MARCH 2009 Democracy &

Progress
*A MONTHLY NEWSLETTER PUBLISHED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY, TAIWAN

Highlight of DPP Events in March The DPP on CECA/ECFA: “3 ‘NO’s &4 ‘SHOULD’s” DPP Survey on CECA 2009 Taiwan’s Accession to WHO and WHA : Two different approaches and what we are paying for what? DPP Chairperson Dr. Tsai Ing-wen’s first visit to Japan
Coming up in April! 2nd phase of the “Taiwan Citizen Conference on National Affairs”: “ECFA: A Bridge or a Dead-End? - A Comprehensive Analysis of the Ma Administration’s Cross-Strait Policies”
When? April 11th, 2009 Where? International Conference Room, National Central Library Themes: The conference will focus on three policy perspectives: economy and trade (Session 1: “On the Road to the One-China Market?”), national security and stability in Asia-Pacific region (Session 2: “On the path to the unification and the Chinese hegemony?”), and social impacts and system reform (Session 3: “Is ‘China’ the only remedy for Taiwan’s economy?”). For a detailed agenda and list of speakers and commentators: www.dpp.org.tw, or contact the DPP Department of International Affairs (foreign@dpp.org.tw, +886-2-23929989 ext. 306)

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Highlights of DPP events in March
March 4 The DPP Central Standing Committee invited Hung Tsai-lung, associate research fellow from Taiwan Institute of Economic Research to present his research on CECA (ECFA) and Chien-Yuan Tseng from Taiwan Friends of Tibet to brief re: current situation in Tibet. Dr. Tsai attended the commemoration for Lei Chen, one of the pioneers of Taiwan’s democratic movement and conference on “Lei Chen, Role of the Opposition Party and Social Movements” The DPP weekly policy meeting (重大議題協調會報) continued discussing the issue of CECA (ECFA) The DPP mayors and county magistrates issued a joint statement responding to the central government’s special budget proposal for the “Expansion of Investment in Infrastructure Construction”. The DPP Central Standing Committee met and discussed the issue of CECA (ECFA): 1. Signing the CECA (ECFA) should be authorized through a referendum; 2. Reviewing the current Cross-strait policy-making system: government practice, legal framework, ratification process, and referendum law. Dr. Tsai met with representatives from civic groups to exchange views on social movements and social reforms The DPP Survey Center released its latest public survey on CECA (ECFA). DPP press conference on CECA (ECFA): the 3 “NO”s and the 4 “Should”s March 14th is the 4th anniversary of China’s passage on the Anti-Secession Law. This year, the DPP joined the efforts of the Tibetans in exile, calling for peace, freedom, human rights and democracy. The DPP also joined a peaceful rally held by Taiwan Friends of Tibet (台灣圖博之友會) on March 16. Dr. Tsai’s first visit to Japan as the DPP Chairperson The DPP launched a blog campaign at www.wretch.cc/blog/supervisor09, calling for supervising government spending on “public construction” in its economic stimulus package, which has been criticized as economically inefficient and failing to address the needs of the country’s development. The DPP Central Executive passed the resolution on “Taiwan first, Buy locally” calling for having government procurement, while not violating the WTO rules, meeting the three “First”s: “Green First”, “Locally-bought First”, and “Taiwan-made First”. Dr. Tsai and Spokesperson Cheng Wen-tsang called for more transparency and a comprehensive industrial risk assessment concerning CECA Dr. Tsai met with more than 100 representatives from women’s rights NGOs in Kaohsiung on women’s participation in politics and the possible impact of CECA (ECFA) from women’s perspectives. The DPP weekly policy meeting (重大議題協調會報) continued discussing the issue of Taiwan’s 2009 participation in WHO and WHA The press conference by Dr. Tsai, former VP Annette Lu, former Premier Yu Shyi-kun, former Minister of Interior Affairs Lee Yi-yang and the DPP party caucus whip Kur Chien-ming, pointed out that the KMT government’s suppression and political cleansing on the opposition leaders still continued, and there is serious discrimination and bias in the judiciary’s investigation, prosecution and legal proceedings re.Special Fee Cases. Investigation on 97 Special Fee cases against KMT members, including Vincent Hsiao, Lian Chan, Wu Poh-hsiung, Liu Chao-shiuan etc, has almost stopped. The DPP Central Standing Committee invited Professor Yan Jiann-fa to present his evaluation of Taiwan’s 2009 accession to the WHA. The DPP press conference on responding to the media uncovered that the central government and Taipei City government use public resources to help the KMT candidate for Taipei Ta-an legislator by-election. Dr. Tsai expressed her grave -2Please note that articles in this publication should not be used as direct quotation unless with the explicit permission from the editor.

