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Answer:

P    
   is a common process applied by the courts in
interpreting and analysing an uprising issue on a particular legislation. The courts
undergo this process whenever there is a statute involved before a case. Statutes
passed by the Legislative body come in diff erent forms. Some may be defined
through the plain and ordinary meaning of it whereas some may portray ambiguity
and vagueness in which the court uses the process of statutory interpretation to
analyse the legislation. The Legislature¶s role is to make the law, the Judiciary, being
the courts are in charge of interpreting the law. Some of the legislation passed,
invites uncertainties, ambiguity and vagueness for the court to determine the
application of the law. These uncertainties include words that are im perfect symbols
to communicate intent. They are ambiguous and change in meaning over time. It
also includes unforeseen situations which are inevitable and new technologies and
cultures which make application of existing laws difficult. And u ncertainties may be
added to the statute in the course of enactment, such as the need for compromise or
catering to special interest groups. There are different types of rules of interpretation
practiced by the courts which include literal rule, golden rule, mischief rule and the
persuasive approach.

There are four rules of statutory interpretation which are the Literal Rule, Golden
Rule, Mischief Rule, and Persuasive Approach.     is a type of statutory
construction, which dictates that statutes are to be interpreted using the ordinary
meaning of the language of the statute unless a statute explicitly defines some of its
terms otherwise. In other words, the law is to be read word for word and should not
divert from its true meaning. It is the mechanism that underlines textualism and, to a
certain extent, originalism. In simple words, Literal Rule is where th e words are given
their obvious meaning such as the strict view of the words of a statue. Judges are
not prepared to countenance any alteration of the statutory language and severely
criticized as being impractical when the Act is ambiguous.

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ëne of the leading statements of the literal rule was made by Tindal CJ in the
P   (1844) 11 Cl&Fin 85:

"«the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be
construed according to the intent of the Parliament which pas sed the Act. If the
words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can
be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The
words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of th e lawgiver." 
        

An example of the literal rule is the case of  


    [1868] 4 LRQB
147. In this case, the defendant was charged under a section that made it an offence
to impersonate 'any person entitled to vote'. Defendant had pretended to be a person
whose name was on the voter's list, but had died. The Court held that he was not
guilty since a dead person is not, in the literal meaning of the words, 'entitled to vote'.
It is illegal to impersonate any person entitled to vote.  But a dead person is not
entitled to vote, so in defendant was acquitted. Literal rule is very much criticized by
many, but there are judges which still regard literal rule as a rule which should be
applied in certain circumstances. The literal rule is liable to lead to hardship - but in
certain circumstances the courts have decided that it should always be followed: in
× × 1982, the House of Lords said that tax statutes with clear meanings
should have that meaning favoured; even if the result is 'wrong', causes hardship or
leaves loopholes that might be exploited. If the precise words used are plain and
unambiguous, in our judgment we are bound to construe them in their ordinary
sense, even though it does lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice"- Jervis CJ in

  1851.

Ô
’     is an ethical code that states one has a right to just treatment,
and a responsibility to ensure justice for others. It is also called the ethic of
reciprocity. It is arguably the most essential basis for the modern concept of human
rights, though it has its critics. A key element of the golden rule is that a person
attempting to live by this rule treats all people, not just members of his or her in-
group, with consideration. The Golden rule appears to have an evolutionary basis,
see Reciprocity (evolution). In simple words, Golden rule only applies where the
words are absurd. Court may depart from the ordinary meaning where that would
lead to absurdity. It was defined in 
  (1857) 6 HL Cas 1, "the ordinary
sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to absurdity, when the
ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the absurdity but no further." In ×  
  1963 - Lord Reid "It is only where the words are absolutely incapable o f a
construction that will accord with the apparent intention of the provision and will
avoid a wholly unreasonable result that the words of the enactment must prev ail."
The example of Golden Rule is the case of    1872. It was held that bigamy
meant go through ceremony even though the Act provided it was illegal to be
  twice, even though the second marriage was void, so they had not literally
broken the law. Second, the case of     1995, public policy reasons
prevented someone who had had a bigamous marriage (and was hence void),
claiming money that they were clearly statutorily entitled to.

¦   is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts to determine the


legislator's intention. ëriginating from a 16th century case in the United Kingdom, its
main aim is to determine the "mischief and defect" that the statute in question has
set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy . Looks at
purpose of Act and what it intends to achieve. Four things are to be considered are:

1. What is the Common law before the Act?


2. What was the mischief/defect it did not provide for?
3. What remedy did Parliament provide?
4. What is the true reason for the remedy?

Example of the Mischief rule are the Gardiner v. Sevenoaks UDC 1950, Smith v.
Hughes 1960, and Corkery v. Carpenter 1951. In case  P  
 , a cave was premises (although it would not always be and depending on the
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mischief), since the mischief was the risk of fire which existed in a cave. Second, the
case of P      ! , a prostitute solicited from inside a building to the
street. A private building was held to be a "street or public place" for the purposes of
the Act to avoid the mischief of harlotry. Third is the case of    
 
 , a bicycle was held to be a "carriage" for drunk in charge of carriage laws, to
stop the mischief of drunks on the highway .

