November 2010

U.S. Housing and Mortgage Trends
Summary

Overview
In August home prices fell 1.5 percent from a year ago, down from July’s 0.6 percent increase. On a month-tomonth basis home prices fell 1.2 percent, the largest monthly decline for August over the last 30+ years. Price declines are geographically expanding as 78 out of the largest 100 metropolitan areas were experiencing declines in August, up from 58 just one month ago. Clearly the market remains very weak and volatile and part of that price volatility is due to the impact of distressed sales (Figure 1). Over the past two years distressed sales have exacerbated price swings by nearly two percentage points in either direction. Excluding distressed sales reveals more stable price trends, with small positive month-overmonth increases since April, but relative to history even non-distressed price trends are still very volatile.
FIGURE 1: HPI MONTH-TO-MONTH PERCENT CHANGE
All Transactions
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5

Prices rapidly decelerated in August, and September preview data suggests the trend will continue. The weak housing market has spread to all price segments and the majority of geographies (Figures 1 - 3). Performance continues to slowly improve but early stage delinquencies have worsened (Figures 4 and 5). Issues around predatory servicing and legality of foreclosures have generated much attention but little data. Mortgage assignments have experienced a strong uptick in recent months, which reflects lenders’ attempt to provide proper paperwork used in foreclosure proceedings (Figures 6 and 7). The total inventory of unsold homes stands at nearly two years supply with shadow inventories accounting for 8 months supply, which will put downward pressure on prices for an extended period of time (Figures 8 – 12).

Excluding Distressed

Aug-09 Jan-10

Aug-06 Jan-07

Aug-07 Jan-08

Aug-04 Jan-05

Aug-00 Jan-01

Home sales declined 8 percent to 242,000 in August, down from 264,500 in July. August’s year-to-date sales are also down 8 percent and sales are on pace to total 3.7 million this year, compared to 4.0 million during 2009. Although sales volumes are down on a year-to-date basis, it varies greatly by price segment (Figure 2). Sales are higher for properties priced at $500,000 and above, and generally the sales increase rises as the price segment increases. Much of that bifurcation was due to the effects
© 2010 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.

