AFSC Historical Publications Series 64-51- M



July-December1963 Volume TTT Termination of the X-20A Dyna-Soar (Narrative)
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History of the Aeronautical Systems Division
July-December 1963, Vol II I


Termination of the X-20A Dyna-Soar (Narrative)
7. AUTHOR(#)



Clarence J. Geiger




ASD, Historical Div Information Office



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AFSC Historical Publication Series 64-51-111
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Clarence J. Geiger

Historical Division Information Office Aeronautical Systems Division Air Force Systems Command


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TABLE OF CONTE1NTS VOLUME III List of Illustrations ....... ........... vi vii 1 40
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.............. .......... Chronology . ' TE•RM1iATIK OF THE X-20A DYIqA-SOAR Glossary of Abbreviations
Index . . ... .. . . .... .

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VOLUIM IV Documents 1-ill


Major Ge. of the program were to obtain research data on maneuverable re-entry and demonstrate conventional landing at pre-selected sites. The Department of Defense completed an agreement with NASA for Air Force participation in the Gemini program.-. Secretary McNamara directed a review of the X-20 program. AFSC completed a report comparing the X-20 and Gemini and recommended the addition of military experiments to the Gemini program and possible further flights of the X-20. A. recommended to Aýr Force headquarters the continuation of the X-20 prkgrain and the limitation of Air Force participation in the Gemini program to a series of military experiments. Ritland. 1962 February 23 1963 January 18 19 21 March 15 May 9 lO 22 I vii . confirmed the redirection of the Dyna-Soar program and stated that the establishment of the necessary technology and experience for manned space missions were the immediate goals of the military space program. The mission control center was to be located at the Satellite Test Center instead of Cape Canaveral. Deputy to the Commander for M-. Secretary McNamara directed the Air Force to conduct a comparison of the milita7-y potentials of the X-20 and Gemini programs.ned Space Flight. The Commander of the Air Force Systems Command. Schriever. S. assigned the X-20 orbital test program to the Space Systems Division.erai 0. General B. AFSC headquarters. R. The Secretary of Defense. McNamara. J.CHRONOLOGY 1961 December 12 The Air Force elLminattd suborbital launches of the Dyna-Soar vehicle and directed early The objectives attainment of orbital flight. The Secretary of Defense instructed the Air Force to re-examine the Titan III program and the Gemini program of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

with the first mu. M. Dr. Johnson requested the 2ecretary of the Defense to prepare a statement on the Lmportance to national security of a space station.-rformed in space. The Director of Defense for Research and Lngineering approved .20 air-la&uch and pilot training programs to the Space Systems Division. 2cmrttoc requested a briefing. 5 The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development. The X-20 office completed a system package program based on a funding level of $125 million for fiscal year 1-964. june The Dyna-Soar System Program Office completed a study concerning the use of the X-20 for antisatellite missions. The President t s 3cientific Ad. the X-20 office completed another revision of the system package program.t. Vice President Lyndon B.3 July 3 12 22 31 August 9 30 Septermber 3 12 viii . study program for a militar-y. recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the X-20 program be continued. space station.1963 May 27 Based on an anticipated funding level of $135 !rllion for fiscal year 1964 and firr. Brockway McMillan. directed that APSC study the operational applications of the X-20 vehicle.from the _ir Force on oossibi• sa[iitary space z7-ssons.iLor. contractor estimates of flight schedules. Secretary McNamara stressed the necessity of multi-marmed orbital flights of long duration. AFSC headquarters informed the X-20 office that the defense department wOmuld only allow $125 million instead of $135 million for fiscal year 1964. and th. E. orbiting. The Secretary of the Air Force. Lios:isa x:rcrens to be .tiorbital flight delayed from August 1967 to December 1967. In his reply to the Vice President. The Commander of AFSC assigned the responsibility for the X. Zuckert.

Hall. A.oranduz. 23 October 7-8 23 Novenber 14 18 29 30 December 4 4 4 I/ . The Dyna-Soar office completed Revision A to the system package program which detailed financial adjustments to the program if the mission control center remained at Cape Canaveral. the X-20 office completed a report for SSD on the use of Dyna-Soar for satellite inspection missions. Secretary Zuckert informed the Secretary of Defense that he supported the position of Dr. Dr. Flax disagreed with Dr. to the Secretary of the Air Force.. Dr. visited the Boeing facilities in Seattle. and the Air Force Aerospace Medical Division. Flax. Deputy Director for Space in the Office of the Director for Research and Engineering. Secretary McNamara was briefed on the Titan III and Dyna-Soar programs at the Martin Companzy facilities in Denver. for a status briefing on the X-20 program.p/ "1963 September 12 capability of Getmihni. and the X-20 vehicles to exccut Lýhese requirements. the Minneapolis-Honeywell Rhg~latcr copar. employing a Gemini capsule and a 1. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development. Apollo. Brown suggested to the Secretary of Defense an orbiting laboratory program. Washington. In a re. AFSC headquarters informed the X-20 office that USAF headquarters had approved three of the proposed four military capability studies relating to Dyna-Soar. C. Dr. and Dr. Flax. Largely because of NASA objections to the space station proposal.500 cubic foot test module. H. Brown's apace station proposal and argued against the cancellation of the X-20. With the assistance of the Boeing Company. A. The Director of Defense for Research and Engineering recommended to the Secretary of Defense cancellation of the X-20 program and initiation of a space station program. Colorado.

Secretary guckert forwa•rdd Gneral Hester's proposal tC the -.stated that thert' was no reason to omit the v-20 from consideration as part of a space station program. The X-20 IngnLeering Office completed a management pian for the continuation of u A-20 efforts. The Secretary of the Air Force directed that X-20 efforts important to other space programs be contijued. Both the system program office and engineering office completýd revisions to the termination . The X-20 System Program Office completed the first phase-out plan. The Secretary of Defense announced the termination of the Dyrna-Uoax progra. cf ofst efforts for continuation.n and the list of efforts for possible continuatio. Orbiting. Laboratory program.L 1963 December 4 a4jor General J.ecretary of Defense and . The X-20 office directed the Dyna-Soar contractors and various Air Fcrze agencies to stop all efforts involving X-20 fuLnds. ýIu .. AssitIant Vicc Chief of Staff. and the initiation of the Manned. AFSC headquarters canceled two studies relating to the military applications of the X-20. and the A final ddition of the program office's termination plan was completed. K. Hestur. The programa office again revised its termination plan. offered a spacu station program which employed the X-20. Further revisions were made to the termination plar. USAF headquarters informed A 2 that the Secretary td of the Air Force had approved 36 tasks for continuation. and the X-20 ýngineering Office compiled a list of useful efforts for continuation. 5 10 1O li 13 16 19-20 20 27 1964 January 3 23 23 29 x . Representatives from variouu governmenL agencies met at the system program office to determine the allocation of X-20 hardware.

McNwraara later confirmed selected site.inate it in lieu of another approach to a manned. research. On these two occasions. this redirection and identified the purposes of the mdLilitary space program. military. The Secretary placed emphasis on acquirirg the ability to rendezvous with uncooperative targets. In order to realize The orbital. The X-20 program.6inimuan refurbislhment. The objectives were to obtain research data on maneuverable re-entry and demonstrate conventional landing at a pre1 Secretary of Defense Robert '. however. Capability' Vehicit ztudits of 2 re-entry approach of the Dyna-Soar glider was critically compared "other re-antry proposals and sy5tems. Secretary Mctarrara offerod three programs. for the X-20 had been severely narrowed: It appeared that the alternatives direct the program towards achievLng military goals or term. these ends. wuu7 Dyna-Soar progr. .fersc was . During the Phase Alpha studies of 1960 the ilitary. In December 1961. b s and to re-use the vehicles wi. to achieve precise recovery.:•-""TERMINATION OF T•$ X-2OA DrD•A-SýOA•R In 1963 the Department of D. space system. • and the Marnieu. Air Force headquarters had eliminated suborbital launches of the Dyna-Soar vehicle atnd had directed the early attainment of orbital flight.Aain seriously questioning the necessity for the Dyna-5Soar programn.mrovide 1cho'ogica1 a necessary tea . was not as fortunate in the 1963 evaluations.. to maneuver during orbital flight and re-entryj. He stated that "he establishrnent of the necessary technology and experience for manned space missions were thu icmediate goals. both the Air Force and the Department of Defense deemed the Dyna-Soar as the most feasible.

