethered balloon. He then returned the spacecraft to ASCS control and continued to check out the spacecraft systems in preparation for the decision to proceed with the third phase of the flight. A go decision was made at 10:00:00, and the ASCS a-c bus was powered down at 10:26:36. Shortly before the start of the rest period, the pilot took some general purpose photographs, had a meal, and checked the manual proportional and FEW-low control modes. His sleep-rest period

lasted from about 1J:50:00 to 21:23:00, at which time the pilot reported to Muchea. At approximately 23:30:00, the pilot powered up the ASCS a-c bus, checked manual proportional and then alined the spacecraft by using FBW-low. He then went to ASCS control for another checkout of the systems and to prepare for the dim-light-phenomena photographs. This experiment, as well as the horizon-definition quadrant photographs, was completed on schedule. The systems were checked prior to the decision to proceed into the fourth and final phase of the flight, and the ASCS a-c bus was powered down at about 25:17:00- The pilot continued with the flight plan and completed moon-earth limb and the infrared weather photography as scheduled. At 28:3^:3^; "the 0.05g relay circuit latched in; however, the pilot continued with the flight plan with the exception of those activities requiring ASCS control. He performed the first half of the HF antenna test on schedule. The ASCS a-c bus was powered up twice after the 0.05g light illuminated and the pilot made checks which verified that the attitude gyros had been lost. However, these checks revealed that the auxiliary damping mode was functioning properly and that ASCS could be used during reentry. As a result of the loss of the attitude gyros, the pilot did not take the horizon-definition photographs. The cabin fan and the cabin-coolant flow were turned back on at 32:05:00, and the pilot stowed the onboard equipment shortly thereafter. At about 33:07:00 planned use of the ASCS for reentry was abandoned when it became evident that all ASCS a-c power had been lost. The pilot did not check out the FBW-high thrusters prior to retrofire as ASCS problems were receiving his primary attention during this period. The retrofire, retropackage jettison, and reentry events were all initiated and controlled manually by the pilot. He momentarily checked his FBW-high thrusters subsequent to retropackage jettison; but he was unable to detect proper high-thruster action and therefore elected to control the spacecraft, during reentry by using FEW, high and low, and manual proportional simultaneously. The pilot was able to control the reentry manually by using this "double-authority" control, and the remainder of the descent was normal. The pilot managed the operation of the telemetry system, the C-band beacon, and the S-band beacon throughout the mission according to the scheduled program. He completed all but three of the short status and consumable reports which were

Page ? programed for approximately once per orbital pass except during the rest period, and he completed all three of the planned long status reports. 7.2.2.2 Operational equipment: The pilot was provided with food, drinking water, and equipment designed to obtain quantitative data during experiments, operational information in case communications were lost, and information which might aid him in completing normal and emergency operating procedures. These items were stored in three locations: a special equipment storage kit to the right of the pilot's shoulder, a specially shaped container with a writing-desk lid that could be pushed out of the way or pulled up into the pilot's lap, and the instrument panel storage compartment. The space in the equipment kit was devoted entirely to experimental equipment and food. (See fig. 7-2.2.2-1.) As in previous manned orbital flights, the pilot reported extreme difficulty in locating, acquiring, and stowing items in this container. Because of the limited space available, a more suitable location has not yet been found. Equipment stowed in the writing desk (see fig. 7-2.2.2-2) was accessible, with the exception of the small standard light source which could not be dislodged from its velcro attachment point between two of the desk's structural ribs. In addition, the desk's position when extended was too close to the pilot's lap during weightless flight. The desk contained equipment for experiments and observations, food, and two items of considerable operational value to the pilot, the navigation booklet and the star navigation charts. The navigation booklet contained a map in two sections, each covering the orbital ground track of 11 passes with ground-elapsed-time marks at 1-minute intervals. The map sections included information relating to primary- and contingency-recovery and tracking-station locations. The booklet also contained the world-wide weather forecast map; the nominal and "red-line" curves for automatic and manual fuel usage, oxygen consumption, and recording-tape expenditure; a table of nominal retrosequence times; normal, emergency, and experiment checklists; and a special list of abbreviated continuous-wave Morse code signals. The star navigation charts were so constructed that a slide mechanism could be positioned by timing marks to provide a star-field picture equivalent to the window view with the spacecraft at attitudes of 0° in roll and yaw and from 0° to -3^-° in pitch.

Page

7-^8 The panel compartment was used for storing two small experimental items, the wrist mirror and the continuous flight-plan strip on its holder. The flight-plan strip contained columns of information consisting of continent passage, tape-recorder switching, telemetry switching, star-chart reference times with day-night overlays, control-mode switching, communicationand tracking-station passage, elapsed time from lift-off, and other pertinent remarks and comments. During flight, the panel compartment was also used as a general-purpose storage area because of its convenient location. As on previous flights, the equipment was held in its stowed position with velcro strips, and as added convenience, the inside of the hatch was covered with velcro to hold items when they were neither being used nor required to be in their stowed positions. A list of all the equipment is given in table 7-2.2.2-1 showing the stowage location during launch. The flight plan and its holder are shown in figure 7.2.2.2-3.

7.2.3 7.2.3.1

Spacecraft attitude control.Turnaround maneuver: The purpose in accomplishing a manual turnaround maneuver by using FBW-low is to conserve control fuel. If the flight were proceeding normally, the maneuver was to be executed at a leisurely pace by using a 3°/sec to 4°/sec yaw rate and relying solely on the rate and attitude indicators. Figure 7-2.3.1-1 shows the turnaround-maneuver flight gyro attitudes, together with those during three maneuvers on the procedures trainer. The turnaround was accomplished about the yaw and roll axes essentially as it had been practiced on the trainer. The only deviation was in pitch attitude and can be explained as follows. There exists approximately a 10-percent thrust coupling, which is caused by the location of the 1-pound thrusters, between the pitch and yaw axes. Therefore, when the pilot puts in a left-yaw rate of 3°/secJ it normally will result in a pitch rate of -0.3°/sec, which had indeed occurred on the trainer. However, on the trainer the initial pitch attitude is normally very close to 0°, whereas the initial inflight gyro pitch attitude was a - ° 9. In the flight situation, the attitude moved from the -9° to a +9° indicated pitch attitude as a result of the spacecraft being yawed 180° in the absence of thrust coupling. This factor, therefore, tended to cancel out the -0.3°/sec pitch rate, resulting from the thruster coupling, and left the spacecraft at approximately 0° in pitch attitude at completion of the turnaround maneuver. The pilot had been informed by the ground that he had a good insertion, and that it was not at all imperative that the spacecraft be pitched down to retroattitude;

CNTIAL

Page 7 -

therefore, he chose to observe and photograph the launch-vehicle sustainer stage prior to assuming orbit attitude. The pilot reported that the maneuver felt just as it had on the procedures trainer and he used the rate and attitude indicators in accomplishing it. The maneuver required 0.2 pound of control fuel. This value is approximately 5 percent of the control fuel typically required by the ASCS during an automatic turnaround maneuver. 7.2.3.2 Gyro realinement maneuvers: The gyros were realined with the spacecraft on three different occasions. Table 7-2.3.2-1 gives the time required and the fuel used for each of these maneuvers. The first two maneuvers were performed by using FBW-low; however, the third realinement was accomplished in part with FBW-low and the remainder with manual proportional. In the two cases in which data are available, there were virtually no errors between the scanner and gyro readouts in pitch and roll when the scanner first came on the line. The data also indicate that yaw was in good alinement at the completion of both maneuvers. During the alinement periods, the spacecraft rates were held to l°/sec or less, and this reduced rate probably accounts in part for the small amount of automatic-system fuel which was used. All three realinement maneuvers were accomplished on the day side of the orbit; however, the astronaut performed an equivalent maneuver on the last night phase of the mission, apparently with good results. The results indicate that realinement of the gyros to the true spacecraft attitude is easy on the day side. Realinement on the night side is not difficult but requires a longer time period than on the day side. That the pilot was able to accomplish these maneuvers so accurately and with so little fuel usage can partially be attributed to the fact that the spacecraft gyros, for the first time, could be realined while at the -3^° position in pitch. Drifting flight: The pilot spent approximately 4 3 percent of the orbital phase in attitude-free drifting flight with the gyros caged and with no control-system operation. He also spent another 39 percent of the flight with the gyros caged, but he used either the manual proportional or the FBW-low control mode at infrequent intervals. The pilot reported during the flight and in subsequent postflight debriefings that drifting flight presented no problems either with respect to his orientation or use of the spacecraft systems. He reported that drifting flight was very pleasant, and the realization that he was conserving electrical power and control fuel was comforting to him. He also commented that, during

7.2.3.3

page 7 - 50
drifting flight, there were long periods with no observable spacecraft rates on the indicators and also periods when rates 1° of -^ /sec were present. The highest attitude rates during drifting flight seemed to predominate in roll, but did alternate between axes. 7.2.3.4 Yaw-attitude determination: Determination of yaw attitudes and rates in daylight was reported to be quite easily accomplished, even when only a small portion of the earth was in view through the window. The pilot felt confident that he could accurately aline the spacecraft directly towards or away from his direction of motion over the ground within 1°. At the 90° position, that is, perpendicular to the direction of travel, he believed that his accuracy might be degraded to ±10°. He therefore chose to use his attitude indicators whenever a precise 90° Yaw maneuver was required. The instrumentation system does not indicate yaw attitude directly; however, analyses of horizon-scanner outputs after each uncaging maneuver and return to ASCS orbit mode suggests that the pilot had determined the proper yaw attitude to within 5°. The pilot used several visual cues to determine yaw attitudes and rates during daylight, such as the "streaming" by of terrain features, cloud patterns, or both, the convergence point of these flow lines, and the tracking of terrestrial objects or cloud prominences across the window. The view through the window kept the pilot constantly aware of his rapid motion over the ground, and he reported absolutely no difficulty in orienting quickly to retroattitude. The pilot reported that yaw-attitude determination at night was not difficult, although it usually required a longer period of time, particularly in the absence of good external visual cues. The determination of yaw attitude at night was accomplished in two different ways. When the moon was illuminating the earth and if the pilot was sufficiently dark-adapted, he used the motion of terrestrial and cloud features to find the points directly approaching or receding along the spacecraft's ground track, just as in the daytime. In some cases lighted cities or the glow of their illumination through thin cloud decks provided a good reference for observing their direction of relative motion, even without moonlight, for yaw attitude determination at night. The second method of determining yaw attitude at night was used during periods when ground objects were not visible. In this situation, the star field was the pilot's only source of information for finding yaw attitude," and more time was required

Page 7 - 5 1

to find identifiable stars and constellations. He found the star charts to "be invaluable for identification and for reestablishing his yaw attitude by using stars near the plane of the spacecraft's orbit. Star recognition was complicated by the restrictive field of viev through the spacecraft window, but prominent groupings of stars were periodically available during the early part of the night phase before moonrise. The pilot's inflight reports and postflight comments of stars in view during the first night after deployment of the flashing light indicated that he may have been some 30° to the right of his intended position while searching for the light. However, this was his first attempt to aline l80° in yaw at night and had the added complication of the reversal of the normal orbital attitude shown on the star charts. He accredited his prompt observation of the beacon just at sunset of the subsequent night phase to the easier task of accurately alining the spacecraft during daylight towards the beacon's expected position. It should be noted that the pilot expertly performed his most critical night yaw alinement, that for retrofire, without attitude indications by using star and ground references only.
A convenient method of yaw determination was put forward by the pilot after observing the relative motion of the socalled fireflies, which he and pilots of all previous orbital missions have reported as having seen. The luminous particles, which appeared to emanate from the thrusters, were observed to move outward from the spacecraft, then to recede back along the spacecraft's trajectory in the manner of a contrail, remaining visible for many seconds. The pilot suggested that by positioning the spacecraft relative to the motion of these particles, an accurate determination of the 0° pitch positions might be possible. Retrofire: It was originally planned to have the pilot use ASCS control during the retrofire period, with the manual proportional control system ready as a backup, if necessary. As a result of the loss of ASCS power, the pilot was required to initiate manually the retrofire event and to control the spacecraft during the retrofire period by using the rate gyro indicators and the view of the earth through the window as his attitude references. The pilot, realizing that he would be conducting the retrofire maneuver shortly after sunrise of the final daylight phase, oriented and maintained the spacecraft near retroattitude throughout the last night period. He made very small attitude corrections by using stars and clouds as

Page

7-52

references. Other than a brief period immediately after sunrise during which the pilot could not see through the window because of frost and glare, the pilot was well prepared for retrofire. He had accomplished the stowage and preretrosequence checklists well in advance of their scheduled times. During the retrofire maneuver, the pilot used the manual proportional control mode and cross-checked between his rate indicators and the view through the window. Because of a high contrast between the relative brightness of his interior and exterior references, the pilot experienced difficulty in adapting his vision while shifting from one reference to the other. Consequently he had to shade his eyes with his left hand when attempting to view his rate indicators. In spite of this problem,, as well as the fact that he never had the opportunity to practice retrofire maneuvers with this combination of attitude references, the pilot was able to maintain excellent control of his spacecraft, as evidenced by the nominal trajectory and accuracy in landing position. Figure 7-2.3-5 -1 gives the spacecraft's attitude rates and attitudes, which were calculated from an integration of the spacecraft rates during the retrofire period. The calculated attitudes and the initial attitudes at the beginning of the retrofire were further verified by reentry trajectory computation. The pilot controlled rates extremely well, particularly in pitch, which is the most critical axis. Rate control was maintained within ±2°/sec In pitch and roll attitudes and within ±5°/sec in yaw attitude throughout 19 seconds of the 22-second retrofire period and during the time when practically all of the decrease in velocity was effected. As the pilot reported, the maximum misalinement torque of approximately ko to 50 foot-pounds produced by the retrorockets appears to have occurred in left yaw when the number two retrorocket was ignited. This value is between one-third and one-half of the manual proportional control response capability. The pilot maintained good control of spacecraft attitudes, with a maximum deviation of -12° occurring in roll at the completion of the retrofire event. Attitude deviations in pitch and yaw were negligible, as far as the reentry trajectory and landing accuracy are concerend. The maximum yaw attitude deviation was 5% and the maximum pitch deviation was 9°} which occurred very late in the retrofire period. The pilot maintained the pitch attitude near the nominal ~^>k° position or slightly lower, a direction of deviation which least affects the reentry trajectory.

ICNTTCAL

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7.2.3-6

Reentry: Because of the loss of the ASCS power, the pilot was required to position the spacecraft manually to the proper reentry attitude by using external visual reference to insert manually the proper roll rate, and to damp manually the reentry rate oscillations. The pilot checked his FEW control mode shortly before the nominal time for the 0.05g event and was not satisfied that the high thrusters were working properly. He, therefore, elected to control reentry rate oscillations by using both the manual proportional and the FEW control systems; thereby, U9 pounds of thrust capability was made available to him about the pitch and yaw axes. The pilot maintained the earth horizon in the window for attitude reference until shortly before the nominal time for 0.05g. He then allowed the spacecraft to pitch up slowly to reentry attitude and reduced his angular rates to near zero. During the early portion of the reentry, he was easily able to damp the small and rather slow oscillations by using FBW-low thrusters and the manual proportional control mode. At approximately 1 minute and 30 seconds prior to peak reentry deceleration, the pilot inadvertently actuated the IW-high yaw thruster. This actuation resulted in almost ^9 pounds of thrusting and added to the amplitude of the oscillations. He brought them back under good control within a 1-minute period and maintained positive control of the oscillations through drogue parachute deployment. The pilot had no further difficulties in controlling the reentry oscillations except for a brief period during maximum deceleration. He was unable to manipulate the control handle at this time because the g-forces pulled his arm away from the control handle and into a trough on the arm rest. The maximum frequency of oscillation occurred at peak deceleration and lasted on the order of 0.9 second. Maximum rates were approximately ±159/sec or 20°/sec, with a maximum amplitude of approximately ±10° in both pitch and yaw which occurred just after the peak deceleration period. The pilot reported that he believed he needed dual authority control to be effective during this reentry period.

7.2.k 7-2.^.1

Systems management and operational procedures.Control system utilization and switching: Table 7.2.U.1-1 and table 7-2.2.2-1 show control-mode usage and switching during the flight. In general, control system usage was almost identical to the planned rate until the 0.05g relay prematurely latched, with a subsequent loss of ASCS power. The pilot was able to perform even more maneuvering during the

Page

period than scheduled "because of this effective and frugal use of control fuel. Following the failure of the amplifiercalibrator, the pilot was required to deviate somewhat from the planned control-mode schedule, and for the remainder of the mission manual proportional or FEW was used for spacecraft control. The pilot was highly successful in switching from the manual proportional and FEW to ASCS control. The orientation highthruster mode was never inadvertently actuated. The pilot alined the spacecraft manually to the proper orbital attitude on eight occasions during the flight. The spacecraft always passed through orientation low before dropping into orbit mode. The -maximum excursion that was evident during periods of switching from manual to automatic control was 5° in atti1° tude and ~z /sec in rate. The pilot's utilization of the manual proportional control mode was much better than what was expected, based on the previous flight results. By making very rapid hand-controller motions in this mode, he was able to produce a thrust level which was much less than the expected level of approximately ^ pounds. The performance of the manual proportional control system, by using this technique, compared very favorably with the performance of the FB¥-low system both with respect to fuel usage and fine attitude control. The manual proportional control mode was utilized during the last orbital pass for alinement and attitude hold prior to retrofire, during which slightly more than 2 pounds of manual fuel was expended. The pilot did not at any time inadvertently use double authority during the mission. The only time double authority was used was for damping the reentry oscillations. This choice was made because the pilot was not satisfied that the FBW-high thrusters were working properly, and he therefore elected to use FB¥ as a backup to the manual proportional control system. 7-2.h-,2 Conservation on consumables: The consumables of which the pilot could directly affect the usage were control system fuel, electrical power, and onboard tape-recording capability. Since the use of these consumables, particularly the first two, is important to the successful completion of the mission, their use was carefully programed prior to flight to allow a sufficient reserve in the event of a procedural change during the mission.

