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David Boswell, 8/30/04, “Whatever Happened to Solar Power Satellites?,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/214/1
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A fully-operational solar power satellite system could end up needing to be enormous. Some designs suggest creating rectangular solar arrays that are several kilometers long on each side. If we assume that enough money could be found to build something like this and that it could be run competitively against other energy options, there is the very real problem of figuring out how to get it into orbit or how to build it in orbit from separate smaller pieces. The largest solar panels ever deployed in space are currently being used on the International Space Station. They cover more than 830 square meters and are 73 meters long and 11 meters wide. These large panels make the ISS one of the brightest objects in the night sky. Scaling up from there to something much larger would be challenging, but the good news is that we can take one thing at a time. Significant technological advances needed to make SPS a competitive and feasible terrestrial power source National Research Council, 2001, Laying the Foundation for Space Solar Power: an assessment of NASA’s Space Solar Power Investment Strategy, http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309075971/html/R1.html#pagetop The current SSP technology program is directed at technical areas that have important commercial, civil, and military applications for the nation. A dedicated NASA team, operating with a minimal budget, has defined a potentially valuable program—one that will require significantly higher funding levels and programmatic stability to attain the aggressive performance, mass, and cost goals that are required for terrestrial baseload power generation. Nevertheless, significant breakthroughs will be required to achieve the final goal of cost-competitive terrestrial baseload power. The ultimate success of the terrestrial power application depends critically on dramatic reductions in the cost of transportation from Earth to GEO. Funding plans developed during SERT are reasonable, at least during the 5 years prior to the first flight demonstration in 2006 (see Table ES-1).
Charles Page HS On Solvency #2 – Space Debris
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A. Increasing satellites increases space junk, thus increasing the risk of damage to spacecraft Christian Science Monitor 03, ((Boston, MA) October 9, 2003, Thursday SECTION: FEATURES; IDEAS; Pg. 11 HEADLINE: Lots in space BYLINE: By Peter N. Spotts Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, l/n) Increasingly, the space about Earth is getting cluttered with such junk. And it's not just messy, it's dangerous. Full-size rocket bodies can destroy. Even smaller pieces - such as a 1965 space glove that zipped around for a month at 17,000 miles per hour - amount to more than a smack in the face. They can puncture space suits and cripple satellites. Fortunately, the aerospace community is giving the problem increasing attention. Engineers are considering everything from techniques for rendering derelict satellites and boosters less harmful, to an international "space traffic control" system, to Earth-based lasers that can zap the stuff. But the problem is expected to get worse as governments and companies prepare to triple the satellite population over the next two decades and send more people into space. "If we don't change our ways, this could become a serious problem," says William Ailor, who heads the Center for Orbital Reentry Debris Studies at the Aerospace Corporation in El Segundo, Calif. B. Independently, SPS would intefere with telecommunications National Research Council 81, (Electric Power From Orbit: A Critique of a Satellite Power System, A report by the Committee on Satellite Power Systems, Environmental Studies Board, Commission on Natural Resources, National Research Council, p. 108) On the basis of present technology, U.S. deployment of the reference SPS would be incompatible with our international obligations to avoid interference with recognized telecommunications uses of the electromagnetic spectrum. To accommodate the unusual use of the spectrum contemplated by SPS would require design improvements in SPS itself, design improvements in telecommunications systems, and some revision of the international arrangements for spectrum management in order to make room for an SPS. C. The economy depends on these satellites Dowd 02, (World and I May 1, 2002 SECTION: No. 5, Vol. 17; Pg. NA ; ISSN: 0887-9346 HEADLINE: Taking the high ground The U.S. Military Marches Into Space. BYLINE: Dowd, Alan W, l/n) Space already plays a crucial role in the U.S. economy, and America's dependence on space will only deepen in the coming decades. Whether we recognize it or not, what happens in space affects our very way of life. "More than any other country," Rumsfeld argues, "the United States relies on space for its security and well-being."9 The United States has more than eight hundred active satellites and probes orbiting the earth at any given moment. Fully a quarter of them have no military purpose at all. Instead, they circle the earth to relay everything from Nike ads to the Nikkei average; improve the use and development of farmland; guide ships, planes, and trucks to their destinations; synchronize financial networks; support police and fire departments; and connect a people and an economy that move at ever- increasing speed. D. Economic decline leads to nuclear war Mead 1992 (Sir Walter Russell, New Perspectives Quarterly, p. 30 Summer) If so, this new failure – the failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression – will open their eyes to their folly. Hundreds of millions – billions – of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles – and drawn closer to the West – because they believe our system can work for them. But what if it can’t? What if the global economy stagnates – or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India – these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the ‘30s.