Aug-08 Jan-09

Aug-05 Jan-06

Aug-01 Jan-02

Aug-94 Jan-95

Aug-03 Jan-04

Aug-97 Jan-98

Aug-99 Jan-00

Aug-02 Jan-03

Aug-96 Jan-97

Aug-98 Jan-99

Aug-95 Jan-96

Aug-10

Jan-94

1

700.8 0. the third FIGURE 3: DISTRESSED SALES VS.Left Axis 45 40 35 30 25 80000 20 15 10 5 0 Jul-08 Feb-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Jun-08 Jan-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-08 May-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 May-09 Mar-09 Nov-09 Jun-10 Jan-10 Feb-08 Mar-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Dec-08 Dec-09 Aug-10 Jan-08 Apr-10 May-10 Jul-10 1 Mil+ 3. which stabilized at 7. the lowest level since May 2008. After the spring improvement. this segment of loans is small in comparison to the 30-to 59-day delinquent segment so the overall performance of 30-to 89-day delinquencies is worsening. It also reflects the typical seasonal improvement that occurs in the spring that can be seen in prior years.FIGURE 2: SALES VOLUME PERCENT CHANGE BY PRICE SEGMENT YoY August 2010 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 YTD August 2010 900k TO 950k 300k TO 350k 350k TO 400k 950k TO 1 Mil 600k TO 650k 500k TO 550k 450k TO 500k 750k TO 800k 700k TO 750k 800k TO 850k 550k TO 600k 650k TO 700k 400k TO 450k 850k TO 900k 0 TO 50k 250k TO 300k 50k TO 100k 100k TO 150k 150k TO 200k 200k TO 250k segment CoreLogic examined is the prime 30-to 59day delinquencies because it provides a broad view of consumer credit distress for the typical borrower (Figure 4).6 0.” validity of the Mortgage FIGURE 5: PRIME 60 TO 89 DAY DELINQUENCY RATE 2007 1. are rising. Since early 2010. Prices for short sales have been more stable over the last few months.000 but the impact on lower priced homes was much smaller.0 2. Distressed sales fell 10 percent in August to 68. it simply reflects the weak demand in the market overall because total sales also declined and the distressed sale share remained stable at 28 percent (Figure 3). DISTRESSED SHARE Distressed Sale Share . which provide an early peek at performance trends. However. especially for the lower to middle segment of the price spectrum. Moving to the 60-to 89-day FIGURE 4: PRIME 30 TO 59 DAY DELINQUENCY RATE of the homebuyer tax credit earlier. Although the level of distressed sales declined.300. The first 1. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission. and as of August the delinquency rate was at the same level as the average of the last two years. after the improvement there was a worsening in delinquency beyond the typical seasonal trends in the early summer. it is most likely temporary because early stage defaults.2 2008 2009 2010 60000 40000 consecutive monthly decline. 2 .0 September February August March June July November January April May October December © 2010 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. averaging $217. which led to a boom in sales above $500.0 0. Over the past month there have been many stories about the issues surrounding the flawed foreclosure practices such as “robo-signing.0 0.000 in August. However. The improvement in the 30-to 59-day segment in the spring of 2010 partly reflects the ramp up in permanent modifications which moved a small percentage of loans to current status.5 2. there have been noticeable modification related improvements in serious delinquencies (SDQ). Once the impacts of the tax credit eroded. the seasonal summer increase in performance was smaller than prior years so relative to prior years it is improving.8 percent of all active loans in August. Although SDQs are steady.5 1.Right Axis 120000 100000 delinquency segment removes the noise from earlier stage delinquencies and provides a cleaner more nuanced trend (Figure 5).4 0. July and August sales collapsed for every price segment.2 0.0 1.5 0.0 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-08 Oct-07 Apr-08 Jan-09 Apr-09 Oct-05 Jan-06 Apr-06 Apr-07 Oct-08 Oct-06 Oct-09 Apr-05 Aug-10 Jan-08 Jul-06 Jan-07 Jan-05 Jul-09 Jul-05 Jul-07 Number of Distressed Sales . The average price of REO sales fell 4 percent to $136.

