DS 918 .

E54 1951

MONOGRAPH

ENEMY
. f;..I,.:; ::; i .>

TACTICS
--~

UNCLASSTap

EIGHTH.UiS. ARMY:<KOREA (EuSAK)
.\

PROPERTY U-S, ARM OF

DJE:rT!' TACTICS

.t - -lllllC’“OPERTV -.

OFus-64 ------

UNCLASSIFIED
i g e4

fiuk.4 _LA... ^._u-u COabt*0*6~8Q
use of smo;..e SC eens to L-L large-scale
daylight movements 63 b Increased propaganda effori ;oOi&;u&*t&*
release of friendly WS 0 o I> o D o +, 0 J 8 e Forward displacement of artillery o B 6 E% statements as to being issued extra*cimiai
rations (up to fifteen-t;Paenty days per man) e Repair and Construction of roads in forward
areas by the enemy pI b 3 tp Q 5 c) 8 8 Sharp increase in re qq3s travel follo&~ ;iy'a: drop in this travel i DJ e s 0 The imposition of radio silence ~y*t~e*e~e~y: Steps taken by friendly forces to counteract: enemy offensive indications I) D L) c 6, 61 (r .

3 6 8 4
o s 4
6 6 4
J B f)
0 6 5
El 6
8 8 6
e B 6
s ir
e e 6

Countermeasures taken by United Xations Forces
%o prevent enemy movement, B d e o y a a 8 o o pB16

UNCLASSIFIED

e e o e 0 . 6 e 118 Isolating Units.. d Miscellaneous. E d 0 . e e ti 9 46 Commitment of Reserves B I) d I 6 0 e . . e o u B * e c e u Oe e B Miscellaneous. 0 0 . e . d a 0 o e 0 e o 0 6 . . D . . .employed enemy reconnaissance o SECTION .2 m 49 Pursuit and Baorganization * n B o o o s d a * e . B e o . a 0 0 o e e Countermeasures Taken to Counteract Artillery and Armor. .North Korean PeopleQs Army Engineer Reconnaissance. : c 0 * 0 0 (I Probing Attacks' B o e o Countermeasures. e SECTION Hs e a e 0 . a o . 65 UNCLASSIFIED a. . d $ c d 0 u d 6 B o . u 0 o e .. 25 10 @26 0 . 0 0 * 0 b t 0 * 0 52 SECTION G. d . Q D d o e ofiaB o 0 0 (I 0 * 0 & 0 e Q B .e~a~eroes56 North Korean Artillery o e e 0 e d CCF Artillery0 . . 63 . s 23 d .& Exploitation of Veak Points in United Nations Lines. . A~o~OO~. 30 o e e e 0 31 Penetration of Mine Fields. . o e . . 60 . . a . o c . 0 Nortars. i o e e I e Observation Posts.. .e~. o e d o . B a o e 8 . 0 * a d . 25 0 . .:on Enemy Movement to the Attaok SECTICN Fs The Attack 0 d o c Ro o c 0 Reconnaissances c e . Enemy o o e * B . @. a . . 0 . s 0 o 146 The Envelopment Support Force* . b e 0 e e e e e . b Q . 64 -. e 20 . 50 Counteralcasur~s 6 Tsken by UN Forces Against Enemy Attank i t 0 5 * 0 * e e. o o 0 B d 0 . a a e d e a o . e O . d .~.!@ Bayonet Companies and Penetration Unit. o B B . 6 d . . 58 .** . e 0 against . e .er~~. D 0 e Patrols.

. 96 n 0 B .-t.rricades) oil routes of edvance. o 8 B B o I) d 0 a o . 0 .les 30 .PTEK IT (pp '71.UNCLASSIFIED C. e . Q d .7 UNCLASSiFlED Establishment of Defensive Positions . d B d . A stubborn defense line instead of an elastio defense. * o e o a93 Employment of Weapons in the Defense 8 .b. kppeararrce of bnm wire entanglamsnts e * 0 e a 0 * e 0 8 . (rdm?? s $ ditches. of SUf'~'li" s f3 6 0 0 * e Q 6 a ID a e 0 Q 75 Stockpflin. o J . covered artillery 2nd troop shcltrzrs.er~:~xt~ :'n impending offense 0B o 0 74 of ll. 8 0 8 0 74 of' mlCr!l~ipccitions. o 6 o 6 0 100 Chinese Communist Forces i:. 0 6 0 d c a e D B e a % c a o e 6 e .c e b O O o B o e e d O .102 Miscellaneous e 0 b 0 0 o 0 e b o o 0 o e o n g o 3-04 Antitank Defense. d B e 8 o O 87 Worth Korean People3s Army n o 0 o o .. 0 0 a 0 . d O O u O o 0 Q O e b e e a .ines and Roadblocks. i'iT 0'0.-11: > SECTIOX A: Defensive lo Indications s Determined by Friendly Forceso 74~-75 positions Elaborate Bunkers. e 0 o 0 o 0 e 0 e 0 e B (I a Q 104 iv . 0 e75 76 The use of an active defense (numerous counterattacks).tcilsive I-z. o c* a o m e a 6 e o Q o * a a 74 in front 2. d B e B 74 Lr ck of I% ~tr~. kac.&. a o o d d ~l‘j. o e e o o g 0 . o 0 a o e 96 North Korean ?eopla*s Army 6 +. a 6 Chinese Communist Forces Utilization of Terrain Feat&s: t) d g (d o B d (t e 76 Entrenchments and Fortifications b 0 L) b e e 8 e e 31 Camouflage O .. e. 50 6.

. WAPIPER IV (pp 128 18) Soapy of the Effioncy of Enemy Tncti:s UNCLASSlFlED . . e . . . 6 * o o . (I . . . 124 UN Countermeasures taken infiltration.UNCLASSIFIED Antiaircraft Defense.. o o 118 . . b. 106 Countermeasures employed by UN F&ces against the stubborn defensea o . a . a o D . . e 108 WTER III (pp 112-127) Infiltration and Guerrilla Activities against enemy e e e q e e e a 0 ... e . . Countermeasures taken by Guerrilla Activities. o d 0 o Guerrilla Activity m 0 .. .. . S . e e lx)‘ UN forces against o o . e B d . .

UNCLASSIFIED !Ms monograpR was mmpfled by peraomel of khs Histor%aal Ssstfm.BQ Drstaohment (Pm)3 UNCLASSIFIED . EWSAKand the Eighth Army Xistarfml SWV~.

40 'In every battle. the of the enemy) to enoirols sf ths msmy forces aad mom the sqme troopa of tha cs~my strength. the offensfve.ed Nations prinsiplas s~rprisefd.hkf. quadruple. triple. the ann%hElatfon of the eneqyls fight%ng strsugth. even ffve OP conc+Wxate sfx tties that superfor foroes (doubls. and thfs of'tezn has to bc nepeaked 'befor@~ thsy can be finally held or trak=. and '%gard strength.y the Communist foroeaB the military doctrine outl5ned particularly the CCF. followed the "ten princfples 10 centrated 2e side. later strjtlre bob- powerful "first enemy forces0 and m5ddfe+izad tams.The CommnMrot armies ployed opposti~~: l. In the taotfoal with western simplioityo exeautfon . o9ties and oouMry- take the small later 30 czapture the big sft9tbs. seuurfty. "First strike by I&o Tm Tung 012 25 December l. foroes namely'. Avofd battles to wipe out other portiana of attrft%on in whioh gabs are not k .n others* fn some aspects BaGfoa1l. principles dfffsred they agreed '1 3. of mepssg movement. in Korea em= the prinicples the oommonly aooepted of IV~P.947 as 2 of war by which theP CCF fight'% soattsrsd and isolated armierp. tactical coordinatfon of these doctrine and of command8 and economy of forse.

Insofar spat%" This interval doi:not should not be too long. 70 of continuous or suc3c+ssive combat a&ions. defended. position& of citi4is.i. had to employ all 3 situation. wrest from the enemy all favorso h@Pd cities $&]R@ @mphasizts the tactics 8. to secure vietory work8 the valiant charactcwistios action of no f6ar Of saorifbO@ md fatigue.me and staff '&omot8 of victory.losses. the (~~~LCIIII~ have a to a8 poasibllr. breathing !I'hs CCF used oertain None was restrioted. "Destroy the enemy while of attaoking to assault he is in mov8mentG At the same the. but we must ~eow6 in every seotian no unprapared arni every oampcaigne Fight no engagem8nts wherea by prsp- 50 thora aration 60 "Fight engageMenCdo &denvor is no assum.r 3nferSor..b. local We (Communists) superiority am aumel:fw~. “rn r8Sp8& and strongpoints similar cities 98 points which are weakly which ar8 defended When opportunity Strongly to a medium degree0 after sonditions and installationrs "Replenish oan bo attacked mature0 and matsrial~ Pronto to rest. committed to one type because the @AamY taaticzal armies to fit the immediate The Chinese Communists developed the Japanese and suooassfully these prinoiplss in war against used them agabst viii the Chinese EJationalist . ?%groupB our army by oapturing enemy personnel at the The 8our00 of men and arms of our army fs mainly 100 and train hoW8V8r0 "Utilize the period8 between combat operations of rest permit the troops. however. armies offensively and oth8rie dsfensfvelyO of warfaro.

.

gmumally in operatzioms sime presaged an lewaem~ attack.n addft%on to swperf@r eamsuflage d%sefpline.--. as the replaoemmts i.n aooordanoe wtPTg. unft.med?l&e of&mslve aotfon.s WQla"ig uni%s ~QA$ ah%f$ed 3. the ?UKTQlitff pwbeter pariod.Adfca%ions o usually pointed to a @mdzbg csffens~vs.owm prim to the attack6 %CXWM.th evnw praot%se of das%gnatbg the !Phis act-&m usually took placclr 5 6 36 k. to prevent were prhsvalemt 'SPaforeall ma@n-attaoks cm United lsatiorm posftfons dfd no% abmys %nd%oat&. This proved true 5 ._-_-_--- . CHAPTEX GTE OFFEXSIV$ TACTICS every ruseg 3. an i.

of darkness. forward amas large supply time. sightings and by his adeptsess in a partfcular In troop of troop evidenos area was ganekally strength in that of an irmrease &. hir ' a8 an effort to dfsguise mafk titention. Sensitivity oonoentPatfons in tIhe dire&fen 0 of lumm or suspeoted troop Init%ally attempted to avoid preoeding all oontact therr an offensive with United operation. to the front foroo and then suddenly lammhed m attaok 6 30 Amqy reserves aa oontrastbd purposes. the delaying ssnsftfv5ty troop to new defensive posftfon8. and delaying for Late in the foroes to shieU the enemy used strong rear area aotitityO foroes screening After withdrew holding a oertafn pradste&.2. dmps at the enemy Wntfl June 1951 the enemy tztilfsed dfvSarlsn and Army (aorpsj level. StoakpIling of supplisa ti. Nations Communist foroes patrols. obsarvatfon movement wad d%fffoult dur3ng period8 of iaolemsnt weather. due to at oamouflagro hfa utfli8atfcm An inoreaae oomlua5lve 7 VfOfnl~. apparently ounpaign. close rather than 9n depthe of the front defeas5ve of enemy Reserves8 within overnight rnarohfag distanse for orfth a deep displacement of reserves Aotud was an offenaiva indiaaticurr. supply of the enemy in the direction of his bases or sonaantratfons was ably illtmtratad by Us resiLstanoe to a In April ?3510 The eaemy used a d&y&tg-screening aga3autlQI fores.ned l'he timb. Subsaguemt to that .

l?o.raaonaafsssnoa attaoks Inoreased tiemy ffnd out troop on the front-pqLyII f'mm rear areas and -e)"D-orrrn-m-J methods WBPB sxsed to command ~GS~B~. friendly forms ~)cPFD~?~ st. Increased Early and some deserted guerrflla aotivfty S. targets being ~onnnpmnl- sharply ths primary bridges. high ground. guerrills 7 O 3% statements tiemy their urcits soldiers were well informed about taetiaal pk& of polftioaX and the overall plan as a result of ths Comunfst indoatrlnation in the operation. of all activity inoreassd to an enemy affensha.ars 9 oonflict.?ice. offensfve. of bzwdmg operehtione.reduced the widely size of his supply installatfons of WI air to minfmize Se the effeot and dispersed 8 a.ad artflleryo them The inorease in deserters'snd :mglers apprehended from units not in oontaot. screem%ng plus the use of ROK Nationa kc raduoad to a m9n~mum.mseasf"ully in the Korean aonflf&. . enemy . soldier rather method of building Readiness up tha indXvfdualqe.nfomad bfs sold3. -was later and supply routes. supply with hampered the Unitad Blatfons auoh actfvfty cations. givm sense of duty tc the smmy dates were prabahjly 11 than the actual attaok data. Due to the suaces&.trom&~fes probing and infiltrntlon artillery s positforms.aptum stragglers future 6.zl. Bight marohas in the rear encouraged straggling and desertion0 of the of of a Duping the summer of 1951 it North was possible to trace the shift%ng Korean VI Corps from the west to ths east front md deserters0 The enemy usually to avoid behbd guerrilla lines0 xw. dispositions.or by the r.

screen aoross effectt of screen5ng and debris troop movements was obtained periods of extended by b-kg clear a smoke vegetation During during 11. He relied any notable and automatic amount of artillery weapons. five Enemy an days before and the probing attaoks took plaoe two or three days prior an area to the attaok. on mortars the forward offensive displacement of artillery had to be considered as a potential . tended later chiefly to indfoate attacks with the movement of artillery defenses a strong but the enemy did not support fire. of enemy RVs who made fantastic with the enemy release to undermine of captured ola3ms of a coming United Bations offensive personnela troops0 coincided This was an attempt the morale of other% 14 of artillery0 into forward areas his 110 Forward displacement In the past. at will during When the enemy had the opportunity a withdrawal. Increased UN capture propaganda effort to include the release of friendly p'fiis. to their and the disposition lines approximately of ROK units. to 15 May 3951 the enemy established front his entire sector 13 to screen the movement of his forces Army% front prior to launching his to the eastern 16 May offensive. reconnaisbanoeu he attacked 12 advancing to reconnoiter W foroes without ix~l--adiate prior 90 Use of smoke screens to hide large-scale The enemy~s use of chemioal daylight movements6 but smoke generators was limited. units. However. of the Eighth 10. the desired dry natural visibility.between fric:?dly agents returned offensive.

.by before launching his attaok. the raad and brMge damye wm . to their departure from assembly area CD. Prior to the May a951 Qffensive.I indication. was bx-okan up afta- seven day% by a Unit&I the aven?Ae of approach of the pendtig enemy caffensl-ve... To pPat%st Short. stated Fvk c3iaptured in the US X and IX Corps sectors they wbr6 3ssued an was prior the aa&. cslnt%nued fez fSwe days..t*heXr march to X @orpa on 16 May. Thf~ &'fansiva WKBB Xalmched again& ncu resupply had baan re~eived~ Nations The COP attack a6 cswnCeratta&.

attacks and probing and his attacks * d. United Nations forces took certain counter measures to his preparations0 Air attacks were increased An extended on known enemy supply effort attacks and troop canoentrations. awaited and foroed this him to commit his reserves *In January Uncioubtedly the enemy attaok* and May 19518 M forses 6 .cn.~~~ use of secondary '~xseof camouflage.a Forces to Counteract Ener?. . the flow of refugees fell sharply6 of* radio silence bxthe (~MMW~ se -_I-Um ‘~~-e. * indications pointed to an attack at an Steps Taken by Friendly dicationso When such enemy offensive early htider date. 24 to 48 hour8 each off'snsfve.?re.lyOffensive ?Cn-.“un-r.. of supply and attaoks suspeoted offensive trails... aircraft and were made on enemy positfons Evldenoes of the suocess of our air roads and of troops0 armor was indicated his extensive objective by tho WW-C."c.uuuc~r was resorted 19 to by the enemy.148 Sharp increase traveL in refu~-frse trawl U" followed by drop in this As the onem~r tightened 150 Ths --MD -11_1impsition Radio silence preceding his security. aerial Night was made to cut his linas by radar guided and reinforcements0 in adverse weather routes of advance.i+ersal Limited by friendly balance in November bgy and Ap~fl 1951 kept the enemy off and attack prematurely.

and other F?!s interrogation obs0rvers" patrol means were screened up with many patrols Increased the primary was stepped capturing determine mission prisonersa Small probing attacks were conducted the arees in Txhich the enemy was most sensitive..lsive. as in the case of the Commllnist f&y offensive. Forces. carefully.ffensive m counter friendly enabled to meet the offe. the enemy rn.. 20 offensive.rmine increased the enemyvs movement and offensive effort was mede by United reports.~ Nations Forces to contain and.had an adverse affect on the . of the a:Iti&imted force? United xere shifted enemy attack was When the direction determined. potential.plles a sustained offensive. This in turn . reports activity of to To dete. .jrgle action of the enemy soldier rather into thm his by forcing one0 of h-im to engage in a defensive These attacks ammunition an offensive stockpiles also made the enemy delve needed for and sup.mf. having air intelligenoe Nations Agent reports.~~.

8 UNCLASSIFIED ..’ . Department was The CCFBortheast charged with into Area Rear Service of supplies. importanoe Nations sir his every movement. strain on preparations The CCF supply to the lower \ forward Supply dumps were destroyed. UNCLASSIFIED SECTI@ B Preparation Prior to launching for the Attaok the enemy carefully was his problem strikes. to . Hampered by persistent a master Of utmost United of supply. 8th Army and the A2. RCCF--NKPA Supply and Transport" jointly by the 62. routes. on at seoondary seoondary roads brsnohing extremities from principal of the roads.- .truoking the transportation Supplies points were moved where vehioles North Korea from China by rail picked them up and delivered roadse Air sightings them to dumps looated revealed that these along main and dumps. 5th Air Force in September 1951. Refsrenoe should be made to this study.:. planned * a major off. North points0 $ol?ea was divided Speaific drivers seot%onso eash wfth W-nit control were assigned This enabled to eaoh se&ion to and and drove only routes beoome familiar facilitated with fn that. for offensive or defensive which aoticmss border of system began at the China-Korea To expedite the transporting fnto and led to Brsnoh eohelonsO supplies dumps. area@ f:h~3 routes the driver and available during oonoealment. the enemy baoame harassment placed a by * of movement and oamouflage due to the constant bombing and strafing. were olustered supply the southern This indfoated was prepared *An excellent study. the transportiug MUitary of supplies the hours of darkness.ensive. .

unftrs ti all to the number of vehicles in a Communfst army were organized supply0 division. wfthin Cart units regimenta. Also within was supposed to travel each regfnent were two tranaportnt%on or pack laborer of supplytie. To deoeive the last vahiole in a oonvoy sometimes used think it was the to make the pilot of the airoraft to overshoot lead vehfele. oompany through divisfoti. branokes and foliage. in these unita. into three Generally.bridgerr.aomet%mea Army units.routea probably front for the forward utilfzed for unita* the flow It alao indioatad these routes were of troop8 inlet various saotors of the or for the withdrawal of unita fn forward area& and The Transportation vard. to night waa also reatrfoted bypassea ti woods0 and Ss tumelde -22 movementa bridges and roada were at bridges to available aromd destroyed utilized. 0arb8 were ute'lized Eaoh cart supplementtig about transportatfon. and squads of enemy seld%ers were stationed - . higher eohelon to draw neoessary auppliea for their Constant use vehicular bombing and harassing travel extenafvely of tree by air to the next organfzationeb rafds forced or in oversast the enemy to weather and at night to employ camouflage fJnited Nations fts headlighta afroraft. During Rail TQ&s oauaed the pflot the oonvoyo the daya vehiolea travel All hid undar. a day.es aocordBng vehioles facilitate to supply avaflable vehioular 23 miles SootSon of a Communfgit army Sa very flexible on hand. group0 dump86 2% groups--a wheelbarrow group and a ~ooolie" the responqibflity These were oharged with forward Eaoh mit. sent personnel . regfments were organized in aaoh enemy dfvisioln All and .

system of war stated delivery from division dazzps. unit If it were destroyed prtis moved to another and trestles completely. half month to one month@ Storage shelters were dispersed. each division.:t:re blown enemy laid It was reported permftting his rails on top of the wreckage8 dangerous travel cmxtinueD although due to the unsteadiness was required ten days*.-.~ However# this wm relatively shiLlow only where the water sl. dumps to regimental in some 5nstanoesg was the exception battalion rather This type of supply 22 than %-ICJ rule.to begin repairs immediately after hostile air raids0 by the enemy.:tian.ightly aircraft daxta~cd. routes0 the anti- On bridges reported several along railroad air sightings Bridgea the to bypasses and alternate were repaired overnight routes construoted. -. in a plaoe that camouflaged. 10 . was a system and. of the wreckage0 to have seven daysg and an army from one and each oatties Eaoh enemy company and regiment aombat rations on hand. Logs were Submerged bridges were used effectively by rocks cut and held undsr the water method was effective and :. aooet:sible and so located A few prisoners of night truok C were able to draw supplies that in some oases there at any time. 23 ioc.A~5bags. thousand po\md+ of food0 readily (approximately located Each dump was to vehicles. rvhioh '. shelter was supposed to aontaz!.n no more than ten thousand thirteen easily .

.

ff amploye9d opt parallel road8 a8 l mrftg. antitaako~arPgm8 . a mmll I&xitedIllatMrr .3~1 salum by aa advame 1000 to lm yardse IdXl 091U!U&la Ih opentsrrafn.the flank .7 8EGTIQSI c lU~-t tethe&aembly&ea WUally Sf OOrp8 8tXW!@iiha:@&lb-W'&!&8 ti OUtly%& biV@tia- - ~~AIWZUW mmutevd out the router of approaoh and any rurpcrofsd uwd at the head af a rrsgilanslptalOO~UIEBfallemd garde The pdnt preoeeded -k2m ina.

H3VllV 3Hl NI NOlllSOd 33NVlSIO 9NMlVA SYflOH Q 39NVlSIO 9NIMlVM SMIOH Q a & 3 33NVlSICl 8Nl)llVM SlHOlN 3N0 MO SWII 09’ o<ja 1 a w 3 Ba AWYV 3AU3S3Y JO SOH MYV AWMV 3AM3S3M JO SNOISIAIO AWMV aNM3vllv 40 OH AWMV AHlMV 9NM9VllV 90 NOlSlAla 3AM3S3U M3VllV Nl NOlSlAla SloawAS -3 -0 -3 -8 -V .

tree8.5.nous substanoea During at night8 to mark traflrb by enemy tro@p8e and the the maroh atrfot about diaofpld$e loud noises0 during V&XI exeroiaed smoking. radios mounted messengers. regarding looatfona generally utilized aeoondary the enemy with troopso informatiOn of UnftedNations and sametimes native blazed the use .'29 gufdes were employed.In rear of files battalions minimfee i - areas1 most mit8 marbhed in a oolmnn of two8 or a 0Olm~1 In forward arealo the men ia the on both sides of the road. Communfoations the maroh were oonduotti by runners were usedo or horreOften OF by written messages delivered eohelona. This alao faoilftated enemy soldiers plstioons # eight yards0 The standard diatanoe between durSpg the maroh wa8 three to ten yards. 1630 hours and oontinued mfnute . upon the amet& Marohes uamlly with brief The diatanoes were dependent sinoe most moves were made at night. of the prior guards were not employed for 28 reoonnafssanoeD movement8# the enew Villagers provided looa& aeourity Dar5ng night roads and trails. At higher soldier the individual wore a white armband to faoilitats . to five paoerg between tan to ffftesll of illumination. were resting. at night. file strikes marohed in single oasualtfer from air control. started five-to while tenthe troop8 beoause about and between oompanies. orally talking. The men were cautioned display either of lights. Routes of approaoh were marked with PW8 reported rOOk8# and sign markerso easily Some oaptured dfaoernible of a lum. on one side of the road to and possible artillery fire. rest periods until daybreak gfven-to the men every hour.

materialr O oreatsd #make hazes by resar%Ang %o widercrpread fas~rwst of villages aga'inst du~5a.nucur at-.dfer on the by f9rtig for mother she%. fired Bfr observers. the shot relayed thus the entire 3 air raid. enemy unftr from rear tene at the rate aerieu8lg of 25 m%lea a daye afr strikes dfd.!$I)yards between groUpsO squatted StsaibLg in d8tohea a high ineffeotfve attaok as the memy soldiers and then moved on0 !I!his indicated ats%s af die:o%pline. and even than St was gener&ly of the wounded. 001~ tith $33 s. TWOa8rsmbl. aet fires during behind Ix0 lties _ - However.- aontrola 30 posted on high ridge lines during the mar&. shot8 wh@I&FI hsotils hearing plane wag sighteda the warntig troepr A araB. la&Lng make p~~daesing . The enemy troops Mach& made in goed weather. infiftratora h$zeo To insure a posaih%ry wixtd shAf%.not impede thel.ng.a~sbw&i. anamy to as~ur(r a a~r&tiuouru daylight sm&ce moves ‘wer(s. the Commuafst May offsnsi.. and reoeived from a dfvisimal .Z.i%%Pa and the firing wind velao%%y. aenditicefas &me daylight QP unde~ the and equf+nt firer OQVQP moms were made during ef amokee advera@ weather The enemy. warning nex3 hill.vs. s5.taoks Wtw@ dartig fhs - 2'j to .g periods sf rela%i~ly f. OnlLy mder ooluren of marohfng was alerted an ant5aipated the most trying oiroumetanoew wer6 wehiLt&~i ussd %@ PimLted te tranoportatien advanoad tPanspor% toqoops. area@ to the battle In spite of thir. was aa tmm approxtila3y ur&~s a~remKLe& through the where ba%%a%fm-size r%aff offfoer.y area8 were used.r chf%eld ERxtiQne 32 mcrsvementa% nigh%. 25m%lea from the frent order8 lines The frirsf.

was generally lines the varied sent area from the front Attack battalions from 7 miles to a point aocounted units9 were later from which the attack for the reoorded designated units was launohed. to march to a designated area* * / a large orange light. were impossible. bivouac area. into the sector. to the United launching civilians the enemy attempted and prohibited in and around his area. an assembly area. However. of United and they may have Nations lines.Regimental reported facing CP. than the bivouac columns0 areas0 and This the subordinate indicated divisional these moved to them in separate on the part an amount of flexibility commander in seleoting of the regimental to an attaoke Nations or his own area prior areas were seleoted spottings Nations out of the range of United artillery. where air of United attaok./&l l/2 the regdmental of this milese area. soldiers on the top of a hill in the direction wfth lines. Large troop of the 34 concentrations light. indicating Before evacuate entrance Nations place all paok horses were gathered that the light a large-scale in the vicinity might have designated attack. and beyond the normal distance prior to the 1 January within artillery $951 range enemy troops moved Into all day* trenches and remained undeteoted 36 * Such light was only . about five feet of the enemy's rear Escaped American square. The distance to 1 I. me' evacuation one month prior 35 reasons* to the launching of the attack A second assembly area. of civilians espionage This was done to counter of civilians for took security aotivities. patrols. Some closeness areas other however.

valleys planes on the high ground aromd of United Nations positions in tE7 air the enemy resorted to digging his bivouac villages. or mountain were seleoted the most heavfly as the bfvouao Nations of a hill This was done to minimize attacks. were dug commenoing at the line only a short proteotion feet. and draws along bunohed.t II-Yand prevent and artillery posftfons observers found these difficult Countermeasures Taken by United Nations Forges used various Fo~oes to Prevent methods to deteot United Nations enemy movement to the front. artfl.. fire. dfstanoe against air toward but these the crest. and around bombed or burned-out usually bombed and strafed bombed villages. These emplasements Beyond a few 37 t0 detaot. ITTs stated molartain tops rather than valleys and prcvfously The enemy also used the reverse the routss fox holes extended were for hundred of advanoe as assembly slopes of hills Closely of foliage. and R'& testiffad secondary of these raids. ruhallow points.DurTng the early rfqetated site. guards POP regiment With the inoreased were posted affe&tiveness and about ten to twenty the area0 power. afr portions phases of the Korean confliot. ~~~. Flare pilots in some seotorsa uNc!kXJFfED ships were used to illuminate E . the effectiveness of United Fox holes were dug and oamouflaged.Movemezr.lery mearM By the use of radar B night concentrations acouraoy and supply fire on suspected The use of night enemy routes bombers and interdicts~ of advsnoe were the ohief bombers were guided Captured reported to enemy troop to the explosions areas so that potits.

were U8sd to note Right patrol8 enemy movsmeint. Patrols oansisting the The80 of Amerioan and Republio enemy linea patrolr. troop movsmsntr and a88ejnbly were pQtit8. gave the sffeot for aerial did not prove too effeative . of Korea roldierr were dirpatohed behind te note enemy troep with enradial. oloud8 flare& were ured to revsal t%ne8. ssmpanies were alro againrt but it low-hanging to I&i-ted nati= ch dark nighbr. illuninatfng prokimity u8dd. snsmy assembly arfilleryo area8 wsre releoted range of friendly plaoed on this 80 toe muoh importanoe oould not be oo~termsasurs. searohlightr of a m0Onlit 38 observation* ' snd 8lxa3nwtar enemy ts@op moVOmsEIt8 frr al080 Ssarsfikight reflected night. equipped 8uooe8rful in oslling dann artillery and airrrtrike8--on &irtiUery oeno&ntratisno.fighter-bombers Interdiotory on all HoweverI into likely oould more effeotively artillery routes fire strafe snd bomb snw troopso Foroes areare wa8 u8ed by tMtedl#atisns of advanoe and on suspeoted lndioated.that through arti$lery enemy asrsmbly enemy prisoner8 positions u8uSlly they had been able to maroh fire rimply by study-g outside the it8 attack pattern.