Charles Page HS On Solvency #3 – Timeframe SPS would require 10,000 launches
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National Research Council 81, (Electric Power From Orbit: A Critique of a Satellite Power System, A report by the Committee on Satellite Power Systems, Environmental Studies Board, Commission on Natural Resources, National Research Council, p. 6) The construction of the SPS satellites would require the development of a complex system of space transportation, both for materials and for space workers. The first stage of transportation, from earth to LEO, would require the development of a heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV) that would be reusable. The reference system postulates the development of an HLLV capable of carrying about 400 metric tons. Since these vehicles would have to carry about 4 million metric tons of materials from earth to LEO over a period of 30 years, it would be necessary to construct a fleet of 40 to 50 HLLVs to make more than 10,000 flights, an average of more than one HLLV launch per day. There are huge barriers that stop solar power satellites for the next 40 years: all their sources are terrible Dwayne Day, writer for the space review, 6/9/08, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1147/1 You may not have noticed, but the space activist community is all worked up about space solar power (see “A renaissance for space solar power?”, The Space Review, August 13, 2007). It is now the topic of much conversation whenever a group of space enthusiasts get together. It was recently on the cover of the National Space Society’s magazine Ad Astra. The upcoming NewSpace 2008 conference will feature a panel on it. The International Space Development Conference in Washington, DC featured no less than three—yes, three—sessions on space solar power, or SSP, to use the shorthand term, plus a dinner speaker who addressed the same subject. With all of this attention, one would suspect that there has been a fundamental technological breakthrough that now makes SSP possible, or a major private or government initiative to begin at least preliminary work on a demonstration project. But there has been none of this. In fact, from a technological standpoint, we are not much closer to space solar power today than we were when NASA conducted a big study of it in the 1970s. The reason that SSP has gained nearly religious fervor in the activist community can be attributed to two things, neither having to do with technical viability. The first reason is increased public and media attention on environmentalism and energy coupled with the high price of gasoline. When even Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups are advertised with a global warming message, it’s clear that the issue has reached the saturation point and everybody wants to link their pet project to the global warming discussion. SSP, its advocates point out, is “green” energy, with no emissions—other than the hundreds, or probably thousands, of rocket launches needed to build solar power satellites. The second reason is a 2007 study produced by the National Security Space Office (NSSO) on SSP. The space activist community has determined that the Department of Defense is the knight in shining armor that will deliver them to their shining castles in the sky. Space activists, who are motivated by the desire to personally live and work in space, do not care about SSP per se. Although all of them are impacted by high gasoline prices, many of them do not believe that global climate change is occurring; or if they do believe it, they doubt that humans contribute to it. Instead, they have latched on to SSP because it is expedient. Environmental and energy issues provide the general backdrop to their new enthusiasm, and the NSSO study serves as their focal point. Many people now claim that “the Department of Defense is interested in space solar power.” But it is not true. The NSSO study is remarkably sensible and even-handed and states that we are nowhere near developing practical SSP and that it is not a viable solution for even the military’s limited requirements. It states that the technology to implement space solar power does not currently exist… and is unlikely to exist for the next forty years. Substantial technology development must occur before it is even feasible. Furthermore, the report makes clear that the key technology requirement is cheap access to space, which no longer seems as achievable as it did three decades ago (perhaps why SSP advocates tend to skip this part of the discussion and hope others solve it for them). The activists have ignored the message and fallen in love with the messenger.
