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168362 January 25, 2007
LADISLAO SALMA and MARILOU SALMA, Petitioners, vs. THE HON. PRIMO C. MIRO, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), BRGY. CAPT. ROLANDO MARTINEZ, and BARANGAY TANODS namely; CRISENTE ZERNA, BALTAZAR CUMCOM, MONTAÑO TORRES, ELDIN MIRAFLOR, NOEL TORRES, FRANCISCO CASTRO, BENITO BAROT, RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ, KASAMA BUENAVENTURA, WILLIAM DAYAO, RICO PIÑERO, JOSEPHINE CORNELIO and GINA SALMA, Respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the Review on Joint Resolution1 dated 15 October 2004 and the Order2 dated 29 March 2005, issued by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Allan Francisco S. Garciano, and approved by Deputy Ombudsman Primo C. Miro, dismissing the cases against Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez (Martinez), et al. The factual and procedural antecedents of this instant petition are as follows: On 15 July 2003, Gina Salma (Gina) went to the residence of Martinez to report the harassment committed by her brother-in-law Ladislao Salma (Ladislao). Ladislao, the brother of Gina’s late husband, was claiming an exclusive right over a property located at Brgy. 3, Tanjay, Negros Occidental, wherein the house and the hollow blocks making business of Gina were situated.3 The aforesaid property was commonly owned by the Salmas although in the possession of Gina and her late husband. After her husband’s demise, Ladislao was very adamant in regaining the possession of the entire property insisting that Gina had no more right to remain therein. At the time Gina brought to the attention of Martinez the alleged harassment, Ladislao was fencing the perimeter of the subject property thereby blocking access to the river, which was indispensable in hollow blocks making, thereby causing tremendous loss to Gina’s business. Aside from physically blocking the vital thoroughfare, Ladislao, in one instance, allegedly threatened the laborers and prevented them from entering the premises to perform their duties, thus, completely paralyzing Gina’s business. Upon hearing the complaint, Martinez advised Gina to go home and wait for the summons for he intended to call Ladislao to a conference in order to settle the brewing dispute amicably, if possible.4
2 In the early morning of the following day, Martinez was awakened by Gina’s report that she was once again harassed by Ladislao that same morning by shouting at the gate of her house and demanding her to vacate the disputed property. Gina related that at around 6 a.m. of that day, Ladislao went back in the same violent mood and in fierce and aggressive manner demanded her to leave her house. At that moment, Ladislao, who was in the fit of anger, was determined to use any means possible just to drive Gina off from the disputed property. At the outset, Ladislao allegedly used verbal threats against Gina by yelling and intimidating her to leave. Not contented, Ladislao even employed effective material control over the subject property by tying with a wire the gate adjoining the fence he himself built a few days ago around the lot, forcing Gina to take another route just to get out from the premises. While Ladislao was absorbed by his temper at the front of her house, Gina lost no time in reporting to Martinez what was happening. Accompanied by her sister, Josephine Cornelio, Gina went back to the Martinez’s residence and narrated to him the entire incident.5 Sensing the urgency of the situation, Martinez agreed to go with Gina to her house, and so he convened his Barangay Tanods, namely: Crisente Zerna, Baltazar Concom, Montaño Torres, Eldin Miraflor, Noel Torres, Francisco Castro, Benito Barot, and Rafael Rodgriguez, then proceeded to the location where the alleged harassment took place to verify the report and mediate between the disputing parties.6 Upon their arrival at the vicinity, the gate adjoining the fence surrounding the entire lot was already tied with a wire but Ladislao was nowhere to be found. Wanting to promptly settle the matter, Martinez requested Alejandro Salma, another brother of Ladislao, who was then present, to summon and inform Ladislao of their presence in the area. Shortly, Ladislao, who was still in an infuriated mood, appeared. To ease the growing tension, Martinez politely greeted Ladislao, "mayong buntag Lad" (good morning Lad), and in a diplomatic manner asked, "di-a mi arong pag klaro aning report sa imong bayaw nga si Gina nga imo kunong gi-alaran ang alagi-an nila ug sa iyang mga kustomer diin naapektuhan iyang negosyo, ug imo pa kuno gihulga ang iyang trabahante, ug unya imo gyud syang gisulong karon lang, unsa man ni katinu-od?" (we are here to verify the truth on Gina’s complaint that you allegedly fenced her house which blocked her and her customer’s passage and, on one instance, mauled her laborer which affected her business, and then again harassed her at her residence this morning). Instead of justifying his actions, Ladislao explicitly admitted the allegations and even retorted, "ngano man diay sulongon nako si Gina? Wala moy labot kay walay makabo-ot sa akong gustong buhaton! Wala moy labot Noy, kay ako ning property," (What if I will harass Gina? What if I will fence my property? This is mine and I will certainly do whatever pleases me and its none of your business anymore). These arrogant utterances were allegedly made by Ladislao while pointing his finger at the the Barangay Captain and pushing him away.7 The contemptuous behavior displayed by Ladislao prompted Martinez to arrest him for direct assault committed against his authority as a Barangay Captain who was on the occasion of performing his official duties. He then requested Ladislao to go with them at the police station but the latter swiftly moved to elude arrest and quickly ran away from Martinez and the tanods. Overpowered by the strength and number of the tanods, Ladislao was finally cornered, after which, he was handcuffed and brought to the police station to answer the charges against him.8
3 In the process of effecting his arrest, Ladislao and his wife Marilou Salma, who tried to help him evade the barangay authorities, suffered slight physical injuries as evidenced by medical reports.9 Spouses Ladislao and Marilou Salma later cried they were victims of "manhandling" and "police brutality" alleging that the force employed by Martinez and the Barangay Tanods was considerably excessive and uncalled for by the circumstances.10 Consequently, Ladislao was charged with the crimes of Direct Assault, Resistance to a Person in Authority or his Agents, and Coercion docketed as I.S. No. 03-152 entitled, "Chief of Police v. Ladislao Salma."11 On the other hand, spouses Ladislao and Marilou Salma filed six counter charges against Martinez and the Barangay Tanods namely Crisente Zerna, Baltazar Concom, Montaño Torres, Eldin Miraflor, Noel Torres, Francisco Castro, Benito Barot, and Rafael Rodriguez, before the City Prosecution Office of Tanjay City and docketed as follows: I.S. No. 03-156, For: Slight Physical Injuries, "Marilou Salma v. Crisente Zerna," I.S. No. 03-157, For: Grave Threats, "Ladislao Salma v. Crisente Zerna and Baltazar Concom," I.S. No. 03-158, For: Slander by Deed, "Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez and Crisente Zerna et al.," I.S. No. 03159, For: Grave Coercion, "Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez and Crisente Zerna et al.," I.S. No. 03-160, For: Arbitrary Detention, "Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez and Crisente Zerna et al.", and I.S. No. 03-161, For: Unlawful Arrest, "Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez and Crisente Zerna, et al."12 On 12 July 2004, the City Prosecutor of Tanjay City issued a Joint Resolution13 dismissing the charges filed by the spouses Salma against the barangay officials, for want of sufficient evidence to establish a probable cause that the offenses charged were indeed committed. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: "ACCORDINGLY, and for reasons already cited, I.S. Nos. 03-156, 03-157, 03-158, 03-159, 03160, 03-161 and 03-162 are hereby ordered dismiss (sic)."14 However, the criminal complaint against Ladislao was ordered filed, it having been established that respondent Ladislao committed the acts as charged and is probably guilty thereof.15 The dispositive portion of the Joint Resolution reads: "ACCORDINGLY, let two separate informations for the offense defined in Article 148 and Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code against Ladislao Maglucot Salma be filed before the proper court."16 Aggrieved, the spouses Salma elevated the matter to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, through an Appeal and/or Petition for Review17 they filed on 5 August 2004, seeking the reversal of the Resolution dated 12 July 2004 issued by the City Prosecutor on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Since the respondents in the criminal complaints instituted by the spouses Salma are public officials, who allegedly committed the offenses charged while in performance of their official duties, the Regional State Prosecutor indorsed the resolution of I.S. Case Nos. 03-156, 03-157, 03-158, 03-159, 03-160, and 03-161 for the proper cognizance by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).
Petitioner spouses availed themselves of an extraordinary remedy allowed under the Rules by filing this Special Civil Action for Certiorari. 03-156. TANODS. Primo C. is hereby APPROVED. Resistance to a Person in Authority or his Agents and Coercion was retained by the Regional State Prosecutor. the Regional State Prosecutor ordered the City Prosecutor of Tanjay to move for the withdrawal of the Criminal Informations filed against Ladislao on the ground that there is no probable cause to believe that respondent committed or is guilty of the offenses charged. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: Wherefore. MIRO COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPROVING THE DISMISSAL OF CASES FILED AGAINST MARTINEZ AND THE BRGY.25 they generally averred that grave abuse of discretion attended the approval of the dismissal of their complaints against the barangay officials. 03-158.S. We rule in the negative. For our resolution then is the following issue: WHETHER OR NOT DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS. but miserably failed to substantiate the allegation. ordering the dismissal of criminal cases filed against herein respondents docketed as I. Miro. the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) resolved the appeal brought before its jurisdiction by approving the dismissal of the complaints filed by the spouses Salma against respondent barangay officials. the City Prosecutor of Tanjay is directed to move for the withdrawal of the informations filed in court and to inform this Office of the action taken hereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. 2004 issued by the City Prosecutor Elson P.21 Similarly ill-fated was the spouses Salma’s Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing resolution which was denied by the Ombudsman in an Order dated 29 March 2005 for lack of merit. In a Resolution18 dated 28 September 2004. 03-160. PRIMO C. In the eight-paged Petition24 filed by petitioner spouses. 03-159. Bustamante of the Tanjay City Prosecution Office. respectively.19 For its part. which was reproduced in toto in their Memorandum. the spouses Salma filed this instant Petition for Certiorari advancing the argument that Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. since Ladislao was a private individual. foregoing premises considered.20 The decretal portion of the Resolution reads: WHEREFORE. and 03-161. the Joint Resolution dated July 12.22 Unyielding. the jurisdiction for the review of the Resolution approving the filing of Criminal Informations against him for the crimes of Direct Assault. 03-157. . Case Nos. under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court but the allegations advanced by the petitioner spouses were empty of any material argument to prove their recantation that the Deputy Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion.4 On the other hand. committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the dismissal of cases filed against respondent barangay officials.
The same is true with the other acts committed by the barangay officials by reason or on the occasion of effecting the lawful arrest. is supported by . or capricious in the above findings. In the disputed Resolution. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. unless contradicted.net In sum. arbitrary. this Court will nonetheless comb the records and address the issue scantily laid by the spouses Salma and apply the pertinent legal and jurisprudential principles to resolve this case. we must look into the Resolution dated 15 October 2004 and the Order dated 29 March 2005 issued by the Ombudsman and determine whether there is a substantial evidence to support its conclusions in order to take it out from the ambit of grave abuse of discretion as defined above. the same was not intentional but merely an incidental consequence considering that he offered initial resistance against the arresting barangay compelling the latter to use reasonable force. or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. thus. based on reasonable belief. Applying the above-laid parameters in the case at bar. if in the act of effecting lawful arrest upon Ladislao. Accordingly. the rule on presumption of regularity in the performance of official function aptly applies in this case. as correctly ruled by the City Prosecutor. Under the Rules of Evidence. it is regretted that. there is no probable cause in filing the criminal charges against the barangay officials. arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power. the arrest without warrant of Ladislao by the barangay officials was proper. Upon close scrunity of the foregoing Resolution. and made a pronouncement that.5 Even if the instant petition is essentially bare in substance. while probable cause need not be an actual certainty.271avvphi1. Finally. for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie. in the exercise of its discretion. could be taken as an assault against a person in authority. petitioner in such cases must clearly show that public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. causing him to step backwards. The said acts were but the necessary and incidental repercussions of the performance of the official duties by the respondents. It particularly cited that the acts of Ladislao in pointing his finger at Martinez and pushing him away.26 By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The determination of the Deputy Ombudsman of the nonexistence of a reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed. In order to avail of the Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. the same does not exist in the present cases. there must be capricous. Significantly. it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. the Ombudsman affirmed the findings of the Graft and Investigation Officer that. we find nothing whimsical.28 Consequently. the Ombudsman found that there is no probable cause to engender a well-founded belief that the crimes charged against the barangay officials were indeed committed and that they were probably guilty thereof. the latter was ridiculed or even injured.
30 we ruled: On the issue of whether respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against respondents. a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers. like the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman in the instant case. and we find no compelling reason to deviate from the time-honored policy of non-interference. to file criminal charges does not preclude them from refusing to file the information when they believe that there is no prima facie evidence to do so. the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence. In Salvador v. in his view.A. but upon practicality as well.29 The authority granted to government prosecutors. Office of the Ombudsman. This Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers. saved on well-recognized exceptions.6 substantial evidence and therefore it cannot be gainsaid that the same is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. The apprehension of complainant Ladislao Salma was but the natural reaction of the respondent Barangay Tanods who . each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Resolution of the Ombudsman was supported by substantial evidence giving us no cogent reason to depart from his findings. Desierto. given its facts and circumstances should be filed or not. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists a reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and thereafter file the corresponding informations before the appropriate courts. executive or judiciary intervention. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form [and] substance or he may proceed with the investigation if.32 In Espinosa v. let it be stressed that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case. "beholden to no one. Thus. in much the same way that the courts will be extremely swamped if they were compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals and prosecuting attorneys. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative. It is basically his call. the Constitution as well as R. and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who. Otherwise. acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service. As significantly observed by the Ombudsman: The acts of complainant Ladislao Salma in laying a hand on the respondent Barangay Captain could be taken as an assault against a person in authority.33 we held: The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it.31 this Court has almost adopted quite aptly.34 We have carefully examined the records." The non-interference rule that we rigorously observed is based.
premises considered. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. this Court has maintained a stature of non-interference from the discretion of the Ombudsman provided there is no grave abuse of discretion. 172070-72 June 1.7 personally witnessed the pushing incident. the spouses Salma utterly failed to single out a particular act indicating abuse of discretion other than the fleeting allegation that respondent Ombudsman has committed such. 2007 . we are constrained to uphold the findings of the Ombudsman. especially that the complainant fled when asked to go with them to the Tanjay Police Station for proper booking and disposition. Costs against the petitioners.R. WHEREFORE. Nos. SO ORDERED. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion as in the case at bar. the instant Petition is DISMISSED.35 On the other hand. In sum.
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. MARAYA. vs. and RAFAEL V.. CASAMBRE.... x. WAGA.. P/CSUPT... TEODORO A. 2006-226 and 2006-234. the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors composed of EMMANUEL Y..S. No. in his capacity as the Secretary of Justice and overall superior of the Public Prosecutors.. OCAMPO... in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City.. JOVENCITO R.... and P/SUPT. and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP). Petitioner. MENDOZA. MARIANO.. RODOLFO B.. RAUL M.8 VICENTE P... GUTIERREZ. CASIÑO.... in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice. TANIGUE. Respondents. MOYA... vs.. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES..R.. MAZA.. ECHANIS. MENDOZA.. in his capacity as Chief. and HONORABLE ELMO M.. vs.. Philippine National Police.. DECISION CARPIO. BELTRAN. YOLANDA G.. MENDOZA... and STATE PROSECUTOR MERBA A. x...-x G. VIRADOR. Nos.. MENDOZA.-x G. STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A.. SECRETARY RAUL M. VELASCO. 172074-76 June 1. in her capacity as Acting Executive Officer of DIDM. Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM). GONZALEZ... VELASCO. 175013 June 1. HONORABLE ENCARNACION JAJA G.. J. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JOSELITA C... MARAYA and MERBA A.. JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M.. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. NATHANAEL S.. CRISPIN B. Respondents. Nos.: The Case These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners’ prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners’ cases.. TANIGUE. GONZALEZ. in his capacity as Acting Deputy Director. WAGA (Panel).. BELTRAN. Branch 146. . in his capacity as Chief State Prosecutor. ZUÑO. RANDALL B. SATURNINO C..R.... LADLAD... Petitioners. Respondents... ALAMEDA. IRWIN A.. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City.. RODOLFO B. the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ). AILEEN MARIE S. SANTIAGO.. YOLANDA G. GONZALEZ. in their capacity as members of the Department of Justice panel of prosecutors investigating I. and REY CLARO C. Petitioners. Branch 150. JR.. LOMIBAO... JOEL G. JOSELITA C. 2006-225.. GUTIERREZ. 2007 LIZA L. 2007 CRISPIN B.
A panel of State prosecutors6 from the DOJ conducted this second inquest. x x x. Crispin B. . unlawfully. No. which have formed a "tactical alliance. Nos. The panel then filed an Information with the RTC Makati. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge Delorino). Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006. and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP). and petitioners in G.R." On 27 February 2006. Tanigue is the Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG). the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as "leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. G.9 The Facts Petitioner in G. Virador (Virador). he was subjected to a second inquest. and detained him in Camp Crame. Maza (Maza). The inquest was based on two letters. The Information alleged that Beltran. x x x. Joel G. and other individuals "conspiring and confederating with each other. was raffled to Branch 137 under Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Bulacan. 175013."7 The Information. the petitioners in G. Nos. Quezon City. Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati. did then and there willfully. San Juan. 175013 (The Beltran Petition) Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. On that evening. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally.R.R. No. 06-452.R. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. while Mendoza is the Acting Deputy Director of the CIDG. while he was en route to Marilao.R. 17207476. with 1st Lt. both dated 27 February 2006. Philippine National Police (PNP). Beltran (Beltran). Ocampo (Ocampo). The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the results of the CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran. this time for Rebellion. and several others as "leaders and promoters" of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The inquest prosecutor4 indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC).2 Petitioners in G. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan). Liza L. Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of probable cause against him.1 are members of the House of Representatives representing various party-list groups. renamed as Partidong Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the duly constituted government. Nos. of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza). Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya). docketed as Criminal Case No. Casiño (Casiño). 17207476. San Juan. Teodoro A." police officers3 arrested Beltran on 25 February 2006. Mariano (Mariano). and Rafael V.8 Before the motion could be resolved. Saturnino C. 172070-72 are private individuals.5 The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where. on 27 February 2006. on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution.
. 06-944. the Court issued a status quo order on 5 June 2006. to whom the case was re-raffled. The prosecutors filed the corresponding Information with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati. However. however. 06-452 in Branch 146). docketed as Criminal Case No.10 In its Order dated 31 May 2006. the petitioners in G.R.11 and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation. 175013 to set aside the Orders dated 31 May 2006 and 29 August 2006 and to enjoin Beltran’s prosecution. Petitioners now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006. Petitioners were furnished the complete copies of documents supporting the CIDG’s letters only on 17 March 2006. Acting on petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ. The DOJ panel of prosecutors denied petitioners’ motion on 22 March 2006. the DOJ sent subpoenas to petitioners on 6 March 2006 requiring them to appear at the DOJ Office on 13 March 2006 "to get copies of the complaint and its attachment. issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners and 46 others with Rebellion. Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel for lack of impartiality and independence. Alameda of Branch 150. later identified as Jaime Fuentes (Fuentes). the Solicitor General submits that the preliminary investigation of petitioners was not tainted with irregularities. Judge Elmo M. No. the petition in G." Prior to their receipt of the subpoenas. Petitioners sought reconsideration and additionally prayed for the dismissal of the cases. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and Ladlad Petitions) Based on Tanigue and Mendoza’s letters. issued an Order on 29 August 2006 denying Beltran’s motion. the panel of prosecutors. charging petitioners and their co-accused as "principals. the counsel for the CIDG presented a masked man. [or] heads" of a Rebellion. G. on 21 April 2006. masterminds. 172070-72 filed a supplemental petition to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No.R. In his separate Comment to the Maza petition. Hence. the panel of prosecutors denied petitioners’ motions on 4 April 2006. In his Comment to the petition. the Solicitor General claims that Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such felony. Branch 146 sustained the finding of probable cause against Beltran. Nos. Prior to this. During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006.9 Beltran sought reconsideration but Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the case without resolving Beltran’s motion. 06-944 has mooted the Maza petition. The panel of prosecutors10 gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their counter-affidavits. Nos.12 Consequently. 06-944 (later consolidated with Criminal Case No. who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’ case. petitioners had quartered themselves inside the House of Representatives building for fear of being subjected to warrantless arrest. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media members present during the proceedings. considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated.R. The Solicitor General also claims that the filing of Criminal Case No.
11 The Issues The petitions raise the following issues: 1. in his presence. or is attempting to commit an offense.— A peace officer or a private person may. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.R. the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran. No. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion. 175013. the person to be arrested has committed.R. under DOJ Circular No. Thus. and xxxx In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above. Consequently. when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion. In G. (a) whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion. (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. 61. the crime of Rebellion. On the Beltran Petition The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. and 2. Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.14 Section 5. 06-944.17 Indeed. and not for Rebellion. arrest a person: (a) When. they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. Nos. thus: Arrest without warrant. without a warrant. whether respondent prosecutors should be enjoined from continuing with the prosecution of Criminal Case No. dated 21 September 1993. is actually committing. the initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine if the arrest of the detained person was made "in accordance with the . in their presence. 172070-72 and 172074-76. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006. sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. In G.13 The Ruling of the Court We find the petitions meritorious.16 for Inciting to Sedition. without a warrant. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances when such warrantless arrest may be effected. when lawful.
does not interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause for otherwise. that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.— Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules. courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor’s findings in such investigations. together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint. Rule 113. to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken. thus denying the accused his right to substantive and procedural due process. he shall: a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained. Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No.22 This exception holds true here."20 To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality.21 However. together with the record of the case. Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind. we have not hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the prosecutor’s findings. There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion.12 provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5. in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause. as a rule. and d) forward the same."18 If the arrest was not properly effected. we declare Beltran’s inquest void.19 Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked the trial court to make a judicial determination of probable cause. the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or . the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation. (Emphasis supplied) For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7. acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor. Rule 112 in relation to Section 5. the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation. affidavit or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence. which effectively took the place of such proceeding. b) note down the disposition on the referral document. 61. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed – [B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws. this Court. 61 which provides: Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.
26 and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela). by its nature. and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal. The elements of the offense are: 1.27 none of the affidavits mentions Beltran. he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. Ocampo. executed by members of the military and some civilians. or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress. naval. or (2) any body of land. executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala). Casiño. rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU). Mariano. dated 23 February 2006. We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. What these documents prove. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. at best. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits. naval.24 The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. and 2. Padre Garcia. dated 20 Febuary 2006. of any of their powers or prerogatives. or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature. is that Beltran was in Bucal. they were met by another individual who looked like San Juan.28 In his affidavit.13 any part thereof. Padre Garcia. Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006. maintaining. and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members. or other armed forces. or any body of land.23 Thus. wholly or partially. The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the government. (2) he took part in criminal activities. Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP’s "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran. Cachuela’s affidavit stated that Beltran attended the 1992 CPP Plenum as "Chairman. Except for two affidavits. Virador. of any of their powers and prerogatives. wholly or partially. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either – (a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws: (1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof." Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP. In fact. he saw Beltran. who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP. Batangas and that after the passengers alighted. Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier. some of which were sworn before a notary public. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government. For his part. Maza. like Beltran. or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting. which Beltran does . Beltran’s alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
The Information in Criminal Case No. Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect by motu proprio submitting to Branch 137 of the RTC Makati Fuentes’ affidavit as part of their Comment to Beltran’s motion for judicial determination of probable cause. among others.14 not acknowledge. San Juan. from whom the "flash drive" containing the so-called minutes was allegedly taken. even assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking part in a Rebellion. although this affidavit is dated 25 February 2006. also do not detract from our finding. he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no allegation in the Information that he is a leader or promoter of the Rebellion. Such belated submission. Even the prosecution acknowledged this. Indeed. The minutes32 of the 20 February 2006 alleged meeting in Batangas between members of MKP and CPP. Thus. Attendance in meetings to discuss.net Nowhere in the minutes was Beltran implicated. maintaining. or heading a Rebellion. the CIDG first presented it only during the preliminary investigation of the other petitioners on 13 March 2006 during which Fuentes subscribed to his statement before respondent prosecutor Velasco. there is no other evidence on record indicating that "Cris" is Beltran. not Rebellion under Article 134. a bailable offense. To repeat. While the minutes state that a certain "Cris" attended the alleged meeting. denies knowing Beltran.29 As for the alleged funding of the CPP’s military equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds. the Information does not charge Beltran with Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion. Cachuela merely alleged that "ang mga ibang mga pondo namin ay galing sa mga party list na naihalal sa Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA – pimumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at CRISPIN BELTRAN.31 as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed. and others conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. including Beltran. Cachuela’s affidavit merely contained a general conclusion without any specific act showing such funding. does not improve the prosecution’s case. 06-452 is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. x x x. the Solicitor General points to Fuentes’ affidavit. what the allegations in Fuentes’ affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion.33 However. Thus. none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting. As worded. the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes’ affidavit in their possession when they conducted the Rebellion inquest against Beltran on that day. Thus. dated 25 February 2006. since the felony charged in the Information against Beltran and San Juan in Criminal Case No. In his Comment to Beltran’s petition. mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.34 .1a\^/phi1. San Juan. the Information in fact merely charges Beltran for "conspiring and confederating" with others in forming a "tactical alliance" to commit rebellion. a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence against Beltran during the inquest. 06-452 itself does not make such allegation. Fuentes’ affidavit was not part of the attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27 February 2006. the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it. Assuming them to be true. punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code."30 Such a general conclusion does not establish probable cause. The Information merely alleged that Beltran. The claim is untenable. plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. among others.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. two months and one day is outlined in Section 3. The counteraffidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section.15 On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted With Irregularities. this Court is similarly loath to enjoin the prosecution of offenses. or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents. or photographing at the expense of the requesting party. or. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. among others. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath. such relief in equity may be granted if. each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. the same is necessary (a) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner36 or (b) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit. the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent. with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. in their absence or unavailability. before a notary public. Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination.—The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner: (a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses. as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. thus: Procedure.35 However. If the evidence is voluminous. copying.37 The case of the petitioners in G. the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation.R. (c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents. . As in the determination of probable cause. plus two (2) copies for the official file. the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. 172070-72 and 172074-76 falls under these exceptions. and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense. a practice rooted on public interest as the speedy closure of criminal investigations fosters public safety. (b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint. Nos. The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by at least four years.
