CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Article 1: Local Gov’t Units

y disputes between two LGUs.

Q — What body has the power to settle boundary disputes between two local governments? Explain.

ANS: Under R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is the primary tribunal responsible in the amicable settlement of boundary disputes between or among two or more municipalities located in the same province. With the LGC of 1991, however, a major change has been introduced – that in the event the Sanggunian fails to effect a settlement, it shall not only issue a certification to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case.

Notably, unlike R.A. No. 6128 and B.P. 337, the LGC of 1991 grants an expanded role on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned in resolving cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside from having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its implementing rules and regulations. This situation, in effect, reverts to the old rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6128, under which the provincial boards were empowered to investigate, hear the parties and eventually decide the case on the basis thereof. On the other hand, under the LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal disputes. Only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan elevate the same. (Mun. of Sta. Fe v. Mun. of Aritao, G.R. No. 140474, September 21, 2007).

Effect of nullification of proclamation. Q — What is the effect if the proclamation of the mayor is nullified? Explain.

ANS: With the nullification of the proclamation, the position became vacant and the vice-mayor shall became the mayor. (Sec. 44, RA 7160).

Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of mayor’s proclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a “permanent incapacity to discharge the functions of his office.” (Jainal v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 174551, March 7, 2007, Tinga, J).

Article 2: Extradition

As a rule prospective extradites are entitled to notice and hearing only when the case is filed in court and not during the process of evaluation.

When may bail be granted to a possible extraditee.

Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. (Rodriguez, et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila Branch 17, et al., supra.).

Right to Bail in Extradition.

Q—

Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hongkong Court with 3 counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as agent in violation of Section 9 (1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hongkong. He was also charged with seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hongkong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received a request from the Hongkong Department of Justice for the provisional arrest of Muñoz. The NBI later on arrested him on the basis of a warrant issued by the RTC, Manila. The order was declared void by the CA, but its validity was sustained by the SC. In the meantime, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the

RTC a petition for his extradition. He applied for bail which was initially denied but which was reconsidered later, granting the petition for bail. There was a motion to vacate the order but it was denied, hence, a special civil action for certiorari was filed alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, Muñoz maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Is a prospective extraditee entitled to bail? Explain.

ANS:

Yes, in view of recent developments, in international law. The following trends in international law cannot be ignored, such as: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20 th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of the Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The

R. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life. this is not the first time that the Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail. and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. liberty. In 1966. ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court.Philippines. has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process. In other words. Director of Prisons. Thus. thus: Sec. Section 13. liberty. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. held that under the Constitution. shall. April 19. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. et al. 13. 70 (1951) the Court. Felixberto Olalia. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. All persons. the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. . No. G. on December 10. 1948. before conviction. also after World War II. 2007). Hon. Excessive bail shall not be required. the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life. therefore. On a more positive note. both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. in Mejoff v. 153675. (Gov’t. Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired. to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.. Nonetheless. 90 Phil. Thus. the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. in granting bail to a prospective deportee. be bailable by sufficient sureties. and due process. Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While not a treaty.

Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Constitution). It is “available only in criminal proceedings.a.” thus: x x x. The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. September 24. (Gov’t. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. J).In Government of United States of America v.R. G. such as deportation and quarantine.” (Sec. such that. VIII. 2002. Q— The SC in USA v. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. and Mark B. Jimenez. 148571. Art. a. as well as Section 4. applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings. 18. Hence. G. Branch 42. In cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. it was held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. Mario Batacan Crespo. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region. the constitutional provision on bail quoted above. Purganan. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction”. 389 SCRA 623. have likewise been detained. Hon. the right to bail may be available in extradition proceedings? Explain. particularly the right to life and liberty. Presiding Judge. is a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan in order. No. Gutierrez.k. No. 153675. ANS: Yes. however. in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights. Respondents in administrative proceedings.R. Guillermo G. the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. . RTC of Manila. April 19. First. 2007.

In fact. the Court opined that “To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law. .” thus. Clearly. The 1909 case of US v. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. et al. is illustrative. 12 Phil. 90 Phil.Second. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime. to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. In this case. Hon. Olalia. bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings. considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases. Thus. If bail can be granted in deportation cases. (Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. The SC has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. Go-Sioco. The Court of Mejoff relied upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail. Under these treaties. the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. supra. there is no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. 490 (1909). Likewise.” and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding. the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. In Mejoff v. Commission of Immigration.). After all. taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights. 256 (1951). Director of Prison and Chirskoff v. there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. some of the machinery used “is the machinery of criminal law. the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings. it was ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired..

