SPACE NEG 2.

0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

SPACE NEG 2.0
Space Militarization Bad F/L...................................................................................................................4 Space Militarization Bad Exts: Hegemony..............................................................................................5 Space Militarization Good F/L.................................................................................................................7 Space Militarization Good F/L.................................................................................................................8 Space Militarization Good F/L.................................................................................................................9 Space Militarization Good F/L...............................................................................................................10 Space Militarization Good Exts: Prolif..................................................................................................11 Space Militarization Good Exts: WMD.................................................................................................12 AT: Space Militarization Inevitable.......................................................................................................14 Space Exploration-> Militarization........................................................................................................15 Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................16 Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................16 Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................18 Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................19 Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................20 Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................21 Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................22 Solvency F/L.............................................................................................................................................23 Solvency Exts: Disease.............................................................................................................................24 Space Colonization F/L...........................................................................................................................25 Space Colonization F/L...........................................................................................................................26 Space Colonization F/L...........................................................................................................................27 Space Colonization F/L...........................................................................................................................28 Weapons Security Case Turn.................................................................................................................30 KO Information Warfare F/L................................................................................................................31 KO Information Warfare F/L................................................................................................................32 Generic Competitiveness F/L..................................................................................................................33 Generic Competitiveness F/L..................................................................................................................34 CM Competitiveness Block.....................................................................................................................35 CO Competitiveness Block......................................................................................................................36 Competitiveness- Space Mil Turn..........................................................................................................37
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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA Competitiveness- Space Mil Turn..........................................................................................................39 F-22 Trade-Off Disad..............................................................................................................................41 F-22 Trade-Off Disad..............................................................................................................................42 F-22 Trade-Off Disad..............................................................................................................................43 F-22 Trade-Off Disad: 2NC OVERVIEW............................................................................................44 F-22 Trade-Off Disad Exts: Heg Impact...............................................................................................46 Space Militarization China Disad..........................................................................................................47 Space Miltarization China Disad...........................................................................................................48 Space Militarization China Disad Exts: Link.......................................................................................49 Space Mil CTBT Turn.............................................................................................................................50 Space Militarization Indo-Pak Disad.....................................................................................................51 Politics Links: Info Warfare Unpopular...............................................................................................52 Politics Links: Dems Oppose..................................................................................................................55 Politics Links: NASA Popular................................................................................................................56 Japan CP Solvency..................................................................................................................................57 Private Sector CP 1NC...........................................................................................................................58 Private Sector CP Solvency....................................................................................................................59 Private Sector CP Solvency.....................................................................................................................60 Cooperation Counterplan 1NC..............................................................................................................62 Cooperation Counterplan – Solvency Exts............................................................................................63 Cooperation Counterplan- Solvency Exts.............................................................................................64 Cooperation Counterplan- Solvency Exts.............................................................................................66 Cooperation Counterplan – AT: China Not Ready..............................................................................67 Cooperation Counterplan – AT: Kills US Business .............................................................................68 Cooperation Counterplan – AT: China Gets US Tech Secrets ..........................................................69 CO Japan F/L...........................................................................................................................................70 CO Japan F/L...........................................................................................................................................71 SPS= Energy.............................................................................................................................................73 SPS= Energy.............................................................................................................................................74 AT: Demonstrations................................................................................................................................75 NASA Say No...........................................................................................................................................76 AT: Fermilab............................................................................................................................................77 AT: Fermilab- Exts..................................................................................................................................78
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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA Space K 1NC Shell...................................................................................................................................80 Space K Link Exts- Colonialism............................................................................................................81 Space K- AT: Perm do Both...................................................................................................................82 Space K Link Exts- Authoritarianism...................................................................................................83 Rocket Launches Environ. Turn............................................................................................................84 Rocket Launches Environ. Turn Exts...................................................................................................85 Rocket Launches Environ. Turn Exts...................................................................................................86 Rocket Launches Environ. Turn Exts...................................................................................................87

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

Space Militarization Bad F/L

Space weaponization key to U.S. hegemony Everett C. Dolman, , 9-14-05 Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,” http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US %20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf This rationality does not dispute the fact that US deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future. This would clearly be threatening, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than any other state doing so. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the status quo, there is also a sense that it is at least tolerable to the majority of states. A continuation of it is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working towards its demise. So long as the US does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. Hegemony key to prevent global nuclear war Zalmay Khalilzad, Senior assistant at RAND Institute and former U.S. ambassador Spring, 1995, The Washington Quarterly, Rethinking Grand Strategy, Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War, Lexis Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

Space Militarization Bad Exts: Hegemony

Space weaponization key to hegemony- global control and surveillance Center for Defense Information, 4-18-02, Theresa Hitches- CDI Vice President, “Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette?,” http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm The United States already enjoys an overwhelming advantage in military use of space; space assets such as the Global Positioning System satellite network have proven invaluable in improving precision-targeting giving the U.S. military a decisive battlefield edge. There would be even a more formidable military advantage to possession of weapons in space — global power projection and the enormous difficulty in defending against space weapons aimed at terrestrial targets. "It is ... possible to project power through and from space in response to events anywhere in the world. Having this capability would give the United States a much stronger deterrent and, in a conflict, an extraordinary military advantage," notes the Space Commission report.

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

Space Militarization Good F/L

Space militarization sparks accidental war David Ritchie, 1982, “Space War,” p. 191-2, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1768/ Perhaps the greatest danger posed by the militarization of space is that of war by accident. At any given time, several thousand satellites and other pieces of equipment -- spent booster stages and the like -- are circling the earth, most of them in low orbit. The space immediately above the atmosphere has begun to resemble an expressway at rush hour. It is not uncommon for satellites to miss each other by only a kilometer or two, and satellites crashing into each other may explain some of the mysterious incidents in which space vehicles simply vanish from the skies. One civillian TV satellite has been lost in space; it never entered its intended orbit, and no signals were heard from it to indicate where it might have gone. Collision with something else in space seems a reasonable explanation of this disappearance. Even a tiny fragment of metal striking a satellite at a relative velocity of a few kilometers per second would wreck the satellite, ripping through it like a Magnum slug through a tin can. Now suppose that kind of mishap befell a military satellite -- in the worst possible situation, during a time of international tension with all players in the spacewar game braced for attacks on their spacecraft. The culpable fragment might be invisible from the ground; even something as small and light as a paper clip could inflict massive damage on a satellite at high velocity. Unaware of the accident, a less than cautious leader might interpret it as a preconceived attack. Wars have begun over smaller incidents

Space weaponization causes backlash and undermines conventional U.S. hegemony Michael Katz-Hyman and Michael Krepon, April 2003, Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space, p. 89, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1304/ Given the extraordinary and growing differential in power that the United States enjoys in ground warfare, sea power, and air power, it is hard to propound compelling arguments for seeking to supplement these advantages by weaponizing space. The current U.S. lead in the military utilization of space has never been greater and is unchallenged. If the United States pushes to extend its pronounced military dominance into space, others will view this through the prism of the Bush administration's national security strategy, which places emphasis on preventive war and preemption. Foreign leaders will not passively accept U.S. initiatives to implement a doctrine of space dominance. They will have ample, inexpensive means to take blocking action, as it is considerably easier to negate U.S. dominance in space than on the ground, at sea, and in the air. The introduction of space weaponry and ASAT testing are therefore likely introduce grave complications for the terrestrial military advantages that the United States has worked so hard, and at such expense, to secure.

Hegemony key to prevent global nuclear war Zalmay Khalilzad, Senior assistant at RAND Institute and former U.S. ambassador Spring, 1995, The Washington Quarterly, Rethinking Grand Strategy, Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War, Lexis Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

Space Militarization Good F/L

Space mil undermines U.S. values and leads to an arms race Mike Moore, 2006, "A New Cold War?." SAIS Review. 175-188, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2302/ We Americans love our Statue of Liberty, our Washington and Lincoln memorials, our Grand Canyon and our Golden Gate, our Constitution, our rule of law, our democratic ways. We never tire of telling the world about these marvels and many more. But for good or ill, how we Americans actually employee our high-tech, space-based military power is the thing by which the United States increasingly will be judged by the rest of the world. In a world of sovereign nations, a unilateral U.S. space-control capability would raise profoundly troubling questions about the meaning of sovereignty in the 21st century. An attempt to deploy a space-control capability and insert weapons into orbit surely would be regarded by many states as an intolerable violation of global norms and of their sovereignty. Today's threats do not require the United States to pursue high-tech, space-based weaponization. To do so would threaten relations with the rest of the world and possibly set off a damaging arms race in space. TURN- space mil undermines U.S. soft power Christopher Coffelt, June 2005, “The Best Defense: Charting the Future of US Space Strategy and Policy,” online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2328/ Weaponizing space also decreases the United States’ ability to influence adversaries and achieve policy objectives short of military action (soft power). It undermines the legitimacy of the United States’ actions and its role as the leader of the free world. How can the United States assume the mantle of world leadership if it continues to act unilaterally at the expense of the international cooperation, peace, and interests it claims to value? Putting weapons in space is the ultimate unilateral act and affords no opportunity to form “coalitions of the willing.” The United States currently enjoys a significant superiority in air/land/sea combat power, robustly enhanced and enabled by space capabilities. In this position of advantage, it makes little strategic sense to disrupt the status quo with the deployment of destabilizing, offensive weapons in space. Putting weapons in space or pursuing an offensive space strategy upsets an advantageous status quo and overplays the United States’ hand, shortening the period of advantage. Moreover, if, as some believe, the world is on a path to the inevitable weaponization of space, there are clear advantages in assuming the follower role. Soft Power key to hegemony <insert>

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

Space Militarization Good F/L

Space militarization crushes U.S. leadership and ability to fight the war on terror Bruce M. Deblois, , 7-5-03 Director of Systems Integration at BAE SYSTEMS, “The Advent of Space Weapons,” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Bergman_11ast03.pdf Beyond adversarial responses, allies and partners abroad might also react unfavorably. Any unilateral decision to weaponize space might have negative consequences for diplomatic relationships worldwide. The European Union has been a consistent and vocal critic and, as validated by multiple resolutions in the UN regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), reflects the opinions of the larger international community. In response to proposed US tests of its mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL), an official from the European Space Agency commented: 'The world space community is confused as to the need for the US to develop space weaponry now, and is dismayed that the US is planning to test a high-powered laser against a satellite target'. Although it is unlikely that weapons in space would threaten or sever strong existing diplomatic ties, simple unpopularity might prompt a shift in the international center of gravity. Countries opposing or alienated by one states' space policy might gravitate to other alignments, possibly creating an international coalition to oppose the space-weaponizing country on these and other issues within international organizations such as the UN or the World Trade Organization (WTO). A decision to posture weapons in space might also diminish the ability of the space-weaponizing country to assemble international coalitions. In the case of the United States, such international political clout has been crucially important to the military, political, judicial and economic conduct of the war on terrorism. These forms of diplomatic influence might be more important than hard power in the maintenance of global stability in the twenty-first century.

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

Space Militarization Good F/L

Space weaponization damages U.S. leadership, environment, economy while promoting war and proliferation Michael Krepon, 2004, Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Center and author of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense and the Nuclear Future, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/publications/journal/Issues/sf04/Forum%20Krepon.pdf The potential debris and disruption caused by space warfare would impair global commerce that depends on space, produce environmental damage, and create hazards to space exploration. Companies that depend on space-aided commerce would be particularly hard-hit by the flight-testing, deployment, or use of space weapons. Insurance companies that backstop spacerelated activities would look for less risky investments, or raise their rates appreciably. The avid pursuit of flight-testing and the deployment of space weaponry by the United States would also be likely to create deeper fissures in alliance ties and relations between major powers, whose assistance is most needed to form “coalitions of the willing” to stop and reverse proliferation. Washington’s choice is therefore stark and clear: The United States and other countries would not be reassured by the flight-testing and deployment of weapons based in space or weapons on Earth designed for space warfare. The pursuit of space weapons would come at the direct expense of space assurance. Space assurance is defined here as a mutually supporting network of agreements, cooperative measures, international norms, codes of conduct and mil itary hedges designed to prevent dangerous military activities in space, especially the flight testing, deployment and use of space weapons.

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

Space Militarization Good F/L

Space warfare creates dangerous debris The Space Review, 3-24-08, Taylor Dinerman, “Messy Battlefields,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1089/1 When it happens, war in space is going to be a very messy business, especially in low Earth orbit (LEO), where most of the really lucrative targets are. Big high-performance spy satellites are especially important. They provide those nations that own and operate them with very high-resolution imagery across swaths of the electromagnetic spectrum. Knocking them out in the first moments of a conflict is going to be a priority. During the Cold War this was expected and planned for. The US expected to USSR to knock out its big Keyhole satellites as a prelude to an all-out nuclear attack. It was one of the reasons why some leaders in the US figured they could count on at least a small margin of early warning. Today, when the possibility of a major nuclear war has receded, space warfare may be fought without the cloud of atomic uncertainty hanging over every operation. According to one report in Aviation Week, the US is now building a pair of advanced Keyhole satellites at a cost of about $15 billion. The idea that the US will launch a defenseless military asset that costs $7.5 billion seems to defy logic, yet that is exactly what the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) seems to have in mind. As space technology spreads, the incentives for small and medium-sized states to seek space warfare capability increases. A dictator who does not want to end the way Saddam Hussein did may seek way to hurt US warfighting capability in such a way as to impose major costs and casualties on the US early on. The destruction of a major US satellite would be both a substantive and a symbolic victory over the US. Hitting a number of satellites would increase the effect. Such an attack would result in a major increase in the amount of debris orbiting the Earth. This would be the equivalent of a “scorched earth” policy if enough deadly debris were created. One possibility that has not been publicly examined might be to build highly- or ultra-destructive ASAT weapons that would literally pulverize the target and leave nothing behind but bits of dust. Even small particles can do some damage, but paint flakes like those that sometimes hit space shuttles have not managed to destroy an orbiter. Technical obstacles prevent successful space weaponization Indeed, the technical barriers to development and deployment of space-based weapons cannot be overestimated, even for the U.S. military. There are serious, fundamental obstacles to the development of both kinetic kill weapons and lasers both for use against targets in space and terrestrial targets — not to mention the question of the staggering costs associated with launch and maintaining systems on orbit. Problems with lasers include power generation requirements adding to size, the need for large quantities of chemical fuel and refueling requirements, and the physics of propagating and stabilizing beams across long distances or through the atmosphere. Space-based kinetic energy weapons have their own issues, including achieving proper orbital trajectories and velocities, the need to carry massive amounts of propellant, and concern about damage to own-forces from debris resulting from killing an enemy satellite. Space-based weapons also have the problem of vulnerability, for example, predictable orbits and the difficulty of regeneration. A detailed discussion of technology challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, but a comprehensive primer on the myriad problems with developing space-based weapons is a September 1999 paper by Maj. William L. Spacy II, "Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons?" written for the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

Space Militarization Good Exts: Prolif

U.S. space leadership increases prolif- no cooperation with China or Russia Michael Katz-Hyman and Michael Krepon, July 2005, "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2468/ Successful efforts to stop and reverse proliferation face long odds when the dominant state demands to play by its own rules. These odds become even longer when the dominant state cannot enlist the active support of Moscow and Beijing on hard proliferation cases that bother Washington more than they do Russia and China. Nor do Russian or Chinese leaders appear unduly distressed over the difficulties U.S. forces presently face in Iraq. Burden sharing with respect to proliferation is not high on their list of priorities and is likely to drop lower if U.S. space warfare initiatives are pursued. Official Chinese and Russian threat perceptions of the United States are not articulated in public, but they may reasonably be inferred. Both capitals might well question why Washington seeks to extend its military dominance into space by pursuing capabilities that would not be particularly helpful in scenarios involving Iran, North Korea, or other developing countries. Instead, the pursuit of U.S. dominance into space may well be viewed by Moscow and Beijing as part of a broader effort to negate their nuclear deterrents. If so, prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament would further decline. When dominance poses a threat to major powers whose cooperation is most needed to halt and reverse proliferation, dominance becomes part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. Space militarization increases proliferation Michael Katz-Hyman and Michael Krepon, July 2005, "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2390/# We argue that additional proliferation of nuclear weapons, rather than new arms races, is the most likely outcome of a renewed interest in space warfare. Proliferation will be a natural consequence of more nations feeling less secure as a result of space weapons. Adverse proliferation consequences could be both direct and indirect. China and Russia will likely feel most directly threatened by U.S. space warfare initiatives. Beijing will likely increase its nuclear weapon requirements to counter increased threat perceptions without engaging in an arms race, while Moscow will probably seek to adjust the contraction of its nuclear arsenal to the extent the Kremlin believes that its deterrent might be challenged by U.S. initiatives. Indirect, horizontal proliferation is likely to result from greater strains in major power relations and in U.S.-alliance ties triggered by U.S. initiatives to dominate space. In the absence of united fronts against proliferation by major powers and by America's friends and allies, international efforts to strengthen nonproliferation and disarmament norms are likely to fail, and hedging strategies against a more worrisome future are likely to multiply.

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

Space Militarization Good Exts: WMD

TURN- U.S. space militarization encourages enemies to develop tech the U.S. cant beat Barry Watts, February 2001, “The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment,” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1539/ The rub, of course, is that potential adversaries may not elect to emulate American approaches to the military use of orbital space. A regional opponent primarily concerned with preventing the United States from projecting its military power into its region of the world could choose to exploit space assets in very different ways than mirroring American capabilities. Some focused capabilities in orbit along with a willingness to combat or negate US advantages derived from space using terrestrial means could very well go far to level the playing field between the United States and a future regional opponent. For example, a redundant fiber-optic network coupled with a few overhead transponders for relaying mobile communications could turn the enemy's in-theater command and control into a system the United States could find nearly impossible to take down. If targeted with data from commercial or military imaging satellites, the system could permit prompt precision-missile strikes against any theater bases and airfields bases being utilized by American forces. This sort of asymmetric response to US power-projection capabilities could be quite effective with only the most limited use of satellite assets, and the trend toward orbital assets becoming a global commons makes denying the enemy access to any commercial satellites a difficult proposition. In such a scenario, the far superior and more sophisticated space capabilities of the US military might yield little overall strategic or operational advantage. U.S. space militarization prompts international WMD use Michael Katz-Hyman and Michael Krepon. April 2003, Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1181/ The flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry has been inextricably linked to the dangers associated with weapons of mass destruction. The initial prohibitions on space weaponry, after all, were expressly tied to weapons of mass destruction. During the Cold War, space warfare was widely considered a harbinger of nuclear warfare, given the connectivity of satellites most likely to be attacked with the command, control, and targeting of nuclear forces. This linkage has not disappeared with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the advent of extreme forms of asymmetric warfare and terrorism. States possessing nuclear weapons that might become adversaries to the United States could view U.S. initiatives to weaponize space as an attempt to negate their deterrents. Space-to-ground warfare initiatives to further extend U.S. military advantages could therefore prompt compensatory steps by weaker states, including the accelerated pursuit of unconventional weapons.

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA
Space Militarization Good Exts: Hegemony Space weaponization crushes U.S. hegemony in the long-term Center for Defense Information, 4-18-02, Theresa Hitches- CDI Vice President, “Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette?,” http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm Chinese moves to put weapons in space would trigger regional rival India to consider the same, in turn, spurring Pakistan to strive for parity with India. Even U.S. allies in Europe might feel pressure to "keep up with the Joneses." It is quite easy to imagine the course of a new arms race in space that would be nearly as destabilizing as the atomic weapons race proved to be. Such a strategic-level space race could have negative consequences for U.S. security in the long run that would outweigh the obvious (and tremendous) short-term advantage of being the first with space-based weapons. There would be direct economic costs to sustaining orbital weapon systems and keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching U.S. spaceweapon capabilities — raising the proverbial question of whether we would be starting a game we might not be able to win. (It should be remembered that the attacker will always have an advantage in space warfare, in that space assets are inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, have inherent vulnerabilities.) Again, the price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial — with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs commercial firms between $300 million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years, according to Ed Cornet, vice president of Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm.130

Weaponization sparks arms race that U.S. wont win- kills hegemony Center for Defense Information, 4-18-02, Theresa Hitches- CDI Vice President, “Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette?,” http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm Spurring other nations to acquire space-based weapons of their own, especially weapons aimed at terrestrial targets, would certainly undercut the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the ground on a worldwide basis — negating what today is a unique advantage of being a military superpower.232 U.S. commercial satellites would also become targets, as well as military assets (especially considering the fact that the U.S. military is heavily reliant on commercial providers, particularly in communications). Depending on how widespread such weapons became, it also could even put U.S. cities at a greater risk than they face today from ballistic missiles. The potential for strategic consequences of a space race has led many experts, including within the military, to tout a space arms control regime as an alternative. A ban on space weapons and ASATs could help preserve — at least for some time — the status quo of U.S. advantage (especially if coupled with U.S. moves to shore up passive satellite defenses). In a recent article in Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Jeffrey Lewis, a graduate research fellow at the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland, makes a good case for an arms control approach, arguing: "If defensive deployments in space cannot keep pace with offensive developments on the ground, then some measure of restraining offensive capabilities needs to be found to even the playing field."33 In any event, it is clear that U.S. policy-makers must look at the potential strategic and direct military risks, and the costs, of weaponizing space.

