752 PHIL.

344

[ G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015 ]

RODOLFO S. AGUILAR
vs.
EDNA G. SIASAT

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the August 30, 2006 Decision and December 20,
[1] [2]

2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229 affirming the August 17, 1999
[3]

Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 and denying
[4]

petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. [5]

Factual Antecedents

Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and without debts,
on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively.  Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein
subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries
of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject titles). [6]

In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City (Bacolod RTC) a civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat.  Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-9591
and assigned to Branch 49 of the Bacolod RTC, the Complaint alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole
[7]

surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were missing, and
thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed affidavits
of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June
22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second owner’s copy of Certificate of
Title No. T-25896, which respondent opposed; and that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent
presented the two missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles.  Petitioner thus prayed for mandatory
injunctive relief, in that respondent be ordered to surrender to him the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject
titles in her possession; and that damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.

In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses,
[8]

but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that
petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his
wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the
subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her
aunt.  By way of counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.

During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as their son.  To prove
filiation, he presented the following documents, among others:

1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School, Purok No. 2, Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Company (BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit “C” and submarkings), wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar
is petitioner’s parent;

2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit “F”), which indicated that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his
mother;
 3. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10, 1957 (Exhibit “G”), a public
instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with BMMC,
which bears his signature and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5,
1945, is his son and dependent;

4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC dated October 29, 1954 (Exhibit “L”),
indicating that petitioner is his son;

5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit “M”), where it is declared that the Aguilar
spouses are his parents; and

6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit “O”) addressed to a BMMC supervisor introducing petitioner as
Alfredo Aguilar’s son and recommending him for employment.

7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry to the effect that the
record of births during the period 1945 to 1946 were “all destroyed by nature,” hence no true copies of
the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could be issued as requested (Exhibit “Q”). [9]

Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-Aguilar (Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester
Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano), his aunt and sister of Alfredo Aguilar.  Abendan-Aguilar confirmed
petitioner’s identity, and she testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses and that during her
marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter in the Aguilar spouses’ conjugal home built on one of the subject
properties.  On the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she is the sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that
the Aguilar spouses have only one son – herein petitioner – who was born at BMMC; that after the death of the
Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not claim ownership of the subject properties because they
recognized petitioner as the Aguilar spouses’ sole child and heir; that petitioner was charged with murder,
convicted, imprisoned, and later on paroled; and that after he was discharged on parole, petitioner continued to
live with his mother Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar in one of the subject properties, and continues to live there with
his family.
[10]

For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired teacher; that she does not know
petitioner very well, but only heard his name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by
consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under
medication in a hospital until her death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s hospital and funeral expenses were
paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an affidavit to the effect that she had no
issue and that she is the sole heir to her husband Alfredo Aguilar’s estate; that she did not steal the subject
titles, but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that a prior planned sale of the
subject properties did not push through because when petitioner’s opinion thereto was solicited, he expressed
disagreement as to the agreed price. [11]

Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (Siasat-Nicavera), 74 years old, who
stated that the Aguilar spouses were married on June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not know petitioner, although she admitted that she knew a certain
“Rodolfo” whose nickname was “Mait”; that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses; and that Alfredo
Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-Pailano. [12]

Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (Exhibit “2”) announcing
among others that she and Alfredo have no issue, and that she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s estate.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing as follows:
 From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence attesting to the fact that
plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a legally adopted one was ever presented.  Neither was
a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming his biological relationship as a son to
the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar.  As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of
Candelaria S. Aguilar (Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and she have
no issue and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof that plaintiff
herein was never a son by consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses
Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.

This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this action to be
considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction and damages
prayed for.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with cost.

The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of legal basis.

SO ORDERED. [13]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.   Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, the appeal essentially
[14]

argued that petitioner is indeed the Aguilar spouses’ son; that under Article 172 of the Family Code, an [15]

admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned constitutes proof of filiation; that through the documentary evidence presented, petitioner has
shown that he is the legitimate biological son of the Aguilar spouses and the sole heir to their estate.   He
argued that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth as all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of [16]

the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed as shown by Exhibits “Q” to “Q-3”; for this reason, he
presented the foregoing documentary evidence to prove his relationship to the Aguilar spouses.  Petitioner
made particular reference to, among others, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”), arguing that the
same was made under oath and thus sufficient under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish that he is a
child and heir of the Aguilar spouses.  Finally, petitioner questioned the trial court’s reliance upon Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar’s affidavit (Exhibit “2”) attesting that she and Alfredo have no children and that she is the sole
heir to the estate of Alfredo, when such piece of evidence has been discarded by the trial court in a previous
Order dated April 1, 1998, stating thus:

Except for defendant’s Exhibit “2”, all other Exhibits, Exhibits “1”, “3”, “4” and “5”, together with
their submarkings, are all admitted in evidence. [17]

On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the trial court’s August 17, 1999 Decision,
pronouncing thus:

The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation with the deceased spouses
Aguilar deserve scant consideration by this Court.  The Elementary School Permanent Record of
plaintiff-appellant cannot be considered as proof of filiation.  As enunciated by the Supreme Court
in the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439:
“Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute
evidence of filiation.”

As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
WE hold that it cannot be considered as evidence of filiation.  As stated by the Supreme Court in
the case of Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360:

“A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation.  More so are the
entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the
amount thereof.”
 With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown that the parents of the former
are Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat Aguilar does not prove filiation.  The Highest Tribunal declared
that a marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of bride is not competent evidence of
filiation nor is a marriage contract recognition in a public instrument.

The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) and the
Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar (Exhibit “L”), allegedly tend to establish that
plaintiff-appellant has been and is presently known as Rodolfo Siasat Aguilar and he has been
bearing the surname of his alleged parents.

WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant’s argument.  Use of a family surname certainly does not
establish pedigree.

Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar are
concerned, WE cannot accept them as sufficient proof to establish and prove the filiation of
plaintiff-appellant to the deceased Aguilar spouses.  While the former is a public instrument and
the latter bears the signature of Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute clear and convincing
evidence to show filiation based on open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.  Filiation is a serious matter that must be resolved according to the requirements of the law.

All told, plaintiff-appellant’s evidence failed to hurdle the “high standard of proof” required for the
success of an action to establish one’s legitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions
regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.

Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased spouses Aguilar, thereby
negating his right to demand the delivery of the subject TCTs in his favor, this Court cannot grant
the writ of mandatory injunction being prayed for.

xxxx

In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and unmistakable right
that has been violated.  Neither had he shown permanent and urgent necessity for the issuance of
the writ.

With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court in denying the same.  Aside
from the fact that plaintiff-appellant failed to show his clear right over the subject parcels of land so
that he has not sustained any damage by reason of the withholding of the TCTs from him, there is
no clear testimony on the anguish or anxiety he allegedly suffered as a result thereof.  Well
entrenched in law and jurisprudence is the principle that the grant of moral damages is expressly
allowed by law in instances where proofs of the mental anguish, serious anxiety and moral shock
were shown.

ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is hereby DENIED.  The
impugned Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED. [18]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but in a December 20, 2011 Resolution, the CA held its ground. 
[19]

Hence, the present Petition.

Issues

In an August 28, 2013 Resolution, [20]

this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which raises the
following issues:

In issuing the assailed DECISION affirming in toto the Decision of RTC Branch 49, Bacolod City,
and the Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Honorable Court of
 Appeals committed reversible error [in] not taking into consideration petitioner’s Exhibit “G” (SSS
E-1 acknowledged and notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing
the petitioner as his son) as public document that satisfies the requirement of Article 172 of the
[Family] Code in the establishment of the legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his father, Alfredo
Aguilar.

The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with respect to the application of
Article 172 of the Family Code particularly [paragraph] 3 thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court relating to public document which is substantial enough
to merit consideration of this Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence and forestall future
litigation.
[21]

Petitioner’s Arguments

In his Petition and Reply seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and praying that
[22]

judgment be rendered ordering respondent to surrender the owner’s duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070, petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies
the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family
Code.  Petitioner contends that said SSS Form E-1 is a declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of
his status as the latter’s son; this recognition should be accorded more weight than the presumption of
legitimacy, since Article 172 itself declares that said evidence establishes legitimate filiation without need of
court action.  He adds that in contemplation of law, recognition in a public instrument such as the SSS Form E-
1 is the “highest form of recognition which partake (sic) of the nature of a complete act of recognition bestowed
upon” him as the son of the late Alfredo Aguilar; that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy
and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy; that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed
pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code; and that having proved his filiation, mandatory
[23]

injunction should issue, and an award of damages is in order.

Respondent’s Arguments

In her Comment and Memorandum, respondent simply echoes the pronouncements of the CA, adding that
[24] [25]

the Petition is a mere rehash of the CA appeal which has been passed upon succinctly by the appellate court.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition.

This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, has held that –

[26]

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.  The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.  In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents.  The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
 There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof
that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.  Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took
effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. [27]

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be concluded that petitioner – who
was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and [28]

before their respective deaths – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. 
[29]

As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies the requirement for proof
of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said
document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”

Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering the
period 1945-1946  of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the
introduction of other documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) – to
prove filiation.  It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it
is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public
instrument.

To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due
recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the Court has further held that:

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1)  Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and

2)  Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten
by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the “paramount consideration” in resolving
questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of
which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social

welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.”  Too, “(t)he State as parens
 patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.” (Emphasis supplied)
[30]

This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a copy of his Certificate of Live
Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was
destroyed.  He would not have had to go through the trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the
NSO copy would have sufficed.  This fact is not lost on petitioner; the Certification dated January 27, 1996
issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit “Q”) contained just such an advice for petitioner to proceed to
the Office of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth,
since for every registered birth in the country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said office.

As to petitioner’s argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally
attack his legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles
170 and 171 of the Family Code, the Court has held before that –

Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a
[31]

person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning
petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate
child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
[32]

Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses, then he is as well heir to
the latter’s estate.  Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s
estate, since succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line.
[33]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.  The August 30, 2006 Decision and December 20, 2011 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, as well as the August 17, 1999 Decision  of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 
Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner’s
duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070.

SO ORDERED.
506 Phil. 347

[ G.R. NO. 153798, September 02, 2005 ]

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES

vs.
ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA

DECISION
GARCIA, J.

In  this  petition  for  review  on  certiorari  under  Rule  45 of the  Rules  of Court, petitioner Belen Sagad
Angeles seeks to set aside the Decision dated May 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
[1]

66037, reversing an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed the petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by the herein respondent Aleli
"Corazon" Angeles-Maglaya.