noeO hostile posftfenr.~dfffersnoer. and were built squadsa Reoonup frsm of were triangular uufG of two officers. and the attack was ured to learn Observation the commenaement psint. level &I the Chfnese Commtasfst ForPoe units ranged from through The sfze of these a platoon nafrsanoe basis aa& at regimental elements to a battalion in struoture ten-man at army group.re-third reoonnafssanoe unit was issued 18 o%vfl%an oloth@ and performed UNCLASSIFIED . hostile strength Reoonnafssanoe in forse and deployment of firapewer. an attempt traat each separately0 basically A captured Chinese manual translated Korean revealed the same objeotives to be reoonnoiterad treop80 sf and the same method8 of reconnaisss. potit the unfte oover.UNClaSSlFlED SECTICN D Reconnaissance The enemy divisfon Nations extensive foroes or Army whioh made inStfa1 oontact with Un%ted and assumed rasponsibflfty mfrsfonr of the front probing conduoted There reoonnafssanoe and light attaoks. pootm ts were used to note enemy movement D and all conduot reoonnaissanoa 39 a%tuatfon 0 offfoerr were required and to know the terrain and the host3le Remmnafssanoe fmm Army group units were organh regiment. routes releoted the break-through of attack. were many eimilfarftieo between Chinese and Iorth Korean reoonnafssanesg has bsen made to into however B beoause of some basfs. of marah. engineering Pn addition. unit werkIg Movement of hostile and fire power were all p~fmapy oonoernc point. and three Ik.

aonrid@ratien. lines the enemy then withdrew suspeotad Ikited and moved alcpng the periti@nr.. patPslling.three and at times The reomnafssanoo this group with oleth&g or four wa8 al6o givan mu at nights hortfle dfrolore alcmg Choir ~&~sfon whfoh was performed The emmy squad ffred posftionr poritienr dffferent in an attempt by retumfpg reotfrar indiroriminataly at ruspoted feroos to have Unfted Natfcwr firao !I!hir prowdur6 Aa a rerult ua6 ropeatod of theea ef the font. At te the next latfonr D(I tfme dfd the enemy reply they appeared to be unarmed. Ikfted other rerpensibilitisr th6n those isrued of Chinere oivilian Conmmirt clothing and pido were to mak0 taib yadr in reoonnai86anoe~ They obtain read gPide6. United the group attompt6d and reoeanoiter behind . to inffltrato prebaa. laurt k *hat the 6rmmy*6 prel%minary r6eonnai66moe prior to 6n The r6o@nat engagsonent in the part was effootivo naireanoo and persirtezat.misrfanr in a semi-agent oapaoity behind hostile 1iXM60 Foroar reooPPnairr- The prirary 6noo mit6 terrain po6ftion6. ffrs.nieed as olose aa 20 yrdr a6 OXMIIIY* draw9ng ffre. or engaged hmmrer. to $thip to of the oanbat rooonnoitered a fmr thoumnd Illatfonr It poritfena but rarely taken taotioal fpte mdo oontaot . being reoog. Divirion of perition6 tha main attaok ef the US 2nd Infantry was made by three in an upright hostile ffrs before XVNDRI gfoupr file before of five to five poritim detaohed or six IWII advauoing bunched uutfl in 8inglO They or aom6timer approached After front wa6 emoouutared. to Unfted Nations fr9 ofvflfan by.

a terrain reoonuaf66anoe. meso leoationr vrere pa88Od baok by m&guards A6 an advanoe patrsl or while aoting as guidee.o the battalfea. enemy petrel6 Upon campletEen rplft of the up ._ and eaoh man reoonnoitered mirefran. te it8 liairon the patrol parent with reastembled at 6-e predearignated element8 spet and returned alre establiohed . other Horth mit6 Beoonnaissanoe 42 in the area0 Korean People98 Army Becmmafrsanoe mite of the North Korean People60 Army were srganized * of every eohelen frem oorpe to oempany level0 Tke Army oerps and dfVf8fen6 had a reoemai66anoe had a reoonnairrame ompany. were righted.p$tohed.Bations In l lin138~ Sane of there there agent6 wore ROKA. orgaufeatien. mortar small patrol8 target8 l f United Natienr and atiilhry 4 w%th btX8t8 .ef automatio fire in%0 and the targot obrervation areaso Peltl. the reoennafsragoe greups were erdered to return to the main body. If the patrol three-man 3000 yard6 and reported report failed patrol baok. te rend em reoennaf88anoe en 6eme oooarfonar a unit squad k larger than It wa8 oemnen praotfoe acoomplfsh a mi8uIen. although a squad was di. As few a6 one or lmo men were ren% ts mke In heatile a oertain terrftery. reotian. US or oivflfan marked the leoatfon olother. unft8 extended Beoennafeeanoe tithin the rtruoture Korean North Peoples8 the regfnteut battalfono *In the CCFo the l rgamfra%imn to regfmental level early. tune inrtanoer. the main body halted If hastfle unit6 and anefher dirpatohed. of reoonnafssanoe . three-man of abe& #se wa8 reoennafssauoe team6 preoeded Bhe 6@n body by a dfstanoe baok eaoh hem-.

8quado All rueh unit8 were attaohed by their of eaoh eoholon arrd were employed rerpeotire Three ornon were perfermd by l&h -8 Korean mado 8ydm’Of Laber ~eOWUN!ii88UUW UZIit8a to detetie villager8 Party the tremd8. aad the politiaal reoannai886nae c06~1tsi8t tendersroior uuit8 of the area were analy6ed0 Korean Lab& PI* The member8'6f momberr or houn were astrally of eympathiterr srientod dootrfne proletarian eroh airrfrn origin. 60 that of Chine80 ?he t&d Of af88fOa ___- . Pirrt.wkk led politioal oitirsn8 and gaI&ng reoenna'lr6anoe gr*upro of mi88i. a poiitio@ thoughtr. of thir !Ihe mombsrr wibro thoroughly type with the cOmm%8t before 60 that their they were oapable 6upporte Politioal ef indootrtiting l ffioer8 . rooonnai8r6soe and the &Mb politioal in the aroa of prope86d rympathirerr attaoka '1210leoal Korean and it8 were oantaoted. and the omnpany. type6 of mirsionf.n W&8 lntelligenoe United Xatiens reoeEmai66amoee olarrif%sd A rearad type primary The oenoerm was te oapture order of battle daovs6e8tr Wa8 and to oolloot infirmatfmo 'Ari8 mi88irn 6OoOI6pli6hed by infiltrating tirean looal Labrr oitfrmr.a platema. United ~atiePA8 poritfrmr. a reoamaissanoe to the h6adquarterr oammmder. a8 8OeUtla u8fng looa% In oeSUbRto Party member8 and 6ympathisorr elR68%f%6d a8 low level agwLt8* wore atilired koause srpionage of their er taotioal iafwmatian km-lodge esd tilitar$ of the surreuading offfoerr terrain and languagoo Politfaal led the iratelligonoe type reoCrri88anoe m8:8igflRr 1Pi88iea6.

A rigfd phyrioal anyone three t@ war made of eaoh unit hinder the arrignment. made to repeat and general The moat advanoed eohelen was a patrol to seven per66ns led by a squad leadera The patrel 300 yard8 ahead sf the squad. Cemmuuiat indaatrination and eaoh group wa8 43 6rderlc oansistiag of three ~86 about MO yards group was given by the palftioal its mirsien offioer. whioh in turn ahead of the plateen. in the dire&fen oarefully rrated.UNCLASSl FIED Commmirt ks detewine Foroea reoc3nnaissanoe hortile firing unitss It 9aa armed reaonnaissanoe Weapon6 iere fired and po6itiou8. 6n terrain upon of oivili6n6 3x1 the area and my hertile a map srientatien &fez-e the mission. to o6ver the advance @f-the reo~nuaf8sanoe C~eRrf?g group te remeve any ObStrUOttin8. or Koresa phraSe6 to u6e Watfm guarda. features himself inspeotfen who might five the group was given ixt the objective nfth the oonditions area@ and every member familiarited ef the approaoh. and 6n 6bstaole suoh a6 barbed wire . indisoriminately return military fireras offioerr. Some advanoe units was absut had a supporting patrol. 6f 16166fOn 'RB6 led by When a tmit his respeotfve trends cmrrmander was given an ebjeotive. Before to deceive a la6t minute b&tad en the mirrion. of 8nepe6ted Thi8 type TH positfens. reoeunai86anoe unit'to determine he salled the pelitioal positienr. m6mber to eli&Mte Eaoh man was issued ef the mission0 ration8 depending were taught mi88fen6 upon the length atiple Englirh Men en the patrols on inffltratfen leaving talk .

battalien i?a Supper* In a nawmal rrituatit#n. iin intelligenoe .raider * grbup.and miue8s ia the way. UpOn doteotimn tnit the members of the reoonnairranoo 44 weapons and sot as refugeeLo Bngineer Eeoonnai66anoe o-bat . OR the unit was attachedo OKI three-to patrolr.lootioned the the oagbeer was habftrrally under the'oontrol lfmftr ia regard allmoated to rubordiaatlr ef the rogtiemtal field -8 oarmnnader8 withfP goaoral of the diri816BI to erdera Y!he mi88f6m of the eag%eeP8 6u6mmd up frr an exaerpt reWZma&88aWM from a oaphured aneq documents . the oonfiroation group rithim i%68WOrd8 ured among member8 af the rooonpccf88aBoo etoa. tmwmr. used amen& leoal age&lb alro oititent patrol6 ukw aoted a8 or low level Of$ea ml1 held the the arrsigned by would of a tesprapy %foTt as heStRg68 t&f1 of the informant foroe6o all wa8 oompletdd. eaoh member wa6 numbered aoosrding Pararordr temporary ftiily mirsian hertile diroard were to the rank held by hfa! In the patrel. umit8 were nermally dopendiag five-man nambr CO ef tree8o which it riv(IP8. areas. patrol OOnSitied of a oonfi8oatien group and a of oapturimg by of !Phe oonfisoation greup had the mirsion order ef battle information enemy daoum6nt8 or obtaining infiltrating preteoting anew liner. of a Rorth regiment8 Korean diVi6im and f\. The raider greap had the mirsien m li3e6.

perfermed reoonnai88anOe0 Korean eng%lpeerr future router road aad brfdge along of advance but more extanr%ve tsarns af the dftisi@ndl repair8 eng$neer were left battalion. ^ and penetrated hostile territory peint within ta a di6fWIOe *hat eight to the 888slnbly harurr af&er The mf68%an was generally The leoatien. and reoennaiiranrse of hestile ebr$a&er oategcbryo . oamauflagkg. and During rfmple the ef Piver-orosrfng rimilar water data of engineer Bm-th repaira impsrtanoe were gathered. reaonnaS68anoe a6 sfx miler return patrol8 inte normally aperated er at . water0 o o) pertinent to aotivities af the ether armlO Nerth night Kerean . to regular pioneer ka additfeu engineers t@ the reoennafrsanoe mfrafon6 stated abeve. ob&aoler of hortile device6 and mine ffeldrj and feasfble the exf8tenOe rignal and busby traps BIbthods of breaching weapona suoh ebStRele8. bridge Pe09Z19L4i88aweD r~OOWAai88WlOe stream-orortfig fell fnts thfr peint. potential reuter the type and nature af attack. PO~~BIMi88~049. sfterg of herrtile emplaoe6@nt8? o@nditfenr pofnt8 of read210 and the lsoatirna and thefr loo&-k&en. engineer a6 far permfttsd departure. eneqr were al8:o oalled having Ifm3ted upen ta oonduot and speoifio speoial reoennairraaoe Road + for a alI -. road building. O o will discharge all duties (engineer reconnaissance0 fartifioatf~nr. orosrhg riverq.The engineers. natureD te aeouro and of Wermation extent of eng%neer intere8te. reoonnairrluloe for drinkfag building bridger. opepatians ebJeotive8.

be light8 Friamdly artillery of enomy rohtoler. be dotourod. method only. At night. the condition engbeer ef the mad wre pIRtrO18 and the repair8o the whether 6UOh neodod repair aad miser material8 leoatioa Bridge8 of roadblookr arrd porrfbl~ reedod and hew they oould and fardr to wore rooamoltored. onemy used rurer. 46 the frPtollfgenee of United &id perba%tig Peroo8. I’ . bridge ar to oonrtmot foario8 45 TJpma~oompleti& te the of the rirrisarp diVi8i6a OAgkOOP a ree8BUai866X¶eO 8kOhh sffioorr* na8 ruluittod Obrermtia Beth Chinere -8t8 Comtnrlrt S&veral Foroe6'and l b6omti. post8 wa6 to ebtafr and the rfrria talooop68. reoessary available.fp\ L-‘. tti road% a road prior load aapaofti. to b&h Uhm is Batian oayarror. a what a +hormgh appeuod to The npxt tl?.. sf mb8ervation m51aPen and tha obremtion cwmm=Poatf6s amilablo. Ji f iri waa adjwtod munkg. Vera proparod rith fs.When remmmltering determined i _. one doffirrite and strength po6t Baoh war 8oloetod m06Ky"8 operation Eacah ob8oPmti6n in mind of thmo aad uu8 wll-ara*uflaged~ 6mmberlo Tao re09rrf88an00 ~a8 of the eenristed pOr8OAAd slad ae de+m-mined by high r%aff raakirg l ffleorb offfoerr 3%.n8.n root6ro Iwth p8t8 Korou timer rrkilised OS the obremtfen hfgh gr&nd p0it8. to an adwe. to laaato Umited Eations arbfllory pO8iti. l>iii. Very pirtmlr Were ured making l bsemtinr. repair the the availability of material8 wa8 notod.

prronnel away from the&r man were dor%rad pri8enere* lines lLnd watt Patrol8 tho were to out telephomm to oapture FrSor to departing patpol determined router the ok a mirrfq~ weak pobt to oapturo pri80ner80 lefiona the line potit 3. 15th loortrh anployed a buvmn Division. by sotmd and flarrh. defense and releoted was alro selected0 of approach 4% fro&the that A rerrdezvour A oaptured prirener atated Beoonnafssanos unit8 Compariy. Qaitod per80nnelc forosa Ikited The enoqv relsoted of tlnited oapture rtragglor8. J . from oirilfonr of their probing patrol8 than on the rermltr important Hatfons soupoe of inform&n Co the enmy u-a8 oaptured the the of arrtvel time to mrft.- f'he Chinsre plaood more weight rooennef8senoe Another CenrmurPfrt For008 end Horth ea fnforrmation gathered Korean Peoplo8* Anay and atteekr. it wa8 believed lafionr the enemy &Meted artillery fire to drew United leoete utxd thus. Pstrolr the gun poritim8.zt the United and withdrawal. 47 .UNCLASSIFIED reoenaeissenoo olem proxiraaity of the eroe produood of the lightr the rehiolo nogetivo ro8ultao Beaaure of the that to the frrsPt lightr liner. reconnafasa?me of three capturfag A rupport team whioh oonsfsted group groups with ene leadorm it of three men ohore a looatfon twe groups0 Fcwae~~ from which oou&d rupport the otbor It8 pPhIPJ7 8&88fon wa8 to allaw the to engage United Iationr ff neoemary. inrtruoted Xatimm pri8ener80 end -6 at a new plaoe er the opportune Hation .

he gave a or using a pa68 mrda to oapture the possibilly were captured. head of the appeared regardless aenter column. whioh alwayr te attaoke prOteO% worked with group. he assumed a poeitfon was employed. and returned * ?&x-e men were used on night patrolas . aapture more than three of failure. had the groupi men. \ ths oapture the at$aok Nation8 8oldi6r8 killed. the aapturo group from a possible Daylight half patralr United Nation8 k3 eightion There oonsisted af approIimately olother.. led by the team leader* while the other ene enemy soldier spotted When the leader by whistling hostile roldlers.group whioh was to take the prisoners A oapture miaslon covered* signal group of three of oapturing te ge a6 far a8 pessible. * ma. were either dressed attem~e+ 50 needed@ of whc#mwere dra6eed in oivilian unarmed QP annsd with in civilian to infiltrate waited olother United pi6tollo The members of the patrols KereaWo and there were u8uallyWorth Nations liner. Chinese Connnunlst Foroes patrols route to their sbjeotive the same way* always to take the shortest of oover and ooncealment. The remainder supporting of the patrol fire if fCpr their Enemy patrol return and furnirbed reemingly formation6 always aorsumed a oolum~ If a at th6 . After'the group rtartsd te group of threti remained in pr$tfen men. formation three-oolunn with the squad loader formatfen at the head of the aoltnm. and wa8 The aapture enc~M@ soldiers group never attempted beoause thir inoreesed when two or more United kept and the other8 withdraw.

The selectfon of routes dfffered with various units. and of the mountains patrol At night. Prearranged b. led a fYLe.ng through mcruntafnous terrafna just parallel f"lles were used to move forward Forting the deffle.. kept a three to five<-paoe interval paotis. the pat. AvoGi%ng defiles enemy patrols and crests of ridge6 was a &aracterSstic Usuaily of two when mavS.htiy squad leader rear0 dlstanoe elth6r ahead of the center led one of the flank CYJ~'EPIU.Unktig a flarshlf&t. was sent fifteen fire to twenty ahead of the mafn body0 the mati body rushed ef recefved from the surrounddng This action hflls. through or withdrew. were uasd 5n the op6n rather UNCLASSlFlEa 243 .eol--lighting hands. below the r~dgeie9ee each membar of the front. from th6 man ti Control in daylight. led the threaman of three it the mfssfon and the amount of fire When the patrol split center fit0 colt. was forced ziappfng or whfsti~&~g~ a three-man If" If the patrol pofnt it to move through m6ters a daffle. files from ten to twenty of the parallel Eaoh was spiit between the squad ieadsr &gals controlled and his assfstant. of matches. three squad moved across ool\rmnsO The squad leader !Rm two flanking 0c13lumns~~hlnsistfrng men ea6hsr moved sii. and a polnt rarely used. dapecded on the lmportan~e received* fiat open terra&. or rear SeourSty guard wa6 guards were not employed aa such.~~ assistant The oolumusr w foliow6d at the D?stanoe between the mt#a and columns depended 88 the from the center Audfbl6 column and the abiifty signals to hear the squad ieader@s sfgnala.

If BaItad a Urrage Ba%imr or 8ignal fommi were war 86nt baok to the 8qyad leader. po8ition a patril. and Jwt of the patrol gradually a petit moved up the sfds in a r3ngle near the minter I ninety of the west Uhca tb below. Similar format&en8 were wed by enemy patrol8 bp whl10 movi6g through whidilbag and lightad wooded arear* mat0hsro unit rent Control war maintatied Whm a reeontiiriaaoa hill. rtraigtdi up the erO8+0 If the mmita%a%n was dear at the bare wuro Irfgnaled reool~naf~ranae retumed Wit mm nsodad.. war% the remainder of the patrol reoennajlrranee uay strength. sighted. 60 reoonaoitur gJtw leader. the two l Ubpe8+8 I* jofm the patrol@ patrol .r 8quadwarlaermally nmmber8 reaemoitered I)%% lllhem it a ridge&m reaohadth0 or h%gh foowu6. a member sf the firrt while the rest rithdkr group wa8 sent tr.thR3aruRlmeanr. Xf not. feature.rrder of the patrol to the mar0 ti If the area w-m slaar. ensar(y rsaohsd the patrol turned degPOe8 and moved in a 8jPgio ef hwtfie is file troo&. three rmmnber8e tith the astiatmt tsrrafi a &filrded squad wore diipatahed to rsoozanaftsr the 'praentiek rwminsd The remaf. by the mm rmzteB the formatl*n ride area ecpntrol appeared to distate If a fairly or four u8ed bJ war Z'~O@XlZU!Lib+lULOO pa0r@18. sad two patrol $oek up perstir at the bars ef the mm&&A aboerved beth aide8 mf its Thmremainder file. omatinaed if w loft te ob8mveb 8aw hortilo to mntkau~ U8Iltlly forosr enin patrol8 Ibar•ly WOPOmmber8 ob8ervntfek* .Xf a further the prooesded.

If hostile dispatched

forces

were not sighted, area on the flank, an objective area,

snother

three-man

team wa8 took

. __

to another

and the squad leader in the tiddle,

two men and reconnoitered Given a time limit either visual

Eaoh teamwar aw&.ted a signalto -_ w~%8-uo~i% _

to oheck its

after

whioh it

or audible,

from the equad leader,

pyhen the signal

was reoafved, the point by wing

the two teams prooeeded The entire of approach,, Probing

to where the squrad leader patrol 51 then returned to its

of rendeevorur, the seme r8ute

dttaokr used to locate United Nations off balanos
United

Enemy probing psiats
diversionep

attack8

were

Nations

strong

and weapons;

te detarmbm

stremgth,o prior

to create

to throw the opponent the junction

to the main attack3 attaoks and other were United

and to determine ordered Nation5 defenses reservw

of units0 point

Enemy probing of ROb units habitually other units liaison

to determine foraes, at night

the junction

In the past, without

ROti uuits with

assumed perimeter on line or with it8

oontaot oontaot

o Laok of physical and diffiault

or oloss

had been caused a series of

by wide frontages strong point8 Probing atbok probing judgment with

terrain,
between

Beaause of this, unitr, prior

wide gap8 exirtsd

attaokr

were mado rnyvhers preuediug

from two weekr

to an of the .-

to immediately -it varied

a main eff8nsivo.

The size

fr8m a platOon~te ownderb

a oompany dspsnding Later larger

upon the

of the eneagr division inoreased

in the onmpaign, th8.n thors
aHsaok&l

enemy attaok8

in size o uiing Foro88*

units

employed by United Hation8

An enemy regiment

a II!!

,

Battaliw,
tsok

anda

battilfon

attaoked

a oompmaye

Stroag

probing

attwkl

plaw

abeut l/% hour to 1 heut after
fil-0.

an intense

preplanned
with tha

8t9pOtiing

C1@8@ l%fsm

wa# anintained

by mesren~or

main body, '

leoated

from 30 te 306%yards to the rear0 ~11 groups were ThQ8e grsupr
organ&red

From the enemy unit,
bhngular formatlam

and a to aveid the er re& us;ing the were

employed0 a&

trisd

frsnt

of a

skroag

psiut

airoladto of apprsaoho
noi8ea

the &u&8 HSllr

base of a hill avoided Ikritod b

a8 an avenw

and &ad8

proven%

any psssibls aotiou

Rhum osntast

was made wSth
a

Batism8

troopeo

was srrfft

aud the enemy adopted withdrew,
the

soattered ferao If

fermatiew,

If' Whited BR$i+lrr8 forsos uutfl re6lisved by

the prsbdag

eoaupisd

the ps8itSou

43mmyt8 main fer0.0

it mar0 waucoe88ful, uulsss
the

St attsmpt6d
for

to oaptur8

pri8esAr oosurrsd. 52

and*

retum,

opprttmity

eaofrslasmu~

UxxStsd lBation8

Foraer

empleyed a3.r ebservatieu patrolsa harnsr%ug

urhg

flare8

80

deteot likely

emmy reosnnafs8anae ea%q appreaohsr

artillery
in

ffre

OR

and’rwpeo~6d

emmy OPI aided

oeuuteraatdng

the effeotivermm serseus, suf'ficient~y

af ensmy reomnaissauoes in advanoe of friendly

&muter-reosnnaisroe lines to ~nteroept regarding

enemy patrols, United Nations

prevented posftiens~

the enemy from gainiug

iuformatfsn

Beoause of the snemy~s stereotyped shtwtsst distauos and his laok

way of us%ug the appreaoh seourityo

ef

of all-aroupld

ambush patrols

were easily

employed*

F'riendly units

defen8e

peAmeters fields

in depth,

with

physical

oontaot

between

and prearranged friendly

of f&e, Rigid

prevmted control

enemy patrol3 of fire

from

determining

boundaries,

also denied of

the enemy this

information. action

Only troops fired on him,

izmediately Friendly

to the front flank elements
53

the enemy~s probing held fire

exoept 2n the faoe of a sizeable

enemy attaok.

of ammuuition saptured wore &scrtx&&to IX? materialQ at ths attack csmnandetrr were givem the* amao In movement frsan the 20~~s of attaok assembly area to the eaoh Pa battalieu m flank multiple crelumus were agaPlP used. was ocmnitted usually thrmgh tc a thrust a weak pint This point was preferably defended at the boundary by ROU treopls loP%ts or a portion The attaok ~atiens fire.~reoeunaissanoe.the After fbilfty gashed the soreeaing &ttaok Fbbt army er dfvisicm whioh had assuued respeasthe tm reor(he of the front armi& had osmpleted ite. ta the lnavemmt en f&ot from ffvs to sewn needed0 to a~ attaok point.SECTI= E Zuemy Movement to.rear meved to an aWmuk point. 8traagtha The aelumus shswed ss %norease of oapharis hewever* hsuro the rata reottrify3 per ef advaaae was reduoedte three almu% 2g. on a maxbnm fmntage ia the bited of the twe diVfSien8 of abeut three Batienr line. enemy troops days? oombat rations Basis loads utflise and were warned were also issuedo not to eat them uutfl md the troops httaliom asssmbly poiut. miles. Salients suppertfng foroes of the front gas usually of two !54 tbited psi& Ipear the juuuture for one te depth of tm where ft was diffioult of sh&aw support the ether Stations by er if was near a point were also fbre seleoted Sa United strez@h as 6 ddparture paint as it aided eneq Ftuutes sf and hfidered Ihtited avsfdeda oammau%tpat Soa were usually Frfe~ were fssued Batieus ‘55 observatisu. or diviSiOu8 iu the.oO yards ht ZBW hours0 squads wure sent eut rrithh audible di8tmoe .

the enemy troop8 girerr a shsrt rest peried az%dwere allemed to eat @no oembat ratie& : At th%s point. wefe About 2000 meters from he&i14 liae.u dc&relled by the division the battalfon maintained liaisea was permW+d Platoons and ooazpany c-der with oempany head- quarters right by runner and deployed of fifty by 'squad celu~~~ to the left to erk hundred yards er w%th intervals between squads f%mation.UNCLASSIFIED of the tidvanoe squad and abaut the oolunmo The rmrte 200 .. and tiij.-3s olose as 800 yards to United 57 for attack. SupportzIng weapons were set up. squad acoording to the terrain* The first squad uaed a line and the third the second squad a triangular echeloned vidual to the left.s 3OU yards from the oenter highwayr a& flat of 56 -- ef advaaoe aveidsd ten-aim. oanpany oenmandsrs were given their erderr and teak . formation.over iram the battalia time element uera flexfbf$fty this respeoto ommandera. Nations lines squads crawled where they awaited the signal - - UNCLASSIFIEII . Method ef attaok oemmadero and the 1Ce 3.tt.

an enemy division a thrust maximum three attacked battalion An enemy infantry battalion usually a was also in on a 400 to 600 yard front. anywhere from the division to the battalion division commander was located CP during rear area to the regimental from the front. but in one instance This battalion approximately width 400 yards An enemy company area varied on the terrati were deployed and the over a from 100 to 600 yards of the en-.SECTION F The Attack Frontages in the attack' * a Communist Army had a front front In the attack. port6 99 roughly to a Wrth wa6 conduoted Movement of of the commnd and observation next higher *A commanders only by order6 Chfae6e Amy corresponded Korean Corps* . causing depending strength large At night. front. United Nations action.. During fqzi‘ces to distribute their commander fire. on a on occasions. commander wa6 found anywhere from the regimental CP or from 200 to 2000 yards from the front. troops 58 front. about 200 yard6 from the front post varied whereas the division from 800 to 2000 yard6 from the front. th6 attack or from 1000 to 8000 yard6 post wa6 uraually lcoated observation The reg3amntal obremmtion ldnee. mile front. attacked on a PO-yard in depth. an offensiw the enemy battalion of his observation Similar usually took a position to the rear point@ post about the CP Thq 100 yard6 from the attaok regimental to our tactics. twelve although milesa of not less than The maximum division was usually cenducted six miles..

teak their . were wounded. 6f the hostile normally The attack their formation6 in great unit6 depth and continued through the troops astaaults in contact. moved forward When the hostile it raoeiwd again until other6 When seme enemy sdldiers from defiladed positiona. file. it approaohed aa close initial as 20 yard6 to friendly In many ca6e6. friendly instance6 line6 CCF columns moved dewn the in calumns of twos and feur6. weapons but just and machine guns engaged and fixed in 6upport of the assault attack. ridgelines In another in a eingle the skirmish was net always u6edo in several toward action. line firs was 300 a degree of flexibility CCF unit6 attacked in exploiting frontally.The Assladt Multiple Force penetrations of United Nations These flank. the skirmish Rations positions approached epening fireg to within but at pcsitienso yard6 of United nfght. Batidrna pe6itiOn6 an enemy platoasn charged United When the enemy skirmish men took cover by laying lifted. force0 line United Nationr In the frontal For example. element6 assault carried wave was not armed with grenadeao Rifle fire. the individual mortar6. mens a penetration a akirmiirh marching employing Ineffectiw line before varying used* from twenty During to sixty the day. it halted and the firo prone on the ground. fire* places the skirmish line line was fired upen. wara line in a given fellomd seater by were / were attempted an envelopment organized of reserve fer by enemy forces. by the passage L The depth allow6d at will.

regiments. and observe of attack. shallow-depth strength. enemy un-fts was dfstr%buted Only a few men with weapons were used in the inftfal The battalfcn with seocndary echelon stayed in line as much as possible and divisional set== the main direction echelons of the attaok.- In some attacks. Regimental with ondary also Elttempted to keep in line out by battalions the main directfmz Wfhsn the oentinued successfullye revealed of assault. company moved up the face of the assault teams. These columns were distributed When an assault If the assault rear troops enemy troops withdrew by leapfrogging0 to the were forced for ef the enemy lines to disperse. they reported . 60 reorganization. assault.---__ _I. This continued echelon United down to smaller The mission of the second disorganized strength of the automatic was to mop up. For example.9 battalions platoons tc search for weak points Another that se the attack could be continued p~sfticns method of assault on Unfted Nations a twelve-man enemy squad. each armed with defended by friendly a submachine . and the first the assault The first the first lfne far& utilized a wide-front twe-thirds deployed and a of its IXO eohelon line deployed of a dfvisfcn deployed of the regiment units. formation. capture Nations forces.uno trocpse A base of deployed fire while hell to a base of a hill on United was placed Nations defensive positions by the squad the remainder in nine ooluxm across of the attacking of three-man the front. prisoners0 twc battalicna. In the mafn line in depth. penetratfen carried and regiments0 through was acccmplfshed. failed.----- _ ..

attaoka. leading The terrain w-as not oonoentrated determined in the spetrilead the number of men usedo United Nations element failed te break through second and third wave were used mtil a breakthrough was established. toop were easily was expended* The third but more friendly wavss were still firepower slackened ammunition slightly trained troops.CIt-c-:: resulted... of the If the lines.. The ffrst training Attaoks phases of the Korean conflict. Koreans who fired A seoond wave of slightly but reldom aimed their stopped and fourth rifles These. .._ -_ This was far a taotio on United be thought were made in waves0 very little had a rifle wave was composed of young Koreans with in the art it. the enemy deployed depending positions. but a costly more took e:. friendly positionsr one piotured a human from . Eaoh enemy soldier but did not fire maition experienoed thefr plaoe. These were easily mowed down. overran Korean troops were usually aooompanisd the positions. These frontal by flanking In the latter phases of the aonflict. a . --- UNCLASWED ! Mass ?Tave Tactics Whsn mass wave taotios sea of bodies correoto In the initial Foroes utilized taotio. 9Jhen United Mations seasoned North attaoks due to. on the in depth and employed numerous waves of troope formation of the United Natidefensive As a rule. which might Nations easily positions Barth Korean a human wave overwhelming were mentioned.:.- - . too muoh strength attack. the laok of ammunition. of warfare.

type hand grenadesn attaoked armed armed In one Chdnese assault. it made them vulnerable to the US QBCQQ fire* of (artilleryjO O D .:s so determined that United artillery fires ou~.cn af *units. from daffladed heavy oasualtfes Chinese Communfst F~roes acoepted ran @ut @f ammunitfen appreaohed oloso the defiond:ing foroes and were Poraed te -withdraw. pattern assaults an artfllsry objeotPve ef sverooming United Na.ns ts 6rm us dfVi8L3?2* In this manner the CCF expeoted te overcome the US with a sea of menO However.tfens floes 6 sf dfvfsfon sfsas The objecth af the CCF wi 11 bs trs destroy US manpower o Brev%o~siy the CCP used large units suoh as three CCF f.. their attaok. until others took their plaoes marohfng fire. pesftionssl.ixs. with bags of 20 to 30 ps+R:o-mashsr strong points Uhfted Bations with anti main positions. when the CCF oonorntrated such large numbers sP man %a a small area. Enemy trosps Heavier autematfo submachine guns supported the att:-ok weapons supported the treepa with from the flanks..ti.ld never oever mere than ens echolone . and to avoid aeucentrating large numberrs: of US Infantry units. . attaoking @no US company tith three CCF oempanfas or ano US battalion with three The main emphasaa will be en destrcyfng small CCF battalions.r. the CCF will now oonaentrate on the destruc.small groups of enemy grenadiers.The distance Yations between theee echoions ws. CCF troops where the 7% $an brfns its superierity ef artillery fnte effecgt. to Unfted Natfons In the attacrk When'anexay trssps pesit5cans D they infantry seldem used bayenet n fellswed oharges. The grenadiers and the submaohfne guns advaaoed at a walk using As s6smewere killed.