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

AT: Space Militarization Inevitable

Space mil not inevitable- self-fulfilling prophecy Andrew Park, 2006, "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." Houston Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, No. 3, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2423/ The simplest argument for space weaponization (inevitability) may also be the most reckless because of its self-fulfilling nature. Proponents of the inevitability of space weaponization have proffered multiple theories as to why the realm of space will eventually become weaponized. According to the logic of these inevitability proponents, the United States should lead the way rather than be left in the dust as military technology continues to rapidly develop. However, while the inevitability argument may have some merit, its true danger lies in its unverifiable nature until weaponization actually occurs. Moreover, it is important to note that this premise is driven not only by American insecurities, but also by the need for the United States to control its own future. Since the ideological divide between “space doves” and those who believe space weaponization is inevitable is not likely to be bridged soon, the international community must recognize the need for a legal regime for space with teeth—or, put another way, a legal regime that goes beyond simply establishing a set of norms that have little to no consequences. Weaponization not inevitable- Cold War proves Michael Krepon, 2004, Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Center and author of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense and the Nuclear Future, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/publications/journal/Issues/sf04/Forum%20Krepon.pdf Dire predictions to the contrary, the weaponization of space, or a “space Pearl Harbor” is not inevitable.1 If the weaponization of space were inevitable, it would surely have occurred during the Cold War. While many countries have used space to support military operations, no weapons are deployed in space, interactive ASAT testing during the Cold War ended two decades ago, and no satellites have been destroyed in warfare. Thus, the weaponization of space is cer tainly not inevitable, unless this mindset holds sway.

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SPACE NEG 2.0 DDI SS 2008 KAPUSTINA

Space Exploration-> Militarization

Increased activity in space will inevitable result in weaponization- plan doesn’t establish anything prohbiting an arms race U.N. Information Service, 10-9-02, “SPEAKERS WARN AGAINST POTENTIAL OUTER SPACE ARMS RACE, AS FOURTH COMMITTEE CONTINUE DEBATE” http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2002/gaspd240.html Cuba's representative described the existing legal regime as insufficient for ensuring the prevention of an arms race in outer space. New mechanisms must be adopted for the verification of space law. An arms race in outer space would not only violate the principle of outer space as a "common heritage", but would also jeopardize collective security. The principles guiding the exploration and uses of outer space must be based on the need to preserve its peaceful use. The representative of Pakistan agreed that a comprehensive convention to prevent an arms race in outer space must be concluded. Outer space, declared the "province of mankind" some 33 three years ago, threatened to become yet another area of military competition. The militarization of outer space must be avoided at all costs. States with significant space capabilities could contribute to achieving the collective goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, and addressing the militarization of outer space was well within the mandate of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

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Solvency F/L

Solar energy distribution is not technically or financially feasible John C. Mankins, 9-7-00, Manager of Advanced Concepts Studies Office of Space Flight, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science of U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html? pid=2568 Power management and distribution continues to be a major challenge for large-scale SSP systems. A major feature of the 1979 SPS Reference System was the presumption of very high solar array voltages (e.g., 40,000 volts) that would largely eliminate the requirement for massive power management for the system. The findings of the SERT Program suggest that this feature is not technically feasible for reasons of interactions with the space environment at these voltages and that lower voltages must be used. However, a great disparity exists between the cost of terrestrial voltage converters (about $0.20 per watt) compared to voltage converters in space (about $20 per watt). Studies are continuing to better understand the reasons for these differences and to formulate affordable and effective power management and distribution concepts for largescale SSP systems. Also during the SERT Program, an option identified during the SSP Fresh Look Study the use of superconducting power cabling at lower voltages has resurfaced as one potential solution. No tech to relay solar energy back to Earth John C. Mankins, 9-7-00, Manager of Advanced Concepts Studies Office of Space Flight, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science of U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html? pid=2568 Many of the space solar power concepts and technologies that have been examined could be applied to the development of power relay systems and/or infrastructures. However, achieving economic viability continues to appear challenging. Early terrestrial demonstrations, as mentioned previously, (e.g., over a 100-kilometer distance) using microwave wireless power transmission may have applicability in specific regions. However, using current concepts for a geostationary Earth-orbitbased relay, a microwave wireless power transmission system is expected to be either too large on the ground (or in space) to be viable. On the other hand, it appears possible that ground-space-ground power relays may be viable in the case of visible light transmission concepts, which would be smaller in size than microwave systems. Investigation of these options which are also useful for a number of ground-to-space and space-to-space power-beaming applications - continues. Space exploration brings back dangerous viruses and diseases Bruce K. Gagnon, 1999, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, “Space Exploration and Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm Potential dangers do exist though. Barry DiGregorio, author and founder of the International Committee Against Mars Sample Return, has written that "…any Martian samples returned to Earth must be treated as biohazardous material until proven otherwise." At the present time NASA has taken no action to create a special facility to handle space sample returns. On March 6, 1997 a report issued by the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council recommended that such a facility should be operational at least two years prior to launch of a Mars Sample Return mission. Reminding us of the Spanish exploration of the Americas, and the smallpox virus they carried that killed thousands of indigenous people, DiGregorio warns that the Mars samples could "contain pathogenic viruses or bacteria." Disease means extinction

Solvency F/L
Even with recent tech advancements, SSP not feasible 16

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John C. Mankins, 9-7-00, Manager of Advanced Concepts Studies Office of Space Flight, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science of U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html? pid=2568 Large-scale SSP is a very complex integrated system of systems that requires numerous significant advances in current technology and capabilities A technology roadmap has been developed that lays out potential paths for achieving all needed advances - albeit over several decades Ongoing and recent technology advances have narrowed many of the technology gaps, but major technical, regulatory and conceptual hurdles continue to exist Space exploration destroys the environment, turning case Bruce K. Gagnon, 1999, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, “Space Exploration and Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm We are now poised to take the bad seed of greed, environmental exploitation and war into space. Having shown such enormous disregard for our own planet Earth, the so-called "visionaries" and "explorers" are now ready to rape and pillage the heavens. Countless launches of nuclear materials, using rockets that regularly blow up on the launch pad, will seriously jeopardize life on Earth. Returning potentially bacteria-laden space materials back to Earth, without any real plans for containment and monitoring, could create new epidemics for us. The possibility of an expanding nuclear-powered arms race in space will certainly have serious ecological and political ramifications as well. The effort to deny years of consensus around international space law will create new global conflicts and confrontations.

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Significant advances in SSP wont happen until 2050 Jeff Foust, 8-13-07, aerospace analyst and writer for The Space Review, “A Renaissance for Space Solar Power, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/931/1 Smith made it clear, though, that he’s not looking for a quick fix that will suddenly make solar power satellites feasible in the near term. “If I can close this deal on space-based solar power, it’s going to take a long time,” he said. “The horizon we’re looking at is 2050 before we’re able to do something significant.” The first major milestone, he said, would be a small demonstration satellite that could be launched in the next eight to ten years that would demonstrate power beaming from GEO. However, he added those plans could change depending on developments of various technologies that could alter the direction space solar power systems would go. “That 2050 vision, what that architecture will look like, is carved in Jell-O.”

More funding wont solve without increased political will Space Review, 8-30-04, staff writer David Bowell, “Whatever happened to solar power satellites?” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/214/1 Another barrier is that launching anything into space costs a lot of money. A substantial investment would be needed to get a solar power satellite into orbit; then the launch costs would make the electricity that was produced more expensive than other alternatives. In the long term, launch costs will need to come down before generating solar power in space makes economic sense. But is the expense of launching enough to explain why so little progress has been made? There were over 60 launches in 2003, so last year there was enough money spent to put something into orbit about every week on average. Funding was found to launch science satellites to study gravity waves and to explore other planets. There are also dozens of GPS satellites in orbit that help people find out where they are on the ground. Is there enough money available for these purposes, but not enough to launch even one solar power satellite that would help the world develop a new source of energy? In the 2004 budget the Department of Energy has over $260 million allocated for fusion research. Obviously the government has some interest in funding renewable energy research and they realize that private companies would not be able to fund the development of a sustainable fusion industry on their own. From this perspective, the barrier holding back solar power satellites is not purely financial, but rather the problem is that there is not enough political will to make the money available for further development. SPS will not become cost-competitive Space Review, 8-30-04, staff writer David Bowell, “Whatever happened to solar power satellites?” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/214/1 Even if a solar power system was built and launched there would still be the economic problem of producing electricity at a cost that is comparable to other options. Government subsidies can help get this new industry on its feet but it will need to compete in the market in order to survive. This is a challenge for all emerging renewable energy solutions. Current non-renewable energy supplies are cheap. Even with the recent increases in the price of oil, it is still historically low. Adjusted for inflation, gas prices are still much lower than they were during the oil crisis in the 1970s. With current prices there is little incentive for customers or producers to pursue alternatives. Even if oil prices continue to increase, it is not likely that this will be enough to drive demand for alternatives. Although we will eventually run out of oil, coal, and other non-renewable energy sources, in the short term rising oil prices will simply generate more oil.

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Impossible to launch SPS into orbit Space Review, 8-30-04, staff writer David Bowell, “Whatever happened to solar power satellites?” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/214/1 A fully-operational solar power satellite system could end up needing to be enormous. Some designs suggest creating rectangular solar arrays that are several kilometers long on each side. If we assume that enough money could be found to build something like this and that it could be run competitively against other energy options, there is the very real problem of figuring out how to get it into orbit or how to build it in orbit from separate smaller pieces. The largest solar panels ever deployed in space are currently being used on the International Space Station. They cover more than 830 square meters and are 73 meters long and 11 meters wide. These large panels make the ISS one of the brightest objects in the night sky. Scaling up from there to something much larger would be challenging, but the good news is that we can take one thing at a time. For a proof of concept satellite it makes sense to use the station’s solar panels as a baseline. By taking advantage of improvements in solar cell technology we could launch a demonstration satellite of the same size that generates up to 3 times as much power. The station’s solar panels are 14% efficient, but recent advances with solar cells and solar concentrators could allow us to build panels that are up to 50% efficient. If this demonstration system validated the theory behind generating power in space and beaming it down to Earth, the next step would be figuring out how to put even bigger solar panels in space. It may be that with our current launch options it simply isn’t possible to launch an operational solar power system into orbit. If that were the case, the concept would need to be put on hold until other lift options, such as a space elevator, are available.

Ground solar power is a prerequisite to effective SPS Geoffrey A. Landis, February ’04, scientist at the NASA Glenn Research Center, “Reinventing the Solar Power Satellite,” NASA, http://gltrs.grc.nasa.gov/reports/2004/TM-2004-212743.pdf Analyses of space solar power often assume that ground solar power is a competing technology, and show that space solar power is a preferable technology on a rate of return basis. In fact, however, space solar power and ground solar power are complementary technologies, not competing technologies. These considerations were initially discussed in 1990 [4]. Low-cost ground solar power is a necessary precursor to space solar power: Space solar power requires low cost, high production and high efficiency solar arrays, and these technologies will make ground solar attractive for many markets. The ground solar power market, in turn, will serve develop technology and the high-volume production readiness for space solar power. Since ground solar is a necessary precursor to space solar power, an analysis of space solar power should consider how it interfaces with the ground-based solar infrastructure that will be developing on a faster scale than the space infrastructure. Satellites have an inefficiently short lifetime Robert McLeoud, 9-12-06, Professor of Computer Science, “Solar Power Satellite,” http://entropyproduction.blogspot.com/2006/07/solar-power-satellite.html A further problem is that satellites in geosynchronous orbit are outside the Earth's magnetosphere, leaving them open to bombardment by charged particles. This will drastically limit their lifetime compared to ground-based systems. A satellite in geosynchronous orbit will see a flux of 6·1013 (1 MeV electrons) cm-2 year-1 (with considerable variation year-to-year depending on solar flare activity). A 1 Mega electron volt particle is highly energetic and more than enough to break bonds and eject K and L-shell electrons from semiconductors. A solar cell in geosynchronous orbit will typically lose 5-6 % of its performance per year. Compare that to ground based units that are guaranteed to provide 90 % power after 12.5 years, or a loss of 0.8 %/year. We can see that even if a space solar panel receives 8× the insolation of a ground based unit, it will in fact produce less energy over its much shorter lifetime. The wikipedia article claims a lifetime of 20 years but that is not realistic. The economics suffer as a result.

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SPS is economically unfeasible Robert McLeoud, 9-12-06, Professor of Computer Science, “Solar Power Satellite,” http://entropyproduction.blogspot.com/2006/07/solar-power-satellite.html The biggest overall drawback to any sort of space power solution is the cost of launching material into orbit. At the top end of the chain, NASA's Space Shuttle or the Titan booster cost approximately $10,000/kg to reach low earth orbit. Getting up to geosynchronous orbit requires an additional booster and increases the cost by a factor of 5-6. Programs such as SeaLaunch or the Russian Proton booster are cheaper but by less than an order of magnitude. Realistically, in order for space solar to have any opportunity costs would need to drop to $100/kg, which is nearly impossible for a Western company. There are all sorts of concepts for reducing the costs of launching satellites − air-launch, or the big-dumb booster concept − but none have the financing given the lack of a dependable market and high-profile busts such as Beal Aerospace. The high capital cost of launch services has a secondary effect that it requires one to use expensive, high-efficiency cells rather than the one with the lowest price per unit peak power. This further hampers the ability of space solar of being cost competitive with ground solar. Successful tech is 40 years away, even with appropriate funding The Space Review, 6-9-08, “Knight in Shining Armor,” Dwayne Day, http://thespacereview.com/article/1147/1 The NSSO study is remarkably sensible and even-handed and states that we are nowhere near developing practical SSP and that it is not a viable solution for even the military’s limited requirements. It states that the technology to implement space solar power does not currently exist… and is unlikely to exist for the next forty years. Substantial technology development must occur before it is even feasible. Furthermore, the report makes clear that the key technology requirement is cheap access to space, which no longer seems as achievable as it did three decades ago (perhaps why SSP advocates tend to skip this part of the discussion and hope others solve it for them). The activists have ignored the message and fallen in love with the messenger.

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SPS is not technologically or economically feasible Geoffrey A. Landis, February ’04, scientist at the NASA Glenn Research Center, “Reinventing the Solar Power Satellite,” NASA, http://gltrs.grc.nasa.gov/reports/2004/TM-2004-212743.pdf Power distribution is a general problem with all conventional solar power system designs: as a design scales up to high power levels, the mass of wire required to link the power generation system to the microwave transmitter becomes a showstopper. A design is required in which the solar power can be used directly at the solar array, rather than being sent over wires to a separate transmitter. (The "solar sandwich" design of the late 70's solved this problem, but only with the addition of an unwieldy steering mirror, which complicates the design to an impractical extent). In addition to technical difficulties, the baseline concept does not meet economic goals. As shown in table 6-4 of the "Fresh Look" final report [1], even with extremely optimistic assumptions of system cost, solar cell efficiency, and launch cost, each design analyzed results in a cost which is either immediately too expensive, or else yields a cost marginally competitive (but not significantly better) than terrestrial power technologies, with an internal rate of return (IRR) too low for investment to make money. Only if an "externality surcharge" is added to non-space power sources to account for the economic impact of fossil-fuels did space solar power options make economic sense. While "externality" factors are quite real, and represent a true cost impact of fossil-fuel generation, it is unlikely that the world community will artificially impose such charges merely to make space solar power economically feasible. Significant tech challenges to successful SPS John Mankins, 10-12-07, interview conducted by David Houle for Evolution Shift, Mankins is Manager of Advanced Concepts Studies Office of Space Flight and former NASA leader, ,”Leading Scientists and Thinkers on Energy – John C. Mankins,” http://www.evolutionshift.com/blog/2007/10/12/leading-scientists-and-thinkers-on-energy-–-john-c-mankins/ Mankins: All of the basic science seems to be in hand. Unlike fusion energy R&D, not fundamental problems of science remain to be solved for space solar power to become feasible. However, there are definitely significant technical challenges remaining before economic feasibility can be established. Solving these challenges is more than just engineering—it requires real invention—but not basic research. A number of areas remain to be developed, including wireless power transmission, robotics, materials and structures, thermal management—and, of course, very low cost Earth to orbit transportation is critical. SPS not being used now because of interference with global satellites Richard M. Dickinson, member of the Technical Staff at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, Jan. 29,1999,<"Lasers for Wireless Power Transmission" trsnew.jpl.nasa.gov/dspace/bitstream/2014/16855/1/99-0263.pdf> A major issue in space solar power systems employing microwave power transmission is their potential interference with satellite communication systems, which use frequencies in the same multi-gigahertz range that is best suited to microwave power transmission. The filtering and/or frequency restrictions necessary to avoid such interference could be a major barrier to the economics of space-based power systems for terrestrial consumption, and obtaining their approval by the Federal Communications Commission and the International Telecommunications Union may be extremely difficult due to the potential interference with the ubiquitous global satellite communication services.

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SPS tech is too big to suspend in space The Space Review, 6-4-07, Taylor Dinerman, “Space solar power: opposition and obstacles,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/881/1 The other really big problem is that no one has ever even tried to build anything the size of a solar power satellite in space. Russia’s Mir space station and the ISS are the only examples we have of anything that even approaches the size and complexity of an SPS. The difficulties that both these projects have encountered bodes nothing but ill for a project that tried to use modern-day technology. Lighter structures made from new materials might help, as would new methods of power and thermal management.

Space debris damage satellite tech Rachel Courtland, 6-27-08, Expert analyst for News Scientist Space MIT alum, “Weak Solar Cycle May Keep More Space Junk In Orbit” (http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn14207-weak-solar-cycle-may-keep-more-space-junk-in-orbit.html) Dodging bullets These numbers are set to fall, regardless of the severity of the solar cycle, as the pieces gradually get dragged into Earth's atmosphere, where they will burn up. But if the weak solar cycle forecast is correct, hundreds more pieces of Fengyun-1C debris larger than 10 cm will still be in orbit by 2019 compared to a normal cycle, according to simulations by Whitlock and colleagues. This could spell trouble for satellite operators, who must plan manoeuvres to avoid passing Fengyun debris. In 2007, for example, the NASA satellite Terra had to dodge a fragment set to approach it within 19 metres. Mild solar weather could also keep thousands of smaller pieces in orbit. An estimated 40,000 Fengyun pieces between 1 and 10 cm across – below the limit ground-based radars can detect – currently circle the Earth, says Whitlock. These objects can also cause considerable damage. "Anything over 1 centimetre can really cause problems, almost for any satellite. If it happens to hit an instrument or an antenna, it could completely disable it," Whitlock told New Scientist.

Debris and nuclear accidents destroy satellites Because of the high velocities of objects in orbit, even a small object can destroy the most durable military satellite. For example, engineers cannot shield satellites against orbital debris larger than one centimeter in diameter – anything larger than an M&M.20 Moreover, the space environment is harsh and subject to human manipulation. During a high-altitude nuclear test in the early 1960s, the United States discovered that a nuclear weapon detonated in space could create a lethal electromagnetic pulse that would deaden virtually all of the satellites in its line-of-sight, and leave a long-term radiation hazard that would disable large numbers of satellites over the next several months.21

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Treaties make SPS illegal – hurts effective tech and competitiveness National Security Space Office, 10-10-07, “Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic Security,” http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf Application of the International Traffic Arms Regulations (ITAR) may constitute a major barrier to effective partnerships in SBSP and negatively impact national security. Right now ITAR greatly restricts and complicates all space‐related business, as it treats all launch and satellite technologies as arms. This has had the effect of causing America’s competitors to develop ITAR‐free products, and had a negative impact on our domestic space industries, which can no longer compete on level ground. Many participants in the feasibility study were very vocal that including satellite and launch technology in ITAR has had a counterproductive and detrimental effect on the U.S.’s national security and competitiveness—losing control and market share, and closing our eyes and ears to the innovations of the competition while selling ourselves on a national illusion of unassailable space superiority. Effective collaboration, even with allies on something of this level, could not take place effectively without some special consideration or modification.