The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)  at
Caloocan City, respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of
[2]

the intestate estate of  Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). In the petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. C-2140 and raffled to Branch 120 of the court, respondent alleged, among other things, the
following:

1. That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park, Caloocan, died intestate on January 21,
1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind  four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable
properties;

2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco's estate;

3. That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and,
together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent's wife by  his second marriage, are the  surviving
heirs of the decedent; and

4. That she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator.

Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the administratrix of
Francisco's estate. In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco on
[3]

August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union which was ratified two
(2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City, and that Francisco
represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent
could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco's legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent,
despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the
marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union.
And evidently to debunk respondent's claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that
she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted   Concesa A. Yamat, et al.   Petitioner thus
urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the
administration of his estate.

In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, the
January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the
alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed.  In the same reply, respondent
dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed with the Court of
Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan. [4]
Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo, commenced the presentation of her
evidence by taking the witness stand. She testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the legitimate
child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January 1988. She also testified having
[5]

been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.   Four (4) other witnesses testified
on her behalf, namely: Tomas Angeles, Francisco Yaya,   Jose O. Carreon and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz.  
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at
the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the
handwritten word "Yes" appears on the space below the question "Legitimate? (Legitimo?)"; pictures taken
during respondent's wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract.
Likewise offered were her scholastic  and  government service records.

After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss"
under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of  the petition for letters of
administration on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove a cause of action", it being her stated
position that "[P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis-à-vis the decedent, i.e.,
that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles." [10]

To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition, followed by petitioner's reply, to which
respondent countered with a rejoinder.

Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999, the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to prove her
[11]

filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the [respondent] to
state a cause of action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil of
Procedure. (Word in bracket added]

Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court in its Order of
December 17, 1999.   Therefrom, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals where her recourse was
[12]

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66037.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 29, 2002, reversed
[13]

and set aside the trial court's order of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as administratrix of the
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is REVERSED.  The Trial Court is hereby ordered
to appoint petitioner-appellant Aleli "Corazon" Angeles as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Francisco Angeles.

SO ORDERED.

The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following main premises:

1. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit premised on the alleged failure of the
underlying petition for letter of administration to state or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of a
demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 33;       [14]

2. Petitioner's motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby waived her right to present opposing
evidence to rebut respondent's  testimonial and documentary evidence; and

3. Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with the deceased Francisco.

Hence, petitioner's  instant  petition  for review on certiorari, on the submission that the Court of Appeals erred:
(1) in reversing the trial court's order of dismissal; (2) in treating her motion to dismiss  as  a  demurrer to
[15]

evidence; (3) in holding that respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco; and (4) in decreeing
respondent's appointment as administratrix of Francisco's intestate estate.

We resolve to grant the petition.

The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of whether or not respondent is the
legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals resolved the
issue in the affirmative and, on the basis of such determination, ordered the trial court to appoint respondent as
administratrix of Francisco's estate.

We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court's conclusion on the legitimate status of respondent,
or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent.  A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore,
implies a valid and lawful marriage.  Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate
filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
"Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."

In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting from Tison vs. Court of Appeals, [16]

stated that since petitioner "opted not to present any contrary evidence",  the presumption on respondent's
legitimacy stands "unrebutted." [17]

Following is an excerpt from Tison:

It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate.  And well-settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy
cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:

'The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a status for
the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. xxx

xxx   xxx   xxx

'Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family Code], the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought. The status
conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be
questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in
wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to force early action to settle
any doubt as to the paternity of such child so that the evidence material to the matter .
. . may still be easily available.'

xxx         xxx         xxx

'Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife . . . .'(Words
in bracket added; Emphasis ours)

Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a  child is
presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and  (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child
cannot be attacked collaterally.

A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish
a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact.   For, a presumption is prima facie proof of
[18]

the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by
legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164
[19]

of the Family Code   may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the
[20]

child's parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that
marriage.  Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.

In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under  review,  did  not categorically state from what
facts established during the trial was the presumption of respondent's supposed legitimacy arose.   But even if
perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for respondent's gratuitous  assertion and
an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedent's marriage to respondent's
mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract – doubtless the best
evidence of Francisco's and Genoveva's marriage, if one had been solemnized – was offered in evidence. No
[21]

priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to  declare  that  he 
solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say
anything  about,  let  alone  affirm,  that  supposed  marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent
was Francisco's daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz testified that they
know respondent to be their cousin because his (Tomas') father  and  her  (Paulita's)  mother, who are both
Francisco's siblings, told them so.   And one Jose Carreon would testify seeing respondent in 1948 in
[22]

Francisco's house in Caloocan, the same Francisco  who  used  to  court  Genoveva  before the war.   In all,
[23]

no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado
marriage contract;  when  and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the
persons present, and like significant details.

While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between Francisco and Genoveva,
we can even go to the extent of saying that respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that her
putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife.  Clearly, therefore, the Court of
Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained,
should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate, absent such a marriage, as
here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut.

Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco Angeles were married in 1938,
respondent never, thru the years, even question what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen
Sagad marriage. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it were, she  
made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion – as well as the appellate court's conclusion - that
Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent had declared that her mother
Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner Belen
S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already "spouses". Now, then, if, as respondent maintained
despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the
marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genoveva's death, would necessarily
have to be bigamous, hence void, in which case petitioner could not be, as respondent alleged in her petition
[24]

for letters of administration, a "surviving spouse" of the decedent.  We quote the pertinent allegation:

4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon] herself who is 58 years old,
and BELEN S. Angeles, the surviving spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his
second marriage, who is about 77 years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . ." (Emphasis and word in
bracket added)

We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that the legitimate filiation of a
child can be established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of
his/her supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:
Art. 172.  The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated
November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh. "E"). In it, her birth was recorded
as the legitimate child of  Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the word "married'" is written in the
certificate to indicate the  union of  Francisco and Genoveva.
Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence,   that "[I]t was error for the Court of Appeals to have ruled .
. . that [respondent's] Birth Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco
and Genoveva who are legally married".

The contention commends itself for concurrence.  The reason is as simple as it is elementary: the Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by
Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having
attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,  evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact
of birth of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
[25]

paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother
alone if the father refuses. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, commenting on the probative value of the entries in a
[26]

certificate of birth, wrote:

xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the putting of his
name by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is necessary. [27]

The  conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth Certificate of respondent, unsigned as it were
by Francisco and Genoveva, establishes – and "indubitably" at that -  not only  respondent's filiation to
Francisco but even her being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity to the limit. In a
very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate as defining proof of filiation, and not just filiation
but of legitimate filiation, by inferring from it that Francisco and Genoveva are legally married. In the apt words
of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a physician who merely certified having
attended "the birth of a child who was born alive at 3:50 P.M. ", created ' a marriage that of ' Francisco and
Genoveva', and filiation (that said child) is the daughter of 'Francisco�'"           
[28]

          
It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself. It cannot, as
[29]

the decision under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician
or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother, with or without the
participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her offspring through the simple
expedient of writing the putative father's name in the appropriate space in the birth certificate.  A long time
past, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth certificate prima facie evidentiary value of
filiation:

Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming
unmarried mother to extort money for her child (and herself) from any eligible bachelor or affluent
pater familias. How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate that the
newborn babe is her legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate will be accepted for
registration . . . . And any lawyer with sufficient imagination will realize the exciting possibilities
from such mischief of such prima facie evidence – when and if the "father" dies in ignorance of the
fraudulent design xxx [30]

Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort  from her marriage contract to Atty.
Maglaya and from her student and  government  records  which  indicated or purported to show that Francisco
Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving
respondent's hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the
execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition. And needless to
[31]

stress, they cannot support a finding of the legitimate union of Francisco and Genoveva.    

The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding pictures, the school and service records and the
testimony of respondent's witnesses lend support to her claim of enjoying open and continuous possession of
the status of a child of Francisco. The Court can even concede that respondent may have been the natural
child of Francisco with Genoveva. Unfortunately, however, that angle is not an, or at issue in the case before
us. For, respondent peremptorily predicated her petition for letters of administration on her being a legitimate
child of Francisco who was legally married to her mother, Genoveva, propositions which we have earlier
refuted herein.
If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this disposition were it not for another compelling
consideration which petitioner has raised and which we presently take judicially notice of.

As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the proceedings at the trial court,  filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the decision of the RTC Caloocan granting the petition of spouses
Francisco Angeles and petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A. Yamat and two others. In
that petition, docketed with the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and captioned "Aleli 'Corazon'
Angeles Maglaya vs. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa A. Yamat, Teodora A. Santos, Franco Angeles and
Belen S. Angeles", respondent alleged that as legitimate daughter of Francisco, she should have been notified
of the adoption proceedings.

Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the aforementioned annulment case to RTC,
Caloocan for reception of evidence.  Eventually, in a Decision dated December 17, 2003, the Court of
[32]

Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent is not, contrary to
her claim, a "legitimate daughter" of Francisco, nor "a child of a lawful wedlock between Francisco M. Angeles
and Genoveva Y. Mercado". Wrote the appellate court in that case:

Petitioner [Aleli "Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious persistence the argument that she is
a legitimate child or the only daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado . . . .

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is nothing in the
record to support petitioner's claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married
before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim of petitioner that
Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938

While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages during
the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to
prove the existence of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado,
even as no witness was presented to confirm the celebration of such marriage . . . .

Petitioner presented pictures.  x x x However, it is already settled law that photographs are not
sufficient evidence of filiation or acknowledgment.

To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner's birth certificate and even her marriage
contract.. . .  Reason:  These documents were not signed by  Francisco . . . . Equally
inconsequential are petitioner's school records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of both
Francisco and Genoveva . . . .

xxx   xxx   xxx

Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural child of the late
Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as
her consent thereto is not essential or required. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added)

Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.47832 was
effectively affirmed by this Court via its Resolution dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No. 163124, denying Aleli
"Corazon" Maglaya's petition for Review on Certiorari, and Resolution dated October 20, 2004, denying with
[33] [34]

"FINALITY" her motion for reconsideration. Another Resolution dated January 24, 2005 resolved to "NOTE
WITHOUT ACTION" Maglaya's second motion for reconsideration.