It was only four days later. he shall dismiss the case. as what this Court had mandated in an earlier ruling. respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath. They may. the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant. Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which. must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. (Emphasis supplied) Instead of following this procedure scrupulously. The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. Further. does not submit counteraffidavits within the ten (10) day period. that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG letters. after receiving the CIDG letters. or. tolerating the complainant’s antics during the investigation. Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor. after receiving the complaint." During the investigation."38 respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses. Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It shall be terminated within five (5) days. (e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. . "so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage. or if subpoenaed. in their absence or unavailability. submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned. PNP as complaints39 and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112. respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments. (f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation." Here. however. If there is none.1a\^/phi1. otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents."40 Indeed.16 (d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed.net These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors’ statement in the Order of 22 March 2006 that the preliminary investigation "was done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f] Criminal Procedure. by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners. respondent prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. with its attachment. and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them. before a notary public. on 17 March 2006.
we SET ASIDE the Order dated 31 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court. then it’s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x. or subversive of. . for political ends. Nos. Makati City. 172070-72 and 172074-76. This clearly shows pre-judgment.17 A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an individual the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may be public’s perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced. and should avoid. the day of the preliminary investigation. giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted.net On Respondent Prosecutors’ Lack of Impartiality We find merit in petitioners’ doubt on respondent prosecutors’ impartiality. Branch 150 to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. the basic and fundamental objective of observing the interest of justice evenhandedly.R. We reiterate what we stated then. In G. whether rich or poor. We ORDER the Regional Trial Court. we have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not "a mere formal or technical right" but a "substantive" one. forming part of due process in criminal justice. on the other hand. Branch 150.441a\^/phi1. Nos. 06-452 and 06-944. without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike.43 but respondents never disputed the veracity of this statement."42 Petitioners raised this issue in their petition. A Final Word The obvious involvement of political considerations in the actuations of respondent Secretary of Justice and respondent prosecutors brings to mind an observation we made in another equally politically charged case.1a\^/phi1. No. if only to emphasize the importance of maintaining the integrity of criminal prosecutions in general and preliminary investigations in particular. "We [the DOJ] will just declare probable cause. Makati City. and peace of mind and liberty.R. In G. we SET ASIDE the Orders dated 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006 issued by respondent prosecutors. 172070-72 and 172074-76.R. stated in an interview on 13 March 2006. 175013. Respondent Secretary of Justice. weak or strong.net WHEREFORE. a determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause. who exercises supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors. Our power to enjoin prosecutions cannot be frustrated by the simple filing of the Information with the trial court. thus: [W]e cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow. powerless or mighty. we GRANT the petitions.41 This especially holds true here where the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be non-bailable for those accused as principals. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General. wittingly or unwittingly. Branch 146 and the Order dated 29 August 2006 of the Regional Trial Court. that. Makati City. on the one hand. or other purposes alien to. SO ORDERED. respondent prosecutors’ filing of the Information against petitioners on 21 April 2006 with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati does not moot the petitions in G. Thus.
BRIGIDO TRIPOLI y CABILOSA and ROMULO STA.R. ELMER HONORIO y GAYO. BENJAMIN GALANO y GLORIA. accusedappellants. J. QUISUMBING.: .18 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. IGLESIA y CUISON. BRIGIDO TRIPOLI y CABILOSA and ROMULO STA. 111806 March 9. accused. 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. No. BENJAMIN GALANO y GLORIA. plaintiff-appellee. IGLESIA y CUISON. vs.
There. CBR 522. 1990. which the driver first maneuvered backwards. 5 Appellant Brigido embraced Virgilio from the back. Elmer Honorio y Gayo. the three assailants ran towards the parked jeepney. The pertinent facts in this case are as follows: On September 8. while appellant Romulo similarly held the brother Leonardo. he informed his father of the plate number of the jeepney that their assailants used. 9 He shouted for help. and Virgilio replied "yes". Branch 5. at around 8:30 in the evening. 1990. and parked on España. Virgilio was more fortunate. 4 To the surprise of Virgilio. at the time of the alleged offense. a 24 yearold baker.. Leonardo was declared dead on arrival. In spite of the pain. After that. Virgilio and Leonardo Torres. Iglesia y Cuison of the crime of murder under Article 248 (1) of the Revised Penal Code for the killing of Leonardo Torres. Leonardo fell on the pavement. 8 Same bystanders joined him in running after the jeepney. as follows: . He and his brother Leonardo continued waiting for a ride. waiting for a ride. After a while. respectively. then turned to Leonardo and likewise stabbed him in the stomach. then sped off towards Lepanto St. 10 He only saw the assailants again when he identified them at the Western Police District headquarters from a police line-up of eight persons.. 6 Appellant Benjamin soon appeared and suddenly stabbed Virgilio on the right side of his stomach. His wounds only required surgery. 12 On October 16. Upon seeing Benjamin this person ran away. were total strangers to the appellants. were standing at a street corner of España near Centro St. Virgilio stayed in the hospital for more or less a month. the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information 13 for Murder against four (4) accused. and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They all resided in the Sampaloc area of Manila. Leonardo turned La Virgilio to ask if he was also hit. and Romulo Sta. was acquitted. Some people heard him and brought his brother and him to the UST Hospital. 1 convincing accused-appellants Benjamin Galano y Gloria. Their coaccused. Their alleged victims.19 This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. they heard somebody shout "snatcher". Leonardo. the two men (whom he later identified as appellants Brigido and Romulo) suddenly held him and his brother. Brigido. 7 Thereafter. Benjamin was a 30 year-old laundryman. As the two brothers tried to follow the jeepney. while Virgilio and his older brother. Brigido Tripoli y Cabilosa. 11 He positively identified appellants Brigido and Romulo as the ones who held him and his brother. A man with a knife in his left hand (later identified as appellant Benjamin) alighted from the jeepney and ran after the person who had shouted "snatcher". Before he was operated on. They approached and asked him what happened. two men alighted from the jeepney. 2 Suddenly. a fast-running jeepney going to Lepanto made a turn at Centro St. Both were brothers who merely happened to be waiting for a ride and came to the succor of an alleged snatching victim when both were suddenly grabbed from behind by appellants Brigido and Romulo. and appellant Benjamin as the one who stabbed them. Virgilio even managed to throw stones at the speeding jeepney. and Romulo. 3 Virgilio then lost sight of both in the traffic. a 24 year-old janitor. Virgilio continued to run after the jeepney and took note of its plate number. Leonardo succumbed to stab wounds but Virgilio survived to tell his story before the trial court. and then stabbed by Benjamin.
and (2) Dr. Iglesia y Cuison of the crime of Murder. premises considered. 1990. Marcial Ceñido y Guevarra. 1990. all accused duly assisted by counsel de oficio. Trial ensued. 17 The jeepney they were riding was stoned but they remained inside while the other passengers jumped off the jeepney. 14 For the defense. where they alighted and proceeded to the house of Romulo spent the night. a MedicoLegal Officer of the Western Police District who conducted the post-mortem examination on Leonardo Torres. 15 Thereafter. 18 On August 20. 1993. at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening. the trial court rendered its decision. the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA is imposed upon them.. along España. and that they left the moviehouse late in the evening and took a ride home to Antipolo St. Some of the passengers jumped out of the vehicle but he remained inside the jeepney. 1990 in the City of Manila. with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation. the jeepney proceeded to Lepanto St. Philippines. except for Elmer Honorio who had no participation in the crime charged. Hence. the jeepney continued on España up to Antipolo St. thereby inflicting upon said Leonardo Torres y Bartolome mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.20 The undersigned accuses Benjamin Galano y Gloria. Elmer Honorio y Gayo. entered a plea of not guilty. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. Appellant Benjamin testified that on September 8. 1990. In their consolidated brief. judgment is hereby rendered finding herein all the three (3) accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly. and who testified that the latter died as a result of severe hemorrhage caused by the stab wound which pierced the internal organs of the victim. the said accused conspiring and confederating together and helping one another. upon arraignment. committed as follows: That on or about September 8. On his way home from Quiapo. 19 appellants Benjamin. where he alighted and went home. Nevertheless. at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Romulo and Brigido assign the following errors: . he saw a man being chased by two other persons. namely (1) Virgilio Torres. Brigido Tripoli y Cabilosa and Romulo Sta. with the prosecution presenting two witnesses. the brother of the deceased Leonardo Torres. he left his place of work (Metrobank) where he is a janitor and proceeded to Raon to canvass certain appliances. the passenger jeepney which he was riding was stoned. and use personal violence upon one LEONARDO TORRES Y BARTOLOME by then and there holding his two arms and thereafter stabbed him at the back of his body. the present appeal. On December 5. claimed that on September 8. 16 Appellants Romulo and Brigido.. attack. assault. Still. appellants testified on their behalf and interposed the defense of alibi and denial. Accused Elmer Honorio waived his right to present evidence on his behalf. they were watching the movie Die Hard II in a moviehouse along Morayta St. in their corroborating testimonies.
and the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court. WHO WAS THEN IN FRONT OF THE VICTIM. AS BORNE BY THE RECORDS OF THIS CASE. E. C. SAID ACCUSSED GALANO IS "RIGHT HANDED". . CONSIDERING THAT THE IDENTITY OF THE ASSAILANTS IS IN QUESTION OR DOUBTFUL AND HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHEDBY EVIDENCE. we find that the main issues in this case concern the credibility of the principal witness. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION'S WITNESS VIRGILIO TORRES IS UNRELIABLE AND INCREDIBLE THEREFORE. INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLlSH THE IDENTITY OF THE ASSAILANTS. Virgilio Torres. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT TREACHERY HAS NOT ATTENDED THE KILLING OF VICTIM. SINCE THE OFFENSE PROVED BY THE EVIDENCE IS HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION TEMPORAL. B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION OR ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED CONSIDERING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IN COMMITTING THE MURDER IS A GROUND FOR THE ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED BENJAMIN GALANO COULD NOT HAVE EXECUTED OR PERPETRATED (SIC) THE STABBING COMMITTED BY A "LEFT HANDED" ASSALLANT.21 A. D. the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to convict the appellants of murder. 20 Considering the aforecited assignment of errors. F. CONSIDERING THAT.
we find the testimony of Virgilio Torres convincing and trustworthy. we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. In several cases. not numbered. is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously. The defense failed to prove any ill-motive on his part to testify against appellants. For indeed. is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 21 particularly in this case where the victims had an opportunity to see the faces of the assailants before and after they were attacked and considering that the distance from the locus criminis to the parked jeepney where assailants fled was only about ten (10) armslengths.22 A. startling or frightful experience. He could not have possibly identified appellants inasmuch as he failed to state that the nearby lamp post shed enough light on the faces of the appellants at the time of the incident. 26 The testimony of a lone eyewitness. Appellants contend that Virgilio Torres was not a credible witness. It has been repeatedly ruled that people react differently under emotional stress and there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident. But the sole testimony of an eyewitness. such that the image of the appellants must have been literally burned into his memory and thus enabled him to identify the appellants subsequently with absolute confidence. it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. 25 The sudden cold-blooded attack on the two brothers by total strangers must have heightened the memory of Virgilio. for nothing therein negates the fact that he was the one who stabbed the victims. no man would have the capacity to remember details of the alleged incident at the same time. if found positive and credible by the trial court. 30 Lastly. were sealed by death. ON THE CREDIBILITY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS VIRGILIO TORRES. Appellants assert that the testimony of Virgilio Torres was uncorroborated. The trial court correctly relied on his testimony. We find appellants contention unconvincing. 27 Witnesses are to be weighed. preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. the lips of his brother. Further. witnesses to a crime react in different ways. if found convincing and trustworthy by the court. the presumption is that he was not so moved and that his testimony was untainted with bias. 22 That Virgilio Torres could vividly recall the circumstances attending the killing of his brother is not at all surprising. Hence. Leonardo. naturally and in a straightforward manner. Nothing on record shows that Benjamin's left hand could not be used in a lethal attack. appellants argue that Benjamin could not have stabbed the victims with his left hand since he was "right-handed. For although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence." as indicated in the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report. we have found that illumination from a lamp post is sufficient for purposes of identification. 29 In this case. In the absence of evidence or any indicium that the prosecution's main witness harbored ill motives against the accused. 28 Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary "only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate. 24 Witnesses to starting occurrences react differently depending upon their situation and state of mind. particularly in regard to the fact that although Benjamin was right-handed. and that coupled with the fast turn of events. according to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report. and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange. 23 In general. .
the brothers were each held in the tight embrace of appellants Romulo and Brigido. 33 Here. Motive because material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive. method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim. who were total strangers to them. where categorical and consistent and without of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. 35 For treachery to be considered a qualifying circumstance. two conditions must be satisfied: (a) the malefactor employed such means. For alibi to prosper. appellants not only admitted to being within the vicinity of the commission of the crime but also failed to prove the physical impossibility of their being present at the time and place it was committed. which tend directly and specially to insure its execution. they immediately fled from the scene of the crime by the use of a motor vehicle. Indeed. Moreover. a jeepney. and (b) the said means. unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. 32 Hence. whether or not appellants had any motive in attacking the victims. Appellants profess innocence and invoke the defense of denial and alibi. prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving weight in law. treachery qualified the killing to murder. Clearly. method or manner of execution was deliberately adopted. D. without risk to himself arising from defense which the offended party might make. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means. and there some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. ON THE EXISTENCE OF TREACHERY Appellants contend that no treachery attended the fatal attack on Leonardo. motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. appellants must prove not only that they were not present at the scene of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for them to have been present there at the time the offense was committed. however. methods or forms in the execution thereof. he could have used his lower extremities to repel the attack by kicking the assailant. however. motive is not an element of the offense. that the deceased was hardly in a position to defend himself. 37 In this case. motive becomes immaterial in the successful prosecution of a criminal case. for though the victim's hands were held at the back. 31 Where a reliable eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony. the attack on the two brothers was unexpected and sudden. Also. We find. 36 The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning — done in a swift and unexpected manner. It is well-settled that "[p]ositive identification." 34 C. ON THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CRIME AND THE PROPRIETY OF THE PENALTY . At no time were the assailants open to retaliation. however. their conviction may still follow from the positive and categorical identification made by witness Virgilio Torres. and neither of them could have resisted the knife attack by Benjamin even if they wanted to because of its suddenness. In the crime of murder. affording the hapless. ON THE ABSENCE OF MOTIVE AND THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI Appellants claim they have no possible motive to attack the victims.23 B.
without the knowledge or consent of . TORRES. we agree with the trial court that the crime committed is murder.000. we cannot appreciate this aggravating circumstance since it was not proved with "clear and convincing evidence. 1913 THE UNITED STATES.R. Costs against appellants.24 Considering that treachery attended the commission of the offense. In this case. defendant-appellant. in the amount of P50. Attorney-General Villamor. appellants ought also to jointly and severally pay civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50.nêt SO ORDERED Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. On September 2. contrary to the allegation in the information that the killing was attended by evident premeditation. J. Nicasio Capule. nor any attempt on the part of the prosecution to establish them. for appellee. for the purpose of appropriating to himself a tract of coconut land. commonly known as the death penalty law. for appellant. the assailed Decision finding appellants guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED. pursuant to prevailing case law.1âwphi1. vs. NICASIO CAPULE. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for the crime of murder then was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. situated in the town of San Pablo.: Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction rendered in this case by the Honorable Vicente Jocson. 1903.000.00. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In addition to said penalty. No. (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination. Appellants are also hereby ORDERED to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim. Leonardo Torres. Laguna." 38 The prosecution ought to have shown the following: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime. judge. Luciano de la Rosa. However. the trial court correctly imposed on appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua. the offense was committed prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 39 The records do not show the presence of these three conditions. plaintiff-appellee. 7659. in line with current jurisprudence. WHEREFORE.00). under Article 248. L-7447 January 2. No. and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and its execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
of legal age. which land is located in the place called Quinayoan. in a trial before the justice of the peace of that town in the attempt to sustain his alleged right to the said piece of land. informed of the contents of the document by the vendor married couple. seems to have been executed on September 2. with right to alienate it. ceded or encumbered in favor of any person other than Nicasio Capule. and agreeing to defend him against any just claims that might be presented. Recorded at the bottom of the document was their ratification of its contents in the presence of said notary. whom he knew as the executors of the foregoing document and they ratified it as executed of their own free will. stating in the document that they had made the declaration that they had sold said land for the sum of 550 pesos paid at the time of the sale to the vendors. sentencing Nicasio Capule to the penalty of eight years of presidio mayor. and the costs. the original whereof appears at pages 17 and 148 of the file exhibits and has been attached to the complaint. for the sum of P550. barrio of Dolores of the said town. exhibiting his cedula. Claudia Reyes. charging Nicasio Capule with the crimes of falsification of a public document and estafa. After due trial the judge rendered judgment therein on March 21. 1910. that the land described had not been sold.25 the owners thereof. pretending that it was made and executed by the said owners of the tract. who signs the document in duplicate and to the same effect in the town hall of San Pablo. On the same date appears the certificate of the notary public. to whom then and thenceforth they delivered the possession and usufruct of said land as its legitimate owner. The defendant Capule exhibited said document later. Inocente Martinez. by agreement and cooperation with the notary public. that on January 31. whose commission extended to January 1. which the purchaser has paid them to their entire satisfaction. residents of San Pablo. and as the vendors do not know how to sign Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia do so at their request. said married couple sold a portion of said land with 150 coconut trees to Esteban Reyes and his wife Elisea Maghirang for 250 pesos. 1905. as does also the purchaser. 1903. as well as the purchaser. who later died. by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. his heirs and successors in interest for the ownership. For this reason a complaint was filed on February 3. from which judgment the defendant appealed. accepted it on his part. before whom the said married couple appeared. who declare therein that they have agreed with the accused Capule on the real and absolute sale of a piece of land planted with 42 fruit-bearing coconut trees and approximately 300 not bearing fruit. It likewise appears from the evidence adduced in this case that said married couple Maghirang and Pili were the owners of said land. 1911. wherein it is recorded that personally appeared before him the married couple Maghirang and Pili. The document whose falsification is here in question. Exhibit A. according to Exhibit B. and further setting forth that the land is the property of Isabel Pili. with its boundaries and situation stated. they being responsible to Capule. and there furthermore appear therein the signatures of Jacinto Peñaflor and Jorge Tolentino as witnesses.000 pesetas. to payment of a fine of 2. which they possessed and had the usufruct of and for which they paid to the Government the corresponding land tax. and Nicasio Capule y Capitulo. because the alleged vendors did not know how to do so. the accessories. and Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia as the signers of the deed of sale. and since then Reyes has possessed . although he had been assured that it was false. prepared and drew up a document setting forth the sale in his favor of the said land. 1904. and Jacinto Peñaflor and Jorge Tolentino appear in said document as witnesses of the execution thereof. but not the woman because she was exempt from payment thereof. who acquired it by inheritance from her deceased niece. the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili. the husband. by Aniceto Maghirang y Espiritu and Isabel Pili y Emnaceno. according to a certified copy of some affidavit proceedings.
1909. when she was alive. Exhibit P. which sale was ratified by the vendors in favor of Reyes before the notary Segundo Abrera on May 2. although in the tax list the tract continues in the name of the vendor. Although Capule presented. but he denied that he or his wife had ever been in the house of the notary Inocente Martinez to execute or ratify any document or that he and his wife Isabel Pili. page 17 of the record. as of land belonging to him. Nicasio Capule filed a complaint before the justice of the peace of San Pablo accusing him of the theft of coconuts from the land he possessed and of which Reyes was the owner. and on June 4. before the notary public Segundo Abrera. the subject matter of an alleged sale. although at the request of the fiscal the case was dismissed. and since then Briñas has possessed and had the usufruct of the land purchased. in a suit they had with Maximino Reyes. page 54 of the record. Exhibit 1. 1909. page 107 of said record. had told the defendant Capule that they wished to sell the said land and that he had offered to buy it. On October 21. 1906. on February 2. setting forth the said sale made in his favor by that married couple. although Reyes. stating that he had conferred a power of attorney upon him so that he might represent himself and his wife. Exhibit C. On April 16. the deed of sale. yet in the judgments rendered therein said instrument was held to be false and no probative value whatever was attached to it. 1909. with the costs against him. claiming to be the owner of the coconut land situated in Dolores.26 and had the usufruct of the portion of land he had bought. Aniceto Maghirang denies that he sold the said land to Nicasio Capule or that he executed in his favor any document of sale. and had been paying the tax from 1903. the owner of one part which he had bought in 1904. 1906. On May 2. according to Exhibit E. the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili likewise sold the remaining portion of the said land with its coconut trees to Melecio Briñas for the sum of 650 pesos. and in spite of the fact that he exhibited the document marked "Exhibit A". according to Exhibit I.25 with the costs. because he could not read or write. because the action exercised by the complainant had to be settled in a civil suit. appears to have paid the tax up to 1910. Exhibit F. . Although Esteban Reyes was in lawful possession of a portion of the land he had purchased. accused the married couple Maghirang and Pili and Eusebio Soriano of theft. who later died. who had made declaration in May. because of the absolute confidence they had in the defendant. 1908. Aniceto Maghirang and Guadalupe Javier were also acquitted of the crime of coercion with which they were accused. page 67. Exhibit A. according to Exhibit J. 1909. for the purpose of proving that he was the owner of the land in question. just as it was the latter himself who drew up the document that was later signed in his stead by Eulogio Ortega. but the court dismissed the case for lack of evidence of the right alleged by the plaintiff. from which judgment they appealed to the Court of First Instance. and made declaration before the land-tax board in May. Exhibit D. Exhibit K. the justice of the peace acquitted the accused of the crime of theft. in some of the said hearings before the justice of the peace court of San Pablo. Nicasio Capule. Nicasio Capule and his wife were accused by Nemesio Briñas of the crime of theft in the justice of the peace court of San Pablo and upon trial were sentenced to two months of arresto mayor and payment of P14. 1908.
were present in that house. all of which Aniceto Maghirang denies. had said was a power of attorney was really a deed of sale executed in his favor by Aniceto Maghirang and in case of winning the suit Capule would give him P200. Doroteo Guia denied that he had been present in the drawing up and execution thereof. the defendant Capule. Jacinto Peñaflor. but he could not assert definitely whether such signature was his or not. or ratify it before the notary Martinez. Doroteo Guia.27 Nicasio Capule avers that the said document. and believing that it was in fact a question of a power of attorney. although he remembered that on a certain occasion said married couple had asked him to sign for them in the defendant Capules's house a document of power of attorney made out in Capule's favor. Capule. setting forth the sale of a . called to him and after offering them wine told him that they should understand each other for that document which he. and Jorge Tolentino. and that one Sunday. Jacinto Peñaflor. for she had died in the meantime. without the necessity for the intervention of the married couple granting the power. for he does not remember having signed such a document in the presence of the married couple Maghirang and Pili and the individuals Eulogio Ortega. and one of the witnesses to the execution of the said document. and Jorge Tolentino with whom he was acquainted. His wife. asserting that he did not execute said document. Capule. that on that occasion Doroteo Guia. Eulogio Ortega likewise denied that he signed any document of sale of land or that he had ever been informed that the married couple Maghirang and Pili had sold any land to the defendant Nicasio Capule. stated that the signature which appears therein with his name and surname looks like his. and Jorge Tolentino were not present. or that he had ever known that the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili had sold any land to the defendant. testified. and at that time Jacinto Peñaflor and Jorge Tolentino. whereupon the defendant told him that as he did not know Spanish the contents of said document would be translated to him so that he might understand them. was drawn up in his own house in the presence of the married couple. but he denies that Eulogio Ortega. Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia did so in their stead. went to the defendant's house and without informing himself of the contents of the document that Capule spread out on a table. did not testify. and that on the afternoon of that day the married couple Maghirang and Pili appeared in the house of the notary Martinez and ratified before him the said document in the presence of the witness testifying. although he remembers that one day about seven years ago Nicasio Capule and Isabel Pili came to his house and the latter told him that as she did not know how to write she begged him to do the favor of signing in her stead a power of attorney. Nicasio Capule. Jacinto Peñaflor. the attorney thus authorized responding for its result. signed it. and as they could not sign. for whom he had to translate the contents of the document into Tagalog. Exhibit A. who figures in said document as a witness. Isabel Pili. for he had never been in the latter's house nor had he ever seen the document. by Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili in the suit against Maximino Reyes. who was there. and they then signified their agreement. Jorge Tolentino. stating at the same time that a power of attorney was conferred upon him. in place of the married couple executing it. and he asserts that said document is Exhibit A. impugned as false. Let us examine the statements of the persons who appear to have signed the document. Exhibit `A. having the same before him. as they had assured him. and that after being informed of the of the contents of the document presented to him he signed it. Upon making his statement and after having been informed of the contents of the document. so that the latter might represent them in a suit they were prosecuting against Maximino Reyes. for it does not appear that the other. also signed it as witnesses. when he was passing a tienda with Jorge Tolentino and Domingo Capuno. Exhibit A. Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili.
when in fact it was a deed of sale of a piece of land. for he had died in the meantime. the legitimate owners whereof had never intended or consented to its alienation. and that he did not recognize the signatures of Doroteo Guia and Eulogio Ortega. who went to the extreme of getting a notary to certify to its ratification before him. Inocente Martinez. it is logically inferred that after preparing the document. he tried by all the means he thought expedient to assert his ownership of the land which. and it is therefore unquestionable that he took advantage of the opportunity when he was to have executed a document or instrument of power . believing what he said to the effect that said instrument was a commission voluntarily conferred upon him by the couple executing it. he could get the courts to override the true owners of the land. they cannot be absolutely denied the ability to distinguish a deed of sale from a power of attorney. but in spite of his allegations and his documentary evidence the persons accused by him were acquitted. None of the persons who appear to have signed said document and seem to have been present at its execution were informed of its true contents. getting two persons to sign in the name of said married couple through deceit. because they have demonstrated well enough that they understood their purpose to be that the defendant should represent them in a suit pending in a court and that they had never intended or executed any fact for the alienation of a tract of land belonging to them in favor of the defendant. to whom he ascribed statements different from what they had made to him and by perverting the truth in the narration of facts. had come to be his property and to that end he tried to dispose of the products of the young trees that there were on the tract. Exhibit A. but when they got to be landowners and acquired property of some value. which he pretended its original owners had sold. under an alleged title of acquisition. even to the point of exhibiting said false instrument. by counterfeiting therein the intervention of the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili. Exhibit A. because they all confided with the greatest good faith in the false and deceitful statements of the defendant. which he claimed to have acquired through the said false instrument.28 tract of lands to Nicasio Capule. the defendant dared to assert that he was the owner thereof and of the coconut trees growing thereon. The notary. after giving them to understand that the document contained a commission or power of attorney. From the result of taking these statements and the conduct of the accused together. It therefore appears to be plainly proven that the crime of falsification of a document has been committed. Believing that with the document. in the various complaints he presented before the justice of the peace of San Pablo against the offended alleged owners and one of the new owners who acquired part of the land in question. up to the point of accusing them as perpetrators of crimes directed against his pretended and false right of ownership. provided for and penalized in articles 300 and 301. The fact that the married couple Maghirang and Pili did not know how to read and write certainly reveals great ignorance and lack of culture in them. as well as when he was accused of theft by the owner of the remaining part of the tract. who never intended to execute any document of sale of their property to the defendant. made apparently by the alleged vendors in the contents of the said false document. while Capule himself was convicted of theft of coconuts on a complaint of one of the owners of said land. and while it may not be public still it is of an official or notarial character. because the defendant executed upon said notarial document of an official character acts constituting falsification. even daring to trample upon the legitimate rights of its original owners and of the new ones who had later acquired it. was not examined.
he is regarded as duly punished as guilty of falsification of a notarial document. even alleged other defenses which were in like manner as those stated completely unsupported. on the afternoon of the same date on which said instrument was drawn up. Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia and two other eyewitnesses to the execution of the document having signed the instrument which he drew up in his house in the presence of all of them. never complied with these obligations of landowner in connection with the land which. according to Exhibit A. if he did not forge the signatures of the two witnesses Peñaflor and Tolentino. Although under article 535 of the Penal Code those who commit fraud by causing another to subscribe a document by the use of deceit. deceiving the alleged vendors and the two persons who signed for them and making them believe that the document executed was a power of attorney or commission.29 of attorney. his boldness did not prevail to the extent of depriving in a frank and open manner its legitimate owners of the possession of the land by appealing to the courts to assert his right. the penalties set forth in the preceding article. 1908. who is a person of more education and knowledge than the offended parties. the rest of the tract was sold to Melecio Briñas. wherein. provided he was sure that it was legitimate. by profession a clerk and acting as such for the notary Martinez. The defendant. would not have dared to sell successively to two of their neighbors in two portions the said land. still when as in the present case the crime of falsification was committed for the purpose of getting a piece of real property. when it fact it was a deed of sale and is the Exhibit A. yet on the other hand it does not appear why he did not enter in possession of the tract if he had really bought it in September of that year. that it was true that he had not in 1906 made any declaration of ownership of said land. 1903. and that it was he who drew up the certificate of ratification authorized by the notary and interpreted the contents of the document with its ratification before the notary to the vendors. although he did not know whether the receipts had been made out in her name. which is the profit its perpetrator sought to obtain. if it had been in fact already sold to the defendant Capule. according to paragraph 7 thereof. with the penalties indicated in said article 301 of the Code. of the land he had bought and from that time on picked the fruit the coconut trees produced. which indicates that although he dared to draw up a false document with the connivance of the notary. 1903. although the alleged purchaser Borja . as the offended parties. which the married couple desired. he sold said land under pacto de retro for two years to Andres Borja. who possessed it during those two years. a part of said land with its coconut trees was sold to Esteban Reyes and in May. who really did not know or understand Spanish. their continuing to pay the land tax is unexplained. The defendant pleaded not guilty and alleged that the married couple Maghirang and Pili had positively sold him the land to which Exhibit A refers for the sum of P500 which he forthwith delivered to them. although he was disturbed in his possession by the vendors themselves and the neighbors Esteban Reyes and Melecio Briñas. Persons so simple. he must have obtained them in an equally deceitful way. in which crime fraud or estafa is held to be included. as is ordered for the purposes of assessment. but he paid the land tax for that time by delivering the money to Isabel Pili. If it were true that the vendors had really alienated their coconut land to the defendant. while the latter. as the defendant has done. in the same month of September. incur. he had acquired on September 2. further stating that immediately afterwards he took possession. In January. even ignorant and of little culture. who made sworn statements before the assessment board and paid the land tax for the year 1906. He tried to prove that in January. to draw up maliciously and deceitfully a deed of sale in his favor. 1904. 1906.
