9/22/2010

Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident…

Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Voice Products
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.shtml

Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2010 September 22 1600 UTC (GMT) Please provide your feedback on this document.

Contents
Cisco Response Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification Additional Information Revision History Cisco Security Procedures Related Information

Cisco Response
This Applied Mitigation Bulletin is a companion document to the following PSIRT Security Advisories: Cisco IOS Software H.323 Denial of Service Vulnerabilities Cisco IOS Software Session Initiation Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerabilities Cisco Unified Communications Manager Session Initiation Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerabilities This document provides identification and mitigation techniques that administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.

Vulnerability Characteristics
There are multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS Software and Cisco Unified Communications Manager (UCM).
kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.x… 1/19

x… 2/19 . This section of the document provides an overview of these techniques. These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and without end-user interaction.cisco.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… The following subsections summarize these vulnerabilities: H. The attack vectors for exploitation are through a packet using the following protocols and ports: SIP using TCP port 5060 SIP over Transport Layer Security (TLS) using TCP port 5061 SIP using UDP port 5060 SIP using UDP port 5061 (on Cisco UCM only) An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities using spoofed packets. as well as verify the source IP address of. packets that are attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities. Information about vulnerable. Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using the following methods: Infrastructure access control lists (iACLs) Transit access control lists (tACLs) Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) IP source guard (IPSG) These protection mechanisms filter and drop.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100922-cucmsip. Administrators are advised to consider these protection methods to be general security best practices for infrastructure devices and the traffic that transits the network.323 packet using TCP port 1720.shtml http://www. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may cause the affected device to crash or result in a denial of service (DoS) condition. which are available at the following links: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100922-h323.323 Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerabilities: These vulnerabilities affect only Cisco IOS Software. CVE-2009-2051 and CVE-2010-2835. The attack vector for exploitation is through an H. unaffected. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may cause the affected device to crash or may result in a DoS condition.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100922-sip.shtml Mitigation Technique Overview Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for these vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2010-2828 and CVE-2010-2829. These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2010-2834.shtml http://www. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) DoS Vulnerabilities: These vulnerabilities affect both Cisco IOS Software and Cisco UCM. kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice. Repeated attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities could result in a sustained DoS condition.cisco. Repeated attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities could result in a sustained DoS condition. and fixed software is available in the PSIRT Security Advisories. These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and without end-user interaction.

evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change. as well as verify the source IP address of. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Analysis. and Response System (Cisco Security MARS) appliance can also provide visibility through incidents. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Tri age and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes. Unicast RPF should be deployed as close to all traffic sources as possible. traffic behavior. As with any configuration change. The proper deployment and configuration of IPSG provides an effective means of protection against spoofing attacks at the access layer. Risk Management Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Cisco IOS NetFlow records can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts. Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix. Effective means of exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers using tACLs and Unicast RPF. The Cisco Security Monitoring. network topology. and event reporting. Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices: Cisco IOS Routers and Switches Cisco IOS NetFlow Cisco ASA and FWSM Firewalls Cisco Intrusion Prevention System Cisco Security Monitoring.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… The proper deployment and configuration of Unicast RPF provides an effective means of protection against attacks that use packets with spoofed source IP addresses. and organizational mission. and Response System Cisco IOS Routers and Switches kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice. Analysis. Cisco IOS Software and Cisco ASA and FWSM firewalls can provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.x… 3/19 . Effective use of Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) event actions provides visibility into and protection against attacks that attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities. These protection mechanisms filter and drop. queries. packets that are attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams.