averaging about 25. the visible inventory of unsold homes stood at about 4. CoreLogic calculated the inventory to sales ratios. Much of that debate is beyond the scope of this publication. but there are some metrics related to those issues such as mortgage assignments and foreclosure releases that bear watching over the next few months. which is not included in the official measures of unsold inventory to gauge the level of total supply because it has very strong implications for prices. The visible inventory measures the unsold inventory of new and existing homes that are currently on the market.Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Apr-08 Oct-08 Oct-09 Apr-10 A mortgage assignment is a recorded notice which serves as evidence of a transfer of a loan obligation from one party to another. or more than 60 percent higher. In this edition CoreLogic focuses on the pending supply or “shadow supply” of homes. and the roll rates were used to determine the pending supply by stage of default. Fannie FIGURE 6: MORTGAGE ASSIGNMENTS 100000 modification activity but will bear watching in the future to see if there are further spikes related to cancellations that may be non-modification related. based on the visible inventory (from Census and NAR) and CoreLogic shadow inventory and home sales data. CoreLogic compiled mortgage assignment and foreclosure release data for a small subset of large counties to gauge trends over the last few years. CoreLogic utilized its LoanPerformance loan databases to size the number of 90+ day delinquencies. since then. The months’ supply of visible inventory was 15 months in August. However.300 and has averaged 65. principal agent problems. the servicer has to file a mortgage assignment from MERS to the servicer. The increase in assignments reflects that change in GSE policy and serves as an indicator of lenders recording the loans in their names in order to proceed to foreclosure. moral hazard and adverse selection have also afflicted the back end. A foreclosure release is a cancellation of the foreclosure notice that is outstanding for a particular property. FIGURE 7: FORECLOSURE RELEASES 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 Jul-10 .000 a month in 2008 and 33. Although it depends on the market and real estate cycle. Lastly. As of August. There has been a noticeable increase in 2010 with releases averaging 45. which is flat from a year ago and down nearly 18 percent from its monthly peak in July 2007 (Figure 8).2 million homes. typically a reading of 6 to 7 months is considered normal so the most recent month’s reading 3 80000 60000 40000 20000 0 Jan-08 Apr-08 Oct-08 Apr-09 Apr-10 Jul-08 Jul-09 Jul-10 Jan-09 Oct-09 Sep-10 Jan-10 Mae in late March 2010 announced servicers could no longer name MERS as a plaintiff in foreclosure actions. Foreclosure releases had been trending up.000 a month the last six months.000 a month (Figure 6). averaging nearly 40. Shadow Inventory Highlights In September’s edition CoreLogic examined the underlying demand for sales.000. CoreLogic removed the defaulted loans that are being listed on MLS’ which nets the shadow supply. During 2008 and 2009 the number of mortgage assignments filed was fairly steady. or months’ supply. In March of 2010 the number of assignments nearly doubled to 77. Apr-09 Sep-10 Electronic Registry System (MERS). This means that when MERS is the mortgagee of record.000 in 2009 (Figure 7). This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission. and clearly home sales will remain weak for an extended period of time for a variety of reasons already discussed. Loan level roll rate analysis was performed to measure the proportion of loans that were in one stage of default that rolled to the next stage of default. Then CoreLogic calculated the share of loans in pending supply that are listed on an MLS by matching public record properties in default to MLS active listings. cloudy title issues. During the 1990s the industry set up MERS to electronically keep track of assignments (in MERS’ name) and during the bust many plaintiffs used MERS records as documentation that they owned the loan. foreclosures and REOs. up from 1 months a 1 year ago (Figure 9). Clearly many of the problems that afflicted the origination end of the mortgage chain such as information asymmetries. which reflects the increased permanent © 2010 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. etc. impact on investors.

