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US DIPLOMACY WITH PAKISTAN POST 9/11´
BY Madiha Naeem
INTRODUCTION: COERCIVE DIPLOMACY:
" As distinguished from deterrence theory."Coercive Diplomacy "is essentially a diplomatic strategy. decisive' military strategy. . or to negotiate the most favorable compromise possible. Its central task is ³to create in the opponent the expectation of costs of sufficient magnitude to erode his motivation to continue what he is doing." Coercive Diplomacy can be more clearly described as "a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary¶s will or incentive structure. the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments. a group (or groups) within a state. coercive diplomacy entails efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action. refined psychological instrument of policy in contrast to the 'quick. one that relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force. it is employed in an exemplary manner.Coercive diplomacy is defined as a defensive diplomatic strategy that is employed in the international arena to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor. in the form of quite limited military action. If force must be used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion. Coercive diplomacy is distinct from deterrence theory in that coercive diplomacy is a response to a hostile action already taken while deterrence attempts to prevent a hostile action.´ He distinguishes this from deterrence ³which attempts to dissuade an opponent from undertaking action that has yet been initiated." This term also refers to "diplomacy presupposing the use or threatened use of military force to achieve political objectives. It is a strategy that combines threats of force. a state. Alexander George describes coercive diplomacy as diplomacy that ³attempts to reverse actions that are already occurring or have been undertaken by an adversary. while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation. to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary. if necessary." In the book Force and Statecraft. Coercive Diplomacy or "forceful persuasion" is the "attempt to get a target. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one¶s demands. which is a strategy aimed at an adversary to dissuade him from undertaking an action not yet started.´ Deterrence ³tries to inhibit behavior by fear of the consequences´ while coercive diplomacy ³tries to initiate behavior by fear of the consequences. there are five areas of critical importance for successful coercive diplomacy: (1) The coercing power must convey that it is more highly motivated to achieve its stated demands than the adversary is to oppose them. and. or a nonstate actor-to change its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force. in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements.´ Coercive diplomacy attempts to have force be a much more "flexible. (2) Careful attention must be paid to ³what is demanded of an opponent. Coercive diplomacy is also distinct from normal forms of diplomacy in that the former implies a coercive element of perceived or actual threats while normal diplomacy consists of international negotiations minus any coercive component.´ According to George. which uses force as a blunt instrument.
rather than an offensive goal of forcing them to do something.´  A strategy commonly associated with coercion theory and coercive diplomacy is the concept of deterrence.´ Alexander L.(3) The threat must be both ³credible and sufficiently potent. George. George's theory of coercive diplomacy is different than Schelling's coercive warfare. deterrence is merely a passive threat aimed at keeping and adversary from acting. or his collaboration by an action that threatens to hurt. It is only a threat. Unlike Schelling. or ³the maintenance of military power for the purpose of discouraging attack. thereby. was a pioneer in the field of political psychology. "Initiative is placed on the opponent to take the first action triggering a response from the coercer. in contrast.´I will now analyze the diplomacy though each of these critical areas. compellence is active. in that he believed that coercive diplomacy was "a subset of coercion and compellence. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman define coercive diplomacy as ³getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force. a scholar of international relations and former professor of political science at Stanford University. deterrence can be described as "drawing a line in the sand" and acting only if the adversary crosses it. shifts the initiative for the first action to the coercer. Arms and Influence. compellence ³requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts´ as in deterrence." He viewed it as encompassing ³defensive´ compellent actions only: to force a target to stop or reverse action already taken. Alexander George worked to create a diplomatic strategy of coercion." Compellence. The Dynamics of Coercion-American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might.´ The term deterrence is differentiated from coercive diplomacy. ³inducing his withdrawal. Like Schelling before him. While deterrence means waiting passively in hope of not seeing a response.´ When differentiating between deterrence and compellence. In his influential work. According to Schelling." Schelling believes that deterrence does not present "a comprehensive picture of coercion.´ Coercion strategy ³relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary¶s decision making but may also include limited uses of actual force. his was the theory of coercive diplomacy. Thomas Schelling puts forth a general concept of coercion theory as it emerges beyond deterrence. leading Schelling to introduce the concept of compellence.. (5) decide ³how much of a sense of urgency to create in the adversary¶s mind to achieve compliance with the demands.. the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it."  . "Coercion composed of both compellence and deterrence is about action and inaction. in contrast to deterrence. BACKGROUND: The term coercive diplomacy falls under the theory of coercion as a foreign policy tool. (4) It should include the ³offer of positive incentives´ with ³carrots´ or incentives combined with ³sticks´ of threats. while appearing threatening at the same time. or his acquiescence.Coercive diplomacy essentially is the embodiment of a ³carrot and stick´ philosophy: motivation is used to induce a target to submit to your wishes. In their book.