March 7

March 9 March 10

March 11

March 11 March 12 March 13 March 14 & 16

March 15-17 March 16

March 18

March 19, 20 etc March 22

March 23 March 25

March 25 March 26

March 28 March 29

concern and called for Central Election Committee Central Election Commission’s action on necessary investigation and intervention. The DPP lost the by-election for Taipei Ta-an legislator. But the DPP support rate is nearly 40%- the highest (in this district) in the past seven elections. The DPP launched a demonstration on the issue of “Graduate’s unemployment”. The job market today is extremely difficult for recent graduates. Today, graduation from college usually means the beginning of unemployment. The campaign was launched to call for the government to take this issue seriously.

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THE DPP ON CECA/ECFA: “3 ‘NO’s & 4 ‘SHOULD’s”
3 “NO”s:
“No” to One-China Principle; “No” to black-box negotiations; “No” to unemployment;

4 “Should”s:
Government should allow industries (esp. traditional industries and SMEs) to participate in the discussion; Government should communicate with the public and help society understand what the CECA (EFCA) is; There should be debates and talks between the ruling and opposition parties, and 4. Whether to sign the CECA (ECFA) should be decided by a referendum.

The DPP is not opposed to normalizing economic and trade relations with China. However, normalization has to be done under the framework of an international agreement and must not hurt Taiwan’s sovereignty. If we have to further liberalize our economic relations with China, the government must conduct in-depth comprehensive assessment, careful planning and most importantly, seek public consensus. The DPP has been listening to the people’s voice and knows that the society feels anxious about what the Ma administration has been doing. If the Ma government does not explain clearly nor follow policy-making process in a transparent and democratic manner, the society is placed at the risk of further division. It will have a grave impact on Taiwan’s democratic system and might radicalize the society for which the ruling party must be held accountable.
For various reasons elaborated below, we continue to have unanswered questions on ECFA:

1.

What is the political price?
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When this economic agreement was first raised by President Ma Ying-Jeou on July, 2008, it was called the “Comprehensive With Hu’s “Six Points” Economic Cooperation Arrangement, CECA”, which meant that proposition still the what President Ma had in mind was to have something similar to guiding principle for the “Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, CEPA” China’s policy on Taiwan, signed between Hong Kong and China with Article II “Principle” for such a major clearly stating “the principle of one country and two system.“ Thus, economic arrangement our first question would be: is there also a one-China framework like a CECA, the Taiwan for the CECA? Secondly, Hu Jintao’s ‘Six-Points’ proposition is government needs to tell still the guiding principle for China’s Taiwan policy regardless of its people what is the policy fields. So, are there political concessions made between political price made for the KMT and the CPP and what kinds of political concessions this deal. have been made in order to get China to the negotiation table to talk about these issues? On such a major economic arrangement, the government needs to tell the people what is the political price for making this deal.

2.

Procedural issues: we are a democracy but where are the transparency, due-process and checks and balances?