1 million homes. but non-linear.0 million a year ago (Figure 10). The total unsold inventory (visible + shadow) was 6. FIGURE 12: CUMULATIVE HOME PRICE DECLINE VS. The markets with the lowest distressed supply are all in Texas. The highest levels of distressed supply are in Florida. Interestingly. California and some northeastern markets that have high SDQ rates combined with very low post tax credit sales activity. Michigan. 4 © 2010 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential.3 million in August. unemployment rates. which largely bypassed the boom/bust. up from 2. the decline in prices rises linearly. As the shadow months’ supply increases. One third of the total supply is distressed shadow inventory and this is important because it portends that the distressed sale share will remain high for an extended period of time as the housing market works off the excess supply. etc. The August shadow months’ supply was nearly 8 months. Looking at the 50 largest metropolitan markets reveals that there is an important. PENDING MONTHS' SUPPLY Visible Months' Supply 30 Pending Months' Supply 25 20 15 10 5 35 0 Apr-06 Apr-07 Apr-09 Jul-06 Jul-07 Apr-08 Jul-09 Apr-10 Jan-06 Oct-06 Oct-07 Oct-08 Jan-09 Oct-09 Aug-10 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-10 30 25 20 FIGURE 10: PENDING INVENTORY DETAIL Pending REO Inventory 2500000 Pending FC Inventory Pending Serious Delinquency Inventory 15 10 5 0 2000000 0% -10% -20% -30% -40% -50% -60% Cumulative Price Change Since National Price Peak 1500000 1000000 500000 0 Jul-06 Oct-06 Apr-08 Apr-09 Oct-09 Apr-07 Oct-07 Jan-10 Apr-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Oct-08 Jan-09 Apr-10 Jul-07 Jul-08 Jul-09 Jan-06 Aug-10 FIGURE 11: MONTHS' SUPPLY PENDING INVENTORY DETAIL Pending REO Inventory 10 Pending FC Inventory Pending Serious Delinquency Inventory 8 6 4 2 0 Oct-09 Oct-06 Oct-07 Apr-09 Apr-08 Apr-06 Apr-07 Jan-09 Jan-06 Oct-08 Aug-10 Jul-09 Jan-08 Jan-07 Apr-10 Jul-06 Jul-08 Jul-07 Jan-10 Although CoreLogic currently does not have metropolitan-level shadow supply. .FIGURE 8: ALL INVENTORY DETAIL Visible Home Inventory 8000000 7000000 6000000 5000000 4000000 3000000 2000000 1000000 0 Jan-07 Jan-06 Jul-06 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-07 Jul-08 Apr-06 Oct-06 Oct-07 Apr-08 Oct-08 Apr-09 Oct-09 Apr-07 Aug-10 Apr-10 Pending REO Inventory Pending FC Inventory Pending Serious Delinquency Inventory is over twice what is typically considered as normal. The shadow supply in August was 2. DISTRESSED SUPPLY FOR 50 LARGEST METROPLIAN AREAS 40 FIGURE 9: VISIBLE VS. which represents 23 months supply of inventory. up from 17 months last August and just under the peak of 24 months from February 2009 when prices were falling at the fastest rate. up from 5 months a year ago (Figure 1 1). relationship between shadow supply and prices (Figure 12). This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission. Phoenix and Las Vegas are not among the highest distressed supply markets because distressed sales volumes have been elevated. Part of the reason prices were falling so quickly was that the distressed sale share was high at the time as well. but a collapse in sales is related to the shadow supply because all of the shadow supply is distressed and leading to distressed sales. but at around 15 months’ supply the relationship begins to breakdown partly due to diminishing returns to distress and other factors that drive prices such as income growth. a good proxy is the months’ supply of 90+ SDQ. economic distress.

