This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Sarah Catanzaro Professor Martha Crenshaw, Advisor Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………...4 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………....5 Chapter 1: Building a Complex Organization………………………………………....6 I. II. III. IV. Evolution of Al Qa’ida’s Organizational Structure…………………………………..7 A Description of Complex Organizations………………………………...…………..12 The Role of “Mergers and Acquisitions”………………………..…………………...13 Initial Thoughts on Policy Implications……………………………………………….15
Chapter 2: Literature Review………………………………………………………….17 I. II. Literature on Al Qa’ida’s Foreign Affiliates…………………………………………17 Literature on Joining Radical Movements……………………………………………20 A. Ideological motivations………………………………………………20 B. Psychosocial motivations…………………………………………….22 C. Strategic/opportunistic motivations………………………………….23 Literature on Terrorist Leadership…………………………………………………….25 A. The personality of terrorist leaders…………………………………..25 B. Targeting leadership………………………………………………….26
Chapter 3: Methodology………………………………………………………………..28 I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. Background……………………………………………………………………………….28 Assessing Q1……………………………………………………………………………...30 Assessing Q2……………………………………………………………………………...38 Developing the Universe of Cases……………………………………………………..40 Selection of Study Subjects……………………………………………………………...42 Problems Regarding Information Gathering…………………………………………43 Case Study………………………………………………………………………………...44 Relevance………………………………………………………………………………….44
Chapter 4: Universe of Cases…………………………………………………………..46 I. II. III. IV. Al Qa’ida’s Affiliates: An Evolving Network…………………………………………46 Al Qa’ida’s Affiliates: The Geographic Distribution………………………………..53 Al Qa’ida’s Affiliates: Mergers? Partnerships? Or Collaborations?...................57 Summary of Findings…………………………………………………………………….59
Chapter 5: Results of Statistical Hypothesis Testing…………………………………60 I. II. Data Analysis and Results for Q1: What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida’s and its pan-Islamic agenda?.......................................................60 Data Analysis and Results for Q2: What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible affiliates with Al Qa’ida……………………………………………………………….. 61
Chapter 6: Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb and Abdelmalek Droukdal – A Well Executed Merger…………………………………………………………………………………64 I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. The Origins of Islamic Violence in Algeria after the War of Independence……...64 The Birth of the Salvation Islamic Front……………………………………………...65 The Beginnings of the GIA and the Onset of an Epoch of Violence……………….66 An Alternative Emerges: The Origins of the GSPC…………………………………67 Fissions Form Within the GSPC……………………………………………………….67 The Rise of Droukdal…………………………………………………………………….71 Droukdal’s Program: Toward Global Jihad……………………………...………….73 The Announcement of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb………………..………...77 A New Organization……………………………………………………………………..78 Final Observations………………………………………………………………………80
Chapter 7: Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya: The Unrealized Merger………………………83 I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. The Emergence of the GAI from the Ashes of the Muslim Brotherhood………….83 The Sadat Assassination………………………………………………………………...84 Crackdown under Mubarak…………………………………………………………….84 Campaign of Terror……………………………………………..………………………85 Collapse of an Armed Group…………………………………………………………...86 Reconciliation…………………………………………………………………………….88 Explaining the Decision not to Affiliate with Al Qa’ida…………………………….89 Final Observations………………………………………………………………………91
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion – Al Qa’ida’s Commanding Officers: A Skilled Management Team……………………………………………………………………..93 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………...107 Appendix I: List of Terrorist Groups………………………………………………..115 Appendix II: Sources by Terrorist Group…………………………………………...116 Appendix III: Commanding Officer Attribute Codebook……………………….....135 Appendix IV: Commanding Officer Attributes……………………………………..136 Appendix V: Data on Universe of Cases……………………………………………..138 Appendix VI: Data on Q1…………………………………………………………….139 Appendix VII: Data on Q2……………………………………………………………140
Abstract: Al Qa’ida has allied with indigenous terrorist groups for over a decade. 4 . Based on this analysis. rather than ideological concerns are the primary motivating factors for joining Al Qa’ida. shared visions become essential. after these affiliations occur. has Osama Bin Laden increasingly relied upon these franchises to prosecute his panIslamic struggle. only in recent years. It then focuses on the role that local jihadist leaders play in the aftermath of the affiliation to shed further light on Al Qa’ida’s current strategy and operations. The conclusion of this paper finds that while opportunistic. The local jihadist leaders who become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers ensure ideological alignment with Al Qa’ida. However. this paper offers some broad recommendations regarding the future conduct of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This paper examines first the motivations of local jihadist groups who associate with Al Qa’ida to understand the transformation that Al Qa’ida has achieved.
Finally. a traditionally male-dominated discipline. Moreover.Acknowledgements: The ideas of more people than I can possibly mention have affected my thinking about terrorist organizations and Al Qa’ida over the years. for whom I would also like to show gratitude. how friends and neighbors had disappeared and presumably perished during this devastating attack on America’s soil. Yet despite a pervasive sense of insecurity. and Professor Crenshaw most certainly earned mine through her impressive career. Admiration should be earned. the members of my community began to dig themselves literally and metaphorically from the ruins of the 9/11 disaster. This solidarity and resiliency consolidated my faith in humanity and sparked my interest in homeland security studies. who is currently a junior in high school. I would like to thank Colonel Joseph Felter and Jarrett Brachman who introduced me to several primary and secondary documents. Professor Crenshaw helped answer my questions promptly. at length. It gives me great pleasure to thank Professors Paul Stockton and Michael May for the opportunity to participate in the CISAC Interschool Honors Program. I hope that a general acknowledgement here of the wisdom and understanding may be counted to me for righteousness. objectivity. Thus. I would be remiss not to acknowledge my parents. Without a doubt. not given. and more recently into the making of this thesis. These sources proved to be a treasure-chest indeed. Through the CISAC seminars. 2001 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers. both personal and intellectual is more important than can adequately be acknowledge in such a brief note. I would also like to thank my brother. She also put at my disposal her insights on numerous topics. but most importantly for serving as an incredible mentor. Thank you so much for your patience. I distinctly remember the sense of dissociation and unreality as we struggled to understand how our beloved Twin Towers were destroyed. In addition. I have been so fortunate to benefit from their generosity and acumen. I have benefited particularly from communications with Professor Martha Crenshaw. I dedicate my thesis to the population of Port Washington. New York which was tragically impacted by the September 11. Their constant support. Professors Stockton and May helped me clarify and expand my views about this project on numerous occasions. Since my sophomore year at Stanford. I would have been hardpressed to get this project done in anything like a timely fashion had it not been for this program. who listened to my presentations with great attention and offered so many thoughtful suggestions and useful comments. he continues to inspire me every day with his thoughtfulness and intelligence. There were cars parked at our train station that were never recovered and fathers and mothers who never returned from work. she has offered me practical and affectionate support. and with enthusiasm. Port Washington. Moreover. Acts of kindness and heroism became increasingly visible in my community as people mobilized to help one another. 5 . this project would have been poorer without her invaluable comments. I am also grateful to Dara Kay Cohen. Professor Crenshaw lives as a role model for the next generation of female investigators researching international security. I want to recognize my community. I was so fortunate to have had Dara around as an academic example and important mentor. Despite his youth. I have had the opportunity to try out some of my ideas and receive valuable criticism from my peers. and coaching.
Stern 2003). Gunaratna 2004). Thus. and to dispatch operatives worldwide. communicate often. most fail to assess the exchange relationships that distinguish Al Qa’ida. Dishman 2005). since the onset of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). to plan attacks. Al Qa’ida’s structure and degree of centralization may fluctuate within a period of months or weeks. A few dominant camps have emerged within this scholarly debate. and depend upon each other. Moreover. In contrast. Some scholars even contend that the main threat no longer emanates from Al Qa’ida but from unassociated radicalized individuals and groups who meet and plot in their neighborhoods and on the Internet (Sageman 2008. Al Qa’ida was a relatively centralized organization that used Afghanistan as a base from which to strategize.Chapter 1: Building a Complex Organization Prior to the September 11. An organization characterized by “loose coupling” has cells that are relatively autonomous and independent. they fail to acknowledge that this combination of loose and tight coupling has enabled Al Qa’ida to become a modern hydra that readily adapts to changes in its environment. 2001 attacks. The first maintains that Al Qa’ida Central Command retains ideological and operational control over the organization and preserves a certain degree of tactical influence. Ronfeldt 2005. all oversimplify the command configuration utilized by Al Qa’ida. However. Al Qa’ida utilizes a mix of both loose and tight coupling to attain a remarkable degree of adaptability. Although most scholars perceive Al Qa’ida as an organization in stasis. While each perspective has its merits. Others suggest that Al Qa’ida has become a decentralized network of individualized and local cells bound together exclusively by common beliefs (Diebert and Stein 2003. Al Qa’ida has transformed into a more ambiguous entity that scholars cannot easily define. an organization characterized by “tight coupling” includes cells that associate intimately. Currently. One can 6 .
Evolution of Al Qa’ida’s Organizational Structure: 7 . Ayman Zawahiri and the core of Al Qa’ida. distinguishing the groups with which Al Qa’ida is strongly associated. and identifying and assessing the role of the commanders who interact with Osama Bin Laden. This study will draw upon open source and primary source information to understand why and how Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers promote the pan-Islamic agenda. the conclusions drawn from this analysis may present policymakers with new and novel ways of targeting Al Qa’ida and its partners. I. It is important to analyze these individuals because they have assumed more authority since September 11. 2001. these external relationships enabled Al Qa’ida to transform into a complex organization. Although Al Qa’ida has cooperated with local jihadist groups for years. since the onset of the Global War on Terror. By defining the new structure of Al Qa’ida (characterized by loosely integrated and operationally attached subunits. characterized by an efficient blend of both tight and loose coupling.therefore classify Al Qa’ida as a complex organization a concept that will be elaborated in this chapter (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2003). One method whereby Al Qa’ida achieves such adaptability is by merging or partnering with local jihadist groups. Moreover. However. recently. this study may affect the allocation of resources in Washington for counterterrorism efforts. Al Qa’ida has begun to depend on these affiliates to obtain organizational flexibility to a considerable extent. This study will examine the incentives and role of former local jihadist group leaders who now serve as Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. Al Qa’ida has affiliated with indigenous terrorist groups for almost twenty years. each led by a commanding officer).
In the Sudan. and Abdullah Azzam. Osama bin Laden. However. However. Bin Laden expanded the Al Qa’ida organization. This council promoted common goals. most of whom he knew since his formative days in Afghanistan.e. that Bin Laden began calling his cadre al Qaeda al Askariya (“the military base”) and developing a greater organizational structure (Riedel 2008). The finance committee oversaw and developed financial resources. a large number of jihadists from the Middle East traveled to Afghanistan to combat the Soviet Union.In the 1980s. Pakistan to serve as a hostel for Arabs coming to fight the Soviets and as a press agency to produce propaganda to promote jihad. The religious committee justified Al 8 . coordinated targets. training. At the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan war. after the liberation of Kuwait from Saddam Hussein by the American-led multinational army. Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia as a hero of jihad. He relocated to the Sudan at the invitation of the government of Hassan Turabi and the National Islamic Front. a multimillionaire from a wealthy Saudi family. procuring. Bin Laden was disenchanted with his native Saudi Arabia. which had rebuffed his offer to defend the kingdom. in 1991. The organization was centered upon the “shura” (i. advisory council) consisting of Bin Laden’s closest associates. established an office in Peshawar. and authorized asset sharing for terrorist operations. and launching support and military operations. it was not until the summer of 1988. an Islamic scholar and founding member of the Kashmiri jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. The Services Bureau (“Maktab al Khadamat”) provided travel funds and guesthouses in Pakistan for recruits and volunteers to facilitate the struggle against the Soviet forces. developing a membership roster and establishing a hierarchical arrangement to guide and oversee its functions (Riedel 2008). The military committee was responsible for recruiting. The shura majilis (consultative assembly) received information from four subordinate committees designed to direct specific segments of planning and operations.
Saudi Arabia. Egypt. Once a specific operation was decided upon. The September 11. and the Capitol Building. other western governments. all three of which faced indigenous terrorist groups supported by Bin Laden. the Pentagon. Al Qa’ida’s former propaganda chief. in its earlier incarnation. thereby strengthening Al Qa’ida Central Command and forming a close-knit group of jihadists uniquely capable of executing terror operations like the September 11. 2001 attacks reveal the former nature of Al Qa’ida’s decision-making apparatus. the last emir of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. the media committee produced propaganda intended to generate Muslim support for the organization and its objectives (Harmony Database Released Documents: Al Qa'ida Goals and Structure 2006). Al Qa’ida could be classified as a centralized organization. In May 1997. although Al Qa’ida also assisted two other Salafi terrorist groups during this formative period in the Sudan. Bin Laden left the Sudan to return to Afghanistan as a result of combined pressure from the United States. Thus. Moreover. Bin Laden cemented his ties to Ayman Zawahiri. Finally. hatched the plan to target the Twin Towers.Qa’ida’s actions and operations within the theological parameters of Al Qa’ida model of Islam. it would be assigned to a carefully selected cell headed by a senior Al Qa’ida operative who reported personally to Bin Laden (Wright 2007). Afghanistan’s lack of central government provided Bin Laden with greater leeway to pursue his agenda and centralize his operations. Bin Laden personally recruited the plot’s 9 . In May 1996. and Libya. The plot to attack the United State began in 1999 after Al Qa’ida executed the simultaneous bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Bin Laden was able to forge his closest alliance yet with the Taliban by providing it with significant financial and human resources to support the ongoing war against other factions in northern Afghanistan. 2001 attacks against the United States (Bergen 2002). Bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad.
Mohammed Atta as well as the fifteen operatives who would intimidate the passengers during the airline hijackings. they established their own individual plans (Felter et al. When operations are so decentralized. Al Qa’ida soon learned that there are limitations to a strictly decentralized structure. In November 2002. Nevertheless. networked terrorist organizations would be less vulnerable to traditional counterterrorism measures used by hierarchically organized security forces. many Al Qa’ida leaders were imprisoned. Mullah Omar in the preparation (Riedel 2008). which used Afghanistan as a base from which to carry out major operations against American targets and did not significantly depend upon its affiliates to support its operations in the Middle East. for instance. individual cells. Captives revealed the names of their commanders and associates thereby highlighting the need for loose coupling between local operatives and Al Qa’ida’s executive leadership in order to evade government interference and limit the consequences of any further compromises. While they operated in support of centralized directives. After the first year of the GWOT and the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan. he engaged the Taliban and its leader. were instructed to develop their own organizational structures. Although Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida considered 9/11 an astonishing success. it becomes particularly difficult to maintain 10 . he personally handled other elements of the conspiracy.tactical leader. 2006). Al Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran at which the shura recognized that Al Qa’ida could no longer function as a hierarchy. These arrests led to subsequent arrests of other senior officers. the attacks precipitated the Global War on Terror (GWOT). detached from Al Qa’ida Central Command and other cells. Additionally. The shura concluded that a decentralized. Prior to 9/11. Al Qa’ida was a centralized organization. composed of less than ten operatives. From this point forward.
Brachman. Al Qa’ida could not effectively monitor its agents’ activities. In 2002 and 2003. prior to the invasion of Iraq. competition for prominence within the movement. who are the most important link in the formation of a resilient. who espoused different personal preferences. Like most other organizations. the U. decision to go to war with Iraq and the Pakistani decision to provoke a crisis with India allowed Al Qa’ida to survive by regaining a degree of centralization. Perkins. Bramlett.S. the US allowed Al Qa’ida to reconstitute itself in the tribal areas of Pakistan. These commanding officers ensure that preference divergence does not result in the loss of 11 . India began to mobilize along the border. after five Kashmiri terrorists attacked Lok Sabha. these low-level operatives sought more violence than was useful due to the cognitive dynamics of an underground organization. Moreover. rather than consolidating its victory in Afghanistan. thereby provoking Pakistan to divert to the east troops that were needed in the west. Invading Iraq diverted troops from the mission of finding Al Qa’ida’s leadership. Thus. the lower house of India’s parliament in New Delhi. and Fishman 2006). Al Qa’ida faced challenges when Central Command was forced to delegate certain duties to low level operatives. Al Qa’ida leadership found itself cornered along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and unable to coordinate its low-level operatives. As the result of restoration of central control. nor could it punish renegade agents (Felter. Often. Within a decentralized framework. Al Qa’ida can rely upon closer relations with its commanding officers (the former leaders of indigenous terrorist groups). Al Qa’ida was able to reestablish some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities by exploiting Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Riedel 2008).situational awareness and control the use of violence to achieve specific political ends. However. and their own talent at conducting aggressive attacks (Shapiro 2007). complex organization.
II. qualified by loosely coupled systems. Empowered by the establishment of its safe haven in Pakistan and increased reliance upon its commanding officers. By contrast. the relationships between cells and between operatives and Al Qa’ida Central Command are loosely coupled. complex organizations can exploit a diversity of systems (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2001). qualified by tightly coupled systems or exclusively decentralized organizations. This flexible structure allows the Central Command to maintain control over specifically identified strategic operations through its commanding officers while enabling cells to maintain their autonomy in local and regional operations (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2006). While it is difficult to 12 . Al Qa’ida’s demand for operational secrecy. Al Qa’ida continues to morph into a complexly structure organization (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2006). While the relationships within the cells are tightly coupled. and large size dictated its organizational decisions. Before Al Qa’ida Central Command reorganized itself in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Unlike strictly centralized organizations.operational success or security. Al Qa’ida now relies heavily upon semiautonomous cells found in operational territories that are horizontally and vertically integrated into the centralized command structure. the relationship between its commanding officers and central authorities were also loosely coupled (thus. who interact with and mutually affect one another. today. intricate nature of resource gathering and allocation. Although a decentralized organization form was more appropriate and prudent after 9/11. Al Qa’ida is a true “complex organization”). A Description of Complex Organizations: As this history indicates. highly visible organizational personnel. the relationship between Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers and central authorities are moderately coupled (thus. Complex organizations are composed of a diversity of agents. Al Qa’ida was effectively a decentralized network). it was not very efficient.
now when Al Qa’ida merges. Brachman. Moreover. Since they are already closely coupled to their agents. and Fishman 2006). they can build differentiated relationships with their rapports rather than espousing an “average” leadership style. Communication frequency. or collaborates with a local jihadist groups. Bin Laden did not seek to exert strategic or operational control over the leaders of its regionally based affiliates. the extensive negotiations that continue to occur between Al Qa’ida and its affiliates suggest that Al Qa’ida has consciously utilized these arrangements to remain resilient. These commanding officers can serve a crucial role since they are better able to monitor the behavior of their agents and can punish and reward them for their performance. However. Al Qa’ida theorist Abu Musab al-Suri noted the importance of a highly trained cadre of senior commanding officers. III.determine if Al Qa’ida assumed this structure by conscious design or coincidence. Previously. The Role of “Mergers and Acquisitions:” By affiliating with local jihadist movements. Perkins. it employs the groups’ leaders as its commanding officers and integrates them into Al Qa’ida Central Command by establishing communication channels and by offering financial and technological resources to these leaders for their local outlets with stipulations. partners. interactive communication 13 . Bramlett. These relationships are characterized by a high degree of leader-member exchange and commitment that was impossible to achieve between Al Qa’ida Central Command executives and operatives due to their lack of physical proximity. Al Qa’ida has achieved an optimal combination of coupling. these commanding officers are effective because they can develop mature relationships with their operatives. He observed that a dearth of such leaders reduces the maximum level of control Al Qa’ida could exert thereby undermining the potential for political impact (Felter.
and Fishman 2006). There is a positive correlation between the level of ideological indoctrination of cell members and the degree of control a leader exerts.patterns. Perkins. Studies from the corporate world as well as observations by Al Qa’ida theorists reveal that when agents develop high quality relationships with their leaders. cohesive units can innovate and adapt to the demands of the environment because they do not need to conform to a strict set of guidelines passed down from Central Command. which can be tracked by counterterrorist forces. leader-member value agreement. Thus. their performance. these new. Al Qa’ida can ensure that strategic and tactical differences between it and its commanding officers are reconciled. and member affect are all key in this dyadic relationship (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). Moreover. 14 . Bramlett. decision influence. relying on lower-level operatives (who are often less committed. Local leaders can also effectively monitor operative’s personal and social network. subordinate loyalty. and their overall unit performance improves (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). Providing funds on a need-to-have basis to smaller groups of operatives is a risky strategy because each additional transfer entails communications and financial transactions. Because affiliations are often preceded by several months of bargaining and negotiations. The moderate coupling between Al Qa’ida Central Command and local leaders is essential to the performance of the organization. Moreover. Al Qa’ida Central Command can rely upon its commanding officers to handle finance and logistic tasks and to engage in auditing strategies. Commanding officers now serve an important role as interlocutors with Al Qa’ida Central Command. since the most devoted operatives are obliged to engage in riskier or inherently fatal assignments) is a more hazardous strategy (Felter. Jarrett Brachman. ensuring that relationships that could dilute commitment are avoided and those that enhance commitment are strengthened(Brachman and McCants 2006).
the use of force. press and scholarly articles. Initial Thoughts on Policy Implications: 15 .By allowing its commanding officers to retain significant freedom to interact with other local leaders and with resource providers. finances. up-to-date. they are given latitude to exploit their specific environment. transmitting new. government documents. efficiency. information between operatives and Al Qa’ida authorities (McAllister 2004). IV. thereby ensuring the unity. and equipment. Thus. accountability for operation effectiveness. and competence of local cells. and Internet articles. duty of care to their agents. obligations to Al Qa’ida Central Command. these commanding officers can ensure the dissemination of innovation and information by acting as an intermediary between their cell members and Al Qa’ida Central Command. local leaders-cum-commanding officers perform a crucial function by liaising with Al Qa’ida Central Command. at present. Although these commanding officers have significant responsibilities (for example. this study provides valuable insight into the transformation that these leaders undergo when they become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers by looking at their responsibilities before and after they affiliate with Al Qa’ida. Drawing upon documents and transcripts of legal proceedings involving global Salafi mujahedin and their organizations. Currently. Moreover. this study compiles the biographies of over forty Al Qa’ida commanding officers. they act as a hub of communication. This is the first study that pinpoints the organizations with which Al Qa’ida has affiliated and identifies their leaders (who subsequently become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers). Moreover. thereby allowing Al Qa’ida to maintain ideological and operational control over the organization and by closely interacting with local operatives. and powers including discipline and punishment of their agents) no researcher has analyzed their role or background. scrutinizing their stories for patterns to determine their motivation.
Government efforts to degrade Al Qa’ida’s capacity should focus on undermining its security environment, minimizing the degree to which it can control operations, and abort its ability to fund its activities. By identifying the crucial role played by commanding officers in sustaining Al Qa’ida, this study will suggest additional means of undermining Al Qa’ida. The government should increase dissension between local leaders and Al Qa’ida Central Command. The US government should publicly recognize and highlight the differences between the acquired groups, who originally espouse ambitions such as regime overthrow and Al Qa’ida, which is committed to a pan-Islamic program. Moreover, the government can disrupt communications channels between local leaders and Al Qa’ida central command by utilizing misinformation and flooding information channels, thereby forcing the commanding officers to communicate more frequently with Al Qa’ida Central Command, possibly revealing crucial information. There may be “psychological” tactics that can be employed to generate dissension, to exploit certain aspects of human or group dynamics that would lead to competition, or rebellion. Moreover, there may be certain personality characteristics of the types of individuals employed at each level of organization that can be manipulated. Finally, government efforts should deny jihadist groups the benefit of security vacuum in vulnerable areas; thereby barring the emergence of potential Al Qa’ida partners. Through troop deployment, the US government can deny terrorists the use of vulnerable countries as staging grounds for the attacks in the West.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Recently, counterterrorist agents and military officers have mounted efforts to combat Al Qa’ida and Bin Laden supporters. However, there is considerable controversy among scholars regarding the structure of Al Qa’ida and therefore, how best to target this formidable foe. The debate regarding the nature of Al Qa’ida’s threat will inevitably impact upon the allocation of influence and resource by the U.S. federal government in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) embarked upon following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The outcome of the bureaucratic turf wars over funding for programs under the new Obama administration will surely define future directions and strategies to confront Al Qa’ida specifically and global terrorism in general. In the introductory chapter, I highlighted the newfound importance of Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers, which lead the groups with which Al Qa’ida has recently merged or with whom it remains associated. Although Al Qa’ida retains its core group and a well-trained terrorist cadre, it has become increasingly engaged with regional affiliates in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula, Indonesia, and other sites in franchise operations. I. Literature on Al Qa’ida’s Foreign Affiliates Several scholars have investigated the process whereby Al Qa’ida has achieved a broader geographic and operational reach by employing local jihadist groups. These researchers confirm my commentary that such partnerships can provide Al Qa’ida with increased flexibility and offer advantages in stimulating tactical level innovation within particular environments when they are astutely directed by Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. In a report prepared for the Combat Studies Institute, Kalic describes Al Qa’ida as a “modern hydra.” He observes that before the onset of the GWOT, Al Qa’ida functioned as a regional indoctrination and training center for Islamic terrorist organizations. However, he
corroborates my observation that because of the loss of support and training centers in Afghanistan due to Operation Enduring Freedom, Bin Laden was obliged to rely upon outside groups in order to perpetuate Al Qa’ida’s agenda. Kalic suggests that Al Qa’ida’s alliances with Abu Sayyaf, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Tunisian Combatant Group, and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group have enabled Al Qa’ida to expand its geographic influence and diffuse its organizational structure. He describes the process whereby Al Qa’ida supports local “walk in” Islamic groups that pitch their plans to Al Qa’ida for financial support. These radical groups provide additional reach to Al Qa’ida and expand its operational capability for minimal investment because they can develop indigenous plans and operations based on local situations and observations. Moreover, they allow Al Qa’ida to minimize exposure of its central command structure (Kalic 2005) In a similar vein, Takeyh and Gvosdev have observed that after the destruction of its sanctuary in Afghanistan, Al Qa’ida has remained buoyant by forging foreign alliances. Through this strategy, Al Qa’ida has established a presence in failed states where it believes the US will opt not to risk significant losses associated with urban/guerilla warfare. Al Qa’ida no longer needs a strong state for funding and supplies since it can rely on its franchises in countries like Kashmir, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Palestine (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). Riedel avows that the US invasion of Iraq and subsequent efforts to quell sectarian unrest have allowed Al Qa’ida to regroup in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where it has established a new base of operations. Now, Al Qa’ida is once again focused on enlarging its network. Consequently, Al Qa’ida has developed a closer relationship with Kashmiri terrorist groups, like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad that have a presence there. Moreover, while Al Qa’ida has failed to topple the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, its attacks against these
foiled in 2006. Al Qa’ida remains associated with these groups as long as they cannot operate independently. Finally. and revivalist organizations (like Tablighi Jamaat) (Stern 2003). indicates that Al Qa’ida has established connections in Europe. For instance. Al Qa’ida can forge broad. the plot to destroy ten commercial airliners en route from the United Kingdom to the United States. or Lebanon in the near future (Riedel 2007).” Due to the adaptability of its mission. when they prove that they no longer need Al Qa’ida’s material or normative support to conduct independent maneuvers. Riedel suggests that Al Qa’ida may seek a foothold in Gaza. Al Qa’ida need not maintain constant supervision or control over the activities of its old affiliate’s operatives (Mishal and Rosenthal 2005). and sometimes unlikely alliances with other jihadist groups (like Jemaah Islamiyah). Mishal and Rosenthal describe Al Qa’ida as a “dune organization” that employs other loosely affiliated organizations to carry out its missions. obliging both entities to adapt. with Shia organizations (like Hezbollah). she avows that Bin Laden has adjusted his objectives over time and describes Al Qa’ida as a “flexible group of ruthless warriors ready to fight on behalf of multiple causes. Africa. In a similar vein.regimes demonstrate its expanded influence throughout the Middle East. She maintains that many organizations will form alliances with groups that have ideologies different from their own. she suggests that both Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan compromised their original mission when they joined forces with Al Qa’ida. thus. However. Al Qa’ida finds another organization that can attain its other goals and leaves this former associate to continue the war on its own. The affiliated groups may employ a modus operandi. 19 . with traditional organized crime groups (like Artab Ansari’s [an Indian gangster] network). which is not identical to Al Qa’ida’s tactics. Stern observes that terrorist groups’ objectives have evolved to ensure their survival. Moreover.
offering only its name. II. He offers Al Qa’ida in Iraq as an example of a group which compromised Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic mission by attacking Muslim civilians and engaging in conflict with other Iraqi insurgent groups (Fishman 2008). and ideology. strategic mistakes and are more susceptible to counterterrorism offensives than their mother organization. Desouza and Hengsen provide the most comprehensive analysis of Al Qa’ida’s collaborative activities. they describe mergers and acquisitions. 20 . or personnel for a specific purpose and duration and “minority equity investments. whereby Al Qa’ida combines with or subsumes another organization. Finally. reputation. He avers that Al Qa’ida offers these franchises few benefits. They analyze several possible arrangements. They contend that these interactions are the most complex form of equity engagements that terrorist groups develop to survive in competitive environments and suggest that mergers/acquisitions allow terrorist groups to consolidate their assets to compete more successfully or exploit resources held by other parties (Desouza and Hengsen 2007).Fishman is less worried about Al Qa’ida franchises than other scholars. Many groups that merge or partner with Al Qa’ida adhere to a program based on the ethnic. They avow that terrorist groups cannot be self-sustaining and must “engage in the fundamentals of established economic practices” to furnish protection from outside threats. equipment. He contends that Al Qa’ida’s franchises are likely to commit rash.” whereby Al Qa’ida finances terrorist groups with the intention of influencing their strategic activity.” whereby Al Qa’ida allows other groups to use its facilities. Literature on Incentives for Joining Radical Movements A. including “licensing agreements. Ideological motivations While these studies analyze Al Qa’ida’s strategy and explain why Al Qa’ida has pursued such arrangements. they do not reveal why local jihadist groups choose to align with Al Qa’ida.
it is a tool for enlarging the potential supporters of the organization. Based on her interpretation. She maintains that political organizations often orient their ideology to support recruitment. Jones. She observes that the attention groups pay to adjusting their ideology to circumstance is revealed when they explain and justify their strategies. she proposes that ideology is a strategic choice made by the organization. Upon allying with Al Qa’ida. One could also envisage that Al Qa’ida is promoting its pan-Islamic vision because it is aware of the magnetism of this dream. Unfortunately. Della Porta suggests that individuals are persuaded to enlist in underground organizations when they are enticed by its ideology. enemies and allies are described in different terms at different times (Della Porta 1995). Like Stern. Consequently. and Weeding validate this line of thought. linguistic. many groups grapple with contradictions between national and supranational aims. they must forsake their indigenous agendas to support the global pan-Islamic movement. In fact. They contend that Al 21 . Al Qa’ida can co-opt local struggles into an evolving network of worldwide jihad by asserting its dedication to an international agenda. one might expect that local jihadist leaders subscribe to Al Qa’ida’s global jihad because the idea of establishing an Islamic Caliphate throughout the world is attractive to them. They observe that although Al Qa’ida was initially devoted to fighting the Soviet forces it now espouses more internationalist objectives.sectarian. Smith. and state boundaries in which they arose. few studies investigate the incentives of the local jihadist leaders who adopt Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program and transform their organization into part of Al Qa’ida’s system. Studies regarding why individuals join radical movements may inform our understanding of the motivations of local terrorists leaders who connect with Al Qa’ida’s global enterprise. Consequently.
as well as 14 secular terrorists from Fatah al-Islam. As a consequence of the GWOT and the war in Iraq. Sprinzak. He avows that traditionally. Consequently. and Denny 2003). B. Pedahzur. Perliger. global events have provided the context for the new generation to gain exposure to significant ideological training and indoctrination. membership in fundamentalist organizations and repeat terrorist acts. and Denny interviewed 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern extremists from Hamas. and Hezbollah. They offer Jemaah Islamiyah as an example of an organization that was seduced by Al Qa’ida’s discussion of a pan-Islamic caliphate (Jones. They observed that most had a high school education and some had additional schooling and that most came from respected families that supported their activism. and Weinberg observed 80 Palestinian suicide terrorists from 1973 to 2002. Sprinzak. Psychosocial motivations Conversely. other studies suggest that individuals join terrorist networks for psychosocial reasons. However. They noticed that these terrorists exhibited a higher rate of religious education. Al Qa’ida successfully transformed the parochial thinking of these groups through a sophisticated propaganda campaign to orient them towards global. Gunaratna also supports this argument. Similarly. As a result. they concluded that income and/or educational inequalities do not account for terrorism. Smith. Post. Islamist groups fought secular Muslim governments either to replace them or to form a separate state. Gunaratna 2002). Moreover. rather than local jihad. Al Qa’ida anti-Western curriculum is increasingly alluring (R. and Weeding 2003). They deduced that peer influence and increased social standing were major reasons for joining a terrorist group (Post.Qa’ida has improved its media wing to appeal to local jihadist groups in their native language and honor regional customs. Islamic Jihad. they 22 .
