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4 (Jul., 1949), pp. 651-664 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20030214 . Accessed: 28/01/2011 02:01
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MUKDEN TO PEARL HARBOR
The Foreign Policies of Japan By Joseph W. Bal Ian tine DURING a the decade and more preceding Pearl Harbor between conflict went on within the Japanese Government a dominant group in the Army, which insisted upon the country into a course of forcible expansion, and plunging civilian and Navy leaders, who were either opposed to such a course or perceived grave risks in it. Each successive step toward the fulfillment of expansionist aims was taken on the initiative of the Army, often in defiance of constituted authority, until lost control of the situation altogether and finally the moderates an Army-dictated Cabinet under Prince Konoye came into office in July 1940. The complete story of this struggle and of the victory of the Army was revealed for the first time by the Inter national Military for the Far East, which on Novem Tribunal ber 12, 1948, completed the reading of its judgment in the trial of the 25 major Japanese war criminals, on which the Tribunal had sat for over two years. Many of the essential facts are still seems little known, and the full significance of the revelations to have been appreciated in the United States. scarcely It is an amazing record of how a reckless, determined and ruthless military group succeeded in imposing its will upon an irresolute nation ;of how that group relied upon an extraordinary
abuse of power in order to gain its ends, and resorted freely to
terrorism and assassination. It shows that intrigue, duplicity, the opposing majority, if crossed, lest the military, apprehensive be aroused to take extreme measures, tried to placate supinely and appease the warmakers. A review of the record suggests that the sequence of events that carried Japan inexorably one step at a time toward the fateful decision to go to war against the west ern Powers falls into three stages. The first reached from 1928 until February 1936, when expansionist moves were made by the on its own initiative without Army awaiting, and often in defi ance of, government orders. The second was from March 1936 until September the Japanese Government itself 1940, when adopted a policy of expansion but with substantial reservations. And September decided to 1940, when the Japanese Government
proceed with expansion even at the risk of war, marked ginning of the final stage. ii
In 1928, General Giichi Tanaka, who had become Prime Min ister the year before, announced what he termed a "positive" policy toward China. By the use of the term he probably intended to make a distinction between the course he proposed to follow and the courses of his predecessors in office during the previous seven years, when liberal influences in the Japanese Government were in the ascendant. Tanaka was far from being the sinister figure that he was supposed to have been by westerners who had for what it purported accepted the so-called Tanaka Memorial an English to be? translation of a confidential Japanese state document, presenting for the consideration of the Throne a plan for a course of far-reaching conquest. Neither in the Tokyo trials nor previously, to the present writer's knowledge, has reliable evidence ever been produced that there ever existed a genuine document. It is true that Tanaka favored a policy of original inManchuria, but he proposed to further Japanese penetration it through conciliating local Chinese leaders. It was in fact while that the latter he was negotiating with Marshal Chang Tso-lin was murdered by Japanese army officers, impatient over Tanaka's policies. His efforts to punish the officers responsible were re sisted by the Army General Staff, which was at that time under the influence of a movement among extremists to take the Man churian question out of the Government's hands. In the face of to the Cabinet in the General Staff and of con the opposition in Manchuria, Tanaka tinuing disorders resigned on July 1,
The Army extremists organized a plot for the seizure of Man churia, which was carried out by the Army in a well-organized incident and a coup atMuk campaign, following a framed-up den on September The story is so well known that it 18, 1931. needs no recounting here ; but we may note that the home gov ernment opposed the plot. Tokyo became aware of the prepara tions when they were in their last stages, and instructions were issued to the Army to stay action. It went ahead in defiance of thus confronted with a fait these instructions. The Government, chose to ratify the action, doubtless in the conviction accompli, that if it did not a revolt of the Army would ensue. Gradually