Since the CECA first arrived on the table, the government has remained vague and illusive regarding its content. Without any public debate nor a process to inform the public what the agreement is about and how ECFA will affect the future of Taiwan and its economy, all President Ma said was that there would be an agreement, and at one point he even said this should be signed as soon as possible. This is in violation of basic democratic procedures. There is not enough participation by the Legislative Yuan, the general public, and even by the cabinet members. CECA/ECFA is a decision made by the top decision-maker, the President, while the cabinet was directed to implement the decision. Without actually knowing what the agreement is, with no understanding of the policy thinking and considerations behind the agreement, the ministers are unable to defend the president’s decision effectively and there has been poor defense of the policy.

This is in violation of basic democratic systemic issues. There is not enough participation by the Legislative Yuan, the general public, and even by the cabinet members.

The basic principle of checks-and-balances is missing. Not even the KMT legislators themselves know what a CECA / ECFA is about. .

The legislature was not informed prior to the previous four agreements signed with China in November 2008. According to the agreements, they would take effect within 30 days upon signing, with or without the Legislative Yuan having the opportunity to review them. As a result, the Legislature Yuan did not get the chance to review the four agreements; the government said these are Executive agreements and therefore, no parliamentary review would be needed.

But who makes the decision that these are executive agreements, especially when these agreements will profoundly affect Taiwan?
Even if the executive branch allows the legislature to review the agreements, the voice of the opposition needs to be taken into account, although the KMT has 3/4 seats at the Legislative Yuan and the DPP has only 1/4 seats. Let us not forget, though, that the DPP represents more than 40% of the voters.

3.

Addressing winners and losers in the trade liberalization process
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When one talks about a trade liberalization plan, what comes to mind is not only how much benefit we would gain. What is equally important, if not more, is to know what we are going to lose with the implementation of the plan.

A responsible government, prior to forming a special trade pact with another economic partner, especially with such a big economy as China, would conduct an in-depth economic assessment to tell its people what the benefits, the losses, and disadvantages of the effects of such an agreement are. There should also be public hearings and processes for public debate on the issue before the policy-making process. It has to convince the losers of the plan or at least help them survive the impact of the liberalization plan. These processes involve both the economic authorities and political authorities in addressing relevant problems that may arise. But, unfortunately, we have not seen the government address this matter at all. In the CECA / ECFA case of Taiwan, many of the problems that will arise or worsen from the trade liberalization venture have not been discussed. A. The government has been ineffective in implementing the safeguard mechanisms embedded in our laws, such as anti-dumping, safeguard measures, and even rules of origin.. For instance, traditional industrial products and lower-end consumer products, such as towels and chopsticks etc, still produced locally but of better quality compared to those made in China are not and will not be effectively protected. With the poor implementation, many products made in China are imported as products of other places; the public is not being protected by the system installed and established by the government to protect the consumers and the industries. Cases, such as poison toys, pet foods, chopsticks and contaminated milk formula etc, have caused public health hazards in Taiwan. One of the ten-top “Image of China” on the DPP’s survey last year is ““Black-hearted products”. And in Kaohsiung city, the city government has forced to have a “Taiwan-product only” area in the supermarket so that people can feel safe to purchase the food they need. B. Issue of exchange: Taiwan has long established a global trade reputation for its manufacturing and quality agriculture goods. In recent years, we have come to recognize that in both the agriculture and manufacturing markets, Chinese prices are much more competitive than Taiwan. For example, the KMT politicians have pushed for Taiwan’s exports of agriculture goods to China which was followed by a whole series of efforts launched to facilitate the process. But the result has been that Chinese agriculture products imported to Taiwan are 5 times the amount of our exports to China. China seems to possess an unlimited capacity to export. C. Winners and Losers: While those with wealth, technical skills, and the more advanced sectors of the economy will benefit from this trade liberalization process with China; the agriculture sector, industries, even the learned professionals are going to suffer from the trade liberalization. People who are in the middle or lower class, particularly those in the more disadvantaged class of the society will suffer more. With the global economic downturn, it is just not good timing to discuss trade liberalization with China now; there are simply not enough jobs at the moment. The initial impact of the trade liberation plan will impact jobs that are already facing unemployment. Given the geographic proximity between Taiwan and China, low transportation costs, the openness of Taiwan’s trade laws and low tariffs, if the market is opened further and tariffs all lifted to zero, the Taiwan market will face major challenges. It is not that we do not want to face the Chinese forever. It is about timing and the need to plan through a carefully designed process because trade liberalization necessitates economic adjustment. Any trade liberalization process would require economic adjustment. The government needs to ask if it is prepared for carrying-out economic adjustment process.
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When one talks about a trade liberalization plan, what comes to mind is not only about how much benefit we would gain. What is equally important, if not more, is to know what we are going to lose.