0.1 192.1 192. and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks.255 0.255 eq eq eq eq 1720 5060 5061 5060 ! !-.60.60.60.60.0. In the following example.168.255 eq eq eq eq 1720 5060 5061 5060 ! !-.255 0.168.0 192.0 0.0 192.168.that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports ! permit permit permit permit tcp tcp tcp udp host host host host 192.255 0.100.60.168. Whenever possible. 192.60.0 192. For the maximum protection of infrastructure devices.x… 4/19 .60.60. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.1 192.0 192.0.168.168.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices.100.(ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks ! deny deny deny deny tcp tcp tcp udp any any any any 192.60.0 192. ip access-list extended Infrastructure-ACL-Policy ! !-.323 packets on TCP port 1720 and SIP packets on TCP port 5060 and 5061 and UDP port 5060 that are sent to affected devices.60.The following vulnerability-specific access control entries !-.100.Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.0.0.255 ! !-.1 192.168.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… Mitigation: Infrastructure Access Control Lists To protect infrastructure devices and minimize the risk. infrastructure address space should be distinct from the address space used for user and services segments.0.168.0 0. The iACL policy denies unauthorized H.0.0 0. deployed iACLs should be applied in the ingress direction on all interfaces to which an IP address has been configured.0. An iACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.0 192.255 0.168.168.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices. Additional information about iACLs is in Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists.168.168.168.0.the infrastructure address space ! deny ip any 192. Administrators can construct an iACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations.168.0.100. Using this addressing methodology will assist with the construction and deployment of iACLs.0.0.255 0.Explicit deny ACE for traffic sent to addresses configured within !-. administrators are advised to deploy infrastructure access control lists (iACLs) to perform policy enforcement of traffic sent to infrastructure equipment.168.100.Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources !-.0. impact.0.255 0.0. and the host at 192.0.0.0.

60.0. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration command no ip unreachables.255 eq eq eq eq 5060 5061 5060 5061 150 150 150 150 deny deny deny deny tcp tcp udp udp any any any any 192.60.0.60.168. and the host at 192.168.168.60.255 0. ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. The tACL policy denies unauthorized SIP packets on TCP ports 5060 and 5061 and UDP ports 5060 and 5061 that are sent to affected devices.100.100.168.100.60. Additional information about tACLs is in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.0.0 192.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices.168.0.168.168.0 192.168.60. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations.1 192.Apply iACL to interfaces in the ingress direction ! interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ip access-group Infrastructure-ACL-Policy in Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic.0.0 0. or VPN connection points.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.x… 5/19 150 150 150 150 permit permit permit permit tcp tcp udp udp host host host host 192.60.0.with existing security policies and configurations ! !-.255 0.168.0. In Cisco IOS Software.255 0. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.255 0. administrators are advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy enforcement.0 192.168.255 0.60. Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points.0.0.that require access on the vulnerable ports ! access-list access-list access-list access-list ! access-list access-list access-list access-list ! kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.60.0.0.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… !-.100.0. partner and supplier connection points. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device.0 192. !-.100.0.168.0.255 0.168.255 eq eq eq eq 5060 5061 5060 5061 . which may include Internet connection points.168. In the following example.1 192.1 192.0 192.Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources !-. 192. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration command ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms.168.0.1 192.0.0 0.0 192.

ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration command ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… !-.with existing security policies and configurations ! !-. Administrators should not rely on Unicast RPF to provide complete spoofing protection because spoofed packets may enter the network through a Unicast RPF-enabled interface if an appropriate return route to the source IP address exists. Unicast RPF might be enabled at the Internet edge and the internal access layer on the user-supporting Layer 3 interfaces. reference the Understanding Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Applied Intelligence white paper. Mitigation: Spoofing Protection Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding The vulnerabilities that are described in this document can be exploited by spoofed IP packets. IP Source Guard IP source guard (IPSG) is a security feature that restricts IP traffic on nonrouted. For additional information about the configuration and use of Unicast RPF. ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default.Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance !-.Explicit deny for all other IP traffic ! access-list 150 deny ip any any ! !-. In an enterprise environment.x… 6/19 . IPSG coupled with strict kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice. Administrators are advised to take care to ensure that the appropriate Unicast RPF mode (loose or strict) is configured during the deployment of this feature because it can drop legitimate traffic that is transiting the network. Layer 2 interfaces by filtering packets based on the DHCP snooping binding database and manually configured IP source bindings. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration command no ip unreachables. Unicast RPF is configured at the interface level and can detect and drop packets that lack a verifiable source IP address. When properly deployed and configured. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device.Apply tACL to interfaces in the ingress direction ! interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ip access-group 150 in Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. In Cisco IOS Software. Additional information is in the Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Loose Mode Feature Guide. Administrators can use IPSG to prevent attacks from an attacker who attempts to spoof packets by forging the source IP address and/or the MAC address. Administrators can deploy and configure Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) as a protection mechanism against spoofing.

