Bin Laden’s Henchmen: Al Qa’ida’s Commanding Officers who are Leading the Global Jihad

Sarah Catanzaro Professor Martha Crenshaw, Advisor Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University


Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………...4 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………....5 Chapter 1: Building a Complex Organization………………………………………....6 I. II. III. IV. Evolution of Al Qa’ida’s Organizational Structure…………………………………..7 A Description of Complex Organizations………………………………...…………..12 The Role of “Mergers and Acquisitions”………………………..…………………...13 Initial Thoughts on Policy Implications……………………………………………….15

Chapter 2: Literature Review………………………………………………………….17 I. II. Literature on Al Qa’ida’s Foreign Affiliates…………………………………………17 Literature on Joining Radical Movements……………………………………………20 A. Ideological motivations………………………………………………20 B. Psychosocial motivations…………………………………………….22 C. Strategic/opportunistic motivations………………………………….23 Literature on Terrorist Leadership…………………………………………………….25 A. The personality of terrorist leaders…………………………………..25 B. Targeting leadership………………………………………………….26


Chapter 3: Methodology………………………………………………………………..28 I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. Background……………………………………………………………………………….28 Assessing Q1……………………………………………………………………………...30 Assessing Q2……………………………………………………………………………...38 Developing the Universe of Cases……………………………………………………..40 Selection of Study Subjects……………………………………………………………...42 Problems Regarding Information Gathering…………………………………………43 Case Study………………………………………………………………………………...44 Relevance………………………………………………………………………………….44

Chapter 4: Universe of Cases…………………………………………………………..46 I. II. III. IV. Al Qa’ida’s Affiliates: An Evolving Network…………………………………………46 Al Qa’ida’s Affiliates: The Geographic Distribution………………………………..53 Al Qa’ida’s Affiliates: Mergers? Partnerships? Or Collaborations?...................57 Summary of Findings…………………………………………………………………….59

Chapter 5: Results of Statistical Hypothesis Testing…………………………………60 I. II. Data Analysis and Results for Q1: What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida’s and its pan-Islamic agenda?.......................................................60 Data Analysis and Results for Q2: What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible affiliates with Al Qa’ida……………………………………………………………….. 61


Chapter 6: Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb and Abdelmalek Droukdal – A Well Executed Merger…………………………………………………………………………………64 I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. The Origins of Islamic Violence in Algeria after the War of Independence……...64 The Birth of the Salvation Islamic Front……………………………………………...65 The Beginnings of the GIA and the Onset of an Epoch of Violence……………….66 An Alternative Emerges: The Origins of the GSPC…………………………………67 Fissions Form Within the GSPC……………………………………………………….67 The Rise of Droukdal…………………………………………………………………….71 Droukdal’s Program: Toward Global Jihad……………………………...………….73 The Announcement of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb………………..………...77 A New Organization……………………………………………………………………..78 Final Observations………………………………………………………………………80

Chapter 7: Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya: The Unrealized Merger………………………83 I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. The Emergence of the GAI from the Ashes of the Muslim Brotherhood………….83 The Sadat Assassination………………………………………………………………...84 Crackdown under Mubarak…………………………………………………………….84 Campaign of Terror……………………………………………..………………………85 Collapse of an Armed Group…………………………………………………………...86 Reconciliation…………………………………………………………………………….88 Explaining the Decision not to Affiliate with Al Qa’ida…………………………….89 Final Observations………………………………………………………………………91

Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion – Al Qa’ida’s Commanding Officers: A Skilled Management Team……………………………………………………………………..93 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………...107 Appendix I: List of Terrorist Groups………………………………………………..115 Appendix II: Sources by Terrorist Group…………………………………………...116 Appendix III: Commanding Officer Attribute Codebook……………………….....135 Appendix IV: Commanding Officer Attributes……………………………………..136 Appendix V: Data on Universe of Cases……………………………………………..138 Appendix VI: Data on Q1…………………………………………………………….139 Appendix VII: Data on Q2……………………………………………………………140


after these affiliations occur. However. 4 . shared visions become essential. Based on this analysis. this paper offers some broad recommendations regarding the future conduct of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). It then focuses on the role that local jihadist leaders play in the aftermath of the affiliation to shed further light on Al Qa’ida’s current strategy and operations.Abstract: Al Qa’ida has allied with indigenous terrorist groups for over a decade. The conclusion of this paper finds that while opportunistic. This paper examines first the motivations of local jihadist groups who associate with Al Qa’ida to understand the transformation that Al Qa’ida has achieved. rather than ideological concerns are the primary motivating factors for joining Al Qa’ida. The local jihadist leaders who become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers ensure ideological alignment with Al Qa’ida. only in recent years. has Osama Bin Laden increasingly relied upon these franchises to prosecute his panIslamic struggle.

how friends and neighbors had disappeared and presumably perished during this devastating attack on America’s soil. Without a doubt. Professor Crenshaw lives as a role model for the next generation of female investigators researching international security. This solidarity and resiliency consolidated my faith in humanity and sparked my interest in homeland security studies. Acts of kindness and heroism became increasingly visible in my community as people mobilized to help one another. I distinctly remember the sense of dissociation and unreality as we struggled to understand how our beloved Twin Towers were destroyed. I am also grateful to Dara Kay Cohen. In addition. Professors Stockton and May helped me clarify and expand my views about this project on numerous occasions. both personal and intellectual is more important than can adequately be acknowledge in such a brief note. I have been so fortunate to benefit from their generosity and acumen. for whom I would also like to show gratitude. I would have been hardpressed to get this project done in anything like a timely fashion had it not been for this program.Acknowledgements: The ideas of more people than I can possibly mention have affected my thinking about terrorist organizations and Al Qa’ida over the years. Moreover. this project would have been poorer without her invaluable comments. he continues to inspire me every day with his thoughtfulness and intelligence. and coaching. I have benefited particularly from communications with Professor Martha Crenshaw. I would also like to thank my brother. Finally. Port Washington. who listened to my presentations with great attention and offered so many thoughtful suggestions and useful comments. I hope that a general acknowledgement here of the wisdom and understanding may be counted to me for righteousness. Thus. Since my sophomore year at Stanford. Through the CISAC seminars. a traditionally male-dominated discipline. There were cars parked at our train station that were never recovered and fathers and mothers who never returned from work. Professor Crenshaw helped answer my questions promptly. It gives me great pleasure to thank Professors Paul Stockton and Michael May for the opportunity to participate in the CISAC Interschool Honors Program. Thank you so much for your patience. she has offered me practical and affectionate support. at length. Despite his youth. but most importantly for serving as an incredible mentor. not given. Yet despite a pervasive sense of insecurity. I would be remiss not to acknowledge my parents. Moreover. 5 . the members of my community began to dig themselves literally and metaphorically from the ruins of the 9/11 disaster. objectivity. and more recently into the making of this thesis. Their constant support. I want to recognize my community. who is currently a junior in high school. I have had the opportunity to try out some of my ideas and receive valuable criticism from my peers. New York which was tragically impacted by the September 11. I would like to thank Colonel Joseph Felter and Jarrett Brachman who introduced me to several primary and secondary documents. and with enthusiasm. and Professor Crenshaw most certainly earned mine through her impressive career. Admiration should be earned. I was so fortunate to have had Dara around as an academic example and important mentor. She also put at my disposal her insights on numerous topics. I dedicate my thesis to the population of Port Washington. These sources proved to be a treasure-chest indeed. 2001 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers.

most fail to assess the exchange relationships that distinguish Al Qa’ida. all oversimplify the command configuration utilized by Al Qa’ida. Al Qa’ida’s structure and degree of centralization may fluctuate within a period of months or weeks. Al Qa’ida utilizes a mix of both loose and tight coupling to attain a remarkable degree of adaptability. Although most scholars perceive Al Qa’ida as an organization in stasis. and to dispatch operatives worldwide. While each perspective has its merits. However. Gunaratna 2004). Moreover. Al Qa’ida was a relatively centralized organization that used Afghanistan as a base from which to strategize. Some scholars even contend that the main threat no longer emanates from Al Qa’ida but from unassociated radicalized individuals and groups who meet and plot in their neighborhoods and on the Internet (Sageman 2008. Al Qa’ida has transformed into a more ambiguous entity that scholars cannot easily define.Stern 2003). communicate often. One can 6 . they fail to acknowledge that this combination of loose and tight coupling has enabled Al Qa’ida to become a modern hydra that readily adapts to changes in its environment.Chapter 1: Building a Complex Organization Prior to the September 11. Thus. 2001 attacks. Ronfeldt 2005. In contrast. Dishman 2005). to plan attacks. An organization characterized by “loose coupling” has cells that are relatively autonomous and independent. A few dominant camps have emerged within this scholarly debate. and depend upon each other. an organization characterized by “tight coupling” includes cells that associate intimately. since the onset of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Others suggest that Al Qa’ida has become a decentralized network of individualized and local cells bound together exclusively by common beliefs (Diebert and Stein 2003. Currently. The first maintains that Al Qa’ida Central Command retains ideological and operational control over the organization and preserves a certain degree of tactical influence.

However. Although Al Qa’ida has cooperated with local jihadist groups for years. since the onset of the Global War on Terror. Al Qa’ida has begun to depend on these affiliates to obtain organizational flexibility to a considerable extent. and identifying and assessing the role of the commanders who interact with Osama Bin Laden. By defining the new structure of Al Qa’ida (characterized by loosely integrated and operationally attached subunits. It is important to analyze these individuals because they have assumed more authority since September 11. I. This study will draw upon open source and primary source information to understand why and how Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers promote the pan-Islamic agenda. 2001. each led by a commanding officer). this study may affect the allocation of resources in Washington for counterterrorism efforts. This study will examine the incentives and role of former local jihadist group leaders who now serve as Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. these external relationships enabled Al Qa’ida to transform into a complex organization. Ayman Zawahiri and the core of Al Qa’ida. recently. One method whereby Al Qa’ida achieves such adaptability is by merging or partnering with local jihadist groups. Moreover.therefore classify Al Qa’ida as a complex organization a concept that will be elaborated in this chapter (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2003). characterized by an efficient blend of both tight and loose coupling. distinguishing the groups with which Al Qa’ida is strongly associated. Evolution of Al Qa’ida’s Organizational Structure: 7 . Al Qa’ida has affiliated with indigenous terrorist groups for almost twenty years. the conclusions drawn from this analysis may present policymakers with new and novel ways of targeting Al Qa’ida and its partners.

established an office in Peshawar. most of whom he knew since his formative days in Afghanistan. Bin Laden expanded the Al Qa’ida organization. In the Sudan. The finance committee oversaw and developed financial resources. that Bin Laden began calling his cadre al Qaeda al Askariya (“the military base”) and developing a greater organizational structure (Riedel 2008). in 1991. an Islamic scholar and founding member of the Kashmiri jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. At the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan war. and Abdullah Azzam. coordinated targets. procuring. Pakistan to serve as a hostel for Arabs coming to fight the Soviets and as a press agency to produce propaganda to promote jihad. and launching support and military operations. The military committee was responsible for recruiting. However. The religious committee justified Al 8 . after the liberation of Kuwait from Saddam Hussein by the American-led multinational army. which had rebuffed his offer to defend the kingdom. a multimillionaire from a wealthy Saudi family. However. advisory council) consisting of Bin Laden’s closest associates. Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia as a hero of jihad. He relocated to the Sudan at the invitation of the government of Hassan Turabi and the National Islamic Front.In the 1980s. it was not until the summer of 1988. and authorized asset sharing for terrorist operations. The Services Bureau (“Maktab al Khadamat”) provided travel funds and guesthouses in Pakistan for recruits and volunteers to facilitate the struggle against the Soviet forces. Osama bin Laden. a large number of jihadists from the Middle East traveled to Afghanistan to combat the Soviet Union. training. developing a membership roster and establishing a hierarchical arrangement to guide and oversee its functions (Riedel 2008). Bin Laden was disenchanted with his native Saudi Arabia. This council promoted common goals. The organization was centered upon the “shura” (i.e. The shura majilis (consultative assembly) received information from four subordinate committees designed to direct specific segments of planning and operations.

hatched the plan to target the Twin Towers. Moreover. In May 1997. Al Qa’ida’s former propaganda chief. all three of which faced indigenous terrorist groups supported by Bin Laden. 2001 attacks reveal the former nature of Al Qa’ida’s decision-making apparatus. In May 1996. in its earlier incarnation. Egypt. Al Qa’ida could be classified as a centralized organization. Bin Laden personally recruited the plot’s 9 . Bin Laden was able to forge his closest alliance yet with the Taliban by providing it with significant financial and human resources to support the ongoing war against other factions in northern Afghanistan. other western governments. the Pentagon. thereby strengthening Al Qa’ida Central Command and forming a close-knit group of jihadists uniquely capable of executing terror operations like the September 11. Saudi Arabia. Finally. it would be assigned to a carefully selected cell headed by a senior Al Qa’ida operative who reported personally to Bin Laden (Wright 2007). Bin Laden left the Sudan to return to Afghanistan as a result of combined pressure from the United States. The September 11. Afghanistan’s lack of central government provided Bin Laden with greater leeway to pursue his agenda and centralize his operations. the media committee produced propaganda intended to generate Muslim support for the organization and its objectives (Harmony Database Released Documents: Al Qa'ida Goals and Structure 2006). Bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. Once a specific operation was decided upon. The plot to attack the United State began in 1999 after Al Qa’ida executed the simultaneous bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Bin Laden cemented his ties to Ayman Zawahiri. and Libya. the last emir of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. and the Capitol Building. 2001 attacks against the United States (Bergen 2002).Qa’ida’s actions and operations within the theological parameters of Al Qa’ida model of Islam. although Al Qa’ida also assisted two other Salafi terrorist groups during this formative period in the Sudan. Thus.

it becomes particularly difficult to maintain 10 . From this point forward. 2006). Al Qa’ida was a centralized organization. Although Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida considered 9/11 an astonishing success. Mohammed Atta as well as the fifteen operatives who would intimidate the passengers during the airline hijackings. Prior to 9/11. Captives revealed the names of their commanders and associates thereby highlighting the need for loose coupling between local operatives and Al Qa’ida’s executive leadership in order to evade government interference and limit the consequences of any further compromises. Al Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran at which the shura recognized that Al Qa’ida could no longer function as a hierarchy. the attacks precipitated the Global War on Terror (GWOT). for instance. which used Afghanistan as a base from which to carry out major operations against American targets and did not significantly depend upon its affiliates to support its operations in the Middle East. After the first year of the GWOT and the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan. individual cells. he engaged the Taliban and its leader. Nevertheless. detached from Al Qa’ida Central Command and other cells. Mullah Omar in the preparation (Riedel 2008). he personally handled other elements of the conspiracy. When operations are so decentralized. networked terrorist organizations would be less vulnerable to traditional counterterrorism measures used by hierarchically organized security forces. In November 2002. Al Qa’ida soon learned that there are limitations to a strictly decentralized structure. many Al Qa’ida leaders were imprisoned. While they operated in support of centralized directives. they established their own individual plans (Felter et al. These arrests led to subsequent arrests of other senior officers. The shura concluded that a decentralized.tactical leader. were instructed to develop their own organizational structures. Additionally. composed of less than ten operatives.

Al Qa’ida was able to reestablish some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities by exploiting Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Riedel 2008). thereby provoking Pakistan to divert to the east troops that were needed in the west. Like most other organizations. These commanding officers ensure that preference divergence does not result in the loss of 11 . Bramlett. the US allowed Al Qa’ida to reconstitute itself in the tribal areas of Pakistan. and their own talent at conducting aggressive attacks (Shapiro 2007). after five Kashmiri terrorists attacked Lok Sabha. the U. Perkins. Al Qa’ida can rely upon closer relations with its commanding officers (the former leaders of indigenous terrorist groups). However. Al Qa’ida could not effectively monitor its agents’ activities. Invading Iraq diverted troops from the mission of finding Al Qa’ida’s leadership. who are the most important link in the formation of a resilient. prior to the invasion of Iraq. India began to mobilize along the border. competition for prominence within the movement. Al Qa’ida leadership found itself cornered along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and unable to coordinate its low-level operatives. Brachman. nor could it punish renegade agents (Felter. the lower house of India’s parliament in New Delhi. In 2002 and 2003. Thus.S. who espoused different personal preferences. Al Qa’ida faced challenges when Central Command was forced to delegate certain duties to low level operatives. decision to go to war with Iraq and the Pakistani decision to provoke a crisis with India allowed Al Qa’ida to survive by regaining a degree of centralization. complex organization. Within a decentralized framework. Often. Moreover. rather than consolidating its victory in Afghanistan. and Fishman 2006).situational awareness and control the use of violence to achieve specific political ends. As the result of restoration of central control. these low-level operatives sought more violence than was useful due to the cognitive dynamics of an underground organization.

the relationship between Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers and central authorities are moderately coupled (thus. Unlike strictly centralized organizations. II. While the relationships within the cells are tightly coupled. and large size dictated its organizational decisions. qualified by loosely coupled systems. today. By contrast. Al Qa’ida was effectively a decentralized network). Al Qa’ida continues to morph into a complexly structure organization (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2006). While it is difficult to 12 . Before Al Qa’ida Central Command reorganized itself in the tribal areas of Pakistan. the relationships between cells and between operatives and Al Qa’ida Central Command are loosely coupled. intricate nature of resource gathering and allocation.operational success or security. who interact with and mutually affect one another. highly visible organizational personnel. complex organizations can exploit a diversity of systems (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2001). Although a decentralized organization form was more appropriate and prudent after 9/11. Al Qa’ida’s demand for operational secrecy. A Description of Complex Organizations: As this history indicates. Al Qa’ida is a true “complex organization”). This flexible structure allows the Central Command to maintain control over specifically identified strategic operations through its commanding officers while enabling cells to maintain their autonomy in local and regional operations (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2006). Al Qa’ida now relies heavily upon semiautonomous cells found in operational territories that are horizontally and vertically integrated into the centralized command structure. Complex organizations are composed of a diversity of agents. Empowered by the establishment of its safe haven in Pakistan and increased reliance upon its commanding officers. the relationship between its commanding officers and central authorities were also loosely coupled (thus. qualified by tightly coupled systems or exclusively decentralized organizations. it was not very efficient.

Al Qa’ida has achieved an optimal combination of coupling. Al Qa’ida theorist Abu Musab al-Suri noted the importance of a highly trained cadre of senior commanding officers. Bin Laden did not seek to exert strategic or operational control over the leaders of its regionally based affiliates. Communication frequency. However. These commanding officers can serve a crucial role since they are better able to monitor the behavior of their agents and can punish and reward them for their performance. it employs the groups’ leaders as its commanding officers and integrates them into Al Qa’ida Central Command by establishing communication channels and by offering financial and technological resources to these leaders for their local outlets with stipulations. The Role of “Mergers and Acquisitions:” By affiliating with local jihadist movements. they can build differentiated relationships with their rapports rather than espousing an “average” leadership style. He observed that a dearth of such leaders reduces the maximum level of control Al Qa’ida could exert thereby undermining the potential for political impact (Felter. Previously.determine if Al Qa’ida assumed this structure by conscious design or coincidence. Bramlett. Since they are already closely coupled to their agents. III. now when Al Qa’ida merges. or collaborates with a local jihadist groups. these commanding officers are effective because they can develop mature relationships with their operatives. Moreover. Brachman. and Fishman 2006). the extensive negotiations that continue to occur between Al Qa’ida and its affiliates suggest that Al Qa’ida has consciously utilized these arrangements to remain resilient. These relationships are characterized by a high degree of leader-member exchange and commitment that was impossible to achieve between Al Qa’ida Central Command executives and operatives due to their lack of physical proximity. partners. interactive communication 13 . Perkins.

Al Qa’ida Central Command can rely upon its commanding officers to handle finance and logistic tasks and to engage in auditing strategies. There is a positive correlation between the level of ideological indoctrination of cell members and the degree of control a leader exerts. The moderate coupling between Al Qa’ida Central Command and local leaders is essential to the performance of the organization. Thus. Bramlett. Because affiliations are often preceded by several months of bargaining and negotiations. and their overall unit performance improves (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). which can be tracked by counterterrorist forces. Studies from the corporate world as well as observations by Al Qa’ida theorists reveal that when agents develop high quality relationships with their leaders. 14 . Providing funds on a need-to-have basis to smaller groups of operatives is a risky strategy because each additional transfer entails communications and financial transactions. relying on lower-level operatives (who are often less committed. and Fishman 2006). leader-member value agreement. since the most devoted operatives are obliged to engage in riskier or inherently fatal assignments) is a more hazardous strategy (Felter. Moreover. and member affect are all key in this dyadic relationship (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). Al Qa’ida can ensure that strategic and tactical differences between it and its commanding officers are reconciled. Moreover. subordinate loyalty. cohesive units can innovate and adapt to the demands of the environment because they do not need to conform to a strict set of guidelines passed down from Central Command. Jarrett Brachman. ensuring that relationships that could dilute commitment are avoided and those that enhance commitment are strengthened(Brachman and McCants 2006).patterns. Commanding officers now serve an important role as interlocutors with Al Qa’ida Central Command. Local leaders can also effectively monitor operative’s personal and social network. these new. their performance. decision influence. Perkins.

By allowing its commanding officers to retain significant freedom to interact with other local leaders and with resource providers. they act as a hub of communication. thereby allowing Al Qa’ida to maintain ideological and operational control over the organization and by closely interacting with local operatives. This is the first study that pinpoints the organizations with which Al Qa’ida has affiliated and identifies their leaders (who subsequently become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers). efficiency. at present. obligations to Al Qa’ida Central Command. finances. local leaders-cum-commanding officers perform a crucial function by liaising with Al Qa’ida Central Command. and Internet articles. and powers including discipline and punishment of their agents) no researcher has analyzed their role or background. government documents. Although these commanding officers have significant responsibilities (for example. transmitting new. these commanding officers can ensure the dissemination of innovation and information by acting as an intermediary between their cell members and Al Qa’ida Central Command. this study provides valuable insight into the transformation that these leaders undergo when they become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers by looking at their responsibilities before and after they affiliate with Al Qa’ida. scrutinizing their stories for patterns to determine their motivation. up-to-date. they are given latitude to exploit their specific environment. IV. duty of care to their agents. Moreover. information between operatives and Al Qa’ida authorities (McAllister 2004). press and scholarly articles. and equipment. thereby ensuring the unity. and competence of local cells. Moreover. Drawing upon documents and transcripts of legal proceedings involving global Salafi mujahedin and their organizations. Currently. Initial Thoughts on Policy Implications: 15 . this study compiles the biographies of over forty Al Qa’ida commanding officers. accountability for operation effectiveness. the use of force. Thus.

Government efforts to degrade Al Qa’ida’s capacity should focus on undermining its security environment, minimizing the degree to which it can control operations, and abort its ability to fund its activities. By identifying the crucial role played by commanding officers in sustaining Al Qa’ida, this study will suggest additional means of undermining Al Qa’ida. The government should increase dissension between local leaders and Al Qa’ida Central Command. The US government should publicly recognize and highlight the differences between the acquired groups, who originally espouse ambitions such as regime overthrow and Al Qa’ida, which is committed to a pan-Islamic program. Moreover, the government can disrupt communications channels between local leaders and Al Qa’ida central command by utilizing misinformation and flooding information channels, thereby forcing the commanding officers to communicate more frequently with Al Qa’ida Central Command, possibly revealing crucial information. There may be “psychological” tactics that can be employed to generate dissension, to exploit certain aspects of human or group dynamics that would lead to competition, or rebellion. Moreover, there may be certain personality characteristics of the types of individuals employed at each level of organization that can be manipulated. Finally, government efforts should deny jihadist groups the benefit of security vacuum in vulnerable areas; thereby barring the emergence of potential Al Qa’ida partners. Through troop deployment, the US government can deny terrorists the use of vulnerable countries as staging grounds for the attacks in the West.


Chapter 2: Literature Review
Recently, counterterrorist agents and military officers have mounted efforts to combat Al Qa’ida and Bin Laden supporters. However, there is considerable controversy among scholars regarding the structure of Al Qa’ida and therefore, how best to target this formidable foe. The debate regarding the nature of Al Qa’ida’s threat will inevitably impact upon the allocation of influence and resource by the U.S. federal government in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) embarked upon following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The outcome of the bureaucratic turf wars over funding for programs under the new Obama administration will surely define future directions and strategies to confront Al Qa’ida specifically and global terrorism in general. In the introductory chapter, I highlighted the newfound importance of Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers, which lead the groups with which Al Qa’ida has recently merged or with whom it remains associated. Although Al Qa’ida retains its core group and a well-trained terrorist cadre, it has become increasingly engaged with regional affiliates in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula, Indonesia, and other sites in franchise operations. I. Literature on Al Qa’ida’s Foreign Affiliates Several scholars have investigated the process whereby Al Qa’ida has achieved a broader geographic and operational reach by employing local jihadist groups. These researchers confirm my commentary that such partnerships can provide Al Qa’ida with increased flexibility and offer advantages in stimulating tactical level innovation within particular environments when they are astutely directed by Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. In a report prepared for the Combat Studies Institute, Kalic describes Al Qa’ida as a “modern hydra.” He observes that before the onset of the GWOT, Al Qa’ida functioned as a regional indoctrination and training center for Islamic terrorist organizations. However, he


corroborates my observation that because of the loss of support and training centers in Afghanistan due to Operation Enduring Freedom, Bin Laden was obliged to rely upon outside groups in order to perpetuate Al Qa’ida’s agenda. Kalic suggests that Al Qa’ida’s alliances with Abu Sayyaf, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Tunisian Combatant Group, and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group have enabled Al Qa’ida to expand its geographic influence and diffuse its organizational structure. He describes the process whereby Al Qa’ida supports local “walk in” Islamic groups that pitch their plans to Al Qa’ida for financial support. These radical groups provide additional reach to Al Qa’ida and expand its operational capability for minimal investment because they can develop indigenous plans and operations based on local situations and observations. Moreover, they allow Al Qa’ida to minimize exposure of its central command structure (Kalic 2005) In a similar vein, Takeyh and Gvosdev have observed that after the destruction of its sanctuary in Afghanistan, Al Qa’ida has remained buoyant by forging foreign alliances. Through this strategy, Al Qa’ida has established a presence in failed states where it believes the US will opt not to risk significant losses associated with urban/guerilla warfare. Al Qa’ida no longer needs a strong state for funding and supplies since it can rely on its franchises in countries like Kashmir, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Palestine (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). Riedel avows that the US invasion of Iraq and subsequent efforts to quell sectarian unrest have allowed Al Qa’ida to regroup in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where it has established a new base of operations. Now, Al Qa’ida is once again focused on enlarging its network. Consequently, Al Qa’ida has developed a closer relationship with Kashmiri terrorist groups, like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad that have a presence there. Moreover, while Al Qa’ida has failed to topple the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, its attacks against these


regimes demonstrate its expanded influence throughout the Middle East. foiled in 2006. Al Qa’ida finds another organization that can attain its other goals and leaves this former associate to continue the war on its own. She maintains that many organizations will form alliances with groups that have ideologies different from their own. obliging both entities to adapt. and revivalist organizations (like Tablighi Jamaat) (Stern 2003). or Lebanon in the near future (Riedel 2007). Mishal and Rosenthal describe Al Qa’ida as a “dune organization” that employs other loosely affiliated organizations to carry out its missions. Stern observes that terrorist groups’ objectives have evolved to ensure their survival. and sometimes unlikely alliances with other jihadist groups (like Jemaah Islamiyah). when they prove that they no longer need Al Qa’ida’s material or normative support to conduct independent maneuvers. Al Qa’ida can forge broad. indicates that Al Qa’ida has established connections in Europe. Al Qa’ida remains associated with these groups as long as they cannot operate independently. The affiliated groups may employ a modus operandi. Finally. which is not identical to Al Qa’ida’s tactics. In a similar vein. For instance. Moreover. Riedel suggests that Al Qa’ida may seek a foothold in Gaza. 19 . the plot to destroy ten commercial airliners en route from the United Kingdom to the United States. she avows that Bin Laden has adjusted his objectives over time and describes Al Qa’ida as a “flexible group of ruthless warriors ready to fight on behalf of multiple causes. with Shia organizations (like Hezbollah). Africa. with traditional organized crime groups (like Artab Ansari’s [an Indian gangster] network). she suggests that both Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan compromised their original mission when they joined forces with Al Qa’ida.” Due to the adaptability of its mission. thus. Al Qa’ida need not maintain constant supervision or control over the activities of its old affiliate’s operatives (Mishal and Rosenthal 2005). However.