. •es onsutica. .ý Air rorce S--tems Com. inspection.ea rendezvous...issions.Co-r.- Systens Division and composed of r-pres thive..National Aeronautics and Spw-ce Admixiistration in its GCmini program would girt t`moe space missions. Following a rcview in the middle of March of the D3ia-Soar _•4r program. It was not until January 1963 that Secretary McNarara took another defining a military space program.. Air Force headquarters directed th. of. sustained tests of military systems could be useful.and to or-anize a 5 studiss concernin4g X-20 and Geori contricution:. *r . :ic. and the introduction of offensive weapons in space were all significa-nt.. defense of space vehicles.3. S Corporation. j He directed a significant step in U comparison ibet:Joe-. Secretary McNarjmara furth-r clai•ie the Gemini and X-20 study.:Jii ycTrXof G•Ci Gemini became even to deterxirine which would be of more military value.ano h-adqurts. more important a few days -"'aer when the Department of Defense completed an agreement with the national aeronautics administration for Air Force participation. reconnaissance. T 1v 0l( . He suggested that the Air Force Lake as long as six t bracticable test veiaicle for thise military months to detcrn.---corm'zttee. i... tu to hes- fcur C . Lastly the defense sucretary stated that a nmaned space laborator'r to conduct. s e "tionsc -ncorning He considered that the Air Force had placed too much emphasis on controlled re-entry and not on the ]missions which could be perforned in orbit.. ir Force .erioe in mar. t -rom rC'T1 %h and th• ...0Lio11n • a . . the Di-aSa anid Gc.2A cooperative vffort eith th. The Secretary of Defense then suggested that a space 4 statios serviced by a fer=y vehicie could be the most fea-'ihe apprcach.5yste.

Lastly. Dyna-Soar glider power. subsystems and mili! ry operations. the committee thought that the operational techniques and ground The research data from the program would also be applicable for the verification of the feasibility. could be extended to 24 hours or longer. design. sufficient and enough cooling capacity to accomodate subsystems required Furthermore. significant information for the development of future maneuvering re-entry spacecraft would be obtained from the X-20 program. had a payload volume of 75 cubic feet. recognition ability. and employment * of glide bombs. There were several reasons. would total $206 million from fiscal years 1964 I . Concerning reconnaissance missions. ind two 4 satellite inspection equipment. demonstration flights. The committee then detailed the necessary modifications to the X-20 glider in order to allow the incorporation of either reconnaissance or A test program of four X-20A fiight3. Since deceleration occurred slowly during lifting re-entry. orbital. and with relative economy. X-20 program could develop low. The committee considertu ýhat the current X-20 program could adapted for testing of military The be rapidly. The fact that the X-20 would develop maneuvering techniques and quick return methods made the program valuable for the development of satellite defensive missions. such an approach would provide a safe "H physiological environment for transfer of personnel from space stations and for other logistical missions. six reorientation flights for testing reconnaissance subsystems. the orbital duration of the vehicle for military missions.43 X-20.

program would total $509 million and a 4cn. demonstration of inspection subsystems. the following flights at five month interval6. with an iispection test flight fccclaliuancu 'lighi. Considering a six flight progra. in space. this time for the testing and would total $228 beginning in July 1966..000 round Gemini capsule only had a limited payload capacity of 10 cubic feet. which would have to be discarded which was The largest test module considered had a volume of 700 cubic feet. Because the 5. the committee considered the addition of a mission module. to the Gemini capsule. The committee estimated that to incorporate a series of military experiments into the current NASA program with only minor equipment and operational flight changes would total about $16. In contrast. this time using the Titan IIIC. T2st progrr. the tecbhrology being developed by the Gemini program of NASA related to the ability to rendezvous and orbit for long dur'ations. The same type of program. . If six Department of Defense flights The committee then the total would be $458 million. and employed If the Department of Defense conducted two Gemini launches the Titan II. inspection and reconnaissance experiments would total $129 million from fiscal years 1964 through 1967. considered a series of Gemini launches conducted by the Department of Defense.1 million from fiscal years 1964 through 1966. would cost $474 miý_ 7 4 . the cost for the same booster as NASA. thrrough 1968. were conducted. The committee then examined the applicability of such a test system to reconnaissance and inspection missions.

inspection. Brockway McMillan. the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development. AFSC headquarters. Both systems could satellite defense. and logistical missions. The assistant secretary recornnended that the X-20 program be energetically *ecretary McNamara approved the incorporatinri of Air Force experiments in the NASA Gemaini program. on 20 June 1963. J." . however. wh. fcw weeks later. Deputy to the Commander for Manned Space Flight. . Major General 0. forwarded the report to Air Force headquarters with the recommendation that the X-20 program be continued because of the contribution a high lift-to-drag ratio vehicle could make to future military systems. neither would directly provide a means 8 of introducing offensive weapons into earth orbit.The committee concluded that the main advantage of the Gemini vehicle was that it was lighter than the X-20 and consequently could carry more fuel for orbital maneuverability or have a larger payload. On 22 May. could land quicker and with more landing The committee recommended that a series of military experiments should be implemented in the NASA Gemini program and that additional flights of the X-20 might be warranted. be modified to perform reconnaissance. The inherent advantage of the X-20 was its maneuverability during re-entry. summarized the report in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.h meant that it site options. Ritland. Air Force participation in the Gemini program should be limited to incorporating a series of military experiments 9 into the NASA program.

the program office then completed The a study concerning the use of the X-20 in anti-satellite missions. the Dyna-Soar office completed its report by the middle of November.II continued. This study offered an insp-uLion vehicle. Such a program would total $227 million from fiscal years To conduct a 50 flight operational program following the completion of the two demonstration flights would cost $1. the provisions for a onr or two-man crew. the systam contract. With the assistance of the Boeing Company. to the X-20 glider of 700 pounds which could be achieved through a series of design changes. he suggested that further examination of the military applications of the X-20 and Gemini be extended under various study i0 programs At the request of AFSC headquarters. Dyna-Scar office proposed an X-20B which would have an interim operational capability of satellite inspection and negation. Near the end of June 1963. the Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company. which cc•Ld h.- . The program office suggested that the last six flights of the current X-20A program be altered to carry inspection sensors and additional fuel for space maneuver demonstration. which would show the capability of the Dyna-Soar vehicle and modified 12 versions to fulfill satellite inspection missions.. 1964 through 1968. X-20 office to conduct. and the Air Force Aerospace Medical DIvision. the Space Systems Division requested the an analysis as part of the 706 Phase 0 studies. X-20X.229 billion from fiscal years 1965 through 1972. r. Two additional flights would be added to demonstrate an This would necessitate a weight reduction interim operational capability. an associate contractor.