For the adjustment, the government needs to get people out of sectors losing competitiveness to sectors with greater economic competitiveness. Is this the best It is not that we do not want to timing for economic adjustment? The DPP is addressing the face the Chinese forever. It is issue in substantive terms, i.e., as a trade liberalization about timing. Any trade process. Does the government have comprehensive plans liberalization process would to carry-out the economic adjustment needed in a trade require economic adjustment. liberalization process? Does the government have The government needs to ask if intentions to carry-out safeguard measures for product this is the best time for sectors that will suffer because of imports from China? We carrying-out economic have only received messages from the government that it adjustment process. wants a CECA / ECFA urgently, and only sees the benefits of the trade agreement. We are concerned despite the knowledge of benefits, but the government needs to think of broader issues of how jobs will be ensured during hard times and how the economy will make the structural adjustments needed. -------------------------------------- Back to the top ------------------------------------

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DPP Survey Concerning the Signing of a CECA/EFCA
DPP Survey Center (March 10-11, 2009)
1. Of those interviewed, 44.7% had some knowledge of what a CECA/ECFA is, while 44.1% did not. 11.2% of interviewees had never heard of it. 2. 56.8% of those interviewed did not agree with the belief that if Taiwan does not strengthen its economic cooperation with China, its economy will be excluded from global trade relations. 37.6% believed that this scenario would happen if Taiwan and China failed to sign an economic agreement. 3. 48.8% agreed with the statement that if Taiwan advances its economic cooperation with China, then it will make the Taiwanese economy over-reliant on China and will hurt Taiwan’s sovereignty in the long run. 43.0% did not agree with this statement. It is interesting to note that among those interviewed who placed themselves in the pan-green camp, 77.0% agreed with the statement. And among those who considered themselves independents, 51% agreed with the statement. 32.0% of those who affiliated themselves with the pan-blue camp agreed with this statement, while 63.0% did not. 4. 70.7% of those interviewed were worried that if Taiwan furthers economic cooperation with China, it will lead to a flooding of the Taiwan market by Chinese manufactured and agricultural products, which will beat Taiwan’s traditional industries as well as increase the unemployment rate. 27.4% were not worried about this outcome happening. 5. 78.2% agreed that cross-strait negotiations like signing a CECA/ECFA should be made once the ruling party has reached a consensus with the opposition party. 17.8% did not agree with this view. 6. Regarding the CECA/ECFA, 89.2% agree that the policy should be fully discussed and overseen by the Legislative Yuan, while 6.7% did not agree. Among the pan-blue supporters, 88.0% believed that the government should hold discussions with the Legislative Yuan before signing a CECA/ECFA. 7. Of those interviewed, 63.8% thought that the CECA/ECFA would have an impact on Taiwan’s sovereignty, and that it should ultimately be decided through a referendum. 32.3% did not agree with this assessment. 8. 53.6% of those polled did not have confidence in the ability of the current government to defend Taiwanese interests during cross-strait negotiations, while 41.3% felt confident with the government’s ability. 9. 80.2% opposed signing a cross-strait agreement under the One-China Principle. Only 13.3% accept the One-China Principle as a pre-requisite for the signing of any cross-strait agreement. Most people from both camps, as well as independents, share the same attitude against signing any agreement under the One-China Principle. 10. 81.7% believed that adequate management is necessary for economic and trade co-operations between Taiwan and China. And 12.8% felt that co-operation should be completely liberalized. -------------------------------------- Back to the top ------------------------------------8Please note that articles in this publication should not be used as direct quotation unless with the explicit permission from the editor.

