INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA CITY, NAMELY: VENANCIO A. ROXAS, SATURNINO V.

PARAS,
EDGARDO G. MANUEL, HERMINILDO V. CRUZ, ALLAN F. TEJADA, ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ, JULITO P. MONDEJAR,
ARMANDO M. CABUANG, JONATHAN O. CRISANTO, EDGAR ECHENIQUE, JANMARK SARACHO, JOSENEL ALVARAN, AND
CRISENCIO NERI, JR., PETITIONERS, v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND SECRETARY
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENTS.

Facts: On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592, amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99
of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima
and Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II on March 26, 2014 and became effective
on April 18, 2014.5 Petitioners and intervenors assail the validity of its Section 4, Rule 1 that directs the prospective application of the
grant of good conduct time allowance (GCTA), time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time allowance
for loyalty (STAL) mainly on the ground that it violates Article 22 of the RPC.6 They contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are
penal in nature and beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. For
them, the IRR contradicts the law it implements.

Issue: Is R.A. No. 10592 a penal law as to subject it to the operation of Art. 22 of the RPC?

Ruling: Yes. Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law that is favorable or
advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the
exception to the exception on the effectivity of laws.46

In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect) is well entrenched.47 

Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC applies to said Code51 and its amendments,52 as
well as to special laws,53 such as Act No. 2126,54 Presidential Decree No. 603,55 R.A. No. 7636,56 R.A. No. 8293,57 R.A. No. 8294,58 R.A.
No. 9344,59 and R.A. No. 10586,60 to cite a few.

But what exactly is a penal law? Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.64
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural rules.65 Moreover, the mere fact that a law
contains penal provisions does not make it penal in nature.66

In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A. No. 10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law
has become an integral part of the RPC as Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to the
RPC that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused cannot be applied retroactively for being an ex post facto law,
a law that makes the penalties lighter should be considered penal laws in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.

We concur.

While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a penalty67 as it addresses the rehabilitation
component68 of our correctional system, its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime.
The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted
prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.

The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the disadvantage of petitioners and those
who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay;
thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed. Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as
a practical matter results in extending their sentence and increasing their punishment.69 Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate
of Article 22 of the RPC.
 G.R. No. 192330               November 14, 2012

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering from malnutrition to the
beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities.

Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan for violation of
illegal use of public propertry (technical malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.1

The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter
Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes.

When construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for
work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such
construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina
Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to
malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had
already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.

After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of
sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2  Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries.

Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's
wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished
children. She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units governed the
distribution of SFP goods.3 Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the
CSAP beneficiaries.

Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food.

The Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical malversation. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro
applied public property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.

Ruling: Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not
from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those
beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.1âwphi1

But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law
or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is
not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public
policy, order, and convenience.13 It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.14

Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical malversation. The law and this
Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.

WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010.
 JESTER MABUNOT, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Facts: The petitioner was charged before the trial court for violation of RA 7610, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER
DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Testimony of the prosecution:

The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that Shiva and the petitioner were classmates at BNHS. Shiva and her group were
sewing inside the classroom when the petitioner, who was then under the influence of alcohol, arrived. The petitioner twisted the arm of
Michael Fontanilla, strangled James and boxed William Thomas (William). The rest of their classmates ran away, but the petitioner
went after them. He boxed Shiva on her left flank leaving the latter with a fractured rib. Shiva passed out and was thereafter taken to
Potia District Hospital. Back then, Shiva was 14 years old, while the petitioner was 19.

Testimony of the defense:

The testimonies of the defense witnesses tend to prove that the class, to which both Shiva and the petitioner belonged, was doing its
Technology Livelihood Education project. William suddenly threw an object at the petitioner's back. The petitioner reacted by boxing
William. When the petitioner stepped out of the room, Dennis followed him and a fist fight ensued between the two. Shiva came to
pacify them, but she was shoved, causing her to fall to the ground. The petitioner posited that since he and Dennis were grappling at
that time, there cannot be any certainty as to who actually injured Shiva.obleslaw

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The evidence is positive and convincing that an
act of cruelty and physical abuse has been inflicted upon a female child of fourteen (14) years of age by the [petitioner,] who was an
adult of twenty (20) years of age. The credible evidence clearly demonstrates that the [petitioner] boxed the left side of [Shiva's] body
causing excruciating pain[,] which made the latter feel dizzy and lose consciousness. It is also highly indicated and very credibly
established by the evidence that the [petitioner] boxed and maltreated four other classmates. x x x All these indicate that the [petitioner]
was on a rampage and had no qualm[s] about inflicting injury upon a helpless female classmate.

Ruling of the CA

In the appeal filed before the CA, the petitioner claimed that the injury inflicted on Shiva was not intentional or deliberate. The petitioner
insisted that he could not have adopted a deliberate design to injure Shiva since he was trading punches with Dennis. Further, Article
26515 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and not R.A. No. 7610, should be the applicable provision. A single and unintended act of
shoving Shiva while the petitioner was engaged in a fist fight with Dennis can hardly be considered as within the definition of child
abuse under R.A. No. 7610.16chanrobleslaw

The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.

The petitioner posits that since he and Dennis were exchanging punches then, he could not have made a deliberate design to injure
Shiva. Without intent to harm Shiva, the petitioner insists that he deserves an acquittal.

Issue: Was the contention of the petitioner correct?

Ruling: No. The Court affirms the conviction and the sentence. The argument of the petitioner is untenable.

"When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.
Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed."26chanrobleslaw

The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a special law. However, physical abuse of a child
is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of a criminal intent on the part of the offender.

In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if the Court were to consider for argument's sake the petitioner's claim that
he had no design to harm Shiva, when he swang his arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He clearly intended to injure another
person. However, it was not Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a fractured rib. Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot escape liability for
his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.27chanrobleslaw

Additional info: On the application of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610
The petitioner avers that Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 only penalizes acts of child abuse which are not covered by the
RPC. He insists that the acts complained of should fall under Article 265 of the RPC, which imposes a lighter penalty.

The claim is unpersuasive.

Article 265 of the RPC punishes physical injuries in general. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7610 is intended to "provide special protection
to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial to their
development."28 Child abuse refers to the infliction of physical or psychological injury, cruelty to, or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation
of a child.29 Physical injury includes but is not limited to lacerations, fractured bones, turns, internal injuries, severe injury or serious
bodily harm suffered by a child.30chanrobleslaw

It is clear that Shiva was 14 years old when she received the blow, which fractured her rib. Being a child, she is under the protective
mantle of R.A. No. 7610, which punishes maltreatment of a child, whether the sam habitual or not.31 Moreover, the Implementing Rules
and Regulation R.A. No. 7610 even explicitly refer to fractured bones as falling within coverage of physical injuries, which may be
inflicted on a child, for which an accused shall be held liable. Further, under R.A. No. 7610, s penalties are prescribed to deter and
prevent violations of its provisions.
 G.R. No. 141066             February 17, 2005

EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts: Three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC. Alfredo Oculam testified that: in 1989, spouses
Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol;7 sometime in
May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check
issued by Adronico; The three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT"; w hen the Ladonga spouses
failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.12

While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the
Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not
encash the checks when they mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance
thereof.14

The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her
husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.17

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.18 It held that the provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special
penal laws. It noted that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special laws
unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a
suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not exculpate her
from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in every act and knows the part which everyone
performed.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF  BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE
LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:

Ruling: Yes. ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made punishable under special laws are
not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two
clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein
specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over
general ones. Second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that
the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary
provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision on principals under
Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of
all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.33

Note: All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.

Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.34 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to
execute or implement the criminal plan.35
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As
testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico,
signed the check, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or
cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only
semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this
inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.

Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.37 Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.

Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR., respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Facts: Two letter-complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after the private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial
governor of Agusan del Sur in March 1986. Gelacio's complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the
provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of 1,391 sq. m., more or less, in the Rosario
public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.

On February 23, 1989, the tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of Butuan City who subpoenaed
Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was served on, and received by, the Station Commander of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. Despite the absence of notice to Paredes, Deputized
Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy conducted a preliminary investigation ex-parte which led to the filing of the
information against the respondent. It was alleged that the then Provincial Attorney Paredes misrepresented the Land
Inspector Luison that the land subject of an application filed by the accused with the Bureau of Lands is disposable by
a free patent when the accused well knew that the said land had already been reserved for a school site, thus a
report favorably recommending the issuance of a free patent was given by the said Armando L. Luison, land
inspector, thereby paving the way to the release of a decree of title, by the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur, an
act committed by the accused, in outright prejudice of the public interest.

Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest" alleging that the offense
for which he is charged has already prescribed

The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash on the ground of prescription of the offense charged. It ruled that the law prescribed a
10-year prescriptive period. The prescription commences from its recording with the Registry of Deeds when the existence of the
document and the averments therein theoretically become a matter of public knowledge; and that the fact of the improper segregation
of the piece of land in question and the grant thereof to the accused became, presumptively at least, a matter of public knowledge upon
the issuance of a Torrens Title over that parcel of non-disposable public land. In this case, notice to the whole world must be presumed
at the very latest on May 28, 1976 when the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur issued Original Certificate of Title No. 8379 in the
name of the accused as a result of the grant of the patent on the school site reservation; the act of filing the approved free patent with
the Registry of Deeds is notice duly given to the various offices and officials of the government, e.g., the Department (Ministry) of
Agriculture and the Bureau of Lands, who are affected thereby specially because it is the Bureau of Lands which files the approved
patent application with the Registry of Deeds. Since the complaint was filed only on October 28, 1986, prescription has already set in.

During the pendency of the case, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amended Section 11 R.A. No.
3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue: Can BP 195 be given a retroactive effect as to make it applicable to cases committed prior to its enactment?

Ruling: NO. Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A. No. 3019 by increasing
from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be
prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11,
R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it.

Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. Where the statute fixes a period of
limitation as to a prosecution for a particular offense, the limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within which
the offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being necessary that the indictment or information be actually filed
within the time prescribed.

Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms,  they do not apply to crimes previously committed.

To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would after his situation to his disadvantage by making him
criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. An ex post facto  law is
defined as:

A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal
consequences or relations of such fact or deed.

An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act
done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it
was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
 when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was
lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty;  every law which, in
relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v. Fields,
Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5. (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)

Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no
reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976.

Note (As to matter of prescription): The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes the
operative date for the commencement of the period of prescription." Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to
recommend approval of his application for free patent (which both of them denied doing), the date of the violation, for the purpose of
computing the period of prescription, would be the date of filing his application on January 21, 1976.