.7 permit orbital flight for 14 days. A few days later. Vice President Lyndon B. ranging from $324 million to $364. depending upon the extent of modifications. Lamar. Director of the X-20 Engineering Office. Since the completion of the Step IIA and 1IB studies by Boeing in June 1962.2 million for fiscal years 1965 13 through 1971. a first flight date of the X-20X in September 1967 and a probable funding requirement. M. Secretary Zuckert. W.000 nautical miles. requested funds for intensive miliuary application studies. Johnson raised the question of the -!?ec. directed studies of the He stated that the X-20 program would probably prove to be invaluable to the national military space 15 program. reiterated this request during a presentation t~o the Secretary of the Air Force. importance of space stations to McNamara replied a few days later and stressed a factor which the Air Force now had to consider: multi-manned orbital flights of long duration. July. the Dyna-Soar office had on several occasions. and.'rity and requested the 16 Secretary Secretary of Defense to prep~xe a statement on this subject. On 22 The Secretary outlined some premises upon which America's manned. E. and be capable of inspecting The Dyia-Soar office estimated targets as high as 1. E. on 8 July 1963. the future of the Lyna-Soar became tied to a projected space station program. Before the purpose of these studies was clarified. military. attending a meeting of the Designated Systems Management Group. operational applications of Dyna-Soar. 14 Zuckert.

biomedical experiments which could be and the capability of Gemini. considered that an orbital space station could prove useful in experiments to improve capability in He condv ct'.7. performed in space. : icn every type of military mission. In September. Because there was no clearly aefined military space mission. He stated that the investigation of the military role in space was important to natioral security. a subcom•mittee of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee Space Vehicle Panel was formed to review the available data relative to a manned orbiting station. present efforts should be directed towards the establishment of the necessary technological base and experience in the event that such missions were determined. The President's Office of Science and Technology requested the Air Force to brief the subcommittee on possible military space missions. Secretary McNamara informed Vice President Johnson that he hoped to have the characteristics of an orbital space station delineated by early 17 1964. Considerations such as mcdification6 cf the X-20 and ./ space program was to be based. and the X-20 ±8 vehicles to execute these possible future requiremento. Additional instructions concerning the briefing to the President's Scientific Advisory Committee were relayed from the Director of Defensp for Research and Engineering by Air Force headquarters to the Aeronautical Systems Divisioni. Apollo. the The Secretary of Defense pointed out that Air Force participation in Gemini program would provide much of this technological base. a system could even evolve into an operational military vehicle.

Dr. Rather a study of the requirements to test military equipment in space was necessary to answer questions such as equipment characteristics and theusefulness 19 of man in space. Lees pointed out that it was necesbarto convince a number of governmental cfficials that military man had a definite mission in space. A few days later. chairman of the subcommittee. Lamar about the coming presentation. Emphasis was to be on specific. vehicle capable of rendezvous and docking. that more specific reasons must be given or it The briefings to the Presidentts Scientific Advisory Committee on 10 October essentially covered the findings concerning Gemini and the X-20 in the earlier 10 May report of the Air Force to Secretary McNamara. Lester Lees.discussion of an orbital space station should be emphasized. however. meaningful experiments which the Air or the X-20. Lamar that . Dr. completion of the presentations. was unlikely that extensive 20 funds would be available for the development of manned space systems. Dr. The usual arguments for manned space flight such as decisionThe subcommittee chairman stated making and flexibility were inadequate. to provide a technological basis for future military space missions. More detail. in order Force could conduct with either Gemini. gave additional information to Mr. Air Force headquarters pointed out that the Department of Defense was not convinced that an orbital space station was needed. was presented on the use of the X-20 as a shuttle A configuration of the X-20 21 After with an orbital development laboratory was also considered. Apollo. Lees commented to Mr.

22 oppose the program. AFSC Vice Commander. proposal which had * On 16 December.although he had previously been against the continuation of the Dyna-Soar program he now saw a definite need for the X-20. G. A final study would examine the economic implications of various modes of recovering space vehicles from near-earth 23 orbit. The Vice Commander added that this program of experiments should be compared to a similar one employing the Gemini vehicle to insure that the Dyna-Soar approach offered the most economical and effective means of accomplishment. He would no longer the purposes of the Dyna-Soar capability July. By the end of October. and also logistical support of a space station. A third study was to examine the future operational potential of re-entry vehicles having a lift-to-drag ratio greater than the X-20. ASD Commander. Estes. M. which Secretary Zuckert had agreed to in Following the instructions of Air Force headquarters. i . surveillance. H. Lieutenant General Ruegg. two studies. satellite inspection. A second study would integrate the findings of variou6 other studies and establish a series of mission models for reconnaissance. AFSC headquarters canceled the first both of which dealt direct'y with the D:ma-Soar program. studies. that the purpose of the first study was to formulate a program of military space experiments involving only engineering changes to the X-20 subsystems. At the end of November. informed Major General R. . were clarified. AySC headquarters informed the X-20 the second office that Air Force headquarters had approved all but 24 * just been submitted.

X-20 program director. later noted that the directions were became apparent during these presentations 26 that Secretary McNamara desired far more than a status briefing. Flax. Colorado. 25 on the status of the X-20 and Titan III programs. Although this film was an updated version of one previously unclassified and released. A. Furthermore. the Office 27 of the Secretary of Defense refused its clearance for the convention. neither Dr. indicated agreement to a briefing by the Air Force Plant military. the Director of Defense for Research and Engineering. 28 4 flight. L. now Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Research and Development. 4! . One of the proposed somewhat in error because it events involved the continuous showing of a brief film on the nature and objectives of the Dyna-Soar program. A. C. It was reported that some X-20 Boeing officials became 29 concerned over the future of the program after this visit. space Representatire at Boeing on the necessity for manned. Several X-20 displays and activities had been planned for the Air Force Association convention which was to be held in the middle of September. Hall.Ai Early in October 1963. A. General B. Moore. AFSC Commander. Schriever. nor Dr. informed ASD and SSD that the Secretary of Defense intended to visit the Martin Company facilities at Denver. Prior to these briefings. there were numerous indications that the future of the Dyna-Soar program was uncertain. Deputy Director for Space in the Office of the Director of Defense for Research and Engineering. to receive briefings Colonel W. H. In addition.

Harold Brown. . . space programs.. Unless an affirmatiye answer were found. A few days later. 31 accompanied and Secretary McNamara.had been demonstrated. Brockway McMillan. had not approved the release of funds for X-20 The AFSC Vice Commander was concerned and range requirements. Colonel Moore stated that it At the conclusion of his presentation. The Secretary of Defense wantee to k-now what was planned for the D-yn---Soar program after maneuverable re-entr-. . He emphasized that ho considered this the most Lmportant part of the X-20 program. He stated that both the Gemini and X-20 programs had very limited ability to answer the question of what man could do in space. 32 there were any questions. . .r. on 23 October. Dr.. L.i " • i •- • . were briefed by Titan III and X-20 officials. there would be no successor to these programs. Brown. Connecticut. . Harold Bro*. appeared critical of the Air Force.. The of Defense publicly state its confidence in X-20 director then asked if Both Secretary icNamara and Dr.- . space systems.. military. would be desirable to have the Department the Dyna-Soar program. by R. . Secretary McNamara stated that the X-20 office had been authorized to study this problem since March 1963. considered that the range operational date of October 1965 for the 30 Dyna-Soar program was certainly in jeopardy. 12 Dr. Lastly. • . manned. in a speech before the United Aircraft Corporate Systems Center at Farmington. now Under Secretary of the Air Force. Deputy Secretary of Defense. Gilpatric.. . Brown asked a series of questions directed towards obtaining inforrmation on the necessity of manned.