Although his research was biased towards leaders who have come to the public attention. members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Jemaah Islamiyah. and Weinberg 2003). Marc Sageman’s book. rational.proposed that the terrorists acted out of altruistic motives (devotion to a religious community) and deduced that recruitment could be based on a network of shared social values(Pedahzur. calculated decision to execute a particular type of action. Perliger. Strategic/opportunistic motivations Alternatively. terrorist leaders may have opportunistic motives for securing a spot under Al Qa’ida’s umbrella. These participants in jihad grew up with strong positive values of religion. spirituality and concern for their communities. Each mode of operation has a per-unit price that 23 . C. On the contrary. he found that social bonds were the critical element in the process of joining jihad and he suggested that such connections precede ideological commitment (Sageman 2004). Moreover. Several academics believe that terrorist action derives from a conscious. He observed that members of terrorist organizations were generally middle-class. which they perceive to be the optimum strategy to accomplish a sociopolitical goal. He sample included expatriate leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group. Sagemen found no evidence of pathological narcissism or paranoid personality disorder amongst those who he surveyed. Understanding Terror Network is particularly revealing. and Al Qa’ida. educated young men from caring and religious families. Sageman compiled data from public sources on 172 individuals who he identified as members of a global Salafi mujahedeen. Sandler and Enders contend that terrorists must choose between different strategies and modes of attack based on their perception of “prices” associated with alternative operations. the GSPC.
It is possible that these groups take the transnational jihadist challenge seriously because the idea of creating a single Islamic state or reviving the united Caliphate of earlier times is captivating. local jihadist leaders may confederate with Al Qa’ida due to psychosocial influences. while training together. access to training facilities. etc. these local jihadist leaders may seek concrete benefits such as the provision of financial resources. 24 . He further notes that local jihadist cells shed their outlaw status within radical Muslim circles when they have Al Qa’ida’s backing. may unite with Al Qa’ida to guarantee organizational survival. Based on these accounts. Hoffman notes that approximately 90 percent of all terrorist groups collapse within a year and only half of the remainder survives another decade. one can imagine three different rationales why local jihadist group leaders would affiliate with Al Qa’ida. Finally. local jihadist group leaders may be lured by Al Qa’ida’s ideology. Finally. In this context. embracing global jihad may be perceived as a way to control and recruit new group members (Bruce Hoffman 2004). any act executed by a terrorist organization can be perceived as a rational choice (Sandler and Enders 2004). In joining Al Qa’ida. and association with the Al Qa’ida label. by extension. Thus. Alternatively. who might otherwise be contained or co-opted by local regimes and. Based on these observations he suggests that several local jihadist outlets need the Al Qa’ida imprimatur to raise money. resources and anticipated outcome. These local jihadist leaders may have developed relationships with Al Qa’ida officials during the Soviet-Afghan war. He remarks upon long running government offensives that have nearly crushed several terrorist groups. the United States and its allies. he mentions that the Iraq war has sapped local jihadist groups of their most active militants. local jihadist leaders.includes the value of time. These affinities may compel local jihadist leaders to liaise with their old compatriots and mutually assist each other in their subsequent struggles. First. while incarcerated together.
III. Literature on Terrorist Leadership A. The personality of terrorist leaders While these studies enlighten the discussion regarding incentives for merging or partnering with Al Qa'ida, very little literature directly addresses the role that local jihadist leaders play before or after a merger. However, some researchers have attempted to identify personality traits that enable leaders to attract and maintain large followings. In the 1920s, German sociologist Max Weber defined charismatic leadership as “resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.” He suggested that charisma was a personality trait by virtue of which a leader appeared endowed with exceptional power or superhuman competencies. Charismatic leaders gained authority through qualities unique their own, not through positions that they occupied (Weber 1968). Kostrzebski applied Weber’s theory of charismatic authority to examine leadership in the context of Islamic tradition. He contends that a certain model of charismatic politico-religious leadership, first exemplified by Mohammed, the prophet and founder of Islam, is prominent in Islamic history. He notices that in the Islamic world, religious and political leadership is usually embodied in the persona of a single charismatic individual. He cites Mahdi of Sudan, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Osama bin Laden as examples of this archetype. Furthermore, he predicts that this type of charismatic politico-religious leader will appear with greater frequency in the future (Kostrzebski 2002). Similarly, Bergen contends that Bin Laden’s charisma helped fuel an influx of recruits and attracted aspiring jihadists to Afghanistan from Western countries. Moreover, he avows that Bin Laden’s cult of personality prompted various militant Islamic groups to affiliate with Al
Qa’ida. He notes that Bin Laden left operational planning to trusted lieutenants and stood above the fray. Consequently, few operatives received personal audience with him. However, those who went through the vetting procedures and gained access to Bin Laden describe their encounters with the legendary terrorist leader as “beautiful” (Bergen 2006). B. Targeting leadership While these studies suggest that a leader’s charisma can inspire a devoted following, they do not address the role that such leaders play within an organizational framework. While research addressing this topic has been extremely sparse, some scholars have discussed how the arrest or neutralization of a terrorist leader can affect the group’s performance. In a Joint Special Operations University report, Turbiville perceives that the United States has emphasized targeting and eliminating key terrorist leadership since 9/11. He describes the diverse experience of foreign operations against insurgent and terrorist high value targets. Based on several case studies, he concludes that leadership targeting can be effective, particularly when a group depends heavily on a charismatic leader. However, he cautions that operations which target leadership must be integrated into an overall and effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorist strategy and warns that abuses of national and international law and human rights committed in terrorist leadership targeting programs have a negative impact on larger counterinsurgency goals (Turbiville 2007). Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells examined 35 leadership crises to determine what happens to terrorist movements after the loss of a leader. Although they predicted that the assassination of a leader would cause a dramatic change in ideology leading to increased violence, they found that the assassination of a leader often causes the group to fail or disband. Moreover, they observed that the assassination of a leader is more likely to devastate a terrorist group than an arrest. They
suggest that arrested leaders may continue to play an important ideological role by guiding their group from their prison cell (Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells 2004). These studies suggest that targeting leadership could damage a terrorist group by depriving it of effective direction and demoralizing its rank and file members. However, while these analyses intimate that terrorist leaders play an important role in ensuring organizational survival, they do not expose the particular function that terrorist leaders must execute. Thus, this study is valuable since its looks at both the motivations and specific responsibilities of Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers.
During negotiations between Al Qa’ida and 28 . Al Qa’ida has expanded its reach through its affiliations so that it is uniquely positioned to target the West through spectacular attacks designed to inflict mass casualties and damage to the global economy. recently. they have become the main link between Al Qa’ida Central Command and the organization’s operative units.Chapter 3: Methodology Al Qa’ida has clearly transformed and evolved in ways described in the introduction. As centralized communication nodes within their system. Al Qa’ida has become a flexible. Currently. By depending upon its commanding officers (the former leaders of local jihadist groups). remains an important security threat. Its terrorist activity. who serve as Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. As such. Osama bin Laden. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the motivations and responsibilities of Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. conducted by operatives capable of inflicting maximum civilian and economic damages on both local and distant targets in pursuit of their extremist goals. Al Qaida’s ability to mete out devastating destruction worldwide has increased as cells have become progressively armed with modern technology. Background: The introductory chapter explained how and why Al Qa’ida relies extensively upon the leaders of regionally focused groups. In fact. Moreover. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are held responsible for its success or failure in their region. we must understand the strength that resides in its leaders. In order to understand why Al Qa’ida is such a forceful and resilient organization. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers have the ultimate authority over their region and are given wide latitude to run their units within the boundaries of Al Qa’ida’s doctrines. moderately coupled network of individuals united by a common need and ultimately aligned behind an emergent leader. I.
Although these commanding officers play a vital role in expanding the agenda of Al Qa’ida and adding legitimacy to its international campaign. The surveys reviewed. it will contribute to the bank of information and stimulate vital discourse on the composition and function of Al Qa’ida today. Just as managers from the corporate arena trying to integrate newly acquired companies and divisions. Past studies have ignored important hierarchical considerations.the potential affiliate. Commanding officers also ensure that an operative’s incentives to supply effort are not diminished and mediate conflict within their unit when the affiliation begins and as it matures. This study is the first to comprehensively examine Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. little is known about the characters. focusing primarily on principals like Osama bin Laden. communicate often and address everyone involved in the deal. so too must the commanding officers that merge their organization with Al Qa’ida prepare accordingly (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2006). because academic studies to date have not focused on Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. commanding officers are influential arbitrators. which consider categories of influence factors and their effect on an individual’s decision to join an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organization. Unfortunately. motivations. do not adequately explain why certain terrorists leaders affiliate with Al Qa’ida and its program of global jihad nor do they reveal the precise role that these officers serve within the Al Qa’ida network once affiliated. plan ahead. they help stimulate interdependency and interaction among their units and other branches of Al Qa’ida. Finally. researchers have overlooked them. involving discussions regarding financial and capital resources and tactics. Negotiations are often lengthy processes. The previous chapter revealed that literature on the role of leadership in terror networks has remained limited in scope. or credentials of these officials. I theorized that by examining the demographic characteristics of Al 29 . Thus.
Qa’ida’s operatives, such as age, educational background, years of religious training, religious affiliation, and by evaluating these operatives for their military backgrounds (e.g. war experiences/participation in the Afghanistan conflict), incarceration/prison time, migration patterns etc, I would be able to detect recognizable patterns that characterize these terrorist executives. The patterns that I observed would help me answer two critical questions: 1) What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida’s and its pan-Islamic agenda? 2) What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible affiliates with Al Qa’ida?
II. Assessing Q1: The previous chapter outlined three explanations for why individuals join terrorist organizations. Some researchers suggest that terrorists follow a strategic logic and are inspired by opportunism; they perceive armed combat at the most effective way to generate significant governmental concessions (Sandler and Enders 2004, Bruce Hoffman 2004). Others scholars suggest that ideology plays an important role in pushing militants of some militants toward terrorism (Della Porta 1995, Jones, Smith, and Weeding 2003, R. Gunaratna 2002). Finally, some academics claim that individuals join terrorist organizations due to strong solidarity bonds derived from interpersonal relations (Post, Sprinzak, and Denny 2003, Pedahzur, Perliger, and Weinberg 2003, Sageman 2004). Since prior studies have not discussed what incentives provoke local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida, I assumed that the motivations for local jihadist leaders to join Al Qa’ida’s global jihad were similar to the motivations for individuals to
join terrorist movements. Thus, to address my first question, I developed the following hypotheses: H11. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to opportunistic motives H21. Al Qa’ida commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to ideological motives H31. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due psychosocial motives H11 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers aligned with Al Qa’ida due to opportunistic motives) reflects the observation that relatively undersized, less powerful indigenous assemblies of terrorists can invigorate their organization by aligning with Al Qa’ida. In recent years, Al Qa’ida has demonstrated unusual resilience and international reach. It has exhibited a complexity, agility, and global scope that is unrivaled by any previous terrorist organization. Its fluid operational style, based on a common mission statement and shared objectives rather than standard-operating procedures has ensured its success (Stern 2003). Al Qa’ida has a remarkable ability to attract membership by relying upon a web of informal relations with various Islamic groups to gain access to operational collaborators and individuals to execute attacks. Currently, Al Qa’ida’s recruitment process seems to be more a matter of joining than being solicited. Moreover, the Salafi message, which has been disseminated over the Internet by Al Qa’ida’s media division, has attracted numerous members of alienated diasporas (sometimes second and third generation immigrants) who feel isolated from their communities and seek to belong to a group (Bruce Hoffman 2003). By associating with Al Qa’ida, local jihadist groups can shore up popular support and amp up recruitment.
Al Qa’ida’s strength may also lie in its impressive coffers; Al Qa’ida has amassed billions of dollars by building a strong network of financiers and operatives who are frugally minded and business savvy. Moreover, Al Qa’ida’s finances are often hidden in legitimate and illegitimate businesses; Bin Laden is reputed to own approximately eighty companies around the world. Al Qa’ida has learned to effectively leverage the global financial system of capital markets by utilizing small financial transfers, under regulated Islamic banking networks and informal transfer systems throughout the world. Thus, it is difficult to choke off funds destined for Al Qa’ida (Basile 2004). Consequently, Al Qa’ida can grant money to local terrorist groups that present promising plans for attacks that serve Al Qa’ida’s general goals. All terrorist organizations must engage in attacks to maintain support, to buttress their organizational integrity, and to foster their continued existence. Associating with Al Qa’ida ensures that a group has access to the necessary financial resources to conduct attacks. In a sense, Al Qa’ida operates like a large multi-national company and the “product” that it exports is terrorism. One must acknowledge the economic principles that underlie Al Qa’ida’s success, that of supply and demand, limited resources, productivity etc. Finally, Al Qa’ida has successfully exploited the technological tools of globalization to communicate with various audiences. Al Qa’ida has launched an effective advertising campaign worldwide using the latest technology and psychology to reach their desired addressees. Al Qa’ida uses mobile phones, text messaging, instant messaging, websites, email, blogs, and chat rooms for administrative tasks, fund-raising, research, logistical coordination of attacks, and recruitment. When Al Qa’ida’s media division airs its hostage videos and films of terrorist attacks or their aftermath, it provides the organization with the oxygen of publicity necessary to sustain itself. Unless civilian populations are made aware of terrorist acts and cowed into fear by
Consequently. I searched for evidence of terrorist group decline based on Cronin’s criteria. the Council of Foreign Relations. if there was strong evidence that the group was in a state of imminent decline immediately prior to its merger with A Qa’ida. In fact. I assumed that opportunism was the primary motivation for merging with Al Qa’ida (coded as 2). To do so. the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi. Moreover. 90% of terrorist organizations have a life span of less than one year. the beginning of a government offensive. Al Qa’ida cannot influence the governments that it targets. etc. In considering this hypothesis. If there was 33 . spectacular attacks. More than one dynamic can be responsible for their decline (Cronin 2006). these materials are seen by potential sympathizers who may be brought into the folds of terrorism itself (Blanchard 2006). to assess H11. it is important to remember that Al Qa’ida is a unique terrorist organization. Information was gathered from various international security think tanks including the Center for Defense Information. the founding. and the NEFA foundation. The timelines featured important events in their life cycle (e. Terrorist groups that align with Al Qa’ida can benefits from Al Qa’ida’s media and propaganda expertise. Consequently. I judged that the local jihadist leader.such assaults. as a rational actor. would affiliate with Al Qa’ida if he desperately needed to give his organization a second wind. the onset of series of attacks.g. most modern terrorist groups do not last long. Cronin lists seven broad explanations for the decline and ending of terrorist groups: 1) the capture or killing of the leader 2) failure to transition to the next generation 3) achievement of the group’s aims 4) transition to a legitimate political process 5) undermining of popular support 6) repression 7) transition from terrorist to other forms of violence. the Jamestown Foundation. I developed timelines for each organization included in this study.).
(Al Qa’ida is a pan-Islamic organization) 3) Al Qa’ida promotes violence against other Muslim denominations as well as nonMuslims. I determined that opportunism was the secondary motivation for merging with Al Qa’ida (coded as 1). To assess H21 (Al Qa’ida commanding officers were inspired by Al Qa’ida’s ideology).”(Al Qa’ida is an anti-Western organization) 2) Al Qa’ida aims to establish a caliphate based on an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam. To perform this appraisal. To execute this assessment. (Al Qa’ida is anti-Shia) (Al Qaida's Ideology) Thus. or anti-Shia agendas. Al Qa’ida’s supports a narrow interpretation of Sunnism.some data that suggested that the group had experienced minor setbacks. Al Qa’ida strongly opposes Western influences and ideologies that it perceives as “un-Islamic. I relied predominantly upon newspaper articles published in both the domestic and international 34 .” most notably Shiite sects. Al Qa’ida’s ideology is centered upon three key points: 1) Al Qa’ida attributes the obstacles encountered by the Islamic world to the JewishChristian apostate Muslim alliance. religious education. and statements. pan-Islamic. According to MI5. the largest denomination and is violently opposed to other Islamic denominations that it regards as “infidel. the UK’s security intelligence agency. I determined if the local jihadist leaders who affiliated with Al Qa’ida espoused anti-Western. More information on statistical hypothesis testing follows in the chapter on data analysis and results. which they had published regarding their ideology. to evaluate H21. I considered the leader’s prior involvement in Islamic societies. Al Qa’ida would like to replace all existing governments with a supranational caliphate and impose a strict and exclusive government based on their interpretation of Sunni Islam. I considered the assessment of Al Qa’ida’s ideology published by MI5.
or anti-Shia goals than regional initiatives. Soon thereafter. If I found that the leader placed more emphasis on anti-Western.press and. eager to put the Afghan jihad in the past. yet also expressed anti-Western. fearing the collapse of communism in Central Asia. communiqués. where available. or antiShia sympathies. Osama bin Laden. I resolved that ideological alignment was the primary motivation for joining Al Qa’ida (coded as 2). others enlisted in the growing corps of “holy warriors” under the lead of the legendary Palestinian Sheikh Dr. Countless numbers of Afghanis joined the Islamic resistance. the Pakistani government ordered the closure of Arab mujahedeen offices in the country and threatened official deportation to any illegal foreign fighters who attempted to remain in Pakistan. operatives from foreign countries began trickling into Pakistan. to assess H31 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to prior social network affiliations). I concluded that ideological alignment was a secondary motivation (coded as 1). While some arrived to provide money and weapons to support the fight. However. statements. and elsewhere 35 . if the leader seemed more committed to local programs. speeches and other primary source materials authored by the leaders themselves. However in January 1993. Thus countless numbers of mujahedeen veterans who had formed tight bonds with their fellow fighters returned to locations in the Middle East. pan-Islamic. Finally. Pakistan. Abdullah Azzam and the Saudi billionaire. which was organized into several native mujahedeen organizations with headquarters in Peshawar. In December 1979. North Africa. the Soviet Union launched a military invasion to restore Soviet control over neighboring Afghanistan. I considered operatives’ involvement in four episodes that served to rally jihadists around Al Qa’ida principals and fostered the development of social bonds between mujahedeen figures. pan-Islamic.
(Wright 2007). who appeased his hosts by mobilizing construction equipment and bankrolling construction projects. After being released. they may have decided to reunite with Zawahiri and the other jihadists with whom they were imprisoned. who became a spokesman for the defendants because of his eloquence and knowledge of foreign languages. he convinced several Saudi businessmen to invest in Sudan and several of his brothers and Jeddah merchants did invest in Sudanese real estate. farming. President Sadat of Egypt died after being shot by gunmen who opened fire as he watched an aerial display at a military parade. After the Soviet-Afghan War. The events that unfolded subsequent to the assassination of Anwar Sadat may have played a similar role in forging social bonds amongst jihadists. despite the prosecution demand of 299 death sentences the judges gave out none.” these former combatants may have opted to rejoin Al Qa’ida. The second trial consisted of 302 defendants charged with conspiracy and being members of the illegal Tanzim al-Jihad. Most jihadists rallied around Ayman alZawahiri. Osama bin Laden journeyed to the Sudan. Two trials took place. where the new regime had raised an Islamic banner. When presented with the opportunity to reunite with their “brethren. In 1981. more than 700 people were rounded up. several former prisoners left Egypt (Wright 2007). Only 58 sentences were given and most of the defendants were released after three years in prison. In prison. Many focused on mobilizing the population to overthrow the government. these jihadists developed strategies for establishing an Islamist state and established important personal connections. In the Sudan. Moreover. Following President Sadat's assassination. However. Ultimately. and agriculture (Gunaratna 36 . The first was held in camera and consisted of 24 suspects directly involved in the assassination. he was treated as a special guest. in subsequent years.
Thus. and embarked upon his jihad against America. although subject to the same or similar influences. Bergen 2001). I assumed that social network affiliation was a permissive factor (i. the Taliban had captured Afghanistan’s capital. participated in the Sadat trial. Bin Laden set up numerous training camps in the region. This treatment was based upon my observation that not every participant in these episodes. requiring women to wear head-to-toe veils.2002). The bonds that these jihadists formed prior to the US invasion may have sparked their cooperation with Al Qa’ida after the onset of the Global War on Terror. Subsequently. Finally. However. I determined whether the group member was involved in the Soviet-Afghan war. Kabul. he established residency in Afghanistan. In the years after departing from the Sudan. 37 . During this time he established links to Sudanese Islamists as well as fundamentalists in Somalia and Yemen. When considering the relevance of social network affiliations. disillusioned with existing ethnic Tajik and Uzbek leaders. the Taliban controlled some 90 percent of Afghanistan's territory. His second presence in Afghanistan attracted many mujahedeen to return there (P. they do not explain why these particular leaders aligned with Al Qa’ida. a large part of the Taliban’s support came from Afghanistan's Pashtun community.e. local jihadist leaders may have established social connections with Bin Laden in Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks and the Global War on Terror. The Taliban rule was characterized by a strict form of Islamic law. As ethnic Pashtuns. After Bin Laden fled the Sudan in 1996 as a result of international pressure. while social affiliations may animate a small minority to engage in Al Qa’ida’s program of global jihad. Before its ouster by U. a precondition which set the stage for the merger). or spent time in the Sudan before 1996 or Afghanistan during the reign of the Taliban.S. became an Al Qa’ida associate.-led forces in 2001. By September 1996. and jailing men whose beards were deemed too short. banning television. he could rekindle these ties. L.
Assessing Q2: To answer my second question (What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible merges or partners with Al Qa’ida?). Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly operational role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida H22. or legal expertise. They have vocational. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly ideological role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida.Unless the local jihadist leader was clearly not incentivized by opportunism or ideological concerns. logistical. ideological/media leaders are responsible for expressing the organizational culture and philosophy of their group through media activity and possibly fatwa as well as personal interactions with their operatives. Operational commanders are primarily responsible for conducting operations (including “spectacular attacks”). developing military tactics. III. Consequently. I developed another three hypothesis: H12. Finally. I posited that Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers would fall into one of three primary leadership categories after the affiliation occurred: operational. or ideological. They have military experience or formation and/or expertise in weapons or explosives. They 38 . financial. They direct the group’s bureaucratic development and organize recruitment drives. and running training camps. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly logistical role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida H32. or foreign language competencies. Logistical leaders are accountable for the administrative and financial activities of their units. I considered social network affiliation to be a secondary motivation rather than a primary motivation.
I compared leadership performance pre.and post-merger. this estimation would have been biases. To determine the role played by the commanding officer. I assessed the commanding officer’s operational. and released audio or videotapes. published books or articles. Thus.have granted interviews. I coded him as a strong operational leader (3). and ideological leadership abilities before and after the merger. logistic. If the leader demonstrated at least two of the factors in the operational leadership category. Instead. I did not compare leadership performance across categories because different measures were used to evaluate leadership faculty for each category. I coded him as an average operational leader 39 . considered the following variables: Type of leader Operational Logistic Ideological Media activity Military/Front line experience Administrative/financial activities Weapons/explosives training Indications Training camp participation Recruitment experience Organizational restructuring Media innovations Involvement in ideological transitions Operational innovations Involvement in major attacks Vocational skills Language skills Fatwa issues Documented political or religious guidance proffered to operatives After analyzing these variables. If he demonstrated one of the factors in this category.
(2). The International Herald Tribune. I used the same secondary and primary source materials listed earlier in this chapter. MIPT collaborated with Detica. 40 . a business and technology consultancy. I coded him as such (0). If the leader was not involved with the organization at the time. From 2004 to 2008 the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security funded the creation and maintenance of the Terrorism Knowledge Base. A discussion of the comparison of leadership performance pre-and post-merger follows in Chapter 5. which is now available to the public through an agreement between MIPT. I conducted further analyses to determine its accuracy by confirming with at least two separate. DHS. to collect information on terrorist groups and key leaders of terrorist groups. and START (About START). including reports available through the Jamestown Foundation. I eliminated several from my study based on the following criteria using open source materials. the Council on Foreign Relations. I coded him as a weak operational leader (1). To perform this evaluation. the Library of Congress. If he exhibited none of these factors. and The Washington Post. the Federation of American Scientists. IV. since START has not evaluated this data and cannot assure the reliability of the information provided. developed by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). Although the TOPs database listed thirty-six Al Qa’ida allies. I used the same criteria to assess logistic and ideological leadership. The New York Times. I used the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) Database included on the website of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror (START). non-partisan sources. I considered two questions: 1) With whom has Al Qa’ida affiliated? 2) Who led these organizations? To answer the first question. Developing the Universe of Cases To develop my universe of cases. However. I also used these sources to determine the date that the affiliation commenced.
the group must have formally announced that this arrangement existed through a communiqué broadcast to a wide audience. contact with its network of financiers.1) The group must have been engaged in operations independently of Al Qa’ida (the group must not be a front for Al Qa’ida My study considers the deliberate decision to affiliate with Al Qa’ida. or a weak affiliation (collaboration). To qualify as a strong affiliation. an official denial of connections with Al Qa’ida should induce caution (and invoke more thorough analysis of the relationship) Based on my evaluation. Finally. I separately examined al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya 41 . for example by contributing to its recruitment efforts or operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. the organization must have developed a symbiotic relationship with Al Qa’ida. thereby potentially compromising their local agenda. a strong affiliation (partnership). assets. informants. intelligence. To qualify as a merger. 3) While not grounds for immediate disqualification. I determined that twenty-one groups conformed to these the above standards. or opportunities for training. 2) The group must not have renounced violence I did not include political movements that supported Al Qa’ida’s aims because armed groups operate differently than other clandestine non-violent organizations. In return. Al Qa’ida aided the local organization. Leaders who head front organizations for Al Qa’ida do not make a pre-meditated choice to cooperate with Al Qa’ida. or logisticians. but did not actively conduct operations outside their region nor did they contribute to Al Qa’ida’s other initiatives in any meaningful way. After performing this assessment. I coded each affiliation as a merger. whereby they supported Al Qa’ida. Those groups that I coded as weak affiliates received financing or training from Al Qa’ida. and media specialists. perhaps by providing access to operatives.