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The fuel usage throughout the entire flight is shown in figure 7.2.IK2-1, and the fuel usage for specific maneuvers is shown in table 7-2.J.2-1. A comparison of the fuel used during flight with the predicted usage shows that the actual fuel remaining stayed above the predicted curve until approximately 23:30:00. The actual fuel remaining was never more than 2 pounds below the predicted curve and was always well above the minimum fuel levels required to continue with a normal flight plan. The pilot used between one-third and one-tenth of the predicted fuel for individual maneuvers. This effective use of fuel allowed him to perform a large number of additional maneuvers, particularly those associated with taking general-purpose photographs. The pilot followed very closely the planned program for electrical-power consumption. The ASCS bus was powered down and up, as scheduled, throughout the mission until the failure of the amplifier-calibrator. Following this failure, the pilot powered up the ASCS bus on two occasions in an attempt to isolate and identify the problem. He then completed the remainder of the mission with the ASCS bus powered down to prevent further short circuiting. The program for other power-consuming equipment, such as the radar beacons, telemetry transmitter, and television system, were followed almost exactly as planned throughout the flight.
The tape recorder was programed to meet two requirements: to record data during the more important phases of the mission and to record medical data continuously, beginning with reentry and lasting until approximately 2 hours after landing. Although the pilot followed the tape program quite closely, some important data were lost early in the flight as a result of the recorder being in the "program" position instead of the "continuous" position, as had been planned. The pilot did follow the remainder of the tape program very well and had approximately 25 percent of the tape supply remaining after landing. (See fig. 7*2.^.2-2.) However, the amount of tape remaining was greater than expected primarily because of a failure that occurred in the programer during the rest period and because the pilot used the vox-record mode less than expected. 7.2.4.3 Power-up and power-down procedure: The pilot's accomplishment of the power-up and power-down exercises of the ASCS inverter was excellent. He performed these procedures six times prior to the loss of the inverter which occurred during the 21st orbital pass. It was required that ASCS control mode be switched from the automatic position and the gyros be caged before powering up or down. After powering up, it

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GOPfFIDEfTTlAr

was recommended that at least 5 minutes be allowed for the gyros to achieve a good operating speed prior to uncaging. In all cases the pilot switched properly and allowed more than 7 minutes after powering up before uncaging the gyros. Experiments procedures and performance: The flashing light was deployed on schedule and was within acceptable limits in attitude. The pilot achieved a good retroattitude and then pitched up at 0.5°/sec. The beacon was deployed at a spacecraft pitch attitude of -20° ±1°. At that time the roll attitude was 3% the yaw attitude was 8% and attitude rates were very near zero. The subsequent power down and yaw maneuver to observe the flashing beacon were completed as planned; however, a possible error in yaw determination during the first night observation probably caused the pilot to miss this sighting. Thereafter, the flashing-light observations were completed exactly as planned. Six of the ten planned radiation measurements were accomplished as scheduled. The final two measurements were not attempted because of more pressing operational problems beginning with the early actuation of the 0.05g relay. The other two measurements which were not taken as planned were overlooked by the pilot; the first during an attempt to sight the flashing beacon, and the second while he was encountering difficulties with the condensate transfer system. The ground-light observation was completed on the 6th orbital pass generally as planned. Continuous recording during this experiment was not initiated;, and as a result no analysis of attitudes and rates was possible. The balloon experiment failed for technical reasons, but the two attempts by the pilot to position the spacecraft for deploying the balloon could be readily analyzed for performance. During deployment, the spacecraft was to be held as close to zero rates and attitudes as possible to allow the balloon to trail directly rearward along the trajectory. On the first attempt to deploy the balloon, attitudes and rates were essentially zero. During the second attempt, rates were zero with attitudes of 8Q in pitch, 5° in yaw, and 0° in roll. In both instances, all switch functions were correct and conducted in the proper sequence, including the setting up of the l6-mm movie camera. The pilot was very conscientious in correctly performing the dim-light-phenomenon experiment. Maneuvering for this experiment consisted of alining yaw on the setting sun while holding pitch at -3^-% caging the gyros, and going to the gyro-free position. A roll maneuver of 3^° was then required to aline

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7 - 57

the pitch plane of the spacecraft with the plane of the ecliptic for the first series of zodiacal-light photographs. The spacecraft was held by the ASCS in this special alinement by first caging the gyros and then switching to the gyro-free position with pitch torquing on. At the conclusion of the zodiacal-light photographs, the gyros were switched to the "slave" position, which allowed the horizon scanners to return the spacecraft slowly to its normal orbital attitude. The pilot accomplished all maneuvers and switching as planned. Using FBW-low, he yawed over to the setting sun; however, he was not satisfied with his alinement and introduced a correction. The 3^-° roll maneuver was difficult to monitor on the instruments because of the bright sunlight streaming directly into the window. After uncaging, the roll angle was set in correctly. Since the roll maneuver had introduced a yaw component, the pilot adjusted yaw attitude before the final gyro caging and uncaging and then went to ASCS control for holding on the ecliptic plane. After completing the zodiacal-light photographs, the pilot switched the gyros to "slave" and corrected the spacecraft back to the normal orbital attitude. For best photographic results, the cockpit was completely darkened; thus, it was necessary to count to himself to obtain the correct exposure times and intervals between photographs. He performed this entire experiment in an exceptionally efficient manner. Shortly after the dim-light photography, the pilot executed a series of yaw maneuvers to accomplish the horizon-definition photography. The pilot used the gyro indicators selectively to locate precisely the 90° positions in yaw. The maneuvers were completed as planned and required 8 minutes during which time only 0.255 pound of control fuel was used.
The U. S. Weather Bureau infrared photography was performed during drifting flight, with small manual proportional control inputs occasionally applied to help in alining on the more interesting cloud features. The pilot's very conservative fuel usage and low-order control inputs in utilizing this control mode indicated a very refined manual technique and skill. In spite of the 0.05g-relay problem, the pilot completed one HF antenna test with good results. The pilot also photographed interesting terrain features, and again the technique and procedures used reflect quite favorably on the pilot's performance.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7 - 58
7.2.^.5

~ COftTFID

Pilot performance summary: The pilot's inflight performance can be summarized as a conscientious adherence to the planned tasks, as well as the application of proper corrective actions when system or operational problems occurred. The pilot was in complete control of every situation throughout the flight, and he exhibited smooth piloting abilities. He completed his inflight activities almost exactly as they were scheduled, even though adjustment of the suit environmental circuit plagued him constantly throughout the flight. The program of scientific experiments, until pre-empted by system difficulties, was conducted very satisfactorily. The premature 0.05g function engrossed the pilot with critical operational considerations in order to complete the flight successfully, and these considerations took precedence over nonoperational activities. Thereafter, the pilot elected to perform only those flightplan tasks which would not complicate or interfere with management of the malfunctioning systems. Switching was both 'timely and accurate throughout the flight. Emergency switching after the 0.05g telelite illumination and ASCS inverter problems became evident was excellent. Some switching in noncritical areas was overlooked occasionally, but usually because the pilot was concentrating on more important tasks. Both his technique and fuel usage during manual control were commendable. The pilot's use of the'manual proportional control mode was so excellent as to warrant a reappraisal of the value of this system. Control systems checks were accomplished quickly, in less than 1 minute per system on the average, and each check required only approximately 0.02 pound of fuel. The pilot consistently used less than the expected amounts of consumables; and, in the absence of the system malfunctions which were experienced, he would, as planned, have had more than enough consumable quantities to accomplish easily all of the many flight activities.

CONriDDMTIAfc

JVF1DEIVTIAL "
HANGAR AND LAUNCH COMPLEX TESTS

-

Page 7 - 5 9

TABLE 7.2.1.1-1.- PILOT TIME IN SPACECRAFT 20 DURING

Date

Test description Integrated systems tests

Duration, hr:min 06:45 03=15 06:^5 07:00 04:^5
01:20 12:10

Oct. 11 to 19, 1962 Nov. 11, 1962 Jan. 5, 1963 Jan. 12 and Mar. 1, 1963

RCS - hangar Altitude chamber

TV systems test Communications systems radiation test
Darkness and egress

Mar. k, Ik, 15, 1963 Mar. 19, 1963
Mar. 20, 21, 22, 1963
April U, 1963 April 18, 1963 April 23, 1963 April 2^, 1963
May 3, 1963 May 6, 1963 May 8, 1963 May 10, 1963 May 14, 1963

Simulated flight, hangar
Prepad RCS test Alinement, weight, and balance Systems test and simulated flight no. 1 Electrical mate Mark instrument normal and emergency limits Flight configuration sequence and abort Launch simulation and RF compatibility Systems test and simulated flight no. 3 Countdovn (canceled)

00:50 0^:00 0^:00 0^:30 00:^5 03:00 05:00 03:^5 06:00

Total

73:50

CONFIDENTIAL

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TABLE 7.2.1.3-!.- FLYING TIME FROM JANUARY 1 TO LAUNCH DATE

Date, 1963

Type aircraft TF-102A TF-102A TF-102A TF-102A F-102A

Hr:min

Date

Type aircraft

Hr:min

Jan. 2 Jan. 10 Jan. 12 Jan. 18 Jan. 30 Jan. 31 Feb. 2 Feb. 3 Feb. 7 Feb. 8 Feb. 12 Feb. 20 Feb. 23

2:00 2:15 2:00 1:30

Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.

8 13 13 2^

F-102A

3:00 1:50 2:00 2:15 2:15 2:15

T-33A
F-102A F-102A

3:15 U:30
i+:00

Mar. 26 Mar. Mar.
27 28

T-35A
T-33A T-33A F-102A F-102A F-102A F-102A T-33A TF-102A

T-33A T-33A T-33A T-33A T-33A
F-102A F-102A T-33A

2:1*5

2:30

Apr. 5 Apr. 7 Apr. 9 Apr. 15 Apr. 18
May 5 May 10

1:30 2:^5
2:00
2:15 2:30 2:00 2:00

3:15 1:30

1:1+5
2:^45
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F-102

Total

6^:35

CONriDDMTIAL

Page 7 - 6 2

TABLE 7.2.1.5-1.- PILOT PKEFLIGHT ACTIVITIES FROM JANUARY 1, 1963 TO LAUNCH DATE

Q

Date

Day
Wed.

Activities
Altitude Chamber Systems Test Review, blood-pressure checkout in altitude

Jan. 2

chamber, flying (TF-102A)
Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Feb. Feb. Feb. Feb. Feb. Feb. Feb. Feb. Feb.
Feb. Feb. Feb. Feb. Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.

Fri. to Tues. U to 7 10 Thurs. 12 Sat. 18 and 19 Fri. and Sat. Mon. 21 Tues. 22 Wed. 23

Altitude Chamber Systems Test

Flight-plan review, flying (TF-102A)
TV systems test, flying (TF-102A)

Morehead Planetarium (celestial reviev)
Weight and balance Systems briefings (ASCS and RCS) Systems briefings (communications and sequential)

2^ 25 30 31 1 2 3 k 5 6 7 8 11
12 20 21 23 1 U 6 8 12 13 lU 15

Thurs. Fri. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun. Mon. Tues. Wed.
Thurs.

Flight- plan and experiments review
Systems briefings (electrical and ECS) Flying (F-102A)

Flying (T-J5A) Booster rollout Flying (T-JJA)
Flying (T-3JA) Experiments status review

Flight -plan review Couch fitting Flying (T-JJA)
Observation of flashing beacon on T-33A

Fri. Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Sat. Fri.
Mon.

Flight-plan briefing to Deputy Director
for Mission Requirements Flying (F-102A)

Flying (F-102A), flight-food testing Experiments briefings
Flying (T-33A) TV systems test

Communication systems radiation test
Weight and balance

Wed. Fri.
Tues.

Flying (F-102A)
Couch fitting Flying (T-JJA, F-102A)

Wed. Thurs. Fri. Tues.

Communication systems radiation test Communication systems radiation test, Mercury Procedures Trainer
Darkness and egress test

Mar. 19

Includes only major activities and does not include such activities as spacecraft reviews, physical exercise, study, monitoring systems test, informal briefings with operational and systems personnel.

IENTIAL
TABLE 7.2.1.5-1.- PILOT PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES FROM JANUARY 1, 1963 TO LAUNCH DATE - Continued

Page

7-63

Date

Day
Wed. to Sun. Sun. Tues. Wed. Thurs.

Activities Simulated flight (Hangar) Flying (F-102A) Flying (T-33A) Flying (T-33-M, Mercury Procedures Trainer Flying (T-33-M, Centrifuge - acceleration re familiarization

Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar. Mar.

20 to 2k 2^ 26 27 28

Mar. 29

Apr. 1 and 2 Apr. U Apr. 5 Apr. 6
Apr. Apr. Apr. Apr.

Fri. Mercury Procedures Trainer Mon. and Tues. Mercury Procedures Trainer DOD-NASA MA-9 Review, Prepad RCS test Thurs. Mercury Procedures Trainer, flying Fri. (TF-102A), Morehead Planetarium (Celestial review) Sat. Morehead Planetarium (Celestial review)
Sun. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Mon.
Flying (F-102A) Flying (F-102A) Egress and recovery training Egress and recovery training, survival pack exercise Flying (F-102A) Mercury Procedures Trainer, mission and flight controller briefing Mission and flight controller briefing Alinement, weight, and balance, Mercury Procedures Trainer Mercury Procedures Trainer Mechanical mate Simulated flight no. 1 Electrical mate

7 9 10 11

Apr. 15 Apr. 16 Apr. 17 Apr. 18 Apr. 19 Apr. 22 Apr. 23 Apr. 2}4 Apr. 25 Apr. 27 Apr. 29 Apr. 30 May 1 May 2 May 3

Tues.
Wed. Thurs. Sat. Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri.

Mercury Procedures Trainer
Mercury Procedures Trainer Yaw demonstration (AF Hangar) Systems briefings (review) Systems and operations examination Launch simulation, Mission Rules review Examination questionnaire review, marked spacecraft's normal and emergency instrument limits Launch simulation Flying (TF-102A) Flight configuration sequence and aborts

May ^ May 5 '4ay 6

Sat. Sun.

ton.

Includes only major activities and does not include such activities as spacecraft reviews, physical exercise, study, monitoring systems test, informal briefings with operational and systems personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7 -

•CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 7.2.1.5-1.- PILOT PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES FROM JANUARY 1, 1963 TO LAUNCH DATE - Concluded

Date

Day

Activltiesa Network simulation, Flight Plan Procedures training
Launch simulation and RF compatibility tests Network simulation Simulated flight no. 3, flying (F-102A)

May 7 May May May May

Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun. Mon. Tues. Wed.

8 9 10 11

May May May May

12 13 14 15

Mission Status Review, flight-plan and experiments briefings Network simulation, physical examination Mercury Procedures Trainer, mission review
Countdown (canceled) Launch

a., Includes only major activities and does not include such activities
as spacecraft reviews, physical exercise, study, monitoring systems tests, informal briefings with operational and systems personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

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TABLE 7.2.2.2-1.- PILOT'S EQUIPMENT LIST

Special equipment storage kit Hand-held Hasselblad camera Hand-held Ro~bot camera U. S. Weather Bureau film magazine MTT film magazine Six-inch focal length TV lens O.JO neutral density filter for 6-inch TV lens Special water flask Water-tight container Condensate purification containers Vomitus container Food Writing desk l6-mm balloon film magazine l6-mm reentry film magazine Extinction photometer Standard calibration light f/2.8 50-mm lens for l6-mm camera Exposure meter Sighting device for the Hasselblad camera Food Star navigation device Navigation booklet Glove box Flight-plan roller and flight plan (see fig. 7-2.2.2-3) U. S. Weather Bureau filter mosaic Radiation dosimeter Wrist mirror

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TABLE 7.2.4.1-1.- CONTROL MODE USAGE

Control mode configuration

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Maximum time used at any one time, hrrmin

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Drift Drift and MP ASCS orbit Drift and FBW-low FBW-low (gyros uncaged) ASCS reentry MP (gyros uncaged)

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Percentage usage times are test estimates "because the tape recorder was in the program mode during some switching operations and because of the apparent tape failure during the rest period. There is only intermittent use of the control system during all of drift and MP and drift and FBW-low periods.

2.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 7^
7-3 Pilot's Flight Report 7.3.1 Introduction.- The MA-9 mission was designed to evaluate the operational and aeromedical aspects of the manspacecraft system in a manned one-day mission. The flight of Faith Seven has demonstrated this capability and, I hope, has shown the way for expanded capabilities in the manned space-flight program. Because of the extension of the flight duration for this flight, there was much more time available for evaluating systems, conducting experiments, and determining man's adaptability to the space environment. The name of my spacecraft, Faith Seven, was chosen for three reasons; a belief in God and country, a loyalty to my parent organizations, and a confidence in the entire Mercury space team. This flight was an excellent example of a well coordinated, well disciplined, voice procedure between the spacecraft and the world-wide tracking network. The information received onboard Faith Seven was clear, concise, and served to keep me continuously updated throughout the flight. In my opinion, it is pertinent that this data flow was so complete that I felt confident of my ability to accomplish the mission successfully in the event of an unexpected loss of air-ground communications. The remaining context of this report will be a chronological discussion of the flight from launch to recovery. 7.3.2 Launch.- Launch activities were well planned and were accomplished smoothly. We were always on or slightly ahead of schedule, and I did not feel at all rushed for time. The donning of the Mercury pressure suit for my second flight attempt was accomplished in good order, and we arrived at Launch Pad Ik on schedule. I was inserted into the cockpit, and we had completed the necessary checks 7 minutes ahead of the scheduled time for gantry removal. This time, the gantry came back without any delays, and the countdown proceeded very successfully with lift-off occurring 4 minutes behind schedule. The time interval between my insertion into the spacecraft and lift-off did not seem excessive, although insertion

GONriDCHTIAL

Page 7 - 7 5
time could be shortened to T-90 minutes. All spacecraft systems were functioning properly. The suit-inlet temperature varied slightly, and for a period of time it was at 57° F and I was quite cold. It slowly increased to approximately 6l° F, which was satisfactory because I wanted to be precooled prior to lift-off. 7.3.3 Powered flight.- I felt that I was well trained, very much at home, and had a complete grasp of the powered-flight of the mission. The engines really felt good when they started. Lift-off was smooth, but definitely noticeable, and the acceleration was very pleasant. There were no lateral or roll accelerations at all. The launch vehicle was very steady with only small vibrations up to "max g" which were not at all disturbing. I was able to read the instruments very clearly. I had more foam-rubber padding behind my helmet than did my predecessors, and this probably reduced my head vibrations.
At approximately 00:01:45, I experienced several yaw oscillations of rather large amplitude which, on the gage, were indicating ±6°/sec. I was somewhat concerned about the possibility of an abort sensing and implementation system (ASIS) abort occurring at this time. However, the oscillations damped and powered flight was again proceeding smoothly at booster-engine cut-off (BECO). The staging event is very obvious. BECO occurred with a load "glung" followed by a sharp, crisp "thud" as the booster engines dropped off. Although the sounds associated with BECO are very definite, the change in acceleration is even more apparent. The sustainer portion of the powered-flight phase was very smooth. I could detect no oscillations. The acceleration felt just like that I had recently experienced on the centrifuge. Tower jettison occurred later than I had anticipated; therefore I was reaching for the manual tower pull ring when it departed. I did not notice it ignite, but first saw it at a range of approximately 100 yards accelerating very rapidly straight ahead and then arcing over slowly, forming a spiral pattern way out and to the left. Sustainer-engine cut-off (SECO) occurred right on time and was very apparent because of the sharp dropoff in acceleration, as well as the distinct "glung" sound similar to the sound made by BECO. I did not get as much of an indication of spacecraft separation as I had expected I

Page

7-76

would; however, the thrust of the posigrades gave me a distinct boot in the rear. Window discoloration, or smudging, occurring during powered flight. The window appeared to be smudged in two areas. The first smudge was streaks, similar to powder burns, on the outside of the window. The second appeared to be a solid, greasy, coating on the inside of the outside pane of glass. It appeared oily when I looked through it with direct light; but with oblique light, it blotted out the external view and resembled ice or frost. 7-3-^Orbital flight.- The turnaround maneuver felt just as it did on the procedures trainer. I went to auxiliary damping control mode, waited for a short interval, and then selected fly-by-wire control and started a k°/sec left yaw rate using instruments. I did not pitch down because we had calculated that a left yaw rate would result in a slow negative pitch rate. However, the spacecraft did not pitch down as much as expected during the turnaround; and, consequently, my pitch attitude was still well above orbit attitude at completion of the maneuver. Immediately after turnaround, my attention was attracted to the booster, which was not more than 200 yards away. I could read the lettering on the sides and could see various details of the sustainer, such as the tanks. It was a very bright silver in color, with a frosty white band around the center portion of it. It was still wisping lox and fuel from the aft end. It was yawed approximately 15° to 20° to its left. I had it in sight for a total of approximately 8 minutes. The front end was slowly turning in counterclockwise rotation'. The last time I saw it, it was turned about 70° to the azimuth at which I had departed from it. I began to drop slowly down to my -3^-° pitch attitude. After selecting ASCS control, I pulled the l6-mm camera out of its bracket and took a short film burst of the booster with part of the east coast of the United States and Cape Canaveral in the background; however, the booster had moved some distance away by this time. I agree with Scott Carpenter that visual perspective changes when you go into zero-g. The cockpit did seem to be somewhat differently located in perspective to myself. You move up forward in the seat, regardless of how tight your straps are cinched. The ditty bag (special equipment storage kit) on the right seems to be a different angle to you than it is when you are on the launch pad. I did

WriDCNTIAL

Page 7 - 77

feel very distinctly that I was sitting upright. Most of the time I felt as if I were lightly floating. A couple of times I felt almost as if I were hanging upside down because of the feeling of floating into the shoulder straps. Every time I "dropped" something, I grabbed below it, expecting it to fall, (items stayed close to the place I put them when the cabin fan was off.) Speed is very apparent when overflying clear or brokencloud areas. You definitely have a feeling of really traveling along. If the cloud is a solid deck underneath you and you don't have any other motion cues, you have a very slow, floating feeling. You really need to use automatic control on the first orbital pass or to have a low work load in order to collect your senses, to acclimatize yourself to this new situation, and to organize the flight activities. I felt that I was not on top of the situation as completely as I would like to be right after insertion. Although I was thinking about all the items to be done and of how to do them, I did not feel completely at home. I felt that I was in a strange environment and was not at my best, until perhaps halfway through the pass. By the end of the first pass, I was feeling really ready to power down and go into drifting flight - able to manage the spacecraft in manner or means. The operating bands of the automatic control mode, particularly in yaw and roll, appeared to "be wider than I thought they would be. You just slop along between these 11-5° bands, Sometimes, it varied right out to the full extent of the limits. It does not hold a precise attitude, as I knew it would not from a previous engineering analysis. However, it did not occur to me that these excursions would show up so much from visual reference. You soon get accustomed to it, and it is no problem. I checked my T +5 second relay by going to gyros-free s with pitch-torquing on, and it worked. I got TV on for the Canary Islands, gave a consumable readout over Zanzibar, and checked the manual proportional system and found that it was functional. The manual proportional control mode in procedures trainer felt identical to that in the spacecraft. It worked very well. After becoming used to the slow light-off and the slight lag, I could control attitudes easily, even down to small changes. It is not as good for very fine attitude control as the 1-pound fly-by-wire low thrusters.

