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I affirm. I value morality. From the resolution we can derive 3 points: 1) Negating obligates adherence to the status quo of treating juveniles charged with violent felonies in a juvenile court system. 2) The negative is defending the status quo, thus, negative fiats must be dropped. 3) If I as the affirmative provide moral obligation to not use the juvenile courts system and treat offenders as adults, you affirm. The essence of morality is derived from contracts. Benson:
Peter Benson. LAW AND MORALITY: CONTRACT LAW: CONTRACT AS A TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP. 2007. William and Mary College.
All agree that contracts are, and must be, voluntary transactions, in this way differing from transactions that come under the law of tort or unjust enrichment. Unless an agreement is voluntary on both sides, it cannot be binding and so cannot be a contract at all.
Voluntary interaction is the essential basis of obligation in contract.Understanding the voluntary character of contract would therefore seem crucial to clarifying its moral basisas well as its distinctive place within private law. But what makes an
agreement voluntary? Most would root the voluntariness of contract in the fact that it arises through the parties' consent. Contract is essentially consensual and in virtue of this it is voluntary. So, for example, Samuel Pufendorf begins his classic discussion On the Consent Required in Promises and Pacts with the proposition, which he presents as self-evident, that no more pertinent reason can be advanced, whereby a man can be prevented from complaining hereafter of having to carry such a burden [of the necessity of doing something] than that he agreed to it of his own accord, and sought on his own judgement what he had full power to refuse. n1 The question is what, if any, conception of consent can function as the essential basis of contractual obligation.I have put the question this way because what we are seeking is a unified and coherent moral basis for contract. It is the central question that I address. The legal point of view itself supposes that a certain sort of consent is pertinent to contract law. We begin with this, because our aim is to elucidate and to justify a conception of consent that is at [*1674] least implicit in the widely recognized principles of contract law and so part of our public reason. Now the sort of consent that is supposed by contract law isone that is
necessary and sufficientfor contract formation and therefore for the establishment of a relation of right and duty between the parties at the moment of agreement.The relation of right and duty arises through the parties' mutual
expressions of assent, prior to and independent of the moment of performance. From a legal point of view, no new rights or duties arise between the parties after formation, whether by performance or by breach. The contractual rights and duties between the
parties are completely specified and determined at formation. Performance adds nothing new but is just the fulfillment of the rights and duties established at contract formation. More precisely, performance respects those rights whereas breach injures them.The character and shape of these rights is
reflected in the fact that they are specified only as between the parties, not against others who are strangers to the contract, and that their breach is remedied through damages or specific performance, both of which aim to put the plaintiff in the position he or she would have been in had the defendant performed as promised. The law supposes that these remedies are necessary and sufficient to enforce, by way of compensation, the rights and duties that are brought into existence by the parties' consents at contract formation. All this seems relatively clear and uncontroversial. To see that it is not, I turn to the celebrated essay by Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.
Due to the wording of the resolution, the only actor in the debate is the United States government. The ultimate contract in the United States is the Constitution. Adherence to the constitution is an inviolable constraint on government decisions.Gingo: The United States Constitution is the highest law of the land. All other laws are subject to the United States Constitution. If there are any state constitutions or federal or state statutes that the court finds contrary on their face, in their application, or that they are vague or overbroad, then the United States Constitution will prevail as the ultimate law of the land and the statute will not be applied.
and some. Pennsylvania. Ainsworth explains. liberty and property. by the very corrections officials charged with their rehabilitation and protection. But 12. the system of juvenile detention is inherently causing rights violations. 12.
report abuse. Of those victimized by staff. The Juvenile Court (Winter. No. pp. When the staff sexually abuses inmates. 2.
The Court's Effectiveness in Protecting the Rights of Juveniles in Delinquency CasesAuthor(s): Janet E. Nevertheless.
Kaiser 2: A full 85 percent of the abuse reported in the study was perpetrated not by other inmates but by staff. the Court pulled back from enforcing complete procedural parity between the adult and juvenile systems in McKeiverv .
When you deny the right to a jury. since some inmates make false claims. 1996).23 holding that juveniles charged with crimes were not entitled to jury trials. Ainsworth 2: Judges. juveniles will face unfair incarceration. and 33 percent by more than one facility employee.220 out of the 26. particularly in high-volume courts such as juvenile court. choose not to
most experts believe that the numbers such studies produce are usually too low. not other inmates. Juvenile detention centers deny the right to a jury. compared with the one or two that jurors hear during their service. the survey shows that thousands of children are raped and molested every year while in the government¶s care²most often. Treatment of juveniles in juvenile detention centers violates the 7thAmendment. This violates the Constitution by denying the juveniles their 1st Amendment right to life.1% of offenders were sexually abused at some point. Vol. Having to sit on so many cases. 88 percent had been abused repeatedly. I contend that the treatment Juveniles in the status quo violates the constitution. 27 percent more than ten times. Overall.Jamis Barcott Glacier Peak
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Thus the standard is Upholding the Constitution. Treatment of Juveniles in juvenile detention centers violates the1stAmendment. hear hundreds. 64-74Published
The Supreme Court in the Gault case expressed skepticism that the ostensible benefits of the traditional juvenile court system justified denial to juveniles of the basic procedural due process rights accorded to adult defendants. 6. AinsworthSource: The Future of Children. 1. of cases a year. Those who took the survey had been in their facilities for an average of just half a year.1 percent of youthstaking the BJS survey across the country said they¶d been sexually abused at their current facility during the preceding year. Kaiser explains:
This is a difficult problem to measure. judges may become less careful in weighing the evidence and more cynical in evaluating the credibility of the juveniles who appear
There are a number of reasons juries are more likely to acquit than judges. 3.550 who were
eligible to take it. even thousands. fearing retaliation even when promised anonymity. When placed in juvenile courts. In essence. That¶s approximately 3.