0.168. Administrators should investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met.323 packets on TCP port 1720 and SIP packets on TCP port 5060 and 5061 and UDP port 5060 that have been filtered on interfaces on which the iACL is applied.0.60.60.60.0. such as ACE counter hits.255 eq 1720 20 permit tcp host 192. access list Infrastructure-ACL-Policy has dropped the following packets that are received from an untrusted host or network: 21 H.60.168.1 192. Example output for show ip access-lists Infrastructure-ACL-Policy follows: router#show ip access-lists Infrastructure-ACL-Policy Extended IP access list Infrastructure-ACL-Policy 10 permit tcp host 192.100.168.168. Additional information about the deployment and configuration of IPSG is in Configuring DHCP Features and IP Source Guard.60. Example output for show ip access-lists 150 follows: kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.323 packets on TCP port 1720 for ACE line 50 9 SIP packets on TCP port 5060 for ACE line 60 8 SIP packets on TCP port 5061 for ACE line 70 34 SIP packets on UDP port 5060 for ACE line 80 For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters and syslog events.1 192.0.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… mode Unicast RPF provides the most effective means of spoofing protection for the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.255 eq 1720 (21 matches) 60 deny tcp any 192.0.168.0 0.0.255 eq 5060 (34 matches) 90 deny ip any 192. Identification: Transit Access Control Lists After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface.60.0 0.0 0.0.0 0.0.0.255 router# In the preceding example.168.255 eq 5060 50 deny tcp any 192.0.168.100. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities.0 0. Identification: Infrastructure Access Control Lists After the administrator applies the iACL to an interface.0.60.0 0.0 0.168.168.255 eq 5061 (8 matches) 80 deny udp any 192.60. the show ip access-lists command will identify the number of SIP packets on TCP port 5060 and 5061 and UDP port 5060 and 5061 that have been filtered. The Applied Intelligence white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.0 0.0. the show ip access-lists command will identify the number of H.0.168.168.168.168.x… 7/19 .0.1 192.100.0.100. reference the Iden tifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Applied Intelligence white paper.60.1 192.255 eq 5061 40 permit udp host 192.0 0.0.0.0.255 eq 5060 30 permit tcp host 192.255 eq 5060 (9 matches) 70 deny tcp any 192.

255 eq 5060 (28 matches) 80 deny udp any 192.0.0. and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.168. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports. such as ACE counter hits.0 0. access list 150 has dropped the following packets that are received from an untrusted host or network: 8 SIP packets on TCP port 5060 for ACE line 50 12 SIP packets on TCP port 5061 for ACE line 60 28 SIP packets on UDP port 5060 for ACE line 70 31 SIP packets on UDP port 5061 for ACE line 80 For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters and syslog events.0 0.1 192.255 eq 5060 (8 matches) 60 deny tcp any 192.60. Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution.60.0.0.255 eq 5061 (12 matches) 70 deny udp any 192.0 0.1 192. reference the Iden tifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Applied Intelligence white paper. Identification: Access List Logging The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… router#show ip access-lists 150 Extended IP access list 150 10 permit tcp host 192. For Cisco IOS Software.100.60.0.0.0.100. kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.255 eq 5060 40 permit udp host 192.0.0. the ip access-list logging interval interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by ACL logging.168.168.0. The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers with Supervisor Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.168. Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met.168.0.168.0 0.100.0 0.0 0. The Applied Intelligence white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.0.0 0.168. The logging rate-limit rate-per-second [except loglevel] command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.0.60.0.168.0 0.168.255 eq 5061 30 permit udp host 192.60.1 192.168.0. For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging.1 192.0.60. log transmission. reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Applied Intelligence white paper.60.168.255 eq 5061 50 deny tcp any 192.100.x… 8/19 .60. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation.255 eq 5060 20 permit tcp host 192.255 eq 5061 (31 matches) 90 deny ip any any router# In the preceding example.168.