Taiwan’s 2009 accession to WHO and WHA:

TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND WHAT WE ARE PAYING FOR WHAT?
For the past few months, the Ma administration has been advertising the possibility it has won an opportunity for Taiwan to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer this May. But what is the price Taiwanese are paying for this deal?

INVOICE
People’s Republic of China Order: Temporary WHA observer status

Price: Taiwan’s sovereignty, Taiwan’s international space, Taiwan’s democracy principle, and the solidarity and stability of Taiwan’s society Paid by: 23,000,000 Taiwanese Purchase made by: Ma Ying-jeou administration

When the DPP administration pushed for Taiwan’s joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), we worked with our international friends and alliances regarding the best strategies to access the organization and also relied on our lobbying efforts. It was a multilateral approach with international support and cooperative effort. Yes, it could be challenging and time-consuming; but by doing so, we left China no room to manipulate its claim of its “right” to give permission about which organization Taiwan can or cannot join. Most importantly, we fought for our own rights in our own way to become a full member of the international organization. The Ma administration, on the other hand, has taken a short-cut: ONLY talk to the source of the impediment to Taiwan’s joining international organizations - China - through a series of closed-door meetings and negotiations. “This is a lazy way of doing it. The secret diplomacy between the Ma government or the KMT with China not only comes with great risks but also has led to immense anxiety in Taiwan society”, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen said, “and what we got is temporary attendance in the WHA’s annual meeting with this status revokable by China at anytime.” She further pointed out that despite the “improvement/calm/stabilization” between the two sides, we should not fail to neglect the other side of the coin- what price Taiwan is paying and what’s the implication for the Asian strategic environment as a whole. (A) Price of Taiwan’s sovereignty This is a grave concern not only for the DPP and its supporters but also for the independent voters and some KMT supporters. Because: 1. The 2005 MOU between the WHO and the Chinese government, which accepted the one-China -9Please note that articles in this publication should not be used as direct quotation unless with the explicit permission from the editor.

principle, is still valid within the WHO. Based on this MOU, China can modify or withdraw its offer at any time upon its own request. *2005 MOU between the WHO and the Chinese government A classified MOU was signed between the Chinese government and the WHO Secretariat in July 2005 in response to the rising international support for “Taiwan’s meaningful participation in WHO” in early 2005. The MOU states: 1. For those medical and public health experts from Taiwan who intend to attend WHO events or conferences, five-week notice is required and their applications have to be agreed by the Ministry of Health of People’s Republic of China. Meanwhile, the experts shall participate in their personal capacity and shall under the level of “director-general” in their institutions or agencies, and they have to be referred to as experts from “Taiwan, China” in all conference materials; 2. If there is a major breakout/epidemic in Taiwan, whether it is “critical/major” will have to be identified by China’s MOH, and whether the WHO should provide Taiwan any medical assistance will have to be agreed by China’s MOD.

The content of the MOU was never uncovered until 2007. The DPP administration never recognized this MOU. 2. Article 3 of the “Rules of Procedure of the World Health Assembly” states that the Director-General may invite 1) States having made application for membership, 2) territories on whose behalf application for associate membership has been made, and 3) states which have signed but not accepted the Constitution to send observers to sessions of the Health Assembly.” This raises great doubts about what condition China and the KMT will agree on and adopt in their backroom negotiations on Taiwan’s qualification for WHA observer status. Even though the Ma administration has repeatedly promised that Taiwan’s sovereignty will not be sacrificed, qualification 1 seems not likely to be accepted by China while Taiwan does not meet qualification 3. Qualification 2 will not be accepted by a majority of the Taiwanese people.