The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the filing of Paredes' application because no one
could have known about it except Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "it
is not only the Lands Inspector who passes upon the disposability of public land . . . other public officials pass upon the application for a
free patent including the location of the land and, therefore, the disposable character thereof" (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the
department personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the
land to ascertain its location and occupancy: (2) the surveyor who prepared its technical description: (3) the regional director who
assessed the application and determined the land classification: (4) the Director of Lands who prepared the free patent: and (5) the
Department Secretary who signed it, could not have helped "discovering" that the subject of the application was nondisposable public
agricultural land.

The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the filing of Paredes application for a free patent in January
1976 or his supposedly having induced Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986.
Gelacio's complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late.
 G.R. No. 180016               April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Topic: Excessive Penalty

Facts:

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990.
Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the
former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to
sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to
petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another
men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that
petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The
period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items
entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information and imposed the following penalty: the accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to
indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of ₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando
City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-
appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years.

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of the continued
validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these
penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of
the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the
case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution.

Issue: What is the duty of the court if the penalty imposed for the crime committed seems to be excessive?

Ruling: After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on
crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years
ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be
remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the
government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed
that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in
cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and
which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may
be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense.18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law
and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation.
The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked
to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is
similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is
deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the
sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a
legislation to provide the proper penalty.

Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such
eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the
legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
 IRENEO CAHULOGAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Topic: Excessive Penalty

Facts: an Information6 was filed before the RTC charging petitioner with the crime of Fencing
The prosecution alleged that private complainant Johnson Tan (Tan), a businessman engaged in transporting Coca-Cola
products, instructed his truck driver and helper, Braulio Lopez (Lopez) and Loreto Lariosa (Lariosa), to deliver 210 cases
of Coca-Cola products (subject items) worth P52,476.00 to Demins Store. The next day, Tan discovered that contrary to
his instructions, Lopez and Lariosa delivered the subject items to petitioner's store. Tan then went to petitioner and
informed him that the delivery to his store was a mistake and that he was pulling out the subject items. However,
petitioner refused, claiming that he bought the same from Lariosa for P50,000.00, but could not present any receipt
evidencing such transaction. Tan insisted that he had the right to pull out the subject items as Lariosa had no authority to
sell the same to petitioner, but the latter was adamant in retaining such items.

The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period often (10) years and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The CA affirmed the conviction.

Issue: Was there a proper imposition of penalty?

Ruling: Yes. Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on petitioner, there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances present in this case, the Court finds it proper to sentence petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for an indeterminate period of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of  prision correccional, as minimum, to
fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

At this point, the Court notes that as may be gleaned from its whereas clauses, PD 1612 was enacted in order to provide
harsher penalties to those who would acquire properties which are proceeds of the crimes of Robbery or Theft, who prior
to the enactment of said law, were punished merely as accessories after the fact of the said crimes. 34 This rationale was
echoed in Dizon-Pamintuan v. People35 where the Court held that while a Fence may be prosecuted either as an
accessory of Robbery/Theft or a principal for Fencing, there is a preference for the prosecution of the latter as it provides
for harsher penalties:

Nonetheless, while PD 1612 penalizes those who acquire properties which are proceeds of Robbery or Theft, its
prescribed penalties are similar to the latter crime in that they are largely dependent on the value of the said properties. In
fact, a reading of Section 3 of PD 1612 and Article 309 of the RPC (which provides for the prescribed penalties for the
crime of Theft) reveals that both provisions use the same graduations of property value to determine the prescribed
penalty; in particular, if the value: (a) exceeds P22,000.00, with additional penalties for each additional P10,000.00; ( b) is
more than P12,000.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00; (c) is more than P6,000.00 but not exceeding P12,000.00; ( d) is
more than P200.00 but not exceeding P6,000.00; ( e) is more than P50.00 but not exceeding P200.00; and (f) does not
exceed P5.00. However, with the recent enactment of Republic Act No. 10951, 37 which adjusted the values of the property
and damage on which various penalties are based, taking into consideration the present value of money, as opposed to
its archaic values when the RPC was enacted in 1932,38 the graduation of values in Article 309 was substantially
amended, without any concomitant adjustment for PD 1612. This development would then result in instances where a
Fence, which is theoretically a mere accessory to the crime of Robbery/Theft, will be punished more severely than the
principal of such latter crimes. This incongruence in penalties therefore, impels an adjustment of penalties.

However, while it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the
Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation. 39 As the Court remains mindful of the fact that the determination of
penalties is a policy matter that belongs to the legislative branch of the government, it finds it prudent to instead, furnish
both Houses of Congress, as well as the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice,
pursuant to Article 540 of the RPC, copies of this ruling in order to alert them on the aforestated incongruence of penalties,
all with the hope of arriving at the proper solution to this predicament.
 G.R. No. 125865           January 28, 2000

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Topic: Diplomatic Immunity

Facts: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the MeTC. The MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the two criminal cases.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued. The petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement

Issue: Is the petitioner immune from suit?

Ruling: No. The petitioner is not immune from suit. Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions
for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity.

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official capacity."
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. 3 The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot
be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.
 G.R. No. 142396             February 11, 2003

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.

Topic: State Agent

Facts: An Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court. The
criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic
agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo. Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision
acquitting the two accused.

Thereafter, Minucher filed a civil case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on
account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. The RTC ruled in favor of Minucher. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with
diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving
State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.

Issue: Is Arthur Scalzo immune from suit?

Ruling: Yes. The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios
accredited to the heads of state,10 (b) envoys,11 ministers or internuncios  accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges
d' affairs12 accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the
diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as
members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission,
are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the
members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied.
Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and
criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff,
thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent
their respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties,
such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily
enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not
charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a
person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.

Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic
mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the
diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also
be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or
department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval,
air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his
duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and
developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the
home government.14 These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they
normally designated as having diplomatic rank.

But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he
worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug
activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting
well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could
then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a
diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign
sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.
The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -
par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another.22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform
an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed
against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 23

This immunity principle, however, has its limitations."It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in
his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. "(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit
will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they
are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the
scope of his authority and jurisdiction."27

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable
requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The consent or imprimatur  of the Philippine government to the
activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from
officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation
of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at
the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication
that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent
Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct
surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would
then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly
can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug
traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
 G.R. No. 191425               September 7, 2011

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Topic under: PREFERENTIAL APPLICATION; BIGAMY- ??? DI NAMAN REL SA PREF APP

The Facts: On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy . The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:

"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O.
NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally
dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second
marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her
co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."

Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as follows:

"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while
she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on
April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit ‘A’).
While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and
emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10)

. Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a
second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit ‘B’) when she secured a
certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
sometime in November 2003.

Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter’s workplace in CBW,
FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which
Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends. \

Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing
income opportunity in the amount of ₱34,000.00 a month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages she
suffered, she declared that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide.
She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
left her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her
sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount of ₱50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-
14).

Evidence for the Defense:

"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa
Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on
January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is
allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.

To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by
one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since
January 19, 1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’ ‘3’ and ‘4’\\
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage because she [sic] told this
fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due
to hatred having learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. he [sic] further testified that Rowena P.
Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell her this fact because
Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.

He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but that
he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the
religion ‘Catholic’ was also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not
approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a
secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).

Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that
she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed.
She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since December
8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted
the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and
the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after
she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after
learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the
Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant that she was sought by the private complainant
and that they had a confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private
complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that
she only came to know the private complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007,
pages 2-8)."5

In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.

Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10

On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.11

The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his Islamic
religion and was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and
practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. 1avvphi1 Nollora’s
two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the
Philippines should apply. Nollora’s claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in
protecting the general welfare.

The IssueThe issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.

The Court’s Ruling ues: Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.

Elements of Bigamy

The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

2. That the marriage has  not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the  absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the  essential requisites for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; 14 (2)
Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted
the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; 15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16

Proofs: The marriage certificate17 A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar G

Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, 20 Nollora cannot
deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or
Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:

Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain
extent fix the property relations of the spouses.

Art. 15. Essential Requisites. -  No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are
complied with:

(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;

(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper
guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and

(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.

Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the age of puberty
or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to
have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.

Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be
declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be
set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the
solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.

Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. -  Marriage maybe solemnized:

(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under
Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person designated by
the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.

Art. 19. Place of solemnization. -  Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge, office of the Circuit
Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.

Art. 20. Specification of dower. -  The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before, during
or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower ( mahr-mithl) shall, upon
petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties.

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of  a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the  [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No.
209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines]  shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that
Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.21

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
 G.R. No. 146710-15      March 2, 2001JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.

On presidential immunity

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally
given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based
numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of
Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny
Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment
court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage.  On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by
students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for
Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will
not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him
from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively
resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only
in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

In the case before sc, Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him;
and  second, he enjoys  immunity  from  all  kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits. No.

as to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer
entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to
the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive
immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. 

From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is
concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time
during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another).

Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should
be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and  second, he
enjoys  immunity  from all  kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the
acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and
unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could
walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or
legislatures.

This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law
has no remedy, but must submit in silence.

On the contrary, it means, simply, that the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the
Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the
performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to
it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly
as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is
assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been
invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-
General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a
member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.

Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation
to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion
heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such
liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his
power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the
right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts
within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgement,
that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the
question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one
over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack
of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be
acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his
act."

Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from suit,  viz "xxx.
Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation;
disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency
to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself." 105

Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada.

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be
prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to
his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that
the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." 109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.

The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself
for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission
make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper
criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:110

This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez 111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond.

Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal
prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.

The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty,
be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.

Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful
acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. 114

Ratio:

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction.
One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. 118 It declared as a state policy that
"the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft
and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 120 It
set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them
or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel." 121 It maintained the
Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. 122 It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers,
among which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient." 123 The Office
of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. 124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain
petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM,  Petitioner, vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

Territoriality

FACTS: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.

Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave
support to Roderigo. 

Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also
resides. 

Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child
with petitioner.

The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUES: Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and

MAIN! 2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

YES TO BOTH

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a
foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation
to family rights and duties..

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to
support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family
Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner .

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well
as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. 32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is
not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a
citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed
by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because
Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. 44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Main issue: Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and
(i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has
the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to
restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited
to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the
woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence
against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines , we find strength in petitioner’s
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the
instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon
all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations."

On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner
is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our
courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction
over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
 Isidro Miranda vs People

Facts: Winardo Pilo, attended a party of his niece in Infanta, Quezon. After the party, he and his friend passed by the house of Isidro
Miranda (Miranda) and threw stones at the latter’s home. Miranda then went outside and attacked Pilo with a bolo which caused several
wounds and injuries to the latter.