Mr. General Schriever had directed that the Dyna-Soar orbital test program be assigned to the Space Systems Division. several changes involving the test organization and funding were made to the X-20 program. H. Some of the participants arrived at varying conclusions concerning the reaction of Secretary McNamara to the briefing. . 33 get the answers. not appear to be firmly against the X-20 nor in Secretary McNamara seemed willing to allow the Air Force to use the X-20 as a test craft and a military system if a case could be adequately made Mr. On 9 May 1963. Boeing's X-20 chief engineer. Only then would the department give a vote of confidence to Secretary McNamara then directed Dr. J. center be located at the Satellite Test Center iL Sunnyvale. From May through September 1963. Rather. Secretary of Defense was not satisfied with the response and that 35 "drastic consequences" were likely if an adequate reply were not made. thought that the Secretary of Defense did favor of Gemini. Goldie. Lamar concluded that the 34 for a manned. further expenditures until he had an understanding of the possible space missions." Just as serious as Secretary McNamara's reception of the X-20 briefing was the refusal of the Department of Defense to sanction a revision of the system package program. space system. The AFSC commander further ordered that the mission control California. military. Colonel Moore prophetically stated that Secretary McNamara "probably 36 will not ask us again. McMillan to the X-20 program.I1 He insisted that he could not justify the expenditure of about $1 billion He was not interested in for a program which had no ultimate purpose.

the Air Force Systems Command headquarters * iformed the X-20 office that attempts to obtain the higher funding level 38 had failed. Incorporation of multiorbital flight was and the X-20 office could defer the first only of secondary importance.37 instead of the Air Force Missile Test Center. Before this could be accomplished. and $3 million for 1969. Considering that $125 million had been authorized for fiscal year 1964 and a total of $339. system package program reflected this change in The 27 May 1963 the test program and registered a requirement of $135 million for fiscal year 1964. 1967. for the Dyna-Soar program would amount to $867. The 3 September program package presented the adjusted financial estimates and flight schedules. These additional changes would also have to be incorporated into the revised system package program.20 million had previously been expended.12 million for 1966.02 million.85 million for 1968. 39 multiorbital flight date to remain within budget limitations.35. The Director of Defense for Research and Engineering to acquire data considered that the primary purpose of the program was on maneuverable re-entry.85 million for The total cost The reduction would be required for 1965. . While Air Force headquarters approved this system package program in June. General Schriever transferred not only orbital test direction to the space division but also responsibility for the air-drop program and '47 the training of X-20 pilots. the program office estimated that $139 million $. the Department of Defense would only allow $125 million for fisca2l year 1964 On 3 July. $93. $31. AFSC headquarters then directed that a revised system package program be 40 completed by early September.

General L. 42 . there was some concern over the expense involved in locating the mission control center at Sunnyvale.and the last piloted flight was to Soon after the issuing of this program package. I.13 $130. Colonel Moore estimated that this relocation 43 would increase program costs by several million dollars. $88. prograu cost would amount to $853.34 million for 1967 and $31. the X-20 office forwarded. a revision of the 3 September system package program the mission control which detailed adjustments to program.09 million for 1968. 6 The first piloted ground- launch was to occur in July 19 6 be conducted in February 1968. Davis. At Lhe request of AFSC headquarters. 4I The X-20 office estimated that $138. costs if center remained at Cape Canaveral. modifications for multiorbital flight and deferring the date of the ninth ground-launch (the first to December 1967.23 million instead of the previous]y 4 . supported this argument by stating to General Schriever that many of the functions necessary for launch control were also necessary for mission control. on 23 September.. and the two unmanned ground-launches were to take place in January 1966 and April 1966.66 million for The total . Major a special assistant to the AFSC Vice Commander.15 of fiscal year 1964 funds was absorbed by delaying the necessai. illion would be required for fiscal year 1965. It would be less expensive to keep both control centers at 44 the Air Force Missile Test Center. multiorbital flight) from August 1967 The 20 air-launches were to occur from May 1965 through May 1966. -Q66.

did not agree and directed an Air Force group to prepare a rebuttal 48 to such a proposal. He Air Force request to conduct a study of an authorized the expenditure of $1 million for fiscal year 1964. informing them that it was more feasible to locate the mission control center 46 This program package did not receive at the missile test center. Gemini. Brown a 14 space station study. This study had to be concluded by early 1964. in August. recommended a program for such an efforL to 3ecretary McNamara in November 1963 memorandum. briefing to Secretary McNamara. Before the . the endorsement of either headquarters. It had been reported that. rcmnLded AFSC headquarters that it would be beneficial to the program if the systems command would 47 approve of the program package. the X-20 assistant director. On 17 October 1963. Brown had offered a manned. and Apollo. General C. Previously. LeMay.z. on the day following the 23 October !963 Dr.02 million. E. Dr. laboratory program to the Air Force in exchange for Air Force agreement to termjiate the X-20 program. however.umpletion of tUhi 49 Dr. Brown had approved an orbital space station.16 45 estimated $867. r.oititg. Trenholm. The Director of Defense for Research and Engineering analyzed varyýing s. In determining the characteristics of such a station. the Air Force should consider the use of such programs as the X-15. J. Mercury. As late as 21 November. The Air Force was to focus on the reconnaissance mission with the objective of assessing the utility of :aan for military purposes in space. thc" X-20. B. s of spac• station systems which would . A&SC headquarters forwarded the system package program to the '4r Staff. thv Air Furce Chief of Staff.

would cost $1. and active station tests could be conducted by late 1967. Brown. manned.966. and a. ferry launch could take place in late 1966. Dr. The Director models of such Structural Systems. The alternative which the Director of Defense for Research and Engineering preferred was to develop a space station with provisions for four men. improved ferry vehicle could be available for later station tests. '- . and he estimated Test program (ASSET) during 1964 and 1965. perform the adapter as a space station and the Saturn The Apollo command module and the Titan IIIC would Dr. however. years 1964 through 1968.cive space station tests cuuld begin in the middle of 1967. manned.incorporate either the Gemini or Apollo capsules as ferry vehicles and would employ either the Titan II.. The first.286 billion from fiscal years 1964 through 1969. he suggested the development of a low lift-to-drag ratio vehicle which could perform maneuverable re-entry and conventional landing. use the Gemini capsule as a ferry vehicle. consequently. or the Saturn IB booster. ferry launch could occur in the middle of 3. and. that an. was concerned because both of the recommended "approaches would employ primitive landing methods. Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) IB as the booster. of Defense for Research and Engineeri-ng suggested that a craft be tested in Environmental. first. the Aerothermodynamic. the Titan IIIC. Brown estimated that this approach The logistics function. launch both the station and capsule with a Titan a 1 separately d From fiscal IIC booster. One would involve the use of the Two of the approaches were suitable. this approach would total $983 million.

Instead NASA suggested a program for an orbiting military. Dr.The total for this more sophisicated vehicle program would amount to $443 million for fiscal years 1964 through 1968. it by no means concurred orith the proposed termination of the X-20 program. advised the Secretary of Defense that the space station proposal of 14 November was still 51 the most feasible and should be initiated. Brown maintained that such an approach could easily be converted into the Gemini alternative he had recommended on 14 November. capable of supporting two to four men for 30 days.iaboratory which did not involve ferrying. analyzed an approach more This alternative would involve the orbiting by a Titan IIIC booster of a Gemini capsule and a 1. Discussions between National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Department of Defense officials made it would agree to a coordinated. Sf . Management of the Gemini program should be transferred 50 from NASA to the Department of Defense by October 1965. Brownts recommendation to Secretary McNamara was brief: the X-20 program and initiate the Gemini approach to a manned. orbital.500 cubic foot test module. docking. While NASA had suggested a simplified Gemini approach. space program. clear that the space agency was military. space station. Dr. This simplified approach would total $730 million from fiqcal year 1964 through 1968. in another memorandum to Secretary McNamara. test program could be conducted in late 1967. cancel military. Dr. but it not prepared to support a space station program. however. agreeable to NASA. Brown. Brown. and resupplying. * and the manned. Dr. On 30 November.

