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North-West Frontier.

Being a complete narrative, with specially prepared maps, of the various risings of the Frontier Tribes in the Tochi Valley, the Swat Valley, the Country of the Mohmands and Mamunds, and the Country of the Afridis and Orakzai and of the several punitive campaigns undertaken against these tribes, as well as the two minor expeditions sent against the Utman Khels and the BunervA/als: the whole covering a period extending from the niiddle of June 1897 to the end of

January, 1898.
(Compiled from the Special

War Correspondence

of the





a b a b a D



23—27 PART The Rising in II...— The Attack on the Malakand II. PART The Rising Chapter. 38-44 45—47 IV. Landaki VIII. — The Relief of Chakdara — Further — The Action at — 48-51 events in the Swat Country 52-54 55-58 VII.stack Annex s CONTENTS. VI.— The Malakand V. 29-33 34-37 —The Situation in the Swat Country — Renewed Attacks on the Malakand Field Force . III. I. in the Tochi Valley. the Swat Valley. I. I. II. Page. The Area of Disturbanxe. — The Maizar Outrage — The Official Account — The Work of Destruction 1-9 10. INTRODUCTION. — Concluding Operations in the Swat Valley 59-63 2017207 .— The Pimitive Expedition I — 22 V.17 18 III.

.... — The Rising of the Orakzai II.. 174 185 . .... . . 224 v.... • .. .— The Re-occupation of the Khyber and the Expedition the Bazar Valley . The Rising of the Afridis and the Orakzai.. — Saragheri and Gulistan. — With General Elles's Division VII. .. .. . .. — The Relief of the Kurram Valley Forts Attack on our Samana Forts ... —The Plan of Campaign further developed IX. .. .......— The Plan of Campaign completed . — 173 . into ... .. 80 — 90 91—94 95-98 99 — 106 PART IV...— The VI.. Forts by the Afridis . . 22S— 238 . Page...... .. . . . .... 150—157 — Crossing Dargai the ..... III. —The Brewing of the Storm . Amir . 132— 142 143 —The Tirah Punative of the Expedition VII.. — Guerilla Warfare — a Heavy Casualty List XII.— The Attitude VIII. — With General Wodehouse's Brigade VI.....— Prompt Reprisals III. 200-210 211—227 XIII. .... — Lifting the Purdah from Tirah XI. I.IV.. of . I.......„ . X. — With General Jeffreys's Brigade V.. — 1S4 — 199 .^ .. . Samana — The Capture and Abandonment .11 PART The Chapter. —The Raid on Shabkadr Fort — The Mohmand Expedition 65-68 69—74 75-79 II. — 116 — 123 — 131 — 149 . Rising of the Mohmands and the Mamunds....... 15S— 166 167 —The Re-capture of Dargai— Gallantry of the Gordons X.. — Further Operations against the Mamunds IV. 107 113 — 112 — The Capture of the Khyber III... 117 IV..

...„ xxxvi .. APPENDICES.V Ill TART Two Minor Chapter. ><- ..— The Utman Khel Expedition II.— The and Mamund Despatches xvii — — xxvi xvi xliii Tirah Field Force xxvii VII. Page.. v. ..— The Tochi Field Force III. 239—244 245-250 The Expedition against the Bunerwals .— The Samana and Kurram Valley Despatches VIII.. V. .. I. vi viii — — vii IV..— The Malakand and Swat Valley Despatches .— The Tochi Valley Despatches .— The Mohmand VI..— The Rewards for Maizar i & iii ii 11..— The Tirah Despatches IX... . Page. Expeditions. I.. — XXXV — xliv — Ixii Ixiii — Casualty List .


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X. tfie -x-x.Scale— English Mil —Indicates tlie boundary between the Punjab proper and tribal lerritor/. ODo o a t a Proposed Halliffay tines. demarcates tha rarious tracts of country inhsbiisd by 1 .roughly -x-x-x-/" different tribes.

the The disturbed area on the true one which we guard and protect. sections of the larger ones with different names.000 first-rate fighting men. on the northern flank of the road from There are many other minor tribes and Kohat to Thull. commencing on the Indus. mention them is The above are our immediate neighbours. of From Waziristan on of the left Bimer on the right a stretch Simla.INTRODUCTION. and the dates of the various risings indicate an identity of design and a unity purpose never before discernible in " the history of frontier disturbances. it From this point the frontier line follows the line of mountains: takes a long sweep to the north and then bends round to the west and south. then come the Khyber Pass and the Afridis. the Orakzai. and are the . and then north-west up to the The tribes which immediately face us on at the top of the semicircle at Dirbund. has been of involved in the outbreak. namely. and lastly. the Bunerwals. the are. more obviously than in any other respect. enclosing the Peshawar Valley. Utman Khels. and it completes a rough semicircle at Kohat. Low in an article in "commences with the mountains on the right bank of the Indus near Dirbund. but to only confusing. as Sir Service Club in George White said in a speech at the United by 200. THE AREA OF DISTURBANCE. this frontier line." wrote Sir Robert the National Review. more than 400 miles our border- land. the Indian Frontier disturbances of 1897-98 differ from to all previous border troubles. taking them in their order. where the river emerges from the hills into the plains. frontier. the Swats. inhabited. I N the extent of the area aftected. and the Mohmunds. From Kohat our frontier goes west to Thull head of the Kurram Valley.

the attack on Shabkudhr on the 9th August the threatening attitude of the Af ridis and Orakzai on the 18th August. and the flanking position of Fort Lockhart and minor posts on the Samana Eange.— ( vi ) prinoijml tribes. as follows: page aflFords a comprehensive view of the The actual tribal outbreaks and their dates were The Maizar outrage on the 10th of June the attack on the Malakand and Chakdara positions on the 27th July. and its then Peshawar with outpost of Jamrood guarding the entrance of Khyber Pass . Thereafter the narrative of events turns from tribal of and follows the punitive operations the Goverumeut of >< . India's forces. the Khyber Pass. then. the forts of Abazai.' ' . Shabkudhr and Michni. and the attack on the Khyber Pass on the . the road to Chitral. aggression." first The map facing the whole affected area. These posts were all occupied by troops or police. — the head-quarters of the Corps of Guides in advance of it in the hills Malakand position with its outpost at Chakdara. further round the the semicircle. (prior to the outbreak) them from the top of the semicircle. and they led the others with tliem to a great extent in such risings as we are dealing with. " — taking the Our positions for the defence of this line. to the station of we come Kurram were held by tribal levies. while beyond them. crossing the spur of the hills which run down Kohat with its outposts on the road to the "Valley at Hangu and ThuU. then. : 23rd August. and the Kurram Valley towai'ds the river Indus. have been Hoti Mardan.



Browne. C. What exactly occurred there was not explained in the first hasty despatches. which is somewhat to the south of Sheranni. 1st Sikhs. v/as in charge of the was to fix a site for a new outpost beyond Sheranni. The three Officers killed were Colonel A. the affair Naturally enough the head-quarters in first account of the Tochi which reached details. A. . The party got as far as Maizar.PART I.A. and the little force was suddenly rushed by a large body had tribesmen.. It appeared that Mr. Cruickshank.. from the men Bombay Colonel Bunny. A desperate fight followed. twenty-two men and two followers being killed. Bunny. and twelve sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. The Fi'ontier disturbances of 1897 began. as has been briefly shown. and also to realise a fine which had been imposed upon the local tribesmen some months back. THE TOCHI VALLEY AFFAIR. Gee. 6 Mountain Battery.. on the 10th of June. cowardly and treacherous attack was made at 2 when the troops of were at rest. M. when a startling outrage was committed on a British party in the Tochi Valley. it was unfortunately certain that the was a heavy one tliree British Officers. The object in view commanding the Tochi Column. Gee. and Lieutenant H. Cassidy J.m. with an escort of 300 1st Sikhs and 1st Punjab Infantry. while three other British Officers and twenty-four men were wounded. but Mr. Captain J. F. in a short preliminary report. two guns of No. left Datta Khel on the morning of the 10th June. nine miles beyond Datta Khel. and Higgiusou and Surgeon-Captain of the 1st Sikhs. Lieutenant C. C. Seton-Browne. THE MAIZAR OUTRAGE. stated that a p. E. and halted. the escort to beat a retreat. R. India from gave but scanty casualty list but . 6 Bombay of the native ranks Mountain Battery ^ while the wounded were Lieutenant A. CIIAFTER I. L. Political Officer in the Tochi Valley. both of No. escort. 1st Punjab Infantry.A. C.

6 wounded. lost. with himself. for : — wounded No. but it seemed quite possible to carry . The in tics Political Officer's reference to the cowardly and treacherous manner to a species of tribal tac- which the original attack was made. through which the Tochi River The Darwesh Khel Waziris had hitherto behaved extremely well. 12 killed. and that ammunition was running Captain Cooper ordered out two companies of infantry with a fresh supply of ammuni- and sent with them the only two British Officers who. that the troops had been attacked. the True. 13 wounded 1st Punjab Infantry. . Cooper. 8 killed. . who stated short. Captain H. and as portions of the tribe dwelt in British territory. Two followers were also killed. the gathering of tribesmen about the camp. The moun. Tlie tribesmen concerned in the affair belonged entirely to the Madda Khel runs. from the casualties. their British Officers killed or wounded. During Sir William Lockhart's expedition against the Mahsud Waziris. the tribesmen desisting from the pursuit and not tion. had been left at Datta Khel. These reinforcements enabled the retirement to be completed. Meanwhile was clear that their punishment would have to be an exemplary one. A. 2 sowars native rank were distributed as follows be attacked. The losses among the 1st Punjab Cavalry. 1st Sikhs. but the guns were brought safely into Uatta Khel. and one other was wounded. it was not expected that they would give trouble. was in news he received was at their 5 o'clock. sub-section of the Darwesh Khel Waziris. they showed no disposition to join with their fellow-tribesmen. 3 wounded 1st Sikhs. They hold the country Da war Valley. tain battery had four mules killed and five wounded. and the when a sowar arrived. and then the sudden rush of others lying hidden near at hand. Until more complete information arrived it judge how it came about that an escort of such a size was not possible to was surprised. venturing near the post. namely. pointed not uncommon on the border. Conjecture was therefore I'ife as to why at the western end of the the men of the Madda Khel it should so suddenly have committed them- selves. the season was not very favourable for movcmeut of a large force. 2 killed.( 2 ) and they were followed first for four miles along the road to Datta Kliel. the British Officers all six seemed to have been the were killed or wounded. command at that post. Nineteen commissariat mules were while the cavalry detachment had three horses killed. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery. the appearance of headmen Judging first to professing friendliness.

Sheranni. Gee. . on the morning of the 10th June. The position was the Officers had finished their lunch. with only the cavalry detachment (12 sabres). from Abbottaof native infantry. It the pursuit before the river bank was reached opposite was clearly established that the tribesmen had planned the latter attack beforehand. the British Officers Sadda Khan had meanwhile provided and also for the Mussalman sepoys in of. Nine rifles only were lost. and all six were shot down. Malik of of the tribesmen. fire apparently unsuitable for defence. The troops were halted near the village. and it The number of their assailants was calculated that a thousand men were engaged in Sheranni. rapidly increased. as fresh parties appeared from the hills between Sheranni and Datta Khel. a few miles away.— ( 3 ) out punitive measures with a small column. some five hundred tribesmen joining in the attack. and other local headmen. The troops did not reach the post Their march was necessarily a slow one. and they were encumbered with their dead and wounded. just as was opened upon them from the village towers. with his escort. following : — . For the moment it was decided to immediately reinforce the garrison of Tochi with one battalion and to move an additional regiment to Bannu. number wounded. proceeded to Datoi. nothing having occurred on the road from Datta Khel to excite suspicion regarding the attitude He was met at Maizar by Sadda Khan. moves were therefore ordered 3rd Sikhs. The Waziris were said to have lost ninety killed and a considerable were four mullahs and a malik. At 2 o'clock. the Political Officer. bad to Kohat. It was satisfactory Among the former to learn that the . accompanied by some of the maliks. whose bearing was quite friendly. arrived at Maizar. Gee. as al- ready stated. This was partaken the party off their guard. The visit was an uneventful one^ and the party returned food for all to Maizar. from Kohat and the 14th from Bannu to Tochi Valley Sikhs from Ferozepore to Bannu 2nd Punjab Infantry. as even and such a show of hospitality' threw among the Pathans the lives of guests are usually held sacred for the time being. and Mr. until 11 o'clock at night. The 33rd Punjab Infantry. which spoke well for the sepoys. Within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the first intelligence : the following further particulars arrived regarding the disaster Mr. almost at once. and the troops began to retire over the hills in the direction of Sheranni. the escort. At the same time a continuous fire from all sides was directed against the sepoys. as a running fight had to be maintained for four miles.

and a portion of them who were not. The men had but thereafter to fall back two miles. reinforced by the two companies from Thus. Gee. Later information received at fully confirmed the first affair at Army Head-Quarters from the Tochi in the estimate of the behaviour of the troops Maizar.zni to Bannu. up to the Amir's boundary. had already been fixed on as the site of the most westerly levy post in the Tochi. and it was mainly for the purpose of finally selecting the site for this post that the Political Officer pro- ceeded there on this occasion. The Madda Khels occupy the Tochi Valley from Sheranni. to discuss the question of the distribution of a fine which was outstanding against the tribe. Sheranni and Maizar are on the main Tochi is route from Birmal or Glia. a fairly complete idea of the circumstances of the disaster was now obtainable. almost immediately the tribesmen opened It appeared that Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny. they quite held their own against the attack. man- aged to issue orders under which the retirement from the neighbour- hood of the towers and walls of the village was effected. but when Datta Khel. concerned in the attack live in the Kazha. from a number of separate reports. eleven miles from Datta Khel Camp. He had also arranged to meet all the Madda Khel Maliks of the Tochi there. as a tribe. and the tribe under agreeto a col- ment to keep this road open. but this disorder. Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny in command. which of the is the name given lection of villages at the mouth Shawal Algad. bringing up more ammunition. was made without Not on-ly so. Maizar. as no defensive position offered. "The escort consisted of 200 rifles 1st Sikhs. 100 rifles 1st Punjab . Political Officer. to Sheranni and Maizar was the work of the Madda Khel section of the Utmanzai Darwesh Khels.— ( 4 ) woundetl Officers and men were on the whole doing well. Tochi. straightforward account of the affair from one of the few survivors of the little party of Officers presented the events in a more con: nected form and in a clearer light "The recent attack on the military escort which accompanied Mr. nine miles above Datta Khel. the troops faced about and shelled Sheranni village. Shortness of ammuni- tion alone compelled further retirement. with Lieutenant Higginson. hit in the knee. though fire. mortally wounded. but the following simple. Lieutenant Higeinson was severely wounded in the left arm Lieutenant SetonBrowne had a flesh wound in the thigh Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was . which is a northern tributary of the Tochi. .

Tliis was taken up on all sides. This spot was jiointed out by the maliks themselves as the best place to camp.. the fine was said by the maliks to have been settled amicably food was provided bv the leading maliks for all the Mussalman sepoys. and a fusillade at once commenced.A. Maizar consists of a number of cultivated terraces gradually sloping down to the Shawal Algad.m. directed at the British Officers. E. as there was plenty of room. about 2 Colonel Bunny ordered play for the villagers to listen to. All necessary precautions were pickets and sentries placed were considered necessary.A. but as they were in an exposed position the two British Officers afforded . behind made themselves comfortable under the "The Political Ofiicer returned about 12 o'clock . taking As soon as this the sowars. with Lieutenant Cruickshauk. G Bombay Mountain Battery undex' Captain Browne. o-arden wall in a field clear of the trees. Lieutenant Seton-Browne was hit in the leg at the second or third shot.. the sepoys in the meantime falling in at once and taking up positions. and water was available near. and accompanied by some of the maliks. and Colonel Bunny was then opened mortally fire wounded almost immediately after. them and not to pile them. left which lies a few miles further on in the Tochi. The lane runs straight from the kotal to the camping ground. which is close to a threshing-floor and then curves round to the north to the hot. The men were ordered to keep their arras with taken — cruards. the question of . 1st Punjab Cavalry. visited Datoi. fotir gnns No. a man was seen waving a drawn sword on a tower in the Drepilari kot.. tree. on the part of the tribesthe pipers to tune. attempted to rush them. while those trees.. R. The escort marched from camp Datta Kliel at 5 a. was settled Mr. Gee and Captain Browne. After lunch. and after halting twice on the road reached Maizar at 9-30. village. The guns and did great execution among a party of men who an easy mark for the men in the bagh. and 12 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry. who wei'e together under a and the Sikhs.. The guns were jjlaced close to a The approach to this camping ground is over a small kotal and down a narrow laue through fields bounded by low stone walls. and the villagers suddenly cleared off towards the A single shot was fired. Medical Officer. slightest suspicion of unfriendliness p. and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy.( 5 ) Infantn. and there was not the men. and they played one Just as they began another.m.uncTor Liontenant Seton-Browne. apparently as a signal. and the men were halted on the highest terrace at an open space under some trees not far from a hot belonging to the Drepilari section of the Madda Khels.

the guns limbei'ing movement was made up and going first up "As from allow the the Infantry retired. The Waziris were.( G ) Captain Browne was hit at about the fifth shot and Lieutenant all Cruickshank shot dead almost directly after. bringing out w^ater for the sepoys and supplying charpoys for the wounded. behaved well. The rear-guard reached camp at 12-30 p. ' ' Once the it aifair commenced it no doubt became a matter of ghaza but does not appear that the nmllahs had previously worked . and one or two of them were being premeditated. but a stand was made round the corner of the bagh to to retire.m. the retirement was orderly and time was given for all the wounded to get safely out on to the plain. successfully held in check by a mixed party of 1st Sikhs and 1st Punjab Infantry. Successive positions were taken up on the six ridges which stretch from Maizar to the plain above Shei'anni. A. I. The Khiddar Khels. Lieutenant Higginson was shot in the ariu a second time while crossing the hills. the village of Sheranni were shelled. however.m. E. and the heights and check. and the guns had expended their ammunition... a back towards the the lane. The force eventually took up a good position about a mile from the last ridge about 5-30 p. in IJ hours and arrived at in the meanwhile kept thoroughly in and the guns were now got to work again. a distance of about two miles. the Waziris came out in great numbers all sides. minutes of the first shot. These reinforcements covered nine miles 6-15 P. road. This put an end to the business and no farther opposition was met with. One Subadar (1st P. and not Mussalmans. kotal.M. This was within five and as the enemy's fire did not slacken. The enemy are reNearly all these were Sikhs ported to have lost 00 killed and many wounded.) " all The causes of this treacherous attack are not at present clear. and the latter retired up the kotal when every one was over. wounded men In the meantime Lieutenant Higgin- son was shot through the arm and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy in the knee. It is known killed. Colonel Bunny and Captain Browne died on the and 22 men were killed and 25 wounded. and waited there until reinforcements (two companies of the 1st Sikhs) with more ammunition under Lieutenant deBrett. but the circumstances point to its that some of the maliks were implicated. and though the Waziris ft)llowed up in a most deter- mined fashion and occupied all available positions on the hills round. who live " The tribesmen had been on the Tochi below Sheranni. arrived from Datta Khel.

Our troops were rested on the ground between. blowing up the mullah. I. One N. mosque. 1st Sikhs. ammunition. and 60 to 70 picked marksmen. and all the Officers were under the trees to the left front near the nullah. . shank was hit by a marksman on the wall. O. the flash neld hospital. and the Veterinary stores fell into the enemy's hands. when orders were received to retire. conducted the retirement the arrival of Lieutenant deBrett who tlu'ew 28 shells into Sheranni. hospital mules stampeded. He was shot dead and the wheels were not recovered. of the battery was hit by a '450 express bullet. Pickets were out at the front and and the guns were unlimbered at the right rear 10 yards from the At the set-off Captain The mules were unsaddled. up both wheels. The 1st Sikhs and the 1st P. the latter with They also held the rising ground and some huts and a tower in the rear. and started to rejoin the Battery. The Colonel Lieutenant Cruickguns opened fire with case shot on the nullah.-C. who was waving a green into the air. The mule was shot dead. 10-foot wall. Gee. single-handed and carried it to the gun mule. so he carried it to the relief mule. left. Then he went back and brought in Lieutenant Cruickshank's body.000 rounds of The ammunition and M. and were commencing common having exhausted shrapIn limbering up a -wheel a nel. One shell struck a flag.-H. but raised himself up on one knee and continued directing the fire on the nullah till hit a second The guns fired reversed shrapnel when the case shot was exhausted. also captured a helio which they now from the top of till Subadar Narain Singh. Browne and Lieutenant Higginson were hit by the first volley and Bunny was struck shortly afterwards while talking to Mr. mule was shot. but Havildar Amardin ran back under fire and picked time and killed. 72ibs." To complete the story the following roughly written notes of the action at Maizar were received privately from Datta Khel :— and had lined " The enemy held a nullah in front in great strength the village walls and a 10-foot high wall on the right. All the bodies were brought in by fiieudiies. eaten food with The fact that they attacked a party who had just them— contrary to all Patlian codes of honour — renders the matter additionally hard to explain.( 7 ) up the tribesmen. SurgeonCaptain Cassidy was hit by a man in the tower. reai^. so 4. each. The enemy a hill. Cruickshank's orderly picked up a gun weighing 200ft>s. Captain Browne and Lieutenant Cruickshank doubled to the guns and Captain Browne was hit immediately by a marksman on the wall. on the yards from the walls on the right.

under orders issued by Lieutenants Higginsou and Seton-Browne who . One of the lead began coolly loading spite of the heavy Salutris of the battery. Gee i-endered great to the and conveyed the order hit. directed the retirement. Narain Singh. though mortally the gallantry shown by the troops. each containing 600 rounds). He told oil" seven men to fetch the boxes. Captain Browne. and . E. named Kevval. but escaped being He has it that over 100 of the to be enemy were killed. they were Sikhs and Punjabis. and their wounded are reported dying All was now known but as tliat could be of the outrage." retii'e- ment. must come fii'st on the list not merely for personal gallantry.. In order to prevent a rush while the mules were being got ready the native gunners tired powder It has already been related how the gunners carried a gun charf^es. severed artery. selves. and limber when the mules were wounded.some of them even up spare mules with the over-coats of the detachfire. These were opened and the packets at once distributed among the two companies of the regiment. staggered to his feet and fought his bullet cruas until hit by a second which killed him. Subadar Narain Singh. Sepoy Shiv Singh made two journeys for this am- munition and was twice wounded.A. tlie details known of the main incidents emerged there was much to say of Colonel Bunny. each of the two guns. Havildar-Major Mahomed Ismail and Havildar Nehal Singh particularly distinguished themThe native drivers vied with the gunners in their gallantry. owing to a carefully after the withdrawal of his guns. as he knew the sepoys had only twenty-two rounds in their pouches.C s ) Sikhs and Patluins were alike assistance throughout mutilated. Mr.t from loss of blood. and they succeeded in carrying six back to the firing line. R. guns for the daily. Officer. wounded thouo-li at the outset. 1st Sikhs. and There were only sixteen shells for their conduct was beyond praise. and these were quickly expended as the tribes- men were within a hundred yards. as senior Native had the burden of carrying out the details of the retirement. Lieutenant Cruickshank. but Captain Browne ordered them to ment in the mules away as the risk of casualties was too great. looked fair. No sooner had the attack begun than he recognized the im- mense importance of saving the reserve ammunition (ten boxes. As to the men with the section of the battery. They assisted in carrying ofi" the wounded.A. regardless of the enemy's approach. but for the military qualities he displayed. As to the infantry. after being shot down. did his best to dress Captain Browne's wound.

and finally he shared in the desperate rear-guard 1st Sikhs. hand-to-hand fighting taking place.. who assisted the enemy were pressing closely upon the troops and last. but adinirablj.. He. gallantry shown was so universal that it is difficult to men Singh. I. himescaping untouched Bugler Bala Singh. 1st P. and not a man budged until the order was given that they might fall back. He was a young Officer. then with a rifle taken from a dead man doing some fighting. I. who carried Lieutenant Seton-Browne . He was twice shot but his wounds did not interfere with his cool discharge of in the leg. The enemy closed with them. the tribesmen could not force their way through this small body of de- termined meji. the Victoi'ia Cross if such a decoration were given to the Native Jamadar Sherzad surely earned Army. a party of three He self first of all carried Lieutenant Higginson away. Subadar Nawab Khan. ing the reserve ammunition. ]st Sikhs. Siibadar Sundar Singli. who killed several of the enemy with the bayonet. was among the last to leave the ground. 1st P.. fight. 1st P. then possessing him- of a rifle he covered by his fire men carrying Surgeon-Captain Cassidy to a place of comparative safety. 1st P.r \veie 9 ) both suffeiing severely from tlieir wounds. Chief Coming now to the rank and single file the out.. It was here that the great majority of the casualties Sundar Singh was killed. formed up a party of sepoys to cover the retirement. same Officer when during the retirement I. duty on the way to Datta Khel. sacrificing himself in order to give more time for the retirement to be eflfected. and afterwards distributing packets of cartridges among the sepoys whose supply was running out. but not least. the . > .. who first assisted in sav. Sepoy Allayar Khan. He was severely wounded in the affray. having entered the service in 1883. I. occurred. 1st P. to the first defensive position taken up Lance-Naik Assa Singh. He did his work must be bracketed with Narain Singh. with his bi'other Sundar and Jamadar Sherzad. who drove ofl" a party of tribesmen by shooting two of them at close quarters and then with a few comrades charging them with the bayonet. Sepoy Nurdah. self among those who distinguished themselves were Lance-Naik Ishar I.

( 10 ) C II APT Eli II. which the tribe it. Madda Khel is It lies two miles beyond the village of Sheranni. and you had hill tracts of I concurred generally with me that the post should be somewhere between Sheranni and Maizar. if possible. 1 have explained the circumstance con- nected with the realisation of the fine in intention of discussing Honda Kam's with case. Under ordinary believed it circumstances. This was an additional leason for I going up the valley. dated 15th June 1897. and not name of one single village. had asked Colonel Bunny Khel have been kept accompany me in order In that he might give me his advice in the final selection of the site. to establish a temporary post there for the who I since our occupation of Datta to camp. my letter. the Political Officer in full of the affair. as we to be an escort of sowars and maliks would have sufficed to . all and my the details of distribution the maliks concerned on my visit to Maizar. Khan Khel and Macha sections of the Ger portion of tribe. As long had visited Sheranni and Maizar with the view sites for the Sheranni levy post. Ali the It consists of a number of broad cultidown to the stream. Sheranni close to levies. contained in the in Tochi. is under keep open. of examining possible Darwesh Khel country. with the valley quite peaceful. and is occupied by Drepilari. though the fact that at Maizar was merely asked the jiryah to meet me due to my intention to halt there as being the most convenient place. to The main road agreement of the to Birmal and Ghazni. My chief object in making for this post. which may be given :— is Maizar the the name given to a group of situated above the junction of the Shawal Madda Khel villages Algad and the Tochi. runs through in and it forms part of that tract Upper Tochi which a more extended influence was contemplat- ed as compared with the ago as September 1896. THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT. as the present visit was to select a final site the building season was already far advanced and the sanctioned plan and estimate were expected back from the Public Works Department. Gee. vated terraces sloping Khoji Khel. Finally there was the official version report of Mr. and. and about eleven miles distant from Datta Khel Camp.

and aa 1 had not visited Maizar foi. asked Colonel Bunny if he would mind taking out the same number of my recent visit to the Kazha. V. I showed the place to Colonel Bunny and the troops were halted there. a small malik. Gul Samid. Maliks Nabbi Khan. Mozammil Khan. one day in advance to lect Sadda Khan and Alambe had been sent on make what preparations were required and colcase. on the topmost terrace. Salehdin. At Ziarat village I was joined by the Khiddar Khel Maliks. and met me there. and Kotan Khan. but owing to rain it was the 10th.( 11 ) visit Maizar. 100 rifles 1st 2 guns. and the kotal above I Maizar visible from Datta Khel Camp. the local maliks for the purpose of discussing the distribution of the fine in Honda Eam's at 5 a. No. Khan Habib and Zer Makhmad. Sadda Khan and Alambe were already at Maizar.. 12 sabres 1st (P.some time.A. 6 Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Seton-Browne. R.A.) Punjab Cavalry. Bombay Mountain Battery under Captain Browne. as the road is lies through open country. Sabil and his son Dande and Khanadin of the Kazha Shadam Khan. especially in view of the early commencement there of the levy post. Surgeon-Captain Cassidy. 1st Sikhs. O. I was of opinion that the sight of a large escort would have a good effect there too. That visit had an excellent effect on the Kazhawals. E. to camp and where a number This was under some Sadda Khan showed me the place where he wanted the troops of charpoys had been placed in readiti-ees ness. A start was made from Datta Khel I reached at 9-30.m. . brother of Malik Sadda Khan. aa men were employed on Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny agreed is to my proposal. and Lieutenant Cruickshank. Kabul Khel. The following 200 riiies 1st the detail of the escort that accompanied me : — Sikhs with Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny and Lieutenant Higginson. . Syad Khan and Khan Wazir. at present officiating as Levy Jamadar. The 9th was postponed till originally fixed for the visit. and Maizar was was accompanied from Datta Khel by Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan. his nephew. close to a threshing floor and not far from the Drepilari kot of Modai. A. Assistant Political Officer. and at Sheranni by the Madda Khel Maliks.

KA. and the sepoys and ourselves were seated under the trees. This was what Malik Sadda to believe . as well as the other Madda Khel who had been there all day.M. Captain Browne. were ready to come and see me. Everything required in the way of grass and wood had been supplied and about midday food which had been cooked in one of the . Khan had Ghulam Muhammad to be trusted. when we had just finished lunch. when suddenly pipes played one tune It was seen that all the villagers cleared off towards the Drepilari kof. and I was told by the Assistant Political Officer that they had come to an amicable agreement by themselves and that that they should come up later and all that was necessary was make a formal statement before led is me. as they had the day before. a3 to inspect Datoi.( I 12 ) wont on at once with ho most of the maliks wlio had come with it nie and the cavahy very liot. to be bound by Sadda Khan's proposals and must have been preparing for the outbreak.. round with Captain Browne and look at sites I was pi-eparing to go for the post. however. something was wrong and the order to fall in was given. some of it. and . and they were told with reference to case that I would have them all up and dis- cuss the matter on my return. which he. till a little while after this. The pipes had begun to play at the request of the maliks. and Lieutenant Higginson me when we all towards Datoi and we returned to camp at 11-30. must have been perfectly well aware of.volley a signal shot was in fired which was followed by an irregular Officers a])parently aimed at the under the tree. for the villagers to listen Tiie to. Sadda Khan and Alambe stayed in camp by my accompanied order. The people of the villages round at that time appeared perfectly friendly. which had been I then made sitting under some trees near for some time. The about 2 attack actually did not take place P. Had Sadda Khan Maliks. Khan but if the evidence available Sadda Khan's statement was a deliberate lie. and talked freely to the Pathan sepoys. Seton-Biowne was hit the thigh at the second or third shot. had breakfast. for at that very time the Maizarwals had refused. but at the same Lieutenant moment . and had just commenced a second. I and the Assistant Political Officer of the saw some the line in Honda Ram's Maizar Maliks.. there would have been plenty of time to prepare for an attack. and came back before was Before going. given us the slightest information of this attitude on the part of the Maizarwals. Maizar kots was brought down for the sepoys. and a special point was made of the British Officers partaking of enquiries as to whether the local J irg a fi.

and Colonel This it. his life had severed the artery. corner of the garden by the lane. and Lieutenant Cruiekshank was shot very soon afterwards. 1st A fine stand was made at the Punjab Infantry. Colonel Bunny and myself had meanwhile gone towards the trees where the men were. first in the arm and then in the chest. and practically the casualties occurred before the kotal was reached. \shich is a part of the Tsirai plain. including Subadar Sundar Singh. It is much to be regretted that no medical aid was the fifth available for Captain Browne. succession. A position was taken up on each ridge .( 13 liini ) Surgeon-Captain Cassidy carried tn a place of comparative safety by a small bhusa stack and tied up his wound. the two Eoyal Artillery Officers afforded an easy mark for the men who were shooting from towers around. The bullet had a proper tourniquet been applied. but the Colonel was mortally wounded in the stomach just as he got there. the second wound being fatal.itself was evacuated. and would have been saved. with the result that the battery and the wounded men were all safely over the kotal before the position was evacuated. time being given for all the wounded to out on the plain. After about five minutes from the commencement of the attack. the all guns having expended their ammunition limbered up. The firing had now become general from all the kots round. along the lane which had low walls on either side of As far as the kotal all we were exposed to fire on both sides. the tribesmen came on numbers. a distance of about two miles. It was here that the greatest loss in men occurred. As they were not protected b an v cover. which were . and Lieutenant Higginson was shot in the left arm almost at the same minute. Directly Maizar in in large . ducted in get safely and the retirement wasconan orderly manner. Bunny gave was efltected orders for a general retirement towards the kotal. fire with case and did great execution among men who had come out of the Drepilari hot and attempted to charge them. and Captain Browne was hit in the arm at about The guns then opened a body of round from the battery. but Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was shot in the knee while going towards the kotal and could give no assistance. and many individual acts of gallantry were performed which will be duly brought to the notice of Government by the Officer Commanding Tochi Valley. The retirement was then continued across the six ridges which extend from the kotal above Maizar to the slopingplain above Sheranni.

were entirely successful the tribe from joining.m.. E. Punjab Cavalry had been despatched as soon as Some sowars of the 1st possible to fetch them and warn the camp. the maliks. to the he had arrived close to the village and was in danger of being hit.m. The Khiddar Khels out water for the of of Ziarat village gave us great assistance in bringing men and join- and though a few them undoubtedly ed the Madda Khels. had been kept thoroughly in check. continued until I This was received a message from Khan Bahadur Ghulam Mu- hammad Khan who had effect that escaped via the Tochi with a few maliks. These reinforcements covered a distance of nine miles in one-and-half hours. Lieutenant Higginson had the misfortune to be shot again in the left arm while crossing the hills.000. and they must have lost a good many men themselves. were shelled. which had been crowded -with men. They were unable to do much damage owing to the steady behaviour of the rear-guard. from which I had myself seen large parties issuing to intercept our retirement. Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan also same night. Captain Browne. and as soon as the gun was got to work (the second gun had lost its wheels) the gathering began to disperse. E.A. They followed up the force closely and persistently and also occupied all the heights they could along the line of retirement. had by this time died from loss of blood. Sadda Khan had him from the jirgah with Kotan Khan and stated that had been arranged for and would be paid up in five days. with. which arrived at 6-15 two companies of the 1st Sikhs and extra gun and rifle ammunition. whose numbers had probably to well over 1.m. and then Sheranni village. It appears that just come over the fine when the outbreak occurred. who had gone straight back from in preventing Maizar when the attack began.. No further opposition was met charpoys for the wounded. The rear-guard reached camp came at 12-30 in the p. The force eventually took up a good position about a mile from the last ridge at 5-30 p. and to . and Colonel Bunny did not live to reach camp.. The heights all round. and waited there for reinforcements from Datta p.( 14 ) constantly being increased by reinforcements from every village round including Sheraiini. under Lieutenant deBrett.A. increased The tribesmen meanwhile. They consisted of Khel.

severely. and 1 think great ci^edit is them for the performance of this service.5 ) Ghulam Muhammad almost directly afterwards the firing began. one mule-driver dangerously. and. and he was at once joined by Nabbi Khan. two men Punjab Cavalry One man slightly. to the Tochi and took refuge on the other side of the Tochi in Tarraori Kila. Nothing In consequence of what he Ghulam Muhammad Khan started down the Tochi. Mussalmans and Sikhs The following is the list of casualties on our side : Three British Officers killed. Shadam Khan. eight men . One Havildar and one driver. Twelve men and a Kahar of 1st Sikhs. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery. Dande. were much mutilated. This party was afterwards joined at different times by Sadda Khan. saying he had dispersed the lashkar and the road was clear. though the force was composed of nearly an equal number of Sikhs and Mussal- mans. his brother. and this they eventually did with the Kotan Khan. Kabul Khel. Three British Officers wounded. Khangai Macha. and he returned after two hours. arrived at Sheranni Officer to camp. Khan had just gone down to a lower terrace to perform his ablutions. 1st Sikhs —Twelve men slightly. His munshi and clerk were also with him. the inhabitants of which were From thei'e Sadda Khan was despatch- ed to Sheranni to keep the people quiet. were the only Ger Madda Khels who came on with the Assistant Political already stated. I called The next day assistance of to the Khiddar Khel Maliks in and asked them due to arrange to bring in the dead. Alimad Madda Khel. Mozammil Khan and Alam Shah. Wadin Saidgi and the Khiddar Khel levies and Border Police.— — — ( 1. — — slightly. Native ranks killed One Subadar and seven men of the 1st Punjab Infantry. Wounded 1st 1st Punjab Infantry Two men severely. especially as the bodies alike. the Madda Khel Daffadar of Kazha. Khan Habib. stated. It is a significant fact that of the above total 17 were Sikhs. as when it was being shelled. No. Zerin and Mozammil Khan and they went down the Shawal Algad just preparing to join the fight. could have been further from the truth.

it would of be unjust to omit mentioning that Mr. The narrative of the Maizar outrage however cannot properly be closed without mention of the rewards granted to those who had taken part in the action connected with the outbreak. Gee. loss in killed severely. • • • Here ends the Political Officer's report." Lieutenant A. slightly. and declared that " the action was a deed of arms second to none in the annals of the British Army.* With affair. L. S. Gee's exertions and presence the retiremind were of great value in the help he rendered during ment and in sending to call up the reinforcements. SetonJ.the line of retirement the ti'ibesmen pressed close. This is wounds probably a total of 100 is not very also the opinion of Native Officers who had the best means number (some 30 or 40) are said to have been killed outside theDrepilari hut by the case shot. one man The Waziri has been put at 100 by the maliks. the three principal Native Officers with the engaged in the Maizar atfair were given the Order of Merit at once as a reward for their gallantry. and Surgeon-Captain liaii Casisidy alreaily succumbed to his wuuud. * Subadar Sund ar Singh. alon". Higginson. Bombay Momitain Battery— Two men one Kahar slightly. . of A large them were shot down." The Government of India " most heartily endorsed this view. and very nearly as many were All killed at the corner of the garden where the stand was made. reports received from Lieutenant-Colonel The military Gray regard- ing the Maizar affair were published as despatches. from it is whom enquiries have been made. regard to Mr. 1st Browne. M." On the recommendation of General Corrie Bird. The Commanderin-Chief placed on record his appreciation of the heroic conduct of Officers and men. supported by the troops Commander-in-Chief. and a number of judging. 1st Sikhs. were recommended for the Distinguished Service Order. Punjab Infantry. The two surviving British Officers who were present at Maizar.( 10 ) No. in his report on the Maizar : thus referred to the Political Officer whose escort was attacked " Though it is not my business to report on Civil Officers. both of whom were severely wounded. and as of their probable that a good many wide have died since of the mark. 1st Punja b Lieutunani Hiusinson did not live to receive this award. Colonel Gray. and Lieutenant C.

in his the charges keenness to keep his battery in continuous play. on June Officer. containing a despatch in A special Gazette was subsequently acknowledged.. published in the Gazette of /nrfea a full of rewards for the Non- commissioned appendices. This E. widow to the title of Bahadur 23 Nonand men were given the Order of Merit Jhanda Singh. rammed home in a mountain gun with a sepoy's rifle without sponging out be- tween the rounds— a most dangerous thing to do. it 10th. cook of the 1st Sikhs. Subadar Narayan Singh. was also gazetted to the Order of Merit. This will be found among the There ground. it such distinction was made. for having carried off a box of ammunition Order of British India. who was killed. was admitted to . the news of the outrage was An impression gained when first published. which the gallantry of Lieutenant de Brett. that the Madda Khel had singled out the Sikhs for attack and that the lightly. so as to enable his 1st Sikhs. though a non-combatant. near Sheranni. was warmly appeared. issued. MahoNo- medan sepoys escaped impossible. whose coolness and gallantry were so noticeable. and indeed in the melee sufficient to would have been sepoys killed in mention that of five the splendid defence at the garden wall three were that both Sikh and in the horrible Mahomedans and Mahomedan bodies were afterwards found mutilated manner peculiar to the frontier tribes.A. was also admitted to the Order of Merit. with the Officers commissioned . . is only one more fact to chronicle. draw a larger pension. Officers and men. The widows of eight men list list killed were admitted to a Later on there was pension of the 3rd class of the Order of Merit. under heavy fire. It is This was altogether erroneous.( 17 ) Infantry.

Commanding MacN. W. Wingate. Major M.-M. which were immediately concerned treacherous attack on the Political Officer's escort. Assistant Field Engineers. Major-General G. Lieutenant E. THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION. Nagpore Assistant Quartermaster-General. (Bombay) Mountain Battery (4 guns).. Sialkot. Major G.. E. A. H. 4th Gurkhas Surgeon-Colonel R. R. Walter. Major F. Commanding . SuperinCockerill of the Intelligence Branch at Army Head-Quarters . Captain H. A. Devonshire Regiment. Q. Mian Mir .. 12th B. Sirhind District. Watkis. .A. the 1st Punjab Infantry. : Brigadier-General W. Major G.. Field Engineer. the 14th Sikhs. Egefton. A. Corrie Bird. Lieutenant-Colonel J. 2n£f Brigade .-M. I). H. A. H. tendent. Captain P.-G. A. Allahabad. then at Army Head-Quarters D. Wintour. Troops -. Wilson. Captain J. The two Brigades were composed \st as follows : Brigade: Colonel C. Captain A.G. Rawlins. Grover. 18th Bengal Lancers Ordnance Major C. Symons. Provost Marshal. W. Madras . Commissariat Officer. Peshawar Transport Veterinary. the 1st Sikhs.-G. members of his staff were as folMajor J. and the principal lows at : — Assistant . the 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade.-G. P. 'Nixon. A. Waghorn .-G.. D. Major G. D. Officer. Principal Medical Officer. C. . K.-M. Kemball and Lieutenant G. Rayment and Captain H. then D. Schreiber and Lieutenant Officer. . I. A. J. As of it appeared imperative to punish without delay the villages in the Maizar and Sheranni. the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Q. B.—The Peshawar Mountain Battery.A. the Government of India arranged within the next two or three weeks for a punitive column to move into the offending country from Datta Khel. Intelligence Officers. Q.C. B. Adjutant-General. Punjab Command. Captain G. 6 S. Howell. then on the Staff at Lucknow D. R. Malcolm. D. E. The expeditionary force consisted of two Brigades. A. CHAPTER HI. Major Digby.. . Troops :— No.A. Army Signalling. L.-G.— . James. was given the chief command. V. Corps of Guides. Carew. The two squadrons of th© . Principal Commissariat Officers. Wilcocks. and the 25th Punjab Infantry. and the 33rd Punjab Infantry. then commanding the Punjab Frontier Force..

2 Companr Bengal Sappers and Miners were also ordered to form part of the expe-{ ditionary force. Lorimer and Mr. as of the composition of the force. as well an appendix. were said to be sending a contingent to join the Madda Khel. It was quite likely. Brigade. While the concentration gress. however. would cross into British territory. Corrie Bird during the operations in the Tochi Valley. Kettlewell were Assistant Political Officers. At note this early period there appeared upon the scene a figure of some —an old acquaintance. As against this. while another tribal force was reported to be moving from Birmal in Afghan territory. showed no desire meanwhile to assume the against the Datta Khel post. Afghan The territory. are added in Full political power was vested in Major-General G. thus giving the tribesmen a free hand for fighting. Mr. while Mr. each attached to a^. Fuller details of General Corrie Bird's staff and of the staffs of the two Brigades. Gee was appointed Chief Political Officer attached to the General. who are subjects of the Amir of Kabul. A proclamation was at once issued notifying to the tribes-' men in and about the Tochi Valley the reason for the expedition. It seemed improbable also that the tribesmen of Birmal.( 19 ) Ist Punjab Cavalry already in the Toclii Yalley and No. that restless spirits among the. speculation of the Tochi Field Force Avas yet in pro- was rife as to the nature and strength of the opposi- tion which our troops would be likely to encounter at and beyond Datta Khel. and their headmen were holding aloof from the Madda Khel. Waziris. Mahsud Waziris would join their kinsmen in Tochi. however. the Mullah Powindah —whose movements thenceforth became a matter of considerable interest to our Intelligence Department in Tochi. latter. Later news from the Waziristan direction stated that the Khiddar from Birmal were helping the Maizarwals to Khel and the Sadgis remove their goods into offensive. The tactics of the Mullah up to the time of the preliminary concentration of our troops at Banna were however of a kind . News received from native sources mentioned that a gathering of The who were then lying to the south. Mahsud : Khel sub-section had brought in the bodies of some sepoys killed in the retirement from Maizar. the Darwesh Khel in the Upper Tochi Valley were certainly not unanimous at that time in the matter of further hostilities the Khiddar tribesmen in strength was contemplated at Sheranni and Maizar.

and with the latter the Mullah had nothing whatever to do. could muster only 1. This in him in order to : increase his prestige was a clever move. but there was such a faint response to his appeal that he promptly changed his ground and wrote into our Political Officers in the Tochi offering to mediate be- tween the Government and the people step was. Lest. in view of these facts in the light of subsequent events it should be thought that the Field Force was too large for the it. The Madda Khel had aside. in fact. As a possible enemy he had to be watched as a friendly mediator he was put Mediation moreover was not called for. to have all The Mullah Powindah himself was if said denounced it its treacherous character. but impossible to say with certainty that no other section of the . Waziristan and the adjacent country it : deliberately planned the attack on Colonel Bunny's detachment and had carried fined it out in the most treacherous way. pected whenever our troops occupy positions beyond the old frontier But the Maizar affair was of an entirely different complexion. The Madda Khel are a section of the Darwesh Khel Waziris. taken by of Maizar and Sheianni. but probably that the he did so at his he only did when he found Mahsuds would not obey Khel. summons to raise a force to help the all Madda From as little that could be learnt it seemed that the great majority of the Darwesh Khel. were to disposed as the Mahsuds commit themselves and to hostilities. and it would have been most unwise to have any dealings with him. is A tribal rising of the ordinary local kind. not of material less consequence in the borderland. however. Such disturbances are more or exline. many of whom held lands in British territory. it work blaze before may be at once said that the Government of India were in anxious not to set the whole frontier from Kurram to the Gumal a which would invite attack. and it was expected that large military preparations would have the effect of checkforce by sending up a small ing the fanaticism of any clans who might be hesitating whether they should join the malcontents in the Upper Tochi Valley. It was that the to known Madda Khel against whom the Tochi Valley Force it was Uarwesh were about move. He at first tried to induce the tribesmen to send a contingent to help the Madda Khel. no status. He had. their Their offence was clearly de- and punishment would need to be exemplary. for it in- volved a breach of hospitality and could only have been successful by cunningly contrived treachery. but the Government could not recognise his position in any way. of course.200 fighting men. or a raid upon an outpost.( 20 ) which showed that his influence over the Mahsud Waziris as a body was not as great as three yeai's previously.

To ensure the Bannu to keep the peace on the border the following additional itself and moves were ordered : — 200 sabres of to the 3rd Punjab Cavalry and the whole of the . Sarwakai and Haidari Kach on the Mahsud frontier. If opportunity offers for striking a sudden blow the tribesmen do not generally hesitate to swordsmen on our surprise. Any force which moved up the Tochi Valley had to be prepared for attack. 3rd Sikhs from Kohat to Bannu the 2nd Punjab Infantry from Abbottabad Kohat. for there was no guarantee that the tribesmen from the Kurram border to the Gumal would not suddenly be infected with a spirit of hostility. who hold the greater part of the Tochi and Mahsud Waziris would Valley. not only from the south but from the north also. And now of the troops collection of to follow the actual course of events. Datta Khel was fixed upon as the advanced base from which the force would to reach Datoi only have to advance about 13 miles to reach Maizar and Sheranni. are of made so secretly. in 60 casualties among the levies. It 5. for Birmal day's journey from Sheranni.000 or 6. they had had enough. and 6 miles further (some tribesmen of which particisafety of pated in the Maizar outrage). Sheranni and Datoi. who any might give trouble along the communications in case of check to our troops beyond Datta Khel. The Dawaris also. a special precaution against the effects of the heat the British soldiers . were known to be an ill-conditioned and fanatical line of lot. and hence the necessity for being prepared for more than a mere promenade to Maizar.000 tribesmen can assemble so quickly. Waziri tactics are. deliver an attack. and 250 of the 4th Sikhs from Dera Ismail Khan As to Jandoula. have made common cause with the Madda Khel are a and they were in a position to is with the comfortable assurance of being able to get away whenever in Afghan territory and is only a was therefore impossible to foresee that General Corrie Bird's force would find no enemy when the advance was made from Datta Khel. as a rule. The concentration was carried out as rapidly as possible consistent with the supplies and transport. As had been proved at Wano. that their presence is first and their movements announced by a rush pickets. Bannu being the base. The Kabul Khel of Birmal who were fight said to section of a big clan of the Utmanzai.( 21 ) join them. based on and valleys which may have been empty of men in the morning may swarm with thousands after nightfall. at Palosin in 1860. The affair at Wano itself was but a repetition of that addition to when our losses were 63 killed and 166 wounded.

all the in constructing (in twelve days) a crib Bannu had rendered valuable service way to Boya. It is probable that this thoughtful measure saved many casualties that would otherwise liave occurred helmets from sunstroke and fever. 600 feet wide. and trestle bridge. a sentry being killed way at Datta Khel. The concentration vance to Datta Khel serenely. but the ad- via Saidgai. Khel was accomplished with the Force was then within striking distance As a minimum result the march to Datta of difficulty. Idak and Boya was not made quite so fired into were repeatedly camp. and the Field of the doomed villages.( 22 ) in the Toclii Field Force were j^rovided witli sola topees in lieu of and with sun glasses. partly through solid rock. over the Tochi Eiver at Boya. as shots in this at Bannu was of course uneventful. en route from The Engineers and in cutting a good road. .

companies were ordered from Miran Shah to Boya. WiTHOTTT a blow being struck or a shot being fired. On arrival at Sheranni the cavalry reconnoitred the scene of the and found one man who was brought in prisoner. but no large body of the enemy was anywhere discernible. and about five yards from the wall of one of the kothis action at Maizar an ordnance pack saddle and one or two other property were found and. as a fair road is said to exist . Boya is the post on the line most exposed to Waziri raids. and the fields around were fairly cultivation. The rear-guard saw a body estimated at about 500 the road men some 2 miles from who disappeared into the further hills. In another direction it was reported that the Mullah Powindah had assembled 7. barley and clover about advanced sufficient in in the village. if this report come a very awkward one. threatened to be- the Madda Khel. the true. There was a certain quantity of bhusa. After the bhusa had been gathered and wood accumulated the fired into destruction of the village was begun.to it from Khaisora.000 Mahsud Waziris near Razani in the adjoining Khaisora Valley to the south. This absence of opposition was variously The Madda watch Khel tribesmen crossed the in a body. explained. with their families. leaving only scouts to the approach of General Corrie Bird's force. as the hills in the vicinity were barren of vegetation. As Birmal were is a tract which usually yields only sufficient supplies for position of its ordinary population. articles of Government Sheranni itself was quite deserted. .( 23 ) CHAPTER IV. Its wood wall was torn down to serve for firewood for the troops. The carcases of five mules and two ponies were seen lying where they had been shot down. THE WORK OF DESTRUCTION. brought in. Sherannl was Occupied by General Egerton's Brigade of the Tochi Field Force on July 20th. were reported to have Afghan frontier into Birmal. General Bird and his Staff accompanied the Brigade. and that his intention was to attack Boya or Datta Khel after the advance from the latter As a precautionary measure two post to Sheranni had been made. A to 20 few shots were camp that night by a band of about 10 men. but it pers and was believed to had been strongly entrenched by the Sapbe impregnable against any tribal attack.

and no demonstration seemed likely to be made in that quarter in fact the Mahsuds as a body had apparently . most of it was probably burnt. July village of Drepilari. shrunk from committing themselves to helping the Madda Khel. of course. however. Idak. while Reports from Wano showed that all convoys were strongly guarded. which lay were some two miles up the stream of Sheranni on the left bank of the Tochi. Boya. It was. of in destroying the kots in the Maizar settlement to the north of the which caught fire. as also were those in the village of Tormor. smoke was seen rising from the direction of Drepilari. The troops were again occupied on the 27th The village itself. southern Waziristan was quiet. and Miran Shah to guard against possible surprises.( 24 ) When all defensive arrangements had been completed news was received of attacking that the Mullah Powindah had abandoned his intention our troops in the Tochi Valley. The night of the towers of the 25th of July witnessed the successful destruction and fortified houses of Sheranni. blowing. varied seizures of straggling camels and donkeys. position eventually and the became very tiresome. Mahsuds had Every precaution. well understood beforehand that nothing less than the surrender of the ring-leaders and the payment of heavy fines could well be exacted by General Bird. was already it pretty well destroyed. letters were sent to the leaders of the Madda Khels. inviting them to come in under safe conduct and hear what the terms demanded by the Government were. The next day parties from each corps went out towers of the villages. the result probably of some woodwork catching tire after the As a high wind was explosions necessary to demolish the towers. was still taken at Datta Khel. On the 28th July the kots to the south of destroyed. and that his gathering of dispersed. The towers were blown up. Finally. Later news made it almost certain that the Mullah Powindah had returned to his own village in Waziristan. When first sum- moned the maliks huug back and apparently placed no reliance on the . there was nothing of time to suggest the presence of an enemy in the neighbourhood. and after the troops had left. on the 5th all August. The Tochi Field Force had therefore little prospect of getting any fighting worthy of the name. and it was further ascertained that there was no large gathering of Mahsuds at Razmak. unless some totally unexpected tribal combination occurred. to Maizar to destroy the fortified houses and The defences of Drepilari hot were destroyed by the Highlanders and Sappers. With by small all this the exception of intermittent and ineffectual sniping. and the kot contained a large quantity of bhusa.

On the 2nd of September there was said to be a probability that the sons of the Madda Khel Maliks would come in that day and give their answer to the terma imposed by the Government. under the Hon'ble Montagu Curzon. There was no enemy to fight and did not seem in the least likely that there ever would be one. and a further fine Ten days was given them in which to of Rs. and the people were told that no discussion was to be permitted to receive the orders of Government. while returning to Miran Shah from towards the Khaisora Valley. The following afternoon General Bird held a Darbar at which some Kazha Khel and Tori Khel Maliks were also present. consisting of the Eifle Brigade. the Madda Khel still definitely refused to accept the terms offered them. mischief was done. and on the 16th of August three Madda Khel Maliks came in. came to be generally regarded as at an end. Nevertheless. The Darbar did not last more than half-an-hour.( 25 ) safe conduct promised them. but the expectation was not realised. M.000 for the outrage.10. The same day a column. and was fired at on arrival and also at night when in camp. The next evening a belated reconnoitring party under Major R. utilized the services of some of the headmen of the neighbouring tribes. marched to Landi of the river near the village of Argun but no . and thereafter news from the Tochi Valley became very scant and infrequent. on the 14th of September. It was announced that Government demanded still the return in good condition of the property which had been lost at Maizar. for want of an enemy to punish. and a company of Khel to make a road along the right bank of the Tochi River to Datoi. Maxwell. the payment of a fine outstanding for the murder of a Hindu writer there. In this uneventful manner the Tochi Valley punitive operations. up leaders whose Our troops meanwhile it could do nothing. The aspect of affairs was not enlivened when. take the terms to the tribe and discuss them and to give an answer. . It was perhaps rather sanguine to expect that carefully avoided a collision with our troops Afghan territory their at this stage any frontier tribe would agree to give execution was admittedly a foregone conclusion. they had been sent for merely On the 22nd of August the tribes were reported to be still discuss- ing the terms imposed on them. two guns. for as they by remaining in contumacy only converted a position of perplexity into an absolute deadlock. the Gov- ernment of India decided to leave the Tochi Force in occupation for a time with the general idea of their continuing to o verawe the Waziris. the 1st Punjab Infantry. was also fired at in the dark by parties from both sides Sappers. General Bird. . however. the surrender of some 18 headmen.

A month came in later — October the 29th to be exact — five headmen belongTormor. It was decided to try them by a the tribunal to be specially assembled for that purpose. On 14th November General Bird received the submission of the whole of the Madda Khel tribe unconditionally. taking with him his prisoners and the jirffa/i of friendly tribes. These points were duly settled. the month Khan Saheb and three other Sheranni Maliks came followed shortly afterwards by Sadda Khan and his brother Shadam. and that they could not make up their mind whether or not to accept the offer. and it was understood that its the tribe as a whole would be admitted back to territory at once. No doubt they hoped by staying out to wear down the patience of Government. A good many of the proscribed headmen.signs of submitting to our terms. the headmen of the Madda Khel tribe. and the Tochi Valley no longer formed part of the " disturbed area. It was stated that the Amir had offered them land and water. and so be readmitted to their own land on terms less severe than those already deliberately imposed on them for their conduct. were said away from their asylum and in Five of the proscribed men for instance were and surrender unconditionally on the 13th November. On the 31st of in." It is but fair to sultory opposition on the part of the enemy. and of obtaining proper payment. but in Tuikistan. and against difficulties unhealthy season in the hottest . situated about two miles above Sheranni. whose families took refuge removing their ready to come families. The work assigned to the Tochi Field Force was accomplished.( 26 ) At the end of J-'eptember the political situation was much the same. for the purpose of of fines finally deciding the question of assessment and distribution security for among those concerned. and they naturally went off to obtain their release before surrendering to General Bird. but during the night received news that their families had been detained beyond the border. General Corrie Bird proceeded to Datta Khel on the 15th November. add here that though the force only experienced deit had to fight against an time of the year. to ing to the villages of and surrendered themselves General Bird. and were still over the border. and among those who surrendered were four more of the seventeen men who were demanded by name for their share in the affair at Maizar. The Madda Khel showed no . in in to be experiencing a difficulty in getting Afghan territory. which they had sworn on the Koran before their whole jiiyuk to do.

In order to preserve the continuity of what separate narrative. * * is * . the expedition has been productive of its strictly it at least one permanently useful result outside the scope of militai-y purpose : a very large extent of country. General Corrie Bird's punitive force was engaged towards the end of July in destroying Sheranni and Maizar. which only those who are actually acquainted with the Tochi Valley can Moreover. and have made no mention of the graver occurrences which were being enacted the greater part of this Thus. has been accurately surveyed and mapped by Lieutenant Pirrie. the whole of in fact that lies between the Tochi Valley and the Kurram River at Thai. the Survey Officer with the Tochi Force. -^^ . while time in other territories on our North-West frontier. who on one day reached the village of Biland Khel which is only some three miles from Thai.( 27 ) properly appreciate. the Malakand position was being fiercely assailed by thousands of Swatis . to some extent a Valley unin- we have carried events in the Tochi terruptedly from the Maizar outrage in June to the submission of the castigated tribesmen in November . and to this stirring period the story now reverts. naissance The gazetteering and reconwork was done by Major Kemball.




a village a few miles to the north-east. At march 9-45 P. in addition to several casualties in the native rank and file. had gathered some hundreds of tribesmen about him and was bent upon mischief. began at the back with great losses. and that the "Mad Fakir" was marching down the valley with the intention of attacking Malakand. An outbreak no less sudden than that in the Tochi Valley. while the troops were engaged preparing for the at daybreak. news reached Malakand that a disturbance had taken place at Thana. which was a Monday. but also not without a severe loss to the garrison. The assailants were for the moment driven serious in its extent and sustained ferocity. From all the information ultimately available it appeared that on the morning of the day in question. Colonel Meiklejohn.. levies employed on the road to Chakdara came their report being that the Swatis had risen en masse. and in- finitely more Malakand on the 26th of July when our strategical position at the head of the Pass was attacked by about 2. THE SWAT VALLEY.( 29 ) PART THE RISING IN II. decided. in order to disperse the tribal gathering. It did not then seem that anything very serious had occurred.m. action But the mullah and his following anticipated this by attacking the camp at half-past ten o'clock at night. Commanding the Malakand Brigade. who usually wait until just before dawn.000 tribesmen. In the evening the flying into camp. a levy jamadar arrived with the news that the . one British Officer being killed and four others wounded. but later in the day further reports were received to the Fakir. CHAPTER THE ATTACK ON THE MALAKAND.M." a mullah effect that the " Mad who had gained much notoriety locally. after consultation with Major Deane. mostly belonging to the Swat country. the Political Officer. a most unusual hour for Pathans. to send out a column at 3 a. opposite Chakdara (the outpost of our Malakand position) where the suspension bridge crosses the Swat River. I.

In another few minutes they would have been in the camp. Major Taylor was wounded was carried away in the side by a bullet early in the fight. holding this gorge for about 20 minutes. and arrived at the narrow gorge through which the Buddhist road passes just in time to meet a mass of several hundred Pathans creeping silently up the road. knowing that he could not recover. and was The eaemy made it. and finally falling back. Tlie Khar now referred to is «''"'''")"'. Lieute- nant Climo. his small party. He gave them a very hot reception. The alarm was at once sounded. was a^pitch dark night. Lieutewho was commanding the 45th Sikhs. all the pickets were doubled. fallen iu the walls and own camp. Another company of 24th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Costello had manned the walls of the commissariat and hospital enclosures facing the gorge from the company of North Camp. as the enemy took possession of ground commanding the gorge.'""^. and that the hillsides east of the camp were covered with Pathans.V' mcutiou in different parts of the nan-ativo. taking as nant-Colonel McRae. on the alarm sounding.( 30 ) " Mad Fakir " and his force had passed Khar. which he held the whole remaining time. fighting unremittingly daybreak. overpowered a vigorous rush at the Abbott Road Dashing through the opening thus made they gamed picket and • There are two places. The other Khar lies ou tlie uortherii ot the Muhiiiaud eouutry. . quite (listinct liom each "ther. to a very strong position completely Colonel he.d (aud Cha><dara.'^''J^^ °'''f. and the regiments fell in on their alarm posts. aided barring the road. so named. undoubtedly saved the camp from being rushed on that As Colonel McRae fell back to the more easily defensible position he Barff. was reinforced by Lieutenant and thenceforth that night they till held in check immense odds. . had manned the walls of the bazar commanding the approaches from the graded road and the gorge below it. with a company of the 24th Punjab Infantry. In the centre and left of the camp. and to hospital. J" couuucb road between Malakai. the in The remainder of the regiment was held No. at once doubled up to the point where the old Buddhist road reaches the top of the hill.and were advancing up the Buddhist and graded roads. McRae's prompt action and the stubborn resistance which by Major Taylor and bers. offered to vastly superior numside. and a third same regiment supported the pickets on the left. at about 10-15 the first shot It fired. 5 Company Sappers and Miners had abattia surrounding their reserve in at their camp. many men as he could get together.

however. led them on to the attempt. his orderly was cut down at his side and a Pathan struck him across the chest with the flat of his sword. Punjab Infantry camp and ordered Lieute- nant-Colonel Lamb to bring up another company of this regiment to strengthen the Sappers. leaving four holes. As they got near they made a dash. asking him about his wound when he himself was struck by a bullet above the knee. commanding the 24th Punjab Infantry. and where Major Herbert.A. but Colouel Meiklejohn. going under both shoulder blades.slight check. Almost immediately two Sappers were shot and fell at his feet. but across the whom he ran through first. The corps behaved splendidly.( 31 ' ) tlio hioli ground behind tlie Rappors lines and surrounded tlioir eamp and the commissariat godown. wounded by as he got in. but missing his spine. the enemy got through.. once taking possession of their quarter-guard. Colonel Meiklejohn was at this time watching the defence on the south and south-east faces of the enclosure. and getting together 10 or 15 men with Captain Holland and Lieutenant Climo. the bullet passing across his back. went at once to the 24th Colonel Meiklejolin. who was now standing ahead . Sergeant Byrne of this company was killed here. and proceeded with them to the Sappers and Miners' camp. This was really the gallant Colonel's second escape. charging the abattis defended by the Madras Sappers and Miners over and over again.to bear enemy were getting round his left flank and in his masked the fire which Lieutenant Costello could In these positions the troops remained all on them. The enemy came on with great determination. Colonel Lamb. to which place Lieutenant Watling was carried. Twice. was being attended to by Surgeon -Captain Langston. who leapt the abattis. and then as he fell cut him again above the heel. for the bullet which had wounded Major Herbert had first passed through Colonel Meiklejohn's gaiter. with his D.A. The reception that this party got caused a . Colonel Meiklejohn leading.-CI. The man struck him shoulder and neck but apparently with the back of his sword. at once decided that it must be retaken. as the position he partially brino. in which was all the ammunition of the corps and some . on hearing that the quarter-guard had been taken. Lieutenant Climo's company was now also ordered into this enclosure. Colonel Meiklejohn. who had also been Lieutenantshot. was leaning over Major Herbert. shattering the bone. driving their assailants back and holding their own manfully under a hailstorm of bullets and rocks shower- ed on them from the rising ground close in front of their abattis. night. In trying to check this charge Lieutenant Watling was a ghazi. spare rifles. Captain Holland was shot here.

and in the confusion mules and ammunition disappeared. and continually charged right up to the abattis. belonging to their reserve supply. grass. The check was only momentary.( 32 ) alono. taking most of their dead with them. was immovable. although their yells and shrieks could be heard. the enemy from the enclosure and saving the ammunition. these boxes. and Colonel Meiklejohn therefore to this enclosure. most of which were recognised as those of men who had been in the habit of bringing wood. and was then Sergeant Harrington had a wonderful escape he had no Officer. It was so dark that. and the enemy. clieered driving. to go up to the fort and bring down 100 men all The enemy were pretty well to round the enclosure. .M. the room was dark. the enemy withdrew. having possession of commanding ground on two sides of this enclosure.400 rounds. etc. 4th Punjab Infantry. milk. dashed up to him and into the guard. but it Lieutenant Eawlings. eggs. After the Madras Sappers had been attacked. of the Some enemy had and at the sariat enclosure into the commencement got into the commisroom where Honorary-Lieutenant Manley. One very unfortunate incident of the fighting was that the enemy succeeded in looting 19 boxes of ammunition containing 10. for : weapons. and Sergeant Harrington were. shooting down his assailants with his revolver as they came for him. on by Lieutenant Climo. shooting two. and the sepoys. they till could not be seen within five '' yards of the men's rifles. Lieutenant them with his revolver. Commissariat Manley went killed. The attack was carried on for the rest of the night with great vigour. but just missed him. who attacked him on the way with his revolver." showing that the men knew the place well and expected to him there. wall. did shooting a ghazi gallantly and. At 2-30 the sound of pipes and " tom-toms coming up the graded road indicated reinforcements coming to the enemy. but some 40 bodies were picked up in the camp. for sale into camp. it ordered Lieutenant Rawlings. The ghazis walked round the room " There feeling the left. re- turned safely with the reinforcements. and thinking the room was empty : As they came in he had heard them say in Pushtoo should be two find here. had been loaded upon mules ready in the lines to be taken up The animals were standing when the tribesmen temporarily captured the quarter-guard. and he stood with his back to the wall as still as he could. accompanied by one orderly. to the fort. and was a risky thing be asked to do. At 4-30 A. brought a severe cross fire to bear on the defenders..

and on the 23rd of August Colonel Lamb also succumbed. fire Costello. For this he was.-G. Watling. R. and Q. while the football ground was overrun with the enemy's swordsmen and swept by a heavy from both the enemy and our own brought troops. woundtd : seriously Lamb. Officer . > . Madras Sappers Killed : Sergeant Byrne. . D. British N. . on the 9th November. Our losses on this the first night were —British . Captain H. . 24th Punjab Infantry Major Herbert. Commissariat Department wuunded dangerously : Major W.-C. Taylor. awarded the Victoria Cross.E.-M. Native ranks : Killed^ 21 . F. in a wounded Lance-Havildar who was lying 60 yards away in the open. It may be added that two days later Major Taylor died of his wound.— — — ( 33 ) A brave deed was performed by Lieutenant E. Manley. W. Dur- ing the hottest part of the fight. 45th Sikhs Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. 31. Commandant. with the assistance of two sepoys. Madras and Miners. ivounded. W. OflScers : Killed : Honorary-Lieutenant L.A. Lieutenant Costello dashed out upon the ground from the hospital enclosure and. Holland^ 24th Punjab Infantry Lieutenant F. : Sappers and Miners..

gathered about him a large fighting whose boldness in attack- ing a stronghold like Malakand showed with what desperate courage they were inspired. Aladand and Khar. The suddenness of the attack on the 26th July illustrates the marvellous rapidity with which the tribesmen on our borders can be mustered for warlike the first projects. and this further sudden and unexpected appearance. totally The rising in the Malakand was when the Chitral Campaign came the unexpected. he was joined by the Lower Swatis. The few hundreds who assembled in Landaki had their numbers swollen by men from Thana. THE SWAT COUXTRY. But for the news brought by the levy jamadar the pickets might have been rushed before they had been doubled. on the scene and quickly Everything Fakir" in fact Suddenly the "Mad appeared force. with the troops broken n\) two parties— in the North . been kept open without any pected in the valley. Trade had expanded. and the regiments would not have had ti>ue . Since the time to an end the Lower Swat Valley had been singularly peaceful. in Once the " Mad Fakir " had succeeded making a disturbance at Thana. from their adherence to the prin^^iples died some years ago. as the " Mad Fakir" made his way down instance at the valley and by nightfall the gathering was so large that the mullah was able to attack the Malakand at once.( 34 ) CHAPTER THE SITUATION IN II. and as the news of the movement spread the lawless Utman Khels from the west and a section of the Bunerwals from the south-east also sent contingents. Their numbers on . He chiefly Mian Guls inculcated as they are called. before beginning their stealthy accounts for this first theii' The tribesmen apparently waited until after sunset movement along the hills. the Chitral road had ditficulty. had with him men from Upper Swat. night were fortunately smaller than on subsequent nights into otherwise. but another motive for their action was the resentment excited by the Khan of Dir-'s attempts to extend his authority over them. and splendid crops were exseemed to make for peace. to reach their posts. carried away by the rising tide of enthusiasm. and the people seemed well content with new order of things. by their great Akhund who These tribesmen are noted for their fanaticism.

as it appeared at the time. and. sence of and they showed marked anxiety to refer their disputes to No resentment was openly mainfested at the pi'eour troops in the country the relations between the sepoys . though permitted to . of Swat leave their rice-fields at a moment's Malakand. was acceptable to them. owing to the imBajour and Chitral and the bridging of the Swat and valley Panjkora Rivers of civilisation tical Officer to . and not a single disturb- ance occurred. made the villagers swarm about the their lives. out in 1896 The annual in relief of the Chitral garrison was carried 1897 without a shot being fired in Swat. to add to all this. some of the material benefits were placed within their reach. through which the In Upper Swat the same contentment did not altogether prevail. They were formally brought within the sphere of manage their own tribal in return for the levies headmen were subsidised left in which they provided they benefited materially by the occupation of required by the troops demand for supplies the Malakand and Chak- dara . fighting with a heroic disregard for isolated garrison at Chakdara. but his fiery preaching was not the sole incentive which notice. and when repulsed turning with savage fury (as will afterwards appear) upon the "When the purdah was their submission. The " Mad Fakir " was. Fanaticism did not entirely account for this determined rising in a country which liad been singularly peaceful for two years. villagers were of the most friendly kind . the people of the valley fought one action on the Malakand and then quietly made At the close of the campaign they accepted will- ingly enough. have spoken so far only of Lower Swat. We Chitral road runs. British political influence. lifted from Swat in April 1895. the Poli- whom their were entrusted. The reason for unrest in the upper country was the growing power of the Khan of Dir. interests Major Deane. him and for decision. the man whom Umra Khan had driven into exile among . and the Government of India might fairly have congratulated itself on and again the peaceful outlook beyond the Malakand. a power in the country at that cime. undoubtedly. the trade of the to proved load developed rapidly. concerns their .( 35 ) Camp and on the Malakancl Ridge— the losses of the garrison nmst have been very great. though no danger was anticipated from that quarter. the new conditions which were established.

He was in league with Hajab-ud-din. It was an attempt to play a trick which is common enough in the East. of Those who employed him had addressed Major Deane direct regarding their grievances and had simultaneously sent the emissary to make a They hoped to obtain conseparate representation at head-quarters. This was and their emissary was referred back to Major Deane. in years. flicting orders and thus to weaken the authority of the Political Officer it on the spot. . When destined to play an active part in subsequent frontier the " Mad Fakir " appeared in Upper Swat in July. after the campaign had all the prestige which attaches to a border chief directly supported began to extend his authority over that portion of adjoins Dir. Mahomed Sharif Khan. A man calling himself Mohamed Ibrahim appeared in Simla at the beginning July bringing a letter addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab from one of the grandsons of the late Akhund of Swat. fell. began to fear certain that the Upper The Mian Guls. travelled to Central Asia and eventually settled in Afghan Turkistan. the notorious Mullah of Hadda. was not This name distinct t>ibes. the fame of his preaching spread far and wide. is also borne by several unimportant sub-sections of other and quite In this part of the book it refers only to the clan dwelling between Swat and Bajour. by the British Government. grandsons of the old Akhund. " the situation in the Swat country when the Mad appeared on the scene. but who rose as the Chief of Jhandoul of 1895. but it is Swatis grew alarmed at his pretensions. Their scheming was so transparent that was seen Fakir " through at once.( 36 ) the Swatia. and he Upper Swat which Further. preaching the necessity of waging war against all enemies of the Faith. who. and it was difficult to reassure them. It way down the valley. According to tribal reports this man his earlier is a native of Swat. whose fanatical hostility to the British Government was already notoriMazar-i-Sharif. ous and who was troubles. the people in the Talash Valley beyond Chakdara were made to feel that he might possibly claim to exercise control over them. Exactly how far he pursued a forward policy is not for the present purpose worth inquiring into. the four that such power as they had might disappear. the Amir's chief cantonment in and then moved to Kabul. his He gradually worked at his heels. the Utman Khel* country and Buner. He During the sumlived there for ten yeai's mer of 1897. he visited Bajour. with a huge rabble of men and boys and on July 26th was at Landaki within * hail of Chakdara.

while another party turned their attention to Chakdara. with one solitary exception. view Chakdara . His excited appeals to the fanaticism dormant in every Pathan were responded to in a manner little short of marvellous on his side . Buner.( 37 ) till then that he took the final step -which . and even more distant parts. his listeners he and he announced that with or without help from would sweep our troops from Chakdara and the Malakand in eight days. must have been a triumphal one the villagers flew to arms joined his standard . all were carried away by the popular enthusiasm. : his progress villages in from Landaki of the to Thana and thence post. and his standard afterwards became the rallying point for thousands of fighting men from Upper Swat. and by nightfall a resolute body of tribesmen were on the move to attack the Malakand. >^- . brought about the rising. except such as the headmen. the Utman Khel country. The mullah had roused the whole valley. to Aladand. the Heavenly Host were. He he claimed to be inspired to work miracles said. both . our levies hastily retired.

m. . Malakand position. 5 * Tliis place will not be confused with the now famous heights of the same name on the Bamaua liange. They found themselves opposed to large bodies of tribesmen. RENEWED ATTACKS ON THE MALAKAND. No. but They were fired upon when within range. the night before. It then became clear that the rising was serious and Colonel Meiklejohn wired down south speed. entrenched position on the Kotal. and the 45th Sikhs. or something under 3. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery. Avhere they could best be utilised in At the same time he telegraphed to at the head-quarters of the Punjab Command this Murree asking that rein- forcements might be sent. Soon after daybreak on the 27th of July. with itj in most oppressive heat. though they had received the order to proceed to Malakand only at 9 p. 16 hours. of tribesmen appeared During same day (July 27th) bodies on the hills about the did not venture upon any determined advance. the 24th and 31st Punjab Infantry.( 38 ) CHAPTER III. 8 Mountain Battery. The garrison in the Malakand at that time consisted of one squad- Company Madras Sappers. one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers. sent out a column consisting of four guns of No. however. The Guides arrived in the evening. a long climb of seven miles at the end of in something like They thus completed the march of 32 miles. had to return Malakand.000 men. Of these. to The guns and infantry. and the 31st Punjab Infantry. in accordance with his original idea. 25 cavalry and 200 infantry were ordinarily detached to hold the outpost at Chakdara and the ron of the 11th Bengal Lancers. Colonel Meiklejohn. They hills dropped a detachment of infantry at Dargai* at the foot of the so as to keep the road open. in enemy had withdrawn after the repulse of their fact immediately the attack on the initial Malakand. It was a march to be proud of. These troops were ordered to pursue and break up any gathering in the Swat Valley and open up communication with Chakdara. but the cavalry pushed on towards Chakdara. concentrating repelling any attack in strength. No. to Mardan his oi'dering the Corps of Guides up with all possible He withdrew the troops from the brigade in and about the North Malakand Camp.

stored there. from Peshawar. The attack commenced at 8-30 P. The numbers of the enemy were thus greatly increased. . and at 8-30 Malakand on all sides." afternoon. the Guides occupying the central enclosure and the 31st Punjab Infantry with two guns and the main body of two guns and 100 of the . .5th Sikhs on the right. not the least fear was entertained regarding the safety bridge-head on the Swat River.( 39 ) The Chakdara post was considered to and was armed with Maxim guns which could sweep be impregnable. which was outside the line of de- and in which 25 men of the 31st Punjab Infantry had been placed. the 3r)th Sikhs Malakand the and the 22nd Punjab Infantry from Jhelum. to shera.M. succeeded in capturing the Serai. as the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were absent on service in the Tochi Valley. as was available to move them and they were too no camel transport heavy for the mules. where there was only . they again attacked The Malakand force had by this time been redistributed. it with great vigour. and eventually mined The picket held on manfully as long as they but ultimately had to let themselves down by the back wall and and could. Guides wei'e sent to strengthen the of 50 4. but this time the enemy did not penetrate. the 24th Punjab Infantry with two guns holding a conical hill on the north side of the camp commanding the approaches from the North Camp direction. p. howof the ever. to Mardan 37th Dogras fi'om Sialkote to Peshawar and one Native Infantry regiment from the Bengal Command to Nowshera. The 45th Sikhs and . When Colonel Meiklejohn evacuated the North Camp on Tuesday camp had to be left standing. the tents in the been visible for miles. while a party Point to close that side men were sent from the Fort to Maxim camp and command the water-supply. : —No. July 27th. and as the conflagration must have vate's. the tribesmen from a distance flocked in to see how far successful the Swatis had been. retire to the enclosure. They. the 18th Dogras from Nowthree squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers from Now- a small detachment of British troops. and was carried on with the same determination as on the night before.m. As ample supplies and reserve ammunition are always the bridge. in doing which they lost ten men. fence. being of the pattern known as " European priThe enemy burnt them. 7 British Mountain Battery from the Murree Gullies. of the post itself. it The enemy attacked set fire to the door. In response to Colonel Meiklejohn's demand for re- inforcements the following movements of troops were promptly ordered from Murree shera.

The attack commenced on the enclosure in which were the Sappers and Miners. troops. decided to deliver a counter-attack. the men were streaming down number being calculated at . Lieutenant wounded . sleep. 31st Punjab Infantry. the 45th Sikhs had a very severe time. 16 wounded. but they must have killed at least 200 of the enemy. desultory fighting was going on in every direction round the camp. and large bodies of the enemy could be seen collecting from all directions and joining our foes on the hills. 10 killed. for pursuit. The fighting was incessant all round the camp. pressing the 24th Punjab Infantry. : Our casualties on this the third night were seriously — Lieutenant Ford. the 31st Punjab Infantry and the Guides and the brunt of the fi<fht fell on this position all night. slightly wounded Lieutenant Maclean. All day during Wednesday. with the risk that they might have to fight again the following niglit. slightly wounded. Accord- ingly with 100 men he advanced up and delivered a tremendous fire. and Lieutenant Climo. the enemy continually charging in the dark right up to the abattis and breast-works. Lieutenant and our losses altogether on the second night were : the spur to the east to meet them The enemy drew off. At 10 o'clock in the evening they attacked f\gain from all sides and with the same vigour as they had shown both nights before.M. the bullet going into his of his cheek. mouth and — Signalling communication was re-established with Chakdara on the 29th. and driven from crest to crest in grand style. signalled that large bodies of the valley. who was in command of the regiment. also . but they did not — The 31st Punjab Infantry suffered heavily. Lieutenant Costello was wounded in this brilliant little counter-attack. Lieutenant Minchin. The penetrate. Lieutenant Swinley. and in the early morning the . and lasted It was impossible then to estimate the total losses of the till 3 A. the 28th July. Native ranks 2 killed.tribesmen could be seen dragging away bodies over the hills. but were pursued — Costello slightly wounded . 31st Punjab Infantry. The distribution of the troops remained the same as on the 27th. losing about 90 killed. 45 wounded. however. but tliey As day dawned the enemy began off the enemy with great loss. Political Officer at Chakdara. native ranks. enemy they were certainly very large. coming out Maclean had a narrow escape. Guides.( 40 ) 24tli drove Punjab Infantry were equally vigorously attacked. had been fighting now fur about 60 hours without and were too exhausted British Oflftcers . when it was ascertained that they also had been attacked twice by day and three times by night but were holding their own.

His followers. and in arranging bonfires to light up the approaches over which the enemy were bound to advance to reach the central enclosure. firmly believing that the " infidels " were now to be delivered into their hands and that the heavens would be opened and crowds of armed spirits would descend and help tliem. saying that he would stay behind and pray. The guns of No. All day during Thursday. delivered on both flanks and in a most determined manner. ^hich had been working almost incessantly for 84 hours. and the enemy drew off. culminating with a tremendous effort from 2 to 2-30. . played enemy and rendered valuable assistance to the defenders. The attack began at 9-30 and was pressed vigorously all night. trees. night. and that another attack might be expected on the Malakand that in their repeated attacks at The determination of the tribesmen night showed how large was the gathering." ( 41 ) 5. "Mad On the three previous nights he had sent his infatuated fol- lowers on to fight. and consequently it this portion of the camp had a less severe left night of than before. force than The same night the garrison was attacked by a very much larger had appeared on the three previous nights the attack was . It was an argument that he dared not resist and so he came. The force was augmented in the afternoon by one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers. clearing the field of of huts. After three nights of defeat. The 24th Punjab Infantry on the and the 45th Sikhs on the right and it had to bear the brunt of the fighting this time. Apparently the enemy did not like the idea of crossing the belt of light given by the bonfires in front of the Sapper enclosure. and having suffered very heavy losses. when it great havoc with the suddenly ceased. The increased fury of the Fakir'* attack this night turned out to be due to the presence of the himself. dashed on to our ranks. the believers began to feel a little dissatisfied with the efficacy of their leader's prayers. under Major Beatson.000. for their losses had been so heavy that unless fresh men were constantly arriving the attacks could not have been renewed. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery. and anything that could give cover to the enemy. the 29th July. seemed to be carried on with even greater ferocity than before. commanded by Lieutenant Wynter. and suggested that he should come himself and lead them and then perhaps the heavenly hosts which he professed to be able to call to his aid would come down and assist them. the troops at Malakand were fire employed strengthening the defences. who were taken into the Fort.

and the garrison prepared for but was not delivered with the same energy as before. The " Mad Fakir's " wound necessitated the amputation of two joints of one of his fingers. At any the fighting. the British Officers were the noticeable feature of the afi'air. and of reverence felt these joints were buried with gieat ceremony. and the enemy. the Fakir gave out that anyone who had it But the most amusing thing was that a wish or want had only to pay fulfilled— and he was believed. taking advantage of the tht- greater durkiitss. in tiie A heavy thunderstorm broke over the scene thunder and the rain. It began at 9-30. a standard being placed over them and a shrine erected. and the repeated and long night attacks caused an enormous expenditure of ammunition. which would ordinarily have been 400 per rifle. the nuise of attempted to . the bone being fractured. This probably- happened at back to when the enemy withdrew. his rapid retirement to Landaki was no doubt regarded by them as a proof that he had not a very strong belief in himself. two having The regiments being short of Officers. the control of the fire could not be so good as it would have been with «i full complement. and it was evident that though the two leaders were /tors de combat the tribes had no intention of giving up the fight yet. but insisted on going on with his duty. another attack in the night. A curious fact afterwards came to light which illustrates the kind by the tribesmen for their mullahs.< lod 42 first ) by tlie Fakir himself and his lieutenant and faithful companion. The accident to their leader considerably shook the 2-30. The casualties among est determination. The latter was killed and the Fakir himself wonnded. He had already been shot in the arm. mostly in the first attack. seriously wounded. Native ranks — killed one. wounded 17. }n excess of the regulation number of rounds. All was pretty quiet during Friday. and was again shot in the other arm. They amounted to 36 killed and 106 wounded. including 15 followers killed and 11 wounded. but a very large organised gathering was seen to have joined the enemy. was no longer pushed with the same hitherto. belief of his followers in his divine power and rate. a visit to the shrine in order to get The four night attacks on Malakand had been made with the greatand the total losses resulting had been very heavy. but fortunately the supply was been killed and nine wounded. middle of the night. the 30th July. Our casualties that night (July 29th) were : British Officer^ Lieutenant Costello. the Fakir himself flyinj^ Landaki. though again spirit as resumed the next night.

but the difficult nature of the ground and the skill with which the enemy availed themselves of it prevented their going far. A heliograph message had however been received at Malakand from Chakdaiu with the two . comjoosed of the Guides Cavalry under Colonel Adams and one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers under Major Beatson. The next day. All red that night. was quiet during the day and nothing but sniping into camp occurrest. and and try to relieve Chakdara.. Practically. Guides.m. Saturday. the cavalry This went down to the plain by the short road to the North Camp.m. cause them the to exhaust their ammunition. and Lieutenant Keyes. and they had to fall back. the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras camp after a most trying march. At Chakdara tinuous. It was now so late in the day and the enemy were evidently in such : British Officers:— Captain Baldwin. and. the heat on the road being and they were a most welcome reinforcement to the garrison. with the same perfectly this jrallant regiment had opposed to figlit them night began. slightly wounded. off till the next day. the attacks upon the fort had been almost conif and it looked as if the assailants intended to wear out the garrison. At 11 a. cool and steady resistance which after night since the Thoy were met. Colonel Adams had his horse shot under him. The enemy withdrew wounded. it possible. and were Iwyoneted in at considerable numbers. so the troops had comparative On Sunday. 12 wounded. and got well into them once. severely : — numbers. enemy to capture the fort until and even then storming fort stands might be beaten back with the bayonet. move was at once discovered by the enemy. having accounted for nearly 100 of the enemy. Amandara The attempt was accordingly put itself. as the on a scarped. another at Butkela and the third at Pass. chai'ged them in grand style. however. their casualties _ being wounded. Guides. July 31st. rocky eminence of great natural strength. Avith the probability of having to fight three fights on the way. Native ranks killed. our casualties being only 2 sepoys arrived in intense. one squadron of cavalry and 2 guns. one in getting out of the kotal. They returned into camp under cover of the fire from the infantry and guns. also 50 Sappers the 1st of August. about 3 a. was impossible it for the troops holding parties had no cartridges left.1 C 43 )> rush the 45th Sikhs. Colonel Meiklejohn decided to take with him 1. The cavalry. who turned up in swai^ms from every direction. that it was thought impossible to get to Chakdara that night.000 infantry.

