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July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee. Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant. J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee. FERNANDO, J.: The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity. The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3). After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being
and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City. cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party.arbitrary. its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition. In the a answer filed on August 3. to a proper purpose. 1964. Instead of evidence being offered by both parties. restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary. in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments. that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room. of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity. there is once again a transgression of the due process clause. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation. keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. manager. which is to curb immorality. a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination. Inc. indefinite and uncertain. and Hotel del Mar Inc. there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila. The lower court on July 6. which reads: 1. unreasonable and oppressive. unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague. all having the capacity to sue and be sued. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. both with offices in the City of Manila. and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would. that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels. a dining room or. motels. That on June 13. 1963. 1963. with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association. by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. 2. 4760 from and after July 8. then the . 1963. and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination. there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28. 1963. arbitrary and oppressive character. 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 3. tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner. 4. 4760. which was approved on June 14. There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room. the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. lodging houses. respondent Mayor prayed for. runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable. while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc..
Its decision cannot be allowed to stand. dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels. 1965. in the very nature of things. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board. would be unconstitutional and. 4760 of the City of Manila. amending sections 661. 1963 (Annex B). the parties." Hence this appeal.904.ñët Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22. wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it. with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued. The local legislative body. As noted at the outset. 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. therefore. but likewise applicable American authorities. which are members of the petitioners association. agreed to file memoranda and thereafter. and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. the judgment must be reversed. 662. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15. with the nod of the Court. be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action.S.acting City Mayor of Manila. the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition. the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance. Then barely two weeks later. to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties. consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication. has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . citing not only U. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101. Salaveria. v. 668-a. and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party. 5.2 . by enacting the ordinance.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. 1äwphï 1. the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. on February 4. After referring to the motels and hotels. The councilors must. 1965." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question. 6. in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor. null and void. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. in both procedural and substantive aspects. copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C.
safety. public safety and the genera welfare. which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry. the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time. primarily rest the exercise of the police power.6 Negatively put. good order.10 prohibiting jueteng. safety and general welfare of the people. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution. to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health.13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines.. and welfare of society. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form.3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls. adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels. which. argues eloquently for it. conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used. Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. in a lobby open to public view at all times. On the legislative organs of the government. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential."5 It would be. whether national or local. and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests.It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v.15 all of which are intended to protect public morals. to increase "the income of the city government. It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval.12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays. In view of the requirements of due process." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case. the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside. to paraphrase another leading decision. morals.9 prohibiting gambling.7 There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts. unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. prepared for the purpose. police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort." Moreover. it cannot be too often emphasized.11 and monte.4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs. insistent and the least limitable of powers. peace. far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance. public morals.14 and prohibiting any person from keeping. the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable. equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties . ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant. is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character.
Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld. or any governmental action for that matter. and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. liberty or property. Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels. or tyrannical. and. in certain particulars.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process.however. It has been the settled law however. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance.500 yearly. official action. but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life. as a general rule. none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. unjust or unreasonable."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. especially in of .17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought. to paraphrase Cardozo. be valid. 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter. as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. We are thus led to considering the insistent. oppressive. To satisfy the due process requirement. arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. almost shrill tone. Negatively put. declined to interfere with such discretion. courts have. and. a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. in each appropriate case. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness."19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious. its alleged vagueness. A strong case must be found in the records."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time. first-class motels being required to pay a P6. the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract.21 It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. as has been set forth. obedience to the dictates of justice. To be more specific. for the regulation or restriction of nonuseful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is. P4. whimsical.000 annual fee and second-class motels. generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels. of course. the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life. place and circumstances. in which the objection is raised to the question of due process.
the mere fact. this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes. it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount. is not license. tavern. even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure. No man can do exactly as he pleases. in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable. or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. with property. are being devoted."27 Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract.23 Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies. then. Every man must renounce unbridled license. the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law. manager. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. and with business and occupations.25 As a matter of fact. health. and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery.licenses for the sale of liquors. call for a different conclusion. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be. such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. As was said in a case.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. just and uniform. keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel. lodging house.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being." here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic. but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue."28 A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner. in order to secure the general comfort. motel. to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. and. that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. Moreover. Only the other day. Again. And surely. or of the public order and safety. with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged. petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. according to the explanatory note. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat. The citizen should achieve the . it is 'liberty regulated by law. and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. In fact. common inn or the like.