Asbat al-Ansar). Based on this data. In performing this assessment. I generated a list of 41 Al Qa’ida field commanders as study subjects. who coordinate and supervise the execution of plans. I made this distinction because I was interested in investigating the motivations and role of those leaders who came from outside Al Qa’ida’s orbit but became involved in its program later in their career. namely the establishment of an Islamic state. it is equally important to comprehend what deters other groups from associating with Al Qa’ida. V. I considered all of the commanding officers of each group from the onset of their relationship with Al Qa’ida to the present. I used open source materials including reports by non-partisan research institutions and newspaper articles. Some organizations had more than one nominal chief at times.(GAI). I identified the leaders (past and present) of each of these 21 groups. both past and present. Thus. and activities. but who never had a vested interest in a particular local jihadist group. In order to understand what motivates certain groups to align with Al Qa’ida. Next. in which case I treated both as leaders. I included a detailed investigation of the GAI in Chapter 7. In a few instances. the Taliban. Selection of Study Subjects My prior discussion focused on terrorist organizations that are overtly in pursuit of Salafi objectives. I included a leader who was had not actively cooperated with Al Qa’ida if this leader had communicated with Al Qa’ida Central Command and if his successors vigorously pursued relations after his term. others experienced numerous leadership transitions (ex. Jemaah Islamiya. Selection of my study subjects/study 42 . Al Qa’ida in Iraq). a group that did not affiliate with Al Qa’ida as a control group. I did not consider Al Qa’ida’s regional staff officers. operations. While some groups did not experience any leadership transitions after they partnered with Al Qa’ida (ex.
the data from this study is inevitably biased towards information about those organizations and individuals who are regarded as more visible and who appear publicly with greater frequency. I included Muslims fighting for the liberation of Kashmir and those fighting an internal insurgency in Central Asia. I did not include Palestinian groups. I did not include the amorphous social movement. there may have been ascertainment bias introduced by the difficulties accurately assessing leaders’ competence in organizing and conducting important attacks. This grouping is just an assemblage of small illegal clusters centered around charismatic preachers. which exists in Morocco. Moreover. bias was introduced by the actual leader interviews and communications that can be considered well-orchestrated propaganda 43 . less magnetized by Al Qa’ida pan-Islamic agenda. and political grievances and who may be less committed to the principles of Salafism and thus. In contrast. Moreover. terrorist organizations will not take credit for successful operations for fear of provoking the government to conduct a counterterrorism response. Although I eliminated all non-Muslim terrorists from the study sample. economic. who are fighting a jihad that involves complex social. I used sources from the public domain. Often. Problems Regarding Information Gathering To conduct this assessment. In addition. Salafia Jihadia. I chose to limit my sample to in order to reveal certain patterns that might not have otherwise emerged with less stringent exclusion criteria. I did include many groups that were deeply invested in domestic uprising and urban warfare against their own governments.sample was based on demonstrated and documented overt commitment to the principles of Salafism and all of the organizations that I studied were well defined with leadership that supported terrorist operations. Because clandestine organizations are often very secretive about their members and operations. For instance. VI.
formerly the Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). empirical data about Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers was collected and analyzed. I arrived at a better understanding of how to recognize and predict who may become Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers and how to anticipate and counter their efforts. and Internet articles. leader of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. With the aforementioned limitations in mind. Next. who merged his organization with Al Qa’ida despite the objections of the GSPC’s former leader Hassan AlBanna (Guidère 2007).exercises that may not appropriately reflect the leader’s true motivations and ideology. These concerns withstanding. I assessed the role he played before and after aligning with Al Qa’ida. as mentioned earlier. VII. I used the materials available to me to try to best collect information about and understand the leaders and organizations that I profiled. I considered the source of information and its degree of reliability. a comparison of leadership performance across categories was impossible. Relevance By seeking to understand who Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are. These sources included: government documents. As a result. what motivates them. When assessing the data. My observations regarding 44 . I considered Droukdal’s prior experiences and the history of the GSPC to determine why he embraced Al Qa’ida’s internationalist agenda rather than remaining committed strictly to jihad in Algeria. I investigated Abdelmalek Droukdal. I completed one comprehensive case study (in addition to my detailed discussion of the GAI). press and scholarly articles. VIII. Case Study Finally. and how they aligned their own local jihadist group with Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program.
First.g. Finally. we can better understand Al Qa’ida’s overall strategy (e. if proven. The fundamentalists who form interpersonal bonds through these venues may be persuaded by Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic partisans to become the next-generation of Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers in locations scattered across the globe. are they focused on promoting their message through propaganda or are they intent on conducting more attacks?).motivations will serve two purposes. they will help develop a model to identify local jihadist leaders who may merge or partner with Al Qa’ida in the future. we can better allocate resources to address this threat. Based on our knowledge of Al Qa’ida’s strategy. Secondly. has strong implications for US foreign policy in the post 9/11 era and greater attention should be paid to identifying such settings. by understanding the role that Al Qa’ida commanding officers play. 45 . my analyses may suggest that our battles in the Middle East and our policies regarding imprisonment are creating gathering places for global Salafi jihadists. This realization.
To address this concern. this relationship has perpetuated to the present day. Despite the popularity of this argument. that a cumulative effect occurs. and failed to overthrow the governments in Egypt. To assess the date of the affiliation. Al Qa’ida’s Affiliates: An Evolving Network Although the purpose of my study was to investigate Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers. and Saudi Arabia. I considered the development of Al Qa’ida’s affiliation over a period of time from 1991 until 2005 (Table 1). the evidence indicates that Al Qa’ida’s strategy is not new: it has operated like an international franchise by providing financial and logistical support. who consolidated relations with Al Qa’ida. I also observed noticeable patterns while developing my universe of cases. Al Qa’ida has transformed into an international enterprise with like-minded local representatives loosely connected to a central ideological base (Riedel 2007). since a group does not merely affiliate with Al Qa’ida and then sever all relations. Although I have recorded the first year in which the group cooperated with Al Qa’ida. and Abu Sayyaf. who diluted relations with Al Qa’ida). It is important to keep in mind. Most of researchers who I discussed in my literature review perceive Al Qa’ida’s strategy of franchising as a new development. surprising. The investigation of Al Qa’ida’s patterns of affiliation with respect to time is very interesting and indeed. 2001. in every case. Al Qa’ida was deprived of a “state within a state” in Afghanistan. Jordan. Since 2001. therefore. They contend that after September 11. First. lost several of its top officials. the relationship between Al Qa’ida and its affiliate has strengthened or weakened (such is the case with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. I have classified the affiliation according to its current state. as well as name recognition 46 . they argue.Chapter 4: Universe of Cases I. In many instances. I determined the year that the group first received or conveyed assistance to Al Qa’ida.
for years. On August 7. These operatives also offered advice to their Somali counterparts on how to set up social services for the local population. For Bin Laden. he departed for the Sudan. Kashmir and Iraq. Turabi and Bin Laden engaged in a convenient symbiotic relationship. Algeria. After Hussein’s forces invaded the small. effectively put him under house arrest. Afghanistan. Al Qa’ida linked up with Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) and Abu Sayyaf. Bin Laden organized training camps at which hundred of his followers were tutored in paramilitary tactics as revealed in the previous chapter.to terrorist groups operating in such diverse places as the Philippines. Al Qa’ida first seriously affiliated with other terrorist organizations in 1991. Yemen. the leader of the National Islamic Front. However. Tajikistan. this was as perturbing and foreboding an event as the Russian invasion of Afghanistan that had occurred a decade earlier. 1990. Bin Laden had immediately volunteered his services and those of his holy volunteers but the Saudis did not take this offer seriously (Gunaratna 2002). where he was warmly welcomed by Hassan al-Turabi. Bin Laden could operate freely in the Sudan and in return he would invest millions of dollars in the desperately poor country. Eritrea. tired of Bin Laden’s critiques. As a result of the Sudanese government’s hospitality and support. when one considers the historical context. Somalia. Bin Laden perceived this intrusion as part of a larger Western design to dominate the whole Arab and Muslim world. the first US troops were dispatched to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield. Consequently. oil rich state of Kuwait on August 1. during his time in the Sudan. 1990. this observation is not nearly as stunning. Chechnya. Bin Laden had the opportunity to interact with other terrorist units to expand Al Qa’ida’s reach. In this year. This relationship strengthened throughout the nineties. While Bin Laden was situated in the Sudan. He was able to send Al Qa’ida operatives to Somalia in 1991-1992 to liaise with their leaders and then help AIAI organize itself militarily. After the Saudi government. 47 . thereby threatening the security of Saudi Arabia.
where their transactions would go unnoticed and in its infrastructure projects. my data indicates that Al Qa’ida did not engage another affiliate until 1996. would next march into Southern Sudan and then into other Islamic countries(Gunaratna 2002). Bin Laden probably saw the struggle in the Philippines as an opportunity to open a second front for his organization without becoming embroiled in the conflicts in the Middle East. Bin Laden convinced several Saudi businessmen. their parent organization. Soon thereafter. to invest in the country’s moribund financial institutions. By 1991. he persuaded his brother in law. while residing in the Sudan. between a thousand and two thousand 48 . From 1991 to 1996. Bin Laden exploited a cache of trustworthy warriors who he could rely upon to cultivate his vision of global jihad. many of whom would be employed by these Arabic executives. While occupied with these financial negotiations. which sought to pursue a more fundamentalist battle against the Philippine authorities than the Moro National Liberation Front. Bin Laden focused his efforts on other missions like determining how best to attack US forces in Somalia. Al Qa’ida was preoccupied with other pursuits and could not devote energy towards developing such high-maintenance relations. Moreover. he broadcast a fatwa in which he avowed that having already taken over the Persian Gulf area and now encroaching upon Somalia. the US military. Concurrently. which would elicit support from the Sudanese population.Bin Laden ramped up his assistance to the Somali terrorists after the Bush administration sent US peacekeeping troops to Somalia in 2002. if successful. Thus. Muhammad Jamal Khalifah to support the Abu Sayyaf Group. Instead. he attempted to centralize the core of Al Qa’ida’s operations and develop its human resources as discussed in Chapter 1. including some of his brothers. Moreover a number of ASG members had fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Rogers 2004). After associating with these groups.
He turned his attention to exotic weaponry and weapons of mass destruction. As a result of this multitude of tasks. no affiliations were observed between 1991 and 1996. once again. Finally. By 1996. a multi-volume series detailing everything the Afghan Arabs had learned in the jihad against the Soviets. hundreds of Afghan Arabs engaged in fighting in Bosnia (P. Mullah Muhammad Omar sent a delegation to assure Bin Laden that the Taliban would be honored to protect him because of his role in the jihad against the Soviets (Gunaratna 2002). attracting Muslim militants to a country. which became the modern world’s first jihadist state. During this time. He also sought to acquire weapons for these militants. intense pressure had been placed on the Sudanese government by the United States and Egypt to expel Bin Laden. To 49 . Bergen 2001). Al Qa’ida engaged 15 of its 21 affiliates. Simultaneously some members of the group undertook the massive task of writing the Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad. who left the Sudan to return to his familiar stamping grounds in Afghanistan. Upon Bin Laden’s arrival. Having obtained sanctuary. L. From Afghanistan. on widening his movement. Bin Laden had set up a number of military camps in the north. it is not surprising that between 1996 and 2001. Bin Laden began to focus. Bin Laden issued a slew of radical pronouncements beginning with a call to arms against the continued American military presence in Arabia on August 23. Bin Laden knew Afghanistan well and greatly admired the Taliban religious warriors who had taken control over much of the country.members of Al Qa’ida converged upon the Sudan and within three years. Thus. Bin Laden and his cadre were engrossed by other concerns and did not focus on developing external relations with other jihadist groups. These communiqués served to attract the attention of various local jihadist leaders. Given this stable and secure environment. Bin Laden was able to function unimpeded. 1996.
and the head of Bangladesh’s Jihad Movement. he probably did not rely extensively upon the leaders of these organizations. “in order to obey the Almighty. Thus. and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. we hereby give all Muslims the following judgment: the judgment to kill and fight Americans and their allies. in the years before the September 11. However.supplement this strategy. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. members included the head of the violent faction of Egypt’s Gama’a al Islamiyya. While Bin Laden was well read in the Koran.” Based on this quotation. 2001 attacks. this is due to the fact that in 1998 Bin Laden created the International Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders (IIF). In addition to Bin Laden and EIJ’s Ayman al-Zawahiri. Later the IIF was expanded to include the Pakistani jihadist organizations Lashkar-eTaiba. In part. Laden convened conferences of several Afghan ulema. Bin Laden’s organization nurtured ties with a variety of other armed jihadist groups. Amidst this background. before 2001. he needed the backing of religious scholars and the clerical cover to call for a real global jihad. the secretary general of the Pakistani religious party known as the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam. In addition to its formal alliances through the IIF. 50 . These sequential steps were part of Bin Laden’s plan to expand his multi-national terrorist campaign. in 1998. is an obligation for every Muslim who is able to do so in any country. According to this Word Islamic Front manifesto. one observes a surge of new Al Qa’ida affiliates. the establishment of the IIF can clearly be interpreted as an effort by Al Qa’ida to expand its battle against Western influence. an anti-Shia sectarian party (Carafano 2005). whether civilians or military. The clerics who Bin Laden summoned also had acquaintances with jihadists beyond Afghanistan who they could introduce to Bin Laden (Bergen 2001). he was not a religious scholar.
characterized by semiautonomous cells that are horizontally and vertically integrated into the centralized command structure. after 9/11. be it to plan attacks or to align with other jihadist groups. few can deny the United States and its allies achieved progress in the first phase of the Global War on Terror. are built up through mergers. operational bases. Osama Bin Laden was compelled to makeover his organization. 51 .Contrary to popular belief. Al Qa’ida aims to establish itself as a complex organization with a flexible structure in order to preserve control over specifically identified strategic operations while offering cells a degree of autonomy in local and regional operations. Bin Laden elected to strengthen existing affiliations rather than pursue new ones. the dearth of new Al Qa’ida affiliates seems puzzling given what scholars perceive to be Al Qa’ida’s organizational strategy. Al Qa’ida’s training camps. There are two explanations for this observation. Whereas before Al Qa’ida had a distinct center of gravity. Bin Laden had to engineer a colossal transformation of his organization from a more or less unitary. As elaborated upon in Chapter 1.e. infrastructure. and command-and-control nucleus in Afghanistan were destroyed and uprooted. and collaborations (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2006). after 2001 and the onset of the Global War on Terror. partnerships. Al Qa’ida has not enlisted many new affiliates. from an actual center to a virtual network) (Bruce Hoffman 2004). Groups such as the Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat and Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad were brought further into Al Qa’ida’s folds. To more easily engineer this metamorphosis. Firstly. After 2001. As stated in the introduction. complex organizations. temporarily crippling it. near bureaucratic entity to a fluid movement tenuously bound by a loosely networked transnational constituency (i. Aggressive US and allied efforts impeded Al Qa’ida’s ability to do anything. Thus.
In fact. beheading of hostages.Moreover. the leader of Tawhid. Nowadays. Al Qa’ida has exploited the Iraqi occupation for rousing propaganda and as a recruitment tool for the global jihadist cause. For instance. Ayman Zawahiri. and for maintaining the momentum of an Islamist victory by expanding operations into Syria. Another observable and notable trend is that the number of affiliates that Al Qa’ida enrolled has increased since the onset of the war in Iraq in 2003. was responsible for developing his own strategy and operations. prior to 2005. for establishing a post-US Islamist emirate governed by a coalition of Islamic groups. in a letter dated July 9. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Bruce Hoffman has suggested that for Al Qa’ida. Al Qa’ida and its affiliates can conduct attacks in countries that are venerable sources of Bin Laden’s antagonism or where an opportunity has presented itself. and lack of concern for public support. 2005. began to instruct Zarqawi regarding tactics and specific theater-of-war concerns. and Egypt (Michael 2007). Moreover. Lebanon. he urged Zarqawi to prepare for a precipitous American military withdrawal from Iraq. However. who had become his commanding officers. Zawahiri reprimanded al-Zarqawi for indiscriminate attacks on Shias. in 2004. Jordan. For example. Israel. the Uzbek fighters associated with the Islamic Jihad Union have supported fighting in South Waziristan against the Pakistani government and US forces hunting Al Qa’ida fugitives (Steinberg 2008). including Shias. For instance. Additionally. Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida Central Command relied more heavily and interacted more frequently with the leaders of these groups. terror attacks 52 . Al Qa’ida now teams up with terrorist groups who can send foreign jihadists to Iraq where they conduct guerilla warfare against the America and British troops. who had become Bin Laden’s second-in command. “Iraq’s preeminent utility has been a useful side show” – an effective means to sidetrack American military forces and divert US attention while Al Qa’ida and its affiliates make inroads and strike elsewhere.
In the aftermath of this transition. Considering the sample as a whole. over forty percent of the 21 affiliates are based in the Core Arab states (Iraq. include the 2004 bombings against Madrid’s commuter trains. Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism strongly manifested. the 2005 bombings against London’s public transport system. the American forces went into Lebanon. and Yemen).around the world tripled in 2004. Lebanon. France fought a war in Algeria and British and French forces invaded Egypt. These regions have a history of conflict with the West. and the 2007 terrorist attacks in Algiers (Bruce Hoffman 2004). Tunisia) and Southern Asia (namely. 53 . Algeria. Afghanistan. Pakistan). Egypt Uzbekistan. Later. it is interesting to consider the geographic distribution of Al Qa’ida’s affiliates (Figure 2). The other large clusters come from the Maghreb (Morocco. according to statistics released by the US government’s National Counterterrorism Center. For instance. The smaller clusters come from Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa. when colonial empires began to retreat. Al Qa’ida Affiliates: The Geographic Distribution Having assessed the development of Al Qa’ida’s affiliations over time. Libya. Samuel Huntington observed that after World War II. II. One can anticipate that the majority of affiliates would hail from the Core Arab states and Maghreb Arab states. The warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990 when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by Saddam Hussein The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling humiliated and resentful of the West’s military presence in the Persian Gulf (Huntington 1992). Notable incidents conducted by or with the assistance of Al Qa’ida’s affiliates since the beginning of the Iraq war. the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot to detonated liquid explosive carried on board from the United Kingdom to the US and Canada. conflicts along the fault line between western and Arab Islamic civilizations frequently erupted.
Al Qa’ida has appealed to militants in the four neighboring former Soviet Central Asian republics. one of the masterminds behind the assassination attempt against Uzbek President Islam A. just a few miles from the border (Luong and Weinthal 2002). Ayubi suggests that the general Islamic resurgence that one observes today represents a reaction to alienation and a quest for authenticity by disaffected Muslims who resent Western participation in their lands. Tahir Yuldashev. Tajikistan. Kyrgystan. Islam can provide a medium of cultural nationalism that is defiant and self-assuring. Since 1996. all of which are in immediate proximity to Afghanistan.These struggles had a profound effect on the development of jihadist outlets. For those countries resisting foreign dominance. He maintains that most Islamic revolutions evolve from movements for indigenous self-assertion. whereas the religious-framed prescriptions of Arabia Islam have a thirteen century-old legacy (Ayubi 1980). Turkmenistan. for years. For instance. the Taliban controlled the Afghan territory bordering Uzbekistan. at the present time operatives from these organizations can assist the Al Qa’ida- 54 . Al Qa’ida and the Taliban could facilitate the transportation of militants moving back and forth across the borders. fled to Afghanistan where he set up a military training camp. Thus. they could permit leaders of these jihadist groups to establish training camps without fear of government intervention. and Uzbekistan. weak security apparatuses and crisis-torn economies. Moreover. There is also a simpler explanation to account for the plethora of Al Qa’ida affiliates hailing from the Core Arab states. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Additionally. Secular prescriptions (whether nationalist or leftist) are regarded as unsuccessful European importations introduced by intellectuals exposed to French and Italian cultures. and leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These states have porous borders. Furthermore. Karimov.
Upon returning to the Maghreb. and has helped to tighten the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. should be expected. Conservative estimates suggest that at least several hundred North African volunteers have traveled to Iraq. Similarly. after the September 2001 attacks. affiliates from these nations are particularly desirable. where Islamabad exercises limited authority. thousands of Muslim extremists were detained. This too. Consequently. Separatist violence in India’s Muslim majority Jammu and Kashmir state has continued unabated since 1989. these groups help Al Qa’ida attack coalition troops in Afghanistan and then escape across the Pakistani frontier (Fair 2004). eager to regroup in Pakistani cities where police control was more negligible. fighters transit through Syria. thus. several Kashmiri separatist terrorist groups turned to Al Qa’ida for support. offered to President Bush Pakistan’s unqualified cooperation in the fight against terrorism. under strong US diplomatic pressure. I also observed that a large percentage of the groups that merged with Al Qa’ida hailed from Pakistan (20%). 55 . terrorist operatives in the Maghreb move easily across international borders. With the assistant of Al Qa’ida’s Algerian affiliates. Al Qa’ida. has helped to identify and detain extremists.supported insurgency in Afghanistan. President Musharraf. Pakistan has allowed the US military to use bases within the country. However. quickly granted this concession in return for safe haven. In the wake of these changes. In addition. The conflict between Muslims and Hindus in the subcontinent manifests itself in the rivalry between Pakistan and India. these militants can stage local campaigns due to their recently acquired front line experience (Boudali 2007). Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are now believed to be in Pakistan’s rugged tribal areas.
in East Africa. Muslims are a minority. while Somalia has served as a transit route for terrorists. In fact. there were fewer groups from the Eastern African region and from the Southeast Asian region. There are almost no legitimate terrorist targets and terrorists themselves can be subject to extortion in largely lawless settings. Although Muslims represent a majority in countries like Somalia and Eritrea. Thailand. the profound ethnic and religious diversity (including in the practice of Islam) that characterizes the area militates against the establishment of a fundamentalist hegemony by any one group. Also. Despite the fact that Southeast Asia seems like a good candidate for the second front in the US campaign since it is home to the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country. many Islamic organizations in Southeast Asia genuinely oppose Al Qa’ida and most are nonviolent. and the fragility of local democracy. Indonesia. Again. it has not emerged as such. this can be easily explained.Within my sample. the depth of its involvement with terrorists is constrained by the very disorder seen as a classical setting for terrorism. Additionally. a central government with even rudimentary influence has yet to emerge. In Singapore. such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). In Indonesia. the rise of political Islam can be linked principally to the collapse of Suharto's regime. where the other major Abrahamic faiths dominate. hostility from indigenous religious authorities may also impede the growth of Wahabism (Dickson 2005). while Buddhism and Roman Catholicism are dominant respectively. most visibly Al Qa’ida. Malaysia and Brunei. and the Philippines. Political organizations representing modernist Muslims were 56 . The largest and most influential are either political parties or revivalist organizations. Moreover. Unlike Eastern European countries. the nation's continuing economic crisis. and two other mostly Muslim states. in which there is just enough government control and economic security to provide an adequate target for terrorist groups. in general Muslims are a minority in East Africa.
the highest order form of equity-based engagement. were much less common. the relationships between cells and between operatives in Al Qa’ida central command are loosely coupled. Al Qa’ida achieves the ideal mix of tightly and loosely coupled systems. Although such groups have since become a major political force in recent years.banned from the 1950s to the 1980s. Al Qa’ida’s Affiliates: Mergers? Partnerships? Or Collaborations? Finally it is important to consider distribution by type of affiliation (Figure 3). By contrast. and many of their leaders were imprisoned. Supporting local terrorist groups in this manner makes noise. Additionally. While Al 57 . the group that Al Qa’ida subsumes must be capable of completely integrating Al Qa’ida’s methods and approaches into their repertoire. causes havoc. it is difficult to cut off centralized funding due to the complex nature of Al Qa’ida’s financial network. Through partnership and collaborations. III. mergers. they forfeit a degree of control. Although this type of arrangement allows Al Qa’ida and the merged group to consolidate their assets so that they can compete more successfully. more extremist forms of Islamism still remain at the fringes (Gershman 2002). While the relationships within the cells are tightly coupled. Al Qaida can provide financial or logistic support to other terrorist groups with the intention of influencing their strategic activities. described in the first chapter. Through partnerships and collaborations. Mergers were much less common (approximately 17%). Both partnerships and collaborations permit Al Qa’ida to structure itself as a complex organization. This sort of arrangement is convenient when Al Qa’ida wants to spread its radical ideas and has financial resources but does not necessarily care for the local politics in the region. The preponderance of affiliations (over 70%) could be classified as partnerships or collaborations. and distracts the enemy while Central Command plans for more detailed attacks elsewhere. When a group merges with Al Qa’ida.
when groups officially merge with Al Qa’ida. In addition. Through this measure. the United States. who have no interest in establishing a global Islamic caliphate. Finally. Moreover. There are other practical difficulties. Executive Order 13224 provides the means to disrupt the support network that funds terrorism. the United States government may block the assets of individuals and entities providing support. When a group commits to jihad against the far enemy. Such blocking actions are a critical tool in combating the financing of terrorism (Mayer and Price 2002). and strategies. Under this order. most prominently. 58 . to designated terrorists and terrorist organizations. which the merged group must obey.Qa’ida Central Command does not usually plan operations. which should be addressed when discussing mergers. goals. supporters of terrorism are publicly identified thereby providing warning to other entities that they are prohibited from doing business with the Al Qa’ida affiliate (Uruena 2008). designation under the UN Security Council’s 1267 Committee’s consolidated list will trigger international obligations on all member countries. Oftentimes. mergers often end up splintering as a result of differences of ideologies. they can “offer” tactical advice. operatives are estranged when Al Qa’ida takes credit for the operation and they are forced to assume a more “behind-the-scenes” role (Desouza and Hengsen 2007). For instance. financial or otherwise. groups that merge officially with Al Qa’ida may risk alienating the local population. but are more interested in deposing their current government. they often become the targets of counterterrorist offensives by foreign governments. as observed with the Zarqawi-Zawahiri letter referenced earlier. they may split their own ranks and upset surrounding communities. requiring them to take steps to prevent designated individuals and entities from continuing to fund or otherwise support terrorism.
such as Western Africa. while Al Qa’ida’s affiliates are concentrated in the Core Arab and Maghreb states. since they offer increased organizational flexibility and operational reach. Moreover. the data demonstrates that Al Qa’ida may be more likely to pursue lower-order affiliations. Summary of Findings Although Al Qa’ida’s policy of pursuing affiliations with local jihadist groups is not a new development. As the example of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. organizations must have the patience and resolve to work through issues.Given these considerations. provided in Chapter 6 proves. 59 . Thus. evidence suggests that Al Qa’ida will continue to pursue such relations and will rely upon them more heavily. IV. Al Qa’ida may be seeking to expand into other Muslim-dominated territories. Like corporations settling a merger. Al Qa’ida may have several mergers in the works that have not yet been publicly announced. While in recent years. it is also important to acknowledge that organizational issues must be addressed up front when a merger is negotiated since this type of affiliation is a longterm contract. several groups have announced a formal merger with Al Qa’ida. mergers only occur when terrorist groups have developed a close relationship and realize the mutual value of working together.
ideological alignment. The null hypothesis tested for each scale was that there was no difference in the frequency of incidence of each level of motational factor. when three scales were used.” and “social network affiliation” respectively.” and "social network affiliations. please refer to Chapter 3 on Methodology). Based on this analysis. in each case. each subject was rated on one of three scales: "opportunist motives. To assess the effects of motivational factors contributing to individual terrorist's decision to affiliate with Al Qa’ida. Data Analysis and Results for Q1: What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida’s and its pan-Islamic agenda? Data were collected on 41 individual subjects (i. and social network affiliation all motivate local jihadist leaders to an extent.05. thus. one can conclude that opportunistic motives. By comparison.Chapter 5: Results of Statistical Hypothesis Testing I. known or suspected terrorists). 1= secondary motivation.” “ideological alignment.606E-06 for “opportunistic motives. All three statistics are significant with a p-value less than 0.” Each subject was rated 0-2 for each scale. ideological alignment appears to be of less powerful significance as a motivating factor for local jihadist leaders. 60 . The chi-squared test yielded pvalues of 1. the null hypothesis was rejected.146E-09. This analysis yielded the results contained in Table 1. and 1. 0.0188. although the smaller values of p for “opportunistic motives” and for “social network affiliation” suggest that these incentives are more robust. Statistically significant differences among subjects were evaluated using a chi-squared test statistic for variation within each scale.e.” "ideological alignment. corresponding to 0= not a motivation. 2 = primary motivation (for a more detailed explanation regarding coding.