"
  #

 is a theory or approach of statutory interpretation that


holds that common law courts should interpret legislation in light of the purpose
behind the legislation. Purposive theory stands in contrast to textualism or statutory
derogation, two other prominent common law interpretation theories. In other words,
the purposive approach is approach which analyze the intent of the Legislature in
coming up with the legislation. This approach falls within the general approach to
statutory interpretation. Reference is now frequently made by judges to the concept
of "purposive" statutory construction. Example, one that will "promote the general
legislative purpose underlying the provisions" (per Lord Denning MR in ù  
×      [1978] 1 WLR 220). There will be a comparison of
readings of the provision in question based on the liter al or grammatical meaning of
words with readings based on a purposive approach. In Ê    


      -$% AC 593, Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred to "the purposive
approach to construction now adopted by the courts in order to give effect to the true
intentions of the legislature". Lord Griffiths stated:

"The days have long passed when the courts adopted a str ict constructionist view of
interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the language. The
courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true
purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that
bears upon the background against which the legislation was enacted." However, a
purposive interpretation may only be adopted if judges "can find in the statute read
as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to
interpretation an expression of Parliament's purpose or policy" (per Lord Scarman in
 × [1983] 2 AC 309).

^
 
 ’  became established in the nineteenth century that the long title
could be considered as an aid to interpretation. The long title should be read as part
of the context, "as the plainest of all the guides to the general objectives of a statute"
(per Lord Simon in ’    [1975]).
The long title of the Act describing it a s an Act to preserve fish stocks, to
establish a licensing system, and for related matters. It reflects the objective of the
Act. The Act requires those fishing µin the course of a business¶ within three miles of
the coast (the µcontrolled area¶) to obtain a Ministry licence and restricts the issue of
licences to those operating vessels under 100 tons. There are three sections to be
considered which are Section 3, Section 4, and Section 5.
Section 3 consists of makes fishing in the controlled area without a licence an
offence. Sections 4 consist of µAny licensee who within the controlled area uses in
fishing for sea fish any ring net or similar net commits an offence¶. Section 5 consist
of µAny person who for consideration supplies fish caught within the controlled area
to any other person, be ing a person carrying on a business of fishing for sea fish but
who is not a licensee under this Act, commits an offence¶.

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’   beforehand is whether Allen has committed what has been
constituted under section 5. Section 5 consist of µAny person who for consideration
supplies fish caught within the controlled area to any other person, being a person
carrying on a business of fishing for sea fish but who is not a licensee under this Act,
commits an offence¶.

In interpreting section 5,       

  . In reference to Per Tindal


CJ¶s statement in The Sussex Peerage case, ³« The words themselves alone do, in
such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver." Implies that to apply literal rule
the words shall be able to stand on its own. Section 5 clearly shows that, person who
for consideration supplies fish caught within the controlled area to any other person,
being a person carrying on a business of fishing for sea fish but who is not a licensee
under this Act, commits an offence.

The facts of the situation provided that William being the person with no
licence under this act provided a consideration of $10 000 to Allen, who is with a
licence. This does constitutes the offence mentioned as what has happened in the
case of  
    [1868] 4 LRQB 147, whereby the legislation was clear on
the impersonation of any person entitled to vote. Furthermore in reference to the
internal aids of which it is mentioned that the act requires those fishing µin the course
of a business¶ within three miles of the coast (the µcontrolled area¶) to obtain a
Ministry licence and restricts the issue of licences to those operating vessels under
100 tons, puts William into a definite position of a person with no licence. Allen has fit
into the literal interpretation of the section whereby he is a person w ith a licence. In
contrast, Allen did not supply the fishes however there were intention but he did not
supply the fishes. In this case, Allen is not guilty.

D
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’   is whether Blake is liable for the offence committed under


section 3 and section 4. Section 3 consists of makes fishing in the controlled area
without a licence an offence. Sections 4 consist of µAny licensee who within the
controlled area uses in fishing for sea fish any ring net or similar net commits an
offence¶. In order to determine Blake¶s situation, the

  

 


  .
In Pepper v Hart, Lord Griffiths stated that ³«.The courts now adopt a
purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and
are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the background
against which the legislation was enacted." The Act requires those fishing µin the
course of a business¶ within three miles of the coast (the µcontrolled area¶) to obtain a
Ministry licence and restricts the issue of licences to those operating vessels under
100 tons, what Blake has done is just for tourist attraction purposes, not ³in the
course of a business´ for fishing purposes. Thus if Blake is to be charged under
section 3 and section 4, it would be in contrast with the intention of the Inshore
Fishing Act 2008 which refers to preserve fish stocks, to establish a licensing
system, and for related matters¶ which refer to those µin the course of a business¶.
Thus, I would say that Blake is not guilty.

 
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’   is whether Charles is liable to be charged under the offence


of not possessing a license in virtue of Section 3. Section 3 consists of µmakes
fishing in the controlled area without a licence an offence ¶.

In reference to the case of 


   (1857) 6 HL Cas 1, golden rule
means "the ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to
absurdity, when the ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the absurdity but no
further." Although section 3 may be interpreted using literal rule as taking the
meaning as it is portrayed in the section, the situation shall be considered too. From
the perspective of the golden rule, it may be said to give rise to absurdity considering
the facts that Charles has the defence of his ship being sailed away by the storm into
the controlled area. He did commit the offence if there is no rising issue of the storm,
but to use the literal rule onto this matter, it would be wrong. Thus, Charles is not
guilty.

 

In conclusion, statutory interpretation is a common process applied by the


courts in interpreting and analysing an uprising issue on a particular legislation . I
would say that the three defendant; Allen, Blake and Charles are not guilty judging
by the facts given. In this case there is no need for translation or interpretation as the
facts of the case to judge them is quite a clear cut.

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