Page 7-78

1 »• J. J^f Hill I

I put a short status report on the tape at ho minutes and went into the night side. I immediately saw the white haze layer, as described by Wally, in which the stars would fade out, when behind it, and then reappear below it before disappearing behind the horizon. The earth has a sharp horizon even at night. I estimated the haze layer to be about 6° or 7° in height and located 2°, or perhaps 5° above the horizon line. I never tired of looking at the sunsets. As the sun begins to get down towards the horizon it is very well defined, quite difficult to look at, and not diffused as when you look at it through the atmosphere. It is a very bright white; in fact, it is almost the bluish white color of an arc. As it begins to impinge on the horizon line, it undergoes a spreading, or flattening effect. The sky begins to get quite dark and gives the impression of deep blackness. This light spreading out from the sun is a bright orange color which moves out under a narrow band of bright blue that is always visible throughout the daylight period. As the sun begins to go down, it is replaced by this bright gold-orange band which extends out for some distance on either side, defining the horizon even more clearly. The sun goes below the horizon rapidly, and this orange band still persists but gets considerably fainter as the black sky bounded by dark blue bands follows it on down. You do see a glow after the sun has set, although it is not ray-like. I could still tell exactly where the sun had set a number of seconds afterward. I conducted the emergency voice check over Muchea, sent a blood pressure, switched the S-band beacon to "ground command," and at 1:10:00 gave a short status report. When there is no moon, the earth is darker than the sky; there is a difference in the two blacks. In general, there was more light from the sky; the sky is a shining black as compared with a dull black appearance of the earth. There is a distinct line at the horizon and the earth is the darker. I saw the lights of Perth on the'west coast of Australia. If there is moonlight, then cloud layers and ground features can be seen. The moonlight is bright enough to see the motion over the ground. On several occasions I could see light from cities on the ground glowing through the clouds.

•-*-3^ ' "

CONFIDENTIAL

page 7 - 7 9
At night I could see the glow from every one of the thrusters. I saw a tremendous amount of these fireflies regardless of my attitude. They appeared to come out from the spacecraft and go back along the flight path. I could see some of them for as long as 30 or kO seconds. I could see them coming directly out of the pitch-down thruster when it was activated. The first indication I got of the sun coming up behind me was the lighting of the clouds from underneath. I noted the clouds getting lighter and lighter, and I could still see the stars. Suddenly, my window would get into the oblique sunlight and appear to frost over just as an aircraft canopy does. This frost was apparently a result of a greasy coating on the inside of the outer pane, which completely occluded my vision under these lighting conditions, I caged the gyros, powered down ASCS bus, and went into drifting flight. I opened the condensate trap clamp and did not see water flowing at this time. I left the clamp open for a while to see if the trap would work, and then I closed the clamp. When I was drifting, the changing view out the window was not at all disconcerting, and the random orientation caused me no concern. In fact, it is a very relaxed way to travel. I might mention an item here on the natural dynamics of the spacecraft. When rates were near zero, and the spacecraft was powered down, I never observed any rate greater than l^sec along any one axis. Generally, if it were as great as this, l°/sec, there were no rates along the other two axes. These rates would switch from axis to axis and, more than likely only two axes would have any rate at all, 1° 1° and these rates would be between j-/sec and p/sec, at the most. Frequently, for long periods of time, the spacecraft would have absolutely no rates at all and would be almost completely motionless. The one axis that appeared to have more predominate rate than the others was the roll axis; and the rate, almost invariably, was to the left, or negative roll. More times than not, while drifting, there 1° would be a roll rate of approximately —/sec. At 3:00:00, I powered up the ASCS bus, and at 3:04:00 I started alining the spacecraft, uncaged the gyros, and went on automatic control. Alining yaw is a simple matter when you have land or broken clouds. Even solid masses of clouds will have some tops and breaks in them and will give

CONFIDEHTIAL

Page T - 80 good yav indications. At night I saw some towns and cities underneath some of the cloud decks, which are excellent yaw indicators. At 3:25:00 I went to fly-by-wire low, slowly pitched up to the -20° mark on the window, deployed the flashing beacon, and there was a loud "cloomp" as the squib fired and it departed. I then caged the gyros and powered down the ASCS a-c bus. I never did see the beacon on that first night, but I was having some difficulty finding my 180° point. I tried unsuccessfully to observe the flashing beacon early on the day side also. On the second night side after deploying the flashing beacon, shortly after going into the night side, I spotted the little rascal. It was quite visible and appeared to be only 8 to 10 miles away. I deliberately moved off target, waited until 5:^0:00 and eased back to l80° yaw and saw the light again, at which time it appeared to be around 12 to 1^ miles away and still quite visible. On the third night side after deploying the flashing light, I had, no anticipation of seeing it at all; but at 6:56:00 there it was, blinking away. It was very faint and appeared to be at a distance of about 16 to 17 miles. I would say it was approximately the brightness of a fifthmagnitude star, whereas on the second night side after deployment it appeared to be about that of a secondmagnitude star. At 4:25:00 I gave the medics their first orbital urine sample. At 4:5^:00 I ate four brownies from one of the little snack boxes and drank five or six gulps of water. While in flight, you must force yourself to eat and drink. When you have a fairly full flight plan, the temptation is not to bother with eating and drinking, but to devote your time to doing a good job on the items you have to do so that you can do them correctly. I deliberately made a point of forcing myself to drink water regularly. The food was so difficult to prepare and to eat that I did not eat the quantity of food I had planned to. The older type of tube food would have been better on this flight. Control of suit circuit is definitely marginal. It was physiologically and psychologically the worst problem I had during the flight. I was concerned with the suit circuit, probably more than with any other system throughout the entire flight. I worked continuously to keep it within limits. The suit was very moist and I was really soaked with water for some time before recovery. Controlling the

n Page 7-81

suit heat exchanger was a big problem during the entire flight. Wo setting, regardless of how small the change, would hold the suit dome temperature within acceptable limits. It was frequently frozen, at which point I would have to turn the suit water flow completely off until it thawed. At times, it would then go to the high temperature side, and the suit-inlet temperature would also become uncomfortably high. I would slowly work it back down to a point where I was beginning to get a comfortable suit; and then upon leaving it there, it would hold for a short while and suddenly would plunge on down to the freezing mark and I would have to start all over. Even when I would remember the settings that I had previously used and go back to even slightly lesser settings than these, it would hold for a short while, but then plunge or rise. It did not appear to be constant at all. Naturally, opening and closing the visor also added to the variations. At 8:21:00, I pitched down to observe the ground light with gyros free. At 9:00:00, I tried to deploy the balloon, with no success. At 9'10:00; I tried again to deploy the balloon, and again with no success. I used the procedure on the checklist, but nothing happened. The valve on the drinking container leaked so much water that I could not place water in any of the plastic food containers. The plastic food containers, with the frozen dehydrated food, are completely unsatisfactory for zero-g use. Under zero-g, there is no way of getting the plastic container away from the nozzle to work the water down into the food. The water tends to come out of the plastic top as you try closing it off. I tried one of them and had so much trouble and got water all over myself, my gloves, and the instrument panel, but only enough water in the container to wet approximately one-third of the food that was in there. I finally just gave it up as a lost cause, and ate only the snack-type foods. The condensate bag appeared to fill up much sooner than it should have and was so hard to pump against that I was afraid I would rupture it if I pumped any harder. I finally stopped pumping, transferred over to the 4-pound tank and proceeded to pump some water into it. Subsequently, the pump appeared to be jammed, and after switching back to the other tank the needle fitting came out with the entire system completely out of commission. As previously stated, I found that orienting the spacecraft after drifting flight was quite easy on the day side and not too difficult on the night side, although

7 - 82
orientation on the night side takes more time unless there is moonlight or broken clouds or land masses below. Stars and star patterns are more difficult to recognize because of the limited view through the window and the various angles and attitudes. You can slowly drift until you find some star pattern that is recognizable and from this you can pick up a zero yaw star. If you have moonlight, or any broken cloud masses or land masses, you can pick up zero yaw very readily if you turn all the lights off in order to become night adapted, and pitch down to approximately -20°. I made a manual fly-by-wire low thruster check at 13:15:00, prior to resting and turned the rate indicators to automatic or off. I had a hang-fire, or slow thrust decay, of the right yaw thruster in the manual proportional mode. It gave me a large yaw rate, which I corrected. I tried it again, and it operated properly. At night I could see lightning. Sometimes five or six different cumulus buildups were visible at once in the window. I could not see the lightning directly, but the whole cumulus mass of clouds would light up. From space, ground lights twinkle, whereas stars don't twinkle. I could not distinguish features on the moon. It was a partial moon at night, but it was full when it was setting in the daytime. It was quite bright at night, but on the day side it was a lightish blue color. I encountered no difficulty in being able to sleep. When you are completely powered down and drifting, it is a relaxed, calm, floating feeling. In fact, you have difficulty not sleeping. I found that I was cat-napping and dozing off frequently. Sleep seems to be very sound. I woke up one time from about an hour's nap with no idea where I was and it took me several seconds to orient myself to where I was and what I was doing. I noticed this again after one other fairly long period of sleep. You sleep completely relaxed and very, very soundly to the point that you have trouble regrouping yourself for a second or two when you come out of it. I noted that I was able to awaken prior to having a task to do. Neither did I encounter any type of this so-called "break-off phenomena." Although this flight was very enjoyable, a thing of delight, it still is a strange environment to a human being and you have every desire to get back to earth.

iOMriDCNTlAL

Page 7 - 83

I dropped off to sleep very soundly at about 13:30:00, and slept on until I woke up at 1^:48:00. I dropped off to sleep again at about 16:50:00 and slept right on through until 17:50:00. I woke up and the dome temperature light was on. After adjusting the temperature, I dropped off to sleep immediately thereafter and woke up at 18:25:00. I dropped off to sleep again and did not wake up until 19:27:00. During portions of the rest period when I was awake, I made several interesting ground observations. I could detect individual houses and streets. I also saw what appeared to be trains and trucks in some of the clear regions in the Tibetian area. I noted several cases of observing wind direction and velocity on the ground from smoke emanating from smokestacks or fireplaces of houses. Particularly in the Himalaya area I could see houses, yards, fields, roads, streams, and lakes. I could see a lot of snow on the ground in the upper portions of the mountains and a lot of the lakes frozen over even down in the lower sections of the windblown, sandy, high plateau areas of the Himalayas. During the day, the earth has a predominantly bluish cast. I found that green showed up very little. Water looked very blue, and heavy forest areas looked blue-green. The only really distinctive green showed up in the high Tibetian area. Some of the high lakes were a bright emerald green and looked like those found in a copper-sulphate mining area. The browns of the Arabian desert showed up quite distinctly, but the Sahara was not quite so brown. If you are looking straight down on things, the color is truer than if you're looking at an angle. At 21:34:00 on the night side, I observed a line of lighted cities along the East Coast of Australia - Sidney, Melbourne, Brisbane. I powered up the ASCS bus at 23:30:00, alined the spacecraft at 23:^0:00 and uncaged the gyros. The Cap Com in the Mercury Control Center mentioned that the scanner outputs and gyro outputs agreed perfectly. At 2^:15:00, I went to fly-by-wire low and zeroed the spacecraft yaw axis on the setting sun, which was very difficult because the sun is extremely bright. I then caged the gyros, brought them back to free, rolled to 3^° right, caged the gyros again, brought them back to free. The pitch torquing switch was on and I placed the spacecraft on automatic mode to start the zodiacal light photographs.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7-84
On the latter part of the night side, I placed the gyros to "slave" and the scanners began to correct the spacecraft back to the orbital plane. Meantime, I was busily snapping pictures. The fuel quantity warning light came on at 6l percent at 24:58:00. I remained on automatic control, snapped two pictures of the horizon-definition quadrant photographs, went to gyros free, yawed 90° right, took two pictures, caged and uncaged the gyros, went to 90° right again (which put me directly into the sun) snapped two pictures, went to 180° right (which put me to the 2700 point) snapped two pictures., gave one negative yaw pulse to start back around to get the gyros off the l80° stop, let it drift on around for a few moments, caged the gyros, and powered down. At 25:20:00 the moon was beginning to set in the west. I was faced in the right direction so I used manual proportional to keep my attitudes nearly correct and made three shots of the setting moon for M.I.T. At this time the moon appeared full from earthshine. At two different times, I saw a faint glow just after sunset or prior to sunrise; it was somewhat cone shaped, and I believe it was the faint glow of zodiacal light. It was not exactly vertical to the horizon. I had a feeling that this was just a glow off the sun. It was not as bright as the Milky Way. Another night phenomenon that I noticed occurred when I was over South America looking East or Northeast. At the particular time I couldn't see this layer, but I had the feeling that it was more of a ceiling than a layer. It was not distinct and did not last long, but it was higher than I was, was not well defined, and was not in the vicinity of the horizon. It was a good sized area very indistinct in shape. It had a faint glow with a reddish brown cast. It seemed to be quite extensive, very faint, and contrasted as a lighter area in the night sky. On the 17th and l8th orbital passes, I took infrared photographs. The G.m.t. time check over Mercury Control at 26:45:00 showed the G.m.t. clock to be 10 seconds fast. I made more photographs. I was using full drifting flight and engaging the manual proportional handle to make some very slight attitude corrections when necessary to photograph, trying to hold a window-down attitude, and allowing yaw to ease around wherever it would. At times during the day, I did note that the sun was very, very hot through the window. The particular pattern of the sun would be hot on my suit. I could feel heat on the inside of the window from the sun, too, and through my glove.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page

7-85

I had been switching the warning light control switch to the "off" position in order to darken completely the interior of the spacecraft and thus become dark adapted. When I returned the switch from the "off" to "dim" position, the 0.05g green light illuminated. I immediately turned off the ASCS 0.05g switch fuse and the emergency 0.05g fuse. Thereafter, we made three checks to verify that the ASCS 0.05g relay functions were operative. Since the amp-cal was now latched into the reentry mode, the attitude gyros were no longer operational. Partial pressure of oxygen in the cabin slowly dropped throughout the flight to about 3-5 psia. I was worried that the range might get concerned about this on the next to the last pass. Also, the partial pressure of CCU in the suit circuit had gradually increased to a reading of 3-5 mm Hg. I suspected the gage and went to emergency rate flow and did not get any apparent decrease in this reading. However, I did not stay on emergency rate flow very long. I recognized that my breathing was more rapid and deep. The PCOp gage indicated that we were up over 5 on the gage setting just prior to retrofire. However, I could have gone on emergency Op flow and accepted slightly higher suit temperatures because of the fans shutting down, which reduces suit circuit flow. At 32:05:00, I turned on the cabin fan and cabin coolant flow, turned the cabin coolant up to the launch mark, and the cabin temperature immediately began to cool down from 95° F, partially because I had entered the night side. The 250 v-amp main inverter failed to operate on the 21st pass. At about 33:03:00 the automatic changeover light for the standby inverter came on. I had noticed two small fluctuations in the ammeter a little previous to this and had gone through an electrical check; everything appeared normal. The temperature on the 250 v-amp inverter was about 115° F, the temperature on the fans inverter was about 125° F, and the standby inverter was about 95° F. At this point the light came on and I checked the inverters, and the 250 v-amp inverter was still reading about 115° F on temperature, but was indicating 1^-0 volts on the ASCS a-c bus voltage. I then turned it off. At that time I selected the slug position (manual selection of the standby inverter for the ASCS) and found that the standvy inverter would not start. I put the switch back to the "off" position of ASCS a-c power and elected to make a purely manual or fly-by-wire retrofire and reentry.

7 - 86
7.3.5 Retrofire.- As a result of the premature latching in of the ASCS 0.05g relay and the subsequent loss of the ASCS main and standby inverter power, I was required to initiate and control the spacecraft manually during the retrofire and reentry events. I decided to control the spacecraft during the retrofire period on manual proportional with fly-by-wire ready as a backup, if necessary. I stowed the equipment and completed the necessary preretrofire switching procedures well in advance and was all set except for the squib switch. As I entered the last night side prior to the retrofire event, and realizing that I would have to orient the spacecraft to the proper retroattitude within 10 minutes after sunrise for a countdown from Coastal Sentry Quebec (CSQ), I decided to orient the spacecraft to retroattitude during the night side and stay fairly close to it. I was able to use stars that were near my flight path as well as cloud patterns after the moon came up to maintain proper yaw orientation. Shortly after sunrise when sunlight first struck the window at an oblique angle, the window became completely translucent, thus making it impossible to see through it for aljnost a minute. I flew instruments (rate needles) during this period and when I again was able to see out the window I was still close to the proper retroattitude. I positioned the spacecraft exactly on retroattitude. I could now see out the window clearly, and the manual proportional control system was operating very well. The procedure from the ground to prepare me for retrofire was good with one exception. The original plan had been to count down to retrosequence (if it was to be used) and then to retrofire. When retrosequence was not used, I had rejected the idea of any count except to retrofire, so that there was some doubt in my mind when the CSQ Cap Com began a countdown, whether it was retrofire or not. I would recommend that we not count down in this same manner for anything but retrofire in the future. Fortunately, we had set the clock on minutes and seconds so that I assured myself with this and waited for the second count. The CSQ spacecraft communicator (John Glenn) gave me a countdown for retrofire, and at 5 seconds to go, I placed the squib switch to "on." I punched the retrofire button at time zero and the retrorockets commenced firing right on time.

Page 7 - 87 Because of the loss of my attitude indicators, I was required to use the view of the earth through the window for attitude reference. During the thrust period of the retrorockets, I used the gnat rate gyro indicators in order to control rates while crosschecking through the window for attitude control. This method proved to Toe somwhat difficult because of the high contrast in brightness level existing between the exterior and interior of the spacecraft. Consequently, I had to hold up my hand to shade my eyes from the light coming through the window while viewing the rate indicators. Other than this, I had no difficulty in controlling the spacecraft during this event. The first retrorocket offset moment was fairly mild; I kept the rates close to zero and observed that attitudes were still fairly close to nominal. As the second one fired, the attitudes shifted off a little but I brought them back and then shifted my vision to the rate indicators. The greatest offset moment appeared to be in plus yaw when the number two retrorocket commenced firing. I had plenty of training using the fly-by-wire and manual proportional control modes to control retrorocket firing disturbances. I did not have the opportunity to practice controlling retrofire simulations on the ground trainers using a combination of window reference and rate indicators. This, however, was not a great problem. If I had lost air - ground communications prior to retrofire, I would have been able to use the last retrofire time I received, which was correct, and could have accomplished retrofire at the proper time and in a proper manner. The retros give a good, solid "thump" in the seat of your pants and I could very easily count each one as it ignited. Retrojettison, which I did manually, was a very solid "clack" in the retropack area. I felt that I could actually feel the pack depart. I maintained retroattitude for part of the 10-minute period prior to the nominal 0.05g time in order to keep the earth reference in view as long as possible before going to reentry attitude. A few minutes prior to the time for 0.05g, I slowly pitched up to a negative 12° to 1^° pitch attitude, just keeping the earth horizon at the bottom of the window and holding yaw and roll at zero.