Data Analysis and Results for Q2: What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible affiliates with Al Qa’ida? 61 .” and “social network affiliation” respectively. was that there was no difference in the frequency of incidence of each level of motivational factor.e. However. the effect of ideological alignment does not even reach statistical significance. It is of note that the statistical significance for social network affiliation is far less impressive than that for opportunistic motives. In contrast. H21 (Al Qa’ida commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to ideological motives) is rejected. The p-value associated with social network affiliation also allows us to reject the null hypothesis. This implies that opportunism is the primary motivation among the variables considered in this study for affiliating with Al Qa’ida. H31 ( Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due psychosocial motives) requires further investigation. 0.042 for “opportunistic motives. Based on this analysis. The p-value for opportunistic motives permits us to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. scores 0 and 1 were combined into a single scale "not a motivation.” “ideological alignment. The p-values associated with the chi-squared test statistic were 1.” while score 2 was considered as "motivation.639. tested for both scales. social affiliations) have some influence on the decision to associate with Al Qa’ida. This analysis produced the results recorded in Table 2. thereby suggesting that this particular factor is not a significant motivating variable for local jihadist leaders in this sample.To supplement this analysis and clarify the relative impact of each incentive. the data suggests that psychosocial motive(i. H11 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers associated with Al Qa’ida due to opportunistic motives) is proven.” The null hypothesis.289E-06. and 0. II.
Accordingto this test. across all terrorists considered as a group. pre.0501). across all terrorists considered individually. which utilizes both the direction and magnitude of the change. These included the Wilcoxon statistic (Table 4).and post-merger score for any category. compared to pre-merger. the p-value for overall leadership performance was borderline (p=0.there was no statistic difference between the pre. as well as the simpler paired sign test (Table 5). The Wilcoxon statistic was negative for all groups. 62 . compared to premerger.” “Ideological. pre and post merger. the paired signed test rejected the null hypothesis for ideology (p=0. we could not reject the null hypothesis for any category.and postmerger. Additionally.” and “Logisitic” on a scale of 0-3. Results are presented in Table 3. However. The chi-squared test statistic was used to evaluate the overall difference in performance in each of the three categories post-versus pre-merger. The null hypothesis tested in this analysis is that there is no difference in each category post-merger. which considers only the direction of change. The null hypothesis tested in this analysis is that there is no difference in each category post-merger.015). This suggests that ideological leadership performance does actually improve after a merger.Subjects were evaluated on their performance in each of three categories: “Operational. thus based on this statistical test. Paired statistics were then applied to compare the scores for each individual terrorist. which suggests that leadership performance may generally improve as well.
This analysis allows us to accept H32 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officer play an increasingly ideological role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida). this was clearly most prevalent and only statistically significant for the ideology category. shared ideological views become important. most changes were positive. after mergers with Al Qa’ida occur. and these swamped the overall effect. for the ideological performance. for all three categories. there were a few changes in the opposite direction in particular subjects that were large. Moreover. there were the fewest number of negative changes post-merger. it lets us to reject both H12 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly operational role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida) and H22 (Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play an increasingly logistical role after affiliating with Al Qa’ida).The results obtained through the paired sign test suggest that the direction of the change for ideological performance was significant. Effectively what we are observing from this study’s data analysis is that while ideological concerns do not appear to be primary motivating factors for joining Al Qa’ida. The operational category had the largest number of “-3” results and “+3” results. the variability among subjects in the magnitude of the changes may have affected the results. Generally. demonstrates that each group had a similar number of “no change” results (i. however. ideological performance improved. Most frequently. a pre-post score of 0). there was a tendency to improve scores post-merger. However. Figures 4-5 demonstrate that for ideological performance. whether they were categorized as only positive or positive plus no change. Moreover. a plot of the distribution of scores. 63 . thereby hindering us from rejecting the null hypothesis using the Wilcoxon statistic.e. Figure 6. however.
While the first official communiqué of the GSPC appeared in September 1998. However. However. the only remaining armed terrorist group in Algeria. Three months later. less powerful Algerian indigenous assembly of terrorists would not have been possible without the leadership of Abdelmalek Droukdal. 2006. Algeria achieved independence from France in 1962.Chapter 6: Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb and Abdelmalek Droukdal – A Well Executed Merger On September 11. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. I. whereupon Ahmed Ben Bella was elected the first president of Algeria. He then adopted an 64 . the leader of Al Qa’ida in Iraq announced the allegiance of the Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Call and Combat or GSPC). the new organization radically changed its tactics: the series of suicide bombings and violent attacks executed in 2007 by Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operatives demonstrated this strategic evolution. After the merger of the GSPC with Al Qa’ida. Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb was born. The Origins of Islamic Violence in Algeria after the War of Independence The GSPC was founded with a regional focus: it sought to establish an Islamic state in Algeria and rejected the legitimacy of secular democratic governance. in 1965. this metamorphosis of a relatively smaller. the Islamic movement in Algeria originated in the 1960s. He accomplished this revitalization and expansion of goals and activities by providing compelling ideological leadership and by organizing sophisticated public relations and media campaign both locally and globally. Defense Minister Houari Boumedienne staged a bloodless coup to remove Ben Bella from power. to Al Qa’ida. Abdelmalek Droukdal served as the commanding officer of Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb region and directed the internationalization of the former GSPC's war in order to revitalize a movement that was slowly dying in Algeria.
However. nationalist. the Salvation Islamic Front (FIS) was formed. which he codified in the Algerian constitution in 1976. Thus. the weak alliance between the secular and religious groups (the Ulama and the academic elite who led the liberation movement against the French) collapsed. under Boumedienne’s chosen successor Colonel Chadli Benjedid the right to establish political parties was accorded in Algeria and with this decision. Before the independence. Mustapha Bouyali. directed by Abdallah Djaballah. the FIS was a political organization. socialist political system. a fundamental Islamic preacher established the Armed Islamic Algeria Movement (MAIA) in 1982 to establish an Islamic state. This political platform resonated with the Algerians. in response to the dictatorial and exclusionary policies proffered by the Socialist party. not an armed group that sought to reverse the economic decline in Algeria by implementing Sharia. Unlike the MAIA. II.authoritarian. The Birth of the Salvation Islamic Front In 1989. the Algerian Islamic movement was centrist. during the 1970s. disgruntled by the failure of Socialist economic policies. In 1991. one-party. The FIS became popular amongst the Algerian population who supported the group financially and politically. The MAIA sought to resolve the social and economic injustices that had emerged in Algeria by forcible means if necessary (Johnson 2006). Islamic religious law. This socialist government's repressive secularism and one party rule were oppressive for many people in Algeria and helped fuel a fundamentalist backlash when Islamic leaders branded the government as “a band of atheists” and called for a return to an Islamic government (Johnson 2006). and maintained an affirmative orientation towards Western learning and culture. 65 . the fundamentalist Islamic movement became increasingly radicalized in response to President Boudemedienne’s abortive leftward shift in economic and cultural policies.
After subsequent leadership transitions. However. several Islamists became disenchanted with the political process and defected from the FIS to form armed splinter groups. 1996. with the prospect of the FIS in control of the parliament. the secular and military elite forced Benjedid's resignation. Thus. The new regime calculated that the repression of the FIS would ignite a wave of extremist fundamentalist violence. after the cancellation of the 1992 general elections in Algeria. was marked by barbaric methods and attacks against entire civilian communities. He was an illiterate criminal and his reign. In an effort to racially purify the country. which lasted until his violent death in February 2002. The GIA was responsible for the murder of over 2000 schoolteachers guilty of “taming the youth” and more than 100 other competing. and suspended parliament. Antar Zouabri became the head of the GIA on July 18. GIA supreme commander Saifullah Ajffar ordered the assassination of over 90 innocent civilians and eventually forced a mass European exodus from Algeria. it dissolved the FIS (Celso 2008). He repelled most members of the GIA when he issued a fatwa condemning the entire Muslim population of 66 . the GIA quickly alienated itself from other Algerian Islamic activities by adopting stringent interpretations of Islamic law.the FIS achieved a victory in national elections. The Beginnings of the GIA and the Onset of an Epoch of Violence As the new regime predicted. less militant Muslim clerics and political leaders whom it designated heretics. Many Islamists became increasingly interested in radical approaches. halted the electoral process. The GIA was formed from a collection of Algerian militant groups who had been executing a series of significant military operations against government targets in an attempt to overthrow the secular government in Algeria. A High Committee was established with Mohammed Boudiaf named as president. which would divide and alienate the FIS’s many Algerian supporters. III. However.
However. Consequently. ambushes. and Martínez 2007). the GSPC denounced the massacres that the GIA had committed and entered the international arena with the goal of restoring the credibility of armed groups in Algeria and attracting embittered Algerian youths for whom the ideology of Islamic guerilla war had lost its appeal. Fissions Form Within the GSPC 67 . he rejected the policy of terror executed by the GIA under Zouabri and enforced symbiosis with the local population. He asserted that the GSPC sought to overthrow the government in Algiers and to install an Islamic regime in Algeria. Zouabri’s attacks on innocent Muslims estranged many former GIA military commanders. bombings. the GSPC was able to amass hundred of defectors from the FIS and the GIA (Guidère 2007). Bucaille. these officers founded the GSPC as a military organization dedicated to the Salafist creed and the battle against the Algerian regime to restore the Caliphate and implement Sharia. However. military. In 1998. and hypocrites” for “not supporting them in their struggle against the government” (Blom. V. IV. he encouraged operatives to target Algerian government officials. who were left without an ideological umbrella. clearly articulated the narrow agenda of the GSPC. and incursions on towns to steal saleable goods (Guidère 2007). While he preferred not to engage in force-on-force confrontations with the Algerian military to avoid depleting his cadre. An Alternative Emerges: The Origins of the GSPC The GSPC was not set up as a pan-Islamic movement. He depicted the Algerian government as a postcolonial lackey at war with Islam. apostates. and gendarmerie through the use of false roadblocks. the decision to establish the GPSC was the direct result of the GIA’s strategic impasse. The first prominent leader of the GSPC. Hassan Hattab. a former GIA commander.Algeria as “kuffar. police.
or sexual crimes would be placed under probation for a period ranging from 3 to 5 years. death penalty and life imprisonment were commuted to a maximum of eight years imprisonment for individuals under probation. 2000 for members and supporters of armed groups to surrender to the authorities (Black 2007). The issue of whether or not to accept the terms of the Civil Harmony Law created considerable dissension within the GSPC. Consequently. Imprisonment sentences were reduced. bombing of public places. Thus. and could even participate in the fight against the remaining active terrorist groups. katibats. it was difficult for the local leadership to coordinate or control the activity of its fighters since attempts to communicate could result in discovery or interception by security services. By the end of the twentieth century. Several GSPC cadres were killed or captured by Algerian security services following leads provided by rival GSPC elements (Celso 2008). Algerians had become less tolerant to the violence of the GSPC. This law declared that citizens not involved in massive killings. the Civil Harmony Law was adopted and overwhelmingly endorsed in a national referendum the following September 2000. Although as supreme emir.The GSPC was originally organized as a loose confederation of regional divisions under a supreme emir who supervised the organization. the katibats were responsible for supplying and funding their own operations. The law set a deadline of January 13. the organization was plagued by internal rivalry. the Algerian government implemented a law that offered amnesty to the combatants who capitulated. controlled a territory that roughly aligned with the governments’ own military districts. A study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School determined that although the probability of defection by GSPC members was less than 10 68 . Hattab provided religious guidance. Nevertheless. These fault-lines were exacerbated by external events that occurred soon after the founding of the GSPC. Each of the regional groups. In July 1999.
on September 26. which resulted in the demobilization of hundreds of militants from both the GIA and the GSPC. Due to this amnesty program. certain members of the GSPC dissented. The GSPC denied involvement. reasserting their dedication to avoiding civilian atrocities. 23 people were killed. They suggested that courting Al Qa’ida would enable the organization to maintain its relevancy and shore up declining recruitment. the probability of defection reached a high of 60 percent during the Civil Concord period (Gyves and Wyckloff 2006). It was thus effectively limited in scope by the Algerian government. and 9 were injured in a massacre that occurred in the Algerian town of Al-Abri. Members of this organization realized that a merger with Al Qa’ida could have both political and financial benefits to GSPC (Guidère 2007). believing that it would be better to take credit for the attack and thereby imply GSPC’s collusion with Al Qa’ida. 2001. They were devoted to regime change and preferred not to actively support the “Muslim brothers.percent before the implementation of the law. The September 11. However. the GSPC’s operational reach diminished. 2001 attacks were another defining moment for the GSPC. Fifteen days after the attacks. This became a point of friction between Hattab and the younger members of the GSPC and two dominant camps emerged within the organization. They accused the Algerian secret service of executing the attack to isolate the GSPC from its popular base amongst the Algerian people and of attempting to align the existing Algerian governmental agency with the intelligence services of the United States in the Global War on Terror. The pan-Islamists encouraged solidarity with their “brothers in Islam” (Al Qa’ida agents) while the Islamo-nationalists were preoccupied with Algerian politics and the installation of an Islamic state there.” This 69 .
thereby joining both sides of the Sahara in a complex map of security arrangements. the war in Iraq further exacerbated the debates that were occurring within the GSPC concerning the strategies to adopt with regards to Al Qa’ida. Mali. Although Hattab invoked the original Charter of the GSPC. Niger. the many GSPC fighters sought to engage in the struggle in Iraq. Moreover.minority faction opposed such a merger and preferred to remain like a small. Chad. Algeria. The United States also provided support for the war on terrorism in North and West Africa and in the Sahara desert through the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). Funded by the United States State Department. The PSI was judged to be a success by US officials and local participants. implemented in November 2003. the majority of the local emirs seated on the GSPC’s shura believed that the war in Algeria was lost. the GSPC was forced to retreat from urban areas (Ellis 2004). which stated that the objectives of armed conflict should be to fight the Algerian regime and not other governments. However. independently operated company that could focus on their own regional national agenda (Guidère 2007). As a result of hard-hitting endeavors by these transnational partnerships. Chad. thus. Hattab refused to send Algerian combatants to Iraq to battle the Americans because he predicted that doing so would deprive the GSPC of its best combatants when they joined the insurgency. and Nigeria signed a co-operation agreement on counterterrorism. the Pan Sahel Initiative consisted of training regional military units by soldiers from the US Special Forces in Niger. Moreover. in July 2003. Observing the images of Iraqi soldiers and citizens humiliated by the American invaders. Although the GSPC was able to recover from the infighting provoked after 9/11 and aggressive counter-terror measures. its next iteration was expanded to include Algeria. Thus. the organization should 70 . and Mauritania in an effort to improve border security and counterterrorism capacity. others within the GSPC did not share this perspective. his efforts were in vain.
his career was cut short when he was killed in a skirmish with the Algerian army in the Béjaïa region in June 2004 (Antil 2006). He continued to make entreaties to Al Qa’ida. for instance.focus on preserving the honor of the Iraqis. asserting his will to establish a community of Muslims dedicated to the creation of a Caliphate and calling upon GSPC members to attack all foreigners who supported the war in Iraq. but who would. Although he wanted to eventually establish his group as some sort of training authority. This was the first strong sign of official will to establish a relationship between the GSPC and Al Qa’ida and the beginning of three years of efforts to prove the GSPC’s will and commitment to Al Qa’ida. VI. in fact be absorbed into the GSPC’s domestic campaign. the 2nd anniversary of September 11. he fostered pan-Islamic solidarity and internationalism in order to reestablish a sense of unity amongst GSPC operatives.” Hassan was obliged to resign. The Rise of Droukdal 71 . he did not yet possess an adequate network of fighters. When the shura of the GSPC voted to actively support the “Iraqi brothers. the old guard members who espoused a nationalist orientation were expelled from the GSPC (Guidère 2007). who succeeded Hattab in 2003. they could use the war in Iraq to attract new recruits who believed that they would be sent to Iraq after basic training in Algeria. Nevertheless. Finally. Abou Ibrahim Mustapha. Soon thereafter. sought to actively support the Iraqi insurgents in order to gain credibility for the GSPC. he issued a communiqué of support for Al Qa'ida in which he criticized Hattab’s position and extolled bin Laden. They also believed that participation in the war in Iraq would enable the GSPC to establish connections with other jihadist groups in North Africa and introduce them to new strategies and tactics. However. On September 2003.
he was assigned the mission of fabricating explosives due to his scientific background and knowledge of chemical bases and mechanical processes. he went underground at the age of 23 (Guidère 2007). the GSPC would gain access to a network of financiers. One year later. who easily obtained his baccalaureate in 1989 in mathematics. he hoped to study engineering. the GSPC was struggling to fill its ranks with recruits. Droukdal sought to provide a new focal point for his members by participating in the global jihad. situated near Mifan in the Blida region. he was attracted to the FIS and actively sought to get close to its leaders. from 1990 to 1993. by supporting a cause that was seen to benefit the global community of Muslims. he was promoted to chief bomb maker for one of the most important GIA 72 . he officially joined the organization and in December 1993. Nevertheless. the GSPC needed to achieve a certain number of visible successes to appear active and successful. a merger with Al Qa’ida was particularly appealing to Droukdal (Johnson 2006).Upon Mustapha’s death. In 1992. informants. and logisticians. Abdelmalek Droukdal immediately assumed control of the GSPC. the GSPC could more easily recruit operatives. and media specialists who could reinforce the group’s capabilities and help it lead operations. After losing combatants due to the amnesty program announced by the Bouteflika regime. Additionally. Droukdal realized that in order to maintain support. As a youth. In 1996. Said Makhloufi. recruited him. 1970 in the small village of Zayan. Thus. Droukdal was recognized as an exceptional student. As a member of the clandestine ranks of the FIS. like the majority of young Muslim students. By affiliating with Al Qa’ida. he was enthused when an officer of the FIS and a former member of the Algerian army. Born on April 20. Thus. he pursued a degree in technology from the University of Blida. assets. He continued to hold this role when he enlisted with the GIA from 1993 to 1996. intelligence.
one year later. In order to accomplish this feat. Hattab selected Droukdal as a member of his consultative council and made him a regional commander for the GSPC. VII. While he was involved in planning a limited number of attacks.battalions. In 2001. he allegedly opposed the massacres conducted by the organization in the late 1990s. Finally. instructing his followers in the ways of global jihad. with his inauguration. and the Sudan. His aspiration was to link his organization to the wider Islamist campaign as represented by Al Qa’ida in order to reinvigorate the group after government crackdowns and legislation had reduced its numbers. he nominated Droukdal as the director of the consultative council. he frequently issued communiqués 73 . Somalia. Droukdal’s Program: Toward Global Jihad Upon assuming power. he had not yet had any contact with Al Qa’ida (Guidère 2007). Although he served the GIA in a military capacity. Thus. he served the GSPC as an ideological figurehead. he seized to opportunity to serve as chief military sergeant for the GSPC. when Hassan Hattab was forced to resign. After Mustapha assumed power. Upon his appointment as emir of the GSPC. incentivized by his opportunistic desire to revive the demoralized GSPC. Thus. He occupied this position until 2003. he commenced a policy of internationalization. he was promoted to the position of supreme emir of the GSPC after Mustapha’s death. which had been created in 1998. sought to align with other jihadist groups. Droukdal. Soon thereafter. Instead of concentrating media attention on local attacks. Libya. he conducted a nuanced public relations campaign and comprehensive media reform. Chechnya. Droukdal sought to inscribe the actions of the GSPC in an international context by publicizing the GSPC’s activities in Afghanistan. he was selected to command the Al-Quds Brigade (Abu Bakr alSiddiq Brigade) at the behest of the leader of the GIA (Guidère 2007).
These initiatives allowed him to transmit his message to operatives across the Maghreb region. The communiqués published in conjunction with the operation in Mauritania demonstrated Droukdal’s commitment to a pan-Islamic program and desire to indoctrinate his operatives in the ways of global jihad. the President of the Chechen Republic in May 2004. he circulated a communiqué congratulating the Chechen mujahedeen for the assassination of Ahmed Kadirov.-led military exercises in northern Africa dubbed 74 . The communiqués included messages with international themes. which were still committed to local initiatives. a more “global” goal. and other international themes (Guidère 2007). he issued a communiqué addressed to the leaders meeting in Algiers. In publishing this document. which took place from March 22-24. 2005. he urged jihad as a way to defend Muslim honor. thereby promulgating Al Qa’ida’s anti-Western program. In response to this event. Later.regarding international politics and events affecting the Middle East and the Maghreb. The first operation undertaken by the GSPC outside its borders occurred in Mauritania in June 2005. He derided these leaders as puppets of the American government. This communiqué. He criticized the Arab leaders who allegedly embraced communism and capitalism and were becoming increasingly sensitive to the JudeoChristian coalition. which was inspired by that of Al Qa’ida in Iraq. It included articles on Salafism. Droukdal launched a magazine for the GSPC. the crisis in Iraq.S. For instance. a GSPC statement posted by Droukdal on the Internet defending the raid indicated that the attack was in response to U. Finally. which was broadcast to a large audience of operatives and supporters. Droukdal’s media strategy became clear after the Summit of the Arab League in Algiers. was a reprisal of themes elucidated by Al Qa'ida. in Chechnya. Droukdal sought to align the GSPC theoretically with Al Qa’ida and express his obeisance to Bin Laden and Zarqawi (Guidère 2007). in Morocco. For instance.
counterterrorism campaign in Africa. in 2005. The communiqué ended by urging the Islamic youth throughout North Africa to join the Algerian cause (Lecocq and Schrijver 2007). Droukdal began filming all operations conducted by the GSPC and distributing these clips online in the same manner as Zarqawi (Guidère 2007). The statement also denounced the recent arrests and trials by Mauritanian authorities of dozens of Islamic extremists accused of having links to the GSPC. Malian. including Algerian. knowing that they had Al Qa’ida’s support. Droukdal sought to encourage Maghreb jihadists to join the Algerians in their struggle. Shortly thereafter. This operation provoked the first official reaction of Al Qa'ida to the GSPC.the “Flintlock Plan” by military officials. Furthermore. Droukdal realized that he could encourage internationalization by amending his membership roster. Mauritanian and Chadian troops. This recognition was particularly meaningful for the Algerian operatives because it made them feel more “secure” in their ventures. the director of the media division of Al Qa’ida in Iraq issued a communiqué congratulating the GSPC. In fact.. 75 . a long video filming the combatants who had participated in the operation was broadcast over the Internet in jihadist forums. This was the first time that Droukdal actively sought to recruit from outside the Algerian ranks. One week after the attack. He began to recruit several operatives from abroad and encouraged his agents to train abroad and engage in jihadist activities in other nations in an effort to expand the GSPC’s global profile. Using this video. Moreover.S. These exercises were part of a broader U. this was the first time Al Qa’ida had congratulated another group not affiliated with their organization. leaders from Al Qa’ida and the GSPC signed a pact of fraternity (Jebnoun 2007).
there were numerous GSPC media outlets transmitting information simultaneously. Thus. During the summer of 2005. Droukdal’s leadership during this time period was primarily ideological in nature. 2005). he sought to bracket the Algerian operations. Those communiqués not approved by this committee could be regarded as unauthentic. Consequently. Droukdal proposed a system of transmitting information whereby a central media committee would transmit all communiqués. the GSPC’s communications were characterized by a general cacophony and ataxia. Prior to this effort. Droukdal launched a systematic communications reform to improve the image of the GSPC amongst Algerians and the international Islamic community and to enable him to preach pan-Islamic sermons to his operatives. This system enabled the GSPC to elucidate several ambiguous arguments and clarify dubious information(Gray and Stockham 2008). When the Algerian government failed to respond. each GSPC katibat possessed its own media bureau and published its own communications regarding its operations and successes within its territory. he murdered the hostages. As a result. he sought to centralize the GSPC’s communications. Moreover. Zarqawi signaled his complicity with the GSPC by seizing two Algerian diplomats. as evidenced by the frequency of his declarations and interchanges and his efforts to improve the 76 . Upon taking these hostages he promised to execute them unless the Algerian government withdrew its support for the war in Iraq. Algerian security services contributed to this information overflow by distributing false reports on the GSPC’s channels. Droukdal responded by issuing a communiqué in which he thanked Zarqawi and extolled Al Qa’ida in Iraq (Guidère 2007). including the attack in Mauritania and the execution of the Algerian diplomats with other attacks that occurred during the same time period (including the coordinated suicide bomb attacks on London’s public transport system that occurred on July 7.In July 2005.. First of all.
on the fifth anniversary of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.GSPC’s reception nationally and internationally. It is important to note that this announcement came one year after Droukdal had made his first forays to Al Qa’ida. Moreover. Two days later. Droukdal’s role as an ideological leader steering the GSPC’s internationalization through an assertive public relations drive continued after this announcement. This was the first time that the GSPC had led an attack against a maritime target. His communiqué was particularly revelatory because it reflected the alleged changes in the official ideology of the GSPC. could positively contribute to Al Qa’ida’s ideological appeals and combat operations. announced the merger of Al Qa’ida and the GSPC. a group of combatants had penetrated the highly protected port. Droukdal also directed several tactical changes to prepare his organization for international jihad. thereby crystallizing the relationship. His discourse supported pan-Islamic notions and highlighted the necessity of creating an “Islamic United States. VIII. intent on ensuring that the GSPC’s membership. on September 11. overall his leadership performance improved during this time period. 2006. However. he expressed the 77 . The attack involved immaculate planning: the GSPC had surveyed the location for weeks and the day before. he published a communiqué affirming the GSPC’s allegiance to Al Qa’ida and bin Laden. Al Qa’ida Central Command had stalled the merger for one year. under Droukdal. one cannot ignore the fact that prior to the official announcement of the merger of Al Qa’ida and the GSPC. two bombs exploded in the port de Delis. Droukdal personally supervised all the preparations (Moss 2008). Therefore.” He spoke of the need to suppress national borders in order to establish an Islamic caliphate and urged the immediate union of the nations of North Africa under Islamic law. 2005. Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Announcement of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb Finally. the deputy leader of Al Qa’ida. On December 22.
and the Algerian stateowned oil company. The bomb attack killed an Algerian driver in a convoy transporting the workers. Some scholars have suggested that AQIM remains sharply focused on its Kabylia strongholds despite Droukdals’s global rhetoric (Filiu 2009). including 78 . however. thereby easing the qualms of his subordinates (Guidère 2007). This change would demonstrate the solidarity of Al Qa’ida and the GSPC. Droukdal issued another claim in which he suggested that after pledging allegiance to Islam and demonstrating his faith in Bin Laden. Approximately six months later. a few recent attacks indicate otherwise. For instance. and France). Droukdal and his operatives began to target foreigners who continued to support secular regimes and proselytize their culture (specifically the United States. Sonatrach. Droukdal expressed concern about projecting a certain image of his organization to his base as well as the international community. Al Qa’ida in the Maghreb (AQIM). He expressed confidence in the specific competencies and ideological underpinning of Al Qa’ida’s leadership. Moreover. Zawahiri himself refused to allow the group to call itself “Al Qa’ida in Algeria” since this name seemed too “local” and did not reflect the transnational and pan-Islamic agenda of Al Qa’ida (Guidère 2007).sentiment that Al Qa’ida was the only group that could unite all Islamic combatants and steer the battle against the Coalition forces. a joint venture between a Halliburton subsidiary. IX. KBR. nine of whom were wounded. in an elaborate roadside bombing. it was now time for him to change the name of his organization. A New Organization In the months after the name change. in December 2006. Spain. In changing the name of the GSPC to Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. he wanted to highlight its role in global jihad. AQIM conducted an attack against a bus transporting employees from Brown & Root-Condor.
He encouraged his operatives to executed attacks inspired by the Iraqi model. While Droukdal’s role was primarily ideological. Chechnya. the use of firearms plummeted while the use of explosives augmented (Gyves and Wyckloff 2006). and train potential terrorists.four Britons and one American. One bomber drove into the guard post at the government building housing the offices of the prime minister and the Interior Ministry. Always attentive to public reaction. Droukdal disclosed a communiqué. Originally. Afghanistan. in online jihadist forums about one month later. A lengthy film of the operation. the surveillance and lookout. emulated the propaganda materials of Al Qa’ida in Iraq (Jebnoun 2007). Some specialists fear that AQIM could severely damage the energy sector in the Niger delta (Moss 2008). recruit. killing at least 33 people and injuring others. the GSPC was engaged in a war of attrition whereby combatants would descend from the mountains and attack the armed forces. However. This video. indoctrinate. intended to galvanize combatants and attract recruits. three cars driven by suicide bombers blew up in Algiers. 2007 demonstrated Droukdal’s new tactics. These recruits were then dispatched to Kashmir. Droukdal encouraged the evolution from guerilla-oriented operations such as armed assaults to terror-oriented operations such as bombings. attention should be paid to the tactical changes that he implemented. Iraq and training camps in the Sahel to pursue international jihad. and the explosions was also transmitted. As a result of Droukdal’s press campaign. AQIM was able to establish communities in Europe to provide money. On this day. Two other cars were detonated beside a police station in the east of the Algerian capital (one at the seat of Interpol and the other at the 79 . Under his leadership. detailing the fabrication of the bombs. The attacks that occurred on April 11. in which AQIM admitted to the attack. Recent reports express fear that AQIM will be able to increased recruitment in Mauritania or Nigeria.
simultaneous explosions. Droukdal was compelled to publish a communiqué to outline his intentions and defuse criticism. remote detonation. This also permitted AQIM officers to move from the periphery of Algeria back into its urban centers. The second justification for the attacks was the Algerian government’s military cooperation with the American forces. Droukdal criticized the adoption of an anti-Islamic policy allegedly championed by the Americans in their war against terrorism. an effective propaganda and selective recruitment were employed to make AQIM a formidable.office of the special forces of the police in Bab Ezzouar). Through this rhetoric. this method consisted of engaging in spectacular attacks with a symbolic dimension that could destabilize the regime. As always. In doing so. Now. Final Observations 80 . kamikaze fighters. These attacks utilized remote explosives and were thus less costly in human lives. His communiqué suggested that the April 11 attacks were executed in response to a concession agreement with the United States. Moreover. which could allow the Western power to use petroleum in Algeria for 100 years. he expressed a message frequently articulated by Al Qa’ida. thereby cementing the link between the two organizations (Guidère 2007). rigged vehicles. X. Such spectacular attacks could also appeal to younger sympathizers (Algeria: Violence Returns 2007). Finally. They also demonstrated the professionalization of AQIM’s services. To capitalize upon his operatives’ anti-colonialist concerns. and sustainable fighting force. Droukdal positioned his group as the defender of the riches of Muslim countries faced with avarice and imperialism of the West. Droukdal suggested that this was the beginning of a foreign occupation and deemed it necessary to combat the Western presence in Algeria.