These new owners took possession from that time on of the respective portions of the land they had acquired. through return of the price by the vendors. and the remainder on May 2.30 said that only a private document was made out for the sale nor did he require of the defendant any previous document of ownership to evidence the defendant's right to the land sold. An attempt was also made to prove that in November. had already got rid of said land. which is set forth in the document. Exhibit K. since at that time he did not yet dare to exhibit the false instrument he had maliciously and fraudulently drawn up and he did not secure from said document the results he expected and intended to become the owner of the land by means of a false instrument. 1909. 1906. having sold a part thereof to Esteban Reyes on January 31. to Melecio Briñas. If this absolute sale is true it is incomprehensible why the purchaser Capiriña did not ever attempt to enter into possession of the land in question sold to him in November. according to the accused and his witness Silvestre Capiriña. in presenting his complaints years later against the married couple Maghirang and Pili and others. nor does it appear that the defendant redeemed the tract.500. Likewise the alleged transaction that he says Eulogio Ortega proposed to him to allow rescission of the alleged sale in the document. Starting from the hypothesis that the defendant really obtained in a fraudulent and deceitful manner the consent of the married couple Maghirang and Pili to the execution of said false instrument. 1904. Exhibit B. which private document was not exhibited in the case and no proof was adduced to show Borja's possession of the land sold to him. Moreover. his counsel argues that still he was not guilty of the crime of falsification of a public . on which date the original owners. is in every way unlikely to have been made in the name of Aniceto Maghirang. Such allegations are nothing more than ingenious quibbles and tricks invented by the defendant's counsel to save him from the punishment he deserves as the proven perpetrator of the crime of falsification. 1908. aside from the fact that he has not proved that the offended party Maghirang ever intrusted such a commission to Eulogio Ortega or authorized him to make the proposition. presented by the offended party Aniceto Maghirang in May of the same year. and therefore the offended party could not get Ortega to talk with the defendant to propose said transaction for the return of a piece of land that had never been sold to him but to the said Reyes and Briñas in 1904 and 1908. so it is not true that he had previously sold it to the said Capiriña. in spite of the alleged previous purchase. attesting that the land was Aniceto Maghirang's and thus Andres Borja signs at page 87 of his statement. Maghirang and Pili. ratified before a notary. Eulogio Ortega denied having interviewed the defendant Capule on behalf of Aniceto Maghirang. because the land had already been sold some years before to Esteban Reyes and Melecio Briñas. the defendant Capule sold the same land absolutely to Marcelino Capiriña with another tract. 1908. and what is stranger still is that in the declaration of ownership of the land. and the purchaser forthwith took possession of the lands sold. nor does it all appear in the case that the purchaser Capiriña asked the alleged vendor to make delivery of the land sold to him. or that he ever appealed in any way to the courts. 1908. one day in the month of July. for the sum of P2. the defendant Capule did so in the capacity of owner of that very land. a transaction proposed. the alleged Andres Borja appears to have signed as a witness. page 116. These two alleged sales to Borja and Capiriña were ways and means chosen by the defendant to see if he could effectually deprive the married couple Maghirang and Pili of their right to the land in question. Exhibit A. and in 1909 he no longer had any interest or right in the land in question.
Finally. according to article 51. whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from are found to be refuted. has not been repealed and subsists in all its force.. provided. there was no contract in the present case. and therefore a person who has obtained such contract by those means. in lieu of said article 300 of the code. nor any consent to the contract pretended to have been stipulated in the instrument. we hold that it should be affirmed. in view of the fact that the contracting parties consented to the terms of the instrument.S. that Nicasio Capule be sentenced to the penalty of eight years and one day of presidio mayor. further keeping in mind that the act of falsification of a public document in itself constitutes a crime. has not yet been promulgated. and therefore the penalty fixed in said article 301 of the code must be imposed in its medium degree. Exhibit A.. is not guilty of the crime of falsification either of a public or of a private document. applicable to the present case. merely because the consent had been secured through intimidation. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. wherein the defendant entered statements ascribed to the alleged vendors. morally and legally punishable. wherein the following principle was laid down: The fact that one's consent to a contract may be obtained by mistake. . since the statements set forth therein were not characteristic and constitutive of an instrument of power of attorney in his favor in order that he might represent them in a suit against Maximino Reyes. 391). The defendant Capule does not come within the purview of article 300 of the Penal Code. or fraud does not make the contract a false contract. but article 301.S. to the accessories fixed in article 57 of the code. not of cadena temporal but of presidio mayor. in accordance with the finding of this court in the decision of the case against Geronimo Milla (4 Phil. and to the costs in the case. who proposed and intended to execute an instrument of commission or power of attorney in favor of the defendant. So ordered. which fixes the penalty. perverting the truth in the statement of facts and ascribing to the offended parties statements different from those they made to him in the counterfeited document. 349) is vainly invoked. to the payment of a fine of 5.000 pesetas. moreover. according to article 300 of the Penal Code. however. the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Weems vs.31 document. for Nicasio Capule is not a public officer and. even though to date the penal law with respect to falsification of a public document committed by public officers. As has been seen. could not find that there was falsification in the statement of the facts. as in bad faith and with evident perverseness the defendant did. Rep. intimidation. Juan Cardona and Geronimo Milla. and for this reason the court. but not a deed of sale. as he is accused of the crime of falsification of a notarial document of official character equivalent to a public document the principle laid down in said decision is totally inapplicable in his favor. This was the question of a contract wherein the offended parties gave their consent to the execution of the document that was later impugned as false. For these reasons. (217 U. but of 301. had used upon them. U. The concurrence of neither extenuating nor aggravating circumstances can be found in the commission of the crime. whatever be the crime he may be guilty of. although this consent was obtained through intimidation which the defendants in that case. violence.
William A. but also for 1910. vs. and sentencing him to one year in prison and to pay a fine of P2.: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. 1911." A complaint was filed charging the accused with falsification of the cedula for 1910. 1189. in ignorance. 1911. Upon examination of the cedula for the latter year it was observed by the justice that the age therein had been changed. MORELAND. No. 1913 THE UNITED STATES. a necessary prerequisite under the law for a legal and valid affidavit.R. Alejandro R. Hartigan. defendant-appellant. and had been for some months prior thereto. Kincaid. 1189. The defendant. convicting the accused of a violation of section 55 of Act No.000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.32 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. and to pay the costs of the trial. is a priest of the Roman Catholic Church and was stationed in the town of Aliaga in the Province of Nueva Ecija during the month of November. Being asked to produce his personal cedula for the current year. Thomas L. in violation of section 55 of Act No. Mateo. ALEJANDRO R. On the 27th day of October. J. he. Attorney-General Villamor for appellee. . plaintiff-appellee. the figures "23" having been changed to "25. he was called on in the performance of his duties to execute an affidavit. 8025 September 17. presented one not only for 1911. MATEO. and Jose Robles Lahesa for appellant.
He declares. he went home and got not only the cedula for 1911 but also that for 1910. I went at once to the court for the purpose of denouncing him for the falsification of a document. and the defendant testified. The fact that he had been called upon to present a cedula aroused his curiosity as to the contents of those in his possession and he read them. the latter refused to cash it until the accused made an affidavit that the check belonged to him and that he was entitled to the sum named therein. prior to going to the justice of the peace to make the affidavit referred to. and asked him for aid in correcting them. It is maintained further that the Act is violated whenever a person makes any change whatever in a cedula. for that reason. observed by the justice. that. from whom he had obtained them. for the purpose of having them corrected before presenting them to the justice. that no criminal intent is required. and that official then and there consented to and confirmed the change. It appears from the evidence of the defense. deeming that his duty was fully performed when he purchased those mentioned he had laid them away without examination and without thought. Being asked to produce the cedula for 1911. being ignorant of what the law required. It is the claim put forward by the prosecution that a loss to the Government is not necessary to maintain the action. and. that he in no sense intended to defraud or prejudice the municipality or the Government by his act. A comparison of the cedulas with the stubs confirmed his observation that the age in said cedulas had been changed as already detailed. Upon seeing this. as we have said. one for 1910 and one for 1911. on showing them to the municipal treasurer. or any other cedulas for that matter. On examination of the cedula for the year 1910 the change in the age of the accused was. who thereupon went to the office of the municipal treasurer to examine the stubs from which cedulas had been torn. he had never examined or even read the cedulas. he was seized with fear as to the consequences which might follow if he exhibited to a public officer cedulas in which his age was stated incorrectly. that he had never had occasion to use a cedula before. that he obtained no profit or benefit therefrom of any kind. utterly regardless of whether the . The justice. that gain or purpose of gain on the part of the accused is not necessary to violate the Act. He. the complaint against the accused seems to have been the immediate result of an angry reply made by him to a question put by the municipal treasurer.33 The testimony of the prosecution tends to show that the accused went to the office of the municipal treasurer to cash a check. To his surprise he found that the ages stated therein were incorrect. In fact. that there was a good deal of friction between the accused and the municipal officers who presented the complaint against him and upon whose testimony he was convicted. therefore. The latter in his testimony says: I asked him who had changed the number in the cedula and he answered me in a threatening voice that I had nothing whatever to do with that because he said that he had purchased the cedula and could do what he killed with it. Thereupon the accused went to the justice of the peace of the village to execute the affidavit thus required. The check not having been indorsed by a person known to the municipal treasurer. which seems to be uncontradicted. He asserts that. asked the affiant to exhibit his cedula for the current year. went to the municipal treasurer. Several suits of one kind or another had been instituted against him by these officials or through their efforts or influence. he frankly stated to him that he himself had changed them in order to make them correspond with his actual age. as a prerequisite to administering the oath. further. and that he did not know that what he had done was illegal or unlawful. The defense asserts. ignorant of their contents. The accused. and was. Being young — he having been out of college little more than a year — and ignorant of the law relating to documents of that kind. that he had no intention of committing any wrong. produced two cedulas.
that he maintained at the time that he had no intention to injure or defraud. Mateo. Mateo of a violation of section 55 of the Internal Revenue Law. to show a pecuniary loss to the Government. the municipal treasurer of the municipality of Baliuag. and. that the accused altered the age in the 1910 cedula. accordingly. whether it corrects the document or falsifies it. or whether the intent or purpose is innocent or otherwise. amending the information. In the discussion of this case we take it that it is undisputed that the accused stated his correct age in his testimony on the trial. innocent. after change. that he made no effort to conceal what he had done. thereby defrauding the internal revenues. accuses Alejandro R. therefore. given by the court. personal cedula No. F-1208348 upon receiving the sum of P2. Province of Bulacan. and retained in his possession such altered cedula for the purpose of using the same. is capable of effecting a fraud or deception or not. not to restrict too narrowly the consideration of this case. is as follows: From the evidence presented the court finds that on the 11th of January. all of which were. that. The foundation of the judgment of conviction. Giving the information the broadest interpretation possible. that he set forth fully the reasons which moved him to make the change. and that he made the change in the interest of truth. first. that age in the altered cedula was his correct age. said accused maliciously and criminally altered the age appearing in his personal cedula for the year 1910. committed as follows: On or about the month of October of the year 1911. 1911. that in the month of October. While. under certain circumstances. that in order to obtain said personal cedula the accused presented to the municipal treasurer his personal cedula for the year 1909 in which cedula the age appeared to be 22. under the facts and circumstances of this case. we will assume that the prosecution can be maintained without showing a financial loss to the Government. The information in this case reads as follows: The undersigned. namely. Alejandro R. It is also uncontradicted that he voluntarily stated to the officials to whom he presented the cedula the he had changed it and that he did so for the purpose of making it state his correct age. being one which relates to the revenues of the Government. But. and second. in the municipality of Aliaga the accused changed the age in said cedula.34 Government losses or the accused gains. upon their face. whether the document. issued in favor of the defendant. that which alleges the alteration of the cedula and that which alleges his retaining it in his possession with intent of future use. putting the age of 25 years in place of 23. we think we might fairly hold that the fraud charged. all that he did was to make the cedula speak the truth. 1910. that the object of the law is to preserve intact the certificates which the Government issues and to prevent them from being changed by any person for any purpose. in order to establish the charge of falsifying a cedula. that he kept it in his possession with intent to use it. such loss must be shown. the phrase "thereby defrauding the internal revenues" being permitted to modify both clauses. nevertheless. it may not be necessary. and therefore to a pecuniary or financial matter. scratching out the figure 3 in the age 23 and . whether the change be material or immaterial. it charges. and for which reason said municipal treasurer put in the said cedula the age of 23 years.
and. a misrepresentation by the accused as to his age. of any part of its revenues. when. in a criminal case. or his father. He himself declared positively. at that time. in reality. did the defendant misrepresent his age at some time prior to the alteration of the cedula and thereby. then. if we regarded it material. whereas he had actually paid it for only six. as the accused himself declares. by the act of changing the cedula. but is. together with the corresponding fine. rather. clear and undisputable. Under all the facts and circumstances of this case. There is no direct proof to that effect. the Government. did the act of altering the cedula and retaining it in his possession after the alteration actually defraud the Government. defraud the Government? The question is not. began paying the cedula tax when he was 18 years of age and that it had been paid every year from that time forward. he ought to have paid the cedula tax for eight years. he should have paid the tax for eight years. making his age appear 25 instead of 23. according to the law. and particularly in view of the failure of the Government to present the evidence in its possession upon that subject. or more. give much importance to this contention. There was no reason why the Government should have left that fact to inference. and that the retained said altered cedula in his possession with intent to use it for perpetration of other frauds. the accused presented said cedula to the justice of the peace of Aliaga and to the municipal treasurer of said municipality. We must observe that the information charges that the defendant. he should have begun payment of his personal cedula tax in the eighteenth year of his age. if it was a material fact. according to the admitted age of the defendant at the time the cedula was changed. the declaration of the defendant that he had paid all of the cedula taxes to which the Government was entitled. in any possible way. even if true. The issue in the case. according to the weight of the evidence. or could it do so in future? Or . this mistake ought to have been corrected and he should have settled the matter with the municipal treasurer by the payment to him of the tax corresponding to the two years. defraud the Government. that there had been. If the defendant had not paid his tax consistently from the time he was 18 years of age. that having altered the cedula in the month of October. somewhere and sometime. at that time. ought not to leave to inference a fact which it seems to regard as so material. accept as true. The basis of that inference is that. With evidence. that after having altered the cedula in the manner stated the accused presented said cedula to the justice of the peace of Aliaga and to the municipal treasurer of said municipality for the purpose of swearing to an affidavit relating to the cashing of a check. It seems to us that there is substantially no evidence in the case from which the inference can properly be drawn that the accused had paid the tax for only six years. in the sense that. more than once. 1911. did this particular act of alteration deprive the Government. easily at hand and capable of being presented. and all the cedulas for that matter. that he. he had paid it for only six.35 putting in the place thereof the figure 5. From this quotation it is clear that the court inferred that the Government had been defrauded of P4. however. that if the father of the accused had made a mistake as to the time when he ought to have begun to purchase the personal cedula for the accused. the age that appeared in the first cedula. we would. defrauded the Government. We do not. and the number of years that he had actually paid. it could easily have been proved by the production of the cedula stubs showing when the defendant began to pay. or could it. that by reason of said change the accused defrauded the internal revenues of the sum of P4. The Government seeks to overcome that evidence by inferences from the fact that the cedula was changed and that the age stated therein before the change was incorrected — in other words. in this case. is. if it is true that he was 25 years of age in the year 1910 as he declared in this case.
reach he age of exemption (60 years) quicker than he really ought. deferred payment until he had reached the age of twenty. Could he have used the 1910 cedula. it was necessary to continue the misrepresentation because any change in the age would be immediately discovered by the official who issued the cedula. he thereupon. altered or unaltered as to age. still it seems to us impossible to have defrauded the revenues by merely altering the age. According to the evidence. with he alteration of which the defendant stands charged. then. when this 1910 cedula was altered. How. altered or unaltered as to age. or the record. It is true that. 1911. therefore. that. was it possible to defraud the revenue by any alteration as to age made in October. to obtain any of the privileges or immunities defined if there had been no alteration? While it is clear that it might have been altered as to the year. the cedula. was incapable of being used to commit a fraud. after the lapse of six or eight years. of the previous year in issuing one for the current year. by misrepresentation. without force or effect on the date on which this crime is alleged to have been committed. no. for any purpose after the expiration of 1910? Clearly. having misrepresented his age at the outset. 1910. altered or unaltered. 1911? Or was it possible for the accused.36 did that act prejudice the Government in any possible way or benefit the accused in any possible was? In considering this question we must note: In the first place. instead of beginning to pay the tax when he was eighteen. 1911? Clearly. The only possible theory upon which it could be urged that the defendant committed any crime at all. But even if this theory be held to be tenable. this cedula was issued to the defendant on the 11th day of January. have served the accused if he had presented it to the justice of the peace in October. for example. the only cedula that had any force or effect in October. could not have been used for any other year. after it was changed. No official would have accepted it for a moment for any purpose whatever. fearing that his former misrepresentation would be discovered. thereby defrauding the Government of the tax for one year. if he had placed a false age in the cedula. 1911. in order to cover up his fraud. Precisely these same reasons show that the Government was not injured or the accused benefited in any other way by the act complained of. The cedula being thus dead in law for all effects and purposes. even if he did. Would that cedula. and said cedula was altered. That being so. he had. The 1910 cedula was. that. The tax had already been paid for the year to which that cedula referred. who is required to refer to the cedula. in the month of October. Only 1911 cedula would have availed him. was the cedula for 1910. was the cedula for the year 1911. would the act of altering the cedula be more than an attempt to hide the evidence of a crime committed long since? . at the outset he or his father had misrepresented his age and. did the act of the defendant defraud the revenues? Did the Government have less money in its coffers after the act was performed than it did before? Would it have had more money in its Treasury if the act had not been performed? Did the act prevent it from receiving a single centavo which it would have received otherwise? Would the act diminish its revenues the day or the month or the year after? Would not the Government have been in exactly the same position if the act had never been performed? The fundamental fact is that the cedula. and that is neither charged nor proved. But it is undisputed that he did not put a false age in the cedula. by such alteration. by using that as the basis for the issuance of succeeding cedulas. It therefore expired on the 31st day of December of the same year. he might thereby. That cedula. as a matter of record. no. changed the cedula to make it correspond to his real age. the assumption that he did so to save P4 thirty-five years later is so remote that we think it negligible in this case. and. would be that. altered or unaltered as to age. when the defendant was called upon for the first time to produce his cedula for the inspection of a public official.
was convicted of imprudencia temeraria in the Court of First Instance. it must. it made it speak the truth. and this is but an addition to the observations just made. It did not deceive. the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. The clerk. . it is necessary that the instrument be altered in some material respect. therefore. The very word. the remaining part of the document being true. neither affected the integrity or truth of said proceedings nor affected in any essential way their results or effects. in contradistinction to private documents. . it is necessary to conclude that the criminal intent . and therefore incorrectly. nevertheless. was the correct age. the word alteration has inherent in it the idea of deception — of making the instrument speak something which the parties did not intend it to speak. which tribunal in reversing the judgment said in part: Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official documents. considering that the fact that Don Augustin Montes Moreno set out the proceedings as of a date prior to that on which they actually occurred. How can the Government be injured by changing a cedula so that the correct age may appear therein? When done honestly and with no evil intent and when no gain or advantage results or could possibly result therefrom. and that the age. whether by public official or by private persons. in spreading upon the record the proceedings taken for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for certain minor children and the alteration of heirship in their favor. While such a change by one party without the consent of the other is always something to be strongly discouraged. Nor was it an alteration of the document in the sense in which the word is ordinarily used. To be an alteration in violation of law it must be one "which causes it (the instrument) to speak a language different in legal effect from that which it originally spake. The crime with which the defendant in this case stands charged is generally spoken of as the falsification of a cedula. Generally. there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is required by article 1 of the Penal Code. It is the capacity which the instrument has for mischief after the change which is the essence of the crime. nevertheless. it was a correction. What harm could ensue to the Government by making the data in the cedula conform to the facts? It is the undisputed evidence in the case that the cedula. and appealed to the supreme court of Spain. was charged with the falsification of a public document. the instrument was not changed in any material sense. It did not make the document speak a lie. unless that happens. falsification. for the reason that. before it was changed. it is not forgery (and falsification is but an extension of the crime of forgery as known in America) under Spanish or American authority to make a document of this kind speak the truth. The change made by the accused in this case was not a falsification. He simply made the cedula speak the truth. If the cedula could produce no other or different effect after the change than before no crime has been committed. 1886. . be made the basis of a criminal prosecution. it is not criminal and cannot. did not contain the correct age of the accused. as changed. Before the crime of falsification of a cedula is complete. 1885. for this act. entered such proceedings as of a date anterior to the date on which they were actually entered. it prevented deception. for. it appeared that one of the clerks in the office of the district court.37 In the second place. be borne in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to effect the integrity of the same or to change the effect which it would otherwise produce." In the third place. In a decision of the supreme court of Spain of the 23d of December. gives a clear insight into the nature of the crime and the act which constitutes it. we do not think that the defendant committed any crime in changing his age. published in the Gazette on the 21st of June. it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person.
Act No. 2. holding that he was guilty of the falsification charged because article 153 of the French Code punishes every alteration of a passport without distinction as to circumstances or motives." We do not hold that the age contained in a cedula issued to a particular person is not an essential element of the cedula. for example. either for what it represented in itself or for the very evident motive that prompted it. the alteration was not of that character.) The judgment is reversed and the accused acquitted. by substituting the word habitant for the word desservant.38 mentioned in the previous observation was absent. the alteration in the age was not sufficient to warrant us in holding that such an alteration was material with respect to the identity of the person to whom it was issued or with regard to his ability thereby to obtain a privilege or immunity which he could not have obtained if the change had not been made. however. in spite of the reasonableness and justice of the grounds upon which it was based. Under the better wording of our article 321. would be a change in the age so as to make one a voter when he in fact was not. The trial court acquitted him of the charge of having falsified a cedula. and its alteration would be an essential alteration. even though the accused consciously attached incorrect dates to the proceedings. only those elements should be considered essential in a cedula the alteration of which has for its object the prevention of identification of the citizen for the escape of that surveillance which the administrative authorities are to exercise in the interest of the public security. it was very proper that the authors of the Code should have limited the falsification of this class of documents to the alteration of the essential elements of the document. Viada (vol. . So ordered. . Thanks to this prudent and well understood limitation. In the case in hand. 125. or to assist in doing so. . 435) says in reply to the question what is to be understood by the words "essential element" of a cedula as used in article 321: We are of the opinion that. The change did not affect in the remotest degree the privileges or immunities which the accused could enjoy under the cedula. if the change were of such character and extent as to enable the one altering it to secure a privilege or an immunity which he would not have enjoyed if the change had not been made. (Sec. 1189.) The age would also be essential. who was journeying in company with a woman with whom he was living in concubinage. considering that. . nevertheless that act does not take on the character of a crime. 125. Such. which was to avoid a public scandal. In the sense before us. Costs de oficio. p. he did nothing more tan yield to a legitimate sense of shame without injuring either public or private interest. there existing no other purpose in this class of documents than that of assuring the identity of the individual and the surveillance of the administrative authorities. however. (Sec. wherein it appears that a cura economo. which is not found in the Penal Code of our neighboring republic. If the alteration in the age is of such a character as to hide the identity of the person. The supreme court. in altering the passport or cedula. however. set aside the judgment of acquittal. sought to hide this identity as a cleric and falsified the passport or cedula he was carrying. and for that reason the Audiencia de Huelva erred in convicting the accused . basing its decision upon the ground that. such alteration would be essential and the crime of falsification would be complete. Moreover. our supreme court would undoubtedly have affirmed the judgment of acquittal on the ground that the alteration in question could not be regarded as essential. there could not arise in this country the situation recorded in French jurisprudence.
-G.R.. Asia Brewery Inc. Aldecoa Jr. We find the defendant Asia Brewery . San Miguel Corporation (SMC) filed a complaint against Asia Brewery Inc. SMC appealed to the Court of Appeals (C. THE HON. (ABI) for infringement of trademark and unfair competition on account of the latter's BEER PALE PILSEN or BEER NA BEER product which has been competing with SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN for a share of the local beer market. RTC Branch 166. 103543 July 5. INC. Bunag. (San Miguel Corporation vs. Salazar. and Filemon H. Civ. GRIÑO-AQUINO. presided over by Judge Jesus O. Rollo). 189. Bersamira. and Justices Venancio D. No. respondents. the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division composed of Justice Jose C. Campos.. J. COURT OF APPEALS and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION. chairman and ponente. Jr. 1988. petitioner.R. as members) reversed the trial court. Abad Santos & Associates and Sycip. 1993 ASIA BREWERY. 56390. vs. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows: In the light of the foregoing analysis and under the plain language of the applicable rule and principle on the matter.). 28104)..: On September 15. Hernandez & Gatmaitan for petitioner. a decision was rendered by the trial Court. Kapunan Law Office for private respondent. No. Pasig. dismissing SMC's complaint because ABI "has not committed trademark infringement or unfair competition against" SMC (p. CV No. 1990.A. On September 30. Mendoza.39 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. On August 27. Case. 1991. Roco. Metro Manila.