A case was later filed against Miranda for FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE taking into consideration the injuries sustained by PIlo and the
weapon used by Miranda. On the other hand, he pleaded self-defense contending that there was unlawful aggression on the part of
Pilo. In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him. Thereafter, Damaso grabbed possession of the bolo.8

The RTC ruled against Miranda and convicted him of frustrated homicide. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC but mitigated the
penalty, ruling that there was sufficient provocation on the part of Pilo. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there was intent to kill on the part of Miranda which justifies the crime of frustrated homicide to be charged?

Held: YES. Significantly, in cases of frustrated homicide, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: "(i) the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (ii) the victim sustained [a] fatal or mortal wound
but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (iii) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are present.

It bears stressing that the main element in frustrated homicide is the accused's intent to take his victim's life. The prosecution
has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. Intent to kill, being a state of mind,
is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, such as the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault
and immediately thereafter. Likewise, such homicidal intent may be inferred from, among other things, the means the offender
used, and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.

In fact, in De Guzman, Jr. v. People,25 the Court, quoting Rivera v. People,26 enumerated the factors that determine the presence of
intent to kill, to wit:

(1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused.27

In the case at bar, Miranda's intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by Pilo. The records
show that Miranda used a bolo measuring 1 ½ feet. The hacking wound was about five inches long, and 1 inch deep fracturing Pilo's
skull in the parietal area. Relentless in his attack, Miranda continuously made several thrusts against Pilo, while the latter was already
sprawled on the ground. This caused Pilo to sustain two additional wounds. These deep gashes measured four inches long by one-inch
deep, and 1.5 inch long by one-inch deep in Pilo's forearm. In fact, these continuous attacks were stopped only when Damaso arrived
and grappled with the weapon. Undoubtedly, the manner of attack and the injuries sustained show forth a clear resolve to end Pilo's
life. Indeed, these injuries cannot simply be brushed aside as grazing injuries, especially considering that one of which, was an injury to
the head of Pilo, which may have caused the latter's untimely demise, if not for the timely medical assistance.
 Ivler vs San Pedro

Facts: Following a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler was charged with two separate offenses, namely:

1) Criminal Case No. 82367 - Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce)
2) Criminal Case No. 82366 - Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent
Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense of reckless imprudence. MeTC dismissed his motion and the RTC affirmed. Hence, the present petition.

Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of
such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

The case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense."
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC
ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not."

Issue: Whether or not double jeopardy is applicable in the case at bar?

Held: YES. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:

“Imprudence and negligence.—Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall
in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article
sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in
which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they
may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which
case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.”

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-
offenses of “imprudence” and “negligence” (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of “reckless
imprudence” and “simple imprudence” (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,”16 unlike willful offenses which
punish the intentional criminal act.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized
under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity
to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that “reckless imprudence is not a crime in
itself but simply a way of committing it x x x” on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed
to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the
mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that “reckless imprudence” is not a crime in itself but simply a way
of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are
crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth,
criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses.
It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would
be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding
penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at
arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the
penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

“Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is
single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and
the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.”

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar
pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
 Sevilla vs People

Facts: Sevilla, on the first day of his term as councilor of the City of Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal Data
Sheet (PDS).6 That in answer to the question of whether there is a pending criminal case against him, Sevilla marked the box
corresponding to the “no” answer despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a person in
authority before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 55.

A case for Falsifcation of Public Document was filed against him in the Sandiganbayan. In his defense, Sevilla admitted that he
indeed marked the box corresponding to the “no” answer vis-à-vis the question on whether he has any pending criminal case.
However, he averred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his
staff, who actually prepared his PDS.

The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which is a public document, and that, in so doing,
he took advantage of his official position since he would not have accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City Councilor.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of
the RPC since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that
Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla
of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC.

Hence, the present petition. Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of the felony of falsification of public
documents through reckless imprudence. He claims that the Information that was filed against him specifically charged him with
the commission of an intentional felony, i.e. falsification of public documents under Article 171(4) of the RPC. Thus, he could not
be convicted of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC, which is a culpable
felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him be violated.

Issue: Whether or not Sevilla can be convicted of a culpable felony despite the fact that he was charged with an intentional felony?

Held: YES. The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part
of those constituting the latter.

Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved when the
offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.

Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated
when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information
only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the
latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents
notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED.  The Decision dated February 26, 2009
and the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.
 G.R. No. L-43530             August 3, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.

Topic: overt act, vague intent

Facts: Policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the
accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods. When the policeman showed up, who
instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.The RTC convicted the accused of attempted robbery.

Issue: Does the act of the accused have logical connection with the crime with which the accused was convicted of?

Ruling: None. It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation
to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its
objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the
intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on
the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps
of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere
beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its
effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; Thus, in
case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an
attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some
personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may
reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in question was making an
opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention
was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store,
was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete
finding.1avvphil.ñet

The overt acts leading to the commission of the offense, are not punished except when they are aimed directly to its execution, and
therefore they must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. Otherwise stated, in order to declare that such and such
overt acts constitute an attempted offense it is necessary that their objective be known and established, or that said acts be of such
nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as
ground for the designation of the offense

The fact under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling
 G.R. No. 166441               October 8, 2014

NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Topic: attempted art. 266-a vs art. 336

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of
attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish
the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of
his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.

Facts: The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving different victims. Norberto
Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of plastic wares and glass wares in different municipalities around
the country. On December 20, 1993, Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La
Union which was then celebrating its fiesta.

Two tents were fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more
goods to be sold. AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less than an hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of
her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she
was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she’ll be killed. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice.

Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to
wake him up. Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her
companion awake but her hands wereshaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.

AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where they met a policeman by the name of "Sabas". They told Sabas the sexual
advances made to them by Norberto. This subsequently led to the filing of the information.

The RTC found Norberto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acts of lasciviousness. The
CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of
lasciviousness charged in Criminal Case No. 2389 due to the insufficiency of the evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s act of climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that they faced each other, with him mashing
her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands, constitutes attempted rape.

Ruling: NO. There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.

The character of the overt actsfor purposes of the attempted stage has been explained in People v. Lizada:22

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a
mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by
external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.

In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal
knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the
commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony. The only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation
to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is
beyond the sphere of criminal law,23 that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable
for attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female.

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when
she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no
other,was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double
interpretation. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress
with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him)26 could also be ultimate felony.
Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony.27 His preparatory acts
could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his
assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct
connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Codefor as long as they remained
equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator’s intent
really was.28

If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of lasciviousness?

It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’sintent to lie with the
female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness.29 Attempted rape
is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is
manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the
female.30 Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.31

He was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly
manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on
top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
G.R. No. 208835

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. NOEL BEJIM y ROMERO, Accused-Appellant

Consummated rape

Facts: Appellant was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, with seven counts of statutory rape under seven separate
Informations, viz.:

Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6765

"AAA'' first met appellant who was the helper of her cousin ''CCC's" father at "CCC's" house when she went there to play. In the first
week of October 2001 while at "CCC's" house, appellant made "AAA'' lie on a sofa. He undressed her, applied cooking oil on her
vagina and on his penis, and then rubbed his penis against her vagina for some time. He then pulled "CCC" to the sofa and again
placed cooking oil on his penis and on "CCC's" vagina. "AAA" saw this because she was just a meter away from them. Appellant
warned "AAA" and ''CCC'' not to tell anyone of what transpired otherwise he would kill them and their families.

Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6766

Sometime in the second or third week of October 2001, while "AAA" and "CCC' were playing at the latter's house, appellant again
pulled them to a sofa. When appellant went to the kitchen, "AAA" and "CCC" tried to run away but appellant caught them at the living
room. He forced ''AAA" to lie on the sofa, pulled down her pants and panties to her ankle, and applied cooking oil on his penis and her
vagina. Appellant rubbed his penis on "AAA's vagina. She felt pain. Thereafter, appellant likewise pulled "CCC" to the sofa, brought
down the latter's pants, and rubbed his penis against her vagina. After threatening them, appellant wore his pants and went out of the
house.

Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6767

"BBB" is also a cousin of "CCC" and "AAA". In the first week of September 2001, while she and "CCC" were inside the latter's house.
appellant suddenly pulled them to the sofa in the living room. Appellant laid "CCC" on the sofa, applied cooking oil on her vagina and
his penis; and tried to insert his penis into "CCC's" vagina. Thereafter, appellant turned to "BBB." He made her Lie on the sofa, lifted her
skirt, pulled down her panties, his pants and brief, and tried to insert his penis into her vagina, Unsuccessful, he just brushed or rubbed
his penis against her vagina. "BBB" felt pain in her vagina. Appellant immediately stood up; fixed his clothes and ran away upon seeing
the arrival of "BBB's" cousins. "DOD" and "EEE." "BB" told her cousins that they were sexually molested by appellant but wan1ed them
not to tell anybody because if they do appellant would kill them.

Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6768

'"CCC" knew appellant because he was the helper of her father and lived with them in their house. In the first week of September 2001,
while she and her cousin "BBB" were playing inside their house, appellant closed all the windows and doors, made her lie on the sofa,
lowered her pant5 and underwear down to her ankle, and put cooking oil on his penis and on her vagina. "BBB" saw appellant's penis
penetrating ''CCC's" vagina. When appellant saw "CCC's" two sisters "DDD" and "EEE" arrive, he went out of the house.

Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6769

In the second week of October 2001, appellant laid ''CCC" on the kitchen table, removed her pants, put cooking oil on his penis and her
vagina and tried to penetrate it but was unsuccessful.

Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6770

In the last week of October 2001, while "CCC" was sleeping in her sister's bedroom, appellant came and removed her clothes, mounted
her and tried to insert his penis but he failed, albeit she felt his big penis. "CCC" did not tell her father of what happened because of
appellant's threat.

Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6771

Sometime in the first week of October 2001 and while inside "CCC's" house, appellant laid "CCC" on the sofa, put cooking oil on her
vagina and his penis. He tried to insert his penis into her vagina but failed. Thereafter, appellant went outside. "CCC" did not tell anyone
about the incident because of appellant's threat to kill her and her family.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven counts of rape
Ruling of the Court of Appeals: affirmed RTC

Issue: Can the accused be convicted of rape?

Ruling: Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force, threat or intimidation or when she is under 12
years of age or is demented. Where the victim is below 12 years old, the only subject of inquiry is whether ''carnal knowledge" took
place. Carnal knowledge is "the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman".23 There must be
proof that his penis touched the labias of the victims  or slid into their female organs and not merely stroked the external surface thereof,
to produce a conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.24

The revelations of "AAA'' and "BBB" show that the evidence adduced by the prosecution did not conclusively establish the element of
carnal knowledge. In the aforementioned cases, there is no categorical proof of entrance or introduction of appellant's male organ into
the labia of the pudendum of "AAA." Neither is there evidence to show that appellant made an attempt to penetrate "AAA's" vagina. The
prosecution’s evidence lacks definite details regarding penile penetration. On the contrary, "AAA'' and "'BBB" stated that appellant
merely "brushed or rubbed" his penis on their respective private organs. While "BBB" testified that appellant tried to insert his penis
into her vagina, she nevertheless failed to state for the record that there was the slightest penetration into it. What is clear on record is
that appellant merely brushed it.