0% 16.3% 2.186 6.835 2.6% -3.915 1.2% 6.2% 6.953 4.8% 12.3 13.971 9.3% n/a 2.0% 3.317 262 657 507 1.9% 0.8% -1.4 16.562 5.8% 57.7% 1.1% 56.3% © 2010 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential.6% 184 102 n/a n/a 14.606 2.478 1.4% -9.9% 27.4% 16.0 21.5% 0.342 Total Auction Filings 2.7% -2. WA Denver-Aurora-Broomfield.6% 200 98 23.7% 18. NV 4. FL Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville.3% 5.339 6.5% -0.0% -9.7 7.1% 0.9% 1.463 895 4.1 7.2% 8.3% 14.1% -4.2% -4.4% 4.0% -2.4% 3.990 3.8% 0.593 Short Sales 354 721 292 192 497 246 1187 827 54 240 199 270 532 491 109 28 305 97 106 386 171 465 547 99 749 Distressed Sales Shares 28.666 3.5% 0.9% -5.4% 3.036 233 519 1.1% -8.9% -4.4% 1.9% 3.0% -0.8% 2.4% -1.144 960 2.814 1.7% -0.4 6.407 1.1% 11. Petersburg-Clearwater.045 2.37 July 2010 265 18 169 56 20 28. NY Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine.2% 9.3 15.4% 1.3% 20.8% 25.1% 59. TX Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale.0% -1.6% 188 100 23.5% 7.8% -2.0% 0.6 21. CA Minneapolis-St.317 1.606 779 1.196 271 65 6.756 Negative Equity Share 23.3% 8.131 3.7% 4.0% 5. Louis.6% 7.774 6.4% -6. NY-NJ Washington-Arlington-Alexandria.971 1.1% 3.0% 40.0% 14. MI Oakland-Fremont-Hayward.6% 180 112 n/a n/a 9.151 6.5% 2. CA St.7 12.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% -7.8% 12.0% 0.4% 7.2% 3.1% 0.6% -0.366 2.6% -4.5 29. MN-WI Dallas-Plano-Irving.681 3.558 2.9% 5.6 17.20 Mar 2010 345 26 217 74 25 28.2% 0.9% 0.4% 8.7% 12.1% 26.6% 161 110 23.7% -1.7% -0.176 927 83 1.4% -7.3% 5.6% 52.7% -0. CA Edison-New Brunswick.9% 0.6% 90 Days + DQ Pct 10.3% 7.8% 8.6% 0.0% 9.1% -0.684 5.3% 0.1% -1.6% 0.9% 29.8% 3.2% 8.6 30.2% 20.2% -12.132 557 366 1.6% -0.9% 16.6% -1.8% 47.3% 35.860 708 138 20.889 2.0% PreForeclosure Filings 6.028 12.4% 11.277 15.09 May 2010 369 28 246 65 26 24.4% -0.2% -0.433 1.8% 10.2% -0.0 15.5% 52.8% 16.9% 22. DC-VA-MD-WV Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown.50 2007 5.5% 0. NJ Las Vegas-Paradise.4% 1.7% -0.4% 7. AZ Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario.1% 0.4% -0.3% 31.5% 5.0% 0.366 1. MO-IL Nassau-Suffolk.5% -2.5 18.5% -4.1% 3.7% 7.321 5.102 23.7% 43.4 18.166 2.748 5.556 2.4% 4.0% 30.4% -1.878 1.2% 8.7% 1.5% 0.0% 10.7% -3.322 8.1% 3.4% 0.474 1.3 14.5% -3.354 3.3% 22.9% 32.094 601 23. TX Seattle-Bellevue-Everett.9 8.0% 2. CA Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta.5% 7.2% -1.2% 8.5% 4.1% -0.8% 2.4% 3.706 2.881 1.6% -0.011 1.063 2.9% 5.0% 8.518 5 1. IL Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale.3% 39.0% 0.6% 187 109 23.0% 9.786 2.0% 25.8% 11.313 208 3.9% 0.19 2009 3.6% 195 96 n/a n/a 9.1% -0.3% -1.2% 20.2% 5. CA Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro.0% HPI YOY -4.7% 11.9% 8.6% HPI MoM -0.469 13.0% 0.018 1.8% 61.8% -4.2% -1.5% -0.4% -0.2 21.8% -1.8% -0. FL San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos.1% 6.6% -2.1% -0.6% -13.1% 23.508 871 234 28.1% -0.2% 8. MD Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills.2 14. OR-WA Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford.00 April 2010 373 28 245 71 27 26.1% -1.0% -0.026 23.5 14.1% -9.003 543 1.122 2.556 860 1. CO Tampa-St.89 * Thousands of Units TOP 25 CBSA SUMMARY AUGUST 2010 Months Supply Distressed Homes 30.0% 52.4% 10.8% -1.7% -2.8% -1.6% 0.19 June 2010 397 37 260 67 30 24.10 Jan 2009 226 17 136 54 17 31.067 4.76 Nov 2009 348 35 227 61 23 24.6% 0.972 1.0% 7.2% 0.5% 31.4 11.0% -1.6 14.3% -0.0 23.6% -1.8% -0.3% n/a 5.6% 2.6% 0.84 Dec 2009 313 27 198 64 23 27.044 270 692 737 676 662 70 300 233 1.9% 17.5% -4.999 354 2.7% 1.407 1.954 2.5% 19.072 3.515 226 2.0% -0.3% -5.8% -1.7% -2.4% 26.799 REO Sales 893 1.318 4. Paul-Bloomington.80 Feb 2009 248 19 151 59 18 30.8% 3.4% 10.850 8.1% 54.1% -0. CA Baltimore-Towson.996 1.8 Total Sales Chicago-Joliet-Naperville.4% 51.6% 195 103 n/a n/a 11.5% 1. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.86 Oct 2009 378 33 249 69 24 24.40 Aug 2010 242 18 154 50 19 28.7% 162 111 n/a n/a 13.9% -1.789 1.3% 43.1% 1.5 17.0% 32.628 787 1.307 8.6% -0.4% 10.9% 41.8% 2.285 545 2.3% -0.385 2.9% -1.4% 73.6% 185 102 n/a n/a 10.118 1.672 1.524 3.2% -1.306 3.NATIONAL SUMMARY Sep 2009 Total Sales* -New Sales* -Existing Sales* -REO Sales* -Short Sales * Distressed Sales Share HPI MoM HPI YoY HPI MoM Excluding Distressed HPI YoY Excluding Distressed 90 Days + DQ Pct Foreclosure Pct REO Pct Pre-foreclosure Filings* Total Auction Filings* Negative Equity Share Negative Equity* Months Supply SDQ Homes 361 31 235 70 23 25.5% 8.2% 3.35 2008 4. GA New York-White Plains-Wayne. 5 .1% 1.4% -1.8% 0.6% 169 112 n/a n/a 8.6% 5.2% 43.165 2.7% 5.0% 0.6% 210 98 n/a n/a 8.4% 15.955 423 1.5% 2.781 1.372 2.