Droukdal advanced the goal of undermining the secular Algerian regime while damaging the interests of Western nations (Black 2007). the GSPC could render itself capable of operating in the context of global jihad. Thus. which had dramatically expanded since the September 11. he reflected AQIM’s international focus and the growing ratio of attacks against foreign targets into an emphasis on international issues and threats against Western countries in AQIM’s statements. attacks. Droukdal recognized the global appeal of Al Qa’ida message. when French police thwarted a series of bombings set to occur in Paris as Algerians voted on the National Charter for Peace and Reconciliation. Droukdal sought to effectively straddle the divide between local and international Islamic terrorism. rather than confining itself to local activity. After the ranks of his organization had been depleted at the turn of the twenty-first century. By uniting radical Islamists to attack Americana and French targets in northwestern Africa. and its success. Through his communications. he directed an ideological shift – from a philosophy based on regional preoccupations to a more internationally oriented perspective. He incited the organization to expand by attacking foreign targets. most particularly French interests. The US invasion of Iraq and media coverage of American detention and interrogation policies lent credence to the Qa’ida narrative that 81 . Moreover. The merger. he effectively brought the Algerians insurgents out of isolation so they could work more closely with international Islamic networks to promote Islam.To this day. can only be explained by highlighting Droukdal’s ideological leadership and the major shifts that he pioneered on the propaganda front. Droukdal recognized that by aligning itself with Al Qa’ida. AQIM continues to conducted several suicide attacks and roadside bombings. The most powerful French AQIM cell to date was dismantled in September 2005. each accompanied by a revealing and incantatory communiqué.
Al Qa’ida’s global ideology intersected with local anger directed at the undemocratic regime would encourage jihadists’ activity in the Maghreb. Droukdal capitalized upon these trends by highlighting the importance of solidarity among the mujahedeen in face of Western aggression against Islam. Having formulated an appropriate ideological stance. He saw clearly an opportunity for synergy.portrayed isolated American actions as a coordinated war against Islam. ready-made networks that could be internationalized. A current of cultural Islamization was created that has increased Al Qa’ida’s attraction. he was able to tap into local grievances and tie them to the global jihad against the west. he successfully aligned with Al Qa’ida to co-opt and exploit local. Thus. 82 .
two prominent Salafi jihadist groups operated in Egypt: Al-Gama’a alIslamiyya (GAI) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Qina. an Egyptian fundamentalist writer and educator. covertly supplying them with arms with which to defend themselves against potential attacks by Marxists or Nasserites. However. The Emergence of the GAI from the Ashes of the Muslim Brotherhood Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GAI) was formally organized as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1973 in the Upper Nile regions of Al-Minya. Both collaborated on the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and both fell victims to the bitter campaign of state violence. renounced violence. Upon its birth. Why did GAI repudiate terrorism rather than affiliate with Al Qa’ida to continue its brutal campaign? I. GAI quickly gained strong support among the university students in both Cairo and Alexandria by recruiting mid-level leaders from the ranks of the unemployed university students who were disillusioned by Egypt’s lack of economic opportunities. Moreover. the GAI rejected the Muslim Brotherhood’s gradualist approach to change.Chapter 7: Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya: The Unrealized Merger In the early 1970s. members of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya apologized for the group’s involvement in the Sadat assassination. the Egyptian Islamic Jihad members joined forced with Al Qa’ida. in the late 1990s. In contrast. and financial crackdowns during much of the 1990s. Asyu’. mass arrests. Both broke with the Muslim Brotherhood over the latter’s commitment to nonviolence. In addition. Both campaigned to overthrow the secular Egyptian government and to replace it with an Islamic regime. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat gave the group’s members free reign. However. and instead based their ideology on the principles articulated by Sayyid Qutb. uneducated individuals from 83 . his rivals. GAI recruited more indigent. and denounced Al Qa’ida. and Sohaj.
Sadat changed his political strategies to combat internal unrest in the mid 1970s. During Al-Rahman’s time abroad. II. Feldner. AlRahman served six months in an Egyptian prison. He provided the moral justifications for the group’s moneymaking attacks on Christian shopkeepers and small-business owners by his issuing fatwa – religious rulings that justify actions normally outlawed by the Koran (Abdel Maguid 2003). Fearing harsh repression (like that which the Muslim brotherhood has experienced under former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser). The Sadat Assassination Upon returning to Egypt in 1980. He began rounding up several Islamic militants and placing them in jail. where he found and developed financial supporters. The GAI and Egyptian Islamic Jihad allegedly cooperated in this conspiracy. including Saudi Arabia. and Lav 2006). they established a branch devoted to jihad and began to execute increasingly violent operations.the southern rural regions of Assiuet and Minya to further populate their rank and file (Keats 2002). clashes between Egyptian security forces and Islamic movements in the universities increased. avoiding a sterner sentence on a technicality (Keats 2002). Perturbed by the rapid development and mobilization of the Salafi organizations in Egypt. Al-Rahman fled Egypt and toured the neighboring Arab countries. Al-Rahman issued a fatwa that provided the religious justification for the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. III. As a result of his policies. Crackdown under Mubarak 84 . Consequently. “A need [had] arisen for a military force for us to defend [themselves]” (Carmon. GAI leaders decided. Sheikh Omar Abdel Al–Rahman assumed the mantle as spiritual leader for the group during its infancy. As a result of his role in the assassination.
torture. His methods included false arrests. like Mustafa Hamza. some GAI members returned to Egypt where they initiated a campaign against the influences of Western culture. Some. they trained and fought alongside al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad and other Afghan Arabs. again provided the religious justification for these attacks by arguing that tourism in Egypt fostered poor morals. During the 1990s. many GAI members and leaders fled to Afghanistan. Several were implicated in numerous plots directed against American diplomatic and military targets in the Balkans and other parts of Europe. and Lav 2006). Campaign of Terror After the Soviet-Afghan war. and executions. many GAI members continued or commenced their training in Al Qa’ida facilities in the Sudan and Afghanistan. where they were active in the jihad against the Soviet Union. who continued to struggle under high unemployment(Gerges 2000). Al-Rahman. IV. such as Osama Bin Laden. they carried out a number of attacks on tourists that killed dozens of people. Feldner. Hosni Mubarak began a brutal campaign against Egypt’s militant groups that lasted throughout the 1980s. who had immigrated to the United States by this time. even worked for businesses owned by Osama bin Laden in Somalia (Carmon. Between 1992 and 1993.Sadat’s successor. many fighters moved on to combat the Serbian forces that were decimating Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia. In Afghanistan. During these years. 85 . a leading member of the GAI. Although fairly successful at curbing the number of violent attacks. and spread diseases such as AIDS (Stacher 2002). this crackdown further radicalized the university-educated population. Moreover. following the Soviet withdrawal.
Al-Rahman was arrested in the United States in connection with the first World Trade Center bombing. and banks. Two months later. Yet despite his arrest. including the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels. a GAI member read aloud a communiqué. several GAI leaders immediately conveyed their disgust. V. he and nine other operatives were convicting for conspiring to destroy New York City landmarks. Thus.In 1993. bookstores. On July 5. which declared a halt to all armed operations within and outside Egypt. militants killed nine German tourists and their driver in front of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. In 1993. he and nine other operatives were convicted for conspiring to destroy New York City landmarks. GAI announced a unilateral initiative of conciliation with the Egyptian regime. signed by six of the organization's leaders. Cairo clamped down on both the GAI and Egyptian Islamic Jihad even more. Collapse of an Armed Group As a result of GAI’s campaign in the late 1990s. GAI continued to attack tourists throughout the 1990s and began targeting Egyptian business establishments as well. In 1995. 86 . the group allegedly collaborated with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in a failed assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa. 1997. when the Luxor attack occurred. In 1996. including the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels. 36 of whom were Swiss) (Keats 2002). During a court hearing. Ethiopia. In 1996. and a stop to agitation to commit attacks. The group bombed theaters. Al-Rahman was arrested in the United States in connection with the first World Trade Center bombing. This prompted some influential militants to reconsider their strategy and tactics and some GAI leaders renounced violence. the group killed 63 people at a tourist site in Luxor (including four Egyptians and 59 foreign tourists. arresting thousands of suspected terrorists and executing or killing others during police raids. In September 1997.
Moreover. After the schism. The Luxor attack and the reports of mutilation of the victims’ bodies had sparked public repulsion at GAI. while the smaller. led by Rifai Ahmad Taha deplored the ceasefire as cowardly and called for a return to armed operations. organized by Mustafa Hamza. Rifai Ahmad Taha courted bin Laden by making trips to Afghanistan and even appeared sitting next to him and Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a videotape released in September 2000 that threatened US interests.insisting that the operation was not executed by the GAI. wanted to seize power in the GAI. Moreover. Taha signed Bin Laden’s 1998 Declaration of War against the “Jews and Crusaders. but rather by a breakaway faction (Ghadbian 2000). For instance. supported non-violence and the ceasefire. The GAI had witnessed how the Egyptian Islamic Jihad had suffered significant setbacks because of its decision to join Al Qa’ida. a Netherlands resident announced his resignation (Cohen 2003). Therefore. the GAI was weakened both operationally and financially by the aftermath effects of the attack. the larger. moderate one. It is unclear whether Taha actually agreed with bin Laden’s views. Yet despite his efforts. Consequently. he was unable to recruit many of his cadres to support Bin Laden and a minimal number joined the global jihad (Botha 2006). the group split into two factions.” thereby becoming a signatory to the International Islamic Front. Zawahiri's organization experienced a major upset when in 1998 Albania agreed to extradite 12 members of EIJ to Egypt 87 . more radical faction. the GAI spokesman Osama Rushdie. it needed a publicity boost if it was to continue functioning as a viable terrorist organization. as a result of increased governmental scrutiny. In 1997. or simply saw the financial and organizational advantages that Al Zawahiri had reaped from making the decision to join Al Qa’ida.
Dr. The GAI has not conducted a terrorist attack either inside or outside Egypt since August 1998. and our aim is Islam. Nevertheless. In 2002.in the case known as the “Returnees from Albania” (Aboul-Enein 2004) Consequently. Even Al-Rahman. the historic leadership of the GAI has published a series of books." he maintained. despite their proclamations in favor of non-violence. He asserted that Al Qa’ida’s aggressive tactics have failed Muslims. agreed to this measure. Since this time. We are even thinking of paying blood money to the victims” (Halawi 2002). announced that the GAI had merged with Al Qa’ida. During his interview with Asharq al-Awsat. “Their aim is jihad. even said the GAI owes the Egyptian people "an apology for the crimes which [the group] has committed against Egypt. by then the closest associate of Osama bin Laden. most members of GAI preferred to go underground until the group regained its strength and influence rather than align with Al Qa’ida and risk further setbacks. Since this time. a self-proclaimed leader of the underground group. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Nageh Ibrahim. Ibrahim challenged Al Qa’ida’s Islamic credentials by emphasizing its dependence on violent struggle as a means to further its goals and suggested that Al Qa’ida was propagating a false definition of jihad. GAI leadership in Egypt quickly rejected this claim. the leadership issued a statement reaffirming its commitment to end violence. known as the “Concept Correction Series” in which they renounce indiscriminate violence and extremist interpretations of Islam. the group’s historic leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire. in August 2006. who remained the group’s spiritual leader. stressed that significant differences in philosophy exist between the GAI and Al Qa’ida. In doing so. despite widespread skepticism in Egypt and abroad about the nature of its true 88 . a senior leader and chief ideological theorist for the GAI. Reconciliation In 1999. VI. Karam Zuhdi.
They believed that their main foe was the Egyptian state and that the near enemy was more worthy of fighting than the distant enemy. which gave precedence to doctrinal correctness above all other issues. GAI interpreted their jihad much more narrowly than groups affiliated or associated with Al Qa’ida. When GAI reemerged in the early 1990s with a renewed sense of purpose after the return of its members from the Afghan jihad. VII. when their group was in a state of imminent decline. evidence suggests that this choice was strategic. primarily to the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt (Rabasa et al. who were not already entrenched in Salafi jihadist circles. the ouster of the “illegitimate” governing power. Consequently. tourists. politicians. police. and exhibited strong anti-Western proclivities. They attacked Coptic Christians. While they attacked Western targets. they decided to renounce violent activity rather than appeal for Al Qa’ida for assistance to continue their existence as a terrorist group. and the media with the goal of undermining Egyptian state power. GAI members were less receptive to Al Qa’ida’s ideology of global jihad than other groups that have emerged since that time. 2006). and the economy 89 . they perceived their struggle as regionally confined to the Egyptian territory.intentions. Explaining the Decision not to Affiliate with Al Qa’ida The leadership of the GAI had longstanding connections with Al Qa’ida. however. its leaders were convinced that they could accomplish in Egypt what the mujahedeen had achieved in Afghanistan. Moreover. While this decision may seem counterintuitive. banks. the GAI has concentrated its efforts on revising its former extremist worldview and distinguishing itself from Qa’ida (Zambelis 2006). GAI’s theoretical and operational priorities were the product of a literal reading of the Quranic and prophetic texts. secular institutions. GAI was well established and active prior to Al Qa’ida’s emergence in the international arena.
and severe treatment in prisons and detention facilities. Thus. this may have been a maneuver to buy time. Reflecting on the seven years of GAI violence between 1992 and 1997. deaths in armed clashes. admitted that the group was in a stronger position before it started attacking the government. Osama Rushdie. stiff sentences that included dozens of executions. the groups’ leaders acquainted themselves with other schools of Islamic thought. Nevertheless. Additionally. He attempted to rationalize this earlier aggression by suggesting that adopting violence in 1992 " was mainly a reaction to what we saw as the suppression and killing of our brothers” (Carmon.” Between arrests. the relative success of the government’s security policy obligated the group to concede to what its leaders called “military defeat. wider reading and understanding is evident in the sources on which the leadership relied to compose the revisionist books that they published (Halawi 2002). after its initiative to end the violence. GAI were compelled to shift strategies as a political tactic. when several leaders of GAI announced its cease-fire initiative. the effect of their new. the ranks of the leadership and general membership were decimated. in the late 1990s. This exceedingly severe security strategy disrupted the ranks and cohesion of GAI prompting the group’s leaders to reconsider its acts and concepts. by the turn of the century the group realized that it was useless to try to topple a powerful regime by force. reunite the groups’ ranks. and prepare for a new offensive. a former leader of GAI. 90 . In fact. the security establishment facilitated meetings between the group’s leader and members in Egyptian prisons to ensure that the group honored this commitment. However. even with Al Qa’ida’s backing.and creating the perception that the Egyptian government could not protect its citizens (Keats 2002). Feldner. and Lav 2006) It is possible that in mid-1997. During their time in prison.
the bulk of which may be able to make a reasonable calculation that they are not a risk. GAI acted on the basis of its calculation of the benefit to be gained from violent action. one must note that terrorism depends on the ability to generate the appropriate level of terror and anxiety. terrorists groups must conduct a sequence of directed attacks that creates a sufficient sense of threat for it to be understood that the campaign will continue unless and until there is a change in state policy (Freedman 2007). A constant failure to achieve its stated goals led to internal strife and its ultimate collapse as a terrorist group. the consequences of adopting a nonviolent position and the probability of achieving its political goals through terrorist undertakings. the costs of attempting violent attacks and of these attacks failing. Thus. Even with some assistance from Al Qa’ida.” When GAI was unable to achieve its political goal through terrorism. by definition. Crenshaw’s description of the instrumental approach to assessing terrorist violence is useful for understanding GAI’s rationale. which must fan out among a possibly substantial population. Terrorist organizations engage in a process of constant adaptation to the strategic environment and are apt to respond to policy-induced changes to their constraints since. GAI used terrorism to influence political behavior by devaluing the state in the eyes of its citizens. they lack resources. GAI would not have been able to defeat the Egyptian government. Final Observations For GAI. the group abandoned its violent 91 . However. terrorism was a means to a political end.VIII. nor did GAI members have any interest in targeting the “far enemy. Acts of terror induce psychological effects. they changed their strategic tactics. not to destroy the government’s military potential. The costs of executing attacks became too high and the consequences of adopting a nonviolent position seemed promising (Crenshaw 1987). Accordingly. it was meant to produce a change in the Egyptian government’s political position.
GAI now appears to be concerned with carving out some political space to operate in Egypt. 92 . terrorism was merely a means to an end and substitutes were available. For GAI.strategy.
e. social bonds served as a “permissive factor”). Recent studies indicate that strategies aimed at enabling stringent police techniques and punitive military action will not succeed in deterring the Al Qa’ida suicide bombers(Atran 2003). It is naïve to focus on chief executives. The data collected in this survey and analysis of Al Qa’ida’s leadership has significantly demonstrated that leaders were strongly incentivized by opportunism. interventions may need to be focused at understanding and disrupting Al Qa’ida’s mid-level management. ideology. the analysis of Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb provides an example of an intelligent and shrewd local jihadist leader. his loosely affiliated. broad-based Al Qa’ida network augmented by affiliations with various groups has durability that will surpass his mortality. the commanding officers that direct Al Qa’ida’s affiliates. 93 . Consequently. I posed the question: what motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida? I hypothesized that opportunism. like Osama bin Laden or Ayman Zawahiri or to concentrate on the suicide bombers who conduct operations. While Osama bin Laden’s capture or death would be an important psychological blow to those vested in his invincibility. it is necessary to examine the staff that operates at each level of the hierarchy within the system. Abdelmalek Droukdal whose desire to revive his group inspired him to associate with Al Qa’ida while the examination of Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya demonstrates why strategic calculations can rouse other organizations to eschew violence and rebuff Al Qa’ida’s forays. Moreover. or social bonds could motivate local jihadist leaders to enroll in Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program.Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion – Al Qa’ida’s Commanding Officers: A Skilled Management Team To understand terrorist organizations. In the first chapters. while social bonds facilitated the process of affiliating (i.
popular support. Conciliation programs can be a successful counter-terrorism strategy when amnesty is offered to operatives who renounce violence. the type of regime against which they are fighting. insurgent groups should also be perceived as rational entities that are more likely to adopt terrorist tactics when the benefits of other forms of violence decrease. as was the case with the GSPC (Sederberg 1995). Moreover. Since they are rational actors. One should consider terrorism as “one of a set of rebel tactics that is consciously selected in response to changes in funding. the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself. My data analysis and case studies support these conclusions. wish to enhance and promote the organizations that they direct since their personal ambitions are tied to the organization’s viability (Cronin and Ludes 2004). But what are these motives? In fact. Leaders. Within the larger understanding of a terrorist group’s political aims. there may be a divergence of opinion on precisely what objectives should be 94 . or both. in particular. it is not surprising that local jihadist group leaders have opportunistic motives for joining Al Qa’ida. when the costs of other forms of violence increase. Counterterrorism efforts aimed at winning battles and capturing terrorist actors deplete the ranks of terrorist organizations by physically eliminating combatants. organizations must attract and retain members. and counterinsurgency tactics” (Laitin and Jacob Shapiro 2008) Like individual terrorists. competition against other rebel groups. Factionalism is also common amongst terrorist organizations. In order to survive.Previous studies depict terrorists as rational actors seeking to maximize political goals (Lake 2003). Psychological surveys indicate that terrorists are not psychologically deviant or ideologically blinded(Sageman 2004). groups may lose members to other terrorist groups when a competing group can put together a package of purposive goals and selective incentives that is more appealing than that of the first organization.
Thus.pursued. transforming from an armed group into a political party is no easy feat. In recent years. security sources in Algeria said that the Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb offensive in August 2008 reflected the recruitment of scores of operatives.000 militants in camps in Afghanistan. their public image shifts from well-intentioned revolutionaries to common delinquents. For example. When loss of membership occurs. Finally. Recruiters for Al Qa’ida reportedly told researchers that volunteers were “beating down their doors” to join (Atran 2004). Al Qa’ida can transfer operatives to help support the local jihadist group since Al Qa’ida’s own recruitment is accelerating. Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida’s elite cadre have convinced many volunteers to fulfill the duty of jihad and to thus respond to “the call of Allah.” While it is impossible to know precisely the size of Al Qa’ida due to the decentralized structure of its organization. 95 . groups may alienate the communities in which they operate by conducting particularly violent or poorly executed operations (Crenshaw 1991). when they occupy a “moral high ground”). including suicide bombers. Al Qa’ida’s recruitment has picked up in 30-40 countries. some groups may find it beneficial to renounce violence and enter the political arena. Groups only enjoy popular support when the population believes their actions are justified under the political conditions of the country (i. This divergence compels operatives to defect. Al Qa’ida probably has several thousand members and associates. especially in less democratic nations. Thus. Al Qa’ida trained over 5. and those with inside knowledge of the military and police(Gray and Stockham 2008). making recruitment amongst these communities increasingly difficult. Al Qa’ida can easily dispatch a few combatants to assist local groups in desperate need of increased membership and expertise.e. many groups may choose to align with Al Qa’ida to remain salient. like the GAI. combatants. Since the 1980s. When this occurs. However.
However. which produces the professional tapes and promotional film clips disseminated throughout the Arab and Western world. Before joining forces with Al Qa’ida. groups gain credibility and respect that can be effectively leveraged to increase recruitment. of coalition soldiers shooting wounded insurgents inside a mosque.Additionally. their social status is enhanced. Al Qa’ida raises awareness amongst Muslims of the grievances that gave rise to its birth. primarily by means of the Qatari television station al-Jazeera. Al Qa’ida also selects sympathetic journalists to whom it grants interviews (Schweitzer 2008). These journalists present Al Qa’ida to the outside world in a supportive manner. Through a program of propaganda and indoctrination.e. they are perceived as legitimate actors. striving for global jihad. Therefore. Recognizing the powerful potential of the media. many terrorist groups are compared to criminal gangs. For instance. Al Qa’ida uses propaganda to foster its positive public image as the defender of Islam. or of occupation forces stepping with their boots on the backs of Arabic men that have just been bound 96 . recruits are shown provocative photos of Iraqi women and children killed or bloodied by Western bombardment. By aligning with Al Qa’ida. To complement this strategy. In doing so. upon aligning with Al Qa’ida. In fact. as discussed in Chapter 3. Bin Laden has created a company called al-Sahab. Al Qa’ida has substantially promoted and publicized its image throughout the globe. the Muslim warriors of the crusader period) by establishing a territorial base for Islam and by protecting those who are oppressed by foreign domination(Henzel 2005). Al Qa’ida is a high-value global brand that is esteemed amongst the Salafi community. depicting its operatives as “freedom fighters. Al Qa’ida established a communications committee to promote this representation through a well-executed publicity campaign.” To supplement recruitment. Al Qa’ida encourages potential operatives to follow in the footsteps of their pious predecessors (i.
Al Qa’ida can offer groups financial resources. Riduan Isamuddin. Al Qa’ida can help groups conduct attacks. For example. physical environment. Al Qa’ida also attributes Muslim societies’ “greatest misfortune and decadence to their abandonment of jihad due to the love of this world and abhorrence of death. Moreover. Because of that. nature of the military and intelligence services. 97 . and weapons. equipment. and mentored.000 of Al Qa’ida seed money (Ward 2005). For instance. Abdelmalek Droukdal certainly modeled his publicity efforts on that of Al Qa’ida and benefited from advice from Al Qa’ida’s media branch. known as Muklhas. financial services. Al Qa’ida’s affiliates learn from Al Qa’ida how to conduct comparable propaganda campaigns in their home countries to attract and enhance their own recruitment efforts. Such emotional narratives highlight the theme of humiliation at the hand of callous and arrogant Western powers(Hafez 2007). According to several reports. Ansar al-Islam was started with $300. Al Qa’ida’s veterans can offer groups tactical and strategic advice. Al Qa’ida is infamous for providing terrorist training and for establishing sites and camps where recruits are educated.and forced to the ground with black sacks over their faces. Al Qa’ida established numerous local military training facilities in Mindanao and Indonesia in the last two decades. Thus. etc. Finally. It can also offer groups information on the government.000 to $600. indoctrinated. tyrants gained dominance over the Muslims in every aspect and every land”(Calvert 2004). both alumni of the Afghan jihad. due to its exceptional intelligence-gathering skills. known as Hambali and Ali Gufron. even death. it effectively encourages redemption through faith and sacrifice. helped Jemaah Islamiyah plan and execute the 2002 Bali bombing that killed more than 2000 people (Abuza 2003).
it may be futile for counterterrorist forces to discourage local jihadist group leaders from soliciting Al Qa’ida. Instead. social networks can be thought of as a stipulation that pre-structures and facilitates the merger process. By joining Al Qa’ida. local jihadist group leaders are positioned to seek assistance from their colleagues when decline within their own organizations seems imminent. thereby making such affiliations more problematic and risky. and because such affiliations are not difficult to initiate due to the existence of prior social connections. in particular. demonstrate that the organization has a loyal and impassioned following. Moreover. strategies should be developed to isolate these groups from Al Qa’ida. just as a conventional military organization might glamorize its heroes to inspire others to volunteer for field military actions. Such missions create publicity events that effectively advertise the organization and psychologically appeal to individual needs to feel important and meaningful through membership in a “higher” movement (Atran 2003). Efforts should ensure that the necessary resources (both human and 98 . Due to these associations. Since Al Qa’ida provides local jihadist group leaders with numerous opportunities to stimulate and expand their organizations. Suicide attacks.Conducting attacks connotes a high degree of devotion and strength to potential recruits. the results of this study suggest that most local jihadist group leaders have already established significant social bonding and networking with members of Al Qa’ida Central Command. While not a precipitant cause for an affiliation. local jihadist leaders are presented with appealing and cost effective opportunities to bolster their own recruitment and ensure organizational survival and their ability to achieve their political aims without abandoning arms and investigating political avenues. Also. rather than abandon their mission. martyrdom operations not only produce spectacular incidents of large-scale destruction. but also create and promote “heroes” that represent the organization.
The new Schengen Information System computer database contains information on criminals on the run. Tom Ridge. In areas like the Core Arab states and the Maghreb. border control measures must be established to prevent the movement of terrorists and terror-related materials. This system is also used to store and disseminate information on extradition. To thwart Al Qa’ida’s connections with local jihadist groups. and illegal migrants” (Ross 2003). governments should implement a networked border monitoring and border control system. thereby crippling its ability to supersede a regional dimension (Filiu 2009). If groups are precluded from affiliating with Al Qa’ida. they are less likely to survive or recuperate from setbacks. former Secretary of Homeland Security. third-country nationals refused entry to the EU and individuals 99 . However. For instance. stolen cars and other stolen property as well as biometric data. some suggest that AQIM’s globalization process has been impeded by the expulsion of AL Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) from Baghdad in 2008. Thus. portrayed US borders as “conduits for terrorists. which features a common visa policy and region-wide fingerprint or iris photography database. Bin Laden has devoted less attention and resources to AQIM. In the age of globalization. communities. especially Muslim. it is necessary to treat carefully because restrictive “fortress” responses and sweeping immigrant surveillance hinder cooperation with key immigrant. terrorists have learned how to make legal immigration channels and legitimate immigrant communities serve their lethal jihadist ends. weapons of mass destruction. Since the Iraqi branch of Al Qa’ida suffered this setback. state borders were opened to international trade flows. A model system is that which is utilized in the European Union.capital) cannot be exchanged between Al Qa’ida and its weaker partner. Unilateral approaches to border control will leave a mismatch of contradictory national policies. previous asylum applications. Throughout the 1990s.
etc. These predictive models could be used in order to develop strategies for a pre-emptive counter-response. the leaders issued more communiqués. One impressive program was the East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative. whereby $50 million for security programs administered by the US Department of Defense was offered to East African states to provide for military training for border control and security of the coastline. For example. gave more speeches.subject to a European arrest warrant or under surveillance for criminal activity(One Single EU Border 2005) A system for region-wide arrests would also be useful in areas where terrorist activity is high. While there were no significant patterns in the data on the operational and logistic role of the leaders profiled. I considered leadership roles before and after the affiliation to uncover trends. counterterrorist forces can better undermine these leaders. police training. The United States can provide assistance to foreign governments to enhance operational capacity to tighten border controls. Future research may also focus on how alliances mature and evolve over time since this article focuses on aspects of maturity among terrorist groups who have engaged in networking with Al Qa’ida. After the merger. Future research will center on the development of predictive models based on emerging patterns among terrorist groups that align with Al Qa’ida. it appears that most leaders took on an increasingly ideological role after the merger. By understanding what function local jihadist leaders play. and aviation security capacity (Kagwanja 2006). 100 . an understanding might be developed of what government initiatives trigger terrorist organizations to seek partnerships with Al Qa’ida and of the strength of the alliance that materializes as a result. granted more interviews. The second question that I sought to answer involved the type of role local jihadist leaders played within Al Qa’ida.