. and by estimating found.of and evaluating of the oonfliot. but usually. Because of to preparing a route of advanoe for the attaoking personnel. ndnefields only a suffioient were removed over a broad front. Another use of wire was lafd to detonate any trip and land mines0 method of olearing mine fields Iry enemy troops was the net -. of the net explcded ji@ mines in the minefield.UNCLASSIFlED Massed manpower was used after to destrsy individual May 1951 by the Comvnmist foroes 61 small United Nations units. for number of paths were cleared 62 Koresn units saorifioed passage of the assault troops. was required Enemy engineers If obstacles their and mine fields efforts in its only in the se&or and obstaoles of the main advanoe. anti- and drove them through personnel. Mine fields were determined of war. observation. time permitted. the terrain of prisoners inhabitants United-Nations and material movement. In the early part the enemy also rounded up large minefields 63 numbers of oivilisns flares. neutralizing fortifioations. oharge wae attaohedo The wire over the mines and then the powder bag was exploded. local enemy from interrogation of the area. small details to explode by the by Both Chinese and North sending them through mines by stepping suspsotsd and known minefields on them. nets to whioh a powder. infantry. Penetratien ef Mine Fields deotrine held ths engineer hostile field staff responsible and The Censsunist engineer for breaohing obstacles. the shortage olear applied of engineer eaoh oombat mit own se&or. The The downward pressure UNCLASSiFlED .

t i I I .r a’ / .r..

auff ioiant happened.r~omnaimenoe United by fbyer Ithan a - firefight iufaatry Mostar . :toered the minefield long and fired w 5n an effort fi111ed with wau determinrdr to datoaate oxploaiver.“a@W fired into maohine gum.fielda urfng. and l xplodedo Whm hand intern1 probing orwad was dqne. all the a&or 1.. rlid with& intO thi rinofiold detonate. whioh Ipeutralfsed of r$fle to a oapt?ing -ited Oouriating &a an effort md a firirrg platooni whioh. oleared and marked paths through oonsisting obstaolelrt a dwwlition throwerao toa@ of an qngineer pill-boxeso squad with IZWQ flame team... in ease one IIU+ detonated m the other olorsly 64 oheokad the arka for ured for 0bAPgWS Booker on long poles were:alao # attiohad to 1010 boobytrapll. oonsisting hostile of an engineer squad.. piper bqoe a minefield pattorn it When ODO wk . the pima* wwo ala0 torpedoep. lines tripping Enepsy ekirmbh uhioh WIifed had the in attaok were prooaeded obstaolm . foro~a.attaoked point t’he Blations infal%tX'y isolate a strong supported and prevent rest reinforoemen~es for00 team whioh fir. of the arsaulbLg with a base.. organfsed aesault amr Korean divisions infantry0 uuite oom@eed $ad foti Of engixmarap end supporting olearing Thsed unit8 dlemantre whioh an obetaole team.of .5 ylrrd@ to kept When this other rurploei~~ oords a mcnqy roldierr a mike .E]mgalorr ursd took plaoe btwea~ uaitr I ahella Bitionu and engrenader. by -11 Wita* primery purpose of oleariug and deStrO@X Waticmr Barth firepcmmr. enemy rlrro probed mh.

positfans available oover and dead spaoe. regime& Hations sohelon offiosr of the forward assault of a division organized two or three team6 in raoh kttalicmo mnd attaohed dfreotly One car two were also organized as a reserv6 to the reg%ment to seoure iter adv6noee UNCLASSIFIED 4? . advancbed by leap6 and the latter aharges. fields the obstaole When ._ and PlaBle throwerse The oapturfng United Bations 9ts supporting *and prepared operation.- and obetaolea.and isolated fnfa&ry. omrmarnd posts. artillery to destroy a&' organized It positions in eaoh battalion had the mission 0 of the regimental Unit6d Hatims alra of destroying Ths aasond type wau amigned to a unit hoetile fields. it tie gun fire. territory. tesm advanoed with the demolition team agd destroyed the objeotive the assault weapon 6mp&aoem6ntr . utflfzing bounds. for any United It also Hationr supported from forse by fire oounterattaok. the demolitien fortifioatione During this the firing it6 team supported fire at hostile and oaphring and w6apoar team by direoting 65 emplao6mant6e 'Ike types The fir& their of ascsault team were organized emmy troops by Barth Korean foree8e in aided the assaulting and seouriug by removing obstaales approaoh &mug by ordir points0 This type teamwas omnnrander. with grmadee. and to penetrate The aomandiug signal deeply oentm-6p military into United warehouses.f Under the cover of 8uppoPting~aLaohine olearing it team marked a path through its tiuaion. Rea6hing the objeative. demalftion attaaked fortified '. had aomplatsd all signaled the ds8aol'ition team0 whioh.

.a~. divided into a me6s6ng6rp rmb- aid rnuo. The . rioa Light dr@aa was generally and 606Mtim66 miform6 "&e pan&rat&z&g gwrrilla~lsadere ai+lar assault to IbhitkFSationa tom psoperated w6re utili6ed~ o obtaining from&hem olosely.appoint$# The assault and rsorganiced and hostile fire team usually at 6 designated wa6 reoeived.slibl~~. it were neoessary. team oarried one day*6 ooobd worn.I’ . ' : supplier and 6qufprmanfr ad+ 9.raw food. f+sh man on the assault and one day*6 . infiltrated spot6 ~r6s. The assault and a medioal team. tithout r. as an assault ~.‘...l'i$th looal. the Ssourity ar6au1t by sub-team uutil assigned . W66uaxIder6g and the pkitioal ur res~~~~. attraoting attentiOn* UNCLASSIFIED .rndn The entire t66JQ OOnei6ted of approximately a platoon and vms otumaudsd The assault aither leader Dnited or a oompany oammander. f&dly line8 one by On0 If larger groupuwsrs used group the assault team 66nt a 6~11 point while to engage and destroy body ohanged direotiOnso populated area5 the frisndly"strong The team:rarely if tbd =%A a into paeesd through it divided however.te&wa6 of one inf'an~ry sub-team. team whioh pen&rated Vations lines wa$ equipped with enough fire. A reriervg and one anti-tank Sub-tOaI6 aoted with 6ub-team. an assault oonsistsd squad with two 6nginOOr6 of four engineers a aeourity whioh oonsistsd with wire outters and &IO heavy maohine gun squad3 two f%nm mortaret~ squad. uhioh attaohadt UNCLASSIFIED team CP was oomposed of one team leader. Eaoh team had tuo altomats team leader...~' seourfty the firet sub-team leader alternate. power $0 withstand a oowatsrattaok.3 gmall groups and passed through _..

teams afthdrew Baysnat Csmpanfes and Penetrat5sn Unft Ch%nese Cozmaun%stForoas employed Bayonet Companf@s -0 "Chfsn !fas Lisn" -a. heavy resfstanoe prearranged and tho assault teams quiokly the assault was enoounteredg 66 assembly points. Two squads. groups -- thb assault tsam was divided a specfffa targot. aoted as a torpedos. CP. 56 grenades o and ssvsn rifles. One squad. and rifles.ar ‘. sub-team apprsaehsd sub-toam attempted roar* In an ..reserve to enwelope the rssistanor attaok on a United Nations and str%ke the flanl. the . fits small eaoh group taking OF tote were entered._ on the runa In the meanwhile. ffro the assault sub-tsam attasksd When an sbj$otive frontally Hatfons undsr the osverfng feraes dfsoovered 6.. f"Rsh submsh%me guns.. equipped with bangalors squads. malts 0 oonmuanfoatfon . the men wera divided one group of lo&out the buildfngs men equal to the number ef entranobsa or tents at the sams timsti rofthdrewe All If ts Ths onsmy sntared ast%ons were swift.osnters8 signal all At a prearranged on various ssv*ral bufldfngs ino9iuding wsapen amplaoements. with RPf&3 the vfsu of ~~%~%dea.f the maohine guns0 the assault assault If United the attaek. or build%ngs.UNCLASSFIED Often native g\?fdes wtwe smplsyeda was ts br taksn. acted as demolition UNCLASSIHED . f%re was distrfbuted and the varfons ffred at ensso smsng the tents weapon emplaoeIn order to firs jinto If the groups. spa: 'qead..and pen&ration ompanfes The first unfts as assault unitse and breaoh United ef oloarfig equipped wfth Ratfans haysnet pssft%snsO for wers used ts assault platoon had the missfen the path four the remainder of the oompany.

team0 a demolit* ITWO wal oomposed of an assault The assaa%' team was equipped with light &mm mortars@ %WO three to p1US three or four maahins gupls. torprdoes <. and took The third platoon.#rr .UNCLASSIFIED . I* 1. In uaord%natiaPr fith:a sqW6 with SqUad. Oru were organized within to that that individual saZ@i~y ior~#~p@y. Eaoh rsgi. and wiro e~tanglement4. dwo~fshing *rr. this team actually attaaked United submaohtie A demolition guns.' f&o. kohk?e triplo Vnfted Nations +ef~&re fortifWation6 -...6ring The penetration toamp and a su&Wt the enemy fnfantr~ unit team. anti-t@ Molotov team.. The sooend platoon rft&r r&Nd the fir@ platoon aoted as the ~@ault.~hostile 3h to eight men carried UNCLASSIFIED .*.'North #~rsan assault team-being of the bayonet of olearing m&268 pnd ob~&aoles I). one hstvy maohino g\n.rakrer.d sp6urhrrad and dauolition . inoluding at least fifteen demdlition squads artd and . @nos. equipped with &mm mrrfrr .no guns from the regime&al used for support. oompaqies.m@z bd.i&. oom~aniss had the mis8fon oompany' WWQ 'Bay&et of thb seoond wave of troopp TJnited Nat&one CPs and artfllery 67 01' trpo of these.ml If 6nd 66 the rupport platoon and r&for6ed heavy ho&b* bavy the awond 6% l&met dompany angquntsrad #. Penetz?rtion. 82tmn mortars 7-e heavy maoh3..: two ligh+ th6 wd roadblookeO QM iqUad.platoon had oomplstad fts mis91an.abattis~ A support team of sii demolished. positions..b6rb6d... teams equipped with Cooktailsp oleared tanka@ banga$ors.. advanoo.. latlon~. oov6r. l otisn plat.~positions. oompanies 0 Their miss%on was sfnilar and the.~fts of removiqg obstaslas in froQt / and also had the objeotive of 86i~tig. gune.

equipment capable ' swam the Aver Temporary bridges oonstruoted 69 trQOpse light vohioles. attacked or anohor. and .. United Rations thf'si'tho Korean unit practically suocaeded in infiltrati.. to -United and hirassfng .' . oxoatitsS. - The Envelopment Great stress Support Foroe on envelopment tactios by the C&Mu&& wa6 placed UNCLASSIFIED - * ': . stages of the Korean oonfliot. .other .. climbed rear0 to the high When it was seouredp United Nations enemy troops from thr the rope and In one other as a'natural and were' a ' ' _ - positions casep United obstacle ferried quickly foot Nations troops depended upon a river The enemy troops over on logs. with To aooomplish ehati shot a form of harpoon grouad." - . WOPSsent through Nations attacks rear were shallow in depth. OP when he determined he was qufok to exploit. . The comp6ny in United Nations two'Unitod hostile Lines units was noted by When the junoturo b&worn Rations foroor the enemy. '. MitS Reoonnafssanoe mainly companies and other by infiltrating. In one tistana'e. the work point. a rope attaohed.: _ areas where road blooks were established mado. of supporting against fndfvfdual the enemy._- idFlED UNCLASS and transported ammunition for commander led the penetration Exploitation of Weak Points tho..68 unit0 ho teams. supposedly natural inacoessiblo the enemy demonstrsted high ground and a lines' " by " In the early his ability brfdging North scaling o'f attaintig other so-called obstacles.ng vertioal cliffs.

were given the United Natfons:oossnand posts and artillery UNCLASSIFIED ..166 from the point where the frontal assault of the United Nations For00 - _ wae taMng plaoa e This was to avoid any possible United Nations t . Thus we oun easily suooeed in breaking . - oaptured ensrmy documents 8 ‘Surrotiding taetios are a gre’at threat to the ensby (II?) The enermy and it is eiksy to suooeed with suoh measuress h6s no great strength.throwh their.. lines aad going iaround them.subh as assault mission of attaokia teams and bayonet oompanies. their morale is low. or attaokSng the front: a eohelsns w6a. a small forae was used to disperse main body oontinued toward its objeotiver Other small them whilr’the groups . from d$fferent as two Other6 hit’ the rear ‘dfreotions.T / was te arrive undet66$6d r(: a given loaaticq as &.I.the ‘pn (oop$g fOroa was three-folds. but the Bnemy are oareless of their guard to th& front.&$y as :?ossibles t : I Seaand B it was to attaok 5” United Nations line UT?Pstrau:z’. 70 The missioln -clf. it ww ta blookade the line of retreat *’ A point fati it break+hrough . a striot watdh not kept. All t&its moved as quietly as possible to aid&d ..- ‘: ’ UiCLASSlFlED‘. foroes itj -Komao This is evident from the taotios em$loydd and frolq. 07'086 fir6o The depth of flanking penetrations and the distanae . and misaicm. The fundamental taotioaldootrine of all Communist Forces 6omblC. Not &nly is their rear unguarded. . be%$6eP @M&rations variedD depend5ng upon the situatiafi~ terrain. of $36 enveloping foroe ads generaiiy seleoted about t&em 11d.and fighting ability is not goad. t. Thirdly8 L. first. of United Nations lines. it . rear 13 -small enemy aits were engaged whiie thrusting towards the .k point was that of “double envelopment” $6 unit taotioso attacked frcsn two direotions.

vehfoles. mortar ffre. lines and two of the hostile approximately reserves0 to engkge United Nations executed The reserve around . a single envelopment UNCLASSIFIED . the two regiments the position. enemy division g %n the meantime.UNCLASSiFlED ' positions. Nations attaok. by ambushing the lead vehiole that then attempted until of a oonvoy and disabling was also disabled.foroes.. fire. advanoed slowly They were taught flanks0 to envelope direction oontinua to advance without United to their Cnoe behind road blooks started Nations Communist foroes The road blook established was usually ita This with to out off fleeing. Enoirolements were aooomplished in great depth behind UT -_ two regiments foroes from the flanks. the r>Ad was oompletely end mortar fire Maohine gun fire were used in road blocks During along the normal Nations fires small arms and automatio north of HCESGSCWG to - the United withdrawal 1951D the enemy lighted the vehfoles near the road at night Then friendly automatio troops as they passodo to intense passed they were subjeoted 71 weapons and Commitment of Reserves JThen a Communist division was well b&talfone to the rear contfnued penetrated line United IIatisns units. blooked Any vehicle tti by-pass proaess was oontinued disabled extensively weapons fir*. Nations Foroes oounterattaoked of an eneq'division If United the Communist frontal would attack Nations foroes the mited did not and attaok from any to . to avoid hostile would then advance to the flanks Enemy boldiers artillery referenoe lihes. lines e If United assault. in February silhouette the fire.

2 3 ++- giI)-EN SYMBOLS ENEMY FORCES DEFENSIVE CCf DlV FLANKINS CCf ON RESERVE CCF DIV ROUTES TAKEN BY DIVS --‘.ATTACK MANEUVER SKETCH (A) UNCLASSIFIED PRIOR TO ATTACK (B) DEVEWPMENT Of ATTACK I t t I------I 'LGBw--- CCF 3 4 1 -----CCF ----- I \ 11 'r b --a$ - l-l E. 1 . --i t AREA INDICATES fANHN6 OUT Of DEfENSlVL: DIV PRO6lN6 ATTAcI( UNCLASSIFIED .

it mission. and usually acoompaniedthe first.UNCLASSlFiED one flank left and joined one of the p&&rating Comrqnist when:the for till' foroes division. unitsa and second. depth. to any area upon demand. isolated When the unit segments. situation. moved up division. depending were designated the attack i‘! as "isolating These way enveloping to attaok United Nations before 'i. on the. certain units of various units. and the enamyts pasaago of After to act as an active Attack continual retserve ob." sizes.. fire.ttack. This tactic to the Conar. Isolating Units In a Communist a.unist forces was employed down to company level0 'The reserve miles Vations to the rear artillery (or defense) WTI~ was generally located about 23 of the attaokfng~armies.9c:! E. moving out to the whioh was about or righta The remaining one nightus maroh to the rear reserve attack commenoed.jeotive formations attaoks units bttacking in great were organized were maintained units which by the consecutive were in contaot. through the oneand was secured9 the enemy re-established was basic his "two-up. b9 Strong . designated force 0 Jk.. divided into two Each one dealt were built one speoifio Defensive provided shelters exoellent were in depth in rugged areas whioh of escape routes and easy camouflage. back" formation. zlit was assigned to destroy two missions: fleeing reinforcements.II a - :I UNCLASSPIED . It was close 72 out of the range of Wnited however8 to be available enough. positions coverage arrived at its with destination.

psychological weapon to add to the resulting fn the early UNCLASSIFIED . lgl!!me. : .. surrounded forces with counterattacked reinforced troops. Communist ccmmsnders saw the opportunity Generally... was removed. if forces United until supported units. yet wide enough apart unit maneuverability.isolating was held for and and'anti-tank positions appear.. fire to relieve power..’ ._ and engaged the assaulting and took cover* The main force Nation8 force to the flanks When the United both flanks enougha the enemy counterattacked approaching Pursuit troopse and the rear 73 and Reorganization an When a major United enemy attack suooeeded in surrounding United Nations forces0 effort Nations was made by the Communist units units.one to prevent to deal with remnants United Nations of. close enough to provide The two positions were construoted to afford ._ easy con&l. built and all spoil SW . a amall enemy unit..United reinforcementad troops Nation8 trying break 6ut of the encirclement.. position the withdrawal Nation8 trosps.were and prevent Nation8 seized to guarantee of United of the position When Unitid troops.UNCLASSIFIED . _ . $'wo different type positions were and to constructed the other -. United pursued an enemy company. Hcwever... pursuit to separate and annihilate was carried of encircling by other out only when the the hostile pursued units.. Nations fleeing contact was broken. . When enemy troops as a Nations soldier. they used shouting oonfusion..3x1 _ deployed drew close of the . e. _ . were set up at ambush points All neighboring terrain spots where tanks might which dominated features the security the pcsition. remained ... reserves A portion of the.s.

When an temporary one by Communist forces. supply the enemy buried during a pursuit* caches of axmunition and weapons to insure T&en the enemy maintained generally conformed routid logistical table? support.stages of the confliot. co rugged a0 b. co light moderate heavy light moderate heavy light moderate heavy BATE OFADIWWE (miles per day} 10 Relatively 2. 74 plan0 to prevent The mopping-up Blfckades method used by the enemy was a well-coordinated on routes of communication units. Rugged 505 3 less h88 h88 than 2 . the objective The second echelon of the attacking mopped up and consolidated the pcaftion. disguises.= Extremely 4 YJhen extensive forces. likely oarried places Special and wearing hours of all troopa* groups out systematic offered foroep during which concealment endeavored United Nations small isolated Chinese Co+nunist to capture of UN soldiers. lightly searches for were set up at key points traffio enemy vehicular equipped daylight frcm withdrawing. Special emphasis was placed UNCLASSiFlED . co a0 b. his advance to the following !rERRAlN TYPE OF RESISTANCE flat a0 b.. than j than 1 Naticns 3. dffffculty objective defensive and rapid withdrawals contact logistical were made by United the enemy normally in maintainfng was seized positfons allowed adequate to be broken due to his support. and issued orders the &emy organized next movement if force for the was contemplated.

the April sn0~ in on. 0asualties During fire Eighth artillery fast of anmtunitiari. Countermeasures Ambushear were established Taken by G Foroes Against . the May Communist 0ffensive.UNCLASSIFIED . Snfliatkzg h~vy . on the enemy. rounds all th0 artillery Van Fleet. for 8n United Army K0rea. fired 186&O and six hundred the artillery at a tima.. . units of the leaders operations mopping-up with of &ted Nations units. torrards Oermartmi. I Corps Artillery.areas were oonoentratienb Vz%it.. Enemy Al$aok Prsbably againat Artillery positiens Artillery Nation8 friendly the most &feotive m0asure takezJ by United t*s the 0ffeativs routes Xati0n8 @'0$?000 Chinese Communist atta! fire wa8 plaoed 0~1 all use sf artialery.sd 'laa$&?& : adj0ining friendly unitN* '. In f&v0 daya. I rer0 oonduoted with a o#znpany 0r@a%00n using a squad wedge formation. A basio load of ammuniti0n per lO5mm h0w%&r gun :$rior to May wa. suspsoted and w&8 regirtered and mortar pOsitiOn8 troop8. any emergency...s 50 rounds gr: par day. fbser* . plaoed on vaoated Unft0d the withdZ%wul Of .. types. on the aapture All front. Within a f0W minute8 after During tr00ps offensiw UUt0d against Batians th0 US I Corps. th0 inoludihg organi@ to divisfens.of 76 . po8iOi0ns oam0 down valley8 fiw. tit0 : . snd under 'oover and isxecuted small Uplits.- the searoh parties were stati0ned at 00nvsanding'k0y positions along Pnour&a%n'r&lgss &$I%* ?#%MQ~ a&w4 th0 to support moved quietly 'isolated searches tha searoh and t0 pr0vib0 fan. was unable to enough to suit States General Jmes Commanding General. envelopm0ntp befor United Nation8 75 began.r4 _: %xi maaU0d _ - OOluRin8 of four.

terrain To prevent for his approach. very effeotive patrols against reported finding 800 te 900 enemy bomb8 in dead in the areas of the drops. the May offensive. 77 2'70 rounds per gun per day for the three the battalion 14. six quiok openfug VT fuses Results alusters Some Ba bombers used lOO-lb general-purpose and PO-lb during bomb8 with offen8ive. inaooessible of all key terrain although by features an all-around preserved United against night their Units. mine field8 and obstadss enelqy. Howeverp during instituted. at CHIPYCNG-NI in February 195l. sorties During Nations integrity * Foroes. Whfa by infiltrating positions and enveloping adopted Comi8t security US rear CPs and artillery all-around 2nd Infantry was-amply pivision.mine were booby-trapped reoonnaissanoe and oovered of fire to prevent and removal. with the enemy from uabig Ul Force8 utilized defensive taotioal supposedly a defense perimeter. 53 UNClASSlFlED . counterattaoking Air effeotive. five 'the ordinary "van Fleet" days' day of fire was Eaoh gm fired supply in one day. : - 1 . troops relieved advanoingienemy attaoks proved to be very and May 19510 by the enemy in April ~26 and 329 bombers were guided to enemy formations the MFQ-2 radar systema An effeative bomb ratio results for by the use of four enemy VT to troep8o one HF was used with In isolated instances. One battalion fired .. until surrounded.580 rouuds during Friendly by fields day period. Division fired of 105mm howitzers in the US 2nd Infantry three days. on Chinese troops 78 were exoellentc attacks the enemy's April To prevent colu~n8. illustrated by the 23rd Infantry Regiment. .

about 200-300 yard8 To strengthen of the W outpost boundaries flareso ordinated between frfendly barb wire. wits.sed fire United of the defensive control UN Forces positions. ing the boundary strong pofnt were as amply supplied as the was in the middle exertC.UNCLASSIFIED ’ measureso Strong outposts to detect. and all Defensive and during - obstacles. strung with of the rugged terrain.- and all Nations' the flanks troops as well the enemy attaoked and dummy positions reconnafissance were employed to deoeive took place the enemiyu as his usually radios a few day8 ahead of the attacks one to two thousand troops yards in Patrols front with were dfspatohed to warn frfendly of outpoata Plans for of the advancing enemy@ an organized withdrawal learned were provided during in case the movementa need arose0 Valuable lessons. within were organized the day.. with OQborder- of fire and the isutposts amunition line. and delay the enemy whioh oould be quickly TriP were set up. the retrograde UNCLASSIFIED ” . that ao aa not to expose f'r$endly were oriented as the frontb to the fact Alternate . fields extensive use 'aas made of trip Adjacent units mfnes.An alert laid of the different wire (two positions tin in zones of responsibility0 and mines across tactioal the entire the defensive wire. their and booby traps. perfrneters at night.'patrols units3 aprons) regardless in strength were dispatohed IN units front . in the area. 2nd d.lLuaGnation natural enemy movement. and an interior manned fi flares strength mafn battle and held at all'oosts shells revealed' was established. posftfons and improvised. line was placed of resistance. Snto tight were covered by fire. reports line . noise cans and other front devfces.

This highfirepower of mobile weapons was also Tank oompanies were used to gieat advantage of friendly in fighting units. made by United Nations foroes early in the conflict. during withdrawals antiairto infantry si. delaying aotfons and permitting defensive forces the withdrawal positions. vehioles Tanks were employed at the head of columns to push disabled off the roads and allew forces oolumas tewithdraw.Lmi.&ss. than one of enoiroling Counterattaoks were planned before the enemy attaoks United lations all lost attaok to foroe a debouohment and proved very after the enamy May offensive suocessful.ED were utilized. IN forces 79 established UNCLASSIFIED . utilized. By a the enemy to withdraw suocessfully new defensive elcploiting line beyong his original the oounterattaik.nate craft soreened key terrain enemy roadblocks. features At the same time.F. Alternate United Natfans manned by fresh and foroed the reservea.. north of the 386 Parallel.. . regained oounterattaoka ground and foroed point. aided in withdrawing enemy to fight snd annihilating a "%far of attrition"'rather friendly units.

by the unit to whioh they were attached.ons unfts. At the eutbreak did'the of hostilities. tanks in its three Ts medfum 22 T3. per hour was achieved whereas a speed 5n open country. and tank regiments were Ordfnarfly organized Commtrnist tank divisi. .!p and 11 l706 %n a training regiment. had approximately 123 Armored Division. attack-. the line of departure thousand yards from the front. on roads. infantry I?orth Korean tanks were supported commander received them to lower The tank regimental oommander and relayed orders echelons. ten to fifteen for thou-h an attaok yards about one Tank assembly areas were usually from hastfle to four poaftfons. as independent The 105th Armored Division*8 of the division Taotioal 80 component tank regimenta but were used in support control was exeroised were not under the control of other infantry divisions. hearing In one instanoeo enemy tanks raoing a US their Regimental engines for Combat Team reported several hours before they attacked.UNCLASSIFIED ' SECTIQJ G Support Armor Only during the early month8 ok the Ksrean oonfliot extent. by infantry from the A small in an of only ffve to ten miles per hour was accomplished As a rule. making a total of 156 tanks. Tank speed8 Approximately ten 81 . in Attaok enemy employ armor to any great the North Korean Peeplegs Army had One armored componentB the 105th Thfs division regiments. depended upon the terrain to twenty miles and the s'ituatfen.