were necessary to provide such data. Bisplinghoff recommended some changes to the Dyna-Soar program. December. Dr. L. Flax completed his reply on 4 He estimated that such a curtailed program would reduce the total cost by $174. metal structures. After completion of an adequate air-drop program and a satisfactory unmanned ground-launch flight. '. Administrator for Advanced Research and Technology. radiationto simulate X-20 flights this lifting re-entry environment.4 million through fiscal year 1969. Test facilities were unable consequently. Flax firmly disagreed with the recommendations of Dr. He pointed out. had repeatedly shown the importance of developing the technology of maneuverable hypersonic vehicles with high-temperature. that such an approach would result in the loss of technical 55 financial savings. in another memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force. Flax to examine such an 54 alternative for the X-20. pointed out that advanced flight system studies Bisplinghoff. and. a piloted orbital flight should be conducted.4 . 53 Dr. cooled. Dr. With the assistance of the X-20 program Dr. The Assistant Secretary pointed out that the X-20 had not been given serious consideration as an element in any of . Brown requ. Dr. data which would be disproportionate to the On the same day. Brown's 14 November memorandum. however. In order to achieve the objective of obtaining data on re-entry.19 The Associate R. Dyna-Soar program and should it NASA had always supported the be canceled the space agency would 52 have to initiate a substitute program. office and AFSC headquarters.ed Dr.

On the same day. but also an entire class of hypersonic winged-vehicles. 4[ . Flax's position. Brown's improved ferry vehicle.yI t 20 the space station proposals. Flax's memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara with the statement that it represented the best technical advice available in the Air Force. Brockway * * The Secretary of the Air Force added that both he and Dr. Dr. Dr * I continued by emphasizing the importance of the X-20 program. While he endorsed the purposes of the space station program. Since about $400 million had already been expended on the X-20 program. Secretary Zuckert further stated that he did not wish to see the Air Force abandon a ( mo L) prograT such as Dyna-Soar and start a new program which perhaps had 57 been projected upon optimistic schedules and costs. "1i including Dr.. Flax believed that the decision to begin such a program was independent 56 of the question to terminate the X-20. approach possessed several advantages: Furthermore. Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert forwarded Dr. the vehicle could make emergency landings without the costly deployment of air and sea elements and there would be a more tolerable force of vehicle deceleration during re-entry. the Assistant Secretary severely questioned * the proposal to cancel Dyna-Soar and initiate a new program with similar objectives. He emphasized that major modifications either were to be the Dyna-Soar were necessary to both the Gemini and the X-20 if employed in an orbital station program. technology not only supported the development of re-entry vehicles. McMillan were in accord with Dr.

This approach would require $978. Brown t s 1-4 November memorandum.4t 21 As an Air Force reply to Dr. if were essential. Secretary Zuckert forwarded General Hester t s memorandum to Secretary McNamara. The Air Force Secretary stated that the Air Staff study clearly indicated that there was no definite reason .4 million for the ASSET program was necessary to advance space technology. The first alternative offered an extended X-20 transition section whicri would provide a module of 700 cubic feet. annual funding level of $6. it a separate program was not necessary to have Rather. only an for an improved ferry vehicle. General Hester. the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. all of which employed the X-20 vehicle. This would be a two-man station The second approach This employing an X-20 launched by a Titan IIIC. the cancellation of the Gemini program.4 million from fiscal years 1964 through 1969 for the development of a space station and the X-20 ferry vehicle. The third alternative. recommended thl economy initiation of a space station program employing the X-20 and. Hester. therefore. X-20 approach to a space station program. The Assistant Vice Chief of Staff considered that the first With an space station launch could take place by the middle of 1967. comprised a separately launched two-room station by the Titan II. suggested to the Secretary of the Air Force several alternatives for varying sizes of space stations.000 cubic feet of volume and would be serviced by an X-20 shuttle vehicle boosted with a Titan IIIC. K. launched by Titan IIIC and capable of orbiting for one year. involved a five-man recommended by General Hester as the most feasible. Major General J. would have 1. station. 58 On the next day.

intended to place logistics operations. a rumor circulated in Air Force headquarters that the Defense Department had reduced X-20 fiscal year 1964 funds from $125 million to $80 million and had not allocated any money for fiscal year 19 6 5. and the President agreed. The Secretary of Defense explained his reasons for canceling the X-20. announced the canceilation of the reviewed. X-20 project. On 8 December. Brown offered in his 1-4 November memorandum) to explore a wide range of re-entry shapes and techniques. He stated that the purpose of the program had been to demonstrate maneuverable re-entry and landing at a precise point. be a manned orbital laboratory (the NASA proposal which Dr. The Secretary of Defense also stated that there would be an expanded ASSET program (the improved ferry vehicle program which Dr. the Secretary of Defense The program had been In its place woulu Apparently. Brown explained in his 30 November 1963 memorandum). 61 On 10 December. . vehicle was The D. and the decision made. defense officials conferred with President Johnson. Secretary McNamara recommended the termination of Dyna-Soar.yna-Soar not intended to develop a capability for carryirg on space Furtherrore. 60 The next day. the X-20 was not. Secretary 59 Zuckert believed that the X-20 alternative deserved serious consideration. alte-rnatives studied.22 for omitting the X-20 from consideration as a re-entry vehicle for an orbital space station or orbital laboratory program. Secretary McNamara estimated that $100 million would be zaved in the following IS month5. This was particularly important because of safety and cost advantages which the X-20 offered for long duration orbital missions. By taking the Gemini approach to a space program.

He stated that both the orbiting laboratory and the expanded ASSET programs would be placed under the management of . the Air Force recommendation involved a greater degree of schedule risk than the chosen program. not be accepted as a The Air Force proposal could feasible substitute for the Manned. Flax and General Hester. construction of a space station and a new and larger X-20. Lastly. A few days after the termination announcement. Orbiting. The Air Force recommended program involved were three objections. in a memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force.The Secretary of Defense stated that about $400 million had already 23 substantial payloads into space. Air Force headquarters informed all of its commands of the termination 64 of the X-20 and the initiation of an orbital laboratory program. nor fulfill extended orbital missions. General Schriever met with some of his staff to discuss the new space approach. of Defense considered that The Department such a large step was not justified and a test module and Gemini vehicle were chosen as the logical first step. On the same day. the Air Force suggestion to cancel Gemini was not within the power of the Department of Defense since this was a NASA program. been expended on a program which still required several hundred million 62 dollars more to achieve a very narrow objective. Following Secretary McNamara's news conference on 10 December. Brown. 63 Laboratory program. Brown stated that before reaching There the Air Force alternatives were carefully considered. Dr. a decision Dr. Furthermore. replied to the arguments of Dr.