He contends that Al Qa’ida’s franchises are likely to commit rash.” whereby Al Qa’ida finances terrorist groups with the intention of influencing their strategic activity. they describe mergers and acquisitions. whereby Al Qa’ida combines with or subsumes another organization. Finally. equipment. Many groups that merge or partner with Al Qa’ida adhere to a program based on the ethnic. They analyze several possible arrangements. 20 . Desouza and Hengsen provide the most comprehensive analysis of Al Qa’ida’s collaborative activities. II. strategic mistakes and are more susceptible to counterterrorism offensives than their mother organization.” whereby Al Qa’ida allows other groups to use its facilities.Fishman is less worried about Al Qa’ida franchises than other scholars. They avow that terrorist groups cannot be self-sustaining and must “engage in the fundamentals of established economic practices” to furnish protection from outside threats. offering only its name. Literature on Incentives for Joining Radical Movements A. and ideology. including “licensing agreements. reputation. or personnel for a specific purpose and duration and “minority equity investments. they do not reveal why local jihadist groups choose to align with Al Qa’ida. Ideological motivations While these studies analyze Al Qa’ida’s strategy and explain why Al Qa’ida has pursued such arrangements. He avers that Al Qa’ida offers these franchises few benefits. He offers Al Qa’ida in Iraq as an example of a group which compromised Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic mission by attacking Muslim civilians and engaging in conflict with other Iraqi insurgent groups (Fishman 2008). They contend that these interactions are the most complex form of equity engagements that terrorist groups develop to survive in competitive environments and suggest that mergers/acquisitions allow terrorist groups to consolidate their assets to compete more successfully or exploit resources held by other parties (Desouza and Hengsen 2007).

it is a tool for enlarging the potential supporters of the organization. few studies investigate the incentives of the local jihadist leaders who adopt Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program and transform their organization into part of Al Qa’ida’s system. She observes that the attention groups pay to adjusting their ideology to circumstance is revealed when they explain and justify their strategies. Studies regarding why individuals join radical movements may inform our understanding of the motivations of local terrorists leaders who connect with Al Qa’ida’s global enterprise. Jones. In fact. Al Qa’ida can co-opt local struggles into an evolving network of worldwide jihad by asserting its dedication to an international agenda. many groups grapple with contradictions between national and supranational aims. Unfortunately. Smith. Consequently. they must forsake their indigenous agendas to support the global pan-Islamic movement. Based on her interpretation. Upon allying with Al Qa’ida. and Weeding validate this line of thought. enemies and allies are described in different terms at different times (Della Porta 1995). linguistic. Consequently. She maintains that political organizations often orient their ideology to support recruitment. one might expect that local jihadist leaders subscribe to Al Qa’ida’s global jihad because the idea of establishing an Islamic Caliphate throughout the world is attractive to them. Della Porta suggests that individuals are persuaded to enlist in underground organizations when they are enticed by its ideology. Like Stern.sectarian. and state boundaries in which they arose. They contend that Al 21 . One could also envisage that Al Qa’ida is promoting its pan-Islamic vision because it is aware of the magnetism of this dream. They observe that although Al Qa’ida was initially devoted to fighting the Soviet forces it now espouses more internationalist objectives. she proposes that ideology is a strategic choice made by the organization.

and Denny 2003). Sprinzak. Pedahzur. they concluded that income and/or educational inequalities do not account for terrorism. rather than local jihad. They observed that most had a high school education and some had additional schooling and that most came from respected families that supported their activism. Islamist groups fought secular Muslim governments either to replace them or to form a separate state. However. Al Qa’ida anti-Western curriculum is increasingly alluring (R. Islamic Jihad. Moreover. and Hezbollah. Similarly. Sprinzak. Smith. membership in fundamentalist organizations and repeat terrorist acts. They noticed that these terrorists exhibited a higher rate of religious education. As a result. Gunaratna also supports this argument. They offer Jemaah Islamiyah as an example of an organization that was seduced by Al Qa’ida’s discussion of a pan-Islamic caliphate (Jones.Qa’ida has improved its media wing to appeal to local jihadist groups in their native language and honor regional customs. They deduced that peer influence and increased social standing were major reasons for joining a terrorist group (Post. Perliger. As a consequence of the GWOT and the war in Iraq. and Weinberg observed 80 Palestinian suicide terrorists from 1973 to 2002. and Denny interviewed 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern extremists from Hamas. they 22 . Post. Gunaratna 2002). and Weeding 2003). B. Psychosocial motivations Conversely. as well as 14 secular terrorists from Fatah al-Islam. other studies suggest that individuals join terrorist networks for psychosocial reasons. global events have provided the context for the new generation to gain exposure to significant ideological training and indoctrination. Consequently. Al Qa’ida successfully transformed the parochial thinking of these groups through a sophisticated propaganda campaign to orient them towards global. He avows that traditionally.

C. and Weinberg 2003). rational. educated young men from caring and religious families. He observed that members of terrorist organizations were generally middle-class. Sandler and Enders contend that terrorists must choose between different strategies and modes of attack based on their perception of “prices” associated with alternative operations. He sample included expatriate leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group. members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. spirituality and concern for their communities. Each mode of operation has a per-unit price that 23 . Marc Sageman’s book.proposed that the terrorists acted out of altruistic motives (devotion to a religious community) and deduced that recruitment could be based on a network of shared social values(Pedahzur. and Al Qa’ida. Although his research was biased towards leaders who have come to the public attention. Strategic/opportunistic motivations Alternatively. Jemaah Islamiyah. Perliger. On the contrary. Moreover. terrorist leaders may have opportunistic motives for securing a spot under Al Qa’ida’s umbrella. he found that social bonds were the critical element in the process of joining jihad and he suggested that such connections precede ideological commitment (Sageman 2004). the GSPC. These participants in jihad grew up with strong positive values of religion. which they perceive to be the optimum strategy to accomplish a sociopolitical goal. Sageman compiled data from public sources on 172 individuals who he identified as members of a global Salafi mujahedeen. Understanding Terror Network is particularly revealing. Sagemen found no evidence of pathological narcissism or paranoid personality disorder amongst those who he surveyed. calculated decision to execute a particular type of action. Several academics believe that terrorist action derives from a conscious.

It is possible that these groups take the transnational jihadist challenge seriously because the idea of creating a single Islamic state or reviving the united Caliphate of earlier times is captivating. etc. Hoffman notes that approximately 90 percent of all terrorist groups collapse within a year and only half of the remainder survives another decade. local jihadist leaders. access to training facilities. local jihadist group leaders may be lured by Al Qa’ida’s ideology. 24 . by extension. First. Alternatively. Finally. Thus. He further notes that local jihadist cells shed their outlaw status within radical Muslim circles when they have Al Qa’ida’s backing. one can imagine three different rationales why local jihadist group leaders would affiliate with Al Qa’ida. resources and anticipated outcome. local jihadist leaders may confederate with Al Qa’ida due to psychosocial influences. and association with the Al Qa’ida label. These affinities may compel local jihadist leaders to liaise with their old compatriots and mutually assist each other in their subsequent struggles. Based on these observations he suggests that several local jihadist outlets need the Al Qa’ida imprimatur to raise money. the United States and its allies. Based on these accounts. may unite with Al Qa’ida to guarantee organizational survival. while training together. he mentions that the Iraq war has sapped local jihadist groups of their most active militants. Finally. who might otherwise be contained or co-opted by local regimes and. These local jihadist leaders may have developed relationships with Al Qa’ida officials during the Soviet-Afghan war.includes the value of time. any act executed by a terrorist organization can be perceived as a rational choice (Sandler and Enders 2004). In joining Al Qa’ida. embracing global jihad may be perceived as a way to control and recruit new group members (Bruce Hoffman 2004). In this context. He remarks upon long running government offensives that have nearly crushed several terrorist groups. these local jihadist leaders may seek concrete benefits such as the provision of financial resources. while incarcerated together.

III. Literature on Terrorist Leadership A. The personality of terrorist leaders While these studies enlighten the discussion regarding incentives for merging or partnering with Al Qa'ida, very little literature directly addresses the role that local jihadist leaders play before or after a merger. However, some researchers have attempted to identify personality traits that enable leaders to attract and maintain large followings. In the 1920s, German sociologist Max Weber defined charismatic leadership as “resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.” He suggested that charisma was a personality trait by virtue of which a leader appeared endowed with exceptional power or superhuman competencies. Charismatic leaders gained authority through qualities unique their own, not through positions that they occupied (Weber 1968). Kostrzebski applied Weber’s theory of charismatic authority to examine leadership in the context of Islamic tradition. He contends that a certain model of charismatic politico-religious leadership, first exemplified by Mohammed, the prophet and founder of Islam, is prominent in Islamic history. He notices that in the Islamic world, religious and political leadership is usually embodied in the persona of a single charismatic individual. He cites Mahdi of Sudan, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Osama bin Laden as examples of this archetype. Furthermore, he predicts that this type of charismatic politico-religious leader will appear with greater frequency in the future (Kostrzebski 2002). Similarly, Bergen contends that Bin Laden’s charisma helped fuel an influx of recruits and attracted aspiring jihadists to Afghanistan from Western countries. Moreover, he avows that Bin Laden’s cult of personality prompted various militant Islamic groups to affiliate with Al


Qa’ida. He notes that Bin Laden left operational planning to trusted lieutenants and stood above the fray. Consequently, few operatives received personal audience with him. However, those who went through the vetting procedures and gained access to Bin Laden describe their encounters with the legendary terrorist leader as “beautiful” (Bergen 2006). B. Targeting leadership While these studies suggest that a leader’s charisma can inspire a devoted following, they do not address the role that such leaders play within an organizational framework. While research addressing this topic has been extremely sparse, some scholars have discussed how the arrest or neutralization of a terrorist leader can affect the group’s performance. In a Joint Special Operations University report, Turbiville perceives that the United States has emphasized targeting and eliminating key terrorist leadership since 9/11. He describes the diverse experience of foreign operations against insurgent and terrorist high value targets. Based on several case studies, he concludes that leadership targeting can be effective, particularly when a group depends heavily on a charismatic leader. However, he cautions that operations which target leadership must be integrated into an overall and effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorist strategy and warns that abuses of national and international law and human rights committed in terrorist leadership targeting programs have a negative impact on larger counterinsurgency goals (Turbiville 2007). Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells examined 35 leadership crises to determine what happens to terrorist movements after the loss of a leader. Although they predicted that the assassination of a leader would cause a dramatic change in ideology leading to increased violence, they found that the assassination of a leader often causes the group to fail or disband. Moreover, they observed that the assassination of a leader is more likely to devastate a terrorist group than an arrest. They


suggest that arrested leaders may continue to play an important ideological role by guiding their group from their prison cell (Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells 2004). These studies suggest that targeting leadership could damage a terrorist group by depriving it of effective direction and demoralizing its rank and file members. However, while these analyses intimate that terrorist leaders play an important role in ensuring organizational survival, they do not expose the particular function that terrorist leaders must execute. Thus, this study is valuable since its looks at both the motivations and specific responsibilities of Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers.


Moreover. we must understand the strength that resides in its leaders. conducted by operatives capable of inflicting maximum civilian and economic damages on both local and distant targets in pursuit of their extremist goals. During negotiations between Al Qa’ida and 28 . Osama bin Laden. I. Currently.Chapter 3: Methodology Al Qa’ida has clearly transformed and evolved in ways described in the introduction. they have become the main link between Al Qa’ida Central Command and the organization’s operative units. who serve as Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. Background: The introductory chapter explained how and why Al Qa’ida relies extensively upon the leaders of regionally focused groups. remains an important security threat. moderately coupled network of individuals united by a common need and ultimately aligned behind an emergent leader. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the motivations and responsibilities of Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are held responsible for its success or failure in their region. Al Qa’ida has become a flexible. In order to understand why Al Qa’ida is such a forceful and resilient organization. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers have the ultimate authority over their region and are given wide latitude to run their units within the boundaries of Al Qa’ida’s doctrines. As centralized communication nodes within their system. recently. In fact. As such. Al Qa’ida has expanded its reach through its affiliations so that it is uniquely positioned to target the West through spectacular attacks designed to inflict mass casualties and damage to the global economy. Its terrorist activity. By depending upon its commanding officers (the former leaders of local jihadist groups). Al Qaida’s ability to mete out devastating destruction worldwide has increased as cells have become progressively armed with modern technology.

Just as managers from the corporate arena trying to integrate newly acquired companies and divisions. they help stimulate interdependency and interaction among their units and other branches of Al Qa’ida.the potential affiliate. because academic studies to date have not focused on Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. This study is the first to comprehensively examine Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. Unfortunately. Past studies have ignored important hierarchical considerations. communicate often and address everyone involved in the deal. so too must the commanding officers that merge their organization with Al Qa’ida prepare accordingly (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2006). The surveys reviewed. researchers have overlooked them. plan ahead. motivations. it will contribute to the bank of information and stimulate vital discourse on the composition and function of Al Qa’ida today. Commanding officers also ensure that an operative’s incentives to supply effort are not diminished and mediate conflict within their unit when the affiliation begins and as it matures. do not adequately explain why certain terrorists leaders affiliate with Al Qa’ida and its program of global jihad nor do they reveal the precise role that these officers serve within the Al Qa’ida network once affiliated. focusing primarily on principals like Osama bin Laden. Although these commanding officers play a vital role in expanding the agenda of Al Qa’ida and adding legitimacy to its international campaign. I theorized that by examining the demographic characteristics of Al 29 . little is known about the characters. or credentials of these officials. which consider categories of influence factors and their effect on an individual’s decision to join an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organization. Negotiations are often lengthy processes. involving discussions regarding financial and capital resources and tactics. The previous chapter revealed that literature on the role of leadership in terror networks has remained limited in scope. commanding officers are influential arbitrators. Finally. Thus.

Qa’ida’s operatives, such as age, educational background, years of religious training, religious affiliation, and by evaluating these operatives for their military backgrounds (e.g. war experiences/participation in the Afghanistan conflict), incarceration/prison time, migration patterns etc, I would be able to detect recognizable patterns that characterize these terrorist executives. The patterns that I observed would help me answer two critical questions: 1) What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida’s and its pan-Islamic agenda? 2) What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible affiliates with Al Qa’ida?

II. Assessing Q1: The previous chapter outlined three explanations for why individuals join terrorist organizations. Some researchers suggest that terrorists follow a strategic logic and are inspired by opportunism; they perceive armed combat at the most effective way to generate significant governmental concessions (Sandler and Enders 2004, Bruce Hoffman 2004). Others scholars suggest that ideology plays an important role in pushing militants of some militants toward terrorism (Della Porta 1995, Jones, Smith, and Weeding 2003, R. Gunaratna 2002). Finally, some academics claim that individuals join terrorist organizations due to strong solidarity bonds derived from interpersonal relations (Post, Sprinzak, and Denny 2003, Pedahzur, Perliger, and Weinberg 2003, Sageman 2004). Since prior studies have not discussed what incentives provoke local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida, I assumed that the motivations for local jihadist leaders to join Al Qa’ida’s global jihad were similar to the motivations for individuals to


join terrorist movements. Thus, to address my first question, I developed the following hypotheses: H11. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to opportunistic motives H21. Al Qa’ida commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to ideological motives H31. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due psychosocial motives H11 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers aligned with Al Qa’ida due to opportunistic motives) reflects the observation that relatively undersized, less powerful indigenous assemblies of terrorists can invigorate their organization by aligning with Al Qa’ida. In recent years, Al Qa’ida has demonstrated unusual resilience and international reach. It has exhibited a complexity, agility, and global scope that is unrivaled by any previous terrorist organization. Its fluid operational style, based on a common mission statement and shared objectives rather than standard-operating procedures has ensured its success (Stern 2003). Al Qa’ida has a remarkable ability to attract membership by relying upon a web of informal relations with various Islamic groups to gain access to operational collaborators and individuals to execute attacks. Currently, Al Qa’ida’s recruitment process seems to be more a matter of joining than being solicited. Moreover, the Salafi message, which has been disseminated over the Internet by Al Qa’ida’s media division, has attracted numerous members of alienated diasporas (sometimes second and third generation immigrants) who feel isolated from their communities and seek to belong to a group (Bruce Hoffman 2003). By associating with Al Qa’ida, local jihadist groups can shore up popular support and amp up recruitment.


Al Qa’ida’s strength may also lie in its impressive coffers; Al Qa’ida has amassed billions of dollars by building a strong network of financiers and operatives who are frugally minded and business savvy. Moreover, Al Qa’ida’s finances are often hidden in legitimate and illegitimate businesses; Bin Laden is reputed to own approximately eighty companies around the world. Al Qa’ida has learned to effectively leverage the global financial system of capital markets by utilizing small financial transfers, under regulated Islamic banking networks and informal transfer systems throughout the world. Thus, it is difficult to choke off funds destined for Al Qa’ida (Basile 2004). Consequently, Al Qa’ida can grant money to local terrorist groups that present promising plans for attacks that serve Al Qa’ida’s general goals. All terrorist organizations must engage in attacks to maintain support, to buttress their organizational integrity, and to foster their continued existence. Associating with Al Qa’ida ensures that a group has access to the necessary financial resources to conduct attacks. In a sense, Al Qa’ida operates like a large multi-national company and the “product” that it exports is terrorism. One must acknowledge the economic principles that underlie Al Qa’ida’s success, that of supply and demand, limited resources, productivity etc. Finally, Al Qa’ida has successfully exploited the technological tools of globalization to communicate with various audiences. Al Qa’ida has launched an effective advertising campaign worldwide using the latest technology and psychology to reach their desired addressees. Al Qa’ida uses mobile phones, text messaging, instant messaging, websites, email, blogs, and chat rooms for administrative tasks, fund-raising, research, logistical coordination of attacks, and recruitment. When Al Qa’ida’s media division airs its hostage videos and films of terrorist attacks or their aftermath, it provides the organization with the oxygen of publicity necessary to sustain itself. Unless civilian populations are made aware of terrorist acts and cowed into fear by


etc. Information was gathered from various international security think tanks including the Center for Defense Information.g. the beginning of a government offensive. the onset of series of attacks. Al Qa’ida cannot influence the governments that it targets. the founding. I searched for evidence of terrorist group decline based on Cronin’s criteria. Cronin lists seven broad explanations for the decline and ending of terrorist groups: 1) the capture or killing of the leader 2) failure to transition to the next generation 3) achievement of the group’s aims 4) transition to a legitimate political process 5) undermining of popular support 6) repression 7) transition from terrorist to other forms of violence. as a rational actor. I developed timelines for each organization included in this study. More than one dynamic can be responsible for their decline (Cronin 2006). the Jamestown Foundation. to assess H11. the Council of Foreign Relations. spectacular attacks. it is important to remember that Al Qa’ida is a unique terrorist organization. 90% of terrorist organizations have a life span of less than one year. if there was strong evidence that the group was in a state of imminent decline immediately prior to its merger with A Qa’ida. In considering this hypothesis. these materials are seen by potential sympathizers who may be brought into the folds of terrorism itself (Blanchard 2006). The timelines featured important events in their life cycle (e.). I assumed that opportunism was the primary motivation for merging with Al Qa’ida (coded as 2). the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi. would affiliate with Al Qa’ida if he desperately needed to give his organization a second wind. In fact. Moreover. I judged that the local jihadist leader. If there was 33 . and the NEFA foundation. To do so. Consequently. most modern terrorist groups do not last long. Terrorist groups that align with Al Qa’ida can benefits from Al Qa’ida’s media and propaganda expertise.such assaults. Consequently.

Al Qa’ida would like to replace all existing governments with a supranational caliphate and impose a strict and exclusive government based on their interpretation of Sunni Islam. the UK’s security intelligence agency. I considered the leader’s prior involvement in Islamic societies. and statements.”(Al Qa’ida is an anti-Western organization) 2) Al Qa’ida aims to establish a caliphate based on an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam. or anti-Shia agendas. Al Qa’ida strongly opposes Western influences and ideologies that it perceives as “un-Islamic. I determined if the local jihadist leaders who affiliated with Al Qa’ida espoused anti-Western. According to MI5. (Al Qa’ida is a pan-Islamic organization) 3) Al Qa’ida promotes violence against other Muslim denominations as well as nonMuslims. To assess H21 (Al Qa’ida commanding officers were inspired by Al Qa’ida’s ideology). the largest denomination and is violently opposed to other Islamic denominations that it regards as “infidel. which they had published regarding their ideology. Al Qa’ida’s supports a narrow interpretation of Sunnism. I considered the assessment of Al Qa’ida’s ideology published by MI5. I determined that opportunism was the secondary motivation for merging with Al Qa’ida (coded as 1).some data that suggested that the group had experienced minor setbacks. (Al Qa’ida is anti-Shia) (Al Qaida's Ideology) Thus. to evaluate H21. To perform this appraisal. pan-Islamic.” most notably Shiite sects. religious education. To execute this assessment. Al Qa’ida’s ideology is centered upon three key points: 1) Al Qa’ida attributes the obstacles encountered by the Islamic world to the JewishChristian apostate Muslim alliance. More information on statistical hypothesis testing follows in the chapter on data analysis and results. I relied predominantly upon newspaper articles published in both the domestic and international 34 .

Abdullah Azzam and the Saudi billionaire. However in January 1993. Soon thereafter. In December 1979. to assess H31 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to prior social network affiliations). eager to put the Afghan jihad in the past. pan-Islamic. Thus countless numbers of mujahedeen veterans who had formed tight bonds with their fellow fighters returned to locations in the Middle East. Osama bin Laden. pan-Islamic. others enlisted in the growing corps of “holy warriors” under the lead of the legendary Palestinian Sheikh Dr. which was organized into several native mujahedeen organizations with headquarters in Peshawar. fearing the collapse of communism in Central Asia. where available. the Soviet Union launched a military invasion to restore Soviet control over neighboring Afghanistan. communiqués. the Pakistani government ordered the closure of Arab mujahedeen offices in the country and threatened official deportation to any illegal foreign fighters who attempted to remain in and. However. If I found that the leader placed more emphasis on anti-Western. operatives from foreign countries began trickling into Pakistan. Countless numbers of Afghanis joined the Islamic resistance. North Africa. or antiShia sympathies. Pakistan. statements. While some arrived to provide money and weapons to support the fight. I resolved that ideological alignment was the primary motivation for joining Al Qa’ida (coded as 2). Finally. I concluded that ideological alignment was a secondary motivation (coded as 1). speeches and other primary source materials authored by the leaders themselves. if the leader seemed more committed to local programs. and elsewhere 35 . or anti-Shia goals than regional initiatives. I considered operatives’ involvement in four episodes that served to rally jihadists around Al Qa’ida principals and fostered the development of social bonds between mujahedeen figures. yet also expressed anti-Western.

Two trials took place. However.” these former combatants may have opted to rejoin Al Qa’ida. who became a spokesman for the defendants because of his eloquence and knowledge of foreign languages. Osama bin Laden journeyed to the Sudan. The second trial consisted of 302 defendants charged with conspiracy and being members of the illegal Tanzim al-Jihad. who appeased his hosts by mobilizing construction equipment and bankrolling construction projects. farming. where the new regime had raised an Islamic banner. he convinced several Saudi businessmen to invest in Sudan and several of his brothers and Jeddah merchants did invest in Sudanese real estate. and agriculture (Gunaratna 36 . The first was held in camera and consisted of 24 suspects directly involved in the assassination. he was treated as a special guest. Only 58 sentences were given and most of the defendants were released after three years in prison. In 1981. After the Soviet-Afghan War. When presented with the opportunity to reunite with their “brethren. despite the prosecution demand of 299 death sentences the judges gave out none. Moreover. these jihadists developed strategies for establishing an Islamist state and established important personal connections. In prison. Most jihadists rallied around Ayman alZawahiri. they may have decided to reunite with Zawahiri and the other jihadists with whom they were imprisoned. more than 700 people were rounded up. After being released. The events that unfolded subsequent to the assassination of Anwar Sadat may have played a similar role in forging social bonds amongst jihadists. Many focused on mobilizing the population to overthrow the government.(Wright 2007). President Sadat of Egypt died after being shot by gunmen who opened fire as he watched an aerial display at a military parade. in subsequent years. Following President Sadat's assassination. several former prisoners left Egypt (Wright 2007). Ultimately. In the Sudan.

Kabul.-led forces in 2001. Subsequently. I assumed that social network affiliation was a permissive factor (i. By September 1996. 37 . became an Al Qa’ida associate. However. and jailing men whose beards were deemed too short. L. When considering the relevance of social network affiliations. requiring women to wear head-to-toe veils. As ethnic Pashtuns. After Bin Laden fled the Sudan in 1996 as a result of international pressure. His second presence in Afghanistan attracted many mujahedeen to return there (P. or spent time in the Sudan before 1996 or Afghanistan during the reign of the Taliban. During this time he established links to Sudanese Islamists as well as fundamentalists in Somalia and Yemen. Bin Laden set up numerous training camps in the region. the Taliban had captured Afghanistan’s capital. participated in the Sadat trial. Bergen 2001). This treatment was based upon my observation that not every participant in these episodes. Thus. In the years after departing from the Sudan.2002). and embarked upon his jihad against America.e. Before its ouster by U. The Taliban rule was characterized by a strict form of Islamic law. Finally. local jihadist leaders may have established social connections with Bin Laden in Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks and the Global War on Terror. while social affiliations may animate a small minority to engage in Al Qa’ida’s program of global jihad. they do not explain why these particular leaders aligned with Al Qa’ida. although subject to the same or similar influences. The bonds that these jihadists formed prior to the US invasion may have sparked their cooperation with Al Qa’ida after the onset of the Global War on Terror. he could rekindle these ties. the Taliban controlled some 90 percent of Afghanistan's territory. a large part of the Taliban’s support came from Afghanistan's Pashtun community.S. disillusioned with existing ethnic Tajik and Uzbek leaders. banning television. a precondition which set the stage for the merger). I determined whether the group member was involved in the Soviet-Afghan war. he established residency in Afghanistan.

I developed another three hypothesis: H12. Consequently. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly operational role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida H22. or foreign language competencies. and running training camps. Operational commanders are primarily responsible for conducting operations (including “spectacular attacks”). III. Logistical leaders are accountable for the administrative and financial activities of their units. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly logistical role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida H32. or ideological. developing military tactics. logistical. I posited that Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers would fall into one of three primary leadership categories after the affiliation occurred: operational. ideological/media leaders are responsible for expressing the organizational culture and philosophy of their group through media activity and possibly fatwa as well as personal interactions with their operatives.Unless the local jihadist leader was clearly not incentivized by opportunism or ideological concerns. They have vocational. Finally. or legal expertise. I considered social network affiliation to be a secondary motivation rather than a primary motivation. financial. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly ideological role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida. They have military experience or formation and/or expertise in weapons or explosives. They 38 . They direct the group’s bureaucratic development and organize recruitment drives. Assessing Q2: To answer my second question (What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible merges or partners with Al Qa’ida?).