“Temporary detention” may be a necessary step in the process of extradition. it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the machinery of criminal law. It is not a criminal proceeding. and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. an extradition proceeding. to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction. created by treaty. . 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines “extradition” as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power. and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action. to a prolonged restraint of liberty. Section 29a) of Presidential Decree (P. for the purpose of trial or punishment.Q— ANS: What is extradition? Explain.” Section 20 allows the requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask for the “provisional arrest of the accused. but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. but one that is merely administrative in character. It is sui generis. an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal. for it is not a punishment for a crime. No. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest.D.) No. Q — ANS: How is extradition characterized if it is not a criminal proceeding? Explain. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the “immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused” if such “will best serve the interest of justice. tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. pending receipt of the request for extradition. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled. even though such punishment may follow extradition. bears all earmarks of a criminal process.” This is shown by Section 6 of P. While extradition is not a criminal proceeding.” Obviously.D. while ostensibly administrative.” and that release from provisional arrest “shall not prejudice rearrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently.

The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2. While administrative in character. there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show he is not a flight risk. this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence. Article XVII of the Constitution on direct proposal by the people. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus. now Chief Justice Reynato S.Q — ANS: What is the standard of proof when a prospective extraditee applies for bail? Explain. an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.” Article 3: Amendatory provisions-people’s initiative Requirements of proposal to amend the constitution thru people’s initiative. Consequently. . According to him. proposed that a new standard which he termed. This section states: Sec. the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. Puno. An extradition proceeding being sui generis. then Associate Justice. Form required of the proposals. the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separation Opinion in Purganan. 2. this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. xxxx. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. In this case.

for example. (State ex. loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. The third mode is through a people’s initiative. this Constitution. portions of the petition that might not be to the signer’s liking.The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition.R. The rationale for this requirement is that. omitting. 949. Myers. applies only to “Amendments to this Constitution. 2. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not revision. Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. or even flatly misrepresenting. 95. 872 (1933). et al. 127 Ohio St. who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot. Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revision to the Constitution. Otherwise. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer. October 25. The unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent. Patton vs. Sec. Extent of the coverage of a people’s initiative to change the Constitution. 407 Mass. COMELEC. 955 [1990]). (Art. G. 186 N. vs. the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition. in this case. referring to the third mode. (Raul Lambino. could easily mislead the signer by. This danger seems particularly acute when. and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. Section 1 of Article XVII. the petition must state the fact of such attachment. and more importantly.” In contrast. 2006). to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. or revision of. XVIII. given the time constraint. The people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments. without the signer having actually examined the petition. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. it is physically impossible. In contrast. Section 2 of Article XVII. No. applies to “Any amendment to. 174153 and other cases. State Ballot Commission.R. Constitution.. Rel. reason. (Capezzito vs. downplaying. Further. If so attached. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its members. referring to the first and second modes. as signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. or attached to it.” .

2d. The main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. Effect of change in the structure of government. .” A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that “jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances. There are the qualitative and quantitative tests. State Board of Equalization.” whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Quantitatively. et al. Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests. from presidential to parliamentary. the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. 1281. 1286 [1978]). (Amador Valley Joint Union High School District vs. the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles – Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive – affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. “a change in the nature of the basic governmental plan” includes “change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution. Thus. COMELEC. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. 583 P. revision not mere amendment.).Two-part test in initiative clauses in Constitution. et al. vs. Qualitatively. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the “substance entirety” of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous provisions.” (Lambino. and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.

No. mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. July 31.A. Exec. (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices. President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department. and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation. “No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate. (Malaria Employees & Workers Assn. Article 5: Judicial Department Intermediate review of death penalty cases by the Court of Appeals. (Lambino. et al. The Lambino Group’s logrolling initiative also violated Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating.Effect if initiative proposes more than one subjects. Since the initiative embraced more than one subject matter. et al. R. Inc. 160093. v. Thus. Secretary. (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment.R. the Lambino Group’s initiative will still fail. COMELEC). is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government.. 2007). No. performance and merit. G. The Hon. x x x.. to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned. (b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created. vs. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. even if RA 6735 is valid. Q — May the Supreme Court provide that such cases shall first be reviewed by the Court of Appeals? Why? . Article 4: Public Offices Reorganization. of the Phils.” The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions. et al. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization. RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate..

and not the Senate. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death. would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before the Congress does not turn on executive privilege. 2006. under applicable laws like Republic Act No.ANS: Yes. then. 170165. et al. Mateo. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed by lower courts. Where life and liberty are at stake. The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. Gudani. nowhere. vs. 296 and Batas Pambansa Blg. et al. or death. August 15. the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. Lt. The exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. President’s refusal to allow a member of the AFP to appear is reviewable. A contrary rule. the factual issues. has it proscribed an intermediate review. The Constitution itself . reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed. The President prevents a military officer from appearing before Congress can do it by virtue of his/ her power as commander-in-chief. all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused. Article 6: Executive Department Power of inquiry of Congress in relation to the Commander-in-Chief Power. the Court now deemed it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Senga. In this instance. G. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death. life imprisonment. (B/Gen. but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. Tinga. would unduly diminish the prerogatives of the President as commander-inchief. [2004]).. 129. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. While the Constitution requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on. No. it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant. the Constitution prescribes that it is the President. (People vs. who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. however. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.). the Supreme Court may exercise its “exclusive appellate jurisdiction” over all cases where the penalty of death. particularly. J. Gen. refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.R. 433 SCRA 64. because the Constitution is not preclusive in character. After all. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate.

et al. It speaks of judicial prerogative inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the court not that the President’s decision is correct. the Constitution reasonably demands that a certain degree of faith be reposed in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but at the same time obligates him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitation. by which members of inquiries even if the not offend the Chief remedy lies with the al. because the Constitution has created a government in the concept of balance of power structure. the discretion of the political departments of the government. it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. Judicial power is the power to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Gudani. . but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. While the President’s “calling out” power is discretionary and solely vested in his wisdom. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief. it just limits his power. Senga. Lt.. The President’s power in case of emergency is not absolute. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. but that the President did not act arbitrarily. This system does not weaken the President. et al. The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory. The courts. G. 170165. 2006 and other companion cases).R. legislative and judicial powers are dispersed to the President. 171396. this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. (B/Gen. 2006).. The standard therefore. Executive. Nature of the calling out power of the President. The constitutional and legal order sanction a modality the military may be compelled to attend legislative President desires otherwise. Distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. the Congress and the Supreme Court. a modality which does Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. In times of emergency. G. Each is supreme within its own sphere. respectively. May 3. vs.recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. No. No.R. (David. Gen. Arroyo. vs. is not correctness but arbitrariness. et August 15. et al.

et al. shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. vs. 1017 is more than that.P. 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers. invasion or rebellion.P. In these cases. But as to the second. by law. upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend.P. Such declaration. Obviously. a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Contention that the President’s inclusion of Section 17. supra. 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. without legal significance.). Chapter 2. to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. (2) In times of war or other national emergency. the statutory authority is Section 4. et al. Section 18. She also relied on take over provision of privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. the Congress may. Article VII grants the President such power. no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. hence. Article VI of the Constitution reads: “Section 23.While the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from the powers as Chief Executive. as in the case of Sanlakas. authorize the President. Section 23. Article VII of the Constitution. (1) The Congress. for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe. Book II of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: “Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest. Unless . a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. is harmless. without legal significance. Arroyo. in the words of Sanlakas. or not written. This is an area that needs delineation. Indeed. To the first. In declaring a state of national emergency the President did not only rely on Section 18. such proclamation cannot be deemed harmless. national constitutional issues arise. and deemed not written. by vote of two-thirds of both houses in joint session assembled. shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. Article XII in P. P..” The President’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest. P. (David. voting separately.