32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process? Lastly. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean. the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success.required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline. age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him. Bengzon.. concur. however. C.J. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision. another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person. Florida.33 toAdderley v. As it stands."35 That is all then that this case presents. Zaldivar. . so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium. With costs. From Connally v. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest. Wherefore. JJ.34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators. Pomar. and Dizon. J. J. but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property. the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith.B. It may be asked. the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting. Far from it. Castro and Angeles.L. J. with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and determination.30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. Petitioners. Reyes. there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. relationship. Concepcion. Sanchez. People v.P.29 It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to contract. Makalintal.. do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it.. which means peace and order and happiness for all. are on leave. point to the requirement that a guest should give the name.. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. General Construction Co.
The local legislative body. INC. Panganiban. U. in both procedural and substantive aspects. consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication. Consequently. and GO HIU. 1967 was filed by petitioners. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitates action. Abad and Associates for respondent-appellant. THE HONORABLE. RESOLUTION FERNANDO.: A Motion for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31. (1) No merit in the Motion for reconsideration. intervenor-appellee. . VICTOR ALABANZA. there is no occasion for this sought-for new trial. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand. Tenchavez and L.petitioners-appellees.R. vs. The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. INC.. in the very nature of things. both motions are denied. J.G. . sought to be reconsidered. its basis was categorically set forth in the following language: As noted at the outset. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity. by enacting the ordinance. has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people. The councilors must. L-24693 October 23. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA. the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. As the Motion for reconsideration is clearly without merit. followed by a Motion for new trial. J. Aruego. respondent-appellant. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. ² In the decision of this Court of July 31. 1967. . No.. . M. . HOTEL DEL MAR. . 1967 ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION. Go for petitioners-appellees. A.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co."7 The late Professor Hamilton of the Yale Law School. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Dodd entertained no doubt: "The accepted view is that stated by Mr. Hartford Fire Ins. It is to betray an almost total lack of awareness of the import and significance of the O'Gorman doctrine in American constitutional law. But perhaps last term marks a more sedulous attention to its observance. Co. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character. De Wolfe Howe. They would restrain unduly and unjustifiably its operation.. Justice Brandeis in the O'Gorman case. there is nothing new in the avowal of a need for concreteness in passing judgment upon the legislative judgment.4 and Kauper5 in their standard casebooks quote the same excerpt from O'Gorman v. the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside. where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. For him. and Brown.It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity. this interpretation is without support in authority or reason and rests upon a misconception. it will compel the bar to argue questions of legislative validity in the perspective of the circumstances which gave rise to a particular statute..3 Freund Sutherland. one of the most distinguished constitutionalists. unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face. In the language of the motion for reconsideration: "The U. The O'Gorman principle1 fails to meet the approval of counsel of petitioners. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. will affect not a little the fate of legislation. if regularly observed. Certainly the procedure followed by the Court in O'Gorman & Young v. Dodd. S. would have been appalled by the unorthodoxy of the view of counsel of petitioners. Co." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case." To paraphrase Justice Brandeis. which is not the case here. appearing in the opinion of this Court. the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts."6 Frankfurter and Landis were equally explicit in their appreciation of what the O'Gorman dictum means. the O'Gorman opinion was a manifestation of the jurist's art at its best: . Authorities on the subject of proven competence and knowledge flatly reject such a view. Hartford Fire Ins. If insisted upon. "As doctrine. the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable.2 Dowling. Supreme Court was not laying down as a general rule in constitutional cases that there must be a factual foundation of record to offset the presumption of constitutionality of any and every law.
If the jurists have the feelings of other men. is there anything else in the Motion for reconsideration that calls for a modification of the decision of this Court? The answer must be in the negative. And." and concludes with a declaration of the test for validity. or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to constitutional rights. As "underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character. continues with a brief summary of the reasons for the statute and a statement that "the business of insurance is so affected with a public interest that the state may regulate the rates. Yet the simple lines of a short opinion present a superb example of the jurist's art.8 This is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the nullity of a statute. Upon that day the views of Brandeis became "the opinion of the court. . the issue came to be the intellectual procedure by which the constitutionality of the acts which make up the public control of business are to be determined. present and ominous." Accordingly the court was compelled to declare the statute valid. must have been a day of consequence in the life of Mr. Justice Brandeis. xxx xxx xxx In form "the opinion of the court" is a very simple and unpretentious document. as the fortunes of litigation broke. It ought not to have escaped petitioners that the opinion of the Court after noting the lack of factual foundation to offset the presumption of constitutionality went on to discuss the due process aspects to make clear that on its face. On that day he handed down the judgment of the United States Supreme Court in the O'Gorman case. executive order. the Ordinance cannot be considered void." It did not appear "upon the face of the statute. The cause was a simple suit in contract: the result depended upon the validity of a New Jersey statute regulating the commissions to be paid by insurance companies to their agents for securing business. or from any facts of which the court must take judicial notice" that in New Jersey "evils did not exist." it follows that "the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. . especially those involving the freedom of the mind. . The more general question was the tolerance to be accorded to legislative price-fixing under the Fourteenth Amendment. . the fifth of January nineteen hundred and thirty one. The prop here failing. Monday." for which the statute was "an appropriate remedy. That in such an event there should not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented does not argue against the force of the above excerpts on the weight to be accorded the O'Gorman doctrine in this case. in fact it was left with no alternative. It begins with a statement of the issue and a history of the case." and a new chapter in judicial history began to be written.