Charles Page HS On Solvency #4– Arcing High-voltaic arcs will rip apart the platform
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Kennedy Space Center, October 02 ("Spaceport Visioning Concept Study". Involving Rainer Meinke of Advanced Magnet Lab; Dr. John Olds of Georgia Institute of Technology, Department of Aerospace Engineering; Dr. James Powell of Star Tram, Inc; Edgar Zapata of NASA/KSC Systems Engineering Office http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/Nexgen_Downloads/Spaceport_Visioning_Final_Report.pdf)[JWu] The current state-of-the-art voltage level for photovoltaic arrays is 160v used on the International Space Station. It is estimated that the arrays for a SSP platform would have to operate at 1000v or higher. At these higher levels it is known that self-destructive arcing occurs [Fig 6]. Design and manufacturing techniques to prevent such damage are in the process of development by Dale Ferguson of GRC [Refs 5 and 6]. In order to utilize existing facilities and equipment, initial development is being performed at the 300-volt level.
Charles Page HS On NASA #1 – Inefficient NASA will not be able to handle the project
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Nansen, space engineer, 95 (Ralph, Sunpower:The global Solution to the Coming Energy Crisis, p. 219-220) Integration of a large complex program is not handled well by a government agency. Just look at the disastrous cost and schedule overruns experienced by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) in their effort to manage the construction of a group of nuclear power plants in the state of Washington several years ago. The end result was the abandonment of the program after completion of one out of the five funded plants. WPPSS then defaulted on the billions of dollars of bonds sold to finance the rest of the project. Even the Saturn/Apollo government integration team ran into trouble. After the Apollo 4 fire the director of NASA recognized that there had been insufficient integration and control of the overall program and turned to an industrial contractor to oversee testing, integration, and evaluation to bring the program to a successful completion. Development of the Space Station was in serious trouble under the direct management of NASA, and it was not until NASA consolidated management under a prime contractor that the cost and schedule was brought under control. Shuttle proves government development of SSP will fail Nansen, space engineer, 95 (Ralph, Sunpower:The global Solution to the Coming Energy Crisis, p. 218-219) The story of the Space Shuttle is an example of how wrong a government procurement can go. The original concept was to develop a fully reusable two-stage vehicle. Each stage would be able to fly back to its launch base. The system was to be designed for minimum maintenance and rapid turnaround to achieve low perflight cost for an operational system. Unfortunately, the government made all the classic mistakes during its development cycle. First of all it was supposed to be an operational system to provide low-cost space access, but was developed by NASA, a research and development agency with no commercial experience. The managers placed in charge were mainly professional bureaucrats or technologists, while many of the experienced leaders of the Saturn/Apollo program had retired or returned to industry. There was serious intercenter rivalry as the various NASA centers worked to change the configuration to favor their center. Instead of using proven low-cost elements to achieve an effective operational system the technologists saw the opportunity to develop new high-technology components. The politicians holding the purse strings saw it as a huge pork barrel and shaped the design to favor contractors in their areas. Annual funding was limited (a typical practice in government procurement) and forced design decisions based on compromise. This in turn limited the development of low-cost operational systems and favored initially cheap systems with future high operational cost. The experienced bureaucrats made sure they could not be blamed for anything. In addition, the detail specifications that evolved were oriented to using the system as a research device rather than an operational system. The final configuration was a hybrid design that incorporated the worst of all these factors. Today we have a Space Shuttle that works some of the time, in spite of everything. But we went through the tragic trauma of watching the Challenger explode, carrying her crew to their deaths. Then the gut-wrenching investigations to determine cause and blame. Finally a fix that is really only a series of splints patching things back together. The Shuttle is two orders of magnitude more expensive to operate than it should be and will never be able to meet its original operational goals. The development of the solar power satellite system cannot be successful if it is developed in the same environment as the Space Shuttle.
Charles Page HS On NASA #3 – NASA would be blocked from SPS NASA accidents and mistakes cause significant setbacks for space programs Freemantle 03 (Tony, February 9, The Houston Chronicle, “NASA facing a test crisis of trust,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030209-shuttle02.htm)
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NASA took nearly three years to get back into space after the shuttle Challenger blew up shortly after liftoff in 1986. It took that long in part because, in addition to repairing the spacecraft's physical flaws, the space agency had to completely rebuild its public image, which lay in ruins as a result of mistakes it made responding to the crisis. Today, underfunded and its mission under siege, NASA cannot afford to make those errors again.. "There was a horrible revulsion in public opinion at the cover-up by NASA in the Challenger case, and they are determined not to let that happen again," said David Acheson, a member of the Rogers Commission, the blue-ribbon panel appointed by President Ronald Reagan to investigate the disaster. "Some people at NASA must recall how close NASA came to losing the confidence of Congress and the taxpayers.". For the shuttle program to continue, whatever its mission, public confidence will be paramount. "Unavoidably, there is going to be some rough sailing here because unavoidably, it will eventually be understood that mistakes were made and eventually it will be understood that someone was asleep at the switch," Pike said. "But if this develops into a massive cover-up of pervasive incompetence and there is an absence of accounting, things could go badly.”