An ultimatum itself has three distinct components: ³a demand on the opponent. it is important to understand that policymakers may shift from one variant option to another depending on the success of each step taken. a time limit or sense of urgency for compliance with the demand. it attempts to persuade an adversary to turn away from its goal. decisive military action if the opponent does not comply. These variants include the following: 1. and a threat of punishment for noncompliance that is both credible to the opponent and sufficiently potent to impress upon him that compliance is preferable. and whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand. They must decide ³what to demand of the opponent. Second. instead the coercer makes a single threat or takes a single action ³to persuade the opponent before threatening or taking another step.´ When constructing a coercive diplomacy strategy. Ultimatum 2. policymakers must consider certain variables or ³empty boxes´ that must be filled.´ When using the coercive diplomacy strategy. it seeks to convince an adversary to reverse an action already taken.´ Finally. Third. it may persuade an adversary to make ³fundamental changes in its government. no sense of urgency conveyed. ³a demand on the opponent. the Try-and-See. The third variant of coercive diplomacy. Gradual Turning of the Screw The first variant of the coercive diplomacy strategy is the classic ultimatum.´ There is no time limit set. Tacit Ultimatum 3. coercive diplomacy seeks to achieve three objectives. the Gradual Turning of the Screw approach is similar to the Try-and-See method in that it makes a threat but then ³relies the threat of a gradual. Try-and-See 4.´  Tacit ultimatum is similar to ultimatum except that it doesn¶t set forth an explicit time limit.´ Alexander George developed a framework in which a number of ³variants´ or methods of using coercive diplomacy could be deployed to achieve these objectives. whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance. incremental increase of coercive pressure rather than threatening large escalation to strong. addresses strictly the first component of the ultimatum variant. whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with demand. US DIPLOMACY WITH PAKISTAN AFTER 9/11: INTRODUCTION: . First.FRAMEWORK OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: According to Alexander George.
required the airspace. but the U. Within the first 24 hours. Glenn and Symington Amendments and the ³Democracy Sanction´ that limited all economic and military aid to Pakistan.To make matters worse.-Pakistan relationship was extremely low. was negotiating with Turkmenistan. U. This attack represented the single largest terrorist attack in history and the largest attack ever on U. the United States quickly determined that Al Qaida was responsible and was destined for a war in Afghanistan where Al Qaida was located under the protection of Afghan¶s Taliban government.S.S. the U.S. the U. the U. U..S. the Bush administration sought to gain Pakistan¶s support though coercive diplomacy. had a large coalition.S. other than being the target of multiple sanctions. Diplomacy with Pakistan following 9/11: On 11 September 2001. Pakistan was in a ³position of extreme vulnerability´ due to its immense debt and struggling economy and its emaciated public education system resulting in a 44% literacy rate which helped spur the rise of Islamic extremism. It had a weak institutional architecture. the U. Pakistan¶s domestic situation was in shambles. The U.S. to determine that al-Qaida was to blame.S. Since Afghanistan is a landlocked country. the U.S. The U. but on the eve of 9/11. a poor educational system. Pakistan¶s most hated enemy. given Pakistan¶s close relationship with the Taliban and its strained relationship with the U. wanted to invade Afghanistan quickly to .S. desperately needed Pakistan¶s support. Thus. Most of the fighter aircraft and many of the troops and supplies came from ships in the Indian Ocean and other than Iran.S. a stillborn political process following a recent coup. and logistical support of neighboring countries to conduct the invasion. al-Qaida operatives hijacked four airplanes crashing two into the World Trade Towers and a third into the Pentagon with the fourth forced down in a Pennsylvania field before it could complete its mission.S. bases. the U. an underdeveloped economy. badly needed Pakistan¶s support for the war. It did not take long for the U. Pakistan was the only other country that bordered both the Indian Ocean and Afghanistan.S. According to the World Bank.S. The U. and Pakistani relations strained over a number of issues including