I coded him as a strong operational leader (3). published books or articles. I coded him as an average operational leader 39 . I did not compare leadership performance across categories because different measures were used to evaluate leadership faculty for each category. logistic. and ideological leadership abilities before and after the merger. To determine the role played by the commanding officer.have granted interviews. If he demonstrated one of the factors in this category. considered the following variables: Type of leader Operational Logistic Ideological Media activity Military/Front line experience Administrative/financial activities Weapons/explosives training Indications Training camp participation Recruitment experience Organizational restructuring Media innovations Involvement in ideological transitions Operational innovations Involvement in major attacks Vocational skills Language skills Fatwa issues Documented political or religious guidance proffered to operatives After analyzing these variables. I compared leadership performance pre. I assessed the commanding officer’s operational. Thus.and post-merger. this estimation would have been biases. If the leader demonstrated at least two of the factors in the operational leadership category. and released audio or videotapes. Instead.

since START has not evaluated this data and cannot assure the reliability of the information provided. developed by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). I used the same secondary and primary source materials listed earlier in this chapter. which is now available to the public through an agreement between MIPT. the Federation of American Scientists. I considered two questions: 1) With whom has Al Qa’ida affiliated? 2) Who led these organizations? To answer the first question. However. I coded him as such (0). and START (About START).(2). I used the same criteria to assess logistic and ideological leadership. including reports available through the Jamestown Foundation. IV. DHS. The International Herald Tribune. I coded him as a weak operational leader (1). and The Washington Post. If the leader was not involved with the organization at the time. I used the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) Database included on the website of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror (START). If he exhibited none of these factors. the Council on Foreign Relations. I eliminated several from my study based on the following criteria using open source materials. non-partisan sources. From 2004 to 2008 the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security funded the creation and maintenance of the Terrorism Knowledge Base. MIPT collaborated with Detica. to collect information on terrorist groups and key leaders of terrorist groups. A discussion of the comparison of leadership performance pre-and post-merger follows in Chapter 5. I also used these sources to determine the date that the affiliation commenced. Developing the Universe of Cases To develop my universe of cases. a business and technology consultancy. Although the TOPs database listed thirty-six Al Qa’ida allies. the Library of Congress. 40 . I conducted further analyses to determine its accuracy by confirming with at least two separate. To perform this evaluation. The New York Times.

To qualify as a merger. an official denial of connections with Al Qa’ida should induce caution (and invoke more thorough analysis of the relationship) Based on my evaluation. Those groups that I coded as weak affiliates received financing or training from Al Qa’ida. I separately examined al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya 41 . or logisticians. or opportunities for training. the organization must have developed a symbiotic relationship with Al Qa’ida. contact with its network of financiers. I determined that twenty-one groups conformed to these the above standards. informants.1) The group must have been engaged in operations independently of Al Qa’ida (the group must not be a front for Al Qa’ida My study considers the deliberate decision to affiliate with Al Qa’ida. whereby they supported Al Qa’ida. for example by contributing to its recruitment efforts or operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. 2) The group must not have renounced violence I did not include political movements that supported Al Qa’ida’s aims because armed groups operate differently than other clandestine non-violent organizations. the group must have formally announced that this arrangement existed through a communiqué broadcast to a wide audience. but did not actively conduct operations outside their region nor did they contribute to Al Qa’ida’s other initiatives in any meaningful way. After performing this assessment. I coded each affiliation as a merger. a strong affiliation (partnership). Al Qa’ida aided the local organization. 3) While not grounds for immediate disqualification. and media specialists. or a weak affiliation (collaboration). thereby potentially compromising their local agenda. In return. Finally. To qualify as a strong affiliation. assets. perhaps by providing access to operatives. Leaders who head front organizations for Al Qa’ida do not make a pre-meditated choice to cooperate with Al Qa’ida. intelligence.

I considered all of the commanding officers of each group from the onset of their relationship with Al Qa’ida to the present. Jemaah Islamiya. I identified the leaders (past and present) of each of these 21 groups. namely the establishment of an Islamic state. who coordinate and supervise the execution of plans. I included a detailed investigation of the GAI in Chapter 7. In a few instances. the Taliban. I included a leader who was had not actively cooperated with Al Qa’ida if this leader had communicated with Al Qa’ida Central Command and if his successors vigorously pursued relations after his term. a group that did not affiliate with Al Qa’ida as a control group. and activities. operations. Al Qa’ida in Iraq). Thus. I used open source materials including reports by non-partisan research institutions and newspaper articles. While some groups did not experience any leadership transitions after they partnered with Al Qa’ida (ex. I generated a list of 41 Al Qa’ida field commanders as study subjects. Asbat al-Ansar). Selection of my study subjects/study 42 . Based on this data. I did not consider Al Qa’ida’s regional staff officers. Selection of Study Subjects My prior discussion focused on terrorist organizations that are overtly in pursuit of Salafi objectives. I made this distinction because I was interested in investigating the motivations and role of those leaders who came from outside Al Qa’ida’s orbit but became involved in its program later in their career.(GAI). In order to understand what motivates certain groups to align with Al Qa’ida. it is equally important to comprehend what deters other groups from associating with Al Qa’ida. both past and present. but who never had a vested interest in a particular local jihadist group. Some organizations had more than one nominal chief at times. V. Next. others experienced numerous leadership transitions (ex. in which case I treated both as leaders. In performing this assessment.

and political grievances and who may be less committed to the principles of Salafism and thus. Problems Regarding Information Gathering To conduct this assessment. Moreover. there may have been ascertainment bias introduced by the difficulties accurately assessing leaders’ competence in organizing and conducting important attacks. I did not include the amorphous social movement. In addition. economic. Often. I used sources from the public domain. I did not include Palestinian groups.sample was based on demonstrated and documented overt commitment to the principles of Salafism and all of the organizations that I studied were well defined with leadership that supported terrorist operations. who are fighting a jihad that involves complex social. which exists in Morocco. Because clandestine organizations are often very secretive about their members and operations. I chose to limit my sample to in order to reveal certain patterns that might not have otherwise emerged with less stringent exclusion criteria. I did include many groups that were deeply invested in domestic uprising and urban warfare against their own governments. Moreover. Although I eliminated all non-Muslim terrorists from the study sample. I included Muslims fighting for the liberation of Kashmir and those fighting an internal insurgency in Central Asia. the data from this study is inevitably biased towards information about those organizations and individuals who are regarded as more visible and who appear publicly with greater frequency. less magnetized by Al Qa’ida pan-Islamic agenda. bias was introduced by the actual leader interviews and communications that can be considered well-orchestrated propaganda 43 . Salafia Jihadia. terrorist organizations will not take credit for successful operations for fear of provoking the government to conduct a counterterrorism response. For instance. In contrast. VI. This grouping is just an assemblage of small illegal clusters centered around charismatic preachers.

empirical data about Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers was collected and analyzed. Case Study Finally. My observations regarding 44 . Relevance By seeking to understand who Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are. I arrived at a better understanding of how to recognize and predict who may become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers and how to anticipate and counter their efforts. as mentioned earlier. When assessing the data. leader of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. what motivates them. VII. I completed one comprehensive case study (in addition to my detailed discussion of the GAI). and how they aligned their own local jihadist group with Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program. These concerns withstanding. formerly the Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). Next. As a result. I considered Droukdal’s prior experiences and the history of the GSPC to determine why he embraced Al Qa’ida’s internationalist agenda rather than remaining committed strictly to jihad in Algeria. These sources included: government documents. VIII. press and scholarly articles. and Internet articles. who merged his organization with Al Qa’ida despite the objections of the GSPC’s former leader Hassan AlBanna (Guidère 2007). With the aforementioned limitations in mind.exercises that may not appropriately reflect the leader’s true motivations and ideology. I investigated Abdelmalek Droukdal. I considered the source of information and its degree of reliability. I assessed the role he played before and after aligning with Al Qa’ida. a comparison of leadership performance across categories was impossible. I used the materials available to me to try to best collect information about and understand the leaders and organizations that I profiled.

Finally. This realization. by understanding the role that Al Qa’ida commanding officers play. they will help develop a model to identify local jihadist leaders who may merge or partner with Al Qa’ida in the future. we can better allocate resources to address this threat. if proven.g. The fundamentalists who form interpersonal bonds through these venues may be persuaded by Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic partisans to become the next-generation of Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers in locations scattered across the globe. we can better understand Al Qa’ida’s overall strategy (e.motivations will serve two purposes. Secondly. has strong implications for US foreign policy in the post 9/11 era and greater attention should be paid to identifying such settings. are they focused on promoting their message through propaganda or are they intent on conducting more attacks?). Based on our knowledge of Al Qa’ida’s strategy. First. my analyses may suggest that our battles in the Middle East and our policies regarding imprisonment are creating gathering places for global Salafi jihadists. 45 .

The investigation of Al Qa’ida’s patterns of affiliation with respect to time is very interesting and indeed. they argue. Most of researchers who I discussed in my literature review perceive Al Qa’ida’s strategy of franchising as a new development. this relationship has perpetuated to the present day. in every case. Although I have recorded the first year in which the group cooperated with Al Qa’ida. the relationship between Al Qa’ida and its affiliate has strengthened or weakened (such is the case with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. To assess the date of the affiliation. as well as name recognition 46 . and failed to overthrow the governments in Egypt. I considered the development of Al Qa’ida’s affiliation over a period of time from 1991 until 2005 (Table 1). Despite the popularity of this argument. I determined the year that the group first received or conveyed assistance to Al Qa’ida. I have classified the affiliation according to its current state. and Saudi Arabia. surprising. It is important to keep in mind. that a cumulative effect occurs. and Abu Sayyaf.Chapter 4: Universe of Cases I. 2001. the evidence indicates that Al Qa’ida’s strategy is not new: it has operated like an international franchise by providing financial and logistical support. lost several of its top officials. who consolidated relations with Al Qa’ida. Since 2001. Jordan. therefore. I also observed noticeable patterns while developing my universe of cases. To address this concern. In many instances. Al Qa’ida’s Affiliates: An Evolving Network Although the purpose of my study was to investigate Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. First. who diluted relations with Al Qa’ida). Al Qa’ida was deprived of a “state within a state” in Afghanistan. Al Qa’ida has transformed into an international enterprise with like-minded local representatives loosely connected to a central ideological base (Riedel 2007). since a group does not merely affiliate with Al Qa’ida and then sever all relations. They contend that after September 11.

Turabi and Bin Laden engaged in a convenient symbiotic relationship. 47 . Tajikistan. effectively put him under house arrest. Kashmir and Iraq. Chechnya. Bin Laden had the opportunity to interact with other terrorist units to expand Al Qa’ida’s reach. Somalia. Bin Laden could operate freely in the Sudan and in return he would invest millions of dollars in the desperately poor country. Algeria. This relationship strengthened throughout the nineties. Yemen. during his time in the Sudan. the first US troops were dispatched to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield. where he was warmly welcomed by Hassan al-Turabi. this observation is not nearly as stunning. when one considers the historical context. the leader of the National Islamic Front. Al Qa’ida first seriously affiliated with other terrorist organizations in 1991. 1990. Al Qa’ida linked up with Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) and Abu Sayyaf. Bin Laden organized training camps at which hundred of his followers were tutored in paramilitary tactics as revealed in the previous chapter. However. tired of Bin Laden’s critiques. As a result of the Sudanese government’s hospitality and support. These operatives also offered advice to their Somali counterparts on how to set up social services for the local population. he departed for the Sudan. oil rich state of Kuwait on August 1. On August 7. After Hussein’s forces invaded the small. While Bin Laden was situated in the Sudan. terrorist groups operating in such diverse places as the Philippines. 1990. Eritrea. Bin Laden perceived this intrusion as part of a larger Western design to dominate the whole Arab and Muslim world. Consequently. After the Saudi government. this was as perturbing and foreboding an event as the Russian invasion of Afghanistan that had occurred a decade earlier. Bin Laden had immediately volunteered his services and those of his holy volunteers but the Saudis did not take this offer seriously (Gunaratna 2002). For Bin Laden. thereby threatening the security of Saudi Arabia. He was able to send Al Qa’ida operatives to Somalia in 1991-1992 to liaise with their leaders and then help AIAI organize itself militarily. In this year. for years.

Soon thereafter. Instead. which sought to pursue a more fundamentalist battle against the Philippine authorities than the Moro National Liberation Front. would next march into Southern Sudan and then into other Islamic countries(Gunaratna 2002). Bin Laden exploited a cache of trustworthy warriors who he could rely upon to cultivate his vision of global jihad. to invest in the country’s moribund financial institutions. he attempted to centralize the core of Al Qa’ida’s operations and develop its human resources as discussed in Chapter 1. While occupied with these financial negotiations. Bin Laden focused his efforts on other missions like determining how best to attack US forces in Somalia. Bin Laden convinced several Saudi businessmen. Thus. After associating with these groups. including some of his brothers. he persuaded his brother in law. while residing in the Sudan. From 1991 to 1996. many of whom would be employed by these Arabic executives. Muhammad Jamal Khalifah to support the Abu Sayyaf Group. if successful. their parent organization. Al Qa’ida was preoccupied with other pursuits and could not devote energy towards developing such high-maintenance relations. Concurrently. the US military. between a thousand and two thousand 48 . Moreover. he broadcast a fatwa in which he avowed that having already taken over the Persian Gulf area and now encroaching upon Somalia. By 1991.Bin Laden ramped up his assistance to the Somali terrorists after the Bush administration sent US peacekeeping troops to Somalia in 2002. Moreover a number of ASG members had fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Rogers 2004). where their transactions would go unnoticed and in its infrastructure projects. my data indicates that Al Qa’ida did not engage another affiliate until 1996. Bin Laden probably saw the struggle in the Philippines as an opportunity to open a second front for his organization without becoming embroiled in the conflicts in the Middle East. which would elicit support from the Sudanese population.

Given this stable and secure environment. Bin Laden began to focus. Thus. Al Qa’ida engaged 15 of its 21 affiliates. Bin Laden issued a slew of radical pronouncements beginning with a call to arms against the continued American military presence in Arabia on August 23. Having obtained sanctuary. To 49 . no affiliations were observed between 1991 and 1996. attracting Muslim militants to a country. Bin Laden knew Afghanistan well and greatly admired the Taliban religious warriors who had taken control over much of the country. which became the modern world’s first jihadist state. As a result of this multitude of tasks. Bin Laden had set up a number of military camps in the north. on widening his movement. During this time. Finally. once again. Bin Laden and his cadre were engrossed by other concerns and did not focus on developing external relations with other jihadist groups. it is not surprising that between 1996 and 2001. Bin Laden was able to function unimpeded. who left the Sudan to return to his familiar stamping grounds in Afghanistan. He also sought to acquire weapons for these militants. L. Mullah Muhammad Omar sent a delegation to assure Bin Laden that the Taliban would be honored to protect him because of his role in the jihad against the Soviets (Gunaratna 2002). Upon Bin Laden’s arrival. Bergen 2001). He turned his attention to exotic weaponry and weapons of mass destruction.members of Al Qa’ida converged upon the Sudan and within three years. From Afghanistan. intense pressure had been placed on the Sudanese government by the United States and Egypt to expel Bin Laden. a multi-volume series detailing everything the Afghan Arabs had learned in the jihad against the Soviets. By 1996. hundreds of Afghan Arabs engaged in fighting in Bosnia (P. Simultaneously some members of the group undertook the massive task of writing the Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad. These communiqués served to attract the attention of various local jihadist leaders. 1996.

” Based on this quotation. the secretary general of the Pakistani religious party known as the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam. one observes a surge of new Al Qa’ida affiliates. the establishment of the IIF can clearly be interpreted as an effort by Al Qa’ida to expand its battle against Western influence. In addition to Bin Laden and EIJ’s Ayman al-Zawahiri. Amidst this background. this is due to the fact that in 1998 Bin Laden created the International Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders (IIF). 50 . in the years before the September 11. Later the IIF was expanded to include the Pakistani jihadist organizations Lashkar-eTaiba. Laden convened conferences of several Afghan ulema. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. In addition to its formal alliances through the IIF. he probably did not rely extensively upon the leaders of these organizations. he was not a religious scholar. he needed the backing of religious scholars and the clerical cover to call for a real global jihad. While Bin Laden was well read in the Koran. we hereby give all Muslims the following judgment: the judgment to kill and fight Americans and their allies. However. “in order to obey the Almighty. The clerics who Bin Laden summoned also had acquaintances with jihadists beyond Afghanistan who they could introduce to Bin Laden (Bergen 2001). 2001 attacks.supplement this strategy. an anti-Shia sectarian party (Carafano 2005). According to this Word Islamic Front manifesto. These sequential steps were part of Bin Laden’s plan to expand his multi-national terrorist campaign. in 1998. is an obligation for every Muslim who is able to do so in any country. members included the head of the violent faction of Egypt’s Gama’a al Islamiyya. before 2001. Thus. and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. In part. and the head of Bangladesh’s Jihad Movement. whether civilians or military. Bin Laden’s organization nurtured ties with a variety of other armed jihadist groups.

characterized by semiautonomous cells that are horizontally and vertically integrated into the centralized command structure. Al Qa’ida’s training camps. operational bases. are built up through mergers. and collaborations (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2006). Aggressive US and allied efforts impeded Al Qa’ida’s ability to do anything. Firstly. After 2001. 51 . infrastructure. Bin Laden had to engineer a colossal transformation of his organization from a more or less unitary. Groups such as the Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat and Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad were brought further into Al Qa’ida’s folds. after 2001 and the onset of the Global War on Terror. Osama Bin Laden was compelled to makeover his organization. complex organizations. few can deny the United States and its allies achieved progress in the first phase of the Global War on Terror.Contrary to popular belief. Al Qa’ida has not enlisted many new affiliates. There are two explanations for this observation. partnerships. Bin Laden elected to strengthen existing affiliations rather than pursue new ones. Thus. As elaborated upon in Chapter 1. and command-and-control nucleus in Afghanistan were destroyed and uprooted. Whereas before Al Qa’ida had a distinct center of gravity. temporarily crippling it. from an actual center to a virtual network) (Bruce Hoffman 2004). the dearth of new Al Qa’ida affiliates seems puzzling given what scholars perceive to be Al Qa’ida’s organizational strategy. Al Qa’ida aims to establish itself as a complex organization with a flexible structure in order to preserve control over specifically identified strategic operations while offering cells a degree of autonomy in local and regional operations. be it to plan attacks or to align with other jihadist groups.e. To more easily engineer this metamorphosis. near bureaucratic entity to a fluid movement tenuously bound by a loosely networked transnational constituency (i. after 9/11. As stated in the introduction.

Israel. However. began to instruct Zarqawi regarding tactics and specific theater-of-war concerns. Jordan. prior to 2005. Al Qa’ida has exploited the Iraqi occupation for rousing propaganda and as a recruitment tool for the global jihadist cause. Al Qa’ida now teams up with terrorist groups who can send foreign jihadists to Iraq where they conduct guerilla warfare against the America and British troops. Ayman Zawahiri. In fact. including Shias. Al Qa’ida and its affiliates can conduct attacks in countries that are venerable sources of Bin Laden’s antagonism or where an opportunity has presented itself. Lebanon.Moreover. in 2004. “Iraq’s preeminent utility has been a useful side show” – an effective means to sidetrack American military forces and divert US attention while Al Qa’ida and its affiliates make inroads and strike elsewhere. he urged Zarqawi to prepare for a precipitous American military withdrawal from Iraq. the Uzbek fighters associated with the Islamic Jihad Union have supported fighting in South Waziristan against the Pakistani government and US forces hunting Al Qa’ida fugitives (Steinberg 2008). who had become Bin Laden’s second-in command. Bruce Hoffman has suggested that for Al Qa’ida. For instance. the leader of Tawhid. and for maintaining the momentum of an Islamist victory by expanding operations into Syria. Another observable and notable trend is that the number of affiliates that Al Qa’ida enrolled has increased since the onset of the war in Iraq in 2003. Nowadays. Additionally. and Egypt (Michael 2007). Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. was responsible for developing his own strategy and operations. beheading of hostages. for establishing a post-US Islamist emirate governed by a coalition of Islamic groups. terror attacks 52 . For example. in a letter dated July 9. Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida Central Command relied more heavily and interacted more frequently with the leaders of these groups. Moreover. 2005. and lack of concern for public support. Zawahiri reprimanded al-Zarqawi for indiscriminate attacks on Shias. who had become his commanding officers. For instance.

Libya. Samuel Huntington observed that after World War II. Notable incidents conducted by or with the assistance of Al Qa’ida’s affiliates since the beginning of the Iraq war. 53 . it is interesting to consider the geographic distribution of Al Qa’ida’s affiliates (Figure 2). the 2005 bombings against London’s public transport system. II. and the 2007 terrorist attacks in Algiers (Bruce Hoffman 2004). These regions have a history of conflict with the West. Pakistan). Lebanon. The smaller clusters come from Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa. over forty percent of the 21 affiliates are based in the Core Arab states (Iraq. The warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990 when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by Saddam Hussein The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling humiliated and resentful of the West’s military presence in the Persian Gulf (Huntington 1992). One can anticipate that the majority of affiliates would hail from the Core Arab states and Maghreb Arab states. Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism strongly manifested.around the world tripled in 2004. conflicts along the fault line between western and Arab Islamic civilizations frequently erupted. the American forces went into Lebanon. In the aftermath of this transition. and Yemen). France fought a war in Algeria and British and French forces invaded Egypt. Egypt Uzbekistan. For instance. according to statistics released by the US government’s National Counterterrorism Center. Considering the sample as a whole. Later. include the 2004 bombings against Madrid’s commuter trains. Tunisia) and Southern Asia (namely. the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot to detonated liquid explosive carried on board from the United Kingdom to the US and Canada. Afghanistan. Algeria. Al Qa’ida Affiliates: The Geographic Distribution Having assessed the development of Al Qa’ida’s affiliations over time. The other large clusters come from the Maghreb (Morocco. when colonial empires began to retreat.

Al Qa’ida and the Taliban could facilitate the transportation of militants moving back and forth across the borders. Karimov. These states have porous borders. they could permit leaders of these jihadist groups to establish training camps without fear of government intervention. one of the masterminds behind the assassination attempt against Uzbek President Islam A. weak security apparatuses and crisis-torn economies. He maintains that most Islamic revolutions evolve from movements for indigenous self-assertion. Thus. and leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Since 1996. all of which are in immediate proximity to Afghanistan.These struggles had a profound effect on the development of jihadist outlets. Secular prescriptions (whether nationalist or leftist) are regarded as unsuccessful European importations introduced by intellectuals exposed to French and Italian cultures. Additionally. Islam can provide a medium of cultural nationalism that is defiant and self-assuring. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan. the Taliban controlled the Afghan territory bordering Uzbekistan. whereas the religious-framed prescriptions of Arabia Islam have a thirteen century-old legacy (Ayubi 1980). fled to Afghanistan where he set up a military training camp. Tahir Yuldashev. just a few miles from the border (Luong and Weinthal 2002). Kyrgystan. Furthermore. Al Qa’ida has appealed to militants in the four neighboring former Soviet Central Asian republics. for years. and Uzbekistan. There is also a simpler explanation to account for the plethora of Al Qa’ida affiliates hailing from the Core Arab states. at the present time operatives from these organizations can assist the Al Qa’ida- 54 . Moreover. For those countries resisting foreign dominance. Tajikistan. For instance. Ayubi suggests that the general Islamic resurgence that one observes today represents a reaction to alienation and a quest for authenticity by disaffected Muslims who resent Western participation in their lands.

Conservative estimates suggest that at least several hundred North African volunteers have traveled to Iraq. affiliates from these nations are particularly desirable. In addition. Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are now believed to be in Pakistan’s rugged tribal areas. With the assistant of Al Qa’ida’s Algerian affiliates. However. under strong US diplomatic pressure. several Kashmiri separatist terrorist groups turned to Al Qa’ida for support. thousands of Muslim extremists were detained. Al Qa’ida. Separatist violence in India’s Muslim majority Jammu and Kashmir state has continued unabated since 1989. should be expected. Consequently. has helped to identify and detain extremists. President Musharraf. eager to regroup in Pakistani cities where police control was more negligible.supported insurgency in Afghanistan. Upon returning to the Maghreb. Pakistan has allowed the US military to use bases within the country. I also observed that a large percentage of the groups that merged with Al Qa’ida hailed from Pakistan (20%). This too. these groups help Al Qa’ida attack coalition troops in Afghanistan and then escape across the Pakistani frontier (Fair 2004). fighters transit through Syria. where Islamabad exercises limited authority. In the wake of these changes. quickly granted this concession in return for safe haven. offered to President Bush Pakistan’s unqualified cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Similarly. 55 . these militants can stage local campaigns due to their recently acquired front line experience (Boudali 2007). after the September 2001 attacks. and has helped to tighten the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. terrorist operatives in the Maghreb move easily across international borders. The conflict between Muslims and Hindus in the subcontinent manifests itself in the rivalry between Pakistan and India. thus.

the profound ethnic and religious diversity (including in the practice of Islam) that characterizes the area militates against the establishment of a fundamentalist hegemony by any one group. where the other major Abrahamic faiths dominate. Also. In Indonesia. a central government with even rudimentary influence has yet to emerge. the depth of its involvement with terrorists is constrained by the very disorder seen as a classical setting for terrorism. Malaysia and Brunei. the nation's continuing economic crisis. hostility from indigenous religious authorities may also impede the growth of Wahabism (Dickson 2005). in general Muslims are a minority in East Africa. Political organizations representing modernist Muslims were 56 . in which there is just enough government control and economic security to provide an adequate target for terrorist groups. and the fragility of local democracy. many Islamic organizations in Southeast Asia genuinely oppose Al Qa’ida and most are nonviolent. and two other mostly Muslim states. Despite the fact that Southeast Asia seems like a good candidate for the second front in the US campaign since it is home to the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country. Moreover. while Buddhism and Roman Catholicism are dominant respectively. In Singapore. In fact. Although Muslims represent a majority in countries like Somalia and Eritrea. There are almost no legitimate terrorist targets and terrorists themselves can be subject to extortion in largely lawless settings. Thailand.Within my sample. it has not emerged as such. while Somalia has served as a transit route for terrorists. Additionally. most visibly Al Qa’ida. and the Philippines. such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Muslims are a minority. The largest and most influential are either political parties or revivalist organizations. Indonesia. in East Africa. there were fewer groups from the Eastern African region and from the Southeast Asian region. Unlike Eastern European countries. the rise of political Islam can be linked principally to the collapse of Suharto's regime. Again. this can be easily explained.

causes havoc. and many of their leaders were imprisoned. While the relationships within the cells are tightly coupled. Although this type of arrangement allows Al Qa’ida and the merged group to consolidate their assets so that they can compete more successfully. the highest order form of equity-based engagement. Both partnerships and collaborations permit Al Qa’ida to structure itself as a complex organization. By contrast.banned from the 1950s to the 1980s. they forfeit a degree of control. Supporting local terrorist groups in this manner makes noise. Al Qa’ida achieves the ideal mix of tightly and loosely coupled systems. Al Qa’ida’s Affiliates: Mergers? Partnerships? Or Collaborations? Finally it is important to consider distribution by type of affiliation (Figure 3). the group that Al Qa’ida subsumes must be capable of completely integrating Al Qa’ida’s methods and approaches into their repertoire. This sort of arrangement is convenient when Al Qa’ida wants to spread its radical ideas and has financial resources but does not necessarily care for the local politics in the region. mergers. The preponderance of affiliations (over 70%) could be classified as partnerships or collaborations. Mergers were much less common (approximately 17%). III. Although such groups have since become a major political force in recent years. While Al 57 . were much less common. Through partnerships and collaborations. When a group merges with Al Qa’ida. Al Qaida can provide financial or logistic support to other terrorist groups with the intention of influencing their strategic activities. it is difficult to cut off centralized funding due to the complex nature of Al Qa’ida’s financial network. described in the first chapter. Additionally. and distracts the enemy while Central Command plans for more detailed attacks elsewhere. the relationships between cells and between operatives in Al Qa’ida central command are loosely coupled. more extremist forms of Islamism still remain at the fringes (Gershman 2002). Through partnership and collaborations.

to designated terrorists and terrorist organizations. Under this order. Such blocking actions are a critical tool in combating the financing of terrorism (Mayer and Price 2002). Through this measure. requiring them to take steps to prevent designated individuals and entities from continuing to fund or otherwise support terrorism. and strategies. Oftentimes. most prominently. Executive Order 13224 provides the means to disrupt the support network that funds terrorism. mergers often end up splintering as a result of differences of ideologies. designation under the UN Security Council’s 1267 Committee’s consolidated list will trigger international obligations on all member countries.Qa’ida Central Command does not usually plan operations. which the merged group must obey. they may split their own ranks and upset surrounding communities. the United States government may block the assets of individuals and entities providing support. goals. Moreover. but are more interested in deposing their current government. which should be addressed when discussing mergers. In addition. the United States. operatives are estranged when Al Qa’ida takes credit for the operation and they are forced to assume a more “behind-the-scenes” role (Desouza and Hengsen 2007). financial or otherwise. Finally. There are other practical difficulties. When a group commits to jihad against the far enemy. 58 . they can “offer” tactical advice. as observed with the Zarqawi-Zawahiri letter referenced earlier. who have no interest in establishing a global Islamic caliphate. when groups officially merge with Al Qa’ida. groups that merge officially with Al Qa’ida may risk alienating the local population. For instance. supporters of terrorism are publicly identified thereby providing warning to other entities that they are prohibited from doing business with the Al Qa’ida affiliate (Uruena 2008). they often become the targets of counterterrorist offensives by foreign governments.