Charles Page HS On NASA #4 – NASA doesn't have the resources
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NASA can barely hold the shuttle together Robert Garmong, PhD in philosophy and writer for the Ayn Rand Institute, 2005, Capitalism Magazine, http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4327 The space shuttle was built and maintained to please clashing special interest groups, not to do a clearly defined job for which there was an economic and technical need. The shuttle was to launch satellites for the Department of Defense and private contractors--which could be done more cheaply by lightweight, disposable rockets. It was to carry scientific experiments--which could be done more efficiently by unmanned vehicles. But one "need" came before all technical issues: NASA's political need for showy manned vehicles. The result, as great a technical achievement as it is, was an over-sized, over-complicated, over-budget, overly dangerous vehicle that does everything poorly and nothing well. Indeed, the space shuttle program was supposed to be phased out years ago, but the search for its replacement has been halted, largely because space contractors enjoy collecting on the overpriced shuttle without the expense and bother of researching cheaper alternatives. A private industry could have fired them--but not so in a government project, with home-district congressmen to lobby on their behalf. There is reason to believe that the political nature of the space program may have even been directly responsible for the Columbia disaster. Fox News reported that NASA chose to stick with non-Freon-based foam insulation on the booster rockets, despite evidence that this type of foam causes up to eleven times as much damage to thermal tiles as the older, Freon-based foam. Although NASA was exempted from the restrictions on Freon use, which environmentalists believe causes ozone depletion, and despite the fact that the amount of Freon released by NASA's rockets would have been trivial, the space agency elected to stick with the politically correct foam.
Charles Page HS On Colonization #1 – Epidemics
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Space exploration will lead to the spread of pathogenic viruses through biohazardous land samples Bruce Gagnon. Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, 1999 (Bruce K., "Space Exploration and Exploitation," http:/lwww.space4peace.orglarticleslscandm.htm) Potential dangers do exist though. Barry DiGregorio, author and founder of the International Committee Against Mars Sample Return, has written that "…any Martian samples returned to Earth must be treated as biohazardous material until proven otherwise." At the present time NASA has taken no action to create a special facility to handle space sample returns. On March 6, 1997 a report issued by the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council recommended that such a facility should be operational at least two years prior to launch of a Mars Sample Return mission. Reminding us of the Spanish exploration of the Americas, and the smallpox virus they carried that killed thousands of indigenous people, DiGregorio warns that the Mars samples could "contain pathogenic viruses or bacteria." New virus spread risks extinction David Franz, Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest Research Institute, 2005 MICROBE As Nobel laureate Josh Lederberg stated, “Pandemics are not acts of God, but are built into the ecological relations between viruses, animal species and human species. There will be more surprises, because our fertile imagination does not begin to match all the tricks that nature can play. The survival of humanity is not preordained. The single biggest threat to [hu]man’s continued dominance is the virus.