X . tion But no reply critical to the ques- had come back. How this relief was carried out at a moment will presently be related. A and great anxiety was consequently felt for the heliograph had been sent in reply " Expect us toIs the bridge standing ? " It morrow morning. was imperative therefoi-e to relieve the post at all costs.( 44 ) words "Help us" little force.

Surgeon-Colonel Artillery. Norie. Brigadier-General Sir B. 8 Bengal Mountain Batteries. tain Intelligence Department. was to be composed Infantry. Aitkin Ad- Royal Artillery. O. H. District). Wharry Assistant Com- missariat Officer. Assistant Adjutant. Thackwell Assistant Transport . Colonel Aitkin was given the command the Royal Artillery. then officiating in command of the Sirhind District. Lieutenant A. Field Engineer. Thomson jutant. the Guides Cavalry and one squadron of the 11th of Bengal Lancers. 11th Bengal Infantry. Jeffreys. Blood . .A. the command of which was given to Brigadier-General Sir Bindon Blood (then commanding the Bundelkhand staff. the 35th Sikhs. The 2nd Brigade. G.— ( 45 ) chaptfh IV. Ordnance Officer. Officer. 5 Company Madras. 7 British and No. Lieutenant-Colonel A.A. General. Blunt Assistant Field Engineers. Captain E. Burney. the 24th Punjab Infantry. F. W. 24th Bombay Infantry . and No. Watkins Cookson. Cap- H. E. W. Gordon Highlanders Assistant Quarter. Stanton. Central India Horse Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General. No. with a complete under Colonel Meiklejohn. . H. . Lathbury R. Major H. 26t. Owing to the serious aspect of affairs in the Swat Valley orders were issued from Army Head-Quarters for the troops at Malakand. THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE. Captain H. was to be composed of the Royal West Kent Regiment. Captain W. under Colonel The 1st Brigade. Chief Commissariat Officer. Major £. F. master-General. M. the 31st Punjab Infantry and the 45th Sikhs.h Punjab Infantry Veterinary . and H. . . Lieutenants C. . together with those moving up. Lieutenant-Colonel Schalch. Commanding Royal Colonel . The following was Force : the full staff of the new Malakand Field Commanding. Grier . 32nd Pioneers . R. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners. M. Captain F. W. S. R. Walters. . and No. . D. Middlesex Regiment Principal Medical Officer. G. Captain C. Divisional Transport Officer. Signalling Officer. was made Base Commandant at Nowshera. Masters. Major H. Field Intelligence Officer. to be formed into a Division for field service. the 38th Dogras and the Guides 1 The Divisional corps were to be No. Hancock. of the Buffs. Cobbe. Captain H.

) Officer. B. H. in the was by this time clear that four sections of the BuUfi wals were . Macnaghten. fi. Lieutenant E. Deputy Deputy Officer^ Assistant Adjutant-General. Colonel W. Hariuan. Colonel . D. . Brigadier-General J. Brooke. H. and No. nth Punjab Cavalry. . Weston. Officer. Orders were also issued for the immediate formation of a Reserve Brigade for the Malakand Field Force. Lieutenant G. Major A. Regimental Transport Officer. Beville . the 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas from Dharmsala. Hobday. Lieutenant T. . Troops: The Highland Light Infantry from Cawnpore. Mann Provost Mar. Baker. Captain G. Captain H. Schalch. Manchester Regiment. Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment Major C. 11th Bengal Infantry Scott.A. Royal Sussex Regiment 18Lh Bengal Lancers . F. A. Meiklejohn E. of this Reserve Brigade was due to further inform- ation received as to the attitude of the tribesmen in the Swat Valley. . Meiklejohn and Colonel P. P. M. 40tl) Patbans. . H. Major E. W. Commissariat Captain W. 2nd Brigade Staff — Commanding. the Gordon Highlanders from Rawalpindi. the 10th Field Battery from Rawalpindi. G. C. R. R. 4th Sikhs Veterinary Captain W. Commissariat Captain J. . Hamilton. and Colonel W. . Border Regiment Veterinary Officer. V. Captain G. Officer. S. Vaughan Transport Lieutenants R. F. D. Jeffreys were given the temporary rank of Brigadier-General while commanding the 1st and 2nd Brigades respectively under Sir Bindon Blood. Lieutenant R." W. Walker. 1st Brigade St off — Commanding. R. Officer. O. Ist Gurkhas Commissariat Captain Officer. . Shore. Brigadier-General Sir Bindon Blood was given the temporary rank of Major-General while commanding the Malakand Field Force. Bombay Grenadiers Regimental Transport . Camillery . T. Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General. 3 Company Bombay Sappers from The formation It Kirkee. Rudd. Captain C. and E. Colonel Bane and Line of Comirinnicadon — Base Commandant. F. V. Officers. Brigade Transport Officer. Assistant Quartermaster-General. S. . Section Commandant. A.A. . F. Dillon. 16tli (Queen's) Lancers. Hawkins Brigade . H. Powell. .'shal. Captain tt. Captain C. Staff Officer at Base. This was composed as fol- lows:— Commanding.: : — ( 40 . D. Wodehouse. Captain O. Jeffreys Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. Lincoln Assistant Commissariat Officer. S. P. Transport Officer. H. Edwards.

from nearly to Communications in the fort were commanded by the enemy. garrisoned by 16 men. as the Malakand now comprised more than of four thousand infantry. rest. soldierly bearing He warmly praised " their Week. of grass to get All this time the garrison could get no or not being able to place. by two Officers and 40 sowars of the] 1th Bengal 'Lancers from Malakand." in With such garrison troops there could no longer be any lack of confidence in relieving assuming the offensive and Chakdara. five or six hundred cavalry. the field. and 25 sowars of the lltli Bengal Lancers. . After inspecting the Malakand defences and the garrison. On the evening of Monday. which was still in progress the following morning till when the relieving force from the ' Malakand dashed victoriously upon the scene. the enemy bringing ladders and bundles over the wire entanglement. . tell when where the enemy's attack would next take On On rifles the Thursday night a desperate assault was made on the isolated signal tower. almost simultaneously with the assault on the Malakand. and they This so closely sur- rounded the other fierce fort that no one could leave cover. He described the spirit of the troops as excellent. Frequent attacks were made on the Tuesday and all sides Wednesday. was augmented on the Tuesday. but was repulsed with great loss. one company Sappers and a mountain battery. the Friday. with little rest and keenness after the almost continuous fighting of the at night and exposure to sun during the day. had already told the Malakand garrison that help was urgently needed at Chakdara. he reported to Army Head-Quarters that all the arrangements made by Colonel all Meiklejohn were admirable in every way. as well as in the Sir Bindon Blood arrived at Swat Valley itself. showing eagerness to be led against the enemy. critical of affairs continued Sunday night when the tribesmen made anonslaught.( 47 ) and thnnoh the Malakand position was no longer in danger there were ten or twelve thousand of the enemy on the hills to the north. it will be remembered. and the position absolutely secure. who sniped from cover at from 100 200 yards distance. two companies of the 45th Sikhs. Malakand in advance of some of his troops on Sunday. the strength of the enemy in men and condition Martini-Henry was very much the increased. north-east and the south-west.July 26th. first Chakdara had been invested by a large force of Pathans. August 1st (the day when Colonel Meiklejohn made his ineffectual attempt to relieve Chakdara% and at once assumed command. The garrison of four British Officers. The heliograph. who attacked from all sides. under circumstances already described.

it They had longed for this opportunity. This task was assigned to Colonel Goldney. It was grand to see the way the troops advanced. and he got three-fourths of the way down bad road before a shot was fired at him. August 2nd. sides.( 48 ) CHAPTER V. taking the enemy Goldney silently completely by surprise. the 35th Sikhs and the 38th Dogras. sending a party to seize the levy post. these two regiments being quite fresh. The Chakdara was carried out by Colonel Meiklejolin in brilIn order to clear the way liant style on Monday morning. Those of the enemy. Colonel Meiklejohn also moved the graded off with his force. THE RELIEF OF CITAKDARA. boulders with which the whole side of oi-aded road is covered. He charged the position with the bayonet. hill west of the graded road. which was about 600 yards in advance of the enemy's position. They took up a position across the road their right being strongly posted on a conical . it was necessary at the outset to disperse the for the relieving relief of the east and north-east. was brisk on both but there was no delaying our They rushed the hill occupied by the enemy's right and drovs . and Colonel Meiklerunning out of the john soon saw swarms of men with many banners villages and down the hillsides to prepare to oppose him. Their exact casualties were never ascertained. and they went at that the with a determination enemy doubtless fire appreciated. who took with him two mountain guns. who down to fled from Colonel Goldney's attack had carried the alarm the villages and encampments at the foot of the hill. their left resting on a high spur running from the main mountain and completely commanding the road. however. The troops. as they commanded the road Swat Valley. as they had had two days' enemy on the hills to leadinf into the rest after arrival at Malakand. At the very first streak of dawn Colonel advanced from the position his troops had held at night to within rushing distance of the enemy's position without firing a shot. column. At the same time that Colonel Goldney started. disappearing like rabbits among the huge rocks and the hill down to the foot of the but seven dead bodies were found and one prisoner was taken. Colonel Meiklejohn immediately deployed to his left. They fired a few wild shots and then fled in every direction.

and galloped on to the Amandara it with dismounted men.( 49 ) them from tions of it. through them. and so the cavalry resumed their direction straight for Chakdara. Colonel Meiklejohn. had another and more pressing object in view than in cutting these men off. Many of them probably had a remembrance of the Guides' charge over the same plain in 1895. where they were noise of the firins^. out. and only them who took to the broad stretch of rice-fields on the banks of the river. however. met by a friendly stream drawn from Butkela by the portions of the Thefleeing and advancing enemy met where the road crosses the saddle of the Dogras Hill. as the infantry came up to the Anmndara Pass. covered by the the north point of the fire of his guns. and given the gathering on the banks a few rousing volleys. The enemy made next to no resistance and fled across the rice -fields As soon to the river. holding enemy's retreat. however. would not wait to be attacked. and in the dix'ec- Khar and Butkela. so as to be position to cut off the enemy from Khar and Butkela. Colonel Meiklejohn. and then cut off the The infantry came up rapidly and attacked Butkela. and disappeared from the view of those who had watched with admiration the brilliant and dashing manner in which the previous week's score was being wiped having taken Dogras Hill. Colonel Meiklejohn's force. but were in reality Swatis. without wasting a moment. The cavalry got beyond the village without a shot being fired at them. sending his cavalry round in a hill. Bunerwals. Colonel Meiklejohn's force advanced on Butkela. advanced on this second position. where the cavalry could not pursue them. This sudden dart from the Malakand spread terror in the valley and people could be seen hurrying in every direction from the village to the river bank. having first dismounted a third of a squadron. those escaped from The cavalry scoured the whole plain. and here they re-formed. . the cavalry dashed Pass. for in a few minutes the cavalry were on them. and others who would fight no more.hills to the east. carrying away what they could. taking up a position on Dogra Hill. resumed his march. They were too late. Covered by the cavalry. however. leaving our polo ground and the whole plain dotted over with what appeared to the garrison little left behind in Malakand Fort only black heaps. and they fled. which was occupied by the enemy. The enemy. and beyond them to the villages of Khar and Butkela. The enemy fled up the.

gari'ison were in good spirits and holding their own The party in the mgimlling tower were suffering most. with which the enemy had evidently intended to get over the walls of the The Chakdara magnificently. The casualties in : Colonel ranks. that severe fighting was going on. from which they kept up a lieavy fire. One discharge of grape from the 9-pounder smoothbore is supposed to have accounted for 80 men. As their losses reliable had all along been enormous.lOO . over at Chakdara. No British Officers were hit. who was hit in coming oat to cover cross the bridge. some towards Uch. for the enemy. Another shot. Meiklejohn's force on its way to Chakdara. who began to retire at once. Other casualties among the garrison were very itself The fort had proved practically impregnable and the garrison had behaved gallantly.m. 5 Queen's Own Sappers and Miners. 700 Colonel at the fighting with . which . Tliey had been fighting with hardly any sleep for seven days. fort. 2. part of the garrison moving out to cover their crossing. In many of the sungars light scaling-ladders were found. Colonel Meiklejohn arrived with the infantry at 10. It may be added here that in addition to the troops already spoken of the Chakdara Relieving Column included No. Tlic Ivridge was intact. The cavalry at once crossed the bridge. among Officers was Lieutenant Rattray. that not having had any water for two days. rt was evident 9 a.000. while the fort supported them with from their 9-pounder guns and Maxims* valley to They killed a great many of the enemy. getting in they at once moved out against the enemy among fire those on the hard ground and attacking those rice-fields the smit/ara in the with dismounted fire. Malakand and Chakdara :—At Malakand. The cavahy reached Cliakdara at but the enemy were occupying the Civil hill Hospital and the terraces of the on which the signalling tower is and also innumerable sunffars all over the level ground and rice-fields round the north and east sides of the fort. The Maxims and 9-pounder guns at Chakdara did great execution. from the noise and smoke. and on reaching the north bank in the open. severely The only casualty wounded morning in the neck. the passage of the cavalry to slight. The following were sent in as estimates for the week's fighting at . 4 Meiklejohn's force in the morning's operations were killed — Native and 26 wounded.( 50 ) on towards Cliakdara. others up the Upper Swat. by which time the fighting had ceased. where.

He Officer of the 11th Bengal Lancers. lance. and attacked the next The Pathan pulled man who came up then attacked an wounding his horse with his sword. One of the Bengal Lancers ran a Pathan through with his and being unable to extra-ct the lance the lance out. as recorded an instance by aw eye-witness.( 51 ) happened to land in the mosque at Chakdara while the enemy were told of is at prayer. it left it and passed away. threw to him. "^^ <^'" ' " . who shot him through the head. and the f<jllowing of their extraordinary vitality. Several stories are the individual courage of the Pathans. on. killed a considerable number.

the 38th Dogras. in concert with Major Deane. way ed to Sir Bindon Blood accordingly issued the following orders on the 4th The 1st Brigade. These order's were quickly carried out and the two brigades then stood ready to move in any direction at the shortest notice. to be placed on the Malakand and at Khar. the 45th Sikhs. was two regiments mountain batteries. The strength of the field force. the Lower Swatis and a certain number of Upper Swatis were implicated not to . the 35th Sikhs.( 52 ) CHAPTER VL FURTHER EVEXTS IN THE SWAT COUNTRY. more es. with the Divisional troops. the 24th and 31st Punjab Infantry. * There is also a Salarzai section of the Bajoui-is. appeared. two companies of sappers. This was quite sufficient for immediate purposes. . three the concentration at Malakand. with a proportion of sappers and artillery. the Kanazai. the 2nd Brigade. to : — concentrate at Amandai'a . So completely was the aspect of affairs changed by the relief of Chakdara that the lately beleaguered troops had now actually to move out and search for the enemy. the Shoniizee.000 and 9. consisting of the Buffs. after doubling the Chakdara garrison and replenishing its stores. equipped with ten days' supplies. . the Adinzai. pecially as the Bunerwals. whose names are only worth repeating by strength of the of showing how general was the rising but the whole enemy actually in the field at that time was not believbe much more than twice as numerous as the full field force. he arranged. who lay on the flank of any force moving into Upper Swat by the river route. Sir who had vanished as quickly as they had Bindon Blood was determined not to give his demoralised foe any breathing time to rally. conAugust regarding the disposition of the troops sisting of the Royal West Kent Regiment. and ten regiments of infantry (not counting the garrison of Jellala) in all between 8. the Nekbe Khels and other sub-sections. the Showazai. the Guides Infantry.000 men. mention the Dushi Khels. a plan of action under which flying columns were to be sent out to sweep the whole full of the disturbed country and enforce submission. It was known that the Utman Khels. : on the completion of of cavalry. and to this end. seemed inclined to disown the hostile action taken by the Salarzai* section of their tribe during the recent fighting.

S. that their clans The Mohmand headmen in the rising. Major Eundle. and Captain Walker. Tagao and other districts about Jellalabad to join either the Mullah of Hadda* or the " Mad Fakir. Chapter I. It who might have been inclined Lower Swatis. The quickness with which Malakand was the tribes reinforced had doubtless exercised a strong effect upon all to join the Swatis." Jirgahs now began to come in to Major Deane from the offending country beyond the Swat River. and these submissions were expedited when Sir Bindou Blood with the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General * Vulti Pait lU. be undisturbed. the Agent at Gilgit. The only disquieting frontier news was to the effect that a number of mullahs with a following of fanatical tribesmen had left Ningrahar. on the border of Peshawar district— with the exception of the who are always ready to turn out Utman Khel. dated the 17th July. and had found all quiet on and the Chilas revenue had been duly paid in to Captain the route . shared in the ffhaza.f 53 ) The rising of the tribes about tlie Malakand did not seem still to have infected those further to the north with any excitement or restlessness. receiving a subsidy in return. Nor were there as yet (August 6th) Tlie any signs seemed to of further outbreaks elsewhere along the frontier. Again. fighting well too. when a prospect of loot sent in offers— had also remained quiet. Indus Kohistan. Communication between Gilgit and Chitral was letters received open. the Khyber. of Aladand. who formed the bulk of the recent attacking force. having come up by way of the Babusar Pass and Chilas with an escort of police levies of the Agency. . though this was of course long antecedent to the Swat outbreak. was among the enemy killed in one of the attacks. had just arrived in Gilgit. whose conduct had been exemplary since Thus the Khan the Chitral Cam- paign. and the last of from Chitral.. spoke nothing unusual. while no signs of unrest were apparent on the Black Mountain border. 4th Gurkhas. Villagers who had been in the habit of furnishing supplies for the past two years. and who were perfectly well known to the garrison. With regard to Kohat and Kurram all Bajour satisfactory news was received from the The tribes Nawab of Dir that the Bajouris had remained quiet. and who had provided a portion of the levies. Godfrey. word had not participated The Buner frontier on the Hazara side continued undisturbed.O. D. who had generally been really was the despised as fighting men. the Mohmand country.

No. The new : brigades were constituted as follows 2nd pore . the Guides Cavalry and Queen's a detachment of the llth Bengal Lancers. of . . had already submitted in haste before the 1st Brigade started marching. left bank of tlie Swat River into U])per Swat. derabad . 3rd Field Batteiy fiom Saugor 3rd Bengal Cavalry from Fyzabad . General Wodehouse then moved out in force to Rustam. holding the country between Landaki and Barikot. 1st Dorsetshire . 4 Company Madi'as Saj^peis from Bangalore. to watch the southern border of the Buner countiy. Zrd Reserve Brigade: — 1st Northampton. The Lower Swatis generally submitted unconditionally and were allowed to return to their villages. 3 Mountain Battery from Jutogh . lieseros Briyaie 2ud Oxfordshire Light lufantiy fromFeroze2nd Royal Iiish Regiment from Jubbulpore and Saugor 1st : . orders were issued from Simla on the 13th August for the concentration at of two additional Reserve Brigades to be known as the 2nd and 3rd Reserve Brigades of the Malakand Field Force. both artillery and cavalry. Gurkha Rifles from Almora . No. 4 Company Bombay Sappers from Kirkee. H. The Bunerwals who were on the right flank were not expected to make any demonstration Brig-Kdier-General J. The Musa Khel. 9th Gurkha Rifles from Lansdowne 1st Battalion Rifles from Dehra Dun . the advancing force to but guard against possible trouble with them. — Battalion 3rd Bareilly . 20 miles north-east of Mardan. 18th Bengal Lancers at Rawalpindi No. the Highland Light Infantry.shire Regiment from SecunRegiment from Bangalore 2nd Guikha . 12th Bengal Infantry from . 5 Company Own Sappers and Miners and as the tribesmen always dread . The strength advance by one of the 1st field Brigade was increased for the purpose of the and two mountain batteries. While Rawalpindi Sir Bindon Blood was preparing for his advance. The appearance of this force at Rustam was very timely as it reminded the Bunerwals that they could be attacked both in front and in rear. . as well as by No. it was not expected that the progress of this formidable force would be seriously resisted. and the 39th Garhwalis. having with him one squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancei^. especially the former.— ( 0-4 ) Meiklejohn moved up tin. the 1st Reserve Brigade at Wodehouse was mised to the full strength Mardan under by the addition of the Highland Light Infantry and the 2nd Queen's Regiment from Rawalpindi.

assisted by No. the action was over.— ( 55 ] CIIA VTER ril. at 8 o'clock the force moved steadily up to the foot of the long spur from the range on the which runs down towards the Swat Eiver and the attack was commenced by the West in front. with two regiments and six companies of native infantry and a mountain battery. worked their way up hill to within 500 yards of the crest position. The 10th Field Batteiy got to work without delay. August 17th. THE ACTION AT LAXDAKI. 7 where they Mountain Battery under Major Fegan^ who kept up a galling fire on the main body of the enemy. : and by 11 A. to make a turning movement and so cut enemy's line of retreat to the hills off the The advancing force also included No. 8 Bombay Mountain Battery. had joined the and came into action at a range of about 500 yards. comfiring line manded by Captain Birch. advanced on the right. . 5 Company Queen's Owai Sappers and Miners. and to clear these away an action became necessary. The tribesmen would not wait until this movement was developed. the enemy being The following are the details of the fighting On the enemy being sighted right. The resistance offered here was slight.M. line. Major-Gexeral Sir Bindon Blood moved out from Tliana on the left bank of the Swat Eiver at 6-30 on Tuesday morning. their ground for some time. about two thousand retiring rapidly over the Morah Pass into Bvmer. As already forewarned by a reconnoitring party. The 24th Punjab Infantry. making its twelve-pounder guns and the Eoyal West Kent Eegiment attacked on the left. Meanwhile the main attack under Brigadier-General INIeiklejohn was developed on the right. The guns had come up to their position over ground which was very difficult for wheeled artillery. but were driven fiora their position. 10 Field Battery from the plain below. he found some three thousand tiibesmen gathered near Landaki to oppose his advance up the valley. in full retreat. The remainder stood on the right. where they opened a heavy on the By this time No. while Brigadier-General Meiklejohn. excellent practice. supported by the 31st Punjab Infantry. with the 45th Sikhs the fire in reserve. These were apparently a contingent of the Salarzai Bunerwals. Kents driving back skirmishers from the small spur were presently reinforced by No.

singled themselves out from the advancing line of horsemen and bi'avely forged ahead many Then occurred a most regrettable invards in front of their corps. Tliey now wheeled to the left. broke into a gallop but to those watching from the . when they were joined by the West Kent Regiment. 8 at a longish range. were met by a heavy volley — the former was shot dead and Captain Palmer's horse was killed and he himself shot through the right wrist. was rushed by the and the enemy were away across the plain below in the direction of Butkela and were harrassed by shrapnel from No. of ghazis who were now surrounded by a crowd — both their horses were shot under them and they found a distance of about 20 yards. The retreatino. 8) opened fire on a small stone fort at a range of 600 yards and after shelling it for about ten minutes it West Kents. who were close behind. at once dashed up to rescue their fallen comrades. cident. and swept the crest of the hill before them for a short distance. horses. meanwhile Lieutenant MacLean was bled to death almost immediately. Lieutenant Greaves and Captain Palmer. and the enemy retreated over the hills. The cavalry now took up trees. they at once advanced and were seen from above moving rapidly towards the village of Kotal. themselves on foot under this fire at By time Lieutenant MacLean with a few sowavs had arrived on the scene and the little party dashed in most gallantly to the rescue Lieutenant Greaves' body was safely removed. All this time the Guides had been anxiously awaiting their oppornarrow causeway commanded by the enemy's fire prevented A them from passing round the end of the ridge into the plain beyond. This closed the operations Other casualties of the day. The battery (No. seen streaming Resistance had practically ceased. better mounted than the rest. 8 Mountain Battery. but of the Officers. . hills it became plain that the fugitives could reach shelter before it was possible for the cavalry to overtake them. Colonel Adams and Lord Fincastle.( 50 ) and the troops soon won their way to the summit of the ridge. but when at last the Sappers had cleared the way both of the enemy and of the obstacles placed in the road. in neighbouring clump of which they defended relieved by some infantry and No. shot Colonel through both thighs and of his Adams and some their position until men ao-ain charged into the hornets' nest at the risk of their lives and a bore away his body. tunity. The two leaders.tribesmen had reached a point about a mile beyond this village and Passing the village the Guides were already close under the hills. The heavy rice-fields soon told on the troop and a few.

Adams' horse. were As some of the Bunerwals who had been engaged in the fight I'etreating into their country over the Morah Pass. was killed a and he ran up on foot. and Adams' horse was wounded. followers.( 57 ) were Colonel Adams. at once engaged in a hand-to-hand called out ' Colonel Adams few Follow me. story any clearer. one wounded two . wounded. one sepoy. followed by Greaves ing his horse. wounded. while Greaves was shot dead in Fincastle's arms as which he to did. . nullahs. Colonel Adams thereupon directed the squadron to move across the plain to a tope of trees. dismounted. hill. 45th Sikhs. owing intersected by derstand his to the ground beingand Colonel Adams was unable to make him unintended movements. thought he meant to charge the enemy's position. while Fincastle tried to get Greaves. but hearing Colonel Adams shouting to Palmer he closed up towards the former and rode towards the tope with him. ahead. wounded. and who now accounted for some 20 or 30 of own these tribesmen. Greaves falling at the foot down. who was still alive. 24th Pun- jab Infantry. the enemy were already taking a position on a hill — manner in which Lieutenants Greaves about Ih miles away up the valley. . The ghazis poured in a heavy fire. yards off'. some rather conflicting accounts were subsequently received as to the details of the Guides' charge. 3lst Punjab Infantry.' and he and Fincastle went straight for Greaves Fincastle's horse who was now surrounded by ghazis. and Palmei^'s horse being shot They were at once attacked. Colonel Adams having already got up. Guides. The on latter dismounted. As must almost necessarily happen after a desperate fight. slightly wounded sepoy. The latter. On nearing the tope Palmer and Greaves hill ards at the foot of the made a dash for some standwhich was now occupied by some four or five hundred of the ghazis. three sepoys. they were pursued and routed by Major Delamain with two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers who had been left behind at Thana. but Fincastle shouted to him to get up again. Shortly afterwards Captain Palmer. looking round and seeing Colonel Adams with to the squadron following. the publication of an Officer with the which set at rest the controversy as to the exact : and MacLean met their deaths " When the 1st squadron of the Guides Cavalry debouched from the causeway. Captain Palmer meanwhile had got separated from his men. about 150 yards from the enemy's position. but letter of To publish all these would not perhaps make the room may be found for an extract from a private 1st Brigade. He therefore kept who seemed have a difficulty in hold- Lord Fincastle meanwhile had been following the cavalry on one flank. on being conflict.

L. Lieutenant H. Greaves belonged to the Lancashire Fusiliers and. MacLean belonged to the Guides he had been wounded in the previous fighting at Malakand but had rejoined his regiment. Two sowars meanwhile had ridden out to Palmer's assistance. whence they kept up a heavy he arrived just time to check the enemy as they were preparing to rush these two Officers. being on leave from his regiment. and got him back to the These two sowars the ghazis were then came on to help closing Adams and Fincastle — on whom —and one had his horse killed. MacLean was shot through both thighs as he was helping Fincastle to lift Greaves' body on to his Adams and Fincastle then got back safely to the tope with the horse. was acting as special correspondent of the Times of India. X . S. Meanwhile Adams and Fincastle had been carrying Greaves nearer the tope. On November castle 9th Lieutenant-Colonel R. two of whom had their horses shot under them. fire Lieutenant MacLean came out a minute tope. the enemy's being exceedingly hot as our troops were practically attacked on three sides. MacLean brought three sowars out with him. later. until the This tope was held for about a quarter of an hour fire infantry arrived. B. Adams and Lord Fin- were gazetted for the Victoria Cross. who was severely wounded. in having dismounted the remainder of the squadron in the on the enemy . T. a bullet. dismounted sowars who supported the bodies of MacLean and Greaves on MacLean's horse. and the latter's scabbai'd was smashed by tope."' Lieutenant R. Lord Fincastle belonged to the 16th Lancers and was acting as the special correspondent of the Times with the : Malakand Field Force in recognition of his heroism General Blood at once attached him to the Guides Cavalry for duty.: ( ^38 ) he was being lifted.

the The " Mad Fakir " was said to have moved off The next day. a large village on a tributary of the Swat River. for some 20 miles. The Swatis appeared to have Upper Swat. general direction E. Villages are thickly scattered along each . although in the main correct as to names and intermediate distances. and the troops camped letter near the village of Here in all Major Deane received a tribes of from the Mian Guls and other tribes This included general terms of submission to the Government.-E. Numerous side streams join the SwatRiver at various points. opposition leaving Landaki at sunrise.. CONCLUDING OPERATIONS IN THE SWAT VALLEY.-N. The Guides Cavalry made a number of peaceful reconnaissances. as it.-E. The force continued its march into Upper Swat on the 18th August. the unknown to Europeans except from the map compiled from various sources by the Intelli. and camped there for five days. August 19th. in the direction of Buner. survey parties did sume work in of the jierfect security. their arms. had been one who had taken and jjart in The greater part of the country travelled over was previously reports of natives . the force moved up the valley to Mingaora./euce Branch. which keeps a more easterly bearing than had been estimated. In short. the object advance up the Swat Valley seemed alieady to have been fully accomplished. the valley runs straight. way. and were sending in everyday their submissions and them even assisting Major Deane in forwarding Over 800 guns and rifles were collected. proved to be considerably out as regards the general direction of the valley. and on the 25th August Brigadier-General Meiklejohu's Brigade started to retrace its steps. We may this pause here for a of the Field Force it moment to describe in greater detail march under General Sir Bindon Blood up the of great interest to all Swat quite Valley. and the whole valley is of wonderful at that time of the year it w-as green with luxuriant crops of fertilit} — <'rowinf' rice und Indian corn. and then again resumes its easterly bearing. No was encountered on the Ghalajai. whence turns sharply almost due north for a short way.( 59 ) CHAPTER VIII. a distance of some 12 miles. including some Government rifles stolen from the Malakand Fort. running about N. and some of daks to and from Chakdara. it From Chakdara as far as Barikot. completely settled down.

000 21st The furthest point reached by the cavalry reconnaissance on the August from Mingaora (the present capital) was Gutibagh. of cultivation are found on both sides of the Swat. in from Barikot the is Swat Valley into the Salarzai portion of Bunei'. where a halt was made on the summit of a small eminence opposite to the junction of the Arnawai River with the Swat. which rise to heights of 3. itself still fertile and Between Mingaora and : this point the village of Manglaor was passed this was the former capital and is surrounded by numerous Buddhist remains. and is one which much used for the export of grain from Upper is Swat southwards to Eustani and other Indian marts.( 00 ) side of the shaded by groves of " stupas. the valley widens. Most of these remains are of great antiquity.t lifted This pass leads of another hitherto unexplored country. and broad stretches The reconnaissance the " purdah " to the Kai'akar Pass on the 25th Augu£. beyond which point the river appears to trend in a more northerly direction towards the Kohistan or hill-country proper— the valley thickly populated. " Numerous remains the is of Buddhist monasteries and other buildings are passed. and for a few miles higher up. and their exact to.000 or 4. instead of narrowing as was expected. '' location are accurately manuscript above referred speaks of the remains as old Even at this and ruined.000 or 17. become more rugged and bolder in outline. From here the view extended some 5 or 6 miles further. These rise to altitudes of 16. The pass an . Here. about 12 miles higher up. main stream. as of the Chinese traveller Hiuen-Tsiang. and also of the footprints of Buddha. " early date Hieun-Tsiang As one advances up mountainous. and whose objects of religious interest remarks upon prominent features and were verified Major Deane. while the snowy peaks of the Kohistan are seen towering in the far distance. trees.000 feet and form a hills fine backits ground to the vista of the river winding sluggishly along through green level valley bounded on either side by bare rocky on which feet. who took a numerous instances by number of interesting described in the impressions of Pali inscriptions. the pines begin to show themselves at elevations of 4.400 years ago. proved by the writings this who ascended in valley some 1. which latter Political Agent. which would afford field for an interesting investigation to archaeologist.000 to 5. the valley the scenery becomes wilder and more The hills. wliich form such a characteristic feature in the scenery of this part of the world.000 feet above the river bed. and around them are the invariable graveyards.

Thus the expedition had served fertility to reveal country of a highly interesting character. stony and uneven. built of stone in The villages are of the usual Pathan type. On Jeffreys. that to say. and their pursuit of the was such a place that delayed the Guides in after the action at Landaki. down from the hills and dip steep- Here the roadway it is generally very bad. fertile and Immediately below the pass is an open valley.( 61 ) easy one. and on the nether side considerable size (the Barundu) is seen winding its way south and east through a broad fertile valley. the 27th August the 2nd Brigade.500 feet in height above the sea level. Vines. the principal means of communication up and down the and is good enough except at those places where spurs run ly to the river. the household utensils few and rude. flagged in places. to relieve the returning 1st Brigade Khar. although doubtless they would flourish once planted and cared well. They are power- fully built. and sharp gleaming eyes. being rough. The general is character of the country appeared to be similar to Swat. roofed. valley. and many of the show signs of strong individuality and character. This move was thought at first to prelude an advance into Buner a measure by no which was ordered to rest at — means uncalled for in view of the fact that the Salarzai section of the Bunerwals retained some twenty rifles and a large amount of Martini . enemy As regards the Swatis themselves both Upper and Lower are of pronouncedly Semitic type with aquiline noses. and if rice fruit trees are scarce. flatand rubble. bins made of earth and straw. hills into a larger valley beyond. and wonderfully active on the hillside. and from its summit a fine view is obtained of this portion of Buner. or else buried in the is still The old Buddhist road. Sir Bindon Blood and his staff and the Eoyal West Kent Regiment proceeding to Malakand. its green with growing crops. : some 40 miles of new The Swat Valley is of great corn. a mountainous country with wide. some 4. under Brigadier-General marched out to Thana. wheat. level river beds which are highly cultivated. thin lips. as they had all been removed to safe retreats among the hills during Sir Bindon Blood's occupation of the valley. Mountains a river of beyond which lies the Indus. faces Most of the elder men are bearded. drained by a stream which makes now way rise through a break in the in the background. barley The principal crops are Indian for. As regards the women few or none (except old hags and quite young girls) were seen. tomatoes and water-melons are grown and ripen with grain stored ground. throughout.

losses at These were the clans which suffered such severe Chakdara. and the 22nd Punjab Uch is situated about six miles from Chakdara on the Dir Road. entertained. of the 10th Field Battery. to reconnoitre the passes. of when in. Khar to Golagrani the 1st Brigade remaining at Khar. force Shabkadr (under and the whole of Sir circumstances which will presently be related) Bindon Blood's Division— that is to say. the Mohmands on the in front of . iu case it should be . On the 29th August the troops composing the Uch force con- centrated at Chakdara. 12 miles from Khar (which the is not to be confused with the pass of country). if it was ever was relinquished. which was composed Infantry. henceforth styled Mardan. will march back past to await orders all . General Meiklejohn's Brigade resting at Khar. will withdraw from Rustani and concentrate at Colonel Reid was given command of the force moving to Uch. The 1st Reserve Brigade. which had been was now directed to move out against the Utman Khels. The work disarmament there was at once be^un. . greatly to the disappointment of the now Field Force and the following moves were ordered " The 2nd . A small force of arms will proceed to right bank of the Uch to support the Khan of Dir in settling Swat. and large quantities of firearms were readily brought showing that the spirit of the Svvatis to the north was thoroughly broken. and General Wodehouse's Brigade watching the Buner frontier tani— was required to be available at Khar to co-operate at Rusat any moment with General EUes's Division at reshawar. the the 3rd Brigade of the Malakand Field Force. General Jefi'reys' Brigade moving against the Utman Khels. Pass.( «^ ) aniiminition captured at the Malakand. but there the advance came to an abrupt end. The 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General marched back to Jeflfreys. In the risen in sudden cancellation of the movefirst place. they were joined by Major Deane. the 38th Dogras. idle But the idea. the same name in Mohmand was reached by General Jeffreys without opposition. and moved oif to Uch the following: day. with divisional troops. and he was well pleased the policy of disarmament being carried out so thoroughly. to see The Khan of Dir was then at Uch. starting on the 30th August and Captain Walters with one troop of the 11th Bengal Lancers was sent on in front. The Inzari Golagram to await orders. all the 11th Bengal Lancers available except one squadron. two days ahead of the brigade. : — Brigade. the brigade being at once recalled to Khar There were two reasons for this ment against the Utman Peshawar frontier had Khels.

* * And now Mohmand be convenient to leave the Malakand Field Force temporarily and to turn to those events at Shabkadr which added the country to the "disturbed area" on our frontier. whom much will and whose Mohmand army just of have to be told in subsequent alluded to had already been severely chastised by General Elles's troops. The Hadda Mullah. From Uch to Sado on the Panj- kora Eiver hostile is one march only. in other words. The move was no sooner carried out than the brigade was further ordered to Uch (instead of General Jeffreys' Brigade) to join Colonel Reid's force. new with events transpiring or at least impending in the direction of Uch. he of Dir. . trieving his fortunes in a to was apparently bent on re- new direction . pages. movement It has been mentioned that the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier- General "Wodehouse was withdrawn from the Buner frontier to Mardan in order to be at hand for possible employment with General Elles's Division against the Mohmands. so that in the event of the Khan of Dir being seriously threatened the brigade could be promptly despatched to join Colonel Reid's Column at Uch. General Wodehouse at once sent out a small force to take possession of the Panjkora bridge from the Dir levies which was effected without opposition. The march was quickly accomplished. and a force placed there could check any against Dir. and on assuming command of the united forces at Uch. was reported in be preparing an attack upon the Khan News was brought that the mullah had succeeded in collecting a large force of "Western Mohmands for this purpose. It was therefore considered advisable to keep General Jeffreys' Brigade in hand at Khar. issued for the On the 5th September orders were 2nd and 3rd Brigades of Sir Bindon Blood's Field Force to move to Nawagai on the northern confines of the right through the heart of the stances.( G3 ) decided to advance into a knock-out blow at the General Jeffreys' Mohmand country and deal The second reason for recalling Brigade from the Utman Khel passes was connected tlie heart of the rising. instead of losing it for a time in trivial operations against a comparatively small clan like the Utman Khels. Mohmand country and then turn southwards Mohmand country according to circum- with the view to eventually effecting a junction with the force under General EUes which would advance from Shabkadr on the southern side of the Mohmand * it will country to meet Sir Bindon Blood. though only just in time to forestall the Mohmands. and that he was trying to persuade the Utman Khels and Bajouris to join him.




and arrived at Shabkadr at 6 A. and burnt there. THE KAID ON SHABKADR FORT. the same evening. and the Border Police fired on the raiders.M. and the whole of the 20th Punjab Infantry. About four o'clock in the afternoon of Saturday. held by a detachment of the Border Police. 18 miles north of Peshawar. four companies of the Somersetshire Light Infantry. The facts are briefly these. On the news of this outbreak reaching Peshawar. another grave outbreak of tribal fanaticism was disturbing that portion of our border in the While for the advance which faces the Mohmand territory. commanding the Peshawar District. it. Brigadier-General E. killing and wounding a number of them. having been warned of the approach of the raiders. but some sort of an assault upon did take place. THE MOHMAND CHAPTER RISING. August 7th. The guns and infantry were a good deal delayed in crossing the Kabul River. By this time the laiders had disappeared and were reported to have hurriedly retired across the border on the approach of the reinforcing troops. Elles. had already sought refuge in the Fort. took out a reinfoi'cing column consisting of four guns of the Slst Field Battery. . which is the bazar of Shabkadr. having to be ferried over.( 6o ) PART III. The cavalry went on ahead. early part of August Sir Bindon Blood was preparing up the Swat Valley which led to the fight at Landaki and to the subsequent subjugation of the Swat tribes. killing two men who had remained The rest of the villagers. Shabkadr itself was not it very fiercely assailed. They moved upon the Hindu village of Shankargarh. I. E. some four or five thousand Mohmands made a sudden incursion into British territory near Shabkadr Fort. two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers.

( GO ) Shabkadr Fort was has walls tifty feet built is high. Najib- who has already been alluded to in these pages. so by the Sikhs. and two full brigades in * The mystery envelopiiiu ^___^ sneral Klles lifted the jMrdah Gene t Lower Swat clear the Malakand were now ready _ ''-(U'aii. only At the time of the raid Shabkadr was held by forty or fifty Border Police. the little garrison accounting for some forty of the tribesmen without loss to themselves. inhabited chiefly by rich Hindu money-lenders. and it was he again beyond all doubt whose plotting the had indirectly hepled to bring about the recent rising in Swat is Valley. and then entered the Gandab Valley. General Ghulam Hyder Kliant Karki (com- manding the troops in Eastern Afghanistan. suffering from their failure capture the his effort Malakand or Chakdara. and so into British territory at Shabkadr.m. and was known to have intimate relations with the Sipah Salar. was the direct ud-din. "f r was dispelled a couple i>f nioutliB VI). This force advanced down the Bohai Valley. This raid. The raid was doubtless designed still to effect a diversion to in favour of the Swatis. this place __ _ of the Bohai Valley - . and widespread all along our Peshawar frontier. and the attack lasted from about 4 p. and had gathered a considerable body of men about hini. Shankargarh was an old Sikh Cantonment bazar. to 5 a.ss.m. As of to was. as well as in Bajour and the Utman Khel was this mullah who tried so hard to create trouble for us during the Chitral Campaign. which three miles distant. Mohmand It country. He lived at the supposed village of Jarobi* in at the head of the Bohai Valley. it may be said at once.. crossed the Nahaki Pa. our troops (as already shown) had swept the tribesmen. who had very profitable is dealings with the tribesmen on both sides of the border. and who was at that time a great power among the more fanatical tribesmen in the districts. though the fact was not learnt of till afterwards. work of the notorious Mullah Hadda. If the Hadda Mullah had timed that Shabkadr should be attacked on the same day uneasiness would have been caused it so as the Mala- kand. that part of the Mohmand country which under the Amir of Kabul. While the recent attack on the Malakand was proceediner the Hadda Mullah had collected a body of men and sent them to help the Swatis. ( I'iilc Chapter _ later when Since . he would have done a clever stroke of business. A few days before the present raid on Shabkadr the mullah had succeeded in stirring up the fanaticism of the Northern and Western Mohmands. It stands on a mound and piactically impregnable to any force with- out artillery. with head-quarters at Jellalabad).

600 . when some 5. were attacked by a column 850 strong under Colonel Boisragon. They extend west- wards to the hill country above the Kunar River. The principal of the latter are the valleys of Shilman. Gandab and Pandiali. boundary runs from Landi Kotal eastwards the watershed separating the basins of the Lalpura and then along Kunar and Panjkora is the most considerable portions of the country are within the British zone." of As the Durand Rivers. already mentioned. a small detach- ment of 170 men of the Merwara Battalion. the rich alluvial lands along the bank Kabul River from Jellalabad to Lalpura. while a reserve brigade liad been formed at Mardan which could move at a few hours' notice into the Peshawar Valley. 2. the Baizai accounting for one-half of the total. the eastern part of the country adjacent to Bajour and the On an earlier occasion. (including the Is Khel and Barhan Creagh. They hold the country bounded on the south by the Kabul River from Jellalabad to its entrance into British territory. In 1880 they made but a poor resistance. They rain. under Captain O'Moore thousand Kane Dakka against several Mohmands who attacked for six hours. and the country to the east of Lalpura. from which slopes of barren ground lead to the rocky spurs dry and arid water-courses. the Dawezai. political country lying about Swat and Panjkora of the Under the Durand The actual Treaty they came partly under the influence of the Indian of Kabul. . Government and partly under that Amir demarcation of the zones of influence has never been carried out. successfully held a position near : .( 67 ) operate in any direction.000 and 18. As a tribe. The following : is an official description is of the Mohmand into territory "The country of the Mohmands divided naturally of the two parts.000 of them. who had crossed the Kabul River near Dakka. the Mohmands are split up into six clans the Baizai. but usually presenting a stony and shingly bed. and on the north by Bajour. These hold Utman Khel border.800 . consisting of a network of hills and valleys. in 1879. the Khwaizai. Khel).800 . 1. the Halimzai. are. raging torrents in heavy and ranges that flank them. a few woi'ds will suffice to tell all needs to be stated here about them. that As for the Mohmand tribes. as a rule. and in the east they touch the Peshawar border and the the junction of the Utman Khel Rivers. the attempt to form a Boundary Commission having come to nought a few months previously. The Mohmands had never been accounted an enemy of much importance in previous conflicts with our troops.000. The fijihting strength of the whole tribe put at between 17. 2. good fighting men the Tarakzai.

situate in the Afridi country. There is a conipavatively easy route into their country from Matta. * Another pass bearing this name.( 68 ) 800 and the Utmahzai. but it in preference to that over was thought desirable not to enter the Mohmand country at that time. ><- . comes into the xiaxrative later. and it might have . a few miles north of Shabkadr.* This is known as the Alikandi route. been used by the Chitral Relief Force in 1895 the Malakand. over the Inzari Pass. 400.

( G9 ) CHAPTER PROMPT II. Their numbers border increased on Sunday night. They withdrew to the low hills which run from the main ranges line. He had had to return to Peshawar on the previous day to arrange the disposition of the garrison thex'e (weakened by the sudden call upon it) and to report by telegraph to Army Head- Quarters the state of affairs on the border. 20th Punjab Infantry. and his small force was outflanked by the hand. . but could make no impression on the position. two companies of the Somersetshire Light Infantry. shortly after 6 o'clock.000 men. REPRISALS. to within a mile of the Fort. which is three miles from the Here they remained out of gunshot range. on the At this period of the action Brigadier-General Elles arrived scene and took command.200 men. The enemy's line was about two miles in length.100 and 1. with the exception of the Tarakzai. and the whole of the 20th Punjab Infantry 600 strong. leaving the Infantry. he heard the sound of heavy Shabkadr and at once pushed infantry to follow. being assembled. August 9th. On Monday morning. began to Woon withdraw towards the Fort. who had been left in command at Shabkadr by Brigadier-General Elles. On arrival at the ferry over the firing at Kabul River. the presence of the Hadda Mullah serving to attract contingents from all the Mohmand clans. or a total of between 1. August 8th. He left early that morning. Lieutenant-Colonel Woon. who streamed out into the plain on either To guard against the infantry being completely enveloped. some 6. at hills. two squad- rons of the 13th Bengal Lancers. Woon began his attack with the infantry. at daybreak. moved out his troops to the attack. Colonel Mohmands. taking with him two companies of the 30th Peshawar again Punjab on. The report regarding the retirement of the Mohmand raiders after the arrival at Shabkadr of strong reinforcements from Peshawar was true only in part. He had at his disposal four guns of the 51st Field Battery. while their Colonel left stretched* into the cultivated ground in the plain itself. least. Their right rested on the high their centre extended across the low hills.

7 Lancers. as the dead they left on the ground General Elles not conshowed. wounded wounded severely. 1 Punjab Infantry. their losses were very heavy. under the leadership rons of This charge was brilliantly carried out Major Atkinson. . and the number of Major Lumb. and to threaten . who was present during the liis fight. rallying of and re-forming on the left of the infantry. The Mohmands were driven on which they took re- hills. but as it was. killed. however. . losses considering how sharp was : the enemy. and pursued to the foot of the high fuge.( 70 ) most General Elles reached the scene of action at 8-40 of the enemy had swarmed down from the low a. 13th Bengal Lancers. By this time the two companies of the 30th Punjab Infantry had come up. Severely wounded fantry. man was had The Hadda Mullah. Somersetshire Light In. sidering it desirable. killed. commanding.m. of the four guns upon the enemy's left. and an infantry attack was ordered against the enemy before they could recover from the effects of the cavalry charge. The two squadLancers swept right along from end to end of the line. Our heavy casualties in this affair were 12 killed and 52 wounded. but Major Atkinson and Lieutenant Cheyne had their horses shot. and they began to retire over the hills when the troops returned to Shabkadr. evidently seen that defeat could not be retrieved. wounded •' Lieutenant Cheyne. setshire slightly slightly slightly. 51st Field Battery. and by two o'clock not a to be seen. . hills by whidi time and were en- gaged with our infantry in the open. in have been almost completely cut off. had received a sufficiently sharp lesson.m. General Elles's opinion. bullet wound in the leg. 13th Bengal 6 Another account of the fight gave the following additional details :— " Our infantry attacked in front. with the small infantry force at his hills. to hotly push further into the particularly as his men had been engaged for four hours.. Had an additional cavalry regiment been present they would. back. bullet wound The in the neck Slightly Captain Blacker. and he at once saw the favourable opportunity offered for using his cavalry. command. The Mohmands. 1 8 severely. The action was over by 10-30 a. not the fighting. Their losses were few. He first concentrated the fire rons of the 13th Bengal Lancers to and then directed the two squadcharge from right to left along the whole line of tribesmen. details of the casualties : were as follows :— Somer8 Light 20th Infantry 4 men 1 killed. 20 wounded severely. the cavalry and artillery on the right being thrown forward for the advantage of the ground.

apparently are in bad case. Officers. but our force was too small to including General enter the hills in pursuit. At 3 o'clock. just 800. and Lieutenant Cheyne and two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers. and immediately ordered up to of the Somersetshire of the 37th Dogras. Turner. and in this None of the wounded have yet died. with 1. a. A. The down the enemy's rolling it up. a loss of about 10 per cent.750 men. however. and where again of the Rifle Brigade. . G. G. General EUes with his Staff arrived at this moment. 5. Having withdrawn the troops Shabkadr the remainder to the neighbourhood of the Fort. On our side the total number engaged was and with these were only 15 British Staff.000. EUes and Officer. a heliographic message was received from Shabkadr stating that no enemy could be seen even on the distant hills. about 9 front. so as to be ready to assume the offensive the Mohmands should reappear. and four of these were wounded in addition to the Medical bullet.. wounded was efliciently performed. case saved many lives. B. Atkinson. and swarmed on both flanks under heavy rifle fire from our and they pressed hard to cut us off from the Fort. defeated a body of Shabkadr. and remained watching in groups. hills facing in men met and January 1864 Colonel of the latter. the Mohmands being tempted into the plain and then charged. The enemy changed front to meet this. Most but the artillery kept the enemy off on our right. The latter was struck by a stone knocked up by a and incapacitated for a short while. who held the low The success like that of General Elles. distant of our casualties occurred at this time. left and took over command. A squadron of the 7th Hussars on that occasion made three successive charges which enabled the infantry to act with decisive effect against the enemy's broken line. Light Infantry and 250 if General Elles returned to Peshawar. The enemy immediately fled to the tops of the foot hills. left. Macdonnel.m.000 Mohmands. about 2 miles." A curious fact worth mentioning with 600 is that the ground on which the action was fought was practically the same as that on which Sir Colin Campbell in 1852 defeated 6. and none Seventy-seven were killed or wounded.( 71 ) the enemy's line of retreat. Lieutenant A. but he insisted on returning to Cei'tainly first aid to the duty. was due to the cavalry. Captain Blacker of the Artillery here received his wound. supported by the artillery fire directed ahead of the cavalry line. and in spite of the heavy ground and bad going. Shells dispersed the groups. He lengthened to the right and threw back our cavalry charged and ordered the cavalry out line. the charge was brilliantly executed by Major F.

500 men. the 20th Punjab Infantry (600 strong). but on arrival by train at Nowshex-a they were sent straight The 9th Bengal Lancers and the 57th Field were also ordered up. two Somersatshire Light Infantry squadrons 13th Bengal Lancers. the 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas arrived on the on. The reinforcement carried out.200 men. (740 strong). 9th Bengal Lancers. and at the same time asked for one battery of artillery. the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Gurkhas. the Gordon Highlanders. 5 Company Bengal Sappers. six companies of the 37th Dogras. 57 Field Battery. to Battery from Carapbellpore enabled General Elles These reinforce- send the whole of the 13th Bengal ments Lancers to Shabkadr. August lOth. had been despatched from Rawalpindi by train at midnight on Sunday. the Devonshire Regiment. and the 2. Mohmand Frontier were the 51st Field The troops now watching the Battery (four guns). No. The arrival of the Gordon . a regiment of native cavalry and one of native infantry. of the Peshawar garrison was most promptly In addition to the Gordon Highlandez's from Rawalpindi and the three companies of the 8th Bengal Infantry. five companies of the 30th Punjab Infantry. Highlanders filled the gap at Peshawar caused by sending the Somer- setshire Light Infantry to Shabkadr.( 72 ) As it was impossible to say how far the excitement extended along the border. however. under orders from Army Head-Quarters. were reported after i-eplenishing their to have lost ammunition and food supplies. August 8th. The as intending to return to the attack Mohmands. The Gurkhas had been intended for the Reserve Brigade at Mardan. scene. five miles without any enemy being seen. General Elles called up tluee companies of the 8th Bengal Infantry from Nowshera. it being important to have a garrison at Peshawar. Apart from this detached column General Elles eventually had the following troops in Peshawar itself : one section of the 51st Field Battery and the whole of No. a handy force of about A reconnaissance into the hills from Shabkadr was made on Tuesday. and three companiea of the 8th Bengal Infantry . The Gordon Highlanders. thus raising the strength of the force there to about 2. the 30th Punjab 37th Dogras (250). and reached Peshawar on the Monday afternoon the 2nd Queen's from JuUundur replacing them at Rawalpindi as part of the Reserve Brigade of the Malakand Division. the Infantry (300). They were said between three and fuur hundred killed and several in the action hundred wounded on the 9th August.

For the next five days or so phenomenally heavy rains came down and made matters extremely uncomfortable for the Peshawar and Shabkadr garrisons. in the Bohai Valley. imitating the beaten Swatis at Chakdara.W^cst Froiitior to still now presented strengthen the however. the more northerly Alikandi This demonstration was announced as arranged for Monday. which was held by wire hawsers. the one to a veritable slough of despond to Transport Officers. however. it was reported at Peshawar that the Hadda Mullah had again worked up the Mohmands. The " Mad Fakir " in Swat. was a triumph of engineering skill. for the reason that no immediate operations were possible and the Mohmand warriors. Simla Hills. As a matter of fact many of them were attending . splendidly : withstood the flood its it consisted of country boats. still smarting tribesmen were apparently not to be thus easily inflamed a second time. and that he in- tended to attack both Shabkadr and Michni. and was generally level with and sometimes overflowing the banks . was obviously wise t'urthei- gairison of Feshawai' so as to have a seeond eolunin ready to take the field in case the tribal excitement should spi'ead. The Government of India therefore ordered up the following troops :— 4tli Dragoon Guards and " K" Battery Royal Horse Artillery.{ r. If it August 23rd.\ ) As itself. was reported to have sent the answer—" Dog. as . was coming down with a roar at a speed of from ten to twelve knots an hour. one tribal column coming down the Gandab Valley and another by route. but the bridge. the i^oneral it sitiiaLioii <»ii the North. On August the 22nd. Fortunately the floods did not interfere with any urgent military operations. the 26th Punjab Infantry from Jullundur. and the roads were turned into bogs. The fair vale of Peshawar almost disappeared under Shabkadr being The new bridge over the Kabul River. 3 (British) Mountain Battery from Jutogh. in replying to a mess- Hadda Mullah asking for congratulations. which runs midway between Peshawar and Shabkadr. had a warm had actually taken place the Mohmands would have more cavalry were now on the scene with General Elles than were available on the 9th of the month but the i^eception. about a fortnight age from the ! after the action at Shabkadr. and No. had completely disappeared. and length was about two hundred yards. The current at that time watei-. from Rawalpindi. pontoon system. The Mullah of Hadda was so discredited that he had retired temporarily to his haunt without an enemy . you have done nothing " which indeed was the plain truth.

August 24th. the recent heavy rains havin? rendered agri. X- . and the grave events which succeeded it. This new fierce attack was rising. * "While General Elles was awaiting permission from head-quarters to press home retaliation upon the Mohmands. the smouldering embers of fanaticism in this new direction burst suddenly into flames.( 74 ) peacefully to their cultural fields. and at length on Tuesday. and because they influenced the Government of India in deciding upon the further exemplary operations against the Mohmands now to be described. signs of restlessness were being reported day by day from the Afridi and Orakzai country. require separate narration. however. work a necessity added to which the war council of the tribe was for the moment * hopelessly torn by * internal dissensions. and are only mentioned here for the sake of chronology. and a made upon our Forts in the Khyber Pass.

with the two brigades of the Malakand Field Force under Brigadier-General Wodehouse and Brigadier-General Jefi'reys.-M. the troops to be drawn from the force already in and about Peshawar.-D. while General Elles. with two brigades (commanded by Brigadier-General Westmacott and Brigadier-General Macgregor). for Intelligence. and that the Mohraands would be the first tribe to be taken in hand.. McLeod D. the southern side. the like 9. Adjutant. The proposed movement against the Mohmands was well timed. Colonel A.000 Baizai Mohmands. Major P.. Q. as two powerful forces were about to move upon the con- demned country from Sir Bindon Blood. A. E. Sulivan. as Hadda Mullah was once again reported to be on the war-path. although the 30th Bengal Infantry. Lieutenant E. Q.first was received in kadr of two brigades under the command of General Elles.000 just been depleted by the despatch to the disturbed Afridi frontier of the 6th 1st it had and Orakzai Battalion 2nd Gurkhas. The Peshawar force at that time numbered something Bengal Cavalry. and men. Definite orders followed for the immediate concentration at Shab- During the . a'nd owing also to Sir Bindon tion. force under Brigadier-General Blood's promptness in recall- ing Briyadier-General Jeffreys' Brigade from the Utman Khel Expedi- Everything pointed to the operations of our troops being short and decisive. A.-G. . of the move forward from Shabkadr on The composition and staff fi'om Peshawar were as follows Mohmand expeditionary force : Commanding : Brigadier-General Elles with the rank of Major. owin» to the rapid movethe ment across the Panjkora Eiver of the Uch Wodehouse. this time with 4. Duthy R. was acting from the north and east. Captain . Captain W. week in September the welcome announcement Peshawar that the Government of India had sanctioned extensive punitive measures against the various tribes on the Peshawar border. .G. his intention being to re-visit Shabkadr. A. Elles A.— ( 75 ) CHAPTER III. Commanding Royal Artillery. RE..K. His other ambitious plan (already described) for attacking Dir and cutting round to Chitral had come to nought. would opposite directions.-M.-C. General. THE MOHMAND EXPEDITION.

9th Gurkhas. . Veterinary -Captain II. Ordnance Officer.E. Rowan Chief CommisOfficer. (^munissariat Officer for the Base at Shabkadr. Battalion 1st Brigadier-General C^. Principal INIedical OlHecr. C!. Forsdyke I>ancers. 3 28th British and No 5 Bombay Mountain Batteries Bombay Pioneers. Divisional Troopn .•— ODmmandingr. It will be noticed that certain Imperial Service Troops were includ- ed in the expeditionary force. Lieutenant E. C. accompanied the Mohmand Expedition in charge of the survey. 19th Bengal Brigaile : — 0>mnianding. Assistant Field Engineers. Field Intelligence OfTicor. A. liideout. Stokes and C. Townsend Field Engineer. F.( 7G ) r. R. J. Troops ] : Oxfordshire Light Infantry. Jloghton. W. Major S. R. Gurkhas. Troops: 2ik1 Somerset Light Infantry. E. The Maharaja General of Patiala Elles's personal staff as and Sir Partab Singh of Jodhpur joined extra Aides-de-Camp Major W. F. E. to It is impossible to employ cavalry to be any great extent . liieutenant E. Provost Marshal. R. . . is affords all the explanation that necessary : — "The tiibal disturbances come forward with on the frontier have prompted the ruling Chiefs in all parts of India to their wonted loy alty to press upon the GovernorGeneral in Council the services of their Imperial Service Troops. G. Greenstreet. . Westropp. Divisional Transport (!aptain F. and one regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.C. Major F. ject. Macgregor. I'lf. Lieutenants VV. A. L. W. The when Governor-General in Council has resolved that the time has come the assistance of the troops so loyally prepared and maintained may be accepted from the Chiefs of the Punjab. K. 20th Punjab Infantry. in the expeditions which have now undertaken the Governor-General in Council has therefore . B. and the following notification on the subwhich was issued from the Foreign Department on September 5th. sariat Officer.—13th Bengal Lancers. Maoqnoid. Massy. Captain G. and when they may be allowed to co-operate in punishing those who have made and are making persistent efforts to disturb the peace of that Province. Vauglian Veterinary Officer. six companies 37th )ogras. Surgeon-Colonel E. No.. Brigadier-General Westmacott. <2nd Brigade . Hyderabad Contingent . . Iflt Bombay Gronadiors . Bythell. Major Kelly .

This Chief is an old rival of Umra Khan's and his territory in the south touches the Mittai Valley. pending the development of which General Elles would not move out from Shabkadr. generally a pass. In some instances heavy losses had been incurred by our troops in this way. and which the patriotic action of His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia and His Highness the Maharaja of Jaipur places again at the disposal of the Government of India. The urgency and unanimity. may now be more fully During previous border wars the custom in attacking hostile tribes had been to march straight into their country on one line of This had always enabled the tribesmen to gather at a single advance. already outlined. thus compelling our troops to storm breastworks before making good their entrance into the country. present expedition was being conducted on very different lines. who had assumed a particularly friendly attitude towards the British Raj. offering a good defensive position. a tract about which Government and the Amir of Nawagai is about 50 miles. These It troops will immediately proceed to the front. When our troops reached Nawagai. which characterise the action in this respect of rulers of States in India emphatical- ly testify to the spirit of loyalty which animates them. the route followed by Sir Robert in the Chitral Low Campaign. point." The plan unfolded. they would be in rear of the Mohmands and could march to any point in their country. possession of The Our Lower Swat and the opening out of the road to Chitral through Dir permitted of a strong flank movement being made against the Mohmands. and progress had necessarily been slow. there had been a dispute between the From Sado to . the head-quarters of the Khan of that name. of campaign. Orders have been given tliat the thanks of the Government of India should be conveyed to all the Chiefs from whom otfers of troops have been received.( 77 ) tlocidcd to aceopt from the States in the ruiijab the service of four bat- talions of infantry and of two companies of Sappers and Miners. A caravan route leads due south to the Peshawar border and this would perhaps be the best to follow as it Kabul. From Mandia a road leads south-west up the Khaluzi Valley to the high range which separates Bajour proper from the Mohmand country. and was marching rapidly due west up the Ushiri Valley to Mandia. Sir Bindon Blood had crossed the Panjkora Eiver at Sado. This range Sir Bindon Blood intended to cross by a pass overlooking Nawagai. has also been deter- mined to utilise the services of the Gwalior and Jaipur transport trains which did such good work in the Chitral Expedition.

are a poverty-stricken and. As each division was 5. made known that the visit was not made in order to deprive any tribe of its independence. and columns could be Jarobi. but because the British Government were determined to "take such into their country. various directions. As our two divisions moved to meet each flee other in the Boliai Valley. its measures as would insure future. Nawagai. the expedition (as will be shown) occupied more than a month. as at the head and could readily be reached. it was believed.000. The Mohmands loading rifles.000 strong.'' * border against being attacked in the that if Further. and as the total strength of the Mohmands was only 17. This place is 30 miles from Nawagai and about 50 from Shabkadr. were badly armed. to the outset. men But to oppose his advance southwards. the Mohmands were informed any opposition ou our fron- tier The attitude of the Amir towards the various is alluded to more fully in a later chapter. No moved proclamation was issued to the Mohmands before our troops Our Political Officers.( 78 ) passes throngli Lokerai in tlio Bnliai Valley. would be obliged to gather their fighting- many villages. as they had never been able to purchase breechIn the raid on Shabkadr they were assisted by the clans which owe allegiance to the Amir. the tribesmen would probably hills. race. though they might make some show of resistance at the lie Their villages would sent out in open to the troops. This then was the plan and predictions were not wanting that within a week the Mohmand operations would be over. the head-quarters it lies of the Hadda Mullah. unlike the Afridis. As a matter of fact. where the Mohmands have The Mohmands. and would clearly be taken at a disadvantage. reach them from this direction now. however. They had never been attacked from the north before. as Abdur Rahman * had shown that he would not permit fighting on his subjects to join in the the border. would of the valley of operations. tribes breakiug the peace . the four brigades being then free to move against the Afridi and Orakzai combination. the their attention in at the very time at which tribe was not likely to make much of a fight against the two forces. their scouts would bring would be turned to news that another big force had entered the country from Shabkadr and was pressing forward through the Gandab defile upon Lokerai. but help could not. and to at least a portion of the troops engaged afibrded quite as much fighting as even a keen soldier could desire. of which one-half had to be furnished by the Baizai clans to the extreme west. doubtless be visited. on the appearance of Sir Bindon Blood's Division at Nawagai.

the Gandab Valley just numbers being unknown. the whole force was concentrated on the Shabkadr-Michini road. General Westmacott's Bzigade marched through the Khorappa* defile into the Gandab Valley. Gaselee. reported to be in the The Hadda Mullah was ahead with a gathering of tribesman belonging to the Khwazai and Utman Khel sections. short delay. the 13th September. enemy. later pages dealing with tlie . The remaining troops of the divi- sion followed in due course. Hence the date of General EUes's alarmed by the march of our troops. before leaving General Blood and returning to Swat. was due to causes affecting General Blood's further advance upon Nawagai. which proved to No be a difficult one. It was now expected that General Blood and General Elles would join hands at Lokerai on the 18th September whereupon Sir Bindon Blood would assume : supreme command of both divisions with full political power. the narrative has now to follow the more chequered fortunes of the two brigades under Sir Bindon Blood on the opposite borders of the Moh- mand * country. who had apparently been wholesomely All their jirghas were anxious to and General Blood at Major Deane's request halted his division for two days for that purpose. and Colonel A. those who engaged in hostilities would be followed up and punished. This On Monday. this Another place bearing name is mentioned in Orakzai rising. come in.( 79 ) was offered. and after a delay of two days man^hed off. Saturday. and General Elles soon found himself in an advanced position in the enemy's country. advance was changed from the 13th to the 15th September. Major-General Elles and the moved out from Peshawar to Shabkadr. On Wednesday. Half of General Macgregor's Brigade followed in support. September 15th. however. was seen on the march. it is worth explaining. as it was most important that the combined advance of the two divisions should be so timed that the enemy could be caught between the two armies approaching simultaneously from north and south. took over the command Divisional Staff of the On Peshawar District with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General. practically unchallenged. then commanding Cawn^Dore station. the 11th of September. desired to secure the complete submission of the Utman Khels. * * Leaving the Shabkadr Division thus marching on unopposed. Major Deane. The advance from the Shabkadr side was uneventful enouo-h.

reached Nawagai on Monday. but Sir Bindon Blood did not stop there was them as no large gathering to be found. No jirgahs and evidently the natives were hostile. as small parties armed with Martinis had fired the previous day on two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers reconnoitring the Mohmand Valley. while nine men in the rank-and-file were hit. . No large body his territory. up to the Durand Boi'der. Geseral Wodeiiouse's Brigade. of collected grain Nawagai was friendly. two British Officers being killed. had sent troops to occupy The country could now be surveyed without interruption (as it seemed). as the before. September 13tli. who inhabit the valleys of south Bajour west of Munda. This was an imjjortant step to take. and while the troops remained in and supplies for them. But the Khan had come in. General Jeffreys was able to adhere the difficult position of But neither General Wodehouse nor strictly to these plans. with a view to the ment Amir of its of boundaries. after which the brigade could swing round and march due south via Lokerai upon Yakhdand. accompanied by Sir IJindoii lilood. of the enemy settle- beinf in sioht. These tribesmen were Mamunds. Kabul. WITH GENERAL JEFFREYS' BRIGADE. the camp having been sniped at the previous night at a place called Lhamshak. when he claimed the valley the year it. and * seeing one brigade thus pass on harmlessly to Nawagai A clau of tlif Biijouii tribes. and about 80 horses and transport animals lost. The tribesmen attacking were Mamunds* and Salarzai. in order to unite with General Jeffreys' Brigade entering the leads direct Mohmand country by the route east of Nawagai which upon Yakhdand.( so ) CU AFTER IV. instructions were issued to the Survey Officers with the force to examine the Mittai Valley closely. It has just been previously a cavalry reconnaissance in mentioned that a day or two the Mohmand Valley was fired to punish upon by tribesmen. While in the neighbourhood of Inayat Kill on the 14th September a determined attack was made at night on General Jeffreys' camp and the firing lasted for nearly six hours. uut to bu cuuf used with tLic Mohmauils. owing to the one and the resolute opposition encountered by the other. and one dangerously wounded.

No. retired carrying dead with them. H. Seventy-six Captain Tomkins and Lieutenant Bailey were buried the next morning with military honours. That same morning. Guides Infantry. when the enemy The disproportionate loss among by the British Officers was due to the fact that they walked about without cover. Cole. Lieutenant Harrington's condition was hopeless from the first. Tomkins and Lieutenant A. E. conducting the defence. Natives killed: one havildar. resulting in the losses already mentioned.m. the bullet having penetrated the brain. lights were extinguished. but the necessity of sending messages involved exposure. His camp. killing 21. dangerously wounded : Lieu- tenant H. was in the best position available. OSicers— killed : Our casualties detail were —British W.m. 38th Dogras. judging by the results of their tire. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery. men were protected The enemy were extremely well armed. under Captain E. September 15th. Firing began at 8-15 p. A. while the shelter trenches. and Brigadier-General Jeffreys proceeded thither to direct the fire.— ( 81 ) they seem to have thought they could hai-ass the troops which still re- mained south country. with the transport animals. Bailey. with the loss of one horse killed and one wounded. principally of Officers. The attack was continued until their 2-15 a.. . 35th Sikhs and the 38th Dogras lined when the enemy opened The tribesmen must have got the range accurately. ** Died of his wounds a fortnight later. but they made no attempt to rush the entrenchments. Harrington. wounded. At 10 o'clock there was a but at 10-30 heavy firing recommenced on the face occupied by the 38th Dogras and the 35th Sikhs. All by in The : enemy were everywhere repulsed. and had sent the Buffs and Sappers to hold the crest for the night. and two followers horses and mules were hit. a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers. of the rauge of hills separating Bajour from the Mohmand General Jeffreys had intended crossing this range the follow- ing day.* 26tli Punjab Infantry. 38th Dogras. cover. 5. one sepoy. . on the face of the camp occupied by the lull. gained positions whence a most galling The troops were directed to avail themselves of fire was delivered. as soon as light allowed. went out and overtook the Mamunds at the foot of the hill. and creeping along various nullahs. Captain "W. and it was guarded by shelter trenches. which the fire. attached to the 38th Dogras. yet such tents as stood were pierced bullets.

On Thursday. includinp. . to gather in were plainly in a sullen temper. which from subjugating the Swat Valley had been awaiting to the cations. and thoufrh Clearly they had not been punished were quiet the next night. did not appear to be disheartenpcl. Sir Bindon Blood. General Jeffreys could comfortably devote his attention to the two sections of the Bajouris which had thus unexpectedly assumed a hostile attitude. In this severe engage- ment nine Officers. and in the event of this task occupying a considerable time he could return to the try Swat Valley would be via Sado. suffi- of returning after ciently. was moved from Sarai Paujkora River. How far these operations would delay the movement of the brigade into the Mohmand country was not yet plain but in any case Sir Bindon Blood with General . which began at 7-30 in the morning. continued throughout the day. General Jeffreys accordingly recalled the Buffs and Sappers of from the crest valleys the Eambat Pass. the plan of the Mohmand Campaign would have fallen through. ordered another squadron of the 11th Lancers at Nawagai to join General Jeffreys. on hearing what had happened. however.the Brigadier himself. Now. Wodehouse could carry out the plan of joining hands with General Elles. TliP tlioy onomy. howovor.( 82 . and did not finally cease till after midnight. they had boldly declared their intention resting. however. to be prepared for possible compliBrigade under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn. General Jeffreys' Brigade fought the important and in some respects memorable action of the Mamund Valley. and proceeded to visit the whence the enemy had come. The incident showed the wisdom of having sent large forces forward from the Swat Valley. This was the gi-eatest loss that had occurred in frontier warfare in a single dav since the Ambela Campaign. as the Bajour clans as a whole had not made common cause In order. September 16th. and 140 men were The either killed or wounded. The idea of joining General Wodehouse's Brigade at Yakhdand was given up in favour of punitive operations in the Maraund (or Watelai) Valley. If there had been only one brigade on the northern Mohmand borders. a depot being established at Sado on the river bank. The Mamunds and Salarzai whether they would be able with them. as the troops already in the sufficient to deal with any possible Mohmand counMohmand combination. seeing that the cavalry already in the Watelai Valley had been used against the Mamunds to such good purpose. the Ist since its return develojjraents. but any great strength seemed doubtful.

and reiuforcemeuts were ordered from the . the tribesmen ascending the At 12 o'clock only a few snipers were visible. which they partially hills. out-flanking the 35th Sikhs. As soon as the ground admitted. The centre column under Colonel P. tact with the At 7-30 the cavalry with the centre column firing began. and The tribesmen retired slowly. large numbers of the enemy ajopeared showing great courage. The left column under Major F. Here Lieutenant Hughes was killed and Lieutenant Cassels wounded. and shooting accurately. and the retirement of the column was ordered. the 35th Sikhs belonging to the same column the Five companies of arrived and cleared now enemy from the hillside. Hasler came up. As soon as this had begun. the Buffs forming part of the same column under Lieutenant J. All this fighting was confined to Colonel Goldney's column. four guns. The enemy showed the greatest daring.( 83 ) facts are these : After the night attack on General Jeffreys' camp on the 14th September the brigade Watelai Valley. each of which was to operate independently of the other two. burned. Vivian consisted of the 38th Dogras. Lieutenant-Colonel F. Fixing bayonets they drove the tribesmen back up the hills. to punish the lages near at hand. Campbell included the Guides and was instructed to operate in the ueighboui'hood of the camp. As columns soon as the enemy's resistance to Colonel Goldney's column to was found be vigorous. a section and two guns. the charge was sounded. and firing was maintained at under 100 yards for 15 minutes. and the had to use their revolvers freely. Golduey consisted of one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers. came in con- enemy. G. orders had been sent to the two other to concentrate. and the enemy loss in retiring across the open suffered considerable from their fire. and the men responded well. the of Sappers 35th Sikhs and the Buffs. taking advantage of cover. The ground favoured the tribesmen. Some of There was also stone-throwing. The rear company was encumbered with the wounded. reaching a village. who succeeded in Their swordsmen and snipers frequently Officers came to within 40 yards. H. and being armed generally with Martinis they pressed the retreat severely. and after destroying some small hamlets had retired. Colonel Vivian had found the villages allotted to him too strongly held to be attacked by so small a force and had returned to camp. moved from Inayat Kili to the head of the Mamunds by burning several of their vilTo expedite the work of destruction General The right column under Jeffreys divided his attacking force into three columns. Major Campbell's column had also avoided an action for the same reason.

and the Brigadier himself had his head cut open by a fragment case-shot through the walls. and literally in the dark as whereabouts of the remainder of his brigade. and in spite of severe fighting. Brigadier-General Jeffreys. and the Buffs and Guides covered the retirement with great steadiness. Night had now come on. The enemy. displaying a standard. advanced recklessly. who now arrived from the camp. followed the troops to the camp. the main body. however. frequently firing at close range. It was here that Captain Ryder and Lieutenant Gunning were wounded. Covered by the fire of the 8th Bengal Mountain Battery. Meanwhile. but still the enemy. however. and the force began marching back to camp again. and and the darkness was intensified by rain. in addition to the main attack. To extricate these troops two companies of the Guides were detached from Their losses were. The steadiness endurance of the troops were admirable. himself belated. At 2-30 the village was completely destroyed. General Jeffreys. of company Sappers who had been covering the Guides's retreat found themselves separated Brigadierto the exact from the main body. the the enemy's position hills to the right of had been crowned by one strong company of the 35th Sikhs under Captain Ryder. of the killed. the Buffs and the 35th Sikhs re-occupied the the tribesmen retiring and inflicting slight loss by sniping. safely. together with a few men of the Buffs. and though suffering severe loss from carefully-aimed volleys. 8 Mountain Battery and a half nearest neighbour. which made its it impossible at times for one company to hear or see anything of four guns of No. The guns fired and eventually the enenjy were expelled with the bayonet. and desperate fighting ensued. and recover the bodies hill again. and severe fighting at close quarters ensued. and they took up an entrenched position.( 84 ) camp. and halted the foz'ce. joined these stragglers and assumed command. and the camp was reached by the main body of the troops in perfect order at 8 o'clock. This company was at 5 o'clock attacked by large numbers of Mamunds. The enemy once more attacked the columns. Here Lieutenants Wynter and Watson were severely wounded. On reaching the village of Thana he decided to give up the idea of reaching camp that night. occuj^ied half the village. ordex^ed the Buffs again to occupy the village. but vivid lightning enabled the enemy to continue firing at the marching columns. to complete its destruction. In the darkness and the pelting rain. darkness and rain. they were relieved and reached the camp severe. .

H. 22 pers and Miners wounded. 'i\\danijerously A. British soldiers . Captain Birch. The brigade was already due "General Elles's Division : in the Mohmand countxy them .• Lieutenant V. Sap- 4 . Captain W. the Mountain guns and the Sappers being held ready for emergencies in case of any particularly strong oj^position. was published some time : The following extract from it is worth The idea of the punitive operations in the early morning was it let loose nearly the whole brigade in the valley. G. which gave rise to much criticism. for the Our day were: — British Officers— 4»7Zed T. and other Officers had bullets through their helmets. E. the 35th Sikhs. 1 5. Subadar. wounded. As soon as moonlight of the 35th casualties and four companies Sikhs proceeded from the camp and relieved the place. they would probably have had to withdraw. Eoyal Artillery. moved off to accomplish their respective tasks : a detachment of the llth Bengal Lancers. I. to co-operate with it its Coiumander and the troojjs composing had the further prospect inducement therefore bold enough to fire of Tirah before ' to ' polish off and there was every quickly the Mamunds who had been Pass. 22. and he was directed to deal with independently. killed. the cavalry. Royal wounded : Brigadier-General Jeffreys and Captain killed. to punish every village of importance in a single day. . ivounded. Lieute- nant F. Wynter. the 38th Dogras and the Guides Infantry. 44. tvounded. 6 . but had they pushed on to Agrah and Gat. or it of villages. The 38th Dogras on the too strong to right found the artilleiy.— — — — ( So ) of rock. 3 slightly ivounded. 2 Havildars.A. each six companies strong. had his left side cut by a bullet. (all of the Buffs). severely toouiided. Royal Artillery Engineers. Thus the Buffs. On the left the Guides were sweeping through some small hamlets. into the camp below the Rambat group To each Commandant was allotted a village. R. Hughes. 35th Sikhs . Slightly Lieutenant T. 2 Sikhs— AiVZerf. . later. 35th llth Beugal Lancers— ivounded. A. Ist Gurkhas (attached to the 35th Sikhs) . 35th : Sikhs. Birch. C. Wounded Lieutenant G. and Lieutenant A. and then march back again to Inayat Kili. 2. Native soldiers — No. allowed. the 38th Dogras. . 5 . Gunning. 8 Mountain Battery 1 killed. Crawford. Guides— Ai/Zerf. Cassels and Lieutenant O. Another account adding " of this action. Royal Artillery. 1 . wounded. as the 38th Dogras . village of Damodolah far attack to without camp. . and 7 men.. Ryder. C Watson. and Colonel Vivian very sensibly returned instead of knocking the heads of his successful in men against mud walls.

until through faintness from loss of blood he Then a sepoy took him in his arms. discovered. was sent to them to There was some desperate retire. and when the retirement was eventually ordered. The details of the fight under the village walls go to show that Officers and men behaved with the finest courage. sat for hours shielding him with his own body against the enemy's fire. Lieutenant Wynter fought his guns after he was wounded. who had been with it killed. and they had to abandon the body of Lieutenant Hughes. and the 11th Bengal Lancers made a charge which. When the reinforcements arrived the Mamunds were driven back. but it Guides Infantry had to double back to save the Sikhs fighting. all Word was sent back for the Buffs and Guides to come up speed. and could no longer give orders. for a thunderstorm marching at night was no easy matter. The General eventually decided to take up a position under the walls of a village.'. were left to fifi-ht their way down alone : an order. The guns. which enabled the enemy to collect in full strength . and it was not until the moon rose that the party were extricated.( SG ) had dune. though could not be driven home owing to broken ground.000 feet high. and as the enemy closed and in. the tribesmen pursued their usual tactics with considerable success. selves against the gunners. and the who were attacked by overwhelming numbers. and in the thick darkness General Jeffreys found himself belated with this small party. and Sappers had to defend them- means of sending off to enemy at very close quarters indeed. Mamunds saw their chance and got to close quarters. with a half company of Sappers separated from their escort of four companies of 15 men of the Buffs. There were no camp for assistance. The valley is intersected with ravines. . Two companies of Sikhs. and here for four or five hours the handful of British soldiers. also. prevented the Sikhs from being surrounded. about an hour after midnight. while thus Another man coolly beat out with his coat the protecting his Officer. holding a hill over 2. and work for the troops. and Lieutenant Hughes's body was recovered. it became pitch dark. and the sepoy was severely wounded. Then came a long halt of some three hours. It was here that the heavy never reached Captain Ryder. The retirement down the Watelai Valley was weary came on. it is said. on well into the hills at the far end of the valley. got the Sikhs. It was an heroic action. who formed the rear-guard. and as the furpushed ther mistake was the made of splitting the six companies into three parties. as the Guides. Three com- panies which had begun to burn the village of Shahi Tangi were forced back. FiuLliei' up the valley the BulFs luid disjXKsed of one villaf^e The 35th Sikhs It was in the centre that matters went wion<. losses occurred.