USA. and (2) the procedural safeguards adequately met the requirements of due process. Ainsworth 4: Juveniles who are not represented by counsel are not likely to exercise their other procedural rights effectively.´29 It is virtually impossible to
. or beliefs might adversely affect the way in which he or she would hear the case. a) Juvenile detention courts deny the right to representation. San Luis Obispo. Negating violates the 5th Amendment. No comparable opportunity exists to inquire into potential bias or prejudice by the judge in a bench trial. reveals significant flaws. 2Professor of Philosophy. which is essential for a functioning and fair system of criminal justice. This is all the more likely when they know before trial of the juvenile's prior record. Fetzer 2:
The primary rationale of the Court was that New York¶s preventive detention law (1) served a legitimate state objective. affirming denies the offender the right to a jury.
In addition. 3. and to propose alternatives to the dispositions advocated by the prosecution. California Polytechnic State University. First. in which the litigants may probe to determine whether any juror's attitudes. USA
The New York Court act authorized pretrial detention of an accused juvenile delinquent based on the finding thata ³serious risk´ existed that a child might commit a crime prior to completion of a fact-finding hearing. Ainsworth 3
For example. or have read the probation officer's report on the juvenile's social background. The impact is that when you deny adequate representation you violate the Constitution and thus the morality necessary to contract adherence.
the parties in a jury trial have an opportunity to exclude jurors whose personal biases may prevent them from fairly trying the case. Jurors undergo voir dire examination. Fetzer:
Professor of Political Science.Jamis Barcott Glacier Peak
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before them. CA. Thus. however. California Polytechnic State University. They are severely hampered in their ability to contest the charges against them. Both lower courts that examined the issue concluded that ³only occasionally and accidentally does pretrial detention under 320. experiences.5 [of the Family Court Act] : prevent the commission of a crime. concluding that only 4% of the lawyers in juvenile court provided effective assistance of counsel to their clients. b) The juvenile court system arbitrarily detains juveniles. San Luis Obispo. CA. Close scrutiny of these arguments. to challenge their detention. have heard the motion to suppress a confession.
a study of the New York juvenile courts commissioned by the state bar criticized almost every aspect of the representation received in juvenile court. This allows juvenile courts to detain individuals who have not been tried and proven guilty for their crimes. there is no adequate evidence that detention of presumptively innocent juveniles is likely to lower the rate of juvenile crime.
For example.´ Under such circumstances. Thus.30 Second. the State is supposed to protect individuals who are not able to take care of themselves. without the due process of law. however.´ 2) This arbitrary imprisonment does not deter or prevent other felonious actions by those detained. But the New York law that the Court found constitutional does nothing of the kind.´31 these standards appear to be much lower than the standards demanded in adult criminal courts. why were they confined in the first place? Third.´35 Such treatment might be distinguished from ³punishment´ on the grounds that the injuries they suffer are not intended as retribution for wrongdoing.34 The juveniles affected by the law are subject to ³secure detention. ³ µthe vast majority¶ of persons
detained under 320. The Court majority concluded.´ not a punitive purpose.
There are 4 impacts: 1) Juveniles are inherently losing their 5th Amendment Right that ³No person shall be«deprived of life.it has been noted that in a hearing of between five and fifteen minutes. To say that the injuries suffered by juveniles who are preventively detained are the unintended result of regulation neitherjustifies these injuries nor the loss of liberty that led to the injuries.Jamis Barcott Glacier Peak
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determine those instances in which the asserted ends are met due to application of this provision and those in which they are not. In fact. It is not constitutional to punish someone who has not been found guilty of a crime. although the Supreme Court concluded that procedural safeguards met the standard of ³fundamental fairness. the contractual consent that is both necessary and sufficient for the achievement of morality and you affirm. liberty and property. The judge has scant grounds for making a reliable prediction. these Constitutional violations will never be solved. a New York Family Court judge receives ³no guidance regarding what kinds of evidence he should consider or what weight he should accord different sorts of material in deciding whether to detain a juvenile´ under the act.´33 Since most detainees were not considered dangerous enough to confine after more careful judicial scrutiny than at the detention hearing. that pretrial detention serves a ³regulatory. 3) This arbitrary imprisonment leads to Constitutional rights violations outlined in Contention 1. we challenge the Court¶s
Under the historical meaning of parenspatriae.32 The judge is then expected to make a prediction as to which juveniles are most likely to commit crimes in the period prior to the hearing. they may be exposed to physical and sexual assault and other injuries ³comparable to those associated with imprisonment of an adult.
. 4) These violations are cyclical and so without a shift from the status quo.
assertion that preventive detention statutes promote the welfare of children. negating violates the Constitution and therefore. This appears to us to be a distinction without a difference.5 : : : are released either before or immediately after their trials.