Anna Liza Cabochan likewise filed her certificate of candidacy but had to withdraw the same due to the Petition to Deny Due Course” filed by a registered voter for the reason that the Notary Public who notarized it had an expired commission. a body cannot delegate a power nor repose upon it. et al. However. not the President. subject to certain conditions. et al. Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. et al. Generally. Clearly. then the framers could have provided so.” The second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to “other national emergency. vs. But the exercise of emergency powers. they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a “state of national emergency. Arroyo. during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it. vs.” The logical conclusion then is that the President could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2). when Section 17 states that the “the State may.) Agency vested with emergency powers. Certainly. Congress is the repository of emergency powers. whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. (David. Matias Defensor filed his certificate of candidacy in . Article 7: House of representatives Electoral tribunal-COMELEC Michael Planas filed his certificate of candidacy for representative of the Third District of Quezon City. Section 17.sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress. is a different matter. Thus. Arroyo. the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President.” it refers to Congress. This requires a delegation from Congress. such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Now. (David.” If the intention of the framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency” pursuant to Section 18. it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers. knowing that during grave emergencies. Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. et al.). temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war).

(Planas v. COMELEC. Defensor won and was proclaimed and took his oath and assumed. His proclamation was valid or legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as representative. The COMELEC ruled that with his proclamation. 167594. 167594. v.R. No. G. the assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues. Q— Is the rule absolute? Why? ANS: No. et al.. without resolving Codilla’s pending motion. 442 Phil. Where however. COMELEC? Explain. the proclamation of Codilla. ANS: Yes. et al. is not without exception. issued a resolution declaring his disqualification and directing the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. COMELEC. Codilla thereupon filed a motion to lift the suspension order. 2006). it was divested of jurisdiction and that the HRET has now jurisdiction. the COMELEC had been effectively divested of jurisdiction over the case. It was held therein . was ordered suspended even if he had not yet been summoned to answer the charges. the proclamation itself is illegal. was proclaimed winner. Despite Codilla’s timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. No. et al. A Petition to Deny Due Course to the certificate of Defensor was filed but before it could be resolved with finality by the COMELEC. In Codilla. 2006. In Mutuc. the votes cast for Codilla were declared stray and Locsin. G. hence.. the resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final. March 10.substitution of Cabochan. et al. COMELEC. Is the ruling of the COMELEC correct? Explain. Carpio Morales. De Venecia. J). 139 (2002) from Planas v. This rule. Note: The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the HRET. however. because at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who garnered the highest number of votes. who garnered the highest number of votes but who was facing charges of many counts of indirect solicitation of votes. et al. March 10. he had at that point in time remained qualified. But that is so only on the assumption that there has been a valid proclamation. Q — ANS: How do you distinguish Codilla v.R. who garnered the second highest number votes. (Planas v.. The COMELEC Second Division. the election was conducted.. it was ruled that it is indeed true that after proclamation the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest.

No.. J). These abuses are. 2007). the Division Resolution which declared Codilla’s disqualification was not yet final. Hence. Article 8: Legislative Department Safeguards that proscribe legislative power of inquiry. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. Carpio-Morales. remediable before the courts. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure. (Planas v. the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division [disqualifying Codilla] was seasonably challenged by [Codilla] in his Motion for Reconsideration.R. an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the . In other words. Article VI establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. at the time Codilla was declared disqualified by the Second Division and his rival Locsin who garnered the second highest number of votes was proclaimed. HRET. as Codilla’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof had yet to be acted upon by the COMELEC En Banc which had exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same. Nonetheless. March 7. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. even if they belong to the executive branch. et al. 2006. G. ANS: The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. upon the proper suit filed by the person affected. The HRET could not thus assume jurisdiction as Locsin’s proclamation was invalid. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. (Abubakar v. et al. 173310 and 173609. March 10. there may be exceptional circumstances. Section 21. necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. COMELEC. 167594. or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility.that at the time of the proclamation of Locsin. Q— When does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review decisions of the HRET? Explain. the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter..R Nos. or course. wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established. G. the The power of Congressional inquiry is not absolute.

Ermita. et al. G. One variety of the privilege. . Types or kinds of executive privilege. 2006). vs. or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions. ed. 276. Finally. et al. D. 2006). courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. April 20. 167777.. Ermita. Appearance during the question hour not mandatory. et al.. et al. vs. 326 U. (Senate. attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.S. Presidents. et al. 167777. et al. Ermita. recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which government decisions and policies are formulated. 2006).R. App. et al. No.R.executive department under the Bill of Rights. vs. 167777. depending on the particulars of each case.. In such instances. is the state secrets privilege invoked by U. It has encompassed claims of varying kinds.. Basis for the three kinds of executive privilege. (Senate. No. Another variety is the informer’s privilege. (In re Sealed. et al.R. No. April 20. the courts.S. 121 F. Senate. G. beginning with Washington. the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Executive privilege is not a clear or unitary concept. executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information. on the ground that the information is such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives.R. 167777.” It is the right of the President and high-level executive branch offices to withhold information from Congress. April 20. G. (Senate. and the Congress. 2006). vs. Concept of executive privilege. Since the beginnings of our nation. April 20. G. No. Executive privilege is “the power of the Government to withhold information from the public. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. Ermita.C. the courts and ultimately the public. 729.