Al Qa’ida may be seeking to expand into other Muslim-dominated territories. since they offer increased organizational flexibility and operational reach. While in recent years. IV. several groups have announced a formal merger with Al Qa’ida. Moreover. evidence suggests that Al Qa’ida will continue to pursue such relations and will rely upon them more heavily. organizations must have the patience and resolve to work through issues. it is also important to acknowledge that organizational issues must be addressed up front when a merger is negotiated since this type of affiliation is a longterm contract. Like corporations settling a merger. 59 . while Al Qa’ida’s affiliates are concentrated in the Core Arab and Maghreb states. Al Qa’ida may have several mergers in the works that have not yet been publicly announced. Thus. such as Western Africa. provided in Chapter 6 proves. the data demonstrates that Al Qa’ida may be more likely to pursue lower-order affiliations.Given these considerations. mergers only occur when terrorist groups have developed a close relationship and realize the mutual value of working together. As the example of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. Summary of Findings Although Al Qa’ida’s policy of pursuing affiliations with local jihadist groups is not a new development.

To assess the effects of motivational factors contributing to individual terrorist's decision to affiliate with Al Qa’ida.” Each subject was rated 0-2 for each scale.” and “social network affiliation” respectively. 60 .05. when three scales were used. and social network affiliation all motivate local jihadist leaders to an extent.146E-09. in each case. one can conclude that opportunistic motives. Statistically significant differences among subjects were evaluated using a chi-squared test statistic for variation within each scale.” and "social network affiliations.0188. The chi-squared test yielded pvalues of 1.e.Chapter 5: Results of Statistical Hypothesis Testing I.” “ideological alignment. 1= secondary motivation. Based on this analysis. This analysis yielded the results contained in Table 1. each subject was rated on one of three scales: "opportunist motives.606E-06 for “opportunistic motives. All three statistics are significant with a p-value less than 0. 0. corresponding to 0= not a motivation. thus.” "ideological alignment. and 1. known or suspected terrorists). 2 = primary motivation (for a more detailed explanation regarding coding. The null hypothesis tested for each scale was that there was no difference in the frequency of incidence of each level of motational factor. although the smaller values of p for “opportunistic motives” and for “social network affiliation” suggest that these incentives are more robust. please refer to Chapter 3 on Methodology). the null hypothesis was rejected. By comparison. Data Analysis and Results for Q1: What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida’s and its pan-Islamic agenda? Data were collected on 41 individual subjects (i. ideological alignment. ideological alignment appears to be of less powerful significance as a motivating factor for local jihadist leaders.

042 for “opportunistic motives. H31 ( Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due psychosocial motives) requires further investigation. The p-value for opportunistic motives permits us to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. The p-values associated with the chi-squared test statistic were 1. and 0. Data Analysis and Results for Q2: What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible affiliates with Al Qa’ida? 61 .289E-06. Based on this analysis. However. scores 0 and 1 were combined into a single scale "not a motivation. II. was that there was no difference in the frequency of incidence of each level of motivational factor. The p-value associated with social network affiliation also allows us to reject the null hypothesis. 0.To supplement this analysis and clarify the relative impact of each incentive.” and “social network affiliation” respectively. H21 (Al Qa’ida commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to ideological motives) is rejected. social affiliations) have some influence on the decision to associate with Al Qa’ida. In contrast. the data suggests that psychosocial motive(i. This analysis produced the results recorded in Table 2.639. the effect of ideological alignment does not even reach statistical significance. It is of note that the statistical significance for social network affiliation is far less impressive than that for opportunistic motives. thereby suggesting that this particular factor is not a significant motivating variable for local jihadist leaders in this sample.” “ideological alignment. This implies that opportunism is the primary motivation among the variables considered in this study for affiliating with Al Qa’ida. H11 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to opportunistic motives) is proven.e.” The null hypothesis. tested for both scales.” while score 2 was considered as "motivation.

These included the Wilcoxon statistic (Table 4). compared to pre-merger. across all terrorists considered individually. The chi-squared test statistic was used to evaluate the overall difference in performance in each of the three categories post-versus pre-merger. as well as the simpler paired sign test (Table 5).” “Ideological. the p-value for overall leadership performance was borderline (p=0. we could not reject the null hypothesis for any category. Results are presented in Table 3. This suggests that ideological leadership performance does actually improve after a merger. which suggests that leadership performance may generally improve as well. The null hypothesis tested in this analysis is that there is no difference in each category post-merger.” and “Logisitic” on a scale of 0-3.and postmerger.and post-merger score for any category.there was no statistic difference between the pre. pre and post merger.Subjects were evaluated on their performance in each of three categories: “Operational. Additionally. Accordingto this test. The Wilcoxon statistic was negative for all groups. However. the paired signed test rejected the null hypothesis for ideology (p=0. 62 . across all terrorists considered as a group.015). Paired statistics were then applied to compare the scores for each individual terrorist. pre. The null hypothesis tested in this analysis is that there is no difference in each category post-merger.0501). thus based on this statistical test. which utilizes both the direction and magnitude of the change. which considers only the direction of change. compared to premerger.

a plot of the distribution of scores. for all three categories. shared ideological views become important. the variability among subjects in the magnitude of the changes may have affected the results. Most frequently.The results obtained through the paired sign test suggest that the direction of the change for ideological performance was significant. Moreover. however. demonstrates that each group had a similar number of “no change” results (i. there were the fewest number of negative changes post-merger. there was a tendency to improve scores post-merger. This analysis allows us to accept H32 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officer play an increasingly ideological role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida). The operational category had the largest number of “-3” results and “+3” results. after mergers with Al Qa’ida occur.e. this was clearly most prevalent and only statistically significant for the ideology category. Moreover. 63 . Generally. Figures 4-5 demonstrate that for ideological performance. a pre-post score of 0). and these swamped the overall effect. most changes were positive. for the ideological performance. however. ideological performance improved. However. Effectively what we are observing from this study’s data analysis is that while ideological concerns do not appear to be primary motivating factors for joining Al Qa’ida. Figure 6. it lets us to reject both H12 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly operational role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida) and H22 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly logistical role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida). thereby hindering us from rejecting the null hypothesis using the Wilcoxon statistic. whether they were categorized as only positive or positive plus no change. there were a few changes in the opposite direction in particular subjects that were large.

this metamorphosis of a relatively smaller. I. the leader of Al Qa’ida in Iraq announced the allegiance of the Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Call and Combat or GSPC). whereupon Ahmed Ben Bella was elected the first president of Algeria. Defense Minister Houari Boumedienne staged a bloodless coup to remove Ben Bella from power. Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb was born. less powerful Algerian indigenous assembly of terrorists would not have been possible without the leadership of Abdelmalek Droukdal. in 1965. the new organization radically changed its tactics: the series of suicide bombings and violent attacks executed in 2007 by Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operatives demonstrated this strategic evolution. the only remaining armed terrorist group in Algeria. After the merger of the GSPC with Al Qa’ida. 2006. He then adopted an 64 . to Al Qa’ida. Algeria achieved independence from France in 1962. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. However. The Origins of Islamic Violence in Algeria after the War of Independence The GSPC was founded with a regional focus: it sought to establish an Islamic state in Algeria and rejected the legitimacy of secular democratic governance. Three months later. While the first official communiqué of the GSPC appeared in September 1998. Abdelmalek Droukdal served as the commanding officer of Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb region and directed the internationalization of the former GSPC's war in order to revitalize a movement that was slowly dying in Algeria. However. He accomplished this revitalization and expansion of goals and activities by providing compelling ideological leadership and by organizing sophisticated public relations and media campaign both locally and globally.Chapter 6: Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb and Abdelmalek Droukdal – A Well Executed Merger On September 11. the Islamic movement in Algeria originated in the 1960s.

However. This socialist government's repressive secularism and one party rule were oppressive for many people in Algeria and helped fuel a fundamentalist backlash when Islamic leaders branded the government as “a band of atheists” and called for a return to an Islamic government (Johnson 2006). socialist political system. the weak alliance between the secular and religious groups (the Ulama and the academic elite who led the liberation movement against the French) collapsed. which he codified in the Algerian constitution in 1976. Mustapha Bouyali. the FIS was a political organization. in response to the dictatorial and exclusionary policies proffered by the Socialist party. directed by Abdallah Djaballah. the Salvation Islamic Front (FIS) was formed. Before the independence. under Boumedienne’s chosen successor Colonel Chadli Benjedid the right to establish political parties was accorded in Algeria and with this decision. The FIS became popular amongst the Algerian population who supported the group financially and politically. II. disgruntled by the failure of Socialist economic policies.authoritarian. Unlike the MAIA. Thus. a fundamental Islamic preacher established the Armed Islamic Algeria Movement (MAIA) in 1982 to establish an Islamic state. one-party. nationalist. not an armed group that sought to reverse the economic decline in Algeria by implementing Sharia. Islamic religious law. and maintained an affirmative orientation towards Western learning and culture. 65 . In 1991. The Birth of the Salvation Islamic Front In 1989. The MAIA sought to resolve the social and economic injustices that had emerged in Algeria by forcible means if necessary (Johnson 2006). during the 1970s. the fundamentalist Islamic movement became increasingly radicalized in response to President Boudemedienne’s abortive leftward shift in economic and cultural policies. the Algerian Islamic movement was centrist. This political platform resonated with the Algerians.

Many Islamists became increasingly interested in radical approaches. The Beginnings of the GIA and the Onset of an Epoch of Violence As the new regime predicted. less militant Muslim clerics and political leaders whom it designated heretics. After subsequent leadership transitions. which would divide and alienate the FIS’s many Algerian supporters. He repelled most members of the GIA when he issued a fatwa condemning the entire Muslim population of 66 . The GIA was formed from a collection of Algerian militant groups who had been executing a series of significant military operations against government targets in an attempt to overthrow the secular government in Algeria. III. which lasted until his violent death in February 2002. halted the electoral process. Antar Zouabri became the head of the GIA on July 18. 1996. several Islamists became disenchanted with the political process and defected from the FIS to form armed splinter groups. He was an illiterate criminal and his reign. The GIA was responsible for the murder of over 2000 schoolteachers guilty of “taming the youth” and more than 100 other competing. However. A High Committee was established with Mohammed Boudiaf named as president. the secular and military elite forced Benjedid's resignation. The new regime calculated that the repression of the FIS would ignite a wave of extremist fundamentalist violence. with the prospect of the FIS in control of the parliament.the FIS achieved a victory in national elections. However. In an effort to racially purify the country. the GIA quickly alienated itself from other Algerian Islamic activities by adopting stringent interpretations of Islamic law. and suspended parliament. was marked by barbaric methods and attacks against entire civilian communities. GIA supreme commander Saifullah Ajffar ordered the assassination of over 90 innocent civilians and eventually forced a mass European exodus from Algeria. after the cancellation of the 1992 general elections in Algeria. it dissolved the FIS (Celso 2008). Thus.

and gendarmerie through the use of false roadblocks. Consequently. police. and Martínez 2007). these officers founded the GSPC as a military organization dedicated to the Salafist creed and the battle against the Algerian regime to restore the Caliphate and implement Sharia. the decision to establish the GPSC was the direct result of the GIA’s strategic impasse. V. a former GIA commander. clearly articulated the narrow agenda of the GSPC. and incursions on towns to steal saleable goods (Guidère 2007). he rejected the policy of terror executed by the GIA under Zouabri and enforced symbiosis with the local population. The first prominent leader of the GSPC. An Alternative Emerges: The Origins of the GSPC The GSPC was not set up as a pan-Islamic movement. the GSPC was able to amass hundred of defectors from the FIS and the GIA (Guidère 2007). IV.Algeria as “kuffar. While he preferred not to engage in force-on-force confrontations with the Algerian military to avoid depleting his cadre. Zouabri’s attacks on innocent Muslims estranged many former GIA military commanders. Bucaille. he encouraged operatives to target Algerian government officials. He depicted the Algerian government as a postcolonial lackey at war with Islam. who were left without an ideological umbrella. ambushes. However. He asserted that the GSPC sought to overthrow the government in Algiers and to install an Islamic regime in Algeria. In 1998. Hassan Hattab. and hypocrites” for “not supporting them in their struggle against the government” (Blom. apostates. However. the GSPC denounced the massacres that the GIA had committed and entered the international arena with the goal of restoring the credibility of armed groups in Algeria and attracting embittered Algerian youths for whom the ideology of Islamic guerilla war had lost its appeal. bombings. military. Fissions Form Within the GSPC 67 .

These fault-lines were exacerbated by external events that occurred soon after the founding of the GSPC. Algerians had become less tolerant to the violence of the GSPC. 2000 for members and supporters of armed groups to surrender to the authorities (Black 2007). the Algerian government implemented a law that offered amnesty to the combatants who capitulated. Although as supreme emir. Imprisonment sentences were reduced. katibats. In July 1999.The GSPC was originally organized as a loose confederation of regional divisions under a supreme emir who supervised the organization. bombing of public places. the Civil Harmony Law was adopted and overwhelmingly endorsed in a national referendum the following September 2000. This law declared that citizens not involved in massive killings. Consequently. or sexual crimes would be placed under probation for a period ranging from 3 to 5 years. Several GSPC cadres were killed or captured by Algerian security services following leads provided by rival GSPC elements (Celso 2008). A study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School determined that although the probability of defection by GSPC members was less than 10 68 . Hattab provided religious guidance. Each of the regional groups. The law set a deadline of January 13. and could even participate in the fight against the remaining active terrorist groups. controlled a territory that roughly aligned with the governments’ own military districts. The issue of whether or not to accept the terms of the Civil Harmony Law created considerable dissension within the GSPC. the organization was plagued by internal rivalry. Thus. By the end of the twentieth century. death penalty and life imprisonment were commuted to a maximum of eight years imprisonment for individuals under probation. Nevertheless. it was difficult for the local leadership to coordinate or control the activity of its fighters since attempts to communicate could result in discovery or interception by security services. the katibats were responsible for supplying and funding their own operations.

believing that it would be better to take credit for the attack and thereby imply GSPC’s collusion with Al Qa’ida. The pan-Islamists encouraged solidarity with their “brothers in Islam” (Al Qa’ida agents) while the Islamo-nationalists were preoccupied with Algerian politics and the installation of an Islamic state there. 2001 attacks were another defining moment for the GSPC. certain members of the GSPC dissented. Fifteen days after the attacks. This became a point of friction between Hattab and the younger members of the GSPC and two dominant camps emerged within the organization. It was thus effectively limited in scope by the Algerian government. on September 26. However. which resulted in the demobilization of hundreds of militants from both the GIA and the GSPC. They were devoted to regime change and preferred not to actively support the “Muslim brothers. They suggested that courting Al Qa’ida would enable the organization to maintain its relevancy and shore up declining recruitment. Members of this organization realized that a merger with Al Qa’ida could have both political and financial benefits to GSPC (Guidère 2007). They accused the Algerian secret service of executing the attack to isolate the GSPC from its popular base amongst the Algerian people and of attempting to align the existing Algerian governmental agency with the intelligence services of the United States in the Global War on Terror. the GSPC’s operational reach diminished.” This 69 . the probability of defection reached a high of 60 percent during the Civil Concord period (Gyves and Wyckloff 2006). 2001. 23 people were killed. The GSPC denied involvement. reasserting their dedication to avoiding civilian atrocities.percent before the implementation of the law. and 9 were injured in a massacre that occurred in the Algerian town of Al-Abri. The September 11. Due to this amnesty program.

the GSPC was forced to retreat from urban areas (Ellis 2004). However. Chad. the many GSPC fighters sought to engage in the struggle in Iraq. independently operated company that could focus on their own regional national agenda (Guidère 2007). Algeria. The PSI was judged to be a success by US officials and local participants. his efforts were in vain. thus. its next iteration was expanded to include Algeria. Funded by the United States State Department. the war in Iraq further exacerbated the debates that were occurring within the GSPC concerning the strategies to adopt with regards to Al Qa’ida. in July 2003. Observing the images of Iraqi soldiers and citizens humiliated by the American invaders.minority faction opposed such a merger and preferred to remain like a small. which stated that the objectives of armed conflict should be to fight the Algerian regime and not other governments. thereby joining both sides of the Sahara in a complex map of security arrangements. and Nigeria signed a co-operation agreement on counterterrorism. the organization should 70 . Chad. Mali. Although Hattab invoked the original Charter of the GSPC. Thus. implemented in November 2003. the majority of the local emirs seated on the GSPC’s shura believed that the war in Algeria was lost. the Pan Sahel Initiative consisted of training regional military units by soldiers from the US Special Forces in Niger. Hattab refused to send Algerian combatants to Iraq to battle the Americans because he predicted that doing so would deprive the GSPC of its best combatants when they joined the insurgency. Moreover. Moreover. others within the GSPC did not share this perspective. Niger. Although the GSPC was able to recover from the infighting provoked after 9/11 and aggressive counter-terror measures. and Mauritania in an effort to improve border security and counterterrorism capacity. The United States also provided support for the war on terrorism in North and West Africa and in the Sahara desert through the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). As a result of hard-hitting endeavors by these transnational partnerships.

but who would. sought to actively support the Iraqi insurgents in order to gain credibility for the GSPC.” Hassan was obliged to resign. This was the first strong sign of official will to establish a relationship between the GSPC and Al Qa’ida and the beginning of three years of efforts to prove the GSPC’s will and commitment to Al Qa’ida. The Rise of Droukdal 71 . On September 2003. the 2nd anniversary of September 11.focus on preserving the honor of the Iraqis. VI. Although he wanted to eventually establish his group as some sort of training authority. asserting his will to establish a community of Muslims dedicated to the creation of a Caliphate and calling upon GSPC members to attack all foreigners who supported the war in Iraq. he issued a communiqué of support for Al Qa'ida in which he criticized Hattab’s position and extolled bin Laden. When the shura of the GSPC voted to actively support the “Iraqi brothers. Finally. he did not yet possess an adequate network of fighters. However. Soon thereafter. Abou Ibrahim Mustapha. Nevertheless. the old guard members who espoused a nationalist orientation were expelled from the GSPC (Guidère 2007). They also believed that participation in the war in Iraq would enable the GSPC to establish connections with other jihadist groups in North Africa and introduce them to new strategies and tactics. his career was cut short when he was killed in a skirmish with the Algerian army in the Béjaïa region in June 2004 (Antil 2006). he fostered pan-Islamic solidarity and internationalism in order to reestablish a sense of unity amongst GSPC operatives. they could use the war in Iraq to attract new recruits who believed that they would be sent to Iraq after basic training in Algeria. who succeeded Hattab in 2003. He continued to make entreaties to Al Qa’ida. in fact be absorbed into the GSPC’s domestic campaign. for instance.

the GSPC could more easily recruit operatives.Upon Mustapha’s death. he hoped to study engineering. he officially joined the organization and in December 1993. As a youth. he was enthused when an officer of the FIS and a former member of the Algerian army. informants. he was assigned the mission of fabricating explosives due to his scientific background and knowledge of chemical bases and mechanical processes. After losing combatants due to the amnesty program announced by the Bouteflika regime. Thus. intelligence. the GSPC needed to achieve a certain number of visible successes to appear active and successful. Nevertheless. he went underground at the age of 23 (Guidère 2007). Droukdal realized that in order to maintain support. Born on April 20. a merger with Al Qa’ida was particularly appealing to Droukdal (Johnson 2006). Droukdal sought to provide a new focal point for his members by participating in the global jihad. Additionally. he was attracted to the FIS and actively sought to get close to its leaders. he was promoted to chief bomb maker for one of the most important GIA 72 . By affiliating with Al Qa’ida. Thus. As a member of the clandestine ranks of the FIS. In 1996. Droukdal was recognized as an exceptional student. like the majority of young Muslim students. and logisticians. Abdelmalek Droukdal immediately assumed control of the GSPC. situated near Mifan in the Blida region. the GSPC would gain access to a network of financiers. assets. the GSPC was struggling to fill its ranks with recruits. by supporting a cause that was seen to benefit the global community of Muslims. One year later. recruited him. from 1990 to 1993. Said Makhloufi. He continued to hold this role when he enlisted with the GIA from 1993 to 1996. and media specialists who could reinforce the group’s capabilities and help it lead operations. he pursued a degree in technology from the University of Blida. 1970 in the small village of Zayan. In 1992. who easily obtained his baccalaureate in 1989 in mathematics.

Somalia. Chechnya. he conducted a nuanced public relations campaign and comprehensive media reform. sought to align with other jihadist groups. Instead of concentrating media attention on local attacks. he seized to opportunity to serve as chief military sergeant for the GSPC. with his inauguration. when Hassan Hattab was forced to resign. he had not yet had any contact with Al Qa’ida (Guidère 2007). Although he served the GIA in a military capacity. VII. Upon his appointment as emir of the GSPC. one year later. he frequently issued communiqués 73 . Soon thereafter. While he was involved in planning a limited number of attacks. he was promoted to the position of supreme emir of the GSPC after Mustapha’s death. In 2001. he commenced a policy of internationalization. After Mustapha assumed power. His aspiration was to link his organization to the wider Islamist campaign as represented by Al Qa’ida in order to reinvigorate the group after government crackdowns and legislation had reduced its numbers.battalions. Droukdal’s Program: Toward Global Jihad Upon assuming power. Finally. Hattab selected Droukdal as a member of his consultative council and made him a regional commander for the GSPC. incentivized by his opportunistic desire to revive the demoralized GSPC. he was selected to command the Al-Quds Brigade (Abu Bakr alSiddiq Brigade) at the behest of the leader of the GIA (Guidère 2007). In order to accomplish this feat. he served the GSPC as an ideological figurehead. he allegedly opposed the massacres conducted by the organization in the late 1990s. he nominated Droukdal as the director of the consultative council. which had been created in 1998. He occupied this position until 2003. and the Sudan. instructing his followers in the ways of global jihad. Libya. Droukdal. Droukdal sought to inscribe the actions of the GSPC in an international context by publicizing the GSPC’s activities in Afghanistan. Thus. Thus.

In response to this event. was a reprisal of themes elucidated by Al Qa'ida. Droukdal’s media strategy became clear after the Summit of the Arab League in Algiers. Droukdal launched a magazine for the GSPC. the crisis in Iraq. 2005. Later.S. and other international themes (Guidère 2007). It included articles on Salafism. in Morocco. in Chechnya. He derided these leaders as puppets of the American government. For instance. The communiqués published in conjunction with the operation in Mauritania demonstrated Droukdal’s commitment to a pan-Islamic program and desire to indoctrinate his operatives in the ways of global jihad. a GSPC statement posted by Droukdal on the Internet defending the raid indicated that the attack was in response to U. The communiqués included messages with international themes. he issued a communiqué addressed to the leaders meeting in Algiers. The first operation undertaken by the GSPC outside its borders occurred in Mauritania in June 2005. He criticized the Arab leaders who allegedly embraced communism and capitalism and were becoming increasingly sensitive to the JudeoChristian coalition. he urged jihad as a way to defend Muslim honor. a more “global” goal. which were still committed to local initiatives. which took place from March 22-24. which was broadcast to a large audience of operatives and supporters. which was inspired by that of Al Qa’ida in Iraq.-led military exercises in northern Africa dubbed 74 . thereby promulgating Al Qa’ida’s anti-Western program. the President of the Chechen Republic in May 2004. In publishing this document. he circulated a communiqué congratulating the Chechen mujahedeen for the assassination of Ahmed Kadirov. Finally. These initiatives allowed him to transmit his message to operatives across the Maghreb region. This communiqué. Droukdal sought to align the GSPC theoretically with Al Qa’ida and express his obeisance to Bin Laden and Zarqawi (Guidère 2007). For instance.regarding international politics and events affecting the Middle East and the Maghreb.

This operation provoked the first official reaction of Al Qa'ida to the GSPC.the “Flintlock Plan” by military officials. Droukdal realized that he could encourage internationalization by amending his membership roster. including Algerian. this was the first time Al Qa’ida had congratulated another group not affiliated with their organization. 75 . Using this video. counterterrorism campaign in Africa. Furthermore.. Moreover. Mauritanian and Chadian troops. The statement also denounced the recent arrests and trials by Mauritanian authorities of dozens of Islamic extremists accused of having links to the GSPC. He began to recruit several operatives from abroad and encouraged his agents to train abroad and engage in jihadist activities in other nations in an effort to expand the GSPC’s global profile. This was the first time that Droukdal actively sought to recruit from outside the Algerian ranks. leaders from Al Qa’ida and the GSPC signed a pact of fraternity (Jebnoun 2007). One week after the attack. knowing that they had Al Qa’ida’s support. Malian. These exercises were part of a broader U. This recognition was particularly meaningful for the Algerian operatives because it made them feel more “secure” in their ventures. Shortly thereafter. Droukdal sought to encourage Maghreb jihadists to join the Algerians in their struggle. In fact.S. a long video filming the combatants who had participated in the operation was broadcast over the Internet in jihadist forums. the director of the media division of Al Qa’ida in Iraq issued a communiqué congratulating the GSPC. The communiqué ended by urging the Islamic youth throughout North Africa to join the Algerian cause (Lecocq and Schrijver 2007). Droukdal began filming all operations conducted by the GSPC and distributing these clips online in the same manner as Zarqawi (Guidère 2007). in 2005.

as evidenced by the frequency of his declarations and interchanges and his efforts to improve the 76 . he sought to centralize the GSPC’s communications. Droukdal’s leadership during this time period was primarily ideological in nature. Upon taking these hostages he promised to execute them unless the Algerian government withdrew its support for the war in Iraq. including the attack in Mauritania and the execution of the Algerian diplomats with other attacks that occurred during the same time period (including the coordinated suicide bomb attacks on London’s public transport system that occurred on July 7. each GSPC katibat possessed its own media bureau and published its own communications regarding its operations and successes within its territory. First of all. Moreover. Thus. there were numerous GSPC media outlets transmitting information simultaneously. Zarqawi signaled his complicity with the GSPC by seizing two Algerian diplomats.. During the summer of 2005. Algerian security services contributed to this information overflow by distributing false reports on the GSPC’s channels. Consequently. he sought to bracket the Algerian operations. This system enabled the GSPC to elucidate several ambiguous arguments and clarify dubious information(Gray and Stockham 2008). As a result. Droukdal launched a systematic communications reform to improve the image of the GSPC amongst Algerians and the international Islamic community and to enable him to preach pan-Islamic sermons to his operatives. Prior to this effort. he murdered the hostages. the GSPC’s communications were characterized by a general cacophony and ataxia. Those communiqués not approved by this committee could be regarded as unauthentic. 2005). When the Algerian government failed to respond.In July 2005. Droukdal proposed a system of transmitting information whereby a central media committee would transmit all communiqués. Droukdal responded by issuing a communiqué in which he thanked Zarqawi and extolled Al Qa’ida in Iraq (Guidère 2007).