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to strengthen the moderate elements in the Government managed at home, but they had little success in checking the their position and across the border in China Army's activities inManchuria where toward extending efforts were being directed proper, to the five northern provinces. domination Japanese the restiveness within the Army over the efforts of Eventually to curb it found expression in the outbreak of the Government an insurrection among Army forces stationed in and near Tokyo. This was the incident of February 26, 1936, when a number of statesmen of moderate views were assassinated. Premier Okada the downfall barely escaped death and the incident precipitated of his cabinet. to courses of expan The second stage in Japan's commitment suc sion began with the advent of the Hirota Cabinet, which and which was ceeded the Okada Cabinet on March 9, 1936, more acceptable to the militarists than its predecessor. This stage was marked by a degree of mutual tolerance between the two the mili forces in the Japanese Government. Although opposing nor their initiative, tarists abandoned neither their ultimate aims they showed a greater readiness to keep within bounds of con the civilian and Navy leaders made stituted authority, while material concessions to the Army standpoint. This does not imply that Japanese leaders differed on any moral issues. Japanese naval the view that Japan's future circles had for years championed to the Army's advocacy of north lay in the south in distinction ward or continental expansion. The Navy had, however, awhole some respect for the prowess of the British and the American the civilian leaders had a clearer per navies, and along with and of the strength that would of Japan's weaknesses ception them than did the Army with itsmore parochial attitude. oppose The issue between the Army and its opponents was over ques tions of method and timing. The Hirota Cabinet reached an agreement on what should be the fundamentals of national policy on August 11, 1936, when it was decided at a Five Ministers' Conference that, among other the efforts of "national defense" and diplomacy should things, be combined to acquire for the Empire a solid footing on the con tinent of Asia and the islands to the south, and to eradicate the Soviet menace. But it was specified that cordial relations with the Powers should be maintained, and, as regards expansion that Japan should move gradually and by peaceful southward,
so as to avoid arousing other nations. This policy deci methods be it noted, had its origin in a draft proposal drawn up sion, some two months earlier. The jointly by the service ministers draft proposal corresponded in every material respect with the final decision, but was more bluntly worded. The outbreak of the all-out attack on China on July 7 of the pro following year grew out of a minor incident near Peiping, voked by and enlarged upon by the Japanese military. Although the Army had thus chosen the time and place of the attack, it was a natural consequence of fixed national policy calling for of a solid footing on the continent. No establishment serious effort was made by the Japanese Government to localize the and on July 26 Prime Minister revealed to hostilities, Konoye the Diet the Government's intention of achieving "the new order" in East Asia and of obtaining a fundamental solution of relations. From the outset of the hostilities there Sino-Japanese was no serious conflict within on Japan's de the Government clared objectives in China, attainment of which would have reduced China to a vassal state. this period active efforts were made by the military During or a mili for a closer political alignment with Germany, party tary alliance, but these efforts were frustrated by the unwilling ness of the Navy and of certain civilian statesmen to accept the of giving Germany military aid in a war against the obligation western Powers. The relatively innocuous and purely defensive Anti-Comintern Pact had been concluded in November 1936, and thereafter every successive Japanese representative in Berlin on the subject of cementing approached the German Government a still closer relationship. Japan's earlier overtures were directed to obtaining an instrument aimed primarily at the Soviet Union. of her special position Japan also wanted German recognition in China, and she offered in return to give Germany "especially favorable" treatment in that country. Germany was unwilling to settle for less than an instrument that included provision for mutual assistance in the event of an unprovoked attack upon one of the signatories, and, being dissatisfied over the systematic dis to which German crimination interests in China were being at the hands of the Japanese authorities there, wanted subjected more explicit and formal commitments with regard to commer cial privileges than Japan was prepared to give. Consequently, came of the first Japanese efforts. nothing
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who had become Prime Minister, In May 1939, Hiranuma, in the took a fresh initiative toward Germany with a declaration a desire for an a personal message to Hitler, form of expressing to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact. This offer agreement was coldly received by the Germans because of a reservation that Japan was unable at that time or in the made by Hiranuma near future to extend to the Axis Powers any effective military aid. He did, however, promise that Japan would gladly support them in that way if a change of circumstances made it possible. at Berlin, an Army General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador was asked by von Ribbentrop whether, in the event appointee, that Germany and Italy went to war with another nation, Japan at war with that nation even though she could be considered could not provide any military aid. Oshima replied in the affirma the same tive, without referring the question to Tokyo. About a new proposal