In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as affirmed with finality by this Court
in G.R. No. 163124, there can be no serious objection to applying in this case the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment, one of two (2) concepts embraced in the res judicata principle.  Following the rule on
[35]

conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter
of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent's legitimate filiation to Francisco
and the latter's marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of
competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between
herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter. [36]

Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as sustained by this
Court in G.R. No. 163124, virtually confirms the ratio of the trial court's order of dismissal in Special
Proceedings (SP) No. C-2140, i.e, that respondent failed to establish that she is in fact a legitimate child of
Francisco. Accordingly, the question of whether or not the Motion to Dismiss interposed by herein petitioner,
[37]

as respondent in SP No. C-2140, is in the nature of a demurer to evidence has become moot and academic. It
need not detain us any minute further.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin", the
[38]

reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose
[39]

relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed,   or, in short,   an heir.  In resolving,
[40]

therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the
decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation.  A separate action
will only result in a multiplicity of suits.  Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it
looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED  and SET ASIDE,
and the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

499 Phil. 307

 [ G.R. NO. 162571, June 15, 2005 ]

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

At issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its
[1]

discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a decision and resolution upholding the
[2] [3]

resolution and order of the trial court, which denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss private respondents’
[4]

complaint for support and directed the parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity
testing.

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner
Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 106. [5]

In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11,
2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by
Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated
requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club
parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the
police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On
March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support. [6]

In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel
admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but “he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she)
had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly
demanding and possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What started as a romantic
liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became
so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to
various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family…. Unable to bear the prospect of
losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by
referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop” where she worked. Later on, Arnel found out that
[7]

Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a
vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her.
Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their “last intimacy was sometime in 1998.” [8]

Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnel’s wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol
Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel,
he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no “alternative but to move on
but without bumping or hitting any part of her body.” Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the
[9]

community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martin’s birth certificate were
falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his
birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964. [10]
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed
willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case. [11]

On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. [12]

Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also moved to
[13]

dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a
forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative
father. In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against
[14]

Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Martin’s birth
certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached the certification of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Thus, this petition.

In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether  a complaint for support can be converted to a petition
for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without
violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. [15]

The petition is without merit.

First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private respondents’
complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of
action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or
wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause
of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged. [16]

In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the petitioner, as a result of
which she gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations
with Fe but denied that he fathered Martin, claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the child’s
conception and birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship
between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship produced the child,
Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not,
petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no
obligation to give support.

Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.

Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness and authenticity of the
child’s birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that the order and resolution of
the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition
for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized
child, has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under Article 283 in
[17]

relation to Article 265 of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule 105 of the Rules of Court.
[18] [19]

The petitioner’s contentions are without merit.

The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely
allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the
authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order
effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in
accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, we allowed the integration of an action to
[20]

compel recognition with an action to claim one’s inheritance:

 …In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights
from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is
necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the
illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to
inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in
Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the
fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations
therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes
of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in
one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.

As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922])
wherein we said:

The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event
maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same
time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this
court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions
justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular
case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to
compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to
the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court,
is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held
in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a
natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in
fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division
of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother
x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to
show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in
partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such
proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)

Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for
integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends
completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how
intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely
appropriate to these proceedings.

On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of
proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit.

Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for determining paternity
has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or
mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee where the appellant was convicted of murder on the testimony of
[21]

three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that “while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as
accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA
test result (emphasis supplied).”

Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of
Appeals, promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because “DNA, being a relatively new
[22]

science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative
father.”

In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in
Tijing v. Court of Appeals:[23]

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of
a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The
DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility
of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.

The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came
in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo where the rape and murder victim’s DNA samples from
[24]

the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that “the purpose of DNA
testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference
sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.”

A year later, in People v. Janson, we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because
[25]

“doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been
perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our
doubts!”

In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then
[26]

presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult
to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the
strong weight of DNA testing…

Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar, we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with
[27]

homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the
process of DNA testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:

Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living
organisms. A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s
lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the
root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the
same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
 xxx xxx xxx

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as
an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it
was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts
subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical
with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen
found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of
the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively
uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that
has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and
reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would
allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one
such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by
the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles
of human genetics and molecular biology.

Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results
thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victim’s vagina were used
to positively identify the accused Joel “Kawit” Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction
of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as
embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows:

The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the
accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs, hair, and other bodily substances.
[28] [29]

We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy
[30]

tests for women accused of adultery, expulsion of morphine from one’s mouth and the tracing of one’s foot
[31] [32]

to determine its identity with bloody footprints. In Jimenez v. Cañizares, we even authorized the examination
[33] [34]

of a woman’s genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was
impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive
and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,
are now similarly acceptable.
[35]
Nor does petitioner’s invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v. Torres, where we struck down
[36]

the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of
[37]

privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s
[38]

case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy
holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason
that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be
compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not
face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.

DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded its first official results
sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general acceptance. Several [39]

cases decided by various State Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of
procedure and evidence.

The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances,
[40]

ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York
allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment.
The Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the
Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests: [41]

§ 516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to

section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred
thirty-five-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a
child pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to
section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law with the registrar of the
district in which the birth occurred and in which the birth certificate has been filed. No further
judicial or administrative proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of
paternity.

(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the
social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may
be rescinded by either signator’s filing of a petition with the court to vacate the acknowledgment
within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a support order) relating
to the child in which either signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding" shall be the date by which the respondent is required to
answer the petition. After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the acknowledgment,
either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary
acknowledgment. Upon receiving a party’s challenge to an acknowledgment, the court shall
order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of the child’s paternity and
shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance with this article. Neither
signator’s legal obligations, including the obligation for child support arising from the
acknowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment except for good
cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the court
determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an
acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately
provide a copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which the child’s birth certificate is filed
and also to the putative father registry operated by the department of social services pursuant to
 section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition, if the mother of the
child who is the subject of the acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to
title six-A of article three of the social services law, the court shall immediately provide a copy of
the order to the child support enforcement unit of the social services district that provides the
mother with such services.

(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established through the parents’
acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded
full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in section
452(a)(7) of the social security act.(emphasis supplied)

DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act: [42]

§532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test results; costs of
tests.

a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic marker tests or DNA tests
and, on the court’s own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the
alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests of a type generally
acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal
department of health and human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an
accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the
determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall
be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests
of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of
legitimacy of a child born to a married woman.  The record or report of the results of any such
genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section one hundred
eleven-k of the social services law shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to
subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where no timely
objection in writing has been made thereto and that if such timely objections are not made, they
shall be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report of the
results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate at least a ninety-five
percent probability of paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a
rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted, the paternity of and
liability for the support of a child pursuant to this article and article four of this act.

(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this section, a report
made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule
forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by any party.

(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the first
instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the
court may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test, if practicable; otherwise,
the court may direct payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district. In its
order of disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any such test be apportioned
between the parties according to their respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party
who does not prevail on the issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay.
(emphasis supplied)

In R.E. v. C.E.W., a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used to prove that H.W.,
[43]

previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the child of
R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time of conception, maintained an adulterous relationship.

In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G., the 4 Department of the
[44] th

New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.’s father by
default, to have the said judgment vacated, even after six years, once he had shown through a genetic marker
test that he was not the child’s father. In this case, G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social
Services, six years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.’s father, sought an increase in his support
obligation to her.

In Greco v. Coleman, the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of law
[45]

allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining
paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support agreements were necessary:

As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has increased
significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support agreement…(current testing
methods can determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time
the parties before us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant
obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported results of modern DNA
paternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported results in 1985, DNA
matching has progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course, while prior
blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the possible father of a child, those
methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the
settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was
a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were often no
more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity action, obtaining child
support depended not merely on whether the putative father was, in fact, the child's biological
father, but rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually
involved with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into private
agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet
her burden of proof.

It is worth noting that amendments to Michigan’s Paternity law have included the use of DNA testing: [46]

§722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child, and
alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling; qualifications of
person conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or
identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of proof;
summary disposition.

Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon application made by or on
behalf of either party, or on its own motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged
father submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may include, but are not
limited to, determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte
antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine whether the alleged
father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue
typing or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the
typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any other remedies available, the court
may do either of the following:

(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.

(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless good cause is
shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.

(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted by a person
accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recognized scientific organization, including,
but not limited to, the American association of blood banks.

xxx     xxx xxx

(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person described in subsection
(2) conducting the blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher,
 and the DNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as provided in
subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the analysis of genetic testing
material from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than 99%, the
contracting laboratory shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the
putative fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers who
have identical DNA.

(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (5), either
party may move for summary disposition under the court rules. this section does not abrogate the
right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7.
(emphasis supplied)

In Rafferty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing paternity were
[47]

sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage:

The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating
Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we
find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94%
probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.

In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W., the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for genetic testing given by
[48]

the Court of Appeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded without such order being given. Significantly,
when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity and support with the District Court, neither party
requested genetic testing. It was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court
remanded the case and ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld.

The case of Kohl v. Amundson, decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota, demonstrated that even
[49]

default judgments of paternity could be vacated after the adjudicated father had, through DNA testing,
established non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of Amundson’s child
through DNA testing, was able to have the default judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling
ordering Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support. The Court
said “(w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that
require(d) Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a default judgment was
entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the amount
withheld from his wages.”

In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services, another case decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi,
[50]

it was held that even if paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and
visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing established someone other than the named individual
to be the biological father. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams. [51]

The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent for
upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and ordered him to
submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is
only available “when any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of
[52]

Appeals where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed at length the
[53]

nature of such a petition and just what was meant by “grave abuse of discretion”:

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
 The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment.  The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction,
an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of
justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision—not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision—the same is
beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of
the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial
officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said
Rules. (emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal
hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent
court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would
have only been an error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court,
being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.

EPILOGUE

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The
growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized
and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed
as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully
reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ decision dated
January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. L-33659, June 14, 1990 ]

VICTORIA U. BALUYUT, MA. THERESA U. BALUYUT and MA. FLORDELIZA U.

BALUYUT
vs.
FELICEDAD S. BALUYUT and HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Note: The family name Baluyut appears as Baluyot is some pleadings.

Donald E. Asis for the Administratrix

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Victoria and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed Baluyot, then minors,
represented by their mother and guardian ad litem, Norma Urbana which seeks the reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38069-R entitled "Felicidad S. Baluyut, Administratrix-Appellant v. Victoria
U. Baluyut, et al., Intervenors-Appellees." The decision brought to this court for review reversed the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (now Regional Trial Court) and dismissed the petition for intervention
filed by petitioners in the trial court.

In Special Proceedings No. 1835, entitled "Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique Baluyut,' filed before the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, herein petitioners filed on April 29, 1965 a petition for intervention. The
petition alleged that petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut; that
petitioners-minors are the illegitimate children of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and
petitioners' mother and guardian ad litem Norma Urbano; that petitioners were conceived and born at the time
when Norma Urbano cohabited with the deceased while the latter was already married to Felicidad S. Baluyut;
that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of children of the deceased during his
lifetime by direct overt acts of said deceased having supported and maintained them. The petitioners also
alleged that they were deliberately excluded from the estate of Enrique M. Baluyut (pp. 10-18, Record on
Appeal).

Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of his estate, opposed the petition for
intervention (p. 20, Record on Appeal). On May 8, 1965 (pp. 18-19, Record on Appeal), the trial court issued
an order allowing the petitioners to intervene.

After trial, a decision (pp. 24-31, Record on Appeal) was rendered declaring the intervenors Victoria, Ma.
Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza the forced heirs of deceased Enrique Baluyut and ordering administratrix Felicidad
Vda. de Baluyut to pay P150.00 monthly support to Norma Urbano, guardian ad litem for the three minor
children. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders:

1) FELICIDAD VDA. DE BALUYUT, the administratrix to pay P150.00 as monthly support out of the
Estate of Enrique Baluyut to Norma Urbano guardian ad litem for the three minor children, Victoria,
Theresa and Flordeliza Baluyut.

2) That under Art. 887, (5) New Civil Code said children are forced heirs of the late Enrique Baluyut.

3) That they are entitled to their hereditary rights in said Estate of Enrique Baluyut under the provisions
of the New Civil Code (pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal).

On February 15, 1966, the administratrix filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's decision. On February
22, 1966, the intervenors filed their Objection to Appeal and Motion for Execution. The latter motion was based
on the pronouncement in Salazar v. Salazar, L-5823, April 29, 1953, that an order granting support pendente
lite is final and executory.

On May 4,1986, the trial court issued an order (p. 37, Record on Appeal) declaring that it considers
intervenors' motion for execution as a motion for reconsideration and amended the decision to the effect that it
granted the minors Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza monthly support pendente lite in the amount of P150.00
payable every first day of the month to their guardian ad litem Norma Urbano.

On April 22, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment (pp. 19-41, Rollo) reversing the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and the intervenors' petition in intervention is
hereby declared dismissed, without costs. The order granting alimony pendente lite to the intervenors is
hereby set aside. (p. 41, Rollo)

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of respondent Court of Appeals' decision was denied on May 24, 1971
(p. 53, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed on June 19, 1971.

On June 23, 1971, We gave due course to the petition (p. 57, Rollo). On July 1, 1971, We required the
petitioners to file their brief (p. 58, Rollo). Respondents, on the other hand, filed their brief on October 28, 1971
(p. 85, Rollo). On December 17, 1971, the petition was considered submitted for decision (p. 87, Rollo).

On June 3, 1975, petitioners filed a "Motion and Manifestation" praying for the reinstatement of the order of the
trial court to grant the petitioners monthly support during the pendency of the case. The said order for monthly
support granted by the trial court in its decision of May 4, 1966 was terminated in the early part of 1971 (p.
90, Rollo). When asked to comment on the manifestation and motion of petitioners, respondents opposed said
motion in view of respondent Court of appeals' finding that petitioners were not the recognized spurious
children of deceased Baluyut (p. 113, Rollo).

On November 25, 1976, We granted petitioner's motion for continuation of their monthly support pendente
lite effective June 1975 until further orders (p. 141, Rollo). After an exchange of pleadings by the parties
regarding the order of this court on the matter of the continuation of petitioners' support pendente lite, and after
a motion filed by petitioners to cite administratrix for contempt, private respondents filed a manifestation on
January 6,1978, informing this Court that: 1) the former administratrix Felicidad S. Baluyut was substituted by
one of her daughters, Milagros B. Villar, as Special Administratrix; and that 2) they have complied with the
September 13, 1977 resolution of the court requiring them to show cause why they should not be dealt with as
in contempt for failing to obey the order to pay petitioners a monthly support pendente lite. Private respondents
also manifested their compliance by depositing with the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 1, a
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank check in the amount of P4,350.00 representing the required support
until October, 1977. Another PCIB check in the amount of P300.00 representing support pendente lite for
November and December, 1977 was also deposited with the trial court (p. 335, Rollo).

On February 19, 1980, petitioners, assisted by their guardian ad litem and private respondent Administratrix
Milagros B. Villar, both parties assisted by their respective counsel, filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the petition
in view of petitioners 'filing of a "Petition for Withdrawal of Intervention" with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga taking cognizance of the Intestate Estate of Enrique Baluyut. The petition for withdrawal was based
on a waiver by petitioners of any right or interest they may have on the estate of the deceased in consideration
of the financial assistance granted them by the administratrix of the estate (p. 371, Rollo). The petition for
withdrawal of intervention was approved by the intestate court on February 14, 1980 (p. 369, Rollo), while the
Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition was noted by this court on April 3, 1981 (p. 372, Rollo).

The withdrawal of intervention in consideration of the financial assistance extended to petitioners by the
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 37, Rollo) is in the nature of a compromise
settlement of the instant petition (p. 371, Rollo). Considering, however, that the issue involved in this case is
whether or not petitioners, Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed Baluyut are the
acknowledged, spurious children of the deceased, Enrique M. Baluyut, the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant
petition cannot be granted, acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of persons and of future
support cannot be the subject of a compromise (pars. 1 and 4, Article 2035 of the Civil Code). (See Advincula
v. Advincula, L-19065, January 31, 1964).

The trial court found that petitioners are the illegitimate children of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut. This
finding was shared by respondent Court of Appeals:

... the testimony of Norma Urbana supported by that of Liberata Vasquez on the one hand as against
that of the administratrix who declared that she and her late husband were always together and that of
Cecilia Waters who testified that Norma had a suitor named Lieut. Alex on the other, leads us to give
credence to the proof of the intervenors specifically the testimony of Norma that the intervenors are in
fact her illegitimate children with the late Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 35, Rollo).

However, proof of filiation of the petitioners to the late Enrique M. Baluyut is not sufficient to confer upon them
any hereditary right in the estate of the deceased. What is necessary to be established by an illegitimate not
natural child in order that he may be entitled to successional rights under Article 887 of the New Civil Code, is
not the fact of his bare filiation but a filiation acknowledged by the putative parent. This has been the
consistent pronouncement of this Court since the reversal of the pronouncement in Reyes, et al. v.
Zuzuarregui, et al., 102 Phil. 346 by the pronouncement in the case of Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697, 700,
701, 702. In the Paulino case, it was held:

An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support and successional rights from his putative or
presumed parents must prove his filiation to them. Filiation may be established by the voluntary or
compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious) child. Recognition is voluntary when "made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing." It is compulsory
when by court action the child brings about his recognition. ...

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to have admitted that the appellant is
the illegitimate spurious, not natural child of the deceased Marcos Paulino. Such an admission,
however, does not entitle her to inherit from her alleged putative father. It is necessary to allege that
her putative father had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment is essential
and is the basis other right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment the action
becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father.

This was reiterated in the case of Republic v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 121 Phil. 261, where
this Court held that:

... the illegitimate (spurious) child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from his parents,
must prove his filiation and this may be done by means of voluntary or compulsory recognition of the
relationship. For this purpose, the provisions concerning natural children are held applicable. ...

There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil Code; one, by the voluntary recognition by
the putative parent made in the record of birth, a statement before the court of record, or in any authentic
writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two, by compulsory recognition under Article 283 of the same law.

Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious children?

There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were recognized by the
deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners' records of birth, although in the name of
Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was no authentic writing presented nor any statement in
a court of record which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased.
With regard to compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates the cases where the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his, namely: a) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception; b) when the child is in continuous possession of the status
of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family; c) when the child was conceived
during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father; d) when the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

The grounds relied upon by petitioners for compelling the heirs of Baluyut to recognize them as the heirs of the
deceased were the alleged possession by the petitioners of the status of recognized illegitimate spurious
children and that they were conceived at the time when their mother cohabited with the deceased. Since the
petitioners were still minors at the time of the death of Enrique M. Baluyut, the action for compulsory
recognition was correctly filed by petitioners' guardian ad litem and mother, Norma Urbano. However, as
correctly pointed out by respondent appellate court, since the recognition sought in the case is compulsory,
strictness in the application of the rules applies. We agree with respondent appellate court that the evidence
presented by petitioners failed to satisfy the high standard of proof required for the success of their action for
compulsory recognition. Respondent court held:

The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her witness Liberata Vasquez insofar as the issue of
recognition is concerned tends to show that Norma was kept by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his
mistress first in the house of Liberata and then in a house supposedly rented from one Lacuna. But this
Lacuna was not even presented to testify in support of the claim of Norma and Liberate that Baluyut
rented his house for Norma. And, according to Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma some twice
a week in the house where she kept her as his mistress; that Baluyut paid the hospital bills for the
delivery of the two younger children of Norma. But, according to Liberata herself, it was not Baluyut
who personally paid the hospital bills but he gave the money for the payment of the hospital bills to
Liberato and he requested her to pay the money to the hospital. This only shows that Baluyut was
hiding his Identity as the father of the children of Norma, an act which is inconsistent with recognizing
such children as his own.

If Enrique did not want to hide being the father of the intervenors who were born at the Ortanez
hospital, there was no need for him to ask Liberata to pay the hospital bill of Norma for the delivery of
her youngest child as Baluyut could have easily done this himself. There is not even evidence showing
that he visited Norma at the hospital when she delivered there. Coupled with the circumstance that
Enrique tried to hide his being the father of the intervenors, there is absence of positive and convincing
proof that Enrique treated the intervenors as his children in all relations in society and in life. Far from
treating them in society as his children, he was hiding Norma and the intervenors from society and
visited them only once in a while evidently only to satisfy his sexual urge with Norma but with no
genuine desire to have and treat the intervenors so as to confer on them the continuous possession of
the status of recognized illegitimate (not natural) children. There is not even any proof that he had
brought out these intervenors to show them publicly as his children. With the single exception of
Liberata Vasquez, not a single neighbor of Norma in the rather populous area of Project 4, Quezon
City, was produced to testify on any act of Enrique to show his genuine desire to treat the intervenors
as his very own in his actual relations. The foregoing deficiencies in the intervenors' proof is fatal to
their case.

In order to prove the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, the acts must be of
such a nature that they reveal, not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire
to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously' (Igar, et al. vs. Vda. de Balingkit, CA, 60 O.G. 7792; Onos, et al. vs. Vda. de
Onos, CA-G.R. No. 24646-R, July 22, 1964).

The birth certificates Exhibits 'A,' 'B' and 'C' of the intervenors do not help their case for these are not
evidence of recognized filiation by the deceased Enrique Baluyut because, firstly, they were admitted in
evidence by the lower court merely as part of the of the witnesses who referred to them in the course of
said witnesses' testimony and hence, they are not evidence of the facts stated in them. Secondly, they
 are merely evidence of the fact that gave rise to their execution, that is, the fact of birth and nothing
else, much leas of recognition as they are not signed by Enrique Baluyut.