2005. On December 22. Therefore. Ayman al-Zawahiri. overall his leadership performance improved during this time period. intent on ensuring that the GSPC’s membership. one cannot ignore the fact that prior to the official announcement of the merger of Al Qa’ida and the GSPC. The Announcement of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb Finally. His communiqué was particularly revelatory because it reflected the alleged changes in the official ideology of the GSPC. 2006. thereby crystallizing the relationship. Two days later. the deputy leader of Al Qa’ida. The attack involved immaculate planning: the GSPC had surveyed the location for weeks and the day before.” He spoke of the need to suppress national borders in order to establish an Islamic caliphate and urged the immediate union of the nations of North Africa under Islamic law. on the fifth anniversary of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.GSPC’s reception nationally and internationally. on September 11. Moreover. However. VIII. Droukdal personally supervised all the preparations (Moss 2008). Droukdal also directed several tactical changes to prepare his organization for international jihad. announced the merger of Al Qa’ida and the GSPC. two bombs exploded in the port de Delis. This was the first time that the GSPC had led an attack against a maritime target. could positively contribute to Al Qa’ida’s ideological appeals and combat operations. Al Qa’ida Central Command had stalled the merger for one year. he published a communiqué affirming the GSPC’s allegiance to Al Qa’ida and bin Laden. under Droukdal. a group of combatants had penetrated the highly protected port. His discourse supported pan-Islamic notions and highlighted the necessity of creating an “Islamic United States. Droukdal’s role as an ideological leader steering the GSPC’s internationalization through an assertive public relations drive continued after this announcement. It is important to note that this announcement came one year after Droukdal had made his first forays to Al Qa’ida. he expressed the 77 .

a joint venture between a Halliburton subsidiary. in December 2006. he wanted to highlight its role in global jihad. Droukdal issued another claim in which he suggested that after pledging allegiance to Islam and demonstrating his faith in Bin Laden. and the Algerian stateowned oil company. A New Organization In the months after the name change. including 78 . This change would demonstrate the solidarity of Al Qa’ida and the GSPC. IX. Droukdal and his operatives began to target foreigners who continued to support secular regimes and proselytize their culture (specifically the United States. a few recent attacks indicate otherwise. it was now time for him to change the name of his organization. The bomb attack killed an Algerian driver in a convoy transporting the workers. Spain. KBR. Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb (AQIM). Some scholars have suggested that AQIM remains sharply focused on its Kabylia strongholds despite Droukdals’s global rhetoric (Filiu 2009). For instance.sentiment that Al Qa’ida was the only group that could unite all Islamic combatants and steer the battle against the Coalition forces. however. He expressed confidence in the specific competencies and ideological underpinning of Al Qa’ida’s leadership. Zawahiri himself refused to allow the group to call itself “Al Qa’ida in Algeria” since this name seemed too “local” and did not reflect the transnational and pan-Islamic agenda of Al Qa’ida (Guidère 2007). in an elaborate roadside bombing. Approximately six months later. and France). thereby easing the qualms of his subordinates (Guidère 2007). nine of whom were wounded. Sonatrach. AQIM conducted an attack against a bus transporting employees from Brown & Root-Condor. Moreover. Droukdal expressed concern about projecting a certain image of his organization to his base as well as the international community. In changing the name of the GSPC to Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb.

Droukdal encouraged the evolution from guerilla-oriented operations such as armed assaults to terror-oriented operations such as bombings. He encouraged his operatives to executed attacks inspired by the Iraqi model. intended to galvanize combatants and attract recruits. in online jihadist forums about one month later. These recruits were then dispatched to Kashmir. detailing the fabrication of the bombs. three cars driven by suicide bombers blew up in Algiers. A lengthy film of the operation. the use of firearms plummeted while the use of explosives augmented (Gyves and Wyckloff 2006). recruit. On this day. Originally. AQIM was able to establish communities in Europe to provide money. While Droukdal’s role was primarily ideological.four Britons and one American. Iraq and training camps in the Sahel to pursue international jihad. Recent reports express fear that AQIM will be able to increased recruitment in Mauritania or Nigeria. Always attentive to public reaction. Afghanistan. and train potential terrorists. attention should be paid to the tactical changes that he implemented. One bomber drove into the guard post at the government building housing the offices of the prime minister and the Interior Ministry. and the explosions was also transmitted. the GSPC was engaged in a war of attrition whereby combatants would descend from the mountains and attack the armed forces. 2007 demonstrated Droukdal’s new tactics. Two other cars were detonated beside a police station in the east of the Algerian capital (one at the seat of Interpol and the other at the 79 . The attacks that occurred on April 11. emulated the propaganda materials of Al Qa’ida in Iraq (Jebnoun 2007). Chechnya. This video. Droukdal disclosed a communiqué. indoctrinate. As a result of Droukdal’s press campaign. the surveillance and lookout. Some specialists fear that AQIM could severely damage the energy sector in the Niger delta (Moss 2008). Under his leadership. in which AQIM admitted to the attack. However. killing at least 33 people and injuring others.

To capitalize upon his operatives’ anti-colonialist concerns. kamikaze fighters. Such spectacular attacks could also appeal to younger sympathizers (Algeria: Violence Returns 2007). he expressed a message frequently articulated by Al Qa’ida. Droukdal criticized the adoption of an anti-Islamic policy allegedly championed by the Americans in their war against terrorism. Moreover. which could allow the Western power to use petroleum in Algeria for 100 years. of the special forces of the police in Bab Ezzouar). The second justification for the attacks was the Algerian government’s military cooperation with the American forces. This also permitted AQIM officers to move from the periphery of Algeria back into its urban centers. Now. As always. an effective propaganda and selective recruitment were employed to make AQIM a formidable. Through this rhetoric. remote detonation. this method consisted of engaging in spectacular attacks with a symbolic dimension that could destabilize the regime. X. His communiqué suggested that the April 11 attacks were executed in response to a concession agreement with the United States. Droukdal was compelled to publish a communiqué to outline his intentions and defuse criticism. rigged vehicles. They also demonstrated the professionalization of AQIM’s services. Droukdal suggested that this was the beginning of a foreign occupation and deemed it necessary to combat the Western presence in Algeria. Droukdal positioned his group as the defender of the riches of Muslim countries faced with avarice and imperialism of the West. simultaneous explosions. thereby cementing the link between the two organizations (Guidère 2007). In doing so. and sustainable fighting force. These attacks utilized remote explosives and were thus less costly in human lives. Final Observations 80 .

attacks. each accompanied by a revealing and incantatory communiqué. The US invasion of Iraq and media coverage of American detention and interrogation policies lent credence to the Qa’ida narrative that 81 . and its success. when French police thwarted a series of bombings set to occur in Paris as Algerians voted on the National Charter for Peace and Reconciliation. Through his communications. he directed an ideological shift – from a philosophy based on regional preoccupations to a more internationally oriented perspective. can only be explained by highlighting Droukdal’s ideological leadership and the major shifts that he pioneered on the propaganda front. By uniting radical Islamists to attack Americana and French targets in northwestern Africa. he reflected AQIM’s international focus and the growing ratio of attacks against foreign targets into an emphasis on international issues and threats against Western countries in AQIM’s statements. He incited the organization to expand by attacking foreign targets. Droukdal advanced the goal of undermining the secular Algerian regime while damaging the interests of Western nations (Black 2007). AQIM continues to conducted several suicide attacks and roadside bombings. he effectively brought the Algerians insurgents out of isolation so they could work more closely with international Islamic networks to promote Islam. the GSPC could render itself capable of operating in the context of global jihad. Thus. most particularly French interests. The merger. After the ranks of his organization had been depleted at the turn of the twenty-first century. The most powerful French AQIM cell to date was dismantled in September 2005. which had dramatically expanded since the September 11. Droukdal recognized that by aligning itself with Al Qa’ida.To this day. Moreover. Droukdal sought to effectively straddle the divide between local and international Islamic terrorism. rather than confining itself to local activity. Droukdal recognized the global appeal of Al Qa’ida message.

82 . he successfully aligned with Al Qa’ida to co-opt and exploit local. Thus. he was able to tap into local grievances and tie them to the global jihad against the west. Having formulated an appropriate ideological stance. He saw clearly an opportunity for synergy. ready-made networks that could be internationalized.portrayed isolated American actions as a coordinated war against Islam. A current of cultural Islamization was created that has increased Al Qa’ida’s attraction. Droukdal capitalized upon these trends by highlighting the importance of solidarity among the mujahedeen in face of Western aggression against Islam. Al Qa’ida’s global ideology intersected with local anger directed at the undemocratic regime would encourage jihadists’ activity in the Maghreb.

However. In contrast. Both campaigned to overthrow the secular Egyptian government and to replace it with an Islamic regime. covertly supplying them with arms with which to defend themselves against potential attacks by Marxists or Nasserites. Asyu’. and Sohaj. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat gave the group’s members free reign. uneducated individuals from 83 . The Emergence of the GAI from the Ashes of the Muslim Brotherhood Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GAI) was formally organized as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1973 in the Upper Nile regions of Al-Minya. and denounced Al Qa’ida. GAI quickly gained strong support among the university students in both Cairo and Alexandria by recruiting mid-level leaders from the ranks of the unemployed university students who were disillusioned by Egypt’s lack of economic opportunities. in the late 1990s. Both broke with the Muslim Brotherhood over the latter’s commitment to nonviolence. two prominent Salafi jihadist groups operated in Egypt: Al-Gama’a alIslamiyya (GAI) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. and financial crackdowns during much of the 1990s. the GAI rejected the Muslim Brotherhood’s gradualist approach to change. members of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya apologized for the group’s involvement in the Sadat assassination. renounced violence. his rivals. and instead based their ideology on the principles articulated by Sayyid Qutb. However. In addition. mass arrests. Why did GAI repudiate terrorism rather than affiliate with Al Qa’ida to continue its brutal campaign? I. Qina. the Egyptian Islamic Jihad members joined forced with Al Qa’ida.Chapter 7: Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya: The Unrealized Merger In the early 1970s. an Egyptian fundamentalist writer and educator. Upon its birth. GAI recruited more indigent. Both collaborated on the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and both fell victims to the bitter campaign of state violence. Moreover.

The GAI and Egyptian Islamic Jihad allegedly cooperated in this conspiracy. Al-Rahman issued a fatwa that provided the religious justification for the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. Crackdown under Mubarak 84 . Fearing harsh repression (like that which the Muslim brotherhood has experienced under former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser). Consequently. and Lav 2006). Sheikh Omar Abdel Al–Rahman assumed the mantle as spiritual leader for the group during its infancy. AlRahman served six months in an Egyptian prison. clashes between Egyptian security forces and Islamic movements in the universities increased.the southern rural regions of Assiuet and Minya to further populate their rank and file (Keats 2002). II. As a result of his policies. including Saudi Arabia. He began rounding up several Islamic militants and placing them in jail. “A need [had] arisen for a military force for us to defend [themselves]” (Carmon. Perturbed by the rapid development and mobilization of the Salafi organizations in Egypt. He provided the moral justifications for the group’s moneymaking attacks on Christian shopkeepers and small-business owners by his issuing fatwa – religious rulings that justify actions normally outlawed by the Koran (Abdel Maguid 2003). avoiding a sterner sentence on a technicality (Keats 2002). As a result of his role in the assassination. During Al-Rahman’s time abroad. Feldner. they established a branch devoted to jihad and began to execute increasingly violent operations. The Sadat Assassination Upon returning to Egypt in 1980. III. where he found and developed financial supporters. Al-Rahman fled Egypt and toured the neighboring Arab countries. Sadat changed his political strategies to combat internal unrest in the mid 1970s. GAI leaders decided.

In Afghanistan. 85 . many GAI members continued or commenced their training in Al Qa’ida facilities in the Sudan and Afghanistan. Several were implicated in numerous plots directed against American diplomatic and military targets in the Balkans and other parts of Europe. and executions. torture. some GAI members returned to Egypt where they initiated a campaign against the influences of Western culture. Although fairly successful at curbing the number of violent attacks. like Mustafa Hamza. this crackdown further radicalized the university-educated population. such as Osama Bin Laden. who had immigrated to the United States by this time. following the Soviet withdrawal.Sadat’s successor. they trained and fought alongside al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad and other Afghan Arabs. again provided the religious justification for these attacks by arguing that tourism in Egypt fostered poor morals. a leading member of the GAI. Some. IV. and Lav 2006). they carried out a number of attacks on tourists that killed dozens of people. Al-Rahman. Hosni Mubarak began a brutal campaign against Egypt’s militant groups that lasted throughout the 1980s. Between 1992 and 1993. During these years. even worked for businesses owned by Osama bin Laden in Somalia (Carmon. During the 1990s. where they were active in the jihad against the Soviet Union. Feldner. many fighters moved on to combat the Serbian forces that were decimating Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia. many GAI members and leaders fled to Afghanistan. Campaign of Terror After the Soviet-Afghan war. and spread diseases such as AIDS (Stacher 2002). who continued to struggle under high unemployment(Gerges 2000). His methods included false arrests. Moreover.

he and nine other operatives were convicting for conspiring to destroy New York City landmarks. including the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels. Two months later. a GAI member read aloud a communiqué. signed by six of the organization's leaders. On July 5. In 1995. the group allegedly collaborated with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in a failed assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa. Yet despite his arrest. arresting thousands of suspected terrorists and executing or killing others during police raids. Al-Rahman was arrested in the United States in connection with the first World Trade Center bombing. In 1993. During a court hearing. and banks. In 1996. V. 1997. GAI announced a unilateral initiative of conciliation with the Egyptian regime. Thus. and a stop to agitation to commit attacks. the group killed 63 people at a tourist site in Luxor (including four Egyptians and 59 foreign tourists. The group bombed theaters.In 1993. when the Luxor attack occurred. This prompted some influential militants to reconsider their strategy and tactics and some GAI leaders renounced violence. Al-Rahman was arrested in the United States in connection with the first World Trade Center bombing. including the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels. Cairo clamped down on both the GAI and Egyptian Islamic Jihad even more. In September 1997. militants killed nine German tourists and their driver in front of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. Collapse of an Armed Group As a result of GAI’s campaign in the late 1990s. 36 of whom were Swiss) (Keats 2002). Ethiopia. GAI continued to attack tourists throughout the 1990s and began targeting Egyptian business establishments as well. bookstores. several GAI leaders immediately conveyed their disgust. he and nine other operatives were convicted for conspiring to destroy New York City landmarks. In 1996. which declared a halt to all armed operations within and outside Egypt. 86 .

the group split into two factions. the GAI was weakened both operationally and financially by the aftermath effects of the attack. wanted to seize power in the GAI. After the schism. Yet despite his efforts. The GAI had witnessed how the Egyptian Islamic Jihad had suffered significant setbacks because of its decision to join Al Qa’ida. It is unclear whether Taha actually agreed with bin Laden’s views. For instance. but rather by a breakaway faction (Ghadbian 2000).insisting that the operation was not executed by the GAI. moderate one. led by Rifai Ahmad Taha deplored the ceasefire as cowardly and called for a return to armed operations. more radical faction. The Luxor attack and the reports of mutilation of the victims’ bodies had sparked public repulsion at GAI. Moreover. supported non-violence and the ceasefire.” thereby becoming a signatory to the International Islamic Front. it needed a publicity boost if it was to continue functioning as a viable terrorist organization. Zawahiri's organization experienced a major upset when in 1998 Albania agreed to extradite 12 members of EIJ to Egypt 87 . he was unable to recruit many of his cadres to support Bin Laden and a minimal number joined the global jihad (Botha 2006). a Netherlands resident announced his resignation (Cohen 2003). Moreover. or simply saw the financial and organizational advantages that Al Zawahiri had reaped from making the decision to join Al Qa’ida. organized by Mustafa Hamza. In 1997. the larger. Taha signed Bin Laden’s 1998 Declaration of War against the “Jews and Crusaders. Rifai Ahmad Taha courted bin Laden by making trips to Afghanistan and even appeared sitting next to him and Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a videotape released in September 2000 that threatened US interests. while the smaller. as a result of increased governmental scrutiny. Consequently. the GAI spokesman Osama Rushdie. Therefore.

the leadership issued a statement reaffirming its commitment to end violence. We are even thinking of paying blood money to the victims” (Halawi 2002). The GAI has not conducted a terrorist attack either inside or outside Egypt since August 1998. Since this time. Reconciliation In 1999. During his interview with Asharq al-Awsat. stressed that significant differences in philosophy exist between the GAI and Al Qa’ida. most members of GAI preferred to go underground until the group regained its strength and influence rather than align with Al Qa’ida and risk further setbacks. even said the GAI owes the Egyptian people "an apology for the crimes which [the group] has committed against Egypt. Even Al-Rahman. and our aim is Islam. announced that the GAI had merged with Al Qa’ida. VI. Nageh Ibrahim. who remained the group’s spiritual leader. Ibrahim challenged Al Qa’ida’s Islamic credentials by emphasizing its dependence on violent struggle as a means to further its goals and suggested that Al Qa’ida was propagating a false definition of jihad. the case known as the “Returnees from Albania” (Aboul-Enein 2004) Consequently. agreed to this measure. In 2002. the historic leadership of the GAI has published a series of books. the group’s historic leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire. Since this time. by then the closest associate of Osama bin Laden. GAI leadership in Egypt quickly rejected this claim. in August 2006. despite widespread skepticism in Egypt and abroad about the nature of its true 88 . Karam Zuhdi. a senior leader and chief ideological theorist for the GAI. a self-proclaimed leader of the underground group. In doing so. Nevertheless." he maintained. despite their proclamations in favor of non-violence. He asserted that Al Qa’ida’s aggressive tactics have failed Muslims. known as the “Concept Correction Series” in which they renounce indiscriminate violence and extremist interpretations of Islam. “Their aim is jihad. Ayman al-Zawahiri.

evidence suggests that this choice was strategic. While they attacked Western targets. Consequently. While this decision may seem counterintuitive. VII. the GAI has concentrated its efforts on revising its former extremist worldview and distinguishing itself from Qa’ida (Zambelis 2006). politicians. GAI’s theoretical and operational priorities were the product of a literal reading of the Quranic and prophetic texts. however. which gave precedence to doctrinal correctness above all other issues. they decided to renounce violent activity rather than appeal for Al Qa’ida for assistance to continue their existence as a terrorist group. GAI members were less receptive to Al Qa’ida’s ideology of global jihad than other groups that have emerged since that time. and the media with the goal of undermining Egyptian state power. and exhibited strong anti-Western proclivities. 2006). and the economy 89 . GAI was well established and active prior to Al Qa’ida’s emergence in the international arena. the ouster of the “illegitimate” governing power. primarily to the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt (Rabasa et al. They believed that their main foe was the Egyptian state and that the near enemy was more worthy of fighting than the distant enemy. who were not already entrenched in Salafi jihadist circles. GAI interpreted their jihad much more narrowly than groups affiliated or associated with Al Qa’ida. When GAI reemerged in the early 1990s with a renewed sense of purpose after the return of its members from the Afghan jihad. they perceived their struggle as regionally confined to the Egyptian territory. Explaining the Decision not to Affiliate with Al Qa’ida The leadership of the GAI had longstanding connections with Al Qa’ida. They attacked Coptic Christians.intentions. police. banks. secular institutions. Moreover. its leaders were convinced that they could accomplish in Egypt what the mujahedeen had achieved in Afghanistan. tourists. when their group was in a state of imminent decline.

However. the relative success of the government’s security policy obligated the group to concede to what its leaders called “military defeat. when several leaders of GAI announced its cease-fire initiative. Thus. reunite the groups’ ranks. wider reading and understanding is evident in the sources on which the leadership relied to compose the revisionist books that they published (Halawi 2002). 90 .and creating the perception that the Egyptian government could not protect its citizens (Keats 2002). Reflecting on the seven years of GAI violence between 1992 and 1997. and Lav 2006) It is possible that in mid-1997. stiff sentences that included dozens of executions. Additionally. the effect of their new. even with Al Qa’ida’s backing. deaths in armed clashes. admitted that the group was in a stronger position before it started attacking the government. the security establishment facilitated meetings between the group’s leader and members in Egyptian prisons to ensure that the group honored this commitment. and prepare for a new offensive. In fact. GAI were compelled to shift strategies as a political tactic. During their time in prison.” Between arrests. after its initiative to end the violence. the groups’ leaders acquainted themselves with other schools of Islamic thought. and severe treatment in prisons and detention facilities. in the late 1990s. He attempted to rationalize this earlier aggression by suggesting that adopting violence in 1992 " was mainly a reaction to what we saw as the suppression and killing of our brothers” (Carmon. a former leader of GAI. Feldner. Osama Rushdie. the ranks of the leadership and general membership were decimated. This exceedingly severe security strategy disrupted the ranks and cohesion of GAI prompting the group’s leaders to reconsider its acts and concepts. this may have been a maneuver to buy time. by the turn of the century the group realized that it was useless to try to topple a powerful regime by force. Nevertheless.

However. The costs of executing attacks became too high and the consequences of adopting a nonviolent position seemed promising (Crenshaw 1987). nor did GAI members have any interest in targeting the “far enemy. the costs of attempting violent attacks and of these attacks failing. by definition. GAI acted on the basis of its calculation of the benefit to be gained from violent action. Thus. A constant failure to achieve its stated goals led to internal strife and its ultimate collapse as a terrorist group. terrorists groups must conduct a sequence of directed attacks that creates a sufficient sense of threat for it to be understood that the campaign will continue unless and until there is a change in state policy (Freedman 2007).” When GAI was unable to achieve its political goal through terrorism. one must note that terrorism depends on the ability to generate the appropriate level of terror and anxiety. Even with some assistance from Al Qa’ida. Terrorist organizations engage in a process of constant adaptation to the strategic environment and are apt to respond to policy-induced changes to their constraints since. GAI would not have been able to defeat the Egyptian government. the group abandoned its violent 91 .VIII. it was meant to produce a change in the Egyptian government’s political position. Accordingly. they changed their strategic tactics. Crenshaw’s description of the instrumental approach to assessing terrorist violence is useful for understanding GAI’s rationale. terrorism was a means to a political end. they lack resources. the bulk of which may be able to make a reasonable calculation that they are not a risk. which must fan out among a possibly substantial population. Final Observations For GAI. Acts of terror induce psychological effects. the consequences of adopting a nonviolent position and the probability of achieving its political goals through terrorist undertakings. GAI used terrorism to influence political behavior by devaluing the state in the eyes of its citizens. not to destroy the government’s military potential.

strategy. For GAI. terrorism was merely a means to an end and substitutes were available. GAI now appears to be concerned with carving out some political space to operate in Egypt. 92 .

the commanding officers that direct Al Qa’ida’s affiliates.Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion – Al Qa’ida’s Commanding Officers: A Skilled Management Team To understand terrorist organizations. the analysis of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb provides an example of an intelligent and shrewd local jihadist leader. While Osama bin Laden’s capture or death would be an important psychological blow to those vested in his invincibility. ideology. broad-based Al Qa’ida network augmented by affiliations with various groups has durability that will surpass his mortality. Moreover. it is necessary to examine the staff that operates at each level of the hierarchy within the system. It is naïve to focus on chief executives. like Osama bin Laden or Ayman Zawahiri or to concentrate on the suicide bombers who conduct operations. I posed the question: what motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida? I hypothesized that opportunism.e. social bonds served as a “permissive factor”). Consequently. Recent studies indicate that strategies aimed at enabling stringent police techniques and punitive military action will not succeed in deterring the Al Qa’ida suicide bombers(Atran 2003). his loosely affiliated. The data collected in this survey and analysis of Al Qa’ida’s leadership has significantly demonstrated that leaders were strongly incentivized by opportunism. In the first chapters. while social bonds facilitated the process of affiliating (i. 93 . Abdelmalek Droukdal whose desire to revive his group inspired him to associate with Al Qa’ida while the examination of Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya demonstrates why strategic calculations can rouse other organizations to eschew violence and rebuff Al Qa’ida’s forays. or social bonds could motivate local jihadist leaders to enroll in Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program. interventions may need to be focused at understanding and disrupting Al Qa’ida’s mid-level management.

competition against other rebel groups. when the costs of other forms of violence increase.Previous studies depict terrorists as rational actors seeking to maximize political goals (Lake 2003). Moreover. But what are these motives? In fact. as was the case with the GSPC (Sederberg 1995). there may be a divergence of opinion on precisely what objectives should be 94 . My data analysis and case studies support these conclusions. insurgent groups should also be perceived as rational entities that are more likely to adopt terrorist tactics when the benefits of other forms of violence decrease. it is not surprising that local jihadist group leaders have opportunistic motives for joining Al Qa’ida. groups may lose members to other terrorist groups when a competing group can put together a package of purposive goals and selective incentives that is more appealing than that of the first organization. One should consider terrorism as “one of a set of rebel tactics that is consciously selected in response to changes in funding. and counterinsurgency tactics” (Laitin and Jacob Shapiro 2008) Like individual terrorists. Conciliation programs can be a successful counter-terrorism strategy when amnesty is offered to operatives who renounce violence. popular support. wish to enhance and promote the organizations that they direct since their personal ambitions are tied to the organization’s viability (Cronin and Ludes 2004). Psychological surveys indicate that terrorists are not psychologically deviant or ideologically blinded(Sageman 2004). Counterterrorism efforts aimed at winning battles and capturing terrorist actors deplete the ranks of terrorist organizations by physically eliminating combatants. Factionalism is also common amongst terrorist organizations. organizations must attract and retain members. Leaders. Since they are rational actors. or both. In order to survive. the type of regime against which they are fighting. Within the larger understanding of a terrorist group’s political aims. in particular. the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself.

” While it is impossible to know precisely the size of Al Qa’ida due to the decentralized structure of its organization. especially in less democratic nations. including suicide bombers. In recent years. Al Qa’ida can transfer operatives to help support the local jihadist group since Al Qa’ida’s own recruitment is accelerating. 95 . When loss of membership occurs.e. when they occupy a “moral high ground”). Groups only enjoy popular support when the population believes their actions are justified under the political conditions of the country (i. Thus. making recruitment amongst these communities increasingly difficult.pursued. For example. some groups may find it beneficial to renounce violence and enter the political arena. When this occurs. transforming from an armed group into a political party is no easy feat. many groups may choose to align with Al Qa’ida to remain salient. However. combatants. like the GAI. groups may alienate the communities in which they operate by conducting particularly violent or poorly executed operations (Crenshaw 1991). security sources in Algeria said that the Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb offensive in August 2008 reflected the recruitment of scores of operatives. This divergence compels operatives to defect. and those with inside knowledge of the military and police(Gray and Stockham 2008). Al Qa’ida trained over 5. Since the 1980s. their public image shifts from well-intentioned revolutionaries to common delinquents. Thus. Al Qa’ida probably has several thousand members and associates. Recruiters for Al Qa’ida reportedly told researchers that volunteers were “beating down their doors” to join (Atran 2004). Finally. Al Qa’ida’s recruitment has picked up in 30-40 countries. Al Qa’ida can easily dispatch a few combatants to assist local groups in desperate need of increased membership and expertise.000 militants in camps in Afghanistan. Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida’s elite cadre have convinced many volunteers to fulfill the duty of jihad and to thus respond to “the call of Allah.

Al Qa’ida raises awareness amongst Muslims of the grievances that gave rise to its birth. Al Qa’ida has substantially promoted and publicized its image throughout the globe. These journalists present Al Qa’ida to the outside world in a supportive manner.” To supplement recruitment. depicting its operatives as “freedom fighters. the Muslim warriors of the crusader period) by establishing a territorial base for Islam and by protecting those who are oppressed by foreign domination(Henzel 2005). they are perceived as legitimate actors. Before joining forces with Al Qa’ida. In fact. For instance. which produces the professional tapes and promotional film clips disseminated throughout the Arab and Western world. However. as discussed in Chapter 3. recruits are shown provocative photos of Iraqi women and children killed or bloodied by Western bombardment. Therefore.e. By aligning with Al Qa’ida. Al Qa’ida also selects sympathetic journalists to whom it grants interviews (Schweitzer 2008). To complement this strategy. of coalition soldiers shooting wounded insurgents inside a mosque. many terrorist groups are compared to criminal gangs. primarily by means of the Qatari television station al-Jazeera. striving for global jihad. Al Qa’ida established a communications committee to promote this representation through a well-executed publicity campaign. Bin Laden has created a company called al-Sahab. their social status is enhanced. upon aligning with Al Qa’ida.Additionally. groups gain credibility and respect that can be effectively leveraged to increase recruitment. Al Qa’ida encourages potential operatives to follow in the footsteps of their pious predecessors (i. Through a program of propaganda and indoctrination. or of occupation forces stepping with their boots on the backs of Arabic men that have just been bound 96 . In doing so. Recognizing the powerful potential of the media. Al Qa’ida uses propaganda to foster its positive public image as the defender of Islam. Al Qa’ida is a high-value global brand that is esteemed amongst the Salafi community.