Thus. the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. Such declaration. that such official is in possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. whenever an official invokes E. in light of the absence of a mandatory question period. otherwise. This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the President. has determined that the requested information is privileged. 464 to justify his failure to be present. In fact. This determination then becomes the basis for the official’s not showing up in the legislative investigation. et al. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not. 464. To that extent. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature. or by the President herself.” such official is subject to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before the Congress. et al. underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by the head of office. however. it would not be able to perform intelligently its power of legislation.O. The provision allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E. as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction. vs. The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation powers. departs from the question period of the parliamentary system.” amounts to an . however. or a head of office authorized by the President. it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.” such official is “covered by the executive privilege.O. Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is “covered by the executive privilege. Ermita. even without mentioning the term “executive privilege. 464. the question hour. (Senate. such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President.O. mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances.The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. and that the President has not reversed such determination.) Meaning of the requirement of prior consent of the President or the head of office allowing an official to appear before the Congress. In view thereof. Basis of the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials or the lack of it. authorized by the President under E.

has determined that it is so. April 20. . That the message is couched in terms that. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President. the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.). in this case to Congress. and that the President has not overturned that determination. or an authorized head of office. by authority of the President. do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. on first impression. No. Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. Only the President can claim privilege. (Senate. be kept confidential in the pursuit of the public interest. an exemption from the obligation to disclose information.implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch. or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. Ermita. 167777. et al. as a matter of necessity. premised on the fact that certain information must. Verily. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. there is an implied claim of privilege. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus. G. Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. (Senate. Executive privilege is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique rule and responsibilities of the executive branch. No need to specify the exact reason. by definition. vs. 2006). et al. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. Such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. No claim of executive privilege by mere silence.. et al. et al. Invocation of executive privilege to be accompanied by reasons. Certainly. on the basis of executive privilege. Ermita. The privilege being. vs. The invocation of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific reasons.R.

If it is exists. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department. The Secretary becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented. and other cases. in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By the order of the President.R. There is no undue delegation of legislation power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. et al. In such instance. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. is invalid on this score. Ermita. This is constitutionally permissible.. September 1. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Article 9: Delegation of Power Congress delegated the power of ascertainment of facts upon which the enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent to the Secretary of Finance.” which means that he personally consulted with her. Congress simply granted the Secretary the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact. or set aside the findings of the Secretary and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. et al. (Abakada Guro Party List. 168056. . In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions. etc. G. the Secretary. by legislative mandate. (Senate. vs. being the agent of Congress and not of the President. The privilege being an extraordinary power. must submit such information to the President who must impose the 12% VAT rate. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside the control of the executive. the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. Executive Secretary.. vs. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization where the authorization is not explicit but mere silence. 2005). 167777. Thus. G. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1. No. et al. he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. the President cannot alter or modify or nullify. to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. in relation to Section 2(b). Section 3. the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate.R. April 20. No.In view of the highly exceptional nature of the privilege. 2006 contingent upon a specified fact or condition. it is essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf. 2006). In other words.

Hence. On the basis of the said ERC decisions. stranded contract costs of NPC or distribution utility refer to the excess of the contract cost of electricity under eligible contracts over the actual selling price of the contracted energy output of such contracts in the market. Panay Electric Company. Stranded Contract Costs of NPC and Stranded Contract Costs of Eligible Contracts of Distribution Utilities and other purposes pursuant to Section 34 of the EPIRA. stranded debts refer to any unpaid financial obligations of the NPC which has not been liquidated by the proceeds from the sales and privatization of NPC Assets. if any. The ERC decided the NPC’s petition authorizing it to draw up to P70. IRR). 000. National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPCSPUG) filed with Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification. ERC issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations defining Universal Charge refers to the charge. . (Rule 4 (rrr. otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 200_” (EPIRA) imposes Universal Charge upon end-users of electricity (a charge imposed for the recovery of stranded cost. this original action. Inc.Q — Section 34 of RA 9136.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003. (PECO) charged Romeo P. 000. imposed for the recovery of Stranded Debts.