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Solvency Exts: Disease

Space increases spread of disease among astronauts, who then spread it on Earth NASA, 9-29-04, Dolores Beasley and William Jeffs, “Study Suggests Spaceflight May Decrease Human Immunity,” http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2004/sep/HQ_04320_immunity.html) A NASA-funded study has found the human body's ability to fight off disease may be decreased by spaceflight. The effect may even linger after an astronaut's return to Earth following long flights. In addition to the conditions experienced by astronauts in flight, the stresses experienced before launch and after landing also may contribute to a decrease in immunity. Results of the study were recently published in "Brain, Behavior, and Immunity." The results may help researchers better understand the affects of spaceflight on the human immune response. They may also provide new insights to ensure the health, safety and performance of International Space Station crewmembers and future spacefarers on extended missions. "Astronauts live and work in a relatively crowded and stressful environment," said Duane Pierson, the study's principal investigator and NASA Senior Microbiologist at Johnson Space Center, Houston. "Stresses integral to spaceflight can adversely affect astronaut health by impairing the human immune response. Our study suggests these effects may increase as mission duration and mission activity demands increase," he added.

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Space Colonization F/L

Space colonization is impossible- inadequate environment and materials Donald F. Robertson, 3-6-06, industry journalist, “Space Exploration: A Reality Check,” http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive06/RobertsonOpEd_030606.html) Two largely unquestioned assumptions long ago took root within the space community. As we prepare to voyage back to Earth's Moon and on to Mars, it is time to question them both. The first assumption is that exploring the Moon, Mars, or any part of the solar system, can be accomplished in a generation or two and with limited loss of life. The second is that we can use robots to successfully understand another world. Both assumptions are almost certainly wrong, yet many important elements of our civil space program are based on one or both of them being correct. To paraphrase Douglas Adams, even within the space community most people don't have a clue how "mind-boggingly big space really is." Most of the major worlds in the solar system have surface areas at least as large as terrestrial continents -- a few are much larger -- and every one of them is unremittingly hostile to human life. Learning to travel confidently through former President John F. Kennedy's "this new ocean" will be difficult, expensive, time-consuming and dangerous. Mr. Kennedy's rhetoric was more accurate than he probably knew. The only remotely comparable task humanity has faced was learning to travel across our world's oceans. We take trans-oceanic travel for granted, but getting from Neolithic boats to modern freighters cost humanity well over 10,000 years of hard work and uncounted lives. Even today, hundreds of people die in shipping accidents every year. We and our woefully inadequate chemical rockets are like Stone Age tribesfolk preparing to cast off in canoes, reaching for barely visible islands over a freezing, storm-tossed, North Atlantic.

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Space colonization prevents quick disaster recovery The Space Review, 3-19-07, “Why the Moon? Human survival!” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/832/1 When we face a brand new situation, such probabilities are impossible to calculate. Countermeasures against each individual threat can of course be taken, but we would also be prudent to back up our civilization and our species. We need to place a self-sufficient fragment of society out of harm’s way, which for practical purposes means off the Earth. A buffer of empty space would protect that sanctuary from virtually all of the catastrophes named above. Physicist Stephen Hawking, and a number of others, have called for humanity to spread out to distant planets of our Solar System. But there is no need to go so far to protect ourselves. After a few decades—centuries at worst—dust and ash will settle, radioactive materials will decay, and viruses will perish. Earth will once again become the best home for humanity in the Solar System. Return would be easiest if a safe sanctuary were nearby. In the more probable instance that only a limited disaster took place, that nearby sanctuary could also play a valuable role in restoring lost data and cultural materials, and coordinating the recovery. And of course, construction of the rescue base will be much easier if it is only days, rather than months or years, away.

Space colonization sparks conflict over sovereignty The Space Review, 1-15-07, “Independent space colonization: questions and implications,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/784/1 If colonization is a dirty word, then so are “conquest”, “exploitation”, “settlement”, and “industrialization”. If fact, anything that goes beyond simple exploration is problematic. The Outer Space Treaty has theoretically forbidden any nation from claiming sovereignty over any “celestial body”. Within a couple of decades we will see if this approach can pass the reality test. Once one or more bases are established on the Moon, nations will find themselves exerting control over parts of that body which, in practical terms, will amount to sovereignty. Within a moonbase, even one occupied by only a couple of astronauts, the government that sent them there will regulate their lives in more or less the same way a government regulates the lives of the crew of a warship. The ship itself is considered the sovereign territory of the state that owns it while the waters through which it passes may be international or belong to another sovereign state that is obliged to respect the right of innocent passage. The ship’s crew lacks anything like the ability to function as free citizens and to buy sell and trade in a free marketplace. One question that advocates for space colonization have to consider is: how can the transition from a quasi-military lifestyle to a civilian one be handled? The experience that many communities in the US have had when a nearby military base closed down might be relevant. Another source of experience might be the transitions from martial law to civilian law that have taken place over the years, including the one that happened in Hawaii at the end of the Second World War. None of these have involved any change in sovereignty. Post World War Two decolonization involved such a change. Yet, if the provision in the Outer Space Treaty (OST) regarding their extended responsibility of launching states for whatever they put into space means anything, it mean that states will have to exercise control over the inhabitants of a colony no matter how long ago their ancestors left Earth. It is difficult to imagine a third or fourth generation inhabitant of Mars or of another “accessible planetary surface”, to use the old NASA euphemism, accepting the right of a distant Earth government to control any aspect of their lives, let alone the kind of regulations promulgated under martial law. Their reaction to such control might not be a quick and easily mollified revolt, but a more permanent split between the Earthbound and the spacefaring parts of humanity.

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Human extinction is inevitable- space colonization just speeds us towards the impact Hank Dolben, 1-6-04, senior software engineer and writer for “Nothing is Perfect,” “No Escape for Environmental Disaster,” http://www.dolben.org/nothingisperfect/archives/2004/01/no_escape_from.html Do you think that mankind can escape an earth it has rendered uninhabitable by thoughtless environmental negligence, and rocket away to colonies in space? I know it's risky to predict what technology cannot accomplish, but feel so strongly about this that I will speak out anyway. OK, what do I risk, you ask. Being proved wrong? When? Who will know? Who will care? Who cares now? Can you see the irony in the ultimate absurdity of "wasting" the environment and then throwing the whole ecosphere away by leaving it behind, as if tossing a styrofoam, fast-food container out the window of an SUV, speeding down the interstate. First, our destruction of the environment seems inevitable. Humanity is a virulent infestation, unlikely to be stemmed by anything short of a catastrophic collapse of the ecosystems it lays waste. By the time the crisis is reached it will be too late to save ourselves, the losses irreversible. It's not that living in harmony with the biosphere that we haven't yet ruined is technically infeasible, rather politically unattainable. I won't try to prove that. I couldn't anyway. I'll even admit that I might be wrong. The optimist in me sees that polls show that people generally want to save the environment. It's just simply and completely inconsistent with the way people have always behaved and continue to behave. The retrograde policies of the current U.S. administration reinforce my pessimism. Our strength is in our ability to exploit the world to satisfy our appetites. Even our environmental consciousness seems to be based on an aesthetic hunger that can be satisfied by little (on global scales) nature parks, which by themselves couldn't provide sustainable support for more than a handful of primitive humanoids. If there is any optimism in my view, it is that the destruction will not be complete. Life on earth will go on, even as it has in the deep past, following astronomical cataclysms, though certainly not as we know it. Among other species, small pockets of our infestation may even survive, as the uneven collapse leaves isolated populations some naturally protected ecosystems, perhaps a Pacific island for example. Life on earth will likely survive until the Sun heats up enough to boil it dry, though anything like humans will be gone long before then. Meanwhile, I'll be scouting Pacific islands. Space colonization is impossible Hank Dolben, 1-6-04, senior software engineer and writer for “Nothing is Perfect,” “No Escape for Environmental Disaster,” http://www.dolben.org/nothingisperfect/archives/2004/01/no_escape_from.html Second, we will never accomplish the colonization of space. Again, not because it is technically impossible, though certainly much more difficult than most people seem to appreciate. How can one imagine that we could create artificial ecosystems that would be sufficiently rich and robust to support human life as we know it, when we could not prevent our own destruction of the natural world that gave us our existence to begin with? What potential return on investment would motivate the unimaginably huge expense of attempting the establishment of a self-sustaining colony? Or do you think that some government would have the political will and resources to accomplish it? There would not be enough resources if the crisis were reached, not enough will if not. In short, there is a better chance of saving our existing environment than creating a new one. Still, it's unprovable, only refutable by counterexample. Space colonization justifies further degradation of the environment Hank Dolben, 1-6-04, senior software engineer and writer for “Nothing is Perfect,” “No Escape for Environmental Disaster,” http://www.dolben.org/nothingisperfect/archives/2004/01/no_escape_from.html Last, given that the colonization of space is theoretically possible, or rather not provably impossible, its potentiality provides a psychological escape hatch that permits our self-annihilation. If you're availing yourself of that excuse, can you at least appreciate that it would be an awful exchange; our beautiful earth for some artificial environment? And, of course, what about the poor bastards we couldn't get off. All x billion just aren't going to fit in those shuttles you know. Well, there won't be so many left by then. Oh, that's not good either. We might even say, look, the earth is doomed by the eventual heating up of the Sun anyway, so we're going to have to get off sooner or later. Now that's taking a long-term view. But, why not go further? Unless there's an as yet unknown loophole in the third law of thermodynamics, life is doomed no matter what we do. Might as well live for today. My point is that there are lots of available escape hatches if that's what you're looking for. The colonization fantasy just happens to fit into a loosely imaginable time scale and relieves some scruples we might have for the lives of future generations that look pretty grim to the environmental pessimists.

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Space Colonization F/L

Space colonization is unfeasible and doesn’t prevent human extinction Economist’s View, 6-16-07, Charlie Stross, “The High Frontier, Redux,” published writer, http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blogstatic/2007/06/the_high_frontier_redux.html And I don't want to spend much time talking about the unspoken ideological underpinnings of the urge to space colonization, other than to point out that they're there, that the case for space colonization isn't usually presented as an economic enterprise so much as a quasi-religious one. "We can't afford to keep all our eggs in one basket" isn't so much a justification as an appeal to sentimentality, for in the hypothetical case of a planet-trashing catastrophe, we (who currently inhabit the surface of the Earth) are dead anyway. The future extinction of the human species cannot affect you if you are already dead: strictly speaking, it should be of no personal concern. Historically, crossing oceans and setting up farmsteads on new lands conveniently stripped of indigenous inhabitants by disease has been a cost-effective proposition. But the scale factor involved in space travel is strongly counter-intuitive. Space can’t sustain human life Economist’s View, 6-16-07, Charlie Stross, “The High Frontier, Redux,” published writer, http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blogstatic/2007/06/the_high_frontier_redux.html We're human beings. We evolved to flourish in a very specific environment that covers perhaps 10% of our home planet's surface area. (Earth is 70% ocean, and while we can survive, with assistance, in extremely inhospitable terrain, be it arctic or desert or mountain, we aren't well-adapted to thriving there.) Space itself is a very poor environment for humans to live in. A simple pressure failure can kill a spaceship crew in minutes. And that's not the only threat. Cosmic radiation poses a serious risk to long duration interplanetary missions, and unlike solar radiation and radiation from coronal mass ejections the energies of the particles responsible make shielding astronauts extremely difficult. And finally, there's the travel time. Two and a half years to Jupiter system; six months to Mars. Now, these problems are subject to a variety of approaches — including medical ones: does it matter if cosmic radiation causes long-term cumulative radiation exposure leading to cancers if we have advanced side-effect-free cancer treatments? Better still, if hydrogen sulphide-induced hibernation turns out to be a practical technique in human beings, we may be able to sleep through the trip. But even so, when you get down to it, there's not really any economically viable activity on the horizon for people to engage in that would require them to settle on a planet or asteroid and live there for the rest of their lives. In general, when we need to extract resources from a hostile environment we tend to build infrastructure to exploit them (such as oil platforms) but we don't exactly scurry to move our families there. Rather, crews go out to work a long shift, then return home to take their leave. After all, there's no there there — just a howling wilderness of north Atlantic gales and frigid water that will kill you within five minutes of exposure. And that, I submit, is the closest metaphor we'll find for interplanetary colonization. Most of the heavy lifting more than a million kilometres from Earth will be done by robots, overseen by human supervisors who will be itching to get home and spend their hardship pay. And closer to home, the commercialization of space will be incremental and slow, driven by our increasing dependence on near-earth space for communications, positioning, weather forecasting, and (still in its embryonic stages) tourism. But the domed city on Mars is going to have to wait for a magic wand or two to do something about the climate, or reinvent a kind of human being who can thrive in an airless, inhospitable environment.

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Space Colonization Exts: Robots Fail

Robots fail, risk of human life is inevitable Donald F. Robertson, 3-6-06, industry journalist, “Space Exploration: A Reality Check,” http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive06/RobertsonOpEd_030606.html) The second assumption is that we can conduct detailed exploration with robots, without personal risk or people on site. Recent events should engender some humility in our toolmakers. In spite of all the money spent on space robotics and some extraordinary successes like the Mars Exploration Rovers, we have failed to reliably automate even relatively simple tasks. Docking two spacecraft together would seem an ideal job for automation, but recent experiments such as the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology have not gone well. The Russian masters of this skill keep welltrained cosmonauts in reserve at the space station whenever possible, and they have to take over with depressing regularity. If we cannot reliably automate docking in Earth orbit, what makes us think we can do so at Mars as part of an expensive effort to return a few small samples?

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Weapons Security Case Turn
Chinese and Russian nuke security tight now- U.S. space weaponization scares them into high security alert and decreases nuke security Jeffrey Lewis, July 2004, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, “What if Space Were Weaponized?” http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf Russian President Vladimir Putin has called the prospects of space weapons “particularly alarming,” while the commander of Russian Space Forces implied that Russia would respond to U.S. deployments of space weapons.37 While China currently maintains its forces on a “no alert” status, Beijing has indicated considerable concern about how a U.S. spacebased missile defense system might undercut its nuclear deterrent. The Chinese ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament warned that the deployment of space weapons would “jeopardize the global strategic balance and stability” and “trigger off … another round of arms race.”38 China currently does not appear to keep nuclear warheads mated to its ballistic missiles, nor aboard its single ballistic missile submarine (which stays in port). All Chinese nuclear weapons appear to be under lock and key in storage facilities that are physically separate from their launch pads. The deployment of space weapons could create strong incentives to reverse this restraint, and increase the alert rates of Chinese forces.39 Raising the alert rates of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces would undermine U.S. security on a day-to-day basis, because forces on alert are inherently more vulnerable to the inherent risks of accident or unauthorized use.

Decreased nuke weapons security increases nuke proliferation and terrorist access Jeffrey Lewis, July 2004, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, “What if Space Were Weaponized?” http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf Accidents happen, including accidents with U.S. nuclear weapons. In some cases, the warheads were lost – the United States lost at least two nuclear weapons during aircraft crashes in 1958 off the coast of Savannah, Georgia, and in 1966 off the coast of Spain.40 In other cases, warheads have been recovered: In 1996, an Energy Department tractor trailer overturned in a Nebraska blizzard carrying “classified cargo” – later confirmed to be several nuclear warheads. Fortunately, the weapons were recovered undamaged after several hours.41 These kinds of accidents are more likely to happen when forces are kept on alert and moved around. There is also the risk that nuclear warheads might be stolen by terrorists or sold by military units. Although Russian soldiers are now paid regularly, obviating concerns that they might sell nuclear weapons on the black market, both Russia and China have indigenous terrorist groups with ties to al Qaeda. These groups would have strong incentives to attempt to steal one or more nuclear weapons – and mobile missiles patrolling in remote areas, for example, might be an inviting target. Forces on high rates of alert are also vulnerable to the nightmare scenario of an unauthorized launch by a field commander. Although the United States has instituted extensive human reliability programs to ensure that U.S. military personnel are psychologically stable, there is little evidence of comparable programs in Russia or China. Even in a perfect program, mistakes are made.

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KO Information Warfare F/L

Information satellites are inefficient and easy enemy targets The Space Review, 7-16-07, Taylor Dinerman, “Solar power satellites and space radar,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/910/1 One of the great showstoppers for the Space Radar (SR) program, formerly known as Space Based Radar, is power. It takes a lot of energy to transmit radar beams powerful enough to track a moving target on Earth from space. What is called the Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) is what makes SR so much better than other space radar systems, such as the recently-launched German SAR-Lupe or the NRO’s LacZrosse system. While many of the details are classified, the power problem seems to be the main reason that the US Congress, on a bipartisan basis, has been extremely reluctant to fund this program. In order to achieve the power levels needed for an effective GMTI system using current technology, very large solar arrays would be needed. Even if these were to use the new Boeing solar cells that, according to the company, are more than 30% efficient, the arrays would still be much bigger than anything on any operational satellite. Such large arrays would make the SR spacecraft easy targets for enemy antisatellite weapons and would also produce so much drag while in low Earth orbit (LEO) that their lifespan would be shorter—perhaps much shorter—than current-generation reconnaissance satellites. No tech for interpreting images from satellites The Space Review, 3-28-05, Taylor Dinerman, “Space Based radar: the Dilemma,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/344/1 One source claims that intelligence analysts find it very difficult to deal with the data that is transmitted from these spacecraft. Either in digital or in picture form, the imagery is hard to interpret. It certainly is not as user friendly as the pictures from the optical or infrared cameras on the Keyhole satellites. Software that can enhance the final product has probably been developed but, even that may not be enough to provide the quality of information which high-level decision makers demand. Imagery distribution ineffective, especially for defense needs The Space Review, 3-28-05, Taylor Dinerman, “Space Based radar: the Dilemma,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/344/1 There is also the problem of imagery distribution. The new national intelligence structure is supposed to facilitate the distribution of useful information to those who need it at the tactical levels. If SBR is to be a success the data will have to flow in an easily comprehensible form to deployed forces, in near real-time. If the problems that some claim exists with the Lacrosse are still happening, there is no reason to believe that SBR will be any better. One hopes that these are the sorts of questions that Congress is asking behind closed doors. For many years now, Congress has resisted funding Space Based Radar, or anything like it, and it has done so in the face of an obvious need by the military warfighters for such a system. In the end, one has to assume that Congress may know something the rest of us do not. The cost growth and constant reorganization of the program are all bad signs. The program managers have not been able to make this system “get well.” From the outside, it would seem that there is a disconnect between the available mature technology and core requirements.

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KO Information Warfare F/L

Space systems allow for stealing of intelligence information Patrick Keefe, "I Spy." 2-6-06, Wired Magazine, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/3562/ In late 2004, a fierce closed-door debate on Capitol Hill burst into the open. Several senators announced publicly that they believed Congress was frittering away precious budget dollars on a proposed new version of Misty. At $9.5 billion, it was likely the largest item in the intelligence budget. While being careful not to mention the codename or specific nature of the project, US senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon), described the new satellite as "unnecessary, ineffective, overbudget, and too expensive." Part of the reason for the apparent ineffectiveness, of course, is the skill of the satellite sleuths. Even if the observers do not currently have a bead on Misty, the fact that they have seen it and continue to look for it - and have posted info on pretty much everything else - raises questions about the efficacy and expense of stealth technology in space. "It's not an encouraging data point that these dudes could find the damn thing," observes the University of Maryland's Lewis. TURN- Space weaponization causes backlash and undermines conventional U.S. hegemony Michael Katz-Hyman and Michael Krepon, April 2003, Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space, p. 89, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1304/ Given the extraordinary and growing differential in power that the United States enjoys in ground warfare, sea power, and air power, it is hard to propound compelling arguments for seeking to supplement these advantages by weaponizing space. The current U.S. lead in the military utilization of space has never been greater and is unchallenged. If the United States pushes to extend its pronounced military dominance into space, others will view this through the prism of the Bush administration's national security strategy, which places emphasis on preventive war and preemption. Foreign leaders will not passively accept U.S. initiatives to implement a doctrine of space dominance. They will have ample, inexpensive means to take blocking action, as it is considerably easier to negate U.S. dominance in space than on the ground, at sea, and in the air. The introduction of space weaponry and ASAT testing are therefore likely introduce grave complications for the terrestrial military advantages that the United States has worked so hard, and at such expense, to secure. TURN- U.S. space leadership increases prolif- no cooperation with China or Russia Michael Katz-Hyman and Michael Krepon, July 2005, "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2468/ Successful efforts to stop and reverse proliferation face long odds when the dominant state demands to play by its own rules. These odds become even longer when the dominant state cannot enlist the active support of Moscow and Beijing on hard proliferation cases that bother Washington more than they do Russia and China. Nor do Russian or Chinese leaders appear unduly distressed over the difficulties U.S. forces presently face in Iraq. Burden sharing with respect to proliferation is not high on their list of priorities and is likely to drop lower if U.S. space warfare initiatives are pursued. Official Chinese and Russian threat perceptions of the United States are not articulated in public, but they may reasonably be inferred. Both capitals might well question why Washington seeks to extend its military dominance into space by pursuing capabilities that would not be particularly helpful in scenarios involving Iran, North Korea, or other developing countries. Instead, the pursuit of U.S. dominance into space may well be viewed by Moscow and Beijing as part of a broader effort to negate their nuclear deterrents. If so, prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament would further decline. When dominance poses a threat to major powers whose cooperation is most needed to halt and reverse proliferation, dominance becomes part of the problem, rather than part of the solution.