000 to $600. Al Qa’ida’s affiliates learn from Al Qa’ida how to conduct comparable propaganda campaigns in their home countries to attract and enhance their own recruitment efforts. 97 . nature of the military and intelligence services. even death. Because of that. Al Qa’ida can help groups conduct attacks. Al Qa’ida’s veterans can offer groups tactical and strategic advice.000 of Al Qa’ida seed money (Ward 2005). indoctrinated. Ansar al-Islam was started with $300. equipment. Al Qa’ida established numerous local military training facilities in Mindanao and Indonesia in the last two decades. etc. Moreover. and weapons. financial services. it effectively encourages redemption through faith and sacrifice. Such emotional narratives highlight the theme of humiliation at the hand of callous and arrogant Western powers(Hafez 2007). For example. tyrants gained dominance over the Muslims in every aspect and every land”(Calvert 2004). Al Qa’ida is infamous for providing terrorist training and for establishing sites and camps where recruits are educated. For instance. It can also offer groups information on the government. Riduan Isamuddin. Al Qa’ida also attributes Muslim societies’ “greatest misfortune and decadence to their abandonment of jihad due to the love of this world and abhorrence of death. due to its exceptional intelligence-gathering skills. Al Qa’ida can offer groups financial resources.and forced to the ground with black sacks over their faces. both alumni of the Afghan jihad. known as Muklhas. known as Hambali and Ali Gufron. Thus. Abdelmalek Droukdal certainly modeled his publicity efforts on that of Al Qa’ida and benefited from advice from Al Qa’ida’s media branch. helped Jemaah Islamiyah plan and execute the 2002 Bali bombing that killed more than 2000 people (Abuza 2003). and mentored. physical environment. According to several reports. Finally.

the results of this study suggest that most local jihadist group leaders have already established significant social bonding and networking with members of Al Qa’ida Central Command. Suicide attacks. strategies should be developed to isolate these groups from Al Qa’ida. and because such affiliations are not difficult to initiate due to the existence of prior social connections. Such missions create publicity events that effectively advertise the organization and psychologically appeal to individual needs to feel important and meaningful through membership in a “higher” movement (Atran 2003). in particular. it may be futile for counterterrorist forces to discourage local jihadist group leaders from soliciting Al Qa’ida. martyrdom operations not only produce spectacular incidents of large-scale destruction. Due to these associations. Since Al Qa’ida provides local jihadist group leaders with numerous opportunities to stimulate and expand their organizations. rather than abandon their mission. just as a conventional military organization might glamorize its heroes to inspire others to volunteer for field military actions. Moreover. social networks can be thought of as a stipulation that pre-structures and facilitates the merger process. Instead. demonstrate that the organization has a loyal and impassioned following. Efforts should ensure that the necessary resources (both human and 98 . thereby making such affiliations more problematic and risky.Conducting attacks connotes a high degree of devotion and strength to potential recruits. While not a precipitant cause for an affiliation. but also create and promote “heroes” that represent the organization. By joining Al Qa’ida. local jihadist group leaders are positioned to seek assistance from their colleagues when decline within their own organizations seems imminent. Also. local jihadist leaders are presented with appealing and cost effective opportunities to bolster their own recruitment and ensure organizational survival and their ability to achieve their political aims without abandoning arms and investigating political avenues.

stolen cars and other stolen property as well as biometric data. some suggest that AQIM’s globalization process has been impeded by the expulsion of AL Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) from Baghdad in 2008. Unilateral approaches to border control will leave a mismatch of contradictory national policies. which features a common visa policy and region-wide fingerprint or iris photography database. However. In the age of globalization. border control measures must be established to prevent the movement of terrorists and terror-related materials. Bin Laden has devoted less attention and resources to cannot be exchanged between Al Qa’ida and its weaker partner. Tom Ridge. it is necessary to treat carefully because restrictive “fortress” responses and sweeping immigrant surveillance hinder cooperation with key immigrant. Throughout the 1990s. former Secretary of Homeland Security. Thus. previous asylum applications. If groups are precluded from affiliating with Al Qa’ida. they are less likely to survive or recuperate from setbacks. This system is also used to store and disseminate information on extradition. To thwart Al Qa’ida’s connections with local jihadist groups. For instance. terrorists have learned how to make legal immigration channels and legitimate immigrant communities serve their lethal jihadist ends. and illegal migrants” (Ross 2003). communities. governments should implement a networked border monitoring and border control system. The new Schengen Information System computer database contains information on criminals on the run. thereby crippling its ability to supersede a regional dimension (Filiu 2009). weapons of mass destruction. especially Muslim. In areas like the Core Arab states and the Maghreb. A model system is that which is utilized in the European Union. portrayed US borders as “conduits for terrorists. state borders were opened to international trade flows. third-country nationals refused entry to the EU and individuals 99 . Since the Iraqi branch of Al Qa’ida suffered this setback.

and aviation security capacity (Kagwanja 2006). The United States can provide assistance to foreign governments to enhance operational capacity to tighten border controls. Future research will center on the development of predictive models based on emerging patterns among terrorist groups that align with Al Qa’ida. By understanding what function local jihadist leaders play. police training. After the merger. These predictive models could be used in order to develop strategies for a pre-emptive counter-response.subject to a European arrest warrant or under surveillance for criminal activity(One Single EU Border 2005) A system for region-wide arrests would also be useful in areas where terrorist activity is high. Future research may also focus on how alliances mature and evolve over time since this article focuses on aspects of maturity among terrorist groups who have engaged in networking with Al Qa’ida. While there were no significant patterns in the data on the operational and logistic role of the leaders profiled. counterterrorist forces can better undermine these leaders. whereby $50 million for security programs administered by the US Department of Defense was offered to East African states to provide for military training for border control and security of the coastline. an understanding might be developed of what government initiatives trigger terrorist organizations to seek partnerships with Al Qa’ida and of the strength of the alliance that materializes as a result. The second question that I sought to answer involved the type of role local jihadist leaders played within Al Qa’ida. 100 . I considered leadership roles before and after the affiliation to uncover trends. One impressive program was the East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative. etc. it appears that most leaders took on an increasingly ideological role after the merger. granted more interviews. For example. gave more speeches. the leaders issued more communiqués.

Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are tightly coupled to their operatives. and subordinate loyalty. interactive communication patterns. leader-member value agreement. The leaders of local jihadist groups develop differentiated relationships with their 101 . In contrast.To understand why this increase in evangelizing and political activity of these leaders occurs. Central to Al Qa’ida’s vision is the awakening of the Muslim ummah. These groups enjoyed popularity in Somalia in the 60s due to their attempts to regain lost Somali land after independence and to their resistance to dictator. When local jihadist leaders are not interested in promoting this agenda. an affiliation will not occur. For example. al-Ittihad al-Islami was established in the 1980s through the merger of Salafi groups. Siad Barre. state. one must consider the philosophy and ambitions of local jihadist groups compared to Al Qa’ida. effective influence tactics. Consequently. a high degree of decision influence. The roots of most of the terrorist networks included in this study can be traced to geographically separate. Al Qa’ida conceives its resistance as a single. as was the case with the GAI. the worldwide community of believers(Sutton and Vertigans 2006). an ideology that was widely unpopular in the country in previous years (West 2006). As mentioned in earlier chapters. The dyadic relationship between these leaders and their followers is characterized by high quality leader-member exchange resulting from frequent communication. Although Bin Laden wants to align with local militant groups with country-specific grievances to increase his global reach and influence. they gained the support of the Somali people through nationalist causes more than through a common affinity for Salafism. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are uniquely positioned to persuade uncommitted followers that Al Qa’ida has a better ideology. ethno-religious struggles. and regional concerns. unified struggle that transcends local. he demands that his commanding officers convince their operatives to adopt and accept Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program.

When the security situation does not permit direct communications. In addition to accepting Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program. Valuable insights can be gained by considering the role that managers play when two companies merge in order to understand the role that Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play in mitigating culture shock and encouraging integration. Because they know their audience well. rhetoric. For instance. the GSPC was encouraged to engage in suicide and arson attacks(Guidère 2007). in which they clarify their vision. as Droukdal did on numerous occasions. culture shock is inevitable. In doing so. When a group first affiliates with Al Qa’ida. through their ideological operations. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers can ground their message in the narrative elements most likely to resonate with this target group. due to their close relationship with operatives. Moreover. followers trust their leaders and can be persuaded to engage in activities that they otherwise would not and can be encouraged to move beyond their own self-interest to focus on larger mutual interests(Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). operatives must also integrate new tactics and strategies into their repertoire. Based on these motivational communications. and interviews. rather than using an average leadership style. and spin. Due to such high quality leader-member exchange. speeches. Like Al 102 .rapports. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers can convince their operatives to integrate their previous regional ambitions with a wider transnational Islamic agenda. they can apply effective message management. Thus. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers correspond with their cohorts through communiqués. they subordinate their radical group to Al Qa’ida’s strategic goals and move their localized Islamic resistance beyond sovereign state boundaries to transcend provincial frames of reference. followers are encouraged to take personal initiative and exercise personal leadership to make their unit more effective.

finally acceptance occurs. Both transition managers and Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers must be skilled in relinquishing and helping others relinquish past values and practices that are not in tune with the current. shared vision of future organizational arrangements (Marks and Mirvis 2000). Droukdal issued a communiqué explaining and justifying this repositioning. one of the most common difficulties that arise during the merger is “cultural differences. transition managers must make the case for integration to large numbers of employees. mergers represent sudden. Helen Kubler-Ross’s four stages of bereavement or 103 .” For example.Qa’ida’s commanding officers. When corporate mergers occur. The threat to old corporate values and organizational lifestyle leaves organizational members in a state of defensiveness accentuated by low levels of trust within the institution. These are identical to Dr. patterned. Employees’ reactions most often pass through four distinct stages. For Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers and corporate transition managers. In addition. and shared. Although some of the groups that Al Qa’ida merges with have less than five hundred operatives. the burden of responsibility still rests on the commanding officers to assuage their followers after the affiliation with Al Qa’ida commences. This can only be achieved by providing ideological guidance through leadermember exchanges and through public communications and appearances. a corporation may encourage teamwork while the venture it subsumes may be more oriented towards individual initiatives. They commence with disbelief and denial and pass into anger and then rage and resentment. Soon after the GSPC announced its merger with Al Qa’ida. often accompanied by frustration and depression. next emotional bargaining begins. major change and generate a great deal of uncertainty due to the fact that organizational cultures are underpinned by deep assumptions that are constant. transition mangers assume full-time responsibility and accountability for making integration work.

promote. optimism. What the operative grapples with is akin to the “death” of the previous organization and the letting go of this relationship (Cartwright and Cooper 1990). When a merger occurs. A wide range of factors affect organizational change as produced during a merger.grief. and support necessary changes in behaviors and culture to successfully realize the post-combination organization. and desired end state. and a sense that the future will be better than the past through their speeches and other outreach activities. they should clarify critical success factors for the merger. 104 . Finally. and address inconsistencies between the espoused operating principles and actual management of change. like Droukdal. Communication should be their major priority throughout the merger process. Leaders hoping to initiative organizational change and general follower acceptance face a daunting task. transition managers (and Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers) must define the new “combination” goals. Leaders. Effective leaders possess powerful persuasive personal characteristics and execute actions designed to change internal organizational culture and substance. anticipate the impact of change. They must assuage their followers’ fears and convince them of the saliency and relevance of the new program through constant communication. Finally. These initiatives can only be achieved by assuming an ideological role (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy 2006). 1997). successfully promote change by implementing and campaigning for a unique vision of the organization through a publicity campaign. Moreover. leadership can be viewed as the art of mobilizing others to want to struggle for shared aspirations (Covin et al. It is their responsibility to define. they must inspire hope. principles. they should serve as role models on how to “work together” for the goals of the organization. In this context.

do opt to renounce violence. Approaching communications in this manner ensures that the government avoids exacerbating feelings of alienation within Muslim communities. Counterterrorism units can use media organizations to launch global propaganda pushes that will taint the Al Qa’ida brand and make it even less attractive to local militants. like the GAI. This program should expose tension between Al Qa’ida leadership and supporters. In fact. another principle Islamist militant group in Egypt. especially religious ones. authorities can publicize the rejection of Al Qa’ida by credible local figures. Proxies must manage from affair and this sort of counter-terrorism publicity campaign. Moreover.Understanding Al Qa’ida’s commanding officer’s role as transition managers during a merger is important when designing initiatives to undermine their efforts. For 105 . The media has become a crucial battlefield in the current conflict against radical Islamic terrorism (Blanchard 2006). For instance. several leaders of GAI and Al-Jihad al-Islami. counterterrorist units should channel messages through volunteers in Internet forums(Brachman and McCants 2006). My data indicates that these commanding officers are leading Al Qa’ida’s growing media offensive. have taken steps to promote peaceful co-existence with the government and society(Gunaratna and Ali 2009). It is important to remember that some groups. messaging should refute the imputation of malign Western intention in the Muslim world and undermine the notion that terrorism is authentically Islamic. Such propaganda will appeal to communities anxious to retain their cultural heritage and religious integrity. Thus. government communications strategy should build an attractive alternative to the Al Qa’ida worldview by appealing to a sense of deracinated nationalism. Counterterrorist forces can also harness the power of the “Shayma effect” (which refers to an incident where an Egyptian schoolgirl was killed in a jihadist attack) by broadcasting images off jihadist attacks that have killed Muslim children. For example.

a struggle for survival. courage and commitment in countering al-Qaida propaganda and recruitment activity. Our government should also realize this truism. Ayman Al Zawahiri acknowledges that the struggle between the secular governments in the West and the militant jihadists of Al Qa’ida is a “battle of ideologies. and a war with no truce” (Payne 2009). This study indicates that Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are playing an increasingly ideological role. Moreover. Salafi and Islamist communities in London have consistently demonstrated skill. The leaders of the Western world should follow suit. The collapse of Al Qa’ida’s propaganda operations will also cause the Arab media to move towards more coverage of the legitimate Iraqi government. 106 .instance. Ed Husain and Shiraz Maher were two young British Muslims who became involved with radical Islamist politics with Hizb ut-Tahir before renouncing their affiliation and speaking out publicly about the dangers of intolerant Islamism (MacEoin 2007). along with their PCS and data files. the government should continue to capture Al Qa’ida news and production staff.

2009].BIBLIOGRAPHY: Abdel Maguid. 1st ed.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. 2003. “The Political Revival of Islam: the Case of Egypt.start. “The Reconstituted Al-Qaeda Threat in the Maghreb. Algeria: Violence Returns.HTM [Accessed January 1. P.ahram. Abuza. Basile. Youssef.mi5. Antil. Bergen. Available at: http://www. Al Qaida's Ideology. Airforce University Maxwell. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2002. Atran. The Osama bin Laden I know: an oral history of al Qaeda's leader.17049. Scott.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27: 169-185. African Research Bulletin (23): 17045 . “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya. Available at: http://acpss.” Terrorism Monitor 5(2): 7-12. “Egypt's Gama'ah Islamiyah: The Turnabout and its Ramifications. 2009]. Available at: http://www. Wahid. About START. 107 . Aboul-Enein. 2003.” The Washington Quarterly 27(3): 67-90. Ayubi. Atran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies: 481-499. Nazih.umd. Andrew. “Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing. Mark. Alain. Bergen. The Threats. 2007. 1980.: inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden. Peter.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25(2): 169-200. Black.html [Accessed May 14. Holy war. 2004. Free Press. Zachary.” Politique Étrangère 3.” Science 299(5612): [Accessed May 14. Bergen. 2007. 2003. 2006. 2009]. 2001. Scott. Inc. Inc. L. New York: Free Press. 2004. Ayman Al-Zawahiri: The Ideologue of Modern Islamic Militancy. 2006. National Consortium for the Study of terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “L’Afrique et la «Guerre Contre la Terreur».uk/output/al-qaidasideology. Holy” Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism.

” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29(4): 309-321. Amelie. 2004. and William McCants. “Leadership Style and Post-Merger Satisfaction. Laetitia Bucaille. The Enigma of Islamist Violence. 1997.” British Journal of Management 1(2): 65-76. “Stealing Al Qaeda's Playbook. p. 2009]. and Louis Martínez. 1991.: The Heritage Foundation. Y. Brachman. Carafano. J. Boudali. “Promoting Freedom and Democracy: Fighting the War of Ideas Against Islamic Terrorism. Anthony.” Comparative Strategy 22(3): 207-221. Cohen.Blanchard. Anneli.” Journal of Strategic Studies 10(4): 13-31.” In 2005 Index of Economic Freedom. 2003. 2005. Crenshaw.” International Security 31(1): 7-48. John. “Al Qaeda in the Maghreb: The" Newest" Front in the War on Terror. “How Terrorism Declines. 2007. “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches. Christopher. “How Al-Qaida ends: The decline and demise of terrorist groups. and Cary Cooper. and D Lav.C. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Cronin.” Orbis 48(1): 29-41. Martha. Washington. 2006. The Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological Reversal. 2006. “The Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on People at Work: Existing Research and 2006.” Terrorism and political violence 3(1): 6987. 2008. Celso. Audrey. 2006. Jarret. Politics and Terrorism: An Assessment of the Origin and Threat of Terrorism in Egypt. Crenshaw.” Journal of Management Development 16(1): 22-33. “Global Terrorism and the Global Economy: Unpeaceful Coexistence. D. Botha. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad. 2007.” Mediterranean Quarterly 19(1): 80. 2006. J. 1987. 1990. Carmon. K. “The Mythic Foundations of Radical Islam. The Middle East Media Research Institute.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA30906 [Accessed February 3. 108 . “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology. Blom. Covin. Martha. L. Sue. Storming Media. Cartwright. Available at: http://memri. 11. Calvert. Ariel. Y Feldner. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.” In Al-Qaeda: An Organization to be Reckoned With. Nova Publishers. Teresa et al.

2003. John. Najib. “Hacking Networks of Terror. Washington. Joe et al. and J. D. Desouza. 2007. Audrey. “Briefing: the Pan-Sahel Initiative. 9 [Accessed December 4. Ghadbian. 2008. “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge. 2000. Fishman.” New Political Science 22(1): 77-88. 2006. Stein.” The Leadership Quarterly 6(2): 219247.” Dialogue IO 1(01): 1-14. Della Porta.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30(7): 593-613.dtic. Gershman.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618(1): 46. Dishman.. and James Ludes. Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa.” The Middle East Journal: 592-612.” Foreign Affairs 81(4): 60-74. 2000. “Using the Mistakes of al Qaeda's Franchises to Undermine Its Strategies. Available at: http://oai. 1995.: United States Institute for Peace. Christine. Brian. “Terrorism as a Strategy. “Political Islam and violence. 2008]. 2004. David. Lawrence. Stephen. 2002. “Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy. Ellis. Freedman.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27(6): 489-504. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28(3): 237-252. 2005. Diebert. Gerges. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press. 109 . and Tobin Hengsen. Fawaz. Counterterrorism Center. 2004. Dickson.” African Affairs 103(412): 459-464.. “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?. 2004. J. George B.” Government and Opposition 42(3): 314339. Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities. “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations. Chris. “Relationship-based approach to leadership: Development of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory of leadership over 25 years: Applying a multi-level multi-domain perspective. Donatella. and Mary Uhl-Bien. Kevin. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. 2005.Cronin. “The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt?: Costs and Prospects. G. 1995.” In Terrorism in Context. Fair.C. “Connectivity among Terrorist Groups: A Two Models Business Maturity Approach. 2007. R. Graen.

2009.. 2006. Henzel. and Mbin Ali. 2003.ahram. “The Clash of Civilizations?. Hoffman. “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies. Hafez. Gyves. 2008]. Halawi. Rohan. Is the Maghreb the “Next Afghanistan"?: Mapping the Radicalization of the Algerian Salafi Jihadist Movement. 2007. Trends in Terrorism. “Algerian Groupe Salafiste de la Predication et le Combat (Salafi Group for Call and Combat. “The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda. GSPC): An Operational Analysis. R. 110 .” Strategic Insights 5(8). Stockham.htm [Accessed May 19. Mohammed. “Al Qaeda. 2002. B. 2006. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: the evolution from Algerian Islamism to transnational terror.” Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22-49.” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line. “The Origins of al Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for US Strategy. Hoffman. “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism. 2004. Bruce. Harmony Database Released Documents: Al Qa'ida Goals and Structure. 2005. Available at: http://weekly. Gunaratna.” The Washington Quarterly 27(3): 91-100. Columbia University Press.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26(6): 429-442. 2002.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27(4): 549-560.” Terrorism and Political Violence 19: 95-115. D. Inside Terrorism. and Chris Wyckloff. Jebnoun. 2008. Gunaratna. Huntington. Al-Qaïda à la Conquête du Maghreb : Le Terrorisme aux Portes de l'Europe. “Time for a Historic Reconciliation?. Christopher.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32(4): 277-291. Guidère. Gunaratna. Georgetown University: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. H. Columbia University Press. and E. 2004. Bruce. Available at: http://ctc.usma. Editions du Rocher.Gray. 2nd ed. Jailan. Rohan. Samuel. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror.” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 2(4): 091-097. Combating Terrorism Center: . 2009]. “De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight.” Parameters 35(1): 69-80.asp [Accessed December 6. 2007. Noureddine. 2007. 1992. Mathieu. and Future Potentialities: An Assessment.

Sean. B. A. Marie H.L. and Jacob Shapiro. 2007.” : 73. and Neal M. “In the Spotlight: Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya . “Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25(1): 141-166. “Complexity theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining complex leadership. Langdon. Anthony.” British Journal of Management 17(S1): S81-S103. “Looking for the Pattern: Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia--The Genealogy of a Terror Network.Johnson. Kalic.” Dialogue IO 1(01): 15-29. The Hijacking of British Islam.. Economic Development. J.” Emergence 5(1): 54-76. Laitin. and Mary Uhl-Bien. Ashkanasy.M. “New friends. Economic. 2009].org/terrorism/algamaa. Fort Leavenworth. 2006. 2003. W. Keats. M. 2005. 2003. Lake. Available at: http://www. D.cdi.” Terrorism. Lecocq. “Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy Makers. Russ. Luong. old strategies. 2006. Schrijver. 2007.” Foreign Affairs 81(2): 61-70. Smith. Jones. and Organizational Sources of Terrorism. 2002. “The Impact of Leadership and Change Management Strategy on Organizational Culture and Individual Acceptance of Change during a Merger. Denis. Wells.” Journal of Public and International Affairs 15. Marion..” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26(6): 443-457. and P. L. “The Shadow of Muhammad: Developing a Charismatic Leadership Model for the Islamic World. Weeding. 2004. and M. 2006. “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. and Political Openness: 209. David.” Institute for Security Studies. Sarapu. “An Introduction to a Special Issue of Strategic Insights: Analyses of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) ..” Strategic Insights 5(8). Kansas: Combat Studies Institute.Islamic Group.” Center for Defense Information. and Erika Weinthal. 2008.cfm [Accessed May 19. 2003.. Combating a Modern Hydra Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism. new fears in Central Asia. Kagwanja.R. 2002. and M. “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front. African Security Review 15(3). Kavanagh. Pauline. “The Political. Peter. Kostrzebski. 111 . David. 2002. Thomas H. E. Policy Exchange. MacEoin.

Kenneth. McAllister. Marks.” Riedel. Bruce. 2003. “Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda.” Deviant Behavior 24(4): 405-424. and Kevin Price. Pedahzur. 2008. Bruce. 2007.” Foreign Affairs 86(3): 24-40. 2009. Angel et al. and Alliances: Creating an Effective Transition Structure.Marion. “Unilateral presidential powers: Significant executive orders. Shaul.euractiv. A. [Accessed May 18. “The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. One Single EU Border. “Al Qaeda Strikes Back. E.Emergence. Payne. 2009]. 2004. and Phillip Available at: http://www.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28(4): 275-293. The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe. Marion. “In Algeria. Mishal. Sprinzak.. “Beyond Al Qaeda: Part 2. Denny. “Leadership in complex organizations. 2005. 112 . Weinberg. Michael.iht. 2005.” Defense Studies 7(3): 338-357. and Maoz Rosenthal. and Mary Uhl-Bien.” Terrorism and Political Violence 15(1): 171-184. Russ. 2002. 2001.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27(4): 297-319.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32(2): 367-386. 2007. and L. A. 2006. and Terror. Ideology. Kenneth. and Mary Uhl-Bien. “Managing Mergers.” International Herald Tribune. Russ.” Emergence 5(1): 54-76. “Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations. Michael. 2006. Mitchell. Acquisitions. 1949-99. 2009]. insurgents gain a lifeline from Al Qaeda . Rabasa. “The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32(2): 109-128. “Altruism and fatalism: The characteristics of Palestinian suicide terrorists.” Organizational Dynamics 28(3): 35-47. Moss. 2003. “ Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm: Demythologizing the Network. M. George. Mayer..php?page=2 [Accessed March 17. Post.” The Leadership Quarterly 12(4): 389-418. 2000. “Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership . J. Euractiv. and L. Available at: http://www.

Peter. Sandler. Understanding Terror Networks.Riedel. Sutton. 2008. “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?. “Islamic "New Social Movements"? Radical Islam. Securitizing Migration after 11 March. David. Guido. 2007. 1995. The Terrorist's Challenge: Security. and Stephen Vertigans. “A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism. 2003. Enders.” European Journal of Political Economy 20(2): 301-316.” The Middle East Journal: 415-432. Jessica. Marc. 2004.. and W. 2007. Bruce. 2008. 2002. James. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Steinberg. 2002. 2008. 2004.” The Washington Quarterly 25(3): 97-108. Steven. 2003. Real Instituto El Cano. Stanford University: Center for International Security and Cooperation. Ronfeldt. and Nikolas Gvosdev. Control. N.” First Monday 10(3). 2004. Sageman. “Istishad as an Ideological and Practical Tool in the Hands of AlQaeda. J. The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership. Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations. Turbiville. Phillip. “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf.” Journal of Peace Research: 295-312.” Foreign Affairs 83(1): 15-21. Shapiro. 113 . Brookings Institution Press. Al-Qa'ida and Social Movement Theory. 2005.” Foreign Affairs 82(4): 27-40. T. Stacher. Marc. Sageman. Ray. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. 2008. and Future. Joint Special Operations University.” Strategic Insights. Stern. “Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat party. “Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy. Takeyh.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 11(1): 101-115. Rogers. Joshua. Yamatz.” Journal of National Defense Studies 6: 25. University of Pennsylvania Press. Schweitzer. “Protean Enemy. The. “Al Qaeda and its affiliates: A global tribe waging segmental warfare?. Ross. 2006. Efficiency. Graham. Sederberg. “An economic perspective on transnational terrorism. Ideology.

Terrorism Monitor 4: 15. Blake . 2007. 2009]. ews%5BbackPid%5D=239&no_cache=1 [Accessed January 1. Ward. West. United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center. 114 . Zambelis.” Terrorism Focus 3(35). Rene. Lawrence.” International Organizations Law Review 4(2): 321-342. “Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya's Public Relations Campaign . “International Law as Administration: The UN's 1267 sanctions Committee and the Making of the War on terror. Chris. On Charisma and Institution Building.jamestown. Osama's Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda. Vintage. 2008. Available at: http://www.” Jamestown Foundation.Uruena. Sunguta. The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. 1968. “Somalia’s ICU and Its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami. Wright. University of Chicago Press. Weber. Max. 2006. 2005.