Page 7-

7.3.6

Reentry.- Initially, I was intending to use fly-by-wire for reentry. The fly-by-wire pitch-up high thruster was slow to light off. So I pushed in the manual proportional handle and decided to go dual authority, which gave me ^9 pounds of thrust capability in the pitch and yaw axes. About 1 minute prior to 0.05g, the spacecraft began to feel definitely like it wanted to reenter. It was sluggish on the controls, and began to pitch up to zero pitch attitude. I allowed it to pitch on up, and started a negative roll rate. I was rather surprised to see what a "wallow" the spacecraft set up with this roll rate. This, of course, is something you do not see in the procedures trainer. The spacecraft more or less "wallowed" or spiraled around, and the pitch and yaw rates began to build very slowly; they were a very low order of magnitude. For the early oscillations, pure manual proportional would have handled them very nicely. The 1-pound thrusters would almost handle the initial oscillations. Later the oscillations had considerable more force to them, and required more thrust to damp them. The fly-by-wire high thrusters were not used during the first part of the reentry. The oscillations began to increase and thereby required a continuously greater control input. It was at this time that the fly-by-wire high thrusters unexpectedly fired, causing me to overshoot two different yaw oscillations. I began to be a little more cautious on the amount of thrust called for and had them well under control prior to max g. On down through max g, I held the rates down relatively low. At 95;000 feet on down to about 50,000 feet, the rates became quite pronounced. It seemed to take on a different ratio in amplitude and frequency. Even using dual authority with ^9 pounds of thrust, I still was not able to pin the rates as well as I would have liked to. The oscillations were held to a reasonable degree until about 50,000 feet at which time the oscillations got fairly large and fast and I was really having difficulty controlling them. You could actually feel the oscillating g-forces, but they were not physiologically objectionable at all.

7.3.7

Landing and recovery.- As planned, I started to deploy the drogue parachute when passing through 42,000 feet as indicated on the altimeter. I pushed the drogue button and the drogue came out immediately. I realized I was in the clouds when the parachute deployed, but I still could see it very easily. It immediately stabilized the spacecraft and it looked very nice.

WIAL*

Page 7 -

The main parachute came out automatically at approximately 11,000 feet indicated altitude, reefed normally, and then blossomed fully. The g's from the parachute opening were much less than I had expected. Rate of descent after parachute opening was between 35 and 40 feet per second. The spacecraft was oscillating slowly under the parachute. At 4,000 feet indicated altitude the rate of descent was down to JO feet per second, but oscillations were still present. The landing bag deployed automatically. Landing was solid but not severe. Considerable water splashed in, apparently through the snorkles, but was splashing all about the cockpit in small amounts from each side. The spacecraft went down to the left side, rolled around with my head down, and wound up with the right side of the spacecraft under the water. I could see the spacecraft then ease back up the water line where it was lying flat in the water, with my head up. The helicopter pilot circling the spacecraft reported that the parachute was slow in disconnecting. I put the main and emergency disconnect fuse switches to number 1, and the rescue aids switch was placed to "manual." (l am not absolutely certain, but it is my feeling that I placed the rescue aids switch to manual immediately after landing.) It appeared to be a matter of a minute before the spacecraft began to right itself, and it came right up to an upright position. At this point, I used the swizzle stick and turned the manual-fill nitrogen handle, pulled it out, turned it to the "on" position and then put the rescue aids switch to "automatic" to extend the whip antenna. By this time there were swimmers actually in the water around me. Immediately after main parachute deployment, I began to hear the helicopters contacting me on radio. There were two of them circling me at this time. They stated that the carrier was very nearby ( . miles) and would be 44 right with me. This was extremely comforting. I was asked how I preferred to be recovered. I elected, as I had planned, to be hoisted onboard the carrier. Everything proceeded very smoothly, and I did not get out of the spacecraft until John Graham and his troops blew the hatch from the outside on the carrier. I was met by John and Dick Pollard, and we took two blood pressures

CQNriDEPfTIAL

Page 7 - 90

CONFIDENTIAL
while I was still inside the spacecraft. I then climbed out and we took another blood pressure. While standing still for the blood pressure I "began to feel somewhat light headed. This feeling disappeared as soon as I had taken two steps away from the spacecraft. At no time after that did I again notice any more light headedness. We then proceeded below for the medical and technical debriefings.

CONriDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
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7:15

CONFIDENTIAL

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Page 7-104

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- C W f f m M * J y W t i T T ^ 8.0 FLIGHT CONTROL AND NETWORK PERFORMANCE 8.1 8.1.1 Flight Control Summary

Page 8-1

Prelaunch operations.- The Mercury Control Center (MCC) and Bermuda (BDA) flight controllers were deployed for the MA-9 mission on April 30, 19^3. The remainder of the flight control teams began to deploy on May 2, and all teams had "been deployed by May 5, 196j. The MCC-BDA flight control teams were exercised through a series of 10 launch simulations. These simulations exercised the decision capability of the flight controllers and the astronaut during the critical powered-flight phase of the mission. Four days of network simulations were conducted in preparation for the mission. The exercises performed on May 1, 8, and 9 involved two simulations daily. The final network simulation was performed on May 12, 1963. At the completion of this exercise, the network and the flight control teams had reached a satisfactory state of readiness and were ready to support the scheduled flight. Because of the extended flight duration, an additional flight controller was assigned to the flight control teams at both Kano, Nigeria (KNO) and Zanzibar (ZZB). The Kauai Island, Hawaii (HAW) site was supported by two complete flight control teams, because of the frequency of its contact periods. Several new flight controllers were used, primarily at BDA, ZZB, Rose Knot Victor command ship (RKV), and HAW. The Corpus Christi, Texas (TEX) site was again used as a training facility for the mission. Five aeromedical monitors and five procedures-trainer personnel from the Flight Crew Operations Division participated in the simulations at this site. The Mercury Control Center was manned on a two-shift basis. The shift changeover occurred approximately every 8 hours throughout the flight. The flight control countdown was initiated by the second shift team at T-215 minutes. The first shift was on duty at T-120 minutes. Both shifts were on duty for the launch and reentry phases of the mission. The flight control documentation for the MA-9 mission was satisfactory. A total of 3^ Instrumentation Support Instructions was transmitted to the network. The majority of these documents required only one revision during the prelaunch period. The only major revisions required were those to the instrument calibration curves. These changes were necessary because of calibration shifts and are normally transmitted after the launchpad tests, conducted 4 days prior to lift-off. Other minor

8 -2
revisions were made to the Network Countdown, Mission Rules, and Data Acquisition Plan. 8.1.2 Prelift-off operations.- The network countdown was initiated on May 14, 1963, at 2:00 a.m. e.s.t. The spacecraft-launchvehicle countdown was proceeding normally. The computer and range checkout (CADFISS) test was completed on schedule and all site equipment mandatory for the mission was in a satisfactory condition with the exception of the BDA FPS-16 radar, which had failed the CADFISS slew tests in "both azimuth and range. The slew tests were rescheduled for BDA and the "C" computer at Goddard was placed on a standby basis to check the BDA data. At BDA, it was estimated that it would take 1 hour to isolate the problem, and at T-125 a decision was made to continue the count, with a hold at T-60, if necessary. The CADFISS tests at T-80 minutes indicated good radar data in azimuth, range, and elevation; however, there were some dropouts in range, and the BDA station personnel continued to investigate the problems in the radar. At T-60 minutes a series of short duration holds, eventually totaling approximately 2 hours, was called because of problems with the diesel engine for the gantry transfer table. The fuel pump on the diesel engine was changed and the count was resumed at 9:09 a.m. e.s.t. During the hold at T-60 minutes, the Bermuda radar passed the CADFISS test. The radar was performing satisfactorily when the count was resumed] however, there was still an error rate of 14 percent in the range data. An error rate of 20 percent is the maximum acceptable error rate for these data. Continual status reports were obtained from BDA, and the radar was in a marginal green condition for the lox status check at T-V? minutes. The spacecraft test conductor was advised that the countdown would be continued until T-15 minutes, at which time a final status would be given. A final slew check was performed with BDA at T-20 minutes; the error rate on these data was 100 percent. It was then determined that the radar would not be able to support the mission and that an additional 12 to 24 hours would be required. The launch attempt was canceled at 9:56 a.m. e.s.t. The BDA station began an immediate investigation of the problems in the FPS-16 radar system. The Goddard computers were placed on a standby status to run Data Slew Tests with the BDA radar when it was repaired. The status of the radar was reported every 2 hours. By 2:00 p.m. e.s.t., the problems had been isolated to the preamplifier in the azimuth digital

Page

8-3

data channel and the shift register in the range digital data channel. The simultaneous failure of both components complicated an effective failure analysis and caused the earlier difficulties in solving the problems. At 4:00 p.m. e.s.t. it was decided that the BDA FPS-16 radar system would be able to support the launch and that the countdown for the second launch attempt would be initiated the following day. The countdown was recycled for 24 hours, and the network countdown was resumed at 2:00 a.m. e.s.t. on May 15, 19&3- All primary network systems, with minor exceptions, were operable when the countdown was initiated. The confidence summaries transmitted by the network to verify the site and calibrations were very good. No major discrepancies were noted in the network voice communications. However, the ZZB, Canton Island (CTN), RKV, and Coastal Sentry Quebec (CSQ) sites were influenced by propagation, and several repeats were required from the stations. The ships were serviced by two diverse radio links. The CSQ communications were routed through New York and Honolulu. In most cases, these different paths allowed communications to the ships during the periods of daynight frequency transition. The sites suffered short-duration dropouts on the voice links throughout the test; however, communications were quickly reestablished. This countdown was continuous, except for a short hold for the launch-vehicle ground support equipment at T-ll minutes 30 seconds. The countdown was resumed within approximately 4 minutes and lift-off occurred at 8:04:13 a.m. e.s.t. 8.1.3 Powered flight.- The powered flight phase was normal and all launch events occurred at nearly the expected time. The guidance and data systems performance was excellent. All data sources provided good, consistent data. Sustainer engine cut-off occurred at 00:05:02.9 at a space-fixed velocity of 25,735 ft/sec. The flight-path angle at cut-off was +0.00321°. A "go" condition was evident at insertion, and the orbit lifetime was not considered to be a problem. All spacecraft and launch-vehicle systems performed satisfactorily during the launch phase, and the air-ground communications were somewhat better than those in previous missions. Orbital flight.- After spacecraft separation, the astronaut performed a fly-by-wire (ZBW) turnaround maneuver. Shortly after completion of this maneuver, the BDA capsule communicator (Cap Com) advised the MCC that an approximate 6° rise in

8.1.4

CONFIDCHTIAL"

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Page 8 -

CONFIDENTIAL
ca~bin- and suit-dome heat-exchanger temperatures had been observed on telemetry at BDA. The astronaut was appraised of this situation and increased the coolant flow. At spacecraft loss of signal with BDA, the dome temperatures had stabilized. When the astronaut acquired communications with the Canary Islands (CYl), he said that the dome-temperature warning light was on. This warning indication was caused by the suit dome temperature decreasing below 51° F. The astronaut was required to monitor this temperature throughout the flight and make frequent adjustments to the coolant control valve. As a result of the exit heat pulse, the cabin temperature indication on telemetry rose from 9^-° F at launch to approximately 118° F when the spacecraft was over Muchea, Australia (MUG). Subsequently, this temperature decreased slowly to a value between 90° F and 100° F. The cabin-air temperature appeared to vary slightly as a function of the spacecraft a-c power usage. During the periods in which the automatic stabilization and control system (ASCS) 115 v a-c inverter was being used, the temperature would rise to a value of between 97° F and 105° F; and when this inverter was not being used, the temperature would apparently decrease slowly over a period of two passes to a value of between 90° F and 97° F. All spacecraft systems were functioning normally, and the MCC advised the Guaymas, Mexico (GYM) site to transmit a "go" decision for seven orbital passes to the astronaut. The first minor discrepancy occurred over MCC at the beginning of the second orbital pass. When the telemetry was commanded by the ground, a series of repetitive R- and Z-calibrations occurred. It was decided that the programed R and Z calibration function would be turned off during the sleep period. This anamoly occurred again when the C-band beacon was commanded "on" over MCC at the beginning of the l6th orbital pass. The flashing beacon was deployed at 03:^5:00. The astronaut reported that he felt the beacon deploy; however, he did not see the light during its first night period. The astronaut

All instrumentation values presented in this section were derived in real time over telemetry, unless otherwise stated.

Page

8-5

verified that the attitudes and time were correct for deployment of the beacon. The "beacon was observed during sunset of the 4th orbital pass~"and was tracked during the night period of that pass. All systems continued to perform satisfactorily. However, the astronaut was required to make frequent changes to the suit coolant control valves in order to maintain the suit heat-exchanger dome temperature within limits. At the beginning of the 5th orbital pass, the astronaut turned the cabin fan and cabin heat exchanger off as scheduled by the flight plan. It was noted subsequently that turning off the cabin fan while in a powered-down condition did not materially affect the cabin temperature. The astronaut opened the outlet port of the condensate trap in accordance with his flight plan. It was noted early in the flight that the actual power usage was slightly less than predicted. This condition resulted in allowing for more radar beacon tracking during the later phases of the flight. The C-band beacon was turned on three times prior to passes over the HAW station to enable tracking by the Range Tracker ship. Attitude-control-fuel usage was also less than expected, and all reports indicated that the astronaut was managing his fuel supplies exceptionally well. The astronaut made two attempts to deploy the balloon for the balloon drag and visibility experiment, starting at 09:00:00. All attempts were unsuccessful; and based upon analysis of the system and the undesirability of powering up the squib bus, it was decided that no further attempts would be made to deploy the balloon. The astronaut was advised not to actuate the jettison switch. During the 7th pass at 10:02:00, MCC directed ZZB to transmit to the astronaut a "go" decision to continue for 17 orbital passes. At this time all systems were performing well. In general, the usage of consumables was better than expected and the astronaut was in excellent condition. Because of the excellent performance of the astronaut and the spacecraft systems, the task of flight control was one of monitoring systems performance, gathering and transmitting summary information, and assisting the astronaut in carrying out his flight plan. At the end of the 7~th pass the astronaut powered down the ASCS bus over the CSQ and began a period of extended drifting flight. At this time he stated that he was perspiring lightly and that

Page

n

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he was continuing to monitor the suit dome temperature. Occasionally, the ground stations became concerned because of the gradual temperature increase apparent in the cabinheat-exchanger dome temperature. This measurement was expected to reach ambient eventually, but it stabilized at approximately 75° F. The HAW site obtained good tracking on the C-band beacon on the 7th pass, and these data confirmed the nominal orbit. All scheduled radar tracking during the orbital phase was good and the acquisition and retrofire times were near nominal throughout the entire flight. The RKV received a readout of the major onboard parameters from the astronaut at 12:28:00, and the astronaut turned the telemetry to continuous in preparation for the sleep period. The astronaut performed a checkout of the manual and fly-bywire (FEW) thrusters. He reported to the CSQ at 13:30:00 that the system was performing satisfactorily and that he had just been sitting quietly looking out the window. He then indicated that he was ready to sleep. The network sites were advised that the sleep period had started, and that they were to maintain air-ground communications silence unless telemetry signals indicated that the astronaut should be contacted. Throughout the sleep period, all parameters indicated normal systems operation. The suit dome temperature reading received at the KNO site changed abruptly. The change indicated that the astronaut had adjusted his suit coolant flow in order to maintain the dome temperature within the limits. The aeromedical parameters which were monitored by the remote sites indicated that the astronaut was sleeping. The respiration rate was holding fairly steadily at 15 breaths per minute, and the heart rate was steady, at approximately 60 beats per minute. During the llth pass, the MCC received electrocardiogram (EGG) data, remoted from the Ascension Island; and a sudden increase in the heart rate from 60 beats per minute to 110 beats per minute was noted. The heart rate then decreased to 70 beats per minute. These data were interpreted by the aeromedical monitors to indicate that the astronaut may have been dreaming. During the llth through l4th passes, the indicated automatic fuel quantity decreased from 82 percent to 75 percent. This change initially caused some concern, but, after evaluation it was attributed to temperature stabilization effects, the normal nitrogen bottle leakage rate, and the readout accuracy of the ground telemetry for automatic fuel quantity. During the l^th pass at 21:23:00, the MUG site received a report on consumables from the astronaut. The astronaut stated

COMriDEHTlAL

Page 8 - 7 that he slept veil, that he had transferred the urine and condensate, and that the condensate trap vas apparently performing satisfactorily. The suit-dome-temperature warning light was on; however, the astronaut had reduced the suit coolant flow and the temperature was increasing. The astronaut checked his FEW-low and manual yaw thrusters during the 15th pass and he advised MUG that the thrusters were operating satisfactorily. At the beginning of the l6th pass the astronaut ate and drank, and he stated that he felt fine. The ASCS was powered up at 23:j6:00, as the spacecraft passed over MUG, and the astronaut selected ASCS orbit mode. The ASCS was operating normally, and good correlation was obtained between spacecraft attitudes and horizon-scanner outputs. The MCC advised the MIJC site to transmit to the astronaut the "go" decision for 22 orbital passes. The automatic-fuel-quantity warning light came on at 2^:58:00 when the spacecraft automatic-fuel-quantity meter was indicating 6l percent remaining. The 17th and l8th passes were completely nominal. The spacecraft clock continued to gain approximately 1 second per orbital pass and it was 18 seconds fast at 27:33:00. This clock error was within specification accuracy and was of no concern. At approximately 29:27:00 during the 19th pass, the HAW capsule communicator contacted the astronaut via the Kwajalein Island air-ground remoting circuit. At this time the 0.05g telelite event had not yet been reported. At 29:32:00 when the spacecraft passed over HAW, the astronaut stated that when he changed the warning-light switch from off to dim, the green 0.05g telelite came on. He then placed the ASCS 0.05g fuse switch and the emergency 0.05g fuse in the off position. It should be noted that at this time the only concern at MCC was co determine what effect the indicated problem had on the amplifier-calibrator and what functions, if any, were lost as a consequence. There was no need to terminate the mission at that time since no Mission Rules had been violated and there were two control modes remaining. After some analysis and discussion of the problem, it was decided that the first step was to have the astronaut power up the ASCS bus, which he did when the spacecraft passed over GYM. Over MCC, the gyros were slaved to the horizon scanners and after about 1 minute of operation no gyro or scanner deviation from the gyro caged condition was noted. This condition indicated that the power to the gyros and scanners was off. At this point, although the tests were

Page 8 -

not yet completed, it was generally thought that the gyros, attitude indicators,, and scanners were inoperative and that the 0.05g circuit was latched up. At this time it was realized that a manual retrofire would be required and that a checklist would have to be prepared for the astronaut. At approximately 30:00:00 the remote site flight control personnel that were on standby status were recalled to their stations, and they were advised to stand by to attempt to relay communications to the astronaut if directed by MCC. While he was in contact with the CSQ, the astronaut was requested to turn on the telemetry and the C-band beacon in order that the Range Tracker could make a check of its radar data, since this ship was the prime station for reentry tracking. These data were even more important since the retrofire maneuver would be performed manually. During the time interval between loss of signal with MCC on the 20th pass and acquisition of communications with HAW on this pass, additional tests were devised to verify where the ASCS logic was latched up. As the spacecraft passed over HAW, the astronaut was requested to place the ASCS 0.05g and emergency 0.05g fuse switches in the on position and to select the ASCS automatic mode to verify the 0.05g event. If the spacecraft began to roll as it would normally do if 0.05g indications were valid, the ASCS was latched in to the reentry mode. The astronaut verified this roll rate, and the 0.05g event was confirmed by telemetry over the GYM site. At this point the flight controllers knew the configuration of the ASCS logic and the required configuration for reentry. After completion of this test, it was determined that the ASCS would provide proper attitude control and roll rate for reentry. Prior to the astronaut's acquiring communications with the CSQ on the 21st pass, a manual retrofire checklist was completed and thoroughly checked out by MCC. This checklist was sent via TWX to ZZB, CSQ, and HAW, and its receipt was acknowledged. The checklist was as follows: A. Primary procedure for retrofire 1. 2. 3. 4. Attitude permission by-pass Retrorocket arm switch, manual Fly-by-wire thrust select switch, high and low Retrosequence fuse switch, number 2

Page 5Retrofire manual fuse switch, number 2

8-9

6. ASCS a-c bus switch, on T. ASCS 0.05g fuse switch, number 1 8. ASCS control switch, select 910. 11.

Mode select switch, off
Manual handle, push on Squib arm at retrofire minus 5 seconds

12.