Rollo. or any similar preparation. sell or palm off the said beer of the defendant as and for the beer of the plaintiff-complainant.000. selling.000. manufacture or beer in bottles and under labels substantially identical with or like the said bottles and labels of plaintiff San Miguel Corporation employed for that purpose. manufacture or beer in bottles and under labels substantially identical with or like the said bottles and labels of plaintiff San Miguel Corporation employed for that purpose.) Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by ABI..00). and a new judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows: (1) The defendant Asia Brewery Inc. (3) The defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of Two Million Pesos (P2. its officers. putting up. The decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED. or supplying Beer Pale Pilsen. agents. or in bottles or under labels which are calculated to deceive purchasers and consumers into the belief that the beer is the product of the plaintiff or which will enable others to substitute. is hereby ordered to render an accounting and pay the San Miguel Corporation double any and all the payments derived by defendant from operations of its business and the sale of goods bearing the mark "Beer Pale Pilsen" estimated at approximately Five Million Pesos (P5. signs. the above dispositive part of the decision. selling. putting up. receptacles and advertisements bearing the infringing mark and all plates. or supplying Beer Pale Pilsen. servants and employees are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from manufacturing. to recall all its products bearing the mark "Beer Pale Pilsen" from its retailers and deliver these as well as all labels.00) as moral damages and Half a Million Pesos (P5. or any similar preparation. wrappers.00) by way of exemplary damages. (p. agents. offering or announcing for sale. molds. servants and employees are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from manufacturing.000. and a new judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows: (1) The defendant Asia Brewery Inc. (2) The defendant Asia Brewery Inc.000.00 plus costs to this suit. The decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED.000.000. prints. (4) The defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P250. its officers. We find the defendant Asia Brewery Incorporated GUILTY of infringement of trademark and unfair competition.40 Incorporated GUILTY of infringement of trademark and unfair competition. 90. advertising. advertising. was modified by the separate opinions of the Special Sixth Division 1 so that it should read thus: In the light of the foregoing analysis and under the plain language of the applicable rule and principle on the matter. or substantially identical with or like the bottles and labels now employed by the defendant for that purpose. materials and other means of making the same to the Court authorized to execute this judgment for destruction. or in bottles or under labels which are calculated to deceive purchasers and . offering or announcing for sale. or substantially identical with or like the bottles and labels now employed by the defendant for that purpose.000. packages.
and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee. (3) Where there is grave abuse of discretion. is hereby ordered 2 to recall all its products bearing the mark Beer Pale Pilsen from its retailers and deliver these as well as all labels. molds. surmises and conjectures. (7) When the findings are without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.41 consumers into the belief that the beer if the product of the plaintiff or which will enable others to substitute. (5) When the appellate court.000. absurd and impossible. Nut Industry Inc. packages. (4) The defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P250. sell or palm off the said beer of the defendant as and for the beer of the plaintiff-complainant. However.. The lone issue in this appeal is whether ABI infringes SMC's trademark: San Miguel Pale Pilsen with Rectangular Hops and Malt Design. prints. there are exceptions to this general rule.000. ABI appealed to this Court by a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.00) as moral damages and Half a Million Pesos (P500. receptacles and advertisements bearing the infringing mark and all plates. and .000.000. (3) The defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of Two Million Pesos (P2. In due time. (2) When the inference of the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken.00 plus costs of this suit. Standard Brands Inc. went beyond the issues of the case. materials and other means of making the same to the Court authorized to execute this judgment for destruction.00) by way of exemplary damages. signs. It is a factual issue (Phil. (2) The defendant Asia Brewery Inc. and they are: (1) When the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation. wrappers. (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. and thereby commits unfair competition against the latter. 65 SCRA 575) and as a general rule. (8) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents. the findings of the Court of Appeals upon factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed by us. in making its findings. (6) When the findings of said court are contrary to those of the trial court. v.
Manlapaz vs. capacity with a white painted rectangular label has committed trademark infringement and unfair competition against SMC. Court of Appeals." (Ibid. defines what constitutes infringement: Sec. 223 citing. 227. 100. prints. 106). CMS Stock Brokerage. (Cruz vs. (Philippine Bureau of Patents. (Emphasis supplied. CA.) Where findings of the Court of Appeals and trial court are contrary to each other.) This definition implies that only registered trade marks. 102 SCRA 817. 36 Phil. 56 SCRA 167. 198 SCRA 333. Court of Appeals.. counterfeit. vs. (Reynolds Philippine Corporation vs. what constitutes. The use of someone else's registered trademark. 142 SCRA 593. Court of Appeals. if it is done "without the consent of the registrant. packages. by manufacturing and selling its BEER PALE PILSEN in amber colored steinie bottles of 320 ml. Rollo. without the consent of the registrant. Casanayan vs. dated 23 Oct. vs. counterfeit. De Jesus. actionable. receptacles or advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with such goods. Manila Candy Co.42 (9) When the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record.. any reproduction. otherwise known as the Trademark Law. the Court has to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct findings based on the record (Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos.) Under any of these exceptions. wrappers. or reproduce. 22 of Republic Act No. 133 SCRA 88]. 609. Manero vs. copy. Jr. Sec. Court of Appeals. 169 SCRA 220. (p. 97 SCRA 734. and Moran. Infringement. Inc. — Any person who shall use. 166. Infringement of trademark is a form of unfair competition (Clarke vs. business or services. IAC. Trademarks and Technology Transfer Trademark Certificate of Registration No. 22. Mendoza vs. 1986. Inc. counterfeit. Sandiganbayan. 336. copy or colorable imitation of any registered mark or trade-name in connection with the sale. Guita vs. 129 SCRA 222. 139 SCRA 576. or identity of such business. IAC. 174. trade name or service mark is unauthorized. shall be liable to a civil action by the registrant for any or all of the remedies herein provided. Carolina Industries. vs. vs.) . Inc. CA. hence. 191 SCRA 411. 156 SCRA 597. signs. CA. also Apex Investment and Financing Corp. offering for sale. business or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the source or origin of such goods or services. CA.) The registered trademark of SMC for its pale pilsen beer is: San Miguel Pale Pilsen With Rectangular Hops and Malt Design. or colorable imitation to labels. 36103. 166 SCRA 458 [citing Tolentino vs. trade names and service marks are protected against infringement or unauthorized use by another or others. Sacay vs. 147 SCRA 238. 420. copy or colorably imitate any such mark or trade-name and apply such reproduction.) The present case is one of the exceptions because there is no concurrence between the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the lone factual issue of whether ABI. or advertising of any goods. the Supreme Court may scrutinize the evidence on record.
. Honover Rubber Co. . Rollo): . Below are the words "Pale Pilsen" written diagonally across the middle of the rectangular design. 95 Phil. 1. Emphasis supplied. citing Eagle White Lead Co. . the test was similarity or "resemblance between the two (trademarks) such as would be likely to cause the one mark to be mistaken for the other.43 As described by the trial court in its decision (Page 177. . In between is a coat of arms and the phrase "Expertly Brewed. (p.." . Rollo. and "Philippines" (third line).. Munn & Co. 2d 588. 579].. Below "Pale Pilsen" is the statement "And Bottled by" (first line. The phrase "Pale Pilsen" appears immediately below in smaller block letters. 40 Phil. thus: It has been consistently held that the question of infringement of a trademark is to be determined by the test of dominancy. . vs." and at the bottom "Net Contents: 320 Ml. . reiterated in Lim Hoa vs." The dominant feature is the phrase "San Miguel" written horizontally at the upper portion. a rectangular design [is] bordered by what appears to be minute grains arranged in rows of three in which there appear in each corner hop designs. 489.) Does ABI's BEER PALE PILSEN label or "design" infringe upon SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN WITH RECTANGULAR MALT AND HOPS DESIGN? The answer is "No. The dominant feature is "Beer" written across the upper portion of the rectangular design. Ang San To. infringement takes place. Director of Patents. [But] this is not such similitude as amounts to identity. 100 Phil. Neilman Brewing Co. Phil. [C. Director of Patents. while relevant. Rollo. The rule was formulated in Co Tiong Sa vs. vs. If the competing trademark contains the main or essential or dominant features of another. . 4 (1954). 177." The "S" in "San" and the "M" of "Miguel. . Independent Brewing Co. "San Miguel Brewery" (second line). 272. (Ltd. 216-217 (1956). nor it is necessary that the infringing label should suggest an effort to imitate. 214. Off.) On the other hand.. Duplication or imitation is not necessary. written in small prints.) (Emphasis supplied. is not conclusive." "P" of "Pale" and "Pilsen" are written in Gothic letters with fine strokes of serifs. Pflugh (CC) 180 Fed. 107 F. Similarity in size. 177.) vs. . 275.) In Forbes. "Asia Brewery Incorporated" (second line). . The question at issue in cases of infringement of trademarks is whether the use of the marks involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistakes in the mind of the public or deceive purchasers. and confusion and deception is likely to result. To the left is a hop design and to the right. At the top is a phrase written in small print "Reg. is the phrase "Net Contents 320 ml. and "Philippines" (third line). (p. consists of: . a rectangular design bordered by what appear to be buds of flowers with leaves. the kind that first appeared in the 1780s in England and used for printing German as distinguished from Roman and Italic. Pat." Immediately below "Pale Pilsen" is the statement written in three lines "Especially brewed and bottled by" (first line). (Auburn Rubber Corporation vs. form and color. ABI's trademark. Emphasis supplied. . 495. 191 F. ." Infringement is determined by the "test of dominancy" rather than by differences or variations in the details of one trademark and of another. as described by the trial court.
written in white Gothic letters with elaborate serifs at the beginning and end of the letters "S" and "M" on an amber background across the upper portion of the rectangular design. there is absolutely no similarity in the dominant features of both trademarks. Besides the dissimilarity in their names. No one who purchases BEER PALE PILSEN can possibly be deceived that it is SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. Nut Industry Inc. . Philippines. just as the words "SAN MIGUEL" do not appear in ABI's trademark.). larger than any of the letters found in the SMC label. Standard Brands Inc." (4) On the back of ABI's bottle is printed in big." What are the dominant features of the competing trademarks before us? There is hardly any dispute that the dominant feature of SMC's trademark is the name of the product: SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. under a row of flower buds and leaves. with the word "Beer" written in large amber letters.44 In Phil. bulging neck. The trial court perceptively observed that the word "BEER" does not appear in SMC's trademark. Hence. SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN is "Bottled by the San Miguel Brewery. the court was more specific: the test is "similarity in the dominant features of the trademarks. its copyrighted slogan: "BEER NA BEER!" Whereas SMC's bottle carries no slogan. bold letters. 65 SCRA 575. Neither in sound. (3) The names of the manufacturers are prominently printed on their respective bottles. (5) The back of the SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle carries the SMC logo. whereas the BEER PALE PILSEN bottle has no logo. No evidence whatsoever was presented by SMC proving otherwise. vs. spelling or appearance can BEER PALE PILSEN be said to be confusingly similar to SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. the following other dissimilarities in the trade dress or appearance of the competing products abound: (1) The SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle has a slender tapered neck. (2) The words "pale pilsen" on SMC's label are printed in bold and laced letters along a diagonal band. the dominant feature of ABI's trademark is the name: BEER PALE PILSEN. whereas the words "pale pilsen" on ABI's bottle are half the size and printed in slender block letters on a straight horizontal band. The BEER PALE PILSEN bottle has a fat.. On the other hand." whereas BEER PALE PILSEN is "Especially brewed and bottled by Asia Brewery Incorporated. Philippines. (See Exhibit "8-a".
A. or when applied to or used in connection with the goods. inasmuch as all persons have an equal right to produce and vend similar articles. . which is a light bohemian beer with a strong hops flavor that originated in the City of Pilsen in Czechoslovakia and became famous in the Middle Ages. [c] 1976. trade-name or service-mark used to distinguish his goods. or is primarily merely a surname. or qualities." "corn flakes" and "cooking oil" may be appropriated by any single manufacturer of these food products. [e] Republic Act No. They belong to the public domain (Ong Ai Gui vs. business or services of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them. it was held that a dealer in shoes cannot register "Leather Shoes" as his trademark because that would be merely descriptive and it would be unjust to deprive other dealers in leather shoes of the right to use the same words with reference to their merchandise." (Sec. page 1716. of a type of beer ("pilsen"). No one may appropriate generic or descriptive words.00 per bottle).. any more than such descriptive words as "evaporated milk. 136. 4. there is a substantial price difference between BEER PALE PILSEN (currently at P4. In Masso Hermanos.) The words "pale pilsen" may not be appropriated by SMC for its exclusive use even if they are part of its registered trademark: SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. 673. business or services of others shall have the right to register the same [on the principal register]. 96 Phil. One who pays only P4. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language.25 per bottle) and SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN (currently at P7.45 (6) The SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle cap is stamped with a coat of arms and the words "San Miguel Brewery Philippines" encircling the same. 676 ): A word or a combination of words which is merely descriptive of an article of trade. The BEER PALE PILSEN bottle cap is stamped with the name "BEER" in the center. 166." (7) Finally.) "Pilsen" is a "primarily geographically descriptive word. nonregisterable and not appropriable by any beer manufacturer. 638) hence. Mass. surrounded by the words "Asia Brewery Incorporated Philippines. for no other reason than that he was the first to use them in his registered trademark. subpar. as inserted by Sec. 2 of R. Director of Patents.. . Edited by Philip Babcock Gove. when applied to or used in connection with the goods. for "pale pilsen" are generic words descriptive of the color ("pale"). business or services from the goods. or of its composition. 139 (1953). cannot be appropriated and protected as a trademark to the exclusion of its use by others. characteristics.A. . Director of Patents. The fact that the words pale pilsen are part of ABI's trademark does not constitute an infringement of SMC's trademark: SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. business or services of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them. 94 Phil.: G & C Merriam Co. 4. No. unless it: xxx xxx xxx (e) Consists of a mark or trade-name which. S." "tomato ketchup. The Trademark Law provides: Sec. The owner of trade-mark. vs. ." (Emphasis supplied.25 for a bottle of beer cannot expect to receive San Miguel Pale Pilsen from the storekeeper or bartender. ." "cheddar cheese. . Unabridged. Springfield. they also .
46 have the right to describe them properly and to use any appropriate language or words for that purpose, and no person can appropriate to himself exclusively any word or expression, properly descriptive of the article, its qualities, ingredients or characteristics, and thus limit other persons in the use of language appropriate to the description of their manufactures, the right to the use of such language being common to all. This rule excluding descriptive terms has also been held to apply to trade-names. As to whether words employed fall within this prohibition, it is said that the true test is not whether they are exhaustively descriptive of the article designated, but whether in themselves, and as they are commonly used by those who understand their meaning, they are reasonably indicative and descriptive of the thing intended. If they are thus descriptive, and not arbitrary, they cannot be appropriated from general use and become the exclusive property of anyone. (52 Am. Jur. 542-543.) . . . . Others may use the same or similar descriptive word in connection with their own wares, provided they take proper steps to prevent the public being deceived. (Richmond Remedies Co. vs. Dr. Miles Medical Co., 16 E. [2d] 598.) . . . . A descriptive word may be admittedly distinctive, especially if the user is the first creator of the article. It will, however, be denied protection, not because it lacks distinctiveness, but rather because others are equally entitled to its use. (2 Callman. Unfair Competition and Trademarks, pp. 869-870.)" (Emphasis supplied.) The circumstance that the manufacturer of BEER PALE PILSEN, Asia Brewery Incorporated, has printed its name all over the bottle of its beer product: on the label, on the back of the bottle, as well as on the bottle cap, disproves SMC's charge that ABI dishonestly and fraudulently intends to palm off its BEER PALE PILSEN as SMC's product. In view of the visible differences between the two products, the Court believes it is quite unlikely that a customer of average intelligence would mistake a bottle of BEER PALE PILSEN for SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. The fact that BEER PALE PILSEN like SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN is bottled in amber-colored steinie bottles of 320 ml. capacity and is also advertised in print, broadcast, and television media, does not necessarily constitute unfair competition. Unfair competition is the employment of deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which a person shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services, for those of another who has already established goodwill for his similar goods, business or services, or any acts calculated to produce the same result. (Sec. 29, Republic Act No. 166, as amended.) The law further enumerates the more common ways of committing unfair competition, thus: Sec. 29. . . . In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition: (a) Any person, who in selling his goods shall give them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or
47 words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose. (b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or (c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another. In this case, the question to be determined is whether ABI is using a name or mark for its beer that has previously come to designate SMC's beer, or whether ABI is passing off its BEER PALE PILSEN as SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. . . ..The universal test question is whether the public is likely to be deceived. Nothing less than conduct tending to pass off one man's goods or business as that of another will constitute unfair competition. Actual or probable deception and confusion on the part of the customers by reason of defendant's practices must always appear. (Shell Co., of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Insular Petroleum Refining Co. Ltd. et al., 120 Phil. 434, 439.) The use of ABI of the steinie bottle, similar but not identical to the SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle, is not unlawful. As pointed out by ABI's counsel, SMC did not invent but merely borrowed the steinie bottle from abroad and it claims neither patent nor trademark protection for that bottle shape and design. (See rollo, page 55.) The Cerveza Especial and the Efes Pale Pilsen use the "steinie" bottle. (See Exhibits 57-D, 57-E.) The trial court found no infringement of SMC's bottle — The court agrees with defendant that there is no infringement of plaintiff's bottle, firstly, because according to plaintiff's witness Deogracias Villadolid, it is a standard type of bottle called steinie, and to witness Jose Antonio Garcia, it is not a San Miguel Corporation design but a design originally developed in the United States by the Glass Container Manufacturer's Institute and therefore lacks exclusivity. Secondly, the shape was never registered as a trademark. Exhibit "C" is not a registration of a beer bottle design required under Rep. Act 165 but the registration of the name and other marks of ownership stamped on containers as required by Rep. Act 623. Thirdly, the neck of defendant's bottle is much larger and has a distinct bulge in its uppermost part. (p. 186, Rollo.) The petitioner's contention that bottle size, shape and color may not be the exclusive property of any one beer manufacturer is well taken. SMC's being the first to use the steinie bottle does not give SMC a vested right to use it to the exclusion of everyone else. Being of functional or common use, and not the exclusive invention of any one, it is available to all who might need to use it within the industry. Nobody can acquire any exclusive right to market articles supplying
48 simple human needs in containers or wrappers of the general form, size and character commonly and immediately used in marketing such articles (Dy Buncio vs. Tan Tiao Bok, 42 Phil. 190, 194-195.) . . . protection against imitation should be properly confined to nonfunctional features. Even if purely functional elements are slavishly copied, the resemblance will not support an action for unfair competition, and the first user cannot claim secondary meaning protection. Nor can the first user predicate his claim to protection on the argument that his business was established in reliance on any such unpatented nonfunctional feature, even "at large expenditure of money." (Callman Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, Sec. 19.33 [4th Ed.].) (Petition for Review, p. 28.) ABI does not use SMC's steinie bottle. Neither did ABI copy it. ABI makes its own steinie bottle which has a fat bulging neck to differentiate it from SMC's bottle. The amber color is a functional feature of the beer bottle. As pointed out by ABI, all bottled beer produced in the Philippines is contained and sold in amber-colored bottles because amber is the most effective color in preventing transmission of light and provides the maximum protection to beer. As was ruled in California Crushed Fruit Corporation vs. Taylor B. and Candy Co., 38 F2d 885, a merchant cannot be enjoined from using a type or color of bottle where the same has the useful purpose of protecting the contents from the deleterious effects of light rays. Moreover, no one may have a monopoly of any color. Not only beer, but most medicines, whether in liquid or tablet form, are sold in amber-colored bottles. That the ABI bottle has a 320 ml. capacity is not due to a desire to imitate SMC's bottle because that bottle capacity is the standard prescribed under Metrication Circular No. 778, dated 4 December 1979, of the Department of Trade, Metric System Board. With regard to the white label of both beer bottles, ABI explained that it used the color white for its label because white presents the strongest contrast to the amber color of ABI's bottle; it is also the most economical to use on labels, and the easiest to "bake" in the furnace (p. 16, TSN of September 20, 1988). No one can have a monopoly of the color amber for bottles, nor of white for labels, nor of the rectangular shape which is the usual configuration of labels. Needless to say, the shape of the bottle and of the label is unimportant. What is all important is the name of the product written on the label of the bottle for that is how one beer may be distinguished form the others. In Dy Buncio v. Tan Tiao Bok, 42 Phil. 190, 196-197, where two competing tea products were both labelled as Formosan tea, both sold in 5-ounce packages made of ordinary wrapping paper of conventional color, both with labels containing designs drawn in green ink and Chinese characters written in red ink, one label showing a double-decked jar in the center, the other, a flower pot, this court found that the resemblances between the designs were not sufficient to mislead the ordinary intelligent buyer, hence, there was no unfair competition. The Court held: . . . . In order that there may be deception of the buying public in the sense necessary to constitute unfair competition, it is necessary to suppose a public accustomed to buy, and therefore to some extent familiar with, the goods in question. The test of fraudulent simulation is to be found in the likelihood of the deception of persons in some measure acquainted with an established design and desirous of purchasing the commodity with which that design has been
The fact that SMC's bottle is registered under R. The record does not bear out SMC's apprehension that BEER PALE PILSEN is being passed off as SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. Registration of SMC's beer bottles did not give SMC a patent on the steinie or on bottles of similar size. beer is ordered by brand.49 associated. amber-colored bottles with white rectangular labels. Barrels and Other Similar Containers) simply prohibits manufacturers of other foodstuffs from the unauthorized use of SMC's bottles by refilling these with their products. The simulation. 209. Only their respective labels distinguish them from each other. Rollo) SMC claims that the "trade dress" of BEER PALE PILSEN is "confusingly similar" to its SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN because both are bottled in 320 ml. The test is not found in the deception. like SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN in amber steinie bottles. pickles and peanut butter are sold in standard glass jars. The manufacturers of these foodstuffs have equal right to use these standards tins. whether in powdered or liquid form. Many other grocery items such as coffee.A. Boxes. page 50. The main thrust of SMC's complaint if not infringement of its trademark. mere similarity in the shape and size of the container and label. or possibility of the deception. those who have been drinking no other beer but SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN these many years certainly know their beer too well to be deceived by a . Kegs. The same can be said of the standard ketchup or vinegar bottle with its familiar elongated neck. SMC did not invent it nor patent it. If his empties are SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. Just as no milk producer may sue the others for unfair competition because they sell their milk in the same size and shape of milk can which he uses. No. shape or color. when as in this case. he will get SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN as replacement. As pointed out by ABI's counsel. must be such as appears likely to mislead the ordinarily intelligent buyer who has a need to supply and is familiar with the article that he seeks to purchase. neither may SMC claim unfair competition arising from the fact that ABI's BEER PALE PILSEN is sold. and who must be indifferent as between that and the other. This is unlikely to happen for consumers or buyers of beer generally order their beer by brand. The same is true in restaurants. 623 (as amended by RA 5700. Casks. pubs and beer gardens — beer is ordered from the waiters by brand. does not constitute unfair competition. mayonnaise. An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles. cit. bottles and jars for their products. However. In sari-sari stores. (Op. is sold in uniform tin cans. steinie type. Most containers are standardized because they are usually made by the same manufacturer. Milk. in supermarkets and tiendas. The steinie bottle is a standard bottle for beer and is universally used.) Considering further that SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN has virtually monopolized the domestic beer market for the past hundred years. It was not uncommon then for products such as patis (fish sauce) and toyo (soy sauce) to be sold in recycled SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottles. but unfair competition arising form the allegedly "confusing similarity" in the general appearance or trade dress of ABI's BEER PALE PILSEN beside SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN (p. and the customer surrenders his empty replacement bottles or pays a deposit to guarantee the return of the empties. of the person who knows nothing about the design which has been counterfeited. in order to be objectionable. the names of the competing products are clearly different and their respective sources are prominently printed on the label and on other parts of the bottle. beer is also ordered from the tindera by brand.
that competition is neither unfair nor fraudulent. we must deny SMC's prayer to suppress it. the courts should "take into consideration several factors which would affect its conclusion. Moreover.R. 419. a common household item which is bought off the store shelves by housewives and house help who. it is attributable to the marks as a totality. we must consider the mark as a whole and not as dissected. to wit: the age. Not to be refilled. 3 that: .R. No. While its BEER PALE PILSEN admittedly competes with the latter in the open market. CV No. 1986 . back and bottle cap) to prove that it has no intention to pass of its "BEER" as "SAN MIGUEL. it will not be because they are confused or deceived. the same is hereby granted. SMC's brand or trademark: "SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN" is not infringed by ABI's mark: "BEER NA BEER" or "BEER PALE PILSEN." There is no confusing similarity between the competing beers for the name of one is "SAN MIGUEL" while the competitor is plain "BEER" and the points of dissimilarity between the two outnumber their points of similarity. Industries. The Court itself cautioned that in resolving cases of infringement and unfair competition. whether the article is bought for immediate consumption and also the conditions under which it is usually purchased" (181 SCRA 410. . Hence. Costs against the private respondent. finding the petition for review meritorious. the nature and cost of the article. SO ORDERED. not usually to any part of it. we held that there was infringement of Del Monte's trademark and unfair competition by Sunshine. If the buyer is deceived. . That ruling may not apply to all kinds of products. 28104 are hereby set aside and that of the trial court is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. would very likely identify it by mere recollection of its appearance. training and education of the usual purchaser. Since the competitor. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Court of Appeals and Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries. not only used recycled Del Monte bottles for its catsup (despite the warning embossed on the bottles: "Del Monte Corporation. Petitioner ABI has neither infringed SMC's trademark nor committed unfair competition with the latter's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN product. to determine whether a trademark has been infringed. Our decision in this case will not diminish our ruling in "Del Monte Corporation vs. Our ruling in Del Monte would not apply to beer which is not usually picked from a store shelf but ordered by brand by the beer drinker himself from the storekeeper or waiter in a pub or restaurant. The Del Monte case involved catsup.") but also used labels which were "a colorable imitation" of Del Monte's label. but because they find the competing product to their taste. 418419). WHEREFORE. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. and prints ABI's name in three (3) places on said bottle (front. Sunshine Sauce Mfg. L-69668 October 2.50 newcomer in the market." ABI makes its own bottle with a bulging neck to differentiate it from SMC's bottle. If they gravitate to ABI's cheaper beer." 181 SCRA 410. if they are illiterate and cannot identify the product by name or brand.