Charles Page HS Links to Militarization #1 – SPS → Militarization Solar key to space weapons
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Hagen 98, Writer for the Global Futures Bulletin, October 1 (Regina, “Military interest in space-based solar power,” http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27b/051.html, accessed 7-12-2008 The US Air Force is officially planning for war from Space and for war in Space. The required new technologies are explored in a 13 volume document entitled New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century by the USAF Scientific Advisory Board. Each volume of “New World Vistas” focuses on a specific topic, eg on “Materials”, “Attack”, “Munitions”, or “Aircraft & Propulsion”. Due to general budgetary cutbacks in defense spending “... the successful pursuit of our new missions will demand creative use of commercial systems and technologies. This will produce an intimate intertwining of commercial and military applications to an extent not yet encountered.” A key consideration is how to provide the tremendous power requirement for the desired Space-based platforms and weapons systems. Although they see that radioisotope thermoelectric generators, nuclear reactors, as well as nuclear propulsion—is the “natural technology to enable high power in space”, they recognise political and social resistance to this option. Current international treaties do not preclude the location of nuclear reactors in Space. Their vision: “It is highly likely that very large orbiting solar power stations capable of delivering energy to the earth will be built in space in the next several decades by the commercial sector. ... These systems will likely use microwaves or millimeter waves for power transmission. It is not likely that we could use such systems in a dual-use mode as space weapons.. [however] ...the DoD could purchase power on demand from such systems.” Solar can power space weapons Grossman 91, Professor of Journalism at State University of New York, May 31 (Karl, “We don’t need reactors in space,” http://www.animatedsoftware.com/cassini/kg9105we.htm, accessed 7-12-2008) The U.S. government prefers nuclear power even when solar energy is an ideal alternative, as on Ulysses. For the 1996 Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby mission, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has said that solar energy could replace plutonium power. There is plenty of time to arrange the solar alternative. Nevertheless, NASA last year began contract negotiations with GE to build plutonium-fueled generators for this mission. Even for Star Wars, solar power could suffice (that is, if we want Star Wars in any form). Pressed at a congressional hearing in 1988 on "The Future of Space Nuclear Power," Col. George Hess, then of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, the Pentagon's Star Wars office, declared: "I believe in the inventiveness of the American engineer, sir; that if we were restricted to have no nuclear power that we would address other options." Military will coopt peaceful military uses David 02 (By Leonard David Senior Space Writer posted: 07:00 am ET 15 May 2002Space Weapons For Earth Wars, http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/space_war_020515-1.html) "The prospect of space weapons and the growing military space agenda engenders a wide variety of viewpoints. Such is the case for America's first woman in Earth orbit, Sally Ride. She recently underscored the fact that space has been used for military purposes for decades. (Ride is the former president of SPACE.com.) Last month, Ride presented the annual Drell Lecture at Stanford University, sponsored by the on-campus Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). After her NASA tour-of-duty, Ride worked in the late 1980s as a CISAC science fellow, serving alongside Sidney Drell, noted physicist and arms control expert. "Space is a real priority for national security," Ride said. She is presently a physics professor at the University of California-San Diego and director of the University of California's Space Institute in La Jolla. Today, U.S. intelligence agencies and the military count on some 100 satellites as part of the country's national security. These space-based assets snap detailed images day and night, keeping an eye on global hotspots, even pinpointing missile launchings around the globe for early warning purposes. A satellite that in peacetime uses the global positioning system (GPS) constellation of spacecraft for navigation purposes, may in wartime utilize that same capability to target bombs or remotely piloted vehicles, Ride said.
Charles Page HS On Militarization #1 – Makes war inevitable Space weapons risk arms races and accidental nuclear war with Russia
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Lori Scheetz, Fall 06, “Infusing Environmental Ethics into the Space Weapons Dialogue,” Georgetown International Environment Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 2006): 57-82, pg. 62 Many in the arms control community, on the other hand, believe that space weapons will destabilize the global community and promote a costly arms race. Emphasizing the destabilizing consequences of space weapons, Thomas Graham Jr. asserts that, because American missile interceptors in space could quickly wipe out Russian early warning satellites, the mere existence of these weapons will escalate tension between the two countries and place Russia on constant alert. One false signal from an early warning satellite could lead to a Russian nuclear strike. Moreover, weaponization of space might not significantly reduce American vulnerability to attack because most weapons systems will depend on ground facilities and radio links, which can be attacked through electronic hacking and jamming. The actual weaponry based in space is also susceptible to attack. China would retaliate to US space weapons deployment but favors an arms control over a weapons approach Hui Zhang, PhD in