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Generic Competitiveness F/L

No risk of competitiveness decline- American Competitiveness Initiative Office of Science and Technology Policy, February 2006, Domestic Policy Council, http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/aci/aci06-booklet.pdf To build on our successes and remain a leader in science and technology, I am pleased to announce the American Competitiveness Initiative. The American Competitiveness Initiative commits $5.9 billion in FY 2007 to increase investments in research and development, strengthen education, and encourage entrepreneurship. Over 10 years, the Initiative commits $50 billion to increase funding for research and $86 billion for research and development tax incentives. Federal investment in research and development has proved critical to keeping America’s economy strong by generating knowledge and tools upon which new technologies are developed. My 2007 Budget requests $137 billion for Federal research and development, an increase of more than 50 percent over 2001 levels. Much of this increased Federal funding has gone toward biomedical research and advanced security technologies, enabling us to improve the health of our citizens and enhance national security. We know that as other countries build their economies and become more technologically advanced, America will face a new set of challenges. To ensure our continued leadership in the world, I am committed to building on our record of results with new investments—especially in the fields of physical sciences and engineering. Advances in these areas will generate scientific and technological discoveries for decades to come. The U.S. will always be way ahead of the rest of the world Science Daily, 6/13/08, “US Still Leads The World In Science And Technology” Despite perceptions that the nation is losing its competitive edge, the United States remains the dominant leader in science and technology worldwide, according to a new RAND Corporation study. The United States accounts for 40 percent of the total world's spending on scientific research and development, employs 70 percent of the world's Nobel Prize winners and is home to three-quarters of the world's top 40 universities. An inflow of foreign students in the sciences -- as well as scientists and engineers from overseas -- has helped the United States build and maintain its worldwide lead, even as many other nations increase their spending on research and development. Continuing this flow of foreign-born talent is critical to helping the United States maintain its lead, according to the study. "Much of the concern about the United States losing its edge as the world's leader in science and technology appears to be unfounded," said Titus Galama, co-author of the report and a management scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. "But the United States cannot afford to be complacent. Effort is needed to make sure the nation maintains or even extends its standing."

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Generic Competitiveness F/L

Hegemony will never decline – U.S. is too far in tech development and growth Stephen G. Brooks, Assistant Prof, Govt, Dartmouth, and William C. Wohlforth, Associate Prof, Dept Govt, Dartmouth College, Jul/Aug, 2002, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, Issue 4, ebsco To understand just how dominant the United States is today, one needs to look at each of the standard components of national power in succession. In the military arena, the United States is poised to spend more on defense in 2003 than the next 1520 biggest spenders combined. The United States has overwhelming nuclear superiority, the world's dominant air force, the only truly blue-water navy, and a unique capability to project power around the globe. And its military advantage is even more apparent in quality than in quantity. The United States leads the world in exploiting the military applications of advanced communications and information technology and it has demonstrated an unrivaled ability to coordinate and process information about the battlefield and destroy targets from afar with extraordinary precision. Washington is not making it easy for others to catch up, moreover, given the massive gap in spending on military research and development (R&D), on which the United States spends three times more than the next six powers combined. Looked at another way, the United States currently spends more on military R&D than Germany or the United Kingdom spends on defense in total. No state in the modern history of international politics has come close to the military predominance these numbers suggest. And the United States purchases this preeminence with only 3.5 percent of its GDP. As historian Paul Kennedy notes, "being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world's single superpower on the cheap is astonishing." America's economic dominance, meanwhile -- relative to either the next several richest powers or the rest of the world combined -- surpasses that of any great power in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily laid waste every other major economy). The U.S. economy is currently twice as large as its closest rival, Japan. California's economy alone has risen to become the fifth largest in the world (using market exchange-rate estimates), ahead of France and just behind the United Kingdom. It is true that the long expansion of the 1990s has ebbed, but it would take an experience like Japan's in that decade -- that is, an extraordinarily deep and prolonged domestic recession juxtaposed with robust growth elsewhere -- for the United States just to fall back to the economic position it occupied in 1991. The odds against such relative decline are long, however, in part because the United States is the country in the best position to take advantage of globalization. Its status as the preferred destination for scientifically trained foreign workers solidified during the 1990s, and it is the most popular destination for foreign firms. In 1999 it attracted more than one-third of world inflows of foreign direct investment. U.S. military and economic dominance, finally, is rooted in the country's position as the world's leading technological power. Although measuring national R&D spending is increasingly difficult in an era in which so many economic activities cross borders, efforts to do so indicate America's continuing lead. Figures from the late 1990s showed that U.S. expenditures on R&D nearly equaled those of the next seven richest countries combined.

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CM Competitiveness Block

<<TO BE READ WITH GENERIC COMPETITIVENESS BLOCK>> 1. No internal link between space tech and overall competitiveness. David evidence doesn’t make a connection between SPS and U.S. leadership, SPS won’t affect the rest of the market. 2. No link to hegemony- Segal doesn’t claim that competitiveness affects hegemony, only leadership in research and development. 3. The tech breakthroughs argument is too much of a stretch- there is no intrinsic link between SPS and the kind of tech development Treder is talking about, like medicine. Space wont affect our ability to solve famine and wars. AND, even if they win SPS is they key link to all tech, the tech production would just be exported to another country. Means plan doesn’t impact overall tech production and doesn’t access the Treder evidence.

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CO Competitiveness Block

<<TO BE READ WITH GENERIC COMPETITIVENESS BLOCK>> 1. No internal link between SPS and competitiveness- NSSO evidence says SPS key to our leadership in aerospace, not overall competitiveness. Things like the American Competitiveness Initiative and better education check the need for the plan. 2. Squo solves the aff- Their own Domestic Policy Council ev indicates the ACI is spurring technological development among U.S. industry. 3. U.S. government not key- the NSSO evidence is horrible on this question- the only part of the card that cites federal involvement says it needs to support private investment. ZERO warrants why federal government needs to act. 4. No link to peace in space- the Asimov card is laughable, it talks about the success of the U.S. in the cold war, but doesn’t cite why U.S. involvement prevents space war.

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Competitiveness- Space Mil Turn

Space weaponization and investment kills U.S. competitiveness Center for Defense Information, 4-18-02, Theresa Hitches- CDI Vice President, “Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette?,” http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm Besides the potential for undercutting, rather than strengthening, the U.S. military edge, there also is reason to be concerned about the possibility that moves toward weaponizing space could damage the competitiveness of the U.S. space industry, which currently dominates the international marketplace and therefore bolsters U.S. economic and military power.

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The commercial space and telecommunications sector is also arguably the most globalized of today's economic sectors. The customer base is international; the industry itself is largely comprised of multinational alliances among companies and consortia, as well as joint government programs. Whereas space used to be available only to the most developed nations, there are more than 1,100 companies in 53 countries now exploiting space.34 Space is a major worldwide market accounting for many billions in revenue, and U.S. firms are dominant in the sector. According to a 2000/2001 study (the 2001/2002 version should be released shortly) by the Washington-based Satellite Industry Association, worldwide revenue (including both government and commercial customers) for 3he satellite industry was $85.1 billion in 2000, and $97.7 billion is estimated for 2001. Over the past five years, the average annual growth has been 17 percent. The industry association was predicting year-end numbers in 2001 to show 15 percent growth. The U.S. satellite industry pulled in $8.9 billion in 2000, and $10.3 billion in 2001 in satellite manufacturing alone, out of worldwide revenue of $17.2 billion and $20.7 billion respectively. Importantly, exports account for half or more of U.S. industry revenue.435 A parallel study, released by the Satellite Industry Association April 5, 2001, and conducted by Henry R. Hertzfeld, senior research scientist at the George Washingto56University Space Policy Institute, showed worldwide spending on "civilian space programs totaled $20.8 billion in 2000 excluding spending by Russian, Ukrainian and Chinese governments. Government spending on space reached $3788 billion when adding in military space budgets. The United States accounted for more than three-fourths of all spending on civil space (78 percent), while combined spending by European countries and all other governments (Japan, China, Brazil an910others) accounted for the remaining spending."1136 While commercial space was a booming market during most of 1990s, the market for low-earth orbit satellites has collapsed over the past two years. Launch providers are predicting a flat marketplace for a number of years.1237 In addition, the market for large geosynchronous orbit satellites for communications also is at near rock bottom and is expected to remain flat through 2011, according to a recent report by Forecast International/DMS Inc.1338

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The growth in the ma14151617181920212223242526272829g driven by satellite services, such as direct downlinks for Internet (with high hopes pinned on the development of broadband Internet services) or TV. <<CONTINUED BELOW>>

Competitiveness- Space Mil Turn
<<CONTINUED ABOVE>> There further is excess capacity in the commercial space market place, with five major manufacturers (three U.S., two European), according to Christopher E. Kubaski, chief financial officer of Lockheed Martin Corp.3039

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Kubaski and other U.S. industry leaders a3132 predicting little growth in the commercial sector in the near term. Corporate chieftains at major defense and space firms already are citing missile defense as a much more lucrative future market than commercial/civil space operations. Such a market assessment by U.S. industry is not without consequences. As one corporate strategist at a major U.S. defense/space firm explained, market assessments drive where corporate research and development dollars go.40 Considering that it is industry, rather than DoD and NASA, that carries the bulk of R&D spending in the defense and civil space arena, there is some possibility that an emphasis on space weaponization could shift technology investment from the commercial to the defense world. Granted, this would hold only for those firms — such as Lockheed Martin Corp., Boeing Co., Raytheon Co., and TRW — that do large percentages of government businesses, rather than for those companies more vested in the commercial end of space operations (providing telecommunications and Internet services for example.) Nonetheless, the ramifications of shifting R&D on market edge in the commercial arena deserve some consideration.

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F-22 Trade-Off Disad

F-22s in production now Honolulu Advertiser, 7-23-08, “Highly advanced F-22 Raptors start arriving in 2010,” http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080723/NEWS08/807230368/1018/LOCALNEWSFRONT HICKAM AIR FORCE BASE — The first two of 20 F-22 Raptor fighters — the Air Force's most advanced weapons system — are expected to arrive in Hawai'i in June 2010. Lt. Col. Christopher "Frenchy" Faurot, a Hawai'i Air National Guard pilot and head of the F-22 "beddown" program here, yesterday said he's looking forward to that date. "It's nothing short of amazing, to tell you the truth," said Faurot, 42, and a Damien Memorial School graduate, of the Raptor. The stealth fighters, which will replace aging F-15 Eagles at Hickam, can reach supersonic speed without afterburners, are highly maneuverable and are almost invisible to radar. Space mil trades off with F-22 budget Everett Dolman, 2006, "U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space." SAIS Review, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2309/ The immediate budget impact of significant funding increases for space weapons would be to decrease funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet, and ground forces. This may well set the proponents of space weaponization at odds with both proponents and opponents of increased defense spending. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities forgone. This is a mighty task. The tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars needed to develop, test and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets around the world could displace a half-dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs such as the F-22, and several heavy armored divisions. This is a tough sell for supporters of a strong military. It is an even more difficult dilemma for those who oppose weapons in general, and space weapons in particular. Ramifications for the most critical current function of the Army, Navy, and Marines—pacification, occupation, and control of foreign territory—are profound. With the downsizing of traditional weapons to accommodate heightened space expenditures, the U.S. ability to do all three would wane significantly. At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police foreign lands, in light of the no-end-in-sight occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will have no direct potential to do so. F-22 production ensures sale to Japan The Korea Herald, 4-30-07, “'Japan's F-22 buy will ignite arms race,” Jin Dae-woong. http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/radgreen/2007-April/025340.html The F-22 Raptor, built by U.S. defense manufacturer Lockheed Martin Corp., is called a "dream fighter jet" with the world's most effective performance. In June 2006, during a U.S. military training exercise, the F-22A achieved a 144-to-zero kill-toloss ratio against F-15s, F-16s and F/A-18s, which outnumbered the F-22A by about 4 to 1 during the exercises. Japan's defense officials are considering acquiring F-22s and F-15FX fighters built by Boeing Co. to replace its aging F-4E fighter jets. On Wednesday, a U.S. official said that the U.S. government is positively considering Japan's offer to purchase F-22 fighters to help the country cope with a rapidly modernizing Chinese military and North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities. "And so we are very positively disposed to talking to the Japanese about futuregeneration fighter aircraft," Dennis Wilder, senior director for East Asian Affairs on the White House National Security Council staff, said at a news briefing ahead of a summit meeting between U.S. President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

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F-22 Trade-Off Disad

F-22 sales key to U.S.-Japan alliance The Korea Herald, 4-30-07, “'Japan's F-22 buy will ignite arms race,” Jin Dae-woong. http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/radgreen/2007-April/025340.html If the U.S. government and parliament allow the export of F-22 stealth fighters to Japan, it will be an indication that Washington has made up its mind to place the U.S.-Japan alliance on the axis of its security strategy in the Northeast Asian region for the upcoming era, experts said. They said it is because the U.S.'s overseas sales of F-22s, which is currently barred by U.S. federal law, will be limited to a few very close allies such as Japan and Australia. "The United States has said the F-22 is a war fighter for U.S. air dominance in the 21st century. It has said the aircraft won't be shared with other countries. So, although the release of F-22s is approved, we can expect that the purchase opportunities will be limited to its No. 1 allies like Japan," Cha Du-hyeon, a research fellow at the KIDA, said. "That means Washington would have decided to further intensify its alliance with Tokyo to make Japan its number one partner in the region," Cha said. Kim Jong-ha, a defense strategy professor of Hannam University, agreed that the F-22 exports will confirm the U.S.'s move into a Washington-TokyoCanberra triangular alliance for security in the West Pacific

US-Japan alliance key to prevent Japan from rearming Daniel Okimoto, 1998, “The Japan-America Security Alliance: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century”, http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/10106/Okimoto.PM.pdf This is not to say that the Kissinger-Kahn-Gallois prediction will never come true. The further the time horizon is extended, the greater the chances that their forecasts might materialize. What realist theory emphasizes is the potentially powerful impact on Japan of the rise of formidable rivals in the region like China, a unified Korea, or a revanchist Russia. Power shifts involving Japan and its Asian neighbors could turn out to be the most dangerous fault line in Asia. A power inversion, if one took place, could touch off large-scale tremors. Japan might move to acquire military power. Whether such tremors lead to a system-shaking earthquake will depend on a number of factors, not the least of which is JASA’s viability. If JASA remains effective, Japan may choose to continue relying on the U.S. security umbrella. As long as Japan is comfortable about entrusting its security to JASA, the alliance ought to obviate the need to “go it alone.” If JASA is terminated, however, and Japan feels threatened by a powerful Asian neighbor, Japan is likely to embark on a crash program of rearmament. A lot will depend on the nature of the security threat. China’s acquisition of a power projection capability is by itself not necessarily a threat; but the combination of an enhanced military capability and uncertainties about Chinese intentions would be worrisome

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F-22 Trade-Off Disad

Japanese rearm triggers nuclear war Ellen Ratner, 2003, “Engage North Korea!” http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30541 Experts predict that with Japan's high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble a full nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery systems within three years. This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race – for who could doubt that if Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks of a nuclear war somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world, where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff.

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F-22 Trade-Off Disad: 2NC OVERVIEW

Recent moves by the U.S. prove any increase in space exploration will inevitably lead to weaponization, that’s un information services. this trades off with the budget to produce f-22 jets. Sales to japan are key to our alliance, only way to ensure they wont rearm. The impact has three implications: 1.timeframe- link is based off sales to japan, means immediate shortage of f-22s created by plan will trigger japan rearmament. Xa the foust card from the solvency flow- sps tech wont be developed until 2050, means perception of weakened alliance with japan will happen way before plan solvency 2. probability- alliance with u.s. is only deterrent to Japanese aggression in southeast asia. The entire region is unstable, any perceived weakening in the alliance will cause japan to shift their focus towards hard power and unleash nuclear war, that’s the strait times evidence.

3. magnitude- japan rearm will draw in china, then allied powers like the u.s. and Russia, means a full-scale nuclear war.

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Funding for space mil trades off within the defense budget David Ziegler, June 1997, Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary Thought, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1239/ In this budget-constrained environment, funding for space weapons could only come at the expense of other US defense forces. These forces are constantly challenged by global competitors for technological and operational superiority. So far, the United States has done well to preserve its advantage through relentless modernization of its systems. Those modernizations are expensive, however, and today are stretched out beyond the life cycle of the systems they replace. While acknowledging that today's force can handle today's threats, the current chief of staff of the Air Force recognizes that resources are not available to modernize everything at once. His acquisition plan, therefore, calls for 'just in time' modernization. F-22s are phased in to replace today's fighters just as those fighters are made obsolete by foreign developments. The C-17 is delivered just as C-141s retire. 'We are phasing in the capabilities so that they arrive when we need them,' he states, but 'delays in the modernization will create vulnerabilities very soon.' The point is this: Why start an arms build up in space when budget limitations already threaten essential programs like the joint strike fighter and the evolved expendable launch vehicle? Funds allocated to space weapons undermine the budget upon which the American services' just-in-time modernization is predicated. It gambles that investing in space superiority is worth the resulting decline in relative advantage in the other mediums.

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F-22 Trade-Off Disad Exts: Heg Impact

F-22s key to U.S. hegemony Arnold Engineering Development Center Public Affairs, 2-22-00, “Acquisition official discusses F-22 role in air power future,” Captain Tim White, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/n20000222_000260.htm ARNOLD AIR FORCE BASE, Tenn. (AFPN) -- The Air Force's top acquisition officer for all fighter and bomber programs visited here recently to discuss the service's No. 1 acquisition priority and the importance of Arnold Engineering Development Center to that priority. Maj. Gen. Claude M. Bolton Jr., program executive officer for fighter and bomber programs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, explained the need for the Air Force's next fighter, the F-22 Raptor, and the work being done to bring the next generation of air dominance to the battlefield. "Maintaining our air superiority and air dominance is No. 1 for us because it is the enabler for everything else we do," said Bolton. "It allows us to prosecute our war plans and allows our Army and Navy colleagues to do what they need to do without worrying about who is flying over them." "Today we have four aircraft around the world that are on par with our F-15," Bolton said. "There are two Russian aircraft, the Eurofighter that is coming on line and there is the French Mirage 2000. When you combine that (one of those planes) with the very good air-to-air missiles that the Russians have, you are faced with one heck of an airplane." Those aircraft threats, coupled with increasingly more sophisticated and lethal surface-to-air missiles, have dramatically increased the importance of the F-22's capabilities. The new fighter will bring together in a single package four capabilities no other fighter system in the world possesses: the ability to fly supersonically without the use of afterburners, or what is called supercruise; stealth design; greater maneuverability at supersonic speeds; and an integrated avionics package designed to present better and clearer information to the pilot.