for an alliance that came before the Jap time, anese Government, from the German purportedly emanating in the Japanese turned out to have originated Foreign Office, to Oshima's hav General Staff. The Foreign Minister objected exceeded his authority and to the sharp practice resorted to ing from Hiranuma, by the Army, but no backing was forthcoming who took the part of the military. From this point on Hiranuma began to lose control of the alike to the opponents and to situation. His stand was displeasing the proponents of the alliance. While favoring an alliance, he to his reservation. When the German Government clung pressed Oshima in Berlin and theWar Ministry in Tokyo for a quick War Minister, Itagaki, in his zeal to get the alliance decision, the that the Foreign sanctioned, falsely represented to the Emperor had come around to supporting the proposal. The Em Minister and taxed him with it. Ita peror learned of Itagaki's duplicity then realized that he could make no headway so long as the gaki the Navy Minister project was opposed by the Foreign Minister, was persuaded by and the Emperor. He talked of resigning but to make one more effort to prevail upon the the Home Minister Cabinet. The Cabinet met on August 8, but was still unwilling to go as far as the Germans required. Itagaki then planned to at Berlin and Rome act under have the Japanese Ambassadors to keep the Foreign Minister out of the mat his instructions and ter until the Cabinet a negotiated could be confronted with that could be represented as being within the frame agreement
work of what had been only a tentative decision by the Cabinet. Before Itagaki's plan could be carried out, the conclusion of the Pact was announced on August German-Soviet Non-Aggression This was a mortal blow to the Hiranuma for its 23. Cabinet, a German alliance had rested on the idea of securing an thesis for In its dying gasps the Cabinet instructed ally against Russia. to protest Germany's action as a violation of secret Oshima was slow to act, but Pact. Oshima clauses of the Anti-Comintern he finally delivered the protest in such a manner that it could be as a matter of information. accepted informally The succeeding Cabinet under General Abe sought to reorient policy toward better relations with the Anglo-Saxon Powers, but as Japan still adhered to her fixed policy of aggression the at lasted only four months. Admiral tempt failed. The Cabinet in the two preceding min who had been Navy Minister Yonai, now took the helm, but found it hard to steer between istries, conflicting national and group interests. The morass into which the Japanese had got themselves in China had a good deal of effect on their domestic policies and their international relations. of the European Pow Japanese leaders saw in the preoccupation ers in the war a golden opportunity to realize their dreams of empire in the south, and were fearful lest if they failed to act by a victorious Germany they would be forestalled promptly eastward. To gain freedom of action for the southern marching venture the speeding up of the conquest of China was imperative, of China and this called for cutting off the National Government States and Great from American and British aid. The United Britain (which also stood in the way of an advance southward) as the chief Japanese now took the place of the Soviet Union Yonai was still averse to Japan's becoming enemies. Although involved in the European war, his objections to the alliance with on that ground were harder to sustain in the face of Germany sentiment. and anti-British anti-American public mounting he found it difficult to combat the argument that the Moreover, alliance would make secure Japan's rear against Russia, cow the in the Far East, and enable United States into noninterference to obtain German aid. scientific and engineering Japan about a change in the Cabinet's These considerations brought attitude. The Foreign Minister, Arita, opposed as he had been of a to the Army's proposals, came out with an announcement more forward policy. The Army, which was already committed
TO PEARL HARBOR
to the overthrow of the Yonai Cabinet, interpreted the announce to gain public ment as an effort to retain power by attempting support at the Army's expense. It charged the Cabinet with re to modify the original text of versing policy, and forced Arita on the following day, the chief of the For statement. When, his the original text of the Press Bureau disclosed eign Ministry's announcement and the fact that the Army had forced its altera tion, the press chief was arrested and subjected to questioning by the military police. A plot was hatched to assassinate Premier Yonai and other opponents of the military faction, but it mis incident shows carried and the plotters were arrested. This that the issues between the contending factions were not clearly on question of principle but of method. The incident failed to daunt the Cabinet in its effort to prolong its life by seeking to consummate an entente with Germany. A Sato, a former Foreign Minister, was special emissary, Naotake sent to Berlin to make a fresh approach to the German Govern ment. He pointed out to von Ribbentrop, among other things, that for three years Japan had served Germany by diverting British and American attention to the Orient; that the threat of fleet in the Pacific; and Japanese action had kept the American that itwas