nuclear physics, research associate in the Project on Managing,and Pavel Podvig, 08, “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space,” Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, pg. 65 In summary, the development and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including weapons in space, would definitely encourage a number of responses from China including technological development, military counter- measures, and political realignment. The type of response would depend on the specific infrastructure of U.S. missile defense and space weaponization programs. At the moment and in the near future, China's major response would be to take an arms control approach, such as firmly advocating at the CD a legal instrument to prevent space weaponization. Facing very limited missile defense deployment, e.g., the initial GMD currently under deployment, China might focus on building more road-mobile ICBMs and developing a variety of penetration aids. If a stronger missile defense system with more interceptors is deployed, China would need to produce more fissile material to fuel more warheads, thus influencing its FMCT participation. If China is confronted with the deployment of a layered (or space-based) missile defense system, it could consider additional measures such as using ASAT weapons. Space weapons increase likelihood of war. Creates incentives for pre-emptive attack. Nina Tannenwald, Director International Relations Program, Brown University, Summer 04, “Law Versus Power on the High Frontie: The Case for a Rule-Based Regie for Outer Space,” http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/tannenwald.pdf, pg. 34-5 In terms of their geostrategic impact, space-based weapons do not simply enhance existing threats but introduce a new and greater danger because of the threat they pose to strategic stability. The vulnerability of space-based weapons will likely create incentives for preemptive attack to protect them during a crisis, greatly increasing the likelihood of war. Further, although supporters of space weapons claim that, consistent with the United States' defensive orientation to the world, such weapons would be for defensive purposes, the reality is that, given their characteristics, many of them are inherently offensive weapons. It is widely recognized that space-based ballistic missile defense systems could carry out surprise attacks against terrestrial targets or satellites. Space weapons lead to “hair trigger” response, hightening chances of accidential war Charles S. Robb, Winter 99, “Star Wars II,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 13 The third consequence of U.S. space weaponization would be the heightened probability of strategic conflict. Anyone familiar with the destabilizing impact of MIRVs will understand that weapons in space will bring a new meaning to the expression "hair trigger." Lasers can engage targets in seconds. Munitions fired from satellites in low-earth orbit can reach the earth's surface in minutes. As in the MIRV scenario, the side to strike first would be able to destroy much of its opponent's space weaponry before the opponent had a chance to respond. The temptation to strike first during a crisis would be overwhelming; much of the decisionmaking would have to be automated. Imagine that during a crisis one of our key military satellites stops functioning and we cannot determine why. We--or a computer controlling our weapons for us-must then decide whether or not to treat this as an act of war and respond accordingly. The fog of war would reach an entirely new density, with our situational awareness of the course of battle in space limited and our decision cycles too slow to properly command engagements. Events would occur so quickly that we could not even be sure which nation had initiated a strike. We would be repeating history, but this time with far graver consequences. 10
Charles Page HS On Militarization #2 – Undermine conventional military strength Space Weapons kill US hegemony by putting current civilian and military satellites at risk.
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Hui Zhang, PhD in nuclear physics, research associate in the Project on Managing,and Pavel Podvig, 08, “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space,” Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, pg. 74 A focused space weapons ban would reduce the proliferation of ASATs. It would reduce the risk of a "Space Pearl Harbor" for other military and civilian satellites. As many experts in the United States point out, the heavy dependence of the United States on its space assets means that it "has more to lose than to gain by opening the way to the testing and deployment of ASATs and space weapons." For example, the United States is now more dependent on satellites to perform important military functions than is any other state. By placing weapons in space, the United States might stimulate others to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against U.S. space assets. It would be very difficult for the United States to maintain unchallenged hegemony in space weaponization, and many have argued that the United States' current military advantage in space assets would be lost or degraded by weaponization. Space weaponization would also threaten U.S. civilian and commercial assets. The economy and society of the United States are highly dependent on the applications of commercial satellites. Placing weapons in space would make these satellites much more vulnerable. Without U.S. hegemony, a new Dark Age would emerge bringing economic and nuclear catastrophe Ferguson 4 Niall Ferguson, Professor, History, School of Business, New York University and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September-October 2004 (“A World Without Power” – Foreign Policy) http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3009996.html So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous-roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.