. as most remarkable.A. Again. and Major Hamilton. D. Chakdara. but enough has been said to show that. and repeatedly extinguished the flaming straw. This man passed safely through delivered his message who were on lage. Lieutenant Watson. reached the vil- and carried back another to Major Worlledge. M. with the relief party from the camp. of the 11th Bengal Lancers did valuable Other Officers specially mentioned were Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery. the Malakand. E. sent out a sowar to open communication with General the tribesmen Jeffi-eys. entered into a full and detailed examinabeen much discussed tion of all the facts." General Jeff"reys in his official despatch afterwards reported several conspicuous acts of gallantly during the fighting on the 16th September. calling out from time to time to show that all was well. In subsequently reporting the Mamund Valley action to Army Head-Quarters. 23rd Pioneers (distinguished himself when Lieutenant Hughes was killed). Lieutenant J. and the men of No. and amongst them. Captain Hodson and Lieutenant Codrington when they relieved the company of the 35th Sikhs which had got isolated.A. the behaviour of the Guides under Major Campbell. to Jeffreys whom General had reported events. (wounded three times). Major-General Sir Bindon Blood. the valley. R. Captain relieved company of Ryder and Lieutenant Gunning with the the 35th Sikhs and Captain Cole with one squadron service. Captain Birch. A Sapper was sent out into the open to watch a door in the walls from which it was feared the tops to light up the ground and enable enemy might rush : his figure was outlined clearly with every flash of lightning and he was repeatedly shot at. As this day's fighting has criticised.straw which the Mamnnds threw from the house- them to aim. and Captain F. and in some quarters severely * we give in an appendix virtually Not yet related.( 87 ) bundles of bnrnin.E. Other instances of devotion and gallantry could be given. at which time Havildar Ali Gul of the Guides particularly distinguished himself. but he stuck to his post. C. The work was perilous in the extreme.. finding that he could not reach the spot whence the noise of firing came. only to get a volley move across the from his own friends.Q. as at Maizar. and the Samana* our troops acquitted themselves in splendid fashion. 35th Sikhs. Duncan. Colvin of the Sappers.A.-G. Major Worlledge. but the sepoy went about it calmly.

it. All was quiet in the camp at Inayat Kili on the night of the IVth At six the following morning. and later in the to come in These jirgahs were informed by General Jeffreys that no proposals would be entertained unless their arms were surrendered. four or five miles from Inayat Kili. tribesmen appeared in considerable numbers. who had by less refused to this time sent in their jirgahs. which had proved . who had been kept well informed of events by means of the heliograph. was free from fighting. to demol- ish the fortifications of the villages in the centre of the Mamund Valley. inflicting loss on the tribesmen.500 fighting men. but some further jjunitive work was carried out. was showino- refused much determination. and though' now suing for mercy. Much indignation was excited in the force by the news that the tribesmen had disinterred the bodies of the Mahomedan native in the recent fighting and had insulted their remains. wounded. owing to the fact that the Mamunds. nevertheJeff'reys. comply with the terms imposed by General This clan. the 19th of September. Sunday. was able to report from Nawagai to Army Head-Quarters that he had not found it necessary to reinforce General Jeffreys' Brigade. was encountered. were : — 35th Sikhs killed. these being the only official data available from which an opinion as to the tactics of the day can fairly be formed. the Guides Infantry in the centre.— — ( 88 ) the whole of Sir Bindon Blood's despatches. the available strength of the 2nd Brigade moved to attack the fortified village of Damodolah. The retirement was brilliantly executed by the Guides. and the Buffs in reserve. The village was carried and completely destroyed. and the 38th Dogras and the Battery occupied positions on the left. still to surrender its own rifles and those captured in the It attack on September 16th. Much 1. and firing began at 8-45. 2. 1 wound- ed. The casualties . Guides— rcouJJtierf. and on the morning in question the force village of Zagadirai. moved out against the and destroyed day jirgahs began No opposition again. grain was captured. Tiring ceased at 2-30. which numbers only about 1. soldiers killed The following day (September 20th) Sir Bindon Blood. and the enemy had no chance of rushing. The 35th Sikhs crowned the spurs to the right of the village. 1. The September. One day's grace was given to allow of this being made known. 2. The Buifs covered the homeward march of the brigade. was desirable. therefore. 38th Dogras killed. who pursued.

M. Cole's squadron trotted forward. . effect. was made with the Lee-Metfords Lieutenant F. The Dum-Dum was most Lieutenant R. S. right. On the left.m. considerable numbers together. killed five men at one valley. when the troops got clear. to bunch and The Battery immediately exploded two this ended the action. E. Power of the were : . ever in terror of cavalry. the Buffs retired fire. Captain E. A re- connaissance by a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers had revealed the was strongly held. After the Buffs were clear open fields. causing the tribesmen. Power was slightly wounded after the the right arm. the operations been completely successful. the Guides Infantry on the and the 35th Sikhs in reserve. the 38th Dogras in the centre. several as ing wounded. The brunt of the casualties shells with great fell to fighting the Buffs. and severe loss was inflicted upon the tribesmen. Unattached List. N. At the very time when Sir Bindon Blood at Nawagai was telegraphing that the end of the fighting in the Watelai Valley was now in view.( 89 ) itself quite equal to dealing with the Mamuuds. since Thursday night wlien the tribesmen in the inflicted such heavy losses to upon the brigade." Maniuud Valley seem have Successful they had undoubtedly been. Sharp fighting cleverly ensued. the men beenemy did not dare to follow into the open. sniping the village was occupied. General Jeffreys' Brigade was obliged to march out to attack the fortified village of Zagai (once owned by Umra Khan). At 11 A. On the extreme left. chiefly with the Buflfs on the right. and Lieutenant E. These were dispersed by long range fire. but hostilities were far fi^om being over. and the guns came into action near the centre about 9-15. The enemy as usual retired. were engaged about 9-20. The executed. and all the fortifications were destroyed. bullet in Reeves's section effective. Firing began on the left at 8-50. who had further to go. On the right. of the enemy appeared. Lieutenant Keen was shot through the left arm and in the body. " in fact (he telegraphed). at 8-50 and ceased at 12-30. the and immediately afterwards the the tribesmen gathered on flanks. but wound was dressed he returned to his company. Firing began fact that the village village was taken and the retirement a. E. the retirement began. The Buffs. with admirable tice discipline. The G. of difficult ground. H. two Officers wounded (Second-Lieutenant Keene. in spite of very sharp . Guides Infantry were threatened by about 600 tribesmen displaying standards. The Buffs were on the left. Excellent pracS. the line of the regiment lay across the fired and the enemy from cover Firing ceased with effect.

But General now demonstrated the ability of his troops. and Officers' ponies. — — In the 2nd Brigade alone the losses of a single week amounted Jeliieys had to 14 British OfKcers and 153 men. when not divided into a number of weak parties. and on the 22nd the important village of Dag was captuied together with great stores of grain with the loss of one killed and two wounded. to sweep the valley from end to end. . cavalry horses. while the movements of General Wodehouse's Brigade with Sir Bindon Blood at Nawagai are brought up to date. 9 . British soldiers tvounded 13. settling accounts with the Mamunds. 2. firing into camp took and several animals and one native orderly were wounded. Total casualties.— ( 90 : ) Buffs) ras. besides nearly 150 transport animals. General Jeffreys and his Brigade may now be left. Buffs. On the night of the 21st September. Native troops — 38tb Doj^place. -^<r~ .

It is in fact easy to realise how serious the effects of such a develop- ment might have been. would have had to stand on the defensive or even to fall back without attacking the Mohmands at all. and he judged rightly. September 17th. and the Mohmand tribes to the south of this position had tendered deal with the aggressive and agreed to surrender the arms demanded of them. was reported to have assembled a large gathering on the Bedmanai Pass. It also paralysed the Khan. some 800 tribesmen were seen near the mouth of the Bedmanai Bass» . The Khan. however. arriving from Shabkadr. Between these two hostile forces lay Nawagai. tion in spite of Bindon Blood considered himself strong enough to hold his posiany attack that might. remain at Nawagai. The Mamund and Salarzai tracts were either in a blaze or at the combustion jooint. twelve miles from Nawagai.be made. the punishment of the Mohmands was steadily proceeding. Nawagai would have been his Brigade and General EUes. might. General EUes was still at or close to Shabkadr and could not therefore be looked to for prompt help.( or ) CHAPTER K WITH GENERAL WODEHOUSe's BRIGADE. between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon. a man of great influence in those part-s. The pass of with. with a large gathering. should help be required. supposing his friendship were weak. Sir loyal Bold measures were costs. The Hadda Mullah. closed. though subsequent events 2)roved his loyalty to be sincere. On Friday. to keep the Khan Bindon Blood decided and the pass clear at to all This action kept the tribesmen in two sections — the Mohmand But it on one side andthe Mamunds on the other. communications. The Hadda Mullah. by throwing his influence against the British have their submission seriously increased the difficulties of the campaign. occupied a strong position in the Bedmanai Pass. Sir Bindon Blood was at Nawagai. It maintained the diflSculty was not unattended with Sir and danger. and it became evident after the arrival of this news that Sir Bindon Blood's position was by no means an. easy one and might in certain contingencies become even critical. necessary. While General Jeffreys was coiintermarcliing his Brigade in order to Mamunds and Salarzai.

The force returned to camp in the evening. but the enemy remained among the ravines and only the cavalry could get near them. Tactically the assault showed considerable skill. some of which were Lee-Metfords. regular rushes being made. dispersed in a few minutes. were in the first line. The safety of the camp was never for a moment in doubt. The enemy left no dead or wounded on the ground. as the bullets picked up in the camp showed. Some horses and mules were shot. venturing out from his ravines. Some 150 of the enemy. covered by till 1 rifle fire. The total strength was estimated at 3. most of these slightly.000 in the second line. 1 cross-fire. as their bodies were afterwards found at that distance.000. Evidently the Hadda Mullah was feeling his way. but being met by steady volleys. The troops ou their part behaved with the utmost steadiness. firing shrapnel as well as star shells. Constant charges were made from more or less simultaneously.( 02 ) The greater part of General Wodeliouse's Brigade turned out. British Mountain Battery four star shells very successfully. . man killed and four wounded in the vrere :— In the British ranks. The first line crept up unperceived to within about 30 or 40 yards of the parapet held by the Queen's Kegiment. and the Mountain Battery fired some shells. and about 1. and began firing. Our casualties were one man of the Queen's Regiment killed and one wounded. After half-an-hour's sniping at this picket they made off. A few rounds were fired by dismounted men. General Blood had been warned at8 p. September 19th-20th. by the Political Oflicer that the attack was intended. fourteen wounded. and firing continued p. the Hadda Mullah. . The enemy must fired have see suffered heavily. On made the following night (September 20th-21st) another attack was in force. Native ranks. so everything was The Mountain Battery was of the The casualties greatest value. The enemy had breech-loading rifles. though some all directions of the tribesmen must have advanced to within ten yai^ds of the parapet. It began about 9 P. Atmidniglit. one ready when the enemy appeared. the Hadda Mullah having been joined by the Saffi Mullahs and a contingent of Shinwaris from Afghan territory. as they came under a No.m.m. chiefly swordsmen. and the fire discipline was perfect. and our men could them plainly as they stood up. The tribesmen then turned their attention with much shouting to the picket held by the Khan of Nawagai's men on the low hills a mile to the west. BrigadierGeneral Wodehouse was shot through the leg. made a half-hearted attack upon General Blood's camp.M. after trying other faces of the camp in a half-hearted way.

On September arrived. .. and the General sent back orders for the 2nd Brigade to halt and camp. and General Elles continued his marched with a proportion of mule transport on September 15th to Galanai. with the 20th Punjab Infantry. Nahaki with Genei-al Sir Bindon Blood's . after the destruction of the Aallage. General Elles with his two Brigades under Brigadier-Generals Westmacott and Macgregor marched out from Shabkadr. and left the 5th Company Bengal Sappers and the 28tli Bombay Pioneers to improve the road. were fired on. 3 Mountain Battery Royal three miles south of the Nahaki Pass. west of Agrah. He thereupon marched who had without further delay right on to Lokerai. protected the flank. where he knew. that he successfully carried out on his side the advance from Shabkadi'. A tomary skill and steadiness. forming the advance-guard. On the night of the 21st September. shells firing who endeavoured also some sniping on the part of the enemy. Three star were fired. a very creditable piece of work for both Sappei^s and Pioneers. was The tribesmen. 1 dangerously wounded. and the following casualties occurred :— Guides Infantry 1. ^ikhaslightly wounded. after the meeting between Elles. early on the 15th September. 16 miles from Shabkadr. followed and harassed the returning troops. news of General Jeffreys' fight at Eambat and two General Westmacott and the 1st Brigade. On the morning attacked. the 20th Punjab The Khorappa defile was found impassable for camels. Five miles out. . but they had disappeared. And now to trace briefly the less exciting movements of MajorGeneral EUes's Division up to the time of his meeting Sir Bindon Blood's troops at Lokerai. Artillery. The six miles of very bad road were turned into one passable for camels by the evening qf the 18th September. as usual.— ( 93 ti'oops ) General Blood moved out the next morninfr to find the enemy. 17th. Helio communication was established at force. there Sir at Bindon Blood and General individual tribesmen was considerable picket to approach the camp. as has been stated. should meet General Elles. moved on six miles to Esuj Khel. No. Infantry. Plenty of forage was found in the valley between the top of Khorajspa Jangi and Nahaki. from lieliographic signals. squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers. 1 35th squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers The Guides executed the retirement with their cus- killed. of the 22nd September the village of Das. supplies for but little the troops.

which dominates the whole Mohmand country. as General Wodehouse's Bx'igade will be styled General Graves's Brigade. who said they had bought up all the grain to sell to the Sirkar. General Macgregor had been left behind with two and a half battalions and two guns to hold a Nahaki Pass.( 94 ) The Lower Mohmands. between Khorappa terras. to be at The Saffi Mullah with 2. Atkinson with 100 men of the 13th Bengal Lancers. Graves of the 39th Garhwalis was givea the 3rd Brigade of the command of Malakand Field Force. Rs. and the Bombay Mountain Battery marched from Dand to Galani on September 19th. This was hard luck on a brave much fighting had yet to take place. after a recon- naissance towards Lokerai. and soon some villagers returned and spoke to Major Atkinson.e. was sent to investigate the truth of the report. the Patiala Regiment. with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General. The Lancei's were fired on from villagers fled. all breach -loading rifles to be given up. 9 miles from Nahaki.. He found two Sikh bunnias. and hereafter in the narrative of the Mohmand Campaign the brigade which has been known all along. The 13th Bengal Lancers. reported very barren country beyond Nahaki water. accepted General 2. C.000 men was reported Kung. but they advanced in line.500. Having seen the completion paign Sir Bin don Blood left of the first part of the plan of cam- General Elles on September 23rd and rode down to Inayat Kili to see how who the operations against the Mamunds were progressing. 300 jezails and maunds of grain . . and Major F. G. and the The Lancers held the village. of his brigade being sick wound in his leg. two sides. the Colonel B. and free forage to be provided for the force while in the district for seven days commencing September with very little 19th. General Macgregor with the Oxford Light Infantry. himself was not able to continue in obliged. On the 21st September General Elles with General Westmacott arrived at Lokerai and met General Blood as already stated. to proceed as by convoy to India. He had Elles. previously made over General Wodehouse's it Brigade to General united with General Westmacott's Brigade for the purpose of making what was intended to be an over- whelming descent upon the Hadda Mullah's gathering reported to be Unfortunately General Wodehouse still holding the Bedmanai Pass. owing to the command Officer. or TTalimzais and Nahaki.500 Elles's in the valley i.

m. when it moved forward As to the actual assault. WITH GENERAL ELLES's DIVISION. the troops moved forward and. contrary to all expectation. Infantry. 1 Mountain Battery. as only 500 of the enemy to the faced General Westmacott's Brigade. Our casualties were only one sepoy killed and four wounded. Eoyal Artillery. General Graves's Brigade returned to Kuz Chinarai. two Brigades faced them they had The contingent of Afghan . and very failed. proved easy of accomplishment. General West' macott's Brigade holding the villages round Bedmanai.( 95 ) CHAPTER VI. attack at 6-30 a. the day before Sir Bindon Blood left Nawagai to join Brigadier-General Jeffreys in the Manuind country. excellent practice. after some opposition. On September 23rd. Hadda Mullah and his supporters. On the morning of the 24th September. Little parties of the enemy were also apparently prowlat Kuz Chinarai. The Mullah had outposts at the foot of the Pass. with The 20th Punjab Maxim detachments. The hills are most precipitous. little and when General Elles's heart for further fighting. and guarding the right flank it but was not actually engaged. particularly distinguished them- selves in clearing the heights. Several forts and towers were destroyed. made . They were driven back until at last our troops crowned the peak 2. as two followers were cut up and two wounded. and our cavalry were fired upon when reconnoitring the position. making the performfirst ance of the infantry more creditable than would at sight appear. carried the Bedmanai Pass. and the spirited manner in which the 20th Punjab Infantry moved forward were too much for the tribesmen.500 feet above the Pass. and the Maxim gun detachments but the Maxim fire and were opposed on every ridge. The capture of the Pass. They had made their real effort then. his held by the ing about the camp. the 20th Punjab Infantry led. No. This easy victory over the Hadda Mullah's forces was attributed to the previous want of success on their part in the night attack on General Blood's camp already described. General Elles concentrated General Graves's Brigade and General Westniacott's Brigade camp being four miles north of the Bedmanai Pass. General Graves's Brigade was meanwhile moving in support of General Westmacott's up the centre.






who had been expected

to help,

no doubt considered

more advisable

to retire across the frontier while their line of retreat



General Elles determined to advance from the Bedmanai Pass on to the much-talked-of Jarobi, where the Hadda Mullah had his headquarters, uncertain whether that fanatical leader would be able to rally


for another stand.
this the

The Afghan border


only a mile away,

and once beyond

Mullah and

his followers

would be

safe, for

British troops cannot cross the



It is of no great importance to describe in detail how General Elles advanced from Bedmanai through the Bohai Valley breaking into the innermost seclusion of this hidden country, and sweeping away in the


general destruction the very nest and hiding-place of the Hadda Mullah. it turned out, the only spot bearing the name of Jarobi was a small

glen, very picturesque to look at but quite devoid of

mystery and



for the often-mentioned " head-quarter

of the

Hadda Mullah,

these were found to consist of nothing

more than a few
difficult defile,



The troops had

to pass

through a

but no real

opposition was

off"ered to their


They, however, were

fired at repeatedly

by small

parties of tribesmen,

and some thirteen or

fourteen casualties

occurred during the advance.

They returned


Bedmanai, having

punished the various villages visited.

of operations had been admirably conceived and carried out. General Elles moved his force in two columns parallel with each other, sweeping the valley, thoroughly destroying all the forts, and punishing

The plan


which declined to submit. Such opposition as was offered was broken down, and General Westmacott's Brigade pushed quite At Manzari Chena our troops close up to the Durand boundary line. Pass, over which a road leads to Jellalawere at the foot of the Sibala
skirted the range of hills which forms the boundary of Afghanistan in this direction, and worked southward, punibhing the



Khoda Khels, who would not accept the terms offered them. These all operations must have convinced the Baizai, who had been hostile faced. through, that the force opposed to them was too strong to be
Their neighbours in the
east, the

Khwazai, submitted.

With regard to the punishment of Khoda Khels just mentioned, a few details may be given, as these villagers alone of all the others offered On September 26th, General Westmacott, with 4 guns of resistance.




No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery, the
a wing of the 28th


Punjab Infantry,




Pioneers, half of No. 5

Sappers and the Devons' Maxim, joined by the

Company Bengal Oxfords, who with
all in

four squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers had marched from Nahaki to

of the

started to destroy the forts and towers of the

a sort of amphitheatre about two miles from camp.

The advance-guard

Gurkhas was met with a heavy


from the

and heights

around, which were held for nearly a mile. The guns were immediately

brought into action and soon cleared the

villages, while four

Gurkhas on the left crowned the heights, their advance being covered by the guns and Maxims. This crowning of the heights was a difficult job, but smartly done. Meanwhile the Sappers thoroughly distroyed
the forts and towers, and when this was completed the retirement was most deliberately carried out, covered by the guns and Maxims

and the Oxfords. The casualties were five Gurkhas wounded, Captain Knapp, commanding the guns, had his horse hit on coming into action.

The Khwazai jn-gah came in to General Westmacott during the fight so their forts and towers, which were to have been destroyed on the way back, were spared. The Khoda Khels were the best armed clan of

Mohmands, which no doubt



they refused to surrender

their breech-loaders.

There was now no prospect of further fighting, as the Dawazai, Utmanzai and Khwazai had all made submission and the troops were permitted to enjoy a well-earned rest. On September 28th, the

Somersets, with the Maharaja of Patiala (who had accompanied General EUes from Shabkadr) returned to the Divisional Head-Quarters at Peshawar. His Highness had been treated all along like any other

and had shared


the hardships of service.

He had


eveiything in a true military

taking the greatest interest in

what was going on and showing the real Sikh keenness to see fighting. The Patiala Regiment, it may be added, was used under General Graves in chastising the MiLtai and Sara Valley, and came into contact
with the enemy.

was now

The military part of this short but very over, and the troops under General

successful expedition

separate columns to Peshawar, each force taking

muved back own route. By



beginning of October the
of as


expedition could fairly be spoken

au event of the past





effect of

these short but completely

successful operations
flight of the

had been very



utter rout

and precipitate


Mullah had made a deep impression on the tribes, who were paying up fines and surrendering arms in all directions. The campaign, conducted in an unexplored and mountainous country, with very bad roads,


and with a great

scarcity of

water— the enemy

having breached the tanks, which are the chief sources of supply
been virtually completed within a
ing the frontier.

one day before


had more than three weeks of crossThe rapid advance and attack on the Bedmanai Pass was expected, and at the moment when everything led
an attack on Mittai, and the subsequent sudden


to anticipate

appearance of General EUes's force in Jarobi, the Mullah's stronghold,

had utterly upset any organised resistance and prevented any further
tribal combinations.

The attacks on Shabkadr and other


were now avenged and the
will be quiet

appearances go for



years to come, while the prestige of



completely re-established throughout the length

and breadth



The Mohmand country was
weeks, the troops lived free
fine of

traversed in every direction for three

upon the country, which was equivalent to a rupees a day, seventy-two towers and forty
and the troops penetrated

four thousand


were destroyed,

to the farthest recesses of the



deemed by the clansmen

inaccessible to British


800 swords

and 100 guns, including breach-loaders and
thousand rupees
in cash.

were collected by

the time the troops left the country, as well as fines aggregating thirteen


remarkable feature of the expedition was

that after the demolition of the last Baizai forts the troops were in



molested, and marched

about the country in perfect peace and

security, nication.

and not a

single offence

was committed on the
it is fair

line of





to conclude the


had taken

to heart the lessons taught them.

General Elles was fortuof frontier

nate in having as Chief Political Officer Mr. Merk, whose intimate
of the people

and country and great experience
little to

matters generally conduced not a
pletion of the operations.

the rapid progress and com-


have now to follow the adventures of Sir Bindon Blood with

General Jeffreys' Brigade in the








It has been stated that on September 23rd, Sir Bindon Blood, after



General Elles with two brigades to capture the Bedmanai
his staff

Pass, left

Nawagai with


divisional troops for Inayat Kili

to see


the operations under General Jeffreys against the


were progressing.


situation at Inayat Kili at


period was


peculiar, as for

two reasons the 2nd Brigade was for the

moment compelled to stand fast. In the first place it had number of ti'ansport mules, and in an undeveloped country
the mobility of a large force must always depend on

a large

of this


pack animals.

Secondly, the memorable fight of the 16th September, the attempt to
clear the Watelai Valley in one day,

had resulted

in 150

wounded men

being thrown on the

and these could not now be carried could they be left behind, because deducting an adequate guard for nor them the rest of the brigade would not have been strong enough for the fighting which was to follow. Hence up to the time of Sir Bindon
field hospitals,

Blood's arrival on the scene with reinforcements only those


within striking distance



camp had been


and the

Sir Bindon The wounded were sent to Panjkora where General Meiklejohn's Brigade was awaiting employment, and the transport animals killed were now

more remote

villages of the valley

remained untouched.



to restore the mobility of the force.



last fight

recorded in the previous chapter dealing with the

Mahmund Campaign was the

taking of the village of

Dag on September

Early the following morning the brigade marched to


fortified village of Tangi, the inhabitants of

which had been concerned in
first in

the recent fighting.

The enemy appeared at

small numbers, and

the guns came into action at 8 o'clock.

Firing continued until 11-45
the hills to the left

the village was taken, the Guides

first seizing


38th Dogras were in the centre, the 35th Sikhs on the right, and the Buffs
in reserve.



on the troops returning considerable numbers

of tribesmen appeared,

but not many cared

to face

our troops.


( of the Buffs



now advanced from cover, .and the Lee-Metford fire the Buffs, Major again checked the enemy. Our casualties were


S. II.





38th Doi^ras, severely wounded, one.

Lieutenant F.


lieeves of the Buffs

had a curious

escape, the bullet

striking his revolver

and glancing thence through

his case.



may be mentioned

that as the


live partly in

Bajour and partly


territory, cultivating

lands on either

the frontier, they

operations to retire in safety

were always able during these punitive when hard pressed and then return

again when our troops withdrew. They are notoriously turbulent, and the Afghan authorities have had much trouble with them since Asmar was occupied a few years ago. During the Chitral Expedition

they caused us constant annoyance. They were among the tribesmen who opposed our troops in the advance beyond the Panjkora, and they

were up in arms the whole time, the "sniping" into camp

in the

Jhandoul Valley being laid at their door.

Again and again Sir Kobert

Low and

Brigadier-General Waterfield wished to punish them but this

was forbidden from head-quarters.
though the

Our troops remained


for months,


Valley lay only one march from

Mandia; and the Field Force returned to India leaving the clan untouched. It would have been a simple matter to have sent a strong brigade to Inayat Kili and thence to have visited every village held by
the tribesmen, for none are mure then ten or twelve miles distant


the Government would not sanction any jsunitive measures.



was that the Mamunds, and their friends the Salarzai, believed that our troojjs were afraid to approach them; and thus, three years later, they were now harassing a force marching past the mouth of their

and not intended

to interfere

with them in any way.


a grave disaster did not occur on the 16th September

when General

Brigade weakened by division began reprisals, was due solely

to the staunchness of our troops.

However, the present punitive opera-


were going far to retrieve past omissions and already the

after the

•were beginning to send in their jirgahs.

For a whole week

capture of

Dag aud Tangi


were stayed while negotiations
Meanwhile, on

with reference to the surrender of arms proceeded.

September 25th, the Buffs mai'ched off to Nowshera to join the Tirah Field Force and weie relieved by the Royal West Kent Regiment
from Panjkora.
Their departure was much regretted, as in the recent




fighting tliey

had shown themselves worthy

of the finest traditions of

the British Infantry.


this stage of affairs it did not of the


to be advisable to hasten

unduly the evacuation



Apart from the


that no axnus had actually been surrendered, there were other and

wider considerations to be seriously weighed.
to return

General EUes was about

Shabkadr, and


was doubtful


view what course the Mohmands intended


Bindon Blood's True all tlie


gatherings had been dispersed; the Bohai, Mittai and

Suran Valleys, south-west

Nawagai, had been


and the Hadda

Mullah chased



while in the central parts of

the Mohmand country our troops had effectually overawed the people. But there were probably some thousands of tribesmen just over the

Afghan border who would return as General EUes's Brigades moved back Nawagai might become their objective, as the to British territory.

Khan had

cast in his lot with the British authorities. Inayat Kill is only one mai^ch from Nawagai, and General Blood would thus if required be able to extend a helping hand to the Khan until the excitement caused

by the expedition had subsided. At the same time the reality submission of the Mamunds and the Salarzai v^ould be assured.

of the


the 27th September Mr. Davis, Political Officer, in an interview

with the



breech-loaders originally

found them determined not to give the 50 demanded as a punishment for their share in

the attack on Chakdara, or the 22 Martinis captured from our troops

on the 16th September.

They admitted having taken part

in the


dara attack without provocation, and coolly offered the excuse that all the world was diomgghaza and they went too. They further admitted going

miles from their valley to attack General Jeffreys'

on the 14th September.

camp at Markanai They stated that the rifles taken on the IGth Sepof trans-frontier

tember were in the hands

tribesmen from the


who had shared in the

and that they could not be recovered.

The J Jrffah

flately refused either to give

up breech-loaders or surrender

hostages, but offered a



money and
to consult

number of useless old matchas

Eventually they


the tribesmen, promising to


The promise was not


and on the 30th September,


further reply had been received and as this amounted to a refusal of

the Government terms, General Jeffreys, in the absence of Sir Bindon

Blood who, anticipating a peaceful submission, had moved


with a

the battery came into action shelling the enemy on the heights. Native ranks 7 . 31st wounded 3 . 31st Punjab Infantry. slightly severely wounded: Lieutenant Isacke. Jdlled. 15. to clear the hills to the The Guides Infantry then advanced The enemy. The enemy's losses were Some description of this severe action is called for. maintained a sharp fire. Royal "West Kent. On the morning of the 1st October the brigade under General fighting ensued.ntry.m. the tribesmen declining to come into the open ground. and Lieutenant Peacock. wounded. and desultory skirmishing ensued. 102 ) resumed punitive operations. tvounded. and very severe fighting ensued. with a long spur on their flank occupied became exposed to a close and deadly It by the enemy. and there was no opposition. 'Pui\]&hlnfa. wounded. Royal West Kent Regiment. the Colonel Adams. Total casualties also heavy. . appeared in considerable numbers both on the standards and action hills where they displayed among the scrub in broken ground to the left. 31st Punjab Infantry. was here that Lieute- nant-Colonel J. The British Infantry cleared the village and attacked the tribesmen in the tangars behind Second-Lieutenant Clayton was killed by a volley at close range. The losses had already been severe.m. Dismounted fire was at once ordered by LieutenantMeanwhile. West Kent.— ( sniall escort to Sarai. and drove back the enemy and captured the sangarg at the point of the bayonet. All the villages in the centi'e of the valley were dealt with. the hills were splendidly carried. Cavalry. : British Officers. infantry were advancing. The Royal and the 31st Punjab Infantry on the right. 38th Dogras. . : Captain N. and Second-Lieutenant Browne Clayton. advanced with Lieutenant Jackson and one and-a-half companies of the Royal West Kent. who occupied mortures but on Major Campbell ordering and fangars. The was opened by the cavalry who at 8-20 a. Jeffreys attacked the village of Agrah and very severe : resulting in the following casualties — British Officers Lieu- tenant-Colonel O'Bryen. the rocks on the right of the village. causingatemporary check but Major Western . Styles. West Kent had now advanced in the centre theenemy at once charged. O'Bryen was killed. and the 31st Punjab Infantry who had ascended cross-fire. the Guides to charge. 5 soldiers. Moving swiftly from point to . and at 9-15 a. killed. and it. L. and reported that the village was occupied and that the adjacent heights were strongly held. British soldiers — Royal 45. were fired on from the scrub and hills. wounded. 4 killed. 4. —Guides 15 . The Guides The enemy Cavalry reconnoitred the ground. left.

The return to camp was then oi^dered. Already he had passed through the drudgery of the lower all ranks of the service and had reached a point when of the profession appeared in clear view. shells whenever the tribesmen pressed heavily or advanced from No. he remained unhurt. which was a tolerably sure sign that the enemy losses.m. were devoted to him. But for a considerable period although bullets fell everywhere around him. everyone at the front deeply regretted the premature close of an honourable and brilliant military career.. wounded from The still fact that Colonel O'Bryen had been specially selected — while a young loss the man — to army the command of a battalion. ployed . most of West Kent having bullet holes in their clothes and helmets. and the display of the cavalry prevented any advance into the open ground. They held a large force of the enemy in check on the left for five hours by dismounted fire and by threatening had suffered heavy the Royal to charge the broken ground. 7 British was maintained from the hills with some etfect. did not vigorously as usual. Mountain Battery fired sharpnel at close lange and kept the nearest spurs clear. Though the guns came under The want of more troops was three additional battalions could have been fully emand only the great skill with which the Guides Cavalry on the left were handled checked the enemy's advance from that direction. kept many sharp fire only one mule was killed. and the homeward march was not further molested. All the had completely destroyed the whole of the village. The Officers displayed great gallantry. goes to show what a in India sustained by his death. and nearly all having strange escapes. It At last however he was shot through the body and carried mortally the action. and when was apparent that the Royal West Kent and Fegan advanced constant fire 31st Punjab Infantry were severely engaged his Major guns within 800 yards of the enemy and by spurs clean. The 38th Dogras under Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian now advanced to support positions were held until the Sappers the Slat Punjab Infantry on the right. the bigger prizes And is though the death in action of a Colonel at the head of his regiment perhaps the finest end that a soldier can hope for. 7 Battery Eoyal Artillery fired 140 sharpnel it during the action. All firing ceased at 2-10 p. . press the retirement as The enemy. who was not long before the enemy's marksmen began to take aim at this prominent figure. The 31st Punjab Infantry also suffered from haviag no battalion on severely left .{ 103 ) point he directed the fire and animated the spirit of the men. The Guides Cavalry were of the greatest service during the action. however. but much firing No.

but the loss was not most severely pressed.— — ( 104 ) The dirticiilty and danger of attacking forLilied villages) ground and high cropa are always great. Guides Cavalry wounded. and it ahould be ill broken remembered that after an adequate camp-guard and the details were their riglit Hank. on which the cavalry were also posted. they did not advance into ground which rendered charging possible. and took refuge in nulin/ts whenever threatened. attacklittle ed the village of Badilai. Guides Infantry 1 . shelling the village. the 2nd Brigade artillery. and the 38th Dogras cleared the hills to the the Guides Infantry covering the left flank. but as soon as the with- drawal of tlie troops began the enemy appeared counted. Firing began at 8-45. killed. On the 3rd October at 6 o'clock in the morning. . in great numbers. 2 . was captured and completely destroyed. During the day Gcucral Meiklejohu and . while the West Kent moved left. Firing ceased at 2-30. Sir Bindon Blood and the Head-quarters valley. with two batteries of under Brigadier-General Jeffreys." He was right. Staff' watched the opera- tions and reconnoitred the 1 The casualties 1 . The whole affair was extremely successful. wounded. 31st Punjab Infantry ivuunded. Staff arrived.300 was severe. Up two casualties had occurred. totAl— killed. as many brisk as three thousand being roughly Firing now became and all the corps were involved. and the force reached camp safely. 2 . and it was hoped that this formidable concentration of artillery would produce decisive to effects. which to this time only The guns came into action at nine o'clock. ivounded. but though tlie small. were as follows : Royal AVest Kanl—damjerouily wounded. wounded. deducted General strong. 3 . The cavalry covered the retirement with great enemy showed much boldness. 3. Jeffreys' Brigade could only parade for lighting some 1. 14. 5 . The 31st Punjab infantry cleared and occupied a spur on the right. but the 31st Punjab Infantry were skill. 8 Battery and four companies 26th Punjab Infantry arrived at luayat Kili. the 10th Field Battery and the Highland Light In- On the 2nd of fantry following on behind . against the village. : Army Head-Quarters Sir Bindon Blood telegraphed —" In his report 1 am crowd- ing every man and gun on the decisive point and expect thei'e will be an end of the Mamund business in a few days. Very opposition was encountered until the return inarch of the troojjs commenced. 39th Dogms— killed. Of this small number the loss in a fortnight of 245 OctoberSir BindonBlood and Head-quarters with four guns of No.

uplifted hands to keep their promises.— ( 105 ) 1. out of a force which never exceeded 1. also to turn Umra two Khan's followers out of their country. which promised to abstain from hostilities and to give no more trouble in future. 4. loounded. Sir Bindon Blood and his two brigades under Generals Jefi^reys and Meiklejohn now moved It is out of the Watelai Valley in the direction of Panjkora and from this point the Mamunds that No. and were dismissed. worth adding the honor Company Queen's Own Sappers and Miners had of sharing in the latter part of the operations in Bajour. jirgah arrived near camp and asked for an interview with Sir Bindon Sir Blood. 6 . but the Mamunds rifles lost in terror of further reprisals dissuaded them from doing so and opened up negotiations for submission. to induce the Mamunds comply unreservedly with of the Government terms and eventually complete submission was secur- On the 12th of October the representatives the Mamunds' Kili. lo^^unded. There was no reason sincerity of the Mamunds. during the in September were brought and nine more were the hands oi the jtrgah men from a sniping into who now put out pickets to prevent trans-border the camp at night. since September 14th had been wounded. Khar* and Jhar endeavoured ed. and received the jirgah.3 . * la Bajour. The Mamunds had received Details of their losses were not obtainable. 1 . . and our animals had lived free of cost for a month.j7/s<^. for the ruins of their forts and villages in the Watelai Valley formed an object-lesson to which even the most turbulent of the tribe could not shut their eyes. rifles still They gave security for the unsurrendered and declared that they wanted peace. having Finally.m. They sat under the trees near the village of Nawah and a durbar was arranged by Major Deane.000 tribesmen from the Kiinar Valley joined the their intention of attacking The Mamunds were now thoroughly broken. all swore with fought only because they feared annexation. British rank and ]i\e—kiU»d. killed. killed. to The damage doubt the done to the valley amply settled all outstanding accounts. staff arrived at Bindon Blood and his 3 p. but 272 men had been buried in the valley and the number of wounded must have been very large.360 fighting men. wounded. The British casualties in the Mamund Valley severe lesson. . 147. as distinct from Khar near Malakaud. This shows how stubbornly the Mamunds fought. 16 50 . Native ranks . : — British Officers— 5 . followers— A. On the Gth of October enemy and expressed the camp. 5 total 273. fight on the 16th Three or four days later ten in. The Khans to of Nawagai. 5 cease to figure in the frontier narrative.

( 106 ) to the Malakand Sir Bindon Blood halted in the and easily forced the cowed tribesmen there to submit. at once surrendered the arms demanded of them. On the 23rd October Sir Bindon Blood and General Jeffreys' Brigade arrived at Chakdara en route for the Malakand. 10 rifles and carbines and 139 guns being surrendered. who had shared in the Swat hia On way back Salarzai Valley Valley rising. . and General Meiklejohn'a Brigade followed the day after. In the same way the Shamazai section of the Utman Khels.





and the 15th Sikhs from Ferozepore. though the tribesmen were urging that they had no representative leader to conduct the operations. The Aka Khel Mullah. — one on our Kohat . after sufficiently border. belonging tribe. Aka Khels. CHAPTER 1. Further disquieting news was received shortly afterwards regardwho were said to have entered into a war alliance with the Orakzai tribe. while Sir Bindon Blood was moving out to subjugate the from Chakdara Elles on the Swat Valley. THE RISING OF THE AFRIDIS AND ORAKZAI. a from Sialkote. a poverty-stricken section of the Afridi ing the Afridis. it Kurram Valley. was threatened by a As there seemed to be good foundation for both reports to reinforce the Head-quarters garrison at was promptly decided Kohat (this post being the support of both Fort Lockhart and Parachinar) -with the following troops :— The 9th Field Battery from Mian Mir. a strong defensible position where six companies of the 36th Sikhs were stationed.( 107 ) PART IV. our chief outpost on the Saraana Range. A couple of days later another report came in that the restlessness was spreading westwards and that Parachinar. by and the other on Jamrud and the mouth of the Khyber by the Afridis. Saiad Akbar. and had met with initial success against came news of restlessness some success. the 18th Bengal Lancers from wing of the Scots Fusiliers Eawalpindi. ascertained that the mullah this On inquiry it was who was trying to brew mischief for us in to the new direction was one Saiad Akbar. and while General Mohmand border was awaiting permission to follow up his the Hadda Mullah's forces at Shabkadr. a tribe found in the hill country to the west of the Kobat district. our last post in the large lashkar. the compact being that two simultaneous attacks should be delivered on British territory the Orakzai . there among the Orakzai. The Orakzai country at that time was watched mainly from Fort Lockhart. THE BREWING OF THE STORM. About the middle of August. A mullah had been trying to induce them to rise and attack our frontier posts.

blocking the tribe from raiding into British territory. beyond the right bank of the Bara River . while westward the Orakzai borders touch the Zaimukhts and extend to the foot of the Safed Koh Range. Moreover as the whole district good deal dependent on the Kohat for supplies. the summer head-quarters liad of the Afridis.000 fighting men.( 108 ) inflaming the Orakzai. their interests not being identical with those . and of no hills to the north-west of mean martial qualities. and especially for salt. while the Adam Khels hold the hills between the Peshawar and Kohat districts and are rcgaided as a separate of the clans to community. and previous expeditions into the Miranzai Valley had been undertaken in order that the Samana Range might be held by a chain of posts. had passed from tlieir country to Tirah. But no unanimity seemed probable. mustering some 25. Kamar and Zakka Khels and the Sipah are known collectively as the Khyber Afridis. west of the Peshawar district. while the whole frontier was in a ferment. but they had been sullenly defiant and might now. Apj^arently this fanatic was bent on doing in these two ti acts of country what the "Mad Fakir" done in Swat and what the Hadda Mullah was at that time doing in the country of the Mohniands. Moreover. of which six. be expected to give trouble if undeterred by the strengthening of the Kohat garrison. Tlie Orakzai are numerically a powerful tribe. The mass of the tribesmen are Sunis. but it was nevercounsel* might listen to evil and try conclusions with our troops. the Orakzai are into two great factions. it was believed that some tribe are a sort of pressure could be brought to bear theless recognised as possible that they upon them . The Aka Khels are found further to the south. The Afridis hold the country and their settlements touch the to the south and west of the Khyber. Malikdin. Of the six divisions of the tribe the Daulatzai and one sub-section of the Mahomed Khels were Pass. so that a general combination seemed difficult of attainment. and sectarian quarrels are not uncommon. Since Fort Lockhart and its posts had been held the tribes- men had not i^entured on any hostile demonstration. Samil and Gar. are divided into eight clans. It is to the south that our own border faces them. receiving allowances for keeping open the Kohafc in and these it was reasonably conjectured would any event remain split vip on their good behaviour. They Kambar. Tliey hold the the Kohat district. the Afridi country lying to the north. the Kuki. but there are some Shiah sub-sections.

a shameless. cowardly. to enter the was not then considered expedient Eajgul and Maidan of at least Valleys. as this would have involved the employment 10. thus described by one treacherous his earliest authority : " Ruthless. cruel savage. however. 4. a high plateau inhabited chiefly move to by the Orakzai. have banded together in their hostile preparations They were posing as something more than religious authorities at fanatics. The Kuki into Khels under Amin Khan were the clan which had sent their professions of friendliness towards the levies the Khyber.000 or 27.000 each Kuki. Brought up from childhood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless revenge. The Rajgul and Maidan Valleys are studded with their mat huts during the hot weather. cold-blooded. Malikdin and Kambar Khels. and their flocks and herds find good pasturage. and was regarded as the Afridi stronghold. and the trained Afridi fights with splendid Han. and 4. robber}^ salt of life.000 belong to some 26.( 109 ) the north-west. murder. are to an Afridi the nothing can change him so he dies. low hills bordering the Jamrud Tirah had never been visited by our troops. yet the Afridi character is no better than was in the days of his fathers. . in our service. In the The whole tribe summer months covers an area of aljont 900 square the majority of the Afridis Tirah. The Kuki Khels always resort to Eajgul. The Afridis muster to the in all whom about 6. and plain. while Maidan is left for the other clans. In the Afghan War of 1878 but it — 80 two expeditions were sent into the Bazar Valley. miles. and that very large numbers are. of the Adam Khels." From such material as this. as he has lived. much but any common menace to in their country unites them.000 men. Their leaders had intimated to the Peshawar that certain concessions were desired from the Goveiument of India. and must have learned in some poor way what faith it it And and mercy and justice are. Already the present instance they seemed to have to sunk their diff'erences and against the British Government. In the winter the whole population swarm also into the down into the Bara and Bazar Valleys.000 fighting men. These were the withdi'awal of all troops . good soldiers have been made of the men enlisted in certain native regiments.500 to the Zakka Khels . The blood internal feuds and quarrels between the various clans lead to fighting. would seem that notwithstanding their long intercourse with the British. The Afridis are men of fine physique is and grand fighting It is qualities. or have been. but their general character of the worst. and their standing feud against the Malikdin Khels as well as Government of India pre- vented at least a portion of them joining in the contemplated rising.

The garrison there was so confident of holding its own that one hundred men had been sent to reinforce the smaller post of Sadda held by 25 of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry as a link with Thall. but the garrison remained in occupation. homes. which lies near the The hostile tribesmen junction of the Kurram and Mii^anzai Valleys. the rectification of the salt tax and the rendition of all Afridi women livinf:f in British Given these terms their fighting men would return to their territory. Assistant Political Officer at Landi Kotal. Instead of descending upon and suddenly as the Swatis and the Mohmands had done. Their attitude had caused some alarm among the friendly Turis of the lower Kurram. On the Peshawar side. Barton. meant to take ordi- narily held Jamrud. 3 (Bi'itish) of the pass. J. but messages were being sent through daily by sowars without hindrance. G. Brigadier-General A. us swiftly they were by their hesitancy giving us an opportunity to make better this vacillation of the Afridis defensive preparations. was withdrawn from that post. owing to the intelligence that 10. like the Orakzai of the Samana. and by the 22nd of August he was able to have a stronfT brigade ready to move out either to the Samana Range or to Kurram. then Commanding the Presidency District. Yeatman-Biggs. •were waiting in some doubt to see how matters developed in the Khyber direction. Jamrud was . It was said that the Afridis. but they were apparently waiting for the Afridis move before carrying out their threatened attack on the Samana.( 110 ) from the Swat Valley and the Saniana Eange. but reassuring news came presently from Parachinar. Orakzai gatherings continued to to be reported. Captain F. was ordered up from Calcutta to take command of the troops at Kohat.000 Afridis were marching on the Khyber Pass from the Bozai Valley. For some days after the first rumours. had their head-quarters there. No more striking instance of the want of union among the congeries of tribes on the North-West frontier had ever occurred than and Orakzai. General Elles. had gone to the length of cutting the telegraph wire. while the Khyber Rifles. now despatched No. H. our post at the Peshawar end by detachments of native cavalry and infantry from Peshawar. who had not yet moved out from Peshawar against the Mohmands. who were garrisoning the Khyber. after capturing the Khyber Pass. Apparently the tribes in the Kurram Valley.

the Malikdin. seven companies of the 1st Gurkhas. be captured by any tribal force withto close the The tactics of the Afridis would no doubt be Khyber. the Malikdin Khels. and then appear in strength about the low hills which are found near the mouth of the pass. to which the Mullah Saiad Akbar belonged. posed of " K the 4th Dragoon Guards. unless their to where they would lay themselves open to numbers should indeed embolden them make a demonstration against also be expected to Jamrud Fort itself. watching the Mohmand country. and the Sipah have already been mentioned as forming with the Kuki Khels the Khyber Afridis : the sixth were the Aka Khels. Kamar. garrisoned by the Border between Jamrud and Koliat.000 men in the Peshawar Cantonments. Kambar. 3 (British) Mountain Battery. H. a wing of the Gordon Highlanders. already foreseen.. could not. buted between the fortified sai'ai at Landi Kotal. Zakka Khels. the strong Fort at Ali Muajid. Amin Khan. and a big garrison of 5. sent some of his followers to assist in the defence of Ali Musjid and Landi Kotal. and Mackeson. south of the Bara River. Bara Fort was held by detachments of native cavalry and infantry.( ni ) Mountain Battery from Peshawar to Jamriid Fort. Commandant of the Khyber Rifles. A. are in a sense a distinct community. was believed. and the minor posts along the pass.000 or 6. but Landi Kotal and Ali Musjid. the Aka Khels. By way of reserve there was the Shabkadr column. On the 21st of August the Afridis really began to move. where Forts Bara Militia. They were scarcely likely to ventui'e far into the Jamrud plain. artillery. might have to be given up if These minor posts. also concentrated four The remainder of the Khyber Rifles were distriof his companies there. it held with deter- mination. attack by cavalry. The Adam Khels the last of the eight Afridi clans. Five of these. and a wing of the 26th Punjab Infantry. holding the hills between Peshawar and Kohat. together with strong detachments of British and native infantry and some cavahy. No. and their astute malik. and the Zakka Khels having collected their fighting-men and started out from Tirah. The Kuki Khels actually would not join. R. Eventually six out of the eight clans into which the Afridis are divided joined in the hostile demonstration. guard our frontier In a very short time General EUes had a column at Jamrud com" Battery. and •they were far-sighted enough to see that any -temporary success secured . it was the Afridis should sweep if down out the Khyber. Their raiding parties might appear to the south. Mahomed Aslani Khan.

of frequent occurrence and is In order to be on the safe-side. both the Hadda Mullah and the " Mad Fakir " wrote to Saiad Akbar. is This duplication of trans -frontier names apt to be confusing. General "Elles despatched a flying column tion in Bara to watch for any hostile demonstrathat quarter.000 strong all. Their jirgah went quiet. while the Jamrud column was kept even more of all three arms to on the alert than usual. Aka Khel Mullah. if it apparently quite enough to smash up a tribal should venture from the hills. and these arrived at their destination on August 22nd. They are subsidised to maintain the road through the Kohat Pass and they declined to close the pass when urged to do so by the mullahs. This gave General Elles 18 squadrons of cavalry in force 10. seeing the advisabilin ity of having a large force of cavalry and about Peshawar. but eventually on the 13th August he managed in Tirah to assemble a number of Afridi maliks in Musjid Bagh the summer head- quarters of the tribe. propriety of attacking British territory. urging him to incite the Afridis and Orakzai to take up arms against the British. and the clan afterwards remained Some tribesmen bearing the name of Adam Khels did aa a matter were a sub-section of quite a of fact join the Afridi lashkar.( 112 ) by a raid would have to be dearly paid for in the long run. and here he succeeded in exciting the tribesmen to such an extent by working upon their Afridis Kohat border if the would move against the Khyber and Jamrud. and it was now clear that the bellicose Afridis and Orakzai would shortly receive a severe lesson. The Commander-in-Chief. But. Saiad Akbar hesitated at first to respond to the appeal. order- ed up the 6th Bengal Cavalry from Eawalpindi. Information reached Peshawar about this time which shed a curious It appeared that side-light upon the tribal risings on the frontier. but these different clan inhabiting Tirah. . The mullah hurried back to Tirah with this news and it was sufficient to excite the fanaticism that they agreed to attack the Aka Khels and Zakka tion Khels. opinion. who gathered their fighting-men at once. the delay in bringing about the tribal combina- force the garrisons of had given the Government of India ample time in which to reinPeshawar and Kohat. Saiad Akbar then left for the Orakzai country. as has been seen. Here there was a great discussion as to the The headmen were divided in sensible many of them taking the view that such an attack could not be successful and might bring reprisals upon the Afridis as a whole. into Kohat when summoned.

These retired at once. for the Khyber was now swarming with Afridis.( 113 ) CHAPTER II. At three o'clock in the afternoon. K" Battery. built garrison. the news reached Jamrud that Fort Maude was being attacked. it When " K" Battery with escort came into action . at 3. where it would have been liable to flank attacks. but there was no telling how far its capture might encourage the Afridis to press forward. The battery eventually opened fire at 3. abandoned and retired to Jamrud . tlie latter a small fort about three miles from Jamrud and just within the mouth The tribesmen had apparently advanced from the of the Khyber Pass. with an escort Dragoon Guards and four companies of British was ordered out towards the mouth of the Khyber Pass with if a view to render assistance this should prove practicable. and " consisting of the 4th infantry. but it was not found possible for the guns relieving force to proceed up the pass. Bozai Valley by the Alachi route. Its little some 40 or 50 of the Khyber Eifles. itself. and well placed on an eminence overlooking the road. This fort was held by a detachment of the Khyber levies Eifles and some Kuki Khel who. and the Afridis at Advancing further along the pass the raiders came upon Fort Maude. which though small was strongly once burned the building to the ground. which brought them into the pass quite After twelve days close to Ali Musjid. or because they did not care to shoot down their own it countrymen. was finally settled on the 23rd August by a sudden and the question overwhelming attack on Ali Musjid and on Fort Maude. of doubt as to the real intentions of the Afridis.200 yards. was some distance up the pass safety this force could not with move far into the hills. The post was one of no great importance in itself. and the would-be was obliged to return to Jamrud. Though the Afridis took Fort its Maude they did not take the garrison.200 yards on a number of tribesmen who were sighted. whose line extended 1| miles. behaved staunchly. THE CAPTURE OF THE KIIYBER FORTS BY THE AFRIDIS. either because they mistakenly it thought they could not of the pofssibly prevent from falling into the hands enemy. but could not save the situation. At night Fort Maude was seen to be in flames. however. As the fort.

of the garrison. and bolted away to their villages. while 180 were true Afridis. Zakka and Malikdin Khels. If we are to believe the story of some the Afridi porof the Khyber Eifles who afterwards came into Jamrud. Not until 10 o'clock the next morning on the part of certain Afridis get inside. — and then only by means of treachery within the stronghold — did the enemy was set As in the other instances. Of the remaining 250. tion of the garrison were so disgusted with these deserters that a volley was to later upon them as they fled. their numbers being pretty equally divided among the Mullagoris. the fortified mrai already mentioned. the building on fire. During that night Janirud itself was sniped. to stand to the defence right and continuing through the night. Then certain of the Afiidis manning . as a whole (for there were defections). within whose limits Landi Kotal lies. On the wounded. joining the battery and returning with it to Jamrud. 70 were Lawargai Shinwaris. and Valley. while the rest were number were from the Peshawar Adam Khels and men from the neighbourhood of the Kohat Pass. offered a steady resistance. but fired they were promptly driven back. but there and next morning all the enemy had disappeared. three or four men being hit. A little some Shinwaris and Zakka Khels among the attacking force managed scale the wall on the north-east face near the Othcers' bungalow.5 recimits and munshis. and 370 men Khyber including . firing volleys at any groups mornof tribesmen who tried to approach the w-alls of the sarai.( H4 ) tomponarily scared ofTtlic assailing horde. This attack began about noonday and the garrison. seeing the ho))clossness of the position. These 250 rifles formed the bulk and they seem to have behaved steadily enough on the 24th August. after which the raiders withdrew and soon afterwards dispersed quietly but exultingly to their homes. were no casualties. Landi Kotal are interesting. An attack was to be made that day on Landi Kotal. and the oarrison. 2. further up the Khyber. There was a reason for the disappearance. took advantage of the brief but welcome diversion to withdraw in safety. Some of the of the details of the taking of The garrison of the sarai consisted of five Ni^tive Officers Rifles. the 25th a Shinwari jemadar named Jhawas Khan was of ing and the Shinwari sepoys then concluded they had done sufficient fightThey accordingly jumped down from the north wall of the sarai in f^. Of these 120 belonged to miscellaneous clans a similar thus 40 were Shilmani Mohmands. keeping the enemy outside during the afternoon and evening.

Of the 40 Peshawaris. and in the attacking force. The Subadar commanding the Mullagori company. and carrying their dead and them. were carried ofl" as prisoners. and it gave probably never will be what exact proportion of the besieged admittance to the besiegers and what proportion remained loyal friendly But there were undoubtedly many true-hearted soldiers to their salt. homes in the Bazar Valley. and joined in looting the rifles. commandant. back Jamrud. who had organised the raid. There was apparently not enough fanaticism at work to induce the tribesmen to remain. when the enemy through treachery efiected an entrance into the Fort. company and fought his way through. put it at 10 only. losing several men in doing He then took his company through the Shilmani country. post. to When the Landi Kotal sarai had been looted and the quarters for fire the troops set on the Afridis began to break up. The Adam Khel sepoys had joined the besieging lashkariit the very six outset. as the protracted resistance would itself suffice to prove. at 34 at Fort as Political Officer in the Khyber. making for their wounded with This was done in spite of the protestations of the mullahs. Colonel Aslam Khan. and 200 at Landi . and who wished to keep the lashkar together. 12 at Ali Musjid. had two sons and one son with him in the Khyber Eifles. It is not clear. The Mullagori and Shilmani sepoys escaped over the wall with their while the Zakka and Malikdin Khel men took refuge under the flags of their clansmen in the attacking force. killed The losses of the Afridi tribes- men were put Kotal. Maude. Subadar who was killed just before the enemy effected an who conducted the defence. A entrance into the s«m?'. among the garrison. to was a promise to gather again on Septem- Coming now their old to consider the loss which the Khyber Eifles sufiered throughout the whole raid upon the Khyber. without the loss of a rifle. The most they were equal ber 15th. and tlie opened the gate and the tribal mob poured in.( 115 ) with their wall began exchanging greetings the reverse of hostile the sequel was that some traitors within fellow-tribesmen outside. who was acting and wounded. and moreover they were running short of supplies. while the rifles remainder were allowed to escape after their had been seized. collected his so.

had expamded into the corps of the Khyber about 1. Khyber. of the cost of which had been defrayed by the Government India. The Afridis. in their raid not only attacked their fellow-clansmen enlisted in the Rifles. Captain Barton. strong in the belief at the time that the pass would be held.000 tribesmen were marching on Khyber. though three days elapsed before the Afridis entered the pass. sent up fifty thousand rounds to that place. . Yet another lakh yearly had been paid in tribal allowances. and when he was peremptorily recalled by Sir Richard this reserve Udny behind him. As an offset againt this the tolls levied on caravans had been collected by Government. When the intelli- gence came in that 10. the annual charge being roughly two lakhs." -"' ' ( IIG ) It may be worth recalling here that in the agreement of the 1881 between the Government of India and Afridis the following paragraph was subscribed to by the headmen of understand we are exclusively responsible for the the tribe future : " We managein this ment of the responsibility. but broke the agreement which had been in force since 1881 and had worked till then without a hitch.000 strong. No effort he had of course to leave was made by the authorities at Peshawar to secure the ammunition. and during the succeeding sixteen years Rifles. Before leaving the Khyber fell it has to be mentioned that one of the most serious results of the capture of Landi Kotal was that an immense of the quantity of ammunition into the hands enemy. therefore. " of Thezailchis in no way shares Under the same agree- ment a corps was raised among the this tribes to garrison All Musjid and Landi Kotal. and that Government and this position we accept.

But their success was short-lived. In March 1868. Accordingly on the morning of the 11th of March. lies on the line separating the Bizoti section of the Orakzai from British It was obviously a matter of very considerable importance. some six miles north-west of Kohat. thus losiu<>a great opportunity. will be remembered. the Orakzai at last made a tardy advance upon our border and on the 26th of August imitated tlie Afridis by capturing the Ublan Pass. had bound themselves by a compact rise as soon as the latter made a demonstration. and the troops retired at sunset. General Yeatman-Biggs recaptured the pass and completely routed the Orakzai lashkar. Pass. that no disturbance should be allowed lo ferment unchecked in the neighbourhood of a pass which overlooks the high-road of our communications to Kurram and is within so short a distance of a comparatively small cantonment like Kohat. all of which failed. strong breastwork situated on the summit of a perpendicular crag on Three attempts were made to storm this position. Before narrating in detail the events which occurred during the recapture of this supposed impregnable position by the then small force under General Yeatman-Biggs. looked at from every point of view. yet they waited until the Afridis had withdrawn from the Khyber and entirely dispersed before themselves commencing.hostilities. Now that the attention of our Peshawar and with the Afridis to Kohat troops was no longer anxiously engaged. various offences against of the life and property comtowers and mitted by this section of the Daulatzai clan culminated in the occupation by them Ublan Kotal with a threat to attack the village at the foot of the pass.( 117 ) CHAPTER III. for the very next day. as will presently be related. on tlie 27th August. The it among Orakzai. having suffered the . it may be interesting to glance brietiy at previous operations directed against the Bizotis. A FURTHER example of the extraordinary want of tactical combina- tion the frontier tribes was supplied by the inactivity of the Orakzai while their allies the Afridis were raidin<^ the Khyber. THE RISING OF THE ORAKZAI. The Ublan boundary territory. The position was assaulted and the enemy gradually driven back into a the right of the pass. a small force moved out from Kohat consisting light held battery two guns of a and some 500 men of the 3rd and 6th Punjab Infantry.

Having destroyed this village the troops returned at once over the pass. The same day Major Bewicke-Copley. and the 2nd Punjab Infantry moved out from Kohat to attack the pass.200 yards. rode out from Kohat and reconnoitred the ground. and the force mov^ed down to the village of Gora on the other side. most of the casualties occur- ring on the way down from the summit of the pass. two companies Eoyal Scots Fusiliers. the fort situated near the foot of the pass. At dusk on of the the 26th. six guns No. Major Wedderburn succeeded in almost completely silencing the enemy's frontal fire and also that on the crags to our left. The losses on were 3 killed and 33 wouuded.( 118 ) heavy loss of 11 killed and 44 wouuded. General Yeatman-Biggs arrived on the scene at daybreak and the guns took up a position near a tank on the plain at the foot of the After some very pretty shooting. the Dispositions were then made for the 2nd Punjab Infantry leading and the Eoyal Scots Fusiliers lying in reserve. closely followed who had by now taken this occasion the alarm and were up in arms. Again in the following year the pass was crossed secretly at night by a foi'ce sent out from Kohat. and opened fire at 2. strength. This short resume of operations in the neighbourhood of the Ublan may suffice to show that the position is one of great natural justifying the Bizotis to a certain extent in their boast that when pro- perly defended it was impregnable. and Captain Wake. with the squadron of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry as escort to the guns. On which the 25th August news was brought in from Mahomedzai. At 4 A.* and one man was killed. by the enemy. 9 Field Battery. Intelligence Officer. and the remaining levies fled for refuge to Mahomedzai. where the troops fire were exposed at every turn of the path to a galling from above. Mahomedzai had been reinforced by one company 2ud Punjab Infantry under Captain Cooper. This movement being totally unexpected no resistance was encountered. but the latter afterwards broke out again during the advance. pass. Let us now turn to actual events. will be uiulerstood tliat this clan has uo couutction .M. The troops advanced up the centre of the pass. Orderly Officer to General Yeatman-Biggs. and when about half-way found themselves exposed to a galling and very accurate • From a previous cxpluiiatiou it with the Utiuau Kbcls lyiug bctwcuu Swat aud Uajour. on the 27th August a force consisting of one squadron 3rd Punjab Cavalry. one havildar and one man wounded. attack. that some snijiiug had been going on at night and that the enemy had occupied the sungars which is had been the scene of the defeat of our troops 29 years ago. The next night our levy post was rushed by some Bizotis and Utman Khels. including 1 Officer killed and 2 wounded.

Adjutant of the 2nd Punjab Infantry. where they crossed the Bara Eiver and entered the village beyond. coming chiefly from the left flank. and it was now that most of the During all this time the snipers concealed among casualties occurred. were 1 sepoy. keeping up a galling fire. : The retirement began about 10-30 a. were concealed amongst some steep crags overlooking the crags These were a : serious difficulty during the whole progress of the it is engagement they are perpendicular and quite inaccessible. and the under the by a fortunate chance running round and coming out without having penetrated very deeply.( 119 ) firo. Elsmie. and was carried out main body moving off" first down the centre of the pass. who had led his company most gallantly from first to last. the Kotal was gained— Lieutenant impossible either to scale or to outflank them. and Subadar Akhbar Khan and to sepoys. 2nd Punjab Infantry. and the ground was too bad The casualties during the advance to allow of mules being brought up. heat-apoplexy. and no counter-fire could dislodge them. terrible. followed in turn by the Eoyal Scots Fusiliers and the two companies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry who had originally advanced on the right. and they now kept moving down and harassing our rear-guard. rendered prompt and latter in the stomach. M. The heat indeed was and the European troops sufi'ered a good deal.m. A. The troops had to fight their way up a rocky and almost precipitous hill with little or no available cover. both of the Royal Scots Fusiliers. being the first to arrive at the summit. and Here a number of the enemy remained concealed. the former in the ankle. : 2nd Punjab Infantry on the the right attack had been having some sharp work of the by the men Meanwhile after fighting their way from ridge to ridge they gamed the crest and swept the enemy be- fore them. the two companies being well lead by Lieutenant Eales and Subadar Bhuta Earn respectively.. were severely wounded. The enemy promptly followed up. under a burning sun and exposed to a heavy fire.m. A. but were seen rapidly retreating in a fairly compact body down the other side of the pass.S. in echelon^ the the crags on the left had maintained a galling fire. North. 2nd Punjab Infantry. wounded. both from the main attack and right. killed. whore a number of sharpshooters pass. also Vollej-s were fired after them. About 8 a. Surgeons-Captain Beyts and Bamfield. About half-way down Captain Baird Smith and Lieutenant L. the bullet ribs efficient aid to the wounded the former with the . one man dying of No water was procurable. aid of a sepoy carrying . The enemy did not wait to try conclusions at close quarters.

of whom two afterwards died. position. 2nd Punjab Infantry. pressing news having been received Kohat from both the Kurram Valley and the Samana posts. for Hangu. tions. The mullahs were said to have given out that all Sikhs were to be wiped out. and being accompanied by Colonel Richardson .m. but the troops on reaching the foot of the pass were almost completely exhausted. Rumours of the enemy's movements and intentions being most conflicting. and after a short rest the remainder marched back to cantonments going well and strong. both from the steadiness and accuracy of their fire the Officers. the evening of the 20th August. but nothing definite could be ascertained regarding the enemy's Various dates were given for intended tribal attacks. However tongas had been sent out from Kohat for these and the wounded. and from the manner in which they at once distinguished They were armed chiefly with Sniders. about 7 miles from Hangu. The retirement fi Avas well and steadily carried out. a reconnaissance was made by the caA'alry the following day to Marai. killed. the 5th Punjab Infantry and one squadron 3rd Punjab Cavalry. Friday being the most likely day of the week. but without encountering any hostile The following days were spent in reconnaissance in various direcforce. and the force encamped at Hangu facing the Samana Range. the escort consisting Samana from Hangu of the 5th Punjab Infantry and 2 guns. and at the eastern end of the Khanki at On Valley in rear of the Samana.( 120 ) woundod Officer for some distance down the hill under a heavy fire when the ground was too bad for doolies to be used. Royal Scots Fusiliers. four guns No.m. this regiment being apparently singled out for tribal revenge owing to their occupation of the Samana for a year previously. On the 22nd August a convoy of ammunition to replenish Forts Lockhart and Gulistan was sent up to the under Colonel Jameson. as the one most favoured by the Prophet. but special attention was to be paid to the 5th Punjab Infantry. 2nd Punjab Infantry. of less While the action on the Ublan Pass was in progress other hostilities magnitude were occurring to the west. under the commandof Colonel Richardson and consisting of the 18th Bengal Lancers. on the Samana Range. 2 Officers. and 1 sepoy. 16 men of the Royal Scots Fusiliers having been knocked over by the sun. a flying column started at 7 p. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery. Royal Scots Fusiliers. 2 Warrant Officers. Several of the enemy were dressed in khaki and appeared to be old sepoys. The 26 miles were covered by 5 a. the following morning. The total casualties were : 1 private. and 8 sepoys wounded.

while Colonel Abbott with the 15th and his two guns moved further west to carry out the task assigned to him. On the morning of the 27th August at 7 a.( 121 ) and his flying column. one follower During this advance the I5th Sikhs lost one wounded and one sepoy wounded. although it was enemy had been watching more prudent not to attack: of much interest except that the usual rumours of an intended attack on the camp were more frequent than ever. Lakha. It was. ready to cover Colonel Abbott's retirement. to relieve Lakha and bi'ing awav the garrison with their rifles and ammunition. venture to anything like close quarters. a column was at once ordered out.. after tiring a few shells at the dispersing down the northern slope of the Samana. but had thought For the next few days nothing happened it met with. White in support. Meanwhile a wing of the 5th Punjab Infantry had moved out from Hangu under Major F. Colonel further to the west. but the regiment went straight ahead. No opposition was ascertained afterwards that a thousand of the the force the whole way. which was accompanied by Colonel Richardson and . under Colonel Abbott. arranged signal of distress. follower killed. in large This column to left at 9 A. and eventually this wing. and on reaching the crest this wing managed most successfully to keep the enemy in check.m. L. ois. this movement all this being similarly covered by the 5th Punjab Infantry. P. away and reaching the crest in a marvellously short time everything considered. Having relieved the : Lakha enemy Post. consisting were aroused by three loud repoi'ts of the 16th Sikhs and two guns. but contended themselves with from behind every possible bit and managed to enfilade the road so successfully that the infantry were forced to leave about half-way up and make a direct ascent up the khud. The enemy never appeared firing numbers. however. This movement was followed up by small parties of the enemy incessantly they did not.. Whilst was being done. however. it when The ground was most sweeping difficult all and steep. Culonel Abbott halted. pressed. found impossible to signal successfully so as to ascertain Colonel Abbott's intention. was also haid Abbott pushed on as rapidly as possible. the troops at Hangu coming from the border police posts As this was the preof Lakha just above Hangu on the Samana ridge.M. and commenced the ascent up the graded road of cover.. the remainder of the 5th Punjab Infantry under Colonel Jameson had moved out from Hangu up to the foot of the hills. The enemy melted away on the northern slopes of the Samana and also away to the east where they opposition could find excellent cover. still Then hear- ing that the post of Saifaldara.

round. The ascent was extremely difficult over huge volcanic jagged rocks with large crevices intervening. explained That same night the Eoyal Irish and the 9th Field Battery arrived in camp from Kohat. When still the last remaining companies reached this place. The following night the troops were aroused the distance and the familiar shouts of a rjhazi rush. At the same time there were persistent rumours that Hangu itself and the vicinity would shortly be to attacked. shouting and firing con- tinuously. they did not chaige home as they might and was perhaps the darkness alone which prevented the regiment having a very bad time. two of whom however turned up during the night. but nothing more occurred. At 7 p. The retirement had now to be finally made. and this prevented Colonel Richards's flying column from mov- ing on to the Kurram Vallev. Great anxiety was for some time felt regarding his force.m. ready move anywhere at the shortest notice. however. It was a it great relief to reach the open country beyond. the whole column moved 11 P. unmolested. dark. as heavy tiring was continually heard and nothing could be seen of the force. fortunately. for some thousand feet. After forming up..( 122 ) Staff. by a tramp of The men feet in fell in quite quietly at their posts. and then passed through the latter in a defile. the remaining wing was much relieved to see some guns about half-way dowa the Saifaldaia road from the Samana. and the men were quite exhausted when they reached the last position to be held. and a few scattered shots were fired by the enemy.M. three men were lost. As it was. for when the very narrow zags liad been passed the road debouched into a small basin behind the low hills. Meanwhile it was getting quite Punjab Infantry. by most of the troops having had no food and very little water for 14 hours. A force was licld in readiness to move out . and this proved to be Colonel Abbott's force retiring covered by the first-mentioned wing of the 5th The remaining wing now halted. There was now a faiily strong force concentrated at Hangu. off and reached the camp at Hangu. . the all enemy were further emboldened and hovered Still. the other being cut up. six of attempting a kind of charge met with a them falling from a volley fired by the 5th Punjab zig- Infantry. yelling and firing as they along down the rocky spurs and even venturing on the road. and the enem}' grew in bolder. which perhaps why the expected attack was not made. came One small body of some 50 severe check. moved along the foot of the hills to the Saifaldara road where it was thought Colonel Abbott would eventually descend. and moved straight up the spurs covering the zig-zag road.

no more snip- ing occurred. evidently a refuge Accordingly one of the 12-pounders was trained on nel shell was to the cave during daylight. just as the fairly men were retiring for the night. left fell in. and some few were seen whence to safely snipe into camp. and the little force returned to on the evening of the 30th August much fatigued. The Maharajah of Kuch Behar Hangu on the 8th September. That same evening hills it was noticed that several men firing were lurking about on the near above the camp. per- fectly quietly and without the slightest and refrained from the returning a single shot. joined General Yeatman-Biggs at His Highness had volunteered for active service on four previous occasions. heavy and continuous firing began from the overlooking sevei'al bullets falling in and about the camp one grazing a sepoy's puggari and one falling near the field hospital. This movement was carried out under Colonel Mansel. but this was the first time he had been allowed to proceed to the front. whence the had come. his Staff rode of his brigade When about six miles from Hangu. bringing in news of the arrival through the Kohat Pass. The Major's baggage was riddled by bullets. Some of the baggage was carried ofij but safely General's baggage was attacked the escort to a large convoy then arriving. emboldened by their success. the by a small raiding party of the enemy. The troops confusion. As may be easily imagined. and the force received a useful Sappers and Miners. and about 9 p.( 123 ) and assist Gulistan. to make for a cave. On the night of the 29th August. but they helio'd that there was no urgency. and the enemy at last Ti'ansport. without however being seriously hurt. . as usual. addition in the Bombay post at Meanwhile news had been received that the border police Shinawari had been attacked and burnt. camp in peace. looting the Hindu bunniahs. The driver was wounded. and other accessories had now been rapidly coming up.m. assisted by a small party sent out from Hangu. and Major Bewicke-Copley's servant was hit three times. into On the 31st August General Yeatman-Biggs with Hangu from Kohat. with their spoil. 3rd Punjab Cavalry. having covered 40 miles. managed to recover everything and drive off the enemy. the Field Battery and the 18th Bengal Lancers The following morning moved out to Shinawari. and five or six bodies were being buried the following day. hoping to catch the enemy returning to the sign hills No camp however was seen of them. had attacked and pillaged the adjacent villages of Kahi and Nariah. a shrapfired into it. hills. field hospitals. and that the Orakzai.

for the troops had been on half ritions for some time The heat was terrific. The guns completed and the . fired into.500 of the enemy.-.. THK UKMKF OF THK KURRAM VALI-KV The nij^lit hefdro tlie arrival f. The transport column. who was with at Doaba. after reconnoitring towards Shinawari had obtained a guide to show him a good camping ground This guide made a deliberate attempt to lead the cavaliy into an ambush. Bensfal tlie 15tli Siklis. two squadron. Captain Chesney dismounted some men andfiredat the ambuscaders. moved out from Hangn towards Thai.. the sun blazing down on the men's faces. column at about but the rear-guard did not arrive until 2 Two of the snipers were captured and brought into Thai. the 1st half of the column. the M'hole being accompanied by Colonel Richai'dson.( 1^^4 ) CIIAVTER I J'. The column was followed at midday on the 1st September by the 5th Punjab Infantry. ekkas. in a gieat huriy. their rout with a few well-directed shells. the ground moreover being unsuitable for cavalry work. It was ascertained that Captain Chesney of the 18th Bengal Lancers. appointed to the command of all the troops composing the who had now been Kurram This relieving force as well as of the troops already in the Kurram.m.iins. and the enemy being nearinsr the large nullah when west of Doaba. having been made up Doaba was 11 p. and two other squadi'ons. Doaba inside a thorn zareba which a little The troops bivouacked at while previously had been occupied by the 1st half of the column under Colonel Abbott. consisted of carts. the whole under Colonel Abbott.f (Jeiicral Yeatman-Biirgs. two other mountain guns. who disappeared in all directions on the approach of the 15th Sikhs and the battery. donkeys. for which runs to the some 1. besides the regulation camels and mules. bullocks. two iiiniiiitaiii i. retiring gi^adually so as to allow the 15th Sikhs to come up.m. serious news having been received that a general and simultaneous attack was intended on Thai and Sadda and various other points in the Kurram Valley. 18th Bengal Lancers. FCtRTS. where they were incarcerated. He managed thus to kill thiee or four of the enemy. proved a most tiring march. having been safely reached by the second half of the relieving a. of the 18th Lancers and the Kojubay Sappers and Miners. it was seen to contain in great strength.

pletely exhausted after their 23 miles in the heat. but unfor- ever. and the march of 36 miles completed in 36 hours no great recoi'd in itself but for the fact of the heat and want of : food. were rewarded here. some of the 18th Bengal Lancers had gone into the village. for supplies were plentiful. who. The alarm was quickly sounded. and the remainder following a few hours later. mounted as they were.( 125 ) column raarclied into Doaba. and a few volleys managed to keep the camp free from sniping for the rest of the night. His property. followed by the 5th Punjab Infantry and two guns under Colonel Jameson. and the following day the Kabul Khel Waziris. in the and fertile all along the Kurram Valley. amid the jumble of transport animals. and the troops had comparatively little rest to prepare them for it.. At 1 p. and the men.m.m. by the way. however. The troops lined the ramparts all night. Thai was safely reached. was a Sikh. The men. and the last of them. the following morning. who fled across the surrounding fields towards the hills. good before the arrival of the 2nd half of the column Colonel Abbott had left for Thai. The second niglit they were fired into aim being taken at the mess table where the Officers were dining and where a lamp was btn-ning. firing as they went. Colonel Richard- son pushed on with the cavalry in the tracks of Colonel Abbott. was shot dead just as he entered. . and they could rest till the following morning. The cavalry meanwhile had had a small engagement. push on to Sadda in theKurrani Valley as soon as The camp and of the 2nd half of the column was somewhat confused. but the force was evidently too impossing for the enemy. Apparently that same night had been fixed upon for a big attack on Thai fort. who were about to water their horses. This was again a very trying march. intending to possible. to Thai. turned out and pursued some 20 or 30 armed men. Everything looked wonderfully peaceful ing this trouble. Colonel Abbott having a very narrow escape. who were breed- tunately the man who had The march to Sadda was resumed same order on the 3rd September. in the pitch darkness it was almost impossible the zareba. Whilst camping near Thai. however. left to way about The troops were comand had scarcely enei'gy to find one's cook their food. shot the sowar escaped. At 6 a. had dispersed. and the occurrence evidently had a good general effect on the people. Just heavily. Six were killed and 14 taken prisoners. Some coni))anies were sent out. howwas confiscated and destroyed. Colonel Richardson pushing on with the cavalry in support of Colonel Abbott.

however. their advance-guard of 500 men had actually committed themselves to an attack. A and gathering of some 3.saw that troops were urgently required.000 to 4. thus completing a very fine march under exceptionally difficult circumstances. Yet the position was critical. especially in all. and part of the Lower Kurram might have risen.( 126 ) Colonel Alibott's half of the column made Alizai on the morning of the 3rd September. Meanwhile the two guns No. with its garrison of 50 Sikhs. after marching 49 miles in 40 hours. view of the scarcity of ammunition. the whole by magic. and Miners. and 300 or 400 Turis. The after- such a reverse would have been serious. consisting of approve of the plan.m. The moment the troops neared the if place.pressed garrison selling their lives dearly. and the militia post at Balesh Khel still more closely. Richardson arrived in time to troops. marched the next day 9 miles. and everything was now perfectly peaceful again. No. he . the 15th Sikhs. a felt at finding all doubt when Colonel Abbott with the advance troops reached little disappointment was quiet instead of a hardly. At Parachinar. whereupon the Kurrani Valley Brigade under Colonel Bichardson became complete. 13 to Alizai. But as a matter of fact the arrival of the troops in was most opportune and probably saved the situation the valley. the garrison could no doubt have held out against immense odds. Worse than also the slightest ad- vantage gained by the tribes would probably have doubled their numbers. from the Political Officer in the Karram Valley to the Commissioner (which was also addressed to the Officer commanding the troops on the I'oad). Sadda. beyond Sadda. 100 Kurram militia. All this was it saved by Colonel Abbott's promptness. while the rest of the valley political effect of would have been given over to fire and sword. miles beyond Thai. would also have gathering melted as been a hard nut to crack. Opening a telegram.000 Oiakzai was threatening Sadda village seriously.. on the 4th. No Sadda. the remainder waiting to see how things would go. So hard did the enemy press. The 3rd Gurkhas arrived shortly afterwards. as wards transpired. 2 Derajat one company Bombay Sajjpers Mountain Battery (4 guns). The 2nd half of the column halted at Manduri. the 15th . and Colonel instead of waiting for orders determined to advance at once. that one mullah was killed at the very door of the fort. consisting of the 18th Bengal Lancers. and the 5th Punjab Infantry. the men being without tents. and Sadda at 3-30 p.m. p. and reached Sadda on the 5th September at about 2 in pelting rain. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery.

a retreat was to be made to the Kurmana from Parachinar. to the village of Hassan Ali. to scaicity of to the discomfort of the men. sowars.( 127 ) Siklis and half of No. practically nothing but reserve ammunition and one day's cooked rations were reported carried on mules. had begun their was intense by day while at night heavy rain added Owing taken. Under the circumit seemed as the disturbances on the to the country between Thai and Hangu. but not to engage any overwhelming force of the enemy. On the 29th of August was reported that the Mussazai. had been brought back to Thai first the sowar carrying instead of finding a relief at the police post. where troops would be ready to cover the retirement. The mail had brought news if of fighting on the Saniana. itself. so had developed before the appearance be described at a little of the relieving troops. trying march to Sadda. it seemed as if the Kurram Valley would be left to look after Sadda therefore was increased by 25 rifles and 200 Kurram militia were despatched under Captain Maconchy. stances. Once in the Kurram. two guns No. and even Kurram villagers were turning against the garrisons. the whole under the com- mand of Major Vausittart. That situation. It has been said that the arrival of Colonel Eichardson's flying in the column altered the situation far as it Kurram Valley. the Officer commanding the Kurram garrison. consisting of 20 sabres. 3rd Punjab Cavalry. G miles in force. however. 7 miles east The Sikh garrison of of Sadda. the friendly Turis readily brought out supplies. 4 Company Bombay The Sappers. The wire was working as far as Thai. and were spreading Samana As a matter of fact raiders were out in Upper Miranzai. District Staff Officer. as already described. but news was received ful sections of the Orakzai. Mamozai. For the above purpose a movable column was organised. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery. that an important telegram. His orders were to endeavour by making a show of strength to postpone the attack of the tribes as long as possible. may now it greater length. supplies could scarcely be obtained. and to help the neighbouring villages as for as possible. three powerhad risen and determined to attack Sadda in force. which should have been taken on from : Thai to Hangu by it. had found the post quite deserted. On the 31st August Captain Maconch} . mule transport only one blanket per man could be and owing to the hostility of the villagers. As little transport as possible accompanied the column. and Alisherzai. 100 rifles 36th Sikhs and 300 rifles l-5th Gurkha Rifles. heat. in the event of the tribes attacking River.