police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts. and welfare of society." It would be. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential. The explanatory note of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution.Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. argues eloquently for it. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. insistent and the least limitable of powers. which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry." There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. prepared for the purpose. public safety and the general welfare. The task of proving that the challenged Nonetheless." Moreover. with the persistence worthy of a better cause. Negatively put. . adultery and fornication in Manila. traceable in great part to the existence of motels. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests. the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time. to paraphrase another leading decision. far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance. to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health. public morals. There is nothing in the Motion for reconsideration that in any wise affects adversely or impairs the force of the above conclusion." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form. safety. to increase "the income of the city government. in a lobby open to public view at all times. petitioners would cite as fatal Ordinance is void on its face is one attended with difficulty. extending as it does "to all the great public needs.
consistently with the fundamental law. the invocation of petitioners as motel operators of their alleged right to being free from unreasonable search and seizure need not be taken seriously. to paraphrase Laurel.11 West Coast Hotel Co. Nor does their claim of the alleged infringement of their liberty deserve any further thought. That and what Justice Cardozo aptly referred to as reference to "grotesque or fanciful situations. . to liberty.9 he has no standing. is that unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance.13 That leaves only the alleged grievance that there was an unconstitutional invasion of property rights. The decision makes clear that such indeed was the case as far as this Ordinance was concerned. to repeat. The same is true in the United States. The Motion for reconsideration. is palpably lacking in merit. its implausibility being self-evident." which if they would arise could then be appropriately dealt with. except in the Pomar10 case as noted in the decision. Unfortunately for them. The Motion for reconsideration is conspicuously barren of any attempt to show that under our previous decisions referred to."14 That is not the way then to impugn the validity of an ordinance.infirmity the alleged invasion of the rights against unreasonable search and seizure. To that aspect. and to property. It goes without saying that petitioners themselves cannot ignore that one could. where such a concept has definitely fallen from its previously high state under the impact of the Nebbia. citing a number of applicable decisions of this Court. That is all there is to the Motion for reconsideration. has never stood in the way of the enactment of police power measures when called for by circumstances such as undoubtedly exist in this case. a considerable portion of the opinion was devoted.12 and Olson decisions. be deprived of his property as long as due process is observed. is deserving of a similar fate. As the famed jurist aptly noted: "That they are conceivable though improbable ought not to govern our construction. the challenged Ordinance could be successfully assailed. in this jurisdiction the liberty to contract. As the unchallenged rule. Neither could it be rightfully looked upon as laying a foundation for setting aside a decision. which is part and parcel of their right to the property. previously shown to be far from persuasive. except perhaps as to the liberty to contract. all tending to demonstrate that there was no due process infraction. It would follow then that this reiteration of an argument.
Then in 1955. A. as it would substantially reduce return on the investment. be extremely farfetched. persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those ." That was in 1940. Did not petitioners take note of the view announced by Justice Laurel quoted in the decision to the effect that the policy "of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest. The alleged denial of equal protection was predicated on the greater advantages that the motels in the suburbs of Manila would enjoy as against those within the city limits. the mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living can not prevent the exercise of the police power. then. namely. and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty." Neither suffices to justify any modification of the decision. City of Manila. as is undeniable. A new trial would therefore be an exercise in futility. with property. an assertion that there is denial of equal protection would. In the main. the alleged denial of equal protection and the repugnancy to "the laissez faire principle underlying our economic system. On its face. which undoubtedly would result in the diminution of income and the loss of business.16 where Justice Reyes. what was so unsuccessfully put forth by counsel for petitioners was adhered to. ." The decision likewise cited this jurist. was filed the same day. the general comfort. the supplemental Motion for new trial should likewise be denied. and with business and occupations. if it could apply to the suburban area. Since. a supplemental Motion for new trial dated September 25. health. If the legislative power of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila were not limited to its boundaries.. Additional counsel would bring in new points. to put it at its mildest. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. for a unanimous Court categorically declared: "And surely. As earlier pointed out. occasion any misgiving as to the conformity of the decision arrived at by this Court with controlling constitutional law principles. . with the Motion for reconsideration having been shown to be devoid of merit.(1) No occasion for new trial. lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law. . ² Subsequently. came Co Kiam v. and prosperity of the state. 1967. the challenged Ordinance applies to all the motels in Manila. such argument is clearly unfounded. speaking for the Court inCalalang v. Perhaps and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens. much less its reconsideration. then perhaps plausibility could be imparted to such a claim. Williams:15 "Public welfare. in order to secure. As was said in a case. Nor does the invocation of the laissez faire concept as bar against the enactment of regulatory measures.