Appendix I: List of Terrorist Groups Merger al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid walJihad) Egyptian Islamic Jihad al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Partnership Ansar al-Islam/Jund alIslam/Ansar al-Sunnah Asbat al-Ansar Taliban Islamic Jihad Union Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Lashkar-e-Taiba Tunisian Combatant Group Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Jemaah Islamiya Abu Sayyaf Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul Mujahidin Jaish-e-Mohammad al-Ittihaad al-Islami Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement Collaboration Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Yemen Islamic Jihad Aden Abyan Islamic Army Unaffiliated (Control) Al-Gama’a alIslamiyya 115 . Available at: http://www. Ned. [Accessed March 4.” The Washington Post: Parker. and Jonathan Finer. The Osama Bin Laden I Know. “President Links Qaeda of Iraq to Qaeda of 9/11. 2007. Kevin.” Operation Iraq Freedom: Official Website of the Multi-National Force . “Shadowy Trail of al-Qaida in Iraq Leader. Available at: http://www. and Rana Gargour-Sabbagh. Kathy.capture/ “Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. Paley. Blitzer. 2007.132/search?q=cache:74UX2mQ_i-0J:www. 2009]. Wolf.html [Accessed January 2. 2009].aspx?briefingslideid=309 [Accessed January 2. 2007. Rutenberg.mnfiraq. Gannon.” The Washington Post: A01. 2009]. Ellen.” The Times of London. [Accessed January “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Leader May Be in Available at: http://www. 2007.S.html [Accessed March 3. 2006b. Bergner. “Starr Reports Live from Ramadi Iraq. 2009].army. Department of Defense. 2009]. “Insurgent Leader Al-Zarqawi Killed in Iraq.defenselink. Mariam.msnbc. Kaplan. and Mark [Accessed January 3.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16576&Itemid=131 [Accessed January 2. 2009].nytimes. Available at: http://www.” New York Times. Ellen.” The Washington and Jonathan Finer.Iraq. 2006a. 2009].” Boston.” U. 2008. New York: Free Press.ece [Accessed March 4. “Maliki Aide Who Discussed Amnesty Leaves Job. “U. MNF-I Press Brief – Operational Update . Jim. Available at: http://www. Knickmeyer.125. 2009].cnn. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www. “The Mysterious Heir to al-Zarqawi .com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/02/AR2007050202036. Coalition Officials 2006. 2006. Jim.cjtf7. 2006a. 2009]. Available at: http://www.html [Accessed January 2. 2009]. Eben. Available at: http://www.pdf+khalid+almashadani&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=24&gl=us&client=firefox-a [Accessed January 2. “Masri Now Leads Iraq Al Qaeda.aspx?id=16029 [Accessed January 3. Available at: http://www. Department of Defense.S. Available at: http://transcripts. Knickmeyer. 2009]. 2006.washingtonpost.02.html [Accessed March 4. Peter L.: Senior al Qaeda in Iraq Leader Held. Karouny. Available at: http://74. Amit.” The Washington Post. “Al Qaeda in Iraq Chooses Zarqawi Successor.cfr. 2008.timesonline. and Ibon Villelabeitia. 2007.” The Situation Room.msn. Multinational Force . Pam.cnn.S. Gregory.” CNN.Iraq. 2009].washingtonpost. “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Update. Available at: Smith. DoD News Briefing.Appendix II: Sources by Terrorist Group Al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (formerly Jama'at alTawhid wal-Jihad) Benson. New Al-Qaida in Iraq Leader Reported .” Backgrounder. 2009]. 116 .com/TRANSCRIPTS/0707/18/ [Accessed March 4. Zarqawi's Mysterious Successor (aka Abu Ayub al-Masri) . Garamone.

” Time. Teslik. Available at: http://www.” Politique étrangère 3. 117 . Linda. 2002. “Ayman Muhammad Rabi’Al-Zawahiri: The Making of an Arch-Terrorist.php?storyId=12060238 [Accessed January 2. Leaving Terrorism 2009].html [Accessed April 8.” Wall Street Journal.telegraph. Alain. 2009b. 2002.00. “Al-Qaeda Founder Launches Fierce Attack on Osama bin Laden .cfr.cnn.html [Accessed March 12.17049. Egyptian Islamic Jihad. “Terrorist’s Odyssey: Saga of Dr. New York: Taylor & Available at: http://www.” National Public Radio. Available at: http://www.” The Telegraph. 2009].co. 2002.Tawfeeq. Andrew. L. Blair.” The New Yorker.S. 2006. 2008. “Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi . Ayman Al-Zawahiri Kamaa Aaraftu/Ayman Al-Zawahiri As I Knew Him. CNN Programs. Zawahiri. Blair. 2009]. Bergen. Lee Hudson.9171.html [Accessed January 14. Says al Qaeda in Iraq Leader Not Captured.cnn. 2006. African Research Bulletin (23): 17045 .” The Telegraph. Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat) Algeria: Violence Returns.” Terrorism Monitor 5(2): 7-12.html [Accessed March 2007. “Ayman al-Zawahiri. 2007. [Accessed March 11. Egyptian Islamic Jihad Al-Zayat. 2006. 2003. Cullison. Cairo: Dar AlHamrousa. Available at: http://www. Raphaeli. 2009].com/time/magazine/article/0. Available at: http://www. Higgins. “The Reconstituted Al-Qaeda Threat in the Maghreb. Nimrod. 2009]. 2007. Available at: http://www. Mansfield. 2008. Ibrahim. “Profile: Ayman [Accessed March 3.” CNN. Tore.cfr. “U. 2006. 2009a.” Council on Foreign Relations. and John Burnett. Mohammed et al. 2006. Wright. Peter. A. David.npr.1187180.. “The Rebellion Within. 2009]. Ayman Al Zawahiri. Laura. Available at: http://www. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. TLG Antil. Available at: http://www. 2005.time. The Al Qaeda Reader.asp?id=5832 [Accessed January 14.” Terrorism and Political Violence 14(4): 1-22. David. 2009].uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/4736358/Al-Qaeda-founder-launchesfierce-attack-on-Osama-bin-Laden.Council on Foreign Relations.alqaedafree/index. Hudson Available at: http://www. M. Lee. His Own Words: A Translation of the Writings of Dr.html [Accessed January 14. New York: Broadway. 2008. 2009]. “Al-Qaeda Founder Launches Fierce Attack on Osama bin Laden. Raymond.start. “L’Afrique et la «guerre contre la terreur». 2009]. Ayman al-Zawahiri. and A. “Al-Qaida in Iraq Figure in Custody : NPR.” Council on Foreign Relations. Bjorgo.

The Enigma of Islamist Violence. insurgents gain a lifeline from Al Qaeda .stm [Accessed March 5. Amelie.” Institute for Security Studies. Jebnoun. 2006.” New York Times .com/report. Available at: http://news. Now. 2007. and Chris Wyckloff. Michael. 2006. 2006. Peter. Liane Kennedy. Intelligence Brief: Al-Qaeda's New Strategy in North Africa. Laetitia Bucaille. 2009]. Gray. Jihadism Online: A Study of how Al-Qaida and Radical Islamist Groups Use the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. 118 . T. 2009].” BBC News. 2009.Blom.” Parameters 35(1): 69-80. “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies. “Algerian Groupe Salafiste de la Predication et le Combat (Salafi Group for Call and Combat. Cliff. Available at: http://www. Mekhennet. and E. “Global Jihadism After the Iraq War.nytimes.” Strategic Insights 5(8). Stockham. Squad et al. Christopher. Himeur. Thomas H. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. Lecocq. West Point Military Academy. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: the Evolution from Algerian Islamism to Transnational Terror. “Briefing: the Pan-Sahel Initiative.html?_r=1 [Accessed March 5. Ib tauris. and P.” African Affairs 103(412): 2006.php?page=2 [Accessed March 17. Power and Interest News Report. 2008. 2009].pinr.” Mediterranean Quarterly 19(1): 80.. H. 2007. Ellis. B. A. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. Filiu. and Louis Martínez. “The Local and Global Jihad of al-Qa ‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb. Kepel. Mohammed. GSPC): An Operational Analysis. Hegghammer. and D. 2007. 2004.” New York Times. Johnson. Boudali. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Moss. 2005. 2006. Anthony. Available at: http://www. “An Introduction to a Special Issue of Strategic Insights: Analyses of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) . Droukdal.php?ac=view_report&report_id=641&language_id=1 [Accessed March 5. “In Algeria. 2009].” International Herald Tribune. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad. 2007. “Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline . Is the Maghreb the “Next Afghanistan"?: Mapping the Radicalization of the Algerian Salafi Jihadist Movement. Jean Pierre. 2008. Old Strategies. “The Origins of al Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for US Strategy. Henzel.” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 2(4): 091-097. 2008. 2007.iht.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25(1): 141-166. Hanna. 2007. Rogan..” The Middle East Journal 63(2): 213-226.” Strategic Insights 5(8). “Counter-Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New Security Frontiers. “New Chief for Algeria's Islamists. Mohamed arezki. Kagwanja. Gyves. 2006. “Al Qaeda in the Maghreb: The" Newest" Front in the War on 2004. Noureddine. African Security Review 15(3). Schrijver. Georgetown University: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.” Terrorism and Political Violence 19: 95-115.” Middle East Journal 60(1): 11. Stephen. 2008. Available at: http://www. “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front. “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal. 2008. Gilles.

Yamatz. 2009]. Phillip. United States Air Force Counterproliferation 2009]. 2006b. and Carol Volk. 119 .” Counterterrorism Blog. 2009]. Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.” Terrorism Monitor 3(6). Werenfels. 2007.” Journal of National Defense Studies 6: 25. Gambil.cfm?DocumentID=2836&IssueID=56&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&ap pendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=39&issueID=56 [Accessed May 20. 2007. Sutton. Available at: http://www. Alison. and John King. and Stephen Vertigans. 2009]. Available at: http://counterterrorismblog. Felter. 2006. Available at: http://www. Al-Qa'ida and Social Movement Theory.asp?id=5862 [Accessed January 26. Boston: Harvard University 2006. 2009].php [Accessed February 27.000 Reward Announced for Ansar al-Sunnah Commander in Iraq.php [Accessed February 27. “Combating Terrorist Networks: An Evolutionary Approach. Pargeter. National Intelligence Council. Schweitzer. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Clark. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism.umd. Alison. 2007. Blake . The Failure of Political Islam.asp?id=4400 [Accessed January 23. Martínez. Gary. 2006.. and Brian Fishman. Ya Libnan. “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. John.umd. G. Available at: http://www. “$50. 2006. The Libyan Paradox. Negroponte. 2009]. 2005.” Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 12(1): [Accessed January 23. and I. Osama's Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda. Pargeter.start. Martinez. Olivier. Available at: http://yalibnan. Ansar al-Islam/Jund al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunnah Ansar al-Islam. “Libya: Reforming the Impossible?.” Mediterranean Politics 12(3): 407-413. “Islamic "New Social Movements"? Radical Islam.” Mediterranean Politics 11(2): 151-165. 2007. Steinberg. New York: Columbia Univ Press. Libyan Islamic Fighting Michael. Ward. Available at: http://www. “North African immigrants in Europe and political violence. “Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ Enemy: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Lebanon's Fatah al-Islam leadership & Organization. Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records. “In the Spotlight: The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).org/program/issue/document.cdi. Kohlmann.jamestown. 2008. Luis. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. Luis. Evan.start.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29(8): 731-747. 1996. “Libya: The Conversion of a ‘Terrorist State’. Rebecca. “Istishad as an Ideological and Practical Tool in the Hands of Al-Qaeda.” Review of African Political Economy 33(108): 219235. 2005.Roy.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 11(1): 101-115. 2006a. Joseph. Counterterrorism Center.” Center for Defense Information. Goolsby. 2007.

gov. 2009].treas.janes.” Global Politician. 2006. 2009.aei.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_T errorism_Organisations_Asbat_al-Ansar [Accessed May 19. Maclean's 115(34): 12. 2006. 2009].au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity. 2003. Available at: http://www.ertatcrg. US Department of State. Available at: http://news. 2009].investigativeproject.ciaonet. Available at: http://www. Jonathan. John. 2005. Rusty. 2005. Courting Public Opinion. al Qaida. Available at: http://www.” subs/sub5. Jonathan. Trevor.mullahomar/ [Accessed May [Accessed May Gregory. BBC.pdf+Asbat+al-Ansar+AND+leadership&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=15&gl=us&client=firefox-a [Accessed January 26.” Available at: http://www. ASIS & DSD .Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism. “Ansar al-Sunna. Rubin. 2009]. 2009]. Available at: http://209.US Department of the Treasury. Anderson Cooper. 2009].nu/archives/057937. “Description des groupes terroristes criminalisés par le Canada. and Charlie Moore.htm [Accessed May 19.globalsecurity.html [Accessed May [Accessed March [Accessed February 28. Ansar Al-Islam: Postmortem or Prelude to More Attacks? The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “Salafi-jihadism in Lebanon.html [Accessed February 27. “Army of Ansar al-Sunnah Website Update. 2004. Available at: http://mypetjawa. 2009]. Available at: [Accessed February 27.” The Jawa Report: . 2009]. 2009]. 2002. “Mullah Krekar Profile.php [Accessed January 26.85. “Ansar al-Islam: Back in Iraq .com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/09/09/pakistan. 2004.132/search? . Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www. Asbat al-Ansar Asbat Al Ansar. 2009].html [Accessed January 26. Taliban Bergen. Press Room . “Mullah Omar in Pakistan . 2006. 2009]. Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon) .” Équipe de recherche sur le terrorism et l'antiterrorisme.Oslo court rejects mullah release. Stanley. Gomez del Prado. Michael. 2008. Gary. Pike. Treasury Designates Individual Financially Fueling Iraqi [Accessed May 19. Schanzer.” he Investigative Project on Terrorism. Available at: http://www. Gambill. Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO. Available at: http://nationalsecurity. 2009].globalpolitician. 120 . “Asbat al-Ansar .” Perspectives on World History and Current Evens. 2009]” Middle East Quarterly 11(1).stm [Accessed May 19. “Ahmad Abd al-Karim al-Sadi.” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.cnn.173. 2009]. Shackleford. 2006. Available at: http://www. 2009]. Available at: http://www.htm [Accessed February 28. Schanzer. 2004.

” The Christian Science Monitor.” In Proceedings of the Forty-eighth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. Mexico: World Scientific. 2009]. and Anders Nielsen. 2001. and Fuel: The Mysterious Rise of the Taliban. Counterterrorism. Sullivan.csmonitor. Kashmir Behuria. “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 2009]. “The Long Roads to Peace. p. 2009. 187.” Strategic Analysis 28(1): 157-176. Christina. Johnson. Gunaratna.southasianmedia. Thomas. “Musharraf et les islamistes.htm. and Chris Mason. Available at: http://news.” The Telegraph.” Journal of Peace Research 44(1): 93.” Etudes 399(2003/7): 9-16.html [Accessed March 10. p. “Who is the Real Mullah Omar?. Negroponte. Steinberg.” Orbis 51(1): 71-89. John.php?t=TP&st=D&no=4 [Accessed May 19.” In The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. Madrid: Fundación José Ortega y Gasset. Tim. 2004. Profile: Mullah Mohammed Omar. Jaffrelot. 2007. Pantucci. Raffaello. Center for Contemporary Conflict. Kartha. 2006. 2007. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Ahmed. “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond. Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for US Oxygen. BBC News. Nichol.” In National Intelligence Council. Robert. Available at: Spark. 1998. “Al-Qaeda 2. Mihalka. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. 2002.” Foreign Policy: 58-64. Congressional Research Service. 2005. Michael. Judah.stm [Accessed March 10. “Indo-Pak Détente: Sustainable Ambiguity. “Islam's Medieval Outposts.” Survival 50(6): 183-192. Available at: http://www.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(9): 775-807. 2009]. Washington.” Survival 44(1): 69-80. 2009]. A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism.html [Accessed March 10. 2008.C. Jim. Guido. K. 2002. Ashok. JIhadist Terrorism in Turkey. “The Taliban Papers. “Counterinsurgency. Tara. Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales. Available at: http://www. “Tinder. 2006. 2001. Islamist Terrorism in Greater Central Asia: The" Al-Qaedaization" of Uzbek Jihadism. . “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan. Available at: http://www. Christophe. Marquand.” South Asia Journal. 2001. Jurica. 2005. 2008. “Sunni-Shia relations in Pakistan: The widening divide. 2003. P. 121 . Islamic Jihad Union Chaudet. Rohan.Haqqani. D. “The Reclusive Ruler who Runs the Taliban . Husain. State-building and Security Cooperation in Central Asia. D. 131-152.

Available at: http://www. Nasr. [Accessed May 19. 2009].” The Guardian Online. “The Two Faces of Lashkar-e-Taiba . 2007. “Defeating Terrorism: A Study of Operational Strategy and Tactics of Police Forces in Jammu & Kashmir (India). 2002. Nazir. Glendinning. 85-114.” Terrorism Monitor 3(4).” In Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation.” Police Practice and Research 6(2): 141-164.jamestown. Available at: http://www. Even Al-Qaeda'. “Islam. Yateendra. the State.” Asia Pacific Education Review 6(1): 1-6. Available at: http://www. Olivier. 2001.” Asharq Alawsat Newspaper.stm [Accessed May 19. “Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 122 . and S. V. 115. ABC Available at: http://news.” In Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation. Gvosdev.” Writenet for Realistically. 2005. Raja.go. Roy. Wilson.htm [Accessed January 28.asp?section=3&id=14953 [Accessed January 29.” The Good Society 14(3). 2008. R. New Delhi: Pentagon “Regional Implications of Shi'a Revival in Iraq.Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. John. Lashkar-e-Taiba Bharadwaj. John. Pakistan Freezes Militant Funds.jamestown. 2009]. Available at: http://www. Roul.” Terrorism Monitor 3(11). Mariam.memri. 2005. Atul. “Sectarianism—A threat to human security: A case study of Pakistan. Farooq. 2002.” The Round Table 94(382): 613-628. Nasr. 2009]. Animesh. 2009]. 2009]. Shah. “Lashkar-e-Toiba: new Threats Posed by an Old Organization. Terrorist Group of Pakistan. “Achieving a Global Community. Available at: http://www. Vali. Available at: http://abcnews. The General and Jihad. 2009].uk. The Middle East Media Research Institute. 2002 “The regional dimension of sectarian conflicts in Key Figures in Kashmir Uprising. 2002. Zed Books. BBC. Wilson. 2009].com/International/Story?id=80271&page=2 [Accessed May 19.” The Washington Quarterly 27(3): 7-24. Abou Zahab. “Humanization of education in Pakistan through Freire’s Concept of [Accessed May [Accessed January 29. Jamaatud Dawa Leader: 'Indians Will Continue to Mislead the World Community By Linking Us to Lashkar[-e Taiba]. and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan. 2009].cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP214308&Page=archives [Accessed May 19. Jafa. Mehtab Ali. Kalyanaraman. Lee. “Can Pakistan be ‘neutral’in the war against terrorism?. Zed Books. Umer. “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Ties to International Available at: http://www. p. “Pakistan police detain founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group | World news | guardian. 2004. The” Strategic Analysis 26(1): 170-173. 2005. 2005. 2005. p. S. 2005.

co.cfm?DocumentID=2227&from_page=. 2009]. 2001. D.” PS: Political Science and Politics 41(01): 19-24. Karthala Editions.An Apology. 2008.” Terrorism Focus 2(6). Tunisian Combatant Group. Federation of American Scientists. [Accessed May 20. 123 . 2009].co. Keating.html [Accessed May 19. Mohamed. GSPC Dossier. p.” Terrorism Monitor 3(12): June 17. BBC. 2009]. “Tunisian Government Threatened by Islamist Group. “Terrorist Outlaws – or a Group with Friends in High Places? . The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG).: RAND Corporation. PO-3380: The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror. 2009. Blake Mobley. Ahmed. Kim. 2006.cfm [Accessed May 19. La Mouvance Islamiste au Maroc: du 11 Septembre 2001 aux Attentats de Casablanca du 16 Mai 2003. Washington.” Center for Defense Information. Sanchez.stm [Accessed May 19. Clark.C. 2005. Stemmann. Yoginder. Darif. Sikand. Available at: http://www. Ulph. New York Times. Benjamin. “Non African Involvement in Transnational Terror Networks: Terrorism in the Maghreb . “The Origins of Militancy and Salafism in Morocco. Anneli.globalsecurity. 2006. “Tunisia: Trading Freedom for Stability May Not Last–An International Security Perspective. 2009]. 2006. Available at: http://www. Jonathan. 2008. 2009]. The Military Balance in the Middle East. Alejandro. and Erin Rosenbach.. Available at: http://www. Cordesman. Available at: http://news.” Boukhars. Greenwood Publishing Group.cdi. Stephen. 2002. 2005. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Botha. 2003. Hudson Institute. 2004. Global Security. 215. The Moroccan Combatant Group. Yoginder. 2008. John. Chaarani.” In The Practice of War: Production. Available at: http://www. Anouar.” The Independent. Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence./index.” The Middle East Review of International Affairs 10(3).org/security/profiles/tunisian_combatant_group. El Guerbouzi . “In the Spotlight: Moroccan Combatant Group (GICM).uk/newswatch/ifs/hi/newsid_4960000/newsid_4968400/4968438. 2004.htm [Accessed May 20. Analisis del Real Instituto.” Defence Studies 9(1): 85-92. Available at: http://www. 2005. 2004. Anthony H. Sikand.ustreas. US Department of the Treasury. “Changing Course of Kashmiri Struggle: From National Liberation to Islamist Jihad?.” Economic and Political Weekly: 218-227. 2009]. “Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of Lashkar-i-Tayyeba. The Politics and Economics of Organized Crime and Terrorism in Europe. Tunisian Combatant Group Assets of Tunisia Group Are Githens-Mazer. Center for Policing Terrorism .independent.htm [Accessed May 20. “Variations on a Theme: Radical Violent Islamism and European North African Radicalization. “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe. Juan Jose Escobar.

Gershman.” New York Times. Real Instituto Elcano. Greg.” The Pacific Review 22(2). Evan. “Indonesia Reports the Arrest of a 2nd Top Terrorism Suspect. Pressure to Hold Militant Sets Off Outcry in Indonesia. R.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24(3): 427-466.htm [Accessed January 26. Gelling. Raymond. 2005. Nesser. 2004.umd. Middle East Online. “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network. 2006. “How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?. Available at: http://www. 2009]. Ranstorp. Ingrid. 2008. 2009].html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=Abu+Bakar+Bashir&st=nyt [Accessed May 19.nytimes.” Mediterranean Politics 10(1): 99-108.asp?id=4341 [Accessed January 28. “Terrorism and Democratic Legitimacy: Conflicting Interpretations of the Spanish Elections.” New York Times. P. Zachary. 2006.” Foreign Affairs 81(4): 60-74. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. Abuzza. 2009]. “In Indonesia. 2004. Peter. Peter. “Islam and society in South-East Asia after 11 September. Jemaah Islamiyah Abuza. Reinares. Gelling.” Newsweek.middleeast-online. Thomas. Raymond. Emmers. Available at: http://www. 2005. “Radical Cleric in Indonesia Is Acquitted of Terrorism. 2007. Fernando. “Terror at Rush Hour.” The New York Times. Available at: http://www. Barton. Bonner. 2005. The London bombings and the broader strategic context.html [Accessed May 19.nytimes. 2002. 2005. The Insider: Daily Terrorism Report . 2002. “Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's Approach to Terrorism and Sea Piracy.” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2): 234-256. Peter. [Accessed May 19. Zachary. Van Biezen. 2008. “Freed Cleric Is Hailed by Students. John.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 56(3): 383-394. Available at: http://abcnews.” Southeast Asian Affairs: 123-145. The Mediterranean Region and International Terrorism: A New Framework for Cooperation. but Support Could Be Waning. Indonesian Police Confirm. “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front? [Accessed May 19. 2009].” New York Times.” The New York Times..Net. Magnus. “Europe's Angry Muslims. Available at: 2009. Atran. Madrid: Real Institute Elcano. 124 . “Indonesia's Year of Living Normally. Bonner. Robert. 2006. Available at: http://www. 2009]. and Stryker McGuire. Moroccan Group "Derivative Structure" of Al Qaeda. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. Scott. 2002.” Foreign Affairs 84(4): 120-35. “ Southeast Asian Terrorist Leader Is Under Arrest. 2009].ABC News. 2005. 2005.” HomelandSecurityUS. Gelling.Leiken.” New York Times.go. “Abu Dujana.S. 2008. Democracy isn’t Enough. “U..

” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30(9): 777-800.C. Zachary. Tomsa.start.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29(4): 323-342. and Thomas “Terrorism in the Southern Philippines: Contextualizing the Abu Sayyaf Group as an Islamist Secessionist Organization. and Nick Grace. Damien..asp?id=6370 [Accessed January 21.cfr. 2004. BBC. Nagma. Nesser. Jemaah Islamiyah (a.stm [Accessed May 19. Southeast Asia and the War Against Terrorism. Elena. 2008. “The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia. 2008. Brynhar. 2009]. 125 .” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 48(1): 128-144. Rachel. Buendia. Kingsbury. Donnelly. Council on Foreign Relations.umd. Washington. Available at: http://news. .” Asian Survey 48(1): 38-46. Available at: http://www.” The Long War Journal.longwarjournal. “Indonesia in 2007: Unmet Expectations. 2003. 2005. Bilveer. and Paolo Pasicolan. 2005. “From a Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI. Abuza. 2009].: The Heritage Foundation. Magouirk. 2004. 2007. Profile: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58(1): 47-68. “Rule of Law. 2009]. FFI explains al-Qaida document.html [Accessed January 22. Elmer. Naval War College. Espin-Digon.” Fragility and Crisis: 320-363. [Accessed January 22. Bali-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf. Harvey. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. “ In Pictures: Jemaah Islamiyah's Leadership. and Scott Atran. G. 2008. “Jemaah Islamiyah's Radical Madrassah Networks. Petter.Hainsworth. Roggio. 2009]. Zachary. Anti-Corruption. “Islam's role in Indonesia. 2001. Geoffrey.” In the Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia. J. Forvarets Forskninginstittut. 2008. Strategic Studies Institute. 2007.” Sudostasia 26(5): 73-84. 2008. D. 2006. 2004. Available at: http://www. Julio et al. Charles. and (US). Abu Sayyaf Abuza. Jemaah Islamiah) . Lloyd's MIU handbook of maritime security. “The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia. “The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines Unresolved National Question or Question of Governance?. Disarming the Bearer of the Sword: Delinking the Abu Sayyaf From the Global Insurgency. Jemaah Islamiyah.stm [Accessed May 19. 2009].k. Despite Improvement.” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 99999(1): 1-17. Available at: http://news. “Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe. Anti-Terrorism and Militant Islam: Coping with Threats to Democratic Pluralism and National Unity in “Jemaah Islamiyah after the Recent Wave of Arrests: How Much Danger Remains? . R. Lia. Pavlova.” BBC. New York: CRC Press.a. 2006. Available at: http://www.” Asian Journal of Political Science 13(1): 109-138.