The day following this direction.24 UNCC 65 I Later. the ASD program office studies of pilot control recommended the continuation of ten activities: of booster trajectories. 'Although official instructions were not received from AFSC headquarters until 17 December. employment of existing Boeing simu-lator crew station and flight instruments for further research. to aid the space division in the preparation of a new ASSET a development plan. Zuckert authorized the Air Force to terminate the X-20 program. however. and development of 69 certain sensoring aid trawsducing equipment for telemetry instrumentation. development of the very high frequency (VHF) search and rescue receiver and transmittuer. fabrication of the Dyna-Soar heat protection system. . nose cap..4 On 18 December. the X-20 program office instructed the Dyna-Soar contractors and various Air Force agencies on 10 December to stop all activities 67 On the next day. Commander of the Research and Technology Division. Demler. Brown remained unchanged: 66 vehicle. A preliminary report was due no later than 16 68 December. fabrication and testing of the high temperature elevon bearings. final acceptance testing of the test instrumentation subsystem ground station. Air Force headquarters irnformed the program office that UNCLAriC F. . construction of the full pressure suit. final development testing of the flight testing on the ASSET vehicle of coated molybdenum panels. it was to continue certain X-20 efforts which were deemed important to other space programs. The objective of this program as first announced by the development of an advanced ferry Dr. Major General Marvin C. Secretary involving the expenditure of X-20 funds. General Schriever requested the A the Space Systems Division.

however. Category D. the Aeronautical Systems The officials decided Division. Category C included items which would contribute to the advancement of the state-of-the-art. Category II i UNCLASSIFIED . addition to the ten efforts continued The X-20 Program Director had not supported the engineering office items either because he did not consider them of sufficiently wide applicability or he could not adequately establish their 71 merit. Category A involved efforts whose cost for completion would be equal to the termination expense. officials from USAF headquarters. items for reinstatement which were in by the program director. and this time a new classification was suggested. a revision of this list had been completed and coordinated with the laboratories of the Research and Technology Division. contained efforts 72 which possessed a potential future use.UNCLASSIFIED the Secretary of the Air Force had approved the ten items. At the end of the month. to identify the items not only by technical area. the Space Systems Division. however. 25 and funding 70 for continuation of these contracts would be limited to $200. and RTD again reviewed proposed items for Category I continuation. Category B comprised items which were applicable to various space programs. but also by four categories. as originally presented by the engineering office. On 20 December 1963. The final classification. The items were classified both by technical area and the suggested categories. The X-20 engineering office. included items which would advance the state-of-the-art. had recommended a list of several. This list.000 a month. was revised on 14 December by representatives from AFSC headquarters. AFSC headquarters. and the Research and Technology Division. ASD.

26 UNCLASSIFIED involved items which conly required feasibility demonstration or design verification. recommending that separate contracts be negotiated for the three categories * For a list of the 36 items which were continued. were efforts which necessitated further justification. USAF headquarters informed AFSC that the Secretary of the Air Force had approved. and III.1 74 million for the completion of the first three categories. see docLument 107. 73 By 3 January 1964. Included in these were the ten items which A few days later. On 23 January. General Estes requested from USAF headquarters authority to retain sufficient funds for program termination. II.09 million of which would be directed towards completing 75 * the three categories. were being continued by the program office itself. Essentially. and Category IV Category III comprised equipment which was nearly completed. A Category V was added which included items that had oeen suggested for continuation by various organizations but were considered unacceptable by the X-20 engineering office. The X-20 engineering office completed a plan at the end of January. The Research and Technology Division was then assigned authority to formulate a management plan for completion of this 76 work. all the efforts The Air Force would allow an expenditure of $70 million from fiscal year 1964 funds for the Dyna-Soar program. the engineering office recommended for continuation the 38 efforts which comprised Categories I. UNCLASSIFIED . which would include $3. $2. a last revision of the proposed useful efforts had been completed. three categories. listed under the first with the exception of two items.

UNCLASSIFIED . The Air Force calculated that Boeing had completed 41. At the time of Secretary McNamarats announcement. re-entry. 27 These contracts would be administrated by the Research and Techiiology Division except for two which were to be transferred to the Air Force Missile Development Center and the 77 Air Force Flight Test Center. the Dyna-Soar program definitely advanced the technology of radiation-cooled structures. and the Radio Corporation of America. The governmental expenditure for these contracts 78 amounted to $410 million. While Air Force headquarters did not give this plan was put into operation.UNCLASSIFIED of items which had not been already reinstated. The Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company. the X-20 program. Paradoxically. Thirty-six X-20 tasks were continued and would directly contribute to other Air Force space efforts. Boeing had 6.74 percent of its tasks. the cancellation of X-20 development apparently made the maneuverablV re-entry concept far more acceptable to the Department of Defense and some elements of the Air Force than it had been during the existence of the Dyna-Soar program. an official approval.475 people involved in had 630 and RCA. While it had only approximately reached mid-point. Also significant was the initiation of an expanded ASSET program directed towards the development of a lifting. the associate contractor for the communication and tracking subsystem. had finished 58 percent. shuttle vehicle. the associate contractor for the primary guidance subsystem. had completed 59 percent of its work. while Minneapolis-Honeywell 565.

. 12. ASAF/R&D to Secy. McNamara. X-20 SPO. Ibid. D. 1963. USAF. Gen.. R. Hq. 1961. lo May 1963. to 2-23. Dir.28 UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCES 1. 1961. Brady. SSD to Col. ASAF/R&D to SAF.. Moore. 21. 14. W.: Response to Secretary McNamara's 15 March 1963 Questions.: Review 10. 1963. USAF. 18 Nov. 2-47h. 5. Hq. S.. Doc.. subj. UNCLASSIFIED . USAF to Hq.: Program 706. 0. subj. 12. 8. Zuckert. 11 Dec. 4. subj. 8 July 13. subj. of Def. 22 May 1963. Acting Dep/Tech. 2-55 to 2-57. TWX. 2-87. to Harold Brown.. 6. 2-27 to 2-29. 15 Mar. 7. Memo. Secy.: fDyna-Soar Briefing to Secretary McNamara7.: fiesponse to McNamara's Questions7. Memo. Col. Lamar. 2-54c to 2-54J. subj. AFSC to Hq... Ltr.: Response to Secretary McNamara's 15 March 1963 Questions. 1963. of Def. 7. 27 Dec.. SAF. Rpt.: The Air Force Manned Military Space Program. subj. SSD. 11. 9... Memo.: Program 706. 25 June 1963. L. 1962. ix-xiii. 15. X-20 Engg. Ofc.: X-20 Status Report.. Doc. 2-37. 2-63. Phase 0 Study. to the Cmdr/Manned Space Flight. DCS/Sys.: of Air Force Space R&D Program. Secy. Der/Tech. 2-79. Memo. subj.. 5 June 1963. 23 Feb. Ibid.. subj. 2. E. Rpt. 14. 1 June 1963. X-20 Anti-Satellite Ltr. 8. X-20 SPO.. 18 Jan. Prog. Presn. to E. ADD. I.. 2-19. subj. Rpt. subj. X-20 SPO.. Hq. subj. SPD. Memo. 18 Mar. Dir. : bGemini and Dyna-Soar7. W. Mission. 1963. 7.. Brockway McMillan. 2. Ritland. Maj. pp. ASAF/R&D to SAF. & Log. I. of Def.. 3. 1963. DDR&E. AFSDC-85081. 12. J. AFSC. W. 2-47c. Phase 0 Study of X-20 RTD to SAF. M. Dep.