(B) Price of Taiwan’s international space: The Ma administration’s “only talk to China” strategy has the side-effect of “exclusion”- i.e. other countries/members’ involvement is now excluded from the process. This gives China leverage to claim that Taiwan’s participation in WHO/WHA (or in any other organization) is an issue only between Taiwan and China and other countries should not interfere. This is where our worry comes in: Taiwan’s international participation is being “domesticated” by China. (C) Price of Taiwan’s democracy: The China issue is always sensitive and controversial in Taiwan. The secret diplomacy between China and the Ma administration has deeply hurt and violated the democratic principles of transparency, accountability and checks and balances, and resulted in great anxiety among our people. (D) Price of solidarity and stability within Taiwan’s society: The observed rising of anxiety and tensions in Taiwan’s society have made Taiwanese people less confident and feel less secure about their future. Social division and conflict are rising as well. If the Ma government continues to fail to address this problem, it could significantly impact the solidarity and stability of Taiwan’s society - 10 Please note that articles in this publication should not be used as direct quotation unless with the explicit permission from the editor.

In conclusion….. The DPP’s Approach and the KMT’s Approach to Taiwan’s Accession to International Organizations
Rights The DPP Taiwan has its own right to participate in any international organization and does not need permission from any other state. Multilateral International support and collective efforts Taiwan’s accession to IOs is an international issue. WTO full membership enjoying all rights and duties given in the WTO rules. More international friends; More international awareness; Opportunity of building consensus, mutual trust and working relations with other states The KMT Shares China’s mentality that China has a say in Taiwan’s participation in the international organizations.

Approach

Bilateral Secret diplomacy Taiwan’s accession to IOs is an issue between China and Taiwan. Temporary observer status in WHA - no rights given to substantively engage in the organization - status can be canceled anytime. Falling into the trap of “domesticating” the issue: it’s a business only between Taiwan and China; Causing confusion in Taiwan’s international image and stands on its sovereignty; Self-suppressed Taiwan’s international space. People feel anxiety for their future and helpless because everything has to rely on and listen to China and the possible loss of the leverage to make decisions for Taiwan’s future status; people also feel tension because of the alarming signs of growing public anger, social conflicts and divisions.

Defined the issue Accomplishments

International effects

Domestic effects

People feel more confident and safe for their future and feel the sense of responsibility of global citizens, because the world is friendly, supportive and listening, and they can make changes and contributions.

DPP’s Four-Points on WHA
The DPP Central Standing Committee passed and announced the following resolution regarding the issue of Taiwan’s possible participation in the WHA: 1. The DPP rejects the Memorandum of Understanding that the Chinese government signed with the WHA Secretariat. This document has never been made public and submerges Taiwan status under that of China, with Taiwan being considered “China Taiwan”. The DPP rejected this in the past and we reject it again now. 2. The DPP objects to information from the WHA regarding epidemics and other related health information being forwarded to Taiwan after the Chinese government gives its approval. 3. The DPP does not accept a situation where China annually controls whether or not Taiwan participates in WHA activities.
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4. The DPP does not accept China being considered the sovereign state to apply for Taiwan’s participation and having Taiwan become an associate member of either the World Health Organization or the World Health Assembly. This marginalizes Taiwan and its sovereignty, subsuming Taiwan’s sovereignty under that of China’s. It severely undermines Taiwan's sovereignty. The DPP spokesperson, Cheng Wen-tsang, said that the DPP Party Caucus in the Legislative Yuan will use this resolution as guideline to oversee government’s action and performance. -------------------------------------- Back to the top ------------------------------------

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Dr. Tsai’s first official visit to Japan as the DPP Chair
On March 15-17, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen paid her first official visit as the DPP Chairperson to Japan. As a new DPP face to Japan, along with the longstanding friendship between Japan and the DPP administration and the rising anxieties within Japanese society over Ma’s policy shifts toward China, Dr. Tsai’s visit drew great media attention as well as a warm welcome from Japanese political leaders and policy makers across party lines.