The dyadic relationship between these leaders and their followers is characterized by high quality leader-member exchange resulting from frequent communication. and subordinate loyalty. an ideology that was widely unpopular in the country in previous years (West 2006). Siad Barre. These groups enjoyed popularity in Somalia in the 60s due to their attempts to regain lost Somali land after independence and to their resistance to dictator. When local jihadist leaders are not interested in promoting this agenda. Al Qa’ida conceives its resistance as a single. an affiliation will not occur. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are tightly coupled to their operatives. one must consider the philosophy and ambitions of local jihadist groups compared to Al Qa’ida. state. and regional concerns. For example. Central to Al Qa’ida’s vision is the awakening of the Muslim ummah. al-Ittihad al-Islami was established in the 1980s through the merger of Salafi groups. unified struggle that transcends local. ethno-religious struggles. he demands that his commanding officers convince their operatives to adopt and accept Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program. The roots of most of the terrorist networks included in this study can be traced to geographically separate. they gained the support of the Somali people through nationalist causes more than through a common affinity for Salafism. as was the case with the GAI. the worldwide community of believers(Sutton and Vertigans 2006).To understand why this increase in evangelizing and political activity of these leaders occurs. leader-member value agreement. Consequently. interactive communication patterns. a high degree of decision influence. Although Bin Laden wants to align with local militant groups with country-specific grievances to increase his global reach and influence. The leaders of local jihadist groups develop differentiated relationships with their 101 . Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are uniquely positioned to persuade uncommitted followers that Al Qa’ida has a better ideology. As mentioned in earlier chapters. effective influence tactics. In contrast.
When the security situation does not permit direct communications. followers are encouraged to take personal initiative and exercise personal leadership to make their unit more effective. through their ideological operations. and interviews. For instance. Based on these motivational communications. When a group first affiliates with Al Qa’ida. Because they know their audience well. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers can ground their message in the narrative elements most likely to resonate with this target group. rather than using an average leadership style. rhetoric. culture shock is inevitable. followers trust their leaders and can be persuaded to engage in activities that they otherwise would not and can be encouraged to move beyond their own self-interest to focus on larger mutual interests(Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). Moreover. they can apply effective message management. Valuable insights can be gained by considering the role that managers play when two companies merge in order to understand the role that Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers play in mitigating culture shock and encouraging integration. Thus. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers correspond with their cohorts through communiqués. Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers can convince their operatives to integrate their previous regional ambitions with a wider transnational Islamic agenda. speeches. due to their close relationship with operatives. they subordinate their radical group to Al Qa’ida’s strategic goals and move their localized Islamic resistance beyond sovereign state boundaries to transcend provincial frames of reference. In addition to accepting Al Qa’ida’s pan-Islamic program. operatives must also integrate new tactics and strategies into their repertoire. Like Al 102 . as Droukdal did on numerous occasions. the GSPC was encouraged to engage in suicide and arson attacks(Guidère 2007). In doing so.rapports. and spin. in which they clarify their vision. Due to such high quality leader-member exchange.
Both transition managers and Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers must be skilled in relinquishing and helping others relinquish past values and practices that are not in tune with the current. major change and generate a great deal of uncertainty due to the fact that organizational cultures are underpinned by deep assumptions that are constant. Soon after the GSPC announced its merger with Al Qa’ida. When corporate mergers occur. Helen Kubler-Ross’s four stages of bereavement or 103 . one of the most common difficulties that arise during the merger is “cultural differences. a corporation may encourage teamwork while the venture it subsumes may be more oriented towards individual initiatives. Although some of the groups that Al Qa’ida merges with have less than five hundred operatives. They commence with disbelief and denial and pass into anger and then rage and resentment. and shared.Qa’ida’s commanding officers. The threat to old corporate values and organizational lifestyle leaves organizational members in a state of defensiveness accentuated by low levels of trust within the institution. transition mangers assume full-time responsibility and accountability for making integration work. mergers represent sudden. transition managers must make the case for integration to large numbers of employees.” For example. These are identical to Dr. patterned. next emotional bargaining begins. often accompanied by frustration and depression. shared vision of future organizational arrangements (Marks and Mirvis 2000). In addition. For Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers and corporate transition managers. This can only be achieved by providing ideological guidance through leadermember exchanges and through public communications and appearances. Employees’ reactions most often pass through four distinct stages. the burden of responsibility still rests on the commanding officers to assuage their followers after the affiliation with Al Qa’ida commences. finally acceptance occurs. Droukdal issued a communiqué explaining and justifying this repositioning.
Finally. Moreover. Leaders. leadership can be viewed as the art of mobilizing others to want to struggle for shared aspirations (Covin et al. they must inspire hope. Leaders hoping to initiative organizational change and general follower acceptance face a daunting task. anticipate the impact of change.grief. like Droukdal. and support necessary changes in behaviors and culture to successfully realize the post-combination organization. 104 . successfully promote change by implementing and campaigning for a unique vision of the organization through a publicity campaign. A wide range of factors affect organizational change as produced during a merger. Finally. They must assuage their followers’ fears and convince them of the saliency and relevance of the new program through constant communication. When a merger occurs. they should clarify critical success factors for the merger. promote. and a sense that the future will be better than the past through their speeches and other outreach activities. In this context. optimism. 1997). and address inconsistencies between the espoused operating principles and actual management of change. It is their responsibility to define. These initiatives can only be achieved by assuming an ideological role (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy 2006). and desired end state. principles. What the operative grapples with is akin to the “death” of the previous organization and the letting go of this relationship (Cartwright and Cooper 1990). they should serve as role models on how to “work together” for the goals of the organization. Effective leaders possess powerful persuasive personal characteristics and execute actions designed to change internal organizational culture and substance. transition managers (and Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers) must define the new “combination” goals. Communication should be their major priority throughout the merger process.
It is important to remember that some groups. In fact. another principle Islamist militant group in Egypt. especially religious ones. Proxies must manage from affair and this sort of counter-terrorism publicity campaign. My data indicates that these commanding officers are leading Al Qa’ida’s growing media offensive. Approaching communications in this manner ensures that the government avoids exacerbating feelings of alienation within Muslim communities. Counterterrorism units can use media organizations to launch global propaganda pushes that will taint the Al Qa’ida brand and make it even less attractive to local militants. For example. Thus. counterterrorist units should channel messages through volunteers in Internet forums(Brachman and McCants 2006). For instance. Moreover. Counterterrorist forces can also harness the power of the “Shayma effect” (which refers to an incident where an Egyptian schoolgirl was killed in a jihadist attack) by broadcasting images off jihadist attacks that have killed Muslim children. government communications strategy should build an attractive alternative to the Al Qa’ida worldview by appealing to a sense of deracinated nationalism. authorities can publicize the rejection of Al Qa’ida by credible local figures.Understanding Al Qa’ida’s commanding officer’s role as transition managers during a merger is important when designing initiatives to undermine their efforts. do opt to renounce violence. have taken steps to promote peaceful co-existence with the government and society(Gunaratna and Ali 2009). several leaders of GAI and Al-Jihad al-Islami. This program should expose tension between Al Qa’ida leadership and supporters. For 105 . messaging should refute the imputation of malign Western intention in the Muslim world and undermine the notion that terrorism is authentically Islamic. Such propaganda will appeal to communities anxious to retain their cultural heritage and religious integrity. like the GAI. The media has become a crucial battlefield in the current conflict against radical Islamic terrorism (Blanchard 2006).
courage and commitment in countering al-Qaida propaganda and recruitment activity. and a war with no truce” (Payne 2009). the government should continue to capture Al Qa’ida news and production staff. Ed Husain and Shiraz Maher were two young British Muslims who became involved with radical Islamist politics with Hizb ut-Tahir before renouncing their affiliation and speaking out publicly about the dangers of intolerant Islamism (MacEoin 2007).instance. The leaders of the Western world should follow suit. The collapse of Al Qa’ida’s propaganda operations will also cause the Arab media to move towards more coverage of the legitimate Iraqi government. This study indicates that Al Qa’ida’s commanding officers are playing an increasingly ideological role. a struggle for survival. Salafi and Islamist communities in London have consistently demonstrated skill. 106 . Moreover. along with their PCS and data files. Ayman Al Zawahiri acknowledges that the struggle between the secular governments in the West and the militant jihadists of Al Qa’ida is a “battle of ideologies. Our government should also realize this truism.
” International Journal of Middle East Studies: 481-499.: inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden.” Politique Étrangère 3. Bergen. About START. Algeria: Violence Returns. Al Qaida's Ideology. Inc. 107 . 1st ed.org. 2006.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27: 169-185. Andrew. Abuza. L.start. Available at: http://acpss.17049. Aboul-Enein. 2009]. Bergen. Available at: http://www. Scott. Atran.” Terrorism Monitor 5(2): 7-12. 2001. African Research Bulletin (23): 17045 .” The Washington Quarterly 27(3): 67-90. Zachary. 1980. New York: Simon & Schuster. Holy war. Free Press. “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya.mi5. P.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. Nazih. 2004. Atran. Ayubi. Peter. National Consortium for the Study of terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. The Osama bin Laden I know: an oral history of al Qaeda's leader.” Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies. “Egypt's Gama'ah Islamiyah: The Turnabout and its Ramifications. Peter. 2003. 2007. The Threats. “The Reconstituted Al-Qaeda Threat in the Maghreb.umd. Airforce University Maxwell. Wahid. “L’Afrique et la «Guerre Contre la Terreur». “The Political Revival of Islam: the Case of Egypt.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25(2): 169-200. 2004.BIBLIOGRAPHY: Abdel Maguid. Alain. “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. Black. 2009]. Youssef.gov.uk/output/al-qaidasideology.HTM [Accessed January 1. Mark. Basile. 2003. Ayman Al-Zawahiri: The Ideologue of Modern Islamic Militancy. 2006. 2003. 2007.html [Accessed May 14.eg/eng/ahram/2004/7/5/EGYP16. 2009].ahram. 2004. “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism. Inc.” Science 299(5612): 1534-1539. New York: Free Press.edu/start/about/ [Accessed May 14. Antil. Available at: http://www. “Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing. Holy War. Bergen. Scott. 2002.
Nova Publishers. Available at: http://memri. Storming Media. Jarret. 2006. “Global Terrorism and the Global Economy: Unpeaceful Coexistence. “Promoting Freedom and Democracy: Fighting the War of Ideas Against Islamic Terrorism. Amelie. Ariel. 2009]. 1991. 1987. Martha. The Middle East Media Research Institute. p. “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology. 2007. Washington. “How Terrorism Declines. 2004. 2006. The Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological Reversal. 2006. Anneli. Sue. Carmon. 2003. Boudali. Botha. Calvert. Laetitia Bucaille. Christopher.” Orbis 48(1): 29-41. Teresa et al.: The Heritage Foundation. K. “Stealing Al Qaeda's Playbook. Cartwright. The Enigma of Islamist Violence.” Comparative Strategy 22(3): 207-221. Crenshaw. Cohen. 1997.” Journal of Management Development 16(1): 22-33.” In 2005 Index of Economic Freedom. Brachman. “Al Qaeda in the Maghreb: The" Newest" Front in the War on Terror. 2006. and Louis Martínez. Cronin. Audrey. and William McCants. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Y Feldner. “The Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on People at Work: Existing Research and Issues.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA30906 [Accessed February 3.” In Al-Qaeda: An Organization to be Reckoned With.org/bin/articles. 1990. Celso. D.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29(4): 309-321. Anthony. Martha.Blanchard. Y. “The Mythic Foundations of Radical Islam.” Mediterranean Quarterly 19(1): 80. 2008. L.” Journal of Strategic Studies 10(4): 13-31. 2005. Politics and Terrorism: An Assessment of the Origin and Threat of Terrorism in Egypt. Covin. 2006. 2007. and D Lav.C. 11. Blom. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad. “Leadership Style and Post-Merger Satisfaction.” International Security 31(1): 7-48. Carafano.” Terrorism and political violence 3(1): 6987. “How Al-Qaida ends: The decline and demise of terrorist groups. J. “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches. Crenshaw.” British Journal of Management 1(2): 65-76. John. 108 . J. and Cary Cooper. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.
” Dialogue IO 1(01): 1-14. George B. David. “Terrorism as a Strategy.. 2003. Najib. 2002. 1995. “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations. Freedman. 2004. and James Ludes. 2007. 1995. Fair. 2005. Della Porta. Chris. Lawrence. “Using the Mistakes of al Qaeda's Franchises to Undermine Its Strategies. and Tobin Hengsen. “Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy. J.” The Middle East Journal: 592-612. Washington. Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities.” The Leadership Quarterly 6(2): 219247. Desouza.Cronin.” African Affairs 103(412): 459-464. Stephen. Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa..” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28(3): 237-252. Gershman. Stein. D. Dishman.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA45991 9 [Accessed December 4. G. Fishman.dtic. Brian. 109 . Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Available at: http://oai. 2007. 2000. R. “Relationship-based approach to leadership: Development of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory of leadership over 25 years: Applying a multi-level multi-domain perspective. “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?. 2004.: United States Institute for Peace. and J.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618(1): 46. 2006.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30(7): 593-613. Ghadbian. Felter. Dickson. 2005. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27(6): 489-504. Christine.” Foreign Affairs 81(4): 60-74. Gerges.” In Terrorism in Context. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press. “Connectivity among Terrorist Groups: A Two Models Business Maturity Approach. Ellis. 2004.” New Political Science 22(1): 77-88. Counterterrorism Center. and Mary Uhl-Bien. Fawaz. 2000. “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge. Graen. 2008. Joe et al. John. 2008]. Diebert. “Hacking Networks of Terror. “Briefing: the Pan-Sahel Initiative. “Political Islam and violence. Donatella. Audrey. Kevin.C. “The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt?: Costs and Prospects.” Government and Opposition 42(3): 314339.
H. Hafez. B.org. Trends in Terrorism. 2004. 2006. 2006. 2007. Christopher. Gunaratna. Available at: http://weekly. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: the evolution from Algerian Islamism to transnational terror. and E. “The Clash of Civilizations?. R. 2008. Hoffman.htm [Accessed May 19.eg/2002/592/eg4. “Algerian Groupe Salafiste de la Predication et le Combat (Salafi Group for Call and Combat. Editions du Rocher. and Future Potentialities: An Assessment. Gyves. Bruce. 2007. Stockham. Jailan. Mathieu. 2002. Combating Terrorism Center: . 2007. Cliff. Columbia University Press. Is the Maghreb the “Next Afghanistan"?: Mapping the Radicalization of the Algerian Salafi Jihadist Movement. and Mbin Ali. Halawi. Jebnoun. “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies. and Chris Wyckloff. Inside Terrorism.edu/harmony/harmony_docs.asp [Accessed December 6. Gunaratna. Georgetown University: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.ahram.” The Washington Quarterly 27(3): 91-100. Harmony Database Released Documents: Al Qa'ida Goals and Structure. Guidère.” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line. Bruce. “The Origins of al Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for US Strategy. “De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary Insight. 2006. Gunaratna. Huntington. 2009. 2008]. Al-Qaïda à la Conquête du Maghreb : Le Terrorisme aux Portes de l'Europe. Rohan. Available at: http://ctc. Columbia University Press. 2nd ed. “The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda.” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 2(4): 091-097. “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism.usma.. 2003. 2002. D. Samuel.Gray. Henzel. Hoffman. GSPC): An Operational Analysis. 2009].” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26(6): 429-442.” Terrorism and Political Violence 19: 95-115. Hoffman.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32(4): 277-291. 110 .” Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22-49. “Time for a Historic Reconciliation?. Mohammed. 2005. Rohan.” Parameters 35(1): 69-80. “Al Qaeda. Noureddine.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27(4): 549-560.” Strategic Insights 5(8). 2004. 1992.
. Sarapu. old strategies. Russ. The Hijacking of British Islam. A. Economic Development.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25(1): 141-166. Wells. Policy Exchange.” Dialogue IO 1(01): 15-29.” Emergence 5(1): 54-76. 2005. 2006.” Journal of Public and International Affairs 15.org/terrorism/algamaa. 2009]. Marion..” Foreign Affairs 81(2): 61-70. Weeding. 2003. “The Impact of Leadership and Change Management Strategy on Organizational Culture and Individual Acceptance of Change during a Merger. Denis. “The Political. Kansas: Combat Studies Institute. 2003. 2002. MacEoin. 2003. Luong. “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front. Laitin. 2004. Kavanagh. Lecocq.” Strategic Insights 5(8). Lake.” Terrorism. Kalic. Langdon. “Complexity theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining complex leadership. 2006. “Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy Makers. and Mary Uhl-Bien.Johnson. and Jacob Shapiro. David. B. Anthony. African Security Review 15(3).cdi.M. 2002. and Organizational Sources of Terrorism. Available at: http://www.” British Journal of Management 17(S1): S81-S103. and M. and Political Openness: 209. and Erika Weinthal. David. Keats. Marie H. E. 111 . “An Introduction to a Special Issue of Strategic Insights: Analyses of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) . “Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers. L. and M. Kagwanja. Jones. J.. 2007. 2006. “Looking for the Pattern: Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia--The Genealogy of a Terror Network. Kostrzebski. Thomas H. Combating a Modern Hydra Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism. “New friends. new fears in Central Asia. Schrijver. Sean. M. and P. Economic. Fort Leavenworth. and Neal M.” : 73. Smith. Pauline.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26(6): 443-457. D. “The Shadow of Muhammad: Developing a Charismatic Leadership Model for the Islamic World..” Center for Defense Information. Peter. “In the Spotlight: Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya . 2008. 2002.L.Islamic Group.” Institute for Security Studies. “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. W. Ashkanasy.R.cfm [Accessed May 19. 2007.
A.iht. Perliger. 2002. 2003. “ Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm: Demythologizing the Network. and Mary Uhl-Bien. M. and Terror. and Phillip Mirvis. 2000. Rabasa. and L. Weinberg. 2009. “Beyond Al Qaeda: Part 2. Post. Sprinzak.” Organizational Dynamics 28(3): 35-47. Michael. Pedahzur. Available at: http://www. insurgents gain a lifeline from Al Qaeda .” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28(4): 275-293. Acquisitions. 2007. 2003. “Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations. Russ. “Al Qaeda Strikes Back. “Managing Mergers. Payne..” Deviant Behavior 24(4): 405-424. “Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership . J.com/articles/2008/07/01/africa/01algeria. Bruce. “Unilateral presidential powers: Significant executive orders. Moss. 2001.Marion.com. 2004. E.” Riedel. 2009]. 2005. and Maoz Rosenthal.Emergence.” International Herald Tribune. “Altruism and fatalism: The characteristics of Palestinian suicide terrorists. Angel et al. Marks. Denny. and Alliances: Creating an Effective Transition Structure. “Leadership in complex organizations. Available at: http://www. 2008. 2005. One Single EU Border. “In Algeria. Mitchell. 1949-99. 2006. 2007. Marion. M.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32(2): 367-386. Russ. Shaul. George. and Kevin Price. Michael.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32(2): 109-128. and Mary Uhl-Bien. Bruce. Mayer.. Kenneth. 2006.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27(4): 297-319. 112 .php?page=2 [Accessed March 17. “The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Euractiv. 2009].com/en/security/border-control-single-eu-border/article-138329 [Accessed May 18. and L. Kenneth. “The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists.” Foreign Affairs 86(3): 24-40.” Terrorism and Political Violence 15(1): 171-184. McAllister.” The Leadership Quarterly 12(4): 389-418. “Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda.euractiv.” Defense Studies 7(3): 338-357. The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe. Mishal.” Emergence 5(1): 54-76. A. Ideology.
Sageman. Joint Special Operations University. Marc. Steinberg. and Stephen Vertigans. 113 . 2004. “Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy. Jessica. 2008. 1995. Phillip.” First Monday 10(3). Rogers. Ross. James. 2004. University of Pennsylvania Press. Sederberg. and W. Sageman. 2008. Bruce. Schweitzer. “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?. Takeyh.Riedel. 2002. 2008. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century.” Strategic Insights. “An economic perspective on transnational terrorism. 2003. N. Securitizing Migration after 11 March. Graham. Ray.” European Journal of Political Economy 20(2): 301-316. Peter. Sandler. 2002. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2005. J. Yamatz. “Istishad as an Ideological and Practical Tool in the Hands of AlQaeda. Stacher.” The Middle East Journal: 415-432. Ideology.. The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership. Understanding Terror Networks. Turbiville. Sutton.” Journal of National Defense Studies 6: 25. Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations.” Foreign Affairs 83(1): 15-21. 2008. Al-Qa'ida and Social Movement Theory. 2003. Marc. 2004. “Protean Enemy. “Islamic "New Social Movements"? Radical Islam. The Terrorist's Challenge: Security. Guido. Ronfeldt. 2006.” Foreign Affairs 82(4): 27-40. Stanford University: Center for International Security and Cooperation. Shapiro. Brookings Institution Press. Real Instituto El Cano. Stern. and Nikolas Gvosdev. “Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat party. David. T. Efficiency.” The Washington Quarterly 25(3): 97-108. The. 2007.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 11(1): 101-115. “A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism.” Journal of Peace Research: 295-312. “Al Qaeda and its affiliates: A global tribe waging segmental warfare?. and Future. Steven. Joshua. “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf. Enders. 2007. Control.
“International Law as Administration: The UN's 1267 sanctions Committee and the Making of the War on terror. Available at: http://www. “Somalia’s ICU and Its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami. Blake . 2008. Osama's Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda. West. Zambelis. 1968. Vintage. Ward. Chris. Wright.” Jamestown Foundation. Rene. Weber. On Charisma and Institution Building. Lawrence. 2006. “Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya's Public Relations Campaign .Uruena.” Terrorism Focus 3(35). 2005. Max. 2006. 2009]. Sunguta. University of Chicago Press. 2007.” International Organizations Law Review 4(2): 321-342. Terrorism Monitor 4: 15. 114 . The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.jamestown. United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=900&tx_ttn ews%5BbackPid%5D=239&no_cache=1 [Accessed January 1.
Appendix I: List of Terrorist Groups Merger al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid walJihad) Egyptian Islamic Jihad al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Partnership Ansar al-Islam/Jund alIslam/Ansar al-Sunnah Asbat al-Ansar Taliban Islamic Jihad Union Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Lashkar-e-Taiba Tunisian Combatant Group Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Jemaah Islamiya Abu Sayyaf Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul Mujahidin Jaish-e-Mohammad al-Ittihaad al-Islami Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement Collaboration Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Yemen Islamic Jihad Aden Abyan Islamic Army Unaffiliated (Control) Al-Gama’a alIslamiyya 115 .
com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/06/12/iraq_mulls_talks_with_rebels/ [Accessed January 3. Bergen. Blitzer. Bergner. Available at: http://www.com/2007/WORLD/meast/07/18/iraq. MSNBC. 2006. 2007.45.132/search?q=cache:74UX2mQ_i-0J:www.S. and Ibon Villelabeitia. Available at: http://www. “Insurgent Leader Al-Zarqawi Killed in Iraq. Pam.Iraq.army. 2009]. “Maliki Aide Who Discussed Amnesty Leaves Job. Available at: http://transcripts.mnfiraq. Karouny. Jim. Ned. 2009].washingtonpost. Paley. 116 .Iraq. 2009]. 2009]. 2009]. Available at: http://www. Rutenberg.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0707/18/sitroom.html [Accessed March 3. “Al Qaeda in Iraq Chooses Zarqawi Successor.mil/news/newsarticle. Eben. Knickmeyer. Parker.” The Situation Room.html [Accessed January 2. 2009]. Available at: http://www. 2009]. “Shadowy Trail of al-Qaida in Iraq Leader. Kevin.” The Washington Post: A22. and Rana Gargour-Sabbagh.cnn.aspx?briefingslideid=309 [Accessed January 2.defenselink.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16576&Itemid=131 [Accessed January 2.com/images/stories/Press_briefings/2007/070718_presser.cnn.html [Accessed January 2. 2008.com/id/13276364/ [Accessed March 4. Available at: http://www. Wolf. The Osama Bin Laden I Know.” Operation Iraq Freedom: Official Website of the Multi-National Force . Garamone.capture/index.” The Times of London. Ellen. Available at: http://www. Peter L. Mariam. 2007. Available at: http://www. and Jonathan Finer. 2007. Available at: http://www.com. 2007. and Mark Mazzetti.boston. “Masri Now Leads Iraq Al Qaeda. Kathy. New Al-Qaida in Iraq Leader Reported .” The Washington Post. New York: Free Press. Ellen.: Senior al Qaeda in Iraq Leader Held.” The Washington Post: A01. DoD News Briefing.ece [Accessed March 4. Multinational Force . Available at: http://74. 2009].uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article674098. MNF-I Press Brief – Operational Update . Knickmeyer.html [Accessed January 2.org/publication/10894/ [Accessed March 4. Zarqawi's Mysterious Successor (aka Abu Ayub al-Masri) .02.S.mil/news/briefingslide.cfr. and Jonathan Finer.125.mil/index.cjtf7. Available at: http://www. “Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. “U. 2006. 2006a.msn. “President Links Qaeda of Iraq to Qaeda of 9/11.” U.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800114.co.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/02/AR2007050202036.” Boston.pdf+khalid+almashadani&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=24&gl=us&client=firefox-a [Accessed January 2. 2006. 2007.washingtonpost. 2009].timesonline. 2009].” Backgrounder.” CNN.nytimes. 2006a. “Starr Reports Live from Ramadi Iraq. 2008. 2009]. 2009]. Gannon.com/2007/07/25/washington/25prexy.S. Coalition Officials Say. Department of Defense.Appendix II: Sources by Terrorist Group Al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (formerly Jama'at alTawhid wal-Jihad) Benson. Smith. Department of Defense. Kaplan.aspx?id=16029 [Accessed January 3. Available at: http://www.” The Washington Post. 2006. 2007. “The Mysterious Heir to al-Zarqawi .com. Jim.msnbc. 2009].defenselink. 2006b. Gregory. Amit. “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Update. “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Leader May Be in Afghanistan.” New York Times.html [Accessed March 4. Available at: http://www. U.
Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat) Algeria: Violence Returns.” The Telegraph.org/templates/story/story. Mansfield. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. 2005. 2008. Says al Qaeda in Iraq Leader Not Captured.” Time.” Politique étrangère 3. 2008. Lee. Linda. Bjorgo. Available at: http://www. M. 2006. New York: Broadway. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www.S. David.umd.cnn. Leaving Terrorism Behind.start. A. and John Burnett. Andrew.cnn. 2006. 2009]. Laura.1187180.cfr. Available at: http://www. The Al Qaeda Reader.npr.org/publication/9750 [Accessed March 11.html [Accessed April 8.” Wall Street Journal.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/4736358/Al-Qaeda-founder-launchesfierce-attack-on-Osama-bin-Laden. 2009]. 2009]. “Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi . L.telegraph.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/4736358/Al-Qaeda-founder-launchesfierce-attack-on-Osama-bin-Laden. 2009b. TLG Publications. “Ayman al-Zawahiri.” Terrorism and Political Violence 14(4): 1-22. Blair. 2008.17049. 2009]. 2007.com/time/magazine/article/0. Egyptian Islamic Jihad Al-Zayat. Zawahiri. Lee Hudson. 2009]. Ibrahim. “Ayman Muhammad Rabi’Al-Zawahiri: The Making of an Arch-Terrorist. Alain. Wertheimer. 117 .asp?id=5832 [Accessed January 14.Council on Foreign Relations. “Profile: Ayman al-Zawahiri. Teslik. Bergen.00. Antil. “U. 2006. “L’Afrique et la «guerre contre la terreur».Tawfeeq. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Cairo: Dar AlHamrousa.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/09/iraq. New York: Taylor & Francis.telegraph.” CNN.php?storyId=12060238 [Accessed January 2.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_member.html [Accessed January 14. 2002. Raymond. Available at: http://www.. 2006.co. CNN Programs. “Al-Qaida in Iraq Figure in Custody : NPR. and A.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/zawahiri/profile.org/publication/9866/ [Accessed March 3. 2009]. David. Hudson Teslik.html [Accessed March 12. “Terrorist’s Odyssey: Saga of Dr. 2009]. Higgins. 2007. Available at: http://www. 2003. Peter. “The Reconstituted Al-Qaeda Threat in the Maghreb.html [Accessed January 14.html [Accessed March 4.alqaedafree/index. Available at: http://www. “Al-Qaeda Founder Launches Fierce Attack on Osama bin Laden. Nimrod. 2002. “The Rebellion Within. Black.co. Cullison.” The New Yorker. Available at: http://www. Raphaeli. 2009a. Available at: http://www.cfr. 2007.” Terrorism Monitor 5(2): 7-12. 2007. Blair. 2002. “Al-Qaeda Founder Launches Fierce Attack on Osama bin Laden . 2006. Wright. 2009]. 2009]. African Research Bulletin (23): 17045 .” Council on Foreign Relations.9171. Ayman Al Zawahiri.time. Egyptian Islamic Jihad.” Council on Foreign Relations. Ayman Al-Zawahiri Kamaa Aaraftu/Ayman Al-Zawahiri As I Knew Him. Mohammed et al.” National Public Radio.” The Telegraph.com. Tore. His Own Words: A Translation of the Writings of Dr.