Charles Page HS On Militarization #3 – Space weapons ineffective Space weapons vulnerable due to inability to maneuver in space
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Bob Preston, and Calvin Shipbaugh et al., “Space Weapons, Earth Wars,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, pg. 104 Because achieving a particular orbit requires such enormous effort, significantly changing established orbits is not generally practical. As a result, it is hard to concentrate the efforts of a constellation of satellites in space and time. As defenses, space weapons are static in the same way that terrestrial fortifications are. Space-based defenses are inherently subject to saturation by a terrestrial opponent that is able to concentrate an attack against them in space and time. This limitation may be an advantage if a limited defense against a limited threat is needed that is observably incapable of destabilizing a deterrence relationship with another, larger threat. Space weapons would exacerbate the fears of a debris chain Michael Katz-Hyman, research associate for the Space Security Project of the Henry L. Stimson Center, and Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, directed defense policy and programme reviews at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 03, “Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space,” pg. 122-3 The weaponization of space, particularly with respect to the flight-testing of antisatellite weapons, would greatly compound existing concerns over safe passage. In the event of a resumption of ASAT tests, the Pentagon would attempt to mitigate space debris, as it does with respect to missile defense tests, but the effectiveness of such efforts is questionable. Moreover, other states that test ASATs may not be as conscientious about debris creation. The actual use of ASATs would compound these dangers exponentially. Space warfare would not only constitute a threat to targeted satellites, it would also create debris fields that would threaten satellites operating in low earth orbit, including NTM, space transportation systems such as the U.S. space shuttle, and the International Space Station. The damage resulting from warfare that includes ASAT use could be more long lasting in space than on Earth.
Charles Page HS On Militarization #4 – Creates new military threats
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A. Space weapons don’t deter other countries from weaponizing space. This leads to countermeasures and space debris destroying commercial access to space Tariq Malik, writer for Imaginova Corporation, 1/22/04, Think Tank Warns Against Space Weapons Systems, http://www.space.com/news/weaponized_space_040122.html Satellites orbiting high above Earth are a crucial resource for the U.S. military in terms of communications, reconnaissance and global positioning. But a new report warns that too much of a space military presence, mainly the use of spacebased weapons systems, may inevitably cause more problems than they're meant to solve. Should the U.S. military "weaponize" space, the report states, it will most likely be affect global commerce, weaken American ties with other nations and eventually lead to space weapons proliferation as other groups develop countermeasures or their own space weapons systems. The study, called Space Assurance or Space Domination? The Case Against Weaponizing Space , was released by the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington D.C.-based nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank aimed at enhancing international peace and security. "When you weaponize space, you invite company," said Michael Krepon, who wrote the report and served as the founding president of the Stimson Center. "When we go first, others will come second. That is an absolute certainty." Once killer satellites start destroying one another above Earth, they will cause space debris that could harm benign satellites used by civilian agencies and companies around the world, which in turn affects global economy, according to the Stimson report. If other nations or groups choose not to put their own space weapons in orbit, they could develop ground-based countermeasures like electronic jamming or spoofing devices to confuse U.S. machines. A ballistic missile could disable satellites in low-earth orbit by detonating a nuclear device, subjecting any ground troops relying intelligence from those satellites to possible attack, the study noted. Finally, the report added, space weapons systems could hurt U.S. diplomatic ties on the ground, with other nations constantly mindful of its space forces in Earth orbit. Krepon said there is a distinction between the current militarization of space -- which uses satellites to support forces on the ground -- and weaponization, defined in the study as the flight-testing and deployment of any system to specifically as systems used to "fight a war in space or from space, or military capabilities on the ground designed to kill satellites in space." B. The world economy is reliant upon safe access to space John E. Shaw and Simon P. Worden, 2002, “Whither Space Power?: Forging a Strategy for the New Century In the meantime, we should expect an increasing use of space for "global utilities." These utilities warrant the term in its fullest sense. Access to high-data-rate, space-based, global access communications (complemented by effective but not ubiquitous terrestrial networks) is increasing and will likely see continued deployment of the so-called big LEO constellations of small communications satellites. The Internet is also going to space. The next utility, the global positioning system (GPS), has been less recognized but is more encompassing. It already precisely locates goods, services, and people. However, as the GPS becomes the mainspring of an increasingly accurate global clock, commerce will depend on it in invisible ways. As the means to provide nanosecond global accuracy, power and communications channels will come to depend on it implicitly in order to work. Other utilities, such as global traffic management via space-based radar, are on the horizon. And, as noted above, we can look for energy grids to migrate to space in the next century. C. Economic decline causes nuclear war. Walter Mead, policy analyst, 1992, World Policy Institute Hundreds of millions – billions – of people have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles – and drawn closer to the west – because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can’t? What if the global economy stagnates – or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor, Russia, China, India – These countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to the world order than Germany and Japan did in the 30s.