x… 9/19 .9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… Identification: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding With Unicast RPF properly deployed and configured throughout the network infrastructure. allow self-ping 18 verification drops 0 suppressed verification drops router# router#show cef drop CEF Drop Statistics Slot Encap_fail Unresolved Unsupported RP 27 0 0 router# No_route 18 No_adj 0 ChkSum_Err 0 router#show ip cef switching statistics feature IPv4 CEF input features: Path Feature Consume Drop 0 RP PAS uRPF 18 Total 18 0 -CLI Output Truncated -router# Punt 0 0 Punt2Host Gave route 0 0 0 0 router#show ip traffic | include RPF 18 no route.4(20)T. Additional information about command modifiers is in the show command sections of the Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference. allow default. Command completion is not available for it. sdrop=0 router# Note: show cef interface type slot/port internal is a hidden command that must be fully entered at the command-line interface. 0 forced drop router# In the preceding show cef drop. the command show ip cef switching has been replaced by show ip cef switching statistics feature. router#show ip interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 | begin verify IP verify source reachable-via RX. drop=18. router#show cef interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 internal | include drop ip verify: via=rx (allow default). Unicast RPF has dropped 18 IP packets received globally on all interfaces with Unicast RPF configured because of the inability to verify the source address of the IP packets within the Forwarding Information Base of kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice. administrators can use the show cef interface type slot/port internal. show cef drop. show ip interface. acl=0. show ip cef switching statistics feature and show ip traffic examples. Note: The show command | begin regex and show command | include regex command modifiers are used in the following examples to minimize the amount of output that administrators will need to parse to view the desired information. show ip cef switching statistics feature and show ip traffic commands to identify the number of packets that Unicast RPF has dropped. Note: Beginning with Cisco IOS Software version 12. 18 unicast RPF.

9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… Cisco Express Forwarding. 4456704 bytes 1885 active.4 TCP-FTP 236 0.0 0.1 4.8 1 196 22.168.228 192.0 22. 0 added.2 192.000 .10.0 2 230 0.89.005 .0 3 61 0.3 Total: 59957957 14.13.88.0 0.8 1 48 3.168.4 4.17 10.202.97 192.168.1 0.001 .4 UDP-NTP 287252 0.0 0.168.8 1 211 18.0 19. 1 chunk added last clearing of statistics never Protocol Total Flows Packets Bytes Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec) -------Flows /Sec /Flow /Pkt /Sec /Flow /Flow TCP-Telnet 11393421 2.168.000 .197 192. router#show ip cache flow IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets): 1-32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320 352 384 416 448 480 .0 1.18.0 4 73 0.60.0 1 1132 0. Cisco IOS NetFlow Identification: Traffic Flow Identification Using NetFlow Records Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. 402056 bytes 0 active.6 15.000 .0 1.0 0.0 3.0 1.1 7.0 15.000 .5 IPv6INIP 15 0. 63651 inactive.004 .222.168.0 1.222 Pr 06 06 06 11 11 11 SrcP 0984 0911 0016 2B3E 2B89 007B DstP 06B8 13C5 22C2 13C4 13C5 007B Pkts 1 3 1 5 1 1 10/19 kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.168. 16384 inactive.168.010 .0 0.3 UDP-DNS 582 0.0 21 1020 0.9 ICMP 11674 0.0 13726 1294 0.201 192.0 15.60.3 TCP-BGP 1 0.256 .8 4.144 10. 0 force free 1 chunk.7 TCP-other 47861004 11.698 .0 0.0 12 66 0. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.003 .0 1.9 0.4 15.000 .5 UDP-other 310347 0.150.000 . 0 added to flow 0 alloc failures.1 TCP-WWW 22282 0.x… .0 18.001 .10.000 .0 15.0 1 40 0.16 192.0 15.004 .0 TCP-Frag 70399 0.011 .1 0.8 TCP-FTPD 21 0.54 192. 0 flow alloc failures Active flows timeout in 30 minutes Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds IP Sub Flow Cache.0 1 76 0.000 IP Flow Switching Cache.16 DstIf Gi0/1 Gi0/1 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 Gi0/1 Gi0/1 DstIPaddress 192.161 192.000 .000 .168.8 15.3 TCP-X 719 0.0 1 48 0.60.000 .000 . 59960004 added 129803821 ager polls.000 .168.0 1 40 0.4 GRE 4 0.5 SrcIf Gi0/0 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 SrcIPaddress 192.000 .000 .60.0 1 688 0.5 0.000 512 544 576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608 .11.