Delfin Dalisay. at about 11:30 o'clock. Delfin Dalisay related that on November 10. Adriano Pagarigan for defendant-appellant. Their purpose was to solicit a contribution for their high school annual. looking very nervous. the complainant. the appellant offered them beer. When she woke up. She moaned presumably in anguish and pain. with five children. She turned on the light and upbraided the appellant who at that time was already putting on his trousers. and Rosalita and her mother left in a huff. Cecile's sister informed them at their market stall that Lolita was in their house. 2 These are the facts as the trial court saw them. 3 Continuing the story. On November 9. He blamed Rosalita for Lolita's misfortune. Rosalita embraced and consoled Lolita. and commandant of the said course. was an 18-year old senior student at the Manuel L. 1 The appellant was 43 years old. vs. resulting in the sentence of reclusion perpetua that he now faces. sir. Lolita became dizzy and the appellant suggested that the two girls stay for the night. She did not scream or call for help because it all happened so fast. Rosalita Quinto. Rosalita left to get her some clothes. Quezon High School and undergoing citizen army training (CAT) under the command of the appellant." The appellant kissed her and bit her lower lip. Upon arrival one hour later. a certain Cecile. The usual plea is made: that there was a misappropriation of the evidence. CRUZ. The appellant was seated on the sofa totally naked. rendering her unconscious. HUMBERTO TEMPONGKO. "Huwag mong gawin sa akin iyan. She proceeded to the house of another friend. Lolita stayed until past noon and when Rosalita did not return decided to leave the office. where she stayed for five days until she was fetched by her stepfather. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. He prays for a reversal. Lolita boxed him in the back and he boxed her in the stomach. As Lolita's jogging pants were bleed.. Lolita Dacoycoy. Rosalita and her mother informed him of Lolita's rape. 1981. and Rosalita woke up. married. She pleaded. This was about 7 o'clock in the evening.51 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. the complainant and her friend. J. He fetched Lolita from there and later. This was Lolita Dacoycoy's testimony.:p The appellant is before us to challenge his conviction of the crime of rape. plaintiff-appellee. which they drank. upon advice of the lawyer to whom they had earlier been referred by a friend. defendant-appellant. he and her mother took Lolita to the National Bureau . Five days later. At the time of the commission of the alleged offense. JR. besides being the owner of a tailoring shop. the deed was done and she was bleeding. went to the appellant's tailoring shop in accordance with the appointment made by them the day before. The appellant then left. He claims it was not he who erred but the trial court. It was at dawn when Lolita felt the weight of a person on her whom she immediately recognized as the appellant. The appellant soon left without saying a word. Lolita slept on the sofa while Rosalita slept on the floor about two arms length from her.
12 Yet it did not occur to her to get other attire. which was a tailoring shop. however. Alternatively. 7 The appellant presented two witnesses to corroborate his testimony. but it seems they did him more harm than good. We shall go to that later. The medical report suggests that the complainant was a virgin at the time of the supposed intercourse. Recto was not far from the complainant's house on Vicente G. which could have been reached by one jeep ride. By her own account. what she did was drink about threefourths of the glass. 4 Part of this narration was contributed by Clarita Dacoycoy. He did not deny that he offered the two girls beer and allowed them to sleep in his office in the night of November 9.M. she decided to stay and sleep in the strange office of this person who.52 of Investigation. she was raped on the sofa while her friend Rosalita was sleeping on the floor only two arms length away and in the same room. of that date. CAT uniforms. Strangely. The other parts of her testimony also raise some perplexing questions. 10 The implication is that the appellant was reckless not only of resistance from Lolita but also of discovery by Rosalita. she went to the office of a man she did not know very well at 7 o'clock on a Sunday evening. considering their age and sex. He declared. First. was by her own narration not close to her. In fact. Then she accepted beer instead of a soft drink. to repeat. he returned thereto at about 9 o'clock in the morning of the following day and not earlier. precisely. the shop was a contractor for the supplying of. Lolita's mother. Orlando Salvador of the NBI in layman's terms. saying he was at home with his family when the rape was supposedly committed. 1981. Cruz. 11 She also said she was desperate for clothing because her jogging pants were bloody. where she underwent a medical examination. In fact. the appellant denied the charge. 8 The appellant's office on C. instead of going home with her companion. which must have been available in abundance in the place where she was then. instead of taking a few sips just to be polite. 6 Testifying for himself. 13 . was hardly maidenly or at least discreet. but it would seem that her conduct in the night of November 9. Not only that. as a result of which she felt dizzy. 1981. One might expect such thoughtless conduct of an experienced girl of loose discipline but not of the virtuous and virginal girl the complainant was supposed to be. she had a telephone at her house and could have called one of her relatives to fetch her if she and Rosalita could not leave by themselves. 9 It is incredible that she did not even trouble to tell her parents of her whereabouts. This witness also testified that the claimed blow inflicted on the complainant's stomach would not necessarily leave any external sign or mark. he saw the complainant having breakfast at that time. In fact. that having left his office at about 11:30 p. Lolita herself testified that Rosalita did not complain of being dizzy. There is no evidence that her friend Rosalita was also dizzy and could not have taken her home that night. 5 According to the medical report as explained by Dr. The complainant testified that he immediately recognized the appellant although she had just awakened and that when she recovered consciousness after having been boxed in the stomach. she had already been ravished. which would have been the proper refreshment for her and her companion. the complainant was deflowered on or about the date of the alleged rape. the appellant was then still seated on the sofa and apparently taking his time about dressing. who also testified on the civil damages suffered by the complainant. Then.m.
the defense was none-too-convincing either and. the appellant's testimony was that the two girls slept in his office on November 9. the complainant was "tulala" when he saw her. Neither did her friend Cecile. the appellant was living in Sisa. The appellant relied on alibi. and also why he allowed them to sleep in his office when they were just trainees under his command and had no special ties with him. 21 and this was more than two years after the alleged rape. and that the appellant returned thereto the following morning of November 9. in the view of the trial court. 1981. One also wonders why Rosalita Quinto. 19 The testimony of the other defense witness. he testified only up to the time he left the appellant's office at about 11 o'clock in the night of November 9. 1981. If. In fact. only on the date itself of the hearing. an inherently feeble excuse that cannot prevail as against the positive Identification of the accused. in the very morning when he was presented as witness. It could have been reached from his house in a matter of minutes. and who was supposed to be in the room when the complainant claimed she was ravished. In the first place. The appellant's first witness. and that he returned thereto the following morning of November 10. 22 The defendant argues that Lolita should have shouted for help but did not. On top of this. Rolando Hermilo. the mysterious Cecile. Moreover. that he would not have attempted the rape in such a cramped place and with another person in the very room where the crime was supposedly committed. 1981. was not presented as a witness by the prosecution It is not often that the prosecution has the good fortune of an actual eyewitness in cases like this. was not only practically useless but in fact prejudicial to the appellant. His claim was that . 20 But what makes his testimony suspect was his admission that he learned of the charge against the appellant. and not before and during. 17 And whereas the appellant testified that the complainant came to his office with a paper bag containing clothes.53 Instead of going straight home. according to Delfin Dalisay. the complainant's companion on the night of the alleged rape. fatally flawed. it was only on the fifth day that Cecile's sister saw fit to tell the complainant's family where Lolita was notwithstanding Lolita's alleged condition at the time. and not on what happened later to the girls who were left behind. considering the light traffic at 5 o'clock in the morning or thereabouts. 1981. as the trial court observed. 16 By contrast. 15 where the rape was allegedly committed. and was asked to testify for him. and that there were no signs of the alleged stomach blow on the complainant's stomach. 18 the witness said Lolita was carrying only a handbag. what she did was stay with a friend. and yet neither the fiscal nor the private prosecutor saw fit to ask Rosalita to corroborate the testimony of Lolita. it would have been the natural thing for Cecile to inform Lolita's family of her state of shock as soon as possible. they presented only the parents of Lolita who testified on what happened after. Instead. 1981. For its part. he could not explain why he offered the two girls beer when soft drinks would have been more appropriate. which would have been the normal reaction of a young woman subjected to her traumatic experience. 14 She stayed there for five days and did not communicate with her mother even once. testified that Lolita and Rosalita slept in the appellant's office in the morning of November 8. in Sampaloc. only two kilometers or so from his office. Remy Oriola. the alleged rape. he was by his own admission reading the transcript of the appellant's testimony before he was actually called to the witness stand. On the other hand.
exercising as he did some moral influence over her as her commandant. More importantly. Serving beer instead of soft drinks and snowing the use of one's office for sleeping purposes are not indictable offenses. This is not a pat case. The defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking. 1981. even before the alleged rape. The proper thing to do was to receive these girls at his office at the MLQ where he was working as commandant of the CAT. to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The almost indifferent reaction of her family is implausible too. and when they did. but that is all. which it declared to be untenable. to say the least. Failing that. Soft drinks would have been a more appropriate refreshment for the young ladies. The only fact conclusively established by the prosecution is that the complainant was deflowered on or about the time of the alleged rape. was hardly befitting a proper young lady. It is important. There should have been a more careful analysis of the other evidence to get to the truth of this unfortunate mess where there is more than meets the eye. especially since such beverages were easily available. the appellant. that he there offered them beer. if we go by the recorded testimony. so to speak. The appellant does not deny that he asked the two girls to see him at his office in the evening of November 9. indeed. The mother testified that they later searched for her but did not elaborate beyond saying that they asked her friends. whose conduct. he should have at least caged up the complainant's mother to tell her that Lolita was in his office. The trial judge should have probed deeper instead of simply relying on the question of alibi. even if there is no defense at all. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. as narrated by the requires not a little explaining. The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. in his office. all these indiscretion do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the appellant raped the complainant in the morning of November 10. But all these improprieties and omissions come under the heading of indiscretions and not crimes. They did not inquire from her classmates in MLQ They did not talk to the alleged rapist. The odds are heavily against him. After being informed of Lolita's rape. . In fact. 23 It is unfortunate that the trial court did little to analyze the evidence of the parties and virtually limited itself to the defense of alibi. and that he permitted them to sleep there that night. The rest of its case is based on the improbable testimony of the complainant. and during school hours. should have counseled her to go home. The conduct of both the complainant and the defendant. even if the defense is weak or. There are many unanswered questions. which they drank.54 they had left home because Lolita had been scolded by her mother was belied by his own testimony that he heard Lolita calling her mother on the telephone to say she was sleeping with a friend. The connection is too far-fetched. they did not immediately look for her. their efforts were hardly energetic. as he says. which is only part of the intriguing mosaic. therefore. he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. it fails utterly. whom Rosalita had Identified. And if it is true. Moral irresponsibility and thoughtlessness are also not prohibited under our criminal laws. If the prosecution fails. that the complainant asked to sleep in his office because she had been scolded by her mother. 1981.
It is so ordered. AMADEO CORRAL. accepted and drank beer with him. The appellant may have been lying. asked to sleep in his office. they were strangely silent and absent at the trial. The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond doubt and so cannot be affirmed in this appellant The defense is weak. All he did.R. No. It was only five days later that they teamed of her whereabouts. to the point of moral certainty. the decision' of the lower court is REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED. But then how could he? He said he was sleeping in his house with his family. the alleged rape was committed within two arms length of her companion. but we are not prepared to accept. WHEREFORE. according to the trial court. vs. It is significant that although she and Rosalita Quinto played key roles as it were in this case. The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of this Court. What does strain the imagination is the complainant's own implausible story: of a virgin who visited a casual acquaintance of the opposite sex in his own office on a Sunday evening. and could have awakened any time and in fact did so. that the complainant was telling the truth. and this because Cecile's sister came to see them and informed them. suffered a blow in her stomach and recovered consciousness to discover she had been raped by the appellant who was still seated on the sofa totally naked. in whose house the complainant supposedly stayed for five days. THE UNITED STATES. plaintiff-appellee. to be sure. without any pronouncement as to costs. Most significantly. when she moaned after her ravishment. The trouble with the appellant. At five o'clock in the morning. by his own account. where else could he have been? How could he have produced third parties as witnesses to testify that he was fast asleep in his own house? His presence in his own bedroom at that time was not incredible or even improbable but perfectly believable. The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our condemning the appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are whispers of doubt that he is guilty. As for Cecile. is that he could not prove his defense of alibi. could not leave because her jogging pants were bloodied notwithstanding that she was in a tailoring shop where clothes were available in abundance. L-5325 3 March 1910 . was blame Rosalita for the incident. who was sleeping with her in the same room. and there is evidence of this. finally went to a friend's house instead of straight to her mother from whom she normally would have sought solace. defendant-appellant.55 when she and her mother informed Delfin Dalisay that Lolita had been raped. he did not ask where she was — a most natural and logical question to ask at that time. this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant raped the complainant. was awakened by the weight of a person on top of her whom she immediately recognized notwithstanding that her eyes were not yet accustomed to the dark. Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila En Banc G. according to Lolita. she was not even presented as witness to corroborate Lolita's testimony. Rosalita Quinto. but for all the persuasive arguments of the Solicitor General and the private prosecutor.
taking with her a trunk and a diamond ring. and that no sooner was he about to read the same than Corral made his appearance and told him that he could not consent to the arrest of his wife. sent for Ramos and said to her: “Here is a warrant and Captain Crame wants you because there is a case against you in the hands of the fiscal. who left on the 4th day of the present month. taking with her one trunk which contained several articles of value. Juan Mapa appeared before the municipal president with a card from the accused (Exhibit F). he said that whatever the said certificate might be. George. The latter left his house and appeared at the police station in Paco and complaint that he had illtreated her. Enclosed I send a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the said woman for proper action. and delivered to the policeman. Mapa for appellant. He then wrote to the justice of the peace of Corregidor Islands.J. wherein she is charged with having taken away one trunk and a diamond ring. Therefore it was possible to present the document. and the former surrendered to him the person of Paz Ramos in compliance with the order of arrest.” Tiburcio Quiogue. testified to the same effect. a diamond ring.56 Basilio R. On another day the municipal president of Corregidor received a warrant by mail (Exhibit A). Corral appeared at the same station asking if he could cause the woman’s arrest because she had left his house. Mr. saying that it was 9 in the evening when he received the paper in the form of an order by Captain Crame. who is the policeman above alluded to. and that no attention should be paid to the paper because it was a forced document and that the order it contained was not a real one. 1908. Later. his letter having been answered. so that he could turn her over to the police in Manila. . and I gave the letter. and in reply he handed him his card (Exhibit C). that is. however. Paz Ramos and Juan Mapa came to Manila. SIR: It is desired to know the whereabouts of Señora Paz Ramos (alias) de Corral. Calle San Marcelino. C. that he should not read it because it was a falsified document. pieced together. throwing them to the ground. and Juan Mapa testifies that: “We got ashore. offered her his services and informed her of the departure of the woman Ramos. to the court. Attorney-General Villamor for appellee. The document is of the following tenor: DEC. inquiring whether he could file a complaint against her in the court of the said justice. from whence they were picked up by Juan Mapa or someone else who was there. and several important documents which are now in the hands of the prosecuting attorney. Hardly had he commenced to read the first words when Corral snatched the paper from his hands and tore it to pieces. a resident of No. one day Corral met the wife of the said justice of the peace in Manila. 15.: Amadeo Corral maintained Paz Ramos as his wife or seamstress. Corral came after the woman Ramos and they left the station together.” and read to her document A. the warrant (Exhibit A) to the first policeman I came across and turned Paz Ramos over to him. The Municipal President of Corregidor. interior. ARELLANO. the sergeant asked him for his address. 144. gave her his card (Exhibit E).
which he uses in signing or that the document should bear no official seal or heading. in charge of Mapa. As the crime of falsification punished by article 301 in connection with article 300 (No. and to pay a fine of P250. believing it a genuine one contained in a request which he also thought was genuine made by the said captain of police. When question as to whether he had read that letter he answered that he read “the first portion of the letter ‘President de Corregidor. that it matters not that the name of the fiscal. he answered that it was because it was not an official document. and that. with costs. that an official document has been imitated. as imposed in the judgment. The defendant has appealed from said judgment. ZARAGOZA. and that Paz Ramos was sent to manila by the municipal president of Corregidor. The accused does not deny Exhibit A. “Given at Manila on the 7th day of December. Let her be brought over to my presence as soon as possible in order that the law may be applied as it may be proper. who appears to have issued the same. “Asst. is improperly written. and the attorney-General has requested that the same be affirmed. the official titles “Assistant Prosecuting Attorney” and “Captain of Police. (Signed) “R. the heading.57 “To all officers of the law. or that the signature of Captain Crame lacks a de. being in due form. and the wording of the order of arrest. without any circumstance modifying the liability therefor. and the exactness of the signatures in inducing belief in the truth of what was set forth. he was sent to the Cuartel et Meisic where Sergeant Keses asked why he had torn that paper. 1908. save that the penalty shall be of presidio mayor instead of prision mayor. that an order of arrest which had not been duly issued by competent authority has been simulated.’” The Court of First Instance of Manila sentenced the accused to eight years and one day of prision mayor. together with Paz Ramos. he tore it up. not an official letter. are of more importance than the seal. 1). that this is true to such extent that the municipal president of Corregidor hastened to comply with the order in question.” “Very respectfully. Prosecuting-Attorney. on the other hand. as he was in bad temper. the . and at the trial he added that it was nothing at all. she having been charged before me with the crime of theft. “J. CRAME. “Captain of Police. with the addition of the accessory penalties prescribed by the law. and says that he saw it in the hands of a policeman on the Muelle de la Reina one night in December when. of the Penal Code has been committed. because.” following the signatures.” An indorsement on the back of the order of arrest shows that the same was complied with. In his brief the Attorney-General states that the signature of Captain Crame has been counterfeited with sufficient likeness. greeting: “The arrest of Paz Ramos (alias) de Corral is hereby ordered.
in violation of 21 U. and this The government states in hearsay was not reliable enough to be used.58 judgment appealed from is in accordance with the merits of the case. The government agrees that. and Chavira may have spoken falsely to Aguilar to maintain control over Aguilar when she was with Corral. arguing 841(a)(1) and 846. Aguilar-Ayala. California. He appeals. the provisions of the law. Chavira was said to be the head of the conspiracy. for the plaintiff-appellee. we reverse Corral's sentence and remand to the district court for recomputation.S. reasons stated below.” The dispute between the parties goes solely to whether the sentencing judge He never said in so many words that he did. 1998. Kathleen A. because Aguilar might have spoken falsely to curry favor. as quoted in the presentence report. is that another defendant. for the defendantappellant. that the sentence shall be presidio mayor and that the accused be further sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties of article 57 of the code with the costs of this instance. Aguilar.1 Sally Ann Perring. -. it would be the same as if she crossed Chavira. its brief to us that “[t]he defendant correctly recognizes that there were no such ‘indicia of reliability’ accompanying the hearsay Appellee's brief at page 7. and it is so ordered. 120 F. v. and the contentions of the Attorney-General. §§ that the district court violated his due process rights by considering unreliable double hearsay in calculating his sentence under the Application of the Sentencing Guidelines to Sentencing Guidelines. and was a fugitive.C. The probation officer had relied on the . Corral argues that this was unreliable. Defendant-Appellant. Therefore. Corral pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. statements of his codefendant. 18.William L. UNITED STATES v. it requires adequate indicia of reliability. Shipley (argued). The hearsay statement.District Judge. Fresno. CORRAL UNITED STATES of America. said that Corral was Chavira's right hand man and that Chavira told her (Aguilar) that she was to follow all of Corral's instructions. United States Attorney. Alberto CORRAL. United States the facts of a case is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Circuit Judges. 96-10535.San Joaquin College of Law.3d 176. while hearsay is admissible in sentencing proceedings. For the v. Servatius (briefed). Plaintiff-Appellee. the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed: Provided. and if she crossed Corral. Argued and Submitted Sept. however. California. 1999 Before: CANBY and KLEINFELD. No. or relied on the hearsay.April 08.1997). and KEEP. 177-78 (9th Cir. Clovis.
on the record as a whole ․ that the error did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed. The “right hand man” significant part for his recommendation. on the unreliable hearsay. United States.1995).2d 1339. A decision cannot be read like a statute. 1112. we remanded because it is unclear whether the sentencing magistrate judge had based denial of an adjustment on an incorrect ground. United States. 203.3d 276 (9th Cir.2(b).3d 1170 (9th decided.59 hearsay in that he did not.1998). Huckins also refers to cases quoting the Supreme Court's formulation in Williams v. 142 F.” “record as a whole. McKittrick.G.S. relying on accomplice hearsay without adequate indicia of reliability Huckins.2d 341 (1992). that the hearsay was not sufficiently reliable for the court to rely on it When defense counsel reminded the court that a hearsay in sentencing. the judge mentioned that Corral was “quite active” in the conspiracy. violated the defendant's constitutional right to due process. a fortiori it has abused its discretion. so the question of whether express reliance was necessary for reversal did not come up and therefore was not In United States v. 580 F.3d at 280. memorandum for a two level downward adjustment for minor role in the The defense also argued for a 3B1. but the judge did not say whether his denial was affected by the hearsay. from Farrow v. though the probation In denying officer's recommendation expressly was based partly on it. Huckins.” and whether “it is unclear. the departure for aberrant behavior. They are all different ways of saying the same thing. which would be a due process . 193. At the sentencing hearing.S. the government did not make the concession it now has.1978). 53 F. that we should read the record and decide whether reliance on impermissible information. and his involvement was “too organized. under U. so he did not This argument pushes the quoted language “demonstrably” rely on it.” which may have been references to his supposed “right hand man” status. defendant's constitutional right to due process.” as the probation officer had recommended. If a sentencing court violates a sentence in the case at bar.’ ” expressly state that he was not relying on the hearsay in the case at bar. 503 U. the objection is rejected. The defense objected to the use Defense counsel argued in his presentence of the unreliable hearsay. 1359 (9th Cir.S. the district judge did expressly rely unreliable hearsay.” is nothing wrong with this. offense. 112 S. we must likewise vacate the 53 F. he also did not expressly state that he was. The judge denied a minor role adjustment. followed those recommendations. This gives us three verbal formulas: “demonstrably made There the basis. and it is not an intracircuit conflict.3d at 280. We vacated a sentence and remanded for resentencing We held that in United States v. Cir. from Huckins too far. § downward departure based on aberrant behavior. statement was the basis for the probation officer's recommendations that an aggravating role in the offense adjustment be considered and a The judge mitigating role in the offense adjustment be denied. and. objection was pending. Following Huckins.Ct. 117 L. Huckins quoted the phrase. fair evaluation of the record as a whole rather than mechanical determination of whether the district judge expressly relied on the In Huckins. that reversal is required when a sentencing considers unreliable information “only if the challenged information is ‘demonstrably made the basis for the The government argues that although the judge did not sentence. that “a remand is appropriate unless the reviewing court concludes. 53 F.Ed. the judge said “the court is satisfied that hearsay is available pursuant to sentencing matters. therefore.” This language suggests review based on a Huckins.
No. plaintiffs-appellants. the sentencing judge might want a chance to take another look. possibly to a downward departure request. that no downward adjustment for minor role be made. asked that they be declared to be entitled to the ownership and possession of their respective lots. L-2116 16 March 1906 Francisco Rodriguez for appellants. The major a 26-year-old with no substantial criminal record. vs. The conspiracy and continued for a substantial period after he left. brought an action in the court of the justice of the peace of Tambobong against the plaintiffs herein for the recovery of several tracts of land. J. It is our judgment that the sentencing The government did judge probably did rely on the unreliable hearsay. possibly to the minor Corral was role adjustment. LAZARO BAENS. The judge denied the defense objection to the hearsay on the ground The judge was correct that that hearsay is admissible in sentencing. Corral's sentence is hereby VACATED and the case is REMANDED for resentencing. then there would be no due process probably did occur. and judgment having been rendered against the said plaintiffs. but denial of the objection without more suggests that he used it. now appellants. Modesto Reyes for appellee. The plaintiffs. BERNARDINO CACNIO. lasted more than two years and seven months. government has conceded the unreliability of the hearsay. That requires an exercise of judgment rather than a violation. . which he The probation officer relied on it. for not relying on it. so the judge had nothing but defense counsel's argument. methamphetamine conspiracy started long before Corral became involved. Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila En Banc G. and as a special remedy prayed for a preliminary injunction to stop further proceedings in the action for ejectment which had been brought against them. not that he disregarded it. hearsay is admissible in sentencing. the circumstances of the sentencing and the judge's language suggest that the unreliable hearsay may have mattered. ET AL. if he did rely on it. defendant-appellee. not concede in the district court that the hearsay was unreliable. Also.: The defendant. they appealed to the Court of First Instance. alleged that they were the absolute owners of their respective building lots in the barrio of Hulong Duhat of the said town of Tambobong and described the boundaries of each particular tract. mechanical word search. that they be awarded the sum of 600 dollars damages and the costs of proceedings. If it did not. Lazaro Baens. rejected.R..60 violation if it occurred. TORRES. The judge accepted the probation officer's recommendation made in reliance on it. but Corral drove truck and Now that the bought chemicals for it for less than a month.
and his wife. who were taxed with the costs. This deed or patent was recorded in the Registry of Property on the 14th . the defendant. nor can we draw from the facts proved the necessary conclusions to render a final judgment. The court reserved his decision upon the question of the admissibility of these documents offered in evidence by the defendant. The denial of the second paragraph of the complaint was limited to the statement contained in the same that without just cause the defendant had brought the action. The question then arises. but did not discuss the materiality of the same. Which of the parties has the better title to the land? The title deeds presented. directed that the case proceed and the evidence be taken. Bernardina Cacnio. Counsel for plaintiffs asked that the fourth paragraph of the complaint be amended so as to read that the plaintiffs acquired the possession and ownership of their respective lands by inheritance from their father. the defendant demurred and in his answer to the complaint. denying the motion for a new trial. be declared null and void. and vacating the preliminary injunction theretofore issued in favor of the plaintiffs. and after hearing the same. Cacnio and Cruz. and asked that the inscription of the said land made in favor of the defendant. asked the court to consider the proof presented by him as having been duly allowed. The preliminary injunction prayed for in order to stay the execution of the judgments which might have been entered in the actions in which the plaintiffs. Baens. as justice and equity require. The defendant denied the title and possession which the plaintiffs claimed to the land in controversy. declaring that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the lands claimed by the defendant. Consequently this court. we should state that to the order of the court of the 30th of October. by the defendant were issued by the Direccion General de Administracion Civil on the 25th of October. 1903. The defendant stated that he had no objection to the allowance of these amendments. section 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure. who had been in possession of the same for more than forty years. were interested. 1891. and that in view of the ruling upon the said demurrer. 1903. will only pass upon the question of law decided by the court below. but that he specifically denied each and all of the allegations contained therein. no exception was taken by counsel for plaintiffs as required in paragraph 3. having been issued. We can not. which said land they acquired by inheritance from their respective parents. therefore. filed immediately thereafter. the defendant having acquired the same by composition with the Government. First of all and for the purpose of this decision. review the evidence.61 alleging in support of their petition that the land belonging to Bernardino Cacnio had a superficial area of 11 ares 95 centares and 15 square centimeters. Counsel for defendant. The plaintiffs brought an action to recover title to certain parcels of land then in their possession. judgment was rendered on the 8th day of September. to quote the law itself. generally and specifically denied all of the allegations contained therein. and that belonging to Severino de la Cruz has 4 ares 60 centares and 55 square centimeters. Baens. Counsel for plaintiffs limited himself to impugning in writing the probatory force of the documents presented by the defendant. to him as the owner of a larger tract of land in which the land in question is included. never having been in possession of the same. Severino de la Cruz. following the general provision contained in the first paragraph of above-cited section 497. therefore. the defendant reproduced his former answer. until the final disposition of the other action for the title and possession.
and was duly recorded in the Registry of Property in accordance with the law. therefore. 23. that is to say. 26. and it was so decided by the court below in its judgment. notwithstanding the fact that they did not participate in the proceedings relating to the composition of the said land between the State and the defendant. 1891.) In the registry of real estate there should be recorded. the deed presented by the defendant to prove his title to the land in question is a public instrument. among others. and as is admitted in the printed briefs presented to this court and in the record of the documentary proof presented by the defendant. The court. giving his reasons therefor. those instruments authorized by a notary public or by a competent public official with all the solemnities required by law. Consequently it is competent proof and may prejudice third persons who for the purpose of this law are those who did not participate in the execution of the instrument of contract thus recorded. and other entities referred to in number 6. Cacnio and Cruz. and under paragraph 31 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it must be presumed that this was done in accordance with the law until the contrary is shown. article 2 of the said law. nor has it been proved that the party failed to publish the necessary notice as to the possession of the land to which the said deed refers. all instruments of conveyance of real estate or any interests therein. as found by the court below. and there being no proof of any defect which would render such instrument null and void. by extraordinary prescription under article 1959 of the Civil Code was sufficient to overcome and defeat the right of the defendant based upon a deed issued to him by the State and duly recorded in the Registry of Property. who was the competent official empowered to issue such instrument.) The inscription. are admissible in evidence even against a third party as to the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (Arts. all instruments relating to the acquisition of such property or property rights owned or administered by the State. and 27 of the Mortgage Law. dismissed the action. Counsel for plaintiffs denied the validity of the said deed. (Arts. It has not been shown that the deed or patent issued by the Direccion General de Administracion Civil had any substantial defect which would render it null and void. according to articles 1 and 2 of the Mortgage Law. The defendant having complied with all the requisites and solemnities prescribed by law for the registration of the said deed. and in view of the provisions of article 27 of the Mortgage Law there can be no doubt that the said plaintiffs should be considered as third persons. whom the execution of the deed or instrument of the defendant and the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property affected and prejudiced. and decided the same in favor of the defendant. but did not deny the fact that the document had been actually recorded. the recovery of which is now sought. 25.62 of November. The question is raised as to whether the parol evidence introduced by the plaintiffs for the purpose of showing that they had acquired title to the land. it can not be held to be void. nor did he ask the court to disallow and reject the documentary evidence thus presented. 24. The court below in deciding this question held that the deed or patent issued by the Direccion General de Administracion Civil showed that the . of the instruments in question prejudices the plaintiffs. Public instruments. after considering this evidence. it having been authorized by the Director of Civil Administration of the Spanish Government. 1216 and 1218 of the Civil Code. As has been seen.