The Court held in People v. Butiong28 that ''the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis
to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of
the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female
organ, i.e., touching of either the labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

As the Court held in People v. Brioso,31 "the Court is loath to convict an accused for rape solely on the basis of the pain experienced by
the victim as a result of efforts to insert the penis into the vagina." Significantly, from their own declaration following the public
prosecutor's questioning, they suffered pains not because of appellant's attempt to insert his penis but because of the grazing of their
vagina.

Given the foregoing and since there is neither clear showing or direct proof of penile penetration or that appellant's penis made contact
with the labias of the victims, which is an essential element of the crime of rape, we cannot sustain appellant's conviction for the crime
of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6765; 07-CR-6766; 07-CR-6767; 07-CR-6769 and 07-CR-6770.

However, appellant can be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to
Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610,32 which was the offense proved though he was charged with rape through sexual intercourse
in relation to RA 7610, applying the variance doctrine.

All the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7 610 were sufficiently established in
the afore-numbered cases. Specifically, appellant committed lasciviousness when he poured cooking oil on the victims' private organ and rubbed them
with his penis. The victims were under 12 years of age as established by their respective birth certificate and therefore way below 18 years of age.

However in Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6768 "CCC" testified that related her ordeal as follows:

Q: And after putting cooking oil [on] your vagina and [on] his penis, what did he do next?

A: He tried again to put his penis [into] my vagina but he failed again.

Q: Did you feel his penis into your vagina?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, why did you say he failed?

A: It was not inserted enough.

Q: Do you know of any reason why it was not inserted enough into your vagina?

A: Because his penis is big.44

Based on the foregoing narration, the Court is convinced that in Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6768 and 07-CR-6771, there was a slight
penetration on "CCC's" genitalia. "CCC'' positively testified that appellant's penis indeed touched her vagina. That appellant's penis was
not inserted enough only indicates that he was able to penetrate her even partially. Anyway, complete penetration is not required to
consummate the crime of rape. "Full penile penetration is not a consummating ingredient in the crime of rape."
 G.R. No. 88724               April 3, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant.

Attempted rape

Facts: The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court
rendered its decision convicting the accused of the crime of Frustrated Rape. The CA modified the decision convicting the accused of
consummated rape.

Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College. Appellant was a Philippine
Constabulary (PC) soldier.

In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates had just brought her home
from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house
(p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder.

With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.With one hand holding the knife, appellant
undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her
bra, pants and panty

He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. She
followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her.
Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to
mount him. In this position, she fled to another room and jumped out through a window.

Issue: Was the ruling of the trial court convicting the accused of frustrated rape correct?

Ruling: NO. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will.

In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.  Nothing more is left to be done by the offender,
because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime.  Thus, the felony is consummated. We have set the uniform rule
that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was
performed.  The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature,
elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated
stage in rape can ever be committed.

The victim positively testified that there was penetration, even if only partially. The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused
may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P30,000.00.

Note: The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a
foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts
have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender
does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some
cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
 G. R. No. 160188              June 21, 2007

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA, respondents.

Topic: theft

FACTS: On May 19, 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket
within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the
open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark “Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU),” hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known “Tide” brand . Petitioner unloaded these cases
in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes,
emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.

Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where
Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle . All these acts were
eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the
merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the
incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered . The filched items seized
from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the
goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.

The accused were charged with theft before the RTC. The RTC convicted them of consummated theft. Before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a
position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.20 However, the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioner’s
conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft only (NO, GUILTY OF CONSUMMATED THEFT)

RULING: NO. Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. A felony is
consummated “when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.” It is frustrated “when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.” Finally, it is attempted “when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”

Court has long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: 1) that
there be taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; 4) that the
taking be done without the consent of the owner; and 5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.

So long as the “descriptive” circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi and apoderamiento, the
completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression went
beyond the attempted stage. As applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of
detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict violence or
intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner
forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him.

In order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft
“produced .” Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of
the law — that theft is already “produced” upon the “taking of personal property of another without the latter’s consent.”

For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the
crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony
that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen
since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice
Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that “in theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession
of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated.”

It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of “taking” itself, in that
there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect
would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted , and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not
been completed, the “taking not having been accomplished.” Hence, the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by
the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a
considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab .

Also, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the “free disposition of the items stolen” is in any way
determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced. The Court thus concludes that under the Revised Penal Code, there is
no crime of frustrated theft.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JESUSA FIGUEROA y CORONADO, Accused-Appellant.

Topic: Sale of drugs (Related sa sale of drugs pero parang di related sa topic kung san sya under sa syllabus)

Facts: There were originally two Informations filed against accused-appellant: one for illegal possession and the other for an attempted
sale of dangerous drugs.

An informant came to the office of P/Supt. Nelson T. Yabut (P/SUPT. YABUT), Chief of the Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operations Task Force (PNP AIDSOTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City and informed him of the drug pushing activities of
a certain "Baby," later identified as accused-appellant FIGUEROA. P/SUPT. YABUT.

The informant called the Desk Officer of the Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP AIDSOTF, who in turn relayed to P/SUPT. YABUT that
accused-appellant FIGUEROA had informed him that she already had a stock of good quality shabu and asked how much shabu would
be bought by PO3 CALLORA (the poseur-buyer). P/SUPT YABUT instructed the informant to tell accused-appellant FIGUEROA that
₱10,000.00 worth of shabu would be bought from her. Later on the same day, the informant made another telephone call and relayed
the information that accused-appellant FIGUEROA had agreed to deliver the shabu worth [₱10,000.00] in front of the 7-Eleven
Convenience Store at the corner of M. Almeda and M. Conception Avenues, San Joaquin, Pasig City. \

A team, composed of P/SUPT. YABUT, PS/INSP. GARCIA, PO2 PINILI and PO3 CALLORA, was then formed to conduct the buy-bust
operation, with PO3 CALLORA designated as the poseur-buyer. The team proceeded to the agreed meeting place. FIGUEROA, after a
few minutes, arrived driving a Toyota Revo with Plate No. XPN 433. Seeing the two, accused-appellant FIGUEROA waived at them and
drove towards them. Stopping near them, accused-appellant FIGUEROA rolled down the window of her car and asked where the
money was. On the other hand, PO3 CALLORA asked for the shabu. At that juncture, accused-appellant FIGUEROA opened a
Chowking plastic bag and showed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. When PO3 CALLORA was about to hand
over the buy-bust money to accused-appellant FIGUEROA, the latter sensed the presence of police officers in the area, so she sped
away towards the direction of Kalayaan Avenue and C-5 road.

Accused-appellant FIGUEROA’s vehicle was finally blocked at Kalayaan Avenue near the intersection of C-5 road. At that time,
PS/INSP. GARCIA saw Christian Salceda y Resma (occupant) alighted from the backdoor of the Toyota Revo and threw the Chowking
plastic bag to the pavement, which was about two steps from the backdoor. PS/INSP. GARCIA picked it up and saw a heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance inside. Also, retrieved under the floor matting of the Toyota Revo were
two heat sealed transparent plastic sachets of undetermined quantity of white crystalline substance.

The RTC rendered its Decision5 acquitting accused-appellant for possession of dangerous drugs, but convicting her in attempted
sale.The Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision affirming the conviction of accused-appellant.

Issue raised by the accused sa case: THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A PRIOR
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PO3 JOSEFINO CALLORA AND ACCUSED REGARDING THE ALLEGED SALE OF SHABU.

Issue na mas madali: Was there an attempt on the part of the accused to commit an illegal sale of drugs?

Ruling: Alleged lack of prior agreement between accused-appellant and PO3 Callora.

Accused-appellant argues that the alleged sale transaction borne out by the evidence of the prosecution was not between Police Officer 3 (PO3)
Josefino Callora and accused-appellant Figueroa, but was instead between the latter and the unnamed informant. Accused-appellant concludes that the
testimony of PO3 Callora regarding the alleged sale transaction is purely hearsay, and therefore inadmissible and without probative value, as it was the
informant which is competent to testify on the alleged agreement to sell drugs. 18

We disagree. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, we have held that the hearsay rule does not apply where only the fact that such
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. 19 In the case at bar, the testimony of PO3 Callora as regards the
conversations between the informant and accused-appellant is admissible insofar as it established that said information led the police officers to prepare
for and proceed with the buy-bust operation. The conversation between the informant and the accused-appellant was not necessary to prove the
attempted sale of shabu, as said attempt to sell was already clear from accused-appellant’s actuations on July 2, 2004, which were all within the
personal knowledge of PO3 Callora and testified to by him, to wit: (1) when accused-appellant arrived at the scene, she waived at the informant and
PO3 Callora and approached them while driving her Toyota Revo; 20 (2) upon reaching PO3 Callora and the informant, accused-appellant asked PO3
Callora where the money was, while the latter asked for the shabu;21 (3) accused-appellant showed PO3 Callora a Chowking plastic bag containing a
sachet of white crystalline substance;22 (4) when PO3 Callora was about to give her the money, accused-appellant sensed that there were police officers
around the area, and drove away;23 (5) PO3 Callora and the informant boarded the car of PS/Insp. Garcia, and they chased her to C-5 Road corner
Kalayaan Avenue.24

Under the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a crime when the offender commences its commission directly by overt
acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.25 This definition has essentially been adopted by this Court in interpreting Section 26 of Republic Act No.
9165. Thus in People v. Laylo,26 we affirmed the conviction of the appellant therein and held that the attempt to sell shabu was shown
by the overt act of appellant therein of showing the substance to the poseur-buyer. In said case, the sale was aborted when the police
officers identified themselves and placed appellant under arrest.

G.R. No. L-14128 December 10, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SEVERINO VALDES Y GUILGAN, defendant-appellant.

Topic: Frustrated Arson

Facts: When M. D. Lewin was absent from the house in which he was living his family, at No. 328, San Rafael Street,
San Miguel, Mrs. Auckback, who appears to have been a resident of the neighborhood, called Mrs. Lewin and told her
that much smoke was issuing from the lower floor of the latter's house, for until then Mrs. Lewin had not noticed it, and as
soon as her attention was brought to the fact she ordered the servant Paulino Banal to look for the fire, as he did and he
found, so asked with kerosene oil and placed between a post of the house and a partition of the entresol, a piece of a jute
sack and a rag which were burning. At that moment the defendant Valdes was in the entresol, engaged in his work of
cleaning, while, the other defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the place.