41. there are multiple flows for H.60.168.185 Gi0/1 192.168.226.168.*(13C4|13C5)_ SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Gi0/0 192.89.60.168.168.168. The packets in these flows may be spoofed and may indicate an attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities.97 10.0/24 address block.168.17 Gi0/1 192. the command show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.168.168.150.89.89.60.131 Gi0/1 192.117 Gi0/1 192.16.64 Gi0/1 192.11.123.168. which is used by affected devices.60.217 06 3003 router# DstP 13C5 06B8 13C5 13C4 06B8 Pkts 6 21 18 1 12 To view only the traffic flows for SIP packets on UDP port 5060 (hex value 13C4) and 5061 (hex value 13C5).141.101 Gi0/1 192.168.12.27 192.168.168.323 on TCP port 1720 (hex value 06B8) and SIP on TCP port 5060 (hex value 13C4) and 5061 (hex value 13C5) and UDP port 5060 (hex value 13C4) and 5061 (hex value 13C5).40.18.60 Gi0/0 10.70 Gi0/1 192.168.60.60.168.102 192.1 Gi0/1 192.185 Gi0/1 192.168.182 06 2487 Gi0/0 192.168.150. the command show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.*(13C4|13C5)_ will display the related UDP NetFlow records as shown here: UDP Flows router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.168.60.60.168.168.160. To view only the traffic flows for H.205 06 1C99 Gi0/0 192.168.168.60.163 Gi0/0 192.10.88.11.168.102.8 Gi0/1 192.60.168.121 06 3AB0 Gi0/0 192.168.168.60.162 Gi0/0 192.13.245 Gi0/0 192.12.150.*(06B8|13C4|13C5)_ will display the related TCP NetFlow records as shown here: TCP Flows router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.60.9/22/2010 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 router# Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… 192.150.22 192.136 06 4567 Gi0/0 192.27 router# Pr 11 11 11 11 11 SrcP 04AA 189D 2983 4098 1089 DstP 13C4 13C5 13C4 13C5 13C4 Pkts 6 1 18 1 2 kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.20 Gi0/0 192.168.97 Gi0/1 192.60 06 06 11 06 06 11 06 11 06 06 3BD7 12CA 1A84 3931 0016 1039 0B40 007B 3409 4322 13C4 0016 00A1 13C5 12CA 13C4 13C5 007B 06B8 0016 1 1 1 3 1 5 1 1 1 1 In the preceding example.230 Gi0/1 192.168.219 10.60.168.60.168.323 packets on TCP port 1720 (hex value 06B8) and SIP packets on TCP port 5060 (hex value 13C4) and 5061 (hex value 13C5).110 Gi0/1 192.10.100 Gi0/1 192. Administrators are advised to compare these flows to baseline utilization for SIP traffic sent on UDP port 5060 and 5061 and also investigate the flows to determine whether they are sourced from untrusted hosts or networks.x… 11/19 .168.168.86 Gi0/1 192.133.226 Gi0/1 192.60.160 192.168.7 Gi0/1 192.141.168.230 Gi0/1 192.226 Gi0/1 192.*(06B8|13C4|13C5)_ SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP Gi0/0 192.168.12.226 192.158 192.60.60.168.239 10.16. The SIP packets on UDP port 5060 and 5061 are sent to addresses within the 192.168.