:by United Natiens ttrs en&y in the oenfliot. to five. destroyed Nation8 of T. the tanks' bhelled'United wa8 moderately W artillery aoburate. The ruperiority move at night the tanks by late and beoame rummer. Korean tankr. From and the tank8 then oame on line these positions. Narth 7: hewever.advanoe infantry frent troop . party0 equipped w$th mine detectorr. ~82 orew8 drove buttened up. In other moved out about 1000 yardr.&Iair air as a. *The NK 105th Armored Division'was reoenrtituted .. Natiena Earsan tank fire poritiap?rr. 1930 use aeoondary rgaga and trails. attaokr# the infantr$ and t&k the at-ok. which in group8 movement. employed . One of the primary 3*j of enemy tank orewi teams..potential launcher the North fighting K&oan foraa 105th Armered DiviSien by the aoouraoy of United peer strength and infantry foroed North ground unitr. This oheoked~in aeught cut hestile and:ob&aolea.to Deoauae of thir. attempt8 by tank the enemy to silenoe ineffeotive position Early fire with fire prmed 83 due to the flat defilade taotios trajeotory af the tank gun8 and the artillery. employed his tIlak8 of the terrain the tank8 operated missions rseket by twer and oftem singly canalized of three because of the nature At ether times. while flank8 advanoed'abreast The tanks attempted to pin down United to the'slder During foroea the the infantry hneuvered and enemy tank ef the ho8tile'porition. wa6 was te seek and <destroy hortile By November 1950. to 500 yard6 of the Jead tank fer mines* diapo8itieni and looated party alro a&warning devioes about 90 The main bedy of infantry to the rear Nation8 attaoked ef the tankr.. defensive poritionr.

roadbound and herded olose together. had L Eash Barth (24) of ‘&m guna.M battalion addition. houses or used thatohed destroyed trucks br roof6 a6 concealment. others oralhod Other tank6 into markings. and one regiment Eaoh infantry (4) 7&m howitzorer . battalion one battory eaoh . and one battalion 122mm howitzar6. tankr.. Enemy tanks moved wkthout The enemy adopted many osmouflage United Nations airmen. power +nd it6 in&t6 battle Soviet artillery over-extendod doctrine dootrina B relied North version Korean of on a modified for the battle-tested of all availlable whioh called the utiJizatirn of eaoh phare of te meot the requirement6 a projeoted operatieno Korean Artillery regiment (12) oonsirtod of two battalion6 In . to deceive the enemy tank . moving one at a time. When IN airoraft measures in order appraaohed.r~ents. crews lit smudge pot6 or oily that the tanks Still rag6 near the tanks to give the used United imprerafon States were burning. light6 at nigh&. oriental air however. one antitank oompany whioh oonsiated 12Omm of six &3nm AT gunrg and en8 mortar mortarlo In an offensive artillery aotion. North Others 84 Korean ArtilleQ North Xorean artillery nation. impotent * liner.regiment of self-propelled had one urtiarioraft artillery.> . This was done by perronal reoennab66anooo . oempany oimposed of rix the artillery d oomnnaner determined the r6quircr. parked beside I was in+tially it'war superior rendered rupply to that of any by United ether Nations artillery.

to neutralize defenses0 to open gaps through opponent's from hctstile foroes. includ3. Fer applioatien dark in the preparatory well fsrward the artillery positions.8 . ta attaok defense The mission Nations of the mortar8 line of and weapon8 in the United fire. information. preparations line It was SOP for at knm firing the enemy to open artillery posititins in the United Nations one or more false A final of infantry intense automatio @f main of resistanoe. F'rem this of United Xations the amount of of subordinate units. and by an analyaia study. from tIMted Bations and the enemy's 82tnm and 1Xbmn mortars.the phase. he olassified was as artillery. of fire. needed to auppert Eaoh attaok preparatsry phase during fire operation wau divided into three fire phases -. UNCLASSIFIED . ef fire The enelny also executed to mask his impending transfers assaulte concentration weapons. aclcempanied by the fire the aotual attack.-up hostile The objectives the hostile supporting the enemy*s preparatory and observation system. fire were to break. and firing of command weapOna. the asaarilt support penetration and osnsolidatien. artillery. minutes and to soften up the varied defending to Preparatory aooordfig oonoentrations ten thirty to the ameunt of available ammunition. he determined and mortar8 UNCLASSIFIED by intelligenoe oapabilities.- . was emplaoed after Flat trajectory lines which camouflaged weapons were fer dire& emplaoed 500 to 1000 yards laying. were plaoed peraennel by ebserved in defilade. sometimes preceded fire..q the artillery the attack. phase.

or through intervals by dire& fired firet support were by the by two1 between platoons. of four each guns and one sub-squad men assigned men assigned artfllery The oompany had one squad of twelve . assault _ L the neutralization fn l rder he prevent of W firepewer. CCP Artillery i Chinese platoon having arki3lery two 10% as Observer8a a8 observer8 oompany hrrrftzer oonsieted of three platoons. Nations on targets of opportunitya Oooupation the forward of the United displaoement and routes line of defeU8e signaled of direot seleoted artillery.Pery oonisinued to support an enemy breakthrough in depth by prompt df8plaoementb laying from the flanks The enemy*8 i@nn or 7&m gun8. Y its ffre te apprepria$e positien. preplanned assault eohelon thirds The sequenoe of displaoement before the attaok. artfllery had 7?.. WI ___~ -. _. to engage the opponent*8 te fselate III? defenders frem refnferoements routes o and supply. nannero and the movement was oontrolled Usually..__- .7kn~ zuzs. SE= Most GCF infantry dfvision organfo UN("&S/.sion oezzusnder or sutematioally The mi8siOn8 l f thie aa direobed fire Were t. a amnhbwcattaok. in the operation8 continue reserves plan. and %o deny the use of any wi$hdrawsl The artil.. UNCLASSIFIED *ilch artfllery the flank8 the start transfer{ of the enemy assault. One-thfrd 85 regimental the artillery displaoed displaoed forward while in a leapfrog remained in posftion. of the United l f the Nations* This wa8 exeouted at the signal dPv5. of three oompaniesS eaoh wfth An battalion oonsisted six guns0 *In a CCF artillery division. general and direot support target8 fn depth and en either . fn addftion to those in the platoons. aoamnander.. 1.

200 yards the artillery from the United 63 company was Nations line of deployed approximately UNCLASSIFIED .2ft to rnght. observer group maintained an OP forward of the artillery company. Eo the There was no apparent observer attached. day. no further plans were made until In preparation the following for an attack. in turn. the night. of the night fire Missions support were ususally of infantry between MOO hours and OYO hours. deployment fortifications. Only one fire secondary or auxiliary plans were made* his position enemy withdrew or shifted from 1. The assistant company oommander was in in front Telephone of the company varied oormnunication was The charge of the group. and the infantry The infantry between the CCF artillery battery to which the artillery fire through requested relayed commander. the artillery to the taotioal by the OP with function troops company oommander. during staff. of the OP was to observe of United This notified the fired and the emplaoement of their information the regimental preparation was relayed to the company commander who in turn This unit plan. team. to the battery commander then relayed plan was prepared the message to the observer by the regimental If.in detection liaison unit as8aultsc This was done to avoid by United Nations airoraft6 forward was battalion commander. who. The battery the request the infantry .. according maintained principal Nations and the distinoe situation. and the battalion mena had an additional forward observer squad of twelve The companyns twelve-man ... was responsible for headquarters.

The observer sub- squad assSgned ts eaoh platoon A~tfllepgr fhe aasfgned target0 Coni~rol oomputeil the moemary as a unit to o. or lift i%. aad more aacura*e. firs ahead of the the message to the oomply ccmvmmdera. for maintaining This was done the attaak. wave8 of iniantry were laid. the divisional artfllery battalion missfon. *CCP artillery beoame more fnteuse improved vastly since the spring of 1951. the was OP FOP nfght assigned regiment although artillery permitted operations. As was irregular although oonoentrated. was neutralized. During artillery by relaying wave reaohed a potit Fire was sontinued the forward until OP approximately the objeative was raaponsfble attaskunits. the fire to divert wau !Rie plag.. 190 preparatory and the barrage oeourred 100 yards when the assault from the TABl&R. who in turns informed gun a~ews to shff) firs by the use of'messengers. to the regiment hav%ng the most diffioult control and prepared the right assumed opewtfonal the dfvisfon battalion onae a fire commander reserved to support another reg3men%Co Xo flexib5lity It was either adhered to plan was made. Interdiotory + and Fire power of the artillery harassing types of firs oorapany was masseda wwre not employed by ahe CCF. It 62 UNCLASSlFlED * ..orreotisns~ of of the csompauy weapons fired target on ame seation other and shifted was oral as a unit for seotiam fire those weapons nearest the ocmqwny ~oxnrnanderB and written a oonsequerme. firipg to Cha gucrs beyond *he range of voi~~e.UNCLASSIFIED ' defense 0 The first wavs of enemy infantry Sueaessive fires dsployed %xanediately to were the artillery echeloned initial oompanyre front. to the rear.

During flanks .Qfw !lmmb . forward ?ho shifMng. was the dootrine mission of destroying mortars had the primary of destroying hostile perronnelJ artillery. was no oloser eighteen target the nigh* operations. fortifications. battalion observation post was oharged with it. whea:a new one was formulated.- abandoned until artillery s _' . empladed on the*reverss !?his afforded was within slops of a hill 10 yards the enemy several 8peaMag distanoe axis* of made advantages3 the forward observer and by plaolng fsr defleotions the g\oa orew. immobile praatioe aad were well The guns remained At night. artillery pieoes were on the right rpaaed aad 1eiY of the regirnembal artflleryoompany approximately @O-500 feet relatively the general apazlt and had a depth of $30 feet. the battalion through awai%ed speoifio Fire regipsn& battalions._ the fire the next day. If 5) exoeeded *ha*. oomputatioms himself on the gun-target whem obtatiing tumeoosrary iaitial-fire 63 UNCLASSIFIED . requests from the infgtry . daylight amault. ni*hin *he lmrgs+ area a& oontrolling &he divieional Ih+ted Xatioas During _ . it oamouflaged. than 600 yards frum batlalion The guns in the battalion area approxiantaly werg normally assigned a general 200 fee+ in diame)er. artillery lipes. of the CCF that and It.. power of Che battalion was oonoetitratsd upon one seation of the target. wa8 for 100-200 yards Mor*arr Mortars about to avoid eaoh weapon to fire 86 deteotiono f5ve rounds and ~OVS were habitually from the ore&.

employed singly. gum was taken oamouf%ged out of posftion and oonosaled %&I Smaller firing holes about 5 t. UNCLASWIED c md .: mortars mortarr were zeroed in in as aebdede in shape with yard deep. as it was times.o 10 yaPd8 from the position. previously infenky prepared unfts concentrations'whiah This were oallad as needed. the gun orew protection from Unfted I?atfons Mortars were infrequently Exoept for used ia batteries his light mor'tarsp but were mostly the enemy used down by .. and field artillery attached fram a CCP army. battalion cadre member0 @ onmnnded by a The supporting mortar@. were regimental guns attaahed fire unit was equipped with heavy gUn8 from the dfvi8foBlo In addftfon.UNCLASSIFIED data0 Thfs posit&on flat trajeotory afforded fire. mountain and howitzers pieces. the indfoated a poor OorePuriOatfOR8 posts of firing and forward five to ten ne-hwork whioh limited sbt3erverse rounds rapfdly in a target The enew use of o&mvation adapted the.polioy Light and thea deploying. Set up by Wtfllery UrnitS themselv98. 87 Captured ensPay dOQuIUOnt8 indicated fn strength battalforr This had that eaoh Comuuist uait BakSPg an assault team0 equipped tith a supportfag firs power unit or (8&n) mortarso aBit WaS supposedly reooilless guns8 and type 92 fapaatr-y gum. well- the and heavier were brought The main mortar the forward Very only little osoupied firfing positions was efrOUlar edge about effort durfiag 1 yard deep and the rear this At all edge l/2 position other was made to oamouflage the aotual fipfag.

obrrtaales in 80 front of the attacking During angle fire adjaoeit for firing. the lather on a ruin strategio enemy infantry unitr. lPatiens a. of fire. 91 Tagen to Counteraot Emmy Artillery oountermeasures and Armw Coratemeasnres Perhaps the two most effsotive emmy artillery fire and air agd armor fPbrik*cr. furnish TWQbatteries a areeping were used $0 neutralize Motmtaim guna fired barrage.r$illery porition8. position8 for artillery Bo roads anmunitiaa in position a protraoted of t&m.UNCLASSIFIED . CCF mortar6 were set up on forward well forward in daylight. a regimental US 7Chnmitiantry gun often amd for . wers the:uae employed against artilky Of oounterbattezy direot *This was'probably fire. objeotive* Beutraliziag CCF artillery fire tared high was also plamd Ed pointr. targets were believed narrowem - placed to fire om pr6sel~oted whioh varied 90 of the field instanoes. in de+th and wa8 displaoemat8 were In other Well disperred was eoheloned Frequent to oombat Ull patrols. the #&oer beoause Of the with Oonneoting pits proteotion shelter8 Beoauee of the overhead UN airoraft.. ia evidenoe. - The mission ia hostile United of the field for iafmtq gunk and howitters ua8 to make breaohes t@ MNI'tralim po8itimS . md to oarry out a areeping US artillery at all agd to I _ krrrage. a& roof agaiast and deep emplaoementr wre fomd..tU!+itS to pesetrato. wre md artillery Infmtry was brought divisioars was left kere slopes as fouud In the 08: ah whioh length iadioated l seator. artillery from 200 to 500 miles. parC of the'oonfliot. xaade by enemy artillery to avoid UBI observation and mmxmterbattery fire.

usfng a the enemy armor to button traok.eed.. The US 70th Tank (Heavy) one round of 7&txa HVQ eaah. of aeaurately urfng friendly adjusted conoentratfons of fuz6 delay. had Priendly posf%ions The system employed oovered !l'he US tanks drive the enemy tanks the road hto frrfaPtryo away from aooompanyfng North than rocket team gunners 93 enemy tanks@ advanced under oover and destroyed the UNCLASSIFIED . 92 strikes destroyed was empJoyed against cm rever8et The affeotivamese potential of air the FBorth Korea38. quiok. armor use of aamonflage afr pOWerc.UNCLASSIFIED To overcome the fort‘ffied artillery using employed intense a preponderance of 15m pos%tions of enemy artillery. launoher teams destroyed the period two euexy T?& tanks with prior to 2 Bcavember 1950D 3. and fuze delay. fire L approximately 100 rounds effeot5veo mfxed fused delay apd VT. during by Kovembar 1950. up aad also fbP%e the tauks were immobill.. The enemy*8 sxtensfve KatiQnS aga%lst measXWds dsaaoastrated Wnfted Katfons the early Eattaliga During days his PUSpeOt of tiited armor was also effeotivs enemy tanks of the Korean sonfliot.. to area fire aomb%atfon mortara sat the vehioles of fnzs oa fire.5 roaket friendly tanks* off Korean were used in oa>n$austfou tith . wns also Tarks wera engaged wilt+ VT face and fuee qu%ako forePeg immobilizfig 1Bt artfllery High angle some by damaging a used 'wp shsaf ffra. w low tith Area fire. 810pes~ VT.

ka ths night Communist Foroes relied whelming General foroe of United on night warfare beoause of the overpower. UNCLASSIFIED . An envelopment the %nJRtfal engagement. prior to daylight. 4: was the favored astsaul. fir6%. Lieutenant stated8 Nation6 artillery and air Ida chaxlg. mations friend attack foroas OP foe. depelnded upoln Several outrsighad faotorsg attaclks.ted Natiom of the faot not differetiiaSa air powore In one attaak. 14th CCF Army (Corpcr)* warfare of a laok of air be employed.~~noe of memy &taake. 5~ his of such an attack the batOle and most imporCant.UNCLASSIFIED The Daylight Ii3 rare !Phe feasibflfty At%aak ins*anoes. the Communist Forses employed daylight. Seoond. the ccver of darkness the effectiveness The attaaks Junior 95 as advantageous of United l'?ations for aira The enemy selected attack artilleryg objective because i% minimized and tank support.q the day. the opinion inovemeat frm Sua&ss the aasual$ies of the enemy oommallpder. the enemy %ook advantags and could tha$ Wited be%wesn were dfsorganited XL the prepondst. Daylfg‘h~ had becme disastrous for power.mdhg General. bha wea%her shfelded obeervation and athok by Uni. mere designed to seoure an to officers were trained *The 4th CCF Army (Corps) was never in Korea. Co. mnsequently night were the the CCF because envelopment musS Ths tactfos employed at night followed SBIIL~as employed dur5x.

small North Korean units. machine gmsa the enemy troops were supported after by heavy and light attaokmg enemy troops Regiment. United positions interval through and along keeping between men* foroa About 100-200 yards Wh6n saoh all rushed the from the hostile the attaaking fired deployed. major control North : movements and to inorease Chinese favored on the penetrated moon to launch 97 the time of the full assuPl%ng that offensives. offset evidently the advantage of taotioal the damager of United Nations to attaok bombing and strafing. was neoessary. control at night by the use of white and whist166 banners. lime. ruses at night Most typiaal UNCLASSlFlED . and tranrnnit trumpets. msn was in position. areae their positions they plaoed !l'his enabled had penetrated 2nd US Infantry of the of the 38th Infantry fllumfnatPng enemy troops grenades slightly pressure on both flanks to the rear to ooordlnate areas. were used the to ' - The enenpr exeroised armbands. In one insCanoe. about 24" in diameter enemy used a series guide troops At of rfoe position.IED UNCLASSIF . approached trails. messages. directions Ropes. defiles. Koreans preferred on dark nights. estimate attaok the situation should be pressed during daylight@ and to determine whether an at nfght. straw doughnuts into night in an assaultg Rations a ten-yard position. United Nations the leader a shot whereupon If a withdrawal defensive posftions. in single valley8 file. to indiaate and placards. 96 In one instance defensive Division. 98 to gain entrsnae was the favorit tridc The enemy employed various into United Nations positfons.

" soldiers North - - noticed In a resulting firsfight.I UNCLASSIFIED enemy soldiers psrfmater by oalligg of pretending gained entransa to bs ROE:troops. utilized the sanm modes of ooxnunioaticm flaga. ~:‘qv -. UNCLASSiFIED 3# - . Nethsrland On other oemdong. fnsignia. the eonfliot. hampered Commmist Foroos oonsiderably 7!hf8 stat6mnt "A Collsotilcbn WS6 berm out by a i% enemy dooumsnt snt.radior. into On ens instanoe.a+led XXX Army Qroups of Combat Exper26n060" Hsadquarters. his attaok Forms had to oontinus even under adv6r68 and the North Koran oonditfolare PSOp10'6 Both the Chinese Comnletist q flares. the enemy waarfig:ROK for the Korean8 usad woodan slappers gprn firs. and me88eng6rdQ a. controlling an6my oftan his unfts the enemy had diffiaulty For this In 6ither maeone th6 or &alt%ag an attaok.. Four flutists yards apart FOP five minutes fs the open aad under they played while kept shuttling drawing fire up to them and wfthdraw%ng. where ROKs. Battalion the Nstherlands out 0 "O=kay. whfah dfsolosed ths SutXine Th6y suooeeded ti 59 of tha perimeter..ntain%mg signal aomzumioations at night after the dspioyment of tmops resultsd in d%ffioulti6s of oommsmd eontrole e o b Reeauas of poor ooammications. communfoat ions_ Lack of oomamicatSons battle. bug106. Diffiaulty of mad. captured 6speoially at night. whirtlea. Shortly aftor dao6ptfve proposes to simulate entered Communist Chinese For668 a preliminary deployed reaonnaissanoe around a base a full skimishsrs lbooop thsy conduetsd of m pOSftfOZl8 by a rusee of a hfll and played about fifty tunes.

support oocasions. the attaok American 100 were used by the enemy. russbar of -11s was used during an attaok. were short and pro- or oonsolidation of positions. of communioation The verve center Nor+& Korran CP. from whioh an evelopment' The enemy found radios in keeping and the failure wire not too reliable in Korea booruse of W of the diffioulty artillery fire in due to the effectiveno in oold weather. and Chinese Communist Foroas telephones Bug106 -primarily.W%$’ UNCLASSIFIED ' Radio Radio aommunications On rare radioa.:i - were used on regimental smaller level and higher. fire. leveba for signals oompany and battalion All signals weapon. forward fareea. preoodad the An of some enemy rogimonts. this varied bugle calls main assault. - disaster and by enemy armored tollits ran from the forward of the oatiro at the forward I?orth in aotual CP to the signal !RIO principal oommndrr’6 axis CP. from rrgimomt to regimen%. arranged During Bugles were uaed. artillery Transmissions to avoid in the alear 'were made only to diraot in battle. SC8 300 than a regiment had Amerioan extended down to and inoluded battalions and fire All messages transmitted by radio were aoded. units . attaoks. extenaivo However. and diaalose the outline of a it was used as a means to draw fire UNCLASSIFIED . the bugle ma employed Imr two ways: first. Koroas system was the base message center During liahed radio the early relay part of the oonfliot. oombat.at and as a fear for withdrawals. As a frar weapon. Wire nets companies. of batteri.ostabon stations of the advanoo mossago eator of United Nations Poroas was to the flank take plaoo.

%mprisaion when a United of an l n6my 6nvrl6pm6nt lVation6 ratruating poaiti6n ma taPam.d of visual ai@aala !I!hoao to ware one of the primoipal colors signiffed The North short moaarrgar. wore deployed around thd partioter in great strength. or drop to the grounds oontrolled. signaled a resumption measagrs were prearranged -. flu. priHlar&ly oond~tions. to flarms Flags -. an enamy attaek Vfhistlo Flares used e faltered. 101 en6apr buglers Whistle6 m&hod - 6ound64 "TapsA to dagoralirr RhisClrs II? soldi6rs. These orders praarranged were used until war8 taotiaally wa6 an engagaant and than naw orders ware isauad* regulated leaders the usage of flags. and only o~mpany.. 60mm6nae firing. 102 on a positi6n. the. in cxnnbat. and platoon wua handled Whtan a blub indioate a flag wa6 used0 it by a squad leader The loaation partioular flags prearranged squad signal. dire& Various batt6lion-size and smaller units under taotiaal withdraw. fire was Koroans used three request 6upporting torah to commonoe and five used to rally troop6 An l leotric to halt it. and its prdmary use was to urge troop6 tha whist16 hfore forward* ollhva of fire.for eaarna\miaations ^ . of other signal of a indioated the preaenoe of the 06ma~ der or the looatioa . a8 a ~ Mh wore used only It duriag cl060 l ngagemenQ u66d only It of group control* was appmron%ly phtOm squad level. typos paoarr6ng.Flag6 were used .6 were ohanged frequently.: .Flare6 Different an l ttaok. order6 movaments meant orders All to attaok.. waved them.UNCLASSlFlED United lOatiaas unit@8 defonae per%mater~ a600ndo buglers to onate Finally. to The ooaanander of a unit battalion. finished.

0-a post. Runners were used for oommnmioati~s between patrola aad parent 7iz . lob units.Mesaengera. from platqom carried were used on size and up had a group of both oral tmd writtm messengera~ These messengers meaaagea. Messengers -.UNCLASSIFIED ' 103 . all levels -.each unit both mounted and diamouated.. '.w.UWASSIFIED "".. .

. of enew faoilitieao This hampered cause for and may have been the basic the inflexfbili~y 4. asaaul-bing Alternate Enemy patrols tiemy were not assiglsed the route6 units. flank support or seourity during Enemy unfts march. employed little 73 JNCLASSIFIED . Nations on maaa employment taotica air and artillery 2. suffioi8nt logistical support to 8u8taiB The enemy lacked offensive.. a~ extended 3e The enemy lacked communieationa control of units in the attaok.” _‘. enemy inaiatenoe. a taotiaal tactics. !Paotios in all lnajor as observed enemy Subordinate xmits were not permitted defenses. doctrtie. in the face of United fire. And finally.’ UNCLASSIFIED 9i'aakmeas in Knemy Offensive 1. utilized of shortest approach and r&urn0 for for whioh formations or slii to were standard frisrrdly inflexible fr md made no allowance Preparation6 pattern differenoea ML attack in terrain followed diapoaiticn. proved oostly due to inflexibility. and umarying aoos became apparent ndly foroea.friendly as being deaii-able. attaoka - The Communist attack in Korea0 was inflexible. B@lBqgb ‘: .:. or other or seaondary always patrol faotora missions to make adjuatment6 might have indicated fo whioh terrniR.

Appearance Barb wire sector of barb wire entanglementsin entaglamenta front * were first of enemy positiona. of numerous obstacles indicated to hinder United Natiosr and tank traffic Barricades a defensive of various in other phase in the enezqfla were used. not to ohawelize IN and ditohes but also of fire.id. AT obstaclea was enoountered (nines. in the North Korean reported of the eastern in June 1951. periods covered of defensive operations.. a new offensive Colmauniat foroes withstood W air or denying prepared oertain'terrain elaborate fortifioationa whioh suocessfully were placed and artillery features attaoks. seotors enemy fields Laak of IV statements Enemy FWs were well of an impending informed of their offense.. as early Extensive aa March. l the HGNGCHWDefense Line. and‘hiadered These positions UV advanoea. barrioader) on routes of advance. either features Forces and troop shel'ters. for the Dunkers." UNCLASSlFlED . offensive operations.. types on routes into of adyanoe. Defaohment. and United Nations * titer officers were able to fix "Breaking the approximate date of attaok 3rd Historioal a&ion Intarviaw8. UNCLASSIFIED DZXEXSIVE TACTICS . Elaborate During Indioations aa Determined artillery by Friendly positions. The appearanoe vehicular operation. when preparing to IN foraea. SECTICN A Defensive 1. positiona although some use of wire in the oentral by the enemy in defensive front 3.. ditches. front on oommanding terrain 2. only troops 4..

attitude that.fro= / c. Lack of information of suoh attackr indioated an enemy defense. their statements. Ihe enemy also when hia supply during the latter bases were threatened. A stubborn defense line Ihe use of a stubborn offensive time for stubborn indicated regrouping defensive a lack of counteroffensive potential and re-equipping. This eras an indication 6. of either instead defense offensive of an elastic line inrmediately or defensive defense* after an enemy and a need Of displayed a a&ion. 5O Stockpiling of supplies. to restore Units from The use of an aotive Communist Forms used numerous counterattacks United Katioas lost positions and to hinder advancese attacks. North Korea troops realized spaoe for they were fighting time. stages of the Korean for their It was alao probable confliot. The armistice homeland and would not trade no doubt influenced defense 70 talks the Communist armies to resort to a stubborn line@ defense (numerous oounterattaokr). squad to battalion size were used in these UNCLASSIFIED .

If the reserve withdrew were unable the offensive to launoh armies a oounterattaok. ocoupied weeks. a deIn peoted to be in one plaoe fensive army whioh phase. but withdrew moderate to stiff resistanoe as far to restore SO* when it withdrew attaak was launohed back as the two reserve the lost ground. Army employed a modified was made for an elastio defense.a position UNCLASWIED . the CCF def. although type defense.was Small foroes on line and delaying limited meantime. ih reserve0 the enemy slowly oounteroffensive A major wa8 then defense. or four Then the enemy exhe employed armies. approximately rested and reorganized. or regiment. walking When United distanoe Nations to the rears Foroes attaoked.. position tactios were Korean some employed by the enemy during People's provision the Qrean &pe The North defense. ' and the Chinese Communist Foroes used a mobile Chinese Communist Foroes The Chinese Communist Foroes did not employ the principle * of a main line of resistanoe nor a position for three defense.initely employed . UNCLASSIFIED SECTI$N B The Elastio Defense It was apparent that two types of defensive oonfliot. _ one division foroe. and two baok . When a defensive was in a delaying as a screening unit Forces.." position. hours' from the defending United Nations attacks to confuse and delay the other two divisions of the army. * Since June 1951. launched In the three 105 offered to do a oounterunits to . the se&or of two offensive formation a defensive the CCF employed a tactioal army of division plaoed of "one up. the unit slowly on line when forced units.

RESERVE DIVISIONS DF DEFENSIVE ARMY C .WFENSIVE ARMY ASSEMBLY AREA ( REORI~AMZA~~ON 8 REGROUPING APPROXIMATELY 100 KYS . 1 SYMBOLS: A . I 3 HOURi MARCHING TIME izj A e POSITION IN THE DEFENSE .DIVISION ON DEFENSE 8 ./ 1 b .DEFENSIVE ARMY HO D.