2. G. 220 SCRA 703. peso devaluation. Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the operations of the NPC. and other variables which cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the legislature.R. The ultimate issues in the case at bar are: . there was a need to delegate powers to administrative bodies. the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional. Orbos. Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. No. The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be used.Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1. G. 1988. and Gaston v. March 31. L-77194. L-79601-03. which is not so in the case at bench. June 23. 3. They posited that the Universal Charge is imposed not for a similar purpose. Nos. Thus. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such. Republic Planters Bank. fixed and approved by the ERC. 162 SCRA 521. The universal charge provided for under Section 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented. invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein. Valmonte v. and to act as buffer to counteract the changes and adjustments in prices. the respective funds were created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar. 1988. 99886. March 15. giving the same unlimited authority.R. They argue that the cases Osmeña v. 2. In said cases. Energy Regulatory Board. hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined. 158 SCRA 626. 1993.

1. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax. Energy Regulatory Board. No. that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State. R. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmeña v. Such can be deduced from Sec. As aptly pointed out by the OSG. Whether or not. Tio v. Decide. Republic Planters Bank. As to the first issue.A. 151 SCRA 208. Gaston v. No. Araneta. it was held that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in exercise of the police power. the State’s police power. 98 Phil. 9136. Republic Planters Bank. (Osmeña v. L-75697. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed. and in Gaston v. Moreover. and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character. ANS: 1. Videogram Regulatory Board. the Universal Charge is not a tax. 216. under the last paragraph of Section 34. a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under the administration of PSALM. evidently. it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund. No. . Orbos. and Lutz v. with respect to the OPSF. particularly its regulatory dimension. With the Universal Charge. et al. In exacting the said charge through Sec. 2. 148 (1955)). is invoked. 34 of the EPIRA. In Valmonte v. Orbos. and Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC. is well within the pervasive and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and economic survival and well-being of the community. the Universal Charge imposed under Sec.

2. The STF reasonably serves and assures attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed. et al. and it contains sufficient standards. to ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry. shall be imposed on all electricity end-users. i. of Energy. accepted as sufficient standards the following: “interest of law and order. Nachura.. economy and efficiency.” “simplicity. G. 159796. v.” “justice and equity. among others. reliability. July 17. in the past. fixed and approved by the ERC. 2007. there is no undue delegation of powers to the ERC. July 17. v.” “adequate and efficient instruction. The EPIRA. J). a Universal Charge to be determined. Dept. read and appreciated in its entirety.This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an exaction imposed primarily in the pursuit of the State’s police objectives. J). 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof. . 34 thereof. 2007. No. does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge..” “public interest. As to the second test. as they provide the limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR.” and “fair and equitable employment practices. (Gerochi. et al.” “public convenience and welfare.. No. “to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality. Although Sec. These are sufficient standards. G. and a Distribution Code. As to the second issue. et al. in relation to Sec.R. and “watershed rehabilitation and management” meet the requirements for valid delegation. et al. This is also the case when the EPIRA law authorized the PSALM to compute the stranded debts and stranded costs of the NPC which is to form the basis of the ERC in determining its universal charge. and therefore. Dept. security and affordability of the supply of electric power”.e. the Court had. the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided by the law itself when it provided for the promulgation and enforcement of a National Grid Code.” “standardization and regulation of medical education. of Energy. Nachura. No. (Gerochi.” Provisions of the EPIRA such as.R. 159796. is complete in all its essential terms and conditions.

