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SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ISO MASTERSON’S PARTICIPATION IN ARBITRATION AND A STAY OF PLAINTIFF RIALES’ CASE
ANDREW B. BRETTLER (BAR NO. 262928) MARTIN F. HIRSHLAND (BAR NO. 322629) LAVELY & SINGER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, California 90067-2906 Telephone: (310) 556-3501 Facsimile: (310) 556-3615 Email: Abrettler@lavelysinger.com Mhirshland@lavelysinger.com Attorneys for Defendant DANIEL MASTERSON SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2, Plaintiffs, v. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE; DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1 – 25, Defendants. CASE NO. 19STCV29458 [Hon. Steven J. Kleifield – Dept. 57]
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S PARTICIPATION IN ARBITRATION AND A STAY OF PLAINTIFF RIALES’ CASE
Complaint Filed: August 22, 2019 FAC Filed: February 28, 2020 Trial Date: None
Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 03/01/2021 05:02 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by R. Sanchez,Deputy Clerk
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SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ISO MASTERSON’S PARTICIPATION IN ARBITRATION AND A STAY OF PLAINTIFF RIALES’ CASE
I.INTRODUCTION
As previously submitted to and recognized by the Court, subject to his constitutional rights and protections, Masterson will participate in the arbitration ordered by the Court. Notwithstanding, Masterson does not object to the Court staying Plaintiff Riales’ non-arbitrable claim pending completion of the arbitration. But, to the extent Ms. Riales’ claims are not stayed, in light of the pending related criminal proceeding against Masterson, all discovery sought from him must be stayed.
1
II.MASTERSON WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION.
In open Court, Masterson previously agreed to participate in the arbitration as ordered by the Court. Plaintiffs did not object to Masterson’s participation in the arbitration on the record, or at any time by written motion.
2
Indeed, Masterson’s participation in the Court-ordered arbitration is consistent with Plaintiffs’ theory of the case – i.e., that Masterson is an alleged “agent” of the other Defendants.
See
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶ 62 (“At all relevant times, Defendant Masterson served and continues to serve as the FSM and therefore was and is an agent of the Institutional Defendants.”), ¶ 158 (“…the Institutional Defendants and Defendant Miscavige never took negative action against Defendant Masterson, their agent.”); Order of December 30, 2020, at 14 (“Plaintiffs have alleged that he [Masterson] is an agent of [Institutional Defendants]...”.). As an alleged “agent” of the signatories, Masterson is entitled to the benefit of the arbitration provision.
Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams
, 40 Cal. 3d 406, 418 (1985) (“If, as the complaint alleges, the individual defendants, though not signatories, were acting as agents for the [signatories], then they are entitled to the benefit of the arbitration provisions.”)
3
Accordingly, based on Plaintiffs’ own allegations, the claims against Masterson are not
1
The Court of Appeal ordered a stay of the Arbitration Order of December 30, 2020 on February 25, 2021 (Court of Appeal Case No. B310559)
2
Plaintiffs, in their Writ to the Court of Appeal, now feign outrage that they were not given an opportunity to object to Masterson’s participation in the arbitration.
3
Plaintiffs likewise advanced this argument in their Opposition to Masterson’s Demurrer to the FAC, arguing that “Masterson is an agent and representative of the Institutional Defendants and Miscavige when dealing with third parties including Plaintiffs…” Opposition to Demurrer; 7:10-13.
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SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ISO MASTERSON’S PARTICIPATION IN ARBITRATION AND A STAY OF PLAINTIFF RIALES’ CASE
severable from those asserted against the other Defendants.
See Garcia v. Pexco, LLC
, 11 Cal. App. 5th 782, 788 (2017) (allowing non-signatory agent to enforce arbitration provision because “the operative complaint alleged [signatory] and [non-signatory] were acting as agents of one another and every cause of action alleged identical claims against ‘All Defendants’ without any distinction.”) As the Court has previously recognized, Plaintiffs’ claims against Masterson are predicated on the allegation that Masterson is an agent of the other Defendants, who are parties to enforceable arbitration agreements with Plaintiffs (except Plaintiff Riales). (Order of December 30, 2020, at 14.) Therefore, Masterson is entitled to enforce the arbitration agreements vis-à-vis those Plaintiffs.
Thomas v. Westlake
(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 614 (“[W]hen a plaintiff alleges a defendant acted as an agent of a party to an arbitration agreement, the defendant may enforce the agreement even though the defendant is not a party thereto.”) As the
Thomas
case rightfully recognized, “it would be unfair to defendants to allow [plaintiffs] to invoke agency principles when it is to [their] advantage to do so, but to disavow those same principles when it is not.”
Id
. at 615. That is exactly what Plaintiffs are attempting to do in the instant case. In light of the Court’s Order, and subject to Masterson’s constitutional rights and protections, he will participate in the arbitration proceedings (after the current stay is lifted) with Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala, Jane Doe #1, and Jane Doe #2, as well as the other Defendants.
III.MASTERSON DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE COURT STAYING PLAINTIFF RIALES’ CLAIMS PENDING COMPLETION OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS.
Masterson does not object to the Court staying Plaintiff Riales’ claims pending completion of the arbitration proceedings, which is within the power of the Court. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.4;
see also Heritage Provider Network, Inc. v. Superior Court
, 158 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1152 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (“Any party to a judicial proceeding is entitled to a stay of those proceedings whenever (1) the arbitration of a controversy has been ordered, and (2) that controversy is also an issue involved in the pending judicial action.”)
