The

Illusion

of

Animal

Rights

David

S.

Oderberg

You

mightbewonderingwhatanarticleonanimalrightsisdoinginajournaldevotedtothedefence

of

humanlife.

It

turnsoutthattheconnectionsarecloserthanyoumaythink.Graspingthemiscrucialtoaproperunderstanding

of

justwhyinnocenthumanlifemustbedefended,

of

whythekilling

of

eventhetiniest,youngestmember

of

thehumanspeciesisanunspeakablecrime.Foritisbyanalysingtheissue

of

whetheranimalshaverightsthatwecometoseethecoredifferencesbetweenhumansandotheranimals

I-the

differencesinthe

nature

of

humansandanimalsthatmeanhumanshaverightsandanimalsdonot.Understandingtheissuealsogivesusaninsightintotheideologicalmotivations

of

theanti-lifemovement,atleastthesignificantstrand

of

itwhichisinfluencedbyPeterSingerandhisfollowers.Theanimalrightsissuecertainlyhasstokedupstrongpassions.InBritain,fewotherissuesarecapable

of

bringingsomanypeople

of

apparentgoodwillontothestreets;

of

causingotherwisequiet,politicallyinactivemiddleclasscitizenstopelttrucks(containingliveanimalexports)withrocks,formhumanbarricades,breakintolaboratoriestoreleasecaptiveanimalsintothewild,disruptfashionshowsandhuntingmeets,andbombardtheirpoliticianswithletters

of

complaintabouttheabuse

of

animals.True,Britainhasbeenderidedasanation

of

"animallovers,"butsuchsentimentalismaside,onefindsmuchhard-nosed,ideologicalresentmentatthewayanimalsaretreated,resentmentwhichcanturnintoactionataslightprovocation.WhenthephilosopherMichaelLeahypublishedabookagainstanimalrights,

2

hewassubjectedtoafiercehatecampaign.AcademicslikeRogerScruton

3

andPeterCarruthers

4

havebravedridiculeandevencontemptfortheirphilosophicaloppositiontoanimalrights.Mostpeople,seeingthepassionandcommitmentwithwhichanimalrightistsdefendtheircause,think:"Surelypeoplewhocangetsoworkedupaboutanissuehaveapoint?"Andwhensomeonestandsuptosaythatanimalsdo

not

haverights,

or

thatitisatleastanarguableissue,inmanyeyesitistantamounttosaying:"It'sOKtodowhatyouliketo

animals-they've

gotnorights,"

wherethespecialemphasisonthelastfewwordsissupposedtoconveytheideathatbecausetheyhavenorights,theyhavenomoralstandingwhatsoever.

DavidS.

Oderberg

isReaderinPhilosophyattheUniversity

of

Reading.England.Thisarticledrawsonmaterialfromchapter3

of

hisrecentlypublishedbook

AppliedEthics

(Oxford:Blackwell,2000),inwhichtheargumentagainstanimalrightsissetoutindetail.

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DAVID

S.

OOERBERG

Itistimetheanimalrightsissue,liketheabortionandeuthanasiaissues,waslookedatinalessemotionallychargedandmorephilosophical

way.

It'stimethatsomemyths,oftendeliberatelysown,werecleared

up.

Herearea

few.

Myth#1:

If

youthinkanimalsdonothaverights,youmustthinkitisallrighttodoanythingtothem,thattheirwelfaredoesnotmatter.Myth#2:PeterSingerandhisfollowersbelieveinanimalrights.Myth#3:Traditionalmoralists,whoarebothpro-lifeandopposeanimalrightsbutbelieveinanimalwelfare,canmakecommoncausewithwhatIwillcallrevolutionarymoralists,whoarebothpro-abortionandeitherbelieveinanimalrights

or

takeaSingerianconsequentialistlinegivingnospecialmoralprioritytohumansjustbecausetheyarehumans.Notethedistinctionbetweentraditionalandrevolutionarymorality.Singerhimselfsubtitledhis1995book