Pakistan¶s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan.S.S.S. the U. The U. and Pakistan were far from allies.S. Despite this estranged relationship. was able to gain Pakistan¶s support for the war in mere days though a combination of credible threats and incentives. sanctions under the Pressler. In fact. The U. started planning for the invasion. but still required Pakistan¶s support to mount the invasion. Given the geopolitical landscape.S. which was not considered a viable ally.S. and NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. and internal tension with Islamist extremism on the rise. soil. received a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force. immediately set out to build an international coalition. pressured the Taliban to turn over bin Laden. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for support. The US-Pakistani Relationship on the eve of 9/11: On the eve of 9/11. was in the process of forging close diplomatic and strategic ties with India. the U.After the attacks on 9/11.S.S. When they refused. Pakistan had little in the way of international relations with the U.Pakistan was being subjected to a wide range of U.
to Pakistan that if Pakistanrefused to cooperate.S.Musharraf indentified four critical concerns: Pakistan¶s security and stability from an externalthreat. never directly threatened the use of force.S.S. U. received Pakistan¶s support.S. for only a day later. In Pakistan. list of demands which included the full use of airspace. this public diplomacy was meant to ensure Pakistan¶s support would be genuine. Armitage was blunt and said that the U.He said that ³Pakistan comes first.In Washington. Realizing that a tentative agreement had been reached. Pakistan announced that it would join the global coalition against terrorism and offered immediate tangible aid to include military bases. Secretary Powell telephoned Musharraf to seek what he said was ³aspecific list of things we think would be useful for them to work on with us. As the details of support had yet tobe determined.S. wanted Pakistani support as soon as possible.S. On 19 September.In Islamabad.S.prevent bin Laden and other al Qaida and Taliban leaders from escaping or going into hiding. According to one source. everything else is secondary.Although the U. government primarily interacted with the Pakistani Embassy. but the extent of Pakistan¶s commitment had yet to be determined.According to one high-ranking official at U. President Bush gave his famous³either you are with us.´Despite potential Pakistani domestic pressure against joining the coalition. and logistical support. force. the revival of the economy. its strategic nuclear and missile assets and the Kashmir cause. Thus.During his speech. Musharraf addressed his nation talking about ³wrong decisions´ in the country¶s moment of crisis (by which he implied declining to join the coalition against terrorism). the U. Finally the negotiations were characterized by several phone calls between President Bush or Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Musharraf. it would be treated like the terrorists.Ambassador. and use of its territory as a staging base. Embassy in Islamabad.S. They met on a daily basis starting on 12 September and during the initial meetings. or you are with the terrorists´ speech to a joint session of Congress andthe American people.S. the U. was responsible for most of the negotiations with President Musharraf and the government of Pakistan.S. through all three methods described above. Armitage presented the U. Are you with us or not?´  On 13 September.Thus. was building a coalition and ³clearly there was a worldwide momentum right now to stand up and be counted. the use of Pakistan¶s airspace.. Musharraf sought to position himself for follow-on negotiations.This was an informal threat by the U. Pakistan¶s closing its borders with Afghanistan. The official diplomacy was conducted through multiple channels. officials threatened to add Pakistan to a State Department list of seven terrorist-sponsoring nations which would portend the possibility of U. but the details had yet to be determined. Wendy Chamberlain.S. the U. The U.S. the American pressure worked and on 16 September. made it clear to Pakistan that it wanted intelligence support.´ Musharraf¶s speech was well timed. Ambassador Chamberlain was presenting the same demands. the U. In Washington the diplomacy was being conducted primarily between Deputy Secretaryof State Richard Armitage and the Pakistan Ambassador MaleehaLodhi and his ISI chief Mahmoud Ahmed. PresidentMusharraf was told to either abandon support of Taliban or be prepared to be treated like the Taliban. in a matter of days. .