1 udp host 192.168.168.255.0 255.60.0 192.with existing security policies and configurations ! !-.Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources !-.0 192.100. 192. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.1 ! !-.323 packets on TCP port 1720 and SIP packets on TCP port 5060 and 5061 and UDP port 5060 and 5061 that are sent to affected devices.255.0 eq sip access-list tACL-Policy extended permit 192.60.1 tcp host 192.that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports ! access-list tACL-Policy extended permit 192.60.168.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… Cisco ASA and FWSM Firewalls Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points.255.60. which may include Internet connection points.168.The following vulnerability-specific access control entries !-.100.0 255.255. Additional information about tACLs is in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.255.0 255. partner and supplier connection points.168.1 tcp host 192.255.255.168.255.255.168.168.168.255.(ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks ! access-list access-list access-list access-list access-list tACL-Policy tACL-Policy tACL-Policy tACL-Policy tACL-Policy extended extended extended extended extended deny deny deny deny deny tcp tcp tcp udp udp any any any any any 192.60. In the following example.168.0 192.0 255.168. and the host at 192.100.168.100.255.255.60.0 eq sip access-list tACL-Policy extended permit 192.60.0 eq h323 access-list tACL-Policy extended permit 192.100.60. or VPN connection points.255.255.255. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.255.0 192.60.168.255.168.255.255. administrators are advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement.0 eq 5061 access-list tACL-Policy extended permit 192.0 eq 5061 tcp host 192.168. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations.0 255. ! !-.0 255.0 255.0 255.255.Explicit deny for all other IP traffic kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.x… 12/19 .0 255.0 eq eq eq eq eq h323 sip 5061 sip 5061 ! !-.Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance !-.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices.60.168.100.0 255.60. The tACL policy denies unauthorized H.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices.1 udp host 192.168.

100.60.168.Apply tACL to interface(s) in the ingress direction ! access-group tACL-Policy in interface outside Mitigation: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding The vulnerabilities that are described in this document can be exploited by spoofed IP packets.255.255.255.255.0 255. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities.255.255.60. 11 elements access-list tACL-Policy line 1 extended permit tcp host 192.168.0 eq sip (hitcnt=0) access-list tACL-Policy line 3 extended permit tcp host 192.255.1 192.0 255.x… 13/19 .100.0 255.60.0 eq 5061 (hitcnt=0) access-list tACL-Policy line 4 extended permit udp host 192.0 255.168. Identification: Transit Access Control Lists After the tACL has been applied to an interface.0 eq sip (hitcnt=8) access-list tACL-Policy line 8 extended deny tcp any 192.60.0 255.168.168.60.168.168.255.1 192.168.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… ! access-list tACL-Policy extended deny ip any any ! !-.255.255.0 eq 5061 (hitcnt=14) kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice. Administrators should not rely on Unicast RPF to provide complete spoofing protection because spoofed packets may enter the network through a Unicast RPF-enabled interface if an appropriate return route to the source IP address exists.60.0 eq h323 (hitcnt=0) access-list tACL-Policy line 2 extended permit tcp host 192.100.168.168.1 192.0 255. Unicast RPF might be enabled at the Internet edge and at the internal access layer on the user-supporting Layer 3 interfaces.0 255. administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of H.100.255.255.0 eq 5061 (hitcnt=0) access-list tACL-Policy line 6 extended deny tcp any 192.0 eq h323 (hitcnt=17) access-list tACL-Policy line 7 extended deny tcp any 192.168. reference the Cisco Security Appliance Command Reference for ip verify reverse-path and the Understanding Unicast Reverse Path Forwardi ng Applied Intelligence white paper.0 eq sip (hitcnt=0) access-list tACL-Policy line 5 extended permit udp host 192.168.1 192.255.255. Administrators can deploy and configure Unicast RPF as a protection mechanism against spoofing. For additional information about the configuration and use of Unicast RPF.255. Unicast RPF is configured at the interface level and can detect and drop packets that lack a verifiable source IP address.60. In an enterprise environment.323 packets on TCP port 1720 and SIP packets on TCP port 5060 and 5061 and UDP port 5060 and 5061 that have been filtered.255.0 255. Example output for show access-list tACLPolicy follows: firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy access-list tACL-Policy.60.168.100.1 192.