285 1.9% 24.379 n/a 628 3.6% 3.7 1.1% 8.5% 7.2% State AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DC DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY Total Sales 881 2.159 3.4% 1.0% 0.0% -1.3 10.0% 30.5% 1.4% -0.9 7.8 19.5% 16.3% -2.968 513 7.2% -1.9% 4.1% 0.5% -2.0% 45.8% 12.915 3.3% -5.543 n/a 4 Total Auction Filings 102 n/a 652 7.527 2.3% -1.4% 7.4% 13.9% 6.9% 21.4% 14.0% PreForeclosure Filings n/a n/a 1.8% -1.816 348 1.7% 19.0% -0.8% -2.9% 11.7% 3.457 2.5% 5.9% 6.7% 13.1% 6.461 968 4.6% 2.5% -2.7% 15.4 6.8% 4.1% 16.249 3.9% 1.600 6.1% 50.8% -0.5% 3.7% 46.5% 17.6% 6.8 10.5% 41.0% 14.8 8.8% 23.2 n/a 11.9% 6.4% 18.6% 10.8 17.544 3.8% 6.8% 7.0% -1.8 14.0% 5.9% 4.2 10.333 1.3% 13.0% -1.9% -7.3% -2.2% -4.7% 4.6% 19.3% 33.0% -3.8% -1.639 1.0 5.8% -2.648 2.7% 6.3% -3.4% -0.6% 13.2% 10.1% 19.9% 5.520 982 3.5 8.4% 53.5% 38.5% 8.1% 0.3% 20.8% -0.029 836 2.0% -5.4% 5.3% 59.8% 5.2% 13.9% n/a 15.6 7.2 12.479 2.5% -3.1% 3.6% 20.554 1.5% 12.1% 15.3 12.5% 30.318 12.7 27.2% 45.0% -5.682 n/a 5.1% -4.233 522 435 1.785 n/a 214 n/a 3.3% 8.4 13 16.4% 2.3% 8.4% 15.6 14.365 7.0% 4.3% 10.7 © 2010 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential.7% -3.343 3.606 3.1% 4.901 2.STATE SUMMARY AUGUST 2010 Distressed Sales Shares 11.6 16.7 20.3% -14.1% 6.5 12.1 24.4 7.285 2.5% -3.6% 22.128 3.0% 5.3% 2.538 1.6% 4.366 n/a 7.439 756 n/a 19.8% -1.6% 3.136 5.8% 4.816 3.004 3.6% 7.668 606 758 1.1 13.593 432 351 832 1.9% -1.9 17.0% 30.7% -1.0% -1.6% -1.5% -0.8% 1.618 185 2.7% 18.7% n/a 21.2% 22.2% 5.7% -2.0 9.9% Months Supply Distressed Homes 2.5% 2.2% -1.9% -2.9% -2.5% 9.194 207 276 REO Sales 69 307 145 3431 9023 1237 395 28 72 7515 1660 90 139 588 1255 588 244 292 225 376 442 48 3032 509 1182 84 64 945 28 31 246 288 86 1921 433 1827 242 836 795 134 633 n/a 1439 4339 600 956 n/a 691 250 10 25 Short Sales 33 64 85 1382 4957 476 232 8 23 3598 388 88 75 137 495 77 77 90 69 115 219 10 288 65 153 n/a 26 315 17 13 57 294 52 929 186 540 44 259 201 90 164 n/a 231 922 240 561 n/a 442 80 n/a 6 HPI MoM -0.1 6.4% -1. 6 .5% 27.0% 7.8% 11.3% 17.4 10.087 30.5% 7.2 n/a 6.253 1.264 47 115 n/a 977 294 3.1% 13.1% -1.2% -1.7% 1.8% 14.2% 4.6% 13.1% -2.672 7.4% -2.2% -1.0% 26.2% 22.786 7.7% 9.613 2.6% -3.6% 15.1% 0.8% 1.8% 9.0% -0.373 n/a 573 897 207 75 91 4.4% 7.5% -2.8% -1.8% 11.5% 1.676 958 2.1 13.817 1.253 8.808 17.154 839 1.0% 13.3% -2.3 16.5 16.116 6.123 3.325 304 656 27.6 7.8% 26.2% -0.6% 18.9% 8.1% 1.7% -3.2 44.4% 7.864 1.7% 1.0% -0.4 9.624 16.229 2.0% 0.6% 8.570 1.9% 10.7% 24.0% 19.5% 3.9% 5.2% n/a 13.0% -1.6% 20.8% 4.2% 8.7% n/a 19.8% -3.9% 11.3% -0.2% 2.153 1.5% -1.7% -4.6% 6.667 7.878 5.2% -3.483 851 525 1.1 10.5% 11.3% 17.4% -2.6% -2.799 6.053 107 165 3.6% 0.907 9.736 26.2 5.5 24.623 2.7% 22.9% -0.5% 6.363 4.7 9.8% 5.3% -2.1% 19.2% 6.1% -6.720 1.5% -2.6% 12.6% 5.991 36 n/a 4.4% -1.1 16.656 7.029 1.4% 7.066 21 83 Negative Equity Share 10.0% HPI YOY -0.8% 5.5% 1.3 23 16.8% 25.6% -3.0% 18.4% 22.100 571 7.2% -1.9% -1.8 15.9% -0.4% 20.2% -2.1% 13.591 n/a 2.8 7.255 1.4 15.0% 11.8% 7.6% 6.9% 5. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.6% -2.0% 10.7% 8.5% -10.716 9.7% 28.7% 2.883 26.3% 90 Days + DQ Pct 2.7 8.084 1.7% 5.8% 23.178 27 6.8% 4.4% -0.807 n/a 2.8% 28.986 593 282 n/a 17.8% 15.8% -1.5% 5.703 490 n/a n/a 2.404 405 784 7.2% 15.3% -6.2% 68.287 10.