USAF. 18. Dev. AFSC to Hq. N. 27. 30. 19. Geiger. Moore. 18 Sept. ASD. 9 Aug. ASD. DCS/Plans. Memo. Memo.. Lamar by C. subj : Report of Visit.: Briefing to PSAC Panel on 10 October 1963. subj. SCG-O-IO-6. subj. ASAF/R&D. 17. Memo. 1963. Rpt.. Doc.. Div. 28. subj. Johnson. USAF to Hq. 1963. McNamara to Johnson.: Dyma-Soar Operational Capability Study. ASD. Flax. 1963. subj. 42. 23 July 1963. Vice Cmdr. AFSC. Trip rpt. Ofc. Doc. C. Hq. A. Hq. Hq. Minutes. Hall. Col. 1963. AFSC to Hq. 32..: Orbital Space Exec. H. W. and Pertinent Background. ltr. 102.Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. subj. Tost'.. 10 Oct. Hq. J.. 23. subj.: Briefing for Presidentts Advisory Committee--Space Vehicle Panel.UNCLASSIFIED 15. Secy. 21. subj. 30 Oct. Hq. Rpt. 1G Oct.: Sixty-fifth Meeting. Memo. Doc. Doc. Maj. USAF. 11SA0. to A. 29. subj. 31. 20. 12 July 1963. B. AFPR. to R. Interview.: Space Planning Studies. Ltr. 12 Sept.. Manned Orbiting 14 Jan.. TWX. 18. 27 Feb.. Lt. Vol. H. Doc. 25. 23 October 1963. ASD. 53. SCLDS-27-11-3.: Record Memorandum of the X-20 Presentation to Secretary of Defense McNamara. 19 Sept. DDR&E. 1963. to Hq. 1963. Gen. E. Pres. C... 23 Sept. P. Col. 19. McNamara. Doc. Secy. IV. July-Dec.. 24. Doc. of Def. W. 1963. 1964. 1963. DC3/R&D. l0 uct. 51. Ofc. Doc. Keese. Doc. 26. 25 Oct. UNCLASSIFIED .. Lamar. Hist. Dep. Estes. DSMG. 1964. ASD. 29 16. Doc. Hq. Exec. Col. L. 1963. Gen. Boeing Co. M. Designated Systems Management Group. Interview. to PSAC. Doc. 29 Nov. USAF. Price. Dir. 22. TWX. Ltr.. B. subj. Hist...: Briefing for Lees Subcommittee of PSAC Space Vehicle Panel. 1963. 36. S. Golovin.. 24. Vice Pres. H. 77. 1963. Memo. Lanar by Geiger. of the Science and Tech. subj. Station. 1963. Hq. AFSC to Hq.: Station and Alternatives. 22 July 1963. R.: Space Stations..

11-3. AFSC ZX-20 Test Progra2. 24 Oct. Gen. Ltr. Estes to Lt.. p. 2i. MSFA-30-7-47. 1963.. Doc. to Vice Cmdr.: Questions Comments. Trip rpt. Gen. ASD. 9 May 1963. Hq. itr. 37. Doc. :4aj. 34. 40.: Memo. 23 October 1963. Doc.. Trip rpt. Ltr. U L-SF . Memo. 24 Oct. 3 July 1963.. pp. 44 17 Oct.. subj. 102. Lamar f. TWX. 1963. 35. Gen. Doc. Doc. TWX. 36. SCCP-3-7-2. 19 Sept. 9 Sept. Hq.: Paraphrased Transcript. A3D. Col.: X-20 Test Program. 3 Sept. 23 October 1963. 1963. d2. Doc. J. Memo.: Record Memorandum of X-20 Memo. Gen.: National Space 30. A. sulj. Discussion After X-20 Status Briefing to Mr. Goldie. USAF. Doc. 42. DCS/R&D. 46... Harold Brown. I. Trip rpt. DDR&E /". Schriever.. 53.. Doc. B. AFSC to Hq. 1963. subj. Boeing Co. 46. 49. AFSC to Hq. SyAem 620A. Rationale of FY 64 RDT&E Program subj.: X-20A System Package Program.: Paraphrased Transcript of d. Rpt. subj. 17 Oct. Ltr. 1963. USAF.. subj.. subj. DDR&E. L. Dev. 23 October 1963. Program.30 UNCLASSIFIED Hist. Moore. James Ferguson. Asst. to Gen. •ubj.7. System Package Program.. Dir. DCS/R&D. Davis. 28. and Pertinent Background. 33. 32.: X-20 Schriever to Cmdr. 39. 1963. subj. Hq. McNamara by Col. pec.. Col. July-Dec. 77. Col.: Doc. and Impressions from McNamara Briefing in Denver. Moore.: X-20A Status Report to Secretary NicNamara. 1963. 11-5. 41. H... Moore in Denver. 43. 1-20 SPO. 50. 23 October 1963. 30 July 1963... Gen. 35.: X-20 Program Management. 31 July 1963. 43. subj. Lt. Doc. ASD. d. subj. Hq. Moore. Speech. Presentation to Secretary of Defense McNamara. 0 Oct. ASD. subj. Cmdr. Program. 44. 1963.. Duc. 1963. 11-1. Lamar f. Schriever. 38. Adjustments by OED. AFSC to Hq.... 31.

Hist.: Manned Military Space Program.: X-20 Program. of Def. Ltr. Mil.. 29 Nov.. 68. USAF. Estes to Lt. Dir. 60. Doc. 63. subj. Memo. J. p. Doc. Scoville. Col.. J. as noted by Max Rosenberg. Hester. Dir. 1963.: Manned Military 57. subj. 64. K.: X-20 Ca-ncellation_. Doc. 30 Nov.. d-7. Assoc.. 1963. DDR&E to Secy.: Manned Military 58. Ltr. Hq. subj.: X-20A System Package Program. subj. subj. 4 Dec.. 48. 11-3. Bisplinghoff. Memo. VCS/AF to SAF. memo.. DDR&E to Secy.: 56.: LEvents Concerning the Military Orbiting Space 49.. System Package Program. Doc. Adm. 53. 43. Doc.. X-20 SPO to Lt.. SAF to Secy. Lt. Res.. Assoc. Gen. DCS/R&D. 27. July-Dec.. Memo. 1963.. Maj. Hq. 102. AFSC. of Def. 65.: Approaches to 51. 59. Doc. Space Program. of Def. 31 3 Sept. USAF. Dir. Memo.: Approaches to a Manned Military Space Program. & Tech. Ibid. Doc. L. Lt.. Hq. 55. UNCLASSIFIED . 1963. X-20 SPO. 4 Dec. 1963. 81. Doc. Col. 4 Dec. Moore. SAF to Secy. 3 Dec.: Telephone Request from ASAF/R&D to DDR&E. Col. 69. 17 Oct... 1963. AFSC. Memo. 46. Asst. Rpt. subj... 14 Nov. subj. 57. Liaison Ofc. Hist. Doc. Doc. Div. of Def. NASA. System 620A. Memo. Doc. 1963. as noted by Rosenberg. p. Scoville f. DDR&E to SAF. Gen. Memo. 1963. Memo. subj. B. otation.: X-20 Program. 21 Nov. Doc.. C. subj. DDR&E to ASAF/P&D. Doc. 1963. R.. 22 Nov. a Manned Military Space Program. X-20A Program. Memo. 1963. 67 1963. AcýTnAdv. Memo. subj. Ltr. Gen. 1963.. 100. Dev. Space Program. 5 Dec. 1963. 1963. Hq.UNCLASSIFIED 45. 1963. Ferguson. subj. NASA to subj.. ASAF/R&D to SAF. Revision A. an Orbital Test Module.. 47. 59. subj. 4 Dec. 50. 54. 60. Asst. L. Space Prog.: Evaluation of 52.... 30 Aug. Trenholm..