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After the expiration of twenty days. It appears from the prosecution evidence that on September 22.A.) 6425. JOHNNY TADENA y TORDA. it should be borne in mind that the court below. So ordered. vs. y Sarocam were charged and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for violation of Section 15 of Republic Act (R. . The information was passed to the operatives’ team leader. Supt. 2002 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.000. the case is now before us on automatic review.00. of the Code of Civil Procedure. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. SEGUNDINO VALENCIA y BLANCA.R. For the reasons hereinbefore stated we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed. Jr. and DOMINGO DEROY. and no valid reason has been assigned to support a finding that the court below committed an error in rendering the decision appealed from. in our opinion. according to section 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure. for unlawfully selling or offering to sell 634.63 defendant had a better right than the plaintiffs to the land in question. a confidential informant of the PNP Narcotics Group confided to the group that he was able to negotiate the purchase of one kilo of drugs from a certain Junior and Johnny. Hence. Further. and the defendant acquitted of the complaint filed by the plaintiffs. Insp. DECISION PER CURIAM: Accused-appellants Segundino Valencia y Blanca. Ramon Arsenal and then to their commanding officer. and can not in this case be reviewed. and let the cause be remanded to the Court of First Instance for execution of the judgment. Johnny Tadena y Torda and Domingo Deroy. 1998. be sustained. in the exercise of its discretion as to the veracity of the witnesses and the manner in which they testified. This ruling of the court should. with the costs of this instance. 143032 October 14. let judgment be entered in accordance herewith. The trial court sentenced each of the accused to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of P500. JR. followed the provisions of section 273 et seq.0 grams of Psuedoephedrine Hydrochloride which is a regulated drug. y SAROCAM. No. and that the latter had no right to claim the ownership thereof. plaintiff-appellee. accused-appellants.
on the other hand.200. Johnny Tadena. while the other members of the team stayed about ten meters away. SPO1 Facto arrested Johnny Tadena while his companions seized the other accused. Col.5 On September 24. approached him. called the informant. . Domingo Deroy claimed that in the evening of September 22.0 grams of white crystalline substance containing Pseudoephedrine Hydrochloride which is a regulated drug. the said accused. 1998. 1998. Supt. confederating with and mutually helping one another.00 and his wallet containing P1. Valencia claimed that the police mauled him and extorted from him the amount of P20. Valencia ordered Deroy to hand him the bag containing the drugs. At about 10:50 in the evening. Valencia then handed the stuff to SPO1 Facto in exchange for the money.4 Meanwhile. did then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale 634. a certain Dodong (Segundino Valencia). Vargas filed the following information against the accused: "That on or about the 22nd day of September 1998 in Quezon City. Johnny Tadena went to see Segundino Valencia in Caloocan City to ask him if he knew anyone who would be interested in buying a 1995 Mitsubishi Lancer. They also took his necklace worth P5. Deroy did as instructed. Castillo. They took Valencia’s gun which he bought from a police asset.2 The substance was submitted for examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory. It tested positive for psuedo-ephedrine. Castillo showed Valencia a plastic bag and said that he would use it as evidence against him. Valencia rode with Tadena to go to Bago Bantay.00. an Isuzu van suddenly blocked their way.3 The defense. UET 384 arrived. a regulated drug. As they were crossing an intersection along Iligan Street. Quezon City. not having been authorized by law to sell. On the way home. Arsenal. SPO1 Facto saw three persons inside the car. 1998. When SPO1 Facto asked Tadena to show him the stuff. SPO1 Facto and the informant waited at the corner of Baler and Miller Streets. SPO1 Facto then introduced himself as a police officer and grabbed the car key from the ignition switch. The latter replied. SPO2 Estrada and SPO1 Facto.00. Domingo Deroy. Castillo immediately formed a buy-bust operation team composed of P/Insp. conspiring. He was to buy the one kilo of drugs for the agreed price of P800.00 bills which he used in preparing the boodle money. SPO1 Facto asked Tadena where the stuff was. Valencia was allegedly engaged in the business of buying and selling used cars. was at the backseat. SPO1 Larry Facto was designated as the poseur buyer.000. Valencia was seated beside the driver while their other companion. P/Insp." He told him not to worry because their boss.00. Quezon City. The police brought Valencia and Tadena to Camp Crame. SPO1 Facto was introduced by the informant to Johnny Tadena as the buyer. together with SPO1 Facto. Tadena was placed in a jail cell while Valencia was brought before Col. "It’s here. SPO1 Facto was given ten P100. Philippines. Assistant City Prosecutor Danilo B. alleged that in the evening of September 22. Tadena then asked SPO1 Facto about the money and the latter showed him a plastic bag containing the money. a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. was present. Beasa. SPO1 Facto examined the content of the bag and when he saw the white substance inside.1 The team proceeded to the corner of Baler and Miller Streets in San Francisco Del Monte.000. deliver.64 Arturo Castillo. dispense. transport or distribute any regulated drug. The three accused were brought to Camp Crame for investigation. The driver.000. The passengers of the van who appeared to be police officers approached them. he scratched his head to signal his companions that the transaction had been consummated. he was picked up by the police without any reason at the house of Valencia’s parents. The informant.
3.65 CONTRARY TO LAW. (2) to pay a fine of P500. Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. Doria 11 the test in determining the credibility of the testimony of police officers regarding the conduct of buy-bust operations."6 Giving more weight to the testimony of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.000. the trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged. of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. It held that the denial and alibi of the accused were not sufficient to overturn the prosecution evidence which established the guilt of the accused. This must start from the initial . SO ORDERED. finding that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.00. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the improbable testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. the courts shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. The presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. and (3) to pay the costs. juris tantum.10 The trial court in this case correctly upheld the testimony of the prosecution witnesses."8 In this appeal. the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.7 The dispositive portion of the decision read: "WHEREFORE. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that there was conspiracy in the case at bar."9 The appeal is without merit. When the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely testify against the accused. The Court said: "It is thus imperative that the presumption. their testimony on the operation deserves full faith and credit. It did not err in applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by law enforcement agents. It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. Accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in a buy-bust operation. We laid down in the case of People vs. accused-appellants raise the following errors: "1. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty. 2. We therefore stress that the ‘objective’ test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. the Court hereby sentences each of them (1) to suffer the penalty of Death.
Mr. Q: What time did you report? A: Nine o’clock in the morning. whether to the informant alone or the police officer. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. His testimony went as follows: "x x x xxx xxx Q: Can you recall. however. Police Inspector Ramon Arsenal. Q: Now. the preparation made by the buy-bust team before conducting the operation. the offer to purchase the drug.. sir. examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused’s predisposition to commit the crime. and the delivery of the illegal drug.. At the same time. ma’am. the payment of the ‘buy-bust’ money. when the informant introduced him as the supposed buyer to the drug dealers. whether or not through an informant. Q: And who ordered you or instructed you to conduct the surveillance? A: Our team leader. recidivism or plain criminal proclivity. Q: Was there any specific person whom you were supposed to conduct surveillance on December 22 . if you reported for duty on September 22. The manner by which the initial contact was made. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency. Q: What was that assignment? A: To conduct surveillance against drug traffic in Quezon City. and the arrest of said drug dealers. SPO1 Facto. while you were on duty was there any specific assignment given to you by your chief? A: Yes. September 22.66 contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher. the offer to purchase."12 In the case at bar. gave the complete details of how the transaction was conducted from beginning to end -. SPO1 Facto positively identified accused-appellants as the drug dealers. then this must also be considered. . must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The group of a certain Johnny alias Paniki group. 1998? A: Yes. ma’am.the negotiation between the confidential agent and the drug dealers. Witness. the poseur-buyer. ma’am. 1998? A: Yes. the exchange of the stuff and the payment between the pushers and the poseur buyer.
if any? A: Inspector Arsenal formed a team to conduct buy bust operation. ma’am. Castillo about that drug transaction. parang tingnan mo P800. Q: So. if any? A: He told me that he was able to negotiate the one kilo drug deal to a certain Junior and Johnny. Q: What did he tell you. Q: And what happened after giving that information to your team leader? A: Our team leader Ramon Arsenal told our CO Col. what did you do? A: We informed our team leader. ma’am. ma’am. ma’am. . Q: And how much were you supposed to buy? A: Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos per kilo. parang may boodle sa loob. Then I prepared the three bundles with numbers inside and make it appear.00. Q: What happened next.000. Q: And what is the gender of this confidential agent? A: A male. how did you know the group of Paniqui would be the subject of surveillance? A: Through our confidential agent. ma’am. Q: What was taken up in that briefing? A: In the briefing. I would pose as poseur buyer. Q: Were you able to talk to this confidential agent? A: Yes. ma’am. Police Inspector Ramon Arsenal the information of our confidential agent. Q: And upon receiving this information. what else were taken up during the briefing? A: Inspector Arsenal furnished me ten (10) pieces of One Hundred Peso-bill.67 Q: Now. Q: Was there any briefing? A: There was a briefing in our office. ma’am.
myself and others..m. pm. minutes later. Q: Were you able to reach the area? A: Yes. we proceeded to the area. Arsenal. what else happened? A: After I prepared the boodle on the night. sir. Mitsubishi Lancer color white UET 384 arrived at the corner of BalerMiller Streets. sir. Beasa. San Francisco del Monte. ma’am. was he present during that briefing? A: Yes. 22 September 1998.. Q: Who were with you at that time? A: Our confidential agent. away from us. Q: Where is this area? A: Corner Baler and Miller Streets. Q: What happened next if any? A: Around 10:30 p. Q: And after preparing the boodle money and 10 pieces of P100-bill. together with the CI. Q: Ten meters away from you? A: Yes. . By the way who are the members of the team? A: P/Insp.68 Q: After that . Q: Where were you at that time when that Mitsubishi Lancer arrived? A: I was at the corner of Baler and Miller Street. Q: You mentioned of a confidential informant.. Quezon City. what happened next? A: The driver called for me and our CI.. there was an automobile. 10 meters. around 10:50. Q: When this Mitsubishi Lancer arrived. P/Insp. Q: How about the other members of the team where were they? A: They were away from us at least 3 meters . SPO2 Estrada...
a certain Dodong. I asked the driver where the stuff was. Q: And then what happened after the CI introduced you to the occupants or to the driver. And then I quickly looked at the stuff and I saw that there was white substance inside so right away I made the pre-arranged signal. Q: Who handed to you the stuff? A: The man beside the driver. bigay mo dito.69 Q: And then what happened? A: The CI introduced me as buyer. seated in front. ‘It’s here’ and he also admonished me not to worry because their boss is there. what happened next? A: After I was introduced as the buyer. Q: How many occupants were there in that Mitsubishi Lancer? A: Three persons. . Q: And when the driver told you that his boss was there. Q: And what happened? A: The man seated in the front seat called the man at the back and said ‘Dalhin mo dito. ‘It’s here’. ma’am. in the front seat beside the driver. Q: What happened next? A: I told him to show me the stuff first because the money was with me. Q: And then what happened? A: And then he handed it to me sabay kaliwaan. The driver said. kaliwaan na.’ The person at the back seat handed the green bag to the person seated in the front seat. what happened next? A: He asked me where was the money. Q: And when it was handed to you. what did you do? A: I gave the money. and while I was holding the money which was placed inside a plastic wrap. ma’am. and I said. a certain Dodong. Q: And where was the other one? A: One at the back seat.
Q: There (sic) were still inside that car? A: Yes. will you be able to identify him? A: Yes. Q: By the way. And I grabbed the key of the vehicle. Mr. ‘Arestado kayo.’ what else happened? A: I got the key. while you were talking with the driver? A: Beside the driver. Q: And then what did you do? A: I said. after that? A: I said. where were you at the time. Q: And when you scratched your head what did you do? A: I introduced myself to the suspect as a police officer. ma’am. Witness. Q: Where was the key at that time? A: It was a(t) the ignition switch. Q: If he is inside the courtroom will you please point him to us? . sir. ma’am. the drug deal was positive. Q: And when you told the driver.70 Q: What was that pre-arranged signal? A: I scratched my head which means the deal was.’ Q: After that what happened? A: My companions alighted from the Tamaraw FX and arrested his other companions. for investigation. Q: If you will be able to see this driver again of that vehicle with whom you had that transaction. ‘you are arrested. ‘Arestado kayo’ and arrested the driver. Q: And then. Q: And then what happened? A: After that we brought them to Camp Crame.
it was not the police nor the confidential agent who induced accused-appellants to commit a violation of the Dangerous .000. Q: How about that man who handed to you that green bag containing the white substance? A: (Witness pointing to a man seated inside the courtroom who when asked to identify himself gave his name as Segundino Valencia).000. The confidential agent facilitated the meeting of accused-appellants and the poseur buyer. the latter was accompanied by the informant who introduced them to each other.00. We are not impressed.14 These facts have been sufficiently proved in this case. have. been engaged in drug dealing. it is immaterial whether the vendor and the vendee are familiar with each other.71 A: That one is Johnny Tadena (the person pointed to by the witness by tapping his shoulder when asked to identify himself gave his name as Johnny Tadena). The police engaged the services of a confidential informant to lead them to transact with them. the Court has observed that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to any customer. Hence. Q: How about the man seated at the back of the car who handed the green bag to Mr. When they met with the poseur-buyer. the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender. The argument deserves scant consideration. be he a stranger or not. accused-appellants. wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. also a member of the buy-bust team. Hence. It is commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime.15 In this case. Indeed. It has been shown that the appellants have previously negotiated with the confidential agent. drug pushers have become increasingly daring. They knew the informant. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Segundino Valencia? A: (Witness pointing to a man who when asked to identify himself gave his name as Domingo Deroy) xxx xxx x x x" SPO1 Facto’s testimony withstood the rigorous cross-examination by the defense counsel and was corroborated by SPO2 Estrada. Prior to September 22. Hence. 1998. whether daytime or nighttime. without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. They were in fact the subject of a surveillance conducted by the operatives of the PNP Narcotics Group. apparently. Its opposite is instigation or inducement. in private as well as in public places. dangerous and openly defiant of the law. In a buy-bust operation. It is only necessary to prove the fact of agreement and the acts constituting sale and delivery of the prohibited drugs. it is not as if the appellants were dealing with strangers.13 Accused-appellants contend that it is incredible that the alleged vendors of the drugs would readily do business with the alleged poseur-buyer whom they met only on September 22. Nonetheless. considering that the transaction involved the huge amount of P800.00. Accused-appellants also argue that the prosecution has not shown by clear and convincing evidence whether the sale was voluntary or whether this was a case of instigation. they have already closed the deal for the purchase of drugs for the price of P800. for some time.
the quantity which is far beyond therapeutic requirements. provides that ‘The penalties for offense under x x x Sections 14. Conspiracy among them is obviously present in this case. who was seated at the back of the car.72 Drugs Law.’ (Section 30.’ The crime is aggravated when committed by any person or persons belonging to an organized or syndicated crime group (Section 30. 6425. 120034.A. 1998)" IN VIEW WHEREOF. Finally. G.18 In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code. to hand him the bag containing the drugs.17 The existence of a conspiracy among the three accused is very much apparent from the narration of SPO1 Facto about how the transaction went. called the informant and SPO1 Facto. July 10. Tadena. as it did not show a common plan or design among them. as determined and promulgated by the DDB. 15. upon finality of this decision. Esparas. accused-appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy among the three accused. 1998). Valencia. Esparas. Tadena asked SPO1 Facto about the money. It may be deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated or from the acts of the accused showing a joint or common purpose and design. In the case of other dangerous drugs. No. 7659. we find otherwise. July 10. confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. R. the death penalty shall be imposed. the penalty is ‘reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Article IV of R.A. Neither is it necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or object to be carried out.R. after consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose. and People vs. SO ORDERED. the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. the Court agrees with the conclusions of the trial court. as amended. ordered Deroy. This demonstrates the concerted effort of the three accused in drug dealing. In such a case. the driver. as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. They were already violating the law and the police only used the buy-bust operation to apprehend them in the act of unlawfully selling drugs. 7659. No. the supposed buyer. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. who was occupying the front passenger seat. As regards the penalty. 14-A. let the records of these cases be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency. thus: "Section 20.A. III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: 8. Again. Upon the arrival of the Mitsubishi Lancer bearing plate no. and 16 of Art.16 The existence of a conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence because it may be inferred from the parties’ conduct indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to the commission of the crime. UET 384 at the corner of Baler and Miller Streets. This is certainly a legitimate entrapment operation and not instigation. G. An organized or syndicated crime group has been defined as a group of two or more persons collaborating. and People vs. 7659. Valencia gave the bag to SPO1 Facto as the latter handed him the money. When SPO1 Facto asked for the stuff. .R. R. concerted action and community of interest. No.’ In Section 15. Q98-78878 is AFFIRMED. 120034.
issued annually by the Collector of Internal Revenue in favor of the said corporation. the said corporation a check for the sum of P858. defendant-appellant.73 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. which tax amounted exactly to P858. that on the 6th day of April. and obtained from. Herrero and Masigan for appellant. Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.88 at the rate of 1/3 of one per cent of the true . MANUEL B. as such employee of the abovenamed corporation. as such employee of the above-named compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas.662. of which they form an integral part. in order to declare and certify with his signature said amount before the Collector of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized agents. making said declaration and certification on the coupons attached with the patents. The complaint alleged: That on and many years before the 7th day of April. to the sum of P257. plaintiff-appellee. payable to the order of the Collector of Internal Revenue. that. that said accused. Philippine currency. with the funds of the said corporation supplied him for said purpose. Philippine currency.87. No. with which to pay the said Collector of Internal Revenue for the tax corresponding to the sales made during the first quarter of 1914. was also bound to pay. the Internal Revenue taxes which it had to pay on the amount of the sales above-referred to. as the accused well knew. the total amount of the sales of the goods and merchandise made during such period by the said corporation. L-11165 August 15. it was his duty to find out. that. during the first quarter of the year 1914. vs. Asensi was and had been a trusted employee of the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas. a foreign corporation domiciled in the city of Manila and duly authorized to engage in business in the Philippine Islands. amounted. 1914. at the end of every quarter.88. 1916 THE UNITED STATES.R. ASENSI. JOHNSON.: This defendant was charged with the crime of estafa. the sales of goods and merchandise made in Manila by the said corporation. the said accused asked for. committed with the falsification of a document. the said Manuel B. 1914. J.
the sum of P400. judge.000 pesetas. namely.662. 2751. declare and certify falsely. willingly. in the aforesaid form. 1914. failing to declare the truth in the statement of the facts. willingly. in the city of Manila. over the said amount of the sales. at this same time and place. was only P458.88 as the tax due on the sales declared. the said accused went to the office of the Collector of Internal Revenue. through the false statement made by him in the above-mentioned coupon No. induced and persuaded the Internal Revenue officers to believe the declarations. equivalent to 2. time and place. accepted. Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arrested. out of the sum of P858. An act committed in violation of law. and there presented coupon No. once he was in possession of the said sum of P400. with his signature. and that the Internal Revenue tax which the corporation should pay on the said amount at the rate of 1/3 of one per cent. that is. returning. referred to. did appropriate the same for himself.78. and the said accused in the time and place referred to. during the first quarter of 1914. was P137. did. and during said employment had been charged with the responsibility of taking care of various branches or departments or work of said corporation. 1 which is an integral part of the patent to which it was attached. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made several assignments of error. that on the 7th day of April. issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue to the Compania General Tabacos de Filipinas. From an examination of the record we find that the following facts are clearly proven. and was still on engaged during the year 1914. 1914. to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law. on April 7. 1914. and the said officers. they are not seriously denied: First. Philippine currency. 2751. herein. That the defendant had been an employee of the offended corporation for a long period prior to the 7th of April. No.74 amount of the sales referred to. the difference between said amount and that stated in the check. and criminally state. tried. Philippine currency. that the said accused. unlawfully. to pay a fine of P2. in fat.88. acting under such belief. Second. Philippine currency. in cash. .500. unlawfully. found guilty of the crime charged. only the sum of P458.88 stated in the check drawn to the order of the Collector of Internal Revenue by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas and which the accused delivered to them. to be imprisoned for a period of ten years and one day of presidio mayor. on a large scale. arraigned. stated and certified to by the accused himself. and criminally and with the intent to defraud the said Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas. and to pay the costs. thus causing damages and injuries to the said corporation amounting to the said sum of P400. as they in fact did return. at the rate of 1/2 of one per cent. corresponding to the year 1914. and was sentenced by the Honorable Richard Campbell. 1 of patent No. that the amount of the sales made by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (of which the said accused was a trusted employee). in the city of Manila. That the offended corporation had been engaged for a long period of years in the city of Manila in the sale of merchandise of various classes. statement and certification made by him in the said instrument.
for the purpose of purchasing the stamps or paying the tax which was due. on or about the 7th of April. That. as false. (See Exhibit C. That the defendant has neglected and refused to return to the offended corporation the said P400 and has willfully appropriated the same to his own use.) Sixth. on the back of Exhibit C. and said check. (Exhibit C. was P137. as received through the false representation made by the defendant to the cashier of the offended corporation and by virtue of his misrepresentation made to the cashier of said corporation. Exhibit D. and paid to him in ash the difference between said amount and the amount of said check. to furnish a certified statement to the Collector of Internal Revenue.662. for which stamps had to be purchased.) Seventh. (See Exhibit C. the defendant represented to the cashier of said offended corporation. Eleventh. marked Exhibit D. That later the defendant. That the certificate marked Exhibit B. and that the defendant well knew that said amount did not represent the amount of the gross business done by said corporation.75 Third. the cashier of the offended corporation executed and delivered to the defendant a check. subject to internal-revenue tax. was P137. amounted to P458.87. 1914. and there purchased the number of stamps sufficient to pay the tax upon the gross amount of business. for the sum of P858. for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of the Internal Revenue Law. That in compliance with said duty and obligation as such employee of said offended corporation. by delivering to the Collector of Internal Revenue the check Exhibit D. Ninth. and of obtaining a check therefor from the cashier of said corporation. made payable to the Collector of Internal Revenue. ending March 31. The Internal Revenue Collector delivered to the defendant stamps amounting to P458. Fourth. was obliged.88. That the defendant was charged with the duty. That the offended corporation being a merchant. upon the representation made by the defendant in Exhibit C. for the purpose of paying the amount of taxes due upon said sales for a particular quarter.88. the defendant did. That upon the representation made by Exhibit C.87.88. that the amount of gross business subject to internal revenue tax was the sum of P257.) Eighth.88. went to the office of the Collector of Internal Revenue.87. (See Exhibit B. engaged in the sale of merchandise. 1914. 1914. as indicated by the preceding paragraph. The certificate (Exhibit B) showed that the amount of taxes due.) Tenth.662. . and that the amount of money which was necessary to pay said merchant's tax for said period was P458. of making out said certificate showing the amount of sales of said corporation for each and every quarter. and that the amount of money necessary to pay said tax was the sum of P858. in that it represented that the gross business of said offended corporation subject to internal-revenue tax for the period ending March 31. represented by said Exhibit B. made by the defendant. done by said offended corporation. showing the amount of sales for each and every quarter of each year. Fifth. notwithstanding said certificate showing the gross business subject to internalrevenue tax. or the sum of P400. prepare and sign the certificate required by the internal revenue department.88. in which he certified that the gross business of said offended corporation. on behalf of the said corporation. with said certificate Exhibit B. That the P400 received by the defendant.662.
The corporation itself. but in various others. even admitting that he had falsified the same. for a number of years. under his first assignment of error. or under any other circumstances. We do not believe that it is within his mouth now to say that he had not been appointed to perform that particular duty in accordance with the provisions of law. etc. and he was therefore not liable. giving rise to the obligation to make delivery of or to return the same.76 Twelfth. and the particular duty which the defendant voluntarily assumed. we are of the opinion and so hold. to the prejudice of another. The courts will not now hear him say that he was performing the duty thus voluntarily assumed. covering a number of years. (U. Baens (5 Phil. or other personal property. vs.. Considering the fraud practiced by the defendant upon the offended corporation and the fact that he obtained the money in question by means of false representations.) We have also held that a receipt issued by the department of assessments and collections of the city of Manila. The defendant accepted the responsibility imposed upon him by the offended corporation. for . with the solemnities required by law. received by such person for safe keeping. in accordance with Act No. or on commission. He voluntarily assumed the obligation to perform the duty imposed upon him. without authority of law. goods. and had. That by reason of the false representations made by the defendant. we are of the opinion that the sentence of the lower court should not be modified by reason of the error alleged in the first assignment. and actually undertook to perform said duty. Any person who. as well as to pay a fine for its failure to comply strictly with the provisions of the law. made out the required certificate for and on behalf of the corporation. attempts to show. 5 Phil. shall be guilty of the crime of estafa and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 535. In the second assignment the appellant argues that. for the purpose off ascertaining the gross amount of business done by it. a demand or the return of the same is not necessary in order to constitute the crime of estafa. The Penal Code contains no definition of what constitutes a public document. Rep. not being able to act for itself. The record shows that the defendant obtained possession of the said P400 by means of fraud and false representations. the appellant contends that the document falsified (Exhibit B) is not a public document. Rep. not only in the certificate marked Exhibit B.. and cites many provisions of the different codes in force here in support of his argument. 742) that any instrument authorized by a notary public or a competent public official. and upon which it was required by law to pay taxes for each quarter. With reference to the third assignment of error. The appellant. The record shows that the defendant had been designated by the offended corporation as its representative. the offended corporation as obliged to pay to the Collector of Internal Revenue a great many thousand pesos to cover its unpaid taxes.. This Court held in the case of Cacnio vs. that a demand for the return of the same and a refusal by him so to do is not a necessary prerequisite as an element of the crime charged against the defendant. was a public document. 90 of the Philippine Commission. are public documents. inasmuch as the proof fails to show that the offended corporation had demanded a return of the said P400. 725. Carrington. was under the necessity of having an agent or representative to act for it. We have also held that the blank forms prepared by the Auditor of the Philippine Islands. Taking into consideration the relation of the offended corporation to the defendant. shall convert or misappropriate money. We find nothing in the second assignment of error sufficient to justify a modification of the sentence of the lower court. that there was no obligation resting upon the defendant to make the certificate Exhibit B. he was not guilty of the crime of estafa. or administration. and it not appearing that the defendant had refused to return the same. in its relation with article 534 of the Penal Code. When money or property is received by means of fraud or false representations. S.