In an action for compulsory acknowledgment under paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code, a
birth certificate which, on its face, was not signed by the supposed natural father is incompetent
evidence on paternity, being in violation of oration 5 of Act 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil
Code' (Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 54 O.G. 4950; Crisolo va. Macadaong, No. L-7017, April
19, 1964; Bernabe, etc. vs. Lacodin, CA, 59 O.G. 3178).

If birth certificates, which are unsigned by the presumed father as required by section 5 of Act
No. 3752 and Article 280 of the Civil Code, are incompetent evidence even to prove paternity
alone, with more reason are birth certificates incompetent evidence to prove recognized filiation.
(pp. 36-39, Rollo)

Petitioners would have Us relax Our rule on strictness of the application of law regarding compulsory
recognition as first laid down in the Javellana v. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393. They opined that the said case was
in fact the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way into the present provisions of the New Civil Code
governing paternity and recognition.

Petitioners failed to grasp the import of this Court's ruling in the Javellana case. That the case was the
forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way into our statute books, is true. But, the rule of liberality
enunciated therein applied only to case involving voluntary recognition specifically in a public document and
not to cases of compulsory recognition. Thus,

Upon the second point, whether a voluntary acknowledgment may be done incidentally in a public
document, a distinction must be made between the two kinds of acknowledgment: (1) voluntary, and (2)
compulsory. In the former, recognition may be incidental, but in the latter, it must be direct and express.

In actions to compel the alleged father to acknowledge his natural child, based upon recognition in an
indubitable writing, article 135, par. 1, of the Civil Code, requires that the father must expressly
recognize his paternity. This provision has been strictly construed by Spanish and Philippine
jurisprudence against the alleged natural child. Thus, in the Sentence of July 5,1906, the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain held in an action to compel acknowledgment under article 135, that a mere allusion,
more or leas clear, by the alleged father to his supposed child, if there is no express recognition of his
paternity, is not sufficient. In the Sentence of April 8,1915, that same Tribunal declared that there
should be an indubitable documentary proof or uninterrupted on of the status of a natural child,
excluding deductions and conjectures. As to Philippine cases, the same rule has been adhered to in
several decisions by this court. Thus, in Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 4 Phil., 746, an action was filed to
compel recognition of a natural child, based in part on a letter of defendant telling the mother of his
affection toward her and asking her to take care of the child. This court held that the letter did not
expressly recognize the child, under article 135. In Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1, the alleged
father wrote the child a letter advising him how to conduct himself. This court held that the letter did not
contain an-express recognition under article 135.

But while in actions to compel recognition the foregoing principle is true with respect to indubitable
writings according to article 135, par. 1 of the Civil Code, however, in cases of voluntary
acknowledgment in a public document under article 131, the law is more liberal and permits an
incidental recognition. ... (Javellana, et al. v. Monteclaro, et al., 74 Phils. 393)

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
770 PHIL. 364

[ G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015 ]

EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO

vs.
KAREN SANTOS

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
[1] [2]

G.R. CV No. 88650 promulgated on January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8. Both courts a quo ruled that
[3]

the subject document titled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman is null and void, and ordered herein petitioner
Eugenio San Juan Geronimo (Eugenio), who was previously joined by his brother Emiliano San Juan
Geronimo (Emiliano) as co-defendant, to vacate the one-half portion of the subject 6,542-square meter
property and surrender its possession to respondent Karen Santos. In a Resolution dated November 28,
[4]

2011, this Court ordered the deletion of the name of Emiliano from the title of the instant petition as co-
petitioner, viz.:
x x x The Court resolves:

xxxx
 
(2 to AMEND the title of this petition to read "Eugenio San Juan Geronimo, petitioner vs. Karen Santos,
) respondent," considering the sworn statement of Eugenio San Juan Geronimo that he does not know
whether his brother is still alive and that his brother did not verify the instant petition; x x x
[5]

The following facts were found by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision,
viz.:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession
against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She
alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one-half of the parcel of land
located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 and
belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered
that defendants executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring
themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the
property in question; and that consequently they took possession and were able to transfer the tax
declaration of the subject property to their names. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be
annulled and the tax declaration of the land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the
property and pay her damages.

In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and
sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were
childless and took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad's sister. They
claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly
impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because
they had never lived or sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in
Bulacan never filed any maternity leave during the period of her service from August 1963 until
October 1984.
 The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. The
defendants Eugenio and Emiliano were the half-brothers of her father Rufino, being the children of
Rufino's father Marciano Geronimo with another woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-owned Lot
1716 with the defendants' mother Carmen, and upon his death in 1980, when the plaintiff was only
8 years old, his share in the property devolved on his heirs. In 1998, some 18 years later, Caridad
and she executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino's estate entitled Pagmamanahan Sa
Labas ng Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod Sa Karapatan, whereby the plaintiffs mother Caridad
waived all her rights to Rufino's share and in the land in question to her daughter the plaintiff. Be
that as it may, in 1985, guardianship proceedings appeared to have been instituted with the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos by Caridad in which it was established that the plaintiff was the
minor child of Caridad with her late husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed guardian of the
person and estate of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been paying the real estate taxes on the
property, but in 2000, the defendants took possession of the land and had the tax declaration
transferred to them. This compelled her to file the present case.

Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is the only child and
legal heir of his brother Rufino. He disclosed that when Rufino's wife could not bear a child, the
couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad's niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in
1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive parents' household. Believing
that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother Emiliano and he should succeed to the estate of
their brother, they executed in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement called Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman.

Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth certificate. It had irregular features,
such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was erased and the word
and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma Daño was superimposed on the entry in the
box intended for the informant's signature.

Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal consultant of the DECS in Bulacan
brought the plaintiffs service record as an elementary school teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan to
show that she did not have any maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11,
1963 to October 24, 1984, and a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent that the
plaintiff did not file any maternity leave during her service. He declared that as far as the service
record is concerned, it reflects the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves that she
availed of. Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that the leaves were reflected but the absences
were not. Testifying on the plaintiffs birth certificate, Exhibit 14, Arturo Reyes, a representative of
the NSO, confirmed that there was an alteration in the date of birth and signature of the informant.
In view of the alterations, he considered the document questionable. [6]

On October 27, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, viz.:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman dated March 9, 2000 executed in
favor of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emilio San Juan-Geronimo as null and void;

2. Annulling Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-01453 of the subject property in the names of Eugenio
San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo;

3. Ordering defendants Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo to vacate
the 1/2 portion of the subject property and to surrender the possession to the plaintiff;

4. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of [P]30,000.00 as attorney's fees;

5. To pay the costs of the suit.

 SO ORDERED. [7]

The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir - being the legitimate child - of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad). It found that respondent's filiation was duly
established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in evidence. The RTC dismissed the claim of
petitioner that the birth certificate appeared to have been tampered, specifically on the entries pertaining to the
date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. The trial court held that petitioner failed to adduce
evidence to explain how the erasures were done. Petitioner also failed to prove that the alterations were due to
the fault of respondent or another person who was responsible for the act. In the absence of such contrary
evidence, the RTC relied on the prima facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate as
a public document.

The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of
respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC considered the
following overt acts of the deceased spouses as acts of recognition that respondent is their legitimate child:
they sent her to school and paid for her tuition fees; Caridad made respondent a beneficiary of her burial
benefits from the Government Service Insurance System; and, Caridad filed a petition for guardianship of
respondent after the death of her husband Rufino. Lastly, the trial court held that to be allowed to impugn the
filiation and status of respondent, petitioner should have brought an action for the purpose under Articles 170
and 171 of the Family Code. Since petitioner failed to file such action, the trial court ruled that respondent
alone is entitled to the ownership and possession of the subject land owned by Rufino. The extrajudicial
settlement executed by petitioner and his brother was therefore declared not valid and binding as respondent
is Rufino's only compulsory heir.

On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate of respondent and the offered
evidence of a mere certification from the Office of the Civil Registry instead of the birth certificate itself.
According to petitioner, respondent's open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is only
secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself. Respondent questioned if it was legally permissible for
petitioner to question her filiation as a legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad in the same action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession that she herself filed against petitioner and his then co-
defendant. Respondent argued that the conditions enumerated under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,
giving the putative father and his heirs the right to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of the child, are not
present in the instant case. She further asserted that the Family Code contemplates a direct action, thus her
civil status may not be assailed indirectly or collaterally in this suit.

In the assailed Decision dated January 17, 2011, the appellate court held that under Article 170, the action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was born
to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in the civil registry.
The CA found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date. It
further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case, Exhibit 14, does not qualify as the valid
registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by the law, viz.:

x x x The reason is that under the statute establishing the civil register, Act No. 3753, the
declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or in default thereof, that
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of birth in
the civil register. The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not identified
as either the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14,
legally, cannot be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as
shadowy as Emma Daño, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the
order of the court Exhibit E be treated as the final judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another
proof of filiation. The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the
child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad
based on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff. [8]
Noting the absence of such record of birth, final judgment or admission in a public or private document that
respondent is the legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad, the appellate court — similar to the trial
court - relied on Article 172 of the Family Code which allows the introduction and admission of secondary
evidence to prove one's legitimate filiation via open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child. The CA agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her legitimate filiation, viz.:

We agree with the lower court that the plaintiff has proven her filiation by open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. The evidence consists of the following: (1) the
plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they
supported her and sent her to school paying for lier tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she
was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino,
Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff
from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the
deceased.

It is clear that the status enjoyed by the plaintiff as the legitimate child of Rufino and Caridad has
been open and continuous, x x x The conclusion follows that the plaintiff is entitled to the property
left by Rufino to the exclusion of his brothers, the defendants, which consists of a one-half share in
Lot 1716. [9]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated May 24,
[10]

2011. Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors:

1. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ALLOWED THE INTRODUCTION
OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE AND RENDERED JUDGMENT BASED THEREON
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY EVIDENCE OF BIRTH
CERTIFICATE [EXHIBIT 14].

2. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS
HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO IMPUGN RESPONDENT'S LEGITIMATE FILIATION. [11]

On the first issue, petitioner argues that secondary evidence to prove one's filiation is admissible only if there is
no primary evidence, i.e, a record of birth or an authentic admission in writing. Petitioner asserts that herein
[12]

respondent's birth certificate, Exhibit 14, constitutes the primary evidence enumerated under Article 172 of the
Family Code and the ruling of both courts a quo that the document is not the one "envisioned by law" should
have barred the introduction of secondary evidence. Petitioner expounds this proposition, viz.:

The findings of the courts a quo that the birth certificate [Exhibit 14] is not [the] one envisioned by
law finds support in numerous cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court. Thus, a certificate
of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of
paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. Where the birth certificate and the
baptismal certificate are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation, they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. x x x

x x x The birth certificate Exhibit 14 contains erasures. The date of birth originally written in ball
pen was erased and the date April 6, 1972 was superimposed using a pentel pen; the entry on the
informant also originally written in ball pen was erased and the name E. Daño was superimposed
using also a pentel pen; there is no signature as to who received it from the office of the registry.
Worst, respondent Karen confirms the existence of her birth certificate when she introduced in
evidence [Exhibit A] a mere Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Sta. Maria,
Ilocos Sur, which highlighted more suspicions of its existence, thus leading to conclusion and
presumption that if such evidence is presented, it would be adverse to her claim. True to the
 suspicion, when Exhibit 14 was introduced by the petitioner and testified on by no less than the
NSO representative, Mr. Arturo Reyes, and confirmed that there were alterations which renders
the birth certificate questionable.

Argued differently, with the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity, the courts a
quo should have stopped there, ruled that respondent Karen is not the child of Rufino, and
therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate.
[13]

On the second issue, petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred and abused its discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it ruled that he does not have personality to impugn respondent's legitimate filiation. While
[14]

petitioner admits that the CA "did not directly rule on this particular issue," he nonetheless raises the said
[15]

issue as an error since the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner argues that in so
affirming, the CA also adopted the ruling of the trial court that the filiation of respondent is strictly personal to
respondent's alleged father and his heirs under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, thereby denying
[16]

petitioner the "right to impugn or question the filiation and status of the plaintiff." Petitioner argues, viz.:
[17]

x x x [T]he lower court's reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code is totally misplaced,
with due respect. It should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on
paternity and filiation of the Family Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child, and the father
[or, in proper cases, his heirs] denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a
child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Petitioners are asserting not merely
that respondent Karen is not a legitimate child of, but that she is not a child of Rufino Geronimo at
all. x x x
[18]

We grant the petition.

Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent offered in evidence is questionable, the trial court
ruled that respondent is a legitimate child and the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC
based this conclusion on secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code to prove the filiation of legitimate children, viz.:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172
because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be
raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession.

Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be
raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. The rationale behind this
procedural prescription is stated in the case of Tison v. Court of Appeals, viz.:
[19]

x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
 "The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code xxx actually fixes a civil status for
the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a

collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: 'The contest of the legitimacy of a child by
the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent
court; any contest made in any other way is void.' This principle applies under our
Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to
"the action to impugn the legitimacy."

This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles.

Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the
presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The
obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from
being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle
any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter,
which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the
child, may still be easily available.

xxxx

Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view
of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his
heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his
heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory." [20]

What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the
legitimacy - or illegitimacy - of a child is at issue. This situation does not obtain in the case at bar.

In the instant case, the filiation of a child - herein respondent - is not at issue. Petitioner does not claim that
respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner
alleges is that respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at; all. He proffers this
allegation in his Amended Answer before the trial court by way of defense that respondent is not an heir to his
brother Rufino. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling
on the secondary evidence of respondent - even if such proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the
second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove one's filiation.
In the following cases, the courts a quo and this Court did not bar the introduction of secondary evidence in
actions which involve allegations that the opposing party is not the child of a particular couple — even if such
evidence is similar to the kind of proof admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172.

In the 1994 case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, therein deceased spouses Vicente Benitez (Vicente)
[21]

and Isabel Chipongian (Isabel) owned various properties while they were still living. Isabel departed in 1982,
while Vicente died intestate in 1989. In 1990, Vicente's sister (Victoria Benitez-Lirio) and nephew (Feodor
Benitez Aguilar) instituted an action before the trial court for the issuance of letters of administration of his
estate in favor of Feodor. In the said proceedings, they alleged that Vicente was "survived by no other heirs or
relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted x x x." They
[22]
further argued that one "Marissa Benitez[-]Badua who was raised and cared for by them since childhood is, in
fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir [of Vicente]." Marissa
[23]

opposed the petition and proffered evidence to prove that she is an heir of Vicente. Marissa submitted the
following evidence, viz.:

1. her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);

2. Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);

3. Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente
naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and

4. School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).

She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter. [24]

Feodor and his mother Victoria offered mostly testimonial evidence to show that the spouses Vicente and
Isabel failed to beget a child during their marriage. They testified that the late Isabel, when she was 36 years
old, was even referred to an obstetrician-gynecologist for treatment. Victoria, who was 77 years old at the time
of her testimony, also categorically stated that Marissa was not the biological child of the said spouses who
were unable to physically procreate. [25]

The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, declared Marissa as the legitimate daughter
and sole heir of the spouses Vicente and Isabel. The appellate court: reversed the RTC's ruling holding that
the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed
the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in
the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as
his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his
child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization
or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles
to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:

"Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family
Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It
is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs
of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat
Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's
child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased." [26]

Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago originated from a complaint for recovery of title, ownership
[27]

and possession before the trial court. Respondents therein contended that petitioner is not the daughter of the
decedent Jose and sought to recover from her the 1/3 portion of the subject property pertaining to Jose but
which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death. Respondents sought to prove that petitioner is
not the daughter of the decedent as evidenced by her birth certificate which did not itself indicate the name of
Jose as her father. Citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals and Article 263 of the Civil Code (now Article
170 of the Family Code), petitioner argued that respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally since the
[28]

case was not an action impugning a child's legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership and possession
of property. We ruled in this case that petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code is misplaced and
respondents may impugn the petitioner's filiation in an action for recovery of title and possession. Thus, we
affirmed the ruling of the appellate court that the birth certificate of petitioner Labagala proved that she "was
born of different parents, not Jose and his wife." Citing the aforecited cases of Benitez-Badua and Lim v.
[29]

Intermediate Appellate Court, we stated, viz.:

[30]

This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity
and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates
situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the husband
(or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a
child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.[31]

Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person
is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of
Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. x x x [32]

Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting secondary evidence similar to the proof
admissible under Article 172 of the Family Code in this action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession, we are constrained to rule after a meticulous examination of the evidence on record that all proof
points to the conclusion that herein respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad.
While we ascribe to the general principle that this Court is not a trier of facts, this rule admits of the following
[33]

exceptions where findings of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court, viz.:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact
are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]). [34]

It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring respondent as a legitimate child and
sole heir of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad is one based on a misapprehension of facts.

A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was tampered specifically on
the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the
date of birth of respondent - April 6, 1972 - and the name of the informant -Emma Daño - were both
superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring erasures, the trial court still relied on the prima facie
presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for failure of petitioner to explain how the
erasures were done and if the alterations were due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that respondent's
filiation was duly established by the birth certificate. The appellate court did not agree with this finding and
instead ruled that the birth certificate presented does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil
register as envisioned by the law. We reiterate the relevant pronouncement of the CA, viz.:

x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not identified as either
the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally,
cannot be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as
Emma Daño, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order of the court
Exhibit E be treated as the final judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation. The
final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the child legitimate.
Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her
representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff.
[35]

Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her filiation by showing
that she has enjoyed that open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad, viz.:

x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to
bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her
tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of
Caridad before the GS1S; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and. was appointed
legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both
Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of
the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased. [36]

We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities
consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the informant made the document
questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that
the entries on the date of birth and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which
rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the following
circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
regularity attached to respondent's birth certificate, viz.:

1. The identity of one Emma Daño, whose name was superimposed as the informant regarding the
birth of respondent, remains unknown.

2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant of the Department of Education
in Bulacan, proved that the deceased Caridad did not have any maternity leave during the period
of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984 as shown by her Service Record as an
elementary school teacher at Paombong, Bulacan. This was corroborated by a certification from
Dr. Teofila R. Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent, that she did not file any maternity leave
during her service. No testimonial or documentary evidence was also offered to prove that the
deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.

3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or 13 years into the marriage of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. When respondent was born, Caridad was already 40
years old. There are no hospital records of Caridad's delivery, and while it may have been possible
for her to have given birth at her own home, this could have been proven by medical or non-
medical records or testimony if they do, in fact, exist.

4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for herself in the instant case.

Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not
sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased
spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative parents because
she was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her and her education, she was the
beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and was appointed as her
legal guardian in relation to the estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement
of the estate of Rufino as his legal heirs.

In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romnaldo Villanueva which incisively discussed its parallelisms and
[37]

contrasts with the case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the presence of a similar set of
[38]

circumstances - which were relied upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at bar - does not
establish that one is,a child of the putative parents. Our discussion in the Rivera case is instructive, viz.:
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove that she was
the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate,
income tax returns and an information sheet for membership in the Government Service Insurance
System of the decedent naming her as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified
that she had been reared and continuously treated as Vicente's daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua's alleged parents had been unable
to beget children, the siblings of Benitez-Badua's supposed father were able to rebut all of the
documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was counted against Benitez-Badua
was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten years
of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the
child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the
child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate,
which is a public document, (emphasis ours)
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by
the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants
in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth
certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua that are simply too compelling to
ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as evidence
of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both
claimed to have been born after their alleged parents had lived together childless for several
years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and this case which
ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter, whether
illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged mother Chipongian, was not only
36 years old but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth.
Unlike Chipongian who had been married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been
living childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her
adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly
participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on
August 8, 1980 was invalid. [39]

In view of these premises, we are constrained to disagree with both courts a quo and rule that the confluence
of the circumstances and the proof presented in this case do not lead to the conclusion that respondent is a
child of the deceased spouses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 dated January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 268-M-2001 for Annulment of Document and Recovery of
Possession is hereby ordered DISMISSED. With costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
428 Phil. 628

[ G.R. No. 138961, March 07, 2002 ]

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR.

vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA
CHRISTINA LIYAO

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro
[1]

Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William
Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to
recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled
to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.

On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No.
24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as “the illegitimate
(spurious) child of the late William Liyao” against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.
Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The complaint was later amended to include the allegation
[2]

that petitioner “was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao,”
petitioner having been “recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime." [3]

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:

Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years
at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up
to the time of William’s untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of
Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:

Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City and Manila.
This was with the knowledge of William Liyao’s legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-
Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at
the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and president,
respectively.

Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her husband,
Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and, had never been
in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of
land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her
three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr.
(Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao.
William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy’s birth
certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the
[4] [5]

office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together.[6]

During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and
Corazon together with Billy’s godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyao’s legal staff and their wives while on
vacation in Baguio. Corazon also presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied
[7]

William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other important meetings. During the occasion of
[8]

William Liyao’s last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly
acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, “Hey,
look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son." Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession
[9]

and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct
and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However,
after William Liyao’s death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees
at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings
and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon.

Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao
who were godparents to her children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two
children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with
some housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions like birthdays or
some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couple’s residence and cook for the family. During these
occasions, she would usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of
1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills
and later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she
was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White
Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery
supplies, money for household expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette and
Enrique. During William Liyao’s birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he
was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, “Look,
this is my son, very guapo and healthy.” He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before
[10]

Christmas. He intended to make it “engrande” and “make the bells of San Sebastian Church ring.” [11]

Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended
Mr. Liyao’s funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue
and gray which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph as well as another shirt of lime green as belonging to the
[12] [13] [14]

deceased. A note was also presented with the following inscriptions: “To Cora, Love From William.” Maurita
[15]

remembered having invited the couple during her mother’s birthday where the couple had their pictures taken
while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo
since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. However,
during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any
other man in the house when she usually visited Corazon.

Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew that Billy is the son of her
neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at
Corazon’s house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to
see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City
from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another
miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught
Corazon how to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes’ wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions
among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the
maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is
separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the
house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.

Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter
abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to
live with them up to the time of the latter’s death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond
of Enrique’s half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as
well as in the office. Enrique’s testimony was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the
various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives
were in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.

Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.

Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally
married. Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got
[16]

married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her
parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in San Lorenzo
Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at
the office, her father would change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father
reportedly had trouble sleeping in other people’s homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict
disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. As a
businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered
two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the
office sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two
(2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign
his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the
collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had
personally changed. He was not active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a
milder stroke during the latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days
and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the
office unlike before and tried to spend more time with his family.

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated
from her husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any
annulment of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at
[17]

the company garage. Immediately after the death of Linda’s father, Corazon went to Linda’s office for the
return of the former’s alleged investments with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land
sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able
to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There was one
instance when she was told by the guards, “Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things again.” Linda then
[18]

instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon
Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown
three (3) large suit cases full of men’s clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.

Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been separated. They
resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her father’s death on
December 2, 1975. Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During
[19]

the first heart attack sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were affected and he had
to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet
which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control. Tita Rose
[20]

testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated
that her family never received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an
illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose
did not come across any check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the
house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by Corazon
Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latter’s office.

The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao
from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his
boss at 8:00 o’clock in the morning. At past 7:00 o’clock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin
Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only
after a month that he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office
regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that
as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr.
Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyao’s breast and decided later to
carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda
Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic
Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go
to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia.
Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.

Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. He freely relayed the
information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty.
Quisumbing when he went to the latter’s law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda
said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno
and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the lawyers’ wives. During his employment, as driver of
Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping.

On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as
follows:

(a Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
)

(b Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao;
)

(c Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian
) Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased
William Liyao, entitled to all succesional rights as such; and

(d Costs of suit. [21]

In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that the
deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon
Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter such as
securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and
publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his
legitimate children.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy
rather than the illegitimacy of the child and “the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground
and by proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in
Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code.” The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of
some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and
have not secured legal separation, were seen in each other’s company during the supposed time that Corazon
cohabited with the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the
baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof
of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of
said certificates and considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that
neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was
presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the
same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyao’s signature and
name do not appear thereon.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.

It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues which
relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late
William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May
petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?

We deny the present petition.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. [22]

The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but
is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is
grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[23]

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown
by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
[24]

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses
shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility
of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

  1 By the impotence of the husband;

)

  2 By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not
) possible;

  3 By the serious illness of the husband.

)
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically
impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To
bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, “Contract of Separation,” executed and signed by
[25]

Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might
acquire in the future. [26]

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner
was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that
the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be
invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the
Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
[27]

cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which
the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are
[28]

allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that
would amount o an insult to his memory. [29]

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then
minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate
son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of
[30]

the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child
born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband,
presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and
the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the
presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully
defeated the presumption. [31]

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in
testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?

We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to
contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already
passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings.
Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not
through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a
direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.

Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both
parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear,
competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized
his paternity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. L-10598, February 14, 1958 ]
In the petition to rectify the Certificate of Birth entered under Registry No. 845 (e45) of
the LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA. JOAQUIN P. ROCES
vs.
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR

RICARDO JOAQUIN V. ROCES, represented by the natural guardian and mother Carmen O.
Valdellon, intervenor-appellee.

Ignacio M. Orendain for appellant.

Alcero Law Offices and Eliseo Alampay for appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

On January 7, 1956, appellant Joaquin P. Roces filed, with the Court of FirstInstance of Manila, a petition
alleging that he is married to Pacita Carvajal; that on November 4, 1955, he came to know of the existence of
abirth certificate registered with the Locakl Civil Registrar of Manilsa, certified true copy of which is attached to
said complaint, mentioning him as the father of one Ricardo V. Roces, an illegitimate child; that said
birthcertificate shows, on its face, that it had been executed which neither the knowledge nor the consent of the
petitioner; and that said information with regard to the alleged party of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces is false,
andcontrary to the provisions of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Codeof the Philippines. The prayer in
said petition is of the following tenor:

WHEREFORE, in accordance with the provision of Article 412 of the Civil Code, it is respectfully prayed
unto this Honorable Court that an order beissued directing the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila
to certifythe original Certificate of Birth represented by Annex 'A' of this petition and the entry made
under Registry No. 845 (E-52) of his office, by striking out from the said documents all informations
having reference to the herein petitioner as the father of the child mentioned therein, and that the
surname 'ROCES' appended to the name 'Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces' be also striken from the aforesaid
records.

Petitioner further prays for any other and further relief which this Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable in the premises.

The Local Civil Registrar of Manila filed an answer stating that he had no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth af the averments contrained in the petition by the court, pursuant to Article 412of
said Code, he would effect the correction prayed for in the petition.

Later on, Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Carmen O. Valdellon,
intervened and opposed the petition upon theground that it "involve, not merely correction of clerical errors,
butcontroversial matters" and that "there is another pending action involvingthe name question." After
appropriate proceedings, the lower court subsequently issued an order, dated February 11, 1956, dismissing
the petition upon the authority of Ty Kin Kong Tin vs. Republic of the Philippines, 94 Phil. 321 50 Off. 1077. A
reconsideration of said order having been denied, petitioner now seeks a review thereof by record on appeal.

The Ty Kong Tin case is not in point. Ty Kong Tin sought an amendment of theentry in the record of birth of his
children relative to his and their political status, so that it may state that all of them are citizens of the
Philippines instead of "Chinese as set forth in the birth certificate of said children and in the records of the local
cicivil registrar. On appeal, we reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila granting this relief,
upon the ground that the corrections authorized under Article 412of the Civil Code of the Philippines are purely
"clerical in nature", not those "which may affect the civil status of the nationality or citizenship of the persons
involved, and that "the procedure contemplated" in said Article 412 "is summary in nature" and "cannot cover
cases involving controversial issues." Indeed, the point in controversy in the Ty Kong Tin case was whetheror
not petitioner and his children were Chinewe citizens, as stated in the corresponding certificate of birth and
record of birth, or Filipino citizens,as contended by Ty Kong Tin.

The issue in the case at bar, however, entirely different in nature. Thelegal status of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces
is not in dispute. The pleadings andhis birth certificate show that he was born outside wedlock. The only
question before Us are whether the statements in said birth certificate identifying the alleged father of said child
are valid and whether the LocalCivil Registrar was justified in making the corresponding entry in the records of
his office.

It should be noted, in this connection, that according to said birth certificate, the mother Ricardo Joaquin V.
Roces, is one Carmen O. Valdellon,is said to be "single". The certificate is signed by the physician of a local
hospital and, apart from naming Joaquin P. Roces as the father of the child, it states that said petitioner is
"married". On the back of the instrument there is a sworn statement of Carmen O. Valdellon about the truth of
the data therein contained. Petitioner Joaquin P. Roces did not subscribe either the birth certificate or the
aforementioned verified statement or ally otherdeclaration of similar import. Upon the other hand, section 5 of
Act No. 3753, specifically ordains, in the penultimate paragraph thereof, that:

In the case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the
child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.

Similarly, Article, 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal the name of
the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby
the other parent may be identified.

Thus, both legal provisions explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of a child born outside wedlock
when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of "any
information" or "circumstance" by which he "could be identified."Accordingly, in Crisolo vs. Macadaeg * (G.R.
No. L-7017, decided April 29, 1954), we held that "the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make of record
the paternity of an illegitimate child "upon the information of aperson"; that "records of public officers which are
admissible 'are limited to those matters which the public officer has authority to record,"; that "it is essential
authorize admission of a copy of the record of a privateinstrument that such instrument 'be made in
accordance with statutory requirement"' (see also, 20 Am. Jur., p. 880); was signed by the mother of and that
the certificate of birth of an illegitimate was signed by the mother of the latter, "is undoubtedly incompetent
evidence of fathership of said child."

It appearing on the face of the birth cwtificate of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces, that the alleged father of child has
not signed the instrument, it is clear that statements therein relative to the identity of the father of said child
were, and are, an open violation of the law. Consequently,the local civil registrar—who is duty bound to comply
with said law and is partly charged with its enforcement—had no authority to incorporate said unlawful
statements in the corresponding entry made by him in the records of his office, and that the entry, insofar as
the identity of the father of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces,is null and void, and should be cancelled or corrected.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed and the relief for in appellant's petition hereby granted, without
special pronouncement as to costs. It so ordered.
794 Phil. 149

[ G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016 ]

GLORIA ZOLETA-SAN AGUSTIN

vs.
ERNESTO SALES

DECISION
REYES, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Gloria
[1]

Zoleta-San Agustin (petitioner) assails the Decision dated May 29, 2009 and the Resolution dated August 25,
[2] [3]

2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90302.