Countdown to retrofire

IJ. Depress fire retro override at retrofire time B. Backup to be used if there is no retrofire
1. 2. C. Retro delay to instant Depress retrosequence button

Additional precautions 1. Retropackage jettison will have to be manual. Be sure not to arm the retropackage jettison switch until after the rockets are fired. Astronaut probably will not get a fire retro telelite

2.

D. Hold retroattitude and jettison retro, keep rates as low as possible while maintaining usual reference as an aid for low rates and at the nominal 0.05g time (3^:09:19); select reentry mode. E. At correct 0.05g time, select automatic on the ASCS continuous switch. In addition to the checklist which was relayed to the spacecraft and written down by the astronaut, the CSQ attempted to reset the clock by a ground command. The desired clock setting for the time of retrofire was 3^ hours 59 minutes and 52 seconds. The desired time of retrofire was 33:59:30. The difference between the clock setting and the desired time of retrofire

- 10
resulted from a correction for the predicted clock error which would be 22 seconds fast at time of retrofire. Also since the clock was not to be used for retrosequence, only the minutes and seconds needed to be accurate for the astronaut's reference and the clock setting advanced 1 hour to avoid possible clock timeout. This command was not set into the clock, but the astronaut successfully reset the clock. The telemetry and G-band beacon were again turned on for the Range Tracker as the spacecraft passed over the CSQ. The astronaut was advised to "take green for go, " which was a coded means of telling him to take a dextro amphetamine pill. The pill was used as an added precaution to be sure that the astronaut was alert for the retrofire maneuver. The flight surgeon was not concerned over the astronaut's condition but he was not sure the astronaut was thoroughly rested from his sleep. The ZZB site noted a rise in carbon dioxide partial pressure (PCCu) and the astronaut was advised to purge the suit circuit with fresh oxygen by going on 0 emergency rate flow. A quick estimate of the quantity of d 1 oxygen remaining indicated that Ip- hours of 0 emergency rate flow was available. The ZZB capsule communicator confirmed each item on the checklist with the astronaut and he verified that all items on the list were completed with the exception of arming the squib switch. Two additional items were added to the checklist at this time. The first was to be sure that the visor was closed, and the second was to cage the gyros. For the first time, the astronaut reported to ZZB that the main and standby 250 v-amp inverters had failed to operate. At this point, MCC advised ZZB to turn the ASCS a-c switch to off, because the inoperative power circuit would require the entire reentry to be manually controlled. The CSQ acquired communication with the spacecraft at 33:56:5^-The capsule communicator and the astronaut reviewed the retrofire and reentry procedures and it was apparent that the astronaut was prepared for his task. Time hacks were transmitted to the astronaut at retrofire time minus 60 seconds and at retrofire time minus 30 seconds. Finally, a 10-second terminal countdown to retrofire was transmitted. The squib bus was armed at retrofire minus 5 seconds. The number one retrorocket was ignited at 33:59:30 and ignition of retrorockets number two and three occurred at the proper 5-second

Page 8 - 1 1

intervals. The telemetry data immediately confirmed the retrofire. The astronaut stated that his attitudes were good and confirmed the ignition of the three retrorockets. The retropackage was manually jettisoned at approximately 3^:00:43. Communications were good through loss of signal with CSQ. The "beginning of the reentry blackout was reported by the Range Tracker to be within 2 seconds of the time predicted, which indicated that the landing point would be close to nominal. Communications were regained by the HAW capsule communicator via the relay aircraft at approximately 3^-: 20:30. The weather in the recovery area was good. The final landing point was only about 4 miles from nominal. 8.2.7 General Comments.- The network flight control teams performed extremely well. Communications between the ground and the astronaut were concise and they conveyed the necessary information. The flight control teams utilized the proper contact and reporting procedures that were developed for this mission. The network data as presented on the summary messages appeared, in most cases, to have an accuracy within 2 percent. The operations messages provided much useful real-time data, and no difficulty existed in determining the precise status of the spacecraft, the astronaut, and the mission. The ground communications were generally good; however, those at the ZZB and CSQ sites were not as good as those from the rest of the network. The air-ground communications as monitored on the Goddard loop were somewhat better than in previous missions and probably resulted from the use of squelch control at the remote sites. The air-ground communications as remoted through the HAW site were good; however, two transmitters at the HAW site failed. The entire mission was an extremely smooth and well coordinated effort. The preflight network simulation exercises were the best planned and executed to date. The flight controllers response was very good, and it is felt that this test was the best executed mission or Project Mercury. The cooperation between the flight astronaut and flight control personnel had a significant influence on the success of the MA-9 mission.

CQNriDEMTIAlr

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8.2

"CONFIDENTIAL
Mercury Network Performance

The Mercury network performed its mission of flight-control support and data collection in a very satisfactory manner. At lift-off, no major equipment problems existed on the network. Several minor equipment malfunctions occurred but they did not materially affect mission support. Communications to all network sites from the Mercury Control Center (MCC) were excellent during the countdown and throughout the flight. Both high-frequency (HF) and teletype communications to the Rose Knot Victor (RKV) tracking ship were lost at J2 minutes prior to lift-off (T-J2) because of unfavorable atmospheric conditions. However,, teletype communications were reestablished at T-9 minutes and HF communications were reestablished 68 minutes after lift-off (T+68) to the RKV. The computer and range checkout (CADFISS) tests made during the mission indicated that the operational condition of sites which had been released to a standby status was satisfactory prior to the next spacecraft pass over that site. Radar data from the tracking ships, Range Tracker and Twin Falls Victory, proved to be usable; however, the data were not needed to determine orbital decay. The telemetry coverage for all sites was excellent. Land-based radar coverage provided excellent data to the Goddard computers. Attempts to skin track the spacecraft were not successful. Air-to-ground communications were good throughout the flight. Remote air-to-ground voice relays were successfully operated through Ascension, Wake, and Kwajalein Islands and through the Range Tracker Ship. Electrocardiogram (EGG) readouts were transmitted in real time to the MCC from the network stations at Antigua, California, Bermuda, and Ascension. The onboard TV system proved to be compatible with the ground systems at MCC and the Canary Islands (CYl); however, the picture definition was usually very poor. This poor quality resulted from unfavorable lighting conditions within the spacecraft and through the window. The Coastal Sentry Quebec (CSQ) TV system did not function properly and the system is being investigated. Command coverage was available throughout the flight but not required for spacecraft control. For the first time during a Mercury mission, aircraft equipped with radar tracking equipment were used in an attempt to skin track the spacecraft while in orbit and through the communications blackout period during reentry. An analysis of the results, of these tests indicates that tracking can be accomplished by airborne radars. Two radar aircraft in the primary recovery area successfully skin tracked the spacecraft from a slant range of over 600 nautical miles to the landing point. The performance of the network for the MA-9 mission is consistent with the support given for the MA-6, MA-7, and MA-8 missions. The

1DENTIAL

Page 8 - 13

absence of equipment malfunctions during the longer duration of the MA-9 mission, considering that sites were allowed to go to a standby status at various times, is indicative of a high degree of excellence in maintenance and operational procedures by all sites. 8.2.1 Computing and trajectory displays.- The network countdown for the MA-9 mission began at the Goddard Computing Center at midnight on May 14. The Goddard computer, equipment, interface, CADFISS, and trajectory confidence tests were all satisfactory. During the countdown, some dropout in the Goddard "B" computer readouts was observed at the MCC. The high-speed output subchannel on the data communication channel for this computer was interchanged with the plotboard high-speed subchannel. At the request of the Flight Dynamics Officer, the poweredflight- phase was supported with the "A" and "C" computers, and then the support was switched to the "A" and "B" computers during orbital flight. The "B" computer gave no indication of dropout during the rest of the mission. Lift-off occurred at 08:04:13 a.m. e.s.t. The Atlantic Missile Eange (AMR) I.P. 709^ and the General Electric - Burroughs computers provided excellent data throughout the launch. A "go" decision was indicated by all three data sources. The cut-off conditions are shown in table 8.2.1-1. In the orbital phase, during the periods when the spacecraft C- and S-band beacons were on, the tracking data received from the network sites were excellent. During the mission, weight changes in the spacecraft resulting from fuel and coolant-water usage were manually put into the computers. The retrofire time recommended by the Goddard computers was 33:59:30, and retrofire was manually initiated at this time. After retrofire, the predicted landing point transmitted to the MCC from the Goddard computer was 27° 22' North latitude and 176° 29' West longitude. An attempt to refine this prediction with six frames of data from the Range Tracker ship, acquired during blackout, failed to yield a converged solution. The computed time of the blackout was from 3 : 8 1 to 3V. 22:30. The actual time of initial blackout ^0:6 was reported by the Range Tracker to be 3^-:08:17« The actual landing point was reported by the recovery ship to be 27° 22.6' North latitude and 176° 35-3' West longitude. Although several minor computer problems were encountered and corrected throughout the flight, at no time during the mission did the computers fail to drive the digital displays and plotboards at the MCC. In addition, performance of the highspeed lines between Goddard and the MCC was excellent.

3For the first time, CADFISS tests were conducted during the mission to determine the operational status of major equipment subsystems at network sites. These tests were considered necessary since mandatory equipment at many sites was shut down for prolonged periods of time when the spacecraft was out of range. All of these tests were successfully supported by the third Goddard computer while the other two Goddard computers continued the operational support of the mission. This flight was the first to be supported by a triplex computing system and the IBM 7 9 computers. 0^ Two range ships, the Range Tracker and the Twin Falls Victory, were used to provide tracking data to the Goddard computers. The Range Tracker provided good tracking data during the 7th, 20th, and 21st orbital passes. During reentry the Range Tracker was poorly positioned with respect to the blackout zone and provided only six frames of data for this phase of reentry. An analysis of these data indicated a landing point which was about-3° or 180 nautical miles away from the correct landing point. Twin Falls Victory data readout was good on three passes. East Island data appear to be unusable. Ascension Island data, used for the first time in a Mercury mission, appear to be satisfactory. 8.2.2 Command system.- The command system for the MA-9 mission operated in a satisfactory mariner, and the command control plan was followed very closely throughout the mission. Several malfunctions were noted at various sites, but command capability was never lost by any site during the time in which the spacecraft was passing over that site. The command carrier "on" indication from BDA to the MCC was delayed approximately 32 seconds on the first pass; however, it had no net effect on the mission since the onboard command receiver signal strength remained above the receiver threshold setting. A summary of the command handover exercises is shown in table 8.2.2-1 and a summary of command transmissions is shown in table 8.2.2-2. Ground system: A preliminary evaluation of the data shows that all command sites had very good command coverage during each pass. Command coverage became reliable at slant ranges varying from 300 to 950 nautical miles. This large variance was caused by the change in spacecraft antenna orientation while the spacecraft was in attitude-free drifting flight, the trajectory of"the spacecraft over the site, and the transmitter output power of the respective sites. MCC, GBI, and San Salvador (SAL) provided command control coverage during launch. This coverage was provided by the MCC low pover unit from lift-off to T+90 seconds, by the MCC high power unit from T+90 seconds to

8.2.2.1

Page 8 - 1 5

seconds, and by the SAL high power unit from T+245 seconds to T+3&0 seconds, at which time command control was switched to BDA. This switch to BDA was performed at 00:05:58.350, but the command carrier "on" indication was not received at MCC until 00:06:30.3^, a delay of 32 seconds. An evaluation of the onboard receiver signal strength data revealed that the ground transmitted carrier was being received by the onboard system at a signal strength of 27.5 microvolts from lift-off to 00:07:03. The ground-recorded telemetry readout correlates well with the onboard recorded data. This delay is considered to have been a function of the ground remoting equipment and was not detrimental to command control during the launch phase. Investigations are continuing to determine the cause of this delay. The command control handover plan was updated one time during the mission. This change compensated for the slight variance in the orbital trajectory over the 22 orbital passes and was sent to the Coastal Sentry Quebec (CSQ) ship for the reentry phase. All other times were nominal. A total of 19 functions was transmitted from the command stations. All of these functions were received onboard the spacecraft with the exception of one telemetry "on" function from Muchea (MUG) and the clock change from the CSQ. The telemetry "on" command from MUG was not received because it was transmitted when the spacecraft was out of range of the 600-watt ground transmitter. The clock change from the CSQ was not received because the command tone was also sent before the spacecraft was within range of the ground transmitter. The frequency monitor aircraft which was stationed in the Pacific reported through the CSQ that they did not attempt any transmissions on the command frequency during the orbital passes monitored. The following ground system malfunctions were experienced: 1. The Bermuda high-power transmitter came on with a 3-6-kw output but did not come up to full power and failed over to low power at approximately 00:06:16. This failover did not interrupt command control during this pass. Beam voltage was low and was corrected in time to support the next pass with full 10 kw-power output.

"Vailover is defined as failure of the primary system, accompanied by automatic switching to standby system.

8 -16
2. The RKV had an intermittent problem in the beam power supply of the backup power amplifier, and at 09:24:47 it was reported as being inoperative for the remainder of the mission. The prime transmitter was used to support the remainder of the mission. 3. At BDA the C-band beacon "on" command was on before the command carrier came up at 22:08:00, giving a code fault. The code fault was released after the command system was brought up manually. 4. Guaymas (GYM) had an autotransformer failure in the standby transmitter at 25:16:47, and the system was reported as operative at 27:13:47. 8.2.2.2 Spacecraft command system: The spacecraft had only one command receiver onboard during the MA-9 mission. The threshold level was intended to be set between 2.5 and 3 microvolts; however, the receiver was capable of and did receive command functions at a level of approximately 5-microvolt. The saturation value of the receiver was 27-5 microvolts. The system operated normally with the exception of spurious command carrier reception at 03:35:00 to 03:38:00, 11:24:00 to 11:27:00, and 27:10:40 to 27:13:20. During the time period of 27:10:40 to 27:13:20, eight functions, having a duration of approximately 2 seconds each, were recorded on the onboard recorder. These functions have yet to be identified; however, they were of such a nature that they did not affect the mission. An investigation is in progress to determine the exact cause of these recorded events. The preliminary results tend to show that these signals were generated outside the spacecraft and were not caused by internal EF beat harmonics. The effect of antenna orientation angle during drifting flight was noticeable, as it had been during the MA-8 mission. However, the signal strengths received were much better than had been anticipated. The onboard system was capable of and did receive functions whenever they were transmitted within range of the ground transmitters. 8.2.3 Eadar tracking performance.- During the countdown on May l4, 1963, the radar at Bermuda failed to pass the CADFISS slew tests. Digital data were intermittently of poor quality in both the azimuth and range channels. Efforts to locate the trouble were ineffective, and the quality of the data gradually decreased. At T-15 minutes, the range data error exceeded the tolerable limits, and at T-13 minutes the mission

CONFIDENTIAL

Page

8-17

was postponed. Subsequent trouble shooting revealed a faulty preamplifier in the azimuth digital data channel and a faulty shift register in the range digital data channel. The simultaneous failure of both components complicated the failure analysis. The radar was repaired at 2:00 p.m. e.s.t. on May l4, 1963. On launch day there were no radar problems, and the C- and S-band beacon checks prior to launch indicated no beacon problems. The network C-band radars tracked approximately 10 percent of the total mission time, which is 80 percent of the total time that the C-band beacon was turned on. The network S-band radars tracked 1.7 percent of the total mission time, which is 36 percent of the total time that the S-band beacon was turned on. The amount of radar data furnished to the Goddard computers was of sufficient quality and quantity to update the trajectories, and it was determined that the orbital parameters did not decay an appreciable amount. Initial tracking reports indicated that the C-band beacon was not as good as it had been on previous missions because of the heavier than usual modulation on the beacon replies. The heavy modulation experienced by the MCC and BDA radars during launch seemed to lessen as the mission progressed. In addition to the normal Mercury Network radar sites, the following sites were used for the MA-9 mission: Ascension Island, East Island, Puerto Rico, and the radar ships Twin Falls Victory and Range Tracker. Radar tracking data for all sites are tabulated in tables 8.2.3-1 and 8.2.3-2. 8.2.4 Ground telemetry system performance.- The telemetry coverage for the MA-9 mission was excellent as shown in table 8.2.4-1. There were no major ground system failures, although some coverage was lost because of the manual switching procedure used onboard the spacecraft. In general, any deviation from nominal coverage can be attributed to spacecraft attitude or to the transmitter being turned off. The telemetry relay circuits from Antigua, California, Bermuda, and Ascension were satisfactory in all respects. During all passes over these stations when telemetry antennas were radiating, data were remoted to the MCC. During the third orbital pass, the telemetry was switched to the high-frequency link prior to the spacecraft's passing over Hawaii and remained on until it was over the California site, at which time telemetry was switched back to the low-frequency link. At all other times, the telemetry remained on low frequency. No telemetry system anomalies were noted during this period.

Page 8 - 18

CONFIDENTIAL

In general, the performance of the acquisition-aid systems at all stations was satisfactory and comparable to that of previous missions. Low-angle elevation tracking, "below approximately 15% was accomplished manually because of multipath conditions at most stations. The only major acquisition-aid problem experienced during the mission was on the CSQ where failure of the elevation antenna drive

system occurred prior to the 6th orbital pass. However, the
antenna was positioned manually from the 6th through the 8th passes, and the malfunction in the drive system was corrected in time for acquisition in the 9~th pass. 8.2.5 Air-to-ground communications.- During the MA-9 mission, the air-to-ground communications were of good quality. The UHF system was used as the primary communications system except for the scheduled HF checks. During periods of communication, UHF coverage varied only slightly from predicted acquisition and loss times because of the nominal orbital trajectory. As expected, air-to-ground communications could not be established during the communications blackout period. An Instrumentation Support Instruction was transmitted to the network outlining the use of the UHF squelch circuit as defined in the network documentation. A premission checkout and the mission results indicate that proper use of the squelch circuit eliminates background noise from open UHF receivers during periods of silence. This change also resulted in a reduction of noise level on the Goddard circuit during air-to-ground transmissions. The results of the ground HF antenna test, in which a vertically polarized antenna replaced the normally used horizontally polarized two-element beam, are inconclusive at this time. The Kano station reported that the signal strength received was lower when the vertically polarized antenna was used than when the horizontally polarized antenna was used. Texas reported higher signal strengths when the vertically polarized antenna was used during the second period of spacecraft contact. Since these reports are conflicting, analysis of the test results is continuing. Relay aircraft in the Atlantic Ocean area reported good UHF reception from the spacecraft and good relay transmissions to MCC on the 2nd, 3rd, and 17th orbital passes. A relay attempt on the l6th pass was unsuccessful because of a severe thunderstorm in the vicinity of the relay aircraft. Communications from the MCC to the spacecraft through the relay aircraft were not attempted on the 2nd pass, and they were unsuccessful on the 3rd pass because the spacecraft had passed out of range. However, they were successful on the 17th pass. Ascension and

8-19
Antigua Islands in the Atlantic were also available for relaying communications between the spacecraft and the MCC. Relay through Ascension was successfully accomplished for a period of approximately 6 minutes during the 3rd orbital pass. The Antigua voice relay was not used during the mission. In the Pacific Ocean area, communications were successfully relayed from Hawaii through Kwajalein and ¥ake Islands on passes 3 and 19, respectively. A voice-operated relay from the MCC through the Range Tracker was attempted on the 20th orbital pass. However, this attempt was unsuccessful because the transmission was made on the MCC/HAW remote air-ground position instead of the Goddard Conference Loop. This error apparently placed a 1700-cps tone on the circuit to the Range Tracker and resulted in keeping the auto-voice relay continuously closed; however, several transmissions from the astronaut were received in the MCC. Another attempt to use the relay on the 22nd pass was ineffective. As in the MA-8 mission, satisfactory communications were established in the primary landing area between the spacecraft and Hawaii using relay aircraft. Table 8.2.5-1 summarizes the air-to-ground communications coverage.