(The delegation visited the Nikkakon (日華懇談會))

Delegation members, accompanied by two former Ambassadors to Japan: Amb. Lo Fu-Chen and Amb. Ko Se-Kai, included: the DPP LY Caucus Whip Hon. Ker Chien-ming DPP lawmakers Hon. Chiu Yi-ying, Hon. Chen Yin, Hon. Twu Shiing-jer, former DPP lawmaker and special assistant to the chairperson Hon. Hsiao Bi-khim, and Dr. Lin Chen-wei, former Director of the DPP Department of International Affairs. During this three-day trip, the delegation visited the Nikkakon (日華懇談會), the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Japan, the People’s New Party, and the new Komeito of Japan and exchanged views on the current political situations in Taiwan and Japan, Taiwan-Japan relations, the global financial crisis and regional security etc. A Japanese press conference was held before the delegation returned to Taiwan. Dr. Tsai also delivered a speech on “The Current Situation in Taiwan and Taiwan-Japan Relations” to overseas Taiwanese in Japan. In her speech, Dr. Tsai said that although the KMT has been back in power for less than a year, three alarming trends have been observed: a growing gap between the government’s policy direction (“Sinicization””) and Taiwan’s social consensus (Taiwan identity and Taiwan’s future can only be decided by 23 million Taiwanese), a rolling back of Taiwan’s democracy- back to authoritarian regime, and a rolling back of Taiwan’s society- back to a conservative one. “During the DPP administration, we created the most liberal, open, culturally diverse and democratic society in Taiwanese history. Though we were not able to change the existing “authoritative-based” system developed under the 40-year KMT’s governance, we made our best effort to ensure the system was not violating anyone’s human rights”, Dr. Tsai said. She stressed that the DPP’s ultimate goal is to make Taiwan a free and democratic country with a liberal and culturally-diverse society. Thus, “society must be liberalized, human rights must be protected, culture must be diverse, economy must be autonomic and direct democracy must be ensured because it is the most important means to protect Taiwan”, Dr. Tsai said.
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In international politics, Dr. Tsai said, “Asia will be the region with the greatest potential for development in the next ten years, and it will play a key role in reviving the world economy. Except the urgent need for the regional economic engines, such as Japan, China and India, to conduct necessary reform in their countries, the process needs the collective efforts of all the Asian countries and their consensus on actions that should be taken.“ “What worries us is that the dramatic expansion pushed by Chinese government in its economy could lead to an “unbalanced Asia”, i.e. all Asian economies will have to heavily rely on China’s. We also worry about the possible roll-back in Asian democracy in this global economic downturn. A developing country that is still in the process of democratization is very vulnerable to political instability and economic recession. We hope that all the Asian countries can work together to safeguard democracy because we firmly believe that the foundation of the future development of Asia lies in democracy in each Asian country. The Pan-Asia we have in mind is a democratic Asia in which every country has an autonomic economy and rich and diverse culture”, Dr. Tsai said. “Facing this difficult international environment, Taiwan needs more international support- whether this means bilateral FTA agreements or support for Taiwan to be included and participate in the Asian economic integration process. We hope international society will keep a close eye on what is really going on in cross-strait developments. Please do not neglect the costs Please do not neglect and risks hidden underneath the issue of “stabilizing Cross-strait relations”. Taiwan’s society is now paying a great political price the costs and risks because of this. Our society is polarizing and people are feeling hidden underneath the anxiety and losing confidence in the future. It will likely lead to issue of ‘stabilizing conflict and a destabilizing of society itself. Only when there are Cross-strait relations’ confident Taiwanese will there be a stable Taiwan society; and only when there is a stable Taiwan society, will there be a stable Taiwan; and only when there is a stable Taiwan, will stable Cross-strait relations be possible; and only when there are stable Cross-strait relations, will there be a stable Asia Pacific.

“Only when there are confident Taiwanese, will there be a stable Taiwan society; only when there is a stable Taiwan society, will there be a stable Taiwan; and only when there is a stable Taiwan, will stable Cross-strait relations be possible; and only when there are stable Cross-strait relations, will there be a stable Asia Pacific.

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