UNCLASS ~IFIED launched by the CCF. a6 two-folds %ard workn' -. employment6 of troops offensive. the holding derire~wr In aa elastio impor tan00 .of minor in The enemyfs major Nations offensive weaknorse which: oould be exploited wat an kpartant by aouMardefease The oountereffort par% of the elrstio employed by the emmy. withdrawing taotio from the importanos of the morale to Evidently wa8 dome t. and telephone The first between the OP and the CP. Co-d Deployment wa8 and in great aad obrervation oosaurications andl seoond po6ts were set up on favorable were established defensive lines terrain. defense. oonsirted of well-oonstruofed trenohe6. forti%ioatiorr pO6itiOlr6 wre oo111lpbcted by oommunioations Dummy oamouflaged All hill positiogr were built to draw United UNCLASSIFIED .ible oouuterattaok. depth. and it no6 ma5nly direoted 106 United Nation6 flask. fir4 the ohazmeS and destroy Communist Force6 high CCF regiment6 the enemynfwaa the 'theme of the Chinese command. I-rrusal of enemy documents leads this his soldiers about thi6 writer toward aa exposed to believe that the enemy propagandized elastio after this defemse taotio. the United effort. and '90-g. Nations fire. line Two-third6 rrith one-third of eaoh unit wa6 6upposedly for kept on both flonka along a narrow front a poss. of term& to ereate was.o bolster The emqy referred hard-wolp poiitims.con6truotion of emplaoslnsntr and field motioa n -Thaited work6 in every plaoe to which they moved. usually deployed disposed in three on the front lizm6. or defenrie deplete to delay a Nation6 the srrezny. "Strong 107 in attaok defense.-.

-.s surprise attacks. from the tactics was permitted diSsngage6mStS of the United Nation6 the subordinate no flexibiliv and crommander. defense. commnderr. line. 198 To counteract aent SOlRO- rmrall groups to counterattaok timers North two or three Korean at night a night to regain amh attaokr Army were employed. Field6 with area a6 possible preponderanoe were selected. appeared to be well-coordinated.I UNCLASSlFlEb 4-6 defended and all by small units fields of fire adequatelyequipped with automatic weapon6. the first line were constructed of United Jdost defensive forward works for facing on the approaoh. withdrawal6 had to be made as the order ocoupied two lines Korean form of the senior at the -I Eaoh regiment but the bulk forward of defense same tixI6P im the the _ of the North was ooncentrated dootriae poritkm.- slope of hills the direction Nations reverse The seoond line the hills." wa6 characterized lines by the aounterattack It was designed tine agatist to suocessive foroe of defense. the front the of maohins guns and automatio United Nation6 daylight weapons* gains0 CCF troops loat ground. United of defense was ustWly fire set up on'the or where its power could readily positions were built Of fir0 support the firrt All-around defensive to guard against covering line having a6 16rg6 6n Nati0B. slope of : . spae for an inferior The general to trade a superior differart exeoutiola of this maz%euver was not greatly Foroer~ All however. People*6 The North Sobile drawal Korean elastic defea6eo or in their terminology rand withto allow foroe. Tha erosmy*r defensive speoified UNCLASSIFIED .

the V. dowa by UV fire. flank a oouxhwattack in the rear the attacker*6 by the troop8 This was done only on the order of the senior position. phases 0. the offensive used an inverted-V & withdrawing troops to enter in conjunctionwith they permitted to the high ground. IX force6 line off count&attacks and inflioh Muediately balaaoe oqewlties. a mobile Formation the early their forces force. Withdra=le Inverted-V . was unable to disengage.f th6 Korean conflict warfare to the low gramd formation wh6a UB forces and valleys. rusd make t%e-oonruming preparation6 the asarault. at which United Nations numerical foroe time a superior the V. The forward unit opened fir6 forces 'at extreme ramr@. .>."-UNCLASSIFIED -- distance ai attacker between the two position6 to dirplaoe his artillery One third had to be great and mortars enough to oause after occupying of trbe urni% of the seooad one of the sectors. '.erin an attempt to for06 United Nations for to (aploy However. of &he effective well rtr6agth on defense was deployed . During restricted Carmuaist -. encircled the attaoking column and closed As one North Korean Ppp stated8 79 'IFlED UNCLASS '. as a reserve to the rear liae of defens6. before the forward line eould be pinned under ewer drawal to throw forward against it withdrew %o rear po6ition6 with the wilhlauachd If the was launched of rupportirg weapomsi Conourreatly were to the second line. 109 oommamder.

a quick The of the enemy troops 111 under cover to afford Parties foroe The covering withdrawal contact placed attack. covered unit an enemy was usually from the last to break parties favorable few. An attempt to canalize the first last vehiole of a colu~ movement on the narrow to the rear roads. were to Thus. with or delaying selected party whioh. D o d Enemy groups occupied ground and plaoed was made to destroy and halt deployed arrival fire the forward slopes of ridges paralleling low on the United Nations and columns. on the first In selecting line was an ambush site. decreased. bulk attaok. Dslayimg the number of riflemen of automatic deployed but an increase weaponswas provided. weapons were able to UNCLASSIFIED B+ 3miiw .UNCLASSlFlED Our troops make strategic withdrawals when the enemy (m) attacks3 our troops then attack from the flanks and encircle the en&y with superior numerical strength* In most case6 the enemy (W) had no additional foroes on their own flanks to assist them. United Nations points Forces0 These delaying at strategic where the land was least where the roads were poor and natural automatic approaches a small number of men armed with hinder a United Nations attack. traps an areas into Tactical troops entice into were employed by the energy to lure Withdrawals a hasty to strike to destroy United Nations to were made by some enemy troops Other enemy troops or flanks W forces exploitationd the flank positioned force8 themselves of the attaokbg such in an attempt small W units. A sizeable of friendly enmy foroe units and the to prevent retreat 110 of W reinforcements.

no delaying withdrawal leaving Close oontaot departure l!iTatAons units was avoided. was suoh an order Withdrawal Ths regiment order units a tithdrawal* withdrew was the Iowest eohelon d of oomman authorized to and the under all Assembly areas were not predesignated. ‘ - also moved in parallel. A marked defended tenaoiowlyo until ilsued. 112 from this was noted when CCF unita foroe was forbidden rarely even to death. The Variation unit usually group to a platoon. the proteotion : of the delay%ng foroe. drawal divert fire by United Wations Foroes. and the pressure oovered party their the with- '. of ooltmn movement were One or mere battalions Contaot between battalions Variations and enemy situation. moved out after United taoti'o the Chinese. before the withdrawal Bnamy artillery and heavy weapons deployed - UNCLASSIFIED ‘. A marked ohange took foroes .A platoon of a battalion* a possible United The mission Hatfons of the delaying by inoreasing was to volm of attaok on IR! positions. as possible during the hours In a battalion file as far d darkness withdrawal. was maintained by radio oommunioations and rumer. ordered A covering to withdraw to do so by higher Taotios authority.not used to oontrol the delaying aotion. 3n size of the a squad was normally group depended on the size of the withdrawing exerted -. . oompanies moved as one oolunm in siugle Regiments diotated used the same prosedureo by the terrain along the same route. dark aotion of CCP. single-file oulumna. after their taotioa. Radios rere.UNCLASSIFIED The oovering L although foraes ranged fn size from a *man employed. May 1951 offensive..oover&ng in their parties. nfth plaoe in'the delaying Usually.

upon reeahing the foot of Hill I. oontaot the 7th Plrtoon. Company B. when l lementr of the 6th Platoon. reaoh the right flank of the 4th Platoon. Coapaw C. tioned between Companies B and C. the letter PO-JOE out in single file toward Compare C. UJ 8’1 . the oowrCcnpany Commanders. lu elements of the 3d Platoon. Company ~mover east in single file elonF the ridgeline toward Company B. Battalion Hradquerters 1~ poriing sqund then joins its parent unit. units me oheoked off b the Battalion Staff and Upon order of the Bettalion Commander.Under oowring fire of one squad of the 1st Platoon. Company A. the latter ~OTOLSnorth landing the Betalion. Company B.

delaying made in oonjunotion inoreasod their to disengage.- UNCLASSIFIED of the main body of troops0 As far as oould be determined. the last This kas dus to their no artillery Gerei rarely units laok of mobility* firs supportsd with with a or mortar a withdrawal.. laoked depth w strong UA%tsd rear when United Bations Nations Fcccaes appeared disorganized. the objeotive by midnight* !&is enPcl. the attaok to regain to permit rsmaiuder began early in the evening. in the 'vioimity of the objeotive ta gain information UNCLASSIFIED . _ withdrawal. togother 113 vslme of fir. souuterattaok the attaok was to delay United began at night. Countsrattaoks although party.led the defensive positions to be spent in organizing tenable for to Lntxe the objeotive the next dayDs fighting* Xations support0 positions He also whioh he oounterattaoked The enemy oounterattauked thought -. If its motive but wa8 Foroes or blunt enough to end the engagement by daybreak* a oaptured reoapturing sf the night position.& Ohs Use of the Counterattaok Enemy oountsrattaaks system and were used for a United foroeg Nations and (3) assaults to reoapture wsre an integral various purposess part of their defensive the edge of sf the hostils (1) to blunt a perti~n (2) to annihilate a lost positions If the purpose Nations early of a Comnunist an offensive.-f .. or when the United point for a Feroes used the oaptured aotion without unit position as a starting fer defeAssa new offensive The regiment the terrain enemy organizing:ft varied attaoking in size from a oampany ts a A thorough reosnnaissanoe of en depending upon the situation.

and the pl. familiar with the routss of approach.. unit. from the se&or was TRTartillery If a planned withdrawal reserve elements to take place. . . - did not extend beyond the limit was taken. and before unit x~~ing out." and armament was aoocmplished by . with United IIations Generally and then attaoked one squad moved out first forward. attaok a seotor weakly me enemy ssuntersupporting fire.an of attaok of the prearran&d The loaation on the flank rear oouxxterattaok line was set up at the depth of the defense defensive position. to the ." .’ .’ * United late Nations afternoon strength... 9 to 80 yards to the trenohes was of the front position oral. &nmnunioation An order for oonneoted the rear usually extended from the front. enemy If oovered the withdrawal of the attaok$ng the position was to be held. evening uere of the attasking the signals of the day of the attaok. Enemy troops were employed infiltrated on both troops + by the enemy in his night into flanks 1x0 rear areas and endeavored ta make the main assault of the United Bations or against position between the frontline defended. and when a position flanks to avoid the enemy main body dfspersed fire. the enemy oonstruoted fortiPioation8 and consolidated 114 UNCLASSIFIED . and penetrations oou&erattaoks. movements .. deployed. . of frontal and reserves. his posftions. turning in a triangular formation one angle pointing Envelopments. size whioh appreaohed swiftly.UNCLASSIFIED . to be used. or early unit disposition. The attaaking the attaok dPvided into foroe was usually widely small groups of squad and platoon lines quietly. . All members L ..

permitted Wited ' lgations tmits to withstand erremy eeuaberrttaoks. of the Cansnt&st of fire. n measures employed agaiast offsns5ve peAmeter..sme such stromg poirt curd surprised UNCLASSIFIED . was eohelemed im depth to oover Rapid follew-up him fraa of ths smew aa the main possible eaeq withdrawal by UN For-s pre+ented reorganizisg aotions. taotic A favorite elsstio defense of United the Xations attaok Foroes against until the enemy18 . Vhm were United defensive dstermiared extremities positioms by observatioxi a withdrawal. tank mits The emoq oooasiomally effestive employed a rear guard. fras the 7m the US Tamk M~talioa ensmy as hs was by-passed6.psint was to press Friendly units an eaemy strmg amd plaoed artillery was oontaoted. preparimg hostile new defensive covering fores pssitioms. Im Ostsber 19511 anar. togsthsr with of fire and repel between units.' To proteot agairut all the %zmwted-V in their fermatktn forward ~atisns of the UI!I tomes flanks the soreensd high growad mommeat and kept &roes well proteoted.lCUMWHQ. say fire mute. oonoeatrations then wsthdrew on the ezmiy's positions0 etlollly. was easily IB smaall wit by-passed aad the nfChdrawimg bedy engaged. the emmy Ul!! provsd in by-passimg *aa+ sbremg psirts. ‘_ UNCLASSF 'IED Comtemeasures Taken & UN Foroes!Against the Elastio Defense The same defensive enemy foroes counterattaoks.. of its pattern enem# aotiora _ - ind%oated artiblsry oonoelatFat%ons plaoed 011 both ends of the sneay'r This artillery withdrawal efterr posit&mm as wll as om the dala-ySng party. the night wsll against a4baak of MS ssordination in a major A t%ght mrked equally ig depth.

air power. inilioted heavy oa ermslliy troops as they withdrew 85 UNCLASSIFIED . Heavy oasualtier were inf'lioted on the hostile Utited lesser Nations by the use of radar.JNCLASS beis relieved by another unit. 1'15 foroe. at Bight.

)he Cumrnirt lirps &roes changed frse (yLB~o no to me util3ris$ may be advawed a mati of res%Stalss ahange. Fome~ly~ ComxuWtte destroy fricmdly divisim-size unit& air by superior and artillery. time igl order Communist Fsreerfootild te launoh @ ammteroff~mive Parallel' measures... of Morth Ia v%aw of a possible Kerea to fall to permit hmds imtm l’hi*od would have g%vea U!J delegates frs%ng the 019 troops world to to.halt retair a weape -* Ya megotiatiom. _ . _. Hmrever. . afferd has beer famd te &port : to trade spaos for when Im the past.:ike. theory as follrrsr UNCLAS$ IFIED . poop10 aid pessibiy armis&. UNCLASSIF ‘IED . i Late an elastio %n the defense Xoream oonflSol. the North by saarifiokg territory ho oould. although Sevsral eonorate thearies 'pruef t(lr justify the aay. Bations would oause loss of the e&tire ef respect of oriental reotioms world. w Parallel would Furthermore. the weight of atmbereD But beoause ef<frieAdly attemptr e]ipcNpr resorted !?hls taotia A Conmmfst k k anthilate s&l fr&smdly ruitso was mere effo&ve'whe@ dosummt swpperts *his the MLR ia defense was employed. net afford to %eq I of Ijhe hsmland of the Morth Korom To do’so. Korean he may have felt. the emumy reaohed the face" people.. have e&led : realm at the its the Commmist "Yrsm curtafir" 'Robably in Xoreai logiaal the-smut for of the ahaage froa elastia t0 stubborn artillery attempted defemo taotias was the offeet BniWd Blations the air md on muses te of ememy trsop*.

TppIc~ymmsIlm~~A~m~m --.----- .-.--“f-c.--i --c-. -._-.-“---y-e- SI(BTCH PREPARED EYms-cm FEC OBTAINED CAPFROM .-e-.-e ..

we must mot yield a s~g~e lw peretratae inoh ef grmmd l r allow even 9~ ememy soldier Ab. division a Ncrth a depth Koreaa rifle to a deptrh ef six miles sometimes'extended Kerean battalien from the mafia 1%~ of resistaneet Nmmally. the 6-0 time. unfts varieda A regiment sometimes a Depths of Berth extended -. we musB be OPL the alert ti the froth lines SO that we say seize uper auWable spperhxti%icw fer aggrsrsbe small unit aetirao 116 : Barth Korean Paople~s Army The 19or$h Korean Army employ@ a modified type p@sitiom dbfease. . of mutual stressed Eaoh island support was capable by ffre.of defense. islands.smuntafnous of 3 l/~miles~ terrain0 an earmy- battalion The Nerth te four miles Korean main line aad was divided of resistawe into regimental had a dep$h of three and battalieja seoborss These consisted About 1 to 1 l/2 of a nuaifmr ef strong miles fa frex& poSnts protsated by ebstaalsse line. .ed of a maim lime of resis$aase deff-sufficiea0 mst oemposed sf a serSes of of all-around Koresla of ilm kypes. mamed strong %a of the MLR was a seouri%y by am enemy bat%alion. in order tr'infllot a large mssber ef casualties. aad to a depth of kwelve miles.We are te defmd amd further fetiify *he present pesitisms of our bat%alior.m defenses and obstacles. Bherefere. peints pro+eaQed. occupied a fro& of about 2000 yards ef 1500 tcs 2000 yards0 often defsndc2 a fro& In. wore capable dootrSne The North defense defensive fire with the fact'that the sffe&ivensss of all posi4&ms antitank depended OR the ae-ordinat5.by whioh eensf+ted sf mmber ef individual 1-k was designed a system of obs0aoles. ThPs aonsisD.

a regiment. f larks arad oritioal key positionso seoters~ supp-xt for shack of a W attack by the on North lime* Korean defensive The Ugit holding was absorbed to forao seourf-by this limo atibmp%ed them fnto s%reng. TE troops to doploy If hostile the prosMxarely presrrure or te lure was toe tho I&R fields the security lim of fire. and company strong-pO%ntS deployed around the regimental the. andldivisions. Eaoh individual by fire frem the maim line of resi6tamcee which ~6Ua11y of the security hasty e6Iplaee6IOntS li~0 was an 0uhpa60 line mmmd with line troops armed wi%h smalr miles arms and hand grenades. UNCLASSIFIED . penetratioms OPS were gelaerally 3OO-JjOOyards3 200-300 yards frem the 500-1QOQ yards. witidrew~te MLE uador the protective all fire fir0 of supporting weapons0 If the IdLR was penetrated. -w a battalion. further. This was about six to eight ia front ef the ML& he one-sixth of the seaior in the of Enemy reserves the main forebe varSed 51 Stremgth from l me-third Commitmsm~ was made omly on the order was usually dome to restsre located cosssandero tmd this kLR. 3500~ The smallest &my fm defemsive self-sufffofent tactioal umit im'the Regimental North seotors Korean in eeaabat was the rogfmemtB the &R were mde up of battalion in a cfrcular This provided The imftial posftfons mammer im depth fire . the rear yardss eommamdpests were leeated 8oQ-1000 yards.3 Battalion URs regfintmts.to 190-2500 ard a divlsien.UNCLASSIFIED to prevent for surprise attack6 and te:aot stroag as a reomnaias~oe point fr the line In fro& @OaSiS~Od Of sorespr 1186 supported the l&R.

UNCLASSIFIED DEFIWSIVJEONESOF A RIFLE DIVISION Z i -.OJland ..--.--I -.1__-*--. i :S=TCH PREPARED ATIP&IiQ FEC FROM BY illATERIALOBTAINEDFROMBNE~-DOCtRIE~ SKETCH1 i-2 EN ~~?....-_CI.rce UNC[ ! ... I i ..---me.ASSIFIED . 2OlJJ4 .----.

Xhsn United a devastating the foroeO enemy 118 tho l nsmy oountorattasked~ dofenss or rmin line sf resistanos Extondsd S&l1 wsapons. Iforth strong-peimts\ : e1p the flauks and depth was ts seal ths gap. BaDisas’ In the evsat a Usitod Korean dofomrsivs line. light aubmalAe groups of ensmy Panned the outposts probing attaeks on soldAers. lafd faltsrod. mission. Ts proven0 sush a hsstils agaimt nevsmoat o the l aoq the flanks l f the the laumshsd~ vigorous OREthdrawal lnas I Whoa such a tro infiltrate 117 csumfsrattaaks mado enly l of the ta m&to oamtudor~ attempted B the order was so&r enemy withdrawal IEi posftfons Chineso impossfbls. WWJ were . The remainder foxholes easily ore&. anal had the mission of dslaying United Hations . its assigned the was still for a&ssiom.UNCLASSIFIED power from the other oonoeutrated . a&ion for a key terrain as a soreeuiug offensfvse to obsorvs A small rooonnaissanso Nations mvsment group oooupied and troop forward Unftod deplomt. and eondaat guorrflla aotivitfes to the rsare Coem~~~is-lr Foroos Shortly they defended psnding positions after the Chinsso For'oes entorod features the Korean oonfliot. uuit fer usit sa-vdopd a soot&m soul&mod its of the the l noirsled unit dofonsive l nsirelod aooordiPag to Hsrth rosgoasfblo Korean do&rise. Whsn m troops of tho onsmy unit over ths arest rsmained aonosalad in wsll-protested it ootiid dispersed attask the of the hill Nations ffro on fromwhieh Foroos arossod the attaoking forward.- Ths CCF stubborn organized plaood in depth along a narrow front0 outposts to ths front armed wfth and on tho flanks.

Battalion The heavy woapons headquarters was All bstwem oompany oooupied the top of the ridge. fsaturo aompanies and the heavy weapons. to ohannelies UnPted Rations fire. doad spaoe was oovered by mortar established bstwosn the strong terrafn slopss and oross f9ro patterns In the mountainous usually oaoupied the CCF rifle oompanies the lower of a ridgeline. Al1 wore usually positions mutually supported fortiffed. mainly in saddles of the terrain from the squad upward mainta3aed Reserve units seleoted for oooupfed areas to the roar a&ion. 139 on oounterassault as an integral of their groupso and o&ha% W small units positions were desfgnatod as assault These attaoked under lover of light maohine gun ffre. pofiitsg of‘Korea. somewhsre between the rifle units hills. in depth bstwesn hill well-supplied tith wars heavily . part the defsnsivs The Chineso dopendod defonss. movement.g defense was normally roadwayse dirooted aga%nst corridors prfnc\fpal and his positions masses0 asmunition.the CCF main line terrain erected features obstacles of resistance0 for an all-around Chinese foroes defense if organized key and All were necessary. We. of Terrain Features hrcas selsoted were Most Utiffzatlon Roth Xorth tops as princfp&e in plaoes Korean _ hill looa-bed and Chinese Communist defensive pos%tfms a Posftions armor0 always inaocossfble positions to Unfted Rations of the enemyls orset three-sided ^ defensive ridge-lines def enae d valley were dug near or on the topographfoaZ and were usually dug in f$r of I - or h%gh hills. !I% enemySs strongest aontain3n.

wfBh logs and soil. All mm-tar fir%ng and 76m psok howitzer aoraaunfaaticms covered pqsitions slopes 'Ipore oonneobd were trenshos. On forward agaSnst United Nations and artillery beoame elaborate oonsistod dirt and log fortifieations. posts for _ &g along and soourity a hillbase observation of fire and observation. -. to fight prolonged at both ends enough for the entire When the enemy was forood adequate protective fire._. %n a defensive Foxholes / a squad. elaplaeomnts type. - .' UNCLASSIFIED _ - 120 and tied together by interlookIng EntreneIments fFee anr Fortifioattons whon Early in the Korean oonfliet utflisod hasty U!I foreos were on the defensive. astQOn. air measures had to be taken Simple omglao&ents A typiaal wsapom positions. these trenohes slope. OA !slopos wro located It was sosmon praetise slope. “‘?’ ..o for riflemen. ffelds wore of the slit-trenoh Foxholes were scmstties oaeh large enough to aemmodate for goal. o~omy Entrenshmsnts slops tore to enable UNCLASSIFIED . enemy strongpo%nD of foxholes posiM~so by automatis positions. Communist foroos .and mortar defense On the rovorss posftions. dofsnsive sstions. suoh positions were large often wore locbated midway'up lrith the hillside.. 8oversd0 firing on the reverse they were only dug-in to plase shelters sholtsrs pFism=y on partially . with prsanol positions slopea and the forward Communicationa the reverse by tuunol to sfford 'between the fzwo were maintaind All pt positions provide l onstrueted by alternate tronohese wsre son&rusted good fields savor from high angle f&e on the forward of fire. Plateau tronshes mmstruotod machine guu smplaooasnts maehinq gun squad.

Ammunition bunkers were connected compartments were also storage H&. by hostile them from oooupying were prepared in case one was destroyed fire. tions slopee fire on a Cammmist through the enemy riflemen trenches moved from foxholes personnel the oomntolioa- to underground ahelters men. . troops. alternate layers of of loga top fortifioatfons logs and dirt were used for from 4 to 15 feet oover. FYon 3 to 12 layera shelters Other underground All were eonstrueted by oommunioations joined to the in soil. mortar. from the vicinity incendiaries. below the brush and inflammable materials were oloared hostile located of the defensive Lips of dirt military works as protection around again& were placed to divert some bunkers. fcaraoe. These were located All were well near the personnel fortified All against on the reverse artillery. UT troops Alternat. the enemy moved back. the flow of W napalm bombs. trenches. strong . - !Fwo-or three-man apart on the forward Nations foxholes were dug about slope and were manned during artillery fire was plaoed Vhen Unit4 paint. were used to oounterat$ack newly Baken positions. and small arms fire. oooupied the former fire and fired placed on the attacking Enemy mortar was alao in shelters to ~/. orest. Eaoh shelter held about six to eight was liFted. on the reverse prevent positions slope.X-I network of defensive shelters hostile position by trenches. slope. six or eigha yards a hostile attaok.UNCLASSIFIED troops to rain Hill grenades down on an assaulting were covered with in'depth. on the assaulting Reserve onemy troops. on the reverse When QI artillery positions. form. rook and shale.

in well-fortifields of positions Often. was given the Communist soldier was responsible dirsipline. However. Q!hen no oover existed. but eaoh squad leader teaohing probably variety the members of his unit why United lrlationr oamouflage foroers enoountered taoties. lotated slops bunkers oreat with on the forward asmunition while oould be fired and resupplied to ahe under sovera‘ p&&aes ti Eseaps tunnels be evaoua4edo leading reverse instame.UNCLASSiFiED The ensmy alro in drawing Mortars fied fire sector observed. mor$bra ti the Us I Corp methods of ksploying in wsll&mstructed of the hill. eonstruoted many dw positior~ which wers aueoessful fire. were restristed several unusual by overhead ej.wer. the soldier . in the for This war of camouflage. so that such a wide Enemy caps and natural oamouflage smeared dirt of aoneealment with and deoep+fve fiber loops coats were equipped oould be used. and deoeption No speoial art inoreased training Methods of ooneealment as the war progressed. Camouflage One of the most effestive weapons of defense employed by the enemy in Korea was his use of oamouflage. and artillery below the wers Pieoes. and artillery on or just pUmes ~sual. The emplaoemenB for least 18 feet guns measured tb ground 21 feet level by 35 fee% and was at 121 of the ridge.ly below thb reverse xere ss~lased slope. forward slope allawed'the four-gun slops battery In one suob on the of ?&skgams @O!$ yard6 was found located of a hill these beneath withb of the enemy MLR.

I UNCLASS\F i . \.\ --.. \\ ..

Units up to battalion in ditches size esaaped aerial deteotion durfng or rolling the up During day by sleepfng . areas and oovered with surrounding had to be ready to move %n a rhort gullies.. and oars were also covered with but the movement of the train method ineffective. branrbhea and other crossed tracks. they were and under partially camouflaged deslmoyed with bridges. in tUI'*llelSs vegetation. too. ground. were tims. dug in during vegetatfone the day in forward If the vehioles parked in ditches. pine bran6heso like piled in straw mats and lying the enemy retrograde pine branohese %n orderly‘ of 6Crawe earrid the movement in May 19510 enemy soldiers afrerafQ were overhead.dual a6 muoh as possible attendant aamouflaged when neoesraryi branohes this and RaSJroad engfner brush. These.wf%h rows. with and the spoke rendered oamouflage However8 open flat oorrugated metal and dirt oars and gondola whioh suooessfully eoneealment cars were camouflaged hid the aargo. soft Paok and In on6 inrtance some dragged when energy vehfolea behind Bo erase their daylighb antih8s trees an-16 were kept hfdd6n during by the indSv3. that the vehiel66 guns and tank6 Others esoaped detection burned smudge pots to g%vethe QIheeled vehioles were i6Ipr666%On were on fire. of an ordelrly he would row of have g5ven lhe bushe by 6ra6hllng Snto appearancae from the air Self-propelled houses or hayetaoks.When United Nations and remained : eneety squatted fmobilee Had the enemy ueed Bhe side of the road ralher +han the middle. - oovered. of trains* Tunnels were frequently used for daylight 94 UNCLASSIFIED . .

’ Camouflage of' depots and other division was not mandatory. elothed garment@. They eamouflaged and when diqisg. . The enemy once oamouflaged a oontinuous to the sides On oocasionr sections roadway. Dummy and bombing. he attaohed to the bridge of the bridge and added gravel bridges he broke up pontoon during the day and hid the bank. rioe materials Enemy soldiers they were skylined.. neoessarys I4aximum use was tide of tunnels and oaveo for unit whenever Excavations were made by the responsible mhen an individual the soil and eoneealed by plaoing later soldier dug hia foxhole natural he carefully removed the hole with it on a oloth. they used short bridge strokes. and simulated madeb represent target8 to used dummy poiitions fire. or of the dirt position. sucoeeded in fire. depots. To oreate a long highway this effect. it He disposed around hir straw. other then by strewing scrub pine. camouflaging at hand. : oonaiderable and air+'% positions W small attraeted arms and maohine ga oonsiderable air material strafing trade out of natural were erplaeel UNCLASSIFIED . with Straw dummies disoarded riflemen. digging sod. it with vegetation. bridges under nearby bridge foroer wreokage thought or along the river that there ponboon For some time friendly were under eonstruetiong The enemy often draw United Nations some partially drawing tank8 Artillery aetually they were being used every night. installations from of units division lower than but installations upward were ~uppljr : welb=oonoealed. to simulate high trees floor. entrenchments were their diff3malt uniforms to see unless and shovels.

a eoarmand reeonnaiaranoe of the outpost line together.. Bnploment North Artillery harassing It alro Korean People18 Army of 7Fleapons in the Defense and Ddortarr -.North and inflioting fired to disperse Purely Xorean artillery on W reserves had the miaa%orc of in assembly tank areas* and oasuaatiea and neutralize interdictory and harassing ranges. North Korean military the (2) to (1) to detenaine of reaistanee. as well always If a oeourred. Unite& Nations mission8 infantry Mortars antiattaok attempted penetration artillery it. eaeh simulated were steel gun. yard8 approximately 450 yards but rarely were within were used when W forQes 1000 to 19 ULR or when ten or more men were conoentrated In the early dootrine required days of the Korean oonfl2et. most suitable assign loo&ion regimental secstors of responsibility.UMCLASS . trails made of straw. of resistanae force in the North and mortaro Korean main line engaged the penetrating laterally to oontah of Mortar? of the Enemy mortars displaeed over a dfstanee deployed in kp%h./FED in the standard placed around shields . fired were not fired. assaults. Real%tracks was carried to the extent 122 in the position area. of 6 insh logrr the wheel@ were of manufacturing plates. as antipersonnel xnieaions Fire missions to separate at extreme W infantry missions from its armor support. and (3) Co seleet . Ehnrrelr oonsisted were boards._ foot and vehiole horseshoe manners while Staoks of empty shell other empty oases were oarea were soattered near eaoh position.