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Page 8 - 2 1

TABLE 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass) 10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California, and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas, and Coastal Sentry Quebec, 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier Station
On, g.e.t

Off, g.e.t.

+10 [iv carrier coverage above line of sight, percent

Mercury Control Center

Launch

0:40 00:5 (00:7 0:40) 0:60 00:0 (00:0 0:60) 00:12:00 (01:0 0:20) 00:59:00 (00:59:00) 01:30:30 (01:33:1^) 0:30 13:0 (01:30:00) 01:38:00 (01:38:00) 01:45:00 (14:0 0:50)

100 100
52 86
Mo radiation

Mercury Control Center (San Salvador) Bermuda

00:04:05 (00:7 0:40) 00:05:58 (00:6 0:61) 00:45:00 (00:45:00)

Muchea

California Guaymas ) Guaymas

(backup to

01:23:00 (12:4 0:21) 0:00 12:0 (01:20:00) 01:33:00 (01:33:02) 01:38:00 (13:0 0:80) 02:15:00 (21:0 0:50) 02:45:00 (02:45:00) 02:56:00 (02:53:49) 03:04:00 (30:0 0:40) 03:06:00 (03:06:02)

85
100

Mercury Control Center

Bermuda

97

Muchea

02 : 32 : 00 (02:32:50)

95
100

Hawaii

02:56:00 (02:56:00) 03:04:00 (03:04:49) 0:60 30:0 (03:06:00) 03:12:00 (03:11:50)

California

93
30 91

Guaymas

Mercury Control Center

xhe times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parentheses are planned. Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier ON/OFF times are as noted.

- 22

TABtE 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Continued Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass) 10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California, and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas, and Coastal Sentry Quebec, 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier Station On, g.e.t. Bermuda 03:12:00 (03:12:03) 03:54:00 (03:54:00) 04:15:00 (41:0 0:50) 04:30:00 (04:27:27) 0:60 43:0 (04:36:00) 04:40:00 (04:40:02) 0:54 44:5 (Ok-.h-y-.k8) Off, g.e.t. 03:18:00 (31:0 0:80) 04:05:00 (Ok: 05:00) 04:30:00 (04:30:00)
Ok : 36: 00 (04:40:12)

+10 p,v carrier coverage atove line of sight, percent

100

t Muchea
Hawaii California Guaymas Mercury Control Center San Salvador Grand Turk Island Hawaii California Guaymas Mercury Control Center Hawaii13

90 69 84
100 100 100

04:40:00 (04:40:00) 04:45:45 (44:8 0:54) 0:70 44:0 (04:47:02) 04:50:30 (04:50:33) 06:03:00 (06:03:00) 06:09:00 (06:11:11) 06:14:15 (06:14:00) 06:19:30 (06:19:29) 07:35:00 (07:35:00)

o4:47:oo
(4:47:03)
05=56:00 (05:55=00) 06:03:00 (06:00:11) 06:09:00 (06:09:00)

97
100 100 100 100

06:14:15 (61:6 0:41)
07:30:00 (07:30:00)

77

The times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parentheses are planned. Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier OH/OFF times are as noted.

counsel

Page 8 - 2 3
TABLE 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Continued Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna ( s pass) 1t 10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California, and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas, and Coastal Sentry Quebec, 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier Station On, g.e.t. Off, g.e.t.

+10 p,v carrier coverage above line of sight, percent

California13

07:37:00 (73:8 0:42) 07:42:30 (74:0 0:23)

07:42:30 (07:44:34) 07:48:00 (07:48:00) 08:54:30 (09:00:40)
09:10:30 (91:0 0:03) 10.28:00 (10:30:21) 10:45:00 (04:0 1:50) 12:02:00 (12:03:46) 12:17:00 (21:0 1:70) 12:33:00 (12:34:06)

82

Guaymas

74 37 96 81 77 88 50 31 97

Coastal Sentry Quebec

08:45:00
(84:0 0:34) 0:20 90:0 (90:0 0:20) 10:18:00 (01:3 1:75) 10:35:00 (10:35:00) 11:53:00 (11:50:36) 1:00 21:0 (21:0 1:00) 12:23:00 (22:7 1:04)

Hawaii

Coastal Sentry Quebec

Hawaii

Coastal Sentry Quebec

Hawaii13

Rose Knot Victor

Coastal Sentry Quebec

13:25:00 (13:23:30) 13:55:00 (13:53:47)
15:00:00 (14:57:24) 15:30:00 (52:7 1:74)

13:36:00 (13:37:42)
14:07:00 (40:5 1:74) 15:09:00 (15:10:53) 15:40:00 (15:41:03)

Rose Knot Victor

100
79 93

Coastal Sentry Quebec

Rose Knot Victor

T?he times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parentheses are planned. Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier ON/OFF times are as noted.

*

Page 8 - 2 4

TABLE 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Continued Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass) 10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California, and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas, and Coastal Sentry Quebec, 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier Station On, g.e.t. Off, g.e.t.

+10 |_LV carrier coverage above line of sight, percent

Coastal Sentry Quebec Rose Knot Victor

(16:28:47) 17:04:00 (70:? 1:14) 18:38:00 (18:34:47) 20:12:00 (00:7 2:84) 20:30:00 (20:30:02) 21:18:00 (11:0 2:80) 22:02:00 (22:02:01) 22:08:00 (20:0 2:80) 22:50:00 (22:50:00) 23:30:00 (23:30:00) 23:35:00 (23:35:01) 23:40:45 (23:40:45)

(l6:42:0j) 17:14:00 (17:14:42)
18:48:00 (84:4 1:84) 20:21:00 (20:21:58) 20:35:30 (20:35:34) 21:27:00 (21:27:00) 22:08:00 (22:08:00) 22:13:00 (22:13:00) 23:00:00 (30:0 2:00) 23:35:00 (23:35:00) 23:40:45 (23:40:46) 23:46:45 (23:46:00) 24:34:00 (24:34:00)

100
92

Rose Knot Victor

Rose Knot Victor

95

Grand Turk Island

57 76 71
100

Muchea

Mercury Control Center

Bermuda

Muchea

78 62 54 81 69

Guaymas

Mercury Control Center

Bermuda

Muchea

24:24:00
(42:0 2:40)

The times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parentheses are planned. Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier ON/OFF times are as noted.

Page 8 - 2 5

TABLE 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Continued Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass) 10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California, and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas, _and Coastal Sentry Quebec, 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier Station On, g.e.t. Off, g.e.t.

+10 n,v carrier coverage above line of sight, percent

1
California Guaymas ) (backup to 2:00 50:0 (50:0 2:00) 25:00:00 (50:0 2:00) 25:10:00 (25:10:02) 25:14:00 (25:14:00) 25:57:00 (55:0 2:70) 2:30 62:0 (26:23:00) 26:32:00 (26:32:04) 26:39:00 (26:39=00) 26:43:00 (26:43:02) 2:80 64:0 (64:0 2:80) 27:30:00 (27:30:00) 27:56:00 (27:56:00) 2:50 80:0 (28:05:15) 25:07:00 (25:06:47) 25:10:00 (25:10:00) 25:14:00 (25:14:00) 25:20:00 (25:20:00) 26:07:00 (26:07:00) 2:20 63:0 (26:32:00) 26:39:00 (26:39:02) 26:43:00 (64:0 2:30) 2:80 64:0 (64:0 2:80) 26:53:00 (26:53:00) 27:40:00 (27:40:00) 28:05:00 (28:05:00) 28:12:00 (28:12:14)

Guaymas
Mercury Control Center

95
55 86 88
100

Bermuda

Muchea
Hawaii

California

56

Guaymas

64 ^5
100 100

Mercury Control Center

Bermuda

Muchea

Hawaii

97
73

California

T?he times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parenthese are planned. Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier OH/OFF times are as noted.

Page 8 - 2 6

TABI£ 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Concluded Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass) 10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California, and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas, and Coastal sentry Quebec* 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier Station On, g.e.t. Off, g.e.t.

+10 u.v carrier coverage above line of sight, percent

Guaymas

28:12:00 (28:12:00) 28:16:30 (28:16:32) 29:30:00 (29:30:00) 29:38:00 (29:38:00)

28:16:30 (28:16:30) 28:23:00 (28:23:00) 29:38:00 (29:38:00) 29:44:30 (29:44:30) 29:50:00 (29:50:00) (30:59:^3)
31 : 11 : 00 (31:11:00)

57 92 78 66 78 49 97 25 70 88 84 91

Mercury Control Center

Hawaii

California

Guaymas

2:):0 9143 (9143) 2:(:0
(04:7 3:84) 31:05:00 (31:05:00) 31:13:00 (31:13:00) 31:15:00 (31:15:30) 32:22:00 (32:19:00) 32:38:00 (32:38:00) 35:55:00 (33:51:30) 34:11:00

Coastal Sentry Quebec

. .b Hawaii

California

(31: 15 -AT)
31:22:00 (31:22:00) 32:30:'00 (32:32:19) 32:46:00 (32:46:00) 34:03:00 (34:05:30) 34:20:00

31: 19 :~00

Guaymas

Coastal Sentry Quebec

Hawaii

Coastal Sentry Quebec

Hawaii (backup for Coastal Sentry Quebec reentry )

times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parentheses are planned. Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier ON/OFF times are as noted.

Page 8 - 2 7
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rH ^li >2 0) CO r H - P f > C O

a O O
rH >5 CU SH-P
CO -H

r? -P fl

O CO O CO
rH Tj

(U 02
CJ

CO
<L>

p l f i H O )
O C U C O r C l C J

^S
C D r C !

CL>
C O

-H > CO

S

r H O C Q O CU ^

S

S

fnO CU

S

O ^

O
^ O

h v 3 S 3 S S
M -P

CD b
ffl

CO <D A
pf

H CD

rH C^

K

^3 s

CD g

S

CQ rs CO C3? o o

-P CU

Page 8 - 2 8

•CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 8.2.3-1.- COMPUTER READOUT OF RADAR TRACKING DATA

Station

Pass no.

Lines of data Total Invalid Garbled

Maximum elevation, deg

1 a Bermuda, Bermuda Canary Islands Canary Islands Muchea
Woomera White Sands Eglin AFB East Island Mercury Control Center Bermuda Hawaii California White Sands Eglin AFB Mercury Control Center San Salvador East Island Bermuda Ascension Rose Knot Victor Hawaii Woomera Mercury Control Center East Island San Salvador Bermuda Muchea Woomera Eglin AFB

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3

7^

18

7k 61
62

17
3 3 11
38 9 33
2

0 0 1 0

85
62

1
0 0 0 0 0 2

67-5 67-5 72.1 72.1

64.4 79-2
15.4

36 70
2

67 77 50
42

25 52 28

44.9 .7 18.2 96.0 25.0 36.5 80.9 36.6
37-2 84.4 47.7 2.8 25.0 59-0 71.7
70.2

4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3

3 3
1* k 4 4 4

^5 73 45 15 56 47 73
26

7 14
10 32 0 1

4T 13

7

7 14
15 15 15 15 15 15 15

49
58 47 15 10 64 74 66 59

18

0

33 25 0

8.8 6.9
2.0

3 17
2 29

14. 3
61.2

49.4
25.2

37

FPS-16

Verlort

Page

8-29

TABLE 8.2.3-1.- COMPUTER READOUT OF RADAR TRACKING DATA - Concluded

Station

Pas s no .

Lines of data Total Invalid Garbled

Maximum elevation, deg

Mercury Control Center Bermuda Hawaii California White Sands Eglin AFB Mercury Control Center San Salvador East Island Bermuda Rose Knot Victor Rose Knot Victor Hawaii Rose Knot Victor

16 16

18 18 18 18

€k 63
30 33

16
24 2k

1*0

17 1
12 12 1 0 0

0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

65.0 76.5 21.1 27.6 70.2 28.0 27-3 56.9

19 19 19 19
20 21 21 22

68 31 kl 8 39 29
28

33-0 2-3 59-8 48.5 9-1
24.1

1 0

37
20

18 14

CONFIDENTIAL ..»
_

8 - 30
TABLE 8.2.3-2.- RADAR TRACKING PERIODS

Station

Duration of signal
Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t.

C-"band
Mercury Control Center

00:00:00 0:55 12:4 04:43:36 22:05:59 28:17:45 00:00:52 Oil-: 114:00
28:18:47

00:06:10 01:itO:07 Oi4-:^7:32 22:09:13 28:23:21 00:05:08 04:Vf:V7 28:23:30 00:06:^7 22:10:1+3 28:24:28

Grand Bahama Island

San Salvador

00:02:00 22:09:39 28:18:58

East Island

04:U6:06
22:07:25 28:21:50

0:1^ 45:
22:09:46 28:24:30 01:40:20 04:48:07 22:08:35 22:10:49 23:44:11 05:04:58 05:06:35 00:09:55 0:01 14:8 04:49:10 22:12:51 23:44:51 24:20:27 28:23:41 01:02:42 21:29:43 23:03=31

Twin Falls Victory

0:80 13:5 0 5 ^ ^ : 0 22:06:59 22:10:09 23:^0:33

Ascension

Olf:59:26 05:05:lU 00:03:25 01:37:38 Ol4-:l|^:39 22:06:^2 23:37:^5 2^:20:15 28:20:30 00:56:16 21:25:12 22:57:2^

Bermuda

Woomera

TABLE 8.2.3-2.- RADAR TRACKING PERIODS - Concluded

Station

Acquisition, g.e.t. C-band

Duration of signal Loss, g.e.t.

Rose Knot Victor

10:33:28 31:01:44 32:35:10 34:09:51
04:23:40 05:57=17 10:37:17 27:58:14 31:06:20 32:40:02 01:27:05 04:29:06 28:ll:lU

10:36:29 31:04:44 32:37:54 34:10:33 04:28:36 06:01:27 10:43:23 28:04:22 31:10:16 32:45:37 01:31:05 04:34:09 28:13:17
01:33:22 04:41:21 23:37:03 26:40:42 28:16:20 01:38:54 04:4-5:57 23:40:16 28:21:25

Hawaii

California

White Sands

01:29:59 04:37:19 23:34:1*4
26:40:22 28:11:59

Eglin APE

0:40 13:1
04:39:21 23:37:28 28:15:16
S-band

Bermuda Canary Islands

00:04:11 00:15:47 22:19:41 00:49:45 22:53:27

00:09:57 00:21:35 22:23:29 00:58:07 23:00:44

Muchea

...

CONFIDENTIAL •* -.

Page 8 - 3 2

TABLE 8.2.4-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE

Duration of signal Coverage., percent

Acquisition, g. e.t.

Loss, g. e. t. Mercury Control Center

0 01:33:22 03:06:57 Ok: kO: 18 06:15:06 22:04:15 23:36:5? 25:09:20 26: 42: 45 28:16:10 29:50:37

00: 07: k2 01: 40: 42 03:14:15 Ok: 47: 16 06:20:00 22:10:37 23:44:21 25:16:27 26:50:51 28:23:10 29:55:05
Grand Bahama Island

90

95 95 95 95 95 90 95 95 95 95

0:11 00:4
01:34:15 03:08:00 04:41:30 06:15:20 22:03:50 23:37:00 25:10:30 26:44:30 28:17:30 29:51:50

00:06:44
0:01 14:5 0:41 31:3 04:45:50 0:03 62:0

22:10:10

23:43:05
25:16:45

26:50:30 28:23:15 29:55:50

98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98

* -ii "r ,

Page 8 - 3 3 TABLE 8.2.4-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal Coverage , percent

Acquisition, g. e.t.

Loss, g. e.t. Grand Turk Island

00:02:30

01:37:04
03:10:12 04:43:00 06:17:08 20:31:10
22:04:09 23=38:45 25:13:0?

00: 07: 42 01:41:10 03:15:06 04:50:50 06:23:10 20:37=30
22:11:04

90
100 100

23=43:43
25:17:12

95 95 98 95 95
100

26:46:08 28:18:55 29:52=03

26:52:10
28:23:12 29: 58: 21

95 98 95

Bermuda

00:03:12 01:36:41 03:10:05 04: 44: 15 20:35:38 22:06:31 23:39:36 25:12:51 26:46:12 28:20:26

00:10:23 01:43:56 03:15:09 04:49:15
20:38:40 22:13:18 23:46:41

95 99

25:20:06 26:53=12 28:23:14

99 99 95 99 99 99 99 95

OOMTDDMIAfc

TABLE 8. 2. 4-1. - TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal Acquisition, g. e.t. Coverage ^ percent Loss, g. e.t. Canary Islands 0:41 01:1 00:21:37
100 98 100 100 100 100 100 100

01:47:52 17=37:14 19:09:54
20:44:04

01: 54: 27
17:43 = 30 19:17:02 20:50:24 22:24:00 23:57:42 25=30=33

22: 17:34
23:50:39 25:24:21

Kano

00:21:09 0:44 15:9 14:33:24 16:07:13 22:26:26 23=57:25 25:31:15

00:28:29 02:01:30 14:40:23 16:13:13 22:28:21

98 97

98

98
94 98 98

24: 04: 42
25:37:20

OONnDDPiTIAL1

Page 8 - 35

TABLE 8. 2. 4-1. - TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal

Acquisition, g. e.t.

Coverage , percent Loss, g. e.t.

Zanzibar

00:29:59 02:04:02 10:00:02 11:52:56 22:35:2? 23=53:55 25:40:42 33: 32: 42

00:39:17 02:11:12 10: Ok: 04 11:38:05 22: 38: 42 24:02:02 25:46:52 33=39:32

96 90 88 89 95 97 96 97

Muchea 00:49:19 02:22:52 03:58:12 21:19:40 22:52:12 24:25:30 25:58:55 27:33:52

00:58:11 02:31:40 04:04:27 21:27:11 23:00:50 24:35:12 26:07=37 27:40:06

96 97 97 97 94 97 98 98

COMriDDWTIAL

Page 8 - 3 6

TABLE 8.2.4-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal Coverage} percent Acquisition, g. e.t.

Loss, g. e.t.
Canton Island

01:09:25 02:43:10 12:16:15 13:50:14 24:11-5:25 26:19:21

01:l6:4l 02:49:45 12:24:06 13:57:03 24:53:01 26:25=35

98 99 95 98 97 99

Coastal Sentry Quebec

08:52:00 1:13 02:0

08:54:57
10:28:22 12:01:46 13:35:42 15:08:03 16: 40: 03 32:30:19 34:03:30

11:55:0? 13:28:34 15:02:02 16:37:45 32:23:26 33:56:52

40 90 95
100

95 05 98 90

.COinTDDOTfAL

Page 8 - 3 7

TABLE 8.2.4-1.-- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal Coverage . percent Acquisition, g. e.t.