The police arrested the defendants. Severino Valdes, after his arrest, according to the statement drawn up in the police
station, admitted before several policemen that it was he who had set the fire to the sack and the rag, which had been
noticed on the date mentioned and he also who had started the several other fires which had occurred in said house on
previous days; that he had performed such acts through the inducement of the other prisoner, Hugo Labarro, for they felt
resentment against, or had trouble with, their masters, and that, as he and his coaccused were friends, he acted as he did
under the promise on Labarro's part to give him a peso for each such fire that he should start. lawphi1.netasdDASDSDFA

For lack of evidence and on his counsel's petition, the case was dismissed with respect to the other defendant Hugo
Labarro.

Issue: What was the crime committed by Severino?

Ruling: The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts conceive to the
burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended was
not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house,
for the reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag, soaked
in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition might have started to burn, had the fire not
been put out on time.
 G.R. No. 100699 July 5, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGAR GUTIERREZ y CORTEZ, accused-appellant.

Topic: Consummated Arson

Facts: While Felipe Enriquez, a barangay tanod, was in front of his house in Makabalo Street, Kalookan City, he noticed
a commotion at a distance. Repairing to the place, he saw appellant, bloodied, being embraced by his mother Corazon
Gutierrez. Enriquez was told by some people around him that there had been a "fight" between appellant and a son of one
Mario Alano.

Later that evening, at about 11:30, while Enriquez and appellant's brother Eric and sister Bolet, were conversing at the
corner of Rajah Soliman and Makabalo Streets about the incident, appellant passed by carrying a bag containing what
seemed to be "gasoline" ("parang gasolina" 2). Enriquez followed appellant. A few meters away, he saw appellant throw
the bag at the house of Mario Alano and then lit it. Forthwith, Enriquez saw Mario Alano pouring water on the ablaze
portion of the house. Neighbors rushed in to help put the fire under control. The house, made of light wooden materials
and galvanized iron, was owned by Mario Alano's sister, Josefa Arroyo, an overseas worker.

Appellant merely denied the commission of the crime.

An information was filed against the appellant for arson. The RTC convicted him of the crime charged.

In this appeal, appellant contends that the corpus delicti  of the crime of arson has not been established. 9

Issue: Was the crime of arson consummated in this case?

Ruling: Yes. Proof of the corpus delicti, indeed, is indispensable in the prosecution of arson  10 as in all kinds of criminal
offenses as well. Corpus delicti  means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been
committed. 11 In arson, the corpus delicti rule rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its
having been intentionally caused. 12 

In the case at bar, although the whole 2-storey wood and galvanized iron house has not been completely gutted by
the fire, the crime committed is still consummated arson.  22 It is enough that a portion thereof is shown to have
been destroyed. 23 

Note: As to sufficiency of the evidence: In this case, the charge against appellant was amply supported in evidence by the
eyewitness accounts of Felipe Enriquez and Mario Alano. Also offered in evidence were copies of the police "blotters" of
two barangays 14 reflecting the report that appellant had thrown a bag of gasoline at the house of Mario Alano, then lit it
and, after setting a portion of the house on fire, fled. The evidence against appellant is simply too overwhelming for it to be
easily overcome by an invocation of alibi.
 G.R. No. L-62439 October 23, 1984

GREGORY JAMES POZAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Topic: Corruption of public official; no frustrated stage

Facts: From the evidence presented, the following facts appear to the court to be indubitable; That the accused was
convicted of the crime of less Serious Physical Injuries, and the crime of Oral Defamation of the City Court of Angeles
City, Branch 1, and the said accused was sentenced to an imprisonment of 15 days of Arresto Menor and to pay a fine of
P50.00 and to pay the complaining witness the amount of P500.00 as moral and exempt damages. After he was
sentenced, he, on November 28, 1979 filed an Application for Probation. That after filing the application for Probation, the
accused, together with his lawyer Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, went to the Probation Office purposely to inquire for the
requirements need for his client's petition for probation. Mrs. Francisco, Assistant Probation Officer, handed to Mr. Pozar a
list of the documents needed in his probation.

On December 10, 1979, Pozar had an occasion to see the Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and in
that meeting, aside from the fact that he was asking permission from the Probation Officer to go to
Baguio, the Probation Officer required him to furnish the Probation Office the xerox copy of his visa, and
his I.D. picture, inasmuch as it was explained to him these were needed, he being a foreigner.

On December 17, 1979 Mr. Pozar went to the Probation Office looking for the Probation Officer, and
when the Probation Officer was not there, he handed to Mr. Manalo an envelope address to the Probation
Of officer and asked and requested Mr. Manalo to give the same to Mr. Ocampo. It was on December
19,1979 when Mr. Manalo handed the envelope given by Mr. Pozar to Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and when
Danilo Ocampo opened it in the presence of Mr. Manalo, he found enclose in the envelope a xerox copy
of the applicant's passport, xerox copy of his visa, and attached also with the same document was a one
hundred peso bill.

An information was charged against the Pozar for corruption of a public official. Pozar contended that the
one hundred peso bill the accused-appellant placed in the envelope delivered to the Probation Officer
was allegedly intended to take care of the expenses in the xerox copying or reproduction of documents
that may be needed by the Probation Office.

The RTC found the petitioner guilty of consummated crime of corruption of a public official. The Court of Appeals (now In
termediate Appellate Court) and subsequently, the appellate court affirmed the same  in toto. 

Issue: Was the ruling of the trial court that the act of Pozar constitutes consummated corruption of public official,
assuming that Pozar has indeed committed the crime, correct?

Ruling: No. The trial court found the accused guilty of the offense of Corruption of a Public Official as charged in
the Information and pursuant to Article 212, in relation to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code.

This is erroneous. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of Corruption of Public Official
as consummated offense (which is affirmed by the respondent appellant court) for it is clear from the evidence of
the prosecution as recited in both decisions of the trial and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation
Officer did not accept the one hundred peso bill. Hence, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public
official.

Note (Optional, kung sakaling itanong lang): Be that as it may, the crucial point is whether the prosecution has established
beyond reasonable doubt that the one hundred peso bill was given to bribe and corrupt the City Probation Officer or that it
will be used to defray expenses in xeroxing or copying of whatever documents needed by the Probation Office in
connection with petitioner's application for probation then pending in said office.

The evidence on record disclose that the petitioner was required by the Assistant Probation Officer, Primitive Francisco, to
submit in connection with his probation application the Court Information ( complaint) Court decision, Custody Status
(recognizance or bail bond), clearances from the Police, the Court, Barangay Certificate, I.D. pictures (3 copies),
residence certificate, and told to report once a week on Mondays. (Exhibit "E").
Aside from these documents, the Probation Officer required of the petitioner on December 10, 1979 when the latter was
asking permission to go to Baguio to submit to the office a copy of his visa and passport. Mrs. Francisco to testified that
the petitioner was asking permission from her to leave for Baguio. And according to the petitioner, "during all the time he
was applying for probation, he made more or less 12 visits in the office as he was directed to report every Monday at
10:00 o'clock in the morning. He reported for 6 to 7 consecutive weeks and there were times that he went there
unscheduled for conference and clarification of the various re. requirements he needed. During all the time he went there,
he met Manalo, Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo himself. Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo interviewed him He submitted
all the requirements to the Probation Officer; at times, he submitted them directly to Mrs. Francisco, and at other times to
Mr. Manalo, and also to Mr.

From the foregoing, We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's application for probation in the
Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut And since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and
quite unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was befuddled, if not
confused so that his act of providing and advancing the expenses for whatever documentation was needed further to
complete and thus hasten his probation application, was understandably innocent and not criminal.

We hold and rule that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There is not that
moral certainty required to convict him.
 Wacoy vs People

Topic: ART. 49

Facts: According to prosecution witness, Benito, he was eating corn in a sari sari store when he heard a commotion and
upon checking he saw his cousin, Elner Aro sprawled on the ground being kicked by Guillermo Wacoy in the stomach,
twice. As Aro stood up, James Quibac punched him on the stomach causing the latter to collapse. Aro was then brought
to the hospital and was diagnosed to he suffering from blunt abdominal trauma and bleeding intestines and was set for
operation. During the operation, he suffered cardiac arrest but was revived.

Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's order. He died the following day.

The RTC convicted Wacoy and Quibac for death by tumultuous affray. It found that Benito's testimony on the mauling
incident does not firmly establish that Wacoy and Quibac conspired in the killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were
neither categorical in stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the mauling directly contributed to his death. Upon
appeal, the CA modified the crime to homicide and appreciated a mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem.

Hence, the present petition contending that since the intention was to merely inflict slight physical injuries, then the
penalty imposed should be that of the maximum as provided by Art. 49 of the RPC.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the crime is homicide or death by tumultuous affray?

2. Whether or not the penalty to be imposed is of slight physical injury in its maximum period or that of homicide? (ito
pinakaissue. Sinama ko lang yung 1 kasi baka itanong sa recit)

Held: 1. It should be homicide. Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous
Affray as follows:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall
be punished by prision mayor. If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used
violence upon the person of the victim.

In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro died. On the
contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one
defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim.
There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful
incident.Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the latter's death cannot be said to
have been caused in a tumultuous affray.

Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was the proximate cause of the latter's
death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable therefore, specifically for the crime of Homicide.

2. On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's contention that in view of their intent only to inflict slight physical
injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the corresponding penalty therefore in its maximum period, pursuant to Article
49 of the RPC. The said provision reads:

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. - In cases in
which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be
observed.

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused
intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused
intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.

3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person
shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter
offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in the maximum
period.

Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different from that intended
and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and not to cases where more serious
consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem).

In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of evidence
showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on the stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the
purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.
 People vs Adriano

Topic: Treachery in Aberratio Ictus

Facts: Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (POI Garabiles) and P02 Alejandro Santos (P02 Santos), were on their way to
Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road when they saw a corolla overtook
the honda crv and later when the latter fell on the canal near the road, 4 armed men alighted from the corolla and fired at
the driver of CRV which was later known as Danilo Cabiedes. A stray bullet then hit a woman named Ofelia Bulanan.
Later both of them died. The car was identified to be owned by Antonio Rivera but was rented by Rolly Adriano. A crime
for 2 counts of murder were charged against Adriano due to presence of treachery.

RTC ruled that Adriano is guilty of murder for killing Cabiedes but only homicide for killing Bulanan. The CA affirmed.
Hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not homicide is the proper charge for killing Bulanan?

Held: NO. Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the unknowing victim from
repelling the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any
particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as
she was killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan
under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for
the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may
not have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet
fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.

As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida.27 In the aforesaid case, we ruled that
accused-appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two counts of murder and seven
counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single act but of several
acts.28 The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.