A later report tipoa this by stating that 2. the middle of the night. and began began to hew it to pieces with axes. however. . about 3 miles from Sadda.000 men marched off. when the Political Officer received a telegram saying that the advance of rein- forcements had been postponed for the present. On the morning of the 1st September the Intelligence Officer heard that the Afridis and Orakzai had been waiting for contingents to arrive from the Chamkannis and Alisherzai.000 tribesmen were collected 5 miles from Sadda. Still graver news was received in the evening. in which are the huts inhabited by the garrison. This they soon succeeded in doing. and damaged to such an extent that no attempt was made for the time being to repair it.000 Afridis and Orakzai had now collected at Badama that they had brought their women-folk and rations. This they did the same night. but the fire from the tower still kept them. to attack Sadda. when i-eturning to the hills. . an isolated militia post. at arm's length. and that although had improved the Maniozai and Alisherzai had gone off to the Saniana. under a havildar. But the fire kept up from the ramparts was so severe that for a long time none of the attackers dared venture near the walls. halting in the jungle to attack About 2. which amounted at the time of attack to 20 men of the Kurram militia. the Afridis crept up to the courtyard gate. kept up on every side till a small tower with a courtyard on the south when a continuous fusillade was midnight. which was built so as to enable raiders to be cut off. and that they intended to make a combined attack on Sadda on the night of the 3rd September. to About midnight ammunition run short. almost literally. a. working as far as Thai. Mussazai village about 3 miles from Sadda . The wire was still capped at 10 P»M. straight for about a mile The remainder proceeded Balish Khel. No doubt the Afridis expected to make short work of this mere handful of men. and then. The Balish Khel Post consists of side. was by information arriving that 3. they left 700 or 800 Mussazai threatening Sadda.( 128 ) that there had been slight firing during the night in the direction of Badania. had voted to attack without them. Sadda. tribal stir up afeeling the Afridis of fanaticism and hostility against But these two so sections were disinclined to join the gathering. uniting their forces. and increased as twilif'ht deepened into darkness. amongst whom mullahs had been sent to the Government. The Afridis apparently did not relish the idea of leaving this small post in their rear. and so determined to take it first. and a message asking for troops was sent off in Almost immediately afterwards the line was broken up in three separate places. This. The firing began in broad daylight.

surrender but he remained faith- his salt. when help at last arrived from two directions. The darkness of the night. It was lucky for them that they did not stumble in the darkness on the 2.m. and charged right up to the fort walls. but failed to set the huts on fire. The enemy were now closing in. But a passenger in the mail astonishing information that troops were on the road between Thai and Sadda. about 11 P.( 129 ) They tried. Khel had been called to ful to bullets. but they were just too late Only one of our men in the fort was to get into touch with the enemy. wounded. Hastings and Major ing of the 3rd September. losing two of their number gateway in doing so. it is impossible to but the Koran and standard of the mullah who led the attack were found on the ground in the morning. arrived from Sadda. Fifty men (Malik Khels) off. and that they would probably reach the latter place by the even- No official intimation of any move of troops had been received since the telegram came stating that the advance had been postponed. and the good cover say. Kurrani militia also arrived from Hassan Ali. the 3rd. bands upon bands of their friendly Turis. so far as the tribes were concerned. and the party of villagers from Sadda (only 50 strong) showed great pluck in going out to help the post. The Afridis Fifty drew leaving two bodies in the of the courtyard. greater surprise to the Afridis than to and instead of attempting a further attack the tribal gathering broke up. The 2nd September passed away quietly. How many of the attackers were killed.000 fall men who were only waiting for the post to to advance and make an attack on Sadda. Matters were getting and they made signals of distress by throwing up bundles of burning grass from the top of the tower. presented a most extraordinary of reinforcements On foot. when returning from patrol. sight. knowing as they did that the Afridis were attacking in force. who had proceeded at to Sadda. on the 3rd and 4th September. got a letter saying that troops would arrive course a still Sadda by 6 p. Vansittart. except that some ekka brought in the pleasantly sowars were fired at close to Parachinar.M. before the news of the advance had been confirmed by letter. and blood stains were found here and there. and asked to in favour of the attacking Balish of . but next morning Mr. however. by nullahs were a great advantage The Afridi havildar in command by name. aflbrded party. The road into Sadda. serious for the little garrison. The arrival of reinforcements was of the garrison . horse and could be seen making way from . and replied to these overtures by volleys of Snider Both he and his men fought as well as men could.

when he had ridden forth in just the same way on some foray far across the border. jezaih. assisted by villagers living three miles east of Sadda. On Pun- the Sadda camp was attacked from the of the 5th of the Karmana defile. and every village sent a contingent. before we took over the safe custody of the valley. one and all of would have imagined they were off to some wedding or other tammtha home.m. but two-thirds of the men had them had the long Pathan knife stuck through their kinnmei hands. and not going to fight against odds for hearth and The Turi cavalry especially took things with evident lightness of heart. The advanced picket sudden rush enemy. Many an old raider's heart must have beat quicker as he thought of the past. while here and there was a revolver or pistol. all these men were going down to help to beat off the call of common enemy.s. tliey all gladly responded to the the Political Officer.. The way they galloped along the hard high road was wonderful to see. Here and there a grass chupli would be stuck up in the middle of the and the next minute it was to be seen at the end of a lance high in the air. despite the arrival at Sadda of Colonel Richardson's flying column indeed the . The portion of the camp attacked was the east face. the The force held by the (iurkhas being kept engaged by several hundred of . the latter generally of native workmanship. and partly by a wing of the 5th Punjab Infantry. held partly by the wing of the 5th Gurkhas. are Shiah Mahomedans . and the section volleys of the 5th Punjab Infantry. with two mountain guns. Breechloaders were very scarce. hence the division and inveterate animosity between the two. under Major Yansit- which had just arrived after a trying march from Parachinar. plan of the attack had evidently been carefully thought out. jab Infantry was driven in by a under Lieutenants Kitchen and Browne. the 16th September at ]0-30 direction of the p. just as they would have done in the old daj-s. The retirement was admirably covered by the steady company volleys of the 5th Gurkhas. the reader may be reminded.( i-'^o ) ITp])or Kiiirani. Knrrani to Sadda and otlior ])oints likoly to he attacked in Lower The big attack was expected on the niglit of the 3rd Septem- ber. Tlie road. To look at their merrv face. tart. wliilst their tribal neisjhbours are almost without exception Sunnis. : Turis. The following day they were to be seen returning to their homes the arrival of reinforcements in the very nick of time had made their presence no longer necessary in Lower Kurram. But hostilities were not yet at an end in the Kurram Valley. very presence of so large a force in rear seemed to incite the now out- flanked Orakzai tribes in the neighbourhood to renewed aggression.

All the troops actively engaged were in shortest possible time. the order that prevailed throughout the attack of three hours spoke highly for the arrangements of the column and for the c^uiet energy of all the British and Native Officers was no opportunity village of response. prevented a counter- Two companies of the 5th Punjab Infantiy under Lieutenant A. for which excite- ment on the border had now yJ/j/AanjA-^aw the Chamkannis people. consequently bore the main thti brunt of enemy's attack. formerly held by the 5th Punjab Infantry picket. strong.000 were unknown. their casualties it when exposed to a fire to which there The enemy was estimated at 2. and the first of the gallant of effecting Gurkhas disabused the enemy's mind in that quarter. Ames. and his Staff Officer. Captain Kennedy. and 18th Bengal Lancers.700 fighting men. . inoffensive and industrious of feudal and distinguished by the non-existence among them lobberies. of about 1. but from a visit to Badhura was apparent that large numbers were wounded. who. an entrance although their maintaining a position on broken the uncertain light. ground 500 yards from the Gurkhas. attack. wounded 2 horses killed and 9 wounded 3 wounded 2 camels killed and 5 wounded." and highway . Colonel Richardson. arranging for a reinforcement. lent admir- ably to the tactics subsequently adopted by the enemy. and one company of the 15th Sikhs. and although the casualties amongst the horses and transport were heavy. and 5 followers mules killed and 2 Our total casualties were 1 man killed. coupled with which concealed their numbers. : . ance except so far as it illustrated the unusual extent to spi'ead. A week noi'th later the Chamkanni tribe. sent up by Colonel Abbott with admirtwo steady and precise volleys as to the possibility able forethought. in Kurram.( 131 ) the enemy. . except for breaks of the east face of five minutes. 5 wounded. tights according to Bellew's Races of are " a quiet. the dead having already been buried. finding the garrison on the alert. The defence was valuably strengthened position in by a company tlie of the 15th Sikhs. and Lieutenants Rickets and Norman. of the The discipline of all ranks was excellent. joined the ranks of the enemy a fact of no great import. Here the ground. the whole under ( "olonel Jameson's immediate command. commanding the flying column. were assisted by Captain Eardley-Wilmot. and settled down fire to a well directed into the musketry attack. abandoned the idea of rushing the camp. pouring a steady and fairly camp for about 2| houi'S. G. whilst the main attack was made on the south-east corner especially that itself held by the 5th Punjab Infantry. were quickly on the spot.

Having checked the enemy's advance. accompanied by Captain Scudamore. where his column halted on the 12th and 13th September. and marched along . five lesser chiefs of the Mala Khel. in order to intercept the of a Samana ridge toenemy and cover Royal Irish The column consisted detachment of the Regiment. . The rear-guard kept the enemy in check by steady made up to 20 yards from the muzzles. Of the enemy the 2nd Punjab Infantry. and the mule transport in safety. It was and that the large of Ibrahimzai on the Kohat-Hangu road might also be threatShahu Khel is only three miles north of Ibrahimzai. The enemy. to return to Hangu. by Gogra escorted volleys. Our casualties were 4 men killed and 9 wounded. ready to move out ajjaia obliged. They attacked the rear-guard. numbered from 3. was slightly wounded. the 1st Battalions of the 2nd and 3rd Gui'khas and the 2nd Punjab Infantry. Mishti and column at dusk. information reached General Yeatman-Biggs on Saraana tliat a combined Orakzai and Afridi Inshkar liad begun Valley. Two companies of under Lieutenant Elsmie. General Yeatman-Biggs wa» owing to the want of water. G. and a very large number of wounded were carried off. Yar Muhamed. consisting of a half battalion of the 3rd Gurkhas and companies of the 2nd Gurkhas. Robinson. who came in touch with the rear of the Sheikhan. move down the Khanki A reconnaissance confirmed the news. carrying standards.000 to 4. about 4 miles from the bivouac Hill. Captain J. were recovered the next morning by Colonel The bodies of our killed Lawrence's column. The sanvans left the camels with one exception. all 1 1 Mala Khel five clans of the Orakzai. in spite of rushes all and bolted. as several thousand surmised that Shalm Khel was their village ened. went out and covered the retirement of the Gurkhas very smartly. lOtli. a leading Chief of the Sheikhan. and 25 others were killed. Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General. men were seen marching eastwards. nilBAL ATTACK ON OUR 8AMANA FORTS — SARAGHERI AND GULISTAN. .several by bullets.000. in any direction should the enemy reappear.( 132 ) CHAPTER Oy September the to V. 2nd Gurkhas. which first objective.the wards Lakha and Shahu Khel Ibrahimzai. in General Yeatman-Biggs accordingly set his column motion. and the camels threw off their loads and being liit wandered off the road. again is five miles east of Hangu.

and may not be absolutely correct. and eventually the whole of the gallant defenders fell victims to their heroism.000 had been subscribed. holding out from 9 o'clock in the morning first till 4-30 in the afternoon against odds which from the Two determined assaults wei'e rush the enemy succeeded in breaking down the door. for not a soldier came out of Saragheri alive. The entire garrison in fact behaved with splendid courage. unable to get at him. a lashkar moving up from Khorappa so Forts Lockhart and Gulistan. coolly kept up communication with Fort Lockhart up till the very last moment. fall of but at all events no more reliable account of the Saragheri will ever be obtainable. Before the end of the year over A fund was subsequently Es. benefitting the opened by the Pioneer with the object of widows and families of the 21 fallen Sikhs and of erecting some suitable monument in the Punjab to perpetuate the memory of the defence of Saragheri.* After repeated assaults. The signaller. but at doorway the swarming tribesmen scaled the walls and all But not a sepoy even then thought of surrendering while life remained. On the receipt of the news of the attack. It has been mentioned that the signaller at Saragheri kept up communication with Fort Lockhart while the Afridis were storming the walls. here came mainly from the enemy. and lost his life was over. . by refusing to budge when the Afridis. made a gallant defence. which consisted of only 21 men of the 36th Sikhs. under circumstances that will long be remembered. and there is perhaps no more touching instance of inflexible devotion to duty than fight will never be The details of the known. finally set the room on fire. but if the story could be told it would beyond doubt be one of the most thrilling that Sikh valour has ever furnished. finding they were blocked on the eaat of the range Sanjana they turned their attention to the small posts on as to place itself between itself. The facts related this in the whole narrative of frontier fighting. and the third when the plucky Sikhs manning the walls rushed down from their posts whelming.( 133 ) the As for the Orakzai. to defend the were clearly overbrilliantly repulsed. as brave as the rest. The garrison. 20. the garrison at Fort * Otlierwise koowa as Cavaguari. the tribesmen succeeded in capturing on the 12th September. the small post of Saragheri on the road between the two forts. One stout-hearted soldier in the guardroom killed twenty of the enemy without hurt to himself.

and the tribesmen could thus get at them with pickaxes. They cheerfully face the danger into which they are thus thrust last. but back."' made so strong that could hold out for at least three or four The opinion may also be quoted here of an Officer who inspected what was left of Saragheri after it had been re-captured by our troops. the door is is 10 or 15 above the ground is and access to the tower is gained by a ladder which pushed up when there an alarm of an enemy approaching. and the men ordinaiily occupying them can generally^riange to make terms with their assailants and so escape with their lives." wrote the small posts are held along the frontier. The re-capturc of Sanvj^hcri .( 134 ) Lockliart attempted a diversion by little foi'ce sending? out 100 rifles. quite close to the has yet to be related. is a great rush of hostile bodies across our frontier. But when war breaks out and there all costs. In more than one ojjen: is there we read of wooden-doors having been forced any good reason why those doors should not be so placed as reach of any one to be out of the who has ? not a scaling ladder be substituted for wood Cannot thick sheet-iron All along the borderland and in Afghanistan ? are towers which might well be taken as patterns for our very small posts. and in a they die fighting to the There must be something very wrong a system which thus makes the fate of a small party of soldiers conclusion. foregone We are If that told that to maintain conmiunication it was essential to hold Saragheri in order by signalling between Forts Lockhart and Gulistan. the doois seem to have been flush with the ground. under cover. At Saragheri. in the case of Saragheri. force an entrance. The fact seems to be that our smaller posts are built for occupation by levies. and only matter of abundant ammunition are our sepoys made happy. and stones. The lower portions feet of these are of rocks . and. and in the interests of those to defend who have some in- them something should be done I'each to give the gan-isons chance of holding out until help can stance them. a scanty supply of water in the is They are hastily given to the garrison. "are certain death-traps in case of at- tack by large bodies of tribesmen.* He declared that the post was situated in a hopeless place and that an attacking force could get up * all round. and at Sadda also. this was threatened on of Saraglieii its right flank and forced to of its fall The capture and the shiughter brave little garri- son served to direct attention some time later to the system under which " Some of them. were so the it little post should have been originally days. some of the posts have to be taken over by regular troops and held at provisioned. i'iojieer in an indignant article.

of The most advanced post enemy. The 'Jl 8ikhs had no chance of holding their own. pushed their advanced parties close up to the hornwork. enemv. but already reduced by casualties. out of the south-east gateway and along the the hornwork. the investment of Gulistan On the fall became a regular attack. was within 20 yards of the south-west corner of the hornwork. elated by their success at Saragheri. of Sara«heri.." a few men can manage to creep up undiscovered they can dig perfect awav at the walls in safety from rifle-fire. as they had done at Saragheri.( 135 ) To have defende. about 350 yards from the western end of the hornwoik. should the sortie be successful. on the other hand failure would mean something . This was what actually happened at Saragheri. would suffer a single still greater losses at a time much when man could ill be spared. On the 12th of September. Inshkars of the enemy holding Saragheri heights. The discovery was also made that the bastions of so that if all the forts on the Saniana have a " dead corner. with several standards. the situation to the foi'ce attacking Fort Gulistan all was decidedly serious in addition communication was cut off" by . who volunteered to take his section and attempt to drive the enemy out : of their advanced post. the which had been at Saragheri. originally numbering 166 of ranks. under cover The enemy. The responsibility was very effect great on the one hand. at about 4 p. were very bold. the moral great. both in dispiriting the would be very enemy and it in raising the spirits of the garrison. The little partj^. and the door should have been bullet-proof. the of the Gogra heights and the Samana Suk. and it was feared that they might. been required. but they men in addition to eneni}^ were men indeed. On the morning of the 13th September. who were enemy there being joined by a considerable part of the force During the night of the 12th-13th. crept least 200. then when within 20 yards or so . very nearly akin to disaster and in any case all was certain that the small garrison. Havildar Kala Singh's section numbered only 16 their gallant leader. the in great force behind Picket Hill. banks improved by mugars erected during the dark night.d it successfully 100 men at least would have walls. especially on the west and north. 36th Sikhs. Under these circumstances Major Des Vceux approved of the suggestion of Colour-Havildar Kala Singh. The at the immediate point to be attacked numbered at with bayonets south wall of fixed.m. at the time that Saragheri was attacked. breach the fort wall at the dead angle of a bastion. Fort Gulistan was closely invested by a large Orakzai lashkar.

two of whom had taken part in the sortie. but lay six down paces fiom the enemy's sav()ar and returned the At this juncture Colour-Havildar Sunder Singh and 12 men posted in the hornwork at the nearest point to the sangar. —a mere snngar tins filled — on the other This wall had been temporarily improved in places by logs of firewood. who had now been at their posts for 30 hours continuously. whilst. and atta bags and kerosine with earth and stones. Havildar Kala Singh was so seriously wounded that he died shortly The so-called hornwork at Tort Gulistan. scrambled over the wall and joined Kala party Singh's section. Three sepoys. They were met with such a . the garrison were in the highest the three sections of the to spirits.* their afterwards. . and thanks partly to this the casualties were not greater. to give a little head cover to the defenders. and Fort by the three standards captured. which they brought back to the fort amidst ringing cheers from their comrades. is an enclosure about 80 yards long by 30 broad. fire tliat they could not get up to the enemy but though sadly reduced at a distance of only fire. It was then discovered that two wounded men had been left behind. having the fort on one side and being surrounded by a wall of loose stones three sides. fire. and were is much * Till here the story of the seige of Gulistan given in the exact words of Colonel Haiighton's official report. for help to Fort of asking leave to surrender. the Afridis if all lives of British Officers the forts were By evening the enemy closed all round. and kept up a the Officers and heavy There were several casualties among men. and the combined killed then charged the enemy. the garrison saw a battery in the Miranzai Valley firing on the enemy. though 12 of the first party and four of the second were wounded and several afterwards died. without waiting for orders and of their own initiative. it is said. they had no thouglit of retreat. The effect of the sortie was great. returned Gulistan saw them no more. During the sortie a hot fire was kept up from every effective rifle in the fort and hornwork. but at 7 p.( 130 ) of the enemy marie a rush. Mamuzai represented homes. drove the remainder out and captured three of their standards.m. letter Major Des Voeux now got through a Lockhart on the pretence having offered to spare the given up. The enemy kept up the field fire all night again. and wounded a great number. at once of their own initiative again got over the wall and brought the two wounded men in.

dated 18th September. and probably an order. Pratt. Her name has gone forward for reward and I hope she will get it." Des Voeux. within twenty yards. they could have taken the fort easily killed they had had the pluck. as enemy were getting too close. received in Australia. The Major had conducted the defence with untiring courage and cheerfulness. She will I have recommended certainly get the medal. The total loss was 2 killed. have been sent to Fort Lockhart. from in the Queenslander Major Des fought like "Va?ux. four children and two nurses. Surgeon-. Captain C. like mad. Lieutenant H. Commanding . attending to the wounded. assisted by Miss McGrath (Mrs. The Medical Officer. and than ever. 8 seriously and 24 till slightly wounded. The enemy were all round. R. though the enemy now closed tribal force then in more fiercely At noon the occupying the captured Sara- gheri post was shelled out by General Yeatman-Biggs's relieving force and soon afterwards Gulistan itself was rescued and the enemy completely : driven off. The following an extract from a private letter. E. and was well backed up by Lieutenant Pratt. who gave birth to a had done noble service previously iu . The strength of the Gulistan garrison was as follows — Major C H. There no doubt that this fallen is as well as the small posts of Sangar and Dhar. We It afterwards transpired that Mrs. Des Voeux. Teresa (Miss McGrath) surpassed herself attending to the sick and wounded.: ( 137 ) encouraged. tigeis. well under cover and the firint. A good many of my poor wounded are dead or dying the rest . wounded. thirty of . felt cheered. my men for the Order of Merit (The Indian Victoria Cross). killed. of whom is 7 did not report themfort. and we captured three standards. for three days. and published but we — "My men here lost heavily — 44 out of 166. I ordered a sortie at 8 a. . Des Voeux. and it was garried out with the most splendid gallantry. daughter during the fighting.000 tribesmen all round me and we held out . in the Miss Teresa McGrath's heroism was spoken of by Major Des Vceux warmest terms. and missing. but my men pulled me through. selves wounded the fort was relieved. Des Voeux's nurse) attended and nursed the woimded under continuous heavy fire. and wounded 200 of the enemy. Things were very serious indeed. would have but for the timely arrival of the relieving column. and 165 rifles. on the 13th. B. 36th Sikhs . Pratt. . besides Mrs. if I had 10. 8 dangerously wound: ed. but at 8 o'clock on the 15th September they again heard firing in the distance.m. All the next day and right through the night — the third night of the attack — the fatigued garrison were forced to morning of the stand to the defence. indicating the approach of help from Hangu.

haunted by the fear that we should be too late to relieve Gulistan. we received news by helio that the greater part of the lashkar we had been hunting had doubled on its tracks. to get as near as possible under Gulistan and do what they could. hearing of the advance of the Orakzai and Afridi lashkar. and anticipated. soon took possession hill with advanced posts at Tsalai. The whole force Lakha by 4-30 a. 3rd Bengal Cavalry. (he : "At 3-30 wrote) just as we had started on our return to Hangu. As it turned out. which reached us that evening. There was not a drop of water to drink . arrived in squadrons and four field guns were . contained English women and children. and was at that moment investing the posts we had left the day before Saragheri and Gulistan being hard pressed. this was a good deal. had marched his column along the Samana ridge and after some ral column arrived on the scene at such an opportune necessary to go back to the 10th September. It is Yeatman-Biggs. with 11 . when Gene- enemy back up the Khanki Valley. the path. for though their appearance not their fire at that range could not be very effective. This they showed by breaking up the roads and planting aangars against us. but misled the enemy by suggesting to them that our advance would be made by Doaba. be it remembered. though taken by surprise. five toiled followed the convoy. not daring to leave Hangu unprotected. From this rear-guard fighting had driven the It will be remembered that the absence point the Special Correspondent of the Pioneer at to take Hangu may be allowed up the narrative P.m. with every pakhal could muster. All next day we rested as well as we could.. view of the condition of men and animals. Very reluctantly the General.— ( 138 it ) We have now Biggs's relieving to relate how came about that Geneial Yeatman- moment. and it was while he was making this return march that we left him. blankets and one day's provisions. a physical impossibility.M.sent off under Major Middleton. waterproof sheets. and to fight our in way back in the dark without it was.m. in order to follow the further movements of the enemy. nearer than Hangu. which. " At midnight we the relieving force started from Hangu. much camp dead beat. the of at daybieak we advanced to was concentrated at Gogra Hill. and we painfully down harassed by the tribesmen. of water on the Samana had compelled the General to hurry back with all speed to Hungu. and at 6-30 p. after receiving the news of the fall of Saragheri. As we an ideal position on the enemy. only greatly cheered the beleagured garrison. As a diversion. carrying only great coats.

< stanclards fire 139 ) and about 4.000 men. At the sight of our skirmishers on the skyline every man of the beleaguerOur guns hurried ed garrison who could stand. supported by the 2nd Gurkhas. ittle sortie the night On we pushed to Fort Lockhart. did their best with long-range volleys to per- suade some at least of the tribesmen to stay behind. slopes above and beyond were packed with swarms of the enemy. and the General. so the General ordering up the guns. which only two days before ' we had deemed impregnable unless reduced by want of ammunition. hurrying down from Lockhart Fort with all of the 36th Sikhs and signallers and sick of the Royal Irish that could be spared. but the guns which were brought up quickly into the fi-ont line soon produced an effect. stood Gulistan Fort literally still bravely holding out. for had we but known it. for there must have been at the lowest there was no news of hill computation 8. last 24 houi's . while the infantry. * ' At last we believed in the oft-reported Still thousands of the lashkar. Gulistan was safe for some hours yet. sprang to the parapets and opened a heavy fire on the now wavering foe. poured in their shrapnel. " Our force rapidly pushed on for Fort Lockhart. across the wide valley. proudly 1 displaying a standard they had captured in a smart before. so open to our fire. The enemy's retreat was pounded by the guns and long-range fire of the Royal Irish. no time was The limbering up we pushed on another two miles. so swept Fort Gulistan. However. mounting the Fort tower.000 tribesmen in battle array. even at extreme ranges. now warned by the sound of our guns that the time for their departure was at hand. covered with masses of the enemy. the fort. on the opposite hill. The guns under Captain Parker made beautiful practice. . its garrison of 41 men were drawn up. wounded or whole. " Saragheri was a piteous sight. and the 3rd Gurkhas. materially quickened their pace. searching out and dispersing every group we could see and putting shell after shell into a village where the tribesmen had imagined themselves at least secure. and Colonel Haughton on the west. we knew. besieged for the of the 36th Sikhs. They opened a hot and fairly accurate on our advance. racing down the steep hillside. and there. up and. could see Saragheri Hill on which the captured post stood. unlimbering. stormed the hill. passing on the little its way post of Sangar. soon had the by shrapnel that on the advance of the infantry not a soul was found. as we passed. and had we but had the time we might have inflicted heavy loss on an enemy whose so far as line of retreat would have beea to be lost. It was a thousand pities.

in band did his duty. it will be noticed. of his family. 8 dangerously and some. who had his anxieties doubly intensified by the presence had been the life and showing a fine example of cheerfulness and steadfastness to all. and horribly mutilated amid the ruins of The whole attack had been clearly and Lockhart. not report themselves wounded relief had come. and at times almost m(jre than a way worthy of the proud name of Sikh. Sikhs and Gurkhas have now seen " of us their mutilated dead. After the second assault on Saragheri a two of the enemy had been left dead angle of the Flanking Tower. some pushed By 2 p. . already given. before the fight began. Their comrades looked on silently as we drew out corpse after corpse. man but there will be. I mortally wounded 8 severely and 24 slightly till wounded. and how one wounded on his charpoy shot down four before they could gain admittance. However. many bandaged and blood-stained. Soon a practicable breach was made. the garrison still presented a brave front. working with some instrument.ss. who were however behind in visible to the garrisons at Gulistan powerless to render effective aid. safe.( 140 ) \vatei' or food. while the bodies of it« gallant carrison lay stripped the post they had so bravely held. a bitter day of retribution to come.. Last. Drawn up rifles at the gate were the survivors of the sortie with the three standards they had captured. ' was almost levelled to the ground. The little garrison. of 165 two had been . differs slightly la detail from what tfceeuemy's version of the affair. an Officer of a year's standing had ably seconded Surgeon-Captain Pratt had him. Out of the original garrison fear. who amid the flying bullets could be seen here bathing a wounded sepoy's head and there tying up : and soul of the defence. but not least.m. Mrs. and with lightened its walls. Lieutenant Pratt. helped by Miss Teresa McGrath. Hundreds swarmed in through the breach and over the walls. how one man in the guard-room slew 20 before they burnt him inside. 9 did Major Des Voeux. 21 rifles only in all. Of these latter. had speedily removed a stone and then mass after mass of masonry fell. guarding against every danger another's arm till the doctor could come. though sufi'ering from dysentery untiringly tended the wounded under heavy fire. worn out with 36 hours of continuous and stre. Des Voeux's maid. and in less time than it takes to write all Was over. toil hearts. it retreated to their sleeping quarters and fought out grimly to the bitter end. These. I ween. we were within Blackened with gunpowder.* Tales have come from the very enemy. killed. every sepoy of this gallant his duty. The state of may be called * This account. Fort Gulistan was on.

But it was impos- any large body of troops to remain on the range for more than yielded a certain quantity. For the time being hostilities had ceased. and he then visited the ghastly signs of what thev had o-one wounded. but there was every prospect of this kind of desultory fighting being resumed. Our forts resist any ordinary attack. two days at a time. exceeded 400." Leaving the fort it. but they could not be beleaguered for days together. last Major Des Voeux presented to him his but not least. Each time his troops advanced on to the Samana Range the tribesmen at once drew oiF into the Khanki Valley. Miss McGrath. with two mountain guns and the 2nd Punjab the main column leturned to Fort Lockhart and miles Infantry to guard there bivouacked. many of whom wore through. The operations therefore became a game of hide and seek. If the Orakzai had only advanced well beyond the Samana there would have been some chance of punishing them severely. as they were not incommoded by any transport train and each were strong enough to be left to man carried his own supplies. with the advantage on the side of the Orakzai that they could move rapidly from point to point. . and gave orders for the remedying of the most obvious defects of the post. it is due only number to the wonderful purity of this mountain air that the place was in any way endurable. but not for a whole bi'igade with Hence the marching and counterfollowers and transpoit animals. having marched since midnight 24 without food and come into action three times. as the water-supply was limited and the springs only This quantity was ample for the normal garrison of six companies of infantry. during these several operations. Officers and. but large as their numbers were they were not bold enough to do this. visited Gulistan and issued a stirring Force Order extolling the heroic defence of these two posts and promising to forward the names of the most distinguished for valour. including some 180 killed The next day General Yeatman-Biggs in the taking of Saragheri. Bearing in mind the dead and wounded in that small space and the impossibility of any but the most primitive conservancy arrangements.( 'the fort 141 ) may of be better imagined than described. and then began marching eastwards so as to threaten our border north-east of sible for Hangu. it From " friendly " was afterwards ascertained that the losses of the Rabia Khels enemy. all told. marching that had to be done. The difficulty which General Yeatman-Biggs had to face was one not easily overcome.

They received orders regarding the making of a road through their country. Several plans for assuming the offensive against the Orakzai were considered. On the 18th of September a representative jirgah of the Aka Khels came in professing their loyalty and pleading that they were in fear of the more powerful clans of the Afridis.( 142 > After tlie fightino. and to repair the roads and tiie telegraph lines. Valley. of Ibrahimzai and Hangu: the Northamptonshire Regiment and to the 2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkhas were railed from Rawalpindi to Kushal- whence they marched Kohat X . the Afridi from its Tirah. it was thought. A all reconnaissance along this valley as far as Khorappa showed that was quiet. In order. and advantage was taken by General Yeatman-Biggs of the suspension of hostilities to improve the very defective water-stipph' of the Samana by digging fresh tanks. and allies. as their rear The Orakzai would then hesitate to move down the Khanki would be threatened. would cover the front of and would at the same time pei'mit of the Sappers and the Samana. separating itself Samana disappeared. however. but the time now was not deemed ripe for any general advance into the Khanki Valley. working parties improving the two routes from Shinawari. plentiful. culminating in the relief of Gulistan. to guard against possible raids east of the Samana. so as to permit of a flying column operating in the neighbour- hood garh. which any Biver. more troops were sent toKohat. where water was and take up a strong position within a mile or so of the This movement. Khanki punitive force advancing into the Afridi country later on would have to follow. and departed promising compliance. The Orakzai villages in returned dispirited to the neighbourhood of the Samana forts all Orakzai were completely abandoned. the enemy betaking themselves with cattle into their temporary security up the Khanki Valley. The plan most favoured was to move four regiments with mountain guns down to Khorappa. of the 15th September. the tribal gatherings on the Ioshkar.

and the third a reserve brigade made up of four legiments of infantry and the Jodhpur Lancers placed at Rawalpindi. another to stand ready for action in the Kurram Valley. one regiment of Native Cavalry and five companies of Sappers. Early in September the Government of India announced their deterthe campaign to be under the supreme Sir William mination to institute punitive operations on an extensive scale against both the Afridisand the Orakzai control of Lieutenant-General : Lockhart. necessary revisions. P. oiie to into the move from Peshawar Bara Valley. being charged of with the foremost task advancing over the Samana into the heart of the Orakzai and Afridi country and sweeping away all opposition en route. We tion publish at the end of this volume full details of the composistaff of the and Tirah Field Force. i^ifs< ZJiwsion. as tinally selected after several force. (Commanding one of the Tochi Valley Bi igades). it was a magniticent flower of oifr and in indeed was quite" correctly described as "the India. THE TIRAH PUNITIVE EXPEDITION. each consisting of two brigades and styled the whole forming what was to be officially the "Main Column. corps constitued the several columns of the Tirah Field Force MAIN COLUMN. firstly Army and most importantly. Army Sir William Lockhart was then at Home. with six Mountain Batteries. two divisional troops.— ( 143 ) CHAPTER VI. divisions. As will be seen.— Commanding : Brigadier-General W. The following . Tlu'ee subsidiaiy columns were also formed. The column as a whole was composed of eight regiments of British Infantry and twelve regiments of Native Infantry. left Brindisi on the 3rd September at almost a day's accompanied by Major- General Lord Methuen. rank C.B. . but he notice. with the local of Major-General. Commanding the Forces in the Punjab and Commander-in-Chief-Elect of the in India." This column was under Sir William Lockhart's personal direction. Symons." It comprised. who desired to have an opportunity of seeing how a big frontier expedition is carried out..

Troops : 2nd King's Own 3rd Scottish Borderers. Hammond. (Commanding Rawalpindi Station). : (Commanding Cawnpore Station). G.O. 15th Sikhs. The commaud of this brigade was originally given to Colonel Ian Hamilton. V. the temporary 1st Dorset- (Assistant Adjutant-General.O. D. Power Palmer. —Commanding Colonel F.. Yeatman -Biggs. (Commanding Punjab Frontier Force). Bombay Nabha Imperial Maler Kotla Imperial Service Sappers. 16th Lancers.— Commanding Brigadier-General R. C. two squadrons IStli Bengal Lancers. No. 2nd Division. 8 and 9 (British) and No. Divisional Troops. Pioneers. 21st Madras Pioneers.. Mountain Batteries.S. : 3rd Brigade.S. Sirmur Imperial Service Sappers. 1st Battalion Gurkhas. 2 (Derajat). 3 and 4 Companies vice Infantry.. : 4th Brigade. Jhind Imperial Service Infantry. C. C. No.B. 3rd Bengal Cavalry. 1st Royal West Surrey Regiment. 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas. G. 36th Sikhs. 1st Battalion : 1st Gordon Highlanders. (Coniinanding Belgaum District). 1 B.—-Nos. 1 (British). two squadrons 18th Bengal Lancers. V. Kempster. D. 28th Bombay Sappers.B. Deputy Quartermaster-Ueueral in India. Westmacott.B. Gaselee. Line of Communication. C. Divisional Troops. ^ (Commanding Nagpur 1st District).. 1 (Kohat) Ser- Mountain Batteries. No.O. Nos. 2nd Gurkhas. D. C. Commanding Brigadier-General A. l)ut he had the misfortune to be thrown from his horse before the lighting had begun and his injuries placed him /lors de combat.B. 2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkhas.— Coiiunandiiig Brigadier-General R. PESHAWAR COLUMN. Troop 2nd Yorkshire Regiment. Hart. 39th Garhwal Rifles. Troops 2nd Royal Inniskilling : : D.C No. J. Commanding the troops already on the Samana). 2nd Brigade. Madras Command) with rank of Brigadier-General. 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas.B.. 4 Company Madras Sappers.S..C. 1st Devonshire Regiment..( 1^4 :* ) 1st Brigade. 22nd Punjab Infanti7. K. Troops : 2nd Deibyshire Regiment.C. 2nd Punjab Infantry.. Troops shire Regiment.. Northamptonshire Regiment. 30th Punjab Infantry. — Commanding Lieutenant-General Sir A.— No.S. 3rd Sikhs. No. Troops : : (Kashmir) Mountain Battery. (then — Commanding : Major-General A.O..C. 5 (Bombay) Machine gun. • . 1 Company (Bengal) Sappers. — Commanding : Brigadier-General A.

Company Bengal KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMX.182 native troops.000 Peshawar Column. the Mamunds being then still in A question arose at this juncture whether it would be quite wise to strain the loyalty of the Afridi sepoys in the Indian Army by employing . British Officers.600.250 followers. D. Sappers. No. 3 British Mountain Battery. .S. The British infantry regiments were file : shown as having each 29 Officers and 103 rank and the native infantry regiments file. R. : Colonel "W. 1. 2. : of the Field Force. (Commanding 42nd Gurkhas and officiating in command of Fyzabad Station). 34th Pioneers. each 9 British Officers and 16 Native Officers and 721 rank and Major-General Sir Bindon Blood and Brigadier-Generals Jeffreys and Meiklejohn were to have been given commands. 197 total. four guns 3rd Field Battery.( Fusiliers. 2nd Regiment Hyderabad Contingent. 491 : hos- British troops. Cavalry. including the Reserve . No. Native Officers.200 camels.. 9th Gurkhas. 4. H5 ) 2nd Oxfordshire Light Infantry. Hill (Assistant Adjutant-General for Mug- Troops : 12th Bengal Infantry. 22.203. to watch Nawagai and Bajour. 34. with 18. Brigade.123 . Commanding ketry). 10. 3. 5.. was as follows pital assistants. E. them against their kinsfolk in the forthcoming Tirah Expedition and . . 13. Kurram Movable Column. 57th Field Battery. grand mules . 9.010. The sti'ength of the 1st Division was about 9.A.040. the former of a Division and the two latter of Brigades. Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers.. with temporary rank of Brigadier-General. Commanding: Colonel C.460 2nd Division.268 Line of Communication troops. RAWALPINDI RESERVE BRIGADE.200. in the Tirah Field Force. one Regiment Central India Horse. Rawalpindi Reserve . but this arrangement was prevented owing to the necessity of retaining a full Division at and beyond the Malakand arms. 9th Bengal Lancers. 1st Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. 45thSikhs. 27th Bombay : Light Infantry.500. 966 ordnance mules. Excluding the Reserve Brigade the total was just under 31.O. 5 R A. The approximate strength Brigade. Kapurthala Imperial Service Infantry. Macgregor. Troops 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. 6th Bengal.000 pack and 2.

they have waged war against our elsewhere." The Afridi in soldiers in the ranks of the native army had done such them any reproach in splendid service that every effort was made to spare communicating the foregoing Order to regiments composed whole or part of Pathans. The necessary orders As far as possible care will be taken that no property belonging to the Afridi soldiei's in the service of the Government who have not taken part ' in the raids on British territory is either confiscated or destroyed during the time our troops are engaged in Oi^akzai or Afridi territory. have broken their alliance with the British (iovernment. At the same time the fact that desertions had occurred. so that they might be strong in the alliance of friendship with the Government of India and have the means of forcing turbulent persons to keep the peace. — which set the question at rest. Further. and arms issued. in conjunction with other tribes. a was issued on the 7th order read as follows: of Octobei'. cannot git down quietly under such of the and outrages. . but their services will be utilised elsewhere. devotion and courage on many and the value of their services has been fully appreciated by the Government of India. and have attacked and destroyed forts which their tribe had engaged to guard. and to send a force into Tiiah to exact reparation for what has lately taken a hard-fought field. and made an agreement with them under which British forts in the Khyber were entrusted to their care. Allowances were paid to the tribe. and to excuse them from service in the campaign which the Government has been forced to wage against their fellow tribesmen. The acts British Government. The Afridi soldiers in the service of the Govei'nment have given proofs of their loyalty. confident defiance in its power. place. to this effect will at once issue. After a most careful consideration of the circumstances connected with the Tirah Expedition. On these grounds alone it has been determined that Afridi soldiers who are serving in regiments detailed for service on the Peshawar-Kohat border.( 146 ) while the point was still beiiiff jniWicly rliscusHed. Without any provocation the Afridis. the GoA'ernment have decided to show consideration to those Afridi soldiers who wish to be loyal to their engagements. killing some of the soldiers in loss gairisons on the Samana and the British service and causing great of property. Government Order The "The Government of India lived at jseace with the Afridi tribe. are not to be employed near the Tirah frontier at the present time. and has been forced by the wanton Afridis themselves to inflict punishment on them in their own country.

the Departmental with him being Major Bythell and Captain C.S. him not only exceptional Campaigns but and 1892 had made the Samana Range and the Khanki Valley familiar ground to him. and whose knowledge of the Afridis and their country is probably unrivalled. who had recently retired from the charge of the Khyber. in 1872. To counteract as far as possible the and to present the Tirali effects of tills false aaaouiicenient Expedition . R. King. "id the Bara Valley Colonel Sir T. and other clans contributed between them only a total of 226. and Mohmands mustered less than 200 each and Waziris. 283 Bunerwals. after visiting Rawalpindi and Murree. for no European had been in the country since Captain L. were appointed Assistant Political Officers with the force. but to General Sir William Lockhart was committed the supreme tion. Sir Pertab as Aide-de- Sir William Lockhart arrived at Simla on the 20th September.B. It was quite expected that the Afridis would give our troops plenty been of fighting. Nicholson. There was a good deal of survey work to be done during the operations in Afridi laud. reached Kohat on the 5th Brigadier-General W. and 232 Ghilzai while Bajouris. Robertson. L. H. Utman Khels.E. whom 1. Hazaras. Sir Eichard Udny received orders to accompany the Tirah Field Force as Civil Political Officer. political as well as military control of the ex]>edi- Colonel R.. Officers was given charge of the survey parties. and Lord Methuen. Singh was permitted to join General Lockhart's Staff camp. Shinwaris. was also asked by the Government political to return temporarily to the scene of his former labours.. 309 Orakzai. Duranis. H Holdich. ..000 in of . Lorimer.( 147 ) Bot only on the Kohat-Peshawar border the action of the 1)ut furtlier afield. interesting to state here that these numbered about 4. Blakeway. showed that Government was quite As to the it number of trans-frontier tribesmen enlisted in infantry battalions may be all. C. E. and to accompany the expedition. Mr. accompanied by his Chief of Staff. Swatis. Mr. jus-tified. C. He had the great advantage of being able to ability bring to bear on the task before exceptional knowledge . Mr. Tucker. G.907 were Afridis. Waburton. and October.I. particularly as a mischievous notice in Urdu had for the Miranzai of 1891 circulated tion among them by their mullahs stating that a war of exterminawas to be waged against them. Donald and Mr. made a hurried trip to the eastern portion of the plateau.

as they may think fit. provided they immediately make subThe terms and conditions on which such mission and reparation.— ( 148 ) in its true light in the eyes of the wliole of the north-west border. and the tribal country from further occupation. attacked. these engagements have been. For these offences all tribal and service allowances hitherto granted by the British Government to the Afridis and Orakzai are declared to be forfeit." . to maintain order throughout the Pass. and entirely at the disposal of the British Govern- ment to withhold or to renew. to deal with to abstain on the road. The Government have neither the intention nor the wish to inflict unnecessary damage on the tribes. and that the Government have power to advance if and when they choose. following proclamation to the Afridis Sir William Lockhart issued the and Orakzai preparatory to advancing against them: " In the year 1881 the Afridisof theKhyber Pass entered into treaty engagements with the British Government. in consideration of certain allowances. and from committing outrages in British territory. The British Government has also determined to despatch a force under my command to march through the country of the Orakzai and the Afridis. wholly or in part. and I am authorised to enforce the fulfil- of these terms and conditions. these tribes took part in the attacks above British submission will be accepted will be announced to the jirgahs of the tribes when ment I have arrived in Tirah. ditions which opposition by any may render it wish to necessary to impose. wliich were garrisoned by the levies furnished for the purpose by the Afridis themselves. faithfully observed. on the whole. It is therefore notified that all live in peace with the Hirkar and desire to possess their it who own country and to see no more in the power of and occupied by the Sirkar^ orders and with the said terms and conditions. made to mark the fact that mentioned. and have joined the Orakzai in an attack on British posts and villages on the Kohat border. should assist to the utmost of their abilities in the work of enforcing compliance with my by which means they will save the tribes from the further punishment which will infallibly any opposition to the advance of the British troops bring upon them. and to announce from the heart of their country the This advance is final terms of the British Government. but during that and the succeeding month the oflFences Afridis have broken in the their engagements. and of any further terms and contribe. plundered and burnt the posts Khyber Pass. undertaking. or section or individuals thereof. to furnish levies for the above purposes. Up to the month of August 1897.

and on the back of : it they had scribbled their British views. Government had occupied the Khyber another that the salt tax was too high (their the third was a protest desire being to buy four maunds for a rupee) . the fourth also related to this subject. saying that they had no option fight. relations . near Kohat. against the occupation of the Samana Range The . while they complained that unfaithful wives in British territory. the Daulatzai.( 149 ) Some time afterwards liad the Mussazai clan in the Kurram Valley sent back to Fort Lockliart the copy of the Government proclamation which been sent to them. their complaint apparently being that our forts free passage over the prevented replied range. had serious grievaDces against the Government matter of the salt tax. Kham Khel Chamkannis to Sir William Lockhart's proclamation. Before proceeding to describe the advance of the Tirah Field Force it is necessary to the attitude of the make a digression in order to explain Amir of Afghanistan towards the at some length frontier risings and the which came into evidence between His Highness and the fanatical tribes then in arms against us. as but to they were under the orders of the Fakir of Swat and the Hadda and Aka Khel Mullahs. as was the case formerly. They had four grievances one was that the . They alleged they The proclamation also drew forth a in the reply from another clan of the Orakzai. who leave their husbands and take refuge were no longer surrendered.

the Afridis captured the Khyber. His sincerity in disapproving of the present tribal risings was shown by the careful manner in whicli . was forwarded to the Amir. on enquiries being 7th. afterwards. Various rumours was circulated connecting Abdur Eahman more or less intimately with the earlier rising in Swat. for they would not dare to take up arms openly for fear attributed all the border disturbances to the action of the mullahs. When. of them had joined the Mohmands at all they must have done so secretly. To a strong expression of the Governor-General's opinion General Ghulam Hyder's relations with the Hadda Mullah regarding and the part taken by Afghans from Jellalabad district in the Mohmand disturbance. it risings against the gadi of Kabul. who he said had former ^ears excited their conduct. public attention became directed to the policy of our ally of frontier tribes generally. of the Durani Chief in this who thought they new outbreak also. hailing from Eastern Afghanistan. but he had made short work of these when they became dangerous to his authority. and at Sipah Salar and solemnly and personally engaged on behalf of the committed by the regular army that no such hostility should ever be Afghan subjects. together with an admonition responsibility that something more than a mere formal disclaimer of to this communication was satiswas expected from him. there was some perceived the hand clear the air. it made regardint. and when. in very explicit terms. them. He of him. in especially the Hadda Mullah. especially as His Highness had forestalled it by a firman to Jellalabad forbidding his subjects to viously despatching was couched The reply to the Governor-General The Amir denied that any Afghan the same time soldiers had shared in the Mohmand fighting. he alleged that if any As regards non -military engage in hostilities on the border. The response prefactory enough. THE ATTITUDE OF THE AMIR.( 150 ) CHAPTER I'll. Kabul with reference to the hostile and the Government of India were not slow to recognise the extreme importance of this factor in planning operations.' the MoLniand attack on Shabkadr on August was ascertained that the Hadda Mullah had with him on that occasion a considerable number of men who were subjects of the Amir. and he denounced in years The Amir had certainly known gone by what was to be plagued by fanatical mullahs.

as was held on the anniverxva ud-din. the Afghan . His postal runners always use the Shilman route to Peshawar in preference to the Khyber route. About the same time the British Agent in Kabul reported that the Amir read in public durbar on the 17tli August the Viceroy's letter which his subjects from taking His Highness solemnly swore that he had always maintained friendly relations with the B)-itish Government.( 151 ) he arranged for the forwarding of his reply to the Viceroy. and had never induced his subjects or sepoys to take hostile action called upon His Highness to restrain part in the frontier disturbances. whence it was forwarded to the Governor-General's Agent at Quetta. This last statement was quite true. Mullah secretly they certainly had not done fear of so openly because of their His Highness. that he would as far as possible watch the disciples of the Hadda Mullah in Afghanistan. its So anxioUs was he that his answer should be safely delivered at via destination that he took the precaution of sending a duplicate Kandahar. The duplicate letter reached New Chaman towards the end of August. The Governor had also arrested 40 of them. The Amir at once replied in an letter. reminding the Agent of what had taken place at the and adding that though the Mullah's disciples had helped the autograph durhar. sary of his assumption of the title of Zin-ul-Millat A to few days after this dwhar the of British His Highness on the subject rumours which had Agent addressed a letter I'eached him that people from the the Lughman and other places in Afghanistan were still joining Hadda Mullah. under orders from Kabul. had been dispersed by Afghan troops were Further. and was taking steps to capture the leader of the gathering. His Highness sent mounted messengers from Kabul through Ghazni and Kandahar. was escaped. and they were also now secretly keeping a watch. and that supplies were being sent from Lalpura for support of the Mullah's gathering. but knowing that the Mohmand country was disturbed. and that the Gov- ernor of Lughman had recently attacked and dispersed a gathering of 500 men collected by one of the Mullah's disciples who were about to proceed from Lughman to join the Mullah. durbar. against the British. who had collected near Pesh Bolak and who probably intended making for the Khyber at the also true that who had invitation of the Mtillah 8aiad Akbar. cavalry. which The Amir also read the draft of his reply it to the was very largely attended. The Amir all he had issued instructions to informed the British Agent that officials in Ningrahar. and it some Sangu Khel Shinwaris.

I have written and sent them replies to their petitions to . for A ammunition but this was refused. About the middle of September the Afridis began to realise the danger which menaced them. officials where they were stopped by the local Afghan and turned back. so far from sympathising with the Afridis in their with them for having closed the Khyber. sect sending consisting of Maliks. and that there was no intention of i-emaining in the country. After the attack on the Khyber and the subsequent spontaneous dispersion of the Afridi force. should be allowed to enter Afghanistan. Ulama and Elders. and even paraded mule loads of ammunition which they asserted had been sent from Afghanistan. In accordance with my orders they were refused detained in . their petitions were sent to me and I have them. The members of this deputation got as far as Jellalabad. in order to induce the tribes- men to renew hostilities played the bold game of pretending that the Amir was at their back. but which had actually been captured from the Khyber Rifles at AH Musjid and Lundi Kotal. Thereafter. in request was preferred all obedience to orders received from Kabul. which was dated September 23rd. as definite preparations for invading Tirah had by that time been begun. each a separate and asking for help. to remove possible doubt the Amir caused deputations. to slip away temporarily to join some tribal gather- At the same time the Amir issued orders that no bodies of armed tiibesmen fleeing before the Government of India's troops in any of the operations about to be undertaken. In return for Abdur Rahman's frankness the Government of India less were no open with him and in further correspondence informed His Highness that the expedition against the Mohmands had been undertaken principally to punish the Hadda Mullah and his gathering and to disperse all who opposed our troops.Jellalabad. as rising. the mullahs.— ( 152 ) •witlidrrawnfrom the outlying posts because of the possibility that they might be tempted ing. was extremely angry loss this caused heavy to him owing to the stoppage of the caravan trade. besides preventing a consignment of arms and stores imported by him from Europe being sent up from Peshawar. As a matter of fact they knew very well that the Amir. to be posted in Kabul a public reply to the Afridi The notification. was as follows : "The petition Afridis of Tirah have sent me now eighteen of their men. They held a h'xgjirgah and decided to send a deputation to Kabul to ask the Amir to help them in the coming struggle.

and we request that Your Highness will be pleased to do what is for our good and benefit and by the grace of God we will act up to Your Highness' instructions. one thana at Tora Wad]. on the top of the said mountain the grace of By God we will destroy and burn these also. We have plundered and destroyed five forts on the Samana above Hangu.• ( 153 ) Jellalabad. We are at present engaged in a jehad on the Samana Eange. Highness. but that of the whole of Afghanistan. one thana at Narai Shams-ud-din. Ab and the Hindu bazaar at forts Narai Ab. one fort at Shinawari at the foot of the Samana in British territory. and the . We will never give up the reins of authority of our country to the hands of the Government. All the people of Tirah have taken up on the top of the mountain and at its base. because we leave the conduct and management of our affairs in the hands of Your Highness in every respect. one thana at Ghalo China. one fort at the Ublan Pass near Kohat. artillery and money. from Kohat to Eud-i-Kurman in the district of Kurram. We therefore send these eighteen persons from among our Maliks. and we have severed our connection with them in every way. On the of we are willing to tender our allegiance to the It is Government the King of Islam. their subjects. Ulama and Elders. We have used our endeavours with our tribesmen to do service to Your . but Your " ' Highness paid no attention to our complaints. a second thana at Kahi. their position tribesmen have been making tive limits. being helphave. we under the guidance of God. one thana at one thana at Naniak. the British prove victorious . We complained of this to the Afghan Government on numerous occasions. one//jano atChardi. the frontier of the Orakzai runs. less and having regard to Islam and our constancy in religion. and they have erected forts at various spots and places. opened the door of ie/jarf in the face of the said Government. and even upon Afghan territory. /eAat? from time to time within their respec- We will never consent to tender our allegiance to the British Government and become contrary. incumbent on the Government of Islam not only to look after our interests and to consider our position. Therefore. The particulars of their petitions are as follows — The British Government have been from olden times gradually encroaching upon our country. All Your Highness in the shape of If regular troops. with our petitions to Your High- ness' presence. There are three big which have not been taken yet. ouethnna at Kar Killa nearKhatak. This is the time to gain the object of at the disposal of the Moslems are now Your Highness. that they may receive : them and go back.

Why Sir did not then your Mullahs. and on many of your tribesmen on If both sides of the Pass salaams to me. Therefore on the day of the resurrecIntion the first question will be about the observance of agreements. when the boundary was being laid down. because the English up to the present time have in on way departed from the line of boundary laid down in ? the map they have agreed upon with me. " I have entered into an alliance with the British Government in regard to matters of State. and up to the present time no breach of the agreement has occurred from the side of the that they are Christians. Dated 7th Eabi- us-Sani. They said: Yes. I Then why should I do so To do so will be far from justice. Sir Mortimer Durand passed through the Khyber and came to Kabul. notwithstanding of the religion' We are of Moslems and followers ? of the Prophet and also of the four Khalifas of the Prophet.Kcellency the Viceroy about Some years after this. so that I might have conferred with E. boundary. swerve from an agreement.( 154 ) they will ruin the IVToslenis. the creatures whether he was their God or not. In Government I had gone I found my friendship with the British to their country as their guest. after you have fought with them and displeased them you inform me. Maliks and Elders come to me when all Mortimer Durand came silent.' " I have perused your petitions. you are our God and our Creator. cannot at the . and you know yourselves that consideration of I went to Eawalpindi by the Khyber route. How can we then commit a breach verse in the Koran — an agreement What do you first say about the ' Fulfil your promise: to fulfil a promise is the first duty of a Moslem. Tlie services to be done on this side may be left to us Your Highness. what you now it ? state is true why did my way who made you not tell me His at that time about the matter.' You will thus I see that the matter of the agreement of great importance. so that I could have discussed liin) ? At that time you remained and silence indicates consent I do not know on what account a breach has now taken place between you and the English. without cause or occasion. 1315. will never. All the frontier tribesmen knew of this their and saw the Mission with with authority to the matter with settle the own eyes. fidels and Moslems will thus be distinguished by this is test. Briti-sh. on the day when the promise was taken. object. asked all God. Now. We hope that after the perusal of our petition Your Highness will favour us with a reply. I all of which were founded on one it is now write to yon in reply that eighteen years since I came to Kabul.

whether in the Amir's territory or the hill tracts. You are the best Now that you have got into trouble— (Me rally^ You have allowed tlie time when matters might have been ameliorated to slip by. but wished only to avenge Major Cavagnari's murder and find a ruler in the place of making himself responsible for when he himself had not much control over Yakub Khan. the latter for Major Cavagnari's safety the Afghan troops and tribesmen. and mention the intent and pur- port of your talk. also a fool. the former for intriguing with Russia. and that in ease your circumstances by your petitions as well as fully aware that you talk in your houses (the Amir) have sold you to the British Government of in these days I you and the British Government when fighting is going on between have held myself aloof and am sitting it and comfort. " What you have done affairs. I have sent back from Jellalabad the JVfaliks you had deputed to me. Yakub." His Highness then proceeded to explain at length the policy of the Government towards Afghanistan in Shere All's time. Now I cannot say or do anything. The Amir also issued of warning to Afghans. Afghanistan from any enemy that might He explained how he Afghan had had to exercise full authority. He (Abdur Rahman) recognised these things and to defend satisfied himself that the British Government only wished aiise..e. and am for and meetings that I money.— — ( 155 ) instance of a few self-interested persons bring ignominy on myself and my people. you all Under these circumstances I think advisable to explain to the facts in detail. Turning then to the tribesmen he ." their — you want me to help you. as he had failed to make the people wise and moral. in It Eastern Afghanistan a proclamation by way began : "This proclamation is from Amir Let it Zia-ull Millat wa ud-din" {i." British Ali. with your own hands you must now carry on your own necks. accepted the . " Shere he said.lO for road expenses. and I did not trouble them to come to Kabul. be known to the learned men of Afghanistan. and his son.showed how they "tendered their allegiance to the British Government. that I have come through to know my informants. I gave them each a lunqi and Rs." He pointed out that the English had never any intention of annexing Afghanistan in those days. judge of your spoiled the matter) I have nothing to do with you. Light of Union and Faith). "was a fool.

king. so that it may serve as a barrier against any future of villages in invasion of by Russia. That being so. They had fi-equently declared to the British Govern- ment that they were independent of the Amir. Do and not be led to think that. were ascribing the rising as due to the British occupation of Chitral and Swat. I be glad to call you religious leaders. France thirty years ago. was dated August 13th. But the first condition of a it is is for jehad. where he died. dethroned A similar instance occurred in when the people there revolted against their never interfere him and sent him to London. that fighting on the British side is though issued late in Sep- to say. He to you. before the Afridi soldiers front. fuss about jehad. Their only desire their population of the country and strengthen own position. they should settle their affairs themselves?.nces jehad or ffhazaf The time will come If it will be announced you behave yourselves courageously on that occasion. I have nothing to do with I your ati'aiis." As they did not consult him when they raised the revolt. When you all 3'ourselves are rendering them assistance how can I be to blame V — (lb — After should here be noted that the proclamation. when does come. they were not justified in throwing the blame upon him. 156 ) made agreements. It is curious that the King on friendly terms with the English and yet you are making a It appears that you yourselves are independent kings. and had set themselves up as kings. shall added: — "Why do you call these dmturha. and do not require a king over you. the Amir said : —" I is to tell you that is in taking possession of Chitral the object of the British Government increase the not to assess revenue. I will with you in religious matters. an d. and to the then. and no concern with you because have no trust in you. tember. raised disis turbances and rebellion at the instance of a fakir whose parentage not even known King of Islam." Ilis Highness concluded : — " In short. without any cause. like Shere Ali.( allowances. nor prevent you from prosecuting your own object provided these be in accordance with the principles of religion. jehad the co-operation of the King of Islam. They have remitted the revenue Swat which they have taken actual possession. because men are taking sides do Mussalmans and most of the Khans and tribeswith the English and helping them. I ofTeiul ntlar. Your real object is to make me fight . or tax them. but the present disturbances have nothing to with religion.) had been withdrawn from the noticing that the tribesmen in talking among themselves.^ for am such a fool as to annoy your sake.

For of this nation. but his action was clearly contrary to the line of policy taken by his master. and the short-sightedness the people to tumult and commotion." And again evil-minded persons. A wise man is unwise in their sight." mer In the foregoing proclamation there was an echo of the Amir's forutterances so far as the unruly and troublesome character of his peojjle was concerned. and I I were to do such a foolish thing. Inhisletters just to the Indian Government in 1880-81 when he had in become Amir. and drive their ruined. own selfish ends they wish to see the whole world desolate and From their ignorance they do not know and see what would In other letters he abused his unruly tend to their lasting comfort. fore on this it Amir in connection may be said at once that thi'oughthe Amir adhered honouiably to the to be said there- Nothing further remains head except a word about the Sipah Salar. and out the remainder of the fighting attitude he had taken up. and appealed to the Government to give him rifles and ammunition in order that his regular army might be etjual to keeping the peace. Thus he wrote : tan are of such a nature that they step beyond the bounds of subjection " The ignorance of to the position of rulers. Beyond all reasonable doubt General Ghulam Hyder continued secretly to urge the Orakzai and Afridis to remain in arms. They lead people astray. and for the sake of a trifling gain they prefer disorder and tumult. and the Sipah Salar would no doubt have been tion to defy the called to account to his influence had he not been in a posi- Amir owing over the troops and tribes^ men in the Jellalabad distiict. >« ." subjects in unmeasured terms.'( 157 if -) with the British Government. After this nothing further was heard of the with the frontier operations. are manifest. am sure you would assume the position of simple spectators. the unwisdom of the principal persons in Afo-hanis- and aspire tan. : They incite them out of the path of humanity. he frequently referred to his difficulties " The people of Afghanisdealing with his subjects.

and theie was only a rough pebbly track. and the tribesmen to realise to the full the now began meaning of the preparations menacing them. — THE CAPTURE AND ABANDONMENT OF DARGAI. An at which urgent jirgah of the Orakzai and Afridis was held at Bagh. By the beginning of October the concentration of the troops composing the Tirah Field Force was in full swing. The Adam Khels on the one hand and the Jowakis on the other refused to obey the exhortations of the Mullah Saiad Akbar to join in the so-called jeAa'y. The Chamkannis. was indeed sufficiently trying with- out the addition of as no proper road existed. who had been giving us so much trouble on the Samana. that clan should be publicly anathematised as enemies of Islam. the last halting-place before Kohat. The last march into Kohat. causing us no annoyance during the march of the several bri- gades from Khushalgarh to join Sir William Lockhart. about 19 miles long from Aimal Chabutra. Kohatj next day Biigadier-Geueral Kempstei-'s column marched . the others. But at our troops a free passage stage the tribes had much to answer for : no reply was returned to their overtures. On the 10th October Brigadier-General Hart's column arrived at in. promising to surrender also all loot and Government offered this late rifles. and carefully refrained from molesting the advancing columns. and they now continued impassive. attacks should be made concurrently on the Kurram. in Tirah. Zaimukhts and Alisherzai of the Kurram country were not represented at the jirgah^ but the Tirah Alisherzai attended. became considerably less pugnacious.{ 158 CHAPTER CROSSING THE SAMANA VIII. the Samana and Jamrud. But the Kohat Pa. that if An oath was taken on the Koran to any individual tribe or section should come all an understandAll the same ing with the Government that did not include the Khanki Valley Orakzai. hostilities . General Yeatman-Biggs especially declining to treat with the enemy while they still had raiding parties out on the Samana harassing our outposts. and before very long all of them were asking to be allowed to make their submission. The Mishtis too made humble salaams and through their territory. it was decided that unless an arrangement could be made with the Government of India to include tribes in all sections of the two main an amnesty. through the pass.ss tribesmen had behaved well.

On the 7th October ajirpah was held at Mishtis. Valley of the irresolute Kandi Mishti in the Khanki Abkhels and Mulla Khels who had come across the Sampagha Pass for the purpose. and the apMason reconnoitred almost 1891. Maidan were to co-operate with the Orakzai in defending the Tirah passes facing the Samana Range. seven or eight miles away. it may be explained. and was it clear that many thousands of tribesmen would be required to hold even for a short time against the force which Sir William Lockhart would be able to bring to bear when once he had concentrated his two divisions in the Khanki Valley. Bara Valley. -where they stood with their faces to the north ready to march upon Samana as soon as the Sappers and Pioneers should have prepared the way. but it had never been reconnoitred. and it was apparently intended to form the left of the enemy's line of Arhanga Pass.( 159 } eihero. Malikdin. the Sipah. Kamar. in which something a tactical disposition of his available was apparent. A bigger jV/ya^ of the Orakzai tribes was held on the 10th October at which it was decided to hold the Sampagha Pass against General Lockhart's advance. and almost immediately Sir William Lockhart . ed from the long the From Kohat the troops inarched to Shinawari. would lie beneath them. districts Khyber were Thus the Kuki and Zakka Khels of the Bazar and to hold Ali Musjid road the Zakka Khels of the . the summer quarters of the Afridis. The Sampagha is almost due north of our line of forts on the Samana. The late Colonel Khanki Valley. but admitted they did not want to fight. The Sampagha Pass. leads direct from the it is proach to fairly easy. This latter pass again was said to be an easy one for packanimals. Zakka and Adam Khels of the . the right resting on the the southern valleys of Tirah. Aka and the Usturi Khels were given the Bara route while the Kambar.- and tfie day after that Bricradier-rjeneral Westitiacott's column pass. The pass can be turned on either flank. hart's It was thus plain that Sir William Lockadvance would be opposed at the Sampagha and other passes leading into the Rajgul and Maidan Valleys. The clans were also to give mutual aid whenever necessity might arise. Sheikans. so to the top of the pass during the Miranzai Expeditions of that our troops would march over ground which have been to a certain extent and would present no great it mapped out difficulties. The Abkhels upbraided the Mishtis for having given in to the Sirkar. and the Mishtis denied this. On war forces the 19th of the month the Mullah Saiad Akbar again like issued his orders. Once our troops crossed it defence.

^\'oulcl be in the heart of tlie tribal . the 21st Madras Pioneers. who had gone down a spur from Gulistan in force that morning on a reconnaissance. and the force returned to Fort Lockhart that evening with no casualties. under Colonel composed of the Northampton Regiment. the machine gun detachment and signallers of the IGth Lancers.000 Punjab coolies was fired on by the enemy. After this the enemy to a rapid continued almost daily to annoy our working parties on the Chagru Kotal road. the 3Gtli Sikhs and . under Brigadier-General Kempster. 8 Mountain Battery Eoyal Artillery. 2 JJerajat Mountain Battery however slightly the retirement vigorously. of very large numbers were disclosed near the village of Dargai. Reports were afterwards brought in that the losses of the tribesmen in this tests of the success of little brush were very heavy. will move from Samana to . one squadron and head-quarters of the 18th Bengal Lancers. if all went well for the Khanki Valley are short. Jhind sepoy severely and one and the only casualties were one wounded. Sappers and 1. which went to prove that the enemy were for the off. and in this instance the rear-guards were left quite unmolested. 4 Company Madras Sappers.( IGO J) country. the Sirmur Sappers. as follows: — "On the 20th October the 3rd Brigade. was close at hand. and Gurkha scouts will advance on Yeatman-Biggs Chaytoi'. No. No. the ranges of hills guarding Tirah on the south being within one march frouj the left bank of the Khanki River. Khorappa in the Khanki Valley under General and on the 21st October a column. On the 11th October a working party on the Chagru Kotal road over the Samana consisting of Pioneers. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery. distances to be traveised from the To follow the actual operations. No. nonce thoroughly beaten On fired the 12th of October a covering party of a half-battalion of the 15th Sikhs and the Jhind Infantry on the north side of the Kotal was on and compelled to withdraw by a force of Gar Orakzai who pressed No. and he quickly brought his guns to bear on the assailants who thereupon retired. successfully covered the withdrawal. nately General whom Fortu- Yeatman-Biggs. with No. the completion of which was essential the expeditionary force. One of the surest an action was whether the troops were followed up during the return to camp. advance of Finally on the 17th October Sir William Lockhart issued orders for the forward movement. 9 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery.

. on the northern another village called Khan.. should for this purpose have the troops of the 2nd Division temporarily under his orders to co-operate with the troops he already had at Shinawtun. and in a more or less northerly direction into the Khanki Valley to Kliorappa. A wing of the Line of Communication troops will advancefrom Shinawari to Khorappa on the same date. though it is difficult to do so clearly. 6 miles distant. who commanded the troops on the Line of Communications.e. to Khorappa. gradually growing less steep. It is necessary here to attempt to exr plain. Division will march from Shinawari to Khorappa. under Brigadierto General Westmacott. falls though narrow. This village is situated on a narrow neck or saddle from which the road runs south to Shinawari. The troops named above. mostly on the northern side of the spur and well under view and fire from the tribesmen. stony and narrow mountain track runs up the spur to Dargai ridge. is Chagru Valley. From Mama Khan. will stand fast at and below that place. This saddle. holding the crest of the plateau. Colonel Chaytor's column advancing from Talai Division. as permanent garrison^ General Yeatman-Biggs accompanies the 3rd Brigade on the 25th. On the 22nd October the 2nd Division to will cross th* Khanki River and move and the 1st Khangirbar and entrench will for the night. and on the same day the remainder of the 2nd i. as also a wing of the Line of Communication troops for the permanent garrison of Khorappa. will advance from Shinawari KHiorappa. . runs down to a village on Chagru Kotal. and at the other end. and improve the road above Yeatman-Biggs. the military geography of the ground which was destined to be the venue of the most important actioa fought during the whole campaign.( ici ) the Talai spur. and it was- arranged that Sir Power Palmer. under General Khorappa. The village of Dargai lies on the northern side of a plateau: and from this plateau a very steep and narrow spur. Or? the 23rd October the 2nd Division advance to the vicinity of Ghandaki and entrench for the night. to Dargai a very steep. to protect the right flank of the 3rd Brigade moving in the Chagru Valley. the 4th Brigade and remaining Divisional troops. a village on the Samana Range west of Chagru KotaL It was now determined to punish these all tribes. into the is a long one. and the 1st Division advance to Khangirbar." It has been mentioned that the working party on the Chagru Kotal road had been repeatedly interfered with by parties of tribesmen coming from the direction of Dargai. after the road side. which on the Chagru Kotal side is almost Mama precipitous and shelves gently away on the western or further aidci.

there were no signs of spurs. there was every chance that the enemy's attention might be distracted and General Kempster's Brigade allowed to execute its advance to some extent unperceived. though the column had started it apparent from the Samana Suk. and also the 3rd Sikhs of the 1st Division. No.( 162 ) South of the Bargai plateau a very high and broken spur trends tously cirrui- down towards Shinawari. but so difficult events for the flank attack to was the country which Brigadier-General Kempster's Brigade advancing to make this turning movement had to traverse. to crown which was almost an impossibility. whence Sir Nor indeed is this to be wondered at. a frontal held. if Presumably was intended that the attack should. the summit of this spur commanding the J>argai ridge and plateau. at develope. The general idea of the operations ordered by Sir William Loekhart was that Brigadier-General Kempster's Brigade and some of the Divisional troops of the 2nd Division. for the crest of the hill along which General Kempster had to advance was a series of precipitous at 4 A. Brigadier-General Westmacott had under his oi'ders two mountain batteries. quite As impossible for even a mountain battery to come into action. that at 12 noon. very few of the enemy were in evidence about the Dargai ridge. the whole under the command should start at 4 A.. Bombay Mountain Battery under .. William Loekhart and his Staff were watching the operations. 9 5 Mountain Battery Eoyal Artillery (. of Sir Power appear ascend this long spur and on the right flank and rear of the Dargai position. 2nd Brigade.M. Brigadier-General Westmacott (commanding the column which was to create the diversion in front for the benefit of General Kempster) decided on making his attack without waiting for Brigadier-General Kempster's flank attack to develope.M. This position had been artificially strengthened by sangars or stoneworks. and many baggage animals carrying ammunition were lost owing to their falling over the So razor-like in sliape were the crests of these hills that it was cliif. lr*almer.Major Rowdy) and No. on the other hand. and cut in on the tribesmen it either in flank frontal all or when wait retreating. from the direction of command of Brigadier-Genearl Chagru Kotal and Mama Khan under the Westmacott were threatened and made strongly demonstrative. it was to be merely demonstrative. and would have to take it in front by the one narrow path approaching it been an almost impossible task if it had been strongly and resolutely attack by another column If.

Thence the Gurkhas. pressed forward to the village of Mama Khan. assistance of the flanking column commanded by General Kempster. they must come under the enemy's About 11 a. advanced slowly along tous hillside. was not. infantry. For this reason then the 36th Sikhs were })art not able either on the 18th or again on the 20th to take operations against Dargai. and the guns. till line.M. led by their Colonel forty yards ahead of everybody else. on The 800 yards start the -ously. Borderers. About path the is 9 A. and in advancing beyond which fire. were rapidly decreasing the distance between to themselves and the summit simultaneGurkhas and straining every nerve Gurkhas had. for the contingency might arise that Fort Lockhart itself would be attacked if all the garrison except the half-battalion 2-2nd Gurklias were withdrawn. and the six companies Northampton Regiment in fir they reached a saddle with a few trees on it about half- way between Mama Khan and opened fire Dargai. with the exception of two companies Northampton in small Regiment. and fired a The few shots at 9-30 on the infantry now in and behind Mama Khan village. covered from the rear by infantry fire and forming up whereever any dead ground gave them breathing time for a fresh advance. which had temporarily ceased joined in again. reach the . in the second line. the two mountain batteries opened fire on the Dargai ridge and on the point more especially where the precipitous seen to cross the ridge. in the Thus with three battalions and two Moun- tain Batteries Royal Artillery at his disposal the task lay before General Westmacott of capturing the Dargai I'idge. the infantry fire. also the King's Own Scottish Rifles. with the possible. the Northregi- ampton Regiment and the l-3rd Gurkha The remaining ment of Brigadier-General Westraacott's Brigade. the l-3rd Gurkhas leading. covered by the ground and avoiding the path which the precipi- lay on the enemy's side of the spur. at a range of about 1. butin these precipitous regions far from certain.( 163 ) Captiiin de Butts. advanced by rushes from one coign of vantage to another.m. from here. the 36th Sikhs (who had recently come prominently under notice for their gallant defence of Fort Gulistan under Major DesVoeux and their equally gallant though unsuccessful defence of FortSaragheri) were retained for the day at Fort Lockhart. whilst infantry.800 yards . who remained as escort to the guns. The King's Own Scottish Borderers meanwhile. however. the King's Own Scottish Bor- derers in second third line. The enemy meanwhile appeared num- bers gradually increasing from the direction of Dargai village.

for all the troops below knew have been assembled numbers behind the crest. l-3rd Gurkhas. It was was crowned. cai-ried out. not off awaiting the assault. was seen slowly advancing with enormous cott's difficulty. District Staff Officer. crest.m. and the enem}^. General Kempster's Column joined General Weatmacott's Column on Dargai height about 3-10 face of this opposition this turning p. This turning movement in the teeth of a powerful foe moreover was so cleverly was executed that only two or three casualties (among the l-2nd Gurkhas) occurred throughout the whole march to Dargai. and the Narik Suk which dominates the Dargai village about 12 noon when the Dargai crest and ridge. revolver in hand. . seen to be rapidly ascending in single file the I'ough stair-case (rather than path) leading up over the regiment and the King's This Indian file crest. crowned. Dargai village was soon hill. at their head. though hidden by intervening heights from the view of General Westmacott. assault was magnificently oflFered little and although as a matter of fact the enemy or no resistance at the last moment. having had in the meantime to beat oiF an attack of several thousands of the enemy. and its fortifications destroyed. they miyht in large ceased. and undoubtedly it movement which. and 1 killed and 5 Borderers. while the remainder of the Own Scottish Borderers followed close behind. ster's force But General Kempthe day had more work cut out for it before was over. had just begun to clear when Brigadier-General WestmaScottish Kempster's Column with Sir Power Palmer.( 164 ) such ground and with soldiere so accustomed to hill warfare as the Gurkhas. that it send back to Shinawari every mule and retain only dhooly-h^divevs and stretchers. in flames. The advance in the was splendidly carried out. the enemy having lost heart as General Kempster swept slowly but irresistibly onwards.. were . nevertheless made the way easy for the charge of his 3rd Gurkhas. The losses sustained by General Column in the direct attack were 2 killed and 14 wounded in the l-3rd Gurkhas. But no such the Gurkhas and the position was gallantly carried. easily regained and before they could quite catch them up the leading Gurkha company. with Liuetenant Beynon. wounded in the King's Own So difficult was the country over which General Kempster's force had been found necessary to had had to advance. and as soon as the artillery fire which it would necessarily do as the infantry approached the fire they might have poured in such a file as to render any approach fear daunted in single an absolute impossibility.

added to which the troops were without water.( 165 ) Just as he began to make arrangements for returning to Shina- wari via Chagru Kotal. on the other hand. As the abandonment of Dargai. and after Chagru Kotal the return to Shinawari was pracBut unfortunately during the preceding stage in tically unmolested. The return to Shinawari vid Chagru Kotal in the face of such overwhelming numbers. without food and without warm clothes. But seeing that to Sir the position.000 Afridis from the Khaniii Valley and thereupon halted and faced about. that the enemy did not dare to press au attack home. was a most diflBcult and dangerous operation: but so well conceived were General Kempster's dispostions. it was certainly very unfortunate that when it captured on the 18th October could not be retained. and must have suflfered severely if they had bivouacked for the night unfed and unprotected on the inclement heights. These two corps were covering had the retirement and hence their heavy losses. abandon the position meant that it would have again two days later when the main advance force to be taken all over of the expeditionary was to take place. the retirement —in coming down the hill between Dargai and Chagru enemy swarming on the heights above. were hurrying up from the Khanki Valley. as already stated. it is as well to give here. The 3rd Sikhs also 1 wounded and the l-2nd Gurkhas 1 killed and 4 wounded. with the Sikhs had 3 killed and 11 wounded. has been severely commented upon by some military critics. while the 15th Kotal—the losses. so admirable the manner in which the troops. carried them out. following the lead of General Westmacott. after it had once been captured. the enemy had been so severely punished that they had not the courage to attempt to follow up the column when General Kemspter. attracted by the sound of the firing. L. and not a shot was fired on the rear-guard. marched back to Head-quarters. Pears and 14 men wounded. Jennings-Bramly were killed and Lieutenant M. It is but fair however to quote. the retreating enemy receved reinforcements of about 8. But. the words of the . for what they may be worth. D. and so great the assistance afforded by the mountain artillery both from Chagru Kotal and the Samana Suk. both British and native. the reasons suggested why Power Palmer did not deem it advisable to retain possession of Very large numbers of Afridis. even at the risk of repetition. even in response to a farewell volley from the troops. considerable: the Gordons had Major R. with darkness growing rapidly.

and the bravely- won heights Avho. of Dargai were abandoned for the time to the enemy though thoroughly beaten." Retirement then on Shinawari md the Chagru Kotal was ordered. were clever enough to perceive what it a splendid stroke would be to return at once to the occupation of this really impregnable position in stronger force than ever. firewood and supplies for tired troops at a height of over 6. it if this was true regard to the European applied with still greater force to the sepoys. and so re-impose awful slopes upon our troops the heavy task of once again scaling those in the face of a deadly hailstorm of bullets. clothing.000 feet are an absolute necessity. .( 166 ) Pioneer's Special Correspondent at J)argai : — " Great in as the ' tactical and strategical advantage of such a retention would have been. and troops.

has i^eal been questioned by some military necessity to men whether there was any take Dargai at all . published as an Appendix. via Chagru Kotal to Khorappa.( 167 ) CHAPTER THE RE-CAPTURE OF DARGAI IX. It was in the execution of this order that the memorable capture of the Dargai heights was carried out for which has sucit the second time. the frontal attack remembered that when Dargai was captured.scribe it) on the west by the Dargai ridge and the Narik Suk. though fortunately they did not " know William Lockliart's own opiniou on this point will be found expressed in bia Despatches.000 yards. or at least whether the tactical dis- advantage of allowing the enemy to remain in occupation of the crest could possibly have led to such a sad crop of casualties as the Gordon road Highlanders. Consequently the tribesmen holding the ridge were enabled. two days by General Westmacott's Brigade had been more or less combined with a turning movement by General It will be Kempster's Brigade. and the argument which has been raised is that with a well-posted flank defence on the Samana Suk no mere musketry fire at such a range upon troops marching heedless of it through the valley below could have been so destructive as the point blank volleys which the enemy poured out at distances up to 300 yards when Dargai crest was assaulted. — GALLANTRY On by the 20th October General Yeatman-Biggs was instructed afresh Sir William Lockhart to advance with the 2nd Division. previously. OF THE GORDONS. and tend) or this valley dominated " (as some con- "overlooked from a distance others prefer to de. the Dorsetshires. but on the present occasion only a frontal attack from Chagru Kotal was made. the 2nd Gurkhas and the 3rd Sikhs suffered in attacking an (Sir all but impregnable position. varying from about 3. In the calm and critical I'eflection ceeded the first outbursts of enthusiasm at this fine feat of arms. Sir .* The from Shinawari William Lockhart's advance base " absolutely " (as in the Miranzai valley of Valley) to Khorappa on the Khanki River runs through the is Chagru Kotal. and that along almost the identical route which General Westmacott had followed. in the Khanki Valley. The musketry range so far as tribal molestation was concerned was certainly a very long one.000 up to about 1. consisting of the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Kempster and the 4th Brigade under Brigadier-General Westmacott.

to give all their attention to this one slope which owing to the rugf- gedneas of the ground could not be properly ascended in regular formation by assaulting parties. They had additional reason to be plucky. thus weakening their powers of resistance against the frontal attack— the only attack actually delivered. however. Major Bewicke-Copley and Mr. but had to be assailants best could. and this of course ensured the " secret " being carried It was evident all through the to the tribal forces crowning Dargai. and they were almost entirely protected from our guns by rocks. as large numbei's of the foe were visible from the Samana Suk awaitinor attack far away on the right flank. nearly 200 Officers and men being either killed or wounded within six hours. atten- tion on the holding of Dargai from the Chagru Kotal so But by a very fortunate circumstance happened that they had been led to tactics of the 18th October. for they had misconon the strued the abandonment of Dargai after capture 18th is of October : frontier men habitually regard any movement which as not in the nature of a direct advance an acknowledgment of defeat. apprehend a repetition of Sir Power Palmer's and under this belief felt obliged to make preparations for a flank attack. and on finding the enemy in strength on Dargai ridge. had told some pretended who were really the enemy's spies.m. on the 20th October. and this division of forces greatly lightened the otherwise almost impossible task of taking the crest direct from Chagru Kotal. its The tribesmen.^tics adopted by General Yeatm«nBiggs.* Serious as the casualties were. were in a fine fighting mood and full of valour.( 1C8 ) tt. subsequent fighting that such a turning movement was seriously apprehended.000. gave Brigadier-General Kempster the simple but weightly order to * It will be seen from the Official Despatches published at the end of this Volume that Sir Williairi Lockhart criticises unfavourably the ta. where two days previously General Kempster's Brigade had appeared. Donald. scrambled over as the In the result the action was the severest ever fought on the north-west frontier since the Ambela Campaign. and moreover affirms that they were not in accordance with his expresaed wishes. they might have been still heavier if the whole of the enemy had concentrated it their undivided side. friendlies. which indeed was the reason why the position could not be captured otherwise than by a hand-to-hand assault. General Yeatman-Biggs marched out of Shinawari at 4-30 a. as a dead secret that an attack on the right flank of Dargai village formed a certian part of General Yeatman-Biggs^g plan of operations. Political Officer. . for their aggregate strength on this occasion was computed at 20.

by the Northamptonshire Regiment. the Derbj shire Regiment (from the First Division) in reserve. and at 10 a.M. our guns responded. It originally intended that the Gordons should take a leading assaulting party part in the assault. 8 Mountain Battery at 1. the infantry opened were repeatedly seen bursting just over the Dargai fire.m. was shot dead. Every rifle fi-om the crest above was promptly aimed at the daring band and 30 men fell dead or wounded. Lieutenant Tillard and his scouts and the wing of the 2nd Gurkhas. continuing at work almost incessantly up to 2 p. the enemy opened fire from the ridge.300 yards and their shells crest. and further advance was impossible until the artillery could inflict greater damage upon the enemy and shake their position. their bodies of course having to be left on the ground. which was 3. and the task at assist the first allotted to them was to by long-range volleys from Mama Khan. and these stage. and troops to reinforce them. afterwards. Mountain Battery and the 3rd Sikhs (from the First Division). by No. and a few minutes later the leading wing of the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas succeeded in reaching a wooded spur half-way between Mama Khan and Dargai. on which the watchful enemy was pi'epared to direct an all-exterminating fire at about 300 yards range. Attached to the 2nd Gurkhas and keeping pace with the foremost companies were Lieutenant Tillard and his scouts of the 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas. the right wing of the 2nd Gurkhas followed suit shortly it was here that Major Judge." General Kenipster at once attacked the ridge with the Isb Battalion 2nd Gurkhas iu advance. was not and the Gordon Highlanders with the maxim guns in rear.800 yards. The Gurkhas were now protected by cover again but for additional . men played a The upward route beyond the wooded spur sheltering the advanced wing of the 2nd Gurkhas ran across a bare prominent part at this slope about 100 yards in extent. At 10-30 a. and by No. Not to be outdone. The guns on the Samana Suk had the exact range.( 169 ) *' take the position. now that the enemy realised that the ad- vance over what was with stern truth termed the "death-zone" . led by Lieutenant-Colonel Travers. Beyond this the enemy's fire was most deadly. Captain Norie (Adj utant) and Captains Macintyre and Bower (attached) dashed out from shelter and made a desperate rush across the exposed slope for the next bit of cover.m. however.m. left Nothing daunted. Fuither support was accorded to the advance by No. Kohat At 9-30 A. the Dorsetshire Regiment in support. 9 1 Mountain Battery well posted on the Samana Suk.






seriously begun,

was doubly


and was


long vainly

attempted, both by the Dorsetsbires and the Derbyshires. Captain W. R. Arnold of the Dorsetshires was seen by the Gurkhas in
front suddenly to spring up, and calling out heroically

Come on

*E' Company !" he fell, dangerously wounded. Lieutenant Hewitt of the same regiment, undismayed by the slaughter he had witnessed, led a whole company forward and every man dropped in his tracks
dead or wounded, he alone

the whole

company getting

across to

elbow being just grazed by a

Occasionally after

that single

men from both

the Derbyshires and the Dorsetshires

ran the terrible gauntlet

but for either regiment to advance in a
to deliver


for the

purpose of helping the 2nd Gurkhas


was an impossiblity until the guns had played with better effect on the position, and until further strong reinforcements were available. Meanwhile the situation was becoming serious. For more than two hours onlookers below and from the adjacent heights anxiously
final assault

contemplated the probability of a retirement, and all that such an event would mean and the later the hour grew the more urgent it


to bring the action to a

speedy end by a successful coup de main.

was then that the Gordon Highlanders and the 3rd Sikhs were

ordered up, and

was arranged that

for three

minutes before they

advanced over the exposed slope eveiy gun
should pour a hot
on to the ridge.

— there

were 24 in



the proper signal a terrible

fusillade was thundered out by the artillery, and when the mighty roar had subsided the Commandant of the Gordon Highlanders, Colonel H. H. Mathias, turning with a glowing face to his regiment, addressed to them

an impassioned voice, a speech that has since been echoed and re-echoed throughout the length and breadth of the British Empire, a speech " The General says the position that thrilled every man who heard it

must be taken

at all costs.

