FLASHPOINTS | SECURITY | SOUTHEAST ASIA

Is the Quad’s
Revival a Threat
to ASEAN?
The reemergence of the
Quad grouping is bound
to raise questions about
ASEAN’s relevance and
centrality.

By Rifki Dermawan
March 18, 2021

Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Gunawan

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 Kartapranata

Last week’s first virtual summit of the

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue –
commonly known as the Quad – signified
the growing cooperation among its four
members: the United States, Australia,
Japan, and India. After a period in which
the idea of the Quad fell into abeyance, the
new-look “Quad 2.0” is fast emerging as an
important part of a novel global security
architecture, raising pressing questions
about the future role and centrality of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).

Despite doubts about the possibility of

deep and institutionalized collaborations
among the Quad countries, the meeting
indicated that the four powers are willing
to cooperate on pressing issues of common
concern, such as the distribution of
COVID-19 vaccines and the global impact
of climate change, in addition to
traditional security challenges. According
to the joint statement issued at the close of
the meeting, the four nations pledged to
“redouble our commitment to the Quad
engagement.”

This moment might well have been

anticipated by China. The Chinese
government has long viewed the Quad as
an American-led attempt to contain and
counter its global rise, and the grouping’s
consolidation could well heighten further
the tensions between the two
superpowers. Despite the changeover of
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 power in the U.S., President Joe Biden has
so far given every indication that he
would take a similar approach to China as
his predecessor Donald Trump.
Furthermore, the involvement of
Australia, Japan, and India through the
Quad could present a novel challenge for
Chinese leader Xi Jinping. This approach,
which emphasizes close cooperation
between the U.S. and its strategic partners,
has been outlined by Biden since last year
as the basis of his strategy toward China.

The spirit of multilateralism championed

by Joe Biden during his election campaign
is also reflected in his dedication to the
Quad. Working together with partners and
allies to deal with issues of common is a
distinctive characteristic of his foreign
policy outlook. Here he clearly differs
from Trump, who preferred to engage
directly with China by waging a unilateral
“trade war” and a bitter competition over
5G technology. Even though the Quad
reemerged in the middle of Trump’s
presidency, it flew in the face of his
administration’s general contempt for
multilateralism, as evidenced by Trump’s
withdrawal from the World Health
Organization and lack of interest in
longstanding alliances. Therefore,
relations between the U.S., China and,
now, the Quad, are set to enter a new
phase under the Biden administration.

In Southeast Asia, one of regions in which

Sino-American contention is most
apparent, the revival of the Quad is no
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 doubt being watched closely. Southeast
Asia has become the subject of strategic
competition both great powers: To take
just the most obvious instance, the South
China Sea remains an ongoing flashpoint,
in which the U.S. Navy is frequently
challenging China’s expansive “nine-dash
line” claim over the vital waterway with
frequent Freedom of Navigation
Operations.

Through history, Southeast Asia has seen

foreign interventions by external actors
on many different occasions. European
powers colonized the region for hundreds
of years. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union
fought over the region as part of the
bipolar struggle during the Cold War. Even
nowadays, Southeast Asia still attracts
considerable global interest. It occupies
the central position of the “Indo-Pacific,” a
strategic concept that has become central
to the foreign policies of many Western
nations, including the U.S., Germany, and
France.

Throughout its history as a regional

organization, ASEAN has taken different
approaches to prevent interference from
external powers. In the middle of the Cold
War tensions between the U.S. and Eastern
Bloc, the Association declared a
framework called the Zone of Peace,
Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The
historic document was signed in 1971 and
became a guideline with which the
member states managed their relations
with external powers.
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 With the resurrection of the Quad, there is
a likelihood that strategic situation in the
region will become more complicated and
potentially affect Southeast Asia’s stance
as a zone of neutrality, as outlined in
ZOPFAN. In the South China Sea, as the
most crucial flashpoint in the region, the
U.S. has become actively involved in this
territorial disputes by directly challenging
the legality of China’s claims. On the other
hand, China has taken serious actions in
its maritime security sector, most recently
with the announcement of a new Coast
Guard Law.

Despite the four Quad powers having no

territorial claims of their own in the area,
they have taken an interest in the disputes
as a matter of “promoting a free,
open rules-based order, rooted
in international law to advance security
and prosperity and counter threats to
both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond,” in
the words of the joint statement issued at
last week’s meeting. This possible scenario
will surely increase regional tensions and
caution ASEAN member states.

ASEAN centrality is another notion that

might be challenged by Quad 2.0. This
concept suggests that the grouping might
usurp the central diplomatic role in
Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
established in 1994, is one of ASEAN’s
initiatives to emphasize its centrality in
the security field by providing a form for
dialogue on political-security issues for 26
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 participants, including both the U.S. and
China.

Another security dialogue constructed by

the Quad and limited to its four members
could displace the ARF from its position of
centrality in the region’s security order.
ASEAN’s attempt to get ARF participants
sitting at the same table and discussing
regional security concerns will not be easy
when Indo-Pacific security architecture is
dominated by the Quad, the members of
which are powerful countries outside
Southeast Asia. This has the potential to
deemphasize the platform that has been
maintained for 27 years by ASEAN on the
basis of “dialogue and cooperation,
featuring decision-making by consensus,
non-interference, incremental progress
and moving at a pace comfortable to all.”

Even though the Quad grouping has

reassured ASEAN that it will respect the
latter’s unity and centrality, on the basis of
the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
issued by the bloc in 2019, this statement
should be evaluated on regular basis
because increasing Sino-American
tensions could change the Quad’s initial
plans and transform Southeast Asia, once
again, into a dangerous arena of great
power competition.

AUTHORS

GUEST AUTHOR

Rifki Dermawan
Rifki Dermawan is a lecturer in
international relations at Universitas
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 Andalas, Indonesia. He obtained his
master’s degree in international relations
at Bristol University, the United Kingdom.
His research interests are in the area of
ASEAN studies and non-traditional security
issues.

TAGS

Flashpoints Security Southeast Asia ASEAN

ASEAN Indo Pacific ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific

Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy The Quad ZOPFAN

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