UNCLASSIFIED areas to be mined and neutralized was oonduoted jofnely by obstacles. line were kept well oomealed unt&l for the element the attaoking of surprise* foroe These weapons were not fired to within 450 yards approached of the main lixke f UNCLKSlF1ED 97 . the main line from alternate posfBiona icaupgort To support coverage p speoifio Speoial attention of resistanoe and assure zones maxhum _ ' to weapons were assigned was given to provide. commanders together s:onsanderr officer of other supporting fire The dSvision made the over-all for fire support inoluding the use of ~&MI and line. zone and by mortar6 whioh were moved in weapon8 line. the zone6 between the individual the artillery generalI!y defense assigned varied The emplaoement of but it was . fire proteotion adequate points. with the division weapons. on the final and support oounterattaoko. regiment. of the with the situation and terrain. regiment. Fire located front support for the seourity line was furnished by NX artillery in the main defense of the I&R. aounterof 1Bmm mortars. of The bulk of the artillery strong points and supporting in the defensiive to an infantry was attached Normally Artillery the security to the various one artillery battalion was attashed fire was delivered line. battery fire. plan. artillery This rssonnaissanse and battalion cmmander and the artille ry by the division. that employed in depth to assure zone oould be brought to support the seourity any penetration The weapons not under fire. of the division protecrtive security line. strong of responsibility.

ths'alternete 123 UNCLASWED ---__~ . by Ibl air Ob8WVathC#n. fqreer If a portion on that spot. guru were dug in between the gun position8 for 101~0 security. 100 yardS aparb A3$armition of the gmr Wa8 on and 800 yard8 to the rear stored level in rhelterr ground.. and rontrol ip the foxkard was aonaentrated immuhndor.UNCLASSIFIED of re8i8tamm. f&r* All firing at night.. to different infantry regimantr The rite8 Of the 8elOb3d were ~81aally on the Sl'Op08 of hill8 GUI positiOn or at +&hefoot high gromd. depended on the gun8 wa8 and the terrain. all available was foouaed In the elastic firing defense. A battery for of mmntain support. The remainder fired of the artillery Of the retior in the rear under ecmt~ol During the la-Her pal'0 of the: eonfliet. of the MLB'wa8 penetrated. pie%08 wre W&e used. aujciliary for an extended wum dug If the enmy length of tire one poaftionr approx%mately br$illery pO8itioP8 1% yards to the flank disowerad of the battery. abouk to the mar and rix Bo Seven fee% where the terrafn posiBionr wa8 hilly. remained on day‘. fire _dark. ‘EJK artillery deployed w emheloru tTnitd af%er lQatiom at am&urn ranges in an endeavor to foroe to deploy. by atta&Ang Par% of the artillery it to unitr wao emplOyed under deeentralfeed defenre poritiunr. were dug approxiaately of front thir%$ febt line troop8. l!TX artillery thir &merally took poritionr hostile assigned situation in inaaoetribls huwever. terrain. was done durbg l aloulations and if the day. in war do+ were made during If the artillery location. Gun positions Light raohine were in bunker-like and well-sauouflagti. both flanks light hour8.

asoaulttig guns opened fire. Thicr permitted obliqw @overage of obotaelss. .. Most of the heavy maohine gun9 were plased a8 Were the light along the front. . Poriticm8 staggered in depth to avoid All riaultaneout-destruotion cpemtrally to anothor by the on hi8 or arbillery....UNCLASS1FIED . were within small than aearurate automatio waited until b. for the light maehine gun range firat When IXf troops asraulted. Weapon8 Am8 and Autcmatio North Korean8 depended on heavy rather in halting troop8 with a BI attacak. UNCLASS\F\ED "...@ weaponsr at about 200 yards.and at di. mtil bnly a few tha. to the defense of the main line had ape heavy maohine gun platmcm.afore weapons fire United Nations The enemy uausally of their '75 yards posktions they opened fire arms and automat!.stanoes rifle8 However. and wera gun8 were eontrolled from one target leader shifted NK heavy mehine gun61 usually opened fire for at a rauge opening fire of 800 to 1000 yards... wa8 300 to 90 yards.- Heavy and Ligh* Maohine Guns heavy ataehine gun oompany war urually Each rifle of reaistancpe sompany assigned deployed - The RR battali'on with the rifle ooznpanies. Grenades were hurled from 10 to 30 yards. at 125 submaohine guns opened fire 100 yards. . to c:~~ss‘ fire.* 1.. . security and antiairorait to the defense a8 did the battalion defsn8eo Thir latter CP for all-around platoon - oould be oommittsd of the MLR in an emergency. troops 3~:ll were vulnerable the enemy usually waited 124..and the gun8 by Ui a& platoon tmzmmd~ were on the flank8 fire of MOhine adquate gWI8.

Normally supported division. a CCF antiaircraft qrtillery strikes.generally coarimander with piaked began to be wll- The artill&y designated for selected speoifis and by the battalion pieces loaaticms Presince the artillery locations by $he battery 6oamander.* Chinese Communist Forces. During moved to the rear the latter part in advance of the withdrawing 1951. . an artillery 9 an artillery batfery.uWd a real hasard.. No an Army. a CCF artillery supported an a platoon. with hi8 infantry. however.'although to the aobual lask minor preparations disengagmt. . ferred were in mountainous pieces areas away from road8. . some time prior beoause of its of mobility. battery area was. paek-type. coordinated to have adopted the Weetern type for at that time his artillery L. in sise to the field un%t was asbigned Chinese did not utiliee withdrawal were fired _ the artillery. . Artillery . auWmatie aorrerponding them. The msny of the CCF artillery were of the. battalion a regwt. was seriously and therefore after depleted by TX air strikes and to 111([ did nbt constitute too great i-ttieat increased in JuSe 1951.llery to supper) the units. well of their infantry their hr‘@. the enemy appeared of August of defense. UNCLASSIFIED CCF artillery artillery foreeat strength regiment infantry fire. units. eaPearyar$illery v and constit. was made $0 ma88 fire. against U? air attemPt. lie * UNCLASSIF1ED . 'Izsually. Fur proteotion weapons unit to a battal%on.

UNCLASSIFIED distance betieen pieces was governad All by the terrain. was between 40 &ndSO yards. 50 to 75 yards Most small oeeurred with ic. when Grenadeso on whiah the enemy plaoed IN forces approaohed within reliance. Maohdne Guns in support All patterns. The CCF also various employed roving fire power units equipped with their weapons to oonfuse UN units and cause them to divert UNCLASWED - . areas of enemy approaeh Short bursts effective of were oovered by maahine gun aross fire fire oommenaed on dispersed within lB troops when they reaohed ranges or eoneentrated Small Arms and Automatia Rifles and dispersed 200 yards. great when U? foroes attaaked . I loeated at the foot position defense of high grotlad. where the fir? line. 10 to &I yards. Three to five and concentrated drawing rounds were fired fire was placed in the @enter and rear TN troops to cause oonfusion. dr Ehiseellaneous U? forces within of the anemy positions. of the main Heavy and Light CCF machine guns were usually'employed line of resistance in defensive warfare. aa a shosk a&ion on offensive of withforses. Weapons weapons were fired fir&g range.troops.. I : 1000 to 1500 yards on hostile ! - and from 5OO'to SO0 yards on attaokdng. were'thrown arms fire.' Mortars were or below the reverse slope of a defensive of the first varying. Mxtiars CCF'mortars just were normally guns were dug in and well-camouflaged. and automatie within effeotive or from 10 to 1OQ yards.fron could be employed in support usually troop employed at ranges eoneentrations. but usually it 126 .

:m UNCLASSIFlED

-

fire

power* On one defensive position captured by UN forces, rocks the enemy These down

had prepared were loaated on attacking oasualt5es. about trip

drums filled;.with 1 on rough ramps and evidently troops with the hope that

corrugated

and TNT.

were to be rolled flying

roek would cause UN was oonstruated eontrolling 127

Also on the same posit+, below the crest to bangalore

a trench

50 yards wires

to oarmeal torpedoes

enemy soldiers around the hill.

attaohed

Mines and Roadblocks Both Chinese Communist Foroes and Worth Korean People's employed mines and roadblooks during defensive operatfons. ARRy
Very

little

use of them was made under other Enemy mines were generally in some instances vehiaular
_

tactical laid

circumstances. although

in roads and- by-passes, which afforded

the enemy mined open fields to defensive plaoes positions. not suitable in a staggered

approaah

Roads were mined in for by-pass. manner at three-paoe to shoulder. one lay in the 1 l/2 yards

cuts,

fills, Usually

and other

they were placed across

intervals

and stretched however,

the road from shoulder so that

In most places, tract

the mines %ere laid

or rut most oommonly used.

Most mines w&e normally

from the edge of the road, Occasionally were stretohed If a vehicle them, trip wires

Depths of minefields to pull-type

were not uniform. fuses on some mines objeots.

attaohed

aaross

the road and tied

to trees

or other

missed the mines,

the tension

on the wire

aativated

102

UNCLASSIFIED

North a distanae

Korean engineers of two to five

plaoed m'Snes in five yards betv@n rows*

to six rows with The interval between averaged

-

mines was two to four from 50 to 500 yards. use by UN armora

yards. Bridges

The depth of the mine fields

and stream beds were mined to prevent

Some mines were buried a great amount of traffic to locate

18 inohes to 28 Snohes deep. to pass before exploding.'

This allowed

These mines were by

very difficult mine deteotors, the shoulders the.suxmer

as they were too deep to be disoovered was useless. detection large

and probing

Other mines were dug in from from the top. .quantities rather During

of the road to avoid

of 1951, the enemy plaoed to destroy spots,

of dynamite than to sorap metal

atop mines in a roadbed, cripple or delay it.

UN Equipment

In other

the enemy buried of II? engineer

and beer abs were clearing they

to hinder paths.

the progress

groups which nor were

Enemy mined areas were not marked,

in the most oases epcvered by fire. The frequent use of roadblocks and undefended taatias. road obstruotions were

charaaterized construoted

the enemyts defensive from large

Roadbloeks

rooks or stones oraters

covered with

brush and logs. and favored I _. ..

Abandoned vehioles, artificial landslides

ditohes,

dynamited

in roads,

oaused by demolitions of advanoe.

were other

means of bloaking and in series,

routes

Roadblooks plaoed

were employed singly close together. Many

fn the latter

aase being

mirres and roadbloaks were booby-trapped. i'
coverd by enemy fire,

Some roadblooks.were

UNCLASStFtED

103:

TYPICAL ANTITibMc ML hmE PI2ul

/em

,r# UNCLASSiFlED

. Korean army. Most detonations wire. aoid were used. to company size. men armed with torpedoes. and bangalore positions Teams were deployed foroes.mental the enemy took various measures. ontop of it to tempt W the A small amount of fresh soldiers fire to build a fire. "'whioh had the dual mission tanks and airoraft. 128 exploded two hours after was kindled. Misoellaneous Antitank Defense of UN armor was extremely effective oh the damage The shock aotion CCF and the NKPA. Earthen were crude. a mortar round a few below the surface in an abandoned fireplaoe. UNCLASSSF tED l Most of the enemy's booby-traps blocks or picric of !BJT and grenades. antitank These teams were orginally battalion and worked with The AT tetis antitank in the from the NK division teams of platoon of four combat engineer consisted grena&s. of three mines. all or "hunter to his troops UN armor. During the enemy booby traps oold weather inches depended on some form of a trip the enemy buried of the ground wood was plaoed The shell of 1950-1951. to attack Speoialized anti- armor units In the North antitank defense organized teams. against rifle regiments had two or three of groups. amatol.~?(.:-l -i?d. submachine guns. tried Many enemy to build up and manuals distributed to oause personnel were organized. done by m tanks._’ . and in some instances. booby-trapped. Their rear of defensive as mobile antitank UNCLASSIFIED . jars with made mostly blooks from of TNT. pamphlets courage To combat both the p::~. was often of Abandoned U? and enemy equipent enemy dead.

were sometimes made to aooomplish Chinese Communist forces The enemy doctrine and platoons called for used antitank all infantry teams of various'. Multiple the purpose. explosives. be used by armor. to four mission to allow to four sL-. . teams. tanks. three and two bangalore subchine team of three machine guns. to maneuver to set up positions approximately 150 yards camouflaged emplaoements. Wellline. IN infantry from armor teams consisted incendiary oharges The platoon of two to three bottles. a demolition to organize teams. two or three. to Imook out the individual tanks As AT guns attempted group" attacked the "hunter attacks in the CO~IRIU. selected Pole and satchel by the antitank crews usually The antitank found it difficult terrain in which tanks in depth. carried men armed with and other submachine guns. from the defense 105 UNCLASSIF ' 'IED . were also mines. organized companies. The men armed with of the support the demolition guns and light team was to separate team to attack. mines and other The "'Titer UN armor? which could obstaoles had"the this. greandes.e teams consisted men. armed with torpedoesi of two parts': one submachine a support gun eaoh.sizes. Eaoh platoon Company and battalion team of three _ _ hand mines. battalibns. planted tanks. ' to The combat engineer hinder mission the approach of attaoking of hostile group" and annfhilat'ing To acoomplish the teams hid near roads or approaohes and attacked front and rear from the flank.* UNCLASSIFIED main mission which in defensive warfare Fas to neutralize hostile tank& penetrated the defensive unit perimeter.

adjacent to the routes of approach. Antiaircraft torpedoes If the. to stay out of sight when the armor returned Defense stages of the Korean conflict. However. units units. UNCLASSIF .ng the early little emphasis on antiaircraft power. periscope in an attempt and keep the tank commander down as the enenly one tank at a time. infantry support. armed The North defense antiaircraft heavy machine guns.- of the ground armswere artillery guarded rear defense. and 30 to 50 peroent Antiaircraft . he attazmpted to climb or gun. of UN air measures* with he employed both active Korean Army organized from the divisional antiairoraft teams. defense. the antitank teams attacked was placed from the rear on the tanks flanks. used in antiaircraft installations. dynamite bags on the turret in the bogies. and from the antiaircraft Air observation machine gun platoons of subordinate posts were used to warn troops. grenades fanatical generally anassault. on fire with threw grenades was disabled.Duri. He A team assaulted When the enemy approached on the rear and hang small and bangalore the 'UN tank. with and passive air the NKPA placed the increase . arms and maahine gun fire the driver's teams attacked. When hostile tanks the support group opened fire When theltanks to separate approached the assaulting without artillery Small to hit from the tanks. to initial to set it Although or Molotov in reaction oontent 1s CCF tank hunter advances of W tanks.tank incendiary teams were they were from the enemy attempted cocktails.UNCLASSIFIED * were built approached.

with oomtnunioation were Emplacements were in the shape of a triangle trenches oonnecting t the guns were set up on .‘. If four four corners machine guns were employed. * * UNCLASSIFIED Ihe enemy also at key tunnels. placed between guns was 50 to 109 yards. in oombat. Nations airoraft. Heavy machine guns fired 107 800 yards. United and other: installations. Three machine guns formed a group and these were with on order an interval of the of 30 to 50 yards between guns. angles. tJNCLASSlFlED .aced Continuous cox~a::(!: : : . In a defensive hostile different planes. ":': yl. bridges. CCF regiments were asa'igned in 1951. due to U'? air oompany armed with each Chinese battalion six to nane 12. was be repaired. on UN airoraft. usually on high terrain where the weapons could cormand the sky over the target.The of the ammunition dumps. one platoon was designated but staggered at ranges over to fire at on The fire was concentrated.. -. . of an invisible square around the installation. the teq remained in position.7mm DSEg guns. and if This team fired the installation If not.'r' : CL." armed with machine guns. . Emplacements guarding and two light key positions guns from each company. the team moved'to Early anantiaircraft In addition. position. triangularly fire. employed an antiaircraft manned tith net It was composed of a unit nine maohine guns maohine were heavy machine guns from the battalion. at any overhead hit and could employed "hunter groups. pmrer. and between groups interval guns. All positions well camouflaged.four guard another key point. 200 yards.

any formation. provided a direct due to the lack one bunker was identified of the precision On an average. or because of poor target three fighter-bombers. each bunker. ! This average decreased identification. the Stubborn Defense of other the Countermeasures In spite weapons.~- 300 yards. and the support and dislodge the infantrymen foe. up and over the crest employed in 500 to 6O. was effective The artillery by fire away any possible by a 155mm shell protective roof. enemy positions camouflage. required destroyed Aerial on enemy fortifications bombardment ms restricted bombing. 500 yards. andirifle fire at altitudes less than break up 130 --. with Enemy maahine gun fire quiok and converged the artillery fire area fire fuse Precision by one pieoe was employed to destroy also reconnoitered using VT fuse to strip a aireot with hit all suspected emplaoement. utilizing Field 250-pound Artillery usually the hill silenced sheal. had to finally air.light machine guns. a lo-second nose and tail hit ~8 proved effeotive scored. used in the softening with up prooess. commanders felt bombs was required fire. air Aerial and bombs fusing. assault close In a typical artillery weighing were first on an enemy defensive position. stubborn Employed by UN Forces Against of excellent artillery.brackets or ridge with defended by the enemy. 131 was of was _ A assault at ranges of 2500 to 3000 yards. out of eight bomb drops on positively in adverse weather that for targets. Fire wassfirst All firing placed on the lead plane to yas controlled by the commanding officer. a It was proven that on enemy pillbox 108 a 5-foot . delay 250 and 5Op pounds. .

. . 'IED direct hit with roof. .21ntn and 8&m mortars intervals pounded When artillery the enemy positions foroe assault . The objective barrage was taken down on the hostile difficulty. and five arms to simulate was brought without minutes an attaok. a 105mm shell was effeotive support on one with was provided a j-foot by the proteotive dire& : _ artillery at night fire The best artillery g of a 155mn. rebuilding. UN troops.! . This neutralized. was fired positions. was the firing a WP shell. was placed A range of 300 to 400 yards was preferred. an opening where the logs two rounds of APC were fired in the fortifioation joined the but to effect earth or just below the slope of the roof. ‘* . high angle fire from heavy tT fuses were used on bunkers 1 to lift if an artillery concentration to prevent A method employed by XN forces on enemy positions recognized this.I ..' or embrasures using Tank fire & delay- on the bunker apertures If these were not visible.1un. fire further 132 was lifted. The enemy quickly he returned and fired from at the and when such a shell manned his defensive hfs bomb shelters. QJ troops In one such attack employed a ruse. the bunkerAntiaSrcraft 2. fire moved up. althot@h also proved egfective. 4. assaulting objective. later p after on a stubborn enemy at &he small A WP round was fired friendly infantry fired enemy. _ . and tried at three-minute 'lank& moved forward to close within as the assaulting in the final of the infantry 4 range of less than 1000 yards to on the enemy bunkers. a mixed TOT and VT artillery position. did notidestroy weapons also moved out UNCLASSIFIED .

To enemy fortifications accomplish this. and flanks.. 133 the artillery and assaulted the bunker being attacked from other The infantry enemy supporting used assault one installations teams consisting demolition opsrator# with WP smoke and FE fire. of one rifle squad. team armed with one 75mm recoilless one SCR 536 radio machine squad. as possible and placed on lrhe bunker. the team hastily to move forward Nations or to consolidate the pc#oitfon. satchel rifle and pole charges. Y'ne flame throwers then moved forward s from the enemy position the demolition team planted and engaged the bunker with the explosive charges. UNCLASSIFIED : . two flame throwers. closed df the enemy baker at a range of about 600 to the flanks with to machine gun squads deplo. support throwers. attacks United armor was used in surprise and hit him from UN engineer the rear to by-. and one light gun squad. reorganized 134 while When and the position prepared was neutralized. continuous reconnaissance of obstacles. praise enemy fire.-ed The rffle in as far squad. was necessary W infantry for the work they Yarious sucpeeded apparatus. together the two flame small arms and until fire . used on tanks to explode enemy mines. or a total The teams deployed fire yards.I~-:.UNCLASSIFIED with the tanks and supported Fhen the infantry tanks isolated the ground assaulte the position. BAR fire 35 yam5 of 26 mena with recoilless the 75nn-1 rifle squad placing on the apertures The light the attack. *' for the removal of mines and reduction and armored offioers and men had the highest in Korea0 Braving of the oombat engineers in detecting suoh as fails the majority and rollers9 of enemy mines employed.

... r . : .. “:.... : : -.. and the great amount of proved unsuccessful explosive charges 135 UNCLASSIFIED ... I . -m : . . "__ 'r--d UNCLASSIFIED __ due to malfunctions employed by the enemy.

and guerrilla of the Korean confliot. and children interspersed other UN positions Korean soldiers among the lead elements. walked into In other instances. fleeing ward because of the reluctance civilians. and tactics. accomplished by the infiltration groups during darkness over a Z-3 day period. Infiltration Infiltration espio!lA.e activities tactics were employed by the enemy for military mingled operations. 138 l&2 UNCLASSiFIED .UNCLASSlFlED ' CHAPTERTHREE IXFILTUTION Infiltration B:emy espionage beginning AND GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES and Guerrilla activity and played The North Activities were widespread a large part in since the &e -. an attack. Communist Forces wanted the groups to be for It appears that a happy medium was 'struck For this reason. activities will infiltration 136 be considered separately. forces enemy's operations intended guerrilla Korean People's military. with of DN pilots groups North columns of of men. enemy soldiers to determine launched As the groups were screened. . part in the enemy's attack of small in the Vb'est sector. with refugees to strafe Early both in the south- and for enemy'troops Korean conflict. political Army to be strictly but the Chinese indoctrination. enemygs infiltration statements as shown by the following Infiltration tactics played a bi&. women. after which the infiltrated elements rallied for attacks in coordination with frontal attacks bs tanks and infantry. between the two Communist tactics and guerrilla I Forces in Korea. 137 UN officials were quick tactics the importance of the.

military and it on captured was forced Lacking to operate of the fittest (as well It was able to keep the DS 1st'iMarine forces) occupied Division as ROK security the in the mountains was committed northeast to action of TAEGU. and gathered at night. in December 1950. the fiatis withdrawing infiltrated as civilians at night UN lines and rear0 friendly Others established units. in civilian with These men hid in caves and buildings information civilians or the day. the 10th North mountainous country from the 38' moved south through to withintwenty It had to rely stocks for mliles of TAEGU. roadblocks to cut off Koreans practiced clothes Both Chinese and North some soldiers dressed the same ruses and mingling during raids of having refugees. units small groups Early succeeded in infiltrating UN lines* but Korean as well. Some so-called conducted harassing by W apprehended 2 UNCLASSIFIED . It was a remarkable on the countryside ammunition: on a survival for food and clothing medical facilities. of the 2nd ROX Division. basis. to its Because of the effectiveness Army changed its tactics of UN air power-$ the North called and carrying and attaoked Korean and adopted dressed an operation "Paktisa. it maintained the form heavy losses unit. the 1st Marine Division enemy force Despite beoame the full time concern i attacks. from constant Approximately northward of a military one-third own lines of the enemy division by breaking into . After 3n February.Not only f major Division Parallel feat. cealed weapons." confrom Groups of enemy soldiers.managed to withdraw 139 smaller units.

troops

carried

mortar

base plates,

mortar

tubes,

ammunition, North Korean

and hand grenades soldiers

concealed

in packs.

Other captured civilian

had a complete

had a package of 900 kemy espionage

changt> of white 140 ROH won*

clothes,

and each _

was widespread of low calibre,

in Korea and mas very effective, Most enemy agents primarily Korean enemy agents - :

but it was generally gathered People's guerrilla to gather tactical

information

in a combat zones

Both North with trained

Army and Chinese Communist Forces9 together forces, utilized large numbers of poorly value0 High-level

information

of military

intelligence Korean

was conducted Political especially agents

by training

companies established

by the North

Security trained

Bureau and by North for intelligence their nets. llrl varied

Korean field

grade officers, work, These of

and espionage

normally

confined

activities

to the supervision

subordinate . 'asions assigned, the location composition, types

information given

50 agents lines,

with

the sector attempted

to which to determine

On the front

the agents

of the UN main line and disposition the condition

of resistance; units;

the strength, the number and and

of various of roads;

of,weaponsg

the objective of hidden

movement of UN patrols; In forward location 163 artillery, various noting refugee areas., of troops. armor,

and the location

foodstuffs,

the agent also determined In addition, he noticed

the number and the location of , ..

and command posts; In rear

the location areas,

of the to '

checkpoints,

in addition agents

the location

and number of UN troops, lL!l

located

UNCLASSIFiED

National

Police

strong

points

and determined of civflians

their

strength, toward the

They

took the names and addresses North also

friendly with

Korean cause and those who collaborated and feeling ‘ of refugees

UN Forces,

Tl.-Y

noted the attitude U-2 3 $e e I-

and the South Korean

Enemy agents were recruited boys were very active partisan bands. in collecting

from bcth sexes and all information for

ages0

Young

the NKPA and

Some individuals themselves activities. for their and tried

were used who brought to prove their loyalty

political by engaging

disfavor

upon

in espionage incentive

Agents were not well-picked work6 Evidently, there.was

and showed little no authority

which centps.lized Youni; #

selection, middle-aged,

assignment

of missions,

or control

of enemy agents*

and e1de::I.y men and women were used singly, groups to facilitate movement,

in pairs,

and iz "f%mTly-type" used a stretcher adults carried

One such agent Two on the

in an attempt the agent,

to pass through

UN lines, father,

who posed as an ailing

stretcher,,

Several

young children,

who kneT:/ they would be well-fed claimed him as father,

as long as the agent Then apprehended, bed clothes, mingled farmers troops with

needed them, willingly

he was found to have concealed adopted

weapons under the children and as

Other agents bonaffde

one or more small Others disguised

reftigees,

themselves

or local

villagers northward,

withdrew

143

and some were Lit .

behind when enemy

115

UNCLASS IFIED

Some attempted utilized mountain

to pass through trails to avoid

UN lines checkpoints.

as refugees, Falsified

others passes Some wore

were carried US clothing units. other

by the agents to be used when questioned. and pretended to be ROK soldiers separated area,

from their and the assigned their

Once the agent

reached his assigned protected Sometimes,

guerrilla

Communist organizations he obtained, subsequent orally,

him and transmitted these organizations transmitted

information the agent information clothes areas,

missions* or concealed

Usually,

agents

information parts

in the seams of their bodies, In rear Korea

or shoes or in the private gained

of their

information U-i by radio0 Enemy espionage

by enemy'agents

was sent to North

agents

used many methods of identifioation. but was also pieoes a means the of

Money was not only a means of identification, of transmitting messages. Japanese fifty-sen

indioated

agent was a member of the Korean Labor Party. various five denominations indicated etc.). types

Japanese ooins

of arms (one sen-oarbine, indicated the rank

sea-Ml rifles,

Other Japanese coins the denomination, colors and buttons Cloth,

of the agent; Buttons

the higher of various

the higher sewed with

the rank* different

145
thread

denoted an agent's other glassess jackets, North

identity.

broken eyeglasses hair

which matohed

and South Korean flags, beans, various

cut in various of spoons, and An pocket colors, full spoons0

manners, tattoo

pencils,

types

marks on the body, were also

used as identification. carried in all a

agent apprehended of various coins

in the US IK Corps sector of all denomfnatfons,

buttons

. pieces."_ UNCLASSIFIED . r 117 . life-long These were the key ooins and the agent's the other coins and trinkets identifioation were a The agent claimed 146 collection. 'IED UNCLASSIF and all Inoluded the known methods of identffioation in the coins were two sen'pieces carried by enemy agents* year of dated in the eighth Emperor Meiji. 9 .

’ UNCLASS . .,
UN Countermeasures Infiltration Taken Agsinst Enemy Infiltration .

of enemy military units was .aombatted in various ,' ways by UN forces, Coordination of fire power between adjaoent W units in suspected areas, plus interdiotory artillery At regimental fire, abetted a

the influx civil

of infiltrating detachment,

enemy troops.

levels,

assistant

two oounterintelligenoe to deteot

agents, All

and one

ROK police refugees

company were utilized in the area were brought by the CIC agents.
were

enemy agents. oolleoting

to a regimental Ail indigenous prisoner

point

and screened

men of military of war channels. point for

age apprehended All others

evacuated

through

were sent to a division&refugee From the division,

oollection the refugees if

further

screenings

were sent to interro-

corps points gation

and on to an Eighth However,

Army point those cleared

further

was necessary0

at oorps level UN personnel army level duty. for This

were turned released screening

over to ROK civilian

oontrol.

All

by the enemy were returned prior to release and return

to at least to military

was done to detect
ment

any possible en& 147 of an espionage mission. troops were instruoted line area5D

indootrination

and assign. -

Friendly civilians assisted

to be suspicious

of any

in front units

Leotures

by CIC agents also Normally, oivilisns by a

in spotting

enemy agents*

were not in the oombat zone. report issued

This statement Pol$oer.

is evidenoed

by the ROK National

*See countermeasures aotivity,

employed ,by RI? F'oroes against 118

guerrilla

ED

-

When the defense line is very! close fron enemy line, those should be evacuated to the area located at 40 to 643 kilometers (approx. &to 36 miles) from,the defense line; and those ztreas loca.i;ed'lO to 20 kilometers (approx, 6 to 12 miles) south of &he next defense line should be evaouated. . o o Checkpoints for the control of trapel units, by civilians civil affairs in both dire&ions

were set up by military National Police.

polioe

teams, and ROK

Close iiaison units

was maintained

between UV Foroes and Palioe, Informants

ROK counterintelligence employed by UN foroes Some UN divisions personnel

and the ROK National in the detecztion organized

also aided

of enemy agents* from indigenous G2, up

had security

forbes

which operated

under thei control

of the division

These assisted of enemy agentso which refugees
148

in the prevention .CSvil assistanoe could

of sabotage detaohments northward

and in the rounding established in an attempt lines to

not cross going

return

home, heasurss to control All civilians a subdivision refugees were also exercised by the ROK in their

- .