The Gordon Highlanders will take



Cheering wildly, and with the pipers lustily playing the slogan, the brave Highlanders, hesitating not a single moment, dashed forward en Colonel, the masse across the fatal slope, led with splendid energy by the

Adjutant and the Sergeant-Major at the head of the regiment, and Major Downman at the head of the leading company. A single example will Lieutenant fire. suffice to show how terribly deadly was the enemy's Dincfwall of the Gordons was hit on his revolver, the impact knocking

him down.

Springing to his feet again he was hit on his ammunition
exploding the
cartridges inside.

the blow







immediately afterwards went through his
he was twice hit on the knee.


and the next moment

Lieutenant Lamont was shot dead,

Major Macbean was dangerously wounded, and Major Donovan was twice hit on the hehiiet. Two pipers were killed and tliree others wounded. One hero, Piper Fiudlater, was knocked over by a Dum Dum
bullet which shattered the bone of his leg, yet he sat up on the ground and played on until a second bullet came and he could play no longer. For this fine exhibition of pluck the piper was subsequently awarded

the Victoria Cross.


3 P.M. the Gordons had gained a sheltered position at the foot

of the last

and after recovering themselves were ready
final assault.



with the 2nd Gurkhas in climbing the precipitous path ahead for the
purpose of delivering the

Led by

their OflScers

and again

loudly cheering, the two regiments, with the few daring soldiers of the

Derbyshire and Dorsetshire Regiments who had managed to get across the exposed slope, advanced indiscriminately in a procession the narrow

path or saddle admitted of no other order.

But the moral

effect of


advance across the death-zone had been too much for the enemy,


had already begun

to slacken,

and when at 3-10 p.m.
would not

this final

assault was


the beaten tribesmen

face the onrushing

procession, but turned tail

and fled precipitately down the



hours the enemy had offered a most stubborn resistance, during the
latter half of the time amhiguo Marte,
brilliant termination

was intense.

and the relief at this sudden and But great as is the honor due to

the Gordon Highlanders and the 2nd Gurkhas,

has to be said in

the other assaulting troops

that until a few


Gordon Highlanders' advance the enemy's position had not yet been sufficiently shaken by artillery fire. Moreover, at the precise moment when the Gordons rushed forward an overwhelming volley of shells was poured on to the Dargai crest by the guns, which to some extent must have interfered with the enemy's fire. The personal gallantry of Colonel Mathias was subsequently rewarded by the bestowal
before the
of the Victoria Cross.

The casualty list was a sadly wounded amounting altogether to

heaivy one, the


of killed


four Officers and 34



five Officers

and 157 men wounded.


Officers killed

Captain C. B. .Judge, 2nd Gurkhas;



and Captain W.

Lieutenant A. Lamont, Gordon E. C. Smith, Derbyshire Regiment. The

( Officers



wounded were Captain

G. Kobinson, 2nd Gnrkhas (dancjer;

ously)*; Captain

H. T. Arnold, Dorsetshire Regiment Major F. Macbean and Lieutenant K. Dingwall, Gordon Highlanders and Lieutenant G. E. White, 3rd Sikhs (all seriously) Colonel H. H. Mathias, Captain


P. Uniacke, Lieutenant



Crawford, Gordon Highlanders

M. Meiklejohn, and Lieutenant G. S. G. The distribution of the (all slightly).

among the non-commissioned officers and men was as follows wounded Gordon Highlanders, 2 killed and 35 wounded Derbyshire Regiment, 4 killed and 8 wounded; 2nd Gurkhas, 16 killed and 49 wounded 3rd Sikhs, 2 killed and 16 wounded 3rd Gurkhas, 2 killed and 9 wounded.
Dorsetshire Eegiment, 8 killed, 38





be mentioned here that the late Captain Charles Bellew

Judge, of the 2nd (Prince of Wales's

merly attached

to the Leinster

Own) Gurkha Regiment, was forRegiment and was appointed to the Indian

Corps in 1881.

He was

Brigade Transport Officer in the expedition

against the Hazaras in 1888, being present at the battle of Kotkai, and
for his gallantry on that occasion

was mentioned

in despatches.



served in the Manipur Expedition of 1891.



Captain William


Clifton Smith, of the Derbyshire Regiment, entered the



1889. He joined the 1st Battalion, and on his return from employment with the Royal Niger Company was posted to the 2nd Battalion which

had already been

in India since 1882.



Lieutenant Alexander
after being educated

of the Gordons,

was born

in 1872,


Eton joined the Gordons three years and a half ago. He was the second son of Mr. James Lamont of Knockdow, Argyllshire, D. L., and formerly M. P. for the County of Bute. He came of a warlike race,


of his ancestors falling

and Waterloo.

by land and sea, at Seringapatam, Trafalgar, Major Forbes Macbean, who was wounded, served with

the 92nd through the Afghan



War He

of 1879-80,

and participated



also took part in the


Lieutenant Kenneth Dingwall (wounded) joined the 92nd in 1891, and served with the Chitral Relief Force in 1895, and was among the

storming party who took the Malakand Pass in that year.
a medal and clasp for his services.




for the

retired in confusion

enemy they were completely driven from the hills, and down to the Khanki River, thus leaving the road

through the Chagru Kotal open for the further advance to Khorappa.

Died three days







was too

late in tlip


for the 2n(l Division with its bao^gage for the

train to

move forward, and General Yeatman-Biggs bivouacked

night on the captured position.

The next morning the Division marched on


Khorappa unopposed

together with the Northamptons, the 36th Sikhs and No. 9 Mountain

Battery Royal Artillery, and pitched camp about a mile short of the











the re-capture of Dargai on the 20th October Sir

hart lost no time in pushing forward, his aim being to give the

WiUiam LockAf ridis

and Orakzai no breathing time. Accordingly on the morning following the action, the 2nd Division continued its march across Ohagru Kotal in the direction of Khorappa. The King's Own Scottish Borderers, the Dorsetshires and the .Thind Infantry were left behind at Dargai and about the kotal in case of any further hostile demonstration from the
Sir William Lockhart himself, with the troops remaining on the Samana, followed the 2nd Division down to Khorappa, tliere to establish his head-quarters within gunshot of the Khanki Eiver, across which

the main body of the enemy had retired.


the night of the 21st October the

new camp


Khorappa was

from across the river by about 8,000 of the enemy, carrying 15 standards but a few rounds from the guns put an end to the fusillade, which was rather fortunate as there had not yet been time enough to
fired into

prepare proper cover. On the night of 22nd there was more firing into camp, and again on the 23rd to a smaller extent, but the damage was

among animals. The 25th was a very bad night. Firing camp began about 5 p.m., and continued more or less without intermission till 10 P.M. Bullets were whistling everywhere, and there were

some extraordinary


but unfortunately also a great many casualsent a foraging party out that morning,


1st Division



though they obtained a good deal of forage, the enemy lined the heights
above them as they returned, and some thirteen casualties occurred. Later in the evening there were some 24 sniping casualties among the
1st Division,

and 10 among the 2nd


Captain F. F. Badcock

(District Staff Officer, 5th Gurkhas), Field Intelligence Officer,



arm had unfortunately on the left elbow while sitting at dinner and Badcock was wounded on to be amputated. Curiously enough, Captain the same arm at the storming of Nilt Fort in the Hunza Nagar Expedition where he showed great gallantry in leading a party of the

5th Gurkhas after the gate of the fort had been blown in by Captain


Lieutenant Croker (Munster Fusiliers), Orderly Officer to

Brigadier-General Kempster, was hit on the right shoulder, also





at dinner, but not seriously injured.

Sir William Lockliart himself


a narrow escape, for barely had some tent as a protection,

gram bags been placed round

when two

bullets whizzed through the canvas


were buried in the grain.
British soldier


the morning of the 26th October a


yards from the camp.
cognisable, but

to pieces a few hundred They were so slashed about as to be quite unrewas presumed they had been detained till late on the

six followers

were found cut

Chagru Kotal road and had
11,200, followers 17,000,

tried to

get into


after dark.


approximate number of troops in camp was

— British
now on


and the animals numbered


Tribal attention was plainly concentrated

the defence of

Sampagha Pass, for contrary to expectation no attacks had been made on the long Line of Communication from Kohat to Shinawari,
there had been on hostile demonstration in the direction of the
Valley, while on the Peshawar frontier General




leaders to

Kurram Hammond's Column had any great gathering beyond Bara. The Khyber also lay and the Zakka Khel, who had been told off by the Afridi watch the road from Jamrud to Ali Musjid, had not apThe flower
of the

parently mustered in force.

Afridi fighting


were assembled with the Orakzai to defend Tirah against the main attack, and small contingents only could be spared to guard the Bara

and Bazar Valleys against possible flank



the evening of the 27th October the order was issued for a

further advance from Khorappa, and a very welcome order

was, for

everyone was tired of the long wait at that place, and the camp, with its thousands of men and animals was not so salubrious a spot as to
invite a longer stay. The water-supply was particularly bad the only procurable water ran through a number of paddy-fields— throuo-h

promised to be a snipe jkeel—cind was But so great had been the difficulties of transport along the road from Shinawari to Khorappa, that it was only on the 27th that the Commissariat godowns were able to supply


in fact sooner or

muddy and

dirty in consequence.

the indents for three days' reserve rations for

men and two

days' for

less, to

one, some four miles or a place called Ghandaki, higher up the Khanki Valley and in the direction of the Sampagha Pass. To ensure that this move should not be molested from the right fii,nk, the Northampton Regiment and 36th

The move on the 28th was only a short

commanding the 1st Gurkhas. hill Colonel and found the unoccu- The sudden start had very probably surprised the enemy. of the made later in the day to the foot of the The enemy were seen in large numbers on the hills to range and also on the spurs of the Colonel Sage. for there was every indication that the hill had been recently occupied. under Colonel Chatyor.m. on the 29th September and was followed by the other brigades artillery position at short intervals. huge camp. The rethis brigade maining battalion of Dargai. commanding the former regiment. and the column as it moved up was fired into from an adjoining eminence. was once again adopted. and consisted in the 2nd Brigade (General Gaselee's) followed by the 4th Brigade (General Westmacott's) with the 3rd Brigade (General Kempster's) behind it making a left flank. A reconnaissance was itself. while the 1st Brigade (General Hart's) sent one battalion to cover the of General battalion to cover the right flank. very different and left. but there were no other casualties. dii'ect attack . followed by the artillery of the 1st and 2nd Divisions. and their diswas mainly designed to guard against this as much as possible. so as to avoid being outflanked at the beginning of the action. position They evidently feared a turning movement. were new camp. fight- ing behind stone bi'east-works with a line of retreat open. into the a. (the 30th Punjab Infantry) was at The 1st Brigade. and from which doubtless many sent to seize a high hill overlooking the route and the men had descended towards dusk to fire Chaytoi-'s two regiments moved off at 5 pied. and only awaited daybreak.( 176 ) Sikhs.m. on the top of which large numbers of the enemy had been visible the day before and on previous days. and another The 3rd and remaining battalion hill Hart's Bri- gade seized a opposite the pass as an artillery position. naturally a strong position. how- from anything the enemy expected. to the right Hence they had nangared the spurs pass would have become untenable. acted as escort to the guns. The hill destined for the first was seized without opposition by the Derbyshire Regiment of Brigadier-General Hart's Brigade. while the Devonshire . the east and was severely wounded during the reconnaissance. and held itself in readiness to support either of the two battalions on the flanks which might require assistance. Sampagha Pass summit west. left camp at 5 a. in which case the The real plan of attack was. ever. in a position to deliver their attack The troops were now Sampagha. and their upon the The Afridis and Orakzai had favourite method of defence.

guarding the right flank. and the moral effect that the enemy were prevented both un- from lining the crest infantry advance to oppose the infantry advance. despite a wound in the arm received eai'ly in the advance. the Yorkshire Regiment on the right centre. very greatly facilitated the and diminished the infantry losses. and which formed a sort of " advanced post " to the enemy's position. left centre. Brigadier-General Spragge. they remained in temporary reserve.— ( 177 ) Begiment worked Mishti. which the 2nd Brigade was assaulting. batteries of which were A portion of the artillery — the whole came into action commanded by Brigadier-General Spragge about 7-30 a. the physical efifect of the guns in the actual destruction of sangars. and though they thoroughly accomplished the protection took but little the flanks of the main column. under Lieutenant-Colonel Purdy. and the 2-lst Gurkhas on the left flank made for Kandi of The two regiments on the flanks had very difficult ground to part in six work over. but the Queen's (commanded by Major Hanford-Flood who. persisted in going on) of were the the off to first to crown the crest. as soon as he saw that the 2nd Brigade were advancing against the hill on which the large sangar was situated. Division under Lieutenant-Colonel Duthy. the 3rd Sikhs and the Yorkshire Regiment. on which the enemy could resulted from the of casualties Although owing to the steep reverse slopes shelter themselves. and here. and the 3-4th Gurkhas pressed up a hill to the left. viz. as there was neither sufficient room nor objective its for the other three batteries under Lieutenant-Colonel Purdy. at once sent on his other brigade of division of artillery. advance in line of regiments : the 3rd Sikhs on the right. for the preparation of the infantry assault already described. The two regiments on the right line. from which some of the while of the other two regiments the Queen's enemy were firing. As the 2nd . their way up by a village called Nazeno. no great number in artillery fire. and the 2-4th Gurkhas on the left flank All these regiments had very precipitous ground to work over. This advance of the 2nd Brigade of General Symon's Division had been well prepared by the artillery.. were doubtedly great..m. and very eff"ectually shelled while. were then sent hill crown a on the right of the pass. The 2nd Brigade meanwhile began the Queen's on the of all. as at Dargai. fired on a large sangar cover- ing the road to the pass. practice against the This brigade division of artillery made beautiful main ridge. remained about the summit of the pass (which was taken about 9-45). and perhaps some regiments encountered greater difficulty than others. when the three batteries of the Ist it. they necessarily whatever fighting there was.

Captain De Butts was home from a very well known mountain indeed. and whatever casualties wounded were successfully removed. The 3rd Brigade (Brigadier-General Kempster's) had pressed along hard after all efforts arrived too late to take any part and was now sent on almost immediately down into the Mastura Valley. 1 Mountain The losses in the 2nd crest. to a hill on the right. Sampagha Pass were 1 killed and 14 wounded. the top of the pass. had fired of fodder at the stock many of the villages. however. The 3rd Sikhs and the Yorkofif. were sent as already stated. 5 to Bombay Mountain Battery In the top of the pass to assist in finally clearing the anngars. and was invalided rejoined He made however a wonderful recovery. pass. The 4th Brigade (Brigadier-General Westmacott's) had meanwhile been supporting the 2nd Brigade. he commanded the same battery in there very ill the late Suakim Expedition. the killed and little resistance. when they reached of the top of the pass. assisted by long-range volleys from the King's fire of Own Scottish Borderers and by the very accurate two guns of No. The The enemy on the total casualties in the whole force were about 24. and the trained scouts of the 3rd and supported the by two companies large the Queen's. worked up a spur between 3i'd Sikhs. So precipitate was their retreat. and had only lately his battery. No sooner had the troops reached the top of the pass than fires were seen at many of the villages down in the valley below on the road to the Arhanga Pass the enemy. of which the Queen's lost 1 killed and 7 wounded. battery officer. rounding a corner in order to get this battery into action Captain De Butts was killed: he was struck by a bullet in the stomach. and the 36th Sikhs. Two guns of this battery under Lieutenant Edlto get into position near mann managed Artillery. commanding a road over the 5th Gurkhas. that the destruction of the fodder was far from successfully .( ns ) Brigade was seen to be nearing the crest of the main position. Yorkshire Regiment and the and "contained" or held back a number of the enemy who were trying to get down to the pass. 9 Mountain Battery Royal which had also been pushed on came into action at the highest point of the road and managed to shell the last sangar held by the enemy at a range shire Regiment. but despite in the action. crowned the Brigade in the taking of the whole had really offered but they had. and did excellent service. of 900 yards. whilst two guns of No. Battery Royal Artillery. and death was almost instantaneous. and arrived on the crest. with a view to hindering the 2nd Brigade. Brigadier-General Spragge sent forward No. : the advance by creating difficulties of food supply.

where the block on the narrow road was enormous and in the evening .. and in the case of the Dorset Regiment and the Gordon Highlanders. day the baggage began from the Sampagha Pass. the King's hill Own Scottish of some 1. except paklial mules. except Kuki Khels. and his prediction proved absolutely correct. Orakzai in times of of the Tirah Field Force both divisions Mastura Valley where the peace have their permanent head-quarters. v/ho has a most intimate knowledge of these tribesmen and their ways. did not assist at all in the defence of the their Pass. Arhanga Pass the The Arhanga Pass leads direct from the Mastui-a Valley into Maidan summer home of the Afridis.. and with the usual towers and walled enclosures. the block being hopeless for that day. at the Mastura The two divisions remained the next day (the 30th) Camp. and the corps who were without their baggage were doubtless prepared for same day on which an action had been fought that eventuality. or because they had quarrelled with the Orakzai as to the disposition of the force in the pass. Donald. and any warm clothing but with nothing to eat except what they had carried with them in their havresacks.m. and heavier articles of i. 3rd. The order of advance was 4th. oi'ders were issued postponing the further advance of the troops and the attack on the until the next day. ous homesteads of The Mastura is a fine wide valley. predicted the night before the attack that not m. even great-coats and blankets.( 179 ) accomplished. and very ample quantities remained. the The Afridis. along a bad mountain track on the in the morning (thus delaying the start of the baggage) was an obvious impossibility. and offered 4th Brigade threw Borderers.ore than about 500 the pass. many corps were without these and had to spend a bitterly cold night. Un- after the capture of the pass.e. Mr. the Political Officer with the 2nd Division. beginning at 6 a. : 2nd and 1st Brigades in the sequence named. men would hold very few indeed in number. The same evening.200 vards from the centre . The forward a regiment. and seized a conical little if The enemy were any resistance. moved down into the fortunately the baggage of the troops. with good All this to slowly trickle in outhouses. without anything in the shape of tents equipment. with numersolidly built two or three storied houses. following in rear of the cloumn. not only without all cases could not follow them in the same day. Of course to pass two divisions with their obligatory mules even. either because they deemed the attack on Sampagha own country so imminent that they could spare no time to assist their allies. all baggage animals.

with the trained scouts of the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas on their right. was the more gratifying. lay before Sir William Lockhart. and the 2-4th Gurkhas were in first line. else . Their impotence to bar the advance of such a force as the Government had sent against them.000 tribesmen in arms. but as there were at least 30. The order of advance of this brigade which practically took the posi( — tion by itself. line. while the 2nd Brigade Brigadier-General Gaselee's). the Yorkshire Regiment just winning on the post. We may at take advantage of the long delay which once again occurred Maidan in bringing up stores from the Samana base. wounded by a stray regiment was supporting the King's Own Scottish Borderers in the 4th After the Arhanga Pass had been crossed the valleys of Maidan and Rajgul in Tirah.( ^80 ) the pass. The 3rd Brigade (Brigadier-General Kempster's) then made a demonstrative movement to the left. and on to this hill Brigadier-General Spragge brought to play the three batteries of the 2nd Division. was now probably to be as clear to the tribesmen as to anybody and the only question was whether they announced by Sir would frankly accept at once the terms soon tige William Lockhart. The ease with which the Afridis had ousted from positions vaunted as virtually impregnable. and the total casualties were only five. the summer quarters of the Afridis. made a flank attack on the right with a view to seizing a hill commanding the pass from the east. so weak was the resistance — was that the Yorkshire Kegiment. of the 36th Sikhs. accompanied by General Symons. having lifted the purdah from Tirah in four days from the time of leaving in the Khorappa been Khanki Valley. The latter course they well knew could only bring severe punishment upon their country. under Lieutenant-Colonel Purdy. the more fiery of the tribal leaders could not be expected to see the necessity of submitting on the spot without striking a further blow. with the 3rd Sikhs in the second line and the Queen's in the third There was a great race up the hillside between the Yorkshire Regiment and the 2-4th Gurkhas. or attempt to partially preserve their military pres- among the frontier tribes by avoiding a regular action and main- taining a guerilla warfare. and these he now proceeded to enter. The enemy fired amongst whom shot as his was Captain Searle Brigade. in order to take a view of the country in which Sir William Lockhart had now established . very few shots. as the experience at the Chagru Kotal had been thought by some of India to foreshadow stubborn resistance throughout the campaign.

no doubt more would remain. is known as the Shilober. occupied by the Zakka Khels from the east the Manakass. The valley is well drained by three or four that to the west. where the Malikdin Khel hamlets large watercourses : stand.. peach. and the Kahudara. nights were not so cold as in the Mastura "Valley. a wide basin fir surrounded by steep trees. just traversed. In a warm winter. walnuts and other comestibles found in the houses showed that the rapid advance of our troops had rather taken the Afridis by surprise. probably not its more than if one-fifth of summer inhabitants. and the whole situation of the troops was greatly improved. Tirah or Maidan Valley. is also applied to the entire stream after the others have joined : the Sherdara. with large areas of fairly flat ground is with deep nw/^a^s between them.0U0 feet. crowned in places on the north side with but there are no forests of trees either in the valley or on the The valley is quite open. or troubles were appre- hended towards Peshawar.000 to 9. But the numerous fowls. surrounded by forest-covered mountains rising from 8. occupied by the Kambar Khels. after which the united stream receives the name of the Bara . : There were numerous homesteads rather than villages everywhere these homesteads generally consisted of a tower and two or tln-ee double or three storied houses surrounded by smaller buildings and outhouses and with many walnut. the country must be very is In the hot weather the central valley no doubt densely populated. enters a narrow rocky gorge three miles long commanded by heights rising one tliousand feet above it on either side. viz. geographically. then joins the Eajgul stream at Dwatoi. which. which the two divisions of the Tirah lies in Field Force reached on the night of the 31st October. but it was easy to see that in the spring or beautiful. the banks of the stream were found to be honeycombed It was difficulty to ascertain how many Afridis with cave-dwellings. hills. stay during the winter in Maidan. from the point of view of camp comfort. Autumn was summer well advanced. the whole valley well cultivated and very fertile. hills. honey. the torrent flows through open country for two or three miles. Tirah tions is Regarded thus described in Records of Frontier Expedi- (Paget and Mason) :— " Maidan is a circular valley or basin. The water-supply was good the . leaving Maidan. about ten miles in diameter. apricot. occupied by some families of the Jowaki and Ashu Khel sections of the Adam Khels.( 181 ) himself. which name it. They were full of grain and fodder. cherry and other trees round them. though in some cases the fodder had been burnt before the troops arrived. After emerging from this defile. These converge from the Shilober Toi. bowls of ata.

and their hamlets lie near the stream in the Temporary sheds are erected by the shepherds among wooded the pine forests which clothe the surrounding mountains.000 feet. 8. November 1st. and the l-3rd Gurkhas lost one sepoy killed and two severely and one slightly The Afridis were seen hills to .000 feet in elevation. the night of the arrival of the troops. The next morning. The ordinary baggage moved through the Arhanga Pass more quickly than it had done over the Sampagha Pass. is On the south Rajgul separated from Maidan by a steep. its elevation being probably over 5. was severely wounded in . off Own Scottish Borderers. and two wounded. and in time the whole road from Khorappa was made practicable for camels.— ( 182 ) Eiver. King's wounded. Lieutenant E. G. but some 71 Jeypore ponies and some 200 kits were carried off. through difficult country overrun with daring in Afridi skirmishers. there was for a long time no occurrence in Tirah to give to the expedition the outward semblance of activity. Part of the baggage belonging to the tribesmen fired from the the 15th Sikhs. the east of the coming down inconsiderable camp with bullocks to carry fodder and goods and the 2nd Brigade. Three drivers were shot dead in the dark." Beyond Maidan is lies the Eajgul Valley.000 to 9. Captain tribal jirgnhs are usually held. at 1 p.m. centre of the valley. the mule drabies bolted. Bagh. rocky. the escort of the 15th Sikhs with great presence of mind closed round the ammunition mules and effect- ively protected them. at the tedious rate of about two days' supplies twenty- four hours.m. the place where the great was reconnoitred. Rajgul is inhabited by Kuki Khel Afridis. was caught by the enemy in the narrow defile on the Maidan side of the pass after dark : heights above. and but the Bombay Sappers and Miners rapidly improved it once down into the valley the path or paths were quite easy. with the Derajat Mountain moved out to stop their operations. The enemy fired on the reconnoitring party but were driven off by a few shells. however. was slightly wounded. returning to camp at 5 p. and every British regiment got their great-coats and blankets on the night of the 31st October. well- spur. numbers from the Battery. Yorkshire Eegiment." "While reserve supplies were being slowly pushed forward from Ehorappa. of which we read : " Its length about ten miles and the breadth of the open country lying on either side of the central stream about four to five miles where widest. to the Tirah Valley was at first very stony and precipi. that is. MacLaren. Caffin. The road from the Arhanga Pass tous.




this affair.


picket of the 36th Sikhs

moving out

to their post at

6 P.M. were attacked, but they drove off the enemy one sepoy waa wounded. The ti^ansport from the Arhanga Pass coming into camp about 7 P.M. was also attacked, and hand-to-hand fighting ensued and

our casualties were*:

— 2nd

Royal West Surrey
transport followers



ivounned 4;

Transport Train

loimnded \;
killed 1 ;

wounded 3; Jeypore


Some baggage was

The main body
their families

of the Afridis


chiefly concerned




flocks into a place

of safety.

upper part of the Bara Valley lay open
only be a temporary refuge

For the moment the them, and although this could

was the best they had to turn to without entering Afghanistan in unwelcome numbers. Excluding the Adam Khels and a part of the Kuki Khels, who had not risen, there were proless

bably not

than 20,000 Afridis bearing arms


counting old men,

women and

children, the whole Afridi population at the lowest estimate

must number 50,000; winter was drawing near; and Sir William Lockhart, who was playing a driving game, hoped by properly combining the movements of his main column in Maidan with the movements of the Peshawar Column then at Bara Fort to make the position of the
tribe one that

must compel complete submission.


was considered

quite unlikely that a huge tribal exodus into eastern Afghanistan would

take place, though doubtless


separate families would


this the only safe line of retreat left

The conclusion generally
forces in

drawn was that

the Afridis would rally their scattered


Bara Valley and would then be driven eastward, the scene
tions gradually shifting nearer to the

of the opera-

Peshawar frontier

so as to play into

the hands of the Peshawar the purpose.

Column which would advance from Bara


There was a possible escape for the Afridis from the Bara Valley into the Bazar Valley which runs north of and parallel to it;
indeed already the Bokar Pass connecting the two valleys was thronged

with the families and

flocks of the

Zakka Khels, the Aka Khels and the
prolong the




this evasion at the best could only



was thought that the warlike Afridis, after having been the way from Chagru Kotal to Khorappa, from Khorappa to

the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, and thence through Tirah into the Bara Valley would at last make an all-decisive stand.
attention, but be well supposed the Orakzai were not dropping out of the plan of campaign, as heavy scores had yet to be settled with the beseigers of

For the moment the Afridis alone were engrossing






GuHstan and Saragheri. A reconnaissance in force was ordered down the Mastura Valley, which runs south of the Bara Valley to discover what opposition the Orakzai were preparing to offer, and it was
intended later on to look up the Khanki Valley also, still further south. But operations in these two directions could be deliberately undertaken by Sir Power Palmer with the strong body of troops forming the Line
of Comnjunication,

at a later stage,


the base of

Sir William

Lockhart's main column had been transferred from Kohat(yjd Shinawari and Khorappa) to Peshawar.









Having removed
of our

their families to places

beyond the immediate reach

grow extremely bold, and on the 5th November they attacked the convoy with the head-quarter staff baggage from Khorappa as it was approaching the Arhanga Pass.
the Afridis

now began

They also attacked a foraging party from the 2nd Division, killing a Jamadar and one man of the 15th Sikhs and wounding five others severely, besides carrying off about 40 mules. The same night there was heavy firint? for three hours into Maidan Camp. Lieutenant C. L. Giffard of the Northamptonshire Regiment was shot dead and Captain E. L. Sullivan of the 36th Sikhs was severely wounded while walking about in
the mess tent.


nights later, Captain E. Y. Watson, Commissariat

4th Brigade, was shot through the head by a stray bullet and

died almost immediately.


the 7th November, a Sunday, while the

2nd Brigade were

at chui-ch parade, a bullet


fired into the


and nearly brought the

service to an abrupt conclusion, as it only just

missed the chaplain. Every tent and sleeping place in camp was



vided with shelter from bullets, either by excavation or by making stone

and mud


and the messes were similarly protected.

The 2nd

Brigade went out foraging on the 8th, and owing to the precautions
taken by Brigadier-General Gaselee, the enemy were kept at a distance

and there was only one
ties of

casualty, in the 2-4th Gurkhas.

Large quantibehind.

grain were seized and

much more had








the 4th Brigade destroyed


of the towers



fied posts of the

in a ji'gah,

Zakka Khels, this tribe having defiantly refused to send and having moreover been mainly responsible for the heavy
Desultory brushes with the enemy

firing night after night into

continued to occur while the Tirah Field Force remained at Maidan

awaiting the completion of


reserve supplies, but they led to nothing:


One unfortunate event which occurred
this period cannot be left unnoticed hero,

in the


Valley at



had no immediate
Colonel Hill,

connection with anything then taking place in Tirah.



Kurram movable

colnntn, taking adNTintage









neighbourhood of Sadda, made a
which, though very successful in

reconnaissance up the Karniana


itself, was incidentally marred by a heavy and quite unnecessary loss of The reconnaissance, which was made in force, took place on the 6th life. November, and a good survey was made of a portion of the Massuzai


The defde


seven miles long, and, according to



ances, could be held

by a thousand tribesmen with proper defensive preparations against almost any attacking force, as the river bed is commanded from both sides within easy rifle range throughout. The enemy, however, were on this occasion completely surprised, and did not
even hold a stockade across the


six miles

from Sadda the

road was found passable for cavalry, and the Central India Horse



in force

and reached the

village of

Esor at 11


Here a

lance belonging to a Diiffadar of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, killed near camp

September was discovered, and also a quantity of arms, gunpowder and o-rain. The arms were confiscated, but nothing was destroyed. The retirement began at 1 P.M., when the enemy collected in considerin

able force.

The 5th Gurkhas,

as rear-guard, pi'oceeded a mile



without trouble, but here a stoppage occurred owing to some delay in getting in a picket of the Kapurthala Infantry from the heights above the right bank of the river. The Gurkhas were detained an
hour, and the

enemy meanwhile advanced in strength with standards few casualties occurred, the Gurkhas losing one killed, one severely and two slightly wounded, the Kapurthala Infantry one slightly wounded, and the Kurram Militia one dangerously and one slightly



The enemy on

their part lost heavily,

and though the ground

was suited

for the peculiar following-up tactics of the Pathan,

back discomfited, the

last five

miles into

camp being

covered without a shot being
of the sance,

The Maxims and long-range

Eoyal which had been conducted in a very able manner, had apparently been a complete success, and what was very important it had served to reveal the true state of this shorter route from the Kurram to the

Scots Fusiliers were very etfective.

So far the reconnais-






everybody except the unfortunate

troops concerned, a sad disaster had befallen the Kapurthala picket al-

ready referred


The picket

consisted of thirty-five Sikhs under a

Subadar, and their

on the heights above the right bank of the

river had apparently

been chosen as

overlooked not only the road

along the river bed but also the Gao defile which joins the
defile at


Jani Kot.


the picket



signalled to




and join the main body, the message was acknowledged but unfortunately the withdrawal was not begun forthwith, though the route by

which the picket had ascended was a perfectly safe one, as none of the

enemy were near it, having in fact begun to retire up the defile. What was worse, the delay made in executing the order of withdrawal entirely escaped attention,

and indeed it was eventually reported

to Colonel

Hill that


units of his

column were present.

Thereafter the march of

the column to Sadda was resumed, and the five miles

home were


ed in ignorance of the absence of the picket.
present " was again reported to the



" all

OMcer Commanding

the Force in


the next morning, and


vvas actually

not until late in the day

that Colonel Hill was informed that a Subadar and thirty-five



the Kapurthala Infantry were " missing." Search parties were sent out,

but no trace of the party could be found, and all too late it was discovered that only a few member.s of it had actually rejoined the column

when it

started back from Jani Kot.




to the


fated picket

was only discovered


The Subadar

command had

apparently watched the running fight in the
closest attention,


with the

and conceived the idea of sharing
it is


were equally keen, and
of brave

perhaps not to be wondered at

The sepoys that a body

men, whose discipline

not of the hard-and-fast kind which

obtains in our

own regiments, should have become

when they

saw an action taking place only a couple of miles or so away they had no prospect of participating. When the signal to




the last hope of the picket of even a chance skirmish dis-


Very reluctantly they began

to descend.

they had ascended was taken at

but after

Theroute by which had been followed for

some distance the Subadar and the more impetuous
disobey the order signalled to them and to
direction which would bring

decided to

move down

the ridge in a


into the defile at a point considerably

higher up than Jani Kot.
original direction




men went on

in the

and reached the main column in safety. So far as could be madeoutthe Subadar's party soon got into very broken ground,



and vul
If they


cult ravine.

and eventually dropped had been able to follow this

into a



toits junction with the

Karmana defile they would have come out above the Gurkha rear-guard, and would even then have been in a highly dangerous position. But as
they moved


the i-avine they discovered that the

way was


the jungle being on

Finding themselves trapped they endeavoured to retrace their steps and were observed by some of the tribesmen. The





lashhar thereupon halted in


retirement, and the

swarmed about the

nullah, effectually cutting off all retreat.

enemy turning back As heavy

might have attracted the attention of the main body of the troops, guard, the Massuzai and Chamkannis contented themselves by sitting on that they made their attack, rolling and it was not until the moon rose Deplorable Btones into the ravine and shooting down the whole party. there could be little doubt that it was as the result must be held to be,
directly due to over-eagerness on the part of the little



men and

their leader to give a good

account of themselves.

They were brave

to rashness a fault, and they paid the penalty which sometimes attaches enemy. After this affair, the attitude of the tribesin the face of an


east of

Sadda became more
b}- all


than ever, and the Massuzai

were reinforced



But no actual fighting
to follow

ensued, and we may once again leave the Kurram Valley, events in Maidan.

On the 9th November, by way of preparing for an early forward movement, Sir William Lockhart ordered a reconnaissance in force front Maidan to the Saran Pass, which leads into the Bara and Bazar Valleys through the Sipah Afridis' country; and again the day's operations though in themselves entirely successful, were marred incidentally by
an unlooked-for



which made the reconnaissance to

Saran Sar was a mixed brigade under the command of Brigadier-General Westmacott. Sir William Lockhart followed the column to the Saran Sar but returned in advance of it and had reached camp some two
hours before the disaster in question occurred. The regiments forming the mixed brigade were the Northamptons, the Dorsets, the 1.5th Sikhs and the 36th Sikhs. After the crest of the Saran Sar had been crowned
the troops started back with

speed, hoping to cover the five miles to

camp before sunset. no sicrn of the enemy being visible.

All went well until within about a mile of the


was then dusk, and one company a nullah, were of the Northamptons, while marching alone down ambuscaded by a party of tribesmen. The enemy would seem to have
been lying close up to the route taken, and their fire at short range was terribly effective, as the regiment had 49 casualties, including three British Officers. Tlie three other regiments were only slightly engaged during the retirement their losses being 3 killed and 15 wounded.


day was as follows: British Officers—^*// d : Lieutenant J. T. Waddell and 2nd-Lieutenaut A. H. Macintyre, Northlist

of casualties for the

amptonshire Regiment




Lieutenants G. A. Trent (Northamp-

in earnest : Here the casual iiies began for the enemy. with only 5 p. Sir was captured by the Northamptons. lay through a nullah ambuscaded by the enemy. of the regiment moving down the ravine. R<iak and file : Northamptonsliire Regiment — IV killed . It villages iu Maidan the Tirah Field Force was not veiy plain at first how off the Northamptons came to find themselves alone in a nuiinh cut later details never from their main body. or. S. entirely cleared up this The facts which ultimately came to light are these. who were seen to be seriously encumbered by their numerous killed and wounded. and the foot of the hill was only reached at 5 p. to The march through the nullah^ under a deadly shower was conducted with wonderful coolness.o»<«rfe(i. and decided to poUr iu chiefly a few rapid volleys at close quarters before a counter-attack could The tribesmen concerned in the attack were again the Zakka Khels. O P. as it chanced. wnuwied. casualties. had njeiely suffered the belated. a commanding occupied. and 29 wounded 15 all . they took a short cut which. connaissance.3 wounded. and the Northamptons who now formed difficult. William Lockhart and arrived about 1-30 and at 2-15 the retirement was ordered. The ambuscade must seemed more either have been most carefully likely. 22. the attacking party were lying con- cealed on the lookout for stragglers from camp. Though powerless retort upon the concealed enemy. in the first In clearing the way for the reposition instance. though havin^jf many casualties. 45.( 189 ) tonshire Eegiraent). loth Sikhs. ordinary fortunes of rear-guard fighting. The 36th Northamptons.-— one Subadar.. the rear-guard had 1 man killed and 11 wounded in quite a short time. as Total of ranks— kii/ed. the unlucky band stuck bravely to their wounded. 36th Sikhs— 3 wounded. amidst whose was then encamped. Dorsetshire Regiment — 2 killed and 6 wounded Sikhs 1 killed and . planned. and losing strength at every step. Mercer (Dorsetshire Regiment. The removal of the wounded became for increasingly stretchers.m. feeling secure from further molestation by reason of their nearness to camp. and the point.M. Ingham and A. Up to this point the and the ground was too precipitous hill to Sikhs were sent back up the assist the Northamptons. A. emerged suddenly from the woods. who as advance-guard enveloped the west flank of the ridge which the enemy The position was taken staff at 11 A. of bullets. Native Officer— «. But being now and anxious (as one version suggested) to make up for lost time. when they became be aware made. following their favourite tactics of withholding their attack until the withdrawal of our troops. When camp was a6 .m.

•2nd Queen's. slightly wounded one man of . and were found killed next morning. most of their jiryahs also at intervals. Lieutenant Macintyre.m. The enemy's loss and 30 wounded by rifle fire. They were further informed that compensation for damage done to their buildings would be taken into consideration later on. when the relations of the Government with the border tribes would be re-arranged.sion of the tribesmen. with two of Sappers. and the different clans departed severally to consider Before leaving.000 and to give hostages fur the fulfilment of such terms as were not required to be carried out forthwith. Letters were sent out to if all the section. being at while the artillery fire was least 12 killed also eflfective. the .«V- the Afridis and Orakzai. the terms of the known to them. some at once and others the Afridis. Our casualties were Second-Lieutenant Wright. A fortnight's yrace was allowed them to comply with these terms. bring in forage and destroy the fortificaThis was all tions of such Zakka Khel villages as could be reached. to restore all rifles rifles. intimating that they would send in their gahs and promise submission. . but after consultation with the Political Ofiicers Sir William Lockhart de- cided that the entire demand should be divided equally between the Gar and Samil factions and that these should make all further internal dis- As for tribution themselves without assistance from the Government. The Orakzai jn-gahti came in Government would be made promptly and were informed that they would be required to make to a formal declaration of submission to the Government. and after evidence had been recorded the papers were sent up to Quarters. and one sepoy of the 1 -3rd Gurkhas slightly wounded. Sir enquiiy to be held William Lockhart at once ordered a military court of regarding this very unfortunate affair. the defences of about 40 villages being destroyed. accomplished satisfactorily and without any serious misadventure. Army Head- Two days later the 2nd Brigade under General Gaselee. a Sergeant and eleven all men of the regiment were reported missing. should apportion the fine among the various sections of the tribe. surrender 500 of their own pay a and Government property lonted.( 190 ) last reached at 8 p. . the 2nd Queen's killed. was considerable./u^ftAs asked that the Government their courses. paid a second visit to mountain guns and one company Saraa Sar to complete the survey. to fine of Es 30. to hear what terms the Government intended to impose. While all this guerilla fighting was in progress the Political Officers under Sir William Lockhart were endeavouring to arrange for the submis.^ of . came in.

8 Mountain Battery the 36th November General Kempster's Brigade Royal Artillery and No. To the defied the " These were the Zakka Khels and Afridi.(/aA. still more strongly to hold out a while for the The appearance of a brigade in the Waran Valley. Contrary to expectation the troops entered the valley practically without any opposition either during their advance or later in the day. within striking distance of the place where Sir William Lockhart's force lay. and Government to the Aka Khels. was therefore one of the first measures called for. near Akhor. where the Aka Khels were then strongly mustered. of all the Afridi mustering They are notoriously bloodthirsty and treacherous. 5 Bombay Sikhs and some companies of Sappers Waran Valley by the Seri Kandao Pass. both vu the 13th and 14th and . declining to anything they had to say or to declare any terras to them until the two recalcitrant clans of their tribe had come in also. lies In the summer they migrate to the Waran then due north of the Mastura Valley. the camp was not all fired quantities into during the night forage was obtained in large and without opposition. have their winter. and are dreaded even by their fellow tribesmen. It was they who had planned and mainly carried out the attack on the Khyber posts. settlements in the Bazar Valley and Khyber tracts daring the and move to Maidaa and the upper part of the Bara Valley during the clans. started out for the the 13th with No. Valley.( 191 ) but two Afridi clans refused to come in or to hear any terms at all.800 men. Their fighting strength is 1. and their poverty prevents their possessing many breechloaders. At daybreak on Mountain Battery." listen to come Lockhart returned a stern answer. and warning them that unless it would be vigorously of all The Zakka Khels.500 fighting men. mostly well armed. who alone the Afridi clans were really responsible for keeping hostilities so vigorously alive. /". and are the most powerful 4. and Brigadier-General Kempster was instructed to carry out this manoeuvre forthwith.s which did come in Sir William on. summer. but in this instance they were dragged in the wake of the Zakka Khels. Some very interesting in Saiad Akbar's house —which was visited letters were found and destroyed during the . which By nature the Aka Khels are not a very bloodthirsty clan. and in all the tribal councils during the past few weeks they alone had formed the irreconcilable war party The Aka Khels are found during the winter to the south-west of Peshawar. submission were voluntarily and quickly made enforced. appeared quiet. and the fact that the Mullah Saiad Akbar belonged to the clan no doubt prompted them sake of their izzat.

in the November and had tried to incite the Aka Khels hope that General Kempster would retaliate by wholesale destruction of villages. 4 Madras Sappers that nearly all the baggage was safely in camp at Maidan by 3 p. Brigadier-General KempKter accordingly issued orders to the efl"ect that the baggage with move soon after daybreak and the road over the way on each side had been so improved by the exertions of No. more especially on the return of the troops The casualties during this day were It 1 killed and 6 wounded . that the English had been turned out of Egypt and deprived of said that the July or August. of this cauticjusiiess was No sooner had the advanced guard got beyond the limits of the camp. appeared later on. that the Zakka Khels had entered the Waran Valley during the night of the 14th to fight. and that now was the time us. keeping up a continuous to camp. to their houses. in spite of the Orders had been sent to Brigadier-General Kempster to return to Maidan on the 16th. suilicient escort was . and the wisdom well exemplified on the loth. The Aka Khels. who Kempster. however. and consequently no damage was done shots fired by Zakka Khels. rifles in hand. pass and for a great .( 192 ) reconnaissance — amongst them one from the Hadda Mullah. held aloof on the 15th. 2 of the latter being Gordon Highlanders. as English troops could to rise against not stand campaigning in the hot weather. fired who were seen coming out on by Zakka Khel tribesmen posted on an adjoining height. due military precautions had been taken throughout. the use of the Suez Canal. the tribesmen fire. than a British flag of truce sent out in the direction of some of their houses. 4 Bombay and No. On the 15th November the force moved out to make a further reconnais- sance towards the junction of the "Waran and Mastura Valleys so as to have this point accurately fixed in the survey of Tirah which was being made under the general superintendenceof Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich. and so drive the Aka Khels into the ranks of the irreconcilables. Sir William Lockhart's intention being that the first move from Maidan to Bagh should begin on the 17th with the 2nd — to — Brigade and the Divisional troops of the 1st Divison. The reconnaissance was pushed forward. and a sepoy wounded. that the Mohmands had defeated us. that our power in India was on the wane. a Gurkha Havildar being killed. Although the Aka Khels on the previous two days had shown no active hostility to the free movement of our troops.jc. written It in Turks had completely defeated the Greeks. who were shot as they were going to their picket jjost at dusk. from acconipanied General information received by Colonel Warburton. Aka was Khels.

or latex'— for the enemy's marksmanship was as usual excellent. whom two comThe 36th Sikhs liad been sent on to hold the pass for a time. who had The 3Gth Sikhs had down Sikhs. and to hold various positions on the high ground above the road. ) Bat as . a perilous duty unflinchingly performed. Captain Maclntyre of his regiment carrying his dead comrade's body himself till a litter could be obtained. will perhaps be found as afitair. both Zakka Khels and Aka Kliels. the enemy.S. But the following extended account of the fighting. and there ensued one of the severest rear-guard actions of the whole campaign. every other regiment^ had a As they began to draw in their pickets from the heights above the pass. met with independent adventures of the field and during different stages of the general action. met with no further casualties till they reached camp. But the 15th Sikhs. To describe in the exact order of occurrence all that took place is to incur some risk of confusing t!ie narrative. so as to cover the retirement of the 15th the The Gurkhas had some very heavy fighting befoi-e they reached pass— which they did not cross till 3 p. showed great courage in tending the wounded under fire. covered by the l5th parties out holding heights on each side of the pass. to panies of the Dorsets afforded great assistance. a most popular Officer with for 1st all who knew him. once they had crossed over the pass. I. despite the cleverness of the Gurkhas in availing themselves of cover. isolated in different parts from the main body. Lieutenant Wylie. pressed boldly forward. Sikhs. and 3 men were killed and 5 wounded. and many losses were Abbott assembled most uf his men (he had only five weak companies) on . the enemy pressed forward suffered before Colonel anew in great numbers. and were eventually relieved by the l5th Sikhs. the two companies of the Dorsets and the l-2nd Gurkhas orders retiring over the pass. Surgeon-Captain Selby.soon as the retirement of the ti^oojis began. when relieved by the 15th Sikhs to take up a position further the road and nearer Maidan. little involved as any that could well be prepared of such an At the outset the enemy were held back by the l-2nd Gurkhas. The Gurkhas.( 19?.M. who had covered the Gurkhas' retirement and far who were now in rear of more stirring adventure awaiting them. for several bodies of troops. while faithful enough in detail. attached to the l-2nd Gurkhas. admirably handled by Lieutenant-Colonel Travers. who had only very lately been transferred duty from the 2nd Battalion of his regiment at Samana to the Battalion with the Main Column..m. was shot through the head by a stray bullet.

( 194 ) the tungars on the spur preparatoiy to a retirement further hill. Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton. Captain Custance. Captain Custance with his isolated company however left was the P. as soon as he was informed of the difficulty in which the 15th Sikhs were immersed. The fire on the main body of the 15th advisable to Sikhs with Colonel Abbott in the large sungar west of the wood was very heavy indeed. down the The enemy had by this time collected in a wood within about 40 yards of the main sungar. and waited before opening the swordsmen were within 40 paces. fixed bayonets. At the same time a second party. his second-in-command. and to show one's head above the sungars was to risk having a bullet through Colonel Abbott had already been wounded by a shot from a jhezail. On this occasion the Afridi were undoubted. Captain Lewarne very coolly halted and fronted the comfire till pany. being greatly delayed by the presence of wounded Sikhs in the sungar whom it would be extremely carry away under a heavy Brigadier-General Kempster at once issued orders for two companies of the Dorsets and five companies of the 36th Sikhs to return towards the 15th Sikhs and assist the retirement. and of his own initiative. under Lieute- nant Vivian. and Major Des Vceux. first to reinforce Colonel Abbott. received two bullets through the helmet and was then shot through the thigh. for the charging tribesmen melted away before fire. which struck him in the face. dashed gallantly up to Captain Lewarne to aid him in checking losses it. hill command away of further to the Before receiving General Kempstei-'s order Colonel Haughton. was at that time i"iding with one of his companies nearest the pass. and both he and Colonel Abbott were being carried down the hill in stretchers when Colonel Haughton arrived on . the Sikh and the company reached the point it was making for without further molestation. the time being then about 4-15 The enemy were firing with very great precision from the wood. apparently loaded with pieces of telegraph wire. a large number of swordsmen charged after him. inflicting a serious though happily not a dangerous wound. to bring on the remaining three companies and the two companies of the Dorset Regiment. and at length Colonel Abbott deemed apprise Brigadier-General it Kempster by difficult to signal that his retirement was fire. while Captain Custance was in another company of the 36th Sikhs holding a right. at once. while reconnoitring for a good position for his company.M. and while Captain Lewarne was taking a company of the 15th Sikhs down from a post they had been occupying to a position further down the hill. started away with the single company near him. it. perceiving the enemy's manoeuvre. Commanding the 36th Sikhs.

as his and with these he had subalterns. for instance. as the fire . Lieutenant Hales also remaining on the spot with his half -company. only numbered from 20 to 30 men each. It should be remarked here that although for the sake of simplicity the narrative of " companies " they of companies. Dorset Regiment. had awaited weak companies of the 36tli Sikhs. most General Kempster's Brigade were very short of this brigade had borne the brunt of the losses. which had hitherto been intense. to hold a house close by above the road. also came up with half a company. especially those of the 15th Sikhs. the greater part holding the sungar close to the wood and a smaller part a swngar further down the spur. Lieutenant-Colonel Haiighton's force was at this stage in two portions. In any case. and as the wounded had all been sent on and the sungara held were untenable for the night. of which Lieutenant Crooke was in command. Suffolk Eegiment (attached to the Dorsets for duty). for and many men had been invalided. before following his Colonel. also brought a company of the Dorset Regiment under Captain Hammond. had only 16 men. there were men absent on baggage duty and employed in conveying the wounded back to camp. The object in leaving a company of the Dorset Regiment to hold the houses was to give a point d'appui for the troops in rear further up the Major Des Voeux then hurried on with the remaining companies Sikhs to catch up Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton. Colonel Haughton ordered a gradual retirement.( 195 ) the scene. Soon after Colonel Haugh ton's arrival the fire from the wood. so that eventually the latter had near him though not all concentrated in the pass. and the Sikh companies. the arrival of three other very Major Des Vceux. or the nucleus The half company under Captain Hammond. so that in all probability Lieutenant-Colonel in all Haughton had not of the regiments more than 200 men sent on the in under his command. Apparently this was due to the tribesmen leaving the wood and working round by the north to try and cut in on the line of retreat further down the hill. had begun to slacken and it was rapidly getting dark. As a matter of fact. Moreover. men at that time. and to leave the other half-company. In making his way to reinforce Colonel Haughton Major Des Voeux decided to take the company of the Dorset Regiment under Captain Hammond on with him. is forced to speak were only companies in name. with Lieutenant Cowie and Lieutenant Ci'ooke. Soon afterwards Lieutenant Hales. especially after he had wounded ahead. of the 36th — same place. East Yorkshire Eegi- ment (attached to the Dorsets). but in different positions on the spur west of the wood^lO companies Sikhs and half-company Dorsets. began to slacken.

After this a the 36th Sikhs. But there was : now then great danger of the separated parties firing on one another. Of three principal houses the 15th Sikhs occupied the northernmost house. wounding Lieutenant Munn. desultory to rise. the Afridi fire man of the 15th Sikhs. and the 36th Sikhs under Colonel Haughton the southern house.irricades and sungarx. was too high.( 19fi ) The party in the westernmost sungar covered tlie retirement of the other party from the sungar nearest the wood. a Subadar. 15th Sikhs. Dorsets with a cheer. Lieutenant Munn. ran one tribesman through with his sword on reaching the plateau or spur on which the houses stood and a few others were shot. and waited till their assailants were within 10 paces before opening a very heavy to the fire. and probably owing ground being in steps. the mud walls only remaining. that the fire came principally from some houses about 300 yards distant. In this critical situation Colonel Haughton did not for a moment lose his presence of mind. and befoi-e the troops could fire be got into position in and lie flat on the ground a very heavy was poured on them. He observed. in flank. fire would have involved heavy loss and possibly To have remained stationary w^ould have been to submit helplessly to being shot down. All the moved down were to the building held biiildings still too hot. as well as it was possible in the darkness. advanced up the cultivated terraces against the houses. the Adjutant of the 36th Sikhs. and the Sikhs shouting their war-cry. and killing 3 sepoys and wounding 5 others. fire was kept up by the tribesmen outside till moon began . and the "cease fire" was accordingly sounded. and search had to be made for a path. The 15th Sikhs and the Dorsets by Colonel Haughton. The the houses. each Officer calling to a certain company to rally round him. and in rear. the Dorsets the centre. To have continued the march under this disaster. At this moment a heavy fire was opened on the force from in front. Luckily. which by the way had been The enemy set on fire that morning. replied with defiant shouts. were reformed. There were no materials for making b. killing Captain Lewarne. to allow of their being entered. after having been burnt. as it was considered advisable to remain on the spur on high ground rather than follow the real road down the nullah. and only one was hit and badly wounded. and with splendid decision he ordered the troops to fix bayonets and turn the enemy out of Equally decisive was the response of the troops. and the march was made to the Here in the darkness the troops foot of the hill without further loss. and the troops were placed in a sort of semi-circle with the main building behind them.

as they had not even a house to go and neither party had great-coats or blankets. opcupied a house and some above the road. Haughton himself went out and connoitred under a heavy before daybreak. a strong position.m. left It had fared very badly with the two half-companies of the Dorsets behind by Major Des Yceux on the pass the previous night to cover the intended retirement of Colonel Haugh ton's little force. and the sentry had orders to fire an occas-ional shot to show the enemy our troops were on the alert and not short of ammunition. especially with the half-company under Lieutenant Crooke. some 35 to 40 men in all. accompanied him. and the party of about two weak companies at once set to work to make a Iji-eastwork with clods of burnt earth and pieces of timber. When the hottse had heen seized. . Trails of shouting that they would serve the defenders as they had defenders of Saragheri. intricate started off to join him. Major Des Voeus served the was not attacked in force. a little been told by Major Des "Voeux the pass. Haughre- ton's men. Lieutenants Crooke and Hales. had cooled down. though the enemy hovered round for hours. the ground between himself and Major Des Voeux. and finding that there was no very the houses. When the whole force had been concentrated a move was made towards camp. was dark.'es found hirnserf In the attack on the he had taken two companies and selected for assault a house further to the south. though it had been burnt. and even throwing stones over the houses behind. Captain Hammond. It will be sun^ars. with. burnt Communication was established with Colonel Haughton's force by whistle. and men were heard moving down the road These were challenged and it is said they replied This point will probably never be cleared up for both they were Sikhs. but the dim light did not admit of accurate aim. remembered that Lieutenant Crooke had tl>at he was to hold on to the houses what- ever might happen in order to cover the retirement of the Sikhs from It in the nullah below. wounded being carried on charpoys found in The enemy fired. But one painful episode remains to be related.( 197 ) Meanwhile Major Des Vanix cnt off from his Colonel. building. temporarily separated from his own company in it the darkness. especially for Colonel into. The night was miserably Colonel fire cold. and the troops sent out by General Kempster to relieve Colonel Haughton were met about 8 a. was This found to be untenable and a move was made to anothe? house. witli his small foiTe villa<. and the retirement was well covered by Lieutenant Cowie with the Dorsets. At the outset the two half-con>panies. Thus ended one of the most exciting rear-guard actions in the whole Tirah Campaign.

and it was impossible. and then clubbing his rifle knocked the third man's brains out. He shot the first. and. and camp was reach- ed about 8 P.( 198 ) Ijiontenant Crooke and Lieutenant Hales are dead. but all what had otherwise been a very successful expediwho spent the night in the captured houses were . a great many of them wounded. As a matter of fact the men whom he had challenged were Afridis. bayonetand was ted the second. a very capable Officer and of great experience. Finally he returned to camp half- brinoino. and in that erroneous belief he pro- bably gave the order to retire — his half -company on one side of the spur nearest the nullah.M. but as darkness came on. by helping 36th Sikhs. losing his bayonet in the man's body. In any case. Brigadier-General Kempster ordered the retirement to be continued. Arrangements were at once made pass. few words remain to be said about the main body of BrigadierGeneral Kempster's force. straggled into camp. Private Vickery of this half-company.with him a wounded comrade. assisted by the their wounded. for the artillery especially. the other half -company further away. believed that the men below him were the 15th and 35th Sikhs. killing him and 9 men and wounding 7 others. Lieutenant Crooke's Hammond's company. He was shot through the foot fire at Dar^ai was one of the then attacked by three swordsmen. to see to fire. for a force to be sent out at daybreak towards the All through the night single men of the Dorset Regiment. and they came on Lieutenant Urooke's half -company. to carry in to cover their retirement. and the sibly also tlie Non-Coniniissiuned Officers. It was a sad ending one and to tion. Lieutenant Crooke. and the funeral of the two Officers and nine men took place on the evening of the 17th November in one part of the camp. and the fact of the challenoin" is not clearly established. which suffered so severely. The bodies of Lieutenants Crooke and Hales and nine men were found close together in a nullah. who all men nnd poscome from Madras cantonments are unawiuainted with Hindustani. while Captain Lewarne and Lieutenant Wylie were buried together in another jmrt. who had previously distino-uished himself by trying to save a wounded man under a heavy wounded. but the half-company which Lieutenant Hales had command- ed was brought intact by the Sergeant. These troops had held on as long as possible A to the foot of the hill the previous evening in the hopes of being able to cover the retirement of the 15th and 36th Sikhs and the two half -com- panies of the Dorset Regiment . belonged to Captain aftbrded such great company of the Dorset Regiment which had assistance to the Northampton Kegiment on the 9th October.

— — — ( 199 ) unanimous oh one point —however much their testimony on main was in conflict— that Lieutenant-Colonel points owing the to the darkness Haughfrom the till ton's coolness. Bombay Moun- ivounded : one man. tcounded: Captain distance. The full return is as follows: Dorsets killed: Lieutenant G. 7 men. excellent tactical arrangements. 36th Sikhs— ^?V/erf 6 men.No. 5 Lieutenant Wylie and 3 tain Battery men loounded : 4 men. completely outmatched the enemy and prevented what might under the leadership of a less cool and able relieving troops were commander have been an actual disaster. both attached to the Dorsets. wounded: 8 men.• . who took part in the bayonet charge on the houses. and presence of mind. Lieutenant Hales (East 4 Officers killed and the total for all ranks being 33 — Yorkshire). Our killed casualty list for the whole affair was a long one. 15th or 36th Sikhs. ivounded: Colonel Abbott (slightly) and 13 men. every man of the Dorsets. Crooke (Suffolk Regiment). Lieutenant Munn and . . and included 3 wounded: and 36 wounded. and 10 men. D. 15th Sikhs killed: Captain Lewarne and 10 men . As it was. had good reason to be proud of his performance. 2nd Gurkhas— fti/^erf. moment he arrived with his small reinforcements at the pass met next day.

one subaltern had his ear grazed by another bullet and another had the knot of his sword shot away. and the attitude of the tribesmen as the troops advanced on Bagh was at first undecided. as to it camp at Bagh was perceived that the intention of the enemy's resistance became very strong. notably the Malikdin and Kuki Khels (for from Bagh a path exists into the Eajgul Valley by following the Shaloba stream to Dwatoi). hill and made up excellent practice against scattered parties of tribesmen on surhills. The distance Bagh from Maidan is about 3 miles. to 6 p.THER DEVELOPED. the enemy The firing from the surrounding heights three-quarters of a circle. came into action on the The assaulting troops having captured it. as they were seemingly under the impression that the movement was in connection with either foraging or reconnaissance. and he turned his face to the north-east in the direction of Bagh. amove to Bagh threatened other sections of the Afridi tribe. rounding but so bold were the enemy that a certain number crept to within 500 yards of the battery. fire was particularly heavy from a north-west of the camp. 2 Derajat.. Captain Parker's Battery. .. CAMPAIGN FUP. and the moral effect of our troops encamping round Bagh which bears a somewhat sacred character. Sir William Lockhart O^ the 18th of November was at last able to make a move from Maidan.e.M. There were several reasons why it was consider- ed desirable to move from Maidan: the troops had exhausted nearly all the grain and forage in the vicinity of the camp. General Symons was and some from i. tire As soon.( 200 ) CHAPTER THE PLAN' OF XII. about 7 A. it would be however. and the Battery Officers had some Captain Parker was shot through the clothes without the bullet hurting him. would also have a wholesome effect in convincing the enemy generally of our Part of the 1st Division (Majorpower to move and encamp anywhere. and that followed by the usual retirement to Maidan in the evening. General Symons') began the move on the 18th November. To the west and north-west of the camp the enemy were holding some very narrow escapes. the force consisting of the 2nd Brigade to and the Divisional troops. and this eminence had to be heavily shelled by the artillery and then attacked by the Queen's and the 3rd Sikhs before the force could occupy it. in hill portion of the troops were under for nearly eleven houi's. No.m.

leaving Brigadier-General Kempon Brigade and some of the Divisional troops behind to cover the to follow removal of the 4th Advanced Depot stores to Bagh and There was a good deal of firing into camp at Bagh on the 19th. the 4th Brigade. too. losing the Colour-Sergeant of the company and one man. but Camp Maidan was left completely alone by the enemy. ster to though every preparation had been made by Brigadier-General Kempmeet an attack. with most of the Divisional troops of the 2nd Division.st and the maximum in severity so 113°. — notably so by 2nd-LieuThe all tenant Edwards. who were most gallantly led. The Gurkha scouts of the 5th Gurkhas did excellent service during the 18th November. accompanied by Sir William Lockhart with the to Staff. for the altitude than Camp Maidan. Staft'. to All the spare animals were sent back Camp Maidan to assist in maunds of stores belonging to the 4th Advanced Depot removing some 10. killing several of the enemy and •were seen being carried away wounded. the enemy as soon as darkness came on crept in between the picket posts and opened a most galling fire. was conminimum temperature on the 19th was 21° after that date the cold greatly' increased fro. the bullets fortunately too high. were 5 men killed and '22 wounded. Major-General Yeatman-Biggs. and so excellent Oflacers at was the work done by the Commissariat and Transport Maidan that the whole of these stores were removed to Bagh 20th. who with a section of 13 men advanced and turned the enemy out of a house on his front in the most gallant manner. by 12 noon on the and Divisional Head-quarter stei^'s On the 19th. and at one time a concerted volley was fired straight at Major-General Symons' head-quarters. although lies the ground at a lower siderably colder.( 201 ) fire. though some animals were hit. incuri'ed total losses before the enemy could be expelled from the positions they had been holding and pickets placed on such of them as it was deemed desii-able to hold for the night. and much so that on the night of the 29th 21° of were recorded. The temperature at Camp Bagh. Undaunted by temporary reverses.000 at Maidan. towers and houses and were keeping up a very galling to be dislodged and tliey from their positions by single companies of the had York- shire Regiment. . all when was clear. all being So excellently had the troops entrenched themselves that there were no casualties from this night firing. many more On ed in the 19th the troops under Major-General Symons were employ- still further fortifying the picket posts. moved Bagh.

down two 40. and thi» and the further destruction of towers and fortified posts south of the camp next day. running hither and thither in the hope apparently of finding sonnething of value left behind. moved to Camp Bagh. hurried ravine. who had been watching the movement from neighbouring swooped down on the site of the old camp. work and move off to the scene of attack. No. the enemy. but they were doomed to disappointment. hills. Two companies of this regiment. a half -battalion Gordoi> Highlanders under Major Downman were posted. spurs lying on either side of the fires. and a few shells fromi some guns tiously ventured. within range of houses south of Camp Bagh. and Major Kelly. and four drabies had been killed before the Madras Sappers could arrive to their assistThe same day a great number of towers and fortified houses^ ance.( 202 ) On tlie 20th November at about 10 o'clock in the morning the Zakka Khels made a determined elfort to cut off the tail of a convoy proceeding up towards the Arhanga Pass. So promptly did the company act under Captain "Wright's command ^hat the enemy were drive n up the valley towards the Arhanga Pass. Meanwhile the 2nd Brivery early gade. from the neighbourhood from which sniping into of which foraging parties had been place. foy four A£ridi jiryahs which had . the November Brigadier-General Kempster's Brigade with remainder of the troops oi the 2nd Division. Commanding the Eoyal Engineers. troubled which they had incauthem considerably. and the enemy were thus caught between two their losses being estimated at something like Unfortunately a sowar of the 12th Bengal Cavalry who was with the convoy. had moved out from Bagh to some 60 or 70 towers and loopholed that morning and had set fire in the rear-guard. whereafter the march of the 3rd Brigade was practically unmolested. There being no definite prospect of the Zakka Khels making subat last announced toaiission the terms of the Government were now been in camp awaiting the declaration. directed the '2nd Division. On the 21st As the last of the 3rd Brigade troops marched off from Can»p Maidan. for there was little or nO' night firing afterwards and foraging parties were practic-ally unmolested. as good luck would have it. inoving separately. fired on and camp had taken were destroyed. had a most salutaiy effect. company to cease ^here. 4 Company Madras Sappers were working not very far from the scene of the occurrence. Brigadier-General GaseTee's.

through a deep and narrow gorge and recrossing the stream. as it proved. that although he approached very near indeed to where they were thought to be. for The route taken was a difficult one.( 2o:5 ) about a fortnight. the 36th Sikhs.000. the enemy were nevertheless able by occupying subsidiary spurs fi'om the main line of hills on both sides to keep up a well aimed fire on the troops and animals moving along the total casualties ravine below. and goes the most part along the bed of the . These terms were : the surrender of in of all stolen proi rifles. Brigadier- General Westmacott commanded the which Sir William Lockharfc. and the track crossing places. It appeared that as the Yorkshire Regiment were moving along the in crest of the hills on the right flank of the line of march. and they also sniped a good deal at the pickets placed round the camp at night. and some of the Officers of the head-quarter staff accompanied. the l-2nd and l-3rd Gurkhas. On the 22nd successful reconnaissance November a most adventurous and. dangerously wounded. was made to Dwatoi or Diva Toi signifying two i rivers). however. the troops spent a most trying night out in the bitter cold at Dwatoi without even their blankets and great-coats: Sir Williarti Lockhart himself had no great-coat or bedding that night. their exact whereabouts could not be discovered . The column was composed of the King's Own Scottish Boiderers. Adam. Brigadier-General Nicholson. Of these casualties. one being Lieutenant Jones of the Yorkshire Regiment. went off by hintself to try and get round the enemy's . Wet to the with no food beyond what they carried in their havresacks. and Lieutenant Jones then most courageously. two companies of Sappers. the Yorkshire Regiment. 4 Bombay) and two batteries. perty. Watson of and 2nd-Lieutenant the same regiment. Although the tribesmen on either side of the pass were held off as far as was possible by the Yorkshire Regiment on the right flank and the 1 -2nd Gurkhas on the left flank. The enemy were well concealed. leaving his men where they wei'e. Shaloba stream. (No. 4 Madras and No. two were killed. Kambar term's and Aka Khels to the other tribes proclamations announcing the were sent out by the Political Officers. Lieutenant Jones saw a few a spur below firing at the troops the ravine and took three so men on men with him to try and turn them out. and 15 wounded. at the junction of the Rajgul and Shaloba streams. the on the 22nd being 2 killed Officers. the 28th Bombay Pioneers.50. and the handing 800 breech -loading The four Jirgahs : in attendance represented the Malikdin. a fine of Rs. force. which is knee deep in waists as they were.

The l-2nd Gurkhas performed equally good The ground they had of there being one hills service on the right. to traverse was also very difficult. As the Gurkhas were advancing on the 22nd November the leading scouts shot an Afridi who was trying to drive off some cattle. and their baggage had to be conveyed up to them left difficult great-coats. thougli the regiment met with a good deal of opposition. but his daring cost him his life. blankets or food other than that by hand on the 23rd. A section of his company hurried down to his assistance and 2nd-Lieutenant Watson. having entered his left side and come out between the shoulders. A curious incident occurred during this portion of the march. under a heavy fire proceeded to get the wounded Officer into a stretcher. These however were the only casualties in the Yorkshire Regiment that day. and for the latter a Kohati follower was found who. by which time they had been 36 hours without which they had brought in their havresacks. which extremely camp before daybreak on the 22nd. had such ground to traverse that their baggage mules could not accompany them. its on the Mess President essential who computed the baby's age to be 18 months. divesting himself By the time this was done Lieutenant of his coat to serve as a pillow. Eegiment. being next door in blood to an Afridi. was promoted to the post of nurse. the range of broken up into a series of knolls with deep ravines between them.( 204 ) flank. The bullet broke a rib. and then fall back was seen : wouiided. who commanded. and instead continuous crest is on which they could move smoothly along. For the former he provided from the scanty mess stores some Swiss milk. Watson himself was most dangerously wounded. left flank with that rendered by the Yorkshire Eegiment on the and had three men wounded. so that the Gurkhas were continually ascending and descending over very rugged ground. to arrange for nourishment and nursing. The completion of the reconnaissance without further loss on the 22nd and the equal success of the return journey on the 24th were undoubtedly due to the skilful manner in which the -troops were handled and to the facility with which the men had adapted themselves to the peculiar conditions demanded in warfare against The Yorkshire skilled marksmen and skirmishers like the Afridis. He had succeeded in unearthing the foe. and lie shouted to one but before the man reached him he of hiamen to come round to him to jump on to a rock and empty his revolver. and when the man's body was found a It devolved little Afridi baby was discovered by his side. The . Even this nianrpuvre did not avail him. vital part. fortunately without actually hitting any A Lance-Corporal with him was shot dead. of the regiment.

and so boldly at one juncture that they actually essayed to cut in between a company of the 36th Sikhs and drive off some hospital ponies which were being kept back to carry any slightly wounded men. the brunt of covering which fell on the 36th Sikhs was admirably performed. of which the 36th Sikhs had 2 and 13 wounded. however. Owing to the killed very late arrival of the baggage on the 23rd a thorough reconnaissance of Eajgul Valley and the entrance to the Bara Valley could not be it made. President decided to restore the infant to Accordingly. Now . stating that it was only because the regiment was reduced by wounds and disease that he had decided to send it back to the Line of Communication. the Main Column effected a most successful retirement to Bagh from Dwatoi on the 24th November. by the 2nd Punjab Infantry. attached to the 36th Sikhs. including Captain Venour. the loth Sikhs had been obliged under orders from Sir William Lockhart to part company with the Before their brigade and march back to the advance base at Shinawari. As has been said. slightly wounded. 5th Punjab Infantry. that Eajgul Valley had been invaded it could fairly be said that the whole of Tirah had been overrun by our troops. when the return jourits Bagh was to be made.( 205 ) ^question of the disposal of the !ney to baby on the 24th. He further said that the regiment had nobly upheld the grand traditions of the Sikhs and of the 15th Sikhs The place of the regiment in the 3rd Brigade was taken in particular. became rather embarrassing and the Mess kinsfolk. left Maidan on the 21st November. ^s the house was being passed where this curious capture was made. The •enemy at first pressed on the retirement strongly. departure Sir William Lockhart issued a most complimentary order in regard to this gallant corps. who had sevei^al killed and five or six of their fire-arms all captured. The column moving along the ravine were dusk. but enough of was seen to show that the route from Dwatoi is onwards through the Bara Valley from Bagh to considerabl}' easier than that Thus ended what under the circumstances was pronounced one of the most successful reconnaissances yet carried out in Afridi-land. having suU'ered lo. who moreover had steadily applied themselves for many days to destroying the villages .sses back in camp before to the extent of 17. charged down on these adventurous spirits. as a result Another company of the 36th Sikhs. the baby was deposited on the threshold in full view of the Afridis who as usual were pressing on the retirement. It is worth mentioning here that when the 3rd Brigade Dwatoi.

No. Sir William Lock- hart promptly ordered an advance into the country. and those who remained in Rajgul were probably regretting they did not make their escape before our for troops appeared at Dwatoi. if would of necessity move down to the Bara and Bazar Valleys. deliberately rejecting the November the Chamkannis sent in Government terms. There was now apparently no further object to be gained by remaining in Tirah and wintering in the cold uplands. and this transfer was begun forthwith by removing all heavy baggage back to Shinawari. by Lozaka Pass. In fact many of them had already left Tirah. in the Kurram. as already described. even not driv^en thither by the troops. Political Officer of the situation in that quarter. ) and fortified enclosures of the obstinate Zakka Kliels. column was placed under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Gaselee. Chief The whole of the Staff". On learning of this. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery and No. the 28th Bombay Pioneers. and to restore all Governof ment property loofed. The time had consequently come changing the base of operations from Shinawari to Peshawar. But before accounts in the Colonel Hill.( 2or. 3 and No. followed the 2nd Brigade into Kurram. The troops following behind with Sir William Lockhart .000. the 3rd Sikhs. 1. 4 Companies Bom« bav Sappers. to surrender 30 breech -loading rifles. 1 Kohat Mountain Battery. On the 19th their reply. it was not until the 26th November that the 2nd Brigade of the Tirah Field Force was free to start for the Lozaka Pass. with of more troops and accompanied by Brigadier-General Nicholson. with their homesteads in ruins and their supplies eaten up. to operate The troops being then more lightly equipped were enabled with greater freedom. was desirable first up Kurram Valley. was master Captain Ross-Keppel. or at aU'events to make quite sure that Commanding the Km-ram Movable Column. the movement to be made in concert with an advance of the Kurram Column up the Kharmana defile. while the milder climate in the Bara Valley would permit of their bivouacking without serious hardship. the 2-4th Gurkhas. and defying Chamkanni and Massuzai Colonel Hill to enforce them. General Hammond's column also made ready to move at short notice. Sir "William Lockhart began this it movement of all to in concert settle with the Peshawar Column. and consisted of the West Surrey. as the tribsemen. Owing however to the more important operations undertaken in the neighbour- way of the hood Bagh. had a few days previously sent out the following declaration terms to the Khanki Khel Chamkannis :— To pay a fine of Es. On the 27th November Sir William Lockhart himself. No.

. in reporting the inci- Army Head-Quarters. the advance was continued. losing only one man killed. 2 Column under Colonel Gordon. remarked: his — "He (Sir Pratab Singh) had is hand bound up by servant and said nothing on the subject. Central India Horse. No. the l-2nd Gurkhas and the half battalion Scots Fusiliers. and on the morning of December 1st Sir William Lockhart east of Esor (the and Colonel Hill met at Lowarimela. This plucky behaviour on Sir Pratab Singh's part only what might be expected of a man of his race and soldierly instincts. and one field troop Central India Horse. the Yorkshire Regiment. There was at this and on the 29th November Sir Pratab Singh. The enemy occupied a sungar on the line of advance. about a mile had ended period in the disaster to the scene of the unfortunate reconnaissance which three weeks previously Kapurthala picket). the chief village of the Khanki Khel Chamkannis with orders to burn and destroy all villages No. escort then proceeded to burn and Signalling communication was now established . 150 carbines of the 6th Bengal Cavalry dismounted. the Kapurthala Infantry. 2 Column from the west. 2 Maxim guns.m:. was wounded dent his to in the hand. No. a half-company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners. 1 the south and No. 150 carbines of the Central India Horse. The Engineer party with a strong destroy the hamlets. After the meeting of the two columns at Lowarimela the Kurrani Column under Colonel Hill marched towards Thabi. 1 Column on the way. consisting of the 2-4th Gurkhas. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery. much sniping into camp at night time. consisting of the 6th Bengal Cavalry and the 12th Bengal Infantry. 1 Kohat : Mountain Battery. After the neigh- bouring villages had been destroyed by way of reprisal. The l-5th and 2-4th Gurkha scoutscovered the advance of both columns on the left flank." ( 207 ) were No. Extra Aide-de-camp to Sir William Lockhart. . and the advanced guard came under the fire of some sharpshooters occupying the hills beyond but the two Maxim guns took up an excellent position in some scrub jungle on a knoll and kept the enemy's fire under. dismounted. Column advanced upon Thabi from The latter arrived at some outlying hamlets about one mile south and west of Thabi at 9-50 a. The other casualties were seven sepoys wounded. the Scots Fusiliers. and a company of the Queen's Regiment under Lieutenant Engledue speedily dislodged them. Tlie force was divided into two columns under Colonel Money. Gaselee met with no serious opposition Brigadier-General when he crossed the Lozaka Pass at the top of a hill on the 28th November. Sir William Lockhart. and No. and the l-5th Gurkhas.

Richmond Battye and was a young Officer of only eight years' service. On debouching from to the south the defile at Thabi the head of the the- column turned to join Colonel Money.m. severely wounded . of a sound understanding . tliat cohinin to proceed right up the defile to Thabi and hira. in some places not more than 50 yards across. their return march being covered by the Gurkhas (scouts and 2-4th) together with the mountain battery of No. and sepoy Kupurthala Infantry. Column. and while this was being done Lieutenant Richmond Battye of the 6th Bengal Cavalry was killed. alert conscientious in the discharge of his duties. the Infantry. Battye. follower killed. followed by the Maxim guns. with preclitfs on either hand rising to 800 or 1. 2 sepoys Kapurthala Infanti-y . shall die but one this may nevertheless regret the death so early in life of yet another of gallant family. Kapurthala Infantry and the 12th Bengal cipitous The defile was very narrow. appeared on the high ground over the ravine and commenced a heavy fire. 6th Bengal Cavalry. 2 sepoys l-5th Gurkhas. 1 Column. 1 Native Officer and 5 sowars 6th Bengal Cavalry. active. On the rear of the column reaching Colonel Hill the 6th Bengal Cavalry and l-5th Gurkhas retired without further molestation. M.• Lieutenant Villiers Stuart. who were on slope the edges of rice terraces which formed the side of the up which they had to retire to join Colonel Money's Column. 2 sepoys l-5th Gurkhas. who join was with handa with Thabi. l-5th Gurkhas. aud oi'ders were sent by Colonel Hill. eager. It was during this period and among these troops that most of the casualties of the day occurred. Pioneer With reference to the death of Lieutenant Battye.— ( 208 ) •with No. after debouching from the trying defile. following their invariable plan. from the enemy's sharpshooters on the opposite excellent cover The enemy had of being among trees with the additional advantage posted above the Gurkhas and the cavalry. Gurkhas and the came under a hill.000 feet above the bed of the river. and they During the genekilled : retirement the total casualties of No. A little later the fire two companies of the l-5th 6th Bengal Cavalry. also wounded. he being then within one mile of and overlooking Colonel Gordon at once issued orders for the l-5th Gurkhas to proceed. the wrote :— " It is now almost a tradition with the Battyes that all on the battlefield. The l-5th Gurkhas and the 6th Bengal Cavalry at once extended to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the force through the ravine. 1 arrived back in ral camp at Lowarimela about 7-30 p. 1 3 sepoys 12th Bengal Infantry. 2 Column had been Lieutenant R. the 6th Bengal Cavalry. and 1 3 sepoys 12th Bengal Infantry. whereupon enemy.

the operations of the 1st December. and nearly fine. extinguisher) and the Pathans or-mur (fire-extinguisher) but the Cham- kannis have turned over a new and become orthodox Mahomedans." According to Scott. really It is worth adding here that the Chamkannis do not belong either to the Afridi or the Orakzai tribe. but neither the Chamkannis nor the Shaonkanris. ordinarily have any dealings with them. deserves a passing word of notice driven out of their —a people described by Bellew as originating in a heretical sect of Persian Islamites. and his letters Kurram Column some time of the in- and telegrams gave abundant evidence terest he took in his work. including 4 of the Kapurtbala Infantry captured on the 7th Novembei'. Mr. The Massuzai. just described. suificiently great to and prevent his enemies Unlike the Massuzai the Chamkannis were not yet conquered . less troublesome task of moving against the This clan made their submission at once." "While Colonel Hill was engaged in punishing the Chamkannis. He had for acted as correspondent of the Pioneer with the back. General Gaselee had the Massuzai. claim proprietary rights over the whole Kharmana basin. Love-feast' of more modern in putting out the lights at a stage of the religious performances in which both sexes joined indiscriminately. own country by is constant persecution on account of their peculiar religious ceremonies and immoral proceedings. 200 square miles in area. a pastoral race in the upper part of the district. and as they readily rifles paid up 67 breech-loaders.( 209 ) and full of a generous enthusiasm for his profession. their villages for all their share of the Orakzai the most part were spared. During the disturbances on the Kohat-Kurram border Chamkannis and Massuzai had made British Government. The Persians leaf called it chiragk-kush (lamp. They are a distinct race in Across and but little is known as to their origin. though Chikkai common cause against the — the " Umra Khan " of the district in hostilities — had remained loyal to his promise not to take part had kept together a following from molesting him. and consisted One of the stories against them ' not altogether without a savour of the sects in ICngland . best land in the zai Oi'akzai into the it is supposed that the Chamkannis held most of the Valley. having only served to . Oliver the Border refers to the Koh and then goes on to say more powerful mountaineers on the upper slopes of the Safed "The petty settlement of Chamkannis. : dropped in amongst them. in fact. but were pushed back by the Massu- Kharmana wilder and colder tracts to the west.

Our casualties were Major Vansittart. Donald. but struck out south-east. but were The column on this occasion consisted of a wing of the Queen's. the heights overlooking by Captain Lucas. a wing of the 3rd Sikhs. No opposition was encountered. and the enemy turned out otf at the in great force to oppose him. having by this second operation been thoroughly broken. by of further chastisement. William Lockhart. kiUcl 2 men of the 5th Gurkhas. some 30 bodies being left behind. it The power of the Chamkannis.- wounded . comply with all ing up to Mr. having thus fully accom- plished his object in making the detour. the 2-4th Gurkhas. to The Orakzai were completely cowed and hastened the terms previously imposed upon them. 5th Gurkhas. be stormed by the Gurkha scouts led enemy were killed and wounded. entering Khanki and Mastura Valleys at their upper extremities and sweep- ing through the principal settlements of the Orakzai. deliverthe Political Officer. Sir William Lockhart was able to leave Colonel Hill in secure his command to of the Kurram country and turn In returning own attention once again the Tirah Afridis. the Kohat Mountain Battery. Thabi on the west having first to Many of the : . Accordingly. 200 men of the 5th Gurkhas. 2 men of the 3rd Sikhs. Sir 317 rifles and 22. >< .250 Government of the rupees. such as was. carried out in the face of strong opposition.( 210 way ) increase their ire. slightly wounded. with his column to the main body of his troops in the Maidan Valley he did not follow the direct route over the Lozaka Pass by which he had the moved into the Kuiram Valley. and Gurkha scouts. returned to Maidan by way Chingakh Pass and reached Bagh on the 6th December. The work of destruction was this time completely beaten point of the bayonet. Sir William Lockhart sent Colonel Hill to Thabi again on the 2nd December.

As regards the road itself. and in the result out of the transport of the whole 2nd Division only 15 animals were lost on the road. offered striking evidence of what the to difficulty of the road had been before the Sappers and Pioneers got work on it. but probably prevented other hill men from breaking it. the track. . proceeded in two brigades. after being further divided. The tactical difficulties besetting the route from Bagh to Dwatoi had been in a great measure removed by the fact that the Malikdin Khels. Without any Valley of the further delay the combined movement into the Bara Main Column in Maidan and the Peshawar Column at Bara was now begun. had been told that their houses.( '^n ) CHAPTER XIII. It will be convenient to follow first the march through Eajgul of General Yeatman-Biggs's Division with Sir William Lockhart — a march which has been severely criticised. nothing could have prevented large losses of men and animals had the Malikdin Khels been resolutely hostile. would be spared the valley was unopposed. and our progress down who therefore not only kept the peace themselves.E. 4 Company Madras and one company Bombay Sappers had been at work on it.the 2nd Division under General Yeatman-Biggs with the Divisional troops and staff being taken by Sir William Lockhart himself through the Rajgul Valley vid Dwatoi. Their neutrality was a most important military precautions were neglected factor. had been greatly improved. the village of Barkai being the common objective. though still difficult. Sir William Lockhart's Column did not make the march en »nat»e. for although of course no by either column. though the number of dead ponies and mules which had fallen into the bed of the stream from the rocks above during the reconnaissance made by General Westmacott's Column to Dwatoi on the 22nd November. while the 1st Division under General Symons. THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN COMPLETED. with the 28th Bombay Pioneers. who had partially complied with our terms. No.. which are large and if solid and amply stocked with grain and forage.. where the two columns were to join hands. the one under Brigadier-General the other under Brigadier-General Hart through the Waran Valley and Gaselee through the Mastura Valley. Major Kelly. and by the time the 3rd Brigade marched forward on the 8th December. R.