RethinkingLifeandDeath

as

TheCollapse

of

ourTraditionalEthics,5

histargetbeingpreciselythemoralitythatregardshumanlifeasbothsacredandqualitativelydistinctfromthat

of

anyothercreatureontheplanet.Hisuse

of

"traditional"iscorrect.Indeed,onecangofurther:thetraditionalmoralposition

of

Westerncivilizationisthathumanshaverightsandanimalsdonot.Thereare,however,peopleinthepro-lifemovement(theirnumbersarehardtoassess),whobelievethatthesanctity

of

humanlifeisjustifiedbythesamereasonthatjustifiesthesanctity

of

all(sentient?conscious?)life:theseareallGod'screatures,andtheyallhavetheirspecialdestiny.Whateverthemerits

of

sucha

position-and

Ibelievethemtobe

few-this

isnot,andmustnotbeportrayedas,thetraditionalmoralposition.Asapreludetoexplainingthemythsstatedabove,Iwanttosketchthetraditionalpositiononanimalrights.Oncewegetclearonwhatethicalstatusanimals

lack

wecanbeclearaboutwhatstatusthey

have,

andabouthowthetraditionalandrevolutionarypositionsdiffer,withsuchdrasticconsequencesfortheabortiondebate.Noteinitially,however,thatthereisnopuzzle

inthe

ideathatwehaveaduty,say,nottoinflictunnecessarysufferingonanimals,butthattheyhaveno

right

nottobetreatedthisway.Therearemanythingsonepersonoughtnottodotoanother,butwhichdonotinvolvearightbythesecondagainstthefirst.

You

oughttobekindtostrangers,buttheydonothavea

right

toyourkindness.Yououghtnottousebadlanguage,butothersdonothavea

right

nottobesubjectedtoyourprofanities.Rightsandjusticego

together-when

youviolatearightyouarebeingunjust.

But

whenthepriestandtheLevitepassedbyontheotherside,theywerenotbeing

unjust

tothemanwhofellamongrobbers;theywerebeing

uncharitable.

Moralityinvolvesmorethanrights:itinvolvesduties,virtues(likecharityandcompassion),customs,traditions,andsoon.

38/SPRING-SUMMER

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THEHUMANLIFE

REVIEW

Sohowdorightsfitin?Whatisaright,anyway?Inordertounderstandtheconcept

of

aright,weneedtounderstandtheconcept

of

agood.Thenweneedtograspwhyitisthatparadigmaticholders

of

rights,namelyhumanbeings,havesuchastatus;andwecanthenseewhythisstatuscannotbeextendedtootheranimals.

To

begin,agoodcanbedefinedasthatend

of

anactionwhichfulfilsthenature

of

athing.Thereareanumber

of

goodswhichfulfilhumannature,withoutwhichahumanbeingcannot

flourish

orliveadistinctivelyhumanlife.Theseincludesuchmaterialthingsasfood,shelter,warmthandhealth,butalsothings

of

amorepsychological,emotionalorintellectualnature,such

as

family,friendship,knowledgeandunderstanding,work,play,artisticexperience,andreligion.Thesearesome

of

theprincipalthingswhich,touseAristotle'sterm,fulfilus

as

rationalanimals.

Theabsence

of

any

of

themdiminishesourhumandignity,our

integrity-it

leavesnotjustaquantitativebutaqualitative

gap

inourlives.

But

if

humanbeingsarerationalanimals,andhaverights,thismeanssomeanimalshave

rights-so

whynotothers?What'ssospecialaboutushumans?

Isn't

it

arbitrary-to

useSinger'sterm,

"speciesist"-to

saythathumananimalshaverightsbutothersdonot?Whenweseehowrightsinteractwithgoods,itbecomesclearwhyitisnot

insofarasweareanimals

thathumanshaverights,but

insofaraswearerational.

Arightisbestthought

of

as

akind

of

protectionconferredbymorality.Forexample,myrighttoprivacymeansthatIamprotected

by

moralityitselfin

mypursuit

of

thegoodwhichprivacyconstitutes,namelyasphere

of

activitywhichremainsunknowntoothers.Withoutsuchasphere

of

activityaperson'sintegritywouldbeundermined;privacyisessentialtohumandignity,andisthereforeagood.Now,likemanygoodsitmaynotbeprotectedbythelegalsystem.Butthisdoesnotmeanwecaninvadeeachother'sprivacy,sincemoralityitselfconfersprotection:Ihaveamoralrighttoprivacy,andyourviolation

of

thatrightwouldbeblameworthyunlessjustifiedbyagreaterright,saytherighttolife.Aright,then,protectsapersoninhispursuit

of

somegood.Itmeansthatothersareunderadutynottoviolatethatright;thattherightholderismorallypermittedtoexercisehisrightwithouthindrance;andeven,insomecases,thatheispermittedtouseforceinsafeguardinghisright(e.g.theright

of

self-defence).Thatisallwellandgood,sayanimalrights

supporters-but

whyareanimalsexcludedfrombeingrightholders?

Don't

they,justlikehumans,havewhateverisnecessaryforthepossession

of

rights?Whythedistinction?

It

isherethatanimalrightistsstartgoing

off

indifferentdirections.

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