In the case of United States vs. Mateo (5 Phil. an official receipt was held to be a public document. Rep. Rep. In the present case the document in question (Exhibit B) was printed in accordance with Schedule C and furnished to merchants.) In the case of United States vs. This form was evidently prescribed by the internal revenue department of the Government. is also public document. Rep.77 taxes collected. was a public or an official document. for the reason that it was invested with the character of an official document by reason of the fact that it was printed in accordance with the standard forms required by the Government. as those terms are used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal Code. we are of the opinion and so hold that the same should be and is hereby affirmed. as that term is used in articles 300 and 301 of the Panel Code.. as that term is used in article 300 of the Penal Code. Rep. in the sense in which those words are used in article 300 of the Penal Code. . The sentence of the lower court being fully sustained by the evidence and the law. it became a part of the records of that office and in our judgment is fully invested with the character of an official or public document. and one who falsified the same is guilty of the falsification of a public document (U.. S. So ordered. 366) we held that the cashbook of a public official. Vy Guico (12 Phil. in accordance with the provisions of the law of 1904. is a public document. Vy Guico (supra). Rep. and should be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of article 301 of the Penal Code. Leyson. 5 Phil.. in which entries are made of accounts of public moneys received. 241) we held that an official cashbook kept by the disbursing officer of the Coast Guard and Transportation Department. with costs. Weems (7 Phil. we are of the opinion that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause shows that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged in the complaint. within the meaning of that term as used in article 301 of the Penal Code. in its relation with article 89 of the same code. Barrios (10 Phil. In the case of United States vs. From all of the foregoing facts. vs.. 462) we held that a burial permit issued by the Board of Public Health of the city of Manila is a public document. 209) we held that the official receipt prescribed by the Government to be issued upon the receipt of money for public purposes is a public document. 447. In the case of United States vs.. In the case of United States vs. When presented to the internal revenue department of the Government.
having been duly sworn as a witness in the Court of First Instance of the said province in criminal case No. On the trial of this case in the court below the appellant again testified that the said Tambolero passed the night of May 15. filed a complaint against the appellant. and as accused. Lope Estraña. on the said 15th day of May. were defendants. 1055. all of which was in violation of the statutes in such case made and provided. leaving about 5 a. that he was then living in the barrio of Japitan. wherein the United States was plaintiff and Gil Gamao et al. Gil Gamao et al. Province of Negros Occidental. willfully. and died about 5 a. convicted. and that he remained in the house of the said accused (Lope Estraña) until the following day. 1909. 1909. 1910 UNITED STATES.: The complaint filed in this case is as follows: That on the 26th of July. Lope Estraña. under oath. 1909. in that the said Tambolero came to the appellant's house and passed the night of May 15. 5751 September 6. there. The prosecuting officers." and to pay the costs of the cause. maliciously. J.78 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. LOPE ESTRAÑA. 1055. on May 15. He appealed to this court. . entitled "United States vs. plead not guilty. Philippine Islands. well knew.m. Subsequently thereto criminal case No. and that one Dionisio Tambolero came to his house in the said barrio about 7 p. No. at his house. was called as a witness for the defense in said criminal case and after being duly sworn according to law. on the following morning. The appellant.m. 1909. jurisdiction of the said town of Escalante. and "to hereafter be incapable of holding public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands. vs. for the period of one year and one day. when. charging him with the crime of perjury. charged with the assassination of the said priest. as a matter of fact. The Roman Catholic priest in charge of the parish in the town of Escalante. plaintiff-appellee. at about 7 p. the said Dionision Tambolero was not at Japitan on the said 15th day of May. and called as witnesses to corroborate him on this point his wife and stepson who did in fact corroborate the testimony of the appellant."1 for murder. but they could not specifically state the hour he left the following morning. on the following morning. illegally. and sentenced to be confined in the Insular penitentiary. testified. that on the 15th day of May. the said Lope Estraña. TRENT. and falsely testified and declared. believing this testimony to be false.m. tried. in the municipality of Bacolod. defendant-appellant. 1909. was instituted in the Court of First Instance in the said province. 1909.R..m. Province of Occidental Negros. The accused was arraigned. and remained there all night. within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Escalante. 1909. among other things. in said province. one Dionisio Tambolero came to his house in Japitan. was fatally wounded on the night of May 15.
either by land or water. that on leaving this store he returned to his own house and later went to the house of his compadre. which requires at least two and one-half hours. He was in the sacristia of the church at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of May 15. had a conversation with Natalio Inson about certain baptisms which had taken place on that afternoon. 1909. 1909. The appellant. 1055. that he and his family did not sleep in his own house on the night of May 15 on account of it being used for the storage of tobacco.79 Dionisio Tambolero testified in this case that he did not know exactly where the defendant's house is situated in the barrio of Japitan and that he never was at any time in the house of the defendant in the said barrio. heard mass. when he was informed by a policeman named Clemente Magallon of what happened to the priest on the night before. called Dionisio Tambolero. and that on leaving the sacristia he went to the store of one Jose Nieva and remained there until about 6. about the commission of that murder. Lope Estraña. when the murder was committed he saw Mauricio Gamao. neither did he spend the night of the 15th of May in the appellant's house. 1909. 1055) a witness for the prosecution. The only reference to the testimony of Tambolero in said murder case appears in the appellant's brief. So it has been conclusively established that Dionisio Tambolero did not go to the house of the appellant in the barrio of Japitan on May 15. that at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon he returned t the sacristia. that within one-half hour after he arrived at the convent Gregorio Tudanca gave him some money and sent him to a Chinese store to buy nails to be used in making a casket for the deceased priest. but that they did sleep in the next house. under oath. before a legally constituted tribunal. Tambolero did not state that he was a witness in the said murder case (No. testify as a witness for the prosecution in that case. It may be inferred that Dionisio Tambolero was a material witness for the prosecution in said criminal case No. as he stated that after leaving the Chinese store he went to his own house. arriving there abut 5 o'clock that afternoon. The prosecution in this case is based on the said false testimony of the appellant given in criminal case No. The testimony of this witness as to the time he was at the sacristia on the afternoon of the 15th of May is corroborated with reference to the time he went to the convent on the following morning is corroborated in every particular by the testimony of Gregorio Tudanca. and was at the convent the following morning just a few minutes after 5 o'clock. did therefore knowingly and intentionally testify falsely. Considering the distance from the appellant's house to the town of Escalante. and the difficulties to be encountered in making this journey. which was owned by an employee of his. all of whom testified positively that they saw the said Tambolero at the convent about 5 o'clock on the morning of the 16th of May assisting in the preparation of the body of the deceased priest for interment. he went direct to the convent. Celedonia Samonte. if anything. slept in the house of one of his employees. with a bolo in his hand. reading his testimony alone. wherein his counsel states that "In said case (referring to criminal case No. and Vicente Olmedo. the record of the case at bar fails to disclose what his testimony was. he went to the church in Escalante.30 or 7 o'clock in the evening. arriving there a few minutes after 5 o'clock. in fact. and returned to his house in the said town of Escalante. According to the testimony of this witness he did not leave the town of Escalante at any time during the night of May 15. 1055). If said Tambolero did. that on the morning of the 15th of May. it was a physical impossibility for Tambolero to have left the house of the appellant at the time stated by him (the appellant) and to have arrived at the convent at the time he appeared there to assist in the burial of the priest. come out of the lower . but on the contrary. that the next morning. when he swore that Tambolero passed the night of May 15 in his (appellant's) house. neither did he make any reference to what he knew. testified that on the night of May 15. 1055. and was informed the following morning by a policeman that the murder had been committed. it would appear that he knew nothing about the facts surrounding the commission of that crime.
as provided in said section. namely. having taken an oath before a competent tribunal. 1055) on the night of the murder leaving the lower part of the convent with a bolo in his hand. or person. Concepcion (13 Phil. and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years. The fact in controversy in both cases was only one. is guilty of perjury. The defendants were accused and convicted for having violated the provisions of the Election Law. or certificate by him subscribed is true. This section specifically provides that any person who has taken an oath before a competent tribunal that he will testify truly. to have his name registered as an elector. The point in controversy in said case was whether or not Esteban Leocario appeared before the inspectors (the accused) in order to have his name registered in the electoral list." (Mauricio Gamao was one of the defendants charged with the assassination of the priest in case No. Section 3 of the Act No. in the election for Delegates held on the 31st of July. officer. moreover. thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed. 424). This section does not impliedly require as an essential element of the crime of perjury that a defendant who is prosecuted for having violated these provisions should have testified twice in any case or in any investigation. basing his contention on the ground that in order to sustain a conviction under said Act it was necessary to show that the appellant had testified twice about a certain matter. under oath. and this court. that he will testify. Counsel for the appellant insists that the court below should have dismissed this case for the reason that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute the crime of perjury as defined and punished by Act No. is guilty of perjury. they appealed. depose. the defendants were inspectors of the election board in the municipality of Calibo. 1907. or that any written testimony. in that they refused to inscribe the name of one Esteban Leocario without just cause. to any material matter which he does not believe to be true. deposition.80 part of the convent. The defendants having testified in that case that the said Esteban Leocario did not appear before them on the day alleged. or that any written testimony by him subscribed is true. in passing upon the questions involved. willfully and contrary to such oath. This statement of counsel will be considered later. his second testimony being contradictory of his first. In the case of the United States vs. and shall.) If this statement of counsel for the appellant be accepted as true. but he can be charged and convicted of the crime of perjury if he willfully testifies. The accused were convicted of having violated the provisions of the Election Law and on appeal to this court the sentence and judgment of the lower court was affirmed. 1697 is as follows: Any person who. 1697. under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Penal Code. hen Tambolero did testify that he saw one of the defendants in that case (No. willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true. in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered. his latter testimony testified once he should have been charged with the crime of false swearing (falso testimonio). the prosecution filed a complaint against the said defendants charging them with the crime of perjury. or certify truly. 1055. 425. The defendants having been convicted of the crime of perjury. 429): . states or subscribes to any material matter which he does not believe to be true.. declare. the appearance or nonappearance of Esteban Leocario before the election inspector. said (pp. Rep. declaration. Province of Capiz.
60 Kan. 137. 613. Cas. was material to the issues involved in the murder case. State vs. Rep. when it is not alleged in the complaint. the question involved in said murder case. State. nor does it appear from the record. or whether these articles have been impliedly repealed by section 3 of Act No. 71. 1697. State. 1697. 12. Ah Bean. and counsel for the appellant. 25 Fed. People..m. Collier.. State vs. and numerous other cases cited. 66 Iowa. 762.. Cowing. Gibson. the judgment must be reversed. 103 Ind. Ann... 33 Tex. and that the crime is now defined and punished by section 3 of Act No. 77 Cal. alleged to be false. of the next day.. People vs. 837.m. State. Williams. nor the brief's filed in this court. or could have in any way affected. 54 Fed.. 1055 was material to the issues involved therein.. This may be done either by a direct allegation that it was material. on May 15 and remained there until 5 a. (30 Cyc. 170 State vs. This testimony was false. 94. Cunningham. and that is that there is no allegation in this complaint that the testimony of the appellant in criminal case No. testified in said criminal case No.. People vs. (Serra vs.. above quoted (the provisions of the Penal Code with reference to false testimony having been repealed by Act No.. reported in 11 Phil. vs. So the reason given by counsel for the appellant as to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is untenable. This question apparently escaped the attention of the trial court. however. 242. the appellant willfully and contrary to the oath which he had taken. If the case falls within the provisions of the Penal Code and those provisions are still in force. 1697. S. Mortiga. 1055 that Tambolero came to his house about 7 p. the prosecuting officers. Our . 551. 52 Ga. Cr. is whether this offense is to be punished by the provision of the Penal Code. Y. or by the allegation of facts from which its materiality will appear. 117. S. and U. that the false testimony given by the appellant in said criminal case No... 488. 26 La. In the absence of a statute to the contrary. 47 Fla. State vs. 470. 59 N.. 1697). It is now necessary to determine whether or not the appellant is guilty of the crime of perjury under section 3 of Act No. S. As we have said. No. Wood vs. C. 1055 was material to the issues involved in said case. it is well settled that an indictment for perjury must show conclusively that the testimony given or assertion made by the defendant on the trial on which he was sworn or it will be fatally defective. vs.) The complaint in the case at bar is fatally defective for the want of an allegation that the testimony. because this case for perjury was tried and decided in the court below before the testimony was given.. 14880.) No objections to the sufficiency of the complaint were made in the court below. U. Hembree vs. Anderson. 16. 1 Mich. Buller vs. but there is a good reason why the complaint is insufficient in law. and it is now well settled that it is not error for this court to refuse to sustain such objections taken for the first time on appeal when the fatal defects in the complaint are supplied by competent proof. Singleton. 1433. 4 Cranch C. Rep. Gibson vs. articles 318 and following. xxx xxx xxx Our conclusion is that the articles of the Penal Code relating to perjury have been repealed. 204 U. but the record does not disclose (aside from the statement of the counsel before mentioned) whether or not this false testimony did affect.81 The important question in the case. It is not mentioned anywhere in the record.
89. he said. .. 1697. 117. and that he was present at the time. 450. and C. brought an action against the prosecutor for malicious prosecution. (Miller vs. (30 Cyc. In this action Hattaway was called as a witness and testified that Shackleford purchased the cow in question from one Carter. a man is answerable only to his God. or one relating to a matter utterly immaterial. For such offense. the one is stubborn and corrupt. The trial court instructed the jury that the testimony was not material so as to constitute perjury. 112. There is a distinction between perjury and false swearing.. taken in idle conversation. 691. Green well. But there are many offenses against morality and religion which are not cognizable in courts of justice. P. Hattaway (10 Am. and the court in passing upon this motion said (p. or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of the inquiry.. State." whereas it was proved that he did not live in the State. and Nelson vs. 580) one Shackleford having indicted for stealing a cow and afterwards discharged. or even an impious oath. 13 Pac. Being asked where he lived at the time. 581): It seems to be agreed by all the writers on criminal law. (In re Franklin County. As no objection to the sufficiency of the complaint was raised this fatal defect could have been supplied by competent testimony on the trial. Dec. 37 Tex.) This definition of perjury. . and cases cited therein. than that the oath must relate to some fact material to the issue. 403. (30 Cyc. and no point better settled. while the other is simply not true. 5 Utah. 1443. or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies. 59 N. Dec. lawfully administered in a judicial proceeding or the course of justice in regard to a matter material to the issue or point of inquiry.82 statute (section 3 of Act No. perhaps. 1399. 32 Iowa. . There can be no doubt but that an extrajudicial oath.) In the case of the State vs. 7 Ohio. (30 Cyc. The defendant then moved to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law. N. 15 Fla. in a material matter.. the offense being enlarged and made to extend to other false oaths than those taken in the course of judicial proceedings. lacking the elements which go to constitute the crime of perjury. 1400.. The perjury assigned was his false testimony as to where he lived..) By the common law perjury is the willful and corrupt taking of a false oath. PI. 577. 5 Ohio S. State vs. There is no offense the general character of which is better understood than that of perjury. The materiality of a matter sworn to must be established by evidence and can not be left to the presumption or inference. may be as offensive in the eye of justice. that one ingredient in the crime of perjury is that the oath relate to some matter material to the question in issue: . but the jury thought otherwise and found the defendant guilty. perhaps within 100 yards. "Near Carter's. and not to the laws of his country. Aikens. and cases cited. People vs. . as modified by statute. Y. under oath or information administered by authority of law. supra) specifically makes materiality an essential element of the crime of perjury and without this the crime can not legally exists. ..) . Cr.. may be more accurately defined to be the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood. Garrett vs. wood vs. People.. State. 198.) The term "material matter" means the main fact which was the subject of the inquiry. or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact.
. in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered.) The contrary rule obtained for prosecutions under the provisions of the penal code. as in Act No. the doctrine of the courts that it must be shown by competent proof that the false testimony was material to the issues involved. moreover. officer. S. thereafter be incapable of giving testimony in any court of the United States until such time as the judgment against him is reversed. 585. vs. 296. the defects must be supplied by competent proof. or certify truly. vs. supra. heretofore referred to. 1697 are exactly the same. that he will testify. This section (5392) is as follows: Every person who. not more than five years. and by imprisonment. 1697 is a copy. having taken an oath before a competent tribunal. (U. declare. The essential parts of this section (5392) and section 3 of that Act No. S. an element of the crime.. Rep. of section 5392 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. but under our law (Act No. "Whatever we move in this department of our jurisprudence we come in contact with it. 6 Phil. Opinion. the prosecution has failed to establish the legal guilt of the accused of the crime of perjury. and U. or certificate by him subscribed is true. 23 Fed. or that any written testimony. It is also true that section 3 of our perjury law is practically the same as that of nearly all of the States of the Union wherein materiality is made. This doctrine pervades the entire adjudged law on the subject. This is not a confession. Landsberg. 12 Phil. as there is a marked difference between a confession and such a statement. We can no more escape from it than from the atmosphere which surrounds us. declaration. which he does not believe to be true. and shall. S. the said statement of counsel can affect the guilt of the accused. or person. but this is purely a statement by counsel made in the appellate court. an essential element of the crime of perjury. is settle beyond question. Rev. As we have said. willfully and contrary to such oaths states or subscribed is true. Concepcion. he has not committed a crime (if this statement of counsel does not affect the result) for which he can be punished under the law in force in this jurisdiction. Rep. is guilty of perjury. 1697. Stat. with the necessary changes only. vs. by statute. It is more than probable that the appellant himself knows nothing of this statement. depose. if any. (U. In order to sustain a conviction based on a fatally defective complaint.) is the materiality of the matter charged to have been falsely stated. and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand dollars. Adolfo. deposition. no doubt he has never seen the brief filed . 662. is guilty of perjury. S. at hard labor. An essential element of the offense created by the statute (section 5392. Rep.) Where materiality is made by statute." Aside from the statement of counsel in his brief. We shall now determine in what way. Counsel in his printed brief in this court states that the witness Tambolero testified in said murder case that when the murder was committed he saw one of the defendants come out of the lower part of the convent with a bolo in his hands.) In some jurisdictions the prosecution of perjury is continued until the same proceedings in which the perjury is alleged to have been committed has been ended.83 Section 3 of Act No. vs. inasmuch as it has not been proven in any manner that the false testimony of the appellant was material in the murder case. (U.. 1697) it is not necessary that the proceeding in which the perjury was committed should be terminated before prosecution for that crime is commenced.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted. whose duty it was to decide the question of the guilt or innocence upon the law as given them by the court. which was otherwise unexceptionable.84 in this case. at the time the defendants were on trial and in their presence. In the case of Sweet Clayton vs. to wit. 17925 March 28. but it does conclusively show that the same was made for the first time in the printed brief on appeal. therefore.R. based on the ground of the insufficiency of the indictment. In the fourth subdivision of the charge the jury are told that "it is admitted by the defendant's counsel that John Woods and Lark Calyton were prisoners legally confined in the county jail of Unvalde County. true or false.. Their admission could not in law prejudice or affect his rights. So such a statement can not be accepted as competent proof to supply the fatal defects in the complaint and form the basis upon which a conviction can be entered. theft of a cow. on an accusation of felony. certain instruments for the purpose of aiding two prisoners to make their escape. said (p. into the jail of Uvalde County. State (4 Tex. for the crime of conveying. The State: The prisoner's counsel had no authority to make any statement or admission to supply the place or have the force of evidence against him. App. but on its own motion reversed the judgment on another ground which was not raised by counsel and which referred to the admissions made by defendant's counsel. with costs de officio. 518): The charge of the court. that the said Woods and Clayton were prisoners legally confined. nor could they be in any wise jeopardized by the assumption of any grounds whatever upon which his defense may have been placed by his counsel. Our conclusions are. A motion for the arrest of the judgment was made in the court of appeals. and the evidence as given by the witnesses. So such a statement made for the first time on appeal is not competent proof to established the guilt of the appellant. that the appellant is not guilty of the crime of perjury for the reasons above set forth. or any grounds upon which they may have rested his defense. irrespective of any admissions by the prisoner's counsel. In the case at bar we do not find it necessary to go as far as the Texas court did. defendant's counsel no doubt admitted in open court. Whether those grounds were correct or incorrect. presents an error which will necessitate a reversal of the case. It does not appear that the defendants made any objections to the said admission. That was not the question for the consideration of the jury. George Spears and Sweet Calyton were indicated in the district court of Uvalde. Texas. 515). for the reason that the statement of counsel for the appellant was not made in the trial court and this record fails to disclose whether said statement was made in the presence of the accused. Counsel for appellant was not authorized by his client to make this statement." As was said in the case of Nels vs. Notwithstanding all these facts the court reversed the judgment solely for this reason. and in passing upon this question the court. speaking through Mr. In this case. was wholly immaterial. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. when such guilt must depend solely upon the said statement. No. or causing to be conveyed. 1922 . The court did not sustain the contention of counsel for the defendants. No confession of theirs could bind or affect him. Justice White.
the defendant was the chief clerk in the office of the district engineer of Ilocos Sur. that the aforesaid Evaristo Abaya did appear in the office of the auditor in the place. Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee. found the defendant guilty as charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P25 and the costs. The court. Quirino & Belmonte for appellant. Section 580 of the Administrative Code reads: When authority to take testimony or evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person. 1921. The defendant appeared in obedience to the subpoena but declined to make oath as a witness or to testify without the permission of his immediate superior. Felipe Jimenez. The case is now before this court upon appeal from that sentence. thereby rendering it impossible for the said auditor to proceed with the investigation he was under obligation to make of certain matters that were awaiting investigation in his office. upon hearing. who was absent at that time. All contrary to section 580 of the Administrative Code in connection with sections 231 of 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure. and the provincial fiscal thereupon filed the following complaint against the defendant: That on the 16th day of July.85 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. a resident of the municipality of Vigan. such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summon witnesses and shall include authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise. EVARISTO ABAYA. It appears that the investigation was within the jurisdiction of the auditor's office and that the officials conducting the investigation were legally authorized to take the testimony and administer oaths in connection with the matter. and on the date and hour stated in the subpoena. defendant-appellant. and maliciously refused to testify when lawfully required to do so. . committee. 1921. he was cited subpoena to appear before the district auditor of the same province to testify in an investigation of certain items in the accounts of the district engineer. to testify in a matter to be investigated in his office. 1921. issued a subpoena addressed to Evaristo Abaya. The district auditor reported the incident to the Court of First Instance for contempt proceedings in accordance with the last paragraph of section 580 of the Administrative Code. unlawfully. OSTRAND. J. at 11 o'clock in the morning. We do not think an appeal to this court lies in the present case. vs. commanding him to appear before the said acting auditor on the said 16th day of July. On July 16. plaintiff-appellee.: The evidence in the present case shows that at the time hereinafter mentioned. the district engineer. but willfully. the acting district auditor of Ilocos Sur. or other body. subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character. Ilocos Sur.
which reads as follows: A Court of First Instance or a judge of such court a chambers. such as the present. No. or both. without lawful excuse. a person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice. are expressly excepted from the operation of the section last quoted. fails to appear upon summons issued under the authority of the preceding paragraph or who. and when the cause has regularly passed to the Supreme Court by bill of exceptions. The appeal is therefore dismissed with the costs against the appellant. The only provision for the revision by the Supreme Court of contempt proceedings in the Court of First Instance is found in section 240 of the Code of Civil Procedure. an obligation with sureties to the acceptance of the judge. or by imprisonment not exceeding ten days. 1911 . but execution of the judgment and orders shall not be suspended until there is filed by the person in contempt. of course. give testimony. as in this act provided. It will be noted that cases of contempt arising under section 231.86 Any one who. or produce documents for inspection. when thereunto lawfully required. and conditioned that if the judgment be against him he will abide and perform the order or judgment.R. in the court rendering the judgment or making the order. appearing before any individual or body exercising the power therein defined. The fact that in the trial of the present case the court below may have observed greater formality than that ordinarily required in summary proceedings does not. L-6294 February 10. alter the character of the offense charged or affect the question of the appealability of the judgment. But such review shall be had only after final judgment in the action in the Court of First Instance. refusal to make oath or to testify before an administrative officer or body is delay with as if such proceeding falls under section 231 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As will be seen. refuses to make oath. by fine not exceeding two hundred pesos. in an amount to be by him fixed. except in cases arising under section two hundred and thirty-one. may punish summarily. Such cases are punished summarily and it was clearly not the intention of the legislators that they should be appealable. So ordered. made in cases of contempt. may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. which reads: The judgment and orders of a Court of First Instance. including the refusal of a person present in court to be sworn as a witness or to answer as a witness when lawfully required. shall be subject to discipline as in case of contempt of court and upon application of the individual or body exercising the power in question shall be dealth with by the judge of first instance having jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by law.
testified that her husband died of fever and that during his illness. to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment is case of insolvency. 163.87 THE UNITED STATES. in that town. the defendant is not guilty. . and at the instigation of one Leoncio Ballena she testified that the fiscal. to the accessory penalties provided for by law. and false. there was tried in the Court of First Instance of the subprovince of Masbate criminal case No. that the testimony was material. Every essential element constituting the crime of perjury must be established by competent testimony. plaintiff-appellee. Ana Ramirez. There are certain well-defined and indispensable requisites which must be established in every case of subornation of perjury before an accused person. If this contention be true. Whereas. Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.. at the time he was in Dimasalang making the investigation into the cause of the death of Ana's husband. 1909. Señor Bailon. attempted to rape her daughter Ana. From this sentence and judgment the defendant appealed. and she also denied having been in the house of one Jose Largo for the purpose of testifying with reference to the death of her husband. and asked for the hand of the girl in marriage. Platon and Lontok for appellant. under oath. Mapa. or officer. Buencamino." in which the defendant was charged with the crime of perjury. In this homicide case Ana Ramirez was called as a witness. or before whom. In the trial of this perjury case on Estefania Barruga. charged with homicide. in that the said Pellejera did. was a witness for the defendant. after being duly sworn. Diokno. The prosecution must show the nature of the proceedings in which the alleged perjury was committed. she observed no contusions or other injuries on his body. that her husband died as a direct result of the blows inflicted by Pellejera and that his death occurred within three days after having received these blows. vs. but she did not desire to accept this proposition of the fiscal because he was a married man. she did testify. defendant-appellant. in which. as a matter of fact. and sentenced to six month's imprisonment. to pay a fine of P500. the false oath was taken. Upon this complaint the defendant was duly tried. and on the 29th of September. by means of blows. LEONCIO BALLENA. TRENT. 1909. Ana Ramirez was found guilty as charged and sentenced accordingly. can be convicted. that the defendant knowingly and willfully procured another to swear falsely. before the said fiscal. and that the witness suborned did testify under circumstances rendering him guilty of perjury. The basis of this prosecution was the false testimony given by the defendant in a certain criminal case tried in that court wherein one Ciriaco Pellejera was defendant.: On the 21st of September. the court. charging him with the crime of subornation of perjury. entitled "United States vs. and. and now insists that the testimony by given by Estefania Barruga in that perjury case was immaterial to the issues involved therein. Buencamino jr. the fiscal filed an information in the Court of First Instance of that province against the said Leoncio Ballena. mother of the defendant Ana. J. Subsequently thereto. She denied having testified under oath before the provincial fiscal in the town of Dimasalang. that the witness was duly sworn. found guilty. charged with the commission of this crime. cause the death of the husband of Ana Ramirez. contrary to her testimony in this case. and to pay the costs. which lasted more than two weeks.