Japan's policy to contain the United States in the west ern hemisphere. Sato explained, however, that Japan could not to provoke the United afford States too far, and that avoidance of war with America was to the best interests of both Germany and Japan. The Japanese emissary dwelt upon the desirability of economic cooperation between the two countries, and proposed in dispensing economic privi that Japan be host to Germany in China. leges Von Ribbentrop, who had been given the cue that a change in cabinets in Japan more favorable to Germany was impending, made a discouraging and noncommittal reply. He instructed the in Tokyo, however, that the Japanese pro German Ambassador to Germany, which no longer required posals were quite welcome in Europe but desired above all the continued military help neutrality of the United States. The Ambassador passed the in formation on to the Japanese military which forthwith group, set inmotion the wheels for toppling over the Cabinet. Since the positions of the two Japanese service ministers could be held only by a general officer and a flag officer respectively, all that needed to be done was to cause the War Minister to resign and then
withhold the nomination of a successor. This the Army did. The Yonai Cabinet fell July 16, 1940, and Konoye came into office for a second time. The way was now prepared for the alliance. the new Cabinet had strong pro-German Although leanings, there were still obstacles ahead, chiefly the opposition of the the new Foreign Min Navy and of the Emperor. Nevertheless, entered into negotiations with the German emis ister, Matsuoka, sary, Stahmer, who had come toTokyo for that purpose. Stahmer made it clear that Germany desired to end the European war that she did not for the moment quickly, require Japanese mili tary assistance, but that she did want Japan to restrain the United said that Germany and Italy would States. He help provide re that Germany with equipment. He assured Matsuoka Japan spected Japan's leadership in eastern Asia and that all German to interests there were in the economic field; and he promised in bringing about a rapprochement and the between Japan assist end quickly, the European war might Soviet Union. Though Stahmer declared, there was destined to develop a struggle for world supremacy against the whole Anglo-Saxon world, and in States could the long run war between Japan and the United the alliance as a avoided. He said that he envisioned hardly be in the coming struggle, for cooperation long-term arrangement before the war and that he therefore desired its consummation was ended. with Great Britain drew up a draft of a treaty, which was Stahmer and Matsuoka laid before the Privy Council on September 16, 1940. The Navy still held back its approval until some days later. The Cabinet had to obtain the sanction of the Emperor, who strongly relied upon the advice of Prince Saionji, the last surviving elder states man and a bitter opponent of the alliance. Kido, who, as Lord Privy Seal, was charged with keeping the aged and ailing Saionji failed to do so, and the old states informed of the negotiations, man was left completely in the dark on what was going on. In this sanction was obtained, and the Tripartite way the Emperor's Alliance was signed on September 27, 1940. Saionji upon learn ing what had been done was sorely aggrieved and felt that the Emperor had been betrayed. in The conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance marked Japan's tran sit from the second to the final stage of a course of unreserved
TO PEARL HARBOR
if necessary. The expansion, and war with the western Powers, for action as drawn up by the Foreign Office and approved plans by the Cabinet early in October called for: 1, the early success ful settlement of the China affair; 2, the negotiation of a non 3, the incorporation of aggression pact with the Soviet Union; the countries of Southeast Asia and the islands of the Malay in the so-called "Co-Prosperity Sphere" Archipelago (i.e. the establishment of domination or control there). At a Four Min and isters' Conference held on September 4, even India, Australia for inclusion in Japan's sphere New Zealand had been marked of influence. All possibility of a settlement with Chiang Kai-shek was de stroyed by the conclusion two months later by Japan of a "treaty" atNanking. And in with the puppet r?gime ofWang Ching-wei a neutrality pact, rather than a non April of the following year aggression pact, was concluded with the Soviet Union. For the realization of the expanded Co-Prosperity Sphere two lines or out, to be pursued along parallel plans were worked to exigencies. One plan called for reli alternatively, according ance upon "diplomacy" (if that term can be rightfully applied to the tactics of chicanery and intimidation and contemplated action. Each of the two and the other upon military attempted), presumably plans focused upon Singapore and the Philippines, because itwas believed that the rest of the area coveted would fall like a ripe plum into Japan's hands. The diplomatic plan, fan an offer to Great Britain to tastic as it may sound, was to make conflict in return for British recognition the European mediate of the Co-Prosperity Sphere (including surrender of Singapore), to the United States that Japan would recognize and to propose in return for United States recognition independence Philippine of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan intended to occupy Singa in any case, along with the Netherlands pore and Malaya Indies, or Guam unless war broke out with the but not the Philippines United States. The military plan for taking Singapore contemplated first the and Siam by means of securing of advance bases in Indo-China treaties with those countries. The next step concluding protective invasion of await a settlement in China or a German would ? ? whichever occurred first Britain or, failing either, some successes. In January 1941, Japanese substantial German military and German military experts agreed that attack on Singapore