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Space Militarization China Disad

U.S.-Sino relations high now- recent bilateral meeting China View, 7-24-08, “China to intensify co-op with S. Korea, U.S., Australia, says Chinese FM,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/24/content_8758225.htm SINGAPORE, July 23 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Wednesday met here separately with South Korea's Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith on bilateral cooperation and regional issues of common concern at the sidelines of the 15th ASEAN Regional Forum. In the meeting with his South Korean counterpart, Yang said China and South Korea have established strategic partnership and the two sides should keep high-level exchanges and deepen understanding and cooperation on strategic regional and international issues while strengthening bilateral trade and economic ties. For his part, Yu Myung-hwan said South Korea is willing to keep high-level exchanges with China, adding that Seoul will strengthen its cooperation and coordination with Beijing in all fields, especially in the area of East Asia cooperation and the Six-Party Talks. During the meeting with Rice, Yang said China and the United States should strengthen dialogue and cooperation in the world affairs and properly handle some sensitive problems so as to ensure the Sino-U.S. ties to develop on the healthy track. Meanwhile, Rice said U.S.-China relations are developing smoothly, adding that the two countries should expand their comprehensive cooperation and dialogue in broad areas. Rice expressed hope that Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and Iran's nuclear problem will be resolved properly through their joint cooperation. Space militarization sparks an arms race and crushes U.S.-Sino relations India 123 News, 1-22-07, “China experts see space blast as puzzle and warning,” http://news.webindia123.com/news/ar_showdetails.asp?cat=&id=701221023&n_date=20070122 Xia Liping, a People's Liberation Army (PLA) officer and professor at the Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies, said Beijing did not want an arms race in space. But the reported test may have been intended to push Washington towards international talks aimed at preventing a race, he suggested. ''The weaponisation of space would be very dangerous; it could lead to a new arms race,'' said Xia, who stressed he had no firm knowledge of any test. ''I would say, though, that in the history of arms control the rule is that the United States is willing to ban a military capability only when other countries possess it.'' The Bush administration has announced plans to maintain US dominance of outer space and prevent other states from threatening its satellites, vital nerves of commerce and security. But China is wary. ''Chinese officials believe the real purpose of US space plans is not to protect U.S. assets but to further enhance US military dominance,'' Hui Zhang, a researcher at Harvard University, wrote in a study recently issued by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Chinese textbooks and speeches show that the country's diplomats and military are worried that U.S. ambitions are leaving China vulnerable. ''The militarisation of space will also become the focus of all military great powers' national security and development strategy,'' states a 2006 textbook on space weapons written by officers from China's Second Artillery Battalion, which wields the country's nuclear arsenal. ''The flames and smoke of war will rise in a new battlefield -- space.'' Chinese military writings also leave no doubt that the PLA has been studying how to directly counter US plans, according to a compilation issued last week by Michael Pillsbury, a researcher close to the Pentagon.

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Space Miltarization China Disad

Conflict escalates to nuclear war The Straits Times, 6-25-00, Singapore, “No-one gains in war over Taiwan” THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.

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Space Militarization China Disad Exts: Link

China perceives U.S. space militarization as an attempt to limit Chinese leadership, killing relations As many experts point out, space-based weapons cannot protect satellites, as these weapons are vulnerable to the same types of attack as the objects they are meant to protect.37 Chinese officials believe the real purpose of U.S. space plans is not to protect U.S. assets but rather to further enhance U.S. military dominance. As one official pointed out, “Space domination is a hegemonic concept. Its essence is monopoly of space and denial of others’ access to it. It is also aiming at using outer space for achieving strategic objectives on the ground.”38 Ambassador Hu Xiaodi warned, “It is rather the attempt towards the domination of outer space, which is expected to serve in turn the absolute security and perpetual superiority (many people call this hegemony) of one country on earth. The unilateralism and exceptionalism that are on the rise in recent months also mutually reinforce this.” Washington’s missile defense plans and ambitions to dominate the use of space would very likely spark competitive military dynamics in space. As China’s proposal on PAROS at the CD states, “Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and plays an ever-increasing role in its future development.” China fears that the U.S. space weaponization plans will have disastrous effects on the peaceful use of outer space.40 U.S. plans will also have harmful consequences for China’s political, military-strategic, commercial, and international security interests. Of particular concern is the effect of U.S. actions on China’s modest deterrent capabilities, its capacity to pursue unification with Taiwan, its commercial stake in space development, and its broader interest in a stable security environment.

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China is ready to ratify the CTBT

Space Mil CTBT Turn

Days after Russia ratified an international agreement prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tuesday that China's legislature will likely ''speed up the process of approving the treaty.'' In a news conference, Sun Yuxi said China welcomes the approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the Russian State Duma last Friday. ''Russia has one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. We believe its approval of the CTBT will have a positive impact'' on the enforcement of the treaty, he said. Sun predicted that after ''discussion and investigation,'' the National People's Congress (NPC), China's legislature, would accelerate its approval of the treaty, marking a significant change in Chinese policy. With the NPC's governing Standing Committee currently in session, ratification could be swift. Although China signed the treaty in 1996, the NPC has yet to ratify it.

Space mil means China won’t sign the CTBT
Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

Nuclear test ban ratification. China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and has not yet ratified it, partly because the U. S. Senate rejected it in 1999. However, U.S. missile defense and space weaponization plans make it politically difficult for China to consider ratification. The cessation of nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as called for in the CTBT, would constrain qualitative improvement of China's existing nuclear weapons and the development of new advanced weapons. In the event of a continuing challenge from the United States, China would need further nuclear tests to avoid a major degradation or neutralization of their limited retaliatory capability. For example, China may need additional nuclear tests to reduce the size of new warheads as needed for deployment of MIRVed missiles or complicated decoys. The development of maneuvering warheads would also require tests. Already, some Chinese scientists and arms control experts believe that China made significant sacrifices in signing the CTBT, arguing that the CTBT places more direct constraints on China's nuclear weapons program than on the weapons programs of other states. However, to achieve the goal of complete prohibition and eventual destruction of nuclear weapons, China decided to sign the treaty despite its drawbacks. Many Chinese question why other nations, including China, should care about an international agreement such as the CTBT when the United States, in pursuing its own absolute security, damages the security of other nations and expresses no interest in international treaties

CTBT key to stop proliferation <INSERT FROM POLITIX FILE>

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Space Militarization Indo-Pak Disad

India and Pakistan are not investing in space weaponization now, but will follow in U.S. footsteps if plan is passed Jeffrey Lewis, July 2004, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, “What if Space Were Weaponized?” http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf Previous scenarios outlined the relationship between U.S. pursuit of space weapons and their possible spread to other countries. Perhaps the most straightforward possibility for this phenomenon lies in the relationship between India and Pakistan. India is a state that may pursue ASAT capabilities, if other states do so first. The chief of the Indian Air Force, S. Krishnaswamy, recently remarked that: “Any country on the fringe of space technology like India has to work towards such a command as advanced countries are already moving towards laser weapons platforms in space and killer satellites.”57 Pakistan has a much smaller industrial base, but has long attempted to match Indian deployments – particularly in military matters. Pakistan is likely to emulate Indian ASAT efforts, given the enmity between the two countries and the relative advantage that India derives from the use of space for military operations. Developing states like India and Pakistan could develop two types of ASATs by 2010. Space weaponization ensures Indo-Pak conflict will escalate into nuke war Jeffrey Lewis, July 2004, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, “What if Space Were Weaponized?” http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf During a conflict in 2010, Pakistan may have a strong incentive to launch preemptive strikes against satellites used by the Indian military for reconnaissance and communications. Such strikes would pose substantial challenges to U.S. security policy. First, even limited strikes against Indian satellites could very well endanger U.S. space assets, including imaging satellites and civil space missions. A 1985 ASAT test conducted by the United States created hundreds of pieces of debris, many of which remained in orbit for a decade. In 1999, one of these pieces of debris came within about one kilometer from the International Space Station. 68 Although unlikely, the National Academy of Sciences has warned of the possibility of “collisional cascading” from debris impacts at crowded altitudes.69 High altitude nuclear detonations could also create substantial collateral damage, through electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and radiation effects. Second, Pakistan might target third-party satellites used by the Indian Army. Potential targets would include commercial imaging and communications satellites, as well as the GPS or European Galileo system if Indian forces were allowed to utilize those services during an offensive. Such attacks would have unanticipated affects on the United States. In one war game, the United States faced what one participant called “ugly choices” about commercial satellites being used by potential opponents. Participants discovered that they were unable to determine who might be affected by a decision to shoot down a commercial satellite. This, according to one participant, “vastly complicates the national security landscape.”70 The United States has made clear that it would regard a deliberate attack on U.S. space assets, including commercial satellites, as an act of war. The U.S. National Space Policy states: “Pur-poseful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The United States may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including if directed by the National Command Authorities, the use of force to respond to such an infringement on U.S. rights.”71 In practice, of course, the U.S. threat to treat attacks on satellites as an act of war may not be credible for commercial satellites supporting foreign military operations. Moreover, the lack of casualties in an attack on U.S. space assets also raises questions about the credibility of this commitment. Perhaps more importantly, the risk of Pakistani ASAT attacks would create the same escalatory incentives for India that the United States faces in the second scenario. U.S. war games suggest that future conflicts in South Asia may not be very stable.72 A contractor who has conduct more than two dozen war games for the Pentagon and other military-planning centers told the Wall Street Journal that the India-Pakistan scenarios usually escalate to the use of nuclear weapons “within the first 12 ‘days’ of the war game.” “It’s a scary scenario,” said one participant. Antisatellite weapons would reinforce the strong escalatory dynamic that many war games have revealed.

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Politics Links: Info Warfare Unpopular

SPS information radar funding unpopular The Space Review, 7-16-07, Taylor Dinerman, “Solar power satellites and space radar,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/910/1 One of the great showstoppers for the Space Radar (SR) program, formerly known as Space Based Radar, is power. It takes a lot of energy to transmit radar beams powerful enough to track a moving target on Earth from space. What is called the Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) is what makes SR so much better than other space radar systems, such as the recently-launched German SAR-Lupe or the NRO’s Lacrosse system. While many of the details are classified, the power problem seems to be the main reason that the US Congress, on a bipartisan basis, has been extremely reluctant to fund this program. Space Based Radar unpopular The Space Review, 3-28-05, Taylor Dinerman, “Space Based radar: the Dilemma,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/344/1 For many years now, Congress has resisted funding Space Based Radar, or anything like it, and it has done so in the face of an obvious need by the military warfighters for such a system. In the end, one has to assume that Congress may know something the rest of us do not. The cost growth and constant reorganization of the program are all bad signs. The program managers have not been able to make this system “get well.” From the outside, it would seem that there is a disconnect between the available mature technology and core requirements.

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Politics Links: Plan Unpopular w/ Public

Plan unpopular with the public because of past failures Jeff Foust, 8-13-07, aerospace analyst and writer for The Space Review, “A Renaissance for Space Solar Power, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/931/1 One obstacle facing space solar power is that most people have not heard of it, and many of those who have associate it with the huge, expensive concepts studied back in the 1970s. Those proposals featured arrays many kilometers long with massive trusses that required dozens or hundreds of astronauts to assemble and maintain: Mankins joked that a giant Borg cube from Star Trek would have easily fit into one corner of one of the solar power satellite designs. “You ended up with a capital investment—launchers, in-space infrastructure, all of those things—on the order of $300 billion to $1 trillion in today’s dollars before you could build the first solar power satellite and get any power out of it,” he said.

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Politics Links: Space Mil Unpopular

Space militarization unpopular with Congress Nina Tannenwald, Summer 2004, “Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1556/ Although SPACECOM and its supporters aggressively assert their views, advocates of weapons in space may be in the minority, even in the Pentagon. As many observers recognize, the interests of the United States in space are much broader than SPACECOM presents. U.S. testing and deployment of orbital weapons could make using space for other military and commercial purposes more difficult. Many in the military, especially those involved in crucial military support activities, are quietly aware of this, as are officials at NASA and the international space station, and their supporters in Congress. Congressional support for antisatellite (ASAT) programs does not appear to be deep or widespread. Serious questions remain as to whether the threats to U.S. assets in space are really as great as SPACECOM argues, and whether, even if the threats were real, expensive and difficult space-based weapons would really be the most effective way to deal with them. In many cases, those wishing to hurt the United States will likely find it much easier, and more effective, to attack terrestrial targets. Space mil unpopular- Congress thinks it allows for stealing of intelligence Patrick Keefe, "I Spy." 2-6-06, Wired Magazine, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/3562/ In late 2004, a fierce closed-door debate on Capitol Hill burst into the open. Several senators announced publicly that they believed Congress was frittering away precious budget dollars on a proposed new version of Misty. At $9.5 billion, it was likely the largest item in the intelligence budget. While being careful not to mention the codename or specific nature of the project, US senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon), described the new satellite as "unnecessary, ineffective, overbudget, and too expensive." Part of the reason for the apparent ineffectiveness, of course, is the skill of the satellite sleuths. Even if the observers do not currently have a bead on Misty, the fact that they have seen it and continue to look for it - and have posted info on pretty much everything else - raises questions about the efficacy and expense of stealth technology in space. "It's not an encouraging data point that these dudes could find the damn thing," observes the University of Maryland's Lewis.

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Politics Links: Dems Oppose

Key Democrats oppose funding for space programs Dr. James Clay Moltz, April 2002, associate professor at the Center for Contemporary Conflict in the Department of National Security Affairs, “Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control,” http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/moltzapril02.asp The same Congress that boosted funding for missile defenses by 57 percent to $8.3 billion last year also cut significant chunks out of Bush proposals for space-based elements of national missile defense. Indeed, the final House-Senate conference committee eliminated $120 million from the president’s proposed $170 million appropriation for the Space-Based Laser. It also eliminated funds entirely for the Space Based Infrared System-low (SBIRS-low), a satellite-based early-warning system. These actions suggest that space weapons are vulnerable to congressional challenges. Also, the full impact of the change in the Senate’s leadership has not yet been felt. Key Democrats have come out in strong opposition to space weapons, including Senators Tom Daschle (SD), Joseph Biden (DE), and Carl Levin (MI). Except for the unprecedented budget unity brought on by the September 11 events, cuts would likely have been made in the missile defense budget for fiscal year 2002,9 forcing even harder choices regarding space defenses. Such debates are beginning for fiscal year 2003. Conservative Democrat Robert Byrd (WV) warned on the Senate floor against “a headlong and fiscally spendthrift rush” to deploy space weapons, concluding, “That heavy foot on the accelerator is merely the stamp and roar of rhetoric.”

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Politics Links: NASA Popular
Congress supports NASA funding Aero News, 6-19-08, “House Approves $20.2 Billion NASA Budget,” ContentBlockID=fd897c96-047a-432d-98dd-41d242bfa3a6

http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?

It's a major win for NASA... but still far short of a decisive victory. On Wednesday the US House of Representatives approved a $20.2 billion NASA spending bill for fiscal year 2009 that includes funds for one more shuttle flight before the fleet's retirement, as well as more money for development of the Constellation program. The Associated Press reports the 2.8 percent increase in funds over FY2008 includes money for one last mission to the International Space Station, so that NASA can fulfill its commitment to deliver the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer. NASA pledged to deliver the 15,000-pound instrument -- to be used to search for unusual matter in space -- early in the ISS program, but shelved those plans following the 2003 loss of Columbia. "We ought to make good on our original commitment to fly this expensive instrument to the ISS," said Texas congressman Ralph Hall, the top Republican on the Science Committee, during debate on the measure last week. Sixteen countries contributed some $1.5 billion to develop the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer for the US Department of Energy. House lawmakers approved reinstatement of that mission by an overwhelming -- and likely veto-proof -- 409-15 vote. The latter is important, as the Bush Administration opposes spending a dime more than originally budgeted for the shuttle program, now slated for retirement in 2010. The White House penned a $17.6 billion budget for NASA for FY2009.

NASA funding overwhelmingly popular Elaine Povich, 6-23-05, journalist for Chicago Tribune and Newsday, “Senate panel approves funding for NASA”, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0605/062305tdpm2.htm The Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee on Thursday unanimously approved a bill aimed at assuring that the United States is able to continuously fly in space while the space shuttle is retired and a new vehicle brought on line. The committee voted 22-0 to send to the full Senate a bill governing the activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) through 2010. Earlier proposals called for a gap in human space-flight capability, but the committee did not agree. The bill would authorize a 3 percent increase in funding for NASA from fiscal 2006 through fiscal 2010, or a budget of $16.6 billion in fiscal 2006 and growing to $18.5 billon. "Our national policy will determine the nation's role in future space exploration and its contribution to broad research and our national security," said Texas Republican Kay Bailey Hutchison, chairwoman of the Science and Space Subcommittee. "The possibility of a gap in space flight must be eliminated if the [United States] wants to be a leader in space exploration."

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Japan CP Solvency
Major efforts in both system aspects and technology advancement for SSP are currently taking place in Japan, Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Prior to the recent intensification of restrictions placed on technology interchanges with non-U.S. engineers and scientists, NASA had invited non-U.S. researchers to contribute to the SSP Technical Interchange Meetings. This interchange had resulted in the incorporation of several non-U.S. technical concepts in the NASA program, and if current restrictions under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) can be mitigated, interchanges with non-U.S. SSP researchers should certainly be continued and expanded. The AIAA found the following specific areas worthy of consideration for international coordination and/or cooperation: (1) Computer modeling. Much work in this area has been conducted in Germany and Japan. (2) Solar array technology development. Again, Germany and Japan have extensive research and development programs in this area. (3) Wireless powertransmission. Japan, France, and Canada are currently developing demonstrations of microwave power transmission, both on the ground and in space. (4) Research facilities. Japan, in particular, has built a Long Duration Microwave Exposure Facility (LDMEF) that could be evaluated for joint use in radiation exposure studies over a range of frequencies. (5) Innovative concepts and technologies. Japan's "sandwich" SSP design concept has already been included in NASA's studies. Germany, Russia, and Ukraine have conducted studies of other innovative SSP concepts. Japan's Laser Energy Network could supplement U.S. laser power transmission studies. (6) Multiple-use applications. Space-to-space "power-plug" concepts developed in France, Japan, and Russia could be of interest in current U.S. evaluations of multiple-use prospects. (7) Demonstrations. Japan has conducted a number of demonstrations of SSP-enabling technologies and concepts on the ground, in the air, and in space. France, the European Space Agency, the International Space University, Ukraine, Russia, and Canada are all currently developing demonstration projects, some of which would use the international space station. Japan is engaged in a major demonstration of a prototype SSP station, SPS-2000, that involves ten equatorial nations.

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Private Sector CP 1NC
TEXT: The fifty states and territorial governments of the United States should offer incentives to private sector companies for the development and implementation of space based solar power. Observation One: Competition The CP competes through the net benefits Observation Two: Solvency Private sector historically key to successful space tech and quick implementation James Burk, 6-3-04, vice president of Artemis Society International and staff writer, “What the Moon-Mars Commission's Report Should Say...” http://www.marsnews.com/articles/20040603-what_the_moonmars_commissions_report_should_say.html NASA should get out of the way of the private sector For too long, NASA has stifled creativity and entrepreneurialism on the part of non-governmental efforts to pioneer space. In the late 1990s, many firms such as Rotary Rocket and Beal Aerospace were working on bringing SSTO/RLV technologies to market, and NASA did everything to prevent their success. Firms like LunaCorp and TransOrbital were talking about private lunar missions and NASA did everything to stifle them, including spreading rumors of a new NASA moon probe, which ultimately amounted to nothing and caused their funding opportunities to dry up. Let the commercial sector do what it excels at, namely cutting through bureaucracy and accomplishing goals on a short timeframe. Instead of stifling private sector efforts, NASA should do everything they can to help them. NASA should enhance and expand their programs to transfer technologies & methods developed internally to start-up companies. During the Apollo days, most of the hardware and operations were conducted by private contractors. That model has worked before and should be returned to for future projects. Let NASA set the direction & goals, but let the private sector implement them and create wealth & commercial opportunities from them. That is a much faster way to get into space, and also much cheaper for the public.