It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.168.255.175/2950 dst inside:192.168. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.0.0.2.38/5060 by access-group "tACL-Policy" Sep 22 2010 00:14:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.0.60.0 eq 5061 (hitcnt=3) access-list tACL-Policy line 11 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=0) firewall# In the preceding example.191/5060 by access-group "tACL-Policy" Sep 22 2010 00:11:42: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.168.115/5060 by access-group "tACL-Policy" Sep 22 2010 00:13:10: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.2.60.2 . Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message.99/2946 dst inside:192.18/2944 dst inside:192.x… 14/19 .9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… access-list tACL-Policy line 9 extended deny udp any 192. access list tACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network: 17 H.2.168. Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression. In the following example.2.168. 8.100/2947 dst inside:192.0.2.106023. the messages logged for the tACL tACL-Policy show potentially spoofed SIP packets for UDP port 5060 and 5061 sent to the address block assigned to affected devices.0 255. the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall.255.323 packets on TCP port 1720 for ACE line 6 8 SIP packets on TCP port 5060 for ACE line 7 14 SIP packets on TCP port 5061 for ACE line 8 30 SIP packets on UDP port 5060 for ACE line 9 3 SIP packets on UDP port 5061 for ACE line 10 Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword present.168.60. kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.60.0. firewall#show logging | grep 106023 Sep 22 2010 00:10:03: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.60.Configuring Logging.0 255.200/2945 dst inside:192.168.255.2.0 eq sip (hitcnt=30) access-list tACL-Policy line 10 extended deny udp any 192. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.0.255.60.33/1720 by access-group "tACL-Policy" Sep 22 2010 00:11:53: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.60.88/2949 dst inside:192.250/5061 by access-group "tACL-Policy" firewall# In the preceding example.168. Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitorin g .240/5061 by access-group "tACL-Policy" Sep 22 2010 00:12:28: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.60.

60. Cisco Intrusion Prevention System Mitigation: Cisco IPS Signature Event Actions Administrators can use Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) appliances and services modules to provide kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.60. 8.100 on interface outside The show asp drop command can also identify the number of packets that the Unicast RPF feature has dropped.60.168. firewall#show logging | grep 106021 Sep 22 2010 00:15:13: %ASA-1-106021: Deny UDP reverse path check from 192. Unicast RPF has dropped 11 IP packets received on interfaces with Unicast RPF configured. Additional information about syslog messages for the FWSM is in Catalyst 6500 Series Swi tch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module Logging System Log Messages.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… Additional information about syslog messages for ASA security appliances is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Messages.168.60.168.100 on interface outside Sep 22 2010 00:15:13: %ASA-1-106021: Deny UDP reverse path check from 192. For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog events. Absence of output indicates that the Unicast RPF feature on the firewall has not dropped packets. reference the Cisco Security Appliance Command Reference for show asp drop. Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitorin g .1 to 192. For additional information about debugging accelerated security path dropped packets or connections. Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.106021.60. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module. Identification: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Firewall syslog message 106021 will be generated for packets denied by Unicast RPF.168.1 to 192. the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall.2 .1 to 192.100 on interface outside Sep 22 2010 00:15:13: %ASA-1-106021: Deny UDP reverse path check from 192. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.60.168. In the following example. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message. 8. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.x… 15/19 .168.Configuring Logging. as shown in the following example: firewall#show asp drop frame rpf-violated Reverse-path verify failed firewall# 11 In the preceding example.2. reference the Identifying Incidents Usi ng Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Applied Intelligence white paper.