Doc. CS/AF to Hq. 10 Dec. d. AFSC to Hq. USAF to All Commands. Scovilie f. 16 Dec. Lt.. X-20 Cancellation7. Schriever to MLaj. Gen.. Ltr. 76. X-20 Program. 17 Dec. 1963. subj. 1963.: ganceilation 61. 10 Dec. USAF to Hq.. 100. Gen. 62. 69. 99. X-20 SPO. Mihneapoli6-Honeywell Regulator Co. Dir/Procurement. subj. Doc.: AF33(657)-7132. 83. 1963. IV-1. 71. ASD. Col. Hq. 74.. ASZRK-12-10-249. 13 Dec. Demler. AFSC. Estes to Hq. TWX. 71. 1964. Doc. 106. 78. subj. 74. Secy. 1963. 10 Dec. MSF'. MSF-17-12-45. X-20 Engg. News Briefing. X-20 Detailed Termination Plan. 95. Doc. Doc. X-20 Phase-out Plan. X-20 SPO to AFPR. ASZR-10-12-1011. pp. AFRDDG-86985. ASD. Doc. 64.: 11 Dec. Dyna-Soar Termination. 1963. subj. 88. 78. 103. Hq. 3 Jan... 1963.. memo.: fvents Concerning the RTD. TWX. 1963. 1964. X-20 Phase-out Plan. TWX. 1963. 7 of the X-20 Program . Memo. Doc. IV-18. TWX. Hq.: Manned Space Program. 10 Dec. Doc. 70. P. 1963. Ltr. SSD. Management Plan for X-20 Continuation Tasks.FCVC-1918/63. Gen...7 subj. P. iltr. X-20A '75. 8 Jan. 18 Dec.W-16-1-38. AFSC. Ltr. USAF. 1964. Doc. Doc. IV-1 to lV-li. 1964. 105. Doc. TWX. TWX. subj.. A. 1964. J. ASD to AFPR. 1963. AFSC. 1963. 12 Dec. TWX. TWX. 75. Doc.. subj. Doc. 63. 1963. Ofc. X-20 SPO. 31 Jan. 12 Dec. 1963. SAF to CS/AF. SAF to Hq. 23 Jan. 73. AFSO to Hq. Lt.. Doc. AFRDD-79094. 4-5. DDR&E to SAF. Hq.. ASD to Hq. 107. 65. DiSalvo. DiSalvo to AFPR. 82. 67. 13 Dec. 73. 68. RTD. Memo. Doc. X-20 SPO. Boeing Co. UNCLASSIFIED . The Boeing Company Percentage of Completion and SPO Recommendations for Final Settlement. 72.. 12 Mar. Dep. pp. of Def. Marvin C. Hq. p. Cmdr. Doc. '77. 1964. 66. Boeing Co.32 UNCLASSIFIED New York Times. 109.: Technology. 10 Dec. Hq. 16 Jan.

Percentage of Completion and SPO Recommendation for Final Settlement.: AF33(657)-7133.. Hitting Msl. DiSalvo to AFPR. 1964. 1964. subj. 108.: Contract AF33(657)-7134. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company Percentage of Completion and SPO Recommendation for Final Settlement. subj. Itr. X-20 SPO. by Geiger. 1964. SPO. interview. DiSalvo. 5 Aug. RCA. 110. Doc. Radio Corporation of America. 30 Mar. UNCLASSIFIED .UNCLASSIFIED 33 27 Feb. 23 Jan. Acting Ch. Doc. 111-2. 1964.. p. X-20 Detailed Termination Plan.

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39 Er-4 .

Co. Div. Structural Systems. Cmdr. Exec.40 UNCLASSIFIED GLOSSARY OF ABBPEVIATIONS Adm. Dep. Adv. DOD DSMG Deputy Chief of Staff Director of Defense for Research and Engineering Defense Deputy Development Director(ate) Division Document Department of Defense Designated Systems Management Group Engg. Dev. Environmental Test Associate Assistant Commander Company Colonel Chief of Staff DCS DDM&E Def. Col. Asst. General UNCLASSIFIED . AF AFFTC AFMDC AFMTC AFPR AFSC ASAF ASD ASSET Assoc. SDir. FY Figure Fiscal Year Gen. CS Administrator Advanced Air Force Air Force Flight Test Center Air Force Missile Development Center Air Force Missile Test Center Air Force Plant Representative Air Force Systems Command Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division Aerothermodynamic. Doc. Engineering Executive Fig.

Presn. Orbiting Laboratory Missile National Aeronautics and Space Administration No Date Number Ofc. Historical Headquarters LEM Log. Capability Vehicle Manned. No. Pages President Presentation Program Presidentts Scientific Advisory Committee RCA R&D RDT&E Res. PSAC Page. and Evaluation Research Report Research and Technology Division Secretary of the Air Force Under Secretary of the Air Force Secretary System Program Directive Special System Program Office SAF SAFUS Secy. Memo.UNCLASSIFIED Hist. Ltr. Lunar Excursion Module Logistics Lieutenant Letter Maj. MMSCV MOL Msl. Prog. Space. NASA N. SPO UNCLASSIFIED . PP. Development. Major Memorandum Manned. Hq. Testing.. RTD Radio Corporation of America Research and Development Research. SPD Spec. Lt. Pres. D. Military. Rpt. Office P.

42 UNCLASSIFIED Space Systems Divisi6n Subject System(s) Technology Teletypewriter Exchange Message United States United States Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Very High Frequency Volume SSD Subj. Sys. UNCLASSIFIED . USAF VCS VHF Vol. 3. TWX U. Tech.

6-7 Air Force Flight Test Center. Gen. 24 Director of Defense for Research and Engineering. 14 Nov. 9-10 UNCLASSIFIED . space station study. Environmental. 14. 27 Air Force Missile Test Center. 25 Aerospace Corporation. A. 22 8. 17. see X-20 program Estes. 2. 16. 15 Air Force Systems Command.. 13 Lees. 19 Brown. Dyna-Soar Program. 18. 23 Cape Canaveral. 1964 memorandum. 22. !On. 15 15 Davis.. Gen. 8. 23-24 Air Force Aerospace Medical Division. X-20 fundings for FY 64. 16. I. J.. 17 43 Boeing Company. Goldie. 41. Maj. Marvin C. Lester. 1964 memorandum. 11. M. H. Gen. 13 7.. X-20 range funds.. 10-26 see Brown•. Harold.. 27 Bisplinghoff. 17 Johnson. Lamar. 19-20 Gemini vehicle. recommended X-20 cancellation. 5-6. reply to X-20 proposals of the A!r Force. 2 Aerothermodynamic. 7. 6-7. Lt.. 25 Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development. B. L. Test program (ASSET).. W. 16-17. 30 Nov. 19-20 Apollo.. Harold Flax. L. 11-12. H. Maj.UNCLASSIFIED INDEX Aeronautical Systems Division. H. 27 Air Force Missile Development Center. 14. E. R. 2-6. 12. speech on space programs. Structural Systems. 11-12. Demler. 2. L.

C. 4. 6. E. B. flight test schedules..tems for continuation. 4. 10. 22-23 Manned Orbiting' Laboratory (MOL). PSAC briefing. 16 Under Secretary of the Air Force. 14 Secretary of Defense. 8-10. 12-13. Z':gg. S. 2. L. 25. 15 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 14-15. Gen.. 15 Saturn IE Booster. 1. 24. 17.. 21 Titan III Booster. . Ofc. MMSCV. 6. 24-2". 18-19 8-9 Satellite Missile Test Center. 11 Mercury. !-2. 7-8. space stations. 17. 5n. Col.A 44 UNCLASSIFIED Lemay. 6. Secretary of the Air Force. 12 Vice President of the United States. 2. BL. B. S. comparison with Gemini. 11. W. McNamara briefing.. 16 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company. Gen. funding. 6-7. Ofc. 2-5. 17 Schriever. 1. President of the United States. 12-13. managemen-i-n. R. 22. 24-15. R. anti-satellite mission report. military applications studies. !6 Lunar Excursion Module adapter. 1-2. redirection of Dyna-Soar. 706 study. see Zuckert. Space Systems Division. 1. 11. 13-16 Titan 1II Booster. 23-24 Martin Company. 12 McNamara. X-20B. 18 Trenholm. 16 X-20 Program. see McNamara. 13. termination activities. space programs. Brockway. 5-6.. the Air Force and Geraiixi. 13. redirection. 27 Moore. 11-12. SPU i. 25 System Package Programs.6 UNCLASSIFIED . J.. 22 Presidentts Scientific Advisory Cormittee. 6-7. Phase Alpha. X-20 cancellation. X-20X. 7 X-15. Engg. items for continuation. 17 McMillan. A. 7. 24.

approved 36 items for continuation. approved 10 items for continuation.. 7. X-20 termination.UNCLASSIFIED Zuckert. supported X-20 program. 24. 26 45 UNCLASSIFIED . M. E. military application studies. 24. 20-22.

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