Factual Antecedents

On March 14, 1994, brothers Teodoro Sales (Teodoro) (now deceased) and Ernesto Sales (Ernesto)
(collectively, the plaintiffs) filed an action for the judicial approval of their recognition as the illegitimate children
of the late Louis C. Fernandez (Louis) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil
Case Nu. Q-94-19781 and raffled to Branch 110. Subsequently, an Amended Complaint was filed on March
[4]

13, 1996, before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 225, where it was alleged that Ernesto and Teodoro were
born in Pasay City on March 20, 1948 and October 22, 1943, respectively. They are the illegitimate children of
Louis and his common-law wife named Epitacia Sales (Epitacia) who was a house helper in the Fernandez
household. Louis and his legal wife, Marie Louise Fernandez (Marie Louise) (Spouses Fernandez), a French
[5] [6]

national, did not have any child. According to the plaintiffs, Louis formally recognized them as his children by
Epitacia in two public documents bearing his thumb marks, viz: (1) a notarized document dated November 11,
1980 jointly executed by Louis and Epitacia formally recognizing the plaintiffs as their children; and (2) a
document solely executed by Louis on December 2, 1980, dominated as Acknowledgement of Children. [7]

The plaintiffs, having no knowledge of any relatives of Spouses Fernandez, directed the action against
unknown defendants. However, on May 30, 1994, the petitioner raised her opposition. She alleged in her
Amended Answer filed on July 26, 1994 that she is the niece of Louis and that the Spouses Fernandez
informally adopted her as their child when she was only 2 years old. She insisted that the father of the plaintiffs
is Corpus Micabalo (Corpus), the former houseboy of the Fernandez household. [8]

One of the principal allegations in the amended answer of the petitioner is that the documents presented by the
plaintiffs to sustain the complaint were spurious. These documents of recognition were forwarded by the RTC
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. Bayani Palad (Palad), a Fingerprint Examiner of
the NBI, compared the thumbprint of Louis on the documents of recognition with the other documents
containing his thumb marks. Thereafter, Palad concluded that all the thumbprints in the disputed documents
belong to Louis. [9]

On February 17, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion to allow deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) Testing on Louis who
already died on January 1, 1987. The RTC, in its Resolution dated June 4, 2001, denied the petitioner's
motion. Subsequently, the presentation of evidence proceeded. [10]
On April 15, 2002, the RTC issued an order denying the admission of the photographs presented by the
petitioner seeking to prove that she was treated by the Spouses Fernandez as their own child. The petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order of denial, but it was denied by the RTC on July 10, 2002. [11]

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA ascribing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction against the RTC judge for declaring the photographs
irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of recognition submitted before the RTC. In a Decision dated [12]

September 29, 2003, the CA denied the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that even if the photographs were
admitted, they remained to be immaterial and irrelevant to the issue of recognition of the plaintiffs as the
illegitimate children of Louis.[13]

Teodoro died on July 23, 1997 and was substituted by his mother Epitacia who subsequently died on March
19, 2004 leaving Ernesto the lone respondent in the present case.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, the RTC in a Decision dated July 12, 2007 ruled in favor of the recognition of the
[14]

plaintiffs as the illegitimate children of Louis. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs' prayer for judicial
approval of the recognition made by [Louis] during his lifetime. Accordingly, [Ernesto] and
[Teodoro] (deceased) are hereby declared the illegitimate children of the deceased [Louis] with the
appurtenant rights of illegitimate children under the law.

SO ORDERED. [15]

The petitioner elevated the adverse judgment of the RTC before the CA. The parties filed their respective
briefs. The petitioner filed her Reply Brief (with Application for DNA Testing of Louis). Ernesto filed his
[16]

Comment objecting to the proposed DNA Testing. In a Resolution dated February 10, 2009, the CA deferred
[17] [18]

its determination of the petitioner's application for DNA Testing.

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision dated May 29, 2009, the CA found the appeal devoid of merit. The CA gave due weight to the
[19]

deeds of acknowledgment executed by Louis. The self-serving denial of the petitioner did not prevail over the
presumption of regularity accorded to the deeds of recognition in favor of the plaintiffs. Quoted hereunder is the
dispositive portion of the decision of the CA, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated 12 July 2007 of the [RTC],
Branch 225, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-19781, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. [20]

On June 22, 2009, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the CA failed to act on her
[21]

application for DNA Testing despite its previous Resolution on February 10, 2009 that it would treat the same
as one of the assigned errors in the appeal. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution [22]

dated August 25, 2009.

The Issues

Undaunted, the petitioner urges the allowance of her Petition for Review on Certiorari enumerating the
following as errors committed by the CA:
I.

THE CA GROSSLY MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS AND MANIFESTLY IGNORED THE

UNDISPUTED AND OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER WHICH,
IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.
 A. The CA gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the two "notarized" documents
submitted by Ernesto despite the petitioner's overwhelming contrary documentary evidence.

B. The CA gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of Ernesto's so-called expert
witness.

II.

THE CA ARBITRARILY REFUSED AND/OR FAILED TO RULE ON THE PETITIONER'S

APPLICATION FOR DNA TESTING DESPITE ITS EARLIER PRONOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL
RESOLVE THE SAME AS AN ASSIGNED ERROR.

A. The CA's failure to act on the petitioner's Application for DNA Testing is a substantial
departure from this Honorable Court's decisions favoring DNA Testing. Moreover, it is
contrary to the CA's very own Resolution dated February 10, 2009 wherein it undertook to
resolve the petitioner's application in the resolution of the main appeal. The exercise of the
Court's power of review and supervision is, thus, proper and necessary under the
circumstances. [23]

Ruling of the Court

The Court denies the instant petition and upholds the assailed decision and resolution of the CA.

The petitioner calls for the relaxation of the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari. It is a well-settled principle that the findings of fact of the CA especially those upholding
the trial court are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. The following
are the recognized exceptions to the said rule:
(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(c) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) when the [CA], in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(g) where the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
(h) where the findings of fact of the [CA] are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere
conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner
are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on
absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. x x x. (Citation omitted)
[24]

None of these enumerated exceptions exists in the case at bar. Nonetheless, the Court will take up the
petitioner's other assignment of errors to the extent that they touch upon legal issues and in order to support
the Court's ruling that the RTC and CA's factual findings are sufficiently justified by evidence and
jurisprudence.

At the center of the present controversy are the documents executed by Louis evidencing his voluntary
recognition of Teodoro and Ernesto as his illegitimate children. The petitioner, in an effort to oppose the judicial
approval of Teodoro and Ernesto's status as illegitimate children, mainly argued that the subject documents
are spurious. The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
 (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. [25]

These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate children. In order to cast doubt as to
[26]

the authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by Ernesto, the petitioner purported that the
circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the said documents are highly suspicious thereby
warranting the overturn of the presumption of regularity in favor of these documents. The petitioner claimed
that during the execution and notarization of the documents, Louis could still write, rendering incredible the
mere affixing of his thumbprints to the contested documents. However, Ernesto testified before the RTC that
[27]

Louis was no longer capable of writing his name as he was already blind and bedridden at the time he affixed
his thumb mark to the document dated November 11, 1980. The witnesses to the document were Margarita
Almeda, the hairdresser of Louis' sister, and Romeo Gadones, Teodoro's acquaintance. A thumb mark has
[28]

been repeatedly considered as a valid mode of signature. The Court, in the case of Dr. Yason v. Arciaga, [29]

held that a signature may be made by a person's cross or mark. [30]

There being no cogent reason to deviate from the conclusion of the RTC finding the testimony of Ernesto
worthy of belief, the Court adopts such testimony and considers it against the contention of the petitioner. It is
settled in a catena of cases that the findings of fact of trial courts are given weight on appeal because they are
in a better position to examine the real evidence, and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and therefore
discern whether they are telling the truth.[31]

The other inconsistencies cited by the petitioner are of no importance and insufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity in favor of the notarized documents. A notarized document is a public document and
as such it enjoys the presumption of regularity which can only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence.
It serves as a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its
[32]

existence and due execution. The bare allegations of the petitioner cannot qualify as clear and convincing
[33]

evidence to overturn such presumption.

The petitioner maintained that the real father of Teodoro and Ernesto is Corpus. She presented various
evidence like school report card and death certificate wherein Teodoro's surname followed that of Corpus. The
use of Corpus' surname by Teodoro does not in itself negate the illegitimate filiation of Teodoro and Ernesto.
As correctly observed by the CA, Louis' existing marriage to Marie Louise must have prevented him from
making any declaration that would have exposed his relationship with Epitacia. The use of Louis' surname by
his children during the lifetime of Marie Louise would run counter to his intention to cover such relationship. It is
no less than the putative father who voluntary recognized that Teodoro and Ernesto are his illegitimate
children. It is emphatically underscored that it is the law and only the law that determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for one's legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. [34]

All told, the authenticity of the documents of recognition executed by Louis which is the core of the present
controversy, as well as the credibility of the expert witness in the person of Palad, are questions of fact for they
involve the examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. There exists a
question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts while a
question of fact concerns itself with the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. To reiterate, a petition for review on
[35]

certiorari covers only questions of law.

The petitioner sought the conduct of DNA Testing to resolve the issue of paternity. However, the RTC already
arrived at a definitive conclusion that Teodoro and Ernesto are the illegitimate children of the deceased Louis
rendering the petitioner's request for DNA Testing immaterial.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2009 and the Resolution dated August 25, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90302 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
406 Phil. 449

[ G.R. No. 125901, March 08, 2001 ]

EDGARDO A. TIJING AND BIENVENIDA R. TIJING

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH DIVISION) AND ANGELITA DIAMANTE

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child
of petitioners.

Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born
on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner
Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo,
Manila.

According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job.
Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She
also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care
of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.

When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith
proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida
that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house
after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her
barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.

Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react to the
disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it,
Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other
places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.

Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly
the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida
lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after
four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late
Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the
[1]

boy despite her demand to do so.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son.
To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin
Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April
27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records. The second
[2]
witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered
John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private
part against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity.
Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and
that he and Angelita were not blessed with children. [3]

For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave
birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong,
Manila. She added, though, that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez. She said
[4]

the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil
registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.

On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also held that the minor
[5]

and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners. The trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition

for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately release
from her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his
person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon
receipt hereof.

Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the decision of this
Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo
Tijing Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.

SO ORDERED. [6]

Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal. Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the
[7]

order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully
surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing. [8]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate
court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by
Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court
erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person, and [9]

disposed of the case, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is hereby
REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and
directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to respondent Angelita
Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said respondent at the time of the filing of the
petition herein.

SO ORDERED. [10]

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the above quoted decision which was denied. Hence, the instant petition
alleging:

I
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY
SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE
PROVEN.

II
 THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR "HABEAS CORPUS" AND
DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS
PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT. [11]

In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?

(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the
son of petitioners?
We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the
[12]

latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving
minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody
over a child. It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant
[13]

and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.

In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be
resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named
John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who between
Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor's biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that
two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. [14]

Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the
person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said
minor.

True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented
to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order. But since the
[15]

conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on
the record to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.

A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to
establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after
the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with
Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she
claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years.
The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or
discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son.
Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas
admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife,
Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with
private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez
instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law,
the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in
default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed
with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated
[16]

Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is
false because even private respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife". This false entry puts to
[17]

doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two
had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial court's
[18]

conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of
the minor and petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and
the signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of
habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for [19]

identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-
NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
[20]

evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
[21]

rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it
[22]

is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.