5 Bombay Mountain Battery Eoyal Artillery. arrived at Dwatoi about 11a. without any till about 2 and then only gleams broke the gloom. and the advance of the remainder of Brigadier-General Kempstei^'s Brigade was much delayed in consequence. but had halted about half-way to Dwatoi. of the hill about 100 rifles of the 36th Sikhs. On the 8th December No. the enemy suffering considerably. sun last miles. so great and then could only advance about three was the congestion of traffic on the narrow path ahead baggage did not get into camp. was on the march from 8 and the Bagh. Van Someren wnth gallant behaviour and The enemy was very quickly 1 dislodged with a loss on our side of killed and 4 wounded. The 3rd Brigade (General Kempster's) began its march from Bagh a. rushed into the camp with the hope up food and grain. This hill was taken in gallant style by the infantry: Lieutenant West with the Gurkhas and Lieutenant the 36th Sikhs distinguishing themselves by their skilful leading. and hardly had the last troops begun to evacuate the camp at Bagh when unarmed men of the Malikon the 8th December about 7-30 din Khels with women and children. the brunt of the attacks being borne by the King's Own Scottish Borderers. so that a proportion of them were on duty for nearly 36 hours. and showing every sign of picking of being famine-stricken.m. till very nearly 11 P. There was some slight opposition when the leading troops reached Dwatoi. the total casualties that day being 2 killed and 2 wounded. so much so that when night fell the head of the brigade had only covered about four miles and had then to halt for the night.m. The 3rd Brigade commissariat godowns had marched on ahead with the 4th Brigade the previous day. The rear portion of the brigade. and some of them were on picket duty the same night and were employed again on the 8th December. with feet wet and cold from fording and . a rather forlorn expectation. and about the same number 3rd Gurkhas and the 5th Gurkha scouts were employed to seize a lield by the enemy whence the pickets had been tired on and commanding the entrance to Rajgul Valley.. . about three miles from a.M.( 212 ) left The head-quarters of tlie 4th Brigade (General Westmacott's). comprising two field hospitals. p.m. and the long standing about. The day was fitful cold and raw. but the pickets guarding the heights round the camp were fired at during the night of the 7th December and attempts were made to rush them.m. to 9 p. which was easily brushed aside.m. which Bagh at daybreak on the 7th December. The 3rd Gurkhas had exceptionally heavy work all day..

viz.m. The 4th Brigade marched about eight miles that day to a camp at Shundana. if much moi-e so tlian they had been on the march throughout. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery and No.. shooting one man of the Royal Scots Fusiliers dead in the ranks as the company was falling in on the camping ground. for they had opposed the advance even at still Dwatoi and of more strongly any further progress up their valley. The Bara Valley at its upper end is wide and the going was easy. that the casualties numbered only four: while on the other hand immense damage was done Kuki Khel property. Fusiliers. inflicting considerable tion of villages lo. were the troops handled by Brigadier-General to the Westmacott. of This clan had apparently abandoned their intention course resisted submitting the moment the troops appeared at their door. for no rain had in Brigadier-General fallen. who inhabit the Rajgul Valley.ss on the enemy. two companies King's Bombay Bombay West- Own Scottish Borderers. had to be constantly forded and re-forded. On the 10th December the movement down theBara Valley began. which was very chilly. accompanied by Sir William Lockhart. mainly of the 4th Brigade of the (Brigadier-General Westmacott's). On the 9th December some troops. four companies of the 28th Pioneers. vated country and dry rice-fields were quite practicable. followed by Brigadier-General Kempstei^s Brigade some two hours later. and Brigadier-General Kemspter's Brigade marched about live miles to a camp near Karana. The 3rd Brigade resumed last of the troops its march fairly early next day (the 9th). So admirably. two companies 36th Sikhs. No. of the . Fowke. all under the command of Brigadier-General macott. The enemy began to fire from long ranges the moment the troops prepared to move off. and the stream. There were no casualties in the 3rd Brigade either on the 8th or 9th December. 5 Mountain Battery. and movements across the cultiThe casualties Westmacott's Brigade that day numbered seven.( 213 ) re-fording the icy stream svas very trying to the men. The day was miserably cold. The 4th Brigade with Divisional Staff and Sir William Lockhart marched first. however. the two companies Royal Scots' 3rd Gurkhas. the scouts of the 5th Gurkhas. the reaching camp about 4 p. five: and in the 3rd Brigade not including Tieutenant F. two com- panies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry. without sun. moved up the Rajgul Valley and destroyed all the houses in the centre of the valley. This destruchad been provoked by the renewed hostility of the Kuki Khels. some 60 in number.

M. catch up the 4th Brigade. and every endeavour was made to keep the transport in the river-bed and to prevent the mule-drivers taking short cuts across country and so getting entangled in heavy ground or in deep-water channels. vis. rain was and the ground was deep in mud. the 4th Brigade for reasons which have yet to transpire. pressed the rear-guard and flanks of the baggage from the first. still falling steadily. and it were the descents that animals were falling about was nearly 11 a. and the cold and wet combined with the constant fording of the the mule-drivers and followers of their senses and to leave them with one idea only. and to guard the flanks of the line of march.. flying and to es- cape the enemy's bullets constantly extraordinary scenes ensued. and who had not dug trenches. of transport however. severely wounded on picket duty in fall the evening. uncomfortable surprise: rain in fact came so as a had threatened really most unpleasant and long that the soldiers had begun to think it would not come after all. and in consequence these heights had to be captured and crowned by troops The enemy of the 3rd Brigade which greatly delayed the advance. The moment. quite regardless of how their animals or their loads were getting on. Alxiut 9 P. the followers wei^e benumbed with cold. before the last animals were drawn off the hill. ral halts in order to close over their heads. Some send out fresh troops to Brigadier-General Kempster called seveup the transport and rear -guard. the wave swept on after it like a pent-up stream suddenly released. to press along as fast as possible. besides which the means of getting down from the camping ground. . that night a cold drizzling rain began to and occasioned great discomfort to those who were The it sleeping on the ground. which was on high ground.. and so slippery to the river-bed below.m. and that the day (the 11th) at whole division should continue the march united..m. To add to all these troubles. were very inade- on all sides. the head of the colunm moved on. spreading .( 214 ) Dorseta. quate. All these circumstances unfortunately delayed the start. the the mist which prevailed enabling them to creep close up unobserved ground except in the stony bed of stream was heavy and yielding and stream seemed to deprive quite unlike that traversed the previous day. early next It had been intended that the 3rd Brigade should start 7-30 a. did not picket the heights on the flanks of the 3rd Brigade. But the next morn- ing was very dark indeed. as the latter had expected them to do. and moreover there was no company of Sappers and Miners with General Kempster's Brigade.

the 3rd Brigade had now been following the 4th General Kempster could Brigade for four days in succession and fighting a continuous rear-guard action during the last two days. certainly not less than four miles an hour so eager presumably were to a fire. As the other camp. and others madly followed them so that everywhere were animals either bogged. pressed on blindly. intact. but hopelessly impossible to those in rear. the fact remains that the order was given to press on and gain the 4th Brigade Camp. the drivers to get in to the next camp and settle the rain was still down for falling incessantly.m. and if now to overhaul General Westmacott the order of march might be reversed. sometimes all jostled together on a front of 100 yards and sometimes all spread out to a width of over 800 yards. despite every endeavour on the part of the Transport Officers to stop them. were with the animals. Brigadier-General Kerapster decided to push on. but whatever baggage little had no special escort or guard with it ran very chance of reach- ing the next camp transport was on a Where the going was fairly easy. and the drabi could then be stopped. an order very welcome to the leading troops. seemed to be gaining first. and the broad front. animal : while the drabi. The additional march was easily accomplished by the troops of . provided he had only the leading animal of his three following him.( 2lo ) out sometimes to a front of half a mile or more. the flanking and picket duties would be lessened and the men enabled get more rest. every blindly forward. Whether or not these were the reasons which actually influenced Brigadier-General Kempster's decision. . and every follower must have the head of the main column of 4th Brigade General Kempster's Brigade arrived in sight of the Camp. British or native. and he had the option of either going on and joining that brigade or halting where he was for the night. About 5 p. seemed near and as the mass of his transport advantage that Avas reported close up. all man pushing and all anxious to avoid fording the river. deep. however. though usually only by main force ." Officers present could not Those who took short cuts across country. or with the chain broken between them and the leading ground at . it moved at a most extraordinary pace. in places kneeacting on the principle of "each man for himself and the Twenty times the number of Transport have controlled this seething mass: it was an indescribable jumble. been wet to the skin. devil take the hindmost. on the other hand. it still This had the dis- further lengthened an already very long march. Where soldiers. the situation was of course different. or slipped up in ditches with their loads under them. but. all unconscious or reckless of everything else.

or rather the bottom of the dhooiie used as a stretcher.) as he was retiring and while still some two miles from camp. Darkness now came on rapidly. a party of Gordon Highlanders with got to who about helpless in the camp. came upon a large drivers number of transport animals entangled in cold. who had been escorting and carrying some wounded whom the fatigued were the dhoolie bearers had deserted. . road to camp was a bee-line for the lights of the camp. and heavy firing had continued for some minutes. the difficult to see. course were leading most of and many of the drabis stupidly made Those drabis who took this rash the animals and loads which eventually start. and an animal once involved was not to be easily extricated. and about three companies of the 1 -2nd Gurkhas. mind and judgment decided on seizing some houses and camp unless the animals and Major Downman with holding them for the night. while some kahars either broached a keg of rum or found one already broached and got hopelessly drunk: three of those camp dying from the effects of intoxication. for the ground. and the gallant Medical Oflicer. and others lying Heavy firing could be heard just outside camp. of the 3rd Brigade. who was the senior Officer with the last portion of the rear-guard. the rain continued. brought all the wounded up to his hospital without further hurt. but fortunately no damage was done. Gordon Highlanders. Surgeon-Major Beevor. and then to everyone's in- tense relief finally stopped. and between 7 and 8 p. their animals. that Surgeon-Major Beevor himself had helped to carry one man's stretcher. At that moment several of the enemy had crept up in the dark to within 20 yards and fired at the party. ditches with their to press benumbed with and Meanwhile the enemy began closely on the rear flanks. which was easy at the was afterwar-ds intei'sected with deep water-courses nearer the camp. half a company of the 2nd Punjab Infantry. one company of the Gordons. that night. of Many drivers deserted and many followers disappeared into houses in search wood. most of wlioui arrived in still camp just before but the transport and rear-guard had to come. Major Downman. rain. Once in those houses the enemy's attacks and shelter was gained from the ever falling which continued till 9 p. •were very easily repulsed. &c. arrived in camp. who had lent such valuable moral and physical assistance.( 21G ) the advance-guard and main column dusk .m. (consisting of one company of the Dorset Regiment. got lost..m. So men who were carrying their wounded comrades. To go on to were left presence of where they were was impossible.

The troops came in by 11 a. and the help he was able to render to his brother Medicial Officers and the benefits he conferred on wounded men were enormous. on whom the enemy had made continual attacks at daybreak. were dressing the wounded. and 4 men and 9 wounded in killed and wounded in the Gordons. No. All day on the 12th December Surgeon-Major Surgeon-Captain Marder. Kegiment. wounded men on the night He had come out to India for a year was attached to this hospital. and 2 killed the l-2nd Gurkhas. for no sooner had one case been in. since 400 men were still some three miles behind on rear-guard duty and probably encumbered with wounded. despite the fact that a unit like this has a much fewer number the of Non-Commissioned Officers and men pains to in proportion to animals than any other unit. 24 British Field Hospital. without further losses. as had been previously intended. many animals and followers were missing.m. and one unit alone had lost as many as 50 animals. besides many followers. to in connection with his gallant Bourke personally Surgeon-Major Beevor. The all Medical Officer in charge of this hospital had taken extraordinary make in efficient.• ( 217 ) To contemplate a resumption of the march early next day from 2nd Division were now en- Sher Khel. in order to experiment with the Rontgen rays. Hampshire (his arm was afterwards amputated) . under Surgeon-Lieutenant- Colonel Bourke. previously referred conduct in helping to carry the of the llth. The casualties in the 3rd Brigade on the 11th and the : early morning of the 12th amounted altogether to between 30 and 40 and included Captain Norie. severely wounded. Between 100 and 150 transport animals with their loads were missing. the third Medical Officer with this Beevor and hospital. was clearly out of the question so far as the 3rd Brigade were concerned. Transport 11 Officer. where most of the troops of the camped. very severely wounded Lieutenant Williams. killing one and wounding three of the Gordons in a single volley. At an early hour Brigadier-General Kempster went out with two battalions and a battery to help to bring in Major Downman's troops. and many followers were lying about like logs hopelessly drunk. and not only did the wounded under circumstances receive every attention and constant food and care. from England. where he was one of the Medical Officers attached to the Brigade of Guards. l-2nd Gurkhas. only lost three animals altogether. dealt with than another was brought . but the disciplinary and transport arrangements were equally excellent — due to the fact that Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel superintended everything.

An attempt had been . basked in the genial rays. but though the sun was warm. unlike the march and 11th December. The Sappers had greatly improved the roads out of camp. and also under the The road is fire of a machine gun. the 4th Brigade. macott personally superintended the fighting all through the day. the morning of the 12th its and seldom has December the sun shone out brightly warmth been more appreciated. and some followers and animals were hit. Scottish Borderers being on one flank and the 36th Sikhs on the other whilst the half-battalion Royal Scots FusiBrigadier-General Westliers moved behind the last of the baggage. All the afternoon and evening there was continual camp. and the 3rd Brigade moved off at 7-30 . which were ably crowned and held by flanking detachments from Brigadier-General Kempsters Brigade. . The enemy and an began to King's fire before the troops had left camp. and thus greatly facilitated the progress of the latter. along the bed of the river for about three miles. and the Afridis came under a heavy cross fire while in the water. picketing the heights on the flanks of the rear brigade. On 13th December the march from Sher Khel was resumed. and then leaves the stream up a very steep ascent on the left bank and passes through undulating country covered with scrub jungle. one Afridi with a Lee-Metford the ritle being particularly aggressive. Own Scottish Borderers were killed in the 3rd equal number Gurkhas. and the ultimate success of the day was largely due to this. The leading brigade met with had perhaps the heaviest practically no opposition. Brigadier-General Westmacott's bringing up the of the 10th On this occasion. to Barkai. and wet clothes and blankets were spread out to dry and soldiers. Everywhere .( 218 ) On attain. not even excluding the operations related in the preceding chapter. sunshine since the 2nd December. with very high hills on the left flank. The enemy's intention in crossing the river was evidently to try and get at the left flank of the baggage. to a place called Gali Khel. and five animals in the whilst loading up . the idea being to move rather more than half-way a. and their losses were very heavy. remaining always with the rearmost troops. British There had been no such day of native. there firing into was a very cold wind. but the 4th Brigade rear-guard fighting that had hitherto occurred in the campaign. The enemy showed great boldness and followed across the river but the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the 3rd Gurkhas were lining the banks above.m. the front brigade performed the task of rear. The latter regiment acted as rear- guard at first. the King's Own .

Bayonets were fixed and the rush repelled with loss. as no water might back . but the mule-driver went on with the one mule. Seeing how far the 4th Brigade Camp was. for from the 12th December till the arrival at Barkai. tried regiments. The foi'ce at General Westmacott's disposal was becom- ing much reduced. actually to take mules over a high stone wall the leading mule scrambled over. a whole regiment being behind the 3rd Brigade baggage at startAll this ing and a half-battalion at the head of the 4th Brigade. and especially so on the 14th December. and he had towards dusk only some 200 of the Northampton Regiment and about 150 each of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. for the river-bed was very wide. it came into the 3rd Brigade camp near Sher The 4th Brigade hospital baggage especially had got far and when dusk fell all the hospitals in the division. kahars and dhnhlie-h&'AYQVs had to be almost entirely replaced by fighting men. having marched some seven or eight miles and as the 4th Brigade were hotly engaged and could not make such a long march.M.. the 36th Sikhs.m. their kits were on ahead and they had the prospect of continued 9 P. but Lieutenant West of the 3rd Gurkhas was shot dead. or to the front could be collected of them. probably thankful enough that he had a stone wall between himself and the flying bullets. many till casual- The enemy continued firing on the pickets about and the troops had no water beyond the little remaining in their bottles. to press very heavily after the river-bed had been and casualties were frequent each casualty taking away several men from the fighting line. the 3rd Gurkhas and the Royal Scots Fusiliers. be obtainable. cases . and ties occurred.. and hardly had he halted than the enemy made a rush. tirinf in rear however. The folwhat lowers had largely absented themselves. had in many and no water was obtainable came in empty. the coupling chain broke. was in vain. and the heavy made the mule-drivers press on regardless of conroads or sequences. though all warned before starting to carry full water bottles. but much of Kamar. . About 4 p. . the head of the 3rd Brigade halted and encamped. neglected to take this precaution in and even pakkal mules some cases To return to the 4th Brigade. the other two hung back. men an followers. The enemy continued left. his even mules. One driver . the Divisional Staff tried to stop the 4th Brigade baggage travelling beyond a camp two miles further . he decided to halt for the night on a convenient ridge. had congregated together. < niade to keep the 219 ) 3rd Brigade and 4th Brigade baggage separate.

and despite the enemy's constant endeavours to get round the flanks and attack the baggage. killed. and Captain and Lieutenant Sellar. Having seen the completion of the march of the 2nd Division. through the Mastura and Waran Valley. under General Yeatman -Biggs. same regiment was slightly wounded.( 220 ) this fi^liting next . we have now to follow the less chequered progress of the 1st Division under General Symons. On the 10th December extremely were carried out in the Waran Valley against the Aka Khel Afridis by way of reprisals for their recent attack on General Kempster's rear- guard (described in the previous chapter). and the general opinion seemed to be that the troops had been most admirably handled by Brigadier-General Westmacott during the two days' continuous rear-guard fighting. Kliel on December 13th. the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Hart being in front and the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Gaselee following at a distance of a successful operations day's march. the wounded in both brigades being carried almost entirely by their comrades. Eiver as far as Hissar without meeting with any opposition. out of the scrub jungle. Maconchy. All the 3rd Brigade got into camp in good time but the 4th Brigade had continuous fighting till they were . and they got into their camp just before dusk. and the head of the 3rd Brigade was soon in contact with the advanced troops of General arrived at Hammond's Column which had already Barkai from Bara. 4th Sikhs. they had the satisfaction of knowing that in the last few days at any rate the enemy's losses had much exceeded their own. it A rest than those of the 3rd and 4th Brigades lost was now ordered and never had troops better deserved and though the division . The whole division marched down the Mastura to the same objective. were severely wounded. The losses during about 70 and in addition to Lieutenant West. The wounded Captain None with his amputated arm most trying time. From the time the brigade left with a further loss of about 10. day. Royal Scots Fusiliers. but all— of the liad a conspicuously— bore their sufferings most patiently. S. W. On a reconnaissance made by Captain E. K. memorable day were Captain Bateman- Champain Short. orders were issued on the evening of the 9th for the 1st Brigade and Divisional troops to . there was practically no loss at all of Camp Sher baggage or animals. The march to Barkai was resumed and completed next day. through the Rajgul and Bara Valleys to Barkai. King's Own Scottisli from the previous day Borderers. had 166 between Bagh and Swai Kot.

Sher Singh. The regihandled by Captain Cox. having all been repaired. could never first have been made by the baggage transport. marched right up to the southern end of the Sapri Pass. who was a lion under Later in the day the 1st Brigade. their accurate fire of the was most effective. and by its Commandant Sirdar fire. The troops were all back in their new camp by 7 p. greatly delighted at having been in action for the ment was well The Nabha Regiment wei-e first time. Our casualties were one Havildar Nabha Imperial Service Infantry killed. ing from the Mastura to the Bara Valley is The Sapri Pass lead- a defile of 11 miles in length which had never been crossed by any European and was quite unknown. The path the whole way through was " commanded " in such a manner as to require but a few of the enemy to make the passage of a force very difficult and dangerous. Fortunately the enemy all failed to take advantage of the After a reconnaissance the companies of Sappers and Miners with the division and a regiment of Pioneers were set to work on the path. commanded by Brigadier-General Hart. was gradual enough and the track a wide. but were prevented from closing at any point. one sepoy of the Nabha Infantry. the damage to these buildings previously inflicted by General Kempster. The Afridis were bold and fired a great deal. and one transport driver wounded. though it looked fairly easy from a distance. glen the ascent. During the day the Zakka Khels from the west joined the Aka Khels. and two privates of the Derbyshire Regiment. and to all. one Bengal Sapper. troops in the valley so skilfully that the General Hart commanded the enemy had no chance. It had been an arduous day. and then watched the proceedings from the The Mullah Saiad Akbar's towers and village were levelled to the ground. and the Divisional troops of the 1st Division. and the successive lines prevented the enemy approaching within effective range. The troops in retirement passed through each other. early next morning. position. and used LeeMetford rifles. well-worn one . if not impossible.( 221 ) cross the range between the Mastura and Waran Valley surprised. Major- General Symons and Staff assisted for four and-a-half hours in passing the troops over the heights. where a halt was called for the night. all under the com- mand of General Symons. as without this preparation the passage. hills.m. For the two miles of the . The Aka Khels were completely and walled houses in the and the whole for a length of of the towers Waran Valley three miles were burnt or blown up. and extra rations and rum were issued The two mountain batteries were particularly well handled.

some of the transport wending also its enemy fired into the line of way down and a mule was killed. The descent for a short distance from the top of the pass on the north side was easy. and by the crossing. but soon tlie gorge became more conti-acted and rocky.( 222 ) but tho last lialf milo \ip to the top was extremely difficult. The drop in elevation feet.. General Hart had bonfires the road. a distance of 11 miles. with half of the force having reached Sapri by nightfall encamped there for the night. dark wooded slopes was very indeed. which was about were beautifully 900 feet above the camp ou the Mastura River.300 With a mass transport animals carrying supplies for the force. collected and the transport that could be passed along down the descent was and parked at Khwaja Khidda. and the rifle In morning when the march through the defile was continued. Under the circumstances it was remarkable that more damage was not done. The rear-guard of the 30th Punjab Infantry had to bivouac on the top of the pass. But the thick weather during the day's halt at Mastura did not permit of survey operations. Boulders of rock had to be blasted and a zigzaf. and tlie advance had to be delayed from time to time to allow of the Sapper companies in front blasting the rocks to clear a path for laden mules. This was the most curious feature of the in the passage difficult and was perhaps unique defile of any military force through a long and over a mountain range. and when fine at dawn the clouds lifted. road made to tlie top. or bivouacking where they were. The hills wooded throughout on the south side. and here and there the way for mules had again to be made by General Symons blasting and clearing a passage over difficult places. from the of top of the pass to Sapri itself was about 2. the long line stretch- ed along the entire road from end to end. while Brigadier-General Hart with such troops fell as could not get beyond Khwaja Khidda when darkness bivouacked there.M. man the^ of the Derbyshire wounded. and it was 5 P. From Khwaja Khidda. before the last of the force was able to make a start. light of these fires the animals were passed along during the dark hours of the night. the first place where there was little water and a open space. fired into The bivouac at Khwaja Khidda was during the night and a of another smashed. The troops started before daybreak on the 11th December. lit at short intervals the whole way down wood luckily being plentiful. At Sapri the troops . the view down the pass showing the snow-covered heights between the steep. There were two casualties among the followers. principally with the evergreen holly ilex. the path continued down the rocky bed of a mountain stream. the remainder of his force coming on by the light of the fires.

and the Sappers and set to Miners were work to make the path of the Mastura River passable for mules. the track left. about four miles. these being the only on. had begun this work on arrival the previous evening. long before dawn. by the light of the moon and later in the morning. who. a very narrow rocky gorge. Brigadier-General Hart with the arriving about 10 p. besides General Symons's Division. very early next morning. but it force it was expected to arrive next day. and the temperature proportionately warmer. The defile the his On the morning of the 12th December General Syraons continued march with the troops that had reached Sapri the previous evenHart following with those that had remained in The road from Sapri. General Symons received orders This sudden move was one of necessity. Shortly after these was brought to notice that the march of the 1st file which. spaces where was possible ground to camp Luckily Sapri at a much lower level than the camp at the Mastura end of the pass. The 2nd Division with Sir William Lockhart had not yet api^eared on the scene. the rear-guard General Symons had reason to congratulate himself and his Division at the very successful crossing of his large and hampered force over one of the most difficult passes in the whole trans-frontier country. would then be collected at a place where supplies had it orders were received Division down the road would block the path by which a single of mules brought up the daily convoy with supplies. Brigadier-General the pass. ran through ing. remainder of the 1st Bi-igade arrived the same evening. to the front as usual on this march. and at the end of it General Symons joined hands with Brigadier-General Hammond. after passing some fields.( 223 ) had to camp is in rice-fields it sodden with the to get level rain. The march was a short one. ascended on to higher ground to the and passing round some low spurs brought the troops along a level and easy road to the new camp ground near Swai Kot just beyond Barkai. half the started. and with General Hammond's would have been difficult to feed more than the three brigades to be brought from India. inquiries regarding a road reported to be used by the A reconnoitring party was sent out.m. whole way down was most picturesque. Eocks had again to be blasted by the Sappers. prepared to puns the night in . On arrival at Mamani. to proceed at once to Bara. On this General Symons made Afridis. down and up the steep banks The Sappers began operations . After crossing a stream. on a 1st Brigade and Divisional troops were new and unknown road.

In the two squadrons of the 11th Hussars every and all the rank-and-file with four exceptions only.( 224 ) liivouac if iinable to get through in the day. though careful not to expose themselves. and Captain . The path became easier and finally led out on to the plain that extends down to Bara. Some men had been unlucky enough to have three or four and the squadrons on arriving at Barkai were still thoroughly The medical returns for the 4th Dragoon Guards were fever-stricken. In fact even the unfortunate in this respect had not fared much worse than had the Peshawar Column. T. On Sunday. as the task originally assigned to column had been to play a waiting game on to Sir William Lockhart's Main Column in Tirah and Peshawar border. under General Bara. were always very alert and allowed no opportunity to pass by of displaying their deadly marksmanship. nearly as bad as those of the division in the Tochi 1 Itli Hussars. October 10th. only two and-a-half miles from Bara. of being able to telegraph that he had practically discovered a new road from Bara to Mamanai and had made General It it as fit for camels as was the road which Hammond had followed over the Gandao Pass. also to repoit at But in addition to much sickness the column had the least one regrettable episode in connection with work of reconnoitring: due to the fact that the tribesmen. in the meantime But the long stay prevent local raids on the at Peshawar and Bara. the part of the road was passed. in The British Cavalry with General so Hammond sniping by particular had a most trying time. though necessarily uneventful in the absence of concerted hostilities. Jones of the 4th Dragoon Guards was sent to reconnoitre the Bara Valley. The constant fighting in Tirah had so completely absorbed public attention that the very existence of a brigade at forgotten. connection with the general concentra- now only remains for us. proved to be no picnic for the troops. had suifered from fever. not much from straggling tribesmen its — though they did not escape this experience and attendant losses — as from the feverish climate of the Peshawar Valley Officer. General Synions thus had the satisfaction on arrival at Ham Gudr. to dispose of the Peshawar Column which. a troop under Captain F. had marched in from movement is alluded to a brief retrospect of the doings of the Peshawar Column from the time it was constituted may be conveniently introduced. however. in tion at Barkai. and before this not very eventful Hammond. Peshawar had been almost As a matter of fact nothing had occurred to direct more than the passing attention to this force. difficult By the assistance of the Sappers and Pioneers. during autumn. attacks.

but as in the case of General Symons's Division and General the stay of the troops at Barkai Hammond's Column Camp was a short one. pending a new projected movement. Littledale. after regretfully learning that. As they reached the end a party about 30 yards distance.( 225 ) Jones. with the consequent necessity of running daily convoys with supplies from Bara. there wei"e no incidents calling for mention except those connected with the difficulty of getting the baggage through the valley. who ordered out Sellar. As for General Hammond's march to Barkai. a purely physical difficulty not enhanced as in the case of General Yeatman-Biggs's Division. trotted through the pass with his advance party. two guns of " K " Battery Eoyal Horse Artillery under Lieutenant Nairn. by fierce hostilities. returned from Barkai to Jamrud. We left Sir William Lockhart with General Yeatman-Biggs's Division on the last stage of his eventful march to Barkai. the whole being commanded by Major hills. leaving his troop at the mouth of the Sanighakhi. two one squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards under Captain companies of the Sussex Regiment under Major Donne. Although this force searched the whole of the neighbouring valley and the adjacent by Sergeant they could find no sign of the enemy. for the Bara Valley was by this time clear of large bodies of the enemy. Corporal Walton and two horses. Commanding at Jamrud. one trooper and a mounted of the Khyber enemy fired a volley at Rifle. fore the troop could get a single shot at them. no employment could be found for them in the Bara Valley. The two bodies were brought worth while to it in Clarke and his party. 4th Dragoon Guards. owing to the entire absence of opposition. The enemy bolted be- Information was immedi- ately sent in to Colonel Sulivan. Captain Jones was hit in two places and Corporal recount other unforwill be easily credited Walton It is scarcely tunate incidents of a less serious nature. consisting of Corporal Walton. besides which the poverty of the surrounding country and its inability to support a large force. On the 15th December the column.m. to camp about in four. killing on the spot Captain Jones. owing to the flight of the enemy. but from what has already been said that the troops were highly delighted when at last the order came for them to move up the Bara Valley and they were thus given a possible chance of getting into action. this time up the Bazar Valley into which the tribesmen had apparently retreated. and eventually returned 2 p. rendered it inexpedient to establish a . and two companies of the Khyber Rifles under Captain Barton.

and on the 4th January the late Commander of the 2nd Division of the Tirah Field Force breathed his last. the South African War. owing weakness. but who had nevertheless courageously persisted in carrying on diflScult the whole of his to increasing of the and responsible of the duties. for British territory. during which he command- ed one of the parties sent in pursuit of Ketchawayo. 1879. "The Commander-in-Chief has it in command from the January 10th Governor-General in India to express to the Army His Viceroy and Excellency's deep regret at the loss which it has sustained in the death of — The following General Oi'der was issued in Calcutta. 1862. and after travelling as far as Peshawar he completely broke down and had to call a halt. where there were already gathered the whole remainder of the Tirah Field Force as well as the Peshawar Column. Major-General Arthur Godolphin Yeat man -Biggs. The record of General Yeatman-Biggs's services covers a period of 37 years.. many weeks his indomitable spirit had triumphed over the : frailty of his body.B. during which he was employed in the following campaigns and military expeditions : —The operations against the Taeping rebels in China. Accordingly a move -was made division found itself and by the 17th December the comfortably ensconced at Bara. C. to give up the struggle and to relinquish the Command 2nd Division Tirah Field Force. Thus the original plan of campaign was at an end. and subsequently .( 22G ) winter camp in this inhospitable region. It proved Day by day as he lay at Peshawar his condition to be " the long halt. who had been in ill-health for some weeks past. Zakka Khel were as It unfortunately happened at this period that General Yeatman- Biggs. The Commander-in-Chief had by this arranged that the gallant General should return to Calcutta and resume the less exacting Command ill of the Presidency District." grew worse until it became first critical and then hopeless. and his high appreciation of the services rendered to the State by that Oflficer. but time he was already too to move back. was at last obliged. task — the —only partially accompto their knees Without a doubt the Orakzai had been brought like the but the more warlike of the Afridi clans fiercely defiant as ever. and the whole of its the Tirah Field Force was back in British territory with task of subjugating the Orakzai and Afridis lished. Those around him understood then for the first time for and how how much he had suffered from broken health all along.

was appointed General Yeatman-Biggs in the Command to the 2nd Division. which ended with the defeat of the tribesmen and the relief of Gulistan. 1897. The .) and the Yorkshire Light Infantry was sent to General Westmacott's Brigade (relieving the Northamptous). —^^ . the 1st Baluch Battalion. and he conducted the operations on the Ublan Pass." Army and distinguished Power Palmer. the In August. Light Infantry. continued in use. Orders were now issued for the breaking up of the Reserve Brigade at Rawalpindi. as the necessity or supposed necessity for maintaining The brigade consisted of the Duke of Cornwall's no longer existed. commanded by Brigadier-General Macgregor it . The will be felt Commander-in-Chief shares the regret which at the premature death of this gallant Sir by the Officer. then threatened by a formidable combination of Afridi and Orakzai tribes. which throughout the Tirah Campaign had been of the greatest service transj^ort and supply. the 2nd Infantry (Hyderabad Contingent) and the Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers but of these the Baluchis had already been despatched to Mombasa. The vacant post filled of Commandant of the Line of Communication was not it up. while the Hyderabad Contingent Infantry had gone to Peshawar. of the Tirah Expeditionary Force he On the formation the 2nd Division. (relieving the Dorsets. the Yorkshire Light Infantry. was appointed to the Command of which he held until a few days before his death. as owing his change of base from Shinawari to Peshawar had now become an easy and simple matter for each General of Division to manage own The Gwalior and Jeypore transport trains. as well as those on the Samana. Tirah Field Force. Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry was now ordered to join General Kempster's Brigade. who had hitherto commanded the Line to succeed of the of Communication. General Yeatman-Biegs of the troops in the Egyptian Campaign of 1882.( 227 ) served as Staflf Officer of the Lydenburg Column against Sekukuni. was entrusted with the command Kohat and Kurtlie ram Valleys.

and Ali Musjid. in any case. the winter quarters of the Zakka No great tribal rising in the Khels. expected. and on account of the scanty numbers to which it has now been reduced owing to fever and sickness been a great previously contracted in the Peshawar Valley. Fort Maude itself and other fortified posts nearer Jamrud had been dismantled and burnt. and. . In concert with this man(leuvre the new plan of campaign also included the despatcli of a punitive force into the Bazar Valley. pleasure to Major-General It has and good fighting Symons to have this extremely well-behaved "West Country Eegiment in his Command. The telegraph posts. who alone of all the Afridi clans seriously menaced the pass. with an escort of a soul was seen in the pass." after his arrival at Jamrud. and the walls in some cases breached. for no avoidable fault of its own. of which a good view was obtained at a distance of about three miles. and General Symons issued a Divisional Order in which " In losing the 1st Battalion Devonshire Eegiment from the : 1st Division theMajor-General Commanding desires to record his great returning to cantonments solely on appreciation of the good services throughout the campaign of this particularly efficient battalion. It was now decided to re-occupy the Khyber Pass. and accompanied by Colonel Aslam Khan. At this period.( 228 ) CHAPTER XIV. were standing. the Khyber was Zakka Khels. Not a The morning Hammond. December 18th. On the 17th December the Peshawar Column marched into Jamrud. General few troops and two companies of the Khyber Eifles under Captain Barton. Political Oflficer in the Khyber. It is the recommendation of the Medical Officers. visited Fort Maude. appeared to be deserted. THE RE-OCCUPATION OF THE KHYBER AND THE EXPEDITION INTO THE BAZAR VALLEY. once Ali Musjid was seized. but with no wire attached. would not presumably be able to do much mischief. the Devonshire Kegiment was recalled he said from the front. followed by General Hart's Brigade (with General Symons) the same day and by General Gaselee's Brigade the next day. The road through the pass was in very good condition. with one or two exceptions. and for this purpose General Symons's Division and General Hammond's Column were ordered to concentrate at Jamrud.

but the wily Afindi. true gorge of its riverside position.m. below the isolated conical hill on which the Fort stands. only to find it empty. however. which had never been rebuilt. The advanced guard started about 7 a. up to which point the hills on the flanks had been previously crowned by Captain Barton's Khyber Rifles. which had. but deserted by way further on the advanced guard entered the the Khyber. halted. .: ( 229 ) This reconnaissance being entirely favourable. left all the woodwork burnt. but the outer walls were not so seriously damaged as had appeared at first sight in the breaches in the front wall as seen from below being those made the original wall. Besides the Fort. by our guns in 1878. and nothing standing but blackened crumbfloor ling walls. which commences at Ali Atusjicl and passing A short . to A the company of the 9th Gurkhas was sent up occupy the Fort till arrival of the 45th Sikhs. Considerable damage had been done to Fort Ali Musjid. been used as a magazine. round Not man was camp life seen nor a Once the camp was marked out. took up the duty of sending out flanking parties and occupied all important points right up to Ali Fort Maude the village of Lala Musjid. the units soon got their tents up. evidently thinking it was likely to contain something of value had gone for it at once. preparations were made for the advance upon the Khyber. After leaving Fort Maude the 9th Gurkhas. everything all was dismantled. and had to bivouac outside. the roofs fallen in. who were on rear-guard. In one room the concrete had been picked up to uncover an old well-shaped excavation. and proceeded in road formation as far as Fort Maude. so that occupy them found the loopholes out of all reach. and the a Staff Officers flat proceeded to lay out the camp on the low spurs and the bordering the river on the east of the Fort. who acted as advanced guard to the column. and the ordinary routine of was once more in full swing. by a which leads on to a plat- form raised some four had feet from the level of the ground. It had been covered in by us because a child had accidentally fallen in and been killed. lying peacefully in the sunshine in its inhabitants. there are circular blockhouses on the these are entered from the outside commanding ladder. and the walls are loopholed at a convenient height above the platform. points near at hand . also been dismantled These blockhouses the pickets sent up to and the doors and" platforms burnt. shot fired the whole day. About two miles beyond Cheena was passed on the left. Inside. previous to our occupation of the Khyber. and on the 22nd December the Peshawar Column received orders to march out next morning.

five from the Peshawar Column. Khyber. A few shots were Meanwhile the 1st fired here. four companies of the 9th Gurkhas and the 45th and guarded that flank for them as far The 45th Sikhs found some 30 men on the extreme right and drove them off. Walls had been left standing. into the Bazar Valley Pass. — the 2nd Brigade. the whole place had been column on December which he covered without dis- mantled inside. consisting of a wing four guns No. Sikhs. but eveiy bit of woodwork of it had been removed or burnt. it was then 4 p. late Political his property. as the pass. all much very . After seeing the 1st Division well started on its way to the Bazar Valley. This was a busy day for the Peshawar Column there : were parties out killings in four to different directions. A -wina.( 230 ) On tlie 24th December the 1st and 2nd Brigades arrived at ^li Musjid from Jamrud. Brigade had hardly got two miles from camp.. the 1st and 2nd Brigades On Christmas Day. but without inflicting any damage. by William Lockhart accompanied the 2nd Brigade. The house Officer in the of Captain Barton. General Hammond himself pushed on to the pass with the Sappers and Miners and blew up the towers of Alachi village. of the Innis. and went into camp on the low fjronnd about Lahi Cheena. held the hills on the right companies Sappers and Miners. and the troops wei-e obliged to spend a cheerless Christmas night in the hills. to reconnoitre the hills on the right of the road to the Alachi Pass. but not without loss. for one man was mortally •wounded. on the went bv the force Chura Kandao Sir the Alachi Pass. cold and exposed. Geneial Hammond marched his 26th to Landi Kotal. with a view to finding a way by which General Hammond's Column could move next day. As at Ali Musjid. meetincf any opposition. went out crown the heights in for the incoming brigades a wing of the Oxfords went out to form a covering party to the 34th opening out the roads that the two . and the 1st Brigade. a distance of 10 miles. Pioneers who were engaged brigades were to take next morning a party of 100 a men from each regiment with the Sappers and Miners went out to blow up the Lala Cheena towers and bring of in two companies of the 9th wood and forage and a fourth party Gurkhas went out w'ith Captain Barton . the transport ahead was badly blocked. and two others were severely and one slightly wounded. so as to cover the right flank of the 1st Brigade in its projected advance into the Bazar Valley. on the right. A of the Oxfords. tive expedition commenced their punileft.m. was a wreck . 3 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery.

Pending the final reply from the Zakka Khels. at first fairly open. cattle. letters. but Khyber villages were empty. 3 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery and the 9th Gurkhas. isolated peaks so placed as to render . household goods. nothing but bare walls being In subsequently de- stroying villages the column came across ton's property. The caravan and the blockhouse had been treated left. Column first arrived at Landi Kotal the Khyber Zakka Khels was uncertain. but the valley soon contracts it and flanked by high. General Hammond set forth on the 27th December with the 57th Field Battery Royal Artillery. four guns No. many small bits of Captain Bararticles of furniture. or hidden in caves. who wished to Empty ammunition boxes were also found. to deploy the field battery. and also to picket daily the high ridge under which the road runs through the Saddu Khel country. and they had been given till the 28th December to accept or refuse our terms. had of course been removed. craggy. practically all the no doubt by the original thief. and stray but nothing of value was recovered. Gurkhas into line. and that they should pay the sum of nine thousand rupees as a money tine. agricultural implements and such like having been taken away to unknown fastnesses in the high hills. The road to the pass runs through defile is a in the hills. They had been rifles which were that they should pay up half the taken by them in the late attack on the Forts. and Captain Barton took advantage of their compliance to make them picket the hills to the north of camp and safeguard it by day and night from that direction.( 231 ) valuable. first only reply was to send back for reserve ammunition. When the Peshawar attitude of the offered terms. and bring up the Two companies of the Gurkhas were then extended and sent round to flank the villages. which was found in a nullah^ placed there avoid recognition. and everything portable had been oorai carried ofiF. in addition to the half of those demanded as a fine (154 rifles) and should give hostages for the payment of the other half. and the malihs sent word General Hammond's want to fight. to reconnoitre the Bori Pass. in a similar mannei'. such as books. except his tum-tum. which runs between the Khyber and the Bazar Valley and from which General Symons's Division was expected to emerge on its return from the Bazar Valley. The Shinwaris had at once accepted the terms offered them and were therefore not to be reckoned with. but if the troops approached their they had 4('0 men there and would resist. This movement necessitated passing close to the Saddu Khel villages. villages commanding heights were occupied and the force advanced through the and up the pass unmolested. that they did not villages.

and by carrying off five miles of telegraph wire and breaking down the posts. therefore. General Hammond at the camp at Landi the enemy. and the troops move out. On the 30th December the Oxfordshire Regiment. and hurried The 34th Pioneers were sent to the- occupy the villages on the right. for the Zakka Khels were well armed and were good shots. December 28th. it The route is in fact impracticable.( 232 ) impossible to efficiently command the flanks. They sniped at the troops almost incessantly and also destroyed the all telegraph lines with such persistence that attempts at repairs had to be given up for the time being. ceased. four companies of the Oxfords. The next day. with an accurate knowledge and of the range of every prominent object. partly to forage. The tribes had not come in. retiring off the hills. seized. Every day . became seriously engaged with About 5-30 p. He found the Oxfords. who were out on serious misadventure. when first attacked had taken cover in a deep nullah which proved to be also . and between precipitous rocks about 100 feet high. the force moved out. still At fifty a distance of ahout three miles from the pass the valley further contracts. and partly to guard outgoing the regular villages and incoming convoys and operations of this nature continued tO' form programme of work for many days afterwards. and under cover of the reinforcements which he had brought General Hammond withdrew the Oxfords and the Gurkhas from the It appeared that the Oxfords villages. were destroyed. but on the contrary had added to their list of offences by shooting a sepoy of the 9th Gurkhas did not about during the night. •who were crowning the furthest heights towards Ali Musjid and had to- form the rear-guard to the retirement. and more forage of the country. occupying points on the flanks as he advanced. as well as 20 men of the Inniskillings and one company had of the 9th Gurkhas (who had been left on flanking heights All firing to co-operate with the retirement) holding three villages.m. On the 29th. and General Hammond with remainder pushed on. nor can be improved. met with a After seeing the dak through and completing the day's work. was wet and cold. and the path runs through a gorge about one hundred and yards in len^^th so narrow as to be impassable for a laden mule. convoy duty. Kotal received a report that the rear-guard was hard pressed and in need The troops in camp were at once spread out smartly to the scene of action. partly to punish the tribes for their presumption. close outside the entrenchments. but not witliout loss. of reinforcements.

General quite close. that the whole moveAient was countermanded. Commanding. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. whence the Gurkhas would have driven them back. : Caj^tain C.— — ( 233 ) exposed it to the enemy's fire. but the weather was so inclement with rain. Later the same day Major Hickman of the 34th Pioneers. severely wounded : one Sergeant. carried safely back to camp. 200 of the 9th Gurkhas were to start out into the hills early and get into position over the Bori Pass by daylight while the rest of the troops demonstrated over the villages at the pass. in clearing the caves and destroying the goods some shots were fired at General Hammond fell and the group with him. Lieutenant R. and further loss would have been inflicted on any line of retreat they might have taken. when retiring. R. The eifect would have been to drive the mouth of the enemy up the pass. The Gurkhas started at 4 a. wounded: Lieutenant- Colonel F. and as it was found impossible to get away the till killed and wounded became one necessary to occupy the villages Kotal. and after this date little or no forage was found in any of the villages. 34th Pioneers. was shot through the heart by a stray bullet a distance of 800 vards. The Zakka Khels. sleet and snow. Plowden. H. It had been intended to surprise the villagers on the morning of the 3rd January. : Hammond's Orderly Officer. Sergeant-Major Dempsay four Sergeants and six privates. The day's Some shots were also fired at the troops casualties were ivounded .A. so that nothing fell into the ammunition and accoutrements hands of the enemy. went up the Tsera Nullah to examine some caves nightly occupied by the enemy. C. and one private. but viortally wounded : Not only were all rifles. Owen. and one follower. covered by a wing of the Inniskillings and Oxfords.. Several bullets R.. who was fired in command of a picket party guarding the road between Ali Musjid and Landi Kotal.rei-s thereupon bolted. Parr. setting fire to the bhoosa stocks.• Lieutenant Hammond . from . and while the troops were engaged of Officers standing L). the dead and wounded were brought in. The same day General Hammond. severely ivounded . and one hit Lieutenant H. Household goods were found in the caves. one Lance-Corporal.m. one sepoy. reinforcements arrived from Landi The casualties in the Oxfordshire Regiment were : ktllei : Sergeant. Hammond. The dhoolte-hea. awakening at took the extreme measure of last to the daily seizure of their bhoosa. were again employed in On New Year's Day most of the troops blowing up towers and in foraging.

The 1st Division will miss their and good qualities of comservices. it homes except caves Tliey must have been cold. The blowing up of their villages was a far greater loss to the Khyber Zakka Khels than to those of the Bara and Bazar Valleys. for was now very frost. and General Symons in part" The General : — Commanding the 1st Division. and in leaving it the Peshawar Column in possession of Landi Kotal and Ali " has only to be mentioned that from this date the to exist. Commanding the Maler Kotla Sappers. desires to record his appreciation of the good services and soldier-like demeanour of these corps. General Symons in the name of the whole Division begs to thank them for their incessant and hard work. the suffering con- siderable distress. Commanding the Nabha Regiment. of which we left in the at the mouth two passes leading into the Bazar Valley. the force Peshawar Column " nominally ceased till under General Hammond then so styled being re-named the " 5th Brigade of the Tirah Field Force. zeal. for the Khyber men stay in the pass all the year round. the tribesmen having apparently crossed over the hills into the Bazar Valley. is The Major.General's especial approbation due to Commandant Sardar These Sher Singh. pre- pared to strike another blow at the Zakka Khels and their villages of Before the advance was continued the Imperial Service Troops with the Division. and quite equal throughout the campaign to that of the best of our native troops." We now return Khyber refuge. Their discipline and good behaviour have been beyond reproach. Officers have displayed intelligence. mand. and to Commandant Sardar Meter Khan. as their ing with them issued the following complimentary order OflScer work was over. received orders to return to their respective States. as the men of the 1st were anxious to avenge the recent losses of the 2nd Division . always cheerfully performed. do not migrate. who throughout the Tirah Campaign had acquitted themselves with very great credit. thermometer at night time registering 13 degrees of The Musjid story of the re-occupation of the Khyber is now complete. and they all leave with congratulations and good wishes.( 234 ) On January 5th a foraging party went out as usual but failed to findl any sign of the enemy. to General Symons's Division." It was a great disappointment in force in to the troops under General Symons not to find the enemy Bivi-sion the Bazar Valley. and not a single shot was fired. and have no other in the hills.

He then went to his company's bivouac to get some food and then to the hospital to have his dressed. who were were engaged warmly for 2^ hours. but the Alachi route proved difficult. and Colonel . and to picket the so as to assist in protecting General Gaselee's left bank Column returning from as usual. were heavily engaged for several hours. lost 3 killed and 3 wounded. there were ten of The great difficulty was to get the pickets down safely: them all pinnacled on the stejo locky hills. A. Brigade they transferred The Eoyal Sussex Regiment. and men. During were for the most part admirably handled. and assisted in carrying the dhoolie all the way back to the camp. General which was destroyed. consisting of the Royal Sussex and the . but the Zakka Khels had been too sharp and had flown. and the enemy did not consider it worth while fighting for. All the villages were surrounded before daylight. 21st Madras Pioneers. Julius was also slightly wounded. de V. and when they retired on Burg the enemy followed them close into camp. the latter in the rear. The pickets on the hill tops reported the enemy in force on the south of the camp and the rear-guard. whole of the upper part of the Bara Valley once again open left The Zakka Khels had the to them. The rear-guard of the 2nd Brigade was followed up 1st but when the Afridis met the pickets of the their attention to the latter. Their cave-dwellings along the Bazar this little expedition the troops River could not be destroyed. while General Hart's Brigade halted at Burg ready for action in case the Zakka Khels should show themselves in great strength. A private in the Royal Sussex behaved with great gallantry. wound On the the morning of the 28th December at a quarter to five o'clock General Hart started in the darkness and rain to surprise and surround Karamna villages as it was reported that the tribesmen had returned. The regiment on this picket duty.( 235 ) during the march from Dwatoi to Barkai. whilst part of his force went on to the Bazar Valley to meet Sir William Lockhart. Cheena. they discreetly Bazar to the care of small bodies of Cheena is the only village of importance iu the valley. The subsequent withdrawal of the force from Burg up a steep ravine was an extremely difficult operation. and a battalion of infantry with commissariat stores had to be : left all night on the pass fortunately it Gaselee's Bi'igade alone went as far as Cheena. Lieutenant St. was not attacked. never numbered more than 200 men in any one On the 27th General Hart remained at Burg. but after he helped a wounded comrade away. this He was shot through the leg and severely wounded. The tribesmen however spot.

Cafe. were accidentally killed. On the 29th December the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Hart. The more distant pickets were brought down and passed up the ravine. and a sapper No. and Lieutenant Tonge. being The within places got who much aided by clouds on the hills. and in carrying out this duty a distressing accident occurred of whereby Lieutenant C. All the valuable towers ia Burg and Karamna were blown up. one sepoy of the 21st Madras Pioneers killed. passed through the strong rear-guard placed in position at the exit of the camp. Tonge. accompanied by General Symons. and many were seen to fall. One of the charges under a tower exploded. and three other men of men slightly wounded . therefore.( 236 ) C. managed the operation admirably. and approached within 100 yards of the Madras Pioneers. E. who commanded the rear-guard. W. thus giving our men a much better chance than usual. The transport did very well. They had 12 or 13 casualties en route. The Afridis followed closely and persistently. which reached India on the 30th January that out troops had met with a serious reverse was wholly unexpected. the operations which led up to this unfortunate business had been carefully planned beforehand and every effort had been made to keep . one rifleman of the 2-1 st Gurkhas dangerously wounded. Our losses were two men of the Eoyal Sussex severely wounded. As it afterwards emerged. The news. and shot well. R. They followed the : rear-guard for six miles.. drawal was closely and boldly followed by the Afridis. four severely and one slightly wounded. H.E. when the second charge went off. General also Gaselee's Brigade marched by another route Jamrud. Even the Zakka Khels were known to be debating for the first time whether it would not be wiser to come to terms. The next few weeks were uneventful. 4 Company Bombay Sappers. thinking that the other fuse had failed. Several of the casualties occurred in withdrawing the pickets They were all eventually from the hills round Karamna Camp. the troops supporting each other admirably. and the others followed in their turn. not one load being to lost. went up to the tower. than risk another invasion in the spring. and towards the end January it of seemed as if the eiForts of the Political Officers were likely to be ci-owned with success. returned to Ali Musjid. The baggage was all sent on ahead and the operation of the withdrawal was skilfully executed. Our casualties were the six Derbyshire Eegiment severely wounded. quite near. Brigadier-General Hart himself came in with the last company.

He found the column retiring in good order. camp at was our field. were formed. Scottish Borderers. further to the west. Too few in numbers to clear the hills. who turned out with 200 King's Own little 100 Gurkhas and two guns. had also nothing of interest to report. The column. to move concentrically so as to cut off the tribesmen's line of retreat The points from which the columns moved on the morning of the 29th January were Ali Musjid. slowly. though men were dropped in their tracks at every step and the column was every moment becoming more and more hampered with the wounded.m. The Bara Column which presumably moved straight across the westwards. Little opposiwas experienced in the advance.— ( 237 ) the proposed movement is of troops secret. Lieutenent Turing. of skilful best they could. Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton. Fortunately it was found possible to send a message of the to General Westmacott. Bara Fort and Mamani. King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. drawn from General Westmacott's Brigade.. Kajurai Plain. News had been is received that the Afridis had driven their cattle and camels to graze on the Kajurai Plain. 36th Sikhs Lieutenants Walker. Dowdall and Hughes. and being the last losses man : himself to get Even as it were extremely heavy. wounded: Major Earle. but very slowly. four companies of the 36th Sikhs and two guns of No. and turned the direction of the retirement "When the whole had passed through he retired left. 7-30 p. reaching in. Jamrud. and ordered western and southern sides by spurs which run hills down from It range of separating the Bara and Bazar Valleys. and our dead had list to be left killed : on the The casualty comprised British Officers . one from each brigade. the main was accordingly resolved to capture the Afridi herds and herdsmen. and consisting of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. For this purpose four columns. which due east of Fort Bara and enclosed on the northern. with Colonel Seppings of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in tion command had a very different experience. but when the retirement began through a narrow defile known as the Shin Kamar Pass the enemy appeared in considerable numbers and pressed hard upon the small It was the old story of a small force completely at the mercy marksmen securely planted on both sides of a narrow gorge. Captian Marrable and Lieutenant . General Symons reported that the Ali Musjid and Jamrud Columns had seen nothing of the enemy. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery. however. Promptly grasping the situation he brought his guns into action from the hills at the mouth of the gorge on the enemy's through his troops. their only coui^se was to retire as column. though they had marched over twenty miles.

On the 31st January General . bhisti Own Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. and one were wounded. Surgeon-Captain M. and 22 bodies were recovered. the few casualties taking place as the force retired. occasion since the operations against the Afridis began. one Gurkha. resolve. were slightly wounded. West- inacott advanced again to the Shin Kamar Pass for the purpose of bringing in the dead. 250 King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. 300 Sikhs. and he was idolised by every X .( 238 ) Hall of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. and inspiring leadership had saved a soldier in his regiment. The rank and file of the Yorkshires also suffered heavily. Dick and Lieutenant Browne. losing 22 killed and 17 wounded the 36th Sikhs lost 3 men killed. 300 2nd Gurkhas. His force consisted of 400 of the Gordon Highlanders. man of the King's So ended what was certainly one of the most unfortunate episodes of the campaign. 30th Sikhs. one gunner and one Scottish Borderers. Colonel Haughton's quick On more than one magnificent courage. 400 King's and No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. Little opposition was made to the advance. critical situation. The loss of the Colonel of the 36th Sikhs in particular was deeply regretted throughout the army. One gunner was killed. 400 3rd Gurkhas.



While in the early part of in punishing the Afridis in the November Sir "William Lockhart was engaged Maidan Valley. were ordered have a to rejoin the and the Guides Cavalry and Infantry Malakand Field Force. The Utman Khels strength is are not an important tribe. of the force After the health had been thoroughly recruited.500 men. and the mere presence of a strong brigade would. as their fighting put at only 1. Preparations for the expedition were accordingly begun at Jalala in the Peshawar District. Years ago they attacked the gangs of labourers employed on the Swat River Canal and cut up a number of unarmed coolies. CHAPTER I. They shared on the Malakand. with the terms imposed upon them by Major Deane. and yet still keep a close watch upon the suspected Buner border. west of the The Utma Khels had informally expressed their willingcomply. but they have been notorious evildoers on the frontier for many years past. and the troops visiting their villages were not likely to meet with resistance. the Malakand Field had co-operated with General the Maniunds. EXPEDITIONS. was thought desirable in the absence of any other work to give some portion of the two brigades a ten days' promenade through the Malakand. Sir Bindon Blood's plan was to detach a strong brigade to visit the sufficient force left to Utman Khels. ness to Utman Khel country. THE UTMAN KHEL EXPEDITION. an offence for which they were never in the attack thoroughly punished.( 239 ) PART TWO MINOR V. but . A certain number of rifles and other arms had to be collected. prove sufficient to remind the tribesmen of their obligations. Force. which under Sir Bindon Blood Elles's Force in subjugating the Mohmands and it was enjoy- ing a well-earned rest and awaiting fresh employment. as far as possible.200 or 1. it was rightly expected.

11th Bengal Lancers Commissariat Officer. 1 British Field Hospital. 50 Native Field Hospital. Major L. . one squadron 10th Bengal Lancers. Harainkot ed at Kot. J. Field Engineer. 5 Company Queen's Own Sappers and Miners. Vallings. Officer. perhaps that were at an end. Colonel P. The Buffs . were so anxious to prevent their country being entered and the Utman Khel jirgahs which had musterby the . Surgeon-Lieutenant. but the instant Sir Bindon Blood's troopa started. Herbert. Captain H. Captain A. Manchester Eegiment . to prevent our troops entering their country. " A" and " B" Sections No. Central India Horse. F. 35 Native Field Hospital. Army Veterinary Department. O'Connor. command of the expeditionary it- with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General. 51 Native command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. Montanaro. Eoyal West Surrey Eegiment Signalling Officer. Eeid was given the force. about three marches distant. Lieutenant H. thinking. after the Mamund military was the southern sections that had now to be visited. F. E. and the force the following troops : self consisted of —The Buffs. J. B. Lieutenant H. Weston. No. of course. their jirgah hastened to make formal submission.( 240 ) withdrew in haste when the I'elieving force arrived. 8 Mountain " Battery. Trevor. Valley. E. Orderly Officer. Their object it was. and it Political Officer. Frasei'. 29th Punjab Infantry. Co-operating with General Eeid was a small force con- sisting of the 16th Field Hospital. Lieute- nant A. Dunsterville. started out from Jalala on The expedition was reached on the November 22nd. and No. H. the 35th Sikhs. . M. District should be thoroughly Colonel A. Office)-. East Surrey Eegiment Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General. . S. No. Cotterill. Dargai and the Peshawar explored. but was important that the Totai Valley and the passes leading into it from the Swat Valley. Provost-Marshal. the 21st Punjab Infantry. C. Waterfield. Officer. Senior Medical Officer. The northern section of the clan living beyond the Panjkora were dealt with by operations in the Major Deane. Lieutenant W. all They had opei'ations hesitated for weeks. Sherwood. Extra Orderly The following Officers were appointed . 19th Bengal Lancers. Burlton. its des- tination being the Totai Valley. M. Indian Medical Service and Senior Veterinary Veterinary-Lieutenant G. Williams. 24th. C" and "D" Sections No. S. Captain A. Lieutenant E. A. : column ComDeputy Assistant Adjutant-General. Eoyal Engineers Intelligence . Staff Corps Transport Officer. Brigadier-General Reid . Lieutenant W. to the staff of the — manding. under the Bengal Infantry and one section of No.

5 Company Sappers and Miners. Progress was necessarily slow. as already stated. force halted on The November 25th reconnoitred. about five miles. Shortly after passing Bhar on the west side of the pass the valley widens considerably. proceeded towards Bargolai place. and Pass. and reached the camp late in the evening. General Hill's reply was that he would meet the jirgah at Kot in the Total Valley. as the column had 600 camels in carriage equipment.( 241 ) troops that. The road over the pass. who. ed the camp at 2 without any mishap.m. at Agrah might be two routes to That over the Khels Pass was found Kot in order that the impracticable for camels. Bargolai was seen to be in a wide cultivated plain the reconnaissance was among of the hills. Groups of men wei'e seen on the Agrah Pass and the sui'rounding hills. proved very difficult for laden camels. Groups of people were seen here and there. namely. the road following the bed of the stream in a deep gorge the whole way. bringing in supplies. however. was necessary to cover the march of the column by parties on the hillsides marching parallel to the column. but no shot was At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 26th November It the force left Kot and marched to Silipatai. made to within two miles Agrah fired. (3) formal submission to the Political . also required was decided to use the route via much work to make it passable. however. . cultivation. The bag5 all gage. as they showed some hesitancy. they sent word on ahead that they were prepared to make submission. were told that the force would exact compliance with the terms at Agrah. crossing over the Bhar Pass en route. Agent at Malakand (4) forage for the force and (5) road-making as its required — an important matter. . All the clans accepted the terms unconditionally. was got over with the loss of a few camels. and is very green and full of of Lower Total showed an unmistakable wish to be friendly. and were told what the Government terms were. except the Agrah jirgah. but the rear-guard reachp. to and made the road passable for camels up to 1| miles from th^ The reconnaissances from this point to Bargolai proved the road be quite practicable for the remainder of the way. Silipatai and Bargolai were very submissive. covei'ed by the 21st Punjab Infantry. (2) survey of the country . although it had been considei'ably improved the day before by No. (1) The surrender of 300 guns and all breech- The villagers — loaders . No. The villagers of Dheri. To Kot he accordingly marched that day. Jiryahs from Lower and Upper Total and Agrah met General Eeid on arrival at Kot. and it Silipatai which. parties Company Queen's Own Sappers and Miners and by working from all corps.

and only fair for mules. Next day. and quite passable The ascent for the last 200 yards is very steep. about five miles away. quietly. The reconnaissance under Colonel Faithfull to the Inzari Pass showed the road over the pass to be a very fair one. bivouacked at on terraced hillsides near Bedani village half a mile south-east of Silipatai. the wheat crops being a few inches high. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th the advanced carrying pickets reported the presence of a gathering of about 500 men a few standards on the right bank of the Swat River. which was visible about three miles otf. four guns of Own Sappers and Miners as a flying column. with mule transport only. march- ed from Bargolai over the Agrah Pass and bivouacked on a low spur in the centre of the valley which gives the pass its name. to A be impassable for On the 28th November General Eeid with 500 rifles of the 21st Punjab Infantry. 250 of the Buflfs. The valley or rather group of valleys were all under cultivation. There are rope bridges over the river at is but crossing so is a slow operation and to get back hurriedly impossible. 27th. No opposition was met with. this point. and half of No. The night of the 28th passed and next morning a reconnaissance under Lieutenant-Colonel FaithfuU went out to the Inzari Pass. hills rising to three or four thousand feet all around. Bargolai leads row gorge that from Kot. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.( 242 ) and were said tender to their submission ni((ht be the Agrah jirgah wlio had come to their boundary to The force to General Reid at that place. the (supposed) Shamozai contented themselves with watching General Reid's movements. the road having been made is Own Sappers and Miners. reconnaissance up the Agrah Pass showed the road camels.ss enabling the Government Surveyor . but they showed no signs of intending to cross the river. The reconfor mules. November the force marched from Silipatai to passable for camels by the Queen's at the extremity of the long nar- Bargolai. They appeared to^be Shamozai. naissance pushed beyond the pa. and the column bivouacked in a pear-shaped valley with a considerable amount of cultivation. about eight miles long. the penalty for any sniping into The surrounding villages were warned that camp would be exacted from them and they crowned all the heights in the neighbourhood with pickets. the grain and fodder demanded were brought in at once and the rifles were surrendered the next day. No. 5 Company Queen's 250 of the 35th Sikhs.

and the Flying Column left Agrah at 8 a. of its object having . The hill drops almost perpendicularly to where the Panjkora and Swat and in the distance the snow peaks of the Lowari Eange were General Reid accompanied the reconnaissance in person. In his despatches to the AdjutantGeneral in India Sir Bindon Blood wrote: " You Avill observe that the — objects in view of which the operations reported on were undertaken.m. all being in Bargolai Camp by 11-30. The Utman Khel Expedition was now an end. been fully accomplished without the necessity any fighting and the column under General Hill bi'oke uji. the force took its departure from Bargolai on the 1st December and marched to Kot. had not come in and had not sent in the arms required submission. The night passed quietly. and the visible. arriving at 4-30 P. contrettrnps were of fully and expeditiously attained. the representatives of the villages were met hurrying down to General all that was required of them in the way of weapons. I would further exalso press an opinion that Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro carried out what he had do with tact and judgment. but as they had neglected to attend at the prescribed time the force continued One of the its march on the villages and the arms were accepted there. surrendered. party returned at 5 p. and the district having made complete submission orders were issued for the force to return to Bargolai next day. The remainig arms required from Bargolai having been surrendered. it was decided to visit their villages in and enforce The villages lie high up the hills to the west of the General Reid's Camp and about 3. Reid with principal maliks. The view from the top of Iiizari was magnificent. A survey was made of the heights overlooking the Panjkora River and the force then having been out 11 hours. the fortifications of his dwelling were destroyed.000 feet above it.m. About half-way up. having refused to appear or tender any sub- mission.M. By this time all the arms demanded had been join. site of of them. at returned to camp. Avhich had been granted leave to meet General Reid on his arrival.. As the Kanawari jirgah. and that no hitch or that any sort occurred. however.. and I have the honour . I venture to think much credit is due to Colonel Reid for the perfect manner in which he arranged and carried out the movement of his force and overcame the conisderable physical difficulties which he encountered .( 2{8 ) to complete his sketch to the point reached fi'om the Malakand side in August Eivers last. The road was very bad and very steep and progress was slow. and I fully endorse the favourable I'emarks he makes regarding to his troops and staff.

C. I was much assisted by information and advice received from Mr. Stuart Waterfield. and also from Mr. to the favourable notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. the Political Agent at the Malakand. Civil Service." ><• . Bunbury. who was specially appointed Assistant Political Officer for the operations.S.( 244 ) accordingly to recommend both these Officers. together with all who served under them. Punjab Police.. C.I. In making the necessary preliminary arrangements for the operations under reference. Merk. from Major Deane. Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar. Civil Service. the Commissioner of Peshawar. from Mr.

stolen on the Eustam border and (4) the payment of fine of a Es. Nos. 5 Company Queen's Own Sappers and Miners and No. The Chamlawals and Gaduns. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.* The terms for the Gaduns. After the return at the end of December of the Tirah Field Force to British tei-ritory. they were expected to voluntarily make submission.500 Buner the surrender and the handing in of 100 swords and : standards from Koga and Nawagai. had both sent contingents to fight at Malakand and in the Swat Valley. a fine of Rs.500.( 24a ) CHAVTEIi II. No. THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BUNERWALS. The following terms were simultaneously announced to the Chamlawals. An ultimatum whom The tribesmen of was now sent submission at (3) the to the tribe calling upon them to comply with the following terms within a week: — (1)A . were not for the moment announced. 10th Field Battery. the 2nd Brigade (General East Kent. the Guides Infantry. *This village has to be distinguished from the place of the same name in Bajour. Formal notice was given that in the event of non-compliance with the Government's terms a column commanded by were Sir Bindon Blood force of arms. like the Bunerwals. representative jirgah to all make complete . Punjab Infantry Divisional troops : four squadrons of Cavalry. 1. the Highland Light Infantry and the 20th and 31st Punjab Infantry Jeffreys's). who inhabit the small valley south-east of of 100 guns. and the 16th and 21st .11. . 7 and 8 Mountain Batteries. who live south-east of the Chamlawals. Brigade (General Meiklejohn's). the Government turned their attention to the Bunerwals with a long outstanding account had to be settled. but like their neighbours the Khudu Khel. the Royal West Kent Regiment. Mardan (2) the restoration of Government property rifles surrender of 600 guns. including 60 Enfield . would be sent to invade Buner and exact submission by : The troops selected for the expedition — 1st . Buner had shown an extreme spirit of hostility during the attack on the Malakand in July and again at Landaki when Sir Bindon Blood's Force was advancing into Upper Swat.

19th Bengal Lancers Assistant Adjutant-Cjleneral. Captain L. Vaughan . Bombay Lancers. Assistant to Brigade Transport Officer. Principal Medical Officer. Royal West Kent S. C. ( 24G ) The following Blood . Brigade Commissariat Captain C. G. Weston. Royal West Kent Regiment Chief Commissariat Officer. H. 11th Bengal Lancers Commissariat Transport Officer. Fraser. Morton. Captain C. Officer. Captain F. Captain dent). Major . Watkins. Sheridan. K. Senior Veterinary Officer. Major H. Brigadier-General Officer. Stanton. Robertson. G. and Mr. W. Meiklejohn j Dragoon Guards Deputy . Royal Engi- Field Intelligence Officers. Regiment Infantry Provost Marshal. Commanding Royal W. Brigade Transport Officer. Gordon Highlanders Assistant Quarter-Master-General. Colonel . 24th Punjab . Belli-Bivar. Appleby and Mr. V. J. G F. Cama. Royal Engineers. O. NichoU and Mr. G. G. Lieutenant J. W. E. Sir Bindon Aide-de-Camp. Brigade ComOfficer.A. E. and Lieutenant A. Artillery. Tod.. Lieutenant R. . Adjutant. Lye. H. G. Ordnance Officer. C. 23rd Pioneers. Assistant Adjutant-General. F. M. D. Dillon Assistant Superinten- Army . Signalling. 7th Section Commandant. Adjutant. Captain H Rouse Commanding Royal Engineers. . . M. P. Captain H. Thackwell Assistant to Chief Commissariat Ofl'icer. . Lieutenant E. Chaplain. Macnaghten. A. Mr. S. S. Aitken . Hewitt. Captain dent. Burlton. Hobday . Captain "W.C. Captain E. Nicholl. S. . Captain R. Peacocke . O'Dowda. . Carmichael . Army . Wharry . S. Major E. Appleby. and in the latter by Mr. Signalling. 1st . Survey Captain C. T. G. Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Barton . Advanced Depot. 16th Lancers . Lieutenant E. Waterfield. Orderly Lieutenant C. W. Royal Artillery C. H. C. Sheridan (Senior Postal Superinten- Mr. Intelligence Department. . Burney. Lord Lieutenant W. R. had acted in a similar capacity with the Malakand Field Force and the Mohmand Field Force. E. R. Gaunt. Lieutenant neers . Beville Brigade . Surgeon-Colonel J. Mann nel . . A. Orderly Officer. 4tli W. C. Veterinary-Captain H. by the way. Blunt and M. W. L. missariat Officer of the Rustam Column. Central India Horse Deputy Assis- tant Quarter-Master-General. W. Royal Engineers Superintendent of Telegraphs. Superintendent. Manchester Regiment . Royal Artilleiy. H. F. Colo. Major E. staff was appointed Fincastle . L. In the former he had been assisted by Mr. M. Robertson. . : — Commanding. C. 7th Bengal Cavalry. Captain J. C. Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General. N. Sherwood Field Engineers. Rev. 2nd-Lieutenant Officer. The Field Postal Staff consisted of Mr. Klugh . H. Stowell Brigade: Commanding. Masters.

Duncan. Lieutenant J. . Lieutenant G. . Banbury. ou receiving the order to advance. 25th Madras Infantry Brigade Commissariat Officer. Eegimental Commissariat . Caniilleri . Brigadier-General P. Army Kent Eegiment Provost Marshal. xVrmy Veterinary Depart- 2nd Brigade: Commanding. concentrated his two brigades in readi- The receipt of the Government's ultimatum by the Bunerwals was the Shaszai sections beinothe Malendir and followed by a summons from the Buner jirgak to the tribesmen to watch . E. and Transport ment. Brooke. to join The the Upper Swatis and Yusufzai Bunerwals. Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General.C. Captain D. Dunsterville Byron Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. went out to . 2nd Bombay Grenadiers Regimental Commissariat Signalling. C. Trevor.( 247 ) Transport Officer. . Captain J. and at once Sir Bindon Blood Brigadiers and the Officers person. they would make one stand in the passes for their name's sake and thereafter open negotiations. Captain A. sections north of Buner refused These defensive arrangements having been made. Hawkins Brigade Transport Officer. A. Williams. Department. and Transport inary Officer. M. A. . D. Major H. Lieutenant J. Army Veterinary Officer. Lieutenant W. Eoyal Scots Fusiliers Veterinary-Lieutenant W. East . Baker. Assistant Superintendent. Captain W. the Malizai sections to the Chaiulawals and Hindustani fanatics to the Ambela Pass. Captain G. Border Eegiment VeterVeterinary-Lieutenant G. The concentration of the force at Sanghao was completed on the 6th in January. Powell. accompanied by the Commanding the I'egimeiits. Officer. the passes and be prepared to defend them detailed to the Tangao Pass. . seeing that they It was not adopt. 2-lst Gurkhas . could not well arrange for a great tribal combination: but others argued that. B. . H. Macdougall. Orderly Officer. a reply was sent in to the Deputy Commissioner of Mardan intimating that the Bunerwals had decided not to comply with the Government's terms. M. . it is immediately beyond Sanghao where Sir Bindon Blood. at all easy to predict what course the Bunerwals would There were those who believed that as their Swati neio-hbours had submitted the men of Buner also would give in. like the Swatis when the Chitral Expedition began. The pass by which it was decided to enter Buner in the event of the tribesmen withholding submission is known as the Tano-i or Tangao ness. The military authorities were fully prepared for either contingency. JefTreys.

The enemy were seen in large numbers crowiiin<T the crest of the hills on the nortli of the gorjre leading to the pass. The latter appeared to have few guns. scaling the camp some one and-a-half miles from the pass the Eoyal West Kent.600 and No. No.. and the remainder at 9 a. 30 standards were visible on the hill top and the enemy were estimated at about 1. the Highland Light Infantry. and two mountain batteries on an eminence to the south of it. . followed by the 16th Bengal Infantry. The frontal attack was sent forward about 12 noon. is and on the top of the pass itself. The Sappers and Miners.000 feet the rise to the pass in about one mile of road. which aliout 3. but few of the enemy were visible at any time. who received the reconnaissance by After the Sappers had firiuf a few funs at intervals at long ranges. throughout the day fired The Mountain Battery ranges were 1.m. but kept up a hot fire with what they had. whilst the Buners were energetically but ineffectually loosening large rocks from the crest About of the hills in the hope of crushing the working parties beneath. The Buffs and the 3rd Bombay Light Infantry escorted the guns and the former extended a long way up the high hills to the south. The 20th Punjab Infantry left camp about 8 A. .200 to 2. about 28. of the troops at 8-30. As the camp was at an elevation of al)ont 2. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery opened at 9 A. were busy all day improving the entrance to the gorge. being overlooked by high impassable cliffs.( i^48 ) examine the Tangao Pass and decide on the plan of attack.800 feet above sea level. numbers of standards. Punjab Infantry the north of the execute a turning movement.650 yards to 2. The 10th Field Battery opened and some 480 rounds at ranges from 2.800 feet. but 500 coolies were engaged to carry up actual necessities for the troops should it be impossible to get the mules up. accomplished on both sides of the gorge being Tery steep. lined the crest. the hills was about 1. A large British Mountain Battery at 10-15. the batteries and escort a little later. The assault on the Tangao Pass was successfully delivered on the 7th January. knocked off work it was still very uncertain whether the mules would be able to ^et over the pass next day after the fight. The to dispositions for the attack were as follows:— 20th hill to ..M.000..M. covered by the 20th Punjab Infantry. mostly Salarzai. and the 21st Punjab Infantry. 7 yards. to make the frontal attack the 10th Field Battery on a low spur at the mouth of the gorge. about which time the 20th Punjab Infantry were heard heavily engaged with the enemy.050.

Next day more work was done on the road. and some 250 mules were passed up with rations for the brigade at Kingargali.000 and that their losses for the day gathering .m. The two companies of Sappers were at work on the night. The descent steep. but ineffectually. and found the road very After the capture of the pass Sir Bindon Blood went up to the top difficut for mules. away from the and the opposition The was crowned by 2 o'clock. it. The shooting of the guns was remarkably accurate. which had been loaded about 11 A. The operations throughout were skill conducted with great range volleys of the Buffs. the 31st Punjab Infantry. About 1-30 the 20th Punjab Infantry had surmounted the high peak. there being no sniping. but with plenty of grain and fodder in While Sir Bindon Blood was carrying out the main advance from Sangao a small column acting under his instructions and consisting of the Guides Infantry. A party of five Buners started for a ghazi rush.500 yards from the top of the pass. The Political Officer's report on the operations stated that the tribal on the Tangao Pass consisted of Salarzai. These animals. the village lies on the border of a level and well-cultivated plain about 2. p. but the road was still difficult in parts and very trying to aden mules. Shortly after this eldest. Asherzai and Gadizai. A quiet night was passed. were therefore sent back to the camp. all the standards were one by one practically ceased. road until dark. and prevented the enemy from collecting. the enemy also tried rolling stones down on the advancing troops. being steei? and narrow. and had been pushed forward some way up the gorge. but the blankets and great-coats for the troops had followed them on from 400 coolies.M. three squadrons of . capturing some standards. numbering in all about 2.100 to 1. from the pass on the other side was found to be sudden and valley to the village of Kingargali is The and to 800 yards wide.400 yards. reaching about 3-30 Brigade went on and occupied the village of The village was found deserted. but only one kept it up and he was quickly shot. and bivouacked there for the Meanwhile the 1st it Kingargali. One man of the Highland Light Infantry was dangerously wounded. amounted to about 20 killed and 60 wounded.( 249 ) When the frontal attack got somewhat up the steep slopes. who were and were materially assisted by the longfiring from 1. and began to descend along the crest to the pass under a dropping carried crest fire.

m.C. and the cavalry after crossing the pass tried to effect a junction with the Sir Bindon Blood. Guides Cavalry. advance of the 31st Punjab Infantry. Malandri and Ambela Passes. reconnoitred four miles on to the village of Kai. slight resistance. and the enemy bolted after a They were evidently quite taken by surprise. bivouThe night was cold and frosty. and had where Hindustani After arrival not time to collect contingents from Malandri Pass. for the time being at least. six on the Pirsai Pass Colonel McRae with companies of the Guides and four companies of the 31st Punjab Infantry pushed on to the village of Chowbanda on the Buner side. fanatics guarded the road. The infantry of the column left acking near Pirsai village. suit. [ THE END. like that of the Swatis. The Salarzai and Asherzai sections of the Bunerwals now hurriedly clearly reduced sent in their jirffaks to Sir Bindon Blood's to a very submissive mood. thoroughly broken. the Bunerwals. On the 6th January Colonel Adams began work by sending three reconnoitring parties towards the Pirsai. and their countiy explored. and at Pirsai the enemy fired on the cavalry.] . their strongest defences shown to be futile.( 250 ) the 10th Bengal Lancers. There was no opposition. the The power of Mohmands and the Bajouris. Rustam at 4 p. V. the whole under the immediate command of Colonel Adams. At daybreak the Guides Infantry covering the on the 7th the infantry left Pirsai. their arms taken away. All three parties reported that the passes were held.. and a party of Sappers. their fighting prestige destroyed. The cavalry followed at noon. on the 6th January. was. Colonel Adams. and all the inhabitants had fled. marched out from Rustam partly to reconnoitre the of Rnstam passes into Buner and partly to distract the attention the Bunerwals from Sir Bindon Blood's advance and divide their forces. but as it main body of the Buner force under was nearly dusk Colonel Adams decided to return and bivouac with the infantry. Next day the column joined hands with the main body. camp and were later of A few days other clans followed the expedition was and by the middle of January the object completely accomplished without any further fighting.



Sepoy Tara Singh.A. Seopy Khoja Mahomed was also subsequently very prominent in the firing line. R. after finishing his duties in limbering up. These three men brought Colonel Bunny. who was lying stunned. and dressed wound. firing Naick Shara AH kept his gun in action under great difficulties. THE REWARDS FOR MAIZAR. Salutri Kewal helped his to carry Captain J. Cruickshank. under a heavy Driver Havildar Rur Singh carried the body of Lieutenant F. A. F. 3 Sub-division to help in carrying Lieutenant Cruickshank's body. each time bringing away a box. is admitted to the 2nd class of the Order of British India with the title of Bahadur. but he continued to load and fire after getting a spare lanyard from Havildar Nihal Singh. Havildar Mahomed Baksh. . Though under heavy fire he remained by the boxes. so as to induce the enemy to think the gun was still in action. Sepoy Habibulah. and then returned to carry the carriage of No. charge of the reserve ammunition which was stacked in the valley when the firing commenced.APPENDIX I. The admissions to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit are as follows :— Havildar Nihal Singh commanded his sub-section with great coolness. He was subsequently twice wounded. picked up Gunner Chet Singh. blank cartridges when the supply of shell was exhausted. Naick Lachman Singh was in Sepoy Sheo Singh helped to bring away the reserve ammunition. fire. out of action under a very heavy fire. and subsequently helped to carry the reserve ammunition away. \si Sikh Infantry. returning twice under a heavy fire. and helped to carry the carriage back to the relief line. and twice the lanyard broke. The were following rewards to the native troops engaged on the notified in the Gasette of India : — Maizar action Subadar Naraj'an Singh. Gunner Jawala Singh helped to the relief line.. R. These four men carried Surgeon-Captain Cassidy out of action under a heavy fire. Sepoy Isar Singh. and gave great assistance in sending the wounded to the rear and saddling up the mules under fire. and carried him out of action. ready for issue. out of action. Browne.. when mortally wounded. and Sepoy Isar Singh helped to bring away the reserve ammunition under a heavy fire. opening two. The gun and carriage twice turned over backwards. Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Khoja Mahomed. ist Sikhs. Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Jalandhar. Havildar Maha Singh. Gunner Diwan Singh.A. out of action.

though they were hard pressed by the enemy and under heavy Without his aid Lieutenant Seton-Browne could not have played the fire. only retiring when actually ordered to do so. Bugler Bela Singh assisted in saving and distributing the reserve ammuniand was also one of the defenders of the garden wall. Punjab Infantry. for conspicuous gallantry on the same occasion. and subsequently led a gallant counter-charge against them. tst . Havildar Umardin and Lance-Naick 1st Utam Chand. in having helped to carry Surgeon-Captain Cassidy out of action under a heavy fire. taking him back from the entrance of the lane to the kotal linder a heavy fire. run out and brought in the box of ammunition the Naick was carrying when he met his death. and Shankar Khan. where he bayoneted two men.A. . and Roshan Khan. Sepoys — Sikh Infantry. where the second stand was made. Browne. repulsing them. 1st Sikh Infantry. 1st Pitttjab Infantry. Naick Assa Singh helped Lieutenant Seton-Browne during the subsequent retirement. Naick Bur Singh. . when Lance-Naick Atr Singh was killed. the enemy fell back. R. Kesar Singh. F.( ii ) fire action of these men in bringing away the reserve ammunition enabled be kept up throughout the retirement..«on Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Sundar Singh helped to bring Lieutenant Higginout of action. for conspicuous gallantry on the same occasion. where he fought bravely with a rifle he had taken from one of the killed. the distinction of the 3rd class of the Order of Merit would have been conferred upon them in consideration of their conspicuous gallantry and heroic devotion to duty on the occasion referred to. under a heavy fire. when wounded. tion.Sikh Infantry. Mahomed Khan. part he did in the conduct of the retirement. Lance-Naicks Atr Singh. The promotion to the 2nd class of the Order of Merit is also sanctioned of Havildar (now Jemadar) Hussain Shah. 1st — Achar Singh. Sepoy Nurdad shot down several of the enemy at very close quarters. and kept off some Waziris. No. Sepoy Indar Singh. The to Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Shah Sowar helped to carry Captain J. Sepoy AUayar Khan carried Lieutenant Seton-Browne. and remained with him the rest of the day. but being himself very severely wounded. in having. The Governor-General in Council is also pleased to notify that had the undermentioned non-commissioned officers and men survived. out of action when wounded. who came close He then again helped to carry Captain Browne when up. The Governor-General in Council is further pleased to sanction the admission to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit of Langri (Cook) Jhanda Singh. and probable was the means of enabling the escort to secure its retreat. when wounded. and much encouraged his men by his example and tenacity. Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Ishar -Singh behaved with great gallantry at the garden wall. by his steady firing. with effect from the date of their death. 6 {Bombay) Motintain Battery. Their widows are admitted to the pension of the 3rd class of the Order of Merit. Lance-Naick Khanaya Singh. to the kotal.