This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.0 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 Nov-02 Apr-03 Sep-03 Dec-04 Oct-05 Aug-06 Feb-04 May-05 Feb-09 Apr-08 Sep-08 Mar-06 Dec-09 Nov-07 May-10 Aug-10 Jan-02 Jun-02 Jul-04 Jan-07 Jun-07 Jul-09 8 0.6 Jul-09 Jun-07 Nov-07 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jan-10 Sep-03 Mar-06 Aug-06 Dec-04 Nov-02 Feb-04 May-05 FILINGS AND SERIOUS DELINQUENCIES 90 Days + DQ Pct 10 Pre-foreclosure Filings (Th Units) 250 MONTHS SUPPLY DISTRESSED HOMES 20 8 90 Days + DQ % 200 15 6 150 10 4 100 5 2 50 0 Jan-06 May-06 Oct-06 Mar-07 Aug-07 Jan-08 May-08 Oct-08 Mar-09 Aug-09 Jan-10 May-10 Jan-02 Jun-02 Jul-04 Oct-05 Aug-06 Apr-08 Sep-08 Dec-09 Dec-04 May-05 Mar-06 Nov-07 Feb-09 Apr-03 Sep-03 Nov-02 Feb-04 May-10 Aug-10 Jan-07 Jun-07 Jul-09 Aug-10 0 0 Apr-08 Apr-03 Oct-05 May-10 Aug-10 Jan-02 Jun-02 Jan-07 Jul-04 © 2010 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential.ANNUALIZED SALES Non-Distressed Sales 10000 Total Sales DISTRESSED SALES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES Short Sales pct 40 35 Reo Sales pct Units in Thousands 8000 30 6000 25 20 4000 15 10 2000 5 Jan-07 May-06 May-07 Jan-06 Jan-08 May-08 Jan-09 May-09 Jan-10 May-10 Sept-06 Sep-07 Sep-08 Sep-09 Aug-10 0 Jun-02 Feb-04 Dec-04 May-05 Mar-06 Aug-06 Feb-09 Dec-09 Nov-02 Sep-03 Oct-05 Apr-08 Nov-07 Sep-08 Apr-03 Jun-10 Aug-10 Jan-07 Jun-07 Jan-02 Jul-04 Jul-09 0 TOTAL SALES BY YEAR 2007 600 2008 2009 2010 HPI M O M BY YEAR 2007 3 2 2008 2009 2010 500 Units in Thousands 1 400 0 -1 -2 -3 300 200 100 -4 -5 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec HOME PRICE TRENDS HPI YoY 20 15 10 5 YoY MORTGAGE PERFORMANCE HPI YoY Excluding Distressed HPI MoM 4 3 90 Days + DQ and Foreclosure % 90 Days + DQ Pct 10 Foreclosure Pct REO Pct 1.8 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 6 0.2 0 0. MoM 4 0.4 2 0.0 7 .