S. started to provide economic and military support to Pakistan. Pakistan provided the U. most notably human intelligence which coalition forces desperately needed tocomplement its technical intelligence. the U.S. Ambassador Chamberlain said that Pakistan provided ³unstinting support´ throughout the war.´ Pakistan followed through with its agreement for military and intelligence support. In thefirst five months of the war. thus demonstratingPakistan¶s full support. On 7 October.S.2 billion inarms-sales. Pakistan¶s cooperation for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) continued to take shapeon 24 September when a combined Task Force from the Department of Defense and Departmentof State negotiated with the government of Pakistan on a broad set of agreements. extended $1 billion in grants. Pakistan provided intelligence support tocoalition forces.000 sorties overflew Pakistani airspace from carriers in theIndian Ocean. the U. captured more terroristsand committed more troops than any other nation in the Global Counterterrorism Force.Pakistan provided fuel to aircraft. Shortly after sanctions werelifted. Finally. DIPLOMACY. According to George. and criticalpetrol supplies.A COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: The diplomacy between the U. the U. Pakistanagreed to provide blanket flyover and landing rights.´ (4) it should include the ³offer of positive incentives´ with ³carrots´ or incentives combined with³sticks´ of threats. there are five areas of critical importance for successful coercive diplomacy: (1) ³the coercing power must convey that it is more highly motivated to achieve itsstated demands than the adversary is to oppose them. reinstituted a military training program. the U. commenced OEF and by 12 November Kabul had fallen.Central Command officer said that ³Pakistan has provided more support. and Symington Amendments and Section508 of the Foreign Assistance Act. wrote off $1 billion in debt. and provided $3 billion for economic aid andsecurity assistance. Pasni.S. over 28.S. initially without anyestablished repayment mechanism.´ (2) careful attention must be paid to ³what is demanded of an opponent.000 troops to protect thesecoalition bases and increased border security that resulted in the reportedly capture of 420 high value Taliban and Al-Qaida fugitives. Predator basing at Jacobabad and Shamsi. averaging 100. U. Glenn.One U.S.000 gallons per day.000 coalition military personnel that bedded down at these locals. access to numerous military bases and helpedestablish a number of facilities including Intermediate Staging Bases at Jacobabad.´ (3) the threat must be both ³credible and sufficiently potent. The U. provided $1. lifted the economic and military sanctions that had beenimposed against Pakistan under the Pressler. also followed through with its commitments.Dalbandin and Shamsi. Much of the logistical support was initially provided without any of the formalagreements or user fees that are normally required for such privileges. In the first threeyears. Pakistan provided over 35. All were waived by Bush under the authority of BrownbackII.S.S. and (5) decide ³how much of a sense of urgency to create in . and Pakistan is a case of coercive diplomacy.Pakistan¶s support was critical to the unequivocal success of the allied invasion. access to naval and air bases.On 22 September. and access to other bases usedby over 50 aircraft and 2.S.