Hanna. Himeur. Peter. Mekhennet.stm [Accessed March 5. Hegghammer. and D. T. Celso.” The Middle East Journal 63(2): 213-226. Kagwanja. Liane Kennedy. Old Strategies. Available at: http://news. 2007. “Global Jihadism After the Iraq War. Rogan. and E. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. Gyves. Jebnoun. Cliff.com/report.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25(1): 141-166. “Briefing: the Pan-Sahel Initiative. 2007. H. Droukdal. “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal. “In Algeria. Gray.co.Blom.bbc. Boudali.uk/2/hi/africa/3635470. 2006. “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies.iht. “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front. Available at: http://www. 2009]. Georgetown University: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. 2009]. Noureddine. Michael. and Chris Wyckloff. Now.html?_r=1 [Accessed March 5. Stockham.” Middle East Journal 60(1): 11. insurgents gain a lifeline from Al Qaeda .” African Affairs 103(412): 459-464.” Strategic Insights 5(8). Stephen. “The Origins of al Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for US Strategy.” International Herald Tribune. Gilles. Henzel. 2007. Filiu. 2007. 2006. 2004. “Algerian Groupe Salafiste de la Predication et le Combat (Salafi Group for Call and Combat. Kepel.php?ac=view_report&report_id=641&language_id=1 [Accessed March 5. “An Introduction to a Special Issue of Strategic Insights: Analyses of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) .” Parameters 35(1): 69-80. 2008. and P. 2009]. 2008. “Al Qaeda in the Maghreb: The" Newest" Front in the War on Terror. Mohamed arezki. Available at: http://www. 2005. Ellis. A. West Point Military Academy.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01algeria. Ib tauris. Jean Pierre. Anthony. Johnson. Laetitia Bucaille. 2006.php?page=2 [Accessed March 17. GSPC): An Operational Analysis. Is the Maghreb the “Next Afghanistan"?: Mapping the Radicalization of the Algerian Salafi Jihadist Movement. 2006.” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 2(4): 091-097. Mohammed. 2006. 2008. Hafez. B.” New York Times. 2006.. Intelligence Brief: Al-Qaeda's New Strategy in North Africa. “Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline . “Counter-Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New Security Frontiers. 118 . Jihadism Online: A Study of how Al-Qaida and Radical Islamist Groups Use the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. “New Chief for Algeria's Islamists. 2004.” Mediterranean Quarterly 19(1): 80. 2009]. 2008.” New York Times . 2008.pinr. Available at: http://www. 2007.” Terrorism and Political Violence 19: 95-115. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad. Squad et al.com/articles/2008/07/01/africa/01algeria. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. D. Moss. Schrijver.” Institute for Security Studies.” Strategic Insights 5(8). Amelie. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: the Evolution from Algerian Islamism to Transnational Terror.nytimes. and Louis Martínez. Christopher. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. The Enigma of Islamist Violence. Lecocq. 2009. 2007. Thomas H. African Security Review 15(3).. Power and Interest News Report. “The Local and Global Jihad of al-Qa ‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb.” BBC News.
” Counterterrorism Blog. Blake . 2006b. 2006a. Olivier.000 Reward Announced for Ansar al-Sunnah Commander in Iraq. and I. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. National Intelligence Council. Goolsby.asp?id=4400 [Accessed January 23.” Mediterranean Politics 11(2): 151-165. “Islamic "New Social Movements"? Radical Islam. 2007.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_member. Sutton. “Libya: Reforming the Impossible?. Alison. Luis. Michael. Gary.cdi. Available at: http://www.asp?id=5862 [Accessed January 26.” Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 12(1): 7-20. “Combating Terrorist Networks: An Evolutionary Approach. “$50. Steinberg. Available at: http://yalibnan.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 11(1): 101-115. 2008. Osama's Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda. 2009]. John. The Failure of Political Islam. Phillip. 2009].” Journal of National Defense Studies 6: 25. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Clark. 2009].start. Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29(8): 731-747. Yamatz. Counterterrorism Center.start.” Terrorism Monitor 3(6).org/program/issue/document.com/site/archives/2007/05/lebanons_fatah_1. 2007. “Libya: The Conversion of a ‘Terrorist State’. “Istishad as an Ideological and Practical Tool in the Hands of Al-Qaeda. G.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=30147 [Accessed January 23. “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center. “North African immigrants in Europe and political violence. “Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ Enemy: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Joseph. “In the Spotlight: The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Available at: http://www.jamestown. 2009].org/2005/06/50000_reward_announced_for_ans. and Brian Fishman.” Review of African Political Economy 33(108): 219235. Ward. 2006. The Libyan Paradox. 2006. Gambil. 2005. Al-Qa'ida and Social Movement Theory.php [Accessed February 27.Roy. Luis. Available at: http://counterterrorismblog. 2006. Ya Libnan. Felter. Ansar al-Islam/Jund al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunnah Ansar al-Islam. Werenfels. 2009]. Negroponte.” Mediterranean Politics 12(3): 407-413. and Stephen Vertigans. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. 2007. New York: Columbia Univ Press.cfm?DocumentID=2836&IssueID=56&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&ap pendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=39&issueID=56 [Accessed May 20. 2009]. Alison. 2007. Evan. Pargeter. 2007. 119 . Rebecca. 1996. and John King.” Center for Defense Information. Kohlmann. Boston: Harvard University Press. Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records. and Carol Volk.umd. Available at: http://www. 2005. Lebanon's Fatah al-Islam leadership & Organization. Martínez.php [Accessed February 27. Schweitzer.umd.. 2005. 2006. Available at: http://www. Martinez. Pargeter. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism.
Ansar Al-Islam: Postmortem or Prelude to More Attacks? The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.132/search?q=cache:PNdZs5NZnv0J:www. 2009]. 2009]. 2009]. Trevor. “Mullah Omar in Pakistan . 2009].treas. 2008. John.meforum.pdf+Asbat+al-Ansar+AND+leadership&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=15&gl=us&client=firefox-a [Accessed January 26. “Mullah Krekar Profile.globalsecurity. 2009]. Available at: http://www. Maclean's 115(34): 12. Available at: http://www. Peter. and Charlie Moore.gov/press/releases/js2206.org/article/20691 [Accessed May 19. Stanley.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Asbat-al-Ansar-Lebanon. Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO.173.” Équipe de recherche sur le terrorism et l'antiterrorisme. Pike.org/groupes/groupes_description.janes.co.html [Accessed May 19.org/security/profiles/ahmad_abd_al-karim_al-sadi. Jonathan. “Asbat al-Ansar . Available at: http://www. “Ahmad Abd al-Karim al-Sadi. Asbat al-Ansar Asbat Al Ansar. 2009]. Available at: http://mypetjawa.pwhce. Rusty.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_T errorism_Organisations_Asbat_al-Ansar [Accessed May 19.stm [Accessed May 19.html [Accessed February 27. Anderson Cooper.aph.org/krekar.cnn.mu.aei. “Army of Ansar al-Sunnah Website Update.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/09/09/pakistan. “Ansar al-Sunna. 2004. Available at: http://www. 2009.Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism. Available at: http://www. Gary.gov. 2004.Oslo court rejects mullah release.mullahomar/index. Press Room .htm [Accessed May 19. Shackleford. 2004. 2002.” Middle East Quarterly 11(1). 2009].php [Accessed January 26. 2006. “Salafi-jihadism in Lebanon. Available at: http://news. 2003. “Ansar al-Islam: Back in Iraq . 2009].ertatcrg. US Department of State. Schanzer.uk/2/hi/europe/3393437. Available at: http://209.” Available at: http://www.html [Accessed March 10. Courting Public Opinion. Gregory.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity.” Perspectives on World History and Current Evens. 2009].US Department of the Treasury.org/579/ansar-al-islam-back-in-iraq [Accessed February 27. 2004. Available at: http://nationalsecurity.gov. Gomez del Prado.org/pbei/winep/policy_2003/2003_740.html [Accessed January 26. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www. 2009]. Jonathan.” Global Politician. 2009]. Available at: http://www.htm [Accessed May 19.85. Gambill. 2009].investigativeproject. 2006. Available at: http://www.ciaonet. BBC. Available at: http://www. Treasury Designates Individual Financially Fueling Iraqi Insurgency. 2005. 2006. 2006.nu/archives/057937. ASIS & DSD . 2009].com/24371-lebanon [Accessed May 19. 2009]. Michael. 2009]. al Qaida.” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 120 . 2005.” CNN. “Description des groupes terroristes criminalisés par le Canada.” The Jawa Report: . Taliban Bergen.htm [Accessed February 28. Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon) .org/profile/127 [Accessed February 28.” he Investigative Project on Terrorism.globalpolitician.com. Schanzer. Rubin. 2005.bbc. 2008.au/house/committee/pjcaad/terrorist_listingsb/ subs/sub5. .ag.
html [Accessed March 10. Robert. Guido. Pantucci. 2005. Madrid: Fundación José Ortega y Gasset. Marquand. BBC News. Available at: http://kashmirherald.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1550419. Steinberg.html [Accessed March 10.telegraph. p.” South Asia Journal. Tara.Haqqani. 131-152. “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond. 2006. Sullivan. Lamb.” Etudes 399(2003/7): 9-16. Oxygen. 2008. “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan. 2002. Washington. Guido. JIhadist Terrorism in Turkey. “The Reclusive Ruler who Runs the Taliban . “Al-Qaeda 2.” In The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. Christophe. “Musharraf et les islamistes. “The Taliban Papers. Behuria.” Strategic Analysis 28(1): 157-176. Spark. Jurica. and Fuel: The Mysterious Rise of the Taliban.net/magazine/Journal/indopak_sustainable. Tim. 2007. Raffaello.” Survival 50(6): 183-192. Rohan. “Who is the Real Mullah Omar?. 2001. “Tinder. Judah.co. and Anders Nielsen.co.” In National Intelligence Council. Islamic Jihad Union Chaudet. Kashmir Herald. A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism. 2001. 2002.” The Telegraph. and Chris Mason. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. 2009]. Islamist Terrorism in Greater Central Asia: The" Al-Qaedaization" of Uzbek Jihadism. K. State-building and Security Cooperation in Central Asia. 2005.com/main.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(9): 775-807.southasianmedia. Jaffrelot. Christina.php?t=TP&st=D&no=4 [Accessed May 19.stm [Accessed March 10. Center for Contemporary Conflict. 2009. Nichol. “Sunni-Shia relations in Pakistan: The widening divide. D. Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales. 1998. Thomas.” Survival 44(1): 69-80. Available at: http://www. Didier. Available at: http://www. P.” In Proceedings of the Forty-eighth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. .csmonitor. 187. 2009]. John. Gunaratna. “Counterinsurgency. “The Long Roads to Peace. Ashok. Jim. Michael.” The Christian Science Monitor.com/2001/1010/p1s4-wosc. 2009].0.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1366159/Who-is-the-real-Mullah-Omar. Available at: http://www. Congressional Research Service. Steinberg. “Islam's Medieval Outposts. 121 . Johnson. 2006. Kartha. Counterterrorism. Available at: http://news.C.bbc. Husain. 2007. 2001. D. “Indo-Pak Détente: Sustainable Ambiguity.” Orbis 51(1): 71-89. 2008. 2009]. Mexico: World Scientific.” Journal of Peace Research 44(1): 93.” Foreign Policy: 58-64. Profile: Mullah Mohammed Omar. Negroponte. “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 2003. Mihalka.htm. 2004. Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for US Interests. 2008. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Ahmed. p.
Animesh. Roy. Wilson. Available at: http://www.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Lej. p. 2009]. 2004. 2009].satp.jamestown. 2009].go.co. John. R. Realistically. “Lashkar-e-Toiba: new Threats Posed by an Old Organization.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=27599 [Accessed May 19.com/english/news. Farooq.” Terrorism Monitor 3(11).” Writenet for UNHCR.” In Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation. 2009]. 2005. “Pakistan police detain founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group | World news | guardian. 2002.aawsat.co. Glendinning. 2005.stm [Accessed May 19.jamestown.” In Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=497 [Accessed May 19.org/bin/articles. Umer. “The Two Faces of Lashkar-e-Taiba . and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan.” Police Practice and Research 6(2): 141-164. ABC News. 2008. Available at: http://www. S.” Terrorism Monitor 3(4). V. “Can Pakistan be ‘neutral’in the war against terrorism?.htm [Accessed January 28. “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Ties to International Terrorism. Key Figures in Kashmir Uprising. Yateendra. Available at: http://www. Roul. 2002 “The regional dimension of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan. Nasr. 2005. John. Wilson. Gvosdev. 2008.com/International/Story?id=80271&page=2 [Accessed May 19. Jafa.Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. 85-114. Available at: http://www. Terrorist Group of Pakistan.bbc. 2002.asp?section=3&id=14953 [Accessed January 29. 2002. 2009]. Available at: http://abcnews. “Humanization of education in Pakistan through Freire’s Concept of Literacy. Zed Books. “Achieving a Global Community. Olivier. p. 122 . Lee. the State. Jamaatud Dawa Leader: 'Indians Will Continue to Mislead the World Community By Linking Us to Lashkar[-e Taiba]. “Defeating Terrorism: A Study of Operational Strategy and Tactics of Police Forces in Jammu & Kashmir (India). BBC. The General and Jihad. Abou Zahab. 2005. 2009]. Pakistan Freezes Militant Funds. Atul.” The Good Society 14(3). Mehtab Ali. 115.co. Kalyanaraman. Lashkar-e-Taiba Bharadwaj. The Middle East Media Research Institute. Even Al-Qaeda'. 2008.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1726813. Zed Books. Available at: http://www.” Strategic Analysis 26(1): 170-173. Nikolas.” The Round Table 94(382): 613-628. Shah. 2009]. 2009].guardian.uk/world/2008/dec/11/mumbai-terrorattacks-pakistan [Accessed January 29. Vali.” The Guardian Online. Available at: http://www. 2005.uk. and S.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP214308&Page=archives [Accessed May 19. 2007. “Islam.memri.” The Washington Quarterly 27(3): 7-24. Raja. Nasr. 2001. New Delhi: Pentagon Press. Mariam. 2005. “Sectarianism—A threat to human security: A case study of Pakistan. “Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Asia Pacific Education Review 6(1): 1-6. “Regional Implications of Shi'a Revival in Iraq. Nazir. The ISI.” Asharq Alawsat Newspaper. Available at: http://news.
2009]. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www.” The Independent. Kim.cfm?DocumentID=2227&from_page=. Blake Mobley. La Mouvance Islamiste au Maroc: du 11 Septembre 2001 aux Attentats de Casablanca du 16 Mai 2003.” Terrorism Focus 2(6). 2008. Darif.” The Middle East Review of International Affairs 10(3).org/program/document. Anthony H.co. “Terrorist Outlaws – or a Group with Friends in High Places? . Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Botha. Cordesman. Analisis del Real Instituto. 123 . D. 2008.Sengupta. Alejandro. Benjamin. Center for Policing Terrorism .cdi. “In the Spotlight: Moroccan Combatant Group (GICM). 2005. 2006. 2004. 2004.” Boukhars. Available at: http://www.” In The Practice of War: Production. 2009]. Sanchez.fas. Stephen. 2004. Yoginder. New York Times. Githens-Mazer. Karthala Editions. BBC.” PS: Political Science and Politics 41(01): 19-24. 2002. Hudson Institute. 2007.” Defence Studies 9(1): 85-92. 2004. “Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of Lashkar-i-Tayyeba.uk/newswatch/ifs/hi/newsid_4960000/newsid_4968400/4968438. PO-3380: The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror. “Non African Involvement in Transnational Terror Networks: Terrorism in the Maghreb . Anouar. 2008.bbc. 2004. 215.htm [Accessed May 20. Ahmed. Yoginder. “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe.. 2009]. 2009]. “Changing Course of Kashmiri Struggle: From National Liberation to Islamist Jihad?. “Variations on a Theme: Radical Violent Islamism and European North African Radicalization. John. Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence.html [Accessed May 19.org/security/profiles/tunisian_combatant_group. Sikand.independent. 2006. Clark. Federation of American Scientists.ustreas. US Department of the Treasury. Ulph. GSPC Dossier. p. Juan Jose Escobar. 2003.” Terrorism Monitor 3(12): June 17.: RAND Corporation. Washington.htm [Accessed May 20.gov/press/releases/po3380. El Guerbouzi . 2009. 2005. Available at: http://www. Keating. Anneli. The Military Balance in the Middle East. Available at: http://news. 2009].htm [Accessed May 20.globalsecurity. Available at: http://www. Tunisian Combatant Group Assets of Tunisia Group Are Frozen.uk/news/world/asia/terrorist-outlaws-ndash-or-a-group-with-friends-in-high-places1042724.cfm [Accessed May 19. 2009]. Stemmann. 2005. Global Security.” Center for Defense Information.stm [Accessed May 19.” Economic and Political Weekly: 218-227. Sikand. Greenwood Publishing Group. 2001. 2002.C. “The Origins of Militancy and Salafism in Morocco. The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG).co. “Tunisian Government Threatened by Islamist Group.An Apology. 2006. Mohamed. Jonathan. Chaarani.org/irp/world/para/tcg. “Tunisia: Trading Freedom for Stability May Not Last–An International Security Perspective. Tunisian Combatant Group. The Moroccan Combatant Group. and Erin Rosenbach. The Politics and Economics of Organized Crime and Terrorism in Europe./index.
Madrid: Real Institute Elcano.com/english/?id=9727 [Accessed May 19. 2005. 124 . 2005.S. The Insider: Daily Terrorism Report . Reinares.” Foreign Affairs 81(4): 60-74. 2005. 2009]. 2009]. Magnus. Gelling. 2009]. “Terrorism and Democratic Legitimacy: Conflicting Interpretations of the Spanish Elections.” The New York Times. 2009].” Foreign Affairs 84(4): 120-35.nytimes. Gelling. “ Southeast Asian Terrorist Leader Is Under Arrest. Raymond. “Terror at Rush Hour.com/2006/06/15/world/asia/15bashir. 2005. Emmers.start. and Stryker McGuire. “Radical Cleric in Indonesia Is Acquitted of Terrorism. but Support Could Be Waning.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 56(3): 383-394. Ranstorp. Scott. Evan. 2008. Barry.” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2): 234-256.Net. Pressure to Hold Militant Sets Off Outcry in Indonesia.” The New York Times. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www. Atran. Nesser. 2004.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile. 2007. “U.ABC News.” Mediterranean Politics 10(1): 99-108. “Indonesia's Year of Living Normally. Zachary. 2007. “Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's Approach to Terrorism and Sea Piracy.” Newsweek. Van Biezen. “Freed Cleric Is Hailed by Students.” The Pacific Review 22(2). Barton. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism.middleeast-online.” HomelandSecurityUS. 2004. 2009]. R. 2008. Abuzza. The London bombings and the broader strategic context. “Europe's Angry Muslims. Available at: http://www. P. “In Indonesia.” New York Times.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24(3): 427-466. Raymond. Thomas. Greg.homelandsecurityus. 2006. Bonner. Gelling. “Islam and society in South-East Asia after 11 September.. Peter.htm [Accessed January 26.. John. “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?. Zachary. Peter.” Southeast Asian Affairs: 123-145. Jemaah Islamiyah Abuza. 2002. 2006. “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network. “How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?. “Indonesia Reports the Arrest of a 2nd Top Terrorism Suspect. Democracy isn’t Enough. 2009. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. 2006. 2002.asp?id=4341 [Accessed January 28. Middle East Online.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=Abu+Bakar+Bashir&st=nyt [Accessed May 19. 2002.Leiken. Ingrid.go. Desker. Moroccan Group "Derivative Structure" of Al Qaeda. Available at: http://www. Gershman.com/2005/03/04/international/asia/04indo. Bonner. “Abu Dujana.” New York Times.com/International/Investigation/story?id=79270&page=1 [Accessed May 19. Peter. 2009]. Indonesian Police Confirm. 2008. Available at: http://www.” New York Times. The Mediterranean Region and International Terrorism: A New Framework for Cooperation.umd.html [Accessed May 19. 2005. Fernando.net/abu_dujana.nytimes. Available at: http://abcnews. 2005.” New York Times. Real Instituto Elcano. Robert.
Abuza. Espin-Digon. 2006. 2001. Jemaah Islamiah) . 2008. 2005. “Jemaah Islamiyah after the Recent Wave of Arrests: How Much Danger Remains? . 2007. Donnelly.” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 99999(1): 1-17. “ In Pictures: Jemaah Islamiyah's Leadership.org/multimedia/JI-Leaders-Jan2008/index. “Islam's role in Indonesia. Elena.start. G. Zachary. Bali-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf. 2003.cfr. Strategic Studies Institute. 2005. Geoffrey.” The Long War Journal. R. New York: CRC Press. Kingsbury. “From a Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI. Petter. “Indonesia in 2007: Unmet Expectations.umd. Despite Improvement. “Jemaah Islamiyah's Radical Madrassah Networks. “The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia. and Paolo Pasicolan. Dana. Anti-Corruption. 2008. 2006. Council on Foreign Relations. Zachary. Brynhar.co. Pavlova. and (US). 2009].a. Available at: http://www. “The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia.: The Heritage Foundation. “Rule of Law. Elmer. Nesser. Disarming the Bearer of the Sword: Delinking the Abu Sayyaf From the Global Insurgency. Bill.” In the Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia. 2009]. 2009]. “Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe. 2008. Dillon. 2007.html [Accessed January 22.” Sudostasia 26(5): 73-84.asp?id=6370 [Accessed January 21.” Asian Journal of Political Science 13(1): 109-138. J. D.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_member. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. Washington.Hainsworth. “Terrorism in the Southern Philippines: Contextualizing the Abu Sayyaf Group as an Islamist Secessionist Organization. Harvey. Lia. Singh.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30(9): 777-800. 2008. Forvarets Forskninginstittut.stm [Accessed May 19. “The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines Unresolved National Question or Question of Governance?. Anti-Terrorism and Militant Islam: Coping with Threats to Democratic Pluralism and National Unity in Indonesia. 2009]. Tomsa. Dirk. Magouirk. 2004. 125 . Naval War College.” BBC.” Fragility and Crisis: 320-363. 2004.co.k. Jemaah Islamiyah.stm [Accessed May 19. Southeast Asia and the War Against Terrorism. Damien.C. Nagma. Lloyd's MIU handbook of maritime security. . and Nick Grace. Available at: http://news. Charles.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 48(1): 128-144. FFI explains al-Qaida document.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2339693. Available at: http://www. Profile: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Abu Sayyaf Abuza. Roggio. 2004. and Thomas Hegghammer. 2006. Bilveer.” Asian Survey 48(1): 38-46. and Scott Atran.longwarjournal..uk/2/hi/talking_point/3091594. 2009]. 2008.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29(4): 323-342. BBC. Buendia. 2007. Jemaah Islamiyah (a.bbc.org/publication/8948/ [Accessed January 22. Rachel. Available at: http://news. Julio et al.bbc.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58(1): 47-68. Available at: http://www.
Yasser Igasan Succeeds Janjalani as Abu Chief .htm&no=34 [Accessed April 9.: Congressional Research Service. Available at: http://www.E. Schwarz. Lumpkin.” Global Security.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity. 2008. and Regine Spector. Jose. 2009]. Australian National Security . politics. “The Southern Philippines: Conflict and Co-operation: Anthony Smith Backgrounds the Separatist Conflict That Has Wracked the Southern Philippines and Discusses the US Military Involvement in the Area. Eduardo. Menardo. Alfredo.htm [Accessed April 9. Sahni. Gunter. and security in Central Asia. Smith. “Religion..” Terrorism and Political Violence 14(4): 131-162.” New Zealand International Review 27(6): 24-29.” Terrorism in the Philippines.satp. Daniel Joseph. “Abdurajak Janjalani Killed. Available at: http://www. 2007. Available at: http://www. Anthony. Shireen. Ajai.de/phileng/history/abu.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(2): 125-144. Rogers.html [Accessed April 9. Larry. “The Alliance System of the Abu Sayyaf. 2002.tv/story/48531/Yasser-Igasan-succeeds-Janjalani-as-Abu-chief [Accessed April 9. 2000. 2009].” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24(1): 33-50. Ugarte. “The US and the Southern Philippines’ Quagmire. Nathan. 2009].” GMA News. 2001. 2009]. 2004. Available at: http://www. Hunter. Available at: http://www.org/security/profiles/abdurajak_janjalani_killed.” RMS & GS. “Moving Out of Moscow's Orbit: the Outlook for Central Asia. 126 . John. “Contemporary History of the Philippines.” Philippine Information Agency.Filler. “The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/Pink130602. Wencesiao.gmanews. “Abdurakjak Janjalani. Anthony.gov. Frazie.htm [Accessed April 9.” SAIS Review 21(2): 65-90. Quimpo..tv/story/24749/The-Abu-Sayyaf-and-Khadaffy-Janjalani [Accessed April 9. Washington. 2009].The Heat is On.pia.htm [Accessed April 9. “What's Next for Abu Sayyaf?. “The Abu Sayyaf and Khadaffy Janjalani.gov. 2002.globalsecurity. 2002. and Rosalinda Morgado-Schwarz. D. Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia. 2004. 2002. “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf.” South Asian Terrorism Portal. “Philippines: Abu Sayyaf Group . A. 2009].edu/~aefrazie/world%20politics116/terrorist_groups/abu_sayyaf/Janjalani. 1993.rms-gs. Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation. 2002. Torres. 2009. 2002. Hyman. “The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society.mtholyoke. 2006. 1993–2000.” The Washington Quarterly 25(1): 193-206. Paul J. Svante.” Foreign Affairs 83(1): 15-21.gmanews.C. Steven. GMA News. 2007. “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Cornell. Available at: http://www.ph/?m=12&fi=p070903. 2002.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-): 289-304.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_ Organisations_Islamic_Movement_of_Uzbekistan [Accessed January 21.ag.” Ringuet. Available at: http://www. 2009]. 2009]. Niksch. 2008. Smith. New York: ME Sharpe. Available at: http://www. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
ru/article. Available at: http://www. Mite.html [Accessed May 20.ir/detail. United Press International.spiegel. Mann.longwarjournal. Vitaly. 2003. Leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Tahir Yuldashev Threatens Presidents Karimov. V.Kimmage. Available at: http://www. Ahmed.00. 2009]. Available at: http://enews.ferghana. 2009].org/multimedia-speeches. The NEFA Foundation . “The Growth of Radical Islam in Central Asia. Bill.” Asia Times Online. Gulf News. and Rakhmonov.” Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies.” The Long War Journal. 2009]. Yassin. Available at: http://www1.553745. Available at: http://www. Poonam. 2006. “al Qaeda. p.htm [Accessed April 8.de/international/europe/0.jamestown.highbeam. S. CBS News. 2001.html [Accessed January 21. A.” Strategic Analysis 16(2). Radical Islam in Central Asia: between Pen and Rifle. Jane.com/blogs/2008/09/17/roundup/entry4454451. 2009]. Ferghana. Available at: http://www. Islamic Jihad. Press TV. 2008. Novak. 2008. Rashid. Daniel. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www. Roggio.Ru Information Agency. 2009].ciaonet.php?id=1864 [Accessed January 21.com/news/gulf/yemen/10245698. 2009]. Messages From Terrorist Leaders. Available at: http://www.php [Accessed January 21. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.org/archives/2006/09/alqaeda_taliban_behi.shtml [Accessed May 20. Musharbash. Presumably. 2007. bin Laden and Iran's hardliners.atimes. Available at: http://enews. Yemeni Islamic Jihad Leader Arrested. Bali. 2001.ru/article. 2002.1518. “Pakistan: Offensive Against Suspected Militants in South Waziristan Ends.html [Accessed January 26.presstv. Ferghana. 127 . 266. Indonesia: Springer-Verlag New York Inc. Available at: http://www. Naumkin. Bakiyev. Available at: http://www. 2000. Ghonchen.org/olj/sa/sa_apr02map01. 2003. 2009]. Yemen Islamic Jihad Analysis: Yemen.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26187 [Accessed March 12. “Police Arrest Members of Alleged Jihadi Financing Network. Taliban behind the Waziristan Accord.” Global Security. 2008.” Terrorism Monitor 1(8). Igor.Ru Information agency. Tazmini.” World Policy Journal 18(1): 45-55. 2009].html [Accessed April 8.” Spiegel Online. “On Visualizing Heterogeneous Semantic Networks from Multiple Data Sources.aspx?id=68033§ionid=351020206 [Accessed May 20.html [Accessed May 20. Available at: http://www. 2009]. 2009]. et al.php?id=1595 [Accessed January 21. Who Is The Yemeni Islamic Jihad Group? .com/doc/1G1-66771883. 2008. Rotar.org/military/library/news/2004/03/mil-040330-rferl04.nefafoundation. 2009]. “US Embassy in Yemen Targeted in Complex Assault. 2009]. 2005. Maureen. Uzbek islamists’ Leader Tahir Yuldashev has been Arrested .” Central Asian Survey 20(1): 63-83. 2009]. 2008. “The Islamic Revival in Central Asia: a Potent Force or a Misconception?. “Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Naumkin. Valentinas.globalsecurity.gulfnews. Group Threatens Attack on UAE Embassy in Yemen.cbsnews.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FC31Ag02.” In Digital Libraries: Universal and Ubiquitous Access to Information. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Will it Strike Back?. “The Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan: A Resurgent IMU?. “The Fires of Faith in Central Asia.html [Accessed March 12. 2008. V. 2004.” The Long War Journal. 2008.ferghana. 2004.