but he did so maliciously.) In the criminal case in which the witness Barruga gave that false testimony. The term 'material matter' means the main fact which was the subject of the inquiry. If he should have attempted to prosecute Ana after having committed these acts the court would not only have disbelieved the fiscal. The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the merits of the case. It was important to know whether or not the fiscal. It is clear that the false testimony of Ana Ramirez against Pellejera was material. supra. the fiscal having prosecuted him previous to this trial. but it would have looked upon the whole prosecution as a fabrication. as it appears from the record that he was an enemy of the fiscal at that time. under oath. MANUEL SAMANIEGO and JUANA BENEDICTO DE PEREZ. necessarily follows that materiality is likewise an indispensable requisite in the crime of subornation of perjury. testifying as a witness. the defendant strongly insisted that by the witness Barruga testifying that the fiscal committed those acts would be the only was to save her daughter from imprisonment. therefore. Rep. S. If the fiscal had committed these acts they would have constituted a strong circumstance showing the innocence of Ana. vs. In the trial of the case against Ana for perjury there was presented a question of fact as to whether or not Ana testified. same is hereby affirmed. So ordered. as she had testified in the trial of the case against Pellejera that she did not so testify before the fiscal. the main question involved was whether or not Ana Ramirez testified before the provincial fiscal that her husband died as a result of the blows inflicted by Ciriaco Pellejera. plaintiff-appellee. as the latter is derived from the former. at the time Ana testified before him. or circumstance. vs. with costs against the defendant.88 In the case at bar the record shows beyond any question of a doubt that the witness Barruga. Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila En Banc . Estraña. after being duly sworn. THE UNITED STATES. S.. or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies. defendants-appellants. that this witness so testified at the instigation of the defendant Ballena. The witness so informed the defendant. which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to such inquiry. or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact. 16 Phil.) It. Estraña. (Quoted with approval in U. Notwithstanding this information. before the fiscal in that investigation that her husband did in fact die as a result of the wounds inflicted by Pellejera. as we have said. (U. and that the defendant knew that the testimony given by the witness Barruga was false. The defendant not only knowingly and willfully induced this witness to swear falsely. vs. Was the testimony of Barruga material to the issues involved in that criminal case against her daughter for perjury? Materiality is an essential element in the crime of perjury. or any fact. did knowingly and willfully testify falsely in a criminal case before a duly constituted tribunal. So the only question to be determined is. The fiscal was the moving party in the perjury case and it was upon his sworn complaint that Ana was prosecuted. attempted to rape her or asked her mother for permission to marry her. 520. The court found this to be true.
without having any matrimonial tie between them. J. in the daytime as well as in the nighttime. the following information was presented to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the defendants in this case: That on or about 25th day of November. and that the said Manuel Samaniego knew that she was married and united in the bonds of matrimony with and was the legitimate consort of Jose Perez Siguenza. L-5115 29 November Joaquin Rodriguez Serra for appellant. vacant houses. the said Samaniego on the 21st day of December. the said Juana Juana Benedicto De Perez was a married woman. and houses of bad repute. Philippine Islands. in the city of Manila. Philippine Islands. On the 8th day of January. the doctors made their report to the Court of First Instance. 1907. did then and there willfully. as the said accused. The defendants were arrested under the said information and were confined in Bilibid. MORELAND. No. pursuant to such permission. unlawfully. 1907. and with shame and humiliation to the husband and family of the said Juana Benedicto de Perez. Juana Benedicto de Perez. after the introduction of the proofs attorney and the trial court believed that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the conviction of either of the defendants. and feloniously lie with and have the sexual intercourse with the said accused. at the instance of the prosecuting attorney. suspicious places. 1908. In the judgment acquitting the defendants the court included permission to the prosecuting attorney to file against either or both of the said defendants a new information charging them with the crime defined in article 441 of the Penal Code. Office of the Solicitor General Harvey for appellee. 1907. and. as follows: That on and for many weeks prior to the 27th day of November. On the 7th day of January. and lewdly and indecently went to the bed together in the house of the husband of the said Juana Benedicto de Perez during the late hours of the night. dressed only in their night clothes. was examined by three physicians for the purpose of determining her mental condition. expressing the opinion that the said Juana Benedicto de Perez was mentally deranged. in the city of Manila. children. Juana Benedicto de Perez. and in decorously. habitually appeared together in public places and frequented together places of recreation. who was then and there. and immodestly embraced each other and caressed each other in the presence of the family. a married woman and the lawfully wedded wife of Jose Perez. Manuel Samaniego. that during the period of time above expressed the said Manuel Samaniego and Juana Benedicto de Perez. and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with the said accused. . willfully. On the 27th day of December. the defendants were tried on the charge of adultery. and the said Juana Benedicto de Perez on the 26th of the same month. and criminally and scandalously. 1908.89 G. illegally. after the arrest of the said defendants. 1907. unlawfully. and servants of the said husband of Juana Benedicto de Perez. the said Manuel Samaniego did then and there willfully. the prosecuting attorney presented against both of the defendants an information charging them with the crime mentioned in said article.R.: On the 20th day of December. all with public scandal and with scandal to the community. as presented in said information. indecently. 1907. being then and there a married woman and the lawfully wedded wife of the said Jose Perez Siguenza. and they were both accordingly acquitted of that charge.
as a preliminary step to that end. during one of such supplications. are situated on the ground floor. He further testified that. at the same time.90 After the presentation of this information. 257 Nozalada. the prosecuting attorney and the attorneys for the defendants agreed to submit and did submit the case to the court for final determination upon the proofs already taken in the trial on the charge of February. Here slept the cochero in a bed called by the family a bench. at his request. in ordering her arrest and reclusion. the kitchen and the toilet of the house. In attempting to prove the adultery alleged in the information. Manila. The husband testified that Juana. a student of medicine. The other accused. after her arrest. condemning the defendant Samaniego to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree and the ordering the defendant Juana Benedicto de Perez confined in an asylum for the insane until the further order of the court. “ of receiving evidence as to the publicity of the acts charged in the complaint. that. no. the trial court rendered a decision in which he found the defendants guilty of the crime charged. 257 Calle Nozaleda. This was the only bed in the lower part of the house which could possibly be used for any purpose. together with the cochero of the family. 18 years of age. viz Caridad Perez. that of adultery. three of his children. He testified further that he himself desired to terminate his marital relations with her and that he wanted a divorce. . additional evidence was taken in the case and used by the court as the basis for a further judgment in the action. so far as appears of record. viz. it appearing that the proofs under the charge therein contained would be the same as were those under the charge in the information first herein set forth. On the night if the 6th of November. Juana. expressed the desire to separate from him on account of the physical abuse and ill treatment which she had received and was receiving at his hands. Concepcion Perez. upon its own motion. who. denied that he had ever taken advantage of that friendship in any way whatever. This was done over the objections and exception of defendant’s attorneys. we obtained her arrest at the hands of the police. but. the husband of Juana Benedicto de Perez. and having borne him more than five children. On the 12th day of February said court. In the same decision he denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. all of whom lived with the accused. 1908.” On the 15th day of April. He declared further that the reason why he thus humiliated and disgraced her and deprived her of her liberty was his ardent desire to save her soul. she many times implored him to give her back her liberty and permit her to return to her family. the prosecution presented as witnesses the persons above mentioned. daughter of the defendant Juana. and. the accused. “ as expressed in the order. where she was detained and imprisoned against her will. accompanied by her daughters. On the 18th day of April the courts rendered a decision affirming the judgment rendered by him on the 5th day of February in the same case. after having lived with him for more than twenty years. daughter of the defendant Juana.. following. Juana Benedicto de Perez. she admitted to him that the defendant Samaniego was her friend. without notice to or consent of the defendants or their attorneys made an order reopening said case “for the purpose only. Rafael Perez. and her husband at No. and his cochero. The witnesses for the prosecution during the trial of the defendants on the charge made in the first information. he was acting under the advice and counsel of various lawyers and doctors. and. attended a dance given by a friend. were Jose Perez. According to the testimony of these witnesses. On the same day the defendants excepted to said decision and made a motion for a new trial. 12 years of age. and that. conducted her in a patrol wagon publicly through the streets of the city of Manila to an asylum for the insane. son of the defendant Juana. 1907.
her mother went below and appeared to be talking with him. that the witness at no time observed anything improper in the conduct or deportment of the two defendants. The cochero testified that he frequently had as passengers in the carromata the two defendants. she awoke her brother Rafael. . and on that occasion her mother delivered to him a pawn ticket. Manolo. he saw the defendant Samaniego on foot near the carromata of his mother in the Botanical Garden talking to her. There were then present in the house the accused. and on another occasion they had gone into a house on Calle Malacañang. Juana Benedicto de Perez. When the mother and the daughters who and attended the dance with her were preparing for bed. testified that. Rosario. There is no proof whatever that these were places of bad repute or that any of them were unoccupied. the prosecuting attorney recommended that the defendants be convicted of the crime defined in article 441 of the Penal Code. that not for a moment did she lose sight of her mother during all the occurrence. On that occasion she was accompanied by her grandson. as he was returning from the hospital in Quiapo. that once when she and her mother were in a carromata on the streets the defendant approached them and spoke to her mother. Caridad. dressed only in his drawers. that he asked her pardon and requested permission to put on his clothes. was not at the dance. and later. her three daughters. The married daughter. of which they stood charged. and a friend of Conchita. Caridad also testified that Samaniego was once at the house and talked with her mother though the window from the street. on hearing the cries of Conchita. her son Rafael. Juana and her daughters returned home late at night. Juana Benedicto de Perez. and the court thereupon convicted them thereof. pais the board of Samaniego for three months in a restaurant where she was cashier. when Conchita informed the family that a stranger was in the lower part of the house. was also present. and that on one occasion Juana ate with Samaniego in the restaurant. but afterwards the cochero went to asleep. and the cochero. he saw Samaniego trying to conceal himself in the kitchen and also observed that the caused. and Conchita. it appears.91 Samaniego. the witness supposing that the house was unoccupied because the accused. Juana. Conchita discovered that there was a stranger in the lower part of the house and by her cries brought the household to the spot. She declares in her testimony that when she first saw the stranger he was near the cochero’s bed and while she was watching the movements of the stranger. was going up and down the stairs. where they found the defendant Samaniego. a younger son. Upon the proofs above stated. Juana Benedicto de Perez. The cochero testified that the stranger was Samaniego and that he came first to the cochero’s bed and talked with him a while. which are all of the proofs adduced in the trial on the charge of adultery and are the same proofs upon which the defendants were acquitted of that charge. who. that permission to do so was refused and she and her brother ejected him from the house by force and later the cochero handed him his clothes over the wall. that on one occasion he had waited for them while they went to a house in Calle Cervantes. Caridad. The testimony of Rafael shows that one morning. Luisa Avesilla testified that the accused. who accompanied her below. that she gave him a blow in the face and ordered him immediately to quit the house. had told him that she was looking for a house to rent.
Viada. Every act that was in anywise public fails entirely of those qualities which offend modesty and good morals by “grievous scandal or enormity. if not absolutely contradictory of. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. 1903. 130. defendant-appellant.” The occurrence at the residence on the night of the 6th of November did not have that publicity which is required by the article of the Penal Code referred to (U. Rep. April 13. Perkins and Brady for appellant. December 14. J. L-20569 October 29. . p. viz. No. The other testimony given on the reopening by this witness and the testimony of the witness Amadeo Pacheco can have no bearing or weight in the decision of this case because such testimony relates to the acts and relations between the defendants which are not “charged in the complaint” and concerning which no evidence whatever had been offered on the trial. 3. supreme court of Spain. S. Testimony was also given on the reopening by the same witness as to an occurrence between the defendants one morning in the Botanical Garden. 1923 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Catajay. Dewitt. plaintiff-appellee.R. Concerning this incident testimony had already been given on the trial by the witness Rafael Perez. KOTTINGER.) The evidence introduced on the reopening adds nothing to the case already made by the prosecution. and January 27. Such testimony can have no weight. his testimony in relation to the same events given on the trial. The case was reopened for a particular purpose and the evidence to be introduced. evidence was presented by the prosecution in relation to the alleged occurrence between the defendants in Plaza Palacio. 1885. The judgments of conviction of the trial court is. J. In the judgment of this court the evidence fails to show the defendants guilty of the crime charged.. 6 Phil. therefore. In relation to this same event he had already given this testimony on the trial. 398. 1908. the “publicity or non-publicity of the acts charged in the complaint. was restricted to a particular condition. His evidence as to these two events given on the reopening of the case is wholly inconsistent with.” On the reopening. vs. vs. if any.92 The acts complained of lack many of the elements essential to bring them within the purview of the article of the Penal Code invoked by the prosecution. Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee. reversed. Fisher. the defendants acquitted and their discharge from custody ordered. vol.
The second point. or otherwise prepares any obscene picture or print.93 MALCOLM. 277. but trial court overruled the demurrer and the defendant duly excepted thereto. The five errors assigned by defendant-appellant in this court divide themselves into two general issues. making obscene or indecent publications misdemeanors. J. in violation of section 12 of Act No. casts. The first point sustained by counsel for the appellant is in nature a technical objection. has here been violated. the manager of the company. cuts. or who moulds. or figure shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding one year.: The question to be here decided is whether or not pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live. paints. But included therein is a section. growing out of the defendant's demurrer. that section 12 does not prohibit the taking. Kottinger in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Counsel has gone to the trouble to make a careful analysis of section 12 of the Libel Law which is intended to bear out his thesis. Manila. The information filed in court charged him with having kept for sale in the store of the Camera Supply Co. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law. for any person who keeps for sale or exhibits any . reads as follow: Any person who writes. or other matter. the defendant interposed a demurrer based upon the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an offense and were not contrary to law. Act No. or prints any notice or advertisement of any such writing. We will take upon the assignments of errors as thus classified in order. or keeps for sale. appellant argues. or who designs. paper. among other things. or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing. and publishing of alleged obscene and indecent pictures and prints. prints. that the information in this case charges no offense prohibited by section 12. or otherwise makes any obscene or indecent figure. Great Britain. Recall.. are absence or indecent. and elsewhere. Out of these facts arose the criminal prosecution of J. selling. He found and confiscated the post-cards which subsequently were used as evidence against J. obscene and indecedent pictures. Kottinger. that the law provides punishment. the question is one of first impression not alone in the Philippine Islands. draws. engraves. copies. in reality the decesive issue. To this information. but in the United States. No. 1922. detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera Supply Co. paper. J. or both. and second. judgment was rendered finding the defendant guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. book. book. at 110 Escolta. 12. distributes. J. is as suggested in the beginning of the decision. sells. first. it is contended by the Government. does not apply to the information and the facts. This will explain why a case which otherwise would be heard and voted in Division has been submitted to the court in banc for decision. Said section 12 which. and the costs. or who writes. publishes. On November 24. however. composes. stereotypes. print. and which. composes. Following the presentation of evidence by the Government and the defense. Surprising as it may seem.
94 absence or indecent writing, paper, book, or other matter, and that the information charges the defendant, among other things, with having wilfully and feloniously kept for sale, distribution, or exhibition, obscene and indecent pictures. The phrase in the law "or other matter", was apparently added as a sort of "catch-all." While limited to that which is of the same kind as its antecedent, it is intended to cover kindred subjects. The rule of ejusdem generis invoked by counsel is by no means a rule of universal application and should be made to carry out, not to defeat, the legislative intent. Even if the phrase "or other matter" be cobstrued to mean "or other matter of like kind," pictures and postcards are not so far unrelated to writings, papers, and books, as not to be covered by the general words (Commonwealth vs. Dejardin , 126 Mass., 46; 30 Am. Rep., 652; Brown vs. Corbin , 40 Minn., 508). The line of argumentation is more refined that practical. Once conceded that section 12 of Act No. 277 does not cover the present case, there yet remain for application article 571, No. 2, of the penal code, and section 730 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. The section of the Revised Ordinances cited is most specific when it provides in part that no person shall "exhibit, circulate, distribute, sell, offer or expose for sale, or give or deliver to another, or cause the same to be done, any lewd, indecent, or absence book, picture, pamphlet, card, print, paper, writing, mould, cast, figure, or any other thing." While admittedly the information is lacking in precision and while the content of section 12 of the Libel Law is not as inclusive as it might be, we yet conclude that the information is not fatally defective, and that said section 12 covers the alleged facts. We come now to decide the main issue. We repeat that our own researches have confirmed the statement of counsel that no one parrallel case be found. We must perforce reason from the general to the specific and from universal principle to actual fact. The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being obscene and indecent, disclose six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. Exhibit A carries the legend "Philippines, Bontoc Woman." Exhibit A-1 is a picture of five young boys and carries the legend "Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-2 has the legend "Ifugao Belle, Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-3 has the legend "Igorot Girl, Rice Field Costume." Exhibit A-4 has the legend "Kalinga Girls, Philippines. Exhibit A-5 has the legend "Moros Philippines." The prosecution produced no evidence proving the postcards obscene and indecent because it thought the post-cards themselves the best evidence of that fact. The fiscal admitted in open court "that those pictures represented the natives (non-Christians) in their native dress." The defendant, on the other hand, attempted to show that the pictures as true to life. Dr. H. Otley Beyer, Professor in the University of the Philippines, corroborated by other witnesses, testified from his studies in various parts of the Islands, such as the Mountain Province, Abra, Palawan, and Mindanao and Sulu, that none of the pictures represented poses which he had not observed on various occasions, and that the costumes worn by the people in the pictures are the true costumes regularly worn by them. Are such pictures obscene or indecent? The word "obscene" ands the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning something offensive to chastify, decency, or delicacy. "Indeceny" is an act against behavior and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular
95 publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency, (29 Cyc., 1315; 8 R. C. L., 312.) The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscene or indecent pictures, writings, papers, or books. But the words "obscene or indecent" are themselves descriptive. They are words in common used and every person of average intelligence understand their meaning. Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures themselves, there is but little scope for proof bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case. (People vs. Muller , 96 N. Y., 408; 48 Am. Rep., 635.) Considerable light can be thrown on the subject by turning to the Federal Laws prohibiting the use of the mails for obscene matter and prohibiting the importation into the Philippine Islands of articles, etc., of obscene or indecent character. (U. S. Rev. Stat., art. 3893; 36 stat. at L., 135; 7 Fed. Stat. Ann., 1194, sec. 3[b].) "Obscene," as used in the Federal Statutes making it a criminal offense to place in the mails any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication, according to the united States Supreme Court and lesser Federal courts, signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, and has the same meaning as is given at common law in prosecutions for obscene libel. (Swearingen vs. U. S. , 161 U. S., 446; U. S. vs. Males , 51 Fed., 41; 6 Words and Phrases, 4888, 4889.) The case of United States vs. Harmon (, 45 Fed., 414), grew out of an indictment for despositing an obscene publication in a United States post-office in violator of the Postal Law. Judge Philips said: The statute does not undertake to define the meaning of the terms "obscene," etc., further than may be implied by the succeeding phrase, "or other publication of an indecent character." On the well-organized canon of construction these words are presumed to have been employed by the law-maker in their ordinary acceptation and use. As they cannot be said to have acquired any technical significance as applied to some particular matter, calling, or profession, but are terms of popular use, the court might perhaps with propriety leave their import to the presumed intelligence of the jury. A standard dictionary says that "obscene" mean "offensive to chastity and decency; expressing or presenting to the mind or view something which delicacy, purity, and decency forbid to be exposed." This mere dictionary definition may be extended or amplified by the courts in actual practice, preserving, however, its essential though, and having always due regard to the popular and proper sense in which the legislature employed the term. Chief Justice Cockburn, in Rex vs. Hicklin (L. R. 3 Q. B., 360), said: "The test of obscenity is this: Where the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall;" and where "it who suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of the most impure and libidinous character." So, also, it has been held that a book is obscene which is offensive to decency or chastity, which is immodest, which is indelicate, impure,
96 causing lewd thoughts of an immoral tendency." U. S. vs. Bennet, 16 Blatchf., 338. Judge Thayer, in U. S. vs. Clarke, 38 Fed. Rep., 732, observed: "The word "obscene" ordinarily means something which is offensive to chastity; something that is foul or filthy, and for that reason is offensive to pureminded persons. That is the meaning of the word in the concrete; but when used, as in the statute, to describe the character of a book, pamphlet, or paper, it means containing immodest and indecent matter, the reading whereof would have a tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds of those into whose hands the publication might fall whose minds are open to such immoral influences." Laws of this character are made for society in the aggregate, and not in particular. So, while there may be individuals and societies of men and women of peculiar motions are idiosyncrasies, whose moral sense would neither be depraved nor offended by the publication now under consideration, yet the exceptional sensibility, or want of sensibility, of such cannot be allowed as a standard by which its obscenity or indecency is to be tested. Rather is the test, what is the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it? What is its probable, reasonable effect on the sense of decency, purity, and chastity of society, extending to the family, made up of men and women, young boys and girls, — the family, which is the common nursery of mankind, the foundation rock upon which the state reposes? . . . To the pure all things are pure, is too poetical for the actualities of practical life. There is in the popular conception and heart such a thing as modesty. It was born in the Garden of Eden. After Adam and Eve ate of the fruit of the tree of knowledge they passed from the condition of perfectibility which some people nowadays aspire to, and, their eyes being opened, they discerned that there was both good and evil; "and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." From that day to this civilized man has carried with him the sense of shame, — the feeling that there were some things on which the eye — the mind — should not look; and where men and women become so depraved by the use, or so insensate from perverted education, that they will not evil their eyes, nor hold their tongues, the government should perform the office for them in protection of the social compact and the body politic. As above intimated, the Federal statue prohibits the importation or shipment into the Philippine Islands of the following: "Articles, books, pamphlets, printed matter, manuscripts, typewritten matter, paintings, illustrations, figures or objects of obscene or indecent character or subversive of public order." There are, however, in the record, copies of reputable magazines which circulate freely thruout the United States and other countries, and which are admitted into Philippines without question, containing illustrations identical in nature to those forming the basis of the prosecution at bar. Publications of the Philippine Government have also been offered in evidence such as Barton's "Ifugao Law," the "Philippine Journal of Science" for October, 1906, and the Reports of the Philippine Commission for 1903, 1912, and 1913, in which are found illustrations either exactly the same or nearly akin to those which are now impugned. It appears therefore that a national standard has been set up by the Congress of the United States. Tested by that standard, it would be extremely doubtful if the pictures here challenged would be held obscene or indecent by any state of Federal court. It would be
or foul. So ordered. who was at that time in Manila. complainant-appellee. in search of the girl's father. and on this question and fact. We hold that pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live. the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines. we reach the conclusion that there has not been proved a violation of section 12 of the Libel Law. are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. 1018 February 17. Disagreeing therefore with the appellant on his technical argument but agreeing with him on his main contention. we will decide them as they arise. or for that matter in the rest of the world. The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live. or filthy. defendant-appellant. lived with he grandmother. 1903 THE UNITED STATES.: The evidence shows that the defendant and two other members of the Insular Police entered the house where Antonia Evangelista. for appellant. would not be shocked by photographs of this type. Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta. without attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. When other cases predicated on other states of facts are brought to our attention. a girl of 17 years of age. J. withdraw from sale certain pictures which can be pointed out to him.97 particularly unwise to sanction a different type of censorship in the Philippines that in the United States. No. the information is dismissed. and the defendant-appellant is acquitted with all costs de oficio. Indeed. vs. it becomes our duty to order the dismissal of the information. for appellee. We would be the last to offend the sensibilities of the Filipino people and the sanction anything which would hold them up to ridicule in the eyes of mankind. TORRES. Carmen Tayag. 1awph!l.R. The defendant and his companions took Carmen . 1902. he might even go further and out of consideration for the natural sensibilities of his customers.net Judgment is reversed. We readily understand the laudable motives which moved the Government to initiate this prosecution. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. We are convicted that the post-card pictures in this case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity. We seem to recall the statement of counsel that the proprietor of the photographic concern whom he represents would on his own initiative place suitable and explicit inscriptions on the pictures so that no one may be misled as to them. IGNACIO CRUZ. We are dealing with a legal question predicated on a legal fact. But we emphasize that we are not deciding a question in political theory or in social ethics. at about 7 o'clock in the evening of the 30th of March. Fermin Mariano. We fully appreciate the sentiments of colleagues who take a different view of the case.
as the offense was committed in the dwelling of the injured party. The accused then testified that he did not rape the girl at all. These statements. being further obliged to recognize the issue that may be born. she was again ravished by three other policemen. shall proceed in each case according to law. where she was ravished by the two policemen already mentioned. a neighbor of the injured party. upon the filing of the necessary information for the five other crimes of rape enumerated on page 28 of the record. and to suffer the corresponding accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification. constitute the crime of rape defined and punished under article 438 of the Penal Code. having been further aided by two others who. These facts. from the window of her house. having stretched her upon the floor and stuffed a handkerchief into her mouth so as to prevent her from calling for help. and shortly after heard the voice of the girl who was crying for help. 20 of article 10 of the Penal Code. The latter was carried to the barrio of Sucat and there. saw the girl Antonia in the hands of two men inside the house where the occurrence took place. who. The judge. to which she replied that all that she had testified to was true. but at the barrio of Sucat. The defendant heard the evidence of the complaining witness. as established by the testimony of creditable witnesses and the damaging evidence furnished by the statements of the defendant.98 downstairs and tied her to a "chico" tree. one Batunbacal and Corporal Tagayum. In the commission of the offense in question there must be appreciated the attendance of the aggravating circumstance No. and to pay the costs of this appeal. if its origin should not be a bar thereto. Her cries were also heard by Paula Cruz. For the reasons stated the judgment should. a relative of the victim. Catiple and Luis. who lived near by. did. to support the same. and asked the girl if she was not mistaken in what she had stated to the court. went upstairs where the girl Antonia had been left alone. inasmuch as the accused. The adequate penalty must therefore be imposed in the minimum grade of the maximum degree. and without provocation. according to the testimony of the accused. in connection with those of the witnesses who either saw or heard of the occurrence and who also heard the noise caused by the struggle between the assailants and the victim. there being no mitigating circumstances to be considered. like himself. be reversed and the defendant sentenced to seventeen years four months and one day of imprisonment. The foregoing facts were corroborated by the witness Carmen Tayag and by Nicolasa Cruz. prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. but that the two constables. used violence and intimidation. were armed with guns. So ordered. He also stated that she was not raped at her house. Defendant shall pay to the injured party an indemnification in the amount of 300 Mexican pesos. who pleaded not guilty. who stated in her testimony that she knew the accused because he was a resident of the same town and gave a full account of the occurrence. who was unable to present any exculpative evidence or adduce any in his defense. being subject to the surveillance of the authorities during his term of confinement and for a like period after the expiration thereof. . as well as the cries of the latter. they being members of the Insular Police. and the three assailants then ravished her in succession. in order to outrage the girl. She came out of her house and unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the assailants from taking the girl Antonia away. in our opinion.
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