. and one who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing by a resort to common knowledge or other matters which may be judicially noticed. See Public Service Commission v. Ct. 209. Ann. Nor is there the least justification for a new trial and reception of evidence. When such legislative action "is called in question. See Turner v. Maryland. J. Bengzon. 546. 1967. The burden is not sustained by making allegations which are merely the general conclusions of law or fact. . ed. Ct. there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts. 77 L.. but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause. 417). v."18 The illustrious Learned Hand writing on Chief Justice Stone's concept of the judicial function had occasion to note the "discredited attitude" of what he referred to "as the old apostles of the institution of property. 1967 and supplemental Motion for new trial of September 25. it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect.B. Concepcion. when freedom of the mind is imperiled by law. saying "the laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs. (City of New Orleans v. Footnotes 1 Justice Brandeis in Pacific States Box v. J. 27 L. 53 S..L.. 370. if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. 187.occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases.. Zaldivar. ed.P. Facts relied upon to rebut the presumption of constitutionality must be specifically set forth. were cited by petitioners. C. ." Two names of great repute. 107 US 38. White (1935) 296 US 176. JJ. was equally explicit. when property is imperiled. Co. the Motion for reconsideration of petitioners of September 16. 1086. See Aetna Ins. 1967. Baldwin. Neither if properly understood. 44. WHEREFORE. 136. 55 S. . The United States Supreme Court in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. 137. 288. further elaborated on the above doctrine: "The order here in question deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. According to Freund: "In short.17 decided in 1943. Dizon. 293 US 194." Nor does the reference by new counsel to American state court decisions call for a different conclusion.. Great Northern Utilities Co. 1080. 1085. ed. it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect. that the action is arbitrary. 79 L. 2 S. 27 L. 289 US 130. Barnette. could help their cause at all. Freund and Learned Hand. or to other legitimate proof. Ct. Reyes. are denied.J. 185."19 What then is left? Clearly nothing to call for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31. Castro and Angeles.concur. 281. Makalintal." Borden's Farm Products Co. Sanchez. Stafford. and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls.
Ins. 319 US 624. 72 A. Law Rev. ed. 726. the O'Gorman decision has been cited with approval in Osborn v. 325. 1073-1075. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 . 75 L. even though it may involve overruling previously decided cases. O'Gorman & Young v. 3 4 Freund Sutherland. Maloney (1951) 341 US 105. Law Rev. 324. 79 L. Carolene Products Co. 300 US 379 (1937). 291 US 502 (1934). 89. 96 Phil. 357. Ct. p. 293 US 163. Hegeman Farms Corp. Hartford F.v. 649. 440 (1924). Referring to the O'Gorman doctrine. 5 Kauper. it has been said: "The propriety of such a change in the method of approach to constitutional questions. E. Dodd. 8 Hamilton. Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials (1960) p. 122. cit. Cases on Constitutional Law (1949) 4th ed. Constitutional Law: Cases and Other Problems (1954). The Jurist's Art (1931). v. 769. v. California Auto Asso. People v. ed. and Brown. 6 7 Frankfurter and Landis. 275 US 440. 48 S.R. 31 Col. and Seagram and Sons v. 282 US 251. 87.. 46 Phil. 174." (Comment. Vera (1937) 65 Phil. Co. 313 US 1305 (1942). 271. City of New York (1915) 109 N. Cases on Constitutional Law (1950) 4th ed. 654.. p." Outside of the Pacific States Box case.. has been recognized since the days of Taney. Ct.) 2 Dodd. Baldwin. ed. Hostetter (1966) 16 L. (1931) 45 Harv. v. Ct.. Dowling. Gaines v. 70 Phil. 336. 130. 56. The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term 1930. Hyde. ed. 596. United States (1944) 323 US 18.. p. 733. 72 L. 86. De Wolfe Howe. 1163. 51 S. 62. Ozlin (1940) 310 US 53.L. op. 594. p. 55 S. 259. 42 Yale Law Journal 1258 .
11 46 Columbia Law Rev. On Understanding the Supreme Court (1950) p.18 Freund. 698 (1945). 19 .
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