Gunter. 2008.htm&no=34 [Accessed April 9. Larry. 2002. 2009].gmanews. Quimpo. Available at: http://www.” New Zealand International Review 27(6): 24-29. 2009]. Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation.gmanews. Steven. Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia.” Global Security. 2008. 2009]. Available at: http://www. “Religion.Filler. Wencesiao. Daniel Joseph.” SAIS Review 21(2): 65-90. “What's Next for Abu Sayyaf?. Rogers.globalsecurity. “The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Nathan. Menardo. Available at: http://www. Shireen.rms-gs. 2002. 2009]. Svante. 2009]. Available at: http://www.C. “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists. Sahni. 2002.htm [Accessed April 9.” Ringuet. “Philippines: Abu Sayyaf Group . 2001. Available at: http://www. Schwarz. Available at: http://www. Frazie..The Heat is 2002.” Terrorism and Political Violence 14(4): 131-162. politics.mtholyoke.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_ Organisations_Islamic_Movement_of_Uzbekistan [Accessed January 21. Washington. 2007. GMA News. Alfredo. “Abdurakjak Janjalani.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(2): 125-144. New York: ME Sharpe. Available at: http://www. “The Alliance System of the Abu Sayyaf.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24(1): 33-50. Smith.: Congressional Research Service. 2004. [Accessed April 9. Eduardo. 2000.” South Asian Terrorism Portal.” Foreign Affairs 83(1): 15-21. 2002. “Abdurajak Janjalani Killed. “The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society. 1993–2000.” The Washington Quarterly 25(1): 193-206. 126 . “Beyond the Abu Jose.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-): 289-304. John.htm [Accessed April 9. “The US and the Southern Philippines’ Quagmire. 2009]. 2007. Torres. Available at: http://www.html [Accessed April 9. 2009. Australian National Security .htm [Accessed April 9. 2002. “Contemporary History of the Philippines. and Regine Spector. “The Southern Philippines: Conflict and Co-operation: Anthony Smith Backgrounds the Separatist Conflict That Has Wracked the Southern Philippines and Discusses the US Military Involvement in the Area. 2009].” Philippine Information Agency. and security in Central Asia. Lumpkin. 2009] [Accessed April Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. 2004. Hunter. Ajai. D. Yasser Igasan Succeeds Janjalani as Abu Chief . 2006.” Terrorism in the Philippines. “Moving Out of Moscow's Orbit: the Outlook for Central Asia.satp. Hyman. Anthony. Niksch. 1993. and Rosalinda Morgado-Schwarz.” GMA Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Cornell. 2002. Paul J. Ugarte. A. “The Abu Sayyaf and Khadaffy Janjalani.” RMS & GS.

ferghana.” Strategic Analysis 16(2). Islamic Jihad. 266. Yemen Islamic Jihad Analysis:” Spiegel Online.html [Accessed May 20. 127 . Leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Tahir Yuldashev Threatens Presidents Karimov. Available at: http://www.ferghana. Bali. Available at: http://www. Messages From Terrorist Leaders. 2003. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Will it Strike Back?. 2009]. Igor. 2009]. Available at: http://www.Kimmage. p.globalsecurity.highbeam. 2000.553745. bin Laden and Iran's hardliners. Who Is The Yemeni Islamic Jihad Group? . Jane. “Pakistan: Offensive Against Suspected Militants in South Waziristan Ends.ciaonet. United Press International. “The Islamic Revival in Central Asia: a Potent Force or a Misconception?. 2004. 2009].ir/detail.1518. 2008. et al. Available at: http://www. Bakiyev. “The Growth of Radical Islam in Central Asia. Available at: http://www. 2005. Novak. 2009]. Taliban behind the Waziristan Accord.jamestown. 2009].” Global Security. 2009]. V. V. 2007.aspx?id=68033&sectionid=351020206 [Accessed May 20. Yassin. “The Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan: A Resurgent IMU?. 2001. Daniel. CBS News. A. Group Threatens Attack on UAE Embassy in Yemen. 2008. 2009]. Available at: http://enews. Naumkin.html [Accessed January 21. [Accessed January 21. Available at: http://www1.atimes. Mann. The NEFA Foundation . “The Fires of Faith in Central Asia.presstv. Available at: Ghonchen. Musharbash.” The Long War Journal.shtml [Accessed May 20. Bill.php [Accessed January 21.html [Accessed May 20. Uzbek islamists’ Leader Tahir Yuldashev has been Arrested . Mite. 2009]. 2009].org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26187 [Accessed March 12. 2008. Available at:” Central Asian Survey 20(1): 63-83. Vitaly. Valentinas. Maureen. Press TV.” Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies. “Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. 2004. and Rakhmonov. Roggio. 2006. “Police Arrest Members of Alleged Jihadi Financing Network. 2008.” In Digital Libraries: Universal and Ubiquitous Access to Information. Available at: http://www. Indonesia: Springer-Verlag New York Inc. 2009]. 2001.Ru Information agency.” Terrorism Monitor 1(8).com/news/gulf/yemen/10245698. Yemeni Islamic Jihad Leader Arrested. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Available at: http://www. 2009]. 2008.nefafoundation.” Asia Times Online. Rashid. 2009]. 2009]. Available at: http://www.html [Accessed April 8. “al Qaeda. S.” The Long War Journal. Naumkin. Radical Islam in Central Asia: between Pen and Rifle. Ferghana. Available at: http://enews. “US Embassy in Yemen Targeted in Complex [Accessed March 12. Gulf News.longwarjournal.gulfnews.htm [Accessed April 8.00. 2003. “On Visualizing Heterogeneous Semantic Networks from Multiple Data Sources.html [Accessed January 26. Ahmed.” World Policy Journal 18(1): 45-55.php?id=1864 [Accessed January 21. Rotar. 2008. 2008.Ru Information Agency.

Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) .globalsecurity.” Terrorism Monitor 4(15). 2009]. India: South Asia Analysis Group. 2009]. 2009]. Daveed. Attack on USS Cole: Background.htm [Accessed May 19. Available at: http://www. “Attack on USS Cole: Who engineered it?.uk/2/hi/middle_east/478046. John. 2009]. Raman.Yemen.. Sunguta.Aden Abyan Islamic Army Amnesty International Report 2000 .jamestown. 2009]. Available at: http://news. Behuria. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www. 2004.asp [Accessed May 19. Raman. 2009]. 2009]. Pike.hinduonnet.php [Accessed April 9. “Yemen: New Terror Camps as a City Falls to &no_cache=1 [Accessed February 4. 2006. The Investigative Project on Terrorism. Available at: http://www.” Strategic Analysis 32(1): 57-80. Scott. Cronin.unhcr. Aden Abyan Islamic Army.” Global Security. 2009].co. [Accessed May 19. 2009]. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. and Kyle Dabruzzi. 2000. 128 .org/papers2/paper152. BBC. Available at: http://www. Library of Congress. 2006.” Middle East Quarterly 14(3): [Accessed May 19. Available at: http://www.” Science. Anti-Defamation 2006. 2005.longwarjournal.adl. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations. “Aden-Abyan Islamic Army.investigativeproject. et al. Yemen: High-Profile Militants Killed and the Yemeni Power Structure .com/businessline/2000/10/23/stories/042355uy. 2009]. Yemeni Militant's Supporters Vow Available at: http://www. The War on Poverty).com/analysis/yemen_high_profile_militants_killed_and_yemeni_power_structure [Accessed April 9.html [Accessed May 19.stratfor. Ashok. 2009]. Goldberg. 2005.umd. 2009].AMNESTY.html [Accessed May 19. Available at: http://www.stm [Accessed May 19.” The Long War Journal. 1999.htm [Accessed May 19. B. Available at: http://www.htm [Accessed May 19. Links to Osama bin Laden and Islamic Jihad. “Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi–Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan. Available at: http://www. Gartenstein-Ross.0. “Somalia's ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami .YEM. 2009. B. John. “Jihad's New Leaders.” Global Security. Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul Mujahideen Atran.3ae6aa106b. 'Londonistan.” In Congressional Research Service. GST Presented Evidence against Claims.” New York Times Magazine 25. West. Available at: http://www.” Business Line. UN Regufee Agency. Lumpkin. 2008. “Inside Jihad U. 2008. 2007. K. 2000. 2009. Stratfor. “Dwindling Expectations (vs.: The Education of a Holy Warrior. 2009]. “Khalid al-Nabi al-Yazidi. Novak.asp?id=4 [Accessed January 31. A.' Al Qaeda and the Finsbury Park Mosque .org/archives/2009/03/ Stratfor. Available at: http://www. 1999.

” An Indian Perspective: and D. 2001.brad. Roman & Littlefield.” The Washington Quarterly 26(3): 7-25.In the Spotlight: Harakat ul-Mujaheddin (HuM). Howenstein. Rothem. Paul. Stephen. 2009].atimes. 2009].” The Maoist Insurgency and Nepal-India Relations: 213. Pakistan Security Research Available at: http://www. Swami. 2008.globalsecurity. “In the Spotlight: Harakat ul-Mujaheddin (HuM). 2001.cdi. 2004. Paramhans. 2009]. Available at: [Accessed May 19. Jessica. Stern.htm [Accessed January 28. 2001. Indian Express. 2008. “Nexalities: What.hindustantimes. Mir. Mariam. 2003. 2003. The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan.cdi.. “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in theory and practice. Kumar. “Meeting with the Muj. Dhungana. Available at: http://www.html [Accessed April 9. “This is not Islam.html [Accessed January 28. Hindustan Times.htm [Accessed January Nicholas. Available at: http://www. Jamiat ul-Ansar. S. 2009]. “The Maoist Insurgency and Nepal-India Relations: Contemplating the Future. Saldhanha. Terrorism . “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan.” Center for Defense Information.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_ Organisations_Jamiat_ul-Ansar [Accessed January 28. Available at: http://74. 2009].htm [Accessed January 28. “The Jihad Lives On. Available at: http://www. Available at: lami. 2002. 2009].” Global Security. Profiles in “Harakat ul-Mujahedin.p df+the+jihadi+terrain+in+pakistan&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a [Accessed April 9. Available at: http://www.” Pakistan: nationalism without a nation?: 115. 2008. “Pakistan's jehadi apparatus: Goals and methods.globalpolitician. Sunita.” Global Politician. 2009]. Aaron. Me Worry?.132/search?q=cache:8YwDXyrFcLcJ:spaces. Amir. 129 .” Strategic Analysis 24(12): 2179-2198. Pike.Harkat ul-Ansar. Goel.cfm [Accessed April 9.cfm [Accessed January 28. Available at: http://www. John. Available at: http://www.satp. Abou Zahab. D. ISI Fixed Meetings for Hostages' Wives with Harkat. Mannes.” South Asia Intelligence Review 3(29). South Asia Terrorism Portal.indianexpress. 1997. 2009]. “Understanding the Militant Mind: Can Psychiatry Help?. “The regional dimension of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan.” India Review 2(3): [Accessed May 2009]. Sahni. Cohen. Australian National Security. 2009].125. 2009]. S. Available at: http://www.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57(1): 42-50. Jaish-e-Mohammad A profile of Maulana Masood Azhar. 2008.” Asia Times Online.

org/irp/world/para/jem.longwarjournal.” Middle East Quarterly 14(3): 3-10. 2007.” Strategic Analysis 25(9): 1081-1987.hinduonnet. 2000. Available at: http://www. 2009].php [Accessed April 9. South Asian Terrorism Portal.htm [Accessed May 19. Available at: http://news. 2001.php [Accessed January 29.3ae6aa106b. “Jihad's New Leaders. 2006. “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in theory and practice.. S. “Terrorism in India: Impact on national security.fas. 130 . 2009]. Sondhi.” Strategic Analysis 27(3): 382-403. 2009. Links to Osama bin Laden and Islamic Jihad. Federation of American Scientists. “Terrorists’ Modus Operandi in Jammu and Kashmir.asp [Accessed May 19. Roggio. Available at: http://www.htm [Accessed January 29. India: South Asia Analysis Group. “Attack on USS Cole: Who engineered it?. Jessica. Available at: http://www. N. “Meeting with the Muj. and Kyle Dabruzzi. Available at: http://www. Lumpkin.investigativeproject. 2009. “Aden-Abyan Islamic Army.” Business Line. Available at: http://www.stm [Accessed May Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions. The Investigative Project on Terrorism. 2003. 2009]. Anti-Defamation League. BBC. John. “Yemen: New Terror Camps as a City Falls to 2009]. John. Mushtaq. Bill. Praveen. Available at: Profile: Maulana Masood Azhar. Jamwal.C. 2008. 2004.” Global Security. 2002. Gartenstein-Ross. 1999. “Khalid al-Nabi al-Yazidi. Available at: [Accessed May em. Available at: http://www. Daveed. 2000. 2009. Najum. “Terrorism and Governance in Kashmir.AMNESTY. B. 2009]. Sunil. Available at: http://www. Mehta.htm [Accessed May 19.asp?id=4 [Accessed January 31. 2009]. 2002.umd. 2009].: Center for Strategic and International Studies.Yemen. 2006. Kamath. Raman.” The Long War Journal. 2009].htm [Accessed May 19.” India Review 2(3): 55-88. Available at: http://www.” The Long War Journal. Mandavi. Aden Abyan Islamic Al-Ittihaad al-Islami Amnesty International Report 2000 .” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56(4): Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) . Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. Swami. M. UN Regufee Agency. 2009]. Stern. Novak. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.YEM.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57(1): 42-50. 2006.html [Accessed May 19. 2009].” Journal of Conflict Studies 24(2).globalsecurity. B. 2005.adl. Available at: http://www. 2000. 2003. Attack on USS Cole: Background. 2009]. “Pakistan: Moderate jihad?. Raman.longwarjournal. Jane. and Teresita Schaffer.html [Accessed May 19.” Global Security. 2009].org/refworld/publisher.htm [Accessed January Mujahideen E-Tanzeem. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM). 2009]. “Jaish-e-Mohammed leader placed under ‘house arrest’. Washington.

John. Available at: http://acpss.html [Accessed January 27. Amer. 2009]. Wahid. Jane's World Intelligence and Insurgency. 2009]. 1946-2004. Bariagaber. Available at: http://www. Makki.” Terrorism Monitor 4(15). Hedru. Hassan Salman. 2008. Khalil Mohammed. Available at: &no_cache=1 [Accessed February 4. Iyob. 2007. Assefaw. 2009].HTM [Accessed January 1. “The Eritrean Experiment: A Cautious Pragmatism?. 1989-2003. Iyob. 2009]. “The Nationalist Revolution in eritrea.asp?id=6274 [Accessed May 19. Markakis.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 26(1): 51-70. Available at: http://news.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21(6): 1056-1073. Shaikh Khalil Mohammed Amer.umd. Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “Blowing the Horn. Harbom. BBC. John.” Available at: http://www. “Interview With the Deputy Amir of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya Abdel Maguid.” Journal of Peace Research 41(5): 625. Mikael. State Formation and the Public Sphere: Eritrea 1991–96. 2003. 1999. and Peter Wallensteen. 131 . “Nationalism. Yemen: High-Profile Militants Killed and the Yemeni Power Structure . Available at: 2006. 2009]. Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement .West. 1991-2003.htm [Accessed January 27.ahram. and Colin Thomas-Fensen. Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement A Military Statement of the Islamic Eritrean Reform Movement to the Islamic Nation and a List of Five Operations Executed in Eritrea. 1998. “Eritrean Islamic Salvation Front. [Accessed May 19. 1996. “Egypt's Gama'ah Islamiyah: The Turnabout and its Ramifications. 2009].” Journal of Peace Research 42(5): 623.fas. 2009]. SITE Institute. 2005. “Armed conflict and its international dimensions. Fouad. Available at: http://www. R. Abul Bara'. Eriksson. 1997. “Armed Conflict.” Foreign Affairs 86(2): 59-74.” Review of African Political Economy 30(97): 435-444. and Peter Wallensteen. 2005.stm [Accessed May 19. 2004. 1998. Debessay. 2004. “The Politics of Cultural Pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea: Trajectories of Ethnicity and Constitutional Experiments. Sunguta.” From Nida'ul Islam. [Accessed April 9. “Somalia's ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami .” Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies. Yemeni Militant's Supporters Vow Revenge.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 35(04): 647-673. 2009]. “Eritrea: transition to dictatorship.start. 2004. Stratfor.” Review of African Political Economy 23(70): Shifting Terrain: Dissidence versus Terrorism in Eritrea. Available at:

Fuller. “Doomed Arab units prepare for final battle against the odds. Columbia University Press.” Perspectives on Terrorism 2(5).iht. Airforce University Maxwell.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=39&Itemid=54 [Accessed February 2000. “Promoting Freedom and Democracy: Fighting the War of Ideas Against Islamic Terrorism. Fred.lebanonwire. Ghadbian.” The New York Times. 2006. Borger. Available at: http://www. 2009]. 1970]. John. Multimedia Counterterrorism Calendar. “Informed Comment. Gerges. 2000. Y Feldner. 2002. Juan.juancole. The Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological Reversal. 2009]. 1987. 132 . Farrag Ismali. Burton. Cohen. “Political Islam and violence. Available at: http://www. Youssef. 2009]. [Accessed February 24. “De-Radicalization of Jihad? The Impact of Egyptian Islamist Revisionists on Al-Qaeda. and Nicholas [Accessed February 24. 2006. “Yemen Reports Arrests of Foreign-Born Arabs in Cole Attack .” South Atlantic Quarterly 101(2): 325-336. Lawrence. Crenshaw.muslimbrotherhood. “Terrorism as a Strategy. Politics and Terrorism: An Assessment of the Origin and Threat of Terrorism in Egypt. R. Najib. 2009]. Abu Jihad al-Masri.” The Muslim Brotherhood Official English Website. Carmon.html [Accessed December 28. Khaled Dawoud. “The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt?: Costs and Prospects. 2006. Freedman.” The Guardian. 2000. “New Approach of Egypt´s Gama´a Islamiya Group \. Available at: http://www. “A Muslim to Muslims: Reflections after September 11.” The Middle East Journal: 592-612. Julian. and D Lav.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA30906 [Accessed February 3. 2009].html?res=9F05E4DA1031F935A15753C1A9669C8B63 [Accessed February 24.” Comparative Strategy 22(3): 207-221. Cole. Martha. Available at: http://www. “Pursuing bin Laden: Driving Al Qaeda:Religious Decree. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. The Middle East Media Research Institute. Available at: http://memri.asp?ID=5166&Lang=E&Press=Show&System=PressR&zPage=Syste ms [Accessed January 1.” Anneli. 2004. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. 2007. “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches.terrorism4 [Accessed January 1.” Government and Opposition 42(3): 314-339.” More on the split among radical Islamists. 2002. Omar. Burns. “ Al Qaeda's Egyptian 2006. Available at: http://www.nytimes. 2003. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www. 2008].co. Y.nctc. Gunaratna. 2009]. Thomas.” International Herald Tribune. Ariel.php?page=2 [Accessed February 24.” New Political Science 22(1): 77-88. Available at: http://query. Ayman Al-Zawahiri: The Ideologue of Modern Islamic Militancy.” Journal of Strategic Studies 10(4): 13-31. Botha. 2002. 2009].

Moussa. 1970]. and Terrorism. “Time for a Historic Reconcilliation?. 2002. Mozaffari. Available at: http://intelfiles. Sentencing Statements. “Beyond Al Qaeda: Part 2006. U. Angel et al.php?id=A6130_0_1_0_M [Accessed January 1. Available at: http://weekly.nytimes. “Makram Mohammed Ahmed interviews the historic leadership of alGama’a al-Islamiyya inside the “Scorpion” prison. 2003.S. 1996. Stacher.theatlantic. 2005.” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.” New York Heyer. Available at: http://www. 2009]. Southern District of New York: Intelwire. 2009]. 2008. Pargeter. Available at: 133 . In Aftermath of Luxor Massacre: Doubtful Initiative to Stop Available at: http://www. Joshua. 2006. University of Pennsylvania Press. M. Zambelis. “Militants freed. Weaver. Available at: http://weekly. Berkeley: University of California Press.cfm [Accessed May 19.stanford. Roland. 2009].ahram. Arabicnews. “Bin Laden.” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line. 2009].” Al Ahram Weekly Online.htm [Accessed December 28. Omar Abdel Rahman et al. Islamism. 2005.132/search?q=cache:1JlCz_Djb9wJ:www. 1997. Alison.ahram.” Al-Ahram Weekly Online. Bill. Available at: http://www.egoplex.pdf+Nageh+Ibrahim&hl=en &ct=clnk&cd=5&gl=us&client=firefox-a [Accessed January 1.defenddemocracy. The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe. Jailan. Chris. “Blowback. Available at: “Egypt attacks: A Closer Look. 2009]” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line.ahram.” Society 42(5): 34-42. The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe. 2009]. Leadership of al-Gama'a” Terrorism Focus 3(35). Anthony. and Jon Rothschild. In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood. Julia. Available at: “Defendant Tells of His Role in Edict Urging Killing of Jews. 2009] Rabasa. Hazel.html [Accessed January 1. 2001. Duke University 2008]. Kepel. 1998.Islamic Group.html?scp=8&sq=Rifai%20Ahmed%20Taha%20&st=cse [Accessed February [Accessed January 1.” The Atlantic Online. “In the Spotlight: Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya . 1970]. “The Taliban Connection. 2002. Available at: http://weekly. Nevine.” The Middle East Journal: 415-432.htm [Accessed February 18. 2009].htm [Accessed January 1. 2009]. Jacquard. Available at: http://www. Roggio.” Rashwan.ahram. Available at: http://travelvideo. Mary Anne.cdi. 2004. Ahmed. 2002.htm [Accessed February 18. v. 2002.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11783544&Itemid=361 [Accessed February 24. 2002. “Senior al Qaeda Leader Thought Killed in North Waziristan” Available at: http://74. “Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya's Public Relations Campaign . “Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat party.” Center for Defense Information. Gilles.Halawi. Muslim Extremism in Egypt.arabicnews.” Travel Video Television “A New Rapprochement?. 2008.htm [Accessed May 19.

2009].jamestown.http://www. 134 .org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=900&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=239 &no_cache=1 [Accessed January 1.

Appendix III: Commanding Officer Attribute Codebook Type of merger Formal merger Strong affiliation (partnership) Loose affiliation (collaboration) No affiliation Primary motive Secondary motive Not a motive Primary motive Secondary motive Not a motive Primary motive Secondary motive Not a motive Strong leadership Average leadership Weaker leadership Not applicable (Was not active in the organization at the time) 4 3 2 1 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 3 2 1 Opportunism Pan-Islamic ideology Social network Operational leadership Ideological leadership Logistic leadership 0 135 .

Appendix IV: Leadership Attributes Organization name Ansar al-Islam/Jund alMullah Krekar Islam/Ansar al-Sunnah Ansar al-Islam/Jund alAbdullah Shafi Islam/Ansar al-Sunnah al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (formerly Jama'at Abu Musab al-Zarqawi al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (formerly Jama'at Abu Ayub Al-Masri al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (formerly Jama'at Abu Khalil al-Souri al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) Abu Muhjin Asbat al-Ansar Mohammed Omar Taliban Ayman Al Zawahiri Egyptian Islamic Jihad Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif Egyptian Islamic Jihad Islamic Movement of Tahir Yuldashev Uzbekistan Islamic Movement of Juma Namangani Uzbekistan Najmiddin Jalolov Islamic Jihad Union Tariq al-Fasdli Yemen Islamic Jihad Zein al-Abideen alAden Abyan Islamic Mehdar Army Aden Abyan Islamic Khalid al-Nabi al-Yazidi Army Maulana Saadatullah Khan Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul Mujahidin Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul Mujahidin Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul Mujahidin Leader name Organization type Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Organization Date of Ideological country or foundin Date of Type of Opportunistic Alignment Social network origin g affiliation affiliation motives? ? affiliations? Iraq Iraq 2001 2001 2001 2001 3 3 2 2 0 0 1 1 Ideological Logistic Operational leadership leadership leadership preprepre-merger merger? merger? 1 0 3 0 3 0 Operational leadership postmerger? 1 3 Ideological leadership postmerger? 3 2 Logistic leadership postmerger? 2 1 Core Arab Cluster Iraq 1999 2004 4 2 0 1 3 2 3 3 3 2 Core Arab Cluster Iraq 1999 2004 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 2 Core Core Core Core Core Arab Arab Arab Arab Arab Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Iraq Lebanon Afghanistan Egypt Egypt Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Yemen Yemen Yemen 1999 1986 1994 1987 1987 1998 1998 2002 1990 1990 1990 2004 2000 1996 1998 1998 1998 1998 2005 1992 1998 1998 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 3 3 1 2 3 3 3 2 2 0 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 0 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 3 3 0 3 1 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 3 2 2 Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 1985 1998 2 2 1 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 Fazlur Rehman Khalil Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 1985 1998 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 3 3 Farooq Kashmiri Khalil Riaz Basra Akram Lahori Hafiz Mohammad Saeed Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri Maulana Masood Azhar Sheikh Ali Warsame Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki Sheikh Khalil Mohammed Amer Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Lashkar-e-Taiba Lashkar-e-Taiba Jaish-e-Mohammad al-Ittihaad al-Islami al-Ittihaad al-Islami al-Ittihaad al-Islami Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement Southern Asian cluster Southern Asian cluster Southern Asian cluster Southern Asian cluster Southern Asian cluster Southern Asian cluster African cluster African cluster African cluster African cluster Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Somalia Somalia Somalia Eritrea 1985 1996 1996 1990 1990 2000 1984 1984 1984 1988 1998 1999 1999 2001 2001 2000 1991 1991 1991 1998 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 1 1 3 3 1 0 2 0 3 0 3 3 1 1 2 0 3 0 2 0 3 3 2 1 1 3 2 3 1 3 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 3 1 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 136 .

Hassan Hattab al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salafist pour la prédication et le combat) Maghreb Arab cluster al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salafist pour la prédication et le combat) Maghreb Arab cluster al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salafist pour la prédication et le combat) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Tunisian Combatant Group Tunisian Combatant Group Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Jemaah Islamiya Jemaah Islamiya Jemaah Islamiya Abu Sayyaf Abu Sayyaf Abu Sayyaf Algeria 1996 2005 4 2 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 0 Nabil Sahraoui Algeria 1996 2005 4 2 1 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 Abdelmalik Droukdal Anas Sebai Tarek Ben Habib Maaroufi Saifallah Ben Hassine Mohammed Al Karbouzi Taeb Bentizi Abu Bakar Bashir Abu Rusdan Abu Dujana Abdurajak Janjalani Khadaffy Janjalani Yasser Igasan Maghreb Arab cluster Maghreb Arab cluster Maghreb Arab cluster Maghreb Arab cluster Maghreb Arab cluster Maghreb Arab cluster Southeast Asian cluster Southeast Asian cluster Southeast Asian cluster Southeast Asian cluster Southeast Asian cluster Southeast Asian cluster Algeria Libya Tunisia Tunisia Morocco Morocco Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Philippines Philippines Philippines 1996 1995 2000 2000 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1991 1991 1991 2005 1997 2000 2000 2001 2001 1998 1998 1998 1991 1991 1991 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 3 3 1 3 1 3 3 2 3 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 137 .

Appendix V: Data on Universe of Cases Figure 1: Number of Affiliations by Year Number of Affiliations by Year 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year Figure 2: Distribution by Type of Affiliation Figure 3: Distribution by Region 138 .

67 13.5 20.67 13.5 20.67 0.67 13.60648E-06 Table 2: Statistical Significance Testing (Two Scales) Opportunistic Motive Not a motivation Motivation Expected (Not a motivation) Expected (Motivation) P Value 5 36 20.Appendix VI: Data on Q1 What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida’s and its pan-Islamic agenda? Table 1: Chi-Squared Test (Three Scales) Opportunistic Motive Total 0 (Not a motivation) Total 1 (Secondary motivation) Total 2 (Primary motivation) Expected Total 0 Expected Total 1 Expected Total 2 P Value 5 Ideological Alignment 22 Social Network Affiliation 14 3 33 13.5 20.67 1.042330234 139 .5 0.67 13.67 13.5 0.14786E-09 11 8 13.639411853 Social Network Affiliation 14 27 20.28936E-06 Ideological Alignment 22 19 20.5 1.67 13.67 1.018767854 27 0 13.

Appendix VII: Data on Q2 What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible affiliates with Al Qa’ida? Table 3: Chi-Squared Test (Strength of operational.5 14 16.5 7.5 9.5 18.5 18.021962838 5 5.5 5.262682055 P Value 140 .5 5 5.5 17 5 8. ideological.5 0. and logistic leadership before and after the merger) Operational Before Total Not active (0) Total Weak (1) Total Average (2) Total Strong (3) Total Expected Not active Expected Weak Expected Average Expected Strong 7 10 After Sum 4 5 11 15 Ideological Before 6 7 After Sum 4 10 10 17 Logistic Before 6 8 After Sum 4 3 10 11 7 17 41 12 20 41 19 37 82 16 12 41 5 22 41 21 34 82 11 16 41 17 17 41 28 33 82 5.5 0.5 17 0.256764552 5 8.5 7.5 10.5 9.5 10.5 14 16.

ideological. and logistic leadership before and after the merger) Paired Sign Test for Operational Leadership Performance (pre-post) # Differences >0 # of Differences <0 # Differences =0 P-Value 10 16 15 0.1397 16 231.466 0.469 10 119.382 0.421 6 108 18 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Logistic Leadership Performance (pre-post) 15 2 -1.25 # Ranks <0 # of Ranks >0 Table 5: Paired Sign Test (Strength of operational.422 0.313 10 122 12.3269 Paired Sign Test for Overall Leadership Performance (prepost) 10 22 9 0.91 0.Table 4: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (Strength of operational.1549 -1.5 11.95 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Overall Leadership Performance (pre-post) 9 5 -1.359 0.614 10 162.0562 22 365.1742 -1.2 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Ideological Leadership Performance (pre-post) 16 3 -1.161 16 229 14.477 0. and logistic leadership before and after the merger) Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Operational Leadership Performance (pre-post) # of 0 Differences # of Ties Z-Value P-Value Tied ZValue Tied PValue Count Sum of Ranks Mean Rank Count Sum of Ranks Mean Rank 15 3 -1.5 16.1269 19 217 11.898 0.3269 Paired Sign Test for Ideological Leadership Performance (pre-post) 19 6 16 0.0577 -1.1425 -1.0146 Paired Sign Test for Logistic Leadership Performance (pre-post) 10 16 15 0.5 16.526 0. ideological.0501 141 .5 14.

Figures 4-6: Paired Sign Test Results 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Operational Ideologigcal Logistic Total Score Difference (Post-Pre) Improved or no change Declined 25 20 Score Difference (Post-Pre) 15 Improved Declined 10 5 0 Operational Ideologigcal Logistic Total 142 .

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful

Master Your Semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Special offer: Get 4 months of Scribd and The New York Times for just $1.87 per week!

Master Your Semester with a Special Offer from Scribd & The New York Times