Signature 30059/0 is not enabled by default. Signature 30059/1 fires when an attempt to exploit a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) packet processing vulnerability over TCP is detected. Cisco Security Monitoring. Firing of this signature may indicate a potential exploit of these vulnerabilities.MALFORMED SIP MESSAGE 30059-1 . and Response System (Cisco Security MARS) appliance can create kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice.x and greater.x… 16/19 . and Response System Identification: Cisco Security Monitoring. Cisco IPS sensors are most effective when deployed in inline protection mode combined with the use of an event action. triggers a Medium severity event. Administrators can configure Cisco IPS sensors to perform an event action when an attack is detected. 30059-1 . these vulnerabilities can be detected by signature 30059/0 (Signature Name: Malformed SIP Message). triggers a Medium severity event.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… threat detection and help prevent attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.x and greater. has a signature fidelity rating (SFR) of 15. Signature 30059/0 fires when an attempt to exploit a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) packet processing vulnerability over UDP is detected. these vulnerabilities may be detected by the following signatures: 30059-0 . Automatic Threat Prevention for Cisco IPS 6. and is configured with a default event action of produce-alert. Exploits that use spoofed IP addresses may cause a configured event action to inadvertently deny traffic from trusted sources. Analysis. and is configured with a default event action of produce-alert. Firing of this signature may indicate a potential exploit of these vulnerabilities. and Response System Incidents The Cisco Security Monitoring. has a signature fidelity rating (SFR) of 15. For additional information about the risk rating and threat rating calculation. reference Risk Rating and Threat Rat ing: Simplify IPS Policy Management. these vulnerabilities can be detected by signature 30059/1 (Signature Name: Malformed SIP Message).MALFORMED SIP MESSAGE Beginning with signature update S514 for sensors running Cisco IPS version 6.MALFORMED SIP MESSAGE 30059-0 . Analysis. Analysis. The configured event action performs preventive or deterrent controls to help protect against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. Signature 30059/1 is not enabled by default.MALFORMED SIP MESSAGE Beginning with signature update S514 for sensors running Cisco IPS version 6.x and greater sensors that are deployed in inline protection mode provides threat prevention against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. Threat prevention is achieved through a default override that performs an event action for triggered signatures with a riskRatingValue greater than 90.

Because MARS will not include these events in inspection rules. obtaining assistance with security kbase/…/cisco-amb-20100922-voice. Additional Information THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY. Revision History Revision 1. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.3. Caution: If dynamic signature updates are not configured.com or from a local web server. the following Cisco Security MARS rule will be triggered: System Rule: CS-MARS IPS Signature Update Failure When this feature is enabled and configured. By default.9/22/2010 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Ident… incidents regarding events that are related to the vulnerabilities that are described in this document using IPS signature 30059/0 (Signature Name: Malformed SIP Message) and signature 30059/1 (Signature Name: Malformed SIP Message). administrators can determine the current signature version downloaded by MARS by selecting Help > About and reviewing the IPS Signature Version value. support for the Cisco IPS dynamic signature updates feature has been added. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. After the S514 dynamic signature update has been downloaded. correctly processes and categorizes received events that match those signatures.1 releases of Cisco Security MARS appliances. this feature is enabled but requires configuration.1 releases. and they also enable the MARS appliance to parse new signatures from the IPS devices.0 2010-September-22 Initial public release.1 and 5. If it is not configured.3.x… 17/19 . This feature downloads new signatures from Cisco.3.3. Cisco Security Procedures Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products. These updates provide event normalization and event group mapping. events that match these new signatures appear as unknown event type in queries and reports.1 and 5. and includes them in inspection rules and reports. using keyword NR30059/0 for IPS signature 30059/0 or using keyword NR-30059/1 for IPS signature 30059/1 and a query type of All Matching Events on the Cisco Security MARS appliance will provide a report that lists the incidents created by the IPS signature. INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. Beginning with the 4. Additional information about dynamic signature updates and instructions for configuring dynamic signature updates are available for the Cisco Security MARS 4. incidents may not be created for potential threats or attacks that occur within the network.

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