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Private Sector CP Solvency

Private sector key to development and commercialization of space- moon mission proves CEN, 2-5-07, Chemical and Engineering News, “NASA Gets Ready To Revisit The Moon,” http://pubs.acs.org/cen/government/85/8506gov1.html Agency officials have already begun talks with several countries interested in being part of the lunar mission, and they also are looking for ways to involve the private sector. For its part, the private sector doing business in human space travel isn't waiting for NASA to get to the moon. In fact, some observers believe NASA should let the private sector develop the details of how to get to and from the moon and should focus instead on next-generation technologies, such as nuclear propulsion, which will enable deeper space travel. "NASA should be playing a Lewis and Clark function with respect to space travel," says Rick Tumlinson, president of X-Tremespace and Orbital Outfitters. In other words, he says, "NASA should go over the hill and tell us what's there. Then the private sector can go out there and figure out ways to utilize it and create wealth from it." State government is enough to incentivize the plan Joseph D. Rouge, 10-10-07, Acting Director of the National Security Space Office, http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf FINDING: The SBSP Study Group found that adequate capital exists in the private sector to finance construction, however private capital is unlikely to develop this concept without government assistance because the timeframe of reward and agree of risk are outside the window of normal private sector investment. Capital in the energy and other sectors is available on the level needed for such a large project, but capital flows under fairly conservative criteria, and SBSP has not yet experienced a suitable demonstration, nor have the risks been adequately characterized to make informed business plan decisions. Only private sector can provide effective funding and development for SBSP National Security Space Office, 10-10-07, “Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic Security,” http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf The SBSP Study Group found that SBSP systems are unlikely to become economically competitive, nor produced on the scale that is needed to help solve global energy and environmental problems unless the systems are manufactured, owned, and operated by private industry. This finding is consistent with the U.S. National Space Policy that advocates space commercialization.

Government control crowds out the private sector, ultimately creating rebellion Taylor Dinerman, editor and publisher of SpaceEquity.com, 1-15-07, “Independent space colonization: questions and implications,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/784/1 In the long term the effort to impose controls on private space colonization by the use of a vague process of international consensus-seeking will create a reaction not only against the OST but against the whole idea that Earth governments should be allowed any say whatsoever in the governance of off-Earth activities. In the near term it is relatively easy for governments to impose their will on space activities, but when vehicles that can provide low-cost access to low Earth orbit are as available to the public as oceangoing private yachts, maintaining control will be much harder.

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Private sector key to successful development- mobile and internet revolutions prove Richard Branson, 1-23-08, business entrepreneur and space investor, New Voyage News, “Richard Branson’s Remarks at the SpaceShipTwo Unveiling,” http://www.newvoyagenews.com/?p=291 As far as science is concerned, this system offers tremendous potential to researchers who will be able to fly experiments much more often than before, helping to answer key questions about Earth’s climate and the mysteries of the universe. And for applied research, it is currently just too expensive to be able to do most of the things in space from which industries like biotechnology could really benefit. The beauty of WK2 and SS2 is that they can help change the paradigm of our relationship to space, achieving an era where space accessibility becomes a commercial and scientific norm, rather than an exception. The other thing that I really admire about the system is that it has the architecture that could someday to be developed into a passenger carrying vehicle, able to take people from A to B around the planet, outside of the atmosphere. That may not happen for some time, but the first generation of space tourists, many of whom are with us today, will be paving the way as they marvel at the beauty of our planet and experience the freedom of weightlessness and the blackness of space. Finally, I think it’s very important that we make a genuine commercial success of this project. If we do, I believe we’ll unlock a wall of private sector money into both space launch systems and space technology. This could rival the scale of investment in the mobile phone and internet technologies after they were unlocked from their military origins and thrown open to the private sector.

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Private Actor CP- AT: Perm Do Both

1. Perm still links to the net benefits, congress would still perceive funding for nasa as part of the plan and would blame bush. Still requires funding from the federal government for the nasa program, means would still trade off with f-22s. cp is still the best policy option.

2. NASA empirically blocks private investment- this drains solvency
Blake Powers, 8-24-03 Director of Outreach for NASA’s Space Product Development Program, “A Time for Everything,” http://laughingwolf.net/archives/000400.html At the same time, NASA has not exactly been a friend to commercial space enterprises. This is particularly true for efforts to develop alternative manned space access. NASA has a great deal invested in being the only way to get people into space, from hardware and infrastructure to an internal culture that claims that only career NASA civil servants can be called astronauts. All those others who fly, or meet the international guidelines for being called such, can not be called such in any NASA publication. NASA has for years tried to block the development of manned commercial access. Just take a look at the regulatory environment for such and NASA’s role in it. NASA has bitterly resisted any suggestion that any other launch service be used, unless it was completely under their control. There are many other examples, for those who care to go do the homework and look them up. It’s official support of commercial activities has been limited. Despite various actions by Congress and its own charter, the agency has not been supportive of commercial research and development. Just go take a look at the history of the Space Product Development Program, which has managed to do some very important and good things with industry, for a good example. Take a good look at the so-called commercialization efforts of Dan Tam, or the idea that Headquarters had that companies would pay for large portions of the ISS without being able to display logos or use their sponsorship in advertising. Those ideas were patently ridiculous, obvious to anyone who had any real-world experience, and beloved by top NASA management who should have known better.

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Cooperation Counterplan 1NC
Text: The United States federal government should remove commercial space technology from the munitions list in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. US-Chinese cooperation over space technology is critical to international space cooperation and the American economy. Dr. James Clay Moltz, CNS Deputy Director, 1/26/06, “Space Conflict or Space Cooperation?” < http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060126.htm>
A current assumption of U.S. defense policy is that the potential vulnerability of U.S. space assets to foreign attack will eventually need to be addressed by the U.S. deployment of space weapons. However, given the breadth of U.S. policy tools, an equally viable option may be a strategy of "cooperative engagement" with possible rivals in space, with the aim of steering these programs into directions favorable to U.S. interests. This could create a "positive sum" game in space for all actors, whereas today we tend to view space competition in Cold War "zero sum" terms.
In order to test this hypothesis regarding the possible use of cooperation as a threat prevention tool, the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University co-sponsored a seminar on January 19, 2006, in Washington, D.C. The meeting featured five speakers, each of whom analyzed the viability of a U.S. "cooperative engagement" strategy in space toward a specific country (or countries) that have been seen as possible U.S. rivals. Approximately 80 persons attended the event, including representatives from the space industry, various non-governmental organizations, local universities, the State Department, the Defense Department, the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and NASA. Speakers (and topics) included Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese (China), Dr. Victor Zaborsky (Russia and Ukraine), Dr. Randall Correll (India), Dr. Daniel Pinkston (North and South Korea), and Dr. John Sheldon (Iran).

Dr. Johnson-Freese's presentation on China provided considerable information about China's interest in space cooperation with the United States, but also noted its desire not to appear to fall into an "unequal" relationship with Washington, given China's priority to develop its own national space capabilities. Dr. Johnson-Freese called U.S.-Chinese space relations today "the last active venue of the Cold War" and urged U.S. policymakers to reconsider the current U.S. strategy of seeking to isolate China in space, largely on nonspace-related political grounds. Her remarks emphasized the questionable effectiveness of current U.S. policy, given the ample availability of Russian and European space technologies to China. Instead, she argued that NASA and U.S. companies could play a positive role--if allowed--in helping to "shape" Chinese space policy and to steer it in a direction favorable to U.S. interests. More specifically, she suggested that space cooperation should be on the agenda of the upcoming summit between President George Bush and Chinese Premier Hu Jintao.
Dr. Zaborsky began his presentation with a review of the success of the U.S. policy of cooperative engagement in dealing with the proliferation threat posed by the Russian and Ukrainian space industries over the past 15 years. By providing Russian and Ukrainian aerospace firms with launch quotas, access to U.S. corporations, and participation in the International Space Station (ISS), Dr. Zaborsky argued, the United States was able to strengthen export compliance within these industries and help provide needed space technologies to assist in the ISS's development. Russian and Ukrainian engines and launch vehicles have also played a key supporting role in ensuring U.S. civilian and military space access over the past decade. Dr. Zaborsky noted Russia's willingness to cancel a lucrative cryogenic engine deal with India as evidence of real compromises made by Russian industry in the 1990s in order to support U.S. nonproliferation goals. Looking ahead, Dr. Zaborsky urged a continuation of U.S. policies and the expansion of cooperation as a means of maintaining U.S. influence and leverage.

The presentation by Dr. Correll explored the still relatively untilled soil of possible U.S.-Indian cooperation in space. While noting past U.S. concerns about nuclear proliferation, Dr. Correll urged rapid expansion of U.S. space ties with India as a means of cementing the bilateral relationship and developing a valuable new cooperative partner. He suggested such specific areas of cooperation as communications satellites, military-to-military ties, robotic Moon missions, and ground tracking (including possible use of Indian ground stations to correct "drift" in U.S. Global Positioning System satellites). Dr. Correll argued that--if properly managed--space cooperation could become the "jewel in the crown" in the emerging U.S.-Indian strategic partnership. Today, he lamented, there is little evidence of dynamic U.S. proposals in this area.
Dr. Pinkston's remarks covered the disparate, but emerging space programs in North and South Korea. He emphasized the highly political nature of both programs and both countries' eagerness to use space as a means of building domestic support and establishing international respect for their scientific prowess. While Dr. Pinkston focused mainly on cooperative opportunities with South Korea, he did not rule out future space cooperation with North Korea in the context of a nuclear settlement on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, Dr. Pinkston suggested that space cooperation could be a low-cost tool for the United States to employ in

seeking to provide a tangible, non-nuclear benefit to Pyongyang as a carrot for ending its nuclear program.
Finally, Dr. Sheldon's presentation, appropriately entitled "A Really Hard Case: Iranian Space Ambitions and the Prospects for U.S. Engagement," provided a unique summary of Tehran's past and current space efforts. While Iran's space accomplishments remain minimal, he said, its ambitions, as in the nuclear sector, are high. Dr. Sheldon cited economic development, security (reconnaissance, mainly), and regional prestige as Iran's main goals. He noted that the United States could undercut Tehran's aims by establishing a regional space consortium in the Middle East (excluding Iran), which could effectively overshadow any Iranian space advances. On the other hand, Dr. Sheldon suggested that space cooperation might play a positive role in the future, if Iran decided to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accepting limits on its nuclear program. In this context, U.S.-Iranian space cooperation could be used both as a confidence building tool and a lever to help ensure continued compliance.

Overall, the experts speaking at the seminar confirmed the possible contribution of space cooperation to threat prevention in space, albeit with certain limitations. Most participants cited current U.S. export control restrictions as a major impediment and urged reform of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). ITAR guidelines to allow trade at least in commercial space technologies already widely available on the international market. Such a move, according to the authors, could free up U.S. companies to compete more effectively in opening up new markets, expand opportunities for NASA, and increase U.S. knowledge of foreign space programs. In general, the experts agreed that space cooperation has been an under-appreciated tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. They urged its more active consideration by policymakers for helping to reduce future space threats, increase transparency, and build bridges in the service of U.S. commercial, scientific, and political goals in space. 62

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China is currently the only country subjected to U.S. regulatory policies on space technology – this kills our ability to cooperate with almost any nation in terms of space Guo Xiaobing, researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations and visiting scholar at the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security, 2007, < http://www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2_7.pdf>
There are two puzzles surrounding U.S. regulatory policies on space technology exports to China. First, among the major space faring nations, China is the only country that the United States has excluded from its space cooperation strategy. Europe and Japan have benefited greatly from their space cooperation with the United States. The former director of the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), even referred to CNES as a little baby of NASA. In the former Eastern Bloc, the United States has adopted an engagement policy and allowed for the establishment of a joint launcher with Russia and Ukraine to canvass business worldwide. This policy kills two birds with one stone. Not only does it reap the business benefits intrinsic in the advanced rockets of the former Soviet Union, but also highlights the security benefits of preventing space technology proliferation. The Iron Curtain is gone and the East and West have been cooperating, with the International Space Station (ISS) acting as an important symbol. However, there is no trace of Chinese participation in this international project. The second puzzle is that despite this blockade by the United States, China’s space capabilities have improved tremendously with regards to manned space missions and satellite exportation. Conversely, the United States, though it is the implementer of sanctions, finds its own share of the commercial satellite market falling continuously. The ISS, advocated by the United States, has been in dire straits, mainly due to the breakup of the Columbia Shuttle China is a strong partner as its reliable and low cost space hardware and services offer an attractive option for these countries. China has fairly mature space launch capabilities and a burgeoning satellite industry. Cooperating with China allows partner countries to reduce their burden and lower risks. At the same time, it allows them to skirt U.S. regulatory obstacles. With the exception of the United States, no country classifies commercial satellites as munitions. Furthermore, only the United States views foreign satellites that contain American made components as its own product and therefore subject to stringent U.S. export controls. Many of the countries partnering with China are fed up with the U.S. practice of imposing its own standards on others. In March 2004, the British newspaper The Observer pointed out in a discussion on the reasons for developing the Galileo system that U.S. policies do not sufficiently consider others’ interests.13 It noted that (Europe) should not trust the United States in developing its satellite positioning system. Jacques Blamont, former CNES director, who acknowledged the close association between his center and NASA, said that an international network to avoid ITAR regulations has gradually formed due to the increasing frustration with U.S. regulatory policies. Countries including Russia, China, India, Japan and Europe, as well as other organizations, have collaborated to circumvent the use of U.S. satellite components. Though he says this trend is likely to increasingly define the international satellite export market, it does not mean these countries will formally organize against the United States. Rather, such moves will likely be decided based on the needs and interests of individual companies and nations It is in the long-term interests of the United States to correct the wrong decision made in 1999 and return to the policies of free trade pursued by the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Nurturing China’s growing space activities through contact and cooperation will be beneficial for both China and the United States.

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Cooperation Counterplan- Solvency Exts.
Current restrictions on commercial space technology inhibit America’s ability to cooperate with other nations over space Vincent G. Sabathier, Space Attache at the Embassy of France and a visiting senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, 2007, “Europe and China” < http://www.space.com/adastra/china_europe_0505.html>
At present, the relationship between the West and China remains ambiguous at best. Some perceive China as the next growing military threat, others as an economic partner not to be neglected. For the United States, however, China remains a potential enemy, if only over the issue of Taiwan. Europe, on the other hand, has taken steps in recent years to welcome China as a potential partner. The attitude of the European Union (EU) is evident in its recent decision to boost economic and strategic relations with China, even while the EU refrains from lifting the 15-year-old arms embargo against the country. The marked difference between U.S. and EU attitudes towards China comes from, and reinforces, their respective philosophies toward international relations-between "realism", the idea that nation states are the dominant players in world affairs and all policy is driven by the national interest of these participants, and "liberalism", the concept that the primary actors on the international stage are individuals, their relation the State and extra-national organizations. It is in the arena of space where these differences are markedly apparent. While the United States places an emphasis on space power and control, Europe maintains that its focus is on the peaceful use of outer space. The former is concentrating on leveraging space to provide itself and its allies with an asymmetric military advantage; the latter is focusing on creating "useful" space applications for Europe's populace and as a tool for the further integration and enlargement of the EU. China is now acknowledged as a space-faring nation. It is the third country after Russia and the United States to have flown a man--a taikonaut--in space. Its human space-flight program is increasingly vibrant with a second manned space launch planned for this year--this time with two astronauts, and long-term goals of sending robotic and manned missions to the moon. Yet, while symbolically important, manned flight is not as valuable to China as its ability to hoist satellites into orbit. With thousands of isolated rural communities characterized by low population densities, and almost nonexistent telecommunication infrastructure, China would benefit greatly from the increased utilization of advanced telecommunication satellite technologies. The many applications of remote-sensing satellites, which have been very helpful in urban development and agriculture in other countries, would also be an invaluable asset to help China cope with both current population and economic growth. The European rationale for cooperation and trade within Europe can naturally be extended to China. The European vision, that space is a medium to explore, research and use for peaceful purposes, makes it a natural arena for cooperation. Cooperation in space science between Europe and China is likely to emerge. The ESA will be instrumental in finding the appropriate domains for cooperation. For example, the new Dragon program will focus on earth observation science and applications for China, using data primarily from ESA's ERS and Envisat satellites. European space industries have sold telecommunication satellites to China in the past. This trend will continue since some European manufacturers have now invested in International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)-free technology that allows them to export systems without the previous tedious, and some say prohibitive, ITAR rules. (ITAR is the U.S. law regarding the import and export of military and defense technologies. All space technology falls under these constraining categories.) Beyond different views of international relations, it is necessary to address another key difference between the EU and the United States. All over Europe, most space-related technology does not fall under military export controls. This reflects the different intended uses of space on each side of the Atlantic. Hence, for Europe, cooperation in space with China is fully decoupled from any lifting of the arms embargo against this country. Under the Clinton Administration, the United States attempted to cooperate with China on space transportation. This was meant to curtail China's exportation of missile technology to countries such as Iran and North Korea, very much like what had been done successfully in the 90s with Russia. The U.S. government forced NASA to redesign the International Space Station with a stronger Russian involvement in mind--very valuable today with the shuttle grounded for more than two years. The U.S. government also encouraged the aerospace industry to engage in commercial partnerships with its Russian counterpart in the field of space transportation. As a result, Lockheed Martin <<CONTINUED BELOW>>

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Cooperation Counterplan- Solvency Exts.
<<CONTINUED ABOVE>> resells the Proton Russian rocket, and incorporates in its new Atlas 5 expandable launcher, a Russian-made first-stage engine, the RD-180. The problem of illegal missile technology transfers between some U.S. companies and the Chinese emerged in 1998, following the failed launch of an Intelsat satellite on a Long March booster, effectively ending that policy. The resulting classification of space technology on the U.S. Department of State munitions list ended any cooperation in space with China. As a result, space cooperation between Europe and the United States decreased as well. If the United States really believes that space technology should not-indeed, must not-be disseminated, it has to engage Europe quickly and explain its concerns. However, such a dialogue would be awkward. Very little cooperation regarding space-based security applications goes on between Europe and the United States despite their military alliance. Meanwhile, ITAR itself has created barriers to prevent such cooperation. At this point, Europe only has relationships with agencies such as NASA and the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) that focus on the peaceful use of space. However, the United States' isolationist policy, which adversely impacts space cooperation through draconian export regulations--while simultaneously taking steps to control and militarize space--forces other space-faring nations, such as Europe, Japan Russia, India and China to cooperate among themselves in the end. The perceived danger the United States feels regarding cooperation between Europe and China is nothing when compared to the difficulties the nation will face should it explore space alone.

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Cooperation Counterplan- Solvency Exts.
US space technology restrictions make international space cooperation and competition impossible – ITAR needs to be changed in order to save the economy and foster cooperation Andhra Pradesh, Indian PressWire, 9/27/07, “US regulations restrict space industry growth” < http://www.indiaprwire.com/businessnews/20070927/24683.htm>
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) of the US are a major hurdle in the growth of new space industry actors in the global market, said speakers from emerging space nations at the 58th International Astronautical Congress (IAC 2007) here. They also made a strong case for change in the rules to facilitate cooperation and healthy competition in the global space industry. The speakers were unanimous that both cooperation and competition were necessary to ensure growth of the space industry, especially among emerging nations and new players. While China said US policy was the biggest hurdle in growth of new actors, India said there was more risk to non-US players because of ITAR rules, which govern the space industry, among other sectors. 'The US policy is the biggest hurdle and it needs to be changed,' said Hua Changzhi, vice president, China Great Wall Corp. Pointing out that US satellite manufacturers had lost market share in recent years, he remarked, 'This is the price paid by US policy'. 'ITAR is the most challenging and difficult regulation we have to contend with. On the issue of licences, there is more risk to non-US players,' said K.R. Sridhara Murthy, executive director, Antrix Corp Ltd, the commercial arm of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). Ray A. Williamson, research professor, Space Policy Institute at George Washington University in the US, said change in ITAR would make it easier for international space industry to operate. 'Unfortunately, given the current political situation in the US, I don't think ITAR regime will change for the next five to 10 years,' he said. 'For this to change, a political change is required in US Congress, where the law was passed,' he added. Murthy called for addressing certain issues at the political level, especially with regard to the export policies of advanced countries. 'Satellite parts come from different countries and when we export satellites for launch in a third country, we often face bottlenecks,' he said. He also called for a unified licensing system for space services and complementary ground services like terrestrial services. Murthy underlined the need to change policy and regulations to facilitate easy access to remote sensing data. He voiced concern over the merger of smaller companies with the big players, saying dominant players would hurt the market and consumers. Another factor affecting the industry was the fact that orbit and spectrum resources were in the hands of government, he added.