In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
Moreover, we also made a distinction that "when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate
and distinct crimes,"29 not a complex crime.

As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six (6) cartridges of bullets from
a .45 caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single burst. Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or
more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious acts
resulted in two separate and distinct crimes.

(THERE IS TREACHERY IN ABERRATIO ICTUS)

Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in
People v. Flora,30 where the Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was
convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the
victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both
killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.
 Buenamer vs People

Topic: Praeter Intentionem

Facts: Stanley Buenamer and Jerome Lambada boarded an fx along Espana Blvd and they announced a hold up. They
told the passengers to surrender their personal belongings including cellphones, wallet, etc. Upon escaping, they boarded
a jeepney in which a passenger of the fx named Ferrarie Tan chased them and tried to hold on the bar of the jeepney.
Buenamer boxed Tan so the latter fell off the jeepney and was subsequently ran over by the rear tire of such jeepney
which caused his death.

RTC then convicted Buenamer of Robbery with homicide and Lambada of Robbery with violence upon persons and
property. Upon appeal to CA, contended that the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(3) of the RPC should/have
been appreciated in his favor because he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that he committed. Buenamer
insisted that when he hit or boxed Ferrarie on the arm, he had no intention of killing him at all. CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.

Issue: Whether or not praeter intentionem can be appreciated as mitigating circumstance in the case at bar?

Held: NO. this Court agrees with the CA that this mitigating circumstance cannot be invoked by the appellant. "This
mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the offender
executes or commits the criminal act"9 - an intention that must comport, amongst others, with the weapon’s used by the:
offender and the mode of attack adopted by the latter, vis-a-vis the injuries sustained by his victim. Thus, in People v.
Gonzalez, Jr.,10 we explained-

[t]his mitigating circumstances is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the
accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed, and the injury sustained
by the victim. x x x

Here, the records showed that Buenamer boxed or struck Ferrarie with such force that the latter lost his grip on the estribo
or handle bar of the vehicle, fell off and run over by the vehicle's rear tire. He subsequently died. The legal postulate
enshrined under Article 3 of the RPC decrees that every person shall be held responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences of his felonious act And, complementing this Article 3 is Article 4 of the same RPC, which provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred (1) by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended." These two articles of the RPC must thus apply with implacable force against appellant; he must
be called to account for all the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act; and hence must be deemed to have
incurred criminal liability, although the felonious act he committed might have been different from that which he intended.
 G.R. No. 116524             January 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee, vs. LYNDON FLORES y MALARAYAP, accused-appellant.

Topic: Praeter Intentionem

LIABLE FOR MURDER- PINAGSISIPA NAKAHIGA NA.

Facts: That on or about the 20th day of June 1993, at around 12:00 o'clock noon, in barangay Malusak, Municipality of Boac, Province
of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill, and with treachery, assault, attack, maim and violently kick the vital parts of the
body of one Manuel Lazarte y Malvar, while he was lying dead-drunk and unconscious on the pavement, inflicting upon him the
following fatal injuries:Ruptured Viscus, allegedly secondary to mauling

Lyndon Flores, upon arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty, and after trial on the merits, he was found guilty by the court  a quo in a
decision which accordingly disposed:

In view of the above observations and findings, this Court found Lyndon Flores y Malarayap guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission.Penalty- Rec perpetua

From said decision, the instant present appeal has been interposed, with accused-appellant putting up the general allegations or, shot-
gun type of arguments that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of murder instead of simple homicide. In consequence,
accused-appellant submits that the trial court erred when it imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. We find no merit in the first
argument. With regard to the second argument, we sustain accused-appellant but on the basis of grounds other than those he proffers.

But first to the background facts which were capsulized by the trial court in this wise:

Cesar Lanot pointed to the accused who is in court and declared that at 12:00 noon of June 20, 1993, while he was at the
ground floor of their residence he saw Manuel Lazarte alias Ato being kicked by Lyndon Flores alias Jojo (accused). Ato
was then opposite Rustico Malvar's house lying on the pavement seven arms length from him dead drunk. Thereafter, Ato
Lazarte was brought to the hospital.

He explained that the accused hit Ato Lazarte at his stomach twice with the use of the right foot with Topsider leather shoes.

He relayed that on that noon Ato's mother Emperatriz Lazarte had an altercation with the accused due to a cassette
belonging to the former. He was attracted by a commotion outside prompting him to go out so he saw Lyndon kicking Manuel
Lazarte who had been lying on the pavement five (5) minutes before the kicking.

Of the persons present around he can remember only Popong Mendoza, Taba, whose exact name he does not know and
Lydia Vargas. Thereafter, Ato Lazarte was brought to the hospital where he died two days after the incident. He even
dissuaded Jojo, saying "that is enough because Manuel will not fight back as he remained lying", thereafter Flores left Ato.

Dr. Dante Osmillo of the Marinduque Provincial Hospital attended to Manuel Lazarte on June 20, 1993 identifying Exh. B,
explaining that there was no swelling nor abrasion but found tenderness at the epigastric area. The exploration of the intestine
was done by Dr. Edgardo Marquez (Exh. B-2) without his assistance.

That at the time of admission the patient Manuel Lazarte was positive of alcoholic breath complaining of epigastric pain . He
did not see any abnormal physical appearance and no sign of external illness. The whole body appeared to be normal
However, in the afternoon of June 21, the victim complained of epigastric pain such that believing it to be merely gas pain he
gave medicine for such. He endorsed the patient normally to another physician (Dr. Sevilla) there being no alarming sign and
symptom.

Accused-appellant denies having kicked the victim. He asserts that he merely touched, with his right foot, the victim who was lying
dead drunk on the pavement to wake him up so that the victim could explain the circumstances of the loss of Emperatriz Lazarte's
cassette recorder. ---Emperatriz imputed to accused-appellant the loss of her cassette recorder which she eventually found in a
pawnshop from where she redeemed it. ---Accused-appellant insists that it was the victim Manuel Lazarte who pawned the cassette
recorder and so he was trying to wake up the victim so that the latter could inform his mother that it was he who pawned the cassette
recorder.

Accused-appellant's denial that he kicked the victim runs counter to the evidence on record. Prosecution witness Cesar Lanot
categorically testified that accused-appellant kicked the victim in the belly, thusly:
Accused-appellant's finally contends that the crime he committed is homicide and not murder.

Issue: Won homicide not murder?

Ruling: There is no reason to doubt the credibility of these prosecution witness and the veracity of their testimony. Their statements are
not tainted with any contradiction, inconsistency, or prevarication. As the trial court observed, witnesses testified in a candid,
categorical, and consistent manner, lending much credibility to their declarations and making their testimony deserving of full faith and
credit (People vs. Barte, 230 SCRA 401 [1994]).

MURDER: Such contention is devoid of merit. The evidence clearly establishes the fact that the victim was totally unconscious, dead
drunk, lying on the pavement, when accused-appellant administered strong, vicious, and as borne out later, killing kicks at the belly of
the victim. Totally unconscious at the time of the attack, the victim could not have put up any defense whatsoever against the sudden
assault by the accused-appellant. Unquestionably, the attack was characterized by treachery. An attack upon an unconscious
victim who could not have put up any defense whatsoever is treacherous. There was absolutely no risk to accused-appellant from any
defense that the victim might have make. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tends directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party may make (No. 16, Article 14, Revised Penal Code).

Nonetheless. we believe the trial court erred when it imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant.

Under Paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Thus, anyone who inflicts injuries voluntarily and with intent is liable for all the consequences of his criminal act, such as death that
supervenes as a consequence of the injuries.

Here, accused-appellant is liable for the demise of the victim for such was caused by the violent kicks which he inflicted on the vital
parts of the victim's body. And, as earlier discussed, since the assault was qualified by treachery the crime committed is murde r and not
homicide as suggested by accused-appellant.

However, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (Paragraph 3, Article
13, Revised Penal Code) should be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant for he had no intent to kill when he attacked the
victim. His intention was merely to inflict injuries on the victim.

Thus, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of  reclusion perpetua for it failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed in favor of the accused-appellant. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. There being no aggravating circumstance to
offset the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, the imposable penalty is  reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, or 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day, to 20 years, the minimum of the penalty provided for by law
(Paragraph 2, Article 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period or 10 years and 1 day of  prision mayor to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal (People vs. Espinosa, 243 SCRA 7 [1995] citing People vs. Roel Ponayo Y Villanueva, G. R. No. 111523,
August 10, 1994
 SALVADOR YAPYUCO Y ENRIQUEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR Nos. 120744-46, 2012-06-25

Topic: Mistake of Fact

GROUP OF POLICE SHIT CLAIMS KALA NILA RELIABLE INTEL NA MGA KEME NPA UNG DADAAN NA SAKAY NGJEEP-
KILLED= SC: LIABLE SILA NOT MISTAKE OF FACT HERE

Facts: Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta
celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m.,... shortly after the religious procession
had passed.

As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and
open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the... back of his Tamaraw jeepney,
Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met
a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.

Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as the commander of the Sindalan Police
Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno

He narrated that he and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for police
assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a... reported presence of armed NPA members in
Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no additional men could
be dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring... their M-16 rifles with them.

Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4)
men carrying long firearms.

Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the
road at the... curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much
closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it
down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed... that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly
inspired him, and his fellow police officers... to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled
to fire at... the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Naron's house directly at the
subject jeepney.

Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time was in bad shape, as in fact there were
several law enforcement officers in the area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements,... and that he frequently...
patrolled the barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men therein.

He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but
rather from Cafgu members assembled in the residence... of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone
past the spot on the road where they were assembled.

The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in
the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take
shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed
the victims with the intent of killing them., it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-
principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No.
16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as charged in

Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case
No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma.

Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which brought the eventual death of Licup has
been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order

He laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the victims were caused by his warning shots, he must nevertheless
be exonerated because he responded to the scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his presence
at the scene of the incident was in line with the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful performance thereof. 75 He also
invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in
these cases, had entertained the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements.

Issues:

whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as
barangay officials and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them.

Or: can the defense of mistake of fact correct?

Ruling:
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton violence is never justified when their duty could be
performed otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society . Never... has homicide or
murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the cost of human life.

NO. At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure.

In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or
omission which is the subject of the prosecution.118 Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where
it negates the intent component of the crime.119 It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general
intent.120 The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,121 and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other
person.122 A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; 123 (b) that it be a matter
of fact;124 and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime125 or the existence of the mental state which the
statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.126

The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah Chong,127 but in that setting, the
principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the
accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his
bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having demanded identification, believed that a
robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the
door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his roommate.
Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit
the charge, the Court explained:

x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse").