432 SCRA 157. the range of police power was no longer limited to the preservation of public health. it is plain to see that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body. 2004. June 15. Police power takes on an even broader dimension in developing countries such as ours. No.” Police power is not exerted “to further the public welfare – a concept as vast as the good of society itself. Chief Justice Reynato S. the law must be read in its entirely. and is animated by one general purpose and intent. it has been held: “In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC. they did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERC’s predecessors. Rather. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital public utility. its exercise should be given a wide latitude. Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety. To sustain the view that the ERC possess only the powers and functions listed under Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a whole. G. Energy Regulatory Commission. where the State must take a more active . which used to be the primary social interests in earlier times. the provisions of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts.Note: It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC’s conferred powers were challenged. because a statute is passed as a whole. Police power now requires the State to “assume an affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy. safety and morals. to wit: Over the years.R. 161113. the ERC in this case. When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC. to enable the latter to implement the reforms sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA. however.” When the police power is delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions.

the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive. February 2. acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power. G. when the need arises. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC. legal structure and regulatory framework for the electric power industry. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility. and thus. Electricity Consumers for No. mostly small and uneconomic. ERC. To attract private investment. dismal to forgettable performance of the government power . poor quality of service to consumers.R. oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves questions of fact. we there fore hold there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC. Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of power outrages or unreliable electric power services. The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of existing generation capacity.role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society. This approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric power rates. extremely high and uncompetitive power rates. where it was held that the have sufficient power to respond in real time multifarious factors affecting public utilities. 481 SCRA 480. The engines of progress may come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. the Court is precluded from reviewing the same. Electric power generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that affects not only a few but the entire nation. Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and improvement of the industry as the large government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of the industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program. largely foreign. It is an important factor in encouraging investment and promoting business. 163935. It established a new policy. Energy Regulatory Commission. the distribution side was fragmented with over 10 utilities. Hence. 2006. This was reiterated in National Association of Reforms v. should to changes wrought by From the foregoing disquisitions. Moreover. 2004. as regulator. Note: One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the EPIRA. the jaded structure of the industry had to be addressed. We should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. such contention is deemed waived or abandoned per Resolution of August 3. While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic. and amounts to taxation without representation.

and an inability to develop a clear strategy for overcoming these shortcomings. transmission. the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry. his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. 161113. the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. Article 10: Citizenship Citation under rule 8171 only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. G. namely: generation. including the privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC). (Freedom from Debt Coalition v. high system losses. ERC. 432 SCRA 157). No. Corollarily. 2004. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus .R. June 15. distribution and supply. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino. and the delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the private entities. Thus. and to the minor children of said naturalborn Filipinos. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. b. The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171. and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.sector. the transition to a competitive structure. and Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

The precursor of RA 8171. August 29. et al. the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171. petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. the children must be minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. 725). “on account of political or economic necessity” in relation to natural-born Filipinos. The first is what we call the “economic refugees” who go abroad to work because there is no work to be found in the country. However. CA. which was enacted on June 5. G. 125793. et al. On their own.D. the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the application of the law only to political or economic migrants. however. we have those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos. G. aside from the Filipino women who lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. 63. (Tabasa vs. 725 (P. Domingo where she stated that there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the country.R. Then we have the “political refugees” who leave the country for fear of their lives because they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of government. Presidential Decree No. Andrea B.. (Tabasa vs.. 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. . By adding the said phrase to RA 8171. 125793. This intention is more evident in the sponsorship speech of Rep. No. CA. the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. No. thereby seeking other citizenship elsewhere. Limited coverage of the law. 2006). The third type are those who have committed crimes and would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. 2006).sanguinis or blood relationship.R. also gave to the same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but without the limiting phrase. in addition women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. Lastly. If a person. August 29. he can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. A reading in Section 1 of RA 8171 shows that the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

G. the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. Effect if foreign country cancels the passport of an alien. 30 May 1989). Santiago. as well as for a safer abode for themselves and their families. G. 9225. 9189 aims. No. are qualified to vote. On the contrary. et al. in essence. Thus. August 2006). but rather of sacrifice to look for a better life. or does not reissue a valid passport to him. it was ruled in Macalintal vs. et al. Section 10 and 15 (Schonemann vs..A. COMELEC. It is for these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being proposed for approval by this body. grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R. (Tabasa vs. under the Immigration Act. No.A. In such instance. the Board of Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory. the first two have to leave the country not of choice.R. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in . in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents. The automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings.A.. the intent of the law is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for reasons other than political or economic necessity. 81461.R. R. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien. save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary citizen. It cannot be overemphasized that R. 9189.A. 9225 – requiring “duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Right to vote of dual citizens. CA. Thus. to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who.Of these four types of Filipinos. 125793. 405 SCRA 614: “It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that it intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. There is no provision in the dual citizenship law – R.