Government0 villag@..or3.n In this

were required of a larger Polioe,

to register city

such as SEOUL, a polioe

manners the Xational

which maintained

-

.

box in every village, Counterintelligence were suspeoted questioned identifioation interrogation, all

knew everyone who belonged teams informed' the National

in the town. Polioe when agents

to be in the areas and the police-immediately strangers, were turned Eaoh civilian All suspicious persons who laoked agencieti for to oarry Certificate, 149 proper

over to investigative

in South Korea was required or City
or

a Refugee Certificate

or a Prefectural

Resident's on request,

These had to be shown at every checkpoint

UNChASSIF1ED

Refugee aativities fifth villages columnists.

were centralized

to ward off

any possible

Groups to be evacuated

were formed in the various leader from

and seotors,

and each group had an appointed He knew everyone within

the same looalitg. proper in rear trails authorities

his group and notffied his oolwm. All refugees 150

when a stranger

joined

areas were required and seoondary

to keep on main roads and avoid and guerrillas.

roads used by infiltrators Guerrilla Activity

At the beginning 5000 comnunist guerrillas trinated People's guerrfllas

of the Korean conflict, were operating

approximately These

in South Korea.

were directed personnel.

by a core of some 1700 Communist indooto thfs foroe, the North unit, the 766th Korean Korean

In addition

Army had an organized an independent

army guerrilla army unit,

the North Infantry

Zennam Unit,,and Regiment. 6 battalions guerrflla sildom

This regiment and trained units

was expanded later for such work.

from 3 battalions Korean divisional

to

North

were sfmilar from their

to NK reconnaissance

oompanies and were

divorced

rti *uler tables

parent unit. 151 of organization, Korean ZennamGuerrilla

HoweverB they had ir-

Both the North Infantry

Unit

and the 766th

Regiment were landed amphibiously groups (about landed

in South Korea in into the hills, ._

company-size

80 men) and dispersed in the wrong se&or was to destroy

The ?X Zennam Unit ineffective. crossings,

and proved traoks at

Its mission bridges,

railroad

tunnelsB

UNCLASSIFIED

ourves, and switches, 120

and to cut

4

own guerrilla bands. the guerrilla unjt withdrew into the hills 152 times. After before platoons.es. With the turn units attempted to escape northward. with other . units mingled with refugees point.. North Korean outfits and carried However. by 20 to 22 each about 8 yards apart.UNCLASWED away telephone mountain succeeded trails and telegraph through wires'. NK guerrilla of UN lines. These soldLers to the hills In the dark and guided the main body back to the objeot%ve. forces they formed thefr previously bands or joined established Communist sympathizers and Korean 121 UNCLASWED . and .- Companies were separated 15 to 17 yards3 and squads. to the rear At a certain they from the civilian column and assembled their or bundles. yards. to other used in'gusrrilla. villages. daylight* At other infiltrated separated . the attaak. approach to the objective. weapons which had been hidden in oxoarts A reconnafssance Units were was then made by the units given specific missions and an attack launched0 tfne limit and a specific to accomplish the assignment. 153 of battle in favor of UN Forces. three s&outs were sent out first. Some could many out-off Consequently. returned and rear wore areas of before dress to reconnoiter in daylight.aotivitd. members of the organization towns. not. The 766th Regiment moved by areas to its t dressed the in objeative and uninhabited UN troops* in harassing Enemy military uniforms standard oivilian UN foroes similar weaponso units. about 10 yards.

000 men. A oonsiderable and by effeotive were inflioted 155 heavy casualties on!the enemy troops. Eaoh The' of and later were divided up into consisted Guerrilla in strength from &OOmen to 4. ooordination 154 of withdrawal and their staffs were responsible . of the guerrilla blooking . As a result. bands established their bands followed 156 headquarters Seourity in the mountainous oamps depended c areas of operation.in South Korea were widely six branohes. Branoh units were the units operated in the eastern se&or* on an army pattern. In to - and to perform that there espionage November 1950. by the Korean the western part of South Korea." offioera It was believed for the over-all CCF and NK Foroes. Labor Party. itself. organized departments the active In addition the NKPA General guerrilla branohes of approximately to the branches.OCOO guerrillas North Korean general was "a Qnin5xium' of that some in South Korea. These were utilized missions. of these upon the guards at the stronghold depl~~yj.as peasants .~~l.000 men. Commandwas one of the twelve Headquarters. The branch organized numerous partisan operated throughout b&da. number were taken prisoners."~~ area. of the activity of these bands with !lhe routes easily determined. dispersed. but the partisan loose organitation Guerrilla terrain in their of the Korean Labor Party. troops a&ions uere by UN Foroes. and it controlled 8. branoh People's guerrilla foroes. and had disguised.Labor Party members also furnish logistioal support joined their ranks. it was estimated 40. Members of the band and farmers.

JNCLASSIF ‘IED spies i __ in nearby villages. in changed secret 157 branches was and . and sympathizers. desperate hatred brutal were conducted items. Messages oarried codes. aided in scouring 158 123 UNCLASSIFIED . or by capturing supplies Female guerrillas : purohased from the local for markets* guerrilla Replacements kidnapped bands were obtained by volunteers.i and supplies from the area in bands were operating. Hostages and enemy soldiers contri- had infiltraged butions of food. These were gathered by raids on farms. bands raided toward of natives treatment & guerrilla bands and resulted A general pattern * of those foroes centratin- in one area was the general were obtained Food. increased and the in of contrend. clothing. dispatched Guerrilla from the Poeple's foroes were able to and by messages from North most of their were frequently mission but UN action captured sending stations. who young men and women. lines were attacked: villages pillaged Many raids oritical All this Communication and raided. The general + mainly supply of the enemy guerrilla to impede the South Korean war effort. hostages. and Communist propagandadisseminated. Korea. which the guerrilla from voluntary . UN lines. out Food and ammunition'were many villagese the guerrilla captured. of necessity. Liaison with these strongholds was maintained Guerrilla reoeive destroyed couriers by the use of couriers Command in North Korea. medioal oontributors TJN supplies.

done one battalion. Protection Eighth of United of On 19 July 1950.X perimeter the breakout large Cactioal by UN F'oroeso it was necessary units.. the area in whioh the enemy was how-n to be. size patrols However. to encircle platoon- The remainder of the regiment of division used deployed Initially. It was also against protection oommunioation steps sabotage and enemy guerrilla One of the first Battalions. Army KoreaIts Rear Areas* mission was set up by. in the route of enemy withdrawal. defense.UNCLASSIFIED Countermeasures Taken by UN Forces Against Guerrilla Activities days of During the days of t.&h and 25th Divisions loaal .I i. ROK police with to the US 2. division or larger. . assigned procuring taken by this one provisional offioe was to form Korean Polioe company was the mission of At first. 159 had good suooesso of Coordinator. used to combat guerrilla and larger foroes company-size were too small. machine guns were then By studying the routes to good effect of the guerrilla of withdrawal. UN signal and bridge:. seouring information on the enemy and . Normally perimeter fired on guerrilla enemy in WP on dug-in and foroed the enemy to flee used directions. guides. the Office Lines States of Communication. to effect the maximum protection to provide of railroads. and the ensuing for UN Foroes to divert areas0 to seoure rear effect Friendly forcesa positions all armor was employed to have a quieting The 73rd Heavy Tank Da&lion within the UN perimeter Heavy and light on the enemy.the was to coordinate the efforts Korean and US police highways.ivity. forces. 1or act. organized for of movement their routes UR troops this were able to blook by employing was.

went immediately ROK Security to the scene to pursue the Battalions did note When a definite . in Korea.Battalions the TABAKK-SAN Command. which had the mission of guarding two . to the Korean National and the Korean National Police guerrillas in rear and were under the operational logistioally by it. comapnies were returned ROK Ulscurity Battalions areas. besides the outbreak of hostilities0 The National as compared to 148. the TANYANG. oontrol the ROK Army and supported for the National Police Arms and ammunition Both-&ad antito were furnished fixed installations by the US Army. American personnel. This cormand was activated in in June 19511z. and the SCX?A.M Command.and bmJYONG passes. combatted of conditions and road nets. The ROKNational expand until Polioe of the ROK Army to combat guerrillas was organized in 1945# but did not It now has 63. the When guerrillas National attaoking Police force. or an installation. the mission guerrilla of'guarding aotivitkes._ UNCLASWIED familiarizing terrain police the respeotive commanding generals After with local the ROK 143 Police.000 in 1945. strategic passes on main supply routes. guarding aotivities.000 men Police. the iusist~notj the area. and oonducting were attached ROK Seourity.. fixed installations and conduoting anti-guerrilla of the railroads to the also were oharged with Several thousand National civilian the security Police population. about two months. were attached corps to control and conduct counterintelligence attacked a village soreen indigenous 162 missions.

154 135. :&fter the air raid..‘300 the guerrillas. enemy troops .Security inflicted Since 25 June 1950.UNCLASSIFIED guerrilla strikes National attacks force was located. guaranteeing areasp harboring distributed safe conduht. to physioally agents contaoting 67. the National guerrilla oasualties Polioe an average a day. 22.837 44. wire.228 23. and UN air the in on the target.were to induce the enemy . booby-traps which were prime targets extensively in and mineswere by-passed * These figures probably included Korea during late 1950. called Polioe the area was surrounded.avy weapons captured Enemy rifles captured Police Police Police Police Police Killed kidnapped missing heavy weapons captured rifles captured In addition Police maintained guerrillas. raids. suspeoted the National to be in towns and provinoes Pamphlets.991 90 2.219 ~233 .571 1. moved up to olean out the area* conducted with Often such Battalionso 100 were jointly the ROK.%! 8. 143 * -8 RESULTS 0~ NATIONAL POLICX OPERATI‘DNSFROM 25 JuNE 50 t0 31 AUGUST 51 Enemy killed Enemy captured Enemy surrendered Enemy h*.-I to surrendera by hand and air 164 in the'same In addition for North guerrilla to guards at VHF stations.900 6.

The first wasito in fronts any mines on the In this by the fall of and the seoond carried machine guns and crews. and rear of some trains. UNCLASSIFtED employed.. during Flat Each rear area organizhtion raid. the guerrilla 165 19510 menaoe was iirtually .*u. oarrying mabhinZi guns and crews0 were placed Hospital explode trains had two I on the front gondolas traoks. eliminated manner. .l . a guerrilla or gondola platoons cars. Security had an SOP which rode railroad it followed trains.

'of the main line foe to dislodge..cjn. Iw Foroes to prepare . were neoessary the enemy adhered to the prinofple and proved a stubborn. of the enemy as. the old Patton them by the nose and kioking used.:. Massed artillery the enemy to clear defensive Certain tactics spicuous to the enemy were noted indioations in the he employed." that air superiority. in an effort After maximum losses on the oppasition. in the days of the PUSAN perimeter machine. time and inflict the enemy used the same taotios..".t. especially landing. definite disadvantages Definite tenaoious assaults of resistanoe. as UT Forces. and good judgment was thorough use of guerrilla and resulted activity.&g terrain on the whole. to gain May 1951.% soreaming fighting and CC Foroes were well-coordinated showed considerable part. namely. and the MCHCLil employed were adage of Envelopfire- aided the ene?qy*s fighting to Western taotios. Reoonnaissance many penetrations."'the to the NK Enemy attaoks for the most were sound and well-exeouted. before offensive This:enabled were oon- every attack. and mobility of the UI? Foroes provided the differenoe between the two forcess Defensively. It is believed them in the pants. ments were widely power. that of trad. similar "holding during of W positions The extensive prior planning maohines. fire and hand-to-hand p.CHAPTERTOUR Summary of the Effioaay Enemy taotics popular conception l of Enemy !Cactios Contrary horde. Taotios especially..

sustain Since the enemy attac'kb :*. capable opponent which . the Communist Force employed in Korea was a empLoyed sound basic principles.. themselves. of the enemy's of UN fire The advantage disadvantage superior manpower became a Eq+my troops to control support was in the fsce superiority* were d9fficult and logistical became demoralized and confused. a week's at&& Consequently. all. followed a definite pattern in defensive measures. supply of food. all cases. the enemy winter This caused by the damage inflicted artillery. weather the resupply was due to the scarcity weather available of natural ' camouflage and to the good flying to W aircraft. was exhausted. Another . UN Forces were able to $ake appropriate weakness noted an offensive. When this lost'momentum x. units because of inadequate dgfficult.* . The capture that communications. in ene&y tactics was his inability to i especially a$ lower unit levels0 This was on his supply system by V-T air and ‘ each en&y soldier carried approximately .in - support was limited.of wara . of many enemy troops Communist medical suffering from old wounds indicated All. of enemy rear Undoubtedly installatfons. hindered and finally &alled.::.

.70 Ibid 80 90 Interview with Lt. 31 Octe 51. Tacta. G2 Section. Combat Information Bulletin #2O." Memo. an analysis G2 Section. and Doctrine. Combat Notes #2. undated report... and Docto. Fallwell." Hq. Tech.. Cal.. Senior Advisor to ROK National Tech. and Do&.. EUSAK. ." IX Corps. G2 Section._I ~. Bulletin Hqo EUSAK. 23 Jun 51. Tech." IX Corps. Tact. Hq. Hqe EUSAK." C-2 Hq* IX Corps. 20 Nov 50." 62 Hq. and Do&. 6s "Summation of Recent and Current Indications. Fallwell.. IX Corps G2 Section. and Do&. 15." Corps.. and Doctrine. L o . Combat Bulletin #lo.. IX Corps. !bo Hqo "Characteristics of the CCF. EUSAK." by Major Robt. "En. EUSAK G2. Fallwell. IX Corps. 31 Ott 51.. 7 Jun 51e 140 %n.‘*17~. act 51* 110 "Ek. 16. with 23 100 '%n. Hq. Cal. _Cal. rept.' Techniques. Tactics. UNCLKsFlED 130 . Interview with< Lt." Combat Information EUSAK. 'How the Chinese Wage 7jiar." IX Corps. Tech. "A Comparison of CCF Doctrineland CCF Practice" undated. Lt." of enemy action in X Corps sector 16 May-l June 19519 X Corps. and Do&. "En... qnemy Tactics.. Cal. Hq. Tech. 2. & Feb 51e 30 PIR -. EUSAK. Tact.* Interview Police.~11. Cal. Tech. IX 13.. EUSAK 29 June 1951 "Enemy Tactics. "En. Tactics. x)0001-202&O Jan 51. Hamby. 16. Lt.GP Research and Analysis. pages 3-4. "Chinese Com-nunist Forces Tactical Concepts. and DO&~.&3." Hqo EUSAK 15 Apr 51.. "Battle of the Soyang.. "Summation of Recent and Current Indications. Tactics. 12. EUSAK." IX Corps. Summary G2 Command Report.CIIAPtiR I CITATIONS 1. b!3. Be Risg. Hq." Memo Hq. Hq. William Tech. & Feb 5:. 4. L.

"En." Intelligence "How to Use AT Guns. trans.. Tact. Tact. enemy ilocument translated MISD. "En. Tech. 14 Mar 51. CCF. Hq.. Tech.. Tech.$ Combat Inf. Research Supplament . S'zsnary. Lt.. People's Liberation Forces Army. Tact. Tech. and Do&. "A lecture of How a Long Lasting Tar. Tech. 30. doct. FEC. 28.!+l. L.. 7 Jun 51.. 12 Mar 51. . G2 Section. Tact. EUSAK. dot. and' Doot . 26.". 164th &3. and Doct. &l-k.- 170 Ibid 18. Ens& -&cument lated by the 164th bZSD. p &L. and ." en." IX Corps.n l4il. 22. Training Sec. "Enemy Movement Capabilities.Reports." MISP and 164th k&SD. transport CCF-NKPA.. PIR. A-2. Tech. Hq. Dist. by l&h. 17 Ott 51. pp. and Doct.. Hq." IX Corps. _a.. Hq. 33.IX b6th R&t. EUSAK. 'Operational Orders.. p . by 528th 31. and Doct.. Prepared and Interview with 1st Lt. Phi $228. EUSAK. M. I. Tact. Chinese trans- 25.. Tact. Hq. Hq. EUSAK. Fallwell. Lt. "En. Hq IX Corps. "En. and. G3 Special Cal. EUSAK.'.. Nelson.. Combat ?qotes #2.. 24. 8th Army. "A Lecture on How to Prepare for a Long Lasting Executive Officer SUNG. Ibid. 1% UNCLASSIFIED .PIR pm 4. PIR &i&3.. War.' Combat Inf. Corps." X Corps. ATIS. Cpl.l>oct . metin #20.t)Oct. trans. 30 Jan 51. X Corps. Projects Div." to prepare for IX Corps. Ml. "En.. Tech. 13 by 51.".. t 21.. Hq. "CCF-NKPA Supply and Transport\" p. PIR #Z332... Hq X Corps--Enemy Tactics Bulletin #3. EUSAK. "Battle # 323. Ibid -_ 190 "Enemy Tact. GHQ."‘IX Daily Corps. Tact."iIX ".. l e. Joint G-2. Fallwell." by Page Study Army. "Interrogation Communist Captain. "En. MI Section." IX Corps.‘ Bulletin -$l. of Soyang. Hq EUSAK.bfISD.. "Supply 23." IX Corps.. B. 5th AF.. of Chinese GHQ.. and Dock.. 32. . "En. FEC. by ~ 22.$!+. en Corps. 15 Sep 51. 30 bkr 51.

L. Cal. Tact... "En. and Doct. S.. L. lb Jul 51 -(Extracted from CIC Report X-KOR (lo)-324. Corps--Enemy Tactics Bulletin*&." Hq IX Corps. Hq EUSAK. 13 Feb 51. Ibid. Z/ Jan 51.. I ":CF Attack Doctrine*and Tactics. Daily Intelligence GRQ. oompiled by 210th CIC Det. Hq X Corps. Hq IX Corps. "En. Psywar Div. Operations Research Office. "New Report of Liaison Visit to 7th Regt...Taotios Bulletin 84. 25th Inf TIR $228. Enemy Tsctics Bulletin #9. 7 Jun 51.. Combat Inf. p." Hq. Armor Observer Report by Lt. Col. by 164th @SD.. X Corps--PI3 #l71.... Taot. A.. A. IX Corps. Hq EUSAK.w by Col. FEC. -' document translated Bulletin $3. Part II.Corps--PIR #la. FEC. PIR @l.I. Enemy Taotios Bulletin #&-PIR #ls. &. Marshall. Sunrmnry. Dooument 146&32-B. from Combat Notes #2. and Do&. Hq EliJSAK.Enemy Tactics "En. G2. Div. GHQ. ATIS. "Battle of Soyang." captured Reports (NK YOth and 73rd Inf. Jack Engle. 11 Jul 51. Tech. X Corps. Div. Enemy Taotios Bulletin -#." Hq IX Enemy. Bulletin #l3. Research Supplement. OR0 Report "CCF in Attack" Part II. p* 4l. Tech. p* 9. Hq IX Corps. Marshall. PIR #376. X . Combat Intell." Combat Inf. 17 Dee 50. 'n IX Corps." Corps. S.. Ibid. Tact. 12 May 51). PO @* >TKPA Reconnaissance and Intelligence.)." G2.. 23 Jul 51. X . Taot. PIR #I. GHQ. Hq EUSAK. (Ext. &. #6. Tact. 17 Deo 50. p 40. Bull. "Notes on Chinese Company Taotics. 13 Mar 51.? IX Corps. and Dbct. Hq. pm 5. and Do&.. Hq. "Reconnaissance Methods." 1st Cav. Inol. by 1st Lt. Hq X Corps. William He Hale: "CCF in the Attack. Patrolling Techniques. Hq X Corps-. Bulletin #. and Do&. Interrogation Divs..#306. Hq X Corps. FECb of Chinese Taotioal Manual. PIR . 27 Jan 51. Korean Translation ATIS.) MIS. "En.JNCLASSlFlED ‘I .. EUSAK. Tech.& Hq X "En. Tech. G3 Training. X Corps.

Enemy Taotics Bull. 5k 56.pp. 13 Feb 51.. pa 12. Farrell. "Taotioal Principles. CCF-EKPA".. 14 Mar 51. ATIS. Doe. #'EC. Korean trhnslatio&f CCF Taotioal Manual. Rq EUSAK. Ibid# Teoh. and Doot. Unnumbered Enemy Taot.. #@2&B. 10 Sep 9. FEC. E@. 30 Jan 511 PIR #228.. Bq IX Corps.Y. p 9. PfR EUSAK. Daily Intell* Summary. undated. Cal. p . Aug 51.Doot " IX Corps.. 15 Sep 51.. Hq a 17 Deo p. Farrell. #l. "Taotieal Prinoiples.. i En. &mbat InfL Bull&in #ll. "CCF Combat Dootrine. 4 Feb 9. Daily Intell. FEC. Hq EUSAK. GHQ. Following the 1st Cav9 Div. #2. 20 No? p. 54. Hq EUSAK." Combat Inf. "' 39th Regt.. William 8. Hq@JSAK. F. Armored Sczhool. Eq X Corps5 "CCF in Attatik . Hq X-:Cp. MI Se&ion. H. "Primary Conolusion of 9th w's Battle Experience at USAN" published by 66th CCF Army Hq. 8-12. 53. &. Tact. -#4. Col. Sum. Disposition Form. Wm. Teoh. Do@. (Extra&e@ from IX Corps PIR j/228. "En Tact. GHQ. Y%unmezatsof offloere of 3rd @5. 6743. PIR #&3. #@26-B. F. 9. PIR #202. Taotios Bull. 12'May 512 Korean Trans. Lt. Bull. X Corps. Col.. Hq IX Corps. 570 "En. Hq ZCorps.. 15 Sep 51. 12 Mar 51.!.&.rpsi Combat Bull. Bull. Action in 'Fate Oat* 50.@F Army Group d&d. pp. Bulletin. $9."' Hq 25th Tnf. Order of Battle Annex #l. MI. 2 Mar 51. Armor Gbsesver Report by Lt. GHQ. Combat Inf. $6768. 19 Aug 50. W. GHQ. ATIS. translated by 164th MISDj D+ly Intslligenes Summary. "IX i Corpf3. . Taotiss Bull.#@O.'Combaf Inflo Bull. #&-PIR Tacef~8. 2 Mar 51j “En. 52. Brig. Doo. 13 May 513 "supply and Transport. Fallwell. PI& fl$J 38th CCF Army. Bq X &pss PIR #228.L" IX Corps..j" IX Corps. and:.FEC. Gen. Captured doouments'by 12th. GHQ.. Gen. GHQ. Korean Tranelat1on of CCF Ta&ioal Se&ion. Teoh. 58. Armor Obsbrver Report by Lt. W from Ghief K?&AG. FE%.."' Chief KMAG. and Do&. 11th @ trans$ated by 164th MISD. l!EC. Hq X Corps. "En. &O. Manual. Daily Intelligenoe Summary. "CCF Attaok Dootrine and Taotios. Hq EUSAK.Brig. Hale.. Hq EUSAK. FIR # 230. Div. p. of CCF Manual. War D Hq EUSAK. Batoh. Tact. 12 May 51). Tad. ATIS. W. #@326-B. and Doot. 51. 1 Combat Inf. Tech. MI Se&ion. Bull. '14 Mar 51. I@ EUSAK.

Bull. H. Divs." Hq. 61. Batch #770. Staff. PIR /ml. Divs."Hq 9th CCF Army Group. 84. G3 (R and 64. Rpts. Visit to 3rd Bn. Bull. "Mine Sweeping Bllork. ATIS.. of 39th CCF Army's battle by 66th CCF Army following 1st Cav 'Div action in late Ott. . by Capt Benj. Staff I&morandum.(Part II)" by Col. Combat Inf. PIR #378. 71. ATIS. Hq X Corps. by ATIS 25 JUT 51. to X Corps by Capt Benj. 15 Sep 51. Interrogation Report. FEC. 26 Jan 51. 23rd Inf. Batch . 17 Dee 50. Operations Research Office. translated by i&h MISD. Korean trans. Hale." G3 Training Section EUSAK. 20 Nov 50. L. PIR -ml. 30 Jan 51. G2 Hq EUSAK. Rpt. Res. S.: Captured Enemy Doournent. #6@26B. 29 Apr 51. 19th Inf." NK Defense Dept. Hq EUSAK. Hq EUSAK. translated by 164th MISD. 27 Jan 51. #@26-B. by Lt. l&!&h MISD on 11 Apr 51. Interrogation Reports MI Section. 23 Jul 50. Doe.. 13 134 . Captured Enemy document.MI Section. 1951. "Mine Sweeping Work.ilI Section. @. Inf. Bull. Enemy Tactics Bulletin unnumbered. Hq X Corps. #13. 10 Mar 51. Annex #l. Order of Battle.. Res. Hq EUSAK. translated by 164th MISD. 70.811." Interrogation SUSAK 13 Ott 51. Combat Inf. "Assault Team Tactics. Report. (?TK 70th and 73rd Inf. Issue if48. Wm. 67. 1G'Mar 51. Rpt. Hq EUSAK. transld. 66.#2$ Hq EUSAK. of Liaison Hunter. 20 Nov 50. FEC. .. "Chien Tao Lien. A. Combat Inf. Batch &'37. Interr. PIR iy482. MI-section. Hq EUSAK.NK translation of CCF Manual. 6 Nov 51. FEC. translated by /$. A.#1770. . Combat Inf. GHQ. 9th CCF Army Group. PIR $202. Hq EUSAK. FEC. ATIS. 29 Mar 51. Bull.earch Supplement. 29Apr51. F. Hq EUSAK. Interviews with men of Cal. Bull." Hq XIX Army Group. DOG. Hq EUSAK. Combat Inf. GHQ.#5. GHQ. FEC. #l3. Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA) Special Planning GHQ. "Liaison Visit Hunter . Cal. 1. Combat Inf. GHQ. War Diary. Bull. Hq Eusak. Bull. I&shall.) Interrogation Reports MI Section. FEC. (NK 70th and 73rd ' 43* Batch &'3'7. ATIS.) 65. Armor Obs. Hb EUSAK. 62. Combat Inf. Hq EUSAK."'pub.. "Primary Concl.earch Supp. Regt. ATIS. 20 Mar 51. 19 Aug 50. Combat I&'. Bull #ll. Hq EUSAK. at UNSAN. Hq EUSAK. 68. File) Hq EUSAK. . GHQ. Regt. . Hq of CCF Manual.. Enemy Tactics Bulletin #2. G2 R and A File. "A Collection of Battle Experiences. &. G2 Section. translated by 164th MISD. exp. 13 Mar 51.

Hq X Corps. Hq EUSAK. O' Researoh Offioe Msmoraadum::S-25 (CCF Tactics in the Envel. 73.. Bodnerp C hnd GSC Repr. 750 "A Collectionof 760 "Report of. Wm. MI Section. Taotio W1. . Hq EUSAK. Ho Hale.51:--Combat Notes ~#b.Convaents and raoommendations on Operations. Jennings. presentative.I!+ Feb l$ Sep 50a 51: Combat lnf. En. ATIS-. Cal. 25 Jun 51s: PIR #375.@. 80. Farrell) disposition form9 2 &far 5’6. Hq EUSAK 25 Jul 5:.. GHQ @. #20.Colleotion of Combat tiperiencesgn Hq XIX Army Group? 29 Mar 51. Cal. 20 Mar 51. G3 Training Dips Hq EUSAK. AFF' Ohs. Bull. 2 Jul 51e Intelligence Summary. I Corps Arty/ET. 17 Feb 51._25 Fob 51. PIR &Z&3. . S~@V. NK'Trans. Lavoie. b 14. Coo. Off. "Enemy Movement Capabilities.. Comigt Japan. Eulld . S. 13 Feb 51. transld. Daily Bull. - 72. _. 12 Mar 51. Armor Observer Report by Lt. of CCF Manual. 8th Hist Det. S. Tdot. 81. FEC. ?!F3 . F0 Vi.. #.s HqX Corps.@28. "Tactics of a Tank Unit. Team #5* 770 Report . GHQ. Teoh. "'G2 PIR #323. Princo.opment of a Column).b from Chief K&M+--(Brig. 780 Ibid.&@$ G2 GHQ. GHQ. 92%d Armd FA Bn.Commaad and General Staff Corps ReArrw Field Force Observer Team #j.Hq EUSAK. Combat Experienoespw Hq XIX Army Group. Leon F. 13 fiy 51. Tactics Bull. 796 PIR-. Intell. 82. Combat Inf.Bodner. Wm. FEC. Report of Col. "'Liaison Visit to X Corps.%.IED 71 conta Mar 15 Sop 51. 14 Sep 50. and D~ct." "Combat Lessons Learned 16 May-5 Jlxn 510n 23rd Inf Be&. Hq IX Corps. ATIS. . 514 PIR ml. Hq E&K.". 29 Mar51 by ATIS.~. #&8926=-B. Jun." 51. Olin.Cql. Inf. W?4i'H0 Ha&.@ Apr 51. "Taot. %n. Bull. 30 Jan 510 Combat Inf. 8 dug 51% Combat Notes go Hq IX Corps9 7 Jun Artillery Perjmeter iq Korea.. 22 Jul 51~1 74. Hq EUSAK.e.Conference with... translated by ATIS. Unnumbered En. PIR #378. Armor Observer Rpt. 25 Jun 51. "Paragraphs on Perimeters-An Lt. Bq'EUSAK. Interview Set 'Changbong~~i-~oen~~~n~~~~'l1-12 Feb 51. kq l!&@AK. FEC. Hq X Corpsg:~&rr&ation Report of CCF Army Captain by 164th MISD. Daily Intelligence Summary0 GHQ." Tra%ning Department Northeastern kanohuria liliilitary District9 Maroh 1951 translated by &a SectO. Hq EUS&K.. Gen. PIR #la.PIR $202..~' Hq IX Corps p0 16.. Cal. #ll. 7 Jan 51.by Lt. of Cal. Hq EUSAK. 2'7 Jun 51: PIR #335g Hq EUSAK.. GBQ.