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Cooperation Counterplan – AT: China Not Ready
Despite some weaknesses in China’s technology, the US can gain a lot from cooperating with them over space technology – this can help us develop our own market Guo Xiaobing, researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations and visiting scholar at the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security, 2007, < http://www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2_7.pdf>
After Shenzhou V successfully carried China’s first taikonaut into space, Sun Laiyan, director of the China National space Administration, expressed China’s sincere desire to cooperate with America during his U.S. visit. However, this idea was met with skepticism; the United States insists that since China lags behind by more than 20 years in terms of space capabilities, it is not in a position to cooperate with the United States. The truth of the matter is that while China still has some weak points in space development, it also has many areas of strength and thus the two countries can, at the very least, engage in fruitful cooperation in two main respects Second, the United States should take advantage of China’s low-cost space launch capability and jointly develop the international commercial satellite market. Some industry experts believe that if the United States made full use of China’s launch capacity in the next five years, it would be possible to bring $8 billion worth of benefits and 16,000 job opportunities to the U.S. space industry.
15

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Cooperation Counterplan – AT: Kills US Business
China’s technology isn’t ready to compete with ours yet Guo Xiaobing, researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations and visiting scholar at the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security, 2007, < http://www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2_7.pdf>
The United States harbors two major concerns about using Chinese space firms. The first is that Chinese rockets will take business away from U.S. space launch companies. In fact, China’s Long March (LM) rocket series is not yet in a position to compete on the international market with the U.S. Delta or Hercules rockets, Europe’s Ariane or Russia’s Proton. The LM series is only a competitor to Japan’s H-2A and India’s GSLV. Also, the orders that China can acquire have a thin profit margin and will not cause an impact on U.S. space launch companies’ client base

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Cooperation Counterplan – AT: China Gets US Tech Secrets
Satellite agreements and Chinese self-reliance moot any risk of the Chinese getting our technology secrets Guo Xiaobing, researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations and visiting scholar at the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security, 2007, < http://www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2_7.pdf>
The second concern is that China will use trade in the space sector to obtain U.S. ‘technology’ secrets.’ However, several factors have made this increasingly irrelevant. A guiding principle of China’s space program development is self-reliance and attaining independent intellectual property rights for space technology. China’s achievements in manned space flight and satellite research and development have amply demonstrated its independent R&D prowess. China does not need to rely on U.S. technology to make progress. Furthermore, it would be difficult to integrate outside technology with China’s own, as China has developed its own standards for rockets and satellites. Finally, the satellite launch agreements signed by China and the United States during the late 1990s contained strict regulations regarding technology safeguards. If these regulations are adhered to, the chances of unsanctioned technology transfer can be minimized. Those companies that made a procedural error in 1996 have already learned their lessons and strengthened their internal compliance system. Thus, chances for repeat mistakes are very slim

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CO Japan F/L
1. Their Farrar evidence is terrible- it indicates SPS key to global energy leadership, not global hegemon. They don’t access an internal link 2. No impact- their own Hornyak evidence indicates Japan is surpassing U.S. SPS development in the status quo- China has not lashed out and will not in the future. 3. Olympics- impact evidence doesn’t take into account China hosting this year- the won’t lash out at international powers 4. USE F-22 TRADE-OFF JAPAN IMPACT AS LINK TURN (INSERTED BELOW) A. Space mil trades off with F-22 budget Everett Dolman, 2006, "U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space." SAIS Review, online version: http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2309/ The immediate budget impact of significant funding increases for space weapons would be to decrease funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet, and ground forces. This may well set the proponents of space weaponization at odds with both proponents and opponents of increased defense spending. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities forgone. This is a mighty task. The tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars needed to develop, test and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets around the world could displace a half-dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs such as the F-22, and several heavy armored divisions. This is a tough sell for supporters of a strong military. It is an even more difficult dilemma for those who oppose weapons in general, and space weapons in particular. Ramifications for the most critical current function of the Army, Navy, and Marines—pacification, occupation, and control of foreign territory—are profound. With the downsizing of traditional weapons to accommodate heightened space expenditures, the U.S. ability to do all three would wane significantly. At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police foreign lands, in light of the no-end-in-sight occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will have no direct potential to do so. B. F-22 production ensures sale to Japan The Korea Herald, 4-30-07, “'Japan's F-22 buy will ignite arms race,” Jin Dae-woong. http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/radgreen/2007-April/025340.html The F-22 Raptor, built by U.S. defense manufacturer Lockheed Martin Corp., is called a "dream fighter jet" with the world's most effective performance. In June 2006, during a U.S. military training exercise, the F-22A achieved a 144-to-zero kill-toloss ratio against F-15s, F-16s and F/A-18s, which outnumbered the F-22A by about 4 to 1 during the exercises. Japan's defense officials are considering acquiring F-22s and F-15FX fighters built by Boeing Co. to replace its aging F-4E fighter jets. On Wednesday, a U.S. official said that the U.S. government is positively considering Japan's offer to purchase F-22 fighters to help the country cope with a rapidly modernizing Chinese military and North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities. "And so we are very positively disposed to talking to the Japanese about futuregeneration fighter aircraft," Dennis Wilder, senior director for East Asian Affairs on the White House National Security Council staff, said at a news briefing ahead of a summit meeting between U.S. President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

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CO Japan F/L

C. F-22 sales key to U.S.-Japan alliance The Korea Herald, 4-30-07, “'Japan's F-22 buy will ignite arms race,” Jin Dae-woong. http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/radgreen/2007-April/025340.html If the U.S. government and parliament allow the export of F-22 stealth fighters to Japan, it will be an indication that Washington has made up its mind to place the U.S.-Japan alliance on the axis of its security strategy in the Northeast Asian region for the upcoming era, experts said. They said it is because the U.S.'s overseas sales of F-22s, which is currently barred by U.S. federal law, will be limited to a few very close allies such as Japan and Australia. "The United States has said the F-22 is a war fighter for U.S. air dominance in the 21st century. It has said the aircraft won't be shared with other countries. So, although the release of F-22s is approved, we can expect that the purchase opportunities will be limited to its No. 1 allies like Japan," Cha Du-hyeon, a research fellow at the KIDA, said. "That means Washington would have decided to further intensify its alliance with Tokyo to make Japan its number one partner in the region," Cha said. Kim Jong-ha, a defense strategy professor of Hannam University, agreed that the F-22 exports will confirm the U.S.'s move into a Washington-TokyoCanberra triangular alliance for security in the West Pacific

D. US-Japan alliance key to prevent Japan from rearming Daniel Okimoto, 1998, “The Japan-America Security Alliance: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century”, http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/10106/Okimoto.PM.pdf This is not to say that the Kissinger-Kahn-Gallois prediction will never come true. The further the time horizon is extended, the greater the chances that their forecasts might materialize. What realist theory emphasizes is the potentially powerful impact on Japan of the rise of formidable rivals in the region like China, a unified Korea, or a revanchist Russia. Power shifts involving Japan and its Asian neighbors could turn out to be the most dangerous fault line in Asia. A power inversion, if one took place, could touch off large-scale tremors. Japan might move to acquire military power. Whether such tremors lead to a system-shaking earthquake will depend on a number of factors, not the least of which is JASA’s viability. If JASA remains effective, Japan may choose to continue relying on the U.S. security umbrella. As long as Japan is comfortable about entrusting its security to JASA, the alliance ought to obviate the need to “go it alone.” If JASA is terminated, however, and Japan feels threatened by a powerful Asian neighbor, Japan is likely to embark on a crash program of rearmament. A lot will depend on the nature of the security threat E. CROSS-APPLY THEIR REARM IMPACT EVIDENCE

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There is nothing inherently wrong with considering space of vital importance to US national security interests, or with a desire to "stay ahead of the game", but when such a policy acts to force other nations to enter a race for military dominance of space out of a desire for self preservation rather than develop new capabilities in a spirit of cooperation, we must anticipate serious trouble... http://blog.hasslberger.com/2006/11/peaceful_space_exploration_a_r.html The third one assumes that budgetary constraints worldwide and the perceived threat from and in space are so great that the world’s nations will favor militarization of space and will postpone exploration. <<continues>> National security spaces typify the final scenario. It assumes that space exploration will slow down to benefit low-Earth orbit space activity focused on security. The proliferation of both missile and nuclear technologies that soon will be available in North Korea and Iran; the instability of Pakistan, and the development of anti-satellite satellites and other measures to deny space capabilities all will tend to push for more spending in missile defense and to some extent space surveillance and space defense. http://209.85.215.104/search? q=cache:GtunDh9IS_cJ:aviationweek.typepad.com/space/2007/03/three_scenarios.html+space+exploration+militarization&hl=en&ct =clnk&cd=37&gl=us

Increased activity in space will inevitable result in weaponization- plan doesn’t establish anything prohbiting an arms race U.N. Information Service, 10-9-02, “SPEAKERS WARN AGAINST POTENTIAL OUTER SPACE ARMS RACE, AS FOURTH COMMITTEE CONTINUE DEBATE” http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2002/gaspd240.html Cuba's representative described the existing legal regime as insufficient for ensuring the prevention of an arms race in outer space. New mechanisms must be adopted for the verification of space law. An arms race in outer space would not only violate the principle of outer space as a "common heritage", but would also jeopardize collective security. The principles guiding the exploration and uses of outer space must be based on the need to preserve its peaceful use. The representative of Pakistan agreed that a comprehensive convention to prevent an arms race in outer space must be concluded. Outer space, declared the "province of mankind" some 33 three years ago, threatened to become yet another area of military competition. The militarization of outer space must be avoided at all costs. States with significant space capabilities could contribute to achieving the collective goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, and addressing the militarization of outer space was well within the mandate of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

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SPS= Energy
SPS would act as energy collectors that would be beamed back to Earth O. Glenn Smith, 7-23-08, former manager of science and applications experiments for the International Space Station at NASA’s Johnson Space Center. “Harvest the Sun — From Space,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/opinion/23smith.html Science fiction? Actually, no — the technology already exists. A space solar power system would involve building large solar energy collectors in orbit around the Earth. These panels would collect far more energy than land-based units, which are hampered by weather, low angles of the sun in northern climes and, of course, the darkness of night. Once collected, the solar energy would be safely beamed to Earth via wireless radio transmission, where it would be received by antennas near cities and other places where large amounts of power are used. The received energy would then be converted to electric power for distribution over the existing grid. Government scientists have projected that the cost of electric power generation from such a system could be as low as 8 to 10 cents per kilowatt-hour, which is within the range of what consumers pay now.

SSP beams energy back to Earth to transition away from fossil fuels ItWire, 4-12-07, website compiling scientific articles, “Space Solar Power from satellites could generate power from Sun,” http://www.itwire.com/content/view/11260/1066/ Such a SSP system would use photovoltaics (PV) to convert energy from the Sun. PV technology consists of solar cells to convert solar energy into electricity. Then, energy collected from the Sun would be transmitted to the Earth with the use of microwave technology. Microwaves are electromagnetic waves with wavelengths in the range between 30 centimeters and one millimeter. The use of microwaves is commonly found in kitchen microwave ovens. The use of the Sun to generate electricity has been used for years to operate satellites, especially those that travel far from the Sun. Unlike, such uses, SSP systems could eventually be used on a global basis in order to reduce, or maybe even eliminate, the dependence on fossil fuels. Although space solar power holds promising improvements to the environment due to virtually no negative by-products (once it is established), its global use is still far in the future of humankind. SPS will be used for public and commercial energy needs Hideo Matsuoka & Patrick Collins, Summer 2004, “Benefits of International Cooperation in a Low Equatorial Orbit SPS Pilot Plant Demonstrator Project,” http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/benefits_of_international_cooperation_in_a_low_equatorial_orbit_sps_pilot_plant_demon strator_project.shtml The SPS 2000 project took a fundamentally new approach; i.e. to include consideration of social, economic, political, legal, public relations and other non-engineering aspects from the start. This was done by planning to deliver useful energy to willing users on Earth, thereby also creating interest on the part of the terrestrial electricity industry, whose leaders will ultimately decide whether or not to use SSP . ...The project therefore provides a useful and popular service on Earth (albeit only on a small scale) which will be readily visible to the mass communications media and understandable to the general public. Hence SPS 2000 has the potential to win the wide public support that is necessary to obtain further public investment in realising the SSP option for future commercial power generation.

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SPS= Energy
SPS systems constructed specifically to be used for alternative energy U.S. White Paper, September 2006, URSI White Paper on Solar Power Satellite (SPS) Systems, http://ursi.ca/SPS2006sept.pdf As a consequence of an ever-increasing world-wide energy demand and of a need for a “clean” energy source, the Solar Power Satellite (SPS) concept has been explored by scientists and engineers in the United States, Japan, and Europe. Several candidate systems have been proposed but so far neither constructed nor tested in space In a typical SPS system, solar energy is collected in space by a satellite in a geostationary orbit. The solar energy is converted to direct current by solar cells, and the direct current is in turn used to power microwave generators in the gigahertz frequency (microwave) range. The generators feed a highly directive satellite-borne antenna, which beams the energy to the Earth. On the ground, a rectifying antenna (rectenna) converts the microwave energy from the satellite to direct current, which, after suitable processing, is fed to the terrestrial power grid. A typical SPS unit - with a solar panel area of about 10 km2, a transmitting antenna of about 2 km in diameter, and a rectenna about 4 km in diameter - may yield an electric power of about 1 GW. Two critical aspects that have motivated research into SPS systems are the lack of attenuation of the solar flux by the Earth’s atmosphere and the twenty-four-hour availability of the energy, except around midnight during the equinox periods.

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AT: Demonstrations
Demonstration satellite has already been created- SPS 2000 SpaceFuture.com, no date given, “SPS 2000 - An SPS Demonstrator” http://www.spacefuture.com/power/sps2000.shtml SPS 2000 is a study project started by the SPS Working Group in Japan to demonstrate energy delivery from space to Earth soon; to put it on the table as a real option for development into a major new source of electric power for Earth. The electricity industry consider SPS as just a "paper idea", and it also suffers from the "space industry problem" that launch costs are still unbelievably high, and so most outsiders don't understand that it's possible for them to be much, much lower.

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NASA Say No
NASA hates SPS development and doesn’t have the resources to do it Taylor Dinerman, 5-19-2008, journalist, “NASA and space solar power” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1130/1 NASA has good reason to be afraid that the Congress or maybe even the White House will give them a mandate to work on space solar power at a time when the agency’s budget is even tighter than usual and when everything that can be safely cut has been cut. This includes almost all technology development programs that are not directly tied to the Exploration Missions System Directorate’s Project Constellation. Not only that, the management talent inside the organization is similarly under stress. Adding a new program might bring down the US civil space program like a house of cards. In the mid-1990s, urged on by the new chairman of the House Science Committee’s space subcommittee, Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), NASA did conduct a so-called “Fresh Look” study of space solar power. According to John Mankins, one of the world’s greatest authorities on space solar power, “Several innovative concepts were defined and a variety of new technology applications considered including solid state microwave transmitters, extremely large tension stabilized structures (both tether and inflatable structures), and autonomously self assembling systems using advanced in-space computing systems.” Concluding his 2003 paper on the study, Mankins wrote:

The economic viability of such systems depends, of course, on many factors and the successful development of various new technologies—not least of which is the availability of exceptionally low cost access to space. However the same can be said of many other advanced power technologies options.
There was no follow-up to this study, partly because of a lack of urgency in the era of cheap energy that existed a decade ago and also because NASA did not, and does not today, see itself as an auxiliary to the Department of Energy. NASA does science and exploration and not much else. Along with its contractors it can develop new technologies that apply directly to those two missions, but outside of that it will resist being forced to spend money on projects that it does not see as falling within those two missions. Technology development in general has been cut back. The NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts has been closed. There is a minimal ongoing effort to build up some technologies that may in the future be useful for reusable launch vehicle development, but it is hard to see how this fits into a coherent future program. The agency has its priorities and is ruthlessly sticking to them. NASA is not the US Department of Spatial Affairs: it does not have the statutory authority to control, regulate, or promote commercial space activities such as telecommunications satellites, space tourism, space manufacturing, or space solar power. Such powers are spread throughout the government in places like the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation, the Department of Commerce, and elsewhere. Even if NASA were somehow to get the funds and the motivation to do space solar power, these other institutions would resist what they would recognize as an encroachment on their turf. Until the shuttle is retired and NASA has a new and secure method of getting people into space, either with the Orion capsule on top of the Ares 1 or perhaps another rocket, or using the SpaceX Dragon capsule and Falcon 9 combination, there is no room for any other major programs. It will require all they can do to cope with their current programs and to deal with a new president and his or her administration. They don’t need any more distractions right now. NASA will reject SPS funding Jeff Foust, 8-13-07, aerospace analyst and writer for The Space Review, “A Renaissance for Space Solar Power, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/931/1 Another big problem has been finding the right government agency to support R&D work on space solar power. Space solar power doesn’t neatly fit into any particular agency’s scope, and without anyone in NASA or DOE actively advocating it, it has fallen through the cracks in recent years. “NASA does science, they do astronauts, and they do aeronautics, but they don’t do energy for the Earth,” Mankins said. “On the other side, the Department of Energy doesn’t really do energy for space.” That situation, at least in regards to those two agencies, shows little sign of changing.

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AT: Fermilab
1. There is ZERO link between plan and Fermilab funding- Scientific American card just indicates funding for Fermilab being cut in the squo; no mention of space or alternative energy. They are literally asserting a trade-off. Prefer specificity of our link evidence- specifically cites SPACE FUNDING trading off with f-22 budget. 2. No link between Fermilab and particle accelerators- none of their evidence even indicates Fermilab has particle accelerators. 3. Impact inevitable- even if they prove Fermilab develops particle accelerators, so do other labs across the world. Development will continue, strange matter will kill us all, regardless of Fermilab. 4. The Wagner evidence is taken out of context- he is describing a hypothetical scenario with particle fusion gone awry. strange matter will only kill us all if produced in large masses and in uncontrolled conditions- no scientists with particle accelerators would let this happen

5. Research studies conclude there is no risk from strange matter produced by accelerators BBC News, 6-23-08, Paul Rincon, science reporter, “Earth 'not at risk' from collider,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/sci/tech/7468966.stm Our planet is not at risk from the world's most powerful particle physics experiment, a report has concluded. The document addresses fears that the Large Hadron Collider is so energetic, it could have unforeseen consequences. Critics are worried that mini-black holes made at the soon-to-open facility on the French-Swiss border might threaten the Earth's very existence. But the report, issued the European Organization for Nuclear Research, says there is "no conceivable danger". The organization - known better by its French acronym, Cern - will operate the collider underground in a 27km-long tunnel near Geneva. This Large Hadron Collider (LHC) is a powerful and complicated machine, which will smash together protons at super-fast speeds in a bid to unlock the secrets of the Universe. Six "detectors" - individual experiments - will count, trace and analyse the particles that emerge from the collisions. Most physicists believe the risk of a cataclysm lies in the realms of science fiction. But there have been fears about the possibility of a mini-black hole - produced in the collider - swelling so that it gobbles up the Earth. Critics have previously raised concerns that the production of weird hypothetical particles called strangelets in the LHC could trigger the mass conversion of nuclei in ordinary atoms into more strange matter - transforming the Earth into a hot, dead lump. New particles The lay language summary of the report, which has been written by Cern's top theorists, states: "Over the past billions of years, nature has already generated on Earth as many collisions as about a million LHC experiments - and the planet still exists." The report added: "There is no basis for any concerns about the consequences of new particles or forms of matter that could possibly be produced by the LHC." The new document is an update of the analysis carried out in 2003 into the safety of the collider by an independent team of scientists. The authors of the latest report, including theoretical physicist John Ellis, confirmed that black holes could be made by the collider. But they said: "If microscopic black holes were to be singly produced by colliding the quarks and gluons inside protons, they would also be able to decay into the same types of particles that produced them." The report added: "The expected lifetime [of a mini-black hole] would be very short."

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AT: Fermilab- Exts.
Risk of death from strange matter very low- DA risk outweighs James Bellinger, 1-5-05 associate scientist in the High Energy Physics Unit at UW-Madison, “Strange Matter,” http://althouse.blogspot.com/2005/01/strange-matter.html Cosmic rays hit our atmosphere with a spectrum of energies: the higher energy, the rarer they are. We've seen evidence of energies so high that no earthly accelerator planned so far comes close to matching the center-of-mass energy you get when one of those cosmic rays hits a nucleus. Given that the earth (and the sun, or anything else in our solar system for that matter) hasn't imploded yet, you have to conclude that the risk is pretty small that undiscovered strange matter physics is going to kill us.