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." x x x

+ Besides, as held in People v. Oanis129 and Baxinela v. People,130 the justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the
basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. 131 Thus, Ah Chong further explained
that –

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be,
but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no
criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.132

Here, The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30 caliber carbine.[145] While the use of these
weapons does not always amount to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the... bullets were
fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be
stressed that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much too... difficult to aim
and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was
aimed at the tires especially considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes... in
encounters with lawless elements in the streets.

Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next
to the driver and in fact even the driver himself of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise.

This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred
to them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate... the
vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the
jeepney suggests that petitioners' actuations leaned towards the latter.

This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva
who was occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no
other... inference than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill.

Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we
dismiss Yapyuco’s alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why: First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely
criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice.147 People v. Guillen148 and People v. Nanquil 149 declare that
a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,150 we
held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to
kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.

OPT:

On 11 (5)

We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this case.

The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law enforcement operation. 

. Even more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as would threaten the safety of any one
of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to
embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to show that the
accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were
armed and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.

Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be, the actuations of these responding law enforcers must
inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties.

The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the
highest caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call.
Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires
nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains to other government officers or
agencies.
G.R. No. 163927             January 27, 2006

ALFONSO D. GAVIOLA, Petitioner,
vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.CALLEJO, SR., J.:

COCONUT NAKAW SA AKALA NYANG LUPA NYA- SC LIABLE FOR QUALIFIED THEFT.

Facts: On May 25, 1954, Elias Gaviola filed a complaint against Eusebio Mejarito in the then Court of First Instance of Carigara,
Leyte, for quieting of title with a plea for injunctive relief. The suit involved a 40,500-square-meter parcel of coconut land located in
Barrio Calbani, Maripipi, Leyte, The suit involved a 40,500-square-meter parcel of coconut land located in Barrio Calbani, Maripipi,
Leyte identified as Cadastral Lot 1301,

On July 29, 1955, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the complaint and declared Eusebio the lawful owner of the property. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

In the meantime, Eusebio died intestate and was survived by his son, Cleto. Elias Gaviola also died intestate and was survived by his
son, Alfonso.

Almost 30 years thereafter, on October 1985, Cleto filed a complaint against Alfonso and four others for recovery of possession
of a parcel of land and execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111. The plaintiff therein alleged that the houses of the
defendants were located in the property that had been adjudicated to his father, Eusebio Mejarito

In their answer to the complaint, the defendants averred that the property in which their houses were located is different from
that which was adjudicated by the court in Civil Case No. 111 to Eusebio Mejarito.

On May 4, 1990, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants in Civil Case No. B-0600 and ordered the complaint
dismissed. The court ruled that the parcels of land occupied by the defendants, inclusive of Lot 1311, were different from the property
adjudicated to Eusebio Mejarito (1311-kina alfonso--- is diff from 1301—ung adjusdicated sa tatay ni cleto)

Eusebio appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment on September 18, 1992, affirming the decision of the RTC.

In the meantime, Cleto Mejarito left the Philippines and stayed in the United States of America. He entrusted the land to the care of
his nephew, Rafael Lozano.

At 7:00 a.m. on September 6, 1997, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto Mejarito, and a barangay councilman, saw Gavino
Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees in Lot 1301. Under the supervision of the spouses
Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola, they gathered 1,500 coconuts worth P3,000.00 from the coconut trees.14 

The Officer-in-Charge of the Maripipi Police Station then filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against the spouses Gaviola and
those who gathered the coconuts in the municipal trial court.15 In the meantime, the coconuts were entrusted to the care of the
barangay captain.

Alfonso admitted that the coconuts were taken upon his instructions, but insisted that the trees from which they were taken were
planted on Lot 1311, the property he had inherited from his father, Elias Gaviola; the property of private complainant Cleto
Mejarito, Lot 1301, was adjacent to his lot. Alfonso testified that the property was placed in his possession by the sheriff since
August 5, 1993, and that since then he had been gathering coconuts every three months without being confronted or prosecuted by
anybody.17 He insisted that his claim was based on the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600, which was affirmed by the CA.18

On April 13, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Alfonso of qualified theft.

Alfonso Gaviola appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment, on October 1, 2003, affirming the decision of the RTC.

petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove animus lucrandi (intent to gain) on his part. He asserts that he had been
taking coconuts from the property in broad daylight three times a year since August 5, 1993 on his honest belief that he was
the owner of the land where the coconut trees were planted. He points out that it was only after he took coconuts on
September 6, 1997 that he was charged of qualified theft. Moreover, his honest belief that he owned the land negates intent to
steal, an essential element of the felony of theft. He argues that the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600 declared him to be the owner of the
property where the coconut trees were planted; the property was placed in his possession by the sheriff and, since then, he had planted
bananas and gathered coconuts from the coconut trees.
ISSUE: Alfonso, now the petitioner, raises the following issues in the instant petition: (1) whether the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that he had intent to gain when the coconuts were taken upon his instruction; and (2) whether he is liable for
exemplary and liquidated damages.

Ruling: Gaviola is liable!!

Thus, the elements of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.21

According to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified if coconuts are taken from the premises of a plantation:

Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is
motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or
civil disturbance.

For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have an intent to steal (animus furandi) personal property, meaning the intent to deprive
another of his ownership/lawful possession of personal property which intent is apart from, but concurrent with the general criminal
intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo (dolos malus).

The animo being a state of the mind may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, inclusive of the manner and conduct of the
accused before, during and after the taking of the personal property. General criminal intent is presumed or inferred from the very fact
that the wrongful act is done since one is presumed to have willed the natural consequences of his own acts. Likewise, animus furandi
is presumed from the taking of personal property without the consent of the owner or lawful possessor thereof.

The same may be rebutted by the accused by evidence that he took the personal property under a bona fide belief that he owns the
property.23

In Black v. State,24 the State Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that the open and notorious taking, without any attempt at concealment
or denial, but an avowal of the taking, raises a strong presumption that there is no animus furandi. But, if the claim is dishonest, a mere
pretense, taking the property of another will not protect the taker:

xxx "In all cases where one in good faith takes another’s property under claim of title in himself, he is exempt from the charge of
larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to
be the true owner. Still, if the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, it will not protect the taker."

The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either for gain or out of wantonness or malice to
deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This cannot be where the taker honestly believes the property is his own or that of
another, and that he has a right to take possession of it for himself or for another, for the protection of the latter.25

In Charles v. State,26 the State Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the belief of the accused of his ownership over the property must be
honest and in good faith and not a mere sham or pretense.

But In the present case, the trial court found the petitioner’s claim of having acted in the honest belief that he owned Lot 1301
when he ordered the harvesting of the coconuts barren of probative weight. The trial court ruled that the petitioner even
admitted in Civil Case No. B-0600 that the private complainant’s property was separate from his:

"Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct from each other is confirmed by the cadastral survey were the lands
of plaintiff (Cleto Mejarito), of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) and of Segunda Gaviola, are denominated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311 and
1303, respectively. Not only that, their definite locations and boundaries are even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court-
appointed commissioner, which sketch is now marked as Exhibits "H" and series" (Memorandum of defendants Gaviolas dated April 13,
1989, in Civil Case No. B-0600).

The petitioner cannot feign ignorance or even unfamiliarity with the location, identity and the metes and bounds of the private
complainant’s property, Lot 1301, vis-à-vis that of his own, Lot 1311. Indeed, in his Memorandum in Civil Case No. B-0600,
petitioner as one of the defendants below, categorically stated:

From the above enumeration or statement of boundaries, it is clear that these three parcels of land are distinct and separate
from each other, as the following observations can be made:
So it is now clear that the land of plaintiff is west of the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (now Segundo Gaviola), and that they are two
distinct and separate lands.

Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct from each other is confirmed by the cadastral survey where the lands
of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola and of Segundo Gaviola, are denominated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303, respectively. Not
only that, their definite locations and boundaries are even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court-appointed commissioner,
which sketch is now marked as Exhs. "H" and series, of plaintiff. Also, the report to which the sketch is attached even states that the
house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola is located on the land of Elias Gaviola; and while said report enumerates the houses located on the
land of plaintiff, neither the house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola nor of defendant Segundo Gaviola nor of the other defendants are
among those mentioned therein.28

Moreover, petitioner’s land is residential, while that of the private complainant is coconut land. There are no coconut trees in the lot
owned by petitioner, nor is there evidence that he planted coconut trees on private complainant’s property at any time, believing that it
was his own land. Petitioner could thus not have mistaken the property of the private complainant for that of his own.

In United States v. Villacorta,29 the Court debunked the claim of the appellant therein that he should not be held criminally liable for theft
(larceny) for honestly believing that he owned the land from which he took the paddy. That case is on all fours with the present case, in
that there was also a court ruling declaring the private complainant therein as the owner of the land on which the paddy grew. The
Court therein ratiocinated as follows:

The attorney for the appellant in this court attempts to show that the defendant could not be guilty of larceny, even though it be
admitted that he took and carried away the paddy in question, for the reason that he claimed to be the owner of the land. That question
had been decided against him by a court of competent jurisdiction and he made no objection to said decision. After that decision he
could no longer claim that he was the owner of the land from which he took and carried away the paddy, and moreover, it was shown
during the trial of the cause that Domingo Corpus, by his laborers, had actually planted the paddy upon the land in question. It is difficult
to understand upon what theory the defendant could justify his claim that he was the owner of the paddy, after a final decision had been
rendered against him to the contrary, and when it was clearly proven that he had not even planted it. The paddy had been planted by
Domingo Corpus upon land which a court of competent jurisdiction decided belonged to him and had been harvested by him and piled
upon the land at the time the defendant entered the land and took and carried it away. The defendant neither planted the paddy nor
reaped it. The court decided, before he took and carried away the paddy, that the land belonged to Domingo Corpus. The defendant
must have known that the paddy did not belong to him. In view of the litigation, he must have known to whom it did belong.30

In fine, we find and so hold that the petitioner’s claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from the private complainant’s land
is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability.
G.R. No. 186412               September 7, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.ORLITO VILLACORTA, Accused-Appellant.

MAY EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE HERE, THUS PHYSICAL INJUURIES LANG. NOT PROXIMATE CAUSE UNG BAMBOO
STABBING- TETANUS

FACTS: Cristina Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, at around 2:00AM, when Danilo Cruz was buying bread, Orlito Villacorta
suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz, using a sharpened bamboo stick.

The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body.

Villacorta immediately fled thereafter.

Her neighbor Aron removed the broken bamboo stick from Cruz’s body. Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.

Dr. Belandres said that Cruz sustained the stab wound, and was treated as an out-patient that day.

Cruz was once again brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died the following day. 

Dr. Belandres was able to determine that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound. 

The RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. 

On appeal, the CA Affirmed in toto the RTC judgment.