.. Tact. sec.S. 17 Dee 50. Hq Corps... p 20.S. Research Supplement. (Hvy) 25 Ott 50. of Interrogation ‘Hq EUSAK. 8 Aug 51. Tech. Interrogation ATIS.. Hq Corps. IvZlitary Intelligenoe 86. Hq XJSAK.' to ltr. Hq IX Corps. Hq IX Corps. 9 b&y 51. 37. FEC. 98. Mt Sect. by 164th NISD. Hq 70th Bn. 99. 19th Inf. #2. 1st Ibid. transld. Daily of a Selected CCF. Tech.. Hq EUSAK. by 214th L?f . 88. $2.g 51: PIR #4lO. Sect.S. 24th U. Ibid. Reports. p 20. FEC. 5 2 Au. Hq EUSAK. Bull. Combat Inf. by Capt Benj. file 470. FEC. PIR $4.. 27 Aug 51." Div.. FEC. Hq EUSAR. Annex #l to Inol. 91. Hq EUSAK. Div.b. 14 Sep '9. "Forward 3rd Inf." and Doct. 90. U. Hq EUSAK. Techniques.4. "Summary of Salvaged Enemy Tanks..." PIR #In. IX Corps. En. ATIS. Hq EUSAK. Regt. War Diary.." m. Div. Hq EUSAK. -85. "En.. Bull. and Doctrines. PIR #388. 50th Forces undated li. Summ. EUSAK. Tact. "Extract of a Special Report Prisoner.TKPA)' Special Planning Staff. " Artillery Section.. Observer Tactics. 6. ofrmor Potential. #&926-B. Bull. "Korean trans. Hunter. #CO. Inf.Div. Enemy Tactics Bull. PIR #&ll. 19 Alg 50... "Report Order of Battle Se&ion.I sect. ATIS. FEC. 26 Aug 51. and Do&. 30 Jul 51. 20. p. En. Hq X Corps. GHQ... "Rpt* of Liaison Visit to 3rd Bn.58. G2. Hq EUSAK. Tact. Hq 2nd U. on 2/." 18 Feb 51. G2 aQ. "Reference for Night Combat for Small Units. Combat Inf.ar 51. . pp 1. GHQ." &. 94. 959 96. Technical Information Armor Section. of CCF finual. Dot. GHQ. Undated. Hq EUSAK. Combat Notes #&. Dee 51. Annex #2. Hq." Dot. #j. Inf. 13 Ott 51. Div. for PIR $474. "Rpt.Order of Battle Handbook (. "En Tact. "En. Order of:Battla. 92. Annex #l..8. p. Hq EUSAK." Hq. -#6. on Armor. 18 Feb 51. Intall. and Doct..'* Tech. Combat Inf. Bull. lg. PIR fill. 15 Sep 51. M-21 Jan 51.. Irr 5. G3 Trng. Section. 93. Batch #lnO. GHQ.

Hq. 17 i... 101. "CCF Combat Doctrine II.Seotion. . Hq EUSAK. Spe$:'al Planni‘q Staff. 1 I CHAP&R II 105. "Hq 12th Army CCF. G2:: Interview with Hq EUSAK. Hq EUSAK.l$ctics. Fizz ATIS. Teohniques.Col. Lb Fallwell. kemy . "Summation of Reoent and Current +Section. ATIS.. pp 19-20. Order of Battle Handbook (&$A). c . #ll. t" "': Y Speoial:&lan. Armor &bserVer Report by Lt." G2 . Combat Inf. 102. 6. "Special Study .' G2. Itransld.. 103e "Use of Signal Flags by the&F 5 Mar 51.. 2TJUn 51.G2Research a$@. i. p 22e. FEC. 14 May 'jl. to Experiences in 108. Combat Inf. m Memoraiiibm. ATIS. by Combat ExperienoesO" Hq XIX.. #ll.pl.AnalysiS. M.3 "CCF Tactical . jb 137 : .. . FEC. "Introduction bgr Defensive Operetions.~#ll. Hq EUSAK. 20 Mar 53. 104. $20. n CAbat Bulletin MI Se&ion. Bull. Lt. WmHi Y Combat Information Bulletin . Combat Inf. pp 20-21. ?A Colldotifm Of Group. Combat Inf. Bull. Inf.. Enemy Tactics'Bulletin E Hq X Corps. #ll. Hq E$ o 37 DOG 50. "The Proper Conception of Fl8xible Defensi+e pamphlet translated by 16L&h~NISD. Bull.100. $6. 7#60'Hq EUSAK.A comparison of CCF Rootrine with. 15 Sep 51.. 15 Apr 51 PIR #2&. PIR :&57. Bull. translated Military Intelligence Seotio&. FEC.. p" an&$@&+. Bull. Warfares" CCF Hq X Corps. . Hq E'ljSJKt bmb*t GHQ.F.. Ibid. Issue #&. 14 May 51. Hq EUSAK. 12 Oot 5r. Col. 12 I%r 51.~ 106. Hq EUSAK. Indioations. 2$3 Mar 51. 107. Research Supplement. Bull. GHQ. L MI Sect. Combat Inf. GHQ. Hq EUSAK. S&f. G2 Section.Bull:.CCF Praotios. Hq EqAK.FIR #96. Fee. Hq EUSAK. Hq IX Corps. j." Conoepts" GG? Se&ion G2 Se&.fi9 Hq EUSAR. 8 Apr 51. GHQ. Hq EUSAK. ATIS. 20 Nov 50J Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA). Combat Inf. p 1. 1090 110. Interro&ation'Reports. QIQ.'q EUSAK. @Z Sect. See. $?@I #07. . FIX. pp 3-4. and Doctrine. Hq EUSAK.. EUSAK. 29 Jun 51..

Tact. Armor Observer Report by Lt. 138 . F'FJC. EUSAK. and Doct. 6 Nov 51.. “En. Tact. I Corps. 2'3 Apr 51. &. Enemy Tactics Bull. Hq X Corps. PIR #377. Batch #l770. #lo. PIR Ml.. Enemy Operations Order of 422nd Regt . . 47th CCF Army.. Col. Hq EUSAK. G3 Training Section. Hale. Hq EUSAK. Batch #7'37 "A Study on the Tactics the U. p 24. H.. "North Korean Defensive Tactics. PIR $4'05. Combat Information of 115. War. Conner.. E. 13 kr 51. 118. Tact. "Report of Liaison Visit to U. Command Report." enemy document translated by 164th MISD. #l1..pp b-9. L. Hq EUSAK..p6. G3 Training Section. Combat Inf.. Wm. 113.Hunter. G3 Training Section. #l3. pp 28-a. Combat Inf. 119. "Directions of Tactics for Defensive Operations. Army. Tech. Report of Liaison Visit to 3rd Bn. 112. Batch #737. Hale. Tact. ATIS Research Supplement.S. En. @. H. Tech. Interview with Lt." Capt Ben J. Col. Hq X Corps. Hq X Corps. Tact. p 28. Hq X Corps. Armor Observer Report by Lt.Bull." Hq IX Corps.. Bull. G3 Psy. "En. Wm. and Doct.S. PIR /&82. #. Wm. 30 Mar thru 4 Apr 51. Hunter. Hq X Corps.S. "Liaison Visit with 1st Iviirine Division. G2. Regt." Hq IX Corps. on 23 Mar 51. Hq EUSAK. 25th Inf. Hq EUSAK. Hunter." Hq 26th CCFArmy. l-31 %ar 51. translated by 164th IvZSD. Do&.S. Col. En. Tech. En. Tact Bull. "l-l &n. Hq EUSAK.. J. Bull. $2. Hq ETJSAK. Hq X Corps." Hq IX Corps. Div. Enemy Tactics Bull." enemy document dated 12 Sep 513.: Liaison Visit with 1st Marine Div Capt Ben J. IX Corps.." Lt. Tact... Hale.: 30 Nar-4 Apr 51. Issue .. and Doct. Col. Cav. EUSAK. 4 Feb 51. p 28. action in late Ott. Div. 164th MISD-T03&L. l-30 Apr 5l. 13 Mar 511 Chinese Document "Primary Conclusion of 39th Army's Battle Experience at UNSAN. mQ. 117. 18 Feb 51. Combat Bulletin Hq U..#$. following the 1st U. EUSAK. Capt Ben." MI Section. Bulletin -#l3. Ammor. 20 Apr 51..Observer Report by Lt. 120. fi. "En. Annex #2. PIR #fl7. (R and A File) 9 Xray 51. Div.UNCLASSIFIED '"+?$ 111. Hq EUSAK. Bull. 63 Section.. H."' Hq IX Corps. Combat Inf.. 116. G2 Report. PIR jk282. G3 Training Div. Hq EUSAK. Tech.. Fallwell.. "An Introduction to previous Combat kperiences. Annex #2. 19th Inf. Hq 3rd Inf. Hq IX Corps. 164th MISD. Cal. Command Report. and 114. 20 Nov 50. Bull." published by 66th CC%Army Hq.

MI sect 0* GHQ FECp Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA). Inf Div. "Primary Concljsion of 39th Army's Battle Experiences at UNSAN." GHQ FEC. Office of AC of S. UNCLASSIFIED . Tact. "CCF Fortifications. "North Korean Defensive Tactics. "Directions of Tactics for Defensive Operations. Hq X Corps.of Technical Intelligence Coordinator. undated. translated by 164th MISD. G2 Sect:‘. Report $86. 5& (file ref'. G2 GHQ 124. Order of Battle Handbook (. Dept. 25th U. #lYp Hq EUSAK. "En. PIR #27Y. 123. Hq IX Corps. 18 Fob 51. PIR #62. in Def. Combat Inf. Div. pp 38-79. Bull. Bull. ATIS.#2?. Inf.. Batch &'37.). G3 Sect. 6.7.' GHQ.. ". Enemy Tactics Bull. FEZ. Sep 51. j Handbook (N&A). PIR #$$?I.. Hq EUSAK. Hq G3 Sect.ISD-T-0157. Letter. Hq I Corps. Batch ij!Tl.. Offibe of G3 Air.l. Div. PIR . % _. Bull." Engineer Iiitel'liigence Notes No. In-tall. Hq EUSAK. Letter. Special Plan Staff. undated. Sec. 30 Jan 51. Hq IX Corps. and Doct." 0ffice.. . "Intro. Hq X Corps. 26 Aug 51.. . 164th M. PIR #In. "North Korean Defensive 1258 Order of Battle FEC. Combat In-f. sec.-&t&-US Inf~i. p 4. Bull. Dip. Hq-X Corps. MI Sect.. Hq EUSAK. Tea& CCF Field Works. the 1st Cav. 8 Jul 510 "Condensation of ADVATIS Special Report O&" En0 Tact. 2Y Apr 5'. Combat Inf.fl3.Engr. .51r PIR &lo. IL5 Ott 51. Hq EUSAK.556th CCF Manual on Field Fortific@zl..H$O 26th GCF Army.. Seco 6. &. 13 Mar . #l. Hq EUSAK.. PIR #ZW. Technical Intell. Combat Exp. G2. 24th UOS.": published by 66th CCF Army foil.S.. Combat Inf.Inf. . Diva. 27 Soi 51. enemy 12'7. #2. Hq X Corps. ATIS Research Sup$lement.. %nemy Camouflage Practices in Korea. 14 Feb 51..~&+p 9. P orth Korean Defensive Tactics. Div. En." by 164th MISD. Hq EUSAK. Batch #I770 p 'An !&trod. by MI Sect.Nl&A). GHQ FEC. to Exp." ATIS Research Supp.* UNCLASSIFIED 121 0 Chinese DOG. Hq EUSAK." Issue 496. 6. Sece 122. PIR #377. Sep 9. to Prev. PIR #l43. Hq 24th IJ. #$. :A "Chan Tung" No.MI seco. Inf. Annex . action in late O&p Combat. document Operations.#62.~Di. Hq I' 5 Corps. S-=1951. GHQ. Bull. Bull.S. 11 Ang 51. GHQ FEC. Combat Inf. ATIS.&?. .. 20 Nov 50. GHQFEC. Hq EUSAK... 4 Feb 51.l. "ATIS Research Supplement 496. - - 6 Ott . 2 Jun 51.." Special Planning Staff. 8 Apr 51s translated 14 May 51. #l$$. Briefing Report. translatedcaptured enemy . Hq EUSAK. Hq 12th CCF Army. P 26 Apr 51. 20 Ott document dtd912 Sop 51 B translated Combat 113. Hq 3rd Inf. Hq IX Corps: Combat Notes #6# Hq IX Corps. Tech.on. #3. I' 126. Hq EUSAK. Bull. - I 2. Bull. Engr. Tactics. /h. of Army. Tact. MI Sect. Special Planning Staff. 6 p p 5. 8 Jul 511 51. 20 Nov 9. ll'.496. Combat Bulletin #lo.

126. Batch #737.#5. . Combat Bulletin fi0. 11 Aug 51. 3 Aug 51. Hq EUSAK.. Hq Northeast Military 30 Vkr 510 Batch #l580. 11 Aug 51. Bull.." NK Defense Dept. 164th MISD. PIR #2.bat Bull. - 131. "Intro. Combat Inf. EUSAK. Hq EUSAK. Hq X Corps. translated by MI Sect.. G2 Sect. Bull. in Def. H2 9th CCF Army Group. j/6. action. Supreme Hq in Pyon. En. undated. PIR .f 155. G2 R&A. Combat Notes &. Hq I Corps. 10 Mar 51. Hq EUSAK. "North Korean Defensive GHQ FEC." Training Directive (DRAFT). G2 Sect*. 4 Feb 51. EUSAK.::xtracts from Translations of Enemy Documents. "Chiang Chiang Issue No.” dl. Hq I Corps. PIR #ll5." G3 Sect.L. Div. "Field UNCLASSIFIED Trip Observations of 25th Div. "Antiaircraft Firing with HMG and Rifle. Div. 9 May 510 Translation of Enemy Document.. translated %I Seot. 1st %rine Div. translated by 1614th'MISD. 7 Ott 51." 13. En. 132. ATIS Resocrch Tactics. Batch #j'fl. Hq EUSAK. Hq EUSAK. Item /A. Translation of daptured Enemy Document. EUSAK Armor Bull. "Methods of and Procedures. Hq IX Corps. "Handbook on AT Tactics. #'b Hq X Corps.: UNCLASSIFIED . Memo. 6 Fob 51. Interview with 1st Lt Thomas L.. Operations. Scullen. 2 May 51.. 31 Aug 51. Div." 30 Dee 50. GHQ FEC. Div. "A Study of AT Tactics. 16 Feb 51. translated by 164th MISD. Combat Bulletin #$.. Hq I Corps.. 14 May 51.Tcrpedoes by CCF. translated by 164th MISD. Heath. Batch $586." Hq 19th CCF Army Group. 9 Ott 51. Combat Inf. Positions. Techniques. 2 Dee 51. Hq 3rd Inf. Hq EUSAK. Combat Bulletin &?. Hq IX Corps: PIR #!$5." translated by 164th MISD. 22 Jul 51. #-lo. Bull. 2nd Battalion. translated by 164th MISD. Combat Notes #& Hq IX Corps. Past AT Experiences. . Tact. CP.. Fallwell. Tact. Hq X Corps. 27 Sep 51. G3 Training. UO238. Interview with Lt. Cozl. 22 Sep 51. 8 Ii4ay 51. Bull. G2 R&A. Hq EUSAK.. "Reference Materials for Small AT Teamss" Iiq 26th CCF Army. Item . 10 Mar 51. 8 Rug 51." 1st Lt Jack Engle. Hq EUSAK." 66th CCF Army Group. TR0223. "A Study of." Assault CCF Bunkers. G2 Yncmy Docur&& Section.. Hq ROKA. 2'7 Ott 51. "Organization of AT Units v. CP and 27th Regt. Interview with Capt. 2'7 J$n 51. $7.. 23rd Inf. Cal. #l. Armor Section . "Forward Observer Tactics. "Battle Order No. CCF Military Training Sect.d 25 Feb 51. ATIS.rithin the Infantry. "Use of Bangalore . to Exp." Batch #822. Hq 2nd Inf. issuing authority unknown." by 164th MISD. Hq 25th Inf." G2 Section. Hcl E&AK.' Hq 12th CCF Army. 1951. Regt. S3. Chinese document "Primary Conclusion of 9th Army's Battle Experience at UNSAN. Armor Operations.!@. Memo Slip. Item $27. Batch $20. undated. Issue &6. 128. Div. 2 Ott 51. ' Hq 3rd Inf..yang. Allen R. M. 140 . Supplement.#266. 8 Apr 51. G2 PIR #454. 130." Distriot. published in late Ott 50 after 1st Cav. Annex $2 to PIR . "Reduction of Fortified Hq EUSAK.

Memo Slip. 6. - . 8 Ilay 51.. CP. 1380 1390 War Diary. "Reduction of Fortified Positions. Hq X Corps. GHQ FEC. 8th Army Armor Sect. Scullen. 13 Jul 506 A!ar 51. Enemy Tactics Bulletin Bulletin Corps. Hq EUSAK.1299. Enemy &. 14. Bodner. CP and 27th Regt. pp 3-h. Enemy Taotics Bulletin undated3 PIR . Enemy Tactics Bulletin #6.. Hq EUSAK. Sec. Army Field Forces &server Team $3." Operations. and Maintenance. Div.. Hq X Corps. Issue #3. * UNCLASSFIED . undated. 8 -May 518 $6. 4 Feb 51. p 3. Officer. 14-l 0 PIR #300." Training Directive (DRAFT). UtQ PIR #300. GHQ FEC.. 16 Nov 51.. Report of Armor. Interview with Capt. 5. 16 Ott 51. 142. pp 30 60 Sect. "North Korean Potential. April 1951. PIR #300.- "Liaison Visit to X Corps. ATIS. Enemy Tactics PIR #300s Hq SUSAK. $6. undated. undated. Copy #21. "Field Trip Observations of 25th Div.#6. PIR //365$ Hq X Corps. Allen R. GHQ FEC.Report of Tank. fiq 1370 Ibid. Hq X Corps. G3 Training. 12 Ott 51. 134.f. PIR a61 o Hq YJSAK. Hq EUSAK. PIR #l87. Letter. Hq ZJSAK. Army Field Foroes Observer Team No. 8 May 51. 26 Feb 513 PIR $300... Interview 8th Historical Detachment. 26 Jan 51. 8 May 51. Inf. Report of Army Command and General Staff School Representative." Researoh Supple- ment. Hq X Corps. Hq YTJSAK. Cal. Set nR4con Dailey. Combat Representative. Hq EUSAK. Willicm S.6. Hq EUSAK. 6. Command Report. Armor Section. Div. Interrogation Reports. Hq X Corps. PIR i/187. Hq X Corps. WSAK. Speofal Planning Staff. l-31 1406 %morandum. Hq EUSAK. Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA). Office of Ordnance 27 sop 51. G2 Sect. Sect. G3 Soot. w/Mine Exploder Attachment (FLAIL)". II. 1350 "Operational 1360 Order of Battle Handbook (-A). Div. Hq EUSAK. Bulletin $2. %!$3E8.. "!&nployment of*Tanks in Assault on Bunkers and Fortified Positions. I . 8 ?Jay 51. Special Planning Staff. 1430 PIR #187. 145m PIR $87.133. PIR -#+61. Hq 'EUSAK. 27 Jun 51. G2 Sect. G3 Sect. Hq 24th Inf. Hq EUSAK. Hq 3rd." G3 Training Division. Hq 3rd Inf. Hq X Corps. Hq X Tactics Bulletin ." 1st Lt Jack Engle. Hq X Corps.' Letter.

Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA). and Doct." and Activities. UNCLASSIFIED . Hamby.off Hq IX Corps. Special Planning Staff. Interview Tech. 10 Jan 51. Wm. G2 Sect.. Bodner. 10 Jan 51." Hq IX Corps. and Docts. 'Overall Plan on Civilian Refugee Evacuation and Their Accomodations. "En. Special GHQ FEC.. PIR #$63. GHQ FEC. Sec. undated. William S. 152. 6." Hq National Police. War Diary. .$j. Advisor to the Ministry of Home Affairs. 11 Nov 9. and Doct. p &.of Korea. 1 WIar 51. Army Field Foroes Observation Team ... Hq X Corps.!A3 "Enemy Guerrilla 11PIR . p 43: Order of Battle.."‘ Hq National Police.Enemy Tactics Bulletin $6. Army Field Forces Observer Team -#5. Tech.S. Republic of Korea.. Tact. Hq EUSAK. Annex #l. with Col. Korean National Government. 13‘Nov 509 PIR j&6. p . Interrogation Reports* ATIS. CINCFE... MI Sect. Tech.19 Aug F. Hq IX Corps. Units in the Field. . 158. War Diary. Army 10 Jan 51." Research Supplement. Col. Office of the Dire&or. R. Tact. Sec. William S. Order of Battle Hq EWSAK. Intelligence Summary jB85. GHQ FEC.147 "Report l of Army Command and General Staff Sohool Representative.n Hq EUSAK. Hamby. %n.. Tech. Offioe of the Director. pp 4.. pp l-4.83'. Tactics 156. 1539 Order of 'Battle Annex #l. Hq EUSAK.Polioe. "!tol. 150. "North Korean Potential. Annex #l. Hq EUSAK. 159. Special Planning Staff. G2 Sect. Interview Lt. "En. Hq EUSAK. Hq X Corps. Bodner. G2. Tact. Issue #3. PIR -j&24. Wm. "Overall Plan on Civilian Refugee Evacuation and Their Aocomodations. and Doct.n! Letter. 19 Aug 50. 63 Training files. Warren K. G2 Sect. Hq IX Corps. Bennett. Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA). R. Tech. Republic. Tech. Hq EUSAK. Republic of Korea. Ibidg PIR j&. PIR f/(463.4-46. 5# pp l-4. Office of the Director. 155. 214 Oot 51~ "En. Tact.Colonel Civil Assistance Officer.. p 1. p 43. "Conference with. 'Overall Plan on Civilian Refugee Evacuation and Their Accomodations. 19 Aug 9. and Doct.. Copy $21. "En. Planning Staff. Hq IX Corps. TaGto.. Sec." Cal. i"?ar Diary." Hq IX Corps.. Francis Hill. Interview with Colonel William R." Hq IX Corps. 151. 154. 18 Ott 51. 8th U. Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA)... 157.. EUSAK. '*En.."Security for Logistical Support " AG 600-96 KGOT. Hq EUSAK. Hamby. p &.‘fGs3. 148.. 18 Ott 51. 5. Tact. Hq with Col. and Doct. GHQ FTC. Armor Section. "Technical Information on Armor. Observer Report. 18 Ott 51." Hq National. 11 Nov 'j0.

Korean National Government. Coordinator. Office Coordinator. Protection of Lines of Communication. Lt. Hq EUSAK. Col. Rear Area. Protection of Lines of Communication. Office. Wm. KMAG.k. Daily Report for EUSAK Diary'for 15 Jan 51. Hamby. 24 Ott of Owen 51. G3 Seotion. Hq EUSAK. War Diary. Hq EUSAK. R. 0~00014&&00 Aw 503 Hq EU$AK. . Star Diary. undated. Hamby. Interview with Cal. Interview 165.160. G3 Se&ion. Wm. Observer Report. llpOOl-l&&O0 act fjo. Hamby. G3 Operations. Hamby. with Capt. Interview Cal.ng Files. to the Ministry 24 Ott 51. Wm. with Cal. Bennett. Interview G3 Section. R. Rear Area. Warren K. Capt. Daily Report for EUSAK Diary for 13-14 Jan 51. Hq EUSAK. 161. War Diary. with with Col. 164. R. G3 lVaini. 162. Qfm. with Hq EUSAK.. Advisor Home Affairs. Owen Carroll. 210001-212‘400 Jul F. Interview 163e Interview Carroll.

UNCLASSlFlED ANNEXA TIE92CAL lEONNAISSANC~ F FORMATIONS .

JI \ X X r( lk \ . LDA. upon erriving et Hill A and determining it to be olear of enq. es& term rclleainr in ito rempectfve seotor to @wait signel from the squad leader to mow to B. the squad 1ePder first seleots the most prominent terrain feature and rends three to four men to reoonnoiter this spot. unit along the approaoh route. a signal is sent to the aquad leader-at XI In the event eqamy ir enoountered in vicinity of Bill A. the point of rendezvous. no UNCLASSIFIED . which was domed the most Important. the squad leeder If dispatoher a three-man teem to reoonnoiter area C. 1 . upon receipt of a signa. SOD.1.SQD. one member reports this to the rquad loader while the balanoe of the group remains to continue observation. either rlsual or audible. In-the above 6+toh the arsiatant squad leader is sent tith three men to Hill A. the two flank teams oonverge on the center bq a route close Alter assembling. the entire squad return6 to its parent to the river bank. The three group8 ore slven a specific time Qot$ment Upon cornletion of the Asrion. SMGX SYGX \I/ RIFLEX / / / LDR. while he hireelf proceed8 to area B with two men.. X RIFLE x SMG \ \ RECONNOITERINS AN AREA when reoonnoitering an prea. enemy are dlaoovered on or in close proximitv of Hill A.JI -At SMGX ASST. in whioh to ocaaplete their reconnaiseanoe.

of the The remainder moves up the side in single file. unit usin? the route of apurosch. thq turn ninety degree8 and move in single file to the ore&. a squad size unit is normally employed.UN t rYhen reoonnoitering a mountain . a &rvl is made to the two men ported et the foot If further reconnaissance is needed/the patrol to proceed to the top. Upon reaching the foothill. If the mountein is clear of hostile troops. oontinuer on or returns to its perent 146 UNCLASSlFlED -- . two ranbsrs of the pstrol tske up positiona eo a6 to obrerve alone both sides of the meas. upon repohing a patrol gradually point just belnw the center of the crest.

If nsoessary oised betwoeh the files by 8 system of prearranged signals. eaoh of whom leeds . to avoid defiles. a three-man point may be sent fifteen. or withadjacent hlllslden.q# ushes through the defile . depending on the emount of &HI r 0-d 147 UNCLASSlF\ED .. a.0 trentyIf the point receives fire from the fin meters ahead of the mein body. the main bo4y either .SQUAD LEAOER . a -b-u UN NOT TO SCALE MOUNTAINS men moving through mountains.t.kwder._ )( SM 0 II niasign.patrol ordina ilv 8 lits into two sections.a column.&eder Control is exei8ndCsEi6tent Oqusd. . to movw through a defile. and the importance of the draws. Cqntrol of the split patrol rests with the y quad .

of whirtlo rignalr and 1iChted match signels. LOR. conriotr oolumnr. also dependent upon the dmriw of the arm).UNCLASSIFIED ' SW6 x RIFLE SM6 X X SW 6we X SOO. l ity of the woods diatmttes ths division of the patrol into two or three Control. --------------------------------------------- RIFLE x P\ 1 A RIFLE x + NOT TO SCALE WOODED AREA The formation used when moving e petrol through a wooded mm is in naerly The denall l speots similar to that employed when crorring open ternin. . x x SY6 X RIFLE x SMO RIFLE X SY6 x 1 UN OPEN TERRAIN THE ASSISTANT SOUAO LEADER PLACES HIMSELF WITH EITHER FLANK COLUMN. AT THE HEAO OR SRINOINO UP THE REAR. OEPENOINO UPON THE SlTUATiON.

UNCLASSIFED UNCLASSIFIED .

32 0-o X(S6D PACES WR) o 0 0 0 0 J ’ .E: 0 0 0 T X (SOD LDR) 0 0 0 0 42-46 0 I 0 4 FACES 3S-64 PACES -----------s-----m-- C. SQUAD LEADERS LEFT 0 TRIANGLE: 0 LOR) I x (SO0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 I 36-64 P&ES 42 .46 PACES l ------- . -----------v-----B 6.UNCLASSIFIED CCF SMALL UNIT FDRMATIDNS A. REAR TRlANBLE: 26. SOUAD LEAOERS l Rl6HT TRIAN6l.

0 0 O 0 0 D x 0 0 0 O ‘sp LDRI 0 . WIOE FRONT: 0 0 000 0 XtS6D LDRI 000 7-6 -------------w----- - 0 --- PACES INWRVAL WS BETWEEN MEN 6. LEFT 0 0 x mo uxu” 0 0 0 STAIR TEAM: 0 0 7-6 ---------------F. iEFT TRIM.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7-6 -8 XtSaO LDRI --m--------w------E. RI6HT TRlAN6LE: 0 0 0 X (SQO LOW 0 0 0 \ -----------v------H.

UNCLtWFlED I. REAR 0 0 0 TRIANGLE 0 td 0 LDR) 0 0 0 0 . FROM TRIANGLE 0 0 X 0 0 0 (SO0 LDR) 0 0 0 0 --------------------------------J.

UNCLASSIFIED ._ lJNCLASSIF/ED .

.-et lo: trench.&erheed CCTPT i:n rp31~: ’ ’ ^:’ 1 .

:: e?lols trmch at CW3329R. .

. .56 . * I.Y !’ 1.” . .

c z f. 2 c’-. I “- ” . ..

) overhead cover CSP93OP3.000. Koree. . hap NJ .Commwication 52-10. trench Ath 1:250.

.

Korea.000. .APi Bunker ~r250. &ap NJ 52-10.) on top of ridp at CSPpPii05.

_.. !.. : ji .. ..C’ I. : ..i <.

ANNEXD AERIALPHOTOGRAPHS .

i63 .

orate antitar& The hill used by Comnmist Tomes in Korea. the two roads was co-ered w?.th lrany well-ccmcuflzged trenches.rr~ws) aerial photograph showing elab. Oblique 165 <itches (see mass Between bunkers and Dl9943 ..a.

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