follow occupation of Saigon and a landing on the Malay in the latter area peninsula. Aerial photography was undertaken to collect data for a landing. Military currency was printed for use in the countries along the line of advance. On February 10, that an attack informed the German Ambassador Matsuoka 1941, on Singapore had been planned; three days later he instructed at London to inform Foreign Minister the Japanese Ambassador to him by the British Am Eden that a report communicated at Tokyo of impending Japanese action was a ridiculous bassador at Berlin 22, the Japanese Ambassador fantasy. On February for attack on Singapore that preparation told von Ribbentrop would be completed by May, and that for safety's sake prepara States and tions had also been made for war against the United Great Britain. for war against the United The preparations States envisaged a plan for the destruction of the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese relied on seizing all points in the western Pacific States could prepare a and Indian Oceans before the United that the United States would counterattack. They expected a prolonged war and negotiate a peace settlement on the weary of basis of recognition of Japanese supremacy in the territories that of the Com had been seized. In January 1941, the Commander to Imperial General and transmitted bined Fleets approved a plan for a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor while Headquarters
the two countries were at peace. In late May the Japanese Navy
for the attack,
By June 1941, Japan had received a number of setbacks to her southward expansion through diplomacy. A hope of achieving with settlement in China had failed to materialize. Negotiations to obtain large quantities of oil and other materials the Dutch from the East Indies had broken down, and Japan's reserves of war supplies were in danger of depletion. Germany had failed to invade Britain, and the British had rebuffed a Japanese ap of the European conflict. Al proach looking to the mediation to explore the United States had expressed a willingness though of a comprehensive Pacific settlement for which the possibilities the Japanese had asked, Secretary Hull had made it clear that that dis would not enter into any agreement this Government of other countries. This meant regarded the rights and interests that there was little hope that the United States would recognize
TO PEARL HARBOR
the program of annexations politely called the Co-Prosperity Sphere. failed to divert Japan from her fixed These discouragements attacked Russia on June 22, some purposes. When Germany the southern project in leaders proposed postponing Japanese an onset on the Russian Far East, but they were over favor of on July 2. Here itwas decided ruled at an Imperial Conference to continue diplomatic negotiations while completing final prep action. The troops that later made landings arations for military inMalaya and the Philippines began practising along the China coast and in Hainan and Formosa. Attention was devoted to ex a shallow water torpedo, and perimenting with and perfecting at sea was practised so that the more secluded northern refueling route could be used for sneaking up on Pearl Harbor. Japan's occupation of southern Indo-China was declared by on July 26 to be for the purpose of Japan's Foreign Minister winding up the China affair. He alleged that Japan had reports of an intended encirclement of Indo-China that would interfere with that purpose. The Tribunal found no evidence of any such but did find conclusive intended encirclement, evidence that reason for advancing into southern Indo-China was to Japan's secure bases for attacking Singapore and the Netherlands Indies. Such bases would also threaten the Philippines. The conclusion coincides with that reached at the time by the United States to freeze Japanese assets on July 26. it prompting Government, In a memorandum of the Department of State of May 19, 1942,1 it was explained that "by this further expansion in southern the encirclement of the Indo-China completed Japan virtually Islands and placed its armed forces within Philippine striking an overt act distance of vital trade routes. This constituted the security of the United States and other directly menacing Powers that were at peace with Japan. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the of their security. problem of preventing a complete undermining . . . .Under those circumstances and in the light of those con the Government of the United States decided at that siderations, point, as did certain other governments especially concerned, that discontinuance of trade with Japan had become an appropriate,
1 "Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941," Vol. II, p. 342.