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Space K 1NC Shell Satellites reduce the world into a flat space with a single controlling entity that disqualifies the voice of the other Masahide Kato, 1993, “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, p. 339 As mentioned earlier, the absolute point of the strategic gaze abolishes the historical contestation over perspectives, giving way to a total monopoly of interpretative media. The camera's eye from outer space produced what had been long sought since the invention of camera and the rocket: a historical or transcendental "retitude. "An aerial photographer captures the emergence of such rectitude very succinctly: The advantage of hyperaltitude space photographs is that each one shows vast terrains in correct perspective, from one perspective and at one moment of time. Thus they are far more accurate than mosaics of the same area pieced together from photographs taken from the constantly shifting points of view of conventional aircraft at random periods of time, extending from dawn to sunset or even over weeks and months, depending upon clear weather? The pursuit of rectitude in the field of aerial photography has been none other than a constant battle against the three-dimensional existence of forms and volumes that allow more than a single point of view. With the vantage point of hyperaltitude from outer space, "three-dimensional forms are reduced to texture, line and color."1° Rendering the totality of Earth a two-dimensional surface serves no purpose other than for technostrategic interpretation of the earth as data and maps, thereby disqualifying "other" points of view (i.e., spatiolocality). In this way, with the back-up of technoscientific reason, the "absolute" point of the strategic gaze manifests uncontestable control as far as the interpretation of surface of the earth is concerned.

This authoritarian control of the globe nullifies the sovereignty of the third world, allowing continued colonialism Masahide Kato, 1993, “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, p. 339 Politically speaking, the image recapitulation of the earth by transnational capital and imperial states bespeaks their effort to reterritorialize/contain the spatial movements of excolonies (the so-called "Third World movements"). Through an objectification process of the periphery, TNCs have attempted to make the Third World disappear from their screen by reclassifying it in the cognitive category of "natural resources." The same process has taken place in the case of the Green Revolution, in which the strenuous recolonization of the peripheral space was none other than a counterrevolutionary attempt to destroy the hegemonic recomposition of the periphery (the Third World movements). In both cases, what was at great stake was the sovereignty of the Third World, that is, the relative autonomy of Third World space and time. By the objectification of the periphery through the eye of the absolute strategic gaze, the sovereignty of the Third World has been nullified without involving any conventional battles. The Declaration of Bogota in 19'76 signed by eight equatorial nations (Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire) protested the First World monopoly over satellite s~rveillance.I'~t w as a desperate attempt by the Third World nations, who were faced with the invisible invasion and destruction of their sovereignty by the TNCs and imperial states.

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Space K 1NC Shell
This continued colonialism of the third world is an ongoing genocide that culminates in extinction Porter 98(Robert B. Porter, Seneca and Professor of Law and Director of the Tribal Law and Government Center, University of Kansas, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Sac and Fox Nation, 21 University of Michigan Journal of Law and Reform, 1998) Nonetheless, this otherwise natural process was dramatically altered by colonization. These colonizing efforts were accomplished by force and often with great speed, producing dramatic changes within Indigenous societies and interfering with the natural process of adaptation and change. This disruption has had a genocidal effect; groups of Indigenous peoples that existed 500 years ago no longer exist. There should be no doubt that their extinction was not an accident – it was the product of a concerted effort to subjugate and eliminate the native human population in order to allow for the pursuit of wealth and manifest destiny. As a result, extinction is the most dramatic effect of colonization. Allowed to run its full course, colonization will disrupt and destroy the natural evolutionary process of the people being colonized to the point of extinction. The alternative is to reject the Aff and its forms of technosubjectivity in order to overcome the dominating nature of our social movements Masahide Kato, 1993, “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, p. 339 The dialectic (if it can be still called such) should be conceived in terms of resistance to and possibly destruction of global space, time, perception, and discourse for the possibility of reinventing space. The nuclear warfare against the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples should be viewed in this context. It is not their expendability or exclusion from the division of labor; rather it is their spatial-temporal construction that drives transnational capital/state to resort to pure destruction. In other words, what has been actually under attack by the nuclear state/capital are certain political claims (couched in the discourse of "sovereignty") advanced by the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples for maintaining or recreating space against the global integration of capital.55 The question now becomes: Can there be a productive link between the struggles of the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples against the exterminating regime of nuclear capital/state, and First World environmentalist and antinuclear social movements? This link is crucial and urgent for a subversion of the global regime of capital/state. Nevertheless, we have not yet seen effective alliances due to the blockage that lies between these social movements." The blockage, as I have shown in this article, is produced primarily by the perception and discourse of the social movements in the North, which are rooted in technosubjectivity. The possibility of alliances, therefo;, depends on how much First World environmentalist and antinuclear movements can overcome their globalist technosubjectivity, whose spatio-temporality stands in diametrical opposition to the struggles of the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. In other words, it is crucial for the former to shatter their image-based politics and come face to face with the "real" of the latter.

I

1

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Space K Link Exts- Colonialism
Technosubjectivity creates a dissolution between self and the other, justifying unrelenting colonialism Masahide Kato, 1993, “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, p. 339 Thus dissolution between self and matter via technosubjectivity demarcates the disappearance of the notion of territoriality as a boundary in the field of propertization/colonization of capital. The globe represented as such in the age of technosubjectivity clearly delineates the advent of nonterritorial space which distinguishes it from the earlier phases of capitalism. According to David Harvey, the Enlightenment conceptualization of the globe had a territorial demarcation, which corresponds to the hierarchical division between self and the other: I do want to insist that the problem with the Enlightenment thought was not that it had no conception of "the other" but that it perceived "the other" as necessarily having (and sometimes "keeping to") a specific place in a spatial order that was ethnocentrically conceived to have homogeneous and absolute qualities.55 Therefore, what is so characteristic of the global spatial order in late capitalism is a total eradication of "the other" by abolishing the notion of territory. As I have already discussed, what matters for the First World is no longer the relationship between self and other but self and matter, which is nothing but a tautological selfreferential relation with self. This ontological violence against "the other" underwrites the physical violence against the Third World, Fourth World, and Indigenous Peoples. Satellites allow the First World to assume a position of total domination over the Third World Masahide Kato, 1993, “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, p. 339 It is clear from the language "individualism" in the statements above that the image of the globe (and other incorporeal bodies) is the outcome of the projection of late capitalist private existence (i.e., the life world of the First World) onto the level of general it^.^^ The self in question is not the self (the life world of the Third World, Fourth World, and Indigenous Peoples) that has been endangered already by nuclear wars. The subjectivity of the periphery, as discussed earlier in this article, has been rendered matter (e.g., natural resources) through satellite surveillance. Under the regime of technosubjectivity, the First World self assumes an unprecedented form of domination by assimilating itself into matter, and thereby it conquers matter.

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Space K- AT: Perm do Both
Perm links to the kritik- All attempts to incorporate space domination with a re-examination of its morals will become corrupt with technosubjectivity Masahide Kato, 1993, “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, p. 339 Frederic Jameson's proposed formula to cope with the global strategy of late transnational capitalism is for us to gain a firmer grip on global space so that such space is brought to the social level. According to him, in the process of socializing this latest spatial horizon (becoming "Symbolic" of the "Imaginary" to use Lacanian terminology), "we may again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and again a capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralized by our spatial as well as our social confu~ion."N~e~v ertheless, let us not forget that the Symbolic in the global configuration of space and time is none other than the discourse of technosubjectivity. The construction of global space and time, accordingly, has been the ontological horizon of the transnational capital/state with its control over the ultimate form of violence. The "social and spatial confusion" (which again resonates in Lifton's formulation of the "numbing effect") in the postmodern aesthetics that Jameson urges us to overcome, stems not so much from the inadequate socialization of global space as from the very meaning-generating machine of technosubjectivity. Thus Jameson's formula has a strong possibility of legitimating technosubjectivity, which leads us nowhere but to a further global integration of capital with its increased power of pure destruction.

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Space K Link Exts- Authoritarianism
Masahide Kato, 1993, “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, p. 339 Let us now tie this configuration of transcendental space and time to the process of transnational capitalist formation, specifically in its conquest of the periphery. In 1962, TNCs such as AT&T, ITT, RCA, and General Telephone inaugurated the state-sponsored monopoly business (Comsat Corporation) in the field of communication satellites. During the Vietnam War, the technology of communication satellites played a critical role in the so-called "remote control warfare." Through various sensorial devices, every movement in the hinterland of Southeast Asia (although they couldn't distinguish liberation armies from lay villagers or water buffaloes) were transmitted to the absolute gaze of the commander positioned at Kissinger's office.lg The words of Retired General Schriever (who was appointed as an adviser on space and science policy by the Reagan administration) accurately summarize the "absoluteness" of the power of surveillance by satellites: What I want is a radar surveillance system which allows you to spot everything that's moving, either on the surface or above the surface of the earth. . . . You could pin your enemy down on earth. What would they do? If I control the high ground and you can't move, what are you doing to do? You're going to negotiate a surrender. That's what it's all about." What is so signifcant here is not so much a sophistication of d a r e enhanced by technological innovation-as the dissemination of warfare into the process of technological innovation itself-for ever more vigorous penetration of the logic of capitalist accum~lation.'T~h e reconnaissance technology spots "everything that's moving" not only in terms of military value but also in terms of economic resource value (oils, crops, forestries, and so on). In 1968, a technician at the University of California, Berkeley, had already found such potential for the penetration of capital in the photo image of Australia taken fhm Gemini V: It seems evident that one of the best ways to produce suitable reconnaissance maps for the remainder of underdeveloped Australia and for other underdeveloped areas of the world would be through the use of space photography supplemented .

..

with field checks.

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Rocket Launches Environ. Turn
The current number of launches per year is not enough to deplete the ozone layer KAROL I. L. ; OZOLIN Y. E. ; ROZANOV E. V. ; Effect of space rocket launches on ozone Annales geophysicae ISSN 0992-7689 1992, vol. 10, no10, pp. 810-814 (11 ref.) Abstract http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=4333752 The exhaust plume produced by space rocket launches can contain chlorine and nitrogen compounds, which cause atmospheric ozone depletion. A system of atmospheric gas composition models is used for assessing the effects of Shuttle (USA) and Energy (USSR) rocket launches on the ozone layer. Two different scenarios of the exhaust gases are used for calculations of the ozone depletion on the local and global scales. Estimations of the local ozone concentration changes near the axis of the space rocket exhausts reveal that the ozone may be reduced by 10-100% for periods up to 4 h, depending on the rocket type and on the gas-release scenario. The total ozone decrease is less then 10%. Annually and globally averaged total ozone depletion due to the assumed 50 launches per year is less than 1% Increased rocket launches for the plan will destroy the ozone layer The Age (Melbourne, Australia) March 29, 1999 WARNED. Pollution from space rockets is a leading source of damage to the Earth's ozone layer, and toxic rocket fuel is a growing threat to people's health in many areas, The Moscow Times reports. Alexei Yablokov, head of the Centre for Environmental Policy, was quoted as warning that 50per cent of the shrinking of the ozone layer could be attributed to the growing number of rockets sent into space with satellites and other cargo. The number of rocket launches should be limited to protect the environment, said Yablokov, a former scientific adviser to President Boris Yeltsin. "In 20 or 30 years there will be a catastrophe. We've got about three years to come up with international norms regulating the space activity."

Ozone depletion means extinction David Crockett Williams, Jr., author of Tetron Natural Unified Field Theory, Chemist, Personal and Financial Agent. 1996 THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRITUAL REVOLUTION http://www.angelfire.com/on/GEAR2000/video96.html

February 7,

Today all life on earth is threatened by many problems associated with the materialistic and shortsighted human activities out of harmony with nature that have led to an oxygen crisis from massive deforestation and fossil fuel combustion which has created global warming responsible for increased weather extremes, flooding, droughts, disease vectors, etc., and an ozone layer depletion that threatens all life on earth by the imminent destruction of the ocean's phytoplankton which produce over half of earth's oxygen and form the beginning of the oceanic food chain. Nuclear testing has caused lasting increases in seismic and volcanic activity, explainable by free energy science, which threatens cataclysmic earth changes. The danger of nuclear conflagration still exists. All these conditions have been predicted independently by many different religious prophecies since many hundreds of years ago. How can this be understood and resolved?

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Rocket Launches Environ. Turn Exts.
Increased launches threaten the ozone layer STEVEN AFTERGOOD 07 September 1991 Poisoned plumes: Across the US, environmentalists are protesting against rocket launches. Toxic exhaust fumes from rockets packed with solid propellant attract the greatest concern http://space.newscientist.com/channel/space-tech/space-shuttle/mg13117854.400 So far, environmentalists have not expressed concern about the troposphere. The stratosphere, however, from 13 to 50 kilometres above the ground with its fragile ozone layer, is a different matter. As the US space programme becomes more ambitious, with plans to send people back to the Moon and to Mars, environmentalists are concerned about how the exhaust from solid-rocket boosters will damage the ozone layer. According to NASA's impact statement, the shuttles' solid-rocket boosters release 59 732 kilograms of hydrogen chloride and 110 304 kilograms of aluminium oxide into this layer. Above 50 kilometres, the solid-rocket boosters have burnt out and the principal exhaust product in the mesosphere and thermosphere from the main engines is water.

Chemicals from rocket exhaust deplete ozone STEVEN AFTERGOOD 07 September 1991 From New Scientist Print Edition. Subscribe Poisoned plumes: Across the US, environmentalists are protesting against rocket launches. Toxic exhaust fumes from rockets packed with solid propellant attract the greatest concern http://space.newscientist.com/channel/space-tech/space-shuttle/mg13117854.400 More recently, concern about depletion of the ozone layer has stimulated renewed interest in the role played by exhaust from solid-rocket boosters. Ozone occurs naturally in the stratosphere, the layer of the atmosphere that begins at an altitude of between 8 and 16 kilometres, depending on latitude, and extends up to about 50 kilometres. The ozone layer absorbs the bands of ultraviolet radiation that can induce skin cancer and decrease photosynthesis in plants. Free chlorine atoms, released when hydrogen chloride from the exhaust reacts with naturally occurring hydroxyl radicals, constitute the principal danger to the ozone layer from rocket launches. The chlorine acts as a catalyst in the breakdown of ozone and, as a catalyst, it is not consumed by the reaction. It becomes part of a continuous cycle of destructive reactions that are still not fully understood. The cycles continue until the chlorine is trapped in a chemical or physical 'sink'. Hydrogen chloride itself is considered a temporary chemical sink for chlorine, but while the hydrogen chloride remains in the stratosphere, it is also a source of free chlorine. Physical sinks include aerosols, which adsorb chlorine and eventually diffuse out of the stratosphere.

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Rocket Launches Environ. Turn Exts.
Small amounts of rocket exhaust can destroy lots of ozone Martin N. Ross, Environmental Systems Directorate, leads research on the stratospheric impact of Air Force launch vehicles. Summer 2000 2K Crosslink, Rockets and the Ozone Layer http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/summer2000/01.html Complicated chemical and physical processes, only partially understood by atmospheric scientists, affect both the amount and distribution of ozone in the stratosphere. In general, ozone is formed in the equatorial stratosphere at altitudes above 30 kilometers. Large-scale winds continuously transport the ozone to lower altitudes and toward Earth's poles to form a layer about 10 kilometers thick, centered at about 22 kilometers altitude. The concentration of ozone is determined by the rate of ozone transport into the layer versus the rate of ozone loss by reaction with ozone-destroying radicals such as the chlorine atom (Cl), nitric oxide (NO), and the hydroxyl radical (OH). Because each radical is able to regenerate after destroying an ozone molecule (called a catalytic cycle), radical molecules exert a major influence on ozone even at the small quantities found in the stratosphere. This means that small changes in stratospheric composition caused by industrial activity, including rocket exhaust, might cause relatively large changes in the ozone layer.

Both solid and liquid rocket fuels deplete ozone Martin N. Ross, Environmental Systems Directorate, leads research on the stratospheric impact of Air Force launch vehicles. Summer 2000 2K Crosslink, Rockets and the Ozone Layer http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/summer2000/01.html Both solid and liquid rocket-propulsion systems emit a variety of gases and particles directly into the stratosphere. A large percentage of these emissions are inert chemicals such as carbon dioxide that do not directly affect ozone levels. Emissions of other gases, such as hydrogen chloride and water vapor, though not highly reactive, indirectly affect ozone levels by participating in chemical reactions that determine the concentrations of the ozone-destroying radicals in the global stratosphere. A small percentage of rocket- engine emissions, however, are highly reactive radical compounds that immediately attack and deplete ozone in the plume wake following launch. Aerosol emissions, such as alumina particles, carbon (soot) particles, and water droplets, can also act as reactive compounds when heterogeneous chemical reactions take place on the surface of these particles. Rocket launches deplete the ozone layer Helen Caldicott , nuclear policy research institute April 15 2000 2K NUCLEAR MADNESS - What you can do Address to the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space "Keep Space for Peace" event http://www.space4peace.org/articles/madness.htm But in reality NASA is busily destroying the ozone layer. Because each space shuttle releases 240 tons of concentrated HCl, hydrochloric acid, much of it in the stratosphere where the ozone layer is located. The chlorine atom then splits off from the HCL molecule and starts eating up the ozone layer. It was predicted a few years ago by a Russian scientist that if the space program continued as planned (though it's actually expanding), ten percent of the ozone would be depleted within ten years. NASA didn't contradict this prediction. I broke this story in the US, and instead of NASA trying to fix the problem they launched a satellite to measure the ozone depletion and the ozone holes in the southern hemisphere, and radioed back the results to high schools here, so the children could all do projects on the ozone depletion. That's called management control in PR language..

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Rocket Launches Environ. Turn Exts.
Current launch rates will not threaten the ozone layer, but increases like the plan will Martin N. Ross, Environmental Systems Directorate, leads research on the stratospheric impact of Air Force launch vehicles. Summer 2000 2K Crosslink, Rockets and the Ozone Layer http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/summer2000/01.html The data and conclusions from the RISO program reinforce a presumption that rocket emissions do not seriously threaten the ozone layer at the present time. However, as the space transportation industry grows, as new launch systems are introduced, and as the ozone layer recovers from past damage caused by now-banned substances, the effect of rocket emissions on stratospheric ozone is likely to become a more visible issue. The space transportation community should continue to support scientific research efforts to fully understand the impact of rocket-propulsion systems on the composition of Earth's natural umbrella, the ozone layer.

Rocket launches are a major factor in ozone depletion Homeland Defense Watch November 15, 2004 Long-time military watchdog Lenny Siegel -- director of the Center for Public Environmental Oversight -- submitted comments to the Defense Department on behalf of PSR last month. PSR was one of several environmental groups that sued DOD in 2001, alleging the department had violated NEPA by failing to prepare a supplemental PEIS analyzing a restructured ballistic missile defense program. Siegel also says the analysis fails to include a genuine "no action alternative," as NEPA requires. DOD's draft PEIS concluded there would be no significant impacts from the activities associated with the development, testing, deployment, and planning for decommissioning the system. The program projects it will have 515 launches in the next decade, according to Siegel. On the perchlorate issue, Siegel notes that ammonium perchlorate, a solid rocket propellant, works as an oxidizer and generates large amounts of hydrogen chloride, which creates hydrochloric acid when it reacts with moisture in the atmosphere. This erodes the ozone layer, he says. "Rocket launches are among the largest causes of ozone depletion," he notes. "The BMDS program should at the very least evaluate the mitigation of such seriously harmful environmental consequences through the development and deployment of alternative solid rocket propellants." According to Siegel, the PEIS estimates BMDS launches over the next decade will release about 1.35 million kilograms of chlorine, primarily hydrogen chlorine, into the stratosphere. Ozone will be OK unless there is a huge increase in launches -- like the plan New Scientist October 12, 2002 EVER wondered whether rocket launches damage the ozone layer? It seems we don't have to worry -- for the time being at least. Peter Popp and his colleagues from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration measured exhaust fumes from solid-fuel rockets and found that the total emission of ozone-damaging nitrogen compounds from today's fleet is only a hundred thousandth of natural levels (Geophysical Research Letters, DOI: 10.1029/2002GL 015197). "Space launches won't be a problem unless there are an awful lot of them," says Popp. Rocket launches need to be limited to save the ozone layer Greenwire March 26, 1999 RUSSIAN ENVIRO GROUP SAYS ROCKETS DEPLETING OZONE LAYER Alexei Yablokov of the Center for Environmental Policy on 3/24 said 50% of the shrinking of the ozone layer can be attributed to the increased use of rockets. Yablokov, a former science adviser to Pres. Boris Yeltsin, called for limiting the number of rocket launches and creating international standards to regulate space activity (AP/CNN interactive, 3/24).

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