Wilcocks. are detailed for the Line of Communications.— • iii ) APPENDIX 11 THE TOGHI FIELD FORGE. Assistant Quarier-Master-General . Punjab Frontier Force. 33rd (Punjabi-Mahomedan) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. 1 Squadron. 2 Sections.b. 6 Guns.. The Rifle Brigade. Orderly Officer . Assistant Adjutant-General . and Section No. to exact reparation for the treacherous and unprovoked attack on the escort of the Political Officer. Bengal Sappers and Miners. Commands and the force : — Staff.. as detailed below. 14th Sikh (The Ferozepore) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.. East Lanca- shire Regiment. Field Veterinary Hospital. Nixcm. d. 2 Sections.i. Punjab Frontier Force. 4 Guns. 1 8th Bengal Lancers. Twynam.o. E. 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry. c. Major J. 2 British Field Hospital. No. Squadron.. W . 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery. : and Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Tochi. Captain H. Scarse-Dickens. No. 27td Brigade. 3rd Battalion. Punjab Frontier Force. 2 Sections. 25th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. C and D Sections... Punjab Frontier Force.. Aide-de-Camp . The following General Order gives the exact details of the above Force : — The Governor-General in Council sanctions the despatch of a force. No. No. The force will be styled the Tochi Field Force : Formation of Force.. 1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry. 30 Native Field Hospital. 2 Company. Leinster Regiment. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery. 2 Sections.. 2 British Field Hospital.. No. on the loth June 1S97.. 6th Regiment of Bengal (Light) Infantry. No.l. Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel J. . 1st Regiment of Sikh Infantry. I. 29 Native Field Hospital. Officer Commanding . No.s. No. —The following Officers are detailed for the staff of General Force. No. M. Punjab Frontier Force. No. 29 Native Field Hospital. Corrie Bird. Captain S. 28 Native Field Hospital.. 32 Native Field Hospital.—'The force will be composed as follows \st Brigade.. for the Base. ist Regiment of Punjab Cavalry. H. the Major-General G.

Captain J.. Assistant Quarter-Master. Army Signalling . .. Rawlins.. . L. Malcolm. r. Devonshire Regiment. lith Bengal i Lancers. Ordnance Officer Chief Commissariat Assistant Officer. Officer . Carevv. Divisional Transport Officer 2nd Battalion. Hagg. to Divisional sary-General. Deputy . . McN. Walter. G. Wingate.. R.. Major C. Military Accounts Department.. Lieutenant T... Schreiber. ... Senior.. 2nd Brigade Staff. 2nd Battalion.„ Assistant Field Engineer . Quarter-Master.-D. Egerton. 4th Gurkhas. Rayment. D. Pirrie.D. . 1st Brigade . 31st Punjab Infantry. Waghorn. i8th Hussars... Captain H. Superintendent. .e... Brigade Commissariat Officer Lieutenant E.s. Colonel A.. Dallas. Watkis. G. Grover. Grant. Field Engineer . Cockerill. Lieutenant Brigade Commissariat Officer Assistant Commissary-General. Captain A. Commanding Orderly Officer ... Captain P. P. P. Wintour. Lieutenant W... Cavalry. Field Paymaster . C.V.Major G. Digby. 20th Deputy Assistant Punjab Infantry. Captain A. . 2nd Battalion.. i. to . Hunt. Shewell.. W. Wilson. G.a. Major G.B.D... Assistant Commis1st sary-General. 1st Gurkhas. .. r. Assistant General {hitelliij. Lieutenant Field Intelligence Officer Deputy 28th Punjab Infantry. Major T.. .M. Veteri>iary Officer . F..( iv ) Quarter-Master. C. S.. Transport Lieutenant E. Deputy General. Gurkhas. r.. 1 2th Bengal d. W.. .. c.. Symons. Lieutenant J..B. 4th Gurkhas. Lieutenant F.. Royal West Kent Regiment. A.o. Deputy Assistant Commissary-General. L.. Assistant Field Engineer .. Commanding Orderly Officer . Howell. D. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General .. Captain A. K.. C. Staff.. l8th Hussars. Assistant Commis- Chief Commissariat . .a... with the temporary rank of . . . R. 2nd Battalion.. G. . r.-c.. Inspecting Veterinary Officer Veterinary-Major G.. R.. ..o.s. . Muscroft.._ Captain ... General. M.V. W.. .S. Captain H.Major H..c.. Cox.. Brigadier-General. C. Welby. Survey Officer Provost-Marshal . A. F. Captain P..s. James. E. Lieutenant J.... Veterinary-Lieutenant A..cnce). c. Kemball. V.Brevet-Major F. Captain M. Assistant Officer.... 2nd Punjab Cavalry. Principal Medical Officer Surgeon-Colonel R. Annesly..e. ... Rose. S. R. L.... Brigade Transport Officer Lieutenant H. A. . T. H. i6th Lancers. H. W.. Brigadier-General W.e. r.. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General ...


Bngade Transport


Captain P.


D. Brockman, 5th Bengal


Regimental, Commissariat Transport Officers,
Veterinary Officer


Lieutenant N. J. H. Powell, 23rd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers). Lieutenant P. H. Cunningham, 1st

Bombay Infantry (Grenadiers). .Lieutenant G. E. Tuson, i6th Lancers. Veterinary-Lieutenant C. B. M. Harris,








extracted from the Gazette of India


Council is pleased to direct the publication of a letter from the Adjutant-General submitting a despatch from Major-General Bird, Commanding the Tochi Field Force, describing the operations of that force from June to November last. The Field Force has, under Major-General Bird, fully carried out the objects of the expedition, and the Governor-General in Council, in concurrence with the Commander-in-Chief, desires to express his high appreciation of the discipline, resolution, and patient endurance displayed by all ranks under the severe trials to which they have been exposed.

The Governor-General

object for

The force has accomplished the The Adjutant-General in his letter says which it was detailed, and the tribesmen have submitted to the terms

imposed by the Government of India. Although practically unopposed by the enemy the duties devolving on the troops have been of an unusually trying nature, owing to the unhealthiness of the climate. Amidst much sickness, which has resulted in a heavy death-roll, the good discipline, endurance, and soldierly qualities of all ranks have been most marked, and are, in the opinion His Excellency of the Commander-in-Chief, deserving of high commendation. would draw attention to the excellent work which the Medical Department is reported to have performed during the operations, and to the good service rendered by the other departments of the force, and by the Officers whose names are mentioned in the despatch. I am desired to add that the Commanderin-Chief considers that



much credit is due to Major-General Bird for the which he has conducted the operations committed to his charge.

On 30th Major-General Corrie-Bird, in the course of his despatch, says October the 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade, which had been in this Valley four months, left Bannu for India. This fine corps had been the victim of an epidemic of dysentery and enteric fever, and had lost three Officers and 75 non-commissioned officers and men, besides a very large percentage of Officers and men invalided or left behind in the field hospitals. I cannot bear too high testimony to the discipline which cheerfully endured, and the pluck which combated the scourge during a long and trying season, and the battalion carried away with it the regrets of the whole force at the losses they had The losses by disease have, I regret to say, been very heavy. Three sustained. British Officers and over 100 British soldiers have died from sickness, besides 50 native soldiers and many followers. Great numbers have been invalided or are still in hospital. The troops notwithstanding these trials have worked cheerfully, and done their duty splendidly, and I thoroughly endorse the high opinion formed of them by the General Officers Commanding the Brigades, and would here place on record my high appreciation of their discipline and soldierly qualities.

submit for the favourable consideration of the Commander-in-Chief the Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Nixon, Assistant of the following Officers Regiment, D. S. O., Leinster Major Wilcocks, Quartermaster- General Lieutenant-Colonel Wingate, Chief Commissariat Assistant Adjutant-General Officer Captain H. James, Captain Clements and Major Williamson, Surgeon-Colonel Carew, Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Simmonds, Surgeon-Major









Hudson, Surgeon-Captain Mamby, Major Kemball, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch Major Digby, Commanding Royal

Engineers Captain Malcolm, 4th Gurkhas, Provost-Marshal Captain Rawlins, 1 2th Bengal Cavalry, Superintendent, Army Signalling Lieutenant Cockerill, 28th Punjab Infantry, Field Intelligence Officer. The Officers of the Personal Staff:— Captain Tvvynam, Captain Scarse-Dickens, Highland Light Infantry, and Lieutenant Talbot, Royal Horse Artillery Brigadier-General Symons, Brigadier-General Egerton, Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon, Rifle Brigade Lieutenant-Colonel Hogge, 33rd Punjab Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel Coats, 25th Punjab Infantry, and Major Pollock, 1st Sikhs.






Of the Officers specially brought to notice by the General Officers CommandMajor Wintour, Deputy ing the Brigades, the following are mentioned Assistant Quartermaster-General Captain Watkis, Deputy Assistant AdjutantCaptain General Major Grover, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General Walter, Devonshire Regiment Lieutenant-Colonel Cunninghame, 1st Punjab Cavalry, Road Commandant.





Major-General Bird adds I desire to record my recognition of the assistance afforded me by Major G. T. Younghusband, who has been Chief Political I trust his services may receieve a Officer of the expedition throughout. suitable recognition. My thanks are also due to the other Civil Officers, Mr. Lorrimer and Mr. Kettlewell. For the good work done by the Telegraph Department, I would record my special thanks. A new line was constructed from Bannu to Datta Khel most expeditiously by Lieutenant Green, Royal Engineers. I would commend the work done by the Postal Department under

Mr. Van Someren.




We take the
No, 727-F.

Gazette of India

— — Field Operations — Malakand, dated Simla,

following extracts from the despatches which appeared in the
15th September 1897.

From Major-General

the Secretary to the

G. de C. Morton, c.b., Adjutant-General in India, to Government of India, Military Department.

have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, information of the Government of India, the accompanying report from Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B.. C.M.G., giving details of what occurred at the Malakand from the 26th July to the ist August 1897, on which latter date Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., took over command of the Malakand Field Force,
for the

which the

to draw attention to the success with sudden attack of the tribesmen was promptly met and repulsed, while he considers that the subsequent arrangements made to hold the position reflect great credit on Brigadier-General Meiklejohn and the force under his

The Commander-in-Chief desires

Sir George White wishes to express his entire concurrence with the 3. remarks of Brigadier-General Meiklejohn as regards the admirable behaviour For five consecutive nights of the troops during the defence of the Malakand. large numbers of the enemy, led on by their Mullahs, and strongly imbued with a spirit of fanaticism, attacked the position with determination, during which time the troops had no rest or sleep. Each successive attack was met and repulsed with steadiness and success.

The incident mentioned when an advanced post in the line of defence 4. was held by a party of a native officer and 25 men of the 31st Punjab Infantry The small party detailed for this duty gallantly cannot pass unnoticed.
maintained their position for 6J hours, and resisted what is described as a most determined attack, until at length the Serai they were holding was set on fire and rendered untenable. Out of the party of 26 men detailed for the duty, ig were either killed or wounded, which in itself testifies to the gallant stand they made.

His Excellency also wishes to express his admiration of the manner 5. which the Corps of Guides marched at very short notice from Mardan, a distance of 32 miles. Despite the intense heat they had gone through, the corps arrived in such a soldier-like condition that, on reaching the Malakand, the Infantry of the Guides at once took up the position allotted to them in the line of defence, and were under arms and fighting throughout the same and ensuing nights. Nor can Sir George White omit a reference to the march of the 35th Sikhs and the 37th Dogras, under Colonel Reid, which regiments proceeded to The march was carried reinforce the Malakand Brigade as rapidly as possible.





out under the most trying conditions and in exceptionally sultry weather, but ranks pushed on to reinforce their comrades, notwithstanding that they left 1 8 of their number dead from heat apoplexy e)i route a loss which His Excellency

deeply deplores.
Sir George White has also heard with the deepest regret of the death of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, 24th Punjab Infantry, Major W. W. Taylor, 45th Sikhs, Lieutenant L. Manley and the non-commissioned officers and men mentioned in the report.

In conclusion, the Commander-in-Chief desires to recommend to the favourable consideration of the Government of India Brigadier- General W. H. Meiklejohn and the Officers mentioned by him in his report.

Brigadier General Meiklejohn, in a despatch, deals with the attacks from July 26th to August 1st. He says

Of the behaviour of the troops of all ranks, I cannot speak too highly. The courage with which they have faced overwhelming odds night after night,

the endurance with which they have stood and fought with next to no sleep for days and five nights, has been be3^ond all praise. The trial has been a very severe one, and I trust that His Excellency will agree that they have come out of it honourably.
All have done well, but I should like to bring before His Excellency for favourable consideration the following names of Officers and men


Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, on the first alarm being sounded on the night of the 26th Juljr, took prompt action in reinforcing the outpost line held by his regiment, and later was of great assistance in directing the defence of the central enclosure till he was severely wounded.

Captain H. F. Holland showed great courage in assisting to drive a number of the enemy out of the central enclosure and was severely wounded in doing so.
I virould specially wish to mention Lieutenant S. H. Climo, who commanded the 24th Punjab Infantry after Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb and Captain Holland had been wounded. This Officer has shown soldierly qualities and ability of the highest order. He has commanded the regiment with dash and enterprise and shown a spirit and example which have been followed bj' all ranks. I trust His Excellency will be pleased to favourably notice Lieutenant Climo, who has proved himself an Officer who will do well in any position and is well worthy of promotion.

Lieutenant A. K. Rawlins has behaved well all through. I would recommend His Excellency for the plucky way in which he went to the fort on the night of the 26th July to bring down reinforcements, and again for the dash he showed in leading his men on the 27th and 28th, of which Lieutenant Climo speaks most highly.



W. Costello, 22nd Punjab Infantry, temporarily attached Punjab Infantry, has behaved exceedingly well, and is the subject of a separate recommendation.
Lieutenant E.
to the 24th

Punjab Infantry.

Major M. I. Gibbs commanded the regiment in the absence of Major O'Bryen with skill and in every way to my satisfaction.
Lieutenant H. B. Ford, Acting Adjutant, 31st Punjab Infantrj^, rendered valuable assistance in helping to bring in a wounded sepoy during the withdrawal from North Camp. He also behaved with courage in resisting an attack of the enemy on the night of the 28th when he was severely wounded.




Surgeon-Lieutenant J. Hug^o, attached to 31st Punjab Infantry, rendered valuable service on the night of the 28th in saving Lieutenant H. B. Ford from bleeding to death. Lieutenant P'ord was wounded and a branch of an artery was cut. There were no means of securing the arterj', and Surgeon-Lieutenant Hugo for two hours stopped the bleeding by compressing the artery with his Had he not had the strength to do so, Lieutenant Ford must have fingers. Early in the morning thinking that the enemy had effected an entrance died. into Camp, Surgeon-Lieutenant J. Hugo picked up Lieutenant Ford with one arm, and, still holding the artery with the fingers of the other hand, carried him to a place of safety.

Rattray s Sikhs.

Colonel H. Sawyer was away on leave when hostilities broke out, but he returned on the 29th and took over command of the regiment from LieutenantColonel McRae, and from that time rendered me every assistance.
specially bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commandername of Lieutenant-Colonel H. N. McRae, who commanded the regiment on the 26th. 27th and 28th. His prompt action in seizing the gorge at the top of the Buddhist Road on the night of the 26th and the gallant way in which he held it undoubtedly saved the camp from being rushed on that


in-Chief the

for the able way in which he commanded the regiment three days of the fighting, I would commend him to His Excellency's favourable consideration.

For during the




Also Lieutenant R. M. BarfF, Officiating Adjutant of the regiment, who, Lieutenant-Colonel McRae reports, behaved with great courage and rendered him valuable assistance.

The Guides. wish to bring the name of Lieutenaut-Colonel R. B. Adams of the The prompt way in which the corps Guides to His Excellency's notice. mobilised and their grand march reflect great credit on him and the corps. Since arrival at the Malakand on the 27th July and till the morning of the 1st August, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams was in command of the Lower Camp, left position, and in the execution of this i.e., that occupied by central and command, and the arrangements he made for improving the defences he gave me every satisfaction. I have also to express my appreciation of the way in which he conducted the cavalry reconnaissance on the 1st August on which occasion his horse was shot under him.


Great credit is due to Lieutenant P. C. Eliott-Lockhart, of the Guides Infantrj', for bringing up the regiment from in such good condition after their trying march.

who was in command


Captain G. M. Baldwin, D.S.O., behaved with great courage and coolness during the reconnaissance of the 1st August, and though severely wounded by a sword cut on the head, he remained on the ground and continued to lead his

Lieutenant H. L. S. Maclean also behaved with courage, and displayed an excellent example on the night of the 28th July, when he was severely wounded. I \tli Bengal Lancers.

Major S. B. Beatson commanded the Squadron, llth Bengal Lancers, which arrived at Malakand on the 29th, and led them with great skill and dash on the occasion of the reconnaissance on the 1st August.
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
Lieutenant F. A. Wynter was the only Officer with No. 8 Bengal Moun26th till the 30th July, and he commanded it during tain Battery from the that time, when all the severest of the fighting was going on, with great ability.

Smyth was most zealous and performed his duties to my satisfaction. Cotterill. to Lieutenant Winsloe. was in command of the company in the absence of Captain Johnson on the 26th. . A. I should like especially to mention him The Battery did excellent work all through. Hassan. Corr has worked night and day in the hospitals in trying to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded. I would wish to commend his gallant conduct for the favourable consideration of the Major L. he has carried on all his office duties on his bed. After Lieutenant Watling was wounded the command for the remainder of the night of the 26th and till Lieutenant Winsloe returned on the 27th devolved on Lieutenant He performed his duties with great credit. commanded company from the 7th in July till the 1st August to my entire satisfaction.. 38th Native Field Hospital. 5 Company. 38th The arrangements made by Surgeon-Major services favourably.. Medical Staff. Surgeon-Captain T.E. by his zeal and his exertions. W. Watling. Man ley. R. The list of casualties is large. was of the greatest assistance to me by the zeal and energy with which he performed his duties from the moment the news of the approach of the enemy was received till he was severely wounded while standing next to me in the enclosure of the Sappers and Miners' Camp on the night of the 26th. Deane is in no way under my authority. and has most ably and efficiently aided Surgeon-Major Hassan. He volunteered to perform the duties of Provost-Marshal. . I feel I am under a great obligation to him for the valuable assistance he rendered me with his advice and for volunteering to put himself at my disposal with the object of carrying on the active duties of Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General when Major Herbert was wounded. the Lieutenant A. my Deputy Commander-in-Chief. rendered valuable assistance in attending to the wounded under a heavy fire on the night of the 26th and each following night. and did so for a short time during the illness of Lieutenant H. The above list of names may appear to be somewhat long but I would point out that the fighting was almost constant for a week. S.( xi ) and has proved himself a good soldier. Surgeon-Lieutenant W. Langston. and the indefatigable attention and care with which he devoted himself to the wounded deserve great praise. was of great assistance.E. O. the defences were invaluable. and was of such a close nature as to demand incessant exertion from every Officer in the force and to elicit constant acts of courage and gallant example which cannot be overlooked. Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. R. Although Major H. Brigade Staff. and commanded it well until he was wounded in gallantly trying to resist a charge of the enemy. Since being wounded. I hope His Excellency will think fit to consider his Officer. and behaved with courage and devotion in carrying out his duties under very exceptional circumstances.E. He was indefatigable in assisting me in every way he could. A. A. and afterwards E. His services strengthening Lieutenant F. Senior Medical Native Field Hospital. Winsloe. for His Excellency's consideration. Herbert. N. Queen's Own Madras Sappers and Miners. R. No. and Surgeon-Major Hassan has been untiring in his exertions for their relief. and I am anxious to put on record my grateful appreciation of the services he rendered me. R. Assistant Adjutant and Ouarter-MasterGeneral.

. to forward herewith despatches from Major-General Sir B. during the operations from the 26th July to the 2nd August.. 4. in spite of the exertions and hardout with skill and judgment ships they had undergone during the past week. Military Department. .....C. including the defence and relief of Chakdara.. ... K.. -Malakand.. separate report on the defence of Chakdara speaks for itself.. . . Blood. advanced with great energy and drove the enemy disheartened and panic-stricken in all directions into the plain. 15th September 1897. . Officers . approbation of Sir B.. . Among many desires to White draw other brave acts performed during the defence. — Fiela Operations. Blood's energy. and all ranks under his command. dated 15th September 1897. Taylor had behaved with the greatest gallantry and dash in meeting the enemy's first charge with Lieutenant-Colonel McRae. 728-F . . I have the honour.. but to record his admiration of the manner in which this small garrison successfully held their own for six nights and days against overwhelming numbers. . . MALAKAND FIELD FORCE.. and Men.. 727-F.. Adjutant-General in Government of India. Officers. some of whom I have therein recommended for the Order of Merit. by direction of the Commander-in-Chief... Manley. Morton.. I attach separately for favourable consideration a list of Native Officers. W. The troops. describing the operations at the Malakand and in the Swat Valley from the 1st to 3rd August 1897.... .b. .. In continuation of my letter No... I trust these recommendations will meet with the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The advance from the Malakand to the relief of Chakdara was carried 3.( ^ii ) I would not like to close this memory of a fine soldier and charming companion deplores.. loss is a heavy one to his regiment and to the Service. as my Commissariat Officer. 19 Non-commissioned . G. both at the Malakand and Chakdara. His loss is a very serious one to the Brigade... non-commissioned officers and men who have done especially good service.B.. Return of casualties in action at Malakand from 26th July to 1st August 1897 inclusive. He would also specially refer to the patient courage and endurance of the followers. 22 13» Wounded No. a tribute to the whose death the whole force Major W.. . The Sir George White wishes 5. I Wounded Killed .. Colonel Reid. who had rendered me great assistance.. From Major-Gencral to the Secretary to the de C.. India.. . of the sound dispositions made by him and of the able way in which he was supported by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn. I have also to deplore the death of Honorary Lieutenant L. dated Simla. ... and who died fighting manfully.. Sir George special attention to the gallantry and devotion of the . despatch without payine. and there is no one in the Brigade who does not mourn him as a friend. where they were pursued by the cavalry and still further dispersed.. SUMMARY. Killed .. In submitting these reports His Excellency desires to express his 2. .. c. and had he His lived he would undoubtedly have distinguished himself in his career...

R. These circumstances were calculated to unpleasantly affect the steadiest nerves. Hobday. isolated as they were in the signal tower under very trying cir« cumstances. F Reid. and the constant sight at no great distance of hordes of wild barbarians thirsting for their blood. F. H. A. due to the steadfast courage and conduct of our native soldiers under the gallant leading of their British Officers. H. was. without water to drink. disposed and led the troops on the morning of the 2nd in the successful attack on the hill since named after him in a most judicious and satisfactory manner. Blood. chiefly and in the first place. especially when we consider the scenes they had witnessed for nearly a week. afforded me valuable assistance by carrying out the re-arrangement of the defensive posts at the Malakand on the 1st August after the Relieving Force had been drawn from them and in making the preparations for Colonel T. is attention of His Excellency the I have the honour to invite the special Commander-in-Chief in India to the good services of the following officers during the operations described above. C. signallers That the morale of the small garrison of Chakdara was in no degree shaken by the severe strain to which they had been subjected is evident from the brilliant sortie which was made by the party under command of Lieutenant Rattray on the arrival of the Relieving Force.G. Colonel A. C.M.— ( xiii ) who.B. and those mentioned by him in the operations under reference. J. in this case some distribution of rewards should be made to the native ranks at proportionate rates per unit to be allotted in each unit by the British Officers acting as a sort of committee. who behaved in the somewhat exciting circumstances of the early morning of the 2nd August. it very difficult to select individuals for reward with fairness. His Excellency desires to commend the services of Major-General Sir B. the heavy and continuous firing at short range which had gone on round two-thirds of our position up to an hour or two before the start of the relieving column. if possible.. and the way in which all sorts and conditions of our native soldiers and followers came out of the trial is a source of keen satisfaction to all of us. P.A. vis : — Brigadier-General W. Truly these men deserve to bear the good old motto Ncc asperat terrent. Sir Bindon-Blood closes his despatch describing his relief of Chakdara in the following terms : The complete and comparatively easy success of these operations. which I have been privileged to direct. and at times under a heavy fire. thing touching. officiating Colonel on the Staff. Major E. Not a little was also due to the patient courage of our mule-drivers and other followers. Goldney. J. In operations such as those connected with the relief of Chakdara Fort. Goldney's attack on the 2nd.. Meiklejohn. Colonel T. was most energetic and indefatigable in assisting Colonel A. Malakand Brigade. to the special consideration of the Government of India. 2nd -and 3rd. H. and I would accordingly suggest that. as if they were parading Their confidence in us was somefor a peaceful march in the plains of India.. carried out his duties in command of the force which relieved Chakdara Fort with great gallantry and judgment. Reid and me in carrying out the multifarious work which had to be done at the Malakand and in the Swat Valley on the ist. 30th Sikhs. . continued to perform their duties in a most soldier-like manner.

O. Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Infantry). I hope. . C. showed great readiness and resource. Assistant Adjutant-General Major H.. Signalling Officer. and Captain A. R. 4th Dragoon Guards. R. J. Deane. Royal Scots Fusiliers. the only Officers Staff" of my force who had arrived at the Malakand on the 2nd Officers worked very hard and were of great use to me. F.. Goldney's command led their observation with gallanti-y and judgment.I. 24th Punjab Infantry. . attracted my favourable notice by his smartness. attached to Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Cavalry). vis : — Captain G. B. Orderly Officer. The following detachments under Officers my own under Colonel T. 1st Battalion. Queen's Miners). C.. in the most gallant and judicious manner. Burney. Ramsay. Central India Horse. Gaunt. Adams.„ .) Lieutenant G. was not in any orders during the operations above described. D. Christian. R. de H. Gordon Highlanders. . who acted as Staff Officer to the Relieving Force.Beatson. 28 . Captain A. H.C.. . Dir and Swat... viz : — Lieutenant-Colonel L. A. 3Sth Dogras. Lieutenants C.. vis : — Colonel H. F.S. H. H. but. G. Dillon. lith Bengal Lancers. E.. and E. Birch.. East Surrey Regiment. .. A... Sawyer. R. Return of casualties in action at relief of Chakdara on 2nd August 1897. who commanded two guns of No. quickness and thorough knowledge of his work. Stainforth.. 2nd Regiment. way under my Major H. Major J. commanded the Cavalry (four squadrons) with the Relieving Force. ville. Captain L. Winsloe. Political Agent. MALAKAND FIELD FORCE. Dunster. 5 Wounded . carried out their duties most satisfactorily.. 45th Sikhs.. Eliott-Lockhart. (8th Bengal Mountain Batterj-. Lieutenant A. Lieutenant-Colonel R. 40th Pathans. Queen's Own Corps of Guides. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery in support of Colonel Goldney's attack.. I may be permitted to express the obligations under which I lie to him for valuable information and general assistance which he gave me. Chief Commissariat Officer. C. Officers . These my Aide-de-Camp. V. Wharry. Surgeon-Captain H. C. Own Sappers and fire Lieutenant. Whitchurch. H. Jemadar Nawab. and his assistance was of the utmost value. of the Divisional August.. A. notwithstanding. B. 35tli Sikhs.( xiv ) who were under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn reports favourably on the following Officers his command during the operations above detailed.E.S. P. . Non-commissioned Killed .. Major Stuart. Bradshaw. and Men.. (No. . The following Officers commanding Units and Detachments of the Relieving Force are stated by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn to have carried out their duties in a thoroughly capable and satisfactory manner. Smith. 5 Company. attended to the wounded under throughout the fighting. I would also wish to bring to His Excellency's notice the good work done by Major H.

Blood has exercised his command and the skilful way in which that Officer handled his troops at the action of Landaki on the 17th August.. to submit for the information of the Government of India the accompanying despatch from MajorGeneral Sir B. dated Simla. 728-F. C.. Brigadier-General W. i6th Lancers. de C. They fought the action at Landaki in a brilliant manner. force.. paragraphs 31 and 35 of the report. with the object of acting as a containing While the made towards A and so preventing the sections of the Bunerwals who had not already committed themselves against us from joining in opposition to our advance into Upper Swat. The Officers of the Divisional Staff and of my personal staff who were with me.M. S. which. Government Sir George White deeply regrets the loss of Lieutenants R. c. . the Secretary to the Government of India.B.B. Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle. on its head-quarters leaving Mardan. 2. K.. — Field Operations — Malakand. and the Native Officers and non-commissioned officers and men of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides who accompanied them. came under my command as the 3rd Brigade. Wodehouse. T. 3.000 mules.b. to Front Major-General G. Blood. Morton. In continuation of my letter No. Minchin gave valuable assistance in collecting intelligence and supplies. Commanding the Malakand Field Force. B. and whose conduct will form the subject of a separate communication. Malakand Field Force.M. Deane. Military Department. B.B. and they endured with perfect cheerfulness the discomforts of several nights' bivouac in heavy rain. when he dislodged the enemy from an extremely strong natural position. Sir I Bindon Blood in his despatch says : would wish to express my admiration of the fine soldierly qualities exhibited by all ranks of the special force which I led into Upper Swat. 729-F. Meiklejohn. Political Agent and his Assistant Lieutenant A. 18 miles north-east of Mardan and about four miles from the Buner border. .C. C. Lancashire Fusiliers.. Greaves. They carried out admirably the trying duties necessitated by marching in hot weather with a transport train ot more than 2. dated 15th September 1897. A. MacLean of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides and he also desires to record his admiration 'of gallantry displayed on the occasion of their death by Lieutenant-Colonel R. Adjutant-General in India. force under Brigadier-General J. and his staff and the several heads of departments and Commanding Officers of Divisional Troops.— ( XV ) No. C. Queen's Own Corps of Guides. working over high hills under a burning sun with the greatest alacrity and showing everywhere the greatest keenness to close with the enemj'. L. I5tli September 1897... by direction of the Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency has much pleasure in bringing to the notice of the of India the admirable manner in which Sir B.G. Adams. C. all carried out their duties in Major H. was concentrated on the 17th August at Rustam. giving an account of the operations of the force under his command from the 4th to 26th August i}^97 inclusive. H. and favourably commends to the notice of the Government of India the Officers therein mentioned. operations above described were in progress a diversion was the southern border of the Buner country from Mardan by the 1st Reserve Brigade. and H. I have the honour. an entirely satisfactory manner. The Commander-in-Chief cordially endorses the opinions expressed in 4.G.

judgment and vigour with which the operations were carried out. Baddeley. : The celerity with which The Adjutant-General in a covering letter wrote the successful result was attained is undoubtedly due to the skilful dispositions made by the commander of the force. Down. force. and reflect the greatest : — credit on all ranks. E. particularly in the attack and capture of the Tangao Pass. and Brigadier-General Wodehouse and his staff made good use of the time they spent at Rustam in acquiring valuable information about several of the passes in the neighbourhood. have been all that could be desired. and to the enterprise. The only casualty during the operations Highland Light Infantry. mortally wounded.E. Sir Bindon Blood in his despatch mentioned Officers. the He makes special mention of the spirit of his troops left nothing to be desired. Bombay Sappers and Miners.— ( xvi ) The presence of this force had the desired effect. British and native. efficiently He remarked :—The 1st between sixty and seventy and 2nd Brigades were most ably and commanded by General Meiklejohn and General Jeffreys respectively. 3 Companj'. was a private of the X- . and has expressed to me a high opinion of that Officer's abilities and acquirements. and he recommends these Officers strongly to the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief. THE BUNER DESPATCH. and the discipline and good conduct displayed by the troops throughout these short but successful operations. work of No. Sir Bindon Blood's despatch on the Buner%val expedition was published in the Gazette of India with the following comments The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion expressed by the Commander-in-Chief regarding the skill with which the operations of the field force were conducted by Sir Bindon Blood. R. Assistant Commissioner. particularly of his proficiency in the local vernacular. under Captain C. He also reports very favourably on the assistance given him by Lieutenant C. The discipline and conduct of the troops. Brigadier-General Wodehouse states that throughout the operations of his which involved considerable fatigue and exposure to heat and rain. P. His Excellency now commends to the notice of the Government the services of Sir Bindon Blood and of the Brigadiers and others mentioned in the despatch.

and MajorGeneral A. de C. much pleasure in endorsing Sir Bindon Blood's commendation of the subsequent operations of this Brigade. however. in the performance of the onerous duties which devolved upon them in connection with these . THE MOHMAND AND MAMUND DESPATCHES. The valuable reconnaissances made by the nth Bengal Lancers under Major Beatson when establishing connection with Major-General Elles's force. are. operations. conspicuous throughout the operations especially so in the night attacks made by the enemy on the 14th. B. His Excellency has. The advance made in knowledge of their special duties evinced by the Transport Officers during the operations now reported on. most satisfactory and creditable. The despatches from Major-General Sir Bindon Blood and Major-General E. as well as during the trying incidents of the i6th September and in the attack on the villages of Agrah and Gat on the 30th September. Elles dealing with the operations of the Malakand and Mohmand Field Forces in September and October. In conclusion. who was responsible for a great portion of the line of communications and for the efficient supply of troops at the front as well as in commending to the favourable notice of the Government the Staff. and of the resource and appreciation of the situation he evinced when confronted with unexpected difficulties. Departmental and Regimental Officers named in the despatch. . and the attention that has been paid to the care and treatment of Transport animals. In a letter from the Government of India it is said that the GovernorGeneral in Council concurs in the Commander-'n-Chief's expression of approval of the general conduct of these operations. F. Adjutant-General. Jeffrej's's disposition of the troops under his command on the 6th September showed that that Officer had greatly underestimated the fighting power of the Mamunds as regards both numbers and strength of position. D. His Excellency has much pleasure in endorsing the favourable terms in which Sir Bindon Blood has mentioned Colonel A. The gallantry and discipline of the troops were. J. Morton. on the 20th September. R. were published in the Gazette of India of the 3rd December. in a covering letter to Sir Bindon Blood's despatch. Reid. He also concurs in the terms in which Sir Bindon Blood speaks of the services rendered by Brigadier-Generals Meiklejohn and Wodehouse. Sir George White desires me to ex: — 1 press his approval of the general conduct of the operations carried out under Sir Bindon Blood's directions. in Sir George White's opinion. Badcock. the Commander-in-Chief desires to bring to the notice of the Government the services rendered by Major-(^eneral G. Adams on the 30th September appear to the Commander-in-Chief to be specially worthy of commendation. R. and the skilful handhng of the cavalry of the Corps of Guides by Lieutenant-Colonel R. Quarter-Master-General in India. The Commander-in-Chief considers that Brigadier-General V.( xvii ) APPENDIX V. and of the skill and resource shown by . says The Adjutant-General. in Sir George White's opinion. i6th and 20th September. the latter of whom was severely wounded in the night attack on the 3rd Brigade.

with the 3rd Brigade at Watelai. Vivian. ampbell and the 35th Sikhs under Colonel T. and ultimately drew off about 2 a. where I promised to join him or send him further instructions. was waiting to march on the 15th to join me in the Mohmand country. with three battalions.. Watelai. with Divisional Head-quarters. doubtless having in view the desirableness of getting beyond reach of cavalry before This. and five days' supplies. the 3rd Brigade halted. under Colonel T. they did not succeed in doing. C. loth Field Battery at Panjkora and Divisional Head-quarters. C. while it was still quite dark. P. This being so. three the Chaharmung stream. 35th Sikhs. miles south-west of Khar on the left bank of 2nd Brigade. and afterwards against that defended by the 30th Dogras under Lieutenant-Colonel F. in-Chief his appreciation of the gallantry and discipline displayed by all ranks throughout the operations. before the moon Brigadier-General Jeffreys's camp was suddenly assailed by a heavy musketry fire from the ravines close by. having detached the Buffs and the 4th Company. Bindon Blood gives the following reasons for separating his two brigades on the inarch to co-operate with Major-General EUes in the Mohmand Sir country : Some little delay being necessitated by political arrangements with the Jandoul Chiefs and others. On the 13th.m. a squadron.. Jeffreys. 1st Brigade. being directed at first chiefly asrainst the faces of the camp held by the Guides under Major F. Goldney. being encamped on the evening of that day about a mile south of the village of Nawagai. G. as they were overdaylight. however.M. carried with . two battalions and the Serai. to the crest of the Rambat Pass to .B. with little intermission for six hours. a mountain battery and a squadron was on the right bank of the Chaharmung stream. taken in the Mamund Valley about 8 a. H. < . on the 14th. The enemy showed no inclination to come to close quarters. The movements detailed in the foregoing paragraph were duly carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades. I directed Brigadier-General P. under Major-General E. Gosam. north of Markhanai. to cross it into Butkor on the 15th with two battalions. H. the 2nd Brigade moved to a point close to south-west of Khar. finding that the country to the south of it was very deficient in water and forage. H. to join me at Nawagai.B. to encamp on the 14th. and to send the remainder of his brigade on the same day. Both brigades them rations for men up to the 23rd September and I had arranged to drop my communications with the Malakand and draw my next supplies from Shabkadar.m. and I personally examined the Rambat Pass. Bengal Sappers and Miners.— — ( xviii ) His Excellency in Council also shares with the CommanderSir Bindon Blood. D. south of Nawagai. The attack was continued. on the 15th by Captain E. to improve the Rambat Pass. R Elles. while Brigadier. Goldney. Cole At about 8 rose. move his special force through Butkor as quickly as possible to Danish Kol. so far as the 14th was concerned the 3rd Brigade. Sir Bindon Blood's Despatch. prepare it for the passage of his special force next morning. the disposition of the force on the I2th September had altered to the following : 3rd Brigade.General Jeffreys. north of Markhanai. a company of Sappers and Miners. where the Mohmand Field Force.. commanding the 2nd Brigade. to which place I intended to march on the to I further directed Brigadier-General Jeffreys 14th with the 3rd Brigade. the remainder on the Line.

aoy of Sappers.I determined to stay where I was until Major-General Elles's advance should make it possible to dispose effectually of the Mullah's gathering. he would have been compelled by the Mullah's men to throw in his lot with them. Early in the morning of the i6th I received a brief report b3' heliograph of the attack on Brigadier-General Jeffrej's's camp the night before. because he was strong 8 enough already for " . some six or eight miles in length. to § 4 Battalions. while! did not Shink it advisable situation rejoin Brigadier-General JeiTrej-s.„^„ ^jvni^j j were . » •Captain iir 17 T W. ninety- were also killed or wounded. some of their men to disclaim hostile intentions joined in the night attack of the 14th. with a view to carr3'ing them out. E. and finally. Squadron. together with information from Brigadier-General Jeffrej-s that he had received my orders and was concentrating his brigade at inayat Kill in the Mamund Valley. immediate requirements . which would have been a serious matter on account of his influence in Bajour. and to do all in his power to provide such supplies as we required. would have been most unwise to have retired through the ravines above mentioned in face of the Mullah's gathering thirdlj'. The Hadda Mullah was reported to be in the Bedmanai Pass with a small gathering which was said to be increasing in numbers but the tribes inhabiting the Mittai and neighbouring valleys seemed somewhat half-hearted about opposing us. H. -as. The tribes south of the Rambat Pass also sent but. notwithstanding this. <> . East of and behind me lay the road to the camp of the 2nd Brigade at Inayat Kili running for about six mi ies through a network of deep ravines. Meanwhile.South Bajour Sqiiacrons. 1 . because my support was necessary to keep the Khan of Nawagai with us. . a village in the Mamund Valle}'. secondly. made a considerable Mo^u'nla. I found myself at Nawagai with a brigade of all arms + in a strongly entrenched position. happened. -^ . faced by the Hadda Mullah's gathering in the Bedmanai Pass. change in the aspect of affairs in . VV. on my arrival at Nawagai on the 14th September. who killed 21 of them and dis- regret to say that • two British Officers .rington. Khan . if I had deserted him.— Aj^/^rf -two native soldiers and ^ two followers wounded one native officer. . He had ascertained that the attack on his camp had been made by a small gathering of Mamunds..— first.. and at once sent him orders to concentrate his force and proceed to the punishment of the Later in the daj' I received a fuller report of what had tribes concerned. Bailey. five . .15th on Brigadier-General Jeffreys's camp. 1 Mountain Battery. The other casualties „.. I was not strong enough to attack the Mullahs gathering in their position with sufficient amount of odds in my favour.and his squadron of the persed the rest. and the Mohmand ccvintry and the strategical . Company of Sappers." Battery. and to clear out the Bedmanai Pass and the Mittai and neighbouring valleys with completeness. and by a few men from the neighbouring tribes.1 5th. t Lieutenant H. I 14th Bengal Lancera. who had been reinforced by some of Umra Khan's followers from Za^i. because I expected that one of Major-General Elles's Brigades would join me in the Nawagai Valley on the 17th or the 18th at latest. the mouth of which is about seven miles south-webt in a straight line from the site of my camp.— itself about one mile south of Nawagai village The intervening ground is a plain of which the western halt is cut up by ravines.— a not very difficult defile. while the rest is favourable for cavalry. were killed * and one dangerously wounded f in this affair. . .. I found the disposed to be friendly. and then for the remaining six or seven over a plain. Naturally the night attack of the 14th. Accordindy. becau. A. other native ranks and two followers eight horses and transport animals . Tomkins 1 o J and Lieutenant A. \ 3 1 which had now developed itself was interesting.se it 1 I Com (. with the consequent turning aside into the Mamund Vallej^ of BrigadierGeneral Jeffreys's Brigade. .

The remainder ot the column pushed and at about 10-30 a. 35th Sikhs. Vivian. under Major Campbell. 38th Dogras. which had suffered heavy losses. with two men slightly wounded. whereupon General Jeffreys ordered Major Campbell with six companies of the Guides Infantrj' to go to his assistance which they did about 4 p. E. Ryder w^ere ordered to cover the movement by climbing to the top of a high ridge to their right and then advancing along it towards the north. The right column under Lieutenant-Colonel F.— ( XX ) The most interesting pait of Sir Bindon Blood's despatch deals with the action of September i6th.Shahi Tangi had been dismantled. was directed against the villages of Minar. being fully occupied for some considerable time in dealing with the numerous villages met with along the road shortly after leaving camp. two companies of the 35th Sikhs which led the on. . . At about 6-30 on the morning of the 1 6th September Brigadier-General Jeffreys moved out from his camp at Inayat Kili with the greater portion of his force in three columns. Towards 9 a.m. found that place too strongly held to be reasonably attempted without artillery. The centre column under Colonel Goldney. it was called up by General Jeffreys. The (luides. to deal with the villages of the Mamunds. the two companies advanced too far from their supports and as the enemy promptly attacked them in force they were compelled to retire about a mile with the loss of one British Officer and one sepoy killed and sixteen non-commissioned officers and sepoys wounded. Damadolah and Badam Kili the central column under Colonel T. as the enemy began to appear in force on his left near Agrah and it joined the centre column about noon. I. had remained far behind. In the earlier part of the day the left column .on the villages of Shinkot. and was directed along the right bank of the Watelai ravine parallel to the centre column.he vvas hard pressed and could not rejoin the main body.m. four guns. however. and brought off Captain Ryder's detachment. and returned thence to camp arriving at 4 p. most successfully and gallantly relieved . Chingai. retirement commenced a message was received from him stating that . who were first reported at Badam Kili to which place a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel A. consisting of six companies and a detachment of Sappers was directed along the eastern side of the Mamund Valle}. and a detachment of Sappers. Goldney.m. Owing to subsequent orders not reaching him. . Hazarnao and Badalai while the left column under Major F. The fact of this movement having to be undertaken so late in the afternoon was a most unfortunate occurrence. The guns came into action.. Campbell of the Guides was composed of five companies and a detachment of Sappers.m. In this movement. one squadron. consisting of six companies. first on the spur north of Badalai and afterwards on the north of Chingai (11^ they were covered in the first position by two companies of the 35th Sikhs posted to their right. Ommanney was sent to dislodge them. since General Jeffre\-s had to wait until the safety of the Guides and Captain Ryder's detachment was assured and the consequent delaj' at that time of the day made it impossible for him to reach camp before dark. as soon as the fortified villages of Chingai (II) and . The right column under Colonel Vivian having advanced by the route ordered as far as Damadolah. Soon afterwards. the Buffs under Colonel Ommanney coming up. the knoll was again occupied without much opposition. G..m. and on their moving towards the second position one-and-a-half of these companies under Captain W. being the furthest point reached by the column during this advance. advance occupied a knoll near Shahi Tangi upwards of nine miles from camp. . along which he attempted to retire in a direction which diverged Soon after the from the line of the retreat of the main body of the force. H.. Captain Ryder went further. At about 2-30 p. advanced some six miles up the valley without seeing anything of the enemy. It may be well to give Bindon Blood says : is it that which Sir in full. General Jeffreys ordered the troops to return to camp Captain Rj'der was still on the high ridge above Chingai (11). a short time being taken up in assembling the companies which were in extended order.

part Jeffreys. After this the enemy were easily driven oft". This state of things continued. although he had been close to him for some time previously without knowing it. however. G. a small party of Sappers and a few men of the Buffs and the 35th Sikhs who got separated from the rest in the darkness. in obedience to an order from General Jeffreys. until the arrival about midnight of Major J. So long as daylight lasted the enemy kept at a respectful distance from him. but as it got dark they got bold and the ground being broken and diflicult they were able to bring a hot fire to bear on the troops. . and on joining the General about dark had been sent to find and support the Guide*.m.. succeed in rejoining General being prevented by niglitfall and a thunderstorm which came on about the same time. Hodson and Lieutenant H. inflicting serious losses on men and animals. JeflVej's. who fired on the General and his detachment from behind walls at a few yards' range. General Jeffreys has also described in very favourable terms the gallant and valuable work done on this day by Captain He has commended E. About dusk General Jeffrey's. with two companies of Guides and two of his own regiment. Codrington of the Guides who commanded the companies of the battalion which were chiefly in contact with the enemy the gallantry of Surgeon-Captain J.m. B. In the consequent confusion the troops got separated and only the detachments above detailed remained with General He proceeded to occupy and entrench an angle of the village.E. then about three miles and a half from camp. however. 5-30 P. F. Cole and his squadron of the nth Bengal Lancers. Worlledge. R.M. as soon as the safety of Captain Rj'der's arriving about 9 p. He has further strongly endorsed Major Campbell's favourable mention of the courage and judgment shown by Captain G. while the rest was soon occupied by the enemy. H. while a heavy thunderstorm which came on at dusk greatly increased the difficulties of the Ultimately. Failing to find the Guides in the dark. L. Perry of Jemadar Sikandar Khan of the Guides. 35th Sikhs. and while he was engaged in arranging this the thunderstorm before referred to came on causing sudden and complete darkness. Major Worlledge tried to retrace his steps to the General but only succeeded in finding him after the moon rose about midnight. by about 8-30 p. detachment was certain. and of Jemadar Narayan Singh. 151 killed and wounded. Fisher who made a most determined though unsuccessful attempt to take medical aid to the wounded of Captain Ryder's detachment through a hot fire of Surgeon-Lieutenant E. some of the troops there having been sent out to his assistance and returning with him. ( xxi ) did not. decided to occupy a neighbouring village called Bilot for the night. chietly with a view to sheltering the battery mules with him from the enemj-'s sharpshooters. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery. carrying the wounded on their backs under a heavy fire. . as well as the distinguished gallantry of Jemadars : — . Havildar Ram Singh and Sepoy Karram Singh of the same regiment. Meanwhile. General Jeffreys continued his retirement towards the camp. while General Jeffreys has specially commended the gallantry with which the Guides Infantry under Major Campbell brought off Captain Ryder's detachment of the 35th Sikhs. four guns of No. all the troops had arrived situation. the conduct of Captain Ryder and Lieutenant O. Gunning. and of several non-commissioned officers and sepoys of the same corps. Sir Bindon Blood conThe behaviour of the troops throughout this trying day was very tinues good. Ultimately they made their waj' to camp without further loss. 55th Sikhs.M. and gave no Major Worlledge had left camp about further annoyance during the night. General Jeffreys ultimately reached camp at 8 A. who were both wounded. of which was burning. on the 17th. The combined detachments After detailing the losses. The steadiness and discipline shown by the Buffs under Colonel Ommanney were admirable. under Major Campbell. He has also brought to notice a gallant act of Captain Birch and his trumpeter Juvan in rescuing a wounded sepoy of the 35th Sikhs. W.. in camp except General JeftVej-s. in spite of several gallant attempts to clear the village which were led by Lieutenants Watson and Colvin.

as well as the efficiency of the simple defensive arrangements which had been made. The The Valley in : — following comments are made on the operations in the Watelai It will dealing with the have been observed.E. of course. liindon Blood.. The Officers mentioned in the despatch include all the heads of departments. the aff'air was a most satisfactory one. the Salarzai and Much of this difficulty was due to the fact that our invasion of the Mamund Valley was not preceded by a decisive action like that at the Malakand on the and August. or Shamozai.. commanding the Royal Artillery with my force. JeflVej's and Wodehouse. The conduct ot these Officers and men in entering the village several times in the dark. Bengal Sappers. while the postal service under Mr. C. R. : — A of the description is given of the movements about Nawagai. the general staff". the with the Masazai Mohmands. Sheridan was also satisfactory. H. Mamund's neighbours. closes in the following : words steadiness of the troops during this somewhat trying action was quite perfect. General Jeffreys further refers in the strongest terms of commendation to the gallant conduct of Lieutenants Watson and Colvin. by such an object-lesson as our operations against the Mamunds them. The telegraph arrangements were well carried out by Lieutenant W. and the account night attack on the camp on September 20th. Base Commandant. with the force.. Political Officers. . in closing his despatch.B. The health of the troops was generally good only seven British and five native soldiers and eight followers died from disease between September 6th and October 27th. under the direction of Mr. The fire discipline of the infantry was shown to be excellent. Sir Bind<in Blood adds It will have been gathered from the foregoing narrative that the three brigades of the force were ab\y commanded by Brigadier-Generals Meiklejohn.) who are in all respects an example of what a The star shells fired by the mountain battalion of infantry should be. A. The commissariat. correspondent of the Pioneer newspaper. Robertson. at Nawagai on the night of the 20th September. Davis. . as in the case of the Salarzai and Shamozai.Sir critical moment. and shrapnel and case were also fired at diff'erent times with great eff'ect. In short. battery were most useful. General Jeff'reys has also commended the gallant conduct of his Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. transport and medical arrangements are all said to have been excellent. seems deserving of the highest recognition. who spent the nights of the i6th and 17th with him in the village of Bijot. himself useful at a . and their respective staff's. Schalch. E Pitman. C. although the enemy's swordsmen were so determined that many of them were shot down close to the entrenchment. or. especially that of the 1st Battalion. Major Deane and Mr. The line of communications and base were also most efficientlj' managed by Colonel Reid and by Lieutenant-Colonel V. 4 Comoany. who were efficiently seconded b\^ their staff's. R.E. Aitken. Major Hamilton and finally he has praised the courage and resolution of Lieutenant Churchill of the 4th Hussars.— ( xxii ) Navvab and Ishar Singh and several non-commissioned officers and men of the battery. and the safety of the camp was never in the slightest degree doubtful. pays a high tribute to the work done by the cavalry. as proving the admirable discipline.selves. C. that there was much more difficulty Mamunds than was experienced with the Swatis. and of the handful of men of the Buff's and No. Queen's (under Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. in the face of a heavy fire directed upon them at close quarters. at Ladakai on the 17th x\ugust. and I have consequently made a special communication to you on it. who made same . all under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel W. confidence and steady shooting of our troops.

while they had a secure refuge to which they could send their movables from our side of the frontier and betake themselves if pressed. that . Cole. Beatson. the troops remained uniformly cheerful. somewhat suddenly on The tribesmen were further much assisted by the circumstances that a great part of their best lands lie in Afghanistan. * ^i„ always retirmg* u r before our ^ troops so long as September. as thej' suffered t severely in every encounter with us. especially when active hostilities were going on. Thus. besides undergoing much loss j r j destruction j * ic of i. in one or two cases. and with hills rising all sides. but is practically waterless at this season the only good water above a point near Inayat Kili beiny. while the rations though abundant and excellent in all respects. under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams. as soon as the lower villages had been dealt with. protecting signalling parties.— ( xxiii ) Besides gave the skill. which extended over seven weeks. Thus. especially towards the . carrying out reconnaissances. This plateau is well cultivated for rain crops. At Nawagai three squadrons of the nth Bengal Lancers. The more credit is due to the Mamunds for holding skill » There was an exception at Agrah and Oat on the 30th <. and then following them up in skirmishing order as far as the open ground on their withdrawal to their camp. on doubtful wells. Notwithstanding these inconveniences. plateau. were necessarily open to the objection of sameness. on the north-western side of the high range of mountains whose crest forms the Afghan frontier in that direction. though costly and difficult for them. Afterwards when Captain Cole and his men left the Mamund Vallej^ the Guides Cavalrj'. acted still more effectually in the same manner showing tactical skill of a high order. the that 220 of besides about 150 of tneir friends who came to help them. this. which was done without opposition.defences ^^ property and whose speedy reconstruction. being in greater strength. The conduct and in was The despatch I closes with the following remarks : have already alluded to the steadiness and gallant bearing of the infantry in the several engagements that took place during the operations under reference. swept the country everywhere cavalry could go. took part in every engagement that occurred while they were there. it was necessary for our troops to attack those on the sides of the hills. cut up by ravines. . H. combined with conspicuous gallantry. the special physical features of the Mamund Valley tribe great advantages. under Captain E. establishing such a reputation that the enemy even when in greatly superior numbers never dared to face them in the open. .in the ravines on ihe sides of the hills where many of the most important villages are consequently situated. and I w-ould now wish to invite attention to the invaluable nature of the services rendered by the cavalry. vvhi. out so well. those on the level depending for their water-supply on tanks or. h had to remain low down the valley on account of the difficulty about water higher up. however. they advanced.• . and watching every movement of the enemy. t It is now known wer^ tribes killed. on ground very difficult for assailants and extremely favourable for defenders. much of their property was beyond our reach. In the Mamund Valley a squadron of the same regiment. They showed commendable and patience in adhering to the only tactics which could give them any' measure of success.u then. discipline of the troops in the operations under reference the highest degree satisfactory. • Both in the Nawagai and Mamund Valleys a considerable number of Martini-Henry and other rifles were used against us with apparently unlimited supplies of ammunition. which they utilised with considerable tactical It will be seen that the valley consists of a broad and gently sloping top. were carried on without tents and on a very low scale of baggage. The operations. is necessary to their existence. under Major S. B.

General Jeffreys. Masters. especially as large convoys of sick and wounded were on the line of this force at the time. Signalling.Captain H. for nearly a month of that time.. The heads of the Head-quarters of departments were : Staff Major H.— ( xxiv ) very interesting: feature of the operations was the presence of field Mamund and Salarzai Valley's.A. althoug. G. Stanton. E. M. R. The postal of the several departments and successful. Mann. No doubt the excellence of the Commissariat arrangements has had a great deal to do with the good state of health of the troops which I have remarked upon. Colonel J. Indian Medical Service. which have just returned from seven weeks in the field.. R. Carmichael. where. . In proof of this I will cite a report just made to me by Brigadier.O. was most successful. J. Central India Horse. Captain H.. C. E. Wharry.. C.E. Lieutenant-Colonel A. but these difficulties were successfully overcome by Colonel A. Army Surgeon-Colonel Medical Officer. their presence produced a f^reat effect.O.E.E. Field Treasure Chest . Indian Medical Service. E. W. The rations were always abundant and of uniformly good and I may here observe that in five previous campaigns I have never quality seen the supply of bread anj-thing like so continuously good as it has been throughout the operations of the Malakand Field Force. who is now Officer of the Force. Deputy General (Intelligence).M. C.. Reid. Banbury. artillery in the A of the force was remarkably good throughout. and its management under the direction of Captain C. C. Sheridan was also satisfactory. and matters were ultimately restored to smooth working on the arrival of Surgeon-Colonel Principal Medical J. The Commissariat arrangements under Major H. while most useful action it was amply proved that they could have been brought into with comparative ease. G. H. was CLE. F. Captain E. were most successful.. H. Superintendent. Assistant Adjutant-General. C. The medical The telegraph arrangements were well carried out Robertson. who was most ably and energetically assisted by Veterinary..G.265 mules attached to his brigade. that this morning. Senior Veterinary Officer.S. The working most satisfactory bj' Lieutenant W. W. Divisional Transport Officer. C. on inspecting 1. Middlesex Regiment.. T. R. E. Principal Lieutenant-Colonel W. Gordon Highlanders. D. besides a considerable proportion of the The health British and five other arms. R. Carmichael.B. Captain Officer. included three brigades of infantry. Pitman. difficulties Some service was carried out in a very satisfactory manner. Commanding Roj-al Engineers— relieved early in October by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke. or a total of only 18 disabled animals in all. 2nd Regiment. Broadbent.A. The transport was most efficient throughout the operations under reference. R. out of a force (including Communications and Base Hospitals) which. Assistant Quarter-Master-General.S. who was in charge of the Line. D.h active operations did not go on after their arrival. under the direction of Mr. he found fourteen sore backs and four animals otherwise unfit for work. Burney. Thackwell. only seven native soldiers and eight followers having died from disease between the 6th September and 27th October. J. G. Commanding Royal Artillery. service under Mr. 25th Madras Infantry. Assistant Quarter-Master- W. commanding the 2nd Brigade of my force. R. Norie. arose on the transfer of Officers and materials to the Tirah Expeditionary Force on its formation. Aitken.

F. Dir. the dams of which had been cut by the Mohraands. Political Agent. He carried out his duties to my complete assistant. Aide-de-Camp Captain A. R. I L. Klogh. have made little of any possible opposition.A. C. and rejoined me at Inayat Kili on the 4th October. Wharry. D. T. Veterinary-Captain H. Mr. Major H. also made himself very useful. is worthy of the highest commendation. the Base Commandant.S. Chaplain. I believe. H. Provost-Marshal.. and anxiety regarding water as in the western Mohmand country the supply is almost entirely from tanks. am — Queen's) Lancers. The despatch contains the following remarks : little fighting.. Dick.. who were efficiently seconded by their staffs. D. . Reid. ist Brigade. i6th September). V. nth Bengal Infantry.E. Chitral and Swat. Lieutenant W. report on the conclusion of the operations of the force. (wounded in action. P. Captain C. I cannot speak too highly of the 20th Punjab Infantry and 21st Gurkhas. and at Jarobi covered the retirement showing high soldierly qualities in both instances. R. expedition by the 28th Bombay Pioneers and No. Edwards.— ( XXV ) Captain W. The 28th Pioneers also did excellent work in reserve to the 1st Brigade in the attack at BediiTanai. G.. 5th Punjab Cavalry. The Rev. Davis was in the Nawagai and satisfaction. in charge of Telegraphs. under great obligations to my personal staff Captain A. gives a very clear account of the operations in the Mohmand country. I. I would wish for no better regiments for The work done during the hill fighting under their respective commanders. 20th September). 3rd Brigade. 2nd Punjab Cavalry. It will have been gathered from the foregoing narrative that the three brigades of the force were ably commanded by Brigadier-Generals W. G. and Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle i6th (The . where I left him on the 12th September. J. W. He gave much assistance in arranging for the collection of local supplies. and In their respective staffs.. Bengal Sappers and Miners. Chief Commissariat Officer. The Line of Communications and the Base were also most efficiently managed by Colonel A. 2nd Brigade. The expedition proved productive of under my command . Divisional Transport Officer.S. W. Captain C. Cookson. A. B. head-quarters on the my Political Officer throughout the operations beyond Mamund Valley prior to Major Deane's return to my 4th October. Survey Officer.I.E. R. 5 Company. Army Veterinary Department. Major-General Elles's Despatch. Staff Corps. Senior Veterinary Officer. The main difficulties to contend with were the passes. F. His native Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan. S. R. on whom the brunt of the work fell.O. was in separate and independent charge of the political arrangements connected with the operations I have described as far as Nawagai. W. Wodehouse (wounded in action. East Surrey Regiment. Robertson. Mann (wounded in action. Captain C. H. L. Robertson. and by Lieutenant-Culonel A. 20th September). I shall have the honour to bring the services of the Officers above brieily referred to more fully to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. Staft" Corps. Ordnance Officer. Thackwell. dated October 13th. Dunsterville. and they often only contained a little dirty water. Jeffreys. Deane. R. Meiklejohn. He accompanied my headquarters to Gosam. final my Major H. Major-General Elles in a despatch. Schalch. and J. but the splendid force would. over which roads had always to be made.St Battalion.

Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs. Mr.( xxvi ) fight The Imperial Service Troops uiuler my commaiul proved their fitness to in the first line and were utilised exactly tiie same as the regular native The cavalry escorts of the Patiala and Jodhpore Cavalry did good troops. the various posts. carried out his work very firmly and in great harmony with the Military Officers at the Captain Cox. his perfect command of their language. Survey Officer. rendered very valuable services as Political The prompt settlement obtained was entirelj' due to his knowledge of Officer. their good service was brought to my notice by the General Tlie Nabha Regiment. ing been added to my force late in September. Stowell carried out all the Everj'thing was carried on postal arrangements entirely to my satisfaction. which enabled him to deal His directly with they/V^«/(S. and was most zealous in his work. C. fine I trust the objects of the expedition were fully carried out. did excellent work under difficulty. Civil Service. had to be kept on the Line of Communications. Merk for the manner in which he conducted the political business throughout. all concerned working verj' willingly. thanks to the body of troops I had the honour of commanding and to the hearty co-operation of my staff and of all ranks in the Force. Major Liythell. carried on all the work connected with them with great smoothness. ably assisted by his subordinate. most creditably by him and his subordinates. Mr. obtained by him regarding distances and water. Merk. Lieutenant Waterfield. and was most keen and energetic. Patiala and Nabha Regiments. laid the telegraph line rapidly and well. Mr. I am under the greatest obligations to Mr. and his firmness in dealing with the jirgahs. marching daily. J. judicious selection of subordinates greatly contributed to the success of the My movements were almost entirely based on the information expedition. : . The following subsidiary despatch was published in the Gazette of Indni by General Elles in connection with the Mohmand Field Force in continuation of the despatch of 13th October 1897:—! bring to the notice of the Commanderin-Chief the names of the following for good services during the Mohmand Expedition — Mr. owing to its havOfficer Commanding the 3rd Brigade. The 1st Patiala Regiment was employed under Lieutenant-Colonel Graves in the operations in the Mittai and Suran Valleys. Royal Engineers. The telegraph work was most satisfactory. Murphy. Assistant Political Officer. and covered the retirement of the brigade under fire. Pike. the tribes. in charge of the Imperial Service Troops. reconnaissance work on more than one occasion and came under fire.

The Line of Communication of the main column between Kohat and Tirah (including the posts on the Samana Range) will be held by a force consisting of one Native Cavalry Regiment and four Native A (c) A ((/) A A (e) Infantry Battalions. which has never before been entered by a British force. Section A. 3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry. mixed brigade will be formed at Rawalpindi as a Reserve. '" mixed brigade. one Printing Section from the Bombay Sappers and Miners. Second Brigade. " Kurram Movable Column " force. for employment as circumstances may require. 34 Native Field Hospital. Sections A. 2 Squadrons i8th Regiment of Bengal Lancers. the Maler Kotla Imperial Ser\'ice Sappers. First Division. 31 Native Field Hospital. Forntation of the Force. the summer home of the Afridis and Orakzais. First Brigade. 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment. Sections A. the Nabha Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry. of No. X Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. 1st Battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment.— 2nd Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment. from Peshawar. No. 14 British Field Hospital and No. 6 British Field Hospital. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery. and No. will advance on Tirah from the neighbourhood of the Samana Range. 1st Battalion the Devonshire Regiment. of No.— 2nA Battalion the Derbyshire Regiment.— The Force which will be styled the " Tirah Expeditionary Force " will be distributed for operations as follows : (rt) (&) main column of two Divisions. which will be designated the will be formed in support on the Hangu-Parachinar line. 63 Native Field Hospital. Divisional Trosps. It is believed that this object can best be attained by the invasion of Tirah. and for the damage to life and property which has thus been inflicted on British subjects and on those in the British service. for their attacks on our frontier posts. each consisting of two Infantry Brigades and certain Divisional Troops.— — ( xxvii ) APPENDIX VI. to be styled the " Peshawar Column will operate. and No. . 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.—^o. No. as may be required. 28th Regiment of Bombay Infantry (Pioneers). 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners. 8 British Field Hospital. 30th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. 13 British Field Hospital. of No. 4 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners. No. Punjab Frontier Force. THE TIRAH FIELD FORCE.— These forces will be composed as follows THE MAIN COLUMN. No. and B. General object for the —The general object of tliis expedition is to exact reparation unprovoked aggression of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes on the Peshawar and Kohat borders. and C. : Composition of the Force. 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment. No.

Section B. 5 Company. . 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment. 3Qth (Garhwal Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. No. Second Battalion the King's the of Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. 1st Battalion the Dorsetshire Re<. British General Hospital of 500 beds at Rawalpindi. Third i?)-. I Kashmir Mountain Battery. (For First Division"). 2nd Regiment of Punjab Infantry. 27th Reigment (ist Baluch Battalion Bombay (Light) Infantry. 9 British Field Hospital. 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkha (Rifled Regiment. No. THE RAWALPINDI RESERVE BRIGADE. (For Second Division). 25 British Field Hospital.Sections. Sections C. Engineer Field Park. 3rd Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.Mce Infantry.bwat Valley. 2 St Regiment of Madras Infantry (Pioneers). 34th Pioneers. 9 tain Battery — Moun- (Bombay) Mountain Battery. No. 15th (The Ludliiana Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. the Sirmur Imperial Service Sappers. and D. 44 Native Field Hospital. 9th Regiment of Bengal Lancers. and No 64 Native Field Hospital. No.tst battalion the Gordon Highlanders. one Regiment of Central 5ndia Horse. 13 British Field Hospital and No. A. 46 Native Field Hospital and Native General Hospital of 200 beds at Kohat. No. Madras Sappers and Miners. No 5 1 Hospital. 24 British Field Hospital and No. No. 48 Native Field Hospital. 22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. LINE OF COMMUNICATION. the Kapurthala Regiment of Imperial Sen. Native General Hospital of 500 beds at Rawalpindi. Maxim Gun Detachment. No.( xxviii ) Second Division. Section D. 4 Guns 3rd Field Battery Royal Artiller\'. 45th (Rattray's Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. Bengal Sappers and Miners. 6th Regiment of Bengal Cavalry. 3 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. 3 British Field Hospital. No. Fourth Brigade. 23 British Field Hospital and No. No. No. 57th Field Battery Royal Artillery. THE PESHAWAR COLUMN. 16th Lancers. .nment. No. Section B. No. 42 Native Field Hospital. Ordnance Field Park..Vi''/<'. 4 Company. one Printing Section from the Madras Sappers and Miners. 1 1 British Field Hospital. No. the Gwalior Imperial Service Transport Corps. 2nd Regiment of Infantry Hyderabad Contingent. 54 Native Field Hospital. No. 1st Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. of No. of No. 1st Battalion the Northamptonshire Regiment. Divisional Troops. of No. the Jeypore Imperial Service Transport Corps. and B. 36th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. 5 British Field Hospital. Second Battalion the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 45 Native Field Hospital. of No. Machine Gun Detachment. 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment. 2 Field Medical Store Depot. 2nd Battalion the Oxfordshire Light Infantry. No. 62 Native Field Hospital. Twelfth Regiment of Bengal Infantry. No. 47 Native Field Hospital. 43 Native Field Royal Artillerv. Punjab Frontier Force. No 5 Veterinary Field Hospital. No. British General Hospital of 250 beds at Nowshera * and Native General Hospital of 500 beds at Nowshera. 2nd Battalion the King's Own Scottish Borderers. the Jhind Regiment of Imperial Service Infantrj-. 2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment. Sections A. and B. 52 Native Field Hospital. two Squadrons 1 8th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.— ^o. *Tliese General Hospitals will also receive the sick and wounded from the Force at the MalaUiUiil iiuil lu the. of No. i Field Medical Store Depot. 9th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.* THE KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN. I Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.

. . H. Commanding Royal W.. r.. H. temporary rank of Surgeon-MajorIndian Medical Service. Barrow.b. O'Siillivan r. 1st Bedfordshire Regiment. Lieutenant G.. Lockhart.Captain E. Punjab. Morris. H.. AssistInielligenee.. Lieutenant H. STAFF..o. commence at and include Kushalgarh. Engineers. but the Line of Communication will. Thomson. Principal Medical Officer (ivith the Surgeon-Colonel G. Annesley. Orderly Officer. 12 British Native Field Hospital. be Peshawar will be the Base of Operations will remain in the Punjab Command. No. E. . A. W.c. . under instructions which will be given from Army HeadQuarters. Staff. A. More-Molyneux. Spragge. . Haldane. 53 All units which will be concentrated at Peshawar.. i8th Bengal Lancers. 2nd Lieutenant E.. .. Central India Horse. de. d.. H. Craster. Field Intelligence Officer .. 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas. Broadbent.s.. Logan-Home.. l8th Hussars. Royal Artillery ... Brigade-Major...b. but COMMANDS AND Army Lieut€7iant-Gencral Force. for the Peshawar Column..G. A. A.a.. Maxwell. Royal Artillery .e.. H. Nicholson. Gordon Highlanders..i.. Captain S. 4th Sikhs. K. Assistant Adjutant-General Assistant Onarter-Master-Gencral Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel E. k.s. E.e. S. Army Medical Staft' Brigadier-General C. L. S. Biddulph r. Major CJ. except such as are detailed for the Peshav(/ar Column.c. Royal Engineers Orderly Officer. d. Artillery.r G.. 7th Bengal Infantry. Lieutenant F. Brigadier-General Commaruiing Royal Brevet-Colonel J. Kohat will be the will also direct all movements of Base of Operations for the First and Second Divisions and will the Kurram Movable Column. Aide-de-Camp Aide-de-Camp Orderly Officer .( xxix ) Jodlipur Imperial Service Lancers..G. will march from Peshawar to Kohat through the Kohat Pass under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces. c. Major H F Mercer. Orderly Officer .. General). r.. Secretary to Principal Medical Opjiccr Surgeon-Major Bngadier-General. Army Signalling ..... for the time being. r.o. Royal Artillery. Captain J. the Staff. . A. Badcock.a. Smith. c. J. Royal Engineers Superintendent. L. ralfor Intelligence. ant Quarter Master-General. r. Commanding ... Brigade-Major. F. W. and he Column beyond Peshawar. Deputy Assistant Qiiarter-Master-Gene. Maconchy. Collen.s. . the General Sir k. Captain C..jo. The General Officer Commanding the Expeditionary Force will direct all the Peshawar movements at and beyond Kohat. de C. Captain F. W. r. . . 2nd-Lieutenant J. Deputy Adjutant-General.a. Kohat and Kushalgarh dissevered from the Punjab Command.e Ma. Field Hospital and No. .. Chief 0/ Brigadier-General W. R. Hamilton.e. Assistant Ouarter-Master-General for Colonel G..b. H. (with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General).. N..

Royal Engineers Field Engineer Assistant Field Engineer Assistant Field Engineer Superintetidoit. k.B. Duthy. LeG. Lieutenant C. Commissariat Transport Officer Inspecting Veterinary Officer . Hall..Advocate-Gcncyal Principal Pyovost-Marshal .s. M. H. Gencral for Intelligence.Advocate-General. Colonel L. Hart. W. Graham.I. K. Army Provost-Marshal Commissary-General Assistant to . Macquoid. Main Column..i.^ Commissary-General Chief Transport Officer Captain W. G. R. 6tli Cavalry. Lieutenant W. W. Chief Ordnance Officer . Lowry. Palin. 1st Lancers. 2nd Derbyshire Regiment Ouarter-Master. Lieutenant-Colonel E. M... C.e.. 29th Infantry. E. Assistant Signalling. ( XXX ) Hcad-Quarlers Coniniandatit Assistant Judge. Medical Staff. Major E. Carmichae!. Royal Artillery Divisional Ordnance Officer Conunanding Royal Engineers Adjutant.. Deputy Judge.a. Balfe. r a. Assistant Commissary-General. Badcock. Adjutant. H. Captain R. H. Scott.. Muir. Hyderabad Contingent Surgeon -Colonel E. 17th 7th Assistant Adjutant-General Assistant Quarter-Master General . Lieutenant-Colonel H. d. Kenny. Captain H. Field Pay-Master . Shewell. Grimston. E. Christopher.b Major.General) Aide-de-Canip E. r. K.. McLeod.E. Comptroller of Military Accounts. Connuanding [ivitli the local rank of Brigadier-General W..e. W. Captain H. E. Comptroller of Military Accounts . First Division. Gosset. Lieutenant G. 16th Lancers. Captain H. Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. 17th Bengal Cavalry. Captain F. G.C. Captain O. R. H.E. Chief Survey Officer . Mansfield..a. (Lieutenant J. Artillery. Veterinary-Lieutenant-Colonel B. r. Captain P. 2nd Punjab InAssistant Deputy fantry. S. Punjab Command. G. Military Accounts Department. c.. Bengal Cavalry. Symons. N. Brevet-Colonel Sir T.. Army Principal Medical Officer . E. Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Royal Lieutenant-Colonel A. Glover. r. Dallas. R. Lieutenant J. Assistant Commissary-General.. A. Bunbury. P. G. R. Major J. c..E. Captain G. Field Intelligence Officer .e. Thackwell. J. Ferrier. Colonel C. CommissaryGeneral. Tovvnsend.xtra Orderly Officers Captain A. 5th Lancers. H . .. Bengal Bombay . 2nd Bombay Lancers. Wikeley.a. Captain A.. Lieutenant-Colonel W. Assistant Commissary-General. Bengal Cavalry. Anderson.E. W. Major H. Holdich.e. Nicholls.. d. h. r. Braid.. G. T. K. F. r. S. L. F. .c.Captain A. A.s o.

W. Bahadur. Captain A.a. 1st Bedfordshire Regiment. The Rev. J... Veterinary-Lieutenant W. Captain 1.s. f. 1st Norfolk Deputy Regiment.s. 5th Bengal Cavalry.. Winkley. c. Aldvvorth. Fagan. Brigade Commissariat Officer Captain A. Veterinary-Lieutenant W. Bevvickc-Copley.ssistant Divisional Transport Officer Captain F.Major A. of Cooch Behar. B. Macandrew. Gurkhas. Kirwan. A. H. Commissary-General. r. Captain E. v. R. -Lieutenant-Colonel H. Brooke.. Commanding Orderly Officer . 6th Bengal Cavalry. 2nd Battalion. G. 5th Gurkhas. C. Brigade Transport Officer Veterinary Officer Lieutenant H. J. R. Brigadier-General A. Wake. Commanding Orderly Officer .a. O. H. Ridgeway. First Brigade (First Division)..( xxxi ) Assistant to ChuJ Transport Officer. Divisional Commissariat Lieutenant C.e. to Commissary-General. D. G. Donne..c. Father N. Wintle. Deputy Assistant Commissary-General. ist Bedfordshire Regiment. 5th General. K. M. d. v. Triscott..B. Saunders Dyer. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General . Hyderabad Contingent. Gaselee. 2nd BatManchester Regiment. Leslie. Yielding. P. Commandmg Aide-de-Camp Orderly Officer Orderly Officer Assistant Adjutant-General Assistant Quarter-Master-Gencral Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General for Intelligence. V. Major W. Major R. g. Yeatman-Biggs.a. C. F. i8th Bengal Lancers. Commissariat Lieutenant H. Major-General A... Hony.B.s... 16th Lancers. H. 7th Hussars.-c. C. Major C. Captain R. Assistant Officer. c. I2tli Bengal Principal Chaplain Clinrch uf Englaiiii Chaplain Roman Catholic Chaplain Divisional Commissariat Officer The Rev.s.. loth Bengal Lancers.i. Maharaja Sir Nripendra Narayan. Lieutenant A. S. Plunkett. Rideout. A.-D..B.. . 1 8th Hussars. C. Deputy Assistant Ouartcr-Master.e. Hart.Captain H. Major W.. B. A.o. Brigadier-General R. d. . to Divisional Transport Captain A. Deputy Assistant . Shore. Brigade Commissariat Officer Lieutenant C. Ist Lancers. Gough. St. Corbett. Mullaly. King's Royal Rifle Corps. L Nicholls. 1st Battalion.i. Captain C. D. N. de la P.c. Assistant Officer. K. Barrett. Assistant to Brigade Coiinnissariat Captain H. A.O. Kemball.. talion the W. Tatam. Cavalry. Assistant Commissary -General. Lieutenant-Colonel R. m. m.c. c. Officer. A. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.. Second Division.O. d. The Rev. Assistant Ouarter-Master. Sinitli.. General. Officer.a. H. 15th Bengal Assistant to Brigade Veterinary Officer Lancers. de V. Svvanston. Second Brigade (First Division). Brigade Transport Officer Captain E. G.

of Brigadier-General).. ^•— ^. Wilkieson. D.O.f. Captain G. 20th Punjab Infantry. Ma. Brigade Commissariat Assistant Officer to Lieutenant t. General. Birch. Macpherson.a. Quarter-Master.^... W. E. Findlater.. . R.Major H. . Leger Wood.-G. 1st Wiltshire Regiment. Royal Artillery Divisional Ordnance Officer Conuuandiiig Royal Engineers Adjutant. r. Purdy.. ^ Roman Catholic Chaplain Church of Scotland (attached to Gordons) The Rev.-d.Captain " M. Reilly.. Fourth Brigade Second (Division). McB. r. A. Assistant Signalling.. ..B.. Edwards. H. Greenstreet. Veterinary-Lieutenant C..Major H. 19th Bengal Lancers. Artillery. Lieutenant C. Grimley. S. r. istan) Retcimeiit of Bombay Infantry. J. B. H. . C. Commanding Orderly Officer . . B. L. Gillan. Lieutenant-Colonel C.. P. b. Kempster. Drake-Brockman.. F.. Field Intelligence Officer . Captain H.. Assistant to Divisional Commissariat Lieutenant A. . . 29th Brigade Commissariat Lieutenant Infantry.. .. D. Lumsden. ChurchofScotland{attachedtoK.. 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers. H.. m. P.-c. L. H. Assistant Com- Assistant cer. W.B's. Lieutenant-Colonel B. .A. m. of Third Brigade (Second Division). .e. Survey India Department.. ..a Captain H. Lieutenant W.e. .a.o. Fraser. Royal Engineers Field Engineer Assistant Field Engineer Assistant Field Engineer Superintendent. 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry... Royal Horse Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General Deputy Assistant General. r. Blood... Lieutenant R. Rose. Captain W. Wellesley.. W. Punjab Brigade Transport Veterinary Officer Officer . Lieutenant R.. 1st Gordon Highlanders. Quarter-Master. Nelson. Officer .o.a... 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers. b.. Hutchins. W. ..C. The Rev.. 24111 (BaluchF. Divisional Commissariat Officer Assistant Commissary-General. Captain F. M. St. ylrtillery Adjutant. D.O.. D.. Tytler. J. A...s. N. Army . Divisional Transport Offi.e. Knight. .s.a. C... Surt^eon-Colonel Ci.e. .)Thti Rev.. 3rd Bengal Infantry. Westmacott. Commanding rattk (ivith the temporary Colonel F.. Head.d.. Weslcyan Chaplain L. Captain T.. Kelly. Davis.. F. Crocker. C./ ( xxxii ) Walters. Father Vanden Deyssel. Divisional Transport Officer Major H. . Orderly Officer Lieutenant G. 1st Dorset- Assistant shire Regiment. Grier. d. Lieutenant W. r. C.. Thomson.. Captain W. Principal Medical Officer .a.a.. Wainwright. Deputy Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.. The Rev. 4th Bengal Cavalry. Major H. r. Lieutenant-Colonel Connnanding Royal Lieutenant-Colonel R.. Brigadier-General R. A. Indian Medical Service. d. to missary-General. Provost' Marslial Field Treasure Chest Officer Captain H. r. Stokes. 2nd PunOfficer jab Cavalry.o. Rigby.^. D. . Survey Officer Mr.ssy....S. . r.. Church of England Chaplain ••• The Rev.. J. ••• J.

W. Keighley. Vousden.... .Pritchett Shaw... 4th Bombay Officer..s. Base Coynmandant .. and Ouar.. . Forsdyke. 2nd Bengal Lancers. Lieutenant H. Assistant Commissary-General. F. 2nd Battalion Light Infantry. 5th ter-Master-General. S.. Captain O. Principal Medical Officer (with the Brigade -Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. .Captain I. Shore. . Tulloch. ) Captain E. G. East Kent Regiment..e. R..W. Lieutenant F. Major L. . r... .. Base Commissariat .o. r... F. vc. Allen. Section Commandant . Peyton. Captain W. W. Galloway.. Assistant Commissary-General.. V... Captain S. Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Lieutenant N. . W. The Rev.. In- Assistant Adjutant and Master-General. r. D. J. C. Infantry (Grenadiers).... Major C. Captain St. Colonel W. Paslej'.... Staff at the Base. Lieutenant R.. Edwardes. British Captain A.. Indian 1st Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-Master-General. British Troops Depot . 1st East Yorkshire Regiment.. r.... Cavalry.. J. V W.S.. Veterinary-Captain F. .e. Staff Corps. 24th Bombay Infantry... Chief Commissariat Officer Chief Transport Officer.. 6th Bengal Cavalry... Deputy Assistant Commissary-Gener. V. 7th Bengal fantry. Lieutenant-General Sir A. Provost Marshal . Gurkhas.( xxxiii . L. H. ...e. .. Brigade Transport Officer .. Veterinary Officer .. Williamson. Field Captain U.Colonel Engineers. Cowie. r.. Major H.. Captain C.. . Part..a. Royal Engineers Field Engineer . S. 2nd Bombay Base Ordnance Officer in Officer . W. South Lancashire Regiment. Steel. Adjutant and Quarter-Master. Captain H. . Veterinary-Lieutenart F. . Fraser. . of C. Commanding Royal . General Off cer Commanding . Rogers. S. Durham Paget. Captain Watkins. Major A. Young.. 2nd Battalion Troops Depot. d. . Lieutenant-Colonel J. Officer Brigade Commissariat Line of Commuxication. r.missarv-General. M. Adjutant.a.O. Charge of Engineer Officer Captain M. S. Y. Armstrcng.. O.. Assistant Com..e. Watson. 1st Battalion. Deputy Assistant Adjutant (temporary Major) J. Biggs. de B. Turner.e.. r.e. Assistant Field Etigineer. K.. Saunders. Hawksley.a. Wilson. Lieutenant. E.e. Major A. W.... Palmer Aide-de-Camp Orderly Offcer . T. H.. Assistant Field Engineer... P. r. Lieutenant H.. . M.. Army Medical Staff. Commandant. . Assistant Field Engineer.. Bundock. Commandant. G. Church of England Chaplain Veterinary hispector .. Captain F. Senior Ordnance Offcer .. 14th Bengal Lancers..B. Phillips.. L.il... Park.C.. k.. B.. 18th Bengal Captain Section Quarter- Commandant .. Lieutenant A. temporary rank of Surgeon-Colonel).. Thurburn. Section Commandant .. de B. Evans. Lancers... r. W.„ Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Native Troops Depots . . P.. ... Marrett. . E.

Commanding Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel R. 1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment. . Jones. G... Major E. Hoghton. Rowan. East Yorkshire Regiment. W. D. Brigade Transport Officer C. A. T. .. Cobb. Assistant Field Ettgineer . G.. Beville. D. R.. Lieutenant H. P. H. Pigott. Bayley... B.O. on October iSth.Major C. Cheshire Regiment. Davis.e. H.. Commanding (with tank and pay of Colonel . ( xxxiv ) /'Captain W. Hj'derabad Contingent. Carr. r. Thomsett. Commanding Orderly Officer Assistant Adjutant .. d. Royal Lieutenant-Colonel W. 1st Battalion 1st Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General .. A. Royal Horse . Deputy Assistant Commissary-General. Hammond. Lancers. E. V. Hammond. Lieutenant E...Lieutenant C. Lieutenant T. r. Field Engineer. to Base Com- 1st Battalion Captain H... r.Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel F.a. Hill.. Lieutenant H.. Farwell. 1897.General.. The Peshawar Column. Charlton.o.M. iwo days before the Column Kft Peshawar and held it throughout the remaining operations. 5th Bengal Cavalry. Drake. ... tock over the apiiointment of Brigade Transport Officer. . The Kurram Moveable Column. Indian Staff Corps. 3rd Infantry Hyderabad Contingent.M... r. 20th Hus- sars. Colonel on the Staff). Hume. .. O. G.B. .S. Smith. M. ..-D. Army Sig. E. Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Lieutenant V. G. Marriott. C. r. H. W. Lieutenant Artillery..-C. Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quar.. to the Base (for TransCommissariat Lieutenant L.* Captain F.. U. P. R.s.e... Captain F. Army Medical StatT. N. S...C. Veterinarj'-Lieutenant F. W.. Deputy > Assistant Commissary-General. Hilliard.. Departmental Assistants missariat Officer.. 13th Bengal Lancers. F. Pollock. Lieutenant C. Orderly Offcer Captain R. . Border Regiment. Gwat- ter. Assistant Commissary-General. Lieutenant C. .. Major T. ^Captain sars. E. 2nd King's Own ter-Master-General.a.. 1st Bombay Infantry (Grenadiers). C. Royal Artillery. ... . Lieutenant F. Brigadier-General C. Rich... Assistant Superintendent. Field Intelligence Officer Scottish Borderers. • Lieutenant P Holland Pryor. kin.a. Ewart. E. r. 13th Bengal Lancers. and Quarter-Mas. McSwinej'.. Principal Medical Offcer.. Adjutant. Lieutenant H. Veterinary Offcer . Forteath. N. Spilsbury. Deputy Assistant Commissary-General. Major E.. Brigade Commissariat Officer ....a. .. Deputy Assistant Commissary-General. H. Officer.. 1st Battalion nailing.. . Becker. to Base Com- Departmental Assistant port) Officer. H.. H. Lieutenant-Colonel Artillery.. i8th Hus- Regimental Assistants missariat Officer.. Captain H. Deputy Assistant Commissary-General. Brigade Ordnance O^cer . D. Smj'th.