warranted Governments and
necessary also froze ? step
as an open warning to Japan
and as a measure On September should endeavor mands incidental
6 the Imperial Conference decided that Japan to gain acceptance of certain "minimum" de to achieving the purpose of southern expansion States and Great Britain, through negotiations with the United in the event of the failure of the negotiations and, by October, a decision on the opening of hostilities should be made. Japan's "minimum" demands were as follows : with Japan's efforts to settle the China (i) Noninterference of assistance to Chiang Kai affair, including discontinuance shek and the closing of the Burma Road. from action in the Far East to threaten Japan's (2) Abstention national defense, from establishing "interests" in any military Indies and the Soviet Far East, the Netherlands Siam, China, from strengthening armaments in the Far East; and the recogni tion of Japan's special relationship with Indo-China. (3) Cooperation with Japan in obtaining supplies of materials and the restoration of commercial relations. In return, Japan would engage to make no military advance to withdraw her toward China, Indo-China except beyond after an equitable peace had been troops from Indo-China of the and to guarantee the neutrality effected with China, IV
This proposed basis of a settlement, with minor variations, formed the essence of the terms put forward by Japan to the United States on successive occasions, including the final set of terms delivered on November the Japanese Foreign 20, which in his instructions to Ambassador Nomura Minister described as an "ultimatum." They called upon the United States and Great Britain to abandon China to Japan, and provide Japan with the British and for a Japanese advance into American, materials territories in the Far East. The reciprocal commitments Dutch that Japan offered to make, even if the Japanese Government since Japan had been one that could be trusted, were valueless, an "equi to determine unilaterally what constituted proposed and expected British and American table" peace with China of Japan's "special relationship" with Indo-China. recognition
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in the such American, British and Dutch demilitarization With Far East as Japan demanded, there would have been no need of of moving Japanese troops beyond Indo-China. Acceptance the Japanese demands would have meant that Japan gained all that she sought without fighting. When the Japanese Government received the American Gov of October 2, which made clear that ernment's communication the Japan's proposed basis for an agreement was unacceptable, at the Im of opening hostilities was again discussed; question of September 6 it had been decided that this perial Conference question would be settled early in October. The Navy had mis it could carry out the mission that would givings as to whether fall to it without more oil than it had. Despite the strong in sistence ofWar Minister Tojo upon making a definitive decision to assume this responsibility for war, Konoye was unwilling until the Navy considered itself better prepared, and he tendered the resignation of his Cabinet on October 16. Two days later Tojo was installed as Prime Minister with a new Cabinet. The final preparations for attacks upon Pearl and other American, and Dutch British Harbor, Singapore 1.At in the Far East were completed by November possessions an Imperial Conference on November 5 it was decided that if the 25th (later extended to the 29th) of the month the United by States had not accepted the Japanese terms the Japanese Gov ernment would inform its allies that a decision had been reached to open hostilities with Great Britain and the United States. was said of a negotiated settlement. On the same day Nothing there was issued a Combined Fleet Operation Order, which as follows : began
The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the approximate date (Y-Day) for commencement of operations and announcing "First Prepara tions forWar."
The order nouncement
then continued with instructions that upon the an of Y-Day all fleets and forces, without further would and complete battle prepara special orders, organize officers would tions, and when directed by their commanding proceed to their rendezvous and wait in readiness for the attack. The order went on to say:
The time for outbreak of war (X-Day) will be given in an Imperial General
order will exist. Each
be given force will in advance. After oooo hours, commence operations according
Order. This Headquarters a state of war will X-Day,
On November who was to com 10, Vice-Admiral Nagumo, mand the carrier task force in its attack upon Pearl Harbor, issued his order to the task force to rendezvous in the Kurile Islands. The order directed all ships of the task force to complete 20 and proceed to the rendez battle preparations by November vous under strict security regulations. Combined Fleet Opera tions Order No. 3 of the same day fixed December 8 (Japan as X-Day. That was the day when after 0000 hours a time) state of war would 22 orders were issued exist. On November to the Japanese task force in the Kuriles to proceed to Lat. 40 N.
and Long. 170 W. so as to arrive there on December 3. Ac
26 the task force moved cordingly on the morning of November out on its mission. It seems quite clear from the facts brought out in the trial and judgment of the Tribunal that at no time during the period of Manchuria after Japan's occupation it have been would possible to have brought Japan to abandon her policy of terri torial and political short of the expansion through measures was determined of superior force. After 1932, Japan application to hold her grip on Manchuria. After 1937, it became Japan's fixed policy to subjugate all the rest of China as well, and, after the whole of the Far East and the western 1940, to dominate Pacific region. It is also abundantly clear that after the summer of 1941 Japan's leaders, with their reserves of oil running lower to realize the dreams of a rich and with the golden opportunity empire slipping by, would brook no delay, and that the United States could not have gained more time by further exploration of the issues and the possibilities. The Japanese were not offering to
negotiate a reasonable settlement by processes of agreement;
they were presenting demands, to be accepted or rejected. The United States had only two choices : either to yield to the Japa nese demands and sacrifice principles and security, or to decline to yield and take the consequences.
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