the U.S.´Its two critical components are that demands must bewell thought out by the coercing power and then clearly transmitted to the coerced power. Thus.S. When Musharraf spoke to his country on 19 September.S. The third component of coercive diplomacy is the threat must be both ³credible andsufficiently potent.´ or officials. The U.S.Pakistan¶s BATNA was to refuse to support the U.´Roger Fisher¶s concept of BATNA. Embassy and in phone callsbetween government leaders. or you are with theterrorists´ speech was one method used to send the demand publically. sufficiently narrowed what it required of Pakistan and did not try toinclude other demands involving nuclear weapons or the Kashmir that would have unnecessarilycomplicated the negotiations.S.the adversary¶s mind to achieve compliance with the demands.¶s BATNA was to wage war on both Pakistan and Afghanistan. carried the same messageand reinforced one another rather than confuse the situation. there was a fairly large ³win set´and negotiating room for each party to try to achieve as much as possible from an agreement.´40 I will now analyze the diplomacy though each of these critical areas. Despite being the coerced power. demanded Pakistan¶s support the war inAfghanistan.S. ³the coercing power must convey that it is more highly motivated to achieve its stated demands than the adversary is to oppose them. First.S. The U. in Islamabad through the U. or Best Alternative to aNegotiated Agreement. he was intentionally narrowing the win set. all U. ³messengers. pressed either issue. invasion and toMusharraf¶s loss of power. butMusharraf correctly calculated that support for the war was the top issue for the U. diplomacy worked to ensure thatPakistan did not improve its position to create a viable BATNA. and Pakistan favored an agreement(Pakistani support) to no agreement (war with Pakistan). it must portray an ³asymmetry of motivation. Pakistan also made its own demands using the sameofficial channels as well as publically. is a useful concept when discussing this point.S.S. also successfully accomplished the second component: the U. By making thispublic statement. The demands were successfully transmitted in Washingtonthrough the Pakistani Embassy.If a (quick) agreementcould not be reached. In thiscase the demand was fairly simple: the U.S. because both the U.this would have been extremely costly (much more so than direct aid) and much more difficult.S. the coercing power must demonstrate both the ³ability and capability´ . Thus. President Bush¶s ³either you are with us. ThusMusharraf correctly used public diplomacy to gain a better negotiated agreement.he made it clear that he wanted aid to revive the economy and he made it clear that its strategicnuclear and missile assets and the Kashmir cause were not open for negotiation.´ in other words. By doing this he ran the risk oflosing public support if he had to go back on his word had the U. neither side had a viable BATNA and U.´ in other words. Despite the lack of viableBATNAs and the desire of both parties to reach a mutual agreement.S. which would lead to a U.S. andmore importantly. the asymmetry ofmotivation still favored the U. The second component of coercive diplomacy is that careful attention must be paid to ³what is demanded of an opponent. transmitted aclear message that was correctly interpreted by the government of Pakistan. Ultimately there were few. Despite usingmultiple communication channels. no major mutual misperceptions which is critical for effective coercivediplomacy.S.
capability. the U. While the will or resolution could havebeen doubted following the U. incentives asPakistan would have likely withheld support until official agreements were signed. wasable to achieve Pakistani support through coercive diplomacy. Without these international endorsements.and the ³will or resolution. However.Second.S. the U. was unable to influence Pakistan inthe late 1990s. Additionally.S.This international coalition thus served to demonstrate credibility for the U. organizers and sponsors of the terrorist attacks. and Pakistan.resolution by assuming the U. this was a credible threat. now has the ability toinfluence actions with the threat of pulling economic aid.S.Together these demonstrated the will of the U.´Through official channels the U.S. And third. Additionally. was ultimately more successful by offering incentives which helped offset domesticcriticism in Pakistan and improved Musharraf¶s ³win-set.S.´Sticks are only helpful if they are credible. clearly demonstrated a credible threat.Additionally.was the threat of war.S. the large internationalcoalition put additional pressure on Pakistan. The fourth component of coercive diplomacy is that it should include both ³carrots´ and³sticks.S. Afterthe first Gulf War. the stick used by the U.failing to use carrots would have likely hurt future relationships. If the government and peopleof Pakistan saw themselves bullied into an agreement as opposed to being in a cooperativepartnership in which they were gaining.S. it received UN Security Council approved the use of Forcewith UN Security Council Resolution 1368 which called on all States to work together urgentlyto bring to justice the perpetrators. and demonstrated that Pakistan had little time to makea decision. the U. As discussed in the previous paragraph. has littleability to influence Pakistan now that the threat of invasion is no longer credible.S. The U.S. no one doubted the U. First. that Pakistan could have misjudged U.S. The fifth and final component of coercive diplomacy is the coercing power must decide³how much of a sense of urgency to create in the adversary¶s mind to achieve compliance withthe demands.S.S.although it is unknown if the U. Ultimately. gainingthe UN Security Council Resolution and NATO invoking Article 5 within 24 hours publiclydemonstrated the urgency felt by the U. With incentives in place. The threat ofinvasion was powerful enough that the U. decided not to pressure Pakistan on its nuclear program or the Kashmir.Providing these incentives likely resulted in greater cooperation from Pakistan. could have chosen to ignore incentives. this support likely would have suffered without U.S. In the earlystages of the war Pakistan provided millions of gallons of fuel and other support without a formalrepayment system established. itreceived NATO approval for the use of force through Article 5.S.´The U.S.However. coercive diplomacy often requires the use of carrots to be successful. threat was not credible because it lacked international approval.S.S. The U. conducted several actions that helpeddemonstrate its commitment.the U. it ispossible.S.S. a joint resolutionby Congress unanimously approved the use of force against those responsible for the 9/11attacks.´ Carrots offered by the U.S. the U. actually issued a deadline for a decision. Without incentives.S. would have a substantially lesser ability toleverage other issues in the future. as witnessed by Saddam Hussein in 2003. Additionally. included economic and military aid and debt relief. In this case.S. withdrawal from Somalia or the type of campaign it wagedduring Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. the U. made it clear that time was of the essence.S. clearly demonstratedand . the negotiation was a success for both the U. The failure tooffer any incentives is was one of the reasons that the U.