2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry. R. 2nd -Lieutenant E. ->« .MasterOfficer Brigadier-General C.. Ridgeway. A. Murphy. P. T. W. H. Murray. Anthony..o. Infantry. Colleton. Poulter. 4th Madras Pioneers. Lieutenant E. r. Vaughan. Trevor. D. E. Captain H. Lieutenant C. Deputy Assistant Commissary-General. Officer Army Brigade Coynmissariat Assistant Officer. Superintendent. R. Captain C. Commanding Orderly Officer Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General . Captain H. Wright. 1st Royal Scots Principal Medical Officer Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. 24th Madras Infantry. R..Hudson.. Officer Brigade Transport Veterinary Officer . 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers. A. Deputy Assistant Quarter. 29th Punjab Infantry. Captain J. P. r. Brigade Ordnance Officer Field Engineer Assistant Field Engineer Assistant Signalling.e.a. W. Colquhoun. to Lieutenant Brigade Commissariat . Hyderabad Contingent.o. Bart. Fusiliers. The Rawalpindi Reserve Brigade. Brigade Commissariat Assistant Officer. N. D. Major Sir R.s.„ Lieutenant K.s. Scott-Elliot. 20th Bombay General. d... E. Macgregor. S.R. Indian Medical Service. Commissariat Captain P. Assistant Qiiarter-Master. Rogers. W.e. to Lieutenant D. Tandy. Lieutenant A. 3rd Infantry. Veterinary-Lieutenant W.( XXXV ) Deputy General. G. Assistant Brigade Commissary-General.o. 19th Bengal Lancers. A. F. Brigade Transport Veterinary Officer Officer Veterinary-Lieutenant W. Gibbon.. r.. Scudamore.s. Nangle.Captain C.

. The Right Hon'blethe Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct the pubfrom the Adjutant-General in India. describing the operations which took place on the lication of the subjoined letter Samana Range and in the Kurram Valley in in August and September last. a . G. The Commander-in-Chief wishes to draw attention to the admirable conduct and steadiness of the 36th Sikhs. The Government of India will. submitting despatches from Majcr-General A. C. and also the conduct of Havildar Sundar Singh. and he wishes to record his Fighting against admiration of the heroism shown by those gallant soldiers. appreciate fully the intrepid manner in which the late Havildar Kaia Singh led the sortie from the Gulistan Fort.— ( xxxvi ) APPENDIX YIl.stan was performed under very trying circumstances. C. and of the behaviour of the troops engaged. devotion which has never been surpassed in the annals of the Indian Army. and of the post of Saragheri by a party of twenty men of the same regiment under the command of Havildar Ishar Singh. reflects the greatest credit on that Officer and the garrison of the post. but the force successfully accomplished its object with the same gallantry and cheerfulness as have been evinced on every occasion by our troops during the various operations which have recently taken place on the North-West Frontier.B. His Excellency is assured. At Sangar. The march to the relief ofGuli. under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton. who assisted his comrades at a critical moment. The Governor-General The Governor-General in Council desires especially to express his admiration of the brilliant defence of Fort Gulistan by the 36th Sikhs. owing to the heat and to a great scarcity of water en route. THE COM. who died fighting to the last. the small garrison made a sortie and gallantly captured a standard from the enemy while the brilliant defence of Fort Gulistan by the detachment under the command of Major Des Voeux. in forwarding the despatches from the Commander-in-Chief to the Government of India. Major-General G.MANDER-IN-CHIEf's COMMENTS. THE SAMANA AND KURRAM VALLEY DESPATCHES. Adjutant-General in India..B. gheri. Yeatman-Riggs. displaying a heroic. de C. Council concurs with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in his appreciation of the conduct of these operations. Morton. says : His Excellency is of opinion that the operations in question were well planned and skilfully carried out. The Commander-in-Chief deeply regrets the loss of the garrison of Sarapost held by 21 men of the 36th Sikhs. Commanding the Kurram-Kohat Force. during the attack on the various posts held by that regiment on the Samana Range.

THE ATTACKS ON HANGU AND THE SAMANA POSTS. makmg up the total number of rounds to four hundred per rifle. Wolseley. have much pleasure in recommending for the Order of Merit all the nonI commissioned officers and men the Major-General has brought to notice. Commanding the Kohat Field Force. and P?n"Iw V 'Balf. In conclusion. . the loth instant. In doing so he said :— These operations seem to have been well planned and carried out. Sec. and the convoy proceeded up the road. writing from Fort Lockhart. in His Excellency's opinion. L. for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.R. and the road was found too bad for guns so I sent the cavalry and artillery back to Hangu. companies. No. worthy of the highest praise. the I-2nd Gurkhas moved up the road as advanced guard. K. ^•". British Field Hospital. 300. Among the names brought specially to notice is that of Miss Teresa McGrath. arriving at Fort Lockhart about mid-day. I deeply lament the loss of the garrison. Yeatman-Biggs. sent the despatches to the Adjutant-General. Major Des Voeux proved himself a gallant and skilful leader. 3rd j-^'? I ^j* V^'' n n y. strength as per mar^^^^ The ammunition supply had. whose heroism is described in terms which His Excellency cordially endorses. CLE. squadron.ccmpany^No!'' 4°°Conipany.B.°" ^^e 9th instant. Lieutenant-General Sir G. and the Major-General's remarks on this Officer's conduct appear to be fully deserved. Richardson. I gave orders to start that night with a column. 8. Royal Iri>h Regi. heroic defence of Saragheri is. B. not only to the steadiness and good discipline of the garrison.B. 4 ment. 500. while upholding to the last the traditional bravery of the Sikh nation. the remainder of the column started. i-2nd Gurkhas. 3rd I ' Punjab Cavalry.. Sec. ^°°' that the necessary amount of transport and supplies for putting thirty days' supplies into the Samana posts had ^^^" collected. No. been sent up by me to the f. the 2ist September.( xxx\ii ) at their post. thus provinq: their loyalty and devotion to their Sovereign. No enemy were reported in sight. ten days previously. Having on the 4 guns.m.• . and occupied the plateau on which Dhar is situated before daylight. . in my opinion. to the effect that the Afridis had decided to come and assist the Orakzai in attacks on Hangu and on the Samana posts on I Friday.C. Native Field Hospital. 36th Sikhs. C. Bombay Sappers and Miners. and those mentioned by him in his despatch. Major-General A. Bengal Cavalry. same day received reports 9th Field ^"^ ^ tiUer"^' 2 I squadrons. GENERAL WOLSELEy's COMMENDATION. i^ ^amana. says: — have the honour to report. Commanding the Forces Punjab. Gulistan and The and I fully endorse the Major-General's commendation on the defence of Fort the behaviour of all ranks. but also to the satisfactory arrangements for the protection of his camp which were made by Colonel G. . 42. Concentrating at Pat Darband at I 30 to On the loth I sent the half-company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners improve the defences of Gulistan. that news was received by me from reliable sources at Hangu on the 8th instant. the Commander-in-Chief recommends to the favourable consideration of Government the services of Major-General Yeatman-Biggs. G.. At 4 a. overwhelming numbers they died The creditable manner in which the attack of the enemy on the post at Sadda was repulsed is due.

and the whole of the sarwans.M. and two companies of the i-2nd Gurkhas. The supplies had been sent up on 5 1 camels. and the camels. Mishtis. This post had been reinforced by me with one company of the Royal Irish and 61 rifles of the 15th Sikhs. 1 sent a few scouts of the l-3rd Gurkhas down the spurs towards the Khanki Valley. wing of the l-3rd Gurkhas. Royal Irish Regiment. At midnight I sent out two companies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry. Royal Irish Regiment. I at once recalled the troops by heliograph.m. These scouts w^ere supported by the l-3rd Gurkhas and two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment. Bewicke-Copley reported to me from Crag Picket that 22 standards and about 10. position assigned to them in the bivouac. I sent out Colonel Lawrence. Just before receiving the order to retire the l-3rd Gurkhas fired a few long-range volleys At I p. where I found them when I advanced with the remainder of the column. the rear-guard had taken up the The enemy consisted of Sheikhans. and did their utmost to save the convoy. large numbers of the enemy could be seen marching down the Khanki Valley. withstood several determined attacks.m. stampeded. Mr. bolted. Donald.( xxxviii ) smoke north pass. The advanced guard and main column hill. Major Rewicke-Copley reported that he had seen clouds of of the Sampagha Pass. Malla Khels and Ali Khels. I-2nd Gurkhas.. their loads. About 10 A. The Royal Irish fired long-range volleys to keep the tribesmen at a respectful distance. and of these only two had loads. and three were seen to drop. me A convoy with two days' supplies had been ordered out from Hangu to meet me at the Pat Darband Kotal. under Lieutenant-Colonel Pulley.) that seven standards and a considerable number of tribesmen were retracing their steps up the valley. but only thirteen camels were recovered.m. to endeavour to recover the camels and stores. under Captain Robinson. as Khorappa cannot be seen from the Samana plateau.M. to ascertain if the information was correct. with two companies of his Battalion and five companies of each of the remaining corps. Major into a parry of the enemy. informed that a large number of the enemy were making for the Darband Kotal. consisting of a drivers and without nose-strings. under command of Major Forster. and that the Afridis were coming over the Hearing that the whole of the Afridi laslikar had arrived at Khorappa during the night. the halted for the night at 9 p. .000 men had passed down the valley. and they admit to their losses being over leading malik of the Sheikhans was wounded 100 killed and wounded. except one.m. and five leading Malla Khels killed. Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General. or perhaps Shahu Khel. about four miles north-west of the point where it is crossed by the Kohat-Hangu road. A few A When morning broke (12th'). a small post guarding the Khanki Valley. D. All but two were found to have thrown to assist in bringing the camels in. under Lieutenant Elsmie accompanied by Captain Scudamore. At 7-30 P. as no mules were available. being left without The rear-guard. on shots were fired at the rear-guard from Gogra Hill. and by 2 a. It seemed probable that the tribesmen intended to carry out their threat of attacking Hangu. The Commandant of the Border Militia Police. so it was useless. supported by the I ordered the 2nd Punjab Infantry to seize Gogra Hill. and the Officer Commanding the i-2nd Gurkhas reported to me (7 p.

but a sortie had been made from the first-named as soon as our guns opened fire. and Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton. The Atridis did not wait for the infantry. which was skilfully occupied with lines of sa«^ars on Saragheri ridge.000. I reached Fort Lockhart and reconnoitred the enemy's position from a bastion of the Fort. and the 2nd Punjab Infantry made a frontal attack on their position. Hangu the they were At 4 A. but fled from their position and made foi the Khanki Valley. so added to our column. they were playing on the enemy's position with shrapnel.M. had earned a rest but about 3-30 P. I arrived at Lakka.m. I received a message by heh'o from Fort Lockhart that Saragheri was hard pressed.m. The troops. had joined the party with 12 men of the Royal Irish and 35 Sikhs. but. Donald who knows the country well. and by 10-30 a.M. I immediately despatched two guns of the 9th Field Battery and the 3rd Ben'^-al Cavalry with their signallers to gallop along the road at the foot of the hills as far towards Gulistan as they could go. Sangar and Dhar had been attacked all night. a message to assure the garrison that they would be relieved by mid-day on the 14th. after their hard day without food or water.M.m. we marched for Gulistan.m. commanding the 36th Sikhs. I issued orders to commence the march to Hangu at 3 p. having made their way by the Darband Kotal. D. Commanding at Gulistan. The strength of the enemy was estimated at about 4. it was helloed that Saragheri had fallen. supported by the two Gurkha battalions as they arrived on the ground. urgently asking for help. Gogra Hill was quickly taken under cover of the fire of the guns. the i-2nd Gurkhas following in support. a letter was brought to me from Major Des Voeux. and he was able to show Ihem a position from which they could fire a few rounds to encourage the garrison. and having lost our food. The four guns of the Derajat Mountain Battery had reached previous day. and sent a wire to Doaba to despatch two more guns of the 9th Field Battery and the squadron of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry to join in the demonstration. and that Gulistan was hard pressed. and had poured long-range volleys into the foe as they retreated down the Sarmela. I arrived there at I p. As we neared Sangar the garrison of that post displayed a white standard which they had captured from the enemy. I set the column once in motion towards Lakka.. and at 4-30 p. just before sunset.( xxxix ) the return of Colonel Lawrence's reconnaissance.000 to 10.m. On more Four riflemen of the i-2nd Gurkhas who had been reported missin". At 10 A. on the 13th. and we set out at midnight for Lakka. The 2nd Punjab Infantry pressed on followed by the guns..000 Afridis h'lldinga strong position. I brought up the guns and shelled the enemy's marksmen out of Tsalai tower at a range of 900 yards. and sent on two companies of the I -3rd Gurkhas to occupy the hill on which we had bivouacked on the night of the lith. At 5 A. rejoined. At 3-30 p. I pressed on with all possible . and one company of the Royal Irish fired long-range volleys at the Orakzai retreating down the Sarmela spur. 36th Sikhs. whilst the 35th Sikhs from Fort Lockhart advanced to turn the Afridi right. on the 14th instant. The guns from Hangu were accompanied by Mr.the previous evening.M. and at once ordered the I -3rd Gurkhas to attack the enemy's position on Gogra. as being the best position from which both Hangu and Shahu Khel could be protected. finding no water.m ) the advanced guard of the I -3rd Gurkhas was assailed with a heavy fire. and found about 8. and the Gurkhas held the position until they had passed through.. having marched 35 miles in under thirteen hours. sent through by helio. On arrival opposite Tsalai (7 a. I ordered up the guns. and Major Middleton commanding the 3rd Bengal Cavalry.

1167. 36th Sikhs. No. 1603. Sepoy Sher Singh. Indian Medical Service. No. and Sepoy Gurmukh Singh. should also have brought forward the names of Havildar Kala Singh. No. whose care fire. of his own accord. Sepoy Harnam Singh. and who was often under heavy my Her Miss Teresa McGrath. they were in full retreat down the Khandartang spur and Gulistan was relieved. 1380. I found that the Fort was invested by about 6. who was the life and soul of the could be done. Sepoy Ghuna Singh.509. 2. under fire. 1588. 180. and kept the enemy at bay against heavy odds. after having been hard pressed by some 7. No. succumbed to his wound. 1 146. Frail. No. 1183. No. 1066. Second-Lieutenant H. 1046. No. 1741.*. who had been previously attached to the hospital orders. 1 trust that in the cases . 817. B. Lance-Naick Sadu Singh. Sepoy Ralla Sin^h. and who. 1597. 36th Sikhs. 36th Sikhs. but they did not wait for the attack of the 2nd Punjab Infantry and 36th Sikhs. Sepoy Jiwan Singh. who is reported to have been conspicuous for his gallantry throughout the siege. No. R. No. Sepoy Ghulla Singh. On reaching the hi^h ground overlooking Gulistan. E. Sepoy Chajja Singh. Pratt. Major C. capturing a standard. 36th Sikhs. est degree. No. w'ho rendered most valuable assistince to the Medical Officer. The rank and : — No. No. with the slender means at his disposal. Sepoy Basawa Singh (since dead). of the wounded was by unremitting.000 Afridis and Orakzais since the I2th instant. 1539. carrying with him those who happened to be near him. He did all that dysentery. 1338. No. 1 177. to frustrate each device of the enemy. Lance-Naick Jiwan Singh. wounded heavy I naick of the Rifleman Dhanbir Sahai. as I did not know whether Gulistan was holding out or not. No. No. No. No. and is very highly spoken of be Major Des Vceux. sprang over the wall of the horn-work. Havildar Sundar -Singh. 36th Sikhs. who. which was made under an accurate fire of the guns of the mountain battery.000 to 8. Sepoy Mehma Singh. 1632. Des Vceux. Sepoy Jowahir Singh. 1123.000 Orakzais. 1600. Sepoy Thaman Singh. for helping in a same battalion on the night of the Il-I2th instant. 807. No. good. Sepoy Bhagwan Singh. Sikhs from Gulistan No. who took part in the sortie made by the No. Sepoy Kala Singh. who led a successful sortie. 823. on ridges and terraces within fifteen yards of the Fort. Sepoy Hira Singh. No. Sepoy Attar Singh Singh. No. who was in command at Sangar. Sawan Singh. The enemy's casualties are reported over 400 killed. in my opinion. 755. whose attack was a most determined one. to the succour of his comrades who had made a sortie to capture a standard. 368.m. No. 36th Sikhs. as the success attending it encouraged the garrison and made the enemy move away from the walls. No 1078. Sepoy Sepoy Phuman Singh. 1369.— ( xl ) speed. and were in imminent peril of being killed to a man. and by 8 p. No. Surgeon-Captain C. 1589. conduct is spoken of most enthusiastically by all ranks. for special recognition. Lance-Naick Dewa Singh. Sepoy Bakram No. though suffering from was always ready for any emergency. No. of I wish to bring to the notice for special recognition the names of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief defence of Gulistan. I regret to say. Sepoy Mihan Singh. w^ho volunteered to command the sortie from Gulistan. but the former has. Sepoy Nabha Singh. H. 1854. No. Sepoy Badan Singh. to open a heavy fire on any one who exposed himself in the slightHis judi^ment in permitting the sortie was. 907. 939. Sepoy Rur Singh. No. 36th file named below. i-2nd Gurkhas. and the latter was last seen signalling from Saragheri just before the enemy swarmed iu. Lance-Naick Harnam Singh. Sepoy Sajin Singh. with riflemen ready. Havildar Bishen Singh.

P. I2th instant. R.m. D. also indebted to Mr. on the i6th. VV. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery. Pulley. Commanding the Lieutenant-Colonel K. Colonel G. Travers. L. for the Commander-in-Chief in India. My thanks are also due to His Highness the Maharaja of Cooch Behar. I wish also to favourably mention the following Officers :— Colonel W. and E. case did the enemy come to close quarters. after which it slackened off considerably. G. gallantry on the occasion of the rear-guard action. Hyderabad Contingent. i -3rd Gurkhas. for conspicuous gallantry on the occasion of the rear-guard action. writing from September. Major-General Yeatman-Biggs. performed the duties of Divisional Staff to a force larger than a division. and Captain P. Indian Medical Service. The enemy's attack was pushed to within twenty or thirty yards of the stone wall with which the camp was surrounded with a certain amount of In no resolution up to midnight. McSvviney. St. and the noise of the water rushing in the nullah prevented the patrols of the 5th Punjab Infantry and l-5th Gurkhas hearing or seeing the approaching enemy.. Staff Officer to the Column. .000. Commanding on the Samana. who accompanied me throughout as Orderly Officer. Commissariat Department. My thanks are due to the various members of my staff. who.S.O. Lieutenant A. Captain J. Elsmie. Captain J. T.. Majors BevvickeCopley. and E.— ( -^li ) of those brave soldiers wlio lost their lives at Saragheii and Gulistan. for conspicuous Il-I2th instant. D. and to Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. numbering about 2.. Scudamore. unrivalled knowledge of the country and people has been of the greatest service to me. Major B.C. Il-I2th instant. G. Sturt. LieutenantLawrence. CLE. 2nd Punjab Infantry. Lieutenant-Colonel i-3rd Gurkhas. H. Captain C. West.S. scattered over a wide area.O.A. I -3rd Gurkhas. Commanding the l-2nd Gurkhas. to my entire satisfaction. A. W. S. F. F. Commanding the Column. H. 6th Bengal Cavalry. King's Royal Rifles. Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel. says : Fort Lockhart on the 30th information of His Excellency the I have the honour to report. losing the Havildar in so doing. Rogers. Donald. l-2nd Gurkhas. Robinson. R. consisting of Massuzais and Chamkannis. Transport Officer. Commanding the Flying Column. though two standards were brought up to within fifty yards of the camp. D. Jemadar Harakbir Gurung. L. Adjutant. Parker.O Royal Scots Fusiliers. and Captains C. Royal Irish Regiment. R. LE. that the camp at Sadda was attacked on the night of the i6th and 17:11 September. without even the organisation cf a Brigade Staff to help them. Haughton. Richardson. their wives and families may be considered for pension as if they had survived to receive the rewards they so justly deserved. Royal Irish Regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel J. N. M.J.S.. I am whose THE ATTACK ON SADDA. The picket had to abandon their saiigar and retire into camp. for coolness and gallantry on the occasion of the rear-guard action. Commanding No. The moon was obscure by passing clouds. Commandant. About lo-io p. D. 36th Sikhs. Yorkshire Light Infantry.. Ii-I2th instant. They s«-emed to have lost heart at the last luomeut iu the face of the steady fire which was brought to bear ou them . Commanding the 2nd Punjab Infantry. Staff Corps. Murray. A. Murphy. a laslikai. ist Lancers. had established himself in a well intrenched camp and high ground overlooking Sadda. Border Militia Police. Wake. R. Doran. Colonel E. for coolness displayed in assisting to bring in the camels on the night of Lieutenant G. collected iu the Khurmandarra and attacked a picket of the 5th Punjab Infantry about a hundred yards outside the south-east corner of the camp. M. who organised their respective departments under circumstances of exceptional difficulty. C. C. loth Bengal Lancers.

Lieutenant A. 36th Sikhs. The Officer Commanding the reconnaissance made by a squadron of the l8th Bengal Lancers to Shinawari.... but soon after their arrival at Gulistan information was received that the enemy's /rts/. so that all posts on the Samana should be held by Sikhs The three following days the enemy remained on the east and west ends of the Samana.. whilst the Mishti.. In this reconnaissanre. decided to return to Fort Lockhart.. . . and the post burnt by the tribesmen the previous evening. I regret to say. strongly posted on the Samana Suk.1ii ) : The expenditure 15th Sikhs 15111 of ammunition was as follows . so the troops en roule to reinforce the garrison. The enemy was found to be about 4. Lockhart. D.. This was the second reconnaissance made from Hangu to Shinawari (a distance of over twenty miles) within the last tew days. .. Donald.000 in number. . and a sepoy of the Border Police deserted from the adjacent post of Dhar with liis rifle and ammunition.. On ihe 3rd September a (i'/i/s/j from Dhar was murdered by the enemy. . Reliable reports were received on the morning of the 29ih August that Shinawari had been evacuated by the Border Police. . reported to me at Kohat.. FURTHER OPERATIONS ON THE 3AMANA. The following day the enemy were discovered to be holding the Chagru Kotal as well as the Samana Suk on the west of the Samana Range.was assembling to the east of Fort Ltckhart. proceeded to Dhar to make inquiries into the circumstances. Commandant of the Border Police. Mamuzai. . I ordered two companies of Gurkhas to march to reinforce the garrison there. and heavy firing was heard in the This was direction of Shinawari..098 Total .>^rt>. In order to anticipate the enemy. and the Sarmela spur on the east end of the range.. and he and his escort were fired on. and decided that the Ali Khel. Reinforcements were sent from Fort 36th Sikhs.. . Sheikhan Malla Khel and Kabia Khel attacked Hangu. .... On I the same day Major-General Yeatman-Biggs reported : have the honour to report that on the 27th August last.200 Hunjub Infantry . K.. but made no further move. .. and his three mules stolen. and reported all well. l-5th Gurkbas 373 2. . 525 1. a large gathering of Orakzai appeared on the Samaoa Suk. The Orakzai held ajirga/t this day. which had been evacuated by the Border Police. This psot was therefore reinforced by one Native Officer and 37 sepoys of the 26th Sikhs. During the night of the 29th the post of Sangar was fired into. Aisherzai and Aka Khel should attack Gulistan on Friday. One squadron of cavalry accompanied them. should a second attack be made on Shinawari. which was held by the Border Police. was wounded in the chest.. The usual casualty returns have been already forwarded. and from Hangu to Shinawari. Mr.. Blair. with orders to return to Hangu as soon as the Gurkhas had reached the post.... Commanding on the Samana. were recalled.... and during the day they buret the posts of Gogra and Tsalai.— — ( 3. Reconnaissances were made from Gulistan towards the Samana Suk. returned the same day to Hangu. Ronnds. September 3rd. so Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton.

to succour the many small posts scattered over the Samana Range that were beset on all sides by overwhelming numbers of the enemy..( xliii ) A-s tribesmen were reported to be advancing^ on Gulistan and Saragheri in force. as the whole ground known. .. . . which had been previously prein a separate letter. took up a position in and about Picquet Hill ^400 yards west of Gulistan.. The expenditure of ammunition between the 27th August and the 3rd September on the Samana was — Rifles ... Munn.. whose names have also been mentioned in the despatch of the 21st September.. these posts were reinforced from Fort Lockhart. Lieutenant-Colonel J. . of the 36th Sikhs. 410 3. is so well have not considered it necessary to attach any sketch. ><- . and set fire to the thorn hedge which had been placed as an obstacle a few yards ouiside the horn-work of the place.. . pared between the horn-work and Picquet Hill. Ttie fire was extinguished by volunteers.. the bonfire..m. whose names have been brought to notice bj' me At 8 p.649 Rounds expended I . with their little handful of men from Fort Lockhart. in considerable force.. The enemy kept up a hot fire until midnight when they retired..... strove hard. Towards evening the enemy.. .. Haughton and Lieutenant and Adjutant R C. and has already been mapped by the Survey Department. .. was lit by volunteers.

by direction of the Commander-in-Chief. K. A. C. in forto the Secretary to the Government of India. from the iSth to the 31st October 1^97. the accompanying despatch from General Sir W. in attacking our frontier posts. S. Non-Commissioned Officers and men under his command. His Excellency in Council. enabled these strong positions to be won with comparatively THE commander-in-chief's COMMENT.C..I.B.C. S. fully shares in the admiration expressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the gallantry displayed by both Officers and men on that occasion. In the assaults on the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes. K. Major-General G. The general object of the expedition was to exact reparation for the unprovoked aggression of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes on the Peshawar and Kohat borderers. describing the opperations of the Tirah Expeditionary Force. of the Government of India. The despatch now submitted shows the measures which were taken by General Sir William Lockhart to carry out the orders of the Government of India and to enter Tirah. to forward. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council concurs virith his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in his appreciation of the ability and judgment shown by General Sir William Lockhart in the conduct of the operations recorded in his despatch.B. said — for the information have the honour. Lockhart. the skilful disposiby the tions of the General Commanding and the excellent qualities displayed little loss.I. de C.S. THE TIRAH DESPATCHES. and also of the gallant and soldierly behaviour of the Officers. Lockhart.. troops..( xliv ) APPENDIX VIII.B. A. K.. 2. The following notification and despatch are taken from the Gazette of India: — The Right Hon"ble the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct the publication of the subjoined letter from the Adjutant-General in India. Military : warding the despatch Department.C.C. while deeply regretting the loss of life which occurred in the attack on the heights of Dargai on the 20th October 1897.. a country which until now has never beeu invaded by a Bntish force. . submitting a despatch from General Sir W. K. and for the damage to life and property which had thus been inflicted on British subjects and on those in the British service. Morton. describing the operations of the Tirah Expeditionary Force from the iSth to the 31st October I 1897.S. Adjutant-General in India.

Tirah Expeditionary Force. and to their skilful conception and the employment of concentrated artillery fire may be ascribed the small loss of life that characterised both operations. the 9th December 1897..8oo j'ards to the left of the road shortly after it cro. 2235-F. Non-Commissioned Officers and men mentioned by him in the despatch. Lockhart to the AdjutantGeneral in India is dated Head-Quarters. while two days' work was said to be necessary to render the road sufficiently good for the passage of laden transport animals. and of the Officers. defended as it was by a resolute all of life. Nor. were thoroughly successful.— ( xlv ) The incidents which occurred between tlie iSth and 20th October. and well armed enemy. Camp Dwatoi.1 expected to assemble at the same place on the 19th. A. the . 9 Mountain Battery troops occupj'ing the Samana ridge near Forts Baitalion.A. 5. . . while by a simultaneous flanking movement 1 seized the heights overlooking . SIR WILLIAM LOCKHARt'S DESPATCH. 2nd Division of the Main Column had concentrated at Shinawari. working under the protection of covering parties. about X. that the improvement of the road could not be continued until the heights had been cleared. that the troops and labourers thus employed were being so molested by the enemy's sharp-shooters who occupied the heights to the west of the Chagru defile. the following account of the operations of the force under my command from the 18th to the 31st October 1897. With regard to paragraph 21 thereof the Commander-in-Chief agrees with Sir William Lockhart that a flanking demonstration combined with a frontal attack would in probability have enabled the Dargai heights to have been taken at less loss but he is confident that the Government of India will share his admiration of the distinguished gallantry and the marked devotion to duty evinced by all ranks in assailing that difScult position. 36th Sikhs. with the exception of the • No.Lockhart and Gulistan* R. and I consequently issued orders for the march of the Main Column on the 20th and following days from Shinawari to Khorappa. Meanwhile the road from the Chagru Kotal towards Khorappa was being improved by military and hired labour. therefore determined to attack and destroy the village of Dargai. It was further reported that no water was obtainable in the immediate vicinity of Dargai. and 3. and he desires makes regarding the behaviour of the troops to recommend for the favourable consideration of Government the distinguished services of General Sir William Lockhart. ^ have the honour to submit. dated the 20th November 1S97.. thamptonshire ^ j i_i ^^1 ^1 . where it had been anticipated the greatest resistance would be met. especially by those living in a small village called Dargai. His Excellency cordially endorses the remarks which the General Officer Commanding the Force engaged in these operations. are detailed in the despatch. It was reported. in the Khanki Valley. 2. On October 1 6th. It is as follows : In compliance with the instructions conveyed in your letter No. the inhabitants getting water from the valley below to the west. The measures subsequently taken by Sir William Lockhart to force 4.St the 1st Division was Kegiment..sses the crest of the pass. the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes. where there were several rich Ali Khel villages and a number of cattle. The despatch from General Sir W. I 3. for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India. each corps being directed to leave behind its tents and heavy baggage under charge of a regimental guard. S. . however. which immediately preceded the concentration of both divisions of the force at Khangarbur.

the opposition slackened and the position was carried by a company of the 3rd Gurkhas under M. : The Main Column employed on the flanking movement was commanded by Brigadier-General Kemspter. The enemy at first kept up a vigorous 6re from the walled terraces and rocks in front of the village.m. the 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas leading. Royal Artillery. At 9 A. 2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers. the 17th. it was joined by No. led by the Gurkha scouts.m. macott. along a track which had been reported as practicable for baggage animals. Palmer. Line of Communication. tery Royal Artillery and No. The remainder continued their march.— — ( xlvi ) the valley to the west. At the same time a working party under Lieutenant-Colonel J.B. the road was found to be impassable for mules. : Brigadier-General Kempster's Column left Shinawari at 4-30 a. consisting of the 21st Madras Pioneers. and No. K. the attack was commenced.. while the troops to be employed were drawn almost exclusivelj. 9 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. C. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery with all laden animals had to be ordered back to Shinawari. P. Thurburn. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. Although I was aware of a hostile gathering in the Khanki Valley. The advance of the troops which was covered by No. Meanwhile the Main Column had moved in a north-westerly direction 7. other than the Ali Khel section of that tribe. On the latter reaching the Chagru Koatl at 8-30 A. At the fifth mile. when the flanking movement began to develop and the tribesmen's line of retreat was threatened. the slopes being extremely steep and affording but little cover. W. Major-General Yeatman-Biggs had and though he was able to move to Shinavvari on October. however.M. 4 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.. This column was accompanied by Lieutenant-General Sir A. on the Samana..^jor Rose. with the 2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers in support and the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment in reserve. No.. Palmer. These operations I accordingly entrusted to Lieutenant-General Sir A.C. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery. and the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment from Fort Lockhart.O. in indifferent health. About 20 of the enemy's dead were left on the ground. the Sirmur Imperial Service Sappers.S. and cleared out the lower villa.. Commanding Royal Engineers. escorted by the ist Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment and two companies of ihe 15th Sikhs. and the hired labourers. but shortly before noon. . 15th Sikhs.B. I thought it better to spare him the fatigue of conducting the operations designed to clear the road and punish the Ali Khels.from the 2nd Division. and consisted of the following troops No.sfes referred to above.M. Rocket Detachment. a few of the enemy's marskmen firing at the advancing troops and wounding two riflemen of the Ist Battalion 2nd Gurkhas. was pushed forward beyond the koial to improve the road. Commanding the Line of Communication. 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment. P. Machine Gun Detachment. been stay During 4. 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkha Rifles. did not intend seriously to oppose my advance until I had reached Khorappa. was necessarily slow. 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles. D. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery. a sure indication of the heavy loss which had been inflicted. Scouts of the 5th Gurkha Rifles. who had the following troops placed at his disposal No.. l6th Lancers.S. and Brigadier-General Westmacott's at 5 a. and that the Afridis were too busily engai^ed in fortifying the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes to be able to assist the Orakzai in any considerable strength. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. the information 1 had received through native channels led me to believe that the Orakzai. my The front attack on Dargai was directed by Brigadier-General West5. D. 9 Mountain Bat6.O. with an escort of one company of the 3rd Sikhs.

The heavy loss inflicted on the enemy caused them to lose heart. which was leading. . and near which the watersupply to Dargai was situated. who were engaged in supporting the attack and covering the withdrawal. and sent No.M. numbering about 4. the junction between tne two columns had been effected. steadily holding their ground and checking the advance of the tribesmen. after which the withdrawal to the Chagru Kotal and thence to Shinawari was entirely unmolested. point. The track to the water was afterwards found to be about three miles in length. having first posted No. who led the attack on Dargai. Witli Brigadier-General Kempsters Column: Lieutenant. R. D.S. The enemy pressing on. Haig. H. 1st landers. Mathias. MacLaren.O. had resolved to reinforce the Ali Khels who had just been driven out of Uargai and the neighbouring villages. C. 1st Battalion 3rd Brigadier-General Westmacott's Column Gurkhas Captain A. H. while another body of the enemy began to ascend the Dargai heights from the same direction.m. no reply being made to a final vollej' fired by the rear-guard about 7 p. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery near the kotal itself. and in some places precipitous. Lieutenant-General Sir A.. 1 1 p. Captain D. so village. F. thus causing zhe tribesmen hastily During to evacuate that village as well as the villages in the valley below.( xlvii ) At II A. Captain A.000 men.. Palmer has commented most favourably on the steadiness and gallantry of the troops engaged on October the 8th. the concentration had been completed. 8.. the 15th Sikhs covering the climb of Brigadier-General Kempsters Column along the rugged path described above and the retirement of the Sikhs being in turn covered by ihe Gordon Highlanders and two companies of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. advancing from the Khanki Valley up the Narik Darra towards Khand Talao.. came under the fire of the ist Battalion 2nd Gurkhas. and has brought to my special notice the services of the following Officers with Major H. who took up a strong position just below the village of Dargai. Beynon. Pipe-Wolferstan. owing to the great difficulties of the road. the Main be halted to allow of the Gordon Highlanders and 15th Sikhs closing up. so commanded from ^he adjacent heights. While this was going on. G. At this to Column had At this time a hostile force. our guns making excellent practice. heliographic communication was established with BrigadierGeneral Westmacott's Column. P. 1 : — . and the Main Column began to move towards Dargai in order to join Brigadier-General Westmacott's force. E. Rose. and shortly before noon the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas. 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkl as. which in the meantime had destroyed that The path was extremely difficult.B. having heard the sound of the guns earlier in the day. therefore. and suffered considerable loss. It was clear. that the gathering of tribesmen near Khorappa. and 2nd-Lieutenant T. about two and a half miles west of Dargai. Sladen.Colouel H. that water could not have been obtained in the presence of an enemy unless these heights as well as Dargai itself had been held. 2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkhas and Lieutenant W. reached a commanding position at Khand Talao. Lieutenant H. L.m. Battman-Champain. a hot engagement ensued between them and the rear-guard. was observed 9. But before the enemy could come within fighting distance. and the Gordon Highlanders with the two companies of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. and it was found impossible to reach villages below Dargai which it had been intended to deal with. At 2-30 p. and also to cover the return to camp at Shinawari of the Mountain Battery and its escort. G. 9 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery with the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment to a position on the Samana Suk. P. estimated to number some 800 men. Also Captain T. Camp was reached by the rear-guard at 10.m. their retirement the enemy. Brigadier-General Westmacott began his withdrawal to the Chagru Kotal. Keyes of the 2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers. which flanked the road from Dargai to the crest of the pass. that progress was slow. — Battalion Gordon High- .

the Samana Suk. reporting that Dargai and the adjacent heights were believed to be strongly held by the enemy. especially as an advance to Khorappa had to be made the ne. On October 19th the Dargai heights were observed during the day 14. 5th Gurkhas. as the presence of a force on the Chagru Kotal might have deterred the enemy from re-occup3'ing Dargai. wounded 21.xt day. British the Non-Commissioned : Native ranks Killed 6. Line of Communication. as the enemy's rear would thus be threatened and to assist him in the frontal attack. Bruce. Pears. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. G. 11. 1st Division. 1st Battalion 2nd Curkhas. indebted to Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. 2967. G. where at 5 p. severely wounded. Captain I. been captured and the two columns had established communication with each I returned to Fort Lockhart. But the heliogram reached me too late to allow of the employment of the working party. Late on the evening of the 19th I received a telegram from Shinawari. from the Samana ridge. . by taking up a position ou the Samana Suk opposite Dargai at 7 a.m. under the protection of two battalions and a mountain battery. Travers. Private W. Abbott. informing me that the object of the reconnaissance had been attained. At il a. who were in charsje of the Gurkha scouts. instead of down the Chagru defile. and the Tsalai spur. For reasons which need not here be detailed. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. Palmer. I am much factory conclusion. and in reply desired Major-General Yeatman-Biggs to adhere to the original plan of movement. Jennings-Bramly. 15th Sikhs. The casualties on October 18th comprised Major R.m. Followers: Wounded 3. although a few tribesmen were seen moving about near the village. . 15. Palmer and Brigadier-Generals Westmacott and Kempster for the skilful manner in which the troops were handled and the operation described above brought to a satis12. I also informed him that No. Phillips. wounded 10. and that the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division proposed to advance the next day to Khorappa via Fort Gulistan. P. D. and in any case would have enabled the road to be further improved. killed. Lucas and Lieutenant the Hoa'ble C. 1 placed at his disposal two battalions and one mountain battery from the 1st Division. who shot down four of the enemy at very close quarters. No. 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas. I received a heliogram from Lieutenant-General Sir A. — — Officers and men:— Killed 2. P. a heliogram was received from Major-General Yeatman-Biggs. Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-Master-General. Rennie. A. reporting that the troops of his division had reached camp so late on the previous evening that he thought it better not to employ them in the manner indicated. but there was no sign of a formidable gathering. Lieutenant M. L. the enemy would probably retire as soon as troops had been pushed on to the point where the Narik Darra joins the Chagru defile. en October 19th.— ( xlviii ) Lieutenant-Colonel H. which otherwise might have been covered by troops detailed from the other. I regret that my orders were not carried out even at the risk of fatiguing the troops. Captain F. I was unable to accept this suggestion. remarked that while it would be necessary to clear the I Dargai heights overlooking the road to the west. Lieutt-nant-Coloiiel E. Having watched the action from the Samana Suk until Dargai had 13. attached to Gordon Highlanders. 1st Battalion Scottish Rifles. I accordingly directed the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division to continue work on the road the next day.m. 9 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery and the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment would be directed to co-operate from Fort Lockhart. and that the troops were returning to Shinawari.

the advance-guard leaving camp at Shinawari at 4-30 a. . by a concentrated artillery fire from No.m. 8 One Sirmur Imperial Service Sappers section. followed by the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. supported by the 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment. with Major Macbean on his right and Lieutenant A. i (Kohat) and No. but though a few men were able to get across the fire-swept zone. in readiness by the heights. The 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Kempster began its attack on the Dargai heights at 10 a. j6th Lancers. 43 Native Field Hospital. the 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment and the 3rd Sikhs. Mountain Battery Royal Artillery.perial Service Highlanders went straight up the hill without check or hesitation.. 48 Native Field Hospi'al Divisional Troops. No. ( xlix ) On October 20th the troops of the 2nd Division. 9 British Field Hospital. No Two sections. l6. 13 British Field Hospital. 9 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery were Tlie troops detailed from the 1st Division to in position on the Samana . 5 (Bombay) Mountain No. No. leaving three Officers and thirty men killed or wounded on its way. made their first rush across the open. 44 Native Field Hospital. No. No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and Miners. the Dorsetshire Regiment was ordered to storm the enemy's entrenchments. the above force was in formation. Gordon on his left. The first rush of the Gordon Highlanders was deserving The troops of the and Division referred to above were as follows ^rd Brigade 1st Battalion ist 1st Batt'ilion Dorsetshire Regiment. 9 Mountain Batteries.m. It dashed through a murderous fire and in forty minutes had won the heights.M. and No. Tst Battalion 3rd Gurkhas. No.Suk. Battalion Gordon Highlanders. Battery Royal Artillery. an advance beyond the line held by the 2nd Gurkhas was reported by the Commanding Officer to be impracticable. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. they were met by such a hot and well-aimed fire that all they could do was to hold on to the position they had reached. moved assist in the advance of the 2nd Division were No. accompanied Gurkha scouts of the 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas. as detailed below. Headed by their pipers and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Mathias. At the latter hour the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment and No.m. owing to the large number of tribesmen lining the edge of Dargni plateau and the steepness of the slope leading up to it. this splendid battalion marched across the open. these being posted slightly in advance of the kotal. the former regiment being replaced on the lower spur which Infantry. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery. i (Kohat) Mountain Battery. At 2 P. No. Two sections. assisted by shelling the enemy's sangars from the Samana Suk.B. The 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment was in reserve.. 2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers. 11-30 A.. and reaching the Chagru Kotal at 8 a. No. The attack was led by the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas.. Thind Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry. The Gordon it had hitherto occupied by the Jhind Im. without being able to advance By to capture the further.M. C. under cover. F.* as directed. but when the 2nd Gurkhas. 2nd Gurkhas. Machine Gun Detachment. 2ist Madras Pioneers. 23 British Field Hospital. 24 British Field Hospital.th Brigade. No. The General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division accordingly ordered Brigadier-General Kempster to move up the Gordon Highlanders and the 3rd Sikhs. No icth Sikhs. a.

ist Battalion Gordon Highlanders. and Lieutenant A. Tillard. who led the first rush of his men. But few of the enemy waited for the bayonet. Nearly every section of the Afridis was represented. 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas. ist Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 19. F. Commanding the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. Arnold.B. White. who. each led by Officers. C. of other ranks 35 were killed. streamed on in support. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 3rd Sikhs. Mathias. E. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas. B. 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas... Subadar Kirpa Ram Thapa. and subsequently returned and brought in Private McMillan. The General my special Major-General Yeatman-Biggs has also reported most favourably on the behaviour of ihe following British and Native Officers and soldiers Major F. namely: Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. for they had just undergone a very severe ch'mb. Lieutenant G. . Macbean. G. H. Lieutenant M. in leading his battalion to the assault of a most difficult position at a critical period of the fight. Major F. ist 1st Battalion Lieutenant K. the remainder of the troops. tst Battalion Gordon Highlanders. G. F. Captain W. 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas. R. C. E.m. though wounded in two places. Highlanders. Mackenzie. and nine wounded. and 158 wounded. D. after being shot through both feet and unable to stand. Downman. I recommend this Officer for the Victoria Cross. many of them being shot down as they fled in confusion. . 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. C. Captain C. 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas. killed. when wounded and unable to move. S. G. and a point beyond which other troops had been unable to advance for over three hours. E. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. and Lieutenant A. who. Robinson. being himself wounded in two places in so doing. but net in full strength. M. The General Officer Commanding : the 2nd Division has also brought to notice the services of the following Officers. Lieutenant G. continued to cheer his men on while lying on the ground. Private E. 1st Battalion'Gordon Highlanders. being immediately afterwards wounded. No.T. Meiklejohn. Dingwall. Lieutenant G. Piper G. 17. Mishtis. Captain J. Smith. Captain W. Gordon Highlanders. Judge. but must have been heavy. and as the leading companies went up the path for the final assault. Mallakhels and Akhels. P. commanding the Gurkha scouts of his regiment. out of a heavy fire. Non-Commissioned Officers and inen as deserving of recognition Major G. E. Captain and Adjutant W. Macintyre and J. No. I'he position : was won at 3-15 p. Uniacke. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders Captain H. Lawson. 3456. among whom the 3rd Sikhs were conspicuous. who carried Lieutenant Dingwall. I recommend Piper Findlater ana Private Lawson for the Victoria Cross. 18. B. 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment. Findlater. Officer Commanding the 2nd Division has brought to notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Mathias. The first rush was followed at short intervals by a second and a third. 1st Battabon 2nd Gurkhas (since dead) Lieutenant G. Robinson. The enemy's loss has not been ascertained. A. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 1st Battalion Go-^don Highlanders. B. IMacbean.— — — ( 1 ) of the had reached highest praise. : 20. C. 2951. with the loss of three Officers namely —Major C. Massozai and Akhels. Captains D. besides contingents from the Mamozai. C. Ist Battalion Gordon Highlanders. Cameron. Travers. G. Miller-Wallnut. when previous attempts had failed. sat up under a heavy fire plaj'ing the regimental march to encourage the charge. continued to discharge his duties in the front line. and who. 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment.500 Sheikhans. Craufurd.. and there were about 1. Campbell. Lainont. 1st Battalion Gordon Battalion Gordon Highlanders . . Lieutenant-Colonel E. who was the first to spring out of cover and lead his company to the attack.

taking with ire No. inasmuch as the movement of the troops. No. No. Arnold. Milne. 1952.B. Sergeant T. The remainder of the division coming in the next day but owing to the steepness and narrowness ot the road. 3937. ColourSersfennt J. 21. the tribesmen would have begun to suffered disperse. Lance-Corporal (piper) G. The 4th Brigade and some of the Divisional troops of the 2nd Division 24. 1st Battalion Gordon High- Captain W. that of the 36th Sikhs not arriving until mid-daj' on the 23rd. or. Richie. Ist Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment.. supported by the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. the Ist Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment. the 36th Sikhs. 2025. C. Mathers. Craib. withdrawal of Brigadier-General Kempster's Colutiin from the Waran Valley. more properly. 22. and I feel confident that. and 1 propose in due course to recoinmend him for the Victoria Cross. On the night of October 20th. Sersreant F. Lieutenant H. 9 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. while in order to avoid a block on the main road. rescued a wounded comrade. E.O. 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment. I think it necessary to point out that the advance was not conducted in the manner in which I had intended. Mackie. as soon as their line of retreat was threatened. I. I am of opinion that the loss would not have been heavy. M'Kay. on the left bank of the Khanki stream. The track from the village of Tsalai down to its junction with the main road was so bad. that none of the baggage of the troops accompanying me reached camp at Khorappa until late the next day. who ran down the slope. 2021. At the same time. the march of the 2nd Division to Khorappa. but if full advantage had been taken of the inequalities of the ground. and the inferiority of a considerable propoitiun of ilie transport .. At daybreak on the 2ist. 3711. de M.( li ) No. who endeavoured to bring in Captain Smith's body. 23. for the success of the operations on October 20th. who led the rush of his battalion. Private S. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. while the remanider of the troops bivouacked on or near the Chagru Kotal. and as I thought I had The General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division restricted clearly indicated. I recognise that the eneiny's defeat was rendered more complete and decisive by their being encouraged to hold on to the last. Norie. 3056. was resumed. 1771. and Brigadier General Kempster. and the result of the action inust be regarded as satisfactory. No. and brought him back to This soldier has subsequently greatly distinguished himself during the cover. to Khangarbur. ist Battalion Gordon Highlanders. Colour. baggage and supplies from Shinawari to Khorappa. and No. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. Pennell. 1st Battalion Cordon Hijjhianders. Donaldson.. -Sergeant D. . 1st Battalion Gordon Highlandeis. arrived at Khorappa towards the evening of the 21st October. proceeded from 1 Fort Lockhart to the satne point vid Fort Gulistan and the Tsalai spur. Vickery. No. 2465. R.St rgeant T. No. Sergeant J. 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas. No. first Captain C. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners. No. who was conspicu- In recording my acknowledgments to Major-General Yeatman-Biggs. subsequent to the capture of the Dargai heights. without employing a portion of the large force at his disposal to turn the enemy's rear by pushing on as rapidly as possible to the point of junction of the Narik Darra with the Chagru Undoubtedly the troops would have been under fire and might have defile some loss in moving along the road below the heights. 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment.'^t Battalion Gordon Highlanders. himself to a frontal attack on the Dargai heights. and only desisted on finding that Captain Smith was dead. landers. Dargai was held by the Ist Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment and 3rd Sikhs. S. ously forward at the commencement of the action. D S. was almost unmolested.

respectively. mules. a wing of the 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas. ponies and donkeys. vvhich they at once began to strengthen. to complete the organisation of the transport service. which I had chosen as my first artillery position. Crocker. animals.S. D.M. This display of force led the enemy to believe that I intended to turn their right. Here it may be noted that. 26. Lieutenant-Colonel Yule quickly brushed away all opposition on that side. killed or wounded. the 2nd Brigade. and to adjust the loads of the several classes of animals employed. I directed the whole force to bivouac near Gundaki. twenty-five British soldiers. F. D. thus protecting my right. At 5-15 A. : : — On October 29th. Hadow. in accordance with instructions issued on the previous evening. the troops of the 1st Division began to move from Shinawari to Khorappa. Advantage was taken of the halt at Khorappa to improve the road from the Chagru Kotal. Our casualties on October 28th were Lieutenant-Colonel C. 27. every military precaution was taken. occupied without resistance a low rocky hill stretching across the plateau between the Kandi Mishti and Sampagha ravines. The 30th Punjab Infantry was detailed to hold the Dargai heights. severely wounded. of the 27th the Main Column. Lieutenant G. cover the advance to the Sampagha.— — ( Hi ) elapsed before all the bao. The names of the Officers are given below : Lieutenant-Colonel R.. left camp with orders to enter the Sampagha ravine. advancing in the centre. I had to detach two battalions to strengthen the force on the Line of Communication. wounded. on October 28th. The 1st Division across the plain and the 2nd Division up the bed of the Kandi Mishti stream.o. and a wing of the 3rd Sikhs. while a detached column consisting of the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment and the 36th Sikhs occupied the hills to the right of my line of advance As the left column was threatened from the west. several days come up. and issued orders for the attack oa the following day.ae:e of the division had October 24th. this advance to be supported ia succession by the 4th and 3rd Brigades. the force marched in two columns to Gundaki. Sage. A. The 2nd Battalion Ist Gurkhas covered my left by occupying the village of Kandi Mishti and met with no opposition The 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment. the camp was fired into every night. and our foraging parties were pertinaciously opposed and followed up by the tribesmen. suffering. wounded 10. sometimes by large bodies of the enemy. aggregating three British Officers. which in the evening had been reduced to two companies. On And here I may mention that during the halt at Khorappa. however. The strong flanking parties which had pushed out enabled me to reCDnnoitre the Sampagha Pass. 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas. Badcock.. 2nd Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers. C. and to advance by a path leading towards the enemy's position up a long bare spur as soon as the guns should have sufficiently silenced the fire from the saiigars .O. 15th Sikhs. R. severely wounded. and having settled on my plan of action. the ist Brigade moved out of camp to 28. and twenty-one native ranks. Captain F. namely. and the 2ist iVIadras Pioneers to form part of the Khorappo garrison.. The losses from this cause were heavy. and by the evenins.m. preceded by the Gurkha scouts. had concentrated in readiness for a further advance. previous to my advance. 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas. I also occupied three hills which commanded that flank with the 2nd Battalion Yorkshire Regiment. and during the night of the 28th the detachment of the 4th Gurkhas. was continuously attacked at close quarters. dangerously wounded. . though 25. with its supplies and transport. The 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment seized the village of Nazeno. Other ranks Killed two. at 5 a. but slight loss owing to the care taken in the day time to protect the position by saiigars. On October 28th.

with the object of threatening the enemy's right and joining the central attack when ordered to do so. oa the enemy's main position along the crest of the pass. On October 30th. the Main Column. The fire of the guns was. in rear of which the brigade was massed ac 8 a.m. as I was convinced that a protracted halt in the Mastura Valle3'. Shortly afterwards the three batteries of the 2nd Division opened fire from this mound at a range of 1. The 2nd Brigade began the action by a flank movement on the right up two rocky . and advanced towards the Arhanga Pass across a broken plain up to a low detached mound. supported by the 3rd Brigade. however. Hanford-Flood. reached the summit of the pass at 9-45 a. while those on the northwest were stormed bj' the 36th Sikhs.— ( liii ) At 6-30 A. Meanwhile the 2nd Brigade had moved up on the right. Brigade. De Butts.850 j^ards. the first shots were fired by the enemy. with the exception of the 1st 31. were now p\ished on. 1st Battalion Royal West Surrey 30. and the enemy quickly evacuated the entrenchments which commanded the lower slopes of the pass. I therefore determined not to postpone the attack on the Arhanga Pass. hide.m.. : Regiment. wounded three. 32. On October 31st.M. but also enable them to destroy. The three batteries of the 2nd Division.. McC. Royal Artillery. The . where 1 proposed to bivouac. The last shots were fired at 11-30 A.xcellent service in assisting the infantry of the 2nd Brigade to dislodge the tribesmen from the heights they were holding on either flank. which continued to hold the Sampagha Pass.m. was met with. and thus render our stay in Tirah a matter of extreme slightly dilliculty. but the action did not really beg:in until "J-^O a. Their fire was effective. Royal Artillery. while the 4th Brigade attacked in the centre. ing The 1st Brigade remained on the Sampagha for the night. and the 3rd Brigade was disposed in echelon on the left. remained in camp on the right bank of the Mastura stream. Ihe heights on the north-east of the pass were eventually cleared by the 1st Battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment and the 3rd Sikhs. thus gaining the crest east of the pass. was tnortally wounded. and the 15th .M. and making use of what could be collected in the neighbouring villages. Other ranks: -Killed one. But by redistributing what there was. killed. supported by six companies of the 2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers. with a view to protecting transport animals and baggage. when the three mountain batteries of the 1st Division opened fire on the saiigars from the first artillery position above mentioned.m. and issued orders for the attack on the following day. some corps having absolutely nothing in hand and the steep and narrow track over the pass delaying the arrival of supplies. On reaching the crest this batterj^ did e. the 4th Brigade crossed the Mastura stream at 6 a. together with the rocket detachment. or remove the forage and grain stored in their villages. each man was eventually provided with two days' rations.200 yards. expedient as it might seem from a commissariat point of view would not only encourage the Afridis and give them time to collect their fighting men. My great difficulty was the want of food. The artillery was again ordered up in support. T. In the morning I made a reconnaissance of the Arhani'a Pass. The casualties during the action were Captain F. the range being I. Major R. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery in front.300 yards. Commanding the battery. but while engaged on this duty I regret to report that Captain De Butts.m. tance While the troops were moving down into the valley some slight resis29. these being seized by the 2nd Brigade at 8 a. with the 1st Battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment (the Queen's) leading.Sikhs were then sent on as an advance-guard into the Mastura Valley. and opened fire on the crest of the pass at a range of 2.spurs and an intervening ravine. No. R. soon masked by the rapid advance of the 2nd Brigade which. but this ceased as soon as the hills commanding the campground had been occupied by pickets. wounded.

and which has necessarily occasioned us considerable loss not only in action. the summit Tiie main attack of which was reached by both sininUaneously at lO a. exceptionally active and well armed.— — ( 'iv ) 2nd Rri'^atle's at'ack wns led by the 2nd f'.)lirin Yorkshire Ree^iment and the Gurkha scouts. each tfallfintly tmc ing up the steep slope. the Officers of the Head-Quarters. Supply and Transport. the General OfHcers Commanding Divisions and Brigades. all of whom have done their duty in a manner befitting Her Majesty's Army. I attribute to the lesson taught those tribes at Dargai in the actions of October iSth and October 20th. My recommendations for the recognition of the services of individual Officers. Divisional. guerilla tactics. General . Non-Commissicned Officers and soldiers. and shortly after lo a.Scottish Borderers. may Immediately after the action I gave orders for the concentration of 33. body of men could have shown a better spirit. was led bj' the 2nd Battalion King's Own . to trreat variations No of temperature. the Heads of Departments.Sir William Lockhart's despatch describing the operations of the Tirah Expeditionary I'orce from November ist to January 26th. but In spite of these difficulties severe punishment also from toil and exposure. During the period dealt with subjected to command were much That a more formidable resist-ince was not offered in the passes leading respectively into Ornkzai and Afridi Tirah. They then learnt that their strongest positions could not avail them against the valour of British and Native troops. country destitute of tionary Force. the Chief of the Staft'. here mention that the road up the Arhanga Pass though short. with the result that the entire : . was the steepest and worst that had j^et been encountered. The I casualties were : — Killed none. and to continual night alarms. especially those of Ordnance. wounded two. and Brigade Staffs. and the Brigadier-Generals Commanding the Koyai Artillery and Royal Engineers. and expert in While avoiding serious resistance to the advance of our troops. 34. the pass was in our hands. together with comments as follows : SIR GEORGE WHITe's LETTER TO GOVERNMENT.m. Neither attack met with serious opposition.s report. roads.itt. part skilled marksmen. Non-Commissioned Officers and men of the several corps under my command. the force in Maidan with the exception of the 1st Brigade. was published in a later issue of the Gazette of India. Commander-in- In a covering letter the Adjutant-General on behalf of the Chief writes : " No campaign on the frontiers of India has been conducted under more trying and arduous circumstances than those encountered by the Tirah ExpediIts operations have been carried out in a. which I had to leave behind for the purpose of dominating the Mastura Valley and of guarding the Line of Communication between Tirah and Khorappa. In submitting thi. will be embodied in my final despatch on the termination of the present expedition. in this report the troops under my privation and fatigue. I desire to record my acknowledgments to 35. and the Commanding and other Officers. and all opposition had practically ceased. the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications. has been meted out to the tribes concerned.. to heavy losses in action. subsequent to the action of October 20th. the phj'sical configuration of which is such as to present the maximum of The enemy w^ere for the most difficultj' to the movement of regular troops. they have lost no opportunity of harassing them both on the march and in bivouac a system of fighting admirably suited to the nature of the country.m.

Manager. Any breakdown of the railway arrangements during the period when troops and supplies were being pushed to the front would have had a very serious effect on the military operations and that no such failure occurred. for Mobilisation Veterinary-Colonel Thomson Hobdaj% Commissary-General-in-Chief. . " As this despatch will probably be the last that Sir George White will submit during his tenure of command. conducted themselves in a manner thoroughly befitting the traditions of Her Majesty's Army. Jacob. and the Officers and others mentioned in paragraphs 22 to 31 of the despatch." . . to the able administration of his railway system by the Manager and to the untiring efforts of his sub: . who were employed as extra Orderly Officers to the Divisional Commanders. and others whose careers were so full of promise. who accompanied the force throughout the expedition as extra Aide-de-Camp to Sir William Lockhart of Lieutenant-Colonel the Maharaja of Cooch Behar and of Major the Maharaj Rana of Dholpur. he desires to take this opportunity of bringing to the notice of the Government the valuable services rendered by the following Officers and Departments in connection with the recent operations. . Traffic Superintendent. or an average of 37 trains per diem in excess of the normal traffic. " Sir George White has much pleasure in commending to the notice of the Government the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Partab Singh. is due. — ordinates. It is further remarked " It has been ascertained that between the 1st July and the 31st October the additional trains on the North-Western Railway required for military traffic amounted to 4.-M.-G. Power Palmer. His Excellency fully shares Sir William Lockhart's appreciation of the assistance rendered by the Imperial Service troops. who has exercised an exceptionally difficult and responsible command with much skill. Director-General of Ordnance Mr.544. 36th Sikhs. Telegraph and Survey Officers and subordinates with the Field Force Colonel Brackenburjr. and the subordinate staff of the North-Western Railway. . Mr. . . Military Secretary Surgeon-Major-General Gore Major Mullaly. but will tender their submission at an early date. . Major-General D. Ouarter-Master-General Colonel Duff. . . General Symons and General Nicholson. vigour and judgment.Q. During: the operations the fighting qualities and endurance of the troops have been highly tested. and His Excellency takes this opportunity of expressing his own acknowledgments to Sir William Lockhart for the able manner in which he has directed the operations of the F'orce under his command. " The Commander-in-Chief would specially commend to the favourable notice of the Government the distinguished Officer selected for the command of the expedition. Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton. Adjutant-General General Badcock. and amongst them such distinguished soldiers as the late Major-General Yeatman-Biggs. The Commander-in-Chief also endorses the commendatory remarks made by Sir William Lockhart on the services of General Sir A. in His Excellency's opinion. ." The Oflicers named are: Sir George Wolseley. Major-General Wace. . His Excellency deplores the loss to the Army of the many brave Officers and men who have died in the performance of their duty. as have also a portion of the Afridis and it seems probable even now that the remainder of this tribe will not force a repetition of offensive operations.( Iv ) Orakzai tribe has submitted and complied witli the terms of the Government. Director-General of Telegraphs the Postal. . . Reynolds. and it is with no small sense of gratification and pride that the Commander-in-Chief brings to the notice of the Government of India the soldierly conduct and discipline of the troops amidst all the hardships and exposure which fell to them both Officers and men having. whether in action or in bivouac.A. Commanding the Punjab General Morton. whose association with our own troops has given them an opportunity of gaining valuable military experience which cannot fail to result in increased efficiency.

They have been subjected to great hardship harassed at night by assaults at close quarters or by distant rifle fire. unremitting watchfulness and personal activity. has passed without casualties. Wolseley and the Staff of the Punjab Command devolved the duty of carrying out the preliminary concentrcition of the Various forces which have been placed in the field." SIR WILLIAM LOCKHART's DESPATCH.050 tionary Force. his Staff and the troops under his command. . especially during the war. Military Secretary. That we have been able to mass the necessary troops without delay on the point threatened by each successive rising as it occurred. and whether we advanced or retired. have been very largely due to the Quarter-Master-General's constant and Sir George White also wishes to bring to the special notice assiduous work. I had impressed on him the necessity of invariably remaining with the troops detailed for his protection. Cheeertul and soldier-like under exceptionally trying conditions.same time.— — ( Ivi ) The " follovving are some of the observations in detail : On Lieutenant-General Sir G. and on bidding him Regarding Sir Henry Havelock Allen's death. Of the staff at Army Head-Quarters I ttm to mention General Morton. and exposure. glad to say the troops responded nobly to the call made upon them. and engaged in long and trying rear-guard actions. were carried out in a country which offered every natural advantage to the tribesmen and imposed on regimental Officers and rank and file ttie necessity I am for individual initiative. who has done all that a direct personal assistant could do to lighten the work and anxiety of the Commander-in-Chief in a time of exceptional difficulty. Officers and men upheld to the utmost the traditions of their corps and the honour of Her Majesty's Army. have been specially onerous. " In bringing this narrative to a close I wish to record my high appreciation Tirah Expediof the conduct of the British and native troops serving with the Up to the present date their losses have amounted to 1. and that our mobilisation arrangements have worked smoothly and without friction. in his despatch. who made no stand The operations in the open but were unrivalled as skirmishers and marksmen. every soldier had to be constantly on the alert against the enemy. in whom His Excellency has always found a Staff Officer of the very highest ability. most earnest sense of duty and soundest judgment. but were also compelled to be in readiness to meet any further complication which might suddenly arise along any portion of the North-West frontier. pertain to his responsible position. and has at all times afforded to the Commander-in-Chief all the assistance in his power. describes the military operations in November. This has been no light task. of the Government of India the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Duff. while the arrangements made Sampagha Pass and to protect the long and exposed line between Kohat and the afterwards to transfer the base from Kohat to Peshawar have been all that I could have desired. who has throughout proved himself zealous and untiring in the performance of the duties which. The difficulty of the task has been greatly enhanced by the fact that we were not only engaged in active operations in several directions at one and the . Their duties on picket and in Hardly a day or night guarding foraging parties. regret. killed and wounded.ed." The despatch continues " : During the oparations described I have received every possible support and assistance from the General Officer Commanding the Line of CommunicaThe requirements ot the tion. but it has been successfully perform. Quarter-Master-General in India. I am especially to bring to notice General Badcock. December and January. Main Column have been promptly and fully met. for which he expresses deep :— " Every precaution had been taken to good-bye at Lala China. Adjutant-General in India. Sir William Lockhart says ensure his safety. Sir William Lockhart. for his supervision of all the arrangements for the mobilisation of the large forces now and recently in the field.

by the inferiority of a large proportion of the transport animals and the want of proper discipline and training amongst many of the transport drivers and Kahars. During the expedition the Mountain Artillery had an important part to its reputation as one of the most eflicient branches of " Much work of a responsible and arduous nature. the companies of Sappers and Miners and the Pioneer regiments. although I have strong hopes that they may before long submit and thus save their country from a fresh invasion in the spring. But it must be remembered tliat a peace organisation which has to be rapidly expanded when war breaks out takes time to render it eflicient. have proved especially valuable. In recording his obligations to the General Officers. " The Imperial Service Corps attached to the force have taken their full share in the hardships of the campaign. and in a manner which has gained the confidence of all ranks.( Ivii ) " The advance into Tirah was delayed. Our enemies. who by tonga service facilitated the transport of the sick and wounded to the base hospital. " During the present expedition the scouts. fodder and fuel of both tribes has been consumed by the force. This work was carried out in a creditable manner. and has commanded it throughout the expedition with great ability and energy. principally road-making and the destruction of village defences. and fighting side by side with their comrades in the regular army have given a tangible proof of their readiness and that of their rulers to assist in the defence of the Empire. " play. and says that medical officers fully maintained their high reputation by their attention to the sick and wounded under fire and in hospital also that the signalling and survey work were well done. " The results attained by the expedition may be summarised as follows The troops under my command have marched everywhere within the Orakzai and Afridi limits and the whole of Tirah has now for the first time been accurately surveyed. and has displayed administrative talents of a high order. He acknowledges the public spirit evinced by Mr. Major-General Yeatman-Biggs was in a very bad state of health from the outset. General Hart joined the 1st Brigade on October 24th. : — . Dhanjiboy. elsewhere had already absorbed much of the better class of pack transport which would otherwise have been available. and their losses are stated on unimpeachable evidence to have been extremely severe. devolved on the corps of Royal Engineers. Major-General Sjniions has commanded the 1st Division with marked ability. Being trained mountaineers and accustomed to guerilla warfare. but the responsible medical officers considered him fit to remain in the field a decision which gratified him. have been punished. . Brigadier-General R." Sir William Lockhart praises the administration of the Army and Civil Departments. Power Palmer has commanded the Line of Communication to my entire satisfaction. Brigadier-General Gaselee has fully maintained his high reputation and proved himself to be an admirable leader in mountain warfare. and that the requirements. only to die at Peshawar on January 5th. Brigadier-General Westniacott has performed : . Sir William Lockhart writes: — '' Sir A. they were able to climb most precipitous hills. lie in ambush at night. and the winter supply of grain. drawn from the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas. and surpass the tribesmen in their own tactics. wherever encountered. The Orakzai have been completely subdued and have complied with the terms prescribed for them but the Afridis still hold out. and fully sustained that arm of the service. Hart was sent to relieve him. but his indomitnble spirit carried him through the whole of the operations. The towers and walls of almost every fortified village in the country have been levelled to the ground. and the subsequent movements of the force were impeded. I would fain have sent him back to India from the Samana or subsequently from Korappa. although I personally could not agree with it Owing to a regrettable accident t^ BrigadierGeneral Hamilton.

Colonel Christopher. Mountain Battery.. . . 15th Sikhs (who are said to have commanded their battalions in a manner which merits high approbation). who has shown energy.A. Broadbent. The following list includes the : names under Sir William Lockhart 's personal notice came under my personal notice of Officers whose good services came " Officers whose good services : — Personal S/a^. W. chief of the staff. O'Sullivan. Chief Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson. 8 Captain Grier. Captain Devonshire Royal Surrey Regiment. 2nd Division. Mr. . 3rd Sikhs. Lieutenant Macquoid. great ability and untiring mental and physical I " ment of India the following — energy. . Lieutenant-Colonel Yule Yorkshire Regiment. I consider these Officers are well deserving of advancement. and his Secretary Surgeon-Major Morris Colonel Scott. both in the reconnaissance to Hissar and during the operations against the Khani Kliel Chamkaunis. and his Lieutenant-Colonels Own Scottish Dixon. I am also much indebted to the Officer Commanding the Kurram Movable Column.E. C. De C. . . Veterinary-Colonel Glover Survey Officer Military Accounts Mr. Jemadar Abdul Ghani. . Pitman. handled. — Leshi . Colonel Hill. and his Brigade-Major Captain Craster Surgeon-MajorGeneral Thomson. Chief Superintendent of Telegraphs. Van Someren and Mr. Assistant Quarter-Master-General. Lieutenantspecially put forward his services for recognition and reward. Captain Shewell. an officer of brilliant service: abilities. Hamilton. though until lately he has not participated in the active operations of the force. Sir Pratab Singh. Surgeon-Captain Morgan. Lieutenant Tillard. Captain Macfarlane and Captain Maclaren . Major Mercer. His troops were well capacity and judgment in the performance of his duties. Lieutenant-Colonel Collins Regiment. Scout. more particularly when withdrawing from the Bara Valley on December 13th and 14th. 3rd Sikhs. . Commanding the Personal Escort. Captain Sergeant. Chief Transport Officer. ( Iviii ) excellent service. 36th Sikhs Borderers Abbott. . — . his Brigade-Major Captain C. Colonel Barrow. Punjab Division Lieutenant Davie. Assistant Adjutant-General and Major G. . Sir William Lockhart says. Veterinary-Lieutenant Rose Lyons Montgomery. King's Assistant Captain Hall Travers. the value of whose assis1 would very tance it is difficult for me to acknowledge in adequate terms. Lieutenant-Colonel Browne Gurkha . Bengal Sappers. .Aide-de-Camps). desire to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief and the GovernOfficers who have rendered exceptionally good Brigadier-General Nicholson. Senior Ordnance Officer. H. Captain Grimston. is a staff officer of high promise. Extra Aide-de-Camp. . Captain Northcctt King's Own Scottish Borderers. .." Other Officers included C. Army and Surgeon-Colonel Townsend. 2nd Gurkhas Haughton. Lieutenant-Colonel Franklyn No 2 Derajat Mountain Battery. Major No. Major Shirres Roj^al Scots Fusiliers. Captain Maconchy. Lieutenants Maxwell and Annesley (. Brigadier-General . has commanded the Peshawar Column to my satisfaction. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General. Press Censor Colonel Holdich. Captain Parker. . Truninger. Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Surgeon-Colonel Davies. and Subadar-Major Bishan Singh. 4th Gurkhas. fertility of resource and experience in war. Postal Department.— . Captain Swanston. Captain Haldane. Risaldar-Major Khan Bahadur Kisaldar Kadam Khan. in charge of Imperial Service troops. Lieutenant-Colonel Tonnochy \ St Division. and in this special list are Brigadier-General Spragge. have fully justified their selection for their important post on the Army Staff.— Colonel More-Molyneux. Balfe. . Brigadier-General Hammond.R. Captain Bajee (Haroda State Artillery). Principal Medical Officer. Lieutenant-Colonel Major Logan-Home. . Commissary-General of the Force Major Mansfield. Lieutenants CoUen and Smith (Orderly Officers). . his acknowledgments are due also to Lord Methuen.R. Major Scallon.

iVIajor Quin and Lieutenant Taylor 4th Gurkhas. Major Tulloch. . Captain Mullaly. Wainright. . . Hamilton. King's Own Scottish Borderers. ^rd Brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel Huggins 1st Gurkhas. . Thurburn. BrigadeSurgeon Lieutenant-Colonel Murray. Lieutenant-Colonel Spurgin. . Major Chase and Lieutenant Moore 2nd Punjab Infantry. Gordon. Kurram Movable Column. 5 Hombay Mountain Battery. Major Doran. — Majors St. Major Smith-Dorrien No. Captain HoUway. Lieutenant Shonbridge Gordon Highlanders. — The Generals following : list is given of Officers favourably mentioned by the different 1st Division Lieutenant-Colonels Muir and Vlart. Captains Sladen and Haig : — . Lieutenant Tomkins. Captain Rogers. Gordon Infantry) Lieutenant-Colonel (iraves (39th Garhwal Rifles). Bevor. — Major McSwinsy. Captain Eales 36th Sikhs. Captain Clarkson Gordon Highlanders. Biggs. Lieutenant Gordon. Major Bond. Lieutenant-Colonel Des Voeux and Lieutenant . . Peshawar Column. OxfordColonel Sawyer. Captain Shakespear. Survey Department. . Captain Lucas and Lieutenant Bruce. Lieutenant Galloway. . Colonels Vousden. ^th Brigade. Captain Denne. — jer. Lieutenant-Colonel R. — . I Kohat Mountain Battery. ( lix ) Dorsetshire Regiment.— . Lieutenant Abadie. Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel H. . Lieutenant Holland. 15th Sikhs. Lieutenant-Colonel Gwatkin. Keighley. Surgeon-Captains Burtchnell and Selby. Captain Edwards. Campbell. . Captain Steel Shore. Surgeon-Colonel Saunders. Lieutenant Edimoun 15th Sikhs. Majors Ferrier and Yielding. RegiCaptain King King Yorkshire Regiment. Assistant Commissary-General. Regimental Roj^al Scots Fusiliers. Hilliard and Wake. . Lieutenant-Colonel Dowseard. Major Barret. Colonel-Lieutenant Gordon. — — 5th Gurkhas. Dorsetshire Regiment. Deputy Aldworth. Mr. Line of Commtiftications. . Watkins. Assistant Quarter-Master-General. Line of Commttnication. Captain Bretherton. 2nd Division. Gerard. Major Allen. — Captain Scudamore. Captain Rowcroft 2nd Gurkhas. Surgeon-Major Priggs and Corker. Surgeon. Major DownNo.}or Purdj'. Captain Carnegy 30th Punjab Infantry. . Central India Horse. . Major Kettlewell. Captains Uniacke and W. . Lieutenant-Colonel Pullej' and NTajor Rose 2nd Punjab Infantry.Majors Whitehead. . Surgeon-Major Granger. man. Major Bowles and Lieutenant Noble Derbyshire Regiment. . Shearer. 3rd Gurkhas. Captain Custance and Lieutenant Van Someren Sirmur Sappers. Captain St. Gurkha Scouts. Young. Major Maj'ne. Captains Macinryre and Norie 3rd Gurkhas. (22nd Punjab Veterinary-Captain Forsdyke. Lieutenant A. Captains Rideout and Dabas. Munn. . Lieutenant-Colonel Money. Leger Wood and Massy. Lieutenant-Colonel Sage and Major Martin 3rd Sikhs.— Ma. Brigade-Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonels King. Lieutenant-Colonel Major Kelly. LieutenantColonel Sturt 36th Sikhs. F. 6th Bengal Cavalr3'. 45th Sikhs. Lieutenant West (since deceased) 28th Bombay Pioneers. shire Light Infantry .Swayne and Triscott. Major Bewicke Copley. Surgeon-LieutenantColonel Bourke. John 2ist Madras Pioneers. Roj-al — Major West Surrey Regiment. . the Maharaj Rana of Dholpur. \st Brigade Major Donne and Captain Kemball. SurgeonMajor Willis. 3rd Bombay Cavalry. Lieutenant-Colonel Mathias. Army Medical Staff. the Maharaja of Cocch Behar. Captain Philipps. Surgeon-Major . Lieutenant Chancellor. Captains Knight. Captain Powes. Lieutenant-Colonel Plowden and Captain Davies. LieutenantColonel Maisej\ mental : 2nd Brigade.

His Excellency tenders to all Officers and men of the Tirah Expeditionary Force the cordial congratulations and thanks of the Government of India. Hussey. His Excellency further desires to acknowledge the services rendered during the operations by the Officers of the Staff" at Army Head-Quarters and of the Departments under the Government of India mentioned bj' the Commander-in-Chief. Pollock. SubConductor Wiggins. Sir William Lockhart further records his acknowledgments to the Native Officers of the various Imperial Service Corps. C. Conductor Morrison. and shares His Excellency's admiration of the devotion to duty and soldierly spirit displayed by the troops on all occasions. D. Davies. Ordnance Department. The withdrawal from Tirah necessitated by the season formed part of the plan of operations from the outset. The Rev. and whom it is intended to recommend for the Distinguished Conduct Medal or Order of Merit. Cookson. THE viceroy's REMARKS. armed moreover with weapons of precision. S." A despatch from Sir William Lockhart describing the operations of the Tirah Expeditionary Force from the 27th January to the 5th April.— ( 1^ ) In addition to tlie transport officers mentioned in the preceding' paragraphs. McDermott. the Maharaja of Cooch Behar. King and other Officers attached to the force in a political capacity. conduct ot the troops during the period in question. Among the honorary commissioned and warrant officers mentioned are: Assistant Surgeons O'Connor. Commissariat Commanding Transport Department Lieutenant J. White. The Governor-General in Council. : their duties satisfactorily. will be submitted in a supplementary despatch. in directing the publication of the above despatch. S. Tibbs. Cotgrave. A. and the Maharaja Rana of Dholpur. Captain Bennett. His Excellency also fully shares in Sir George White's appreciation of the assistance rendered by the Imperial Service Troops. The Non-Commissioned Officers mentioned are Sergeant-Major Diblett. and takes this opportunity of acknowledging the ready loyalty of the chiefs who have placed their regiments and transport trains at the disposal of the Government and the personal services rendered by Sir Partab Singh. C. Pepper and Ashworth. Colonel Warburton. Comprehensive lists of Non-Commissioned Officers and men. Blaker. Miscellaneous Departments. but it was nevertheless an operation of great difficulty under circumstances requiring not only most careful dispositions. native. was published still later with comments : in Council agrees with the Commander-in-Chief in his appreciation of the services of the Officers named in tile Adjutant-General's The Governor-General and ot the letter. Sergeants Howell. Browne. British and who have shown conspicuous gallantry. . Conductor Falkland. of which they thoroughly understood the use. Payne. remarks :—" These operations have been conducted in a country of great natural difficulty and against an enemy of extraordinary boldness and activitj'. The Governor-General concurs with the Commander-in-Chief in his opinion that the manner in which the campaign has been conducted reflects very great credit on Sir William Lockhart's skill and judgment. Sir William Lockhart concludes by recording his indebtedness for advice and assistance to Sir Richard Udny. Dyer and the chaplains of all denominations were mentioned as having performed . the Commissary-General witii the Tirah Expeditionary Force brought to special notice the services of the followins: regimental officers :— Captains Weller. G. Conductors Land and Thorne. courage and endurance on the part of the troops. but also a very high degree of discipline. Lieutenant Ezechiel. White. and cannot allow this opportunity to pass without conveying to Sir George White his sense of the distinguished ability with which on this occasion and throughout his term of office the responsible duties of Commander-in-Chief have been performed. Mr. A. Charters.

Service. Robb. . Rigby. Base Transport Officer. Orderly Officer Captain G. Base Commissariat Officer Major A. . : are now most " In bringing this narrative to a close I would wish to record my appreciation of the soldier-like behaviour of the troops under my command. C. L. Veterinary-Captain Richardson Captain H. I trust that these tribesmen who have proved themselves as brave foes as the Sikhs did. . H. F. Army Signalling Captain W. despatch describes the Shinkamar action. and admit that the recent operations in Tirah have convinced them of the folly of their unprovoked attack on the Khyber and the Samana posts and other hostile acts. Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General for Intelligence Captain U. . Field Intelligence Officer . . of my previous despatches the unde"mentioned : whose names were omitted in the first instance. and if by firm 3'et sympathetic treatment we succeed in gaining the confidence aqd aftection of these hardy mountaineers.( I-xi ) Sir The Commander-in-Chief endorses tlie commendatory remarks made by William Lockhart on the services of Brigadier-Ceneral Hamilton. Hoghton. remarks desirous of resuming their former friendly relations with the British Government. Their conduct during the second phase of the campaign has been as creditable as were their gallantry and endurance during the first. W. more particularly in connection witii the improvement of communications and the restoration of the Khyber posts. we may hope to utilize their services more fully than before in the defence of the Empire. W. H. Indian Medical Yorkshire Light Infantry) : . Transport Officer Captain H. Jameson. . Captain Birdwood. K. not only while actively engaged in the field. Smj'th. . Evans. They express contrition for their misconduct and acknowledge the justice of their punishment. Dick. and adds: "Among the killed the country has to deplore the loss of LieutenantColonel Haughton. i Mountain Battery Royal Artillery Major E. The force can congratulate itself on having carried out in the most thorough manner the task entrusted to it. Lloyd. or . Field Intelligence Officer Captain G. Hegan. St. . M. . as also the soldierlike conduct shown bj- the troops. 4 Company Madras Sappers . obligations to Brigadier-General Hamilton. who has performed his duties also to Brigadier-General Ottley. Morton. " Since the publication Officers. Palin. Helyar.Surgeon-Captain J. Nathan. . Marrett. . W. Barter and Captain H. Durham Light Infantry (attached to King's Own Surgeon-Lieutenant M. Wells Cole. Assistant Superintendent. Field . No finer fighting material can be found on the borders of India. Captain A. but also while employed on the tedious and monotonous duties of a blockade. R. Wright. in concluding his despatch. may like the latter become our firm friends. . . Commanding 57th Field Battery Surgeon-Major Spence. B. an officer whose able and gallant leading of the fine regiment which he commanded had repeatedly come under my notice. . . Captain A.Cafe. "During the period dealt with in this despatch the following Officers have been brought to my notice as deserving of favourable mention Major C.S. the 3rd Brigade. Cheshire Regiment. 5th Dragoon Guards. F. Army Medical Staff" Captain H. King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry Lieutenant A. Army Medical Staff". H. Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General Major H. Commanding No. who has with marked ability and energy rendered valuable service as commanding the Royal Engineers of the force. B. and the others named in the despatch. Walters. ed. In no previous campaign on the north-west frontier of India has a more exemplary punishment been inflictI have to record my a more complete submission been enforced. in charge of the Engineer Field Park Captain F. Royal Sussex Regiment Major G. Commissariat Transport Officer ." Sir William Lockhart in his — " The Afridis Sir William Lockhart. Nicholls. have been specially recommended for their good services by the general officers concerned — Lieutenant-Colonel C. Commanding No. A. 36th Sikhs. B. Briiradier-General Ottley. Commanding Commanding the Royal Engineer Force. .

Hill. 24th Punjab Infantry. with the Afridi representatives. Bengal Sappers A. Pan. 15th Siklis. M. Lieutenant Sheppard. . Transport Officer Lieutenant lery. Orderly Officer dead) Second-Lieutenant Young. Lieutenant Hammond. . and I trust his be duly recognised. Transport Officer. . Leslie. whom he recommends for the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Order of Merit. Brigade Commissariat Officer. . O. Brigade Transport Officer Lieutenant Lieutenant C. . Non-Commissioned Officers and men and of native ranks who have shown conspicuous gallantry in the field during the operation-^ subsequent to the 26th January. " I am much may for his assistance in dealing services indebted to Subadar-Major Yasin Khan. MacAndrew. . S. Royal Horse ArtilLieutenant Ballard. Lieutenant Beatt_v.( Ixii ) Captain H. Transport Officer. Turner. Assistant Eield Engineer. D. Orderly Officer Lieutenant Herbert. Engineer ." Sir William Lockhart forwards lists of British. E. Lieutenant H. J. attached to (dangerously wounded and since the Gordon Highlanders.

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