Loss, g. e.t.
Hawaii

02:49:17
04:22:01 05:57:20 07:30:51 09:04:02 10: 37: 03 12:11:18 26:24:50 27:57:57 29:35:02 31:07:00 32:39:3^

02:55:12 04:29:02 06: 01: 45 07:35:07 09:10:25 10:44:48 12:17:17 26:31:22 28:04:32 29:37:20

80 93 92
10

60
75 75 90 75 95 85 80

31:10:41
32:45:50

Rose Knot Victor

12:25:26 13:58:22 15:32:24 17:06:30 18:39:57 20:13:34

12:33:20 14: 07: 14 15: 40: 40 17:14:22 18:48:31 20:21:14

98 98 98 93 98 98

Page 8 - 3 8
TABLE 8.2.4-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal Coverage, percent Acquisition, g. e.t.

Loss, g.e.t.

Guaymas

01:25:57 03:00:23 04:34:22 06:07:33 07:40:59 23:30:23 25:02:42 26:36:28 28:10:03 29:43:18 31: 16: hO

01:33:27 03:06:47 04:40:27

80 89

06:14:17
07:47:20 23:35:37 25:09:31 26: 42: 47 28:16:17 29: 50: 03 31:22:40

96 96 94 94 97 95 96 98 94

California

0:64 12:? 02:58:37 04:31:07
06:04:02 07:38:17 25:02:32 26:34:27 28:06:27 29:39:07 31:13=47

01:31:07 03:05:07 04:38:32 06:11:03 07:44:17 25:07:32 26:41:02 28:14:25

29:47:17
31:19=47

95 98 97 95 98 98 99 98 97 98

COIUriDDNTIAtr

Page 8 - 3 9
TABLE 8.2.^-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal Coverage , percent Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t.

Texas
01:29:31 03:03:20 0^:36:52 01:36:25 03:09:55 0^:^3:55 06:17:30 0::7 7^0

70
100 100 100 100 100 100

06:10:08 07:50:00 22:02:05 23:32=22 25:05:^0 26:39:25 28:12:^5 29:^6:56 31=12:35

22:03:^7 23=39:1^ 25:12:3^ 26:^5:55 28:19:^2 29:53:00 31:23:20

98

100

90
100

50

Ascension

06:3^:39 12: 52: Ml14: 2k: ^3 16:02:13 27:01:^0

06:39:38 12: 58: 57 1^:33:21 16:02:17 27:09:39

99 99
99 99

99

COMriDDPiTIAL

Page

40

•CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 8.2.4-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Concluded

Duration of signal Acquisition, g. e. t.

Loss, g. e.t.

Coverage , percent

Antigua Island

05:12:53 04:45:22 06:19:52 18:59:40 20:32:10 22:07:00 26:48:50 28:21:20 29:55:50

03:13:30 04:52:30 06:25:24
19:05:20 20:39:30

22: 11: 40 26:54:35 28:23:15 30:00:29

98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98

Pretoria

02:05:50

06:44:25 27:12:37 31: 53: 20 33:26:46

03:10:37 06:52:20 27:18:26 32:02:07 33:33:00

98 98 98 98 98

fflFIDEMTIAL-

Page 8 - 4l TABLE 8.2.5-1.- AIR-GROIMD COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE

Orbital
Pass

Duration of signal Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t. Mercury Control Center

Average UHF signal

strength, microvolts

1 2

00:00:00

00:10:30
01 : 42 : 04

1000
40

3 4 5 15 16 17 18 19 20

01:33:53 03:OT:29 04:40:30 06:15:28 22:02:30 23:37:00 2:12 51:4 26:45:50 28:16:38 29:52:00

03:14:01 04:49:20
06:25:20 22:12:28

23:43:15 25:17:52 26:47:38
28:21:28 29:56:00

34 53 52 30 3T 50 100 80 48

Grand Bahama Island

1 2

00:00:27

00:07:17

(a)

3 4 5 15 16 IT 18 19
20

01:34:22 03:08:07

04:41:17 06: 16: 17
22:03:3T 23:36:22 25:11:32
26 : 45 : 42

01:40:12 03:13:07 04:48:12
0:91 61:7 22:09:04 23 : 43 : 07

25:16:32
26:47-:4l 28:21:25

28:l6:5T 29:50:07

29:55:06

Grand Turk Island

1 2

3 ^ 5 15 16 IT 18 19 20

00:03:18 01:37:13 03:10:10 04:43:18 06:17:13
22:04:18

00:06:48 01:41:03 03:13:48 04:49:13 06:20:03
22:10:43

(a)

23:39:18 25:13:03

23:43:38 25:16:43

26:46:48
28:18:48 29:52:48 Recordings not available

26:48:48
28:20:48

29:55:48

Page 8 - 4 2

TABLE 8.2.5-1.- AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE - Continued

Orbital Pass

Duration of signal Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t. Bermuda

Average UEF signal strength, microvolts

1
2

00:03:29

00:09:33

41

01:36:48
03:10:27 04:44:39 22:06:52

3 4 15 16 17 18 19

01 : 42 : 04 03:14:01 04:48:13
22:12:28

70
28
12
17-5

23:39:59
25:14:00 26:46:23 28:21:28

23:43:15
25:17:52 26:47:38 28:21:30 Canary Islands

80 4l 29
() *

1 2

00:15:10

01:48:35
22:18:24

15 16 IT

00:21:20 01:50:23 22:23:31

5.4 l 5-3
(c)

23:51:37 25:25:54

23:56:10
25:30:09 Kano

3-5

1 2

00:22:28

00:27:48

01:55:09
22:27:09

01:55:14
22:27:54

15 16 17

31 17-5 6
24

23:57:48
25:31:49

23:59:31 25:35:17
Muchea

11

1 2

00:51:07 02:24:17

00:56:57
02:30:47

60 38
(c)

3 14 15 16 17 18
b

03:58:37
21:22:27 22:53:12 24:27:36 26:00:39 27:33:23 Wo contact

04:04:13
21:26:29 22:57:20

4o

25

24:33:13
26:07:14 27:40:00

60
50
22

'No record

Page 8 - 4 3
'TABLE 8.2.5-1.- AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE - Continued

Orbital Pass

Duration of signal Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t. Canton Island

Average UEF signal strength^ microvolts

1 2 9 10

01:09:25 02:43:11

01:16:42

13:44:37

15:18:40
24:45:22 2:91 61:4

16

02:49:49 13:52:40 15:25:32 24:53:03
26:25:40 Guaymas

22 20 (b) (b) 22

17
1 2

5

01:27:16

3 4 5 15
18 19
20

03:01:00 04:35:22 06:08:42

01:29:10 03:04:17 04:37:17 06:10:34

25

4o 25
30 15 12

07:4l:54
23:30:50 25:03:07
26:36:41 28:12:49

07:45:58
23:33:16 25:09:13
26:36:43

16 17

50
(c)
10

28:13:18
29:49:18

29:43:46 31:16:43

31:22:39
Zanz ibar

15 15

1 2 7

00:30:55
02:05:23

8 15 16 17
22

09:59:5^ 11:32:29 22:36:14 24:07:24 25:41:37 33:32:55

00:37:^5 02:19:53 10:03:37 11:36:02 22:37:49 24:14:04 25:42:43 33:38:47 Texas

32.2 13-5 18 55
21
26.9

19
(c)

2 3 1*

03:03:47 04:36:55

16

5

18

19

06:16:22 07:45:47 25:06:12 28:13:02 29:46:12
Wo contact

03:10:02 04:43:57 06:17:37 07:48:17 25:12:44 28:19:52 29:53:12

12 20

15 20 40
20

25

"No record

Page 8 - 44

EKTIAL

TABLE 8.2.5-1.- AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE - Concluded

Orbital Pass

Duration of signal Average UHF signal Acquisition, g.e.t. | Loss, g.e.t. strength, microvolts Coastal Sentry Quebec

5 6 1
20 21 22

07:17:20

(a)
08:5^:57 10:28:22 12:01:46 13:35:^2

08:51:37
10:21:30

(a)

8 9

11:55:01 13:28:34 30:50:46
32:22:31

33:56:5^

30:51:56 32:31:06 34:03:18
Rose Knot Victor

8"

12:25:47

12:33:32 Hawaii

18

2 3 4

02:51:47
04:22:12

02:52:17
04:25:12

34
110

5 6 8 17 18

7

05:58:37 07:31:25 09:0^:17 10:37:33 12:10:15
26:26:^-5 28:00:11

06:05:15 07:3^:50
09:09:52

7
22 29 51 37

10:43:40
12:14:20 26:26:54 28:01:47 29:36:42

19
20 21

29:33:^7 31:07:17
32:40:22

31:11:47 32:45:57 California

48 80 19 19 18

1 2

01:28:22

3 4 5 16 17 18 19
20

03:00:02 0^:33:16 06: 06: 00 07:^0:55 25 : 03 : 22 26:36:32 28:07:51
29:41:17 31:16:22 Recordings not available One contact only

01:29:22 03:05:02 04:37:02 0:14 61:7

20

16
24

07:44:0?
25:07:27 26:38:12 28:13:27

29:44:32 31:19:^5

25 14 15 14 39 3^
30

E ^ * H ~ 9.0 RECOVERY 9-1 Recovery Plans

Page

9-1

The areas where recovery ships and aircraft were positioned in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are shown in figure 9-l-l(a) and figure 9-l-l(b), respectively. Recovery capability was provided in areas A through F in the event that it became necessary to abort the mission during powered flight. Areas 2-1 through 21-1 were areas in which the spacecraft could have landed if the flight were terminated earlier than planned. These areas were spaced so that the spacecraft would pass over one of them approximately every 90 minutes, or about once per orbital pass. Area 22-1, which was the primary planned landing area for a nominal flight of 3^- hours and 20 minutes, was located approximately 70 nautical miles southeast of Midway Island. Recovery forces were deployed within these planned landing areas so" that recovery and assistance could be provided within 3 to 9 hours after spacecraft landing. This "access time" varied for the different areas and was based on the probability of a spacecraft landing within a given area and the planned deployment of recovery forces in that area. Selection of landing areas at spacecraft ground-track intersections permitted a unit to move from one area to another and thereby provide a recovery capability in several landing areas. A total of 23 ships and kk aircraft were employed in the MA-9 recovery operation, of which 12 ships and 26 aircraft were in the Atlantic landing areas and 11 ships and 18 aircraft were in the Pacific. Table 9-1-1 indicates the number of ships and aircraft on station at the various landing areas, their movements from one area to another, and the access time for each area. Additional search aircraft were available as back-ups to the aircraft on station. Also, helicopters, amphibious surface vehicles, and small boats were positioned for recovery support near the launch complex. Contingency recovery aircraft and personnel were on alert status at staging bases around the world to provide support in the event a landing should occur at any place along the orbital ground track. These aircraft were equipped to locate the spacecraft and to provide emergency on-thescene assistance if required. A typical support unit at a staging base consisted of 2 or 3 long-range aircraft and pararescue personnel. The locations of these staging bases are as follows: Patrick Air Force Base, Florida Kindley Air Force Base, Bermuda Lajes Air Force Base, Azores Nouasseur, Morocco Wheelus Air Force Base, Libia Kano, Nigeria Aden Protectorate Singapore, Malaya Clark Air Force Base, Philippines Waha, Okinawa Tachikawa, Japan Andersen Air Force Base, Guam Perth, Australia Townsville, Australia

COMF1DEMTML

Page

9-2

Nairobi, Kenya Salisbury, Rhodesia Mauritius Island Ascension Island Trinidad Island Lima, Peru Galapagos Islands

Midway Island Kwajalein Island Wandi, Fiji Islands Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii Johnston Island Papeete, Tahiti San Diego, California

9-2

Recovery Operations

All recovery forces were on station at launch time and moved to planned positions as the mission progressed. Weather conditions were favorable for spacecraft location and retrieval in all planned and contingency areas throughout the mission. A communications network linked the deployed recovery forces to the recovery room of the Mercury Control Center at Cape Canaveral. Recovery communications were good throughout the entire operation and the recovery forces were informed of mission status during all phases of the flight. At an appropriate time, recovery units were informed that the flight would proceed to normal completion, and the expected retrorocket ignition time of 33:59:30 for landing area 22-1 was transmitted. At about 3 : 4 0 , 40:0 approximately l6 minutes prior to landing, recovery forces in area 22-1 were informed that the retrorockets had ignited normally and that the landing position was predicted to be 2T°23r North latitude and 176°30' West longitude. This information was transmitted as CALREP 1 (calculated landing position report) to the recovery forces from the Recovery Coordinator in the Mercury Control Center.. Recovery units in the area made contact with the descending spacecraft before any additional predicted landing positions, based on reentry tracking, were made available from network support. At about 34:12:00 the U.S.S. Kearsarge, the aircraft carrier positioned in the center of area 22-1, reported radar contact with the spacecraft at a slant range of l80 nautical miles and held contact until shortly before spacecraft landing. A "sonic boom," similar to that heard during the MA-8 reentry, was detected by recovery ship personnel. Personnel aboard the U. S. S. Kearsarge reported first visual contact with the spacecraft as it descended on the main parachute at an altitude of about 8,000 feet. (See fig. 9.2-1. ) The spacecraft landed at approximately 34:20:00 at 27°22.6' North latitude, 176°35.3' West longitude, which corresponded to a position approximately 4.4 nautical miles uprange of the recovery ship. Weather conditions in the recovery area are listed in section 10.3. Helicopters had been launched from the U.S. S. Kearsarge 15 minutes prior to spacecraft landing and were in an excellent position to deploy swimmers immediately. These swimmers quickly installed the auxiliary flotation collar around the spacecraft. Helicopter pilots and swimmers

1 M.J\Li

Page 9-3
in the landing area reported that the spacecraft, Immediately after landing, was floating on its side and gradually righted itself soon after main parachute release, which was estimated to have occurred about JO seconds after landing. Four minutes after landing, the astronaut reported that he would remain in the spacecraft and await retrieval "by the recovery ship. The antenna canister landed within 600 feet of the spacecraft but sank before the back-up swimmers could attempt retrieval. The ejected reserve parachute was retrieved by the swimmers. At about 5k:k6:OQ as the U. S. S. Kearsarge approached within 600 feet of the spacecraft, a motor whaleboat (shown in fig. 9.2-2) attached a lifting line to the recovery loop of the spacecraft. The spacecraft was then brought alongside the ship, lifted clear of the water, and placed on the no. 3 elevator of the recovery carrier at 3^t56:00. The explosive -actuated hatch was released, as shown in figure 9-2-3, by using the external release lanyard. At about 35sOlsOO> doctors began examining the astronaut and taking blood-pressure measurements. The astronaut egressed from the spacecraft kQ minutes after landing at 3 : 8 0 . (See fig. 9.2-^. ) He remained onboard the Kearsarge for a 50:0 period of examination, rest, and debriefing. There was no apparent damage to the spacecraft at the time of landing. The swimmers who attached the auxiliary flotation collar to the spacecraft reported that none of the heat -shield straps were broken and damage to the landing bag consisted of several small vertical tears. However, while the spacecraft was being lifted aboard the carrier, the UHF descent and recovery antenna was broken loose at the hinge point. In addition, when the explosive -actuated hatch was released, the spacecraft window was broken. Certain spacecraft onboard equipment was removed immediately after recovery and flown to Cape Canaveral. Two days after recovery, the spacecraft was transferred from the recovery ship to a truck at Pearl Harbor Naval Base. Prom there, it was taken to Hickam Air Force Base, loaded aboard a C-130 aircraft, and delivered to Cape Canaveral the next day. 9- 3 Recovery Aids Prior to spacecraft landing, telemetry aircraft established contact before and after communications blackout, and radar tracking aircraft maintained contact during most of the blackout period. All spacecraft visual and electronic recovery aids were reported to have been operating normally. Helicopters reported that the dye marker presented a brilliant green visual target which could be observed from a distance of 500 yards. The flashing light was reported as operating normally by on-scene observers.

page 9 -

ooinrroraiTLiL

The HF/DF- stations in Midway Island and San Francisco, California, received, spacecraft • HF transmissions after landing and determined the landing position within approximately JO nautical miles of the actual retrieval point, as shown in figure 9- 3-1The telemetry and search aircraft reported contact with and verified the operation of both spacecraft SARAH beacons. Acquisition ranges reported by these aircraft were as great as 270 nautical miles. Stations reporting fixes from the SOFAR -bomb detonation determined the landing position within 10 nautical miles. A quick fix was provided approximately 20 minutes after landing. Post-landing details of area 22-1 are illustrated in figure 9-3-1-

Page

9-5

TABLE 9.1-1. - RECOVERY SHIP AND AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT IN PLANNED LANDING AREAS

Areas

Access time, hours Atlantic

Ships

Aircraft Cb)

A B C D E F 2-1
16-1 and 17-1
3-1 and 18-1 15-1
1*4—1

6 9 6

3 6
6

3 3 3 3 3
5

13-1
Total

3 destroyers 4 destroyers and 1 carrier 1 destroyer 1 fleet oiler 1 fleet oiler 1 destroyer 1 destroyer, 1 carrier from area B Area 2-1 ships plus additional destroyer from B 2 destroyers from A 2 destroyers (l from B, 1 from C) 1 fleet oiler, 1 destroyer from D and E 1 destroyer from F 12 Pacific

2

3 1 1 1 1 3 9 k
2 2 1
26

9-1
10-1 11-1 3-2, 8-1, and 18-2 ^-1, 7-1, and 22-1 5-1 and 6-1 20-1 and 21-1

5 5 3 3 3

1 destroyer 1 destroyer 2 destroyers 2 destroyers 2 destroyers, 1 carrier 2 destroyers 11

2 2 2 2 2 12 2
18

3

Total

Carriers had recovery helicopters embarked. Numbers indicate maximum number of aircraft supporting a specific area at the calculated time of spacecraft landing in that area. In some cases aircraft supported more than one area.

COMTDDPiTIAL

Page 9-6

Ai

Page 9-7

CONriPEMTIAL

Page 9-9
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CONFIDENTIAL

Page 9-11

Page

9-12

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CQIiiriDCMTIAL

Page 10.0 10.1 APPENDIX A

10-1

Spacecraft History

Spacecraft 20 arrived at Cape Canaveral, Florida, on October 9> 1962. The preparation period for the spacecraft and the individual onboard systems and equipment was slightly different from that of previous spacecraft in that an integrated systems test was made prior to the normal individual system tests. This sequence of testing was possible because of the extensive individual spacecraft systems tests which had been performed by the spacecraft contractor. The number of work days in the hangar totaled 170 days, of which 59^ days were spent on formal tests. There were 6ll Mission Preparation Sheets (MPS), which authorize specifically required work, and 62^ Discrepancy Reports (DR), which describe items requiring rework. The spacecraft was transported to the launch site and mated with the launch vehicle on April 22, 19&3The major prelaunch tests, modifications, and events in the history of spacecraft 20 at Cape Canaveral are shown in chronological order in the following table:

Page

10-2

COffriDENTlAL

Number

Item Spacecraft arrived at Hangar S Voltage standing vave ratio (VSWR) check completed Integrated systems test completed Rate stabilization control system (RSCS) fuel selector valve replaced with a shut-off valve Cabin leak checks Reaction control system (RCS) tests Blood pressure measuring system (BPMS) controller and pneumograph installed Time -delay relay changed to extend HO jettison time from 60 seconds to 150 seconds

Completion date

1 2

Oct. 9, 1962
Oct. 15, 1962 Oct. 19, 1962

3

U

Oct. 26, 1962 Nov. 15, 1962 Nov. 19, 1962

5 6 7 8

Nov. 27, 1962

Nov. 28, 1962 Dec.
7, 1962

9
10

Coolant control valves (CCV) installed Environmental control system tests completed (ECS)

Dec. 17, 1962

11
12

Solenoid functional blip test in altitude chamber completed Alt itu.de -chamber test completed Wiring installed to enable simultaneous HF and UHF transmission after landing Balloon-drag experiment wiring and circuit test completed Six bolts added to the ablation heat shield More reliable type of relief valves installed in HO system

Jan. Jan.