Hence, this instant appeal where accused condents that ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME, HE
COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Cruz was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Villacorta from any liability for Cruz’s death.

RULING:YES There is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he
should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is
the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”

In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated
as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of
severe tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of the
emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any
other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.

We quote from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. 

We face similar doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval
of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of
severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot
sooner than 22 days later. 

The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the
time of his death.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the RTC for
the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.

As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that
exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only
deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the
proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability.1âwphi1 Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries under Article
266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for
murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is
necessarily included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those
constituting the offense of murder.25

Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made
considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries
constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder. 

Opt: another case discussing nature of tetanus:- cited topic

In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 the Court was confronted with a case of very similar factual background as the one at bar.
During an altercation on October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound on Javier’s hand. Javier was
treated by Dr. Meneses. On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with lockjaw and convulsions. Dr. Exconde, who
attended to Javier, found that Javier’s serious condition was caused by tetanus infection. The next day, on November 15, 1980, Javier
died. An Information was filed against Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court found
Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano appealed
before this Court, arguing that Javier’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his death. Urbano alleged that when Dr. Meneses
examined Javier’s wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and that Javier could have acquired the tetanus germs when he returned
to work on his farm only two (2) weeks after sustaining his injury. The Court granted Urbano’s appeal.

We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his
death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

"The  incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56
days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease,
and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

"Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the
incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent
stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more
intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and
death.

"Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days.  Trismus is usually
present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe
trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983
Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in
hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms
of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the
22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.23

The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus
infection created doubts in the mind of the Court that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We
explained in Urbano that:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.

The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote  cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the  proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)24
 [G.R. NO. 162540 : July 13, 2009]GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: Petitioner Gemmy, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft,

In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner gemmy a Banco De Oro (BDO)
Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases
from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam.

Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the
sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.

Ricablanca another employee of Mega Foam also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was
looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account
had been dishonored.

Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline
Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the
message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and
former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.

Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace
the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself,
Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the
matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check
for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in
July 1997, petitioner gemma also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced.5 Verification from company
records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had
already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.6

Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its
agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two (2) and
Jacqueline Capitle.

__

Entrapment: Ricablanca went to petitioner's house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle.. However, the cash
RICABLANCA (KASABWAT SA ENTRAP) actually brought out from the premises was the  P10,000.00 marked money
previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave  P5,000.00 each to
Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole
time.

RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and
each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years, Eight (8) months
and Twenty (20) days

Issue: 1WON MAY IMPOSSIBLE CRIME HERE? YES

OPT: 2OR WON THEFT CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A CONTINUING CRIME? NO.

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it
was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.

Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a person,
peppered the latter's bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court
and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the
factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the  inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. ( emphasis supplied)

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property;
(2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed
was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in  Intod10 in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or
(b) ineffectual.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment.
There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify
the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. x x x 1

In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat
pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all
the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the
mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched---. Were it not for the
fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. ---Therefore, it was only due
to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from
being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was
eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored
check.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law
- that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latter's consent."

x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product
of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x

OPT: From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant
for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the
dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft.--- Obviously, the plan to convince Baby
Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since
the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a
continuation of the theft. ---At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating
evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.

Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and
59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
 G.R. No. 190632               February 26, 2014PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ, alias "Machete," Accused-Appellant.

COUNTS OF RAPE- HERE 3 COUNTS – DIFF CARNALITY EVERY 5 MINS HERE

Facts: a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by means of force,
threat or intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and consent. (Emphasis and italics supplied).

The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges against him.5 Thereafter, the cases were jointly
tried.

The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child Protection Unit, University of the
Philippines – Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH), who examined the victim.

The testimonies of the above-named prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who
was then 17 years old, having been born on 10 July 1986, was walking and chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed them that they were being
arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAA’s companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she
alone was apprehended.6 AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in
jail, AAA pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit any offense as she was just chatting with her friends. AAA’s plea,
however, remained unheeded.7

the appellant told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her house.8

But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio, Parañaque City. While
on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant
ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he would do with her but the former did not respond. The
appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and
commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis
into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after
about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third
time, the appellant inserted again his penis into AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire , the appellant stopped and finally
ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about what happened
between them.9

The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay kagawad, who simply advised her to just proceed to
the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the appellant. AAA and her mother subsequently went to PGH, where she was
subjected to physical examination by Dr. Tan,11 which resulted in the following findings:

The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against him but he denied that he knew her personally.
He also vehemently denied the following: (1) that he raped AAA; (2) that he was one of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA
for violating the curfew ordinance of their barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle in going to the barangay hall.
Instead, the appellant claimed that after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he was shocked when he was
arrested on 25 September 2003 as he did not commit any crime.16

In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical, straightforward and positive testimony
of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of rape as defined and
penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:

the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision dated 24 August 2009 sustaining appellant’s conviction for three (3)
counts of rape, The said three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an interval of five (5) minutes, wherein the
appellant would take a rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the
appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault on AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3)
counts of rape is irrefutable.20

Hence, this appeal.21the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation attended the commission of
rape. The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening period of five (5)
minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He
maintains that what is of prime importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal intent.

ISSUE: Won correct na 3 counts of rape? yes

Ruling: Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes rape: (1) when force or intimidation is
used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age.26

The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it
is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the
force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the
perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such
degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as
when the latter is threatened with death.28

In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as observed by the trial court, which the Court of
Appeals sustained, AAA’s categorical, straightforward and positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the
same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her
life and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, not
only once but thrice. This happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that
he would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the
former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were
employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.

While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and
was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being
killed that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still within appellant’s
reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires.
AAA’s lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit her testimony.

We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3) counts of rape.1âwphi1 

It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3)
penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon
his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA].

Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and distinct
acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence,
his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).

This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA were in satiation of
successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
 [G.R. Nos. 136300-02. September 24, 2002.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EMMANUEL AARON, Accused-Appellant.

COUNTS OF RAPE- HERE ONE COUNT LANG- CHANGE OF POSITION LANG NANGYARI

Facts: The appellant, Emmanuel Aaron y Dizon, was charged with three counts of rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A
and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, filed and signed by the private complainant, Jona G. Grajo,

The evidence of the prosecution shows that, on January 16, 1998, at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning, the private complainant, Jona
Grajo, was asleep in bed ("papag") inside her room on the second floor of the apartment unit which she shared with her sister and her
brother-in-law, herein appellant Emmanuel Aaron. Jona was wearing only a panty and was covered with a blanket. Sensing that
someone was inside her room, Jona opened her eyes and was surprised to find Emmanuel sitting beside her in bed totally naked.
Emmanuel immediately went on top of Jona and poked a knife on her neck. Jona’s attempt to cry for help proved futile as Emmanuel
quickly covered her mouth with his left hand. 3

Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Jona who could only manage to cry.
Subsequently, Emmanuel withdrew his penis and ordered Jona to lie down on the floor. He inserted his penis into her vagina
for the second time with the knife still poked on Jona’s neck. Thereafter, Emmanuel stood up and commanded Jona to lie
down near the headboard of the "papag" bed where he inserted his penis into her vagina for the third time, still armed with a
knife, and continued making pumping motions ("umiindayog"). 4

After the incident, Jona pleaded to be released but Emmanuel initially refused. He budged only after Jona told him that she urgently
needed to relieve herself ("Ihing-ihi na ako, puputok na ang pantog ko.") but not before warning her not to tell anyone about the
incident. Jona quickly put on her panty and hurried down the street in front of the apartment with only a blanket covering herself. Her
cries drew the attention of a neighbor, Lilibeth Isidro, who tried to persuade Jona to go back inside the apartment, to no avail, for fear of
Emmanuel. Upon the prodding of another neighbor, a certain Agnes, Jona revealed that she was raped by her brother-in-law, 5 the
appellant herein.

sHE THEN went to the police station in Balanga, Bataan to report the incident.

After bringing Emmanuel to the police station, Police Officers Morales and Flores accompanied Jona to the provincial hospital in Bataan
for physical examination. Thereupon, the attending physician at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, Dra. Emelita Firmacion, M.D., found
"multiple healed laceration(s) at 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 o’clock position(s), incomplete type" in Jona Grajo’s private part.

The defense denied any liability for the three counts of rape charged. Appellant Emmanuel Aaron testified that he and his wife
were residing in an apartment unit together with his sister-in-law, herein private complainant, Jona Grajo. 12 Jona occupied a room on
the second floor while the couple stayed at the ground floor. 13

On the date of the incident, Emmanuel admitted that he and Jona were the only persons inside the apartment. He had just arrived from
work as a night-shift waiter at Base One restaurant in Balanga, Bataan. He had earlier met Bong Talastas at 7:00 o’clock in the morning
as Bong was preparing to leave his house while his wife had gone to the market. Emmanuel changed his clothes upstairs where the
cabinet was located opposite the room occupied by Jona. Emmanuel noticed that the door of Jona’s room was partly open so he
peeped through the narrow opening and saw her wearing only a panty. He was about to close the door when Jona woke up and began
shouting. 14

Emmanuel did not know why Jona kept on shouting. She even followed as Emmanuel descended the stairs and she proceeded to the
nearby store of their landlady. Emmanuel went her to the store to caution Jona about her words ("Ayusin mo ang sinasabi mo")
because she was telling their landlady that he raped her. However, Jona ignored him so he left and decided to see Bong Talastas in
San Jose, Balanga, Bataan to inquire from the latter why Jona was accusing him of having raped her. Emmanuel denied that he was
armed with a knife during the incident, much less threatened Jona with it. 15

On October 14, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, 16 the dispositive portion of which read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the single act of rape having been proved beyond reasonable doubt,

ISSUE: WON CORRECT NA SINGLE ACT OF RAPE LANG? YES

WON MAY RAPE.? YESAfter a thorough review, we find that the testimony of private complainant, Jona Grajo, sufficiently established
all the elements of rape committed under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: a) that the offender, who
must be a man, had carnal knowledge of a woman and (b) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. 22 The gist of
private complainant’s testimony clearly shows that the appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, forced himself on her at around 7:00 o’clock in the
morning on January 16, 1998. The sexual assault started on the "papag" bed inside her room on the second floor of their apartment
unit. After going on top of the private complainant, the appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina after which he made
pumping motions while poking a knife on her neck. He then succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina two more times on the
same occasion after transferring locations inside the room, with the knife continuously poked on her neck.

Ruling: We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be convicted of only one count of rape.
 It may appear from the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of Jona Grajo.
However, the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the appellant was obviously motivated
by a single criminal intent. There is no indication in the records, as the trial court correctly observed, from which it can be inferred that
the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change
positions inside the room where the crime was committed.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo convicting the appellant Emmanuel Aaron of one count of rape