India: South Asia Analysis Group. Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul Mujahideen Atran. “Attack on USS Cole: Who engineered it?.org/Terror/focus/17_focus_a2.. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism.umd. UN Regufee Agency. 2009]. “Yemen: New Terror Camps as a City Falls to Jihadists. 2006. et al. “Khalid al-Nabi al-Yazidi. Yemeni Militant's Supporters Vow Revenge. A. 2005. Ashok.Yemen.” In Congressional Research Service.org/profile/151 [Accessed May 19. “Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi–Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan. Behuria.Aden Abyan Islamic Army Amnesty International Report 2000 . Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www.YEM.bbc.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.org/security/profiles/khalid_al-nabi_al-yazidi. Available at: http://www. 2009.longwarjournal. Daveed.com/londonistan_al_qaeda_and_finsbury_park_mosque [Accessed May 19.3ae6aa106b. 2009]. 2009]. 2009].' Al Qaeda and the Finsbury Park Mosque . Available at: http://www. Yemen: High-Profile Militants Killed and the Yemeni Power Structure .southasiaanalysis. 128 .stratfor. 2009]. Raman. B. Available at: http://www. Lumpkin. The Investigative Project on Terrorism.asp?id=4 [Accessed January 31.org/refworld/publisher. 2008. Available at: http://www. “Dwindling Expectations (vs. Available at: http://news. 2005.investigativeproject. Aden Abyan Islamic Army.co. Available at: http://www. 2009].hinduonnet. Novak. 2009].” Strategic Analysis 32(1): 57-80.com/analysis/yemen_high_profile_militants_killed_and_yemeni_power_structure [Accessed April 9.org/archives/2009/03/yemen_new_terror_cam.stm [Accessed May 19. Stratfor.org/military/world/para/aden-abyan. Scott. West. John. Library of Congress.htm [Accessed May 19.: The Education of a Holy Warrior.start.” Global Security.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=854&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=181 &no_cache=1 [Accessed February 4. 2000. B.adl.asp [Accessed May 19. 2009].htm [Accessed May 19. Available at: http://www. Pike. 2009]. K. 2008. Available at: http://www.com/businessline/2000/10/23/stories/042355uy. Available at: http://www. 1999. John. 'Londonistan.html [Accessed May 19.html [Accessed May 19. Anti-Defamation League.” Terrorism Monitor 4(15).” Global Security. and Kyle Dabruzzi. 1999. 2006. Jeffrey.” The Long War Journal. The War on Poverty). 2009]. 2009].uk/2/hi/middle_east/478046.php [Accessed April 9. 2009.” Science. 2000. Links to Osama bin Laden and Islamic Jihad. 2006. 2004.stratfor. Attack on USS Cole: Background.globalsecurity. “Inside Jihad U. Available at: http://www.0.globalsecurity. Cronin. “Aden-Abyan Islamic Army. 2009]. 2009].AMNESTY. “Somalia's ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami . Jane. Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) . Stratfor. Raman. GST Presented Evidence against Claims.” Business Line. Gartenstein-Ross. Sunguta.unhcr.” Middle East Quarterly 14(3): 3-10. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” New York Times Magazine 25.org/papers2/paper152. Available at: http://www.jamestown. “Jihad's New Leaders. 2007. 2000. Goldberg.htm [Accessed May 19. BBC.
S. Howenstein.95.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57(1): 42-50. 2001.cfm [Accessed April 9. “The regional dimension of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan. Pakistan Security Research Unit. Sahni. Dan. Abou Zahab. Available at: http://www. 2008. Sunita. 2009]. Available at: http://www.ac. Available at: http://www.org/terrorism/harakatpr.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_ Organisations_Jamiat_ul-Ansar [Accessed January 28. Goel. “In the Spotlight: Harakat ul-Mujaheddin (HuM).atimes.” Global Security. Stephen. Mir. 2009]. “Pakistan's jehadi apparatus: Goals and methods. Mannes. Cohen. Available at: http://www. Rothem.org/terrorism/harakat. 2009]. Jessica. Terrorism . The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan. 2009]. 2009]. Available at: http://www. “The Maoist Insurgency and Nepal-India Relations: Contemplating the Future.” The Washington Quarterly 26(3): 7-25.” The Maoist Insurgency and Nepal-India Relations: 213. “Harakat ul-Mujahedin. 2001. “Meeting with the Muj. 2009]. Available at: http://www. Ajai.” Pakistan: nationalism without a nation?: 115.gov.” Center for Defense Information. Profiles in Terror.” Strategic Analysis 24(12): 2179-2198. Stern.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_29. Available at: http://www. 2009]. Jamiat ul-Ansar. 2002. Sunita. Amir.hindustantimes. 129 .ag. Roman & Littlefield. 2009]. 2004.com/ie/daily/19970629/18050243.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity.htm [Accessed January 28. Kumar.aspx?sectionName=indiasectionpage&id=1d0f988f-debe4d6e-b285-188cc397c5f2&Headline=A+profile+of+Maulana+Masood+Azhar [Accessed May 19.html [Accessed April 9.org/military/world/para/hua. Available at: http://74.brad. South Asia Terrorism Portal.html [Accessed January 28. Mariam.htm [Accessed January 28. and D.globalsecurity. Available at: http://www.indianexpress. Dhungana. “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan.” South Asia Intelligence Review 3(29). Jaish-e-Mohammad A profile of Maulana Masood Azhar. 2002.” Global Politician.” Asia Times Online. Aaron.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/resrep1. Available at: http://www.132/search?q=cache:8YwDXyrFcLcJ:spaces. 2001.Harkat ul-Ansar.. Australian National Security. 2009]. ISI Fixed Meetings for Hostages' Wives with Harkat. Paramhans. “The Jihad Lives On. D. Swami. 2005. 2008.satp.htm [Accessed January 28.globalpolitician. Available at: http://www. Hindustan Times. “This is not Islam.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.” India Review 2(3): 55-88. 2003. “Understanding the Militant Mind: Can Psychiatry Help?.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkat_ul_ansar_or_harkat_ul_jehad_e_is lami. Paul.com/24767islam [Accessed May 19.cdi. Pike. John. S. 2009]. Indian Express.satp. Nicholas.cfm [Accessed January 28. 2008.cdi. 2009]. 2005.125. “Nexalities: What. Saldhanha. 1997.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC11Df07. 2003. Me Worry?.” An Indian Perspective: 256.p df+the+jihadi+terrain+in+pakistan&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a [Accessed April 9. 2008.In the Spotlight: Harakat ul-Mujaheddin (HuM). “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in theory and practice.
B.org/military/world/para/aden-abyan.globalsecurity. Jamwal.org/archives/2009/03/yemen_new_terror_cam. Federation of American Scientists.org/Terror/focus/17_focus_a2. 2003.satp.fas. Mushtaq. 2002. UN Regufee Agency.stm [Accessed May 19. Raman. “Aden-Abyan Islamic Army. “Attack on USS Cole: Who engineered it?. 2001.edu/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile. “Yemen: New Terror Camps as a City Falls to Jihadists.Yemen. “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in theory and practice. 2001. 2000. 2009]. Available at: http://www. “Pakistan: Moderate jihad?. BBC. Available at: http://www. Attack on USS Cole: Background. Gartenstein-Ross. Sondhi.co.hinduonnet.umd.htm [Accessed May 19. M.php [Accessed January 29.htm [Accessed January 29. 2008. Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) .” Global Security.asp?id=4 [Accessed January 31. 2009.” Journal of Conflict Studies 24(2). Links to Osama bin Laden and Islamic Jihad.org/security/profiles/khalid_al-nabi_al-yazidi. 2000. 130 . 2009].html [Accessed May 19. India: South Asia Analysis Group.globalsecurity. “Jaish-e-Mohammed leader placed under ‘house arrest’.htm [Accessed May 19.org/refworld/publisher. “Terrorism in India: Impact on national security.” Global Security. John.start. Sunil. “Jihad's New Leaders.org/papers2/paper152. Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions.org/archives/2008/12/jaishemohammed_leade.” Business Line. Available at: http://www. 2009].htm [Accessed January 29. and Teresita Schaffer.php [Accessed April 9. South Asian Terrorism Portal. Mehta. John. Praveen. 2009]. “Meeting with the Muj. 2007.YEM.html [Accessed May 19.C. “Terrorism and Governance in Kashmir.bbc.adl. Pike. P. 2009]. Raman.” Strategic Analysis 25(9): 1081-1987. B. Aden Abyan Islamic Army.” The Long War Journal. Daveed.unhcr. Novak. Mandavi. 2009]. Kamath.0.” Middle East Quarterly 14(3): 3-10. N. Washington.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanze em. Swami. The Investigative Project on Terrorism. Profile: Maulana Masood Azhar. Available at: http://www. Stern. Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. S.investigativeproject.org/irp/world/para/jem. 2009.longwarjournal.htm [Accessed May 19. D. Available at: http://www. Bill. Najum.asp [Accessed May 19. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM). 2006. Anti-Defamation League. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www. 2009].” Strategic Analysis 27(3): 382-403.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57(1): 42-50.southasiaanalysis.3ae6aa106b.Jaish-e-Mohammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem. Roggio. 2009]. 2003.” The Long War Journal. Available at: http://www. and Kyle Dabruzzi. “Terrorists’ Modus Operandi in Jammu and Kashmir. 2005. Available at: http://www. Jessica. Available at: http://news. 2002.. Al-Ittihaad al-Islami Amnesty International Report 2000 . 2009]. 2006. 1999.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2009].com/businessline/2000/10/23/stories/042355uy. 2006. 2009.org/profile/151 [Accessed May 19. Available at: http://www. 2009].” India Review 2(3): 55-88.longwarjournal. Available at: http://www.uk/2/hi/south_asia/578369.AMNESTY. 2009]. Available at: http://www. 2000. 2004.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56(4): 15-16. 2009]. “Khalid al-Nabi al-Yazidi. Lumpkin. Jane.
com/extracts/extract/jwit/jwit0453.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21(6): 1056-1073. BBC. Makki. and Colin Thomas-Fensen. Jane's World Intelligence and Insurgency. Sunguta. Available at: http://acpss.HTM [Accessed January 1. 2003. R. 2009]. Markakis.” Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies.asp?id=6274 [Accessed May 19.janes. Yemen: High-Profile Militants Killed and the Yemeni Power Structure .” The Journal of Modern African Studies 26(1): 51-70.” From Nida'ul Islam.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_member. “Armed conflict and its international dimensions. Iyob.com/analysis/yemen_high_profile_militants_killed_and_yemeni_power_structure [Accessed April 9.” Review of African Political Economy 23(70): 475-497. 2009]. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya Abdel Maguid. Fouad. Eriksson. 2004.” Journal of Peace Research 42(5): 623. Wahid. 1998. 2009]. “Interview With the Deputy Amir of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement. 2005. Harbom. 2004. 1998. Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement A Military Statement of the Islamic Eritrean Reform Movement to the Islamic Nation and a List of Five Operations Executed in Eritrea.awate. Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.co. 2004. Shaikh Khalil Mohammed Amer. Available at: http://www.West. Hedru. 2009]. 2006. 2007. Bariagaber. 2007.bbc. Available at: http://news. 1989-2003. Hassan Salman. and Peter Wallensteen. SITE Institute. “Armed Conflict. Yemeni Militant's Supporters Vow Revenge. “The Eritrean Experiment: A Cautious Pragmatism?. Prendergast.” Available at: http://www.” Terrorism Monitor 4(15).” Journal of Peace Research 41(5): 625.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 35(04): 647-673. John. Debessay. Mikael.fas. 2008.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=854&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=181 &no_cache=1 [Accessed February 4.org. 1998.stm [Accessed May 19.start. 2005. Khalil Mohammed.umd. and Peter Wallensteen.com/portal/content/view/2744/11/ [Accessed May 19. John.uk/2/hi/middle_east/478046. “The Politics of Cultural Pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea: Trajectories of Ethnicity and Constitutional Experiments. Available at: http://www. Stratfor.” Review of African Political Economy 30(97): 435-444. 1999. “Nationalism. 2008.html [Accessed January 27.” Foreign Affairs 86(2): 59-74. Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement . State Formation and the Public Sphere: Eritrea 1991–96. 2009]. “Egypt's Gama'ah Islamiyah: The Turnabout and its Ramifications.org/irp/world/para/docs/eritrea. 1991-2003. 1996. 2003. 1946-2004. “Eritrean Islamic Salvation Front. Iyob. “The Nationalist Revolution in eritrea. Abul Bara'. “Eritrea: transition to dictatorship. 2009]. “Blowing the Horn. Available at: http://www. Available at: http://www.eg/eng/ahram/2004/7/5/EGYP16.jamestown. Shifting Terrain: Dissidence versus Terrorism in Eritrea. Assefaw. 2009]. 1997. Lotta. Ruth.stratfor. 2009].htm [Accessed January 27. 131 . Available at: http://www. Amer. “Somalia's ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami .ahram.
” Lebanonwire. 132 . Y Feldner. Ayman Al-Zawahiri: The Ideologue of Modern Islamic Militancy. and Nicholas Watt. Carmon.” The Muslim Brotherhood Official English Website. Alarbya. 2009]. 2009].com/pt/index.html [Accessed December 28. and D Lav. 2008]. “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches. Martha. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. “Terrorism as a Strategy. Najib. Multimedia Counterterrorism Calendar. 2002.Aboul-Enein. 2002. “Doomed Arab units prepare for final battle against the odds. 2002.” More on the split among radical Islamists. Juan.terrorism4 [Accessed January 1. 2006. 2000.com/articles/2002/01/31/book_ed3_. 2000. Cornell.asp [Accessed February 24. Gerges.” Comparative Strategy 22(3): 207-221.gov/site/profiles/al_masri. Cole. Fred. Available at: http://www. Crenshaw. “The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt?: Costs and Prospects. Columbia University Press. Airforce University Maxwell. Available at: http://query. “New Approach of Egypt´s Gama´a Islamiya Group \.” Government and Opposition 42(3): 314-339. “ Al Qaeda's Egyptian Bet. Burns. 2004. Available at: http://www.html [Accessed February 24. Politics and Terrorism: An Assessment of the Origin and Threat of Terrorism in Egypt. “Informed Comment.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=39&Itemid=54 [Accessed February 13.lebanonwire. 2009].html?res=9F05E4DA1031F935A15753C1A9669C8B63 [Accessed February 24. 2009]. Youssef. Freedman.asp?ID=5166&Lang=E&Press=Show&System=PressR&zPage=Syste ms [Accessed January 1.com/gst/fullpage. 2006. Available at: http://www. Cohen.uk/world/2001/nov/20/afghanistan. The Middle East Media Research Institute. The Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological Reversal.org/bin/articles. Khaled Dawoud. 2003. Available at: http://www.” Journal of Strategic Studies 10(4): 13-31.” The Middle East Journal: 592-612.nytimes. Fawaz.iht.muslimbrotherhood.nctc.co. “A Muslim to Muslims: Reflections after September 11. “Yemen Reports Arrests of Foreign-Born Arabs in Cole Attack .” International Herald Tribune.” The Guardian. R. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. Vincent. 2001. 2009].” New Political Science 22(1): 77-88. Burton. Thomas. Available at: http://www.juancole. 2009]. Borger. Abu Jihad al-Masri. Gunaratna. John.” South Atlantic Quarterly 101(2): 325-336. Ghadbian. Lawrence. “Promoting Freedom and Democracy: Fighting the War of Ideas Against Islamic Terrorism. Available at: http://www.guardian. Omar. Fuller.co.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA30906 [Accessed February 3. “De-Radicalization of Jihad? The Impact of Egyptian Islamist Revisionists on Al-Qaeda.com. Ashour.uk/Home. 2006. Farrag Ismali. “Pursuing bin Laden: Driving Al Qaeda:Religious Decree. 2009]. 1970]. 2000. Anneli. 1987.” The New York Times.terrorismanalysts. “Political Islam and violence.php?page=2 [Accessed February 24. Available at: http://www. 2007.com/2002/07/date-mon-8-jul-2002-081210-0400-edt-to. Ariel. Y.” Perspectives on Terrorism 2(5). Botha. Julian.com/0608MLN/06081004STR. Available at: http://memri. 2006.
” Center for Defense Information.” The Middle East Journal: 415-432. Available at: http://travelvideo. Available at: 133 . 2002.theatlantic. Available at: http://intelfiles. 1997.edu/~blaydes/part1. Available at: http://weekly. 2009].com/issues/96may/blowback. Keats. Mozaffari.ahram. 2005.eg/2001/541/eg11.htm [Accessed May 19.htm [Accessed February 18.” New York Times. Hazel.org. Anthony.” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line.nytimes. Leadership of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya.com/ansub/Daily/Day/971203/1997120301. Joshua. Arabicnews. Available at: http://www. 2004.45.org/index. 2009].htm [Accessed January 1. Moussa. “Blowback. Chris. Ahmed. Kepel.” Rashwan. 1996.html [Accessed January 1. The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe. Khalil. 2002. 2009]. 1998. “Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat party. 2009].pdf+Nageh+Ibrahim&hl=en &ct=clnk&cd=5&gl=us&client=firefox-a [Accessed January 1. The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe.” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. “Defendant Tells of His Role in Edict Urging Killing of Jews. Preston. 2002. Roggio. 1970]. Omar Abdel Rahman et al. Available at: http://www. Julia.com/61HKRAHS-sentencing.ahram. 2009]. 2009].eg/1998/396/eg4. Zambelis. University of Pennsylvania Press. Jailan. 2008]. 2003. Nevine.” The Atlantic Online. Weaver. 2005. 2008. 2002.com/2004/12/09/nyregion/09stewart. 2002. Alison.” Society 42(5): 34-42. Available at: http://weekly. Angel et al.ahram. 2009].php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11783544&Itemid=361 [Accessed February 24.” Al-Ahram Weekly Online. Gilles.org/terrorism/algamaa.org.Islamic Group. Available at: http://www. Mary Anne. Stacher. “The Taliban Connection. Muslim Extremism in Egypt. Available at: http://www. “Bin Laden.defenddemocracy. Islamism. v.html?scp=8&sq=Rifai%20Ahmed%20Taha%20&st=cse [Accessed February 24. U. Berkeley: University of California Press. “Beyond Al Qaeda: Part 2.ahram.htm [Accessed February 18. Heyer. 1970]. 2001. “Militants freed. Bill.php?id=A6130_0_1_0_M [Accessed January 1.htm [Accessed January 1.125. In Aftermath of Luxor Massacre: Doubtful Initiative to Stop Violence. Southern District of New York: Intelwire. “Egypt attacks: A Closer Look. “In the Spotlight: Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya . 2006. M. Diaa.tv/news/more.org. Sentencing Statements. Available at: http://www.eg/2002/592/eg4. Roland. 2009] Rabasa. and Terrorism. “Makram Mohammed Ahmed interviews the historic leadership of alGama’a al-Islamiyya inside the “Scorpion” prison.132/search?q=cache:1JlCz_Djb9wJ:www. “Time for a Historic Reconcilliation?. “A New Rapprochement?. Pargeter.S.org.arabicnews.htm [Accessed December 28. In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood. “Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya's Public Relations Campaign .” Terrorism Focus 3(35).” Al Ahram Weekly Online. 2009]. “Senior al Qaeda Leader Thought Killed in North Waziristan Strike. and Jon Rothschild.cfm [Accessed May 19.egoplex. 2008. Jacquard.” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line. Duke University Press.Halawi. Available at: http://weekly.stanford. 2006.eg/2002/593/op5. Available at: http://weekly.com.” Travel Video Television News.cdi.” Available at: http://74. 2004.
134 .http://www.jamestown. 2009].org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=900&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=239 &no_cache=1 [Accessed January 1.
Appendix III: Commanding Officer Attribute Codebook Type of merger Formal merger Strong affiliation (partnership) Loose affiliation (collaboration) No affiliation Primary motive Secondary motive Not a motive Primary motive Secondary motive Not a motive Primary motive Secondary motive Not a motive Strong leadership Average leadership Weaker leadership Not applicable (Was not active in the organization at the time) 4 3 2 1 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 3 2 1 Opportunism Pan-Islamic ideology Social network Operational leadership Ideological leadership Logistic leadership 0 135 .
Appendix IV: Leadership Attributes Organization name Ansar al-Islam/Jund alMullah Krekar Islam/Ansar al-Sunnah Ansar al-Islam/Jund alAbdullah Shaﬁ Islam/Ansar al-Sunnah al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (formerly Jama'at Abu Musab al-Zarqawi al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (formerly Jama'at Abu Ayub Al-Masri al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (formerly Jama'at Abu Khalil al-Souri al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) Abu Muhjin Asbat al-Ansar Mohammed Omar Taliban Ayman Al Zawahiri Egyptian Islamic Jihad Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif Egyptian Islamic Jihad Islamic Movement of Tahir Yuldashev Uzbekistan Islamic Movement of Juma Namangani Uzbekistan Najmiddin Jalolov Islamic Jihad Union Tariq al-Fasdli Yemen Islamic Jihad Zein al-Abideen alAden Abyan Islamic Mehdar Army Aden Abyan Islamic Khalid al-Nabi al-Yazidi Army Maulana Saadatullah Khan Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul Mujahidin Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul Mujahidin Harkat ul-Ansar/Harakat ul Mujahidin Leader name Organization type Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Organization Date of Ideological country or foundin Date of Type of Opportunistic Alignment Social network origin g afﬁliation afﬁliation motives? ? afﬁliations? Iraq Iraq 2001 2001 2001 2001 3 3 2 2 0 0 1 1 Ideological Logistic Operational leadership leadership leadership preprepre-merger merger? merger? 1 0 3 0 3 0 Operational leadership postmerger? 1 3 Ideological leadership postmerger? 3 2 Logistic leadership postmerger? 2 1 Core Arab Cluster Iraq 1999 2004 4 2 0 1 3 2 3 3 3 2 Core Arab Cluster Iraq 1999 2004 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 2 Core Core Core Core Core Arab Arab Arab Arab Arab Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Iraq Lebanon Afghanistan Egypt Egypt Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Yemen Yemen Yemen 1999 1986 1994 1987 1987 1998 1998 2002 1990 1990 1990 2004 2000 1996 1998 1998 1998 1998 2005 1992 1998 1998 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 3 3 1 2 3 3 3 2 2 0 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 0 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 3 3 0 3 1 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 3 2 2 Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Core Arab Cluster Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 1985 1998 2 2 1 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 Fazlur Rehman Khalil Southern Asian cluster Pakistan 1985 1998 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 3 3 Farooq Kashmiri Khalil Riaz Basra Akram Lahori Haﬁz Mohammad Saeed Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri Maulana Masood Azhar Sheikh Ali Warsame Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki Sheikh Khalil Mohammed Amer Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Lashkar-e-Taiba Lashkar-e-Taiba Jaish-e-Mohammad al-Ittihaad al-Islami al-Ittihaad al-Islami al-Ittihaad al-Islami Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement Southern Asian cluster Southern Asian cluster Southern Asian cluster Southern Asian cluster Southern Asian cluster Southern Asian cluster African cluster African cluster African cluster African cluster Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Somalia Somalia Somalia Eritrea 1985 1996 1996 1990 1990 2000 1984 1984 1984 1988 1998 1999 1999 2001 2001 2000 1991 1991 1991 1998 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 1 1 3 3 1 0 2 0 3 0 3 3 1 1 2 0 3 0 2 0 3 3 2 1 1 3 2 3 1 3 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 3 1 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 136 .
Hassan Hattab al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salaﬁst pour la prédication et le combat) Maghreb Arab cluster al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salaﬁst pour la prédication et le combat) Maghreb Arab cluster al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Groupe Salaﬁst pour la prédication et le combat) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Tunisian Combatant Group Tunisian Combatant Group Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Jemaah Islamiya Jemaah Islamiya Jemaah Islamiya Abu Sayyaf Abu Sayyaf Abu Sayyaf Algeria 1996 2005 4 2 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 0 Nabil Sahraoui Algeria 1996 2005 4 2 1 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 Abdelmalik Droukdal Anas Sebai Tarek Ben Habib Maarouﬁ Saifallah Ben Hassine Mohammed Al Karbouzi Taeb Bentizi Abu Bakar Bashir Abu Rusdan Abu Dujana Abdurajak Janjalani Khadaffy Janjalani Yasser Igasan Maghreb Arab cluster Maghreb Arab cluster Maghreb Arab cluster Maghreb Arab cluster Maghreb Arab cluster Maghreb Arab cluster Southeast Asian cluster Southeast Asian cluster Southeast Asian cluster Southeast Asian cluster Southeast Asian cluster Southeast Asian cluster Algeria Libya Tunisia Tunisia Morocco Morocco Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Philippines Philippines Philippines 1996 1995 2000 2000 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1991 1991 1991 2005 1997 2000 2000 2001 2001 1998 1998 1998 1991 1991 1991 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 3 3 1 3 1 3 3 2 3 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 137 .
Appendix V: Data on Universe of Cases Figure 1: Number of Affiliations by Year Number of Affiliations by Year 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year Figure 2: Distribution by Type of Affiliation Figure 3: Distribution by Region 138 .
14786E-09 11 8 13.042330234 139 .67 1.5 20.28936E-06 Ideological Alignment 22 19 20.67 13.018767854 27 0 13.5 1.Appendix VI: Data on Q1 What motivates local jihadist leaders to affiliate with Al Qa’ida’s and its pan-Islamic agenda? Table 1: Chi-Squared Test (Three Scales) Opportunistic Motive Total 0 (Not a motivation) Total 1 (Secondary motivation) Total 2 (Primary motivation) Expected Total 0 Expected Total 1 Expected Total 2 P Value 5 Ideological Alignment 22 Social Network Affiliation 14 3 33 13.5 20.67 13.60648E-06 Table 2: Statistical Significance Testing (Two Scales) Opportunistic Motive Not a motivation Motivation Expected (Not a motivation) Expected (Motivation) P Value 5 36 20.67 13.5 0.67 1.5 20.67 13.5 0.67 13.67 13.639411853 Social Network Affiliation 14 27 20.67 0.
5 10.5 0.5 18.5 17 0.5 7.262682055 P Value 140 .5 10.5 0.5 5 5. ideological.5 9.5 18.256764552 5 8.5 7.5 5.Appendix VII: Data on Q2 What type of role do local jihadist leaders play within Al Qa’ida’s network when the organization for which they are responsible affiliates with Al Qa’ida? Table 3: Chi-Squared Test (Strength of operational.5 17 5 8. and logistic leadership before and after the merger) Operational Before Total Not active (0) Total Weak (1) Total Average (2) Total Strong (3) Total Expected Not active Expected Weak Expected Average Expected Strong 7 10 After Sum 4 5 11 15 Ideological Before 6 7 After Sum 4 10 10 17 Logistic Before 6 8 After Sum 4 3 10 11 7 17 41 12 20 41 19 37 82 16 12 41 5 22 41 21 34 82 11 16 41 17 17 41 28 33 82 5.021962838 5 5.5 14 16.5 9.5 14 16.
0562 22 365. ideological.0501 141 .1269 19 217 11.526 0.3269 Paired Sign Test for Ideological Leadership Performance (pre-post) 19 6 16 0.5 11.422 0. and logistic leadership before and after the merger) Paired Sign Test for Operational Leadership Performance (pre-post) # Differences >0 # of Differences <0 # Differences =0 P-Value 10 16 15 0.1397 16 231.2 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Ideological Leadership Performance (pre-post) 16 3 -1.382 0.614 10 162.469 10 119.5 16.1549 -1.161 16 229 14. ideological.0577 -1. and logistic leadership before and after the merger) Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Operational Leadership Performance (pre-post) # of 0 Differences # of Ties Z-Value P-Value Tied ZValue Tied PValue Count Sum of Ranks Mean Rank Count Sum of Ranks Mean Rank 15 3 -1.91 0.466 0.313 10 122 12.95 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Overall Leadership Performance (pre-post) 9 5 -1.0146 Paired Sign Test for Logistic Leadership Performance (pre-post) 10 16 15 0.898 0.3269 Paired Sign Test for Overall Leadership Performance (prepost) 10 22 9 0.421 6 108 18 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Logistic Leadership Performance (pre-post) 15 2 -1.1742 -1.25 # Ranks <0 # of Ranks >0 Table 5: Paired Sign Test (Strength of operational.5 14.5 16.Table 4: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (Strength of operational.477 0.359 0.1425 -1.
Figures 4-6: Paired Sign Test Results 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Operational Ideologigcal Logistic Total Score Difference (Post-Pre) Improved or no change Declined 25 20 Score Difference (Post-Pre) 15 Improved Declined 10 5 0 Operational Ideologigcal Logistic Total 142 .
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.