Charles Page HS On Militarization #5 – Agreements
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U.S. security has more to gain from not deploying space weapons. It allows cooperation from China over agreements. Blazejewski in 8. Kenneth S. Blazejewski, a JD/MPA joint degree student at NYU School of Law and the Woodrow Wilson School, Spring 2008, “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1, pg. 45-6 A second reason for US commitment not to place weapons in space is the negotiating leverage such a concession would provide. Of course, such leverage cannot be taken for granted. Rather, agreement not to weaponize outer space could be loosely conditional on making progress in other areas of US security. There are at least three areas where the United States could expect to gain concessions from China in return for a commitment not to weaponize space. First, China's participation at the CD strongly suggests that it might be willing to begin negotiations on an FMCT, a top security priority of successive US governments, if the United States agrees to negotiate on space weapons. Since China's commitment to the FMCT can facilitate the FMCT commitments of India and Pakistan, its participation is critical. Second, the United States can demand greater support from China on the Proliferation Security Initiative. The PSI, which seeks to prevent illicit sea and air transport of fissile material, has been identified by the Bush administration as a key program in reducing the possibility of acquisition of nuclear weapons by a terrorist organization. To date, China's muted opposition to the PSI stands as one of the greatest impediments to a fuller development of the initiative. Chinese cooperation could be vital to this program's success. Third, the United States should demand greater transparency in Chinese military planning, especially with regard to ASAT and space-focused programs. Such transparency, long sought by US defense officials, would reduce the likelihood of potential conflicts over speculative intelligence and give the United States greater insight into how military decisions are made (and whether China indeed suffers from a stovepiped bureaucracy). I argue that progress in each of these three areas would represent a greater security gain than proceeding with the weaponization of space. If the United States is able to negotiate a quid pro quo in one or all of these areas in return for a commitment not to weaponize outer space, the agreement would represent a clear US net security gain.
Charles Page HS On Militarization #5 – Proliferation Space militarization increases nuclear proliferation
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Karl P. Mueller, associate political scientist at RAND, 5/8/2002, Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate, http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/spaceforum/TotemandTabooGWUpaperRevised%5B1%5D.pdf Sanctuary internationalism also warns of potential coupling between space weaponization and nuclear instability, on several levels. First, and perhaps least seriously in the current global environment, opponents of space-based ballistic missile defense, like generations of BMD critics before them, fear that such systems would weaken the deterrent potency of major powers’ second-strike nuclear forces. Second, sanctuary advocates are concerned that anti-satellite warfare could contribute to nuclear instability by disabling space-based ballistic missile launch detection systems, reducing strategic warning and potentially allowing states to launch missile attacks anonymously, and thus with hope of avoiding retaliation. Third, they note that conventional space weapons, such as kinetic energy projectiles launched from orbit, might have considerable utility in their own right as part of a first strike against an enemy’s nuclear capabilities. Finally, they argue that space weaponization might encourage nuclear proliferation, since states facing threats from space weapons but lacking the ability to respond in kind or to neutralize the danger would be likely to seek asymmetric means to shore up their security, among which the acquisition of nuclear weapons might be attractive. Proliferation leads to extinction Utgoff 2. Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 02, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”, Survival The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shootouts will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
Charles Page HS 2NR Impact Caclulus Conventional warfare faster, easier and cheaper than space weapons
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Frank G. Koltz, 1/99, “Space, Commerce, and National Security,” Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, pg. 19 Conventional military forces can also be employed to deny an adversary access to space goods and services. A satellite is only one segment of the total system that is required to deliver space products and services. Equally important are ground-based antennas, control centers, relay stations, and distribution nodes. All of these segments can be targeted by familiar military tactics (e.g., bombing or missile attack), as well as emerging techniques popularly referred to as information or cyber-warfare. In addition, the headquarters and other facilities in which space products and services are actually used by an adversary can also be attacked. In short, highly specialized weapons will not always be necessary to deny an adversary the use of space. In many cases, it may be faster, easier, and cheaper to accomplish the same objective using forces that perform other functions closer to the Earth's surface.
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