“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act. and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1. et al. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction. G. Article V. Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and RA 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of RA 9225. No. …. which became R. Article V of the Constitution. 9189. the irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.the Philippines. 2104. 162759. RA 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise: “Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote. COMELEC. 2006). It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2.. who is abroad on the day of elections. This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in RA 9225 which reads: . The expanded thrust of RA 9189 extends also to what might be tagged as the next generation of “duals”. Rule cover the next generation of duals. August 4. (Loida Nicolas-Lewis. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No.A. vs.R. not otherwise disqualified by law.

Q — State the rationale for the enactment of RA 9139 otherwise known as Administrative Naturalization Law.A. 2007). 473.A. 473. 4.. as amended. Sections 3 and 4 of R. No.Sec. Rep. whether legitimate. of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. August 4.A. Is the contention correct? Why? ANS: No. – The unmarried child.A. .. et al. there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. 2007). (Loida Nicolas-Lewis. below eighteen (18) years of age. On the other hand.A. it was contended that the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization should possess those provided for in R.R. G. 9139 and not those set forth in C. (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C. January 29. COMELEC. ANS: R.R. No. No. It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who. No. illegitimate or adopted. 473. 162759. G. and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. No. Rep. No. ANS: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. (So v. less technical and more encouraging. 9139. No. cannot practice their profession. 2006). Q — What is naturalization? Give the modes of becoming a citizen by naturalization. No.R. vs. 170603. No. 170603. G.(So v. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious. 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. Derivative Citizenship. Under current and existing laws.A. Q — In a petition for naturalization. by reason of lack of citizenship requirement. January 29. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of C.

No. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribed another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. On the other hand. No.A. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing here.A. Rep. 170603. No. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious.A. No. the intention of the legislature in enacting R. Thus. although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines. Q— Are the qualifications prescribed under Act No. No. if we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws. January 29. though resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the application is also disqualified.A.A. an alien who is not qualified under R. who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos. 473.A. First. Third. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.thus promoting “brain drain” for the Philippines. a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization. One of the qualifications set forth in R. subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. G.A. there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C. if the qualifications prescribed in R. No. one who was born here but left the country.A. who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. 2007). (So v. 473 and R.A. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R. Second. No. 9139. No.A. No. No.A. The only implication is that.R. ANS: No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization.. applying the provisions of R. Thus. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives. C. . 473 applicable to RA 9139? Explain. It must be stressed that R. less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature.

G. absent a specific provision expressly amending C. or whose affidavit or testimony is not credible. Q — State the basic requirement of witnesses in a naturalization proceeding.R. that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. ANS: The witnesses presented should be competent to vouch for his good moral character. No. (So v. they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. Q — State the duty of an applicant for naturalization before he can be naturalized. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community.. ANS: Yes.R. Rep. Q — In naturalization proceedings. Rep. January 29. 473.. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. 2007). 170603. that he is known to be honest and upright. Explain. G. as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness. The character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicant’s conduct and character. 2007. v.R. citing Rep.. (So v. No.A.R. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding. and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses. January 29. who has not perjured in the past. January 29. 170603. 485 SCRA 405). 168877.Thus. A certificate of . who must be credible persons. March 24. 2007). No. the law stands and the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained. G. 2006. who is not a police character and has no police record. Rep. (So v. Explain. may the State appeal the decision even if it did not oppose the petition? Explain. Within the purview of the naturalization law. No. No. and are themselves possessed of good moral character. ANS: In naturalization proceedings. Thus. G. a “credible person” is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime. Hong. 170603. and that his word may be taken on its face value.

(So v. 170603. v. 153986... Rep. Shewak A. et al. ANS: It is well-settled rule that “it is the bounded and inescapable duty of anyone applying for naturalization to carry at all times the burden of proving his right thereto. Rep. and upon strict compliance with the law.R. (Tiu v. 1137 (1974). G. 2007). In Re: Petition for Admission as Citizen of the Phils. Rep. June 8. Q — Who has the burden to show that a person is entitled to be naturalized? Explain. G.. No. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. not only by complying with all the substantive and procedural requirements and submitting proof thereof at the trial. 158 Phil. January 29.naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it.. Note: It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. No. Keswani. with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.R. . If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship. 2007).