7, 1963 8, 1963

13

Jan. 17, 1963 Jan. 18, 1963

111
15 16

Jan. 2h, 1963

Feb.

1, 1963

COMTDDHTIAl,

Page

10-3

Number

Item

Completion date
Feb.
2, 1963

17 18 19
20 21 22

Temperature survey wiring removed
Recovery light manual disable svitch installed HO low-pressure indicators installed

Feb. Feb.

3, 1963 5, 1963

Thruster "B" nut temperature wiring installed for T/M and recorder

Feb. 10, 1963 Feb. lU, 1963

Geiger counter calibration completed
CO adsorber assembly insulation installed

Feb. 16, 1963

23 2U

Coolant control valve flow rate tests were completed BPMS microdot cable was replaced with a seven- strand cable A later model pitch attitude gyro having a -3^-° pitch caging capability was installed Final inspection of TV circuitry Television system test completed Communications system radiation test completed Trial mating of spacecraft with adapter Main clamp-ring fitted Air deflector installed on cabin fan Urine bags and couch installed Primary simulated flight in hangar

Feb. 18, 1963

Feb. 20, 1963

25

Feb. 20, 1963 Feb. 28, 1963 Mar.
1, 1963

26

27
28

Mar.

k, 1963

29
30

Mar. Mar. Mar.

5, 1963 7, 1963 8, 1963

31
32
33

Mar. 16, 1963 Mar. 23, 1963

Page 10 -

IVFIDEPrTLIL

Number

Item Adapter transported to the launch site

Completion date
Mar. 26, 1963 Mar. 26, 1963 Mar. 27, 1963

35 36 37

Automatic stabilization and control system (ASCS) test completed Low-level fuel warning indicator system installed ECS system reworked to flight configuration. The automatic and reserve fuel tanks paralleled. Special test to evaluate inverter output voltages completed Prepad RCS test completed Special screen added to the negative pressure relief valve

Mar. 28, 1963 Apr. Apr.
h, 1963 6, 1963

38 39

Apr. 10, 1963 Apr. 1*4-, 1963 Apr. 15, 1963 Apr. 16, 1963 Apr. 17, 1963 Apr. 18, 1963 Apr. 22, 1963 Apr. 23, 1963 Apr. 2U, 1963 Apr. 25, 1963 Apr. 30, 1963

in

N -pressurized whip antenna installed Flight batteries installed Final heat-shield drop tests Final prepad cabin-leak check (i+50 cc/min) Alinement, weight, and balance completed Spacecraft transported to the launch site for mating Simulated flight no. 1 Electrical mate Simulated flight no. 2 (Joint FACT)

50

Urine transfer pump installed

KFIDEKTIAL
Number Item Simulated flight no. 2., joint FACT (repeated) RCS checks completed Launch simulation
Condensate trap installed in the suit circuit Simulated flight no. J One of the squibs in the retropackage explosive bolt disabled Launch postponed because of radar encoder problem at Bermuda site

Page

10-5

Completion date
May
1, 1963

51 52 53
5U

May
May

1, 1963
8, 1963

May

9, 1963

55 56 57 58

May 10, 1963

May 13, 1963
May 'Ik, 1963 May 15, 1963

Final launch countdown and lift-off

MFIDEPOIAL

10 - 6

• CONFIDENTIAL
10.2 Launch Procedure

The space-vehicle launch operations were planned about a 560-minute split countdown, with a scheduled 19-hour hold at T-390 minutes for fueling of the spacecraft reaction control system and servicing of pyrotechnic systems. To provide additional assurance that the projected launch time of 8:00 a.m. e.s.t. could be met, a scheduled 90-minute hold was established at T-l4o minutes. The second half of the split countdown was started at midnight on May 13, 1963- Because of a fuel-pump failure in the gantry diesel engine, a hold lasting 2 hours and 9 minutes was begun at T-60 minutes to repair this malfunction. The countdown was resumed, but at T-13 minutes, another hold was called to evaluate a malfunction in the C-band encoder at Bermuda-. The nature of this problem prompted a decision at 9:56 a.m. e.s.t. to postpone launch operations until this problem could be corrected. The flight was rescheduled and the second half of the split countdown was started at midnight on May lk, 1963. The countdown proceeded smoothly; and after a ^--minute hold at T-ll minutes, launch occurred at 8:0^-:13 a.m. e.s.t. on May 15, 19^3The following is a sequence of major events which occurred during the final countdown: Time, min T-390 T-l4o T-107 T-92 Start of second half of countdown Astronaut insertion Spacecraft hatch closure began Spacecraft hatch closure secured; shingle installation began Spacecraft shingle installation complete Service tower removal Lox pumping started Lox filling complete A ^--minute hold was called to evaluate an external KF interference problem with the guidance central rate station. Lift-off

T-82 T-62 T-35 T-24 T-ll

T-0

Page

10-7

10.3

Weather Conditions

Weather conditions in the area of the launch site vere completely satisfactory for operations several days prior to and on the days of the MA.-9 flight. However, there was a trough in the Atlantic Ocean near the Caribbean which was moving north and could have caused concern in some of the mid-Atlantic recovery areas had launch been postponed longer than a few days. In addition, a weather front was moving down the Atlantic seaboard that could have resulted in unsatisfactory launch conditions, but these conditions did not materialize. In the western Pacific Ocean, a tropical disturbance near the southern Philippine Islands did not intensify sufficiently to cause problems in the planned recovery area. Possible scattered light showers and cloud cover were the only items of concern for the Pacific recovery areas, and conditions were deemed satisfactory on the day of launch for normal recovery operations. During the 2 days of flight, exceptionally good weather conditions were prevalent around the world. High-pressure regions which were prevalent throughout the latitudes of the orbital ground track resulted in only slight cloud cover around the entire ground track and in excellent visibility for the astronaut from orbital altitudes. Weather observations in the launch area at 8:07 a.m. e.s.t., just after lift-off, were as follows: Wind direction, deg Wind velocity, knots Temperature, °F Relative humidity, percent Dew point, °F Visibility, miles Cloud coverage (Cirrus with haze aloft) Pressure, in. Hg 270 5 7^.8 J2 65 8 5/10 30.095

A plot of the launch-area wind direction and speed is shown in figure 10.3-1.

KriDEPFTIAL

Page 10 -

CONFIDENTIAL

The weather and sea conditions reported in the primary Pacific landing area by the Kearsarge at landing were as follows: Wind direction,, deg Wind velocity, knots Wave direction, deg Wave height (at 6 sec intervals), ft Swell direction, deg Swell height (at 9 sec intervals), ft Cloud cover (l,500 ft scattered; 10,000 ft scattered; high, broken) Relative humidity, percent Temperature, °F Sea temperature, °F 060 19 060 080

8/10 69 75 75

Wind shifted from 090° at 10 minutes prior to landing.

Page 10-9
10.h Flight Safety Review

Flight safety and mission review meetings were conducted to determine the flight worthiness of the MA-9 spacecraft and launch vehicle and to ascertain the readiness of all supporting elements for the MA-9 mission. 10.h.I Spacecraft. - As a result of the systems changes necessitated by the extended mission, flight safety review meetings were held after the completion of the RCS and ECS systems tests and after the primary simulated flight in the hangar. The meeting on the RCS system was held on November 29, 19^2, and, for that stage of checkout and preparation, the system was found to be capable of performing,' its intended mission. The meeting on the ECS system was held on February 5, 19&3, and no problems other than those already in the process of being resolved were noted. Again, for that stage of checkout and preparation, the system was found to be capable of performing it's mission. A review of the spacecraft systems following the primary simulated flight was held on April 9, 1963? arid all problems encountered were discussed and direction for corrective action was given. At the spacecraft flight safety review held on May 9, 196j, all systems were approved as ready for flight, pending the successful completion of the final simulated flight test, which was satisfactorily completed on May 10, 1963. Launch vehicle.- Several meetings were held to determine the status of the Atlas IJOD launch vehicle. The first meeting was conducted on April 22, 1963, to review the nature and the solutions of the problems in the flight control system that had caused the late delivery of the launch vehicle to the Atlantic Missile Range. Satisfactory resolution had been obtained on all problems. The regular launch-vehicle review meeting was held at 9'00 a.m. e.s.t. on May 11, 1963- The status of the launch-vehicle systems was reviewed and all systems were approved for flight, pending the resolution of a ground-equipment fuse anomaly. Subsequent testing revealed the anomaly to be an out-of-tolerance fuse, and this component was replaced. Mission.- The MA-9 mission review meeting was held on May 11, 1963The launch vehicle was listed in a no-go status because of the fuse problem mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The spacecraft was also determined to be in a no-go status pending a leak check on a pressure transducer in the reaction control system. In addition, trouble with Bermuda tracking was reported. All other elements of the flight were found to be ready.

10. U. 2

10.^-3

-CONFIDENTIAL

Page 10 - 10

GOFfriDDHTIAL

The X-l Day Flight Safety Reviev Board met on May 1J, 1963. This board was advised that the Launch-Vehicle Status Reviev Board had met earlier at 8:15 and had determined the Atlas 1JOD was ready for flight. In addition,, problems with the spacecraft and Bermuda tracking were reported as having been solved, and the Flight Safety Review Board approved both the MA-9 spacecraft and launch vehicle for flight.

10 10.5 Photographic Coverage
Photographic coverage, including quantity of instrumentation committed and data during the launch phase, which was obtained "by the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) is shown in table 10.5-1 and discussed in the following paragraphs. Additional coverage obtained by the recovery forces in the landing area is also described. Launch-phase photographic coverage was generally poor in quality because of sunlight and overcast haze conditions. However, photographic data were obtained through the time of launch-vehicle staging and were available for a detailed photographic evaluation had it been necessary. The photographic coverage discussed in the following sections is based on film available for evaluation during the postlaunch reporting period. 10.5-1 Metric film.- Metric film from and the results were tabulated not required for evaluation by since the powered-flight phase 16 cameras were processed, by the AMR. These data were the Manned Spacecraft Center, was normal.

10.5-2

Engineering; sequential film.- Engineering sequential coverage of the launch phase is shown in figure 10.5-2-1. This figure indicates the time interval for which the spacecraft, launch vehicle, and/or exhaust flame were visible to the tracking camera. Optimum camera coverage was obtained from lift-off through the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and adequate data would have been available had a malfunction occurred during this time. Although photographic coverage was obtained through launch-vehicle staging, coverage near the region of staging is considered marginal. At lower altitudes, coverage was primarily limited in quality by a low-level haze. At higher altitudes sun, haze, and image reduction caused by the increasing slant range restricted tracking capability and affected both the quality and the duration of tracking camera coverage. Fifteen films were reviewed, including l6-mm and 35-mm film from four fixed cameras and eleven tracking cameras. Fixed camera coverage with respect to exposure, focus, and film quality was good, with the exception of one item which faced into the sun and overexposed and one item which was grainy because of haze. Two fixed cameras indicated normal lox boil-off, umbilical disconnect, and umbilical door closure. The two other fixed cameras showed close-up views of spacecraft and launch-vehicle displacement through lift-off. The quality of the tracking camera coverage was generally good with respect to exposure, focus, and tracking but was poor in quality with respect to color, grain, and resolution. Five tracking cameras showed launch-vehicle ignition and lift-off. Ten tracking cameras indicated normal launchvehicle staging.

Page 10 - 12

10.5-3

Documentary film. - Documentary coverage used for engineering evaluation of the mission was provided "by eight l6-mm motionpicture films and numerous still photographs. Three films provided tracking coverage of lift-off from different locations near complex 12 and from a recovery vehicle positioned on the beach. Six aerial motion-picture films of the launch sequence were taken by aircraft in the launch area. Two films provided very good aerial photographic coverage with the exception of slight camera vibration and intermittent tracking. The remaining aerial films provided additional photographic coverage of the launch sequence but were poor in quality with respect to color, focus, and resolution. One motion-picture film of the recovery operation was- available for review. This film provided aerial and shipboard photographic coverage of the spacecraft descending on the main parachute, spacecraft landing in the water, pararescue personnel being dropped near the spacecraft, activities of pararescue team with the spacecraft in the water, spacecraft retrieval from the water by the recovery aircraft carrier, spacecraft preparation for astronaut egress, removal of the spacecraft hatch, astronaut egress from spacecraft, and retrieval of pararescue personnel from water. Photographs of personnel with the spacecraft below the main deck of the aircraft carrier were also obtained. Documentary coverage of the mission by still photography was very good. Numerous still photographs were available for review, in which prelaunch, launch, flight, recovery, and postflight operations were documented. Still photographs of prelaunch activities included views of astronaut preparation at Hangar S, insertion of the astronaut into the spacecraft, and securing for launch. Also included were prelaunch photographs of the spacecraft alone and mated with the launch vehicle. Still photographs taken during the flight provided views of the launch sequence from different locations, flight operations in Mercury Control Center, and the slow-scan TV pictures received from the spacecraft. Recovery photographic coverage showed views of the spacecraft on the main parachute, the spacecraft and pararescue personnel in the water before retrieval by the recovery carrier, spacecraft retrieval by the aircraft carrier, the spacecraft onboard the carrier after pick up, removal of the hatch, astronaut's egress, the spacecraft in close-ups after recovery, and astronaut activities after the medical examination. Engineering still photographs, showing close-up views of the spacecraft during postflight inspection at Cape Canaveral, were also available.

Page 10 - 13

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CONFIDENTIAL

10 10.6 Postf light Inspection Spacecraft 20, shown in figure 10.6-1, underwent the normal postflight inspection and conditioning procedure. A thorough visual inspection was made of the external and internal areas of the spacecraft in the "as received" condition. The immediate postflightinspection procedure included removal of the heat shield, landing bag, and conical and beryllium shingles for inspection of the pressure bulkhead and internal skin areas. A photographic record was made of the inspection process. A desalting wash-down, tank drainage, and flushing procedure, as applicable, was accomplished; and safeguards against deterioration were taken. The detailed inspection results of the individual spacecraft structural systems are discussed in the following paragraphs. 10.6.1 General.- The overall condition of the spacecraft structure was good. The outer pane of the spacecraft window was broken during actuation of the explosive hatch aboard the recovery ship. As on previous flights, there were drops of water on the inside of the outer pane of the spacecraft window. The exterior of the spacecraft showed the usual discoloration due to aerodynamic heating. There were numerous deposits of molten metal on both the conical and cylindrical portions of the spacecraft exterior. The deposits were in the areas above each of the three retropackage umbilicals and one of the spacecraft-adapter umbilicals, all of which failed to jettison from the spacecraft. Most of the deposits had the appearance of solder spots. There was also evidence of considerable aerodynamic heating in the area around where the still attached umbilicals were located. The coaxial antenna cable also did not separate from the spacecraft, although it had been severed by the coaxial cutter located beneath the shingle. The cable evidently was caught at the hole in the shingle, through which it passed and broke off, leaving about 6 inches of free cable remaining. Hydrogen peroxide was noted to be dripping very slowly from the spacecraft between stringers 15 and l6 on to the edge of the heat shield. Subsequent inspection showed that an RCS line beside stringer 15 had corroded through from the outside and was leaking hydrogen peroxide. Several RCS lines had "considerable amounts of corrosion on their outer surfaces; however, all RCS lines were exceptionally clean and free of corrosion on their inner surfaces.

COMJD:

Page 10 - 15 10.6.2 Structure.- The spacecraft experienced very little structural damage. Two cracks in the outer skin of the pressure vessel, one of which was 3^ inches long and the other 2 inches long, were noted in the area just to the right of the hatch. This damage most probably resulted from the explosive-hatch actuation which produced a warp in the hatch sill.
10.6.3 Ablation shield.- The ablation shield appeared to be intact. There were several minor circumferential cracks noted in ablation laminate, but they were less severe than the ones noted on the MA-8 heat shield. One of the heat-shield retaining lugs was broken off and another was bent. The ablation-shield bondline under the flotation weights had separated in places, but the bolts held the weights in place. Landing bag.- The landing bag was slit vertically in six places. The slits varied in length from 6 to 20 inches. In addition, there were numerous small tears and punctures near the top of the bag. All of the landing bag straps were intact, although they were twisted and kinked. Twisting and kinking probably occurred during postrecovery handling. Recovery compartment.- Wo damage was noted in the recovery compartment area except that the UHF descent and recovery antenna was broken loose at the hinge point. This damage occurred while the spacecraft was being lifted aboard the recovery ship. Main pressure bulkhead.- The main pressure bulkhead area sustained very little damage on landing. The postflight appearance of the honeycomb structure was not noticeably changed from that before the flight. The fiberglass shield had five scratches along the right X-axis and a dent in the center stiffening ring in the same location. The protector over the manual system selector valve was bent; and two dents, or creases, in a bead in the skin next to the valve indicated that the skin was pushed in during the landing. Also, there was a surface crack in a spot weld in this area. Spacecraft interior.- The interior of the spacecraft was in good condition. The astronaut's couch had been removed by the recovery forces for access to the area under the couch and it had been replaced without being bolted down. Approximately 0.28 pound of liquid was removed from under the couch by the recovery personnel, and approximately 0.39 pound of liquid was removed from the same area during

10.6.^4-

10.6.5

10.6.6

10.6.7

Page 10 - 16

postflight inspection at Cape Canaveral. A chemical analysis of this liquid to determine its source is in process. There was a considerable amount of paint chips throughout the interior of the spacecraft. These chips resulted from initiating the explosive-actuated hatch.

CONFIDE1

Page 10-17

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Page 1 1 - 1

APPENDIX B

1. 10

ACKNCMIiEDGEMENT

The Flight Evaluation Team for the MA-9 flight, upon whose analysis this report is "based, was composed as follows:

3.0 SPACE VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 3-1 Spacecraft Description C. Vaughn 3.2 Launch Vehicle Description L. DuGoff A. E. Franklin 14-.0 TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS D. M. E. P. Incerto Cassetti Hawkins McKaskill M. F. J. S. Apple McCreary Wells Yates

5.0 SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE 5.1 'Spacecraft Control System G. T. Sasseen R. Buckley T. Williams 5.2 Lift Support System F. Samonski D. Hughes J. Whalen 5-3 J. Billingham, M.D. D. Hampton F. Hettinger

Communications Systems W. R. Stelges

5.^ Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems S. T. Beddingfield

FIDENTIAL

11 - 2
5-5

COPTIC CMTIALi
Electrical and Sequential Systems M. A. Guidry J. D. Collner

5-6

Instrumentation System ¥. R. Durrett M. A. Wedding H. J. Ness

5-7

Heat Protection Systems J. Pavlosky

5.8

Scientific Experiments ¥. Armstrong J. McKee

6.0

LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE L. DuGoff M. Cassetti A. E. Franklin

7.0 ASTRONAUT ACTIVITIES 7-1 Aeromedical Analysis E. D. R. H. R. 7-2 P. McCutcheon, M.D. D. Catterson, M.D. A. Pollard, M.D. A. Minners, M.D. Hackworth

Astronaut Performance J. B. Jones J. J. Van Bockel R. D. Mercer T. ¥. Holloway R. B. Benson G. ¥. Harvey

7.3

Pilot's Flight Report L. G. Cooper, Jr.

8.0 FLIGHT CONTROL AND NETWORK PERFORMANCE 8.1 Flight Control Summary C. Kraft E. Kranz J. Hodge

HAL/"'

Page 8.2 Mercury Network Performance R. Holt T. Stuart
9.0 RECOVERY OPERATIONS

11-3

J. C. Stonesifer C. I. Tynan, Jr. 10.0 APPENDIX A 10. 1 Spacecraft History H. Shoaf 10.2 Launch Procedure D. Phillips 10.3 Weather Conditions R. Hegwood 10.h Flight Safety Reviews N. Vaughn 10. 5 Photographic Coverage F. Blanton 10.6 Postflight Inspection K. Christopher NOTE: Acknowledgement and gratitude are extended to the many typist, artists, and clerical help who assisted so admirably in the publication of this report.

ENTUL

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