If the mortgage debt is greater than the current value. Negative equity is calculated as the difference between the current value of the property and the origination value of the mortgage. 01-HOUSINGMRKT-1110-00 corelogic. We estimate current UPB value. The number of mortgages where the lender has initiated foreclosure proceedings and it has been made known through public notice (NOD).9 billion.corelogic. This material may not be reproduced in any form without expressed written permission.S. Proprietary and confidential. Number of bank owned properties that were sold to an unaffiliated third party. The number of mortgages in negative equity. DOES NOT INCLUDE REO AND SHORT SALES. flood determination. Percent increase in total sales over a year ago.com.. Percent increase in HPI single family combined series over a year ago. The number of previously constucted homes that were sold to an unaffiliated third party. analytics and services to business and government. financial and property information. mortgage application. or 2) takes legal possession of the property. not origination value. Percent increase in REO sales over a year ago. Percent increase in short sales over a year ago. Formerly the information solutions group of The First American Corporation. property tax. and improve business performance in their daily operations. These are where the lender conducts an auction sale and either 1) accepts a bid where the proceeds are used to repay the debt owed. real estate. Percent increase in HPI single family combined series over a month ago. and loan performance databases and is a recognized leading provider of mortgage and automotive credit reporting.VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS Variable Total Sales New Sales Existing Sales Definition The total number of all home-sale transactions during the month. CoreLogic began trading under the ticker CLGX on the NYSE on June 2. The company. The percentage of the overall loan count that are 90 or more days delinquent as of the reporting period. fraud. Auction Filings are the notice of the auction filing that has take place. The total number of newly constructed residentail housing units sold during the month. The percentage of the total sales that were a distressed sale (REO or short sale). and geospatial analytics and services. has more than 10.com . prevent fraud. support underwriting. The company combines public. The variable represents the number of properties were sold at a public auction sale. investment and marketing decisions. The percentage of the overall loan count that is currently in foreclosure as of the reporting period. 2010. Percent increase in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a month ago. Calif. For more information visit www. Percent increase in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a year ago. This percentage includes loans that are in foreclosure or REO. The number of short sales. contributory and proprietary data to develop predictive decision analytics and provide business services that bring dynamic insight and transparency to the markets it serves. the property is considered to be in a negative equity position. CoreLogic has built the largest U. valuation. REO Sales Short Sales Distressed Sales Share HPI MoM HPI YoY HPI MoM Excluding Distressed HPI YoY Excluding Distressed 90 Days + DQ Pct Foreclosure Pct REO Pct Pre-foreclosure Filings Total Auction Filings Negative Equity Share Negative Equity Months Supply Distressed Homes Total Sales YoY Change REO Sales YoY Change Short Sales YoY Change Seriously DQ Pct About CoreLogic CoreLogic (NYSE: CLGX) is a leading provider of consumer. The percentage of mortgages in negative equity. The count of loans in REO as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period. A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the sale proceeds fall short of the balance owed on the property's loan. More than one million users rely on CoreLogic to assess risk. FOR MORE INFORMATION PLEASE CALL 1-415-536-3500 © 2010 CoreLogic All other trademarks are the property of their respective holders. headquartered in Santa Ana. The denominator for the negative equity percent is based on the number of mortgages from the public record. The months it would take to sell off all homes currently in distress of 90 days delinquency or greater based on the current sales pace.000 employees globally with 2009 revenues of $1. The count of loans in serious delinquency (90 days +) as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.

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