Thus. we should be cautious about applying it to similar situations in the future. a credible threat and its urgency to Pakistan.communicated its motivation. it presented a credible threat.S. and Pakistan have a history of an on-again off-again relationship. and Pakistan only had to dust off their play book from 1980 rather than develop a completely new strategy² this same play book probably would not work in Iran. it should be with caution that we think that this same strategy would lead to success anywhere or anytime.Additionally. it narrowly defined what it demanded and clearly transmitted this demand. its flexible strategy of employing carrots and sticks. used more or less the same coercive diplomacy with the Taliban (though arguably with less carrots) and the Taliban chose war over agreement.S. Theend result was that Pakistan provided ³unequivocal support´ and in return received billions ofdollars in aid and debt relief. so the U. it offered carrots as well as sticks and it ensured that Pakistan understood the urgency for a quick decision.S. CONCLUSION: The U. its demand.S. achieved Pakistan¶s full support following 9/11 because it successfully incorporated the five major components of coercive diplomacy: it conveyed an asymmetry of motivation. but the carrots allowed the government to ³sell´ theagreement to a population that was relatively anti-American following years of sanctions. demands. while this was a case of successful diplomacy. Also. the U. not only allowed Pakistan toquickly concede to the U.S. The U. REFERENCES . Despite this success and many of the positive lessons of diplomacy that were demonstrated.
8. Byman. Inc. George. 2002. 15. eds. ³U. Colorado: Westview Press. Jack S. Aziz Haniffa. Alexander. in Barnett and Lord. ed. "Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George" 5. "The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might" New York. ed. [Boulder.html 12. Christine Fair. George. Daniel and Matthew Waxman. 2nd Rev. DC. Nemeth. 9.. George.S. 1994] 7.edu/news/2006/august23/obitgeorge-082306. Jr.stanford."The Use of Pauses in Coercion: An Explanation in Theory" 4. 1989) 3. Force and Statecraft. Cambridge University Press.´ India Abroad. Nemeth. Washington. Major Lisa A."The Use of Pauses in Coercion: An Explanation in Theory" 10. ³The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy" 2nd Rev. Washington: RAND Corporation. Smith. Colorado: Westview Press. New York: Oxford University Press. Major Lisa A." with comments by Paul A. Alexander and William Simons."The Use of Pauses in Coercion: An Explanation in Theory" 13. Art and Patrick M. Political Warfare and Psychological Operations (National Defense University Press. Robert J. Stilwell.. Levy. Alexander. "The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy". [Boulder. Cronin. The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India.1. 21 September 2001 . DC 2003 2. and Richard G. Major Lisa A. Carnes Lord. Inc. Alexander and William Simons. "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy. 2004. Nemeth. 1994] 6. Major Lisa A. 2007. George. Washington.1991 14. Nemeth. "The United States and Coercive Diplomacy" United States Institute of Peace Press. will count on Pakistan for strikes against bin Laden. "Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War" United States Institute of Peace Press. http://news-service."The Use of